Jussi Backman
Tampere University, Faculty of Social Sciences/Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Phenomenology, Continental Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Gilles Deleuze, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, and 63 moreAristotle, Plato, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Deconstruction, Heidegger, Alain Badiou, Edmund Husserl, Speculative Realism, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Presocratic Philosophy, Phenomenology of Temporality, Heraclitus, Ancient Metaphysics, Parmenides, Heidegger's later thought, Postphenomenology, Heidegger and critique of subjectivity, Heidegger's Being and Time, Ancient Theology, Speculative Materialism, History, Quentin Meillassoux, Hannah Arendt, Political Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Time, Philosophy of Action, History of Philosophy, Theology, Ontology, Hermeneutics, Early Heidegger, Temporality, Unity, Heidegger's Concept of "The Fourfold", Postmetaphysics, Multiplicity In Identity, Later Heidegger, Continental Philosophy of Religion (Philosophy), Ontotheology, Conceptions of divinity, Context, Narrativity, Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle/Phronesis/Praxis, Practical Rationality, Plato's Parmenides, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Augustine, Translation and Interpretation, Plato and Platonism, Transcendental Philosophy, Post-Kantian Philosophy, Philosophy of Education, Humanism, Philosophy, Plato's Parmenides Concept of Unity, Metaphysics of the Unity, Fideism, Speculative Realism (Philosophy), Continental Philosophy of Religion (Theology), Conceptual History, and Philosophy of Happiness(Aristotle, Plato, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Deconstruction, Heidegger, Alain Badiou, Edmund Husserl, Speculative Realism, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Presocratic Philosophy, Phenomenology of Temporality, Heraclitus, Ancient Metaphysics, Parmenides, Heidegger's later thought, Postphenomenology, Heidegger and critique of subjectivity, Heidegger's Being and Time, Ancient Theology, Speculative Materialism, History, Quentin Meillassoux, Hannah Arendt, Political Philosophy, Metaphysics, Philosophy of Time, Philosophy of Action, History of Philosophy, Theology, Ontology, Hermeneutics, Early Heidegger, Temporality, Unity, Heidegger's Concept of "The Fourfold", Postmetaphysics, Multiplicity In Identity, Later Heidegger, Continental Philosophy of Religion (Philosophy), Ontotheology, Conceptions of divinity, Context, Narrativity, Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle/Phronesis/Praxis, Practical Rationality, Plato's Parmenides, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Augustine, Translation and Interpretation, Plato and Platonism, Transcendental Philosophy, Post-Kantian Philosophy, Philosophy of Education, Humanism, Philosophy, Plato's Parmenides Concept of Unity, Metaphysics of the Unity, Fideism, Speculative Realism (Philosophy), Continental Philosophy of Religion (Theology), Conceptual History, and Philosophy of Happiness)edit
- Current position: Senior Research Fellow, Tampere Institute for Advanced Study / Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere ... moreCurrent position: Senior Research Fellow, Tampere Institute for Advanced Study / Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University.
Ph.D. 2010 Theoretical philosophy (University of Helsinki)
Diplôme d'études approfondies 2003 Philosophy and history of ideas (Université de Nice)
M.A. 2002 Theoretical philosophy, Comparative literature, Aesthetics, Ancient Greek, Latin (University of Helsinki)
Senior research fellow 2023-2026 (Tampere University)
Academy of Finland research fellow 2018-2023 (University of Jyväskylä)
Senior lecturer in philosophy 2012-18 (University of Jyväskylä)
Postdoctoral researcher 2010-12, research project European Rationality in the Break from Modernity (University of Helsinki)
Visiting academic 2019 (Radboud University Nijmegen)
Visiting academic 2018-19 (University of Helsinki)
Visiting academic 2014 (Kingston University London)
Main areas of interest:
- phenomenology, hermeneutics, continental political thought, recent French philosophy (Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, Alain Badiou, Quentin Meillassoux)
- ancient philosophy (the Presocratics, Plato, Aristotle)
- conceptual history
Latest research:
- the Greek beginning and the contemporary "end" of metaphysics, the new postmetaphysical ontologies in contemporary continental philosophy
- the philosophical history of the concept of creativity(Current position: Senior Research Fellow, Tampere Institute for Advanced Study / Faculty of Social Sciences, Tampere University.<br /><br />Ph.D. 2010 Theoretical philosophy (University of Helsinki)<br />Diplôme d'études approfondies 2003 Philosophy and history of ideas (Université de Nice)<br />M.A. 2002 Theoretical philosophy, Comparative literature, Aesthetics, Ancient Greek, Latin (University of Helsinki)<br /><br />Senior research fellow 2023-2026 (Tampere University)<br />Academy of Finland research fellow 2018-2023 (University of Jyväskylä)<br />Senior lecturer in philosophy 2012-18 (University of Jyväskylä)<br />Postdoctoral researcher 2010-12, research project European Rationality in the Break from Modernity (University of Helsinki)<br /><br />Visiting academic 2019 (Radboud University Nijmegen)<br />Visiting academic 2018-19 (University of Helsinki)<br />Visiting academic 2014 (Kingston University London)<br /><br />Main areas of interest: <br />- phenomenology, hermeneutics, continental political thought, recent French philosophy (Martin Heidegger, Hannah Arendt, Jacques Derrida, Alain Badiou, Quentin Meillassoux) <br />- ancient philosophy (the Presocratics, Plato, Aristotle)<br />- conceptual history<br /><br />Latest research:<br />- the Greek beginning and the contemporary "end" of metaphysics, the new postmetaphysical ontologies in contemporary continental philosophy<br />- the philosophical history of the concept of creativity)edit
From its Presocratic beginnings, Western philosophy concerned itself with a quest for unity both in terms of the systematization of knowledge and as a metaphysical search for a unity of being—two trends that can be regarded as converging... more
From its Presocratic beginnings, Western philosophy concerned itself with a quest for unity both in terms of the systematization of knowledge and as a metaphysical search for a unity of being—two trends that can be regarded as converging and culminating in Hegel’s system of absolute idealism. Since Hegel, however, the philosophical quest for unity has become increasingly problematic. Jussi Backman returns to that question in this book, examining the place of the unity of being in the work of Heidegger. Backman sketches a consistent picture of Heidegger as a thinker of unity who throughout his career in different ways attempted to come to terms with both Parmenides’s and Aristotle’s fundamental questions concerning the singularity or multiplicity of being—attempting to do so, however, in a “postmetaphysical” manner rooted in rather than above and beyond particular, situated beings. Through his analysis, Backman offers a new way of understanding the basic continuity of Heidegger’s philosophical project and the interconnectedness of such key Heideggerian concepts as ecstatic temporality, the ontological difference, the turn (Kehre), the event (Ereignis), the fourfold (Geviert), and the analysis of modern technology.
Review by Michael Bowler at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/complicated-presence-heidegger-and-the-postmetaphysical-unity-of-being/
Review by Pascal Massie in Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual:
https://heidegger-circle.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Gatherings2019-09Backmanreview.pdf
Review by Michael Bowler at Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:
http://ndpr.nd.edu/news/complicated-presence-heidegger-and-the-postmetaphysical-unity-of-being/
Review by Pascal Massie in Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual:
https://heidegger-circle.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Gatherings2019-09Backmanreview.pdf
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Ontology, Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, Continental Philosophy, and 18 moreMartin Heidegger, Early Heidegger, Heidegger, Heidegger's later thought, Heidegger and Technology, Heidegger's Being and Time, Temporality, Dasein, Unity, Heidegger and art, Fundamental ontology, Heidegger's Concept of "The Fourfold", Postmetaphysics, Multiplicity In Identity, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Later Heidegger, History of Being, and Metaphysics of the Unity(Martin Heidegger, Early Heidegger, Heidegger, Heidegger's later thought, Heidegger and Technology, Heidegger's Being and Time, Temporality, Dasein, Unity, Heidegger and art, Fundamental ontology, Heidegger's Concept of "The Fourfold", Postmetaphysics, Multiplicity In Identity, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Later Heidegger, History of Being, and Metaphysics of the Unity)
(Martin Heidegger, Early Heidegger, Heidegger, Heidegger's later thought, Heidegger and Technology, Heidegger's Being and Time, Temporality, Dasein, Unity, Heidegger and art, Fundamental ontology, Heidegger's Concept of "The Fourfold", Postmetaphysics, Multiplicity In Identity, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Later Heidegger, History of Being, and Metaphysics of the Unity)
The attempt to refer meaningful reality as a whole back to a unifying ultimate principle—the quest for the unity of Being—was one of the basic tendencies of Western philosophy from its beginnings in ancient Greece up to Hegel’s absolute... more
The attempt to refer meaningful reality as a whole back to a unifying ultimate principle—the quest for the unity of Being—was one of the basic tendencies of Western philosophy from its beginnings in ancient Greece up to Hegel’s absolute idealism. However, the different trends of contemporary philosophy tend to regard such a speculative metaphysical quest for unity as obsolete.
This study addresses this contemporary situation on the basis of the work of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). Its methodological framework is Heidegger’s phenomenological and hermeneutical approach to the history of philosophy. It seeks to understand, in terms of the metaphysical quest for unity, Heidegger’s contrast between the first (Greek) beginning or “onset” (Anfang) of philosophy and another onset of thinking. This other onset is a possibility inherent in the contemporary situation in which, according to Heidegger, the metaphysical tradition has developed to its utmost limits and thereby come to an end.
Part I is a detailed interpretation of the surviving fragments of the Poem of Parmenides of Elea (fl. c. 500 BC), an outstanding representative of the first philosophical beginning in Heidegger’s sense. It is argued that the Poem is not a simple denial of apparent plurality and difference (the “mortal acceptances,” doxai) in favor of an extreme monism. Parmenides’ point is rather to show in what sense the different instances of Being can be reduced to an absolute level of truth or evidence (aletheia), which is the unity of Being as such (to eon). What in prephilosophical human experience is accepted as being is referred to the source of its acceptability: intelligibility as such, the simple and undifferentiated presence to thinking that ultimately excludes unpresence and otherness.
Part II interprets selected key texts from different stages in Heidegger’s thinking in terms of the unity of Being. It argues that one aspect of Heidegger’s sustained and gradually deepening philosophical quest was to think the unity of Being as singularity, as the instantaneous, context-specific, and differential unity of a temporally meaningful situation. In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger articulates the temporal situatedness of the human awareness of meaningful presence. His later work moves on to study the situational correlation between presence and the human awareness as such. Heidegger’s “postmetaphysical” articulation seeks to show how presence becomes meaningful precisely as situated, in an event of differentiation from a multidimensional context of unpresence. In resigning itself to this irreducibly complicated and singular character of meaningful presence, philosophy also faces its own historically situated finitude. This resignation is an essential feature of Heidegger’s “other onset” of thinking.
This study addresses this contemporary situation on the basis of the work of Martin Heidegger (1889–1976). Its methodological framework is Heidegger’s phenomenological and hermeneutical approach to the history of philosophy. It seeks to understand, in terms of the metaphysical quest for unity, Heidegger’s contrast between the first (Greek) beginning or “onset” (Anfang) of philosophy and another onset of thinking. This other onset is a possibility inherent in the contemporary situation in which, according to Heidegger, the metaphysical tradition has developed to its utmost limits and thereby come to an end.
Part I is a detailed interpretation of the surviving fragments of the Poem of Parmenides of Elea (fl. c. 500 BC), an outstanding representative of the first philosophical beginning in Heidegger’s sense. It is argued that the Poem is not a simple denial of apparent plurality and difference (the “mortal acceptances,” doxai) in favor of an extreme monism. Parmenides’ point is rather to show in what sense the different instances of Being can be reduced to an absolute level of truth or evidence (aletheia), which is the unity of Being as such (to eon). What in prephilosophical human experience is accepted as being is referred to the source of its acceptability: intelligibility as such, the simple and undifferentiated presence to thinking that ultimately excludes unpresence and otherness.
Part II interprets selected key texts from different stages in Heidegger’s thinking in terms of the unity of Being. It argues that one aspect of Heidegger’s sustained and gradually deepening philosophical quest was to think the unity of Being as singularity, as the instantaneous, context-specific, and differential unity of a temporally meaningful situation. In Being and Time (1927) Heidegger articulates the temporal situatedness of the human awareness of meaningful presence. His later work moves on to study the situational correlation between presence and the human awareness as such. Heidegger’s “postmetaphysical” articulation seeks to show how presence becomes meaningful precisely as situated, in an event of differentiation from a multidimensional context of unpresence. In resigning itself to this irreducibly complicated and singular character of meaningful presence, philosophy also faces its own historically situated finitude. This resignation is an essential feature of Heidegger’s “other onset” of thinking.
Research Interests:
Mitä oleva on? Omaisuus ja elämä pureutuu tähän filosofian peruskysymykseen seuraten kahta länsimaisen filosofian jättiläistä, Aristotelestä ja Heideggeria. Siinä missä Aristoteles kysyy olevaa substantiivina ja tilana, etsii Heidegger... more
Mitä oleva on? Omaisuus ja elämä pureutuu tähän filosofian peruskysymykseen seuraten kahta länsimaisen filosofian jättiläistä, Aristotelestä ja Heideggeria. Siinä missä Aristoteles kysyy olevaa substantiivina ja tilana, etsii Heidegger olemisen mieltä verbinä ja tapahtumana. Nämä kaksi merkitystä löytyvät myös suomen olla-verbistä: "omistaa jotakin" ja "olla olemassa, elossa". Omaisuus ja elämä antavat peruslähtökohdat olevan tulkitsemiselle. Kirja vie lukijansa filosofian kreikkalaisille juurille ja sen uusimpiin, Heideggerin avaamiin mahdollisuuksiin.
https://www.frontiersin.org/research-topics/28135/conservative-dispositions-in-continental-thought Conservative thinkers on the European continent have generally been less prone to compromise with the political Enlightenment than their... more
https://www.frontiersin.org/research-topics/28135/conservative-dispositions-in-continental-thought
Conservative thinkers on the European continent have generally been less prone to compromise with the political Enlightenment than their Anglo-American counterparts. Since the eighteenth century, they have been profoundly influenced by the relativist and antirationalist intellectual currents designated by Isaiah Berlin as the "Counter-Enlightenment" and extending via nineteenth-century Romanticism and vitalism to the "conservative revolution" of Weimar-era Germany. If such an uncompromising stance towards the main tenets of progressive thought constituted a liability in the aftermath of the Second World War, soon their fundamental questioning of liberal principles acquired a new – and perhaps unexpected – audience among left-leaning democratic theorists and critics of modernity. Today, with the resurgence of nationalism, nativism, and cultural and ethnic particularism, it is safe to argue that such a thinking is far from being old news.
The volume engages in a discussion of conservative topics and thinkers on the European continent from 1789 to the present. It addresses issues such as attitudes towards change, conceptions of time, sovereignty and democracy, the role of conflict, the limits of reason, and the relation between the individual and the community, as they have been interpreted and reinterpreted from conservative points of view. In addition, close attention is paid to the links of conservative thought to late modern strands of continental philosophy – nihilism, relativism and historicism, among others – and to its permeation by ideational components stemming from the universes of liberalism, socialism, nationalism and fascism. The contributions will mainly draw on the resources of political philosophy, conceptual history, and ideological analysis. They assess the relevance of the continental varieties of conservatism for – and their impact on – contemporary discussions in and beyond Europe. The main aim of the volume is to shed new light on the conservative intellectual lineages of various topical notions in today’s political disputes.
The focus of the volume is on conservative political movements, ideologies, thinkers, and intellectual currents on the European continent (as opposed to Anglo-American political conservatism) from the 1789 French Revolution to the present day. In particular, the volume explores the ways in which continental political conservatism was influenced by the Counter-Enlightenment. The emphasis is on original research articles in the fields of political philosophy and theory and intellectual history, but empirical studies as well as systematic review and review articles will also be welcomed. Relevant topics include but are not limited to:
- The proto-Romantic German Counter-Enlightenment and its conservative political legacy.
- French counterrevolutionary conservatism and its legacy.
- Conservative political legacy of German idealism and Romanticism.
- Conservative political legacy of historicism.
- Conservative political legacy of Lebensphilosophie and Nietzsche.
- The German "conservative revolution" of the Weimar period and its legacy.
- Postwar and contemporary "radical conservatism".
Jussi Backman and Pedro T. Magalhães:
Editorial: Conservative Dispositions in Continental Thought
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.1095849
Giovanni Damele:
Crowds, Leaders, and Epidemic Psychosis: The Relationship Between Crowd Psychology and Elite Theory and Its Contemporary Relevance
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.1009181
Timo Pankakoski:
What is Conservative and Revolutionary about the "Conservative Revolution"? Argument-Level Evidence from Three Thinkers
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.959411
Ville Suuronen:
Why Are Political Discussions with Fascists Impossible? Reflections on the Far-Right Politics of Silence
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.951236
Hjalmar Falk:
The Modern Epimetheus: Carl Schmitt's Katechontism as Reactionary Chronopolitics
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.957094
Jussi Backman:
Radical Conservatism and the Heideggerian Right: Heidegger, de Benoist, Dugin
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.941799
Pedro T. Magalhães:
Beyond the Reactionary Sea Change: Antimodern Thought, American Politics, and Political Science
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.954668
Tuukka Brunila:
Depoliticization of Politics and Power: Mouffe and the Conservative Disposition in Postfoundational Political Theory
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.974065
Conservative thinkers on the European continent have generally been less prone to compromise with the political Enlightenment than their Anglo-American counterparts. Since the eighteenth century, they have been profoundly influenced by the relativist and antirationalist intellectual currents designated by Isaiah Berlin as the "Counter-Enlightenment" and extending via nineteenth-century Romanticism and vitalism to the "conservative revolution" of Weimar-era Germany. If such an uncompromising stance towards the main tenets of progressive thought constituted a liability in the aftermath of the Second World War, soon their fundamental questioning of liberal principles acquired a new – and perhaps unexpected – audience among left-leaning democratic theorists and critics of modernity. Today, with the resurgence of nationalism, nativism, and cultural and ethnic particularism, it is safe to argue that such a thinking is far from being old news.
The volume engages in a discussion of conservative topics and thinkers on the European continent from 1789 to the present. It addresses issues such as attitudes towards change, conceptions of time, sovereignty and democracy, the role of conflict, the limits of reason, and the relation between the individual and the community, as they have been interpreted and reinterpreted from conservative points of view. In addition, close attention is paid to the links of conservative thought to late modern strands of continental philosophy – nihilism, relativism and historicism, among others – and to its permeation by ideational components stemming from the universes of liberalism, socialism, nationalism and fascism. The contributions will mainly draw on the resources of political philosophy, conceptual history, and ideological analysis. They assess the relevance of the continental varieties of conservatism for – and their impact on – contemporary discussions in and beyond Europe. The main aim of the volume is to shed new light on the conservative intellectual lineages of various topical notions in today’s political disputes.
The focus of the volume is on conservative political movements, ideologies, thinkers, and intellectual currents on the European continent (as opposed to Anglo-American political conservatism) from the 1789 French Revolution to the present day. In particular, the volume explores the ways in which continental political conservatism was influenced by the Counter-Enlightenment. The emphasis is on original research articles in the fields of political philosophy and theory and intellectual history, but empirical studies as well as systematic review and review articles will also be welcomed. Relevant topics include but are not limited to:
- The proto-Romantic German Counter-Enlightenment and its conservative political legacy.
- French counterrevolutionary conservatism and its legacy.
- Conservative political legacy of German idealism and Romanticism.
- Conservative political legacy of historicism.
- Conservative political legacy of Lebensphilosophie and Nietzsche.
- The German "conservative revolution" of the Weimar period and its legacy.
- Postwar and contemporary "radical conservatism".
Jussi Backman and Pedro T. Magalhães:
Editorial: Conservative Dispositions in Continental Thought
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.1095849
Giovanni Damele:
Crowds, Leaders, and Epidemic Psychosis: The Relationship Between Crowd Psychology and Elite Theory and Its Contemporary Relevance
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.1009181
Timo Pankakoski:
What is Conservative and Revolutionary about the "Conservative Revolution"? Argument-Level Evidence from Three Thinkers
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.959411
Ville Suuronen:
Why Are Political Discussions with Fascists Impossible? Reflections on the Far-Right Politics of Silence
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.951236
Hjalmar Falk:
The Modern Epimetheus: Carl Schmitt's Katechontism as Reactionary Chronopolitics
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.957094
Jussi Backman:
Radical Conservatism and the Heideggerian Right: Heidegger, de Benoist, Dugin
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.941799
Pedro T. Magalhães:
Beyond the Reactionary Sea Change: Antimodern Thought, American Politics, and Political Science
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.954668
Tuukka Brunila:
Depoliticization of Politics and Power: Mouffe and the Conservative Disposition in Postfoundational Political Theory
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpos.2022.974065
Research Interests:
The volume studies, from different perspectives, the relationship between ancient thought and biopolitics, that is, theories, discourses, and practices in which the biological life of human populations becomes the focal point of political... more
The volume studies, from different perspectives, the relationship between ancient thought and biopolitics, that is, theories, discourses, and practices in which the biological life of human populations becomes the focal point of political government. It thus continues and deepens the critical examination, in recent literature, of Michel Foucault's claim concerning the essentially modern character of biopolitics. The nine contributions comprised in the volume explore and utilize the notions of biopolitics and biopower as conceptual tools for articulating the differences and continuities between antiquity and modernity and for narrating Western intellectual and political history in general. Without committing itself to any particular thesis or approach, the volume evaluates both the relevance of ancient thought for the concept and theory of biopolitics and the relevance of biopolitical theory and ideas for the study of ancient thought. The volume is divided into three main parts: part I studies instances of biopolitics in ancient thought; part II focuses on aspects of ancient thought that elude or transcend biopolitics; and part III discusses several modern interpretations of ancient thought in the context of biopolitical theory.
PART I: BIOPOLITICS IN ANCIENT THOUGHT
1:Biopolitics and the "boundless people": An Iliadic model (Sara Brill)
2:Plato and the biopolitical purge of the city-state (Mika Ojakangas)
3:Sovereign power and social justice: Plato and Aristotle on justice and its biopolitical basis in heterosexual copulation, procreation, and upbringing (Kathy L. Gaca)
PART II: ANCIENT THOUGHT BEYOND BIOPOLITICS
4:Otherwise than (bio)politics: Nature and the sacred in tragic life (Kalliopi Nikolopoulou)
5:Beyond biopolitics and juridico-institutional politics: Aristotle on the nature of politics (Adriel M. Trott)
6:Bene vivere politice: On the (meta)biopolitics of "happiness" (Jussi Backman)
PART III: BIOPOLITICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ANCIENT THOUGHT
7:Hannah Arendt's genealogy of biopolitics: From Greek materialism to modern human superfluity (Ville Suuronen)
8:From biopolitics to biopoetics and back again: On a counterintuitive continuity in Foucault's thought (Sergei Prozorov)
9:Agamben's Aristotelian biopolitics: Conceptual and methodological problems (Antonio Cimino)
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/biopolitics-and-ancient-thought-9780192847102?cc=nl&lang=en
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192847102.001.0001
Review by Morten S. Thaning in Foucault Studies:
https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.i35.7083
PART I: BIOPOLITICS IN ANCIENT THOUGHT
1:Biopolitics and the "boundless people": An Iliadic model (Sara Brill)
2:Plato and the biopolitical purge of the city-state (Mika Ojakangas)
3:Sovereign power and social justice: Plato and Aristotle on justice and its biopolitical basis in heterosexual copulation, procreation, and upbringing (Kathy L. Gaca)
PART II: ANCIENT THOUGHT BEYOND BIOPOLITICS
4:Otherwise than (bio)politics: Nature and the sacred in tragic life (Kalliopi Nikolopoulou)
5:Beyond biopolitics and juridico-institutional politics: Aristotle on the nature of politics (Adriel M. Trott)
6:Bene vivere politice: On the (meta)biopolitics of "happiness" (Jussi Backman)
PART III: BIOPOLITICAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ANCIENT THOUGHT
7:Hannah Arendt's genealogy of biopolitics: From Greek materialism to modern human superfluity (Ville Suuronen)
8:From biopolitics to biopoetics and back again: On a counterintuitive continuity in Foucault's thought (Sergei Prozorov)
9:Agamben's Aristotelian biopolitics: Conceptual and methodological problems (Antonio Cimino)
https://global.oup.com/academic/product/biopolitics-and-ancient-thought-9780192847102?cc=nl&lang=en
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192847102.001.0001
Review by Morten S. Thaning in Foucault Studies:
https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.i35.7083
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Aesthetics, Contemporary Art, Philosophy of Art, Martin Heidegger, Michel Henry, and 13 moreHeidegger, Art and technology, 17th Century French Baroque Artist Nicolas Poussin, Heidegger and Technology, Modern and Contemporary Art, Anselm Kiefer, Andy Goldsworthy, Heidegger and art, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Continental Philosophy and Aesthetics, Heideggerian Aesthetics, Heidegger's Black Notebooks, and Heidegger and Black Notebooks(Heidegger, Art and technology, 17th Century French Baroque Artist Nicolas Poussin, Heidegger and Technology, Modern and Contemporary Art, Anselm Kiefer, Andy Goldsworthy, Heidegger and art, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Continental Philosophy and Aesthetics, Heideggerian Aesthetics, Heidegger's Black Notebooks, and Heidegger and Black Notebooks)
(Heidegger, Art and technology, 17th Century French Baroque Artist Nicolas Poussin, Heidegger and Technology, Modern and Contemporary Art, Anselm Kiefer, Andy Goldsworthy, Heidegger and art, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Continental Philosophy and Aesthetics, Heideggerian Aesthetics, Heidegger's Black Notebooks, and Heidegger and Black Notebooks)
”Jussin pyrkimys opettaa ajattelun ankaruutta epäonnistumiselle alttiin aloittelijan roolissa kertoo omalla tavallaan filosofian opettamisen paradoksista. Miten opettaa jotain, jota ei voi opettaa? Tämä julkaisu kokoaa yhteen muutamia... more
”Jussin pyrkimys opettaa ajattelun ankaruutta epäonnistumiselle alttiin aloittelijan roolissa kertoo omalla tavallaan filosofian opettamisen paradoksista. Miten opettaa jotain, jota ei voi opettaa? Tämä julkaisu kokoaa yhteen muutamia Jussin ystävien ja oppilaiden kirjoituksia. Teksteistä löytää monia eläviä jälkiä Jussin työstä, mahdottoman opettamisesta, ja myös tämän alati aloittelevan opetuksen alullepanemista erilaisista oppimisen prosesseista.”
Research Interests:
"Outoa tässä olemisen ajattelussa on sen yksinkertaisuus". Näin totesi Martin Heidegger omasta työstään. Heidegger – Ajattelun aiheita kokoaa suomalaisten tutkijoiden kirjoituksia Heideggerin avaamilla poluilla. Kokoelma piirtää... more
"Outoa tässä olemisen ajattelussa on sen yksinkertaisuus". Näin totesi Martin Heidegger omasta työstään. Heidegger – Ajattelun aiheita kokoaa suomalaisten tutkijoiden kirjoituksia Heideggerin avaamilla poluilla.
Kokoelma piirtää Heideggerin haastavasta ja syvällisestä ajattelusta rikkaan ja moni-ilmeisen kuvan, joka soveltuu niin tutkijoiden kuin filosofian harrastajienkin käyttöön. Teos on ensimmäinen kattava kokoelma suomalaista Heidegger-tutkimusta. Kirja sisältää myös toimittajien johdatuksen Heideggeriin ja katsauksen aiheen historiaan Suomessa.
Kokoelma piirtää Heideggerin haastavasta ja syvällisestä ajattelusta rikkaan ja moni-ilmeisen kuvan, joka soveltuu niin tutkijoiden kuin filosofian harrastajienkin käyttöön. Teos on ensimmäinen kattava kokoelma suomalaista Heidegger-tutkimusta. Kirja sisältää myös toimittajien johdatuksen Heideggeriin ja katsauksen aiheen historiaan Suomessa.
”Metafysiikan peruskysymyksenä kysymme: ’Miksi ylipäätään on olevaa eikä pikemminkin ei mitään?’ Tässä peruskysymyksessä väreilee jo esi-kysymys: miten on olemisen laita? Mitä tarkoitamme sanoilla ’olla’, ’oleminen’? Yrittäessämme vastata... more
”Metafysiikan peruskysymyksenä kysymme: ’Miksi ylipäätään on olevaa eikä pikemminkin ei mitään?’ Tässä peruskysymyksessä väreilee jo esi-kysymys: miten on olemisen laita? Mitä tarkoitamme sanoilla ’olla’, ’oleminen’? Yrittäessämme vastata joudumme heti hämmennyksen valtaan. Haromme jotakin, josta ei saa otetta. Silti oleva jatkuvasti koskettaa meitä, olemme edelleen suhteessa olevaan, tiedämme edelleen itsestämme ’olevana’. Pidämme ’olemista’ hädin tuskin pelkkänä sanana, loppuun hyödynnettynä nimikkeenä.”
Martin Heideggerin luentosarja Johdatus metafysiikkaan vuodelta 1935 edustaa siirtymää Olemisen ja ajan (1927) fundamentaaliontologiasta hänen myöhempään ”olemishistorialliseen” ajatteluunsa, joka hahmottelee metafyysisen tradition rajoja ja viitoittaa tietä kohti länsimaisen ajattelun ”toista alkua”. Kielen ja filosofian historiaa koskevien pohdiskelujen avulla Heidegger pyrkii osoittamaan, ettei ”oleminen” pohjimmiltaan suinkaan ole tyhjä ja epämääräinen sana, vaan sen mieli onkin länsimaisessa ajatteluperinteessä rajautunut ja määrittynyt monessa suhteessa.
Martin Heideggerin luentosarja Johdatus metafysiikkaan vuodelta 1935 edustaa siirtymää Olemisen ja ajan (1927) fundamentaaliontologiasta hänen myöhempään ”olemishistorialliseen” ajatteluunsa, joka hahmottelee metafyysisen tradition rajoja ja viitoittaa tietä kohti länsimaisen ajattelun ”toista alkua”. Kielen ja filosofian historiaa koskevien pohdiskelujen avulla Heidegger pyrkii osoittamaan, ettei ”oleminen” pohjimmiltaan suinkaan ole tyhjä ja epämääräinen sana, vaan sen mieli onkin länsimaisessa ajatteluperinteessä rajautunut ja määrittynyt monessa suhteessa.
Preprint of Jussi Backman, "Not One Power, But Two: Dark Grounds and Twilit Paradises in Malick," in Life Above the Clouds: Philosophy in the Films of Terrence Malick, edited by Steven DeLay (Albany: State University of New York Press,... more
Preprint of Jussi Backman, "Not One Power, But Two: Dark Grounds and Twilit Paradises in Malick," in Life Above the Clouds: Philosophy in the Films of Terrence Malick, edited by Steven DeLay (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2023), 127–146.
https://sunypress.edu/Books/L/Life-Above-the-Clouds
"If the previous chapters by Cabrera, Reid and Craig, and Cerbone all accentuate the paradox of existence, that our being-in-the-world is simultaneously beautiful and ugly, good and evil, joyous and painful, Jussi Backman's "Not One Power, But Two: Dark Grounds and Twilit Paradises in Malick" investigates this fundamental ambivalence in terms of Schelling's doctrine of evil, a view that assigns evil (and hence melancholy) a fundamental place as a basic principle of reality. Backman's suggestion at once deepens and complexifies the way in which Malick's films can be seen as exercises in "aesthetic theodicy," as Sinnerbrink has said." (Steven DeLay, Introduction)
https://sunypress.edu/Books/L/Life-Above-the-Clouds
"If the previous chapters by Cabrera, Reid and Craig, and Cerbone all accentuate the paradox of existence, that our being-in-the-world is simultaneously beautiful and ugly, good and evil, joyous and painful, Jussi Backman's "Not One Power, But Two: Dark Grounds and Twilit Paradises in Malick" investigates this fundamental ambivalence in terms of Schelling's doctrine of evil, a view that assigns evil (and hence melancholy) a fundamental place as a basic principle of reality. Backman's suggestion at once deepens and complexifies the way in which Malick's films can be seen as exercises in "aesthetic theodicy," as Sinnerbrink has said." (Steven DeLay, Introduction)
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The paper studies the significance of Martin Heidegger's philosophy of history for two key thinkers of contemporary radical conservatism and the Identitarian movement, Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin. Heidegger's often-overlooked... more
The paper studies the significance of Martin Heidegger's philosophy of history for two key thinkers of contemporary radical conservatism and the Identitarian movement, Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin. Heidegger's often-overlooked affinities with the German “conservative revolution” of the Weimar period have in recent years been emphasized by an emerging radical-conservative “right-Heideggerian” orientation. I first discuss the later Heidegger's “being-historical” narrative of the culmination and end of the metaphysical foundations of Western modernity in the contemporary Nietzschean era of nihilism and of an emerging postmodern “other beginning” of Western thinking, focused on historical and cultural relativism and particularism. In Heidegger's work of the 1930s and 1940s, we find attempts to apply this historical narrative to interpreting contemporary geopolitical and ideological phenomena in ways that connect Heidegger to certain central ideas and concerns of the conservative revolutionaries, especially Carl Schmitt's geopolitical particularism. De Benoist, the key name of the French Nouvelle Droite and a founding figure of contemporary Identitarianism, is particularly inspired by Heidegger's reading of Nietzsche as the culmination of the “metaphysics of subjectivity” dominating Western modernity. For de Benoist, this modern metaphysics is the root of the “ideology of the Same” underlying the liberal universalism and individualism that he opposes in the name of a cultural ethnopluralism. De Benoist's Russian disciple Dugin bases the pluralistic geopolitics of his radical-conservative “fourth political theory” on the legacy of the conservative revolution, the key intellectual model of which Dugin discovers in Heidegger's notion of the “other beginning”.
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In the introduction to the volume, the editors explain the overarching aim of the volume and contextualize the main themes of its chapters. Even if the notions of biopolitics and biopower have played a crucial role in philosophy, the... more
In the introduction to the volume, the editors explain the overarching aim of the volume and contextualize the main themes of its chapters. Even if the notions of biopolitics and biopower have played a crucial role in philosophy, the humanities, and the social sciences over the last decades, they have been used in various and at times diverging senses, which has also produced different narratives about the history of biopolitics. The main aim of the volume is to clarify whether and to what extent the concept of biopolitics is applicable to antiquity. To answer such questions, the chapters collected in the volume address three main topics, namely the possible presence of biopolitical discourse in ancient thought, the extent to which the application of a biopolitical approach to ancient thought requires qualifications, and some influential contemporary interpretations of the relation between biopolitics and antiquity.
Research Interests: Governmentality, History Of Political Thought (Political Science), Giorgio Agamben, Michel Foucault, History of Political Thought, and 13 moreArendt, Roberto Esposito, Antonio Negri, Biopolitics, Ancient social & political philosophy, Biopower, Hannah Arendt, Agamben, Michael Hardt, Biopower and Biopolitics, Ancient Political Thought, Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, and Foucault
This chapter approaches the question of biopolitics in ancient political thought looking not at specific political techniques but at notions of the final aim of the political community. It argues that the “happiness” (eudaimonia,... more
This chapter approaches the question of biopolitics in ancient political thought looking not at specific political techniques but at notions of the final aim of the political community. It argues that the “happiness” (eudaimonia, beatitudo) that constitutes the greatest human good in the tradition from Aristotle to Thomas Aquinas is not a “biopolitical” ideal, but rather a metabiopolitical one, consisting in a contemplative activity situated above and beyond the biological and the political. It is only with Thomas Hobbes that civic happiness becomes “biopolitically” identified with simple survival; for modernity, as Hannah Arendt puts it, mere being alive becomes the greatest human good, and happiness is understood as a subjective “quality of life.” In both models, the political realm is a means to an end. Arendt draws our attention to a neglected third alternative to both the classical/metabiopolitical and the modern/biopolitical ideals: “public happiness” consisting in political participation itself.
Research Interests: Aristotle, Hobbes, Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Aquinas, and 15 moreMichel Foucault, History of Political Thought, Happiness, Arendt, Biopolitics, Ancient social & political philosophy, Biopower, Hannah Arendt, Aristotle's Politics, Biopower and Biopolitics, Ancient Political Thought, Philosophy of Happiness, Eudaimonia, Governmentality and Biopower, and Foucault
A Rejoinder to Harri Mäcklin, "A Heideggerian Critique of Immersive Art"
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In this chapter, Jussi Backman approaches Hannah Arendt’s readings of ancient philosophy by setting out from her perspective on the intellectual, political, and moral crisis characterizing Western societies in the twentieth century, a... more
In this chapter, Jussi Backman approaches Hannah Arendt’s readings of ancient philosophy by setting out from her perspective on the intellectual, political, and moral crisis characterizing Western societies in the twentieth century, a crisis to which the rise of totalitarianism bears witness. To Arendt, the political catastrophes haunting the twentieth century have roots in a tradition of political philosophy reaching back to the Greek beginnings of philosophy. Two principal features of Arendt’s exchange with the ancients are highlighted. The first is her account, in The Human Condition (1958), of the profound transformation of the Greek perceptions of political life initiated by Plato, the founder of the Western tradition of political philosophy; this transformation, according to Arendt, leads to an instrumentalization of politics as a means toward a higher end. The second feature is Arendt’s distinction, in her unfinished Life of the Mind (1977–8), between three different points of departure for thinking discovered by ancient philosophy—wonder, fear, and conscience—and three different outcomes of thinking—contemplation, willing, and judging. Backman argues that what connects these two interpretations of ancient philosophy is an attempt to rethink and rearticulate the complex relationship between thinking and action, between the reflective vita contemplativa and the world-oriented vita activa.
Research Interests: Political Theory, Hellenistic Philosophy, Plato, Aristotle, Totalitarianism, and 15 moreContinental Philosophy, Stoicism, Socrates, Conscience, Arendt, Ancient Philosophy, Plato and Platonism, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Hannah Arendt, Aristotle's Ethics, Contemporary continental political philosophy, Epictetus, Moral Judgment, Plato's Republic, and Continental Political Thought
This paper compares two influential but conflicting contemporary models of politics as an activity: those of Hannah Arendt and Alain Badiou. It discovers the fundamental difference between their approaches to politics in their opposing... more
This paper compares two influential but conflicting contemporary models of politics as an activity: those of Hannah Arendt and Alain Badiou. It discovers the fundamental difference between their approaches to politics in their opposing evaluations of the contemporary political significance of the legacy of Plato, Platonism, and the Platonic Idea. Karl Popper’s and Arendt’s analyses of the inherently ideological nature of totalitarianism are contrasted with Badiou’s vindication of an ideological “politics of the Idea.” Arendt and Badiou are shown to share an understanding of politics as a realm for the human deployment of novelty and world-transformation. Their key disagreement concerns the form of activity that accomplishes this deployment. For Arendt, political activity has the basic form of noninstrumental and nonteleological action (praxis), devalued by the Platonic tradition of political philosophy. Badiou, by contrast, follows Plato in regarding politics essentially as a process of production (poiēsis) oriented to an ideal end.
Research Interests: Political Philosophy, Political Theory, Plato, Ideology, Totalitarianism, and 15 moreContinental Philosophy, Arendt, Alain Badiou, Karl Popper, Plato and Platonism, Political Ideology, Social and Political Philosophy, Platonism, Hannah Arendt, Badiou, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Contemporary Political Theory, Contemporary continental political philosophy, Ancient Political Thought, and Continental Political Thought(Continental Philosophy, Arendt, Alain Badiou, Karl Popper, Plato and Platonism, Political Ideology, Social and Political Philosophy, Platonism, Hannah Arendt, Badiou, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Contemporary Political Theory, Contemporary continental political philosophy, Ancient Political Thought, and Continental Political Thought)
(Continental Philosophy, Arendt, Alain Badiou, Karl Popper, Plato and Platonism, Political Ideology, Social and Political Philosophy, Platonism, Hannah Arendt, Badiou, Contemporary Political Philosophy, Contemporary Political Theory, Contemporary continental political philosophy, Ancient Political Thought, and Continental Political Thought)
This article looks at the role of Hellenistic thought in the historical narratives of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt. To a certain extent, both see—with G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Droysen, and Eduard Zeller—Hellenistic and Roman philosophy... more
This article looks at the role of Hellenistic thought in the historical narratives of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt. To a certain extent, both see—with G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Droysen, and Eduard Zeller—Hellenistic and Roman philosophy as a “modernity in antiquity,” but with important differences. Heidegger is generally dismissive of Hellenistic thought and comes to see it as a decisive historical turning point at which a protomodern element of subjective willing and domination is injected into the classical heritage of Plato and Aristotle. Arendt, likewise, credits Stoic philosophy with the discovery of the will as an active faculty constituting a realm of subjective freedom and autonomy. While she considers Hellenistic philosophy as essentially apolitical and world-alienated—in contrast to the inherently political and practical Roman culture—it nonetheless holds for her an important but unexploited ethical and political potential.
Research Interests: Hellenistic Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Stoicism, Martin Heidegger, Arendt, and 14 moreAncient Philosophy, Heidegger, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Hannah Arendt, Heidegger's later thought, Roman Stoicism, Stoicism (Philosophy), Roman Philosophy, Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Stoics, History of Philosophy, Ancient Roman Philosophy, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy(Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Hannah Arendt, Heidegger's later thought, Roman Stoicism, Stoicism (Philosophy), Roman Philosophy, Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Stoics, History of Philosophy, Ancient Roman Philosophy, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy)
(Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Hannah Arendt, Heidegger's later thought, Roman Stoicism, Stoicism (Philosophy), Roman Philosophy, Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy, Stoics, History of Philosophy, Ancient Roman Philosophy, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, and Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy)
The paper studies two fundamentally different forms in which the concept of care makes its comeback in twentieth-century thought. We make use of a distinction made by Peter Sloterdijk, who argues that the ancient and medieval ‘ascetic’... more
The paper studies two fundamentally different forms in which the concept of care makes its comeback in twentieth-century thought. We make use of a distinction made by Peter Sloterdijk, who argues that the ancient and medieval ‘ascetic’ ideal of self-enhancement through practice has re-emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, particularly in the form of a rehabilitation of the Hellenistic notion of self-care (epimeleia heautou) in Michel Foucault’s late ethics. Sloterdijk contrasts this return of self-care with Martin Heidegger’s concept of being-in-the-world as ‘total care’ (Sorge), an utterly ‘secularized’ understanding of the human being as irreducibly world-embedded that rejects the classical ascetic ideal of world-secession. We examine further the historical roots and emergence of these contrasting contemporary reappropriations of care in the Western tradition of thought and show them to be rooted in two different ontologies and ethics of the self as either world-secluded or world-immersed, autonomous or constitutively relational. The historical point of divergence of these two approaches to care, we argue, can be found in the Christian transformation of Hellenistic ethics.
Research Interests: Sloterdijk, Peter, Martin Heidegger, Self Care, Michel Foucault, Peter Sloterdijk, and 13 moreHeidegger, Heidegger and Ethics, Heidegger's Being and Time, Caring / Care Ethics, Sloterdijk, Self-Care, Care of the Self, Ethics of Care of the Self, Caring, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Ethic of Caring, Foucault, and Philosophy of Care
The chapter argues that radical contextuality, often seen as a hallmark theme of “postmodern” thought, is a key element of Heidegger’s thinking. Aristotelian metaphysics, as the question of being qua being, looks for a universal principle... more
The chapter argues that radical contextuality, often seen as a hallmark theme of “postmodern” thought, is a key element of Heidegger’s thinking. Aristotelian metaphysics, as the question of being qua being, looks for a universal principle common to every particular instance of “to be.” By contrast, the postmetaphysical approach gradually developed by Heidegger addresses being as the irreducible context-sensitivity and singularity of a meaningful situation, understood as a unique focal point of a dynamic and complex meaning-context. The fundamental ontology of Being and Time (1927) articulates the temporally contextual structure of the human being as Dasein, culminating in the concept of the multidimensional singular instant (Augenblick). After the failure of his attempt to articulate the temporally contextual singularity of being in terms of its correlation with Dasein, Heidegger attempts an inverted approach: Contributions to Philosophy (1936–38) considers Dasein as the spatiotemporally situated site of the singular event (Ereignis) of being. The chapter finally suggests an interpretation of the fourfold (Geviert) of sky, earth, gods, and mortals, allusively introduced in the 1949 Bremen lectures, as Heidegger’s most elaborate account of the multidimensional structure that makes possible the contextual singularization of meaning.
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Contextualism, Martin Heidegger, Heidegger, Heidegger's later thought, and 10 moreHeidegger's Being and Time, Singularity, Heidegger, Metaphysics, Question of Being, Fundamental ontology, Beitrage Zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger's Concept of "The Fourfold", Heidegger Ecstatic Temporality, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Aristotle Four Causes Theory, and Identity and difference(Heidegger's Being and Time, Singularity, Heidegger, Metaphysics, Question of Being, Fundamental ontology, Beitrage Zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger's Concept of "The Fourfold", Heidegger Ecstatic Temporality, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Aristotle Four Causes Theory, and Identity and difference)
(Heidegger's Being and Time, Singularity, Heidegger, Metaphysics, Question of Being, Fundamental ontology, Beitrage Zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Heidegger's Concept of "The Fourfold", Heidegger Ecstatic Temporality, Philosophy of Martin Heidegger, Aristotle Four Causes Theory, and Identity and difference)
The chapter tackles the complex, tension-ridden, and often paradoxical relationship between relativism and conservatism. We focus particularly on radical conservatism, an early twentieth-century German movement that arguably constitutes... more
The chapter tackles the complex, tension-ridden, and often paradoxical relationship between relativism and conservatism. We focus particularly on radical conservatism, an early twentieth-century German movement that arguably constitutes the climax of conservatism's problematic relationship with relativism. We trace the shared genealogy of conservatism and historicism in nineteenth-century Counter-Enlightenment thought and interpret radical conservatism's ambivalent relation to relativism as reflecting this heritage. Emphasizing national particularity, historical uniqueness, and global political plurality, Carl Schmitt and Hans Freyer moved in the tradition of historicism, stopping short of full relativism. Yet they utilized relativistic elements-such as seeing irrational decisions or the demands of "life" as the basis of politics-to discredit notions of universal political morality and law, hereby underpinning their authoritarian agendas. Oswald Spengler, by contrast, took the relativistic impulses to the extreme, interweaving his conservative authoritarianism and nationalism with full-fledged epistemic, moral, and political relativism. Martin Heidegger has recently been perceived as the key philosopher of radical conservatism, and his thought arguably channeled antimodern aspects of historicism into contemporary political thought. We conclude by analyzing how some radical conservative arguments involving cultural relativism and plurality still reverberate in contemporary theorists such as Samuel Huntington, Aleksandr Dugin, and Alain de Benoist.
Research Interests: Historicism, Conservatism, Conservative Revolution, Conservatism (Political Science), Martin Heidegger, and 15 moreHans-Georg Gadamer, Relativism, Carl Schmitt, Leo Strauss, Hannah Arendt, Relativism (Philosophy), Counter-Enlightenment, Oswald Spengler, History of Conservatism, Cultural Relativism, Philosophical Hermeneutics, Hans Freyer, Alain de Benoist, Alexandr Dugin, and Othmar Spann
The chapter examines Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin's (b. 1962) attack on the perceived Western liberal order. The chapter introduces Dugin's role on the Russian right-wing political scene and his international networks,... more
The chapter examines Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin's (b. 1962) attack on the perceived Western liberal order. The chapter introduces Dugin's role on the Russian right-wing political scene and his international networks, Russian neo-Eurasianism as his ideological footing, and his more recent "fourth political theory" as an attempt to formulate a new ideological alternative to the key twentieth-century ideologies, for him, liberalism, communism, and fascism. Dugin's "fourth" ideology draws inspiration from the German conservative revolutionary movement of the Weimar era. In particular, Martin Heidegger's philosophy of history, with its thesis of the end of modernity and another beginning of Western thought, and Carl Schmitt's pluralistic model of geopolitics are highlighted as key elements of Dugin's eclectic political thought, which is most appropriately characterized as a form of radical conservatism.
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The chapter approaches the hermeneutic concept of experience introduced by Hans-Georg Gadamer in Truth and Method (1960) from the perspective of the conceptual history of experience in the Western philosophical tradition. Through an... more
The chapter approaches the hermeneutic concept of experience introduced by Hans-Georg Gadamer in Truth and Method (1960) from the perspective of the conceptual history of experience in the Western philosophical tradition. Through an overview of the concept and the epistemological function of experience (empeiria, experientia, Erfahrung) in Aristotle, Francis Bacon, and Hegel, it is shown that the tradition has considered experience first and foremost in methodological terms, that is, as a pathway towards a form of scientific knowledge that is itself increasingly immune to experience. Science strives “beyond” experience because of the limitations inherent in the fundamentally contingent, singular, and negative character of experience: experience comes to us through unpredictable chance encounters and in singular situations and negates, tests, or “imperils” previous knowledge, thereby transforming it. By contrast, philosophical hermeneutics rethinks experience precisely in terms of these limitations. In the hermeneutic approach articulated by Gadamer and Claude Romano, experience is an encounter with the irreducible finitude and historical situatedness of one’s understanding and conceptual framework, an encounter with an otherness that puts our preunderstanding to test and requires us to revise it. Hermeneutic experience is thus a singular event that irreparably transforms us.
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The essay studies Aristotle's critique of Parmenides (Physics 1.3) in the light of the Heideggerian account of Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics as an approach to being (Sein) in terms of beings (das Seiende). Aristotle's critique focuses... more
The essay studies Aristotle's critique of Parmenides (Physics 1.3) in the light of the Heideggerian account of Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics as an approach to being (Sein) in terms of beings (das Seiende). Aristotle's critique focuses on the presuppositions of the Parmenidean thesis of the unity of being. It is argued that a close study of the presuppositions of Aristotle's own critique reveals an important difference between the Aristotelian metaphysical framework and the Parmenidean "protometaphysical" approach. The Parmenides fragments indicate being as such in the sense of the pure, undifferentiated "is there" (τὸ ἐόν)—as the intelligible accessibility of meaningful reality to thinking, prior to its articulation into determinate beings. For Aristotle, by contrast, "being itself" (αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν) has no other plausible meaning than "being-something-determinate as such" (τὸ ὅπερ ὄν τι), which itself remains equivocal. In this sense, Aristotle can indeed be said to conceive being in terms of beings, as the being-ness of determinate beings.
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Ontology, Presocratic Philosophy, Aristotle, Continental Philosophy, and 20 moreMartin Heidegger, Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Ancient Metaphysics, Parmenides, Heidegger's later thought, Ancient Greek Philosophy / Aristotle, Presocratics, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Aristotle's Physics, Aristoteles, Eleatic Monism, Eleatics, History of Philosophy, Postmetaphysics, The Eleatics, Parmenides' Poem, Aristotle's Criticisms of the Presocratics, and Metaphysics of the Unity(Martin Heidegger, Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Ancient Metaphysics, Parmenides, Heidegger's later thought, Ancient Greek Philosophy / Aristotle, Presocratics, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Aristotle's Physics, Aristoteles, Eleatic Monism, Eleatics, History of Philosophy, Postmetaphysics, The Eleatics, Parmenides' Poem, Aristotle's Criticisms of the Presocratics, and Metaphysics of the Unity)
(Martin Heidegger, Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Ancient Metaphysics, Parmenides, Heidegger's later thought, Ancient Greek Philosophy / Aristotle, Presocratics, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Aristotle's Physics, Aristoteles, Eleatic Monism, Eleatics, History of Philosophy, Postmetaphysics, The Eleatics, Parmenides' Poem, Aristotle's Criticisms of the Presocratics, and Metaphysics of the Unity)
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A brief overview of the current status of the scholarship on Heidegger and contemporary art and of the contributions included in the special issue.
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This chapter is an overview of Giorgio Agamben's engagement, in the Homo Sacer series (1995–2014), with Aristotelian philosophy. It specifically studies Agamben's attempt to deconstruct two Aristotelian conceptual oppositions fundamental... more
This chapter is an overview of Giorgio Agamben's engagement, in the Homo Sacer series (1995–2014), with Aristotelian philosophy. It specifically studies Agamben's attempt to deconstruct two Aristotelian conceptual oppositions fundamental for the Western tradition of political thought: (1) that between the bare fact of being alive and "qualified" living (associated by Agamben with an alleged distinction between zōē and bios) and (2) that between potentiality (dynamis) and actuality (energeia). Agamben's concept of form-of-life (forma-di-vita), a life that is never "bare" but always in the process of qualifying itself, is designed to deactivate and overcome these distinctions. In the final volume of the series, The Use of Bodies (2014), this is done with the help of the Aristotelian concepts of use (chrēsis) and habit (hexis).
Research Interests: Aristotle, Giorgio Agamben, Aristotle's Commentators, Potentiality (Aristotle), Aristotle's Politics, and 8 moreAgamben, Biopolitics (in Agamben, Foucault and Negri), Homo Sacer, Bare Life and Refugees, Aristotle's Metaphysics, Bare Life, Biopower, Biopolitics and Governmentality, Homo sacer, and Actuality and Potentiality
The chapter studies the speculative realist critique of the notion of finitude and its implications for the theme of the "end of the world" as a teleological and eschatological idea. It is first explained how Quentin Meillassoux proposes... more
The chapter studies the speculative realist critique of the notion of finitude and its implications for the theme of the "end of the world" as a teleological and eschatological idea. It is first explained how Quentin Meillassoux proposes to overcome both Kantian and Heideggerian "correlationist" approaches with his speculative thesis of absolute contingency. It is then shown that Meillassoux's speculative materialism also dismantles the close link forged by Kant between the teleological ends of human existence and a teleological notion of the "end of the world." Speculative materialism no longer sees the end of thought, or the end of the thinking human being, as an insurmountable limit of conceivability, but rather as one contingent and possible event among others. This allows us to conceive an "end of all things" in a positive sense with regard to which the old eschatological hope for the end of the present world of injustice and for the emergence of a new world of perfect, "divine" justice becomes meaningful and legitimate in an entirely new sense.
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The paper analyzes Quentin Meillassoux’s conception of the fideistic approach to religious faith intrinsic to the “strong correlationism” that he considers pervasive in contemporary thought. Backman presents the basic elements of... more
The paper analyzes Quentin Meillassoux’s conception of the fideistic approach to religious faith intrinsic to the “strong correlationism” that he considers pervasive in contemporary thought. Backman presents the basic elements of Meillassoux’s “speculative materialism” and especially the thesis according to which strong correlationism involves a “fideistic” approach to religiosity. In doing so, Backman critically examines Meillassoux’s notions of post-metaphysical faith, religious absolutes, and contemporary fanaticism, especially against the background of Heidegger’s philosophy. According to Backman, Meillassoux’s logical and conceptual critique of strong correlationism is innovative, and it may remain legitimate if its presuppositions are accepted. And yet, Backman argues that Meillassoux’s allegations of fideism seem to rely on the questionable application of Enlightenment conceptions to the contemporary situation.
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Hermeneutics as we understand it today is an essentially modern phenomenon. The chapter presents observations that illustrate some of the central ways in which the modern and late modern phenomena of philosophical hermeneutics relate to... more
Hermeneutics as we understand it today is an essentially modern phenomenon. The chapter presents observations that illustrate some of the central ways in which the modern and late modern phenomena of philosophical hermeneutics relate to the ancient philosophical legacy. First, the roots of hermeneutics are traced to ancient views on linguistic, textual, and sacral interpretation. The chapter then looks at certain fundamentally unhermeneutic elements of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Augustinian “logocentric” theory of meaning that philosophical hermeneutics and its heirs sought to call into question, reconsider, and deconstruct. Augustine's De doctrina christiana, can be regarded as an epitome and culmination of the ancient protohermeneutic heritage, theological as well as philological. Finally, Aristotle's practical philosophy, particularly the notion of phronesis, “practical insight”, is designated as an implicit ancient prototype of hermeneutic thinking, the reappropriation of which lay at the core of the Heideggerian and Gadamerian philosophical projects.
Research Interests: Plato, Aristotle, Hermeneutics, Martin Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and 15 moreAugustine, PHRONESIS, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, History of Interpretation, Interpretation, Translation and Interpretation, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, Ancient Hermeneutics, Ancient Philosophy of Language, Aristotle/Phronesis/Praxis, and History of Translation and Interpretation(Augustine, PHRONESIS, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, History of Interpretation, Interpretation, Translation and Interpretation, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, Ancient Hermeneutics, Ancient Philosophy of Language, Aristotle/Phronesis/Praxis, and History of Translation and Interpretation)
(Augustine, PHRONESIS, Hermeneutic Phenomenology, Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, History of Interpretation, Interpretation, Translation and Interpretation, Ancient Greek Philosophy, Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, Ancient Hermeneutics, Ancient Philosophy of Language, Aristotle/Phronesis/Praxis, and History of Translation and Interpretation)
The paper outlines a tentative genealogy of the Platonic metaphysics of sight by thematizing pre-Platonic thought, particularly Heraclitus and Parmenides. By “metaphysics of sight” it understands the features of Platonic-Aristotelian... more
The paper outlines a tentative genealogy of the Platonic metaphysics of sight by thematizing pre-Platonic thought, particularly Heraclitus and Parmenides. By “metaphysics of sight” it understands the features of Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysics expressed with the help of visual metaphors. It is argued that the Platonic metaphysics of sight can be regarded as the result of a synthesis of the Heraclitean and Parmenidean approaches. In pre-Platonic thought, the visual paradigm is still marginal. For Heraclitus, the basic structure of being is its discursive articulation (logos) into conceptual pairs of binary opposites, an articulation that at the same time binds differences together into a tensional unity. The fundamental grasping of this ultimate unity-in-difference is conceived primarily through acoustic terms as a non-sensory “hearing.” For Parmenides, the ultimate unity of contraries is based on the capacity of thinking (noos) to intend anything as present; in fragment B 4, the exclusive relationship of thinking to intelligible presence is finally visualized in terms of a seeing or looking (leusso).
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Epistemology, Presocratic Philosophy, Phenomenology, Martin Heidegger, and 13 morePre-Socratic (Pre-Platonic) Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, Plato and Platonism, Pre-Socratic Philosophy, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Vision, Presocratics, Pre-socratics, Fragments of Presocratic Philosophy, Sight, and Plato and Heraclitus
The chapter discusses Quentin Meillassoux's recent interpretation and critique of Heidegger's philosophical position, which he describes as "strong correlationism." It emphasizes the fact that Meillassoux situates Heidegger in the... more
The chapter discusses Quentin Meillassoux's recent interpretation and critique of Heidegger's philosophical position, which he describes as "strong correlationism." It emphasizes the fact that Meillassoux situates Heidegger in the post-Kantian tradition of transcendental idealism that he defines in terms of a focus on the correlation between being and thinking. It is argued that Meillassoux's "speculative" attempt to overcome the Kantian philosophical framework in the name of absolute contingency should be understood as a further development and dialectical overcoming of its ultimate contemporary form, the Heideggerian philosophy of finitude.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Kant, Phenomenology, Continental Philosophy, Martin Heidegger, and 13 moreTranscendental Philosophy, Speculative Realism, Meillassoux, Immanuel Kant, Heidegger, Mortality, Philosophy of Finitude, Quentin Meillassoux, Post-Kantian Philosophy, Transcendental Phenomenology, Speculative Materialism, Transcendental Idealism, and History of Philosophy
The Heideggerian account of the ontotheological constitution of Western metaphysics has been extremely influential for contemporary philosophy of religion and for philosophical perspectives on theology and the divine. This paper... more
The Heideggerian account of the ontotheological constitution of Western metaphysics has been extremely influential for contemporary philosophy of religion and for philosophical perspectives on theology and the divine. This paper introduces and contrasts two central strategies for approaching the question of the divine in a non- or post-ontotheological manner. The first and more established approach is that of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics and deconstruction, inspired by Heidegger’s suggestion of a “theology without the word ‘being’ ” and by his later notions of an “ultimate god” and of “divinities” as one of the four axes of the fourfold (Geviert). Here, the divine is no longer articulated in terms of the supreme or absolute being, but as one of the interdependent dimensions of finite and contextual meaningful presence. The more recent approach introduced by Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux dissociates itself from the Heideggerian hermeneutics of finitude and adopts mathematics as its basic ontological model. Rather than focusing on meaning and sense, Badiou and Meillassoux replace ontotheological metaphysics with materialist frameworks. With regard to the divine, this approach leads either to a contemporary version of atheism (Badiou) or to the reintroduction of a divine entity, but now a merely possible and contingent one (Meillassoux).
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Theology, Continental Philosophy, Continental Philosophy of Religion (Philosophy), Continental Philosophy of Religion (Theology), and 13 moreMartin Heidegger, Speculative Realism, Meillassoux, Alain Badiou, Continental Philosophy and Theology, Badiou, Quentin Meillassoux, Speculative Materialism, Ontotheology, Conceptions of divinity, History of Philosophy, Postmetaphysical Theology, and Subtractive Ontology
The paper studies, within the framework of Martin Heidegger's narrative of the history of metaphysics, two perspectives on the unity of being: the "protometaphysical" perspective of Parmenides, the thinker of the "first beginning" of... more
The paper studies, within the framework of Martin Heidegger's narrative of the history of metaphysics, two perspectives on the unity of being: the "protometaphysical" perspective of Parmenides, the thinker of the "first beginning" of Western philosophy, and the postmetaphysical perspective of Heidegger, situated in the ongoing transition from the Hegelian and Nietzschean end of metaphysics to a forthcoming "other beginning" of Western thought. Both perspectives involve a certain "crisis", in the literal sense of the Greek krisis, "distinction," "decision." Parmenides' goddess exhorts the thinker to decide for being in the sense of pure intelligible accessibility or presence and to exclude all references to non-accessibility and non-presence. This is the foundation of the Parmenidean thesis of the unity of being. In the Heideggerian perspective, by contrast, meaningful presence is seen as constituted precisely by references to a withdrawing meaning-context, to background dimensions that in themselves are not immediately present. Since presence is constituted only in terms of non-presence, the "decision" or "crisis" between presence and non-presence is an unresolvable and irreducible feature of postmetaphysical thinking.
Research Interests: Metaphysics, Presocratic Philosophy, Continental Philosophy, Martin Heidegger, Pre-Socratic (Pre-Platonic) Philosophy, and 10 moreAncient Philosophy, Heidegger, Pre-Socratic Philosophy, Parmenides, Presocratics, Pre-socratics, Unity, Fragments of Presocratic Philosophy, History of Philosophy, and Metaphysics of the Unity
Derrida’s deconstructive strategy of reading texts can be understood as a way of highlighting the irreducible plurality of discursive meaning that undermines the traditional Western “logocentric” desire for an absolute point of reference.... more
Derrida’s deconstructive strategy of reading texts can be understood as a way of highlighting the irreducible plurality of discursive meaning that undermines the traditional Western “logocentric” desire for an absolute point of reference. While his notion of logocentrism was modeled on Heidegger’s articulation of the traditional ontotheological framework of Aristotelian metaphysics, Derrida detects a logocentric remnant in Heidegger’s own interpretation of gathering (Versammlung) as the basic movement of logos, discursiveness. However, I suggest that Derrida here touches upon a certain limit of deconstruction. As Derrida himself points out, the “decentering” effect of deconstruction does not simply abolish the unifying and focalizing function of discourse. Insofar as deconstruction involves reading and interpreting, it cannot completely evade narrative focalization. Rather, both Heidegger and Derrida can be understood as addressing the radical contextuality of all discursive centers and focal points as well as the consequent impossibility of an ultimate and definitive metanarrative.
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The paper studies Heidegger's reading of the poet Stefan George (1868-1933), particularly of his poem "Das Wort" (1928), in the context of Heidegger's narrative of the history of metaphysics. Heidegger reads George's poem as expressing... more
The paper studies Heidegger's reading of the poet Stefan George (1868-1933), particularly of his poem "Das Wort" (1928), in the context of Heidegger's narrative of the history of metaphysics. Heidegger reads George's poem as expressing certain experiences with language. First, it voices an experience of the constitutive role of language, of naming and discursive determination, in granting things stable identities. Second, it expresses an encounter with the unnameable and indeterminable character of language itself as a meaning-constituting process, and a subsequent insight into the human being's dependency on language and her incapacity to master it subjectively. Heidegger characterizes these experiences as "transitional" (übergänglich). It is shown that in Heidegger's historical narrative, this places George's poem within the framework of the ongoing transition (Übergang) from the Hegelian and Nietzschean end of metaphysics to a forthcoming "other beginning" of thinking.
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The article re-examines the Aristotelian backdrop of Arendt’s notion of action. On the one hand, Backman takes up Arendt’s critique of the hierarchy of human activities in Aristotle, according to which Aristotle subordinates action... more
The article re-examines the Aristotelian backdrop of Arendt’s notion of action. On the one hand, Backman takes up Arendt’s critique of the hierarchy of human activities in Aristotle, according to which Aristotle subordinates action (praxis) to production (poiesis) and contemplation (theoria). Backman argues that this is not the case since Aristotle conceives theoria as the most perfect form of praxis. On the other hand, Backman stresses that Arendt’s notion of action is in fact very different from Aristotle’s praxis, to the extent that Arendt thinks of action as an external to the means-ends scheme, whereas Aristotle ultimately remains caught in this scheme proper to poiesis in thinking of praxis as its own end. According to Backman, Arendt’s concept of action can therefore be understood as a critique, rather than as a rehabilitation, of Aristotelian praxis.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of Action, Aristotle, Praxis, and 12 moreContinental Philosophy, Martin Heidegger, Arendt, Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, Practical Rationality, Nicomachean Ethics, Hannah Arendt, Aristotle's Ethics, Philosophy of Praxis, Aristotelian Ethics, and Aristotle/Phronesis/Praxis
The paper studies a transcript of notes from Heidegger's 1930–31 seminar on Plato’s Parmenides. It shows that in spite of his much-criticized habit of dismissing Plato as the progenitor of “idealist” metaphysics, Heidegger was quite aware... more
The paper studies a transcript of notes from Heidegger's 1930–31 seminar on Plato’s Parmenides. It shows that in spite of his much-criticized habit of dismissing Plato as the progenitor of “idealist” metaphysics, Heidegger was quite aware of the radical potential of Plato's later dialogues. Through a temporal account of the notion of oneness (to hen), the Parmenides attempts to reconcile the plurality of beings with the unity of being. In Heidegger’s reading, the dialogue culminates in the notion of the “instant” (to exaiphnes, Augenblick) in which the temporal plurality of presence and nonpresence converges into a unified disclosure.
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The paper discusses Heidegger’s early notion of the “movedness of life” (Lebensbewegtheit) and its intimate connection to Aristotle’s concept of movement (kinesis). Heidegger’s aim in the period of Being and Time was to inquire into the... more
The paper discusses Heidegger’s early notion of the “movedness of life” (Lebensbewegtheit) and its intimate connection to Aristotle’s concept of movement (kinesis). Heidegger’s aim in the period of Being and Time was to inquire into the implicit presuppositions of the Aristotelian ideal of being as ousia – constant and complete presence and availability – by showing that the background for all meaningful presence is Dasein, the ecstatically temporal context of human being. Life as the event of finitude is characterized by an essential lack and incompleteness, and the living present therefore gains meaning only in relation to a horizon of nonpresence and unavailability. Whereas the “theological” culmination of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics finds the supreme fulfillment of human life in the semi-divine self-immanence and self-sufficiency of the bios theoretikos, a radical Heideggerian interpretation of kinesis permits us to find in Aristotle's Physics the basic structures of mortal living as a self-transcending movement.
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For Heidegger, the fundamental “rationality” of Western metaphysics lies in the fact that its “leading question” concerning beings as beings constantly refers back to the question concerning the ground (arche, ratio, Grund) of beings.... more
For Heidegger, the fundamental “rationality” of Western metaphysics lies in the fact that its “leading question” concerning beings as beings constantly refers back to the question concerning the ground (arche, ratio, Grund) of beings. Whereas metaphysics has sought to ground beings in ideal beingness, Heidegger attempts to think beingness as itself based on the withdrawing “background” dimension of no-thing-ness that grounds finite presence by differing from it. In Heidegger’s earlier work, the structure of this “grounding” is considered in terms of Dasein’s temporal transcendence; later, it is rearticulated through the fourfold dimensionality of meaningfulness (Geviert), converging in a concrete thing.
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Puhuttaessa Ukrainan sotaan kärjistyneen Venäjän geopoliittisen ja ideologisen ajattelun filosofis-teoreettisista taustavoimista nousee toistuvasti esiin ”putinismin pääideologiksi” ja ”maailman vaarallisimmaksi filosofiksi” maalaillun... more
Puhuttaessa Ukrainan sotaan kärjistyneen Venäjän geopoliittisen ja ideologisen ajattelun filosofis-teoreettisista taustavoimista nousee toistuvasti esiin ”putinismin pääideologiksi” ja ”maailman vaarallisimmaksi filosofiksi” maalaillun Aleksandr Duginin nimi. Kuka Dugin on, millaista on hänen vaarallinen ajattelunsa ja mikä on sen yhteys suurvallan aggressioon ja hyökkäyssotaan? Seuraavassa luodaan tiivis yleiskatsaus Duginin ajattelun kahteen keskeisimpään ideologiseen elementtiin: geopoliittiseen Euraasia-ideologiaan ja Duginin radikaalikonservatiiviseen ”neljänteen poliittiseen teoriaan”. Vaikka Duginin suora vaikutusvalta on rajallinen, hänen ajattelunsa heijastelee Venäjän poliittisen eliitin ajatusmaailmaa laajemminkin.
https://netn.fi/fi/artikkeli/mita-aleksandr-dugin-tarkoittaa?fbclid=IwAR2gDtmjz8wnio6jpabh-JerEcPT_ZVNMJ55clYyBknUyWe-gV6DszhNw6k
https://netn.fi/fi/artikkeli/mita-aleksandr-dugin-tarkoittaa?fbclid=IwAR2gDtmjz8wnio6jpabh-JerEcPT_ZVNMJ55clYyBknUyWe-gV6DszhNw6k
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Kommentaariteksti Nuoren Voiman Liiton, Kriittisen korkeakoulun, Ylioppilasteatterin ja Tutkijaliiton Nykyaika-tapahtumaan. Tutkijaliiton blogi, 7.5.2021.
Artikkeli käy läpi Quentin Meillassoux’n Äärellisyyden jälkeen -teoksessa esittelemiä spekulatiivisen materialismin lähtökohtia: ajatuksen Kantin jälkeistä filosofiasta hallinneesta korrelationismista ja sen ”heikosta” ja ”vahvasta”... more
Artikkeli käy läpi Quentin Meillassoux’n Äärellisyyden jälkeen -teoksessa esittelemiä spekulatiivisen materialismin lähtökohtia: ajatuksen Kantin jälkeistä filosofiasta hallinneesta korrelationismista ja sen ”heikosta” ja ”vahvasta” muodosta sekä Meillassoux’n perusargumentin, jolla hän pyrkii osoittamaan vahvan korrelationismin pyrkimyksen absoluuttisista viitepiisteistä luopumiseen sisäisesti ristiriitaiseksi. Tarkastelun pääpaino on Meillassoux’n väitteessä, että ajattelun riisuminen kaikista absoluuttisista näkökohdista johtaa vahvan korrelationismin omaksumaan ”fideistisen”, uskon ja järjen erillisyyttä ja keskinäistä riippumattomuutta korostavan suhtautumisen uskonnolliseen uskoon. Tällainen fideismi voi Meillassoux’n mukaan suojella tai jopa palvella ”nykypäivän fanatismia”. Artikkeli esittää joukon kriittisiä huomioita Meillassoux’n fideismin ja uskon, uskonnollisten absoluuttien sekä fanatismin käsitteistä. Hänen klassiseen valistusmoderniin nojaava fideismikritiikkinsä osoittautuu toistaiseksi puutteellisesti perustelluksi ja ongelmallisesti muotoilluksi.
Kirjasymposioartikkeli esittelee Hanna Meretojan teoksen The Ethics of Storytelling: Narrative Hermeneutics, History, and the Possible (Oxford University Press, 2018) keskeisimmät ajatukset ja kytkee ne laajempaan hermeneuttiseen ja... more
Kirjasymposioartikkeli esittelee Hanna Meretojan teoksen The Ethics of Storytelling: Narrative Hermeneutics, History, and the Possible (Oxford University Press, 2018) keskeisimmät ajatukset ja kytkee ne laajempaan hermeneuttiseen ja jälkistrukturalistiseen ajatteluperinteeseen, etenkin Jean-François Lyotardin luonnehdintaan jälkimodernista aikakaudesta suurten modernien historiallisten metakertomusten horjumisen ja pienten paikallisten kertomusten moneuden aikakautena. Tässä valossa Meretojan hermeneuttista kertomusetiikkaa voidaan lukea ennen muuta pienten, ei-totalisoivien kertomusten etiikkana. Artikkeli esittää, että tällaiselle etiikalle löytyy hedelmällinen vertailukohta Hannah Arendtin totalitarismiteoriasta, joka sijoittaa ideologiset metakertomukset totalitaarisen hallinnan ja sen tuottaman ”banaalin pahuuden” ytimeen; niin Arendtin kuin Meretojankin kertomusetiikan keskeisenä viitekohtana on holokausti moderniteetin eettisenä nollapisteenä. Nämä yhteydet tuovat esiin Meretojan hahmotteleman hermeneuttisen etiikan laajan teoreettisen kaikupohjan myöhäismodernissa ajatteluperinteessä. Lopuksi pohditaan kysymystä hermeneuttisen pienten kertomusten etiikan jatkuvasta ajankohtaisuudesta sosiaalisen median ja sen ”kuplien” aikakaudella.
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Väitetään, että nykypäivän populismi vetoaa tosiasioiden sijasta ”kokemukseen”. Mutta mitä on kokemus? Se ei ole vain ennakkoluuloihin nojautuvaa mutua eikä myöskään pelkkää empiirisen datan rekisteröintiä mutta liittyy molempiin.... more
Väitetään, että nykypäivän populismi vetoaa tosiasioiden sijasta ”kokemukseen”. Mutta mitä on kokemus? Se ei ole vain ennakkoluuloihin nojautuvaa mutua eikä myöskään pelkkää empiirisen datan rekisteröintiä mutta liittyy molempiin. Artikkelin luoma tiivis katsaus kokemuksen käsitehistorian pääpiirteisiin osoittaa, että länsimaisen filosofian perinteessä kokemus on ymmärretty ohittamattomana vaiheena tiedon hankkimisessa ja koettelemisessa. Toisaalta kokemukseen on liitetty tiettyjä tiedollisia heikkouksia – kontingenssi, tilannesidonnaisuus ja ennakoimattomuus – jotka tieteellinen metodi on eri tavoin pyrkinyt voittamaan. Artikkeli esittää, että 1900-luvun filosofinen hermeneutiikka irrottautuu tästä perinteisestä kokemuksen välineellistämisestä ja alistamisesta korkeammille päämäärille ja keskittyy uudella ja hedelmällisellä tavalla juuri mainittuihin kokemuksen ”vaaroihin”. Hermeneuttisesti ymmärretty kokemus muodostuu äärellisen ihmisen ainutkertaisista kohtaamisista todellisuuden muuttuvan ja ehtymättömän mielekkyyden kanssa – omalle ymmärrykselle vieraan toiseuden ja samalla oman ymmärryksen äärellisyyden ja inhimillisen äärellisyyden kohtaamisesta.
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Artikkeli tarkastelee Lauri Rauhalan (s. 1914) filosofista kädenjälkeä. Se perehdyttää lukijan Rauhalan vuonna 1973 esittelemään situationaalisen säätöpiirin malliin, joka on hänen tuotantonsa tärkeimpiä käsitteellisiä innovaatioita.... more
Artikkeli tarkastelee Lauri Rauhalan (s. 1914) filosofista kädenjälkeä. Se perehdyttää lukijan Rauhalan vuonna 1973 esittelemään situationaalisen säätöpiirin malliin, joka on hänen tuotantonsa tärkeimpiä käsitteellisiä innovaatioita. Artikkeli seuraa myös Rauhalan situationaalisen säätöpiirin taustoja filosofian klassikoista nykypäivän ajattelijoihin.
Martin Heideggerin hiljattain ilmestyneiden ajattelupäiväkirjojen, niin sanottujen mustien vihkojen, neljä ensimmäistä nidettä vuosilta 1931–1948 valottavat uudella tavalla hänen ”olemishistoriallista” tulkintaansa kansallissosialismista,... more
Martin Heideggerin hiljattain ilmestyneiden ajattelupäiväkirjojen, niin sanottujen mustien vihkojen, neljä ensimmäistä nidettä vuosilta 1931–1948 valottavat uudella tavalla hänen ”olemishistoriallista” tulkintaansa kansallissosialismista, totalitarismista ja toisesta maailmansodasta modernin aikakauden huipentumina. Juuri ajankohtaisten ilmiöiden analysointi tekee muistiinpanoista ainutlaatuisen osan Heideggerin tuotantoa. Antisemitistisesti latautuneet näkemykset ”maailmanjuutalaisuudesta” yhtenä äärimodernin ilmenemismuodoista avaavat kuitenkin uuden, ristiriitaisen ja synkeän näkökulman filosofin ajatusmaailmaan.
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Lähtökohtanaan Jean-Paul Vernantin ja Albrecht Dihlen historialliset teesit artikkeli tarkastelee tärkeimpien ”lakia ja järjestystä” ilmaisevien käsitteiden (nomos, dikē) roolia esisokraattisten filosofien, erityisesti Anaksimandroksen,... more
Lähtökohtanaan Jean-Paul Vernantin ja Albrecht Dihlen historialliset teesit artikkeli tarkastelee tärkeimpien ”lakia ja järjestystä” ilmaisevien käsitteiden (nomos, dikē) roolia esisokraattisten filosofien, erityisesti Anaksimandroksen, Herakleitoksen ja Parmenideen, ajattelussa. Arkaaisessa kreikkalaisessa ajatusmaailmassa sekä luonnon että ihmisyhteisön sisäinen tasapaino ilmentää moninaisen jumalmaailman ja ihmisten välistä vuorovaikutusta. Esisokraatikot ajattelevat todellisuutta eriytyneenä ykseytenä, jonka moninaisuutta sitoo yhteen yhtenäinen perusrakenne; tämän mallin uusi filosofia jäsentää uudesta polis-ajattelusta lainattujen käsitteiden avulla. Tämä esisokraatikkojen ”poliittinen ontologia” ja toisaalta nomoksen, yhteisöllisen normiston, enenevä ymmärtäminen inhimillisenä konventiona, mahdollistaa fysiksen ja nomoksen, ”luonnon” ja ”kulttuurin” välisen myöhemmän vastakkainasettelun.
Artikkeli tarkastelee aluksi Hannah Arendtin analyysiä totalitarismin pohjimmiltaan ideologisesta luonteesta ja ideologisen ”idean” olemuksesta. Tätä analyysiä verrataan Alain Badioun yritykseen herättää henkiin ideologinen ”idean... more
Artikkeli tarkastelee aluksi Hannah Arendtin analyysiä totalitarismin pohjimmiltaan ideologisesta luonteesta ja ideologisen ”idean” olemuksesta. Tätä analyysiä verrataan Alain Badioun yritykseen herättää henkiin ideologinen ”idean politiikka”. Artikkelin perusväitteen mukaan sekä Arendt että Badiou näkevät politiikan alueena, jolla uutuus ja ihmisen kyky ryhtyä maailmaa muuttaviin hankkeisiin voivat toteutua. He ymmärtävät kuitenkin poliittisen aktiviteetin muodon olennaisesti eri tavoin: Arendtille politiikka on perusluonteeltaan toimintaa, praksista, Badioulle se on pohjimmiltaan idean tuottamista, poiesista. Tällä on keskeisiä seurauksia heidän politiikkakäsityksilleen. Lopuksi osoitetaan, että Badioun ”ideologinen” ymmärrys politiikasta jää alttiiksi Arendtin peruskritiikille, jonka mukaan politiikan välineellinen ymmärtäminen keinojen ja päämäärien viitekehyksessä on viime kädessä kyvytön sulkemaan pois poliittisen terrorin mahdollisuutta.
Kirjoitus tarkastelee Martin Heideggerin myöhäisajattelussa esiin nousevaa olemisen ainutkertaisuuden (Einzigkeit, Einmaligkeit) teemaa ja sen edelleenkehittelyä Jean-Luc Nancyn ajattelussa. Teeman osoitetaan kytkeytyvän Heideggerin... more
Kirjoitus tarkastelee Martin Heideggerin myöhäisajattelussa esiin nousevaa olemisen ainutkertaisuuden (Einzigkeit, Einmaligkeit) teemaa ja sen edelleenkehittelyä Jean-Luc Nancyn ajattelussa. Teeman osoitetaan kytkeytyvän Heideggerin välienselvittelyyn filosofian esisokraattisen alun, erityisesti Parmenideen ajattelun kanssa. Parmenides ajattelee olemista kaikkia yksittäisiä ilmentymiään, "kuolevaisten" äärellisiä "näkemyksiä" (doksai) yhdistävänä absoluuttisen homogeenisena ja itseidenttisenä ilmeisyytenä (alētheia), todellisuuden puhtaana läsnäolona ajattelulle. Tätä vasten Heidegger ajattelee olemisen nimenomaan yksittäisten ilmentymiensä kontekstuaalisena ainutkertaisuutena, mielekkyystilanteiden ainutkertaistavana kontekstualisoitumisena. Nancy jatkaa ajatusta kuvailemalla olemista "ainutkertaiseksi-monikolliseksi" (singulier pluriel), mutta täydentää Heideggerin ajatteluun tunnetusti jäänyttä aukkoa soveltamalla ajatusta yhteisön ajattelemiseen ainutkertaisuuksien yhdessäolemisena ja keskinäisyytenä. Näin avautuva "ainutkertaisuuden politiikan" teema onkin viime vuosikymmeninä noussut mannermaisen poliittisen ajattelun keskiöön.
Artikkeli toimii johdantona Martin Heideggerin suomennettuun teokseen Johdatus metafysiikkaan. Se avaa historiallisia tilanteita, joissa kyseiset luennot alun perin pidettiin (1935) ja julkaistiin (1953). Johdatus metafysiikkaan... more
Artikkeli toimii johdantona Martin Heideggerin suomennettuun teokseen Johdatus metafysiikkaan. Se avaa historiallisia tilanteita, joissa kyseiset luennot alun perin pidettiin (1935) ja julkaistiin (1953). Johdatus metafysiikkaan -luennoista voidaan löytää epäsuora kuvaus Heideggerin suhteesta kansallissosialismiin hänen rehtorikautensa (1933–1934) jälkeisinä vuosina ja ne dokumentoivat myös filosofian olosuhteita ja ehtoja kansallissosialismin aikana. Filosofisesti luennot kiteyttävät Heideggerin Olemisen ja ajan (1927) jälkeisen käänteen (Kehre) ja esittävät ohjelmallisen luonnoksen Heideggerin myöhäisajattelun tärkeimmistä suuntaviivoista.
Spanish translation of Jussi Backman, "Divine and Mortal Motivation: On the Movement of Life in Aristotle and Heidegger", Continental Philosophy Review 38 (2005): 241-261, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-006-9007-4. Translated by... more
Spanish translation of Jussi Backman, "Divine and Mortal Motivation: On the Movement of Life in Aristotle and Heidegger", Continental Philosophy Review 38 (2005): 241-261, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11007-006-9007-4.
Translated by Fernando Huesca Ramón, translation revised by Jean Orejarena Torres and César Mora Alonso.
Translated by Fernando Huesca Ramón, translation revised by Jean Orejarena Torres and César Mora Alonso.
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Research Interests: Philosophy, Philosophy of Action, Aristotle, Praxis, Continental Philosophy, and 12 moreMartin Heidegger, PHRONESIS, Arendt, Heidegger, Practical Rationality, Nicomachean Ethics, Hannah Arendt, Aristotle's Ethics, Heidegger's later thought, Philosophy of Praxis, Aristotelian Ethics, and Aristotle/Phronesis/Praxis
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Dieser Aufsatz erörtert Heideggers Auffassung vom ‚metaphysischen‘ Charakter des abendländischen Humanismus mittels einer Hervorhebung einiger Grundzüge der Geschichte des philosophischen Bildungsbegriffes. Nach Heidegger sind die... more
Dieser Aufsatz erörtert Heideggers Auffassung vom ‚metaphysischen‘ Charakter des abendländischen Humanismus mittels einer Hervorhebung einiger Grundzüge der Geschichte des philosophischen Bildungsbegriffes. Nach Heidegger sind die Bildungsideale der europäischen Humanismen von den metaphysischen Grundauffassungen vom idealen Sein des Seienden bestimmt. Außerdem ist für Heidegger der Bildungsbegriff mit der Tradition der Bildmetaphysik – sowohl mit der platonisch-christlichen Vorstellung des Menschen als Abbild eines göttlichen Vorbilds als auch mit der neuzeitlich-subjektivistischen ‚Eroberung der Welt als Bild‘ – verbunden. Schließlich wird die Möglichkeit eines Heideggerschen nachmetaphysischen, nicht mehr ‚idealistischen‘ Bildungsbegriffes mit Rücksicht auf seinen späteren Begriff des ‚Wohnens‘ behandelt.
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Dieser Aufsatz, der sich den Interpretationen u. a. von Robert Bernasconi, Jacques Taminiaux und Franco Volpi anschließt, betrachtet Heideggers „Wiederholung“ der praktischen Philosophie des Aristoteles als eine Radikalisierung des... more
Dieser Aufsatz, der sich den Interpretationen u. a. von Robert Bernasconi, Jacques Taminiaux und Franco Volpi anschließt, betrachtet Heideggers „Wiederholung“ der praktischen Philosophie des Aristoteles als eine Radikalisierung des aristotelischen Begriffs des Handelns (praxis). Die moderne „Not des Wohnens“ erweist sich als ein Ergebnis der Unterordnung der Endlichkeit und Zeitlichkeit des menschlichen Handelns in der abendländischen philosophischen Tradition unter die metaphysischen und theologischen Ideale, die aus dem anfänglichen Verständnis der Seiendheit als beständiger Anwesenheit (ousia) hervorgehen. Die Grundform dieser Unterordnung ist die aristotelische Auslegung der reinen praxis als eine „übermenschlich“ selbstgenügsame Betrachtung ohne äußere Zwecke. Die Behandlung der praktischen „Besinnung“ (phronesis) in der Nikomachischen Ethik bietet jedoch eine Einsicht in die endliche und situationsbedingte Verfassung der eigentlich menschlichen Selbstverwirklichung. Die Lektüre der Nikomachischen Ethik in Heideggers Marburger Vorlesung über Platons Sophistes kann als der Ausgangspunkt für die Geschichte des tätigen Lebens in Hannah Arendts Vita activa angesehen werden. Gleichwohl gliedert Arendt die geschichtliche Entwicklung der praxis ausdrücklicher als Heidegger auf und bedenkt auch, was bei Heidegger weitgehend ungedacht bleibt: den politischen Charakter der ursprünglichen praxis und das apolitische Wesen der Philosophie.
Research Interests: Philosophy, Philosophy of Action, Aristotle, Praxis, Continental Philosophy, and 19 moreMartin Heidegger, PHRONESIS, Arendt, Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, Practical Rationality, Nicomachean Ethics, Hannah Arendt, Aristotle's Ethics, Heidegger's later thought, Philosophie, Philosophy of Praxis, Antike Philosophie, Aristoteles, Aristotelian Ethics, Handlungstheorie, Praktische Philosophie, Aristotle/Phronesis/Praxis, and Later Heidegger(Martin Heidegger, PHRONESIS, Arendt, Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, Practical Rationality, Nicomachean Ethics, Hannah Arendt, Aristotle's Ethics, Heidegger's later thought, Philosophie, Philosophy of Praxis, Antike Philosophie, Aristoteles, Aristotelian Ethics, Handlungstheorie, Praktische Philosophie, Aristotle/Phronesis/Praxis, and Later Heidegger)
(Martin Heidegger, PHRONESIS, Arendt, Ancient Philosophy, Heidegger, Practical Rationality, Nicomachean Ethics, Hannah Arendt, Aristotle's Ethics, Heidegger's later thought, Philosophie, Philosophy of Praxis, Antike Philosophie, Aristoteles, Aristotelian Ethics, Handlungstheorie, Praktische Philosophie, Aristotle/Phronesis/Praxis, and Later Heidegger)
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Research Interests:
Book review of Fredrik Westerlund, Heidegger and the Problem of Phenomena (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020).
https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/heidegger-and-the-problem-of-phenomena/
https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/heidegger-and-the-problem-of-phenomena/
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Book review of Esa Kirkkopelto, Logomimesis: tutkielma esiintyvästä ruumiista (Tutkijaliitto, 2020)
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Presentation at Tampere IAS Society Cluster research workshop, May 2, 2024.
Research Interests:
Invited talk at Narrare Seminar, Tampere University, April 10, 2024. https://research.tuni.fi/narrare/news/nss4/. At the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama presented his provocative thesis of liberal democracy as an “end of... more
Invited talk at Narrare Seminar, Tampere University, April 10, 2024. https://research.tuni.fi/narrare/news/nss4/.
At the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama presented his provocative thesis of liberal democracy as an “end of history,” as the culmination of political history in a system of maximal freedom and mutual recognition. Fukuyama invokes the teleological philosophy of history of Hegel, Marx, and Alexandre Kojève that sees the historical process as fueled by intellectual, social, and economic contradictions whose ultimate resolution will remove the driving force behind substantial historical transformations. Fukuyama’s thesis contrasted conspicuously with Jean-François Lyotard’s equally provocative 1979 diagnosis of the ongoing loss of credibility of grand “metanarratives” – post-Hegelian teleological and totalizing narratives of universal history – as a result of the increasing fragmentation of knowledge. Instead of an end of history, Lyotard predicts the end of History as a universal narrative and its replacement by “small narratives” or micronarratives – local histories whose limited scopes accommodate the existence of other, incommensurate narratives. In the light of Heideggerian and Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics and Foucauldian discursive genealogy, micronarratives can here be understood as a heuristic, temporary, and situated narrative interpretations that are never total or definitive, but are constantly being renarrated for the changing purposes of changing presents.
I suggest that the dispute between grand and small narratives of history is an ongoing one and an aspect of the wider complex conflict between the legacies of the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment. The primarily theoretical and intellectual conflict has a central and volatile political dimension. While the critique of totalizing metanarratives has typically been seen as an emancipatory critique and can be connected to Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the structure of totalitarian ideology, it has in recent decades been associated with “post-truth” phenomena and has also been increasingly appropriated by radical-conservative and “ethnopluralistic” ideologists such as Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin. An example of an opposite but no less controversial historical narrative strategy is Steven Pinker’s recent rehabilitation and vindication of Enlightenment universal progress narratives.
At the end of the Cold War, Francis Fukuyama presented his provocative thesis of liberal democracy as an “end of history,” as the culmination of political history in a system of maximal freedom and mutual recognition. Fukuyama invokes the teleological philosophy of history of Hegel, Marx, and Alexandre Kojève that sees the historical process as fueled by intellectual, social, and economic contradictions whose ultimate resolution will remove the driving force behind substantial historical transformations. Fukuyama’s thesis contrasted conspicuously with Jean-François Lyotard’s equally provocative 1979 diagnosis of the ongoing loss of credibility of grand “metanarratives” – post-Hegelian teleological and totalizing narratives of universal history – as a result of the increasing fragmentation of knowledge. Instead of an end of history, Lyotard predicts the end of History as a universal narrative and its replacement by “small narratives” or micronarratives – local histories whose limited scopes accommodate the existence of other, incommensurate narratives. In the light of Heideggerian and Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics and Foucauldian discursive genealogy, micronarratives can here be understood as a heuristic, temporary, and situated narrative interpretations that are never total or definitive, but are constantly being renarrated for the changing purposes of changing presents.
I suggest that the dispute between grand and small narratives of history is an ongoing one and an aspect of the wider complex conflict between the legacies of the Enlightenment and the Counter-Enlightenment. The primarily theoretical and intellectual conflict has a central and volatile political dimension. While the critique of totalizing metanarratives has typically been seen as an emancipatory critique and can be connected to Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the structure of totalitarian ideology, it has in recent decades been associated with “post-truth” phenomena and has also been increasingly appropriated by radical-conservative and “ethnopluralistic” ideologists such as Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin. An example of an opposite but no less controversial historical narrative strategy is Steven Pinker’s recent rehabilitation and vindication of Enlightenment universal progress narratives.
Research Interests:
Invited talk at the 45th annual conference of the Phenomenological Association of Japan, Meiji University, Tokyo, Oct. 29, 2023.
Research Interests:
Invited talk at the Philosophy Research Seminar, Tampere University, September 28, 2023. The terms “biopower” and “biopolitics” were famously used by Michel Foucault in the 1970s and 1980s to describe the intensifying tendency of modern... more
Invited talk at the Philosophy Research Seminar, Tampere University, September 28, 2023.
The terms “biopower” and “biopolitics” were famously used by Michel Foucault in the 1970s and 1980s to describe the intensifying tendency of modern political governments to view and control their citizens as members of a biological population, with a focus on health, reproduction, and genetic, in some cases even eugenic, considerations. For Foucault, biopolitical government was primarily a modern phenomenon connected to the emergence of industrial capitalism and modern human sciences and biosciences. However, several later commentators have argued that biopolitical tendencies are in fact characteristic of the entire history of Western political thought and political technology since antiquity.
In my talk, I approach the question of the history and origin of biopolitics by looking not at specific political techniques but rather at political ideals, theoretical notions of the final aim of the political community. I acknowledge that it is undeniable that biopolitical techniques and means of control existed already in Greek antiquity and ancient and medieval political thought. However, I argue that the “happiness” (Greek eudaimonia, Latin beatitudo) that constitutes the greatest human good and the ultimate end of polities in the Aristotelian tradition is not a “biopolitical” ideal, but rather a “metabiopolitical” one, consisting in a contemplative activity situated above and beyond the biological as well as the political levels of human existence. This ideal persists through the medieval tradition of Aristotelian thought.
It is only in modernity that this classical ideal of happiness is fundamentally challenged and transformed; as Hannah Arendt puts it, in Western modernity, mere being alive comes to be seen as the greatest human good, and happiness gradually begins to be understood as a subjective “quality of life.” This is particularly evident in Thomas Hobbes, who denies the validity of the Aristotelian ideal of a supreme human good and insists that the end of the political commonwealth is rather to preserve citizens from the supreme evil, namely, violent death. This “biopolitical” understanding of the end of political government as mere preservation of life leads Hobbes to identify civic happiness with “commodious living,” that is, with the liberty to privately pursue one’s private goals and to thus seek a maximal quality of life. John Locke echoes Hobbes by equating happiness with maximal subjective pleasure, which different for different persons; the purpose of the commonwealth is the preservation of life for the pursuit of whatever one’s individual happiness may consist in.
I conclude by noting that in both the Aristotelian “metabiopolitical” and the Hobbesian “biopolitical” paradigms, the political realm is ultimately seen as a means to an end that itself is situated outside the realm of politics. Hannah Arendt draws our attention to a neglected third alternative: an ideal of “public happiness” consisting in political participation itself.
The terms “biopower” and “biopolitics” were famously used by Michel Foucault in the 1970s and 1980s to describe the intensifying tendency of modern political governments to view and control their citizens as members of a biological population, with a focus on health, reproduction, and genetic, in some cases even eugenic, considerations. For Foucault, biopolitical government was primarily a modern phenomenon connected to the emergence of industrial capitalism and modern human sciences and biosciences. However, several later commentators have argued that biopolitical tendencies are in fact characteristic of the entire history of Western political thought and political technology since antiquity.
In my talk, I approach the question of the history and origin of biopolitics by looking not at specific political techniques but rather at political ideals, theoretical notions of the final aim of the political community. I acknowledge that it is undeniable that biopolitical techniques and means of control existed already in Greek antiquity and ancient and medieval political thought. However, I argue that the “happiness” (Greek eudaimonia, Latin beatitudo) that constitutes the greatest human good and the ultimate end of polities in the Aristotelian tradition is not a “biopolitical” ideal, but rather a “metabiopolitical” one, consisting in a contemplative activity situated above and beyond the biological as well as the political levels of human existence. This ideal persists through the medieval tradition of Aristotelian thought.
It is only in modernity that this classical ideal of happiness is fundamentally challenged and transformed; as Hannah Arendt puts it, in Western modernity, mere being alive comes to be seen as the greatest human good, and happiness gradually begins to be understood as a subjective “quality of life.” This is particularly evident in Thomas Hobbes, who denies the validity of the Aristotelian ideal of a supreme human good and insists that the end of the political commonwealth is rather to preserve citizens from the supreme evil, namely, violent death. This “biopolitical” understanding of the end of political government as mere preservation of life leads Hobbes to identify civic happiness with “commodious living,” that is, with the liberty to privately pursue one’s private goals and to thus seek a maximal quality of life. John Locke echoes Hobbes by equating happiness with maximal subjective pleasure, which different for different persons; the purpose of the commonwealth is the preservation of life for the pursuit of whatever one’s individual happiness may consist in.
I conclude by noting that in both the Aristotelian “metabiopolitical” and the Hobbesian “biopolitical” paradigms, the political realm is ultimately seen as a means to an end that itself is situated outside the realm of politics. Hannah Arendt draws our attention to a neglected third alternative: an ideal of “public happiness” consisting in political participation itself.
Research Interests: Aristotle, Hobbes, Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes, Thomas Aquinas, and 15 moreMichel Foucault, Happiness, Arendt, Biopolitics, John Locke, Biopower, Hannah Arendt, Aristotle's Ethics, Happiness and Well Being, Aristotle's Politics, Biopower and Biopolitics, Eudaimonia, John Locke's Political Philosophy, Foucault, and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
Paper at the annual conference of the Finnish Political Science Association, University of Jyväskylä, May 11, 2023. The Septuagint translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek since the third century BCE required the readaptation of Greek... more
Paper at the annual conference of the Finnish Political Science Association, University of Jyväskylä, May 11, 2023.
The Septuagint translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek since the third century BCE required the readaptation of Greek terms to transmit theological concepts foreign to the Greek mythological and philosophical traditions to the Hellenistic world. One such concept was the notion of divine creation that had become central in Second Temple Judaism. While the verb poieō, “to make, to produce,” was often used, in certain contexts the Septuagint uses the verb ktizō, which originally signifies “to inhabit, to settle (a land or place)” and later “to found, to establish, to institute (a city,polity, or institution).” Philo of Alexandria (De opificio mundi) compares the act of creation to the founding of a new city (polis) by a ruler with sovereign power (autokratēs exousia), and contrasts this with the Platonic model of the divine Demiurge, who works on the basis of pre-existing models and materials. I examine these special political connotations of ktizō (“to create”) and ktisis (“creation”) and argue that the use of these terms seeks to emphasize the absolute novelty of the act of creation and the absolute sovereignty of the creator’s will.
The Septuagint translation of the Hebrew Bible into Greek since the third century BCE required the readaptation of Greek terms to transmit theological concepts foreign to the Greek mythological and philosophical traditions to the Hellenistic world. One such concept was the notion of divine creation that had become central in Second Temple Judaism. While the verb poieō, “to make, to produce,” was often used, in certain contexts the Septuagint uses the verb ktizō, which originally signifies “to inhabit, to settle (a land or place)” and later “to found, to establish, to institute (a city,polity, or institution).” Philo of Alexandria (De opificio mundi) compares the act of creation to the founding of a new city (polis) by a ruler with sovereign power (autokratēs exousia), and contrasts this with the Platonic model of the divine Demiurge, who works on the basis of pre-existing models and materials. I examine these special political connotations of ktizō (“to create”) and ktisis (“creation”) and argue that the use of these terms seeks to emphasize the absolute novelty of the act of creation and the absolute sovereignty of the creator’s will.
Research Interests:
Invited talk, United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain, UAE, April 25, 2023. The terms “biopower” and “biopolitics” were famously used by Michel Foucault in the 1970s and 1980s to describe the intensifying tendency of modern political... more
Invited talk, United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain, UAE, April 25, 2023.
The terms “biopower” and “biopolitics” were famously used by Michel Foucault in the 1970s and 1980s to describe the intensifying tendency of modern political governments to view and control their citizens as members of a biological population, with a focus on health, reproduction, and genetic, in some cases even eugenic, considerations. For Foucault, biopolitical government was primarily a modern phenomenon connected to the emergence of industrial capitalism and modern human sciences and biosciences. However, several later commentators have argued that biopolitical tendencies are in fact characteristic of the entire history of Western political thought and political technology since antiquity.
In my talk, I approach the question of the history and origin of biopolitics by looking not at specific political techniques but rather at political ideals, theoretical notions of the final aim of the political community. I acknowledge that it is undeniable that biopolitical techniques and means of control existed already in Greek antiquity and ancient and medieval political thought. However, I argue that the “happiness” (Greek eudaimonia, Latin beatitudo) that constitutes the greatest human good and the ultimate end of polities in the Aristotelian tradition is not a “biopolitical” ideal, but rather a “metabiopolitical” one, consisting in a contemplative activity situated above and beyond the biological as well as the political levels of human existence. This ideal persists through the medieval tradition of Aristotelian thought. It is only in modernity that this classical ideal of happiness is fundamentally challenged and transformed; as Hannah Arendt puts it, in Western modernity, mere being alive comes to be seen as the greatest human good, and happiness gradually begins to be understood as a subjective “quality of life.” I show that this is particularly evident in Thomas Hobbes, who denies the validity of the Aristotelian ideal of a supreme human good and insists that the end of the political commonwealth is rather to preserve citizens from the supreme evil, namely, violent death. This “biopolitical” understanding of the end of political government as mere preservation of life leads Hobbes to identify civic happiness with “commodious living,” that is, with the liberty to privately pursue one’s private goals and to thus seek a maximal quality of life.
I conclude by noting that in both the Aristotelian “metabiopolitical” and the Hobbesian “biopolitical” paradigms, the political realm is ultimately seen as a means to an end that itself is situated outside the realm of politics. Hannah Arendt draws our attention to a neglected third alternative: an ideal of “public happiness” consisting in political participation itself.
The terms “biopower” and “biopolitics” were famously used by Michel Foucault in the 1970s and 1980s to describe the intensifying tendency of modern political governments to view and control their citizens as members of a biological population, with a focus on health, reproduction, and genetic, in some cases even eugenic, considerations. For Foucault, biopolitical government was primarily a modern phenomenon connected to the emergence of industrial capitalism and modern human sciences and biosciences. However, several later commentators have argued that biopolitical tendencies are in fact characteristic of the entire history of Western political thought and political technology since antiquity.
In my talk, I approach the question of the history and origin of biopolitics by looking not at specific political techniques but rather at political ideals, theoretical notions of the final aim of the political community. I acknowledge that it is undeniable that biopolitical techniques and means of control existed already in Greek antiquity and ancient and medieval political thought. However, I argue that the “happiness” (Greek eudaimonia, Latin beatitudo) that constitutes the greatest human good and the ultimate end of polities in the Aristotelian tradition is not a “biopolitical” ideal, but rather a “metabiopolitical” one, consisting in a contemplative activity situated above and beyond the biological as well as the political levels of human existence. This ideal persists through the medieval tradition of Aristotelian thought. It is only in modernity that this classical ideal of happiness is fundamentally challenged and transformed; as Hannah Arendt puts it, in Western modernity, mere being alive comes to be seen as the greatest human good, and happiness gradually begins to be understood as a subjective “quality of life.” I show that this is particularly evident in Thomas Hobbes, who denies the validity of the Aristotelian ideal of a supreme human good and insists that the end of the political commonwealth is rather to preserve citizens from the supreme evil, namely, violent death. This “biopolitical” understanding of the end of political government as mere preservation of life leads Hobbes to identify civic happiness with “commodious living,” that is, with the liberty to privately pursue one’s private goals and to thus seek a maximal quality of life.
I conclude by noting that in both the Aristotelian “metabiopolitical” and the Hobbesian “biopolitical” paradigms, the political realm is ultimately seen as a means to an end that itself is situated outside the realm of politics. Hannah Arendt draws our attention to a neglected third alternative: an ideal of “public happiness” consisting in political participation itself.
Research Interests: Hobbes, Thomas Hobbes, Michel Foucault, Happiness, Arendt, and 11 moreBiopolitics, Ancient social & political philosophy, Biopower, Hannah Arendt, Happiness and Well Being, Aristotle's Politics, Biopower and Biopolitics, Ancient Political Thought, Philosophy of Happiness, History of Political Thought (Ancient and Modern), and Foucault
This is an overview of the first part of a book on the conceptual history of creativity. It looks at the emergence of the philosophical and theological concepts of creation (Greek ktisis, Latin creatio) in antiquity. I argue that three... more
This is an overview of the first part of a book on the conceptual history of creativity. It looks at the emergence of the philosophical and theological concepts of creation (Greek ktisis, Latin creatio) in antiquity. I argue that three key phases of conceptual transformation can be distinguished here:
(1) The emergence of the creation narratives of the Hebrew Bible, dated by most scholars to the postexilic period of the development of Second Temple Judaism in the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. The new focus on the theology of creation is closely linked to the development of Jewish monotheism in the full sense of the word and its new universalistic dimensions. This theology is transmitted to the wider Hellenistic world by the Greek Septuagint translation of the Hebrew Bible since the third century BCE.
(2) While actual creation myths are largely absent from traditional Greek cosmogony and theogony, the gradual emergence of teleological conceptions of nature in Greek philosophy from Anaxagoras and Empedocles to Diogenes of Apollonia and Socrates makes the notion of intelligent divine design relevant in a novel manner. This approach culminates in Plato’s Timaeus, a rational reconstruction of the design and ordering of the cosmos by the divine Demiurge, on the basis of pre-existing ideal forms and chaotic materiality. This model and its many reinterpretations had a determining influence on the Platonic tradition and Stoicism as well as the earliest Christian theology (Athenagoras of Athens, Justin the Martyr).
(3) The emergence in the second century CE (Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian) of the theological doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, creation from nothing, which denies the pre-existence of matter and interprets the ideal forms as thoughts of the creator. This radical concept of creation, which as such does not appear in the Hebrew Bible or the New Testament, was partly motivated by the need to resist Gnostic ideas of the material world as inherently evil; its focus on the absolute novelty of creation is the basis for the modern concept of creativity.
(1) The emergence of the creation narratives of the Hebrew Bible, dated by most scholars to the postexilic period of the development of Second Temple Judaism in the sixth and fifth centuries BCE. The new focus on the theology of creation is closely linked to the development of Jewish monotheism in the full sense of the word and its new universalistic dimensions. This theology is transmitted to the wider Hellenistic world by the Greek Septuagint translation of the Hebrew Bible since the third century BCE.
(2) While actual creation myths are largely absent from traditional Greek cosmogony and theogony, the gradual emergence of teleological conceptions of nature in Greek philosophy from Anaxagoras and Empedocles to Diogenes of Apollonia and Socrates makes the notion of intelligent divine design relevant in a novel manner. This approach culminates in Plato’s Timaeus, a rational reconstruction of the design and ordering of the cosmos by the divine Demiurge, on the basis of pre-existing ideal forms and chaotic materiality. This model and its many reinterpretations had a determining influence on the Platonic tradition and Stoicism as well as the earliest Christian theology (Athenagoras of Athens, Justin the Martyr).
(3) The emergence in the second century CE (Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian) of the theological doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, creation from nothing, which denies the pre-existence of matter and interprets the ideal forms as thoughts of the creator. This radical concept of creation, which as such does not appear in the Hebrew Bible or the New Testament, was partly motivated by the need to resist Gnostic ideas of the material world as inherently evil; its focus on the absolute novelty of creation is the basis for the modern concept of creativity.
Research Interests: Creativity, Early Christianity, Second Temple Judaism, Septuagint, Philo of Alexandria, and 12 moreBook of Genesis, Plato and Platonism, Doctrine of Creation, Conceptual History, Platonism, Genesis 1-11, Plato's Timaeus, Creation myths, Creation, Historical Theology/Church History: Early Christianity, Theology of Creation, and Second Temple Judaism and Early Christianity
Online lecture with Antonio Cimino on biopolitics and ancient thought, The Paideia Institute, New York, February 9, 2023 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0CRQS2PtFYg) Following up on the introductory talk by Antonio Cimino, I briefly... more
Online lecture with Antonio Cimino on biopolitics and ancient thought, The Paideia Institute, New York, February 9, 2023 (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0CRQS2PtFYg)
Following up on the introductory talk by Antonio Cimino, I briefly discuss biopolitics as 1) a “political technology,” as governmental techniques aimed at controlling citizens as members of a biological population, with a special focus on their health, reproduction, and mortality, and involving genetic, sometimes even eugenic, considerations; and as 2) an ideal of political theory in which the ultimate aim and purpose of the political community and the political government is to enhance the biological life-process of the population, and which understands the civic “happiness” of the population in terms of a biologized “quality of life.” As many commentators have shown, it is evident that biopolitics in the first sense of a governmental technique existed in antiquity and was also an important facet of ancient and medieval political theory in Plato, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas. However, I argue that biopolitics as a political ideal is a modern phenomenon that properly emerges with Thomas Hobbes. In ancient and medieval political theory, the ultimate purpose of the polity – supreme human happiness – was situated on a level above and beyond the human biological life-process.
Following up on the introductory talk by Antonio Cimino, I briefly discuss biopolitics as 1) a “political technology,” as governmental techniques aimed at controlling citizens as members of a biological population, with a special focus on their health, reproduction, and mortality, and involving genetic, sometimes even eugenic, considerations; and as 2) an ideal of political theory in which the ultimate aim and purpose of the political community and the political government is to enhance the biological life-process of the population, and which understands the civic “happiness” of the population in terms of a biologized “quality of life.” As many commentators have shown, it is evident that biopolitics in the first sense of a governmental technique existed in antiquity and was also an important facet of ancient and medieval political theory in Plato, Aristotle, and Thomas Aquinas. However, I argue that biopolitics as a political ideal is a modern phenomenon that properly emerges with Thomas Hobbes. In ancient and medieval political theory, the ultimate purpose of the polity – supreme human happiness – was situated on a level above and beyond the human biological life-process.
Research Interests:
Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen vuosikollokvio Menneisyys. Tulevaisuus. Filosofia., Oulun yliopisto, 9.6.2022. Francis Fukuyama herätti kylmän sodan jälkeen laajaa ärtymystä teesillään liberaalista demokratiasta ”historian loppuna”, joka... more
Suomen Filosofisen Yhdistyksen vuosikollokvio Menneisyys. Tulevaisuus. Filosofia., Oulun yliopisto, 9.6.2022.
Francis Fukuyama herätti kylmän sodan jälkeen laajaa ärtymystä teesillään liberaalista demokratiasta ”historian loppuna”, joka on osoittautumassa koko ihmiskunnan poliittisen historian päätepisteeksi, vapauden ja keskinäisen kunnioituksen huipentumaksi. Fukuyama viittaa teesillään G. W. F. Hegelin, Karl Marxin ja Alexandre Kojèven teleologiseen ajatusperinteeseen, jossa historian moottorina nähdään erilaiset ajatukselliset, yhteiskunnalliset tai taloudelliset ristiriidat, jotka lopulta raukeavat jännitteettömään loppuratkaisuun, jolloin myös sisällöllisen historiallisen muutoksen perusdynamiikka häviää. Hegeliläinen historianfilosofia on modernin idealismin tuote, mutta se juontaa juurensa kristilliseen luomisesta viimeiseen tuomioon etenevään pelastushistoriaan ensimmäisenä aidosti universaalina kehityskertomuksena.
Vastaavaa ärtymystä herätti Jean-François Lyotardin kymmenisen vuotta aikaisemmin esittämä analyysi jälkimodernista ajasta tilanteena, jossa suuret ”metakertomukset” menettävät uskottavuutensa. Metakertomuksilla Lyotard viittasi juuri hegeliläisiin historianfilosofisiin narratiiveihin, joissa historia näyttäytyy universaalina teleologisena kehityskulkuna; tiedon etenevä fragmentoituminen vie Lyotardin mukaan yhtenäisiltä metakertomuksilta pohjan. Hegeliläinen historian loppu kääntyy universaalihistorian lopuksi ja korvautumiseksi ”pienillä kertomuksilla”, paikallisilla historioilla, joille toisten, yhteismitattomien kertomusten olemassaolo ei ole ongelma.
Esitelmä tarkastelee ajatusta universaalihistorian jälkeisestä pienten kertomusten ajasta Martin Heideggerin ja Hans-Georg Gadamerin filosofisen hermeneutiikan valossa. Hermeneutiikka hyväksyy Hegelin ajatuksen ajattelun ja kulttuurin historiallisuudesta ja muuttuvuudesta ja myös sen, että historia kerrotaan aina lopustaan käsin. Se kuitenkin hylkää hegeliläisen teleologian taustalla olevan ajatuksen absoluuttisesta tiedosta, loppuun saakka kehittyneestä ja täydellisen (itse)tietoisesta näkökulmasta, jolla ei ole enää ulkopuolta. Ajattelumme nykytila on historiallisen perinteensä kehityksen muovaama emmekä katso tuota kehitystä objektiivisesti tai neutraalisti vaan aina nykytilanteesta käsin, mutta nykytilanteen näkökulma on olennaisesti äärellinen ja kontekstisidonnainen. Itseymmärryksemme edellyttää, että yritämme muodostaa historiastamme johdonmukaisen kertomuksen, joka kaikkien kertomusten tapaan kerrotaan lopustaan käsin – mutta samalla on hyväksyttävä, että tämä kertomus on nykytilannetta palveleva heuristinen väline, joka voidaan kertoa toisin ja tullaan kertomaan toisin. Voimme kertoa menneisyytemme, emme tulevaisuutta. Hermeneuttisella ajatuksella historian kerronnallisesta tilannesidonnaisuudesta on ollut keskeinen vaikutus Hayden Whiten ja Paul Ricœurin kaltaisten teoreetikkojen edustamaan historianfilosofian ”narratiiviseen käänteeseen” ja myös Michel Foucault’n diskurssihistoriallisiin genealogioihin, jotka palvelevat viime kädessä ”oman itsemme kriittistä ontologiaa”.
Francis Fukuyama herätti kylmän sodan jälkeen laajaa ärtymystä teesillään liberaalista demokratiasta ”historian loppuna”, joka on osoittautumassa koko ihmiskunnan poliittisen historian päätepisteeksi, vapauden ja keskinäisen kunnioituksen huipentumaksi. Fukuyama viittaa teesillään G. W. F. Hegelin, Karl Marxin ja Alexandre Kojèven teleologiseen ajatusperinteeseen, jossa historian moottorina nähdään erilaiset ajatukselliset, yhteiskunnalliset tai taloudelliset ristiriidat, jotka lopulta raukeavat jännitteettömään loppuratkaisuun, jolloin myös sisällöllisen historiallisen muutoksen perusdynamiikka häviää. Hegeliläinen historianfilosofia on modernin idealismin tuote, mutta se juontaa juurensa kristilliseen luomisesta viimeiseen tuomioon etenevään pelastushistoriaan ensimmäisenä aidosti universaalina kehityskertomuksena.
Vastaavaa ärtymystä herätti Jean-François Lyotardin kymmenisen vuotta aikaisemmin esittämä analyysi jälkimodernista ajasta tilanteena, jossa suuret ”metakertomukset” menettävät uskottavuutensa. Metakertomuksilla Lyotard viittasi juuri hegeliläisiin historianfilosofisiin narratiiveihin, joissa historia näyttäytyy universaalina teleologisena kehityskulkuna; tiedon etenevä fragmentoituminen vie Lyotardin mukaan yhtenäisiltä metakertomuksilta pohjan. Hegeliläinen historian loppu kääntyy universaalihistorian lopuksi ja korvautumiseksi ”pienillä kertomuksilla”, paikallisilla historioilla, joille toisten, yhteismitattomien kertomusten olemassaolo ei ole ongelma.
Esitelmä tarkastelee ajatusta universaalihistorian jälkeisestä pienten kertomusten ajasta Martin Heideggerin ja Hans-Georg Gadamerin filosofisen hermeneutiikan valossa. Hermeneutiikka hyväksyy Hegelin ajatuksen ajattelun ja kulttuurin historiallisuudesta ja muuttuvuudesta ja myös sen, että historia kerrotaan aina lopustaan käsin. Se kuitenkin hylkää hegeliläisen teleologian taustalla olevan ajatuksen absoluuttisesta tiedosta, loppuun saakka kehittyneestä ja täydellisen (itse)tietoisesta näkökulmasta, jolla ei ole enää ulkopuolta. Ajattelumme nykytila on historiallisen perinteensä kehityksen muovaama emmekä katso tuota kehitystä objektiivisesti tai neutraalisti vaan aina nykytilanteesta käsin, mutta nykytilanteen näkökulma on olennaisesti äärellinen ja kontekstisidonnainen. Itseymmärryksemme edellyttää, että yritämme muodostaa historiastamme johdonmukaisen kertomuksen, joka kaikkien kertomusten tapaan kerrotaan lopustaan käsin – mutta samalla on hyväksyttävä, että tämä kertomus on nykytilannetta palveleva heuristinen väline, joka voidaan kertoa toisin ja tullaan kertomaan toisin. Voimme kertoa menneisyytemme, emme tulevaisuutta. Hermeneuttisella ajatuksella historian kerronnallisesta tilannesidonnaisuudesta on ollut keskeinen vaikutus Hayden Whiten ja Paul Ricœurin kaltaisten teoreetikkojen edustamaan historianfilosofian ”narratiiviseen käänteeseen” ja myös Michel Foucault’n diskurssihistoriallisiin genealogioihin, jotka palvelevat viime kädessä ”oman itsemme kriittistä ontologiaa”.
15th annual meeting of the Comparative and Continental Philosophy Circle, Tallinn University, May 14, 2022.
Research Interests:
18th annual conference of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology, Södertörn University, Stockholm
Research Interests:
UNR Symposium on the Soul, University of Nevada, Reno (online symposium), April 1, 2022 I argue that the visual paradigms and metaphors permeating Platonic metaphysics can be regarded as the result of a synthesis of the approaches of... more
UNR Symposium on the Soul, University of Nevada, Reno (online symposium), April 1, 2022
I argue that the visual paradigms and metaphors permeating Platonic metaphysics can be regarded as the result of a synthesis of the approaches of Heraclitus and Parmenides. In pre-Platonic thought, the visual paradigm is still marginal. For Heraclitus, the basic structure of being is its discursive articulation (logos) into conceptual pairs of binary opposites, an articulation that at the same time binds differences together into a tensional unity. The fundamental grasping of this ultimate unity-in-difference is conceived primarily through acoustic terms as a non-sensory “hearing”; in Heraclitus, we thus find a primarily auditory epistemological paradigm. For Parmenides, by contrast, the ultimate unity of contraries is based on the capacity of thinking (noos) to intend anything as present; in fragment B 4, the exclusive relationship of thinking to intelligible presence is finally visualized in terms of a seeing or looking (leussō). This, I claim, is where a visual paradigm initially emerges.
I argue that the visual paradigms and metaphors permeating Platonic metaphysics can be regarded as the result of a synthesis of the approaches of Heraclitus and Parmenides. In pre-Platonic thought, the visual paradigm is still marginal. For Heraclitus, the basic structure of being is its discursive articulation (logos) into conceptual pairs of binary opposites, an articulation that at the same time binds differences together into a tensional unity. The fundamental grasping of this ultimate unity-in-difference is conceived primarily through acoustic terms as a non-sensory “hearing”; in Heraclitus, we thus find a primarily auditory epistemological paradigm. For Parmenides, by contrast, the ultimate unity of contraries is based on the capacity of thinking (noos) to intend anything as present; in fragment B 4, the exclusive relationship of thinking to intelligible presence is finally visualized in terms of a seeing or looking (leussō). This, I claim, is where a visual paradigm initially emerges.
July 12, 2021. Panel: Conservative Dispositions in Continental Thought: From Post-Revolutionary France to the Resurgence of Nationalism in the Twenty-First Century. International Political Science Association (IPSA) 2021, 26th World... more
July 12, 2021.
Panel: Conservative Dispositions in Continental Thought: From Post-Revolutionary France to the Resurgence of Nationalism in the Twenty-First Century.
International Political Science Association (IPSA) 2021, 26th World Congress of Political Science, virtual conference. https://wc2021.ipsa.org/wc/panel/conservative-dispositions-continental-thought-post-revolutionary-france-resurgence.
Aleksandr Dugin has recently characterized Martin Heidegger as the key philosopher of the German “conservative revolution” of the Weimar era; Pierre Bourdieu and Göran Dahl have described Heidegger as a “radical conservative.” The paper will examine this “right Heideggerian” reading—contrasted with a “left Heideggerian” tradition— by tracing radical-conservative features in Heidegger’s work and by looking at the significance of Heidegger for two of the most influential theorists of contemporary radical conservatism, Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin.
According to the historical narrative of the later Heidegger, the Western metaphysical tradition culminates in the modern technological domination and homogenization of reality, which, however, opens up the possibility of a post-metaphysical, post-modern “other beginning” of Western thinking, involving a profound rethinking of the Greek beginning of philosophy. This idea of a cyclic movement through which nihilistic modernity is overcome by letting modernity radicalize and culminate itself, which allows us to turn back to the roots of our tradition in a novel sense, is indeed analogous to the basic model of a “conservative revolution.” In Heidegger’s work of the 1930s and 1940s, especially in his recently published Black Notebooks, we encounter the national and cultural particularism of the German conservative tradition. Heidegger’s view of Nazi biological racism as an extreme avatar of modern technicity alongside liberalism and Bolshevism presents him as a radical conservative rather than a committed National Socialist. '
De Benoist, the key figure of the French Nouvelle Droite, is particularly inspired by Heidegger’s account of late modern technological nihilism, its historical roots and different manifestations. He makes use of this account in his attack on the universalism, subjectivism, and absolutism he sees as underlying the Western human rights doctrine and in the formulation of his own culturally particularistic “ethnopluralism” and “ethnoregionalism.” De Benoist’s Russian collaborator Dugin, sometimes perceived as a“chief ideologue of Putinism,” bases his polemic against the Western liberal hegemony and his conservative “fourth political theory” on the legacy of the German conservative revolution, particularly Heidegger’s philosophy of history and Carl Schmitt’s geopolitical particularism, and on the Russian tradition of Eurasianism.
Panel: Conservative Dispositions in Continental Thought: From Post-Revolutionary France to the Resurgence of Nationalism in the Twenty-First Century.
International Political Science Association (IPSA) 2021, 26th World Congress of Political Science, virtual conference. https://wc2021.ipsa.org/wc/panel/conservative-dispositions-continental-thought-post-revolutionary-france-resurgence.
Aleksandr Dugin has recently characterized Martin Heidegger as the key philosopher of the German “conservative revolution” of the Weimar era; Pierre Bourdieu and Göran Dahl have described Heidegger as a “radical conservative.” The paper will examine this “right Heideggerian” reading—contrasted with a “left Heideggerian” tradition— by tracing radical-conservative features in Heidegger’s work and by looking at the significance of Heidegger for two of the most influential theorists of contemporary radical conservatism, Alain de Benoist and Aleksandr Dugin.
According to the historical narrative of the later Heidegger, the Western metaphysical tradition culminates in the modern technological domination and homogenization of reality, which, however, opens up the possibility of a post-metaphysical, post-modern “other beginning” of Western thinking, involving a profound rethinking of the Greek beginning of philosophy. This idea of a cyclic movement through which nihilistic modernity is overcome by letting modernity radicalize and culminate itself, which allows us to turn back to the roots of our tradition in a novel sense, is indeed analogous to the basic model of a “conservative revolution.” In Heidegger’s work of the 1930s and 1940s, especially in his recently published Black Notebooks, we encounter the national and cultural particularism of the German conservative tradition. Heidegger’s view of Nazi biological racism as an extreme avatar of modern technicity alongside liberalism and Bolshevism presents him as a radical conservative rather than a committed National Socialist. '
De Benoist, the key figure of the French Nouvelle Droite, is particularly inspired by Heidegger’s account of late modern technological nihilism, its historical roots and different manifestations. He makes use of this account in his attack on the universalism, subjectivism, and absolutism he sees as underlying the Western human rights doctrine and in the formulation of his own culturally particularistic “ethnopluralism” and “ethnoregionalism.” De Benoist’s Russian collaborator Dugin, sometimes perceived as a“chief ideologue of Putinism,” bases his polemic against the Western liberal hegemony and his conservative “fourth political theory” on the legacy of the German conservative revolution, particularly Heidegger’s philosophy of history and Carl Schmitt’s geopolitical particularism, and on the Russian tradition of Eurasianism.
Luento Holistisen psykologian täydennyskoulutuksessa, Kriittinen korkeakoulu, 23.4.2021.
Esitelmätilaisuus Eero Rauhalan kanssa, Luonnonfilosofian seura, Helsinki 27.10.2020. Videotallenne: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cXF43afnl6U.
The term “postmodernism” is used to describe certain trends in Western art that, since the 1960s, have challenged the ideals of Western aesthetic modernism, such as its utopian faith in historical progress. With the publication of... more
The term “postmodernism” is used to describe certain trends in Western art that, since the 1960s, have challenged the ideals of Western aesthetic modernism, such as its utopian faith in historical progress. With the publication of Jean-François Lyotard’s The Postmodern Condition (1979), postmodernity, understood as the fading away of the great modern teleological narratives of history as progress, also became a debated theoretical keyword in the humanities and social sciences.
I will present an alternative, Heideggerian account of the allegedly ongoing end of Western modernity and the possible dimensions of genuine postmodernity. In the Heideggerian historical narrative, the contemporary end of modernity is first and foremost a culmination and completion of the entire history of Western metaphysics, which begins to unfold in ancient Greece with Parmenides’ insight into being as pure intelligibility, as pure accessibility to thought. Metaphysical modernity is only the last phase in the development of metaphysics in which being gradually comes to be seen as availability to subjective control and ordering; Western modernity culminates in the late modern age of technical nihilism in which reality shows itself as a completely manipulable and homogeneous resource.
What is today commonly seen as postmodernity is, in fact, completed modernity in which the modern autonomous subject and the modern teleological “metanarratives” of history as progress dissolve into what Heidegger calls the technical “enframing” or “setup” (Gestell): a matrix of complete scientific, economic, and social surveillance and administration of all resources, including “human resources.” For Heidegger, the key thinker of completed modernity is Friedrich Nietzsche, the last great metaphysical philosopher of the West. A true “postmodernity” in the Heideggerian sense has not yet emerged—for Heidegger, postmodern thinking would consist in a radically new encounter with the fundamental finitude, historical and cultural situatedness, locality, and contextuality of all meaningful presence. Heidegger describes the turn from modernity to postmodernity as the turn from the complete homogeneity and universality of the technical Gestell to the extreme heterogeneity and singularity of the Geviert, the “fourfold,” a postmetaphysical perspective on things as dynamic points of convergence of four dimensions of meaningfulness.
The Heideggerian narrative of metaphysical modernity, contemporary late modernity, and emerging postmodernity is illustrated, in particular, with the help of examples from architectural modernism and postmodernism, with a focus on the question of what a genuinely postmodern architecture in the Heideggerian sense could look like.
I will present an alternative, Heideggerian account of the allegedly ongoing end of Western modernity and the possible dimensions of genuine postmodernity. In the Heideggerian historical narrative, the contemporary end of modernity is first and foremost a culmination and completion of the entire history of Western metaphysics, which begins to unfold in ancient Greece with Parmenides’ insight into being as pure intelligibility, as pure accessibility to thought. Metaphysical modernity is only the last phase in the development of metaphysics in which being gradually comes to be seen as availability to subjective control and ordering; Western modernity culminates in the late modern age of technical nihilism in which reality shows itself as a completely manipulable and homogeneous resource.
What is today commonly seen as postmodernity is, in fact, completed modernity in which the modern autonomous subject and the modern teleological “metanarratives” of history as progress dissolve into what Heidegger calls the technical “enframing” or “setup” (Gestell): a matrix of complete scientific, economic, and social surveillance and administration of all resources, including “human resources.” For Heidegger, the key thinker of completed modernity is Friedrich Nietzsche, the last great metaphysical philosopher of the West. A true “postmodernity” in the Heideggerian sense has not yet emerged—for Heidegger, postmodern thinking would consist in a radically new encounter with the fundamental finitude, historical and cultural situatedness, locality, and contextuality of all meaningful presence. Heidegger describes the turn from modernity to postmodernity as the turn from the complete homogeneity and universality of the technical Gestell to the extreme heterogeneity and singularity of the Geviert, the “fourfold,” a postmetaphysical perspective on things as dynamic points of convergence of four dimensions of meaningfulness.
The Heideggerian narrative of metaphysical modernity, contemporary late modernity, and emerging postmodernity is illustrated, in particular, with the help of examples from architectural modernism and postmodernism, with a focus on the question of what a genuinely postmodern architecture in the Heideggerian sense could look like.
September 6, 2019. Panel: Biopolitics in the History of Political Thought. ECPR 2019 General Conference, Wrocław, Poland. https://ecpr.eu/Events/Event/PanelDetails/8803 In On the Greek Origins of Biopolitics (2016), Mika Ojakangas shows... more
September 6, 2019. Panel: Biopolitics in the History of Political Thought. ECPR 2019 General Conference, Wrocław, Poland. https://ecpr.eu/Events/Event/PanelDetails/8803
In On the Greek Origins of Biopolitics (2016), Mika Ojakangas shows beyond dispute that the political art of governance as understood by Plato and Aristotle offered a wide array of techniques for governing human beings through the exercise of what can be characterized as “biopower” in the Foucauldian sense. In this sense, Platonic and Aristotelian political though was indeed “biopolitical.”
However, with the help of Hannah Arendt, I will propose a slightly different understanding of biopolitics based not on techniques of governance but on the way in which the final aim of the political community is conceptualized. The Western tradition of political thought since Plato has generally identified this aim as “happiness” (eudaimonia, beatitudo, felicitas), taken to consist in the attainment of the supreme good (summum bonum) accessible in the human life; Ojakangas cites this as one of the “biopolitical” features of ancient political thought. I argue—with Arendt—that Aristotelian eudaimonia was not a “biopolitical” ideal in the sense that the supreme good, for the human being, consists neither in the fact of being alive (zēn) nor in any way of life (bios) typical for the human species, but rather, as Aristotle puts it in Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, in a bios according to something “divine” in the human being, namely, in a contemplative beholding (theōrein) of reality in the light of an intuitive insight (noein) into its most fundamental principles. This “metabiopolitical” understanding of the “good life” (eu zēn), for the sake of which the political community ultimately exists (even though, according to Aristotle, it initially comes into being for the sake of survival), was then transposed by Thomas Aquinas into a Christian context, in which the ultimate aim of political governance becomes the salvation of souls for an eternal life of the contemplation of God (contemplatio Dei), which alone constitutes the perfect human beatitudo.
As Roberto Esposito notes, it is only in the early modern model introduced by Thomas Hobbes that civic happiness (felicitas civilis) becomes identified with the simple avoidance of violent death as the human summum malum. For modernity, Arendt maintains in The Human Condition, being alive as such becomes the greatest human good, and the task of the contractual state is the coordination of individuals’ private pursuits of subjective happiness—or “quality of life” or “welfare”—in order to avoid the deadly conflicts characteristic of the prepolitical “state of nature.” In this sense, “biopolitics” is a decidedly modern paradigm. Interestingly, Arendt traces the roots of this biopolitical valuation of life for its own sake to the Christian notion of the sanctity of life, which Ojakangas, in turn, credits for the decline of ancient biopolitical practices under the influence of Christianity.
In On the Greek Origins of Biopolitics (2016), Mika Ojakangas shows beyond dispute that the political art of governance as understood by Plato and Aristotle offered a wide array of techniques for governing human beings through the exercise of what can be characterized as “biopower” in the Foucauldian sense. In this sense, Platonic and Aristotelian political though was indeed “biopolitical.”
However, with the help of Hannah Arendt, I will propose a slightly different understanding of biopolitics based not on techniques of governance but on the way in which the final aim of the political community is conceptualized. The Western tradition of political thought since Plato has generally identified this aim as “happiness” (eudaimonia, beatitudo, felicitas), taken to consist in the attainment of the supreme good (summum bonum) accessible in the human life; Ojakangas cites this as one of the “biopolitical” features of ancient political thought. I argue—with Arendt—that Aristotelian eudaimonia was not a “biopolitical” ideal in the sense that the supreme good, for the human being, consists neither in the fact of being alive (zēn) nor in any way of life (bios) typical for the human species, but rather, as Aristotle puts it in Book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, in a bios according to something “divine” in the human being, namely, in a contemplative beholding (theōrein) of reality in the light of an intuitive insight (noein) into its most fundamental principles. This “metabiopolitical” understanding of the “good life” (eu zēn), for the sake of which the political community ultimately exists (even though, according to Aristotle, it initially comes into being for the sake of survival), was then transposed by Thomas Aquinas into a Christian context, in which the ultimate aim of political governance becomes the salvation of souls for an eternal life of the contemplation of God (contemplatio Dei), which alone constitutes the perfect human beatitudo.
As Roberto Esposito notes, it is only in the early modern model introduced by Thomas Hobbes that civic happiness (felicitas civilis) becomes identified with the simple avoidance of violent death as the human summum malum. For modernity, Arendt maintains in The Human Condition, being alive as such becomes the greatest human good, and the task of the contractual state is the coordination of individuals’ private pursuits of subjective happiness—or “quality of life” or “welfare”—in order to avoid the deadly conflicts characteristic of the prepolitical “state of nature.” In this sense, “biopolitics” is a decidedly modern paradigm. Interestingly, Arendt traces the roots of this biopolitical valuation of life for its own sake to the Christian notion of the sanctity of life, which Ojakangas, in turn, credits for the decline of ancient biopolitical practices under the influence of Christianity.
April 12, 2019. Conference: Coming Home: The Post-War Return of Refugee Scholarship. Law, Identity and the European Narratives, University of Helsinki.... more
April 12, 2019. Conference: Coming Home: The Post-War Return of Refugee Scholarship. Law, Identity and the European Narratives, University of Helsinki. https://www2.helsinki.fi/en/news/society-economy/coming-home-the-post-war-return-of-refugee-scholarship-conference.
The paper studies Hannah Arendt’s attempt, in On Revolution (1963) and related writings, to retrieve the “lost treasure” of the American Revolution as an outstanding act of postwar intellectual “homecoming” in political theory. In stark contrast to most European theorists, Arendt, herself a refugee from the Third Reich, thought that Europe had a vital political lesson to learn from its American offspring—not from its contemporary mass culture, consumerism, and social inequality deplored by other émigré intellectuals such as Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, but from the original political ideas of its founders. Arendt argues that the French Revolution of 1789 was turned by the Jacobins into a program of social transformation aimed at the eradication of misery and moral vice and that this social orientation subsequently became the standard model for the European revolutions of the nineteenth century, particularly with the introduction of the Marxist notion of class struggle as the motor of history. The American Revolution, by contrast, largely thanks to the absence of social misery of citizens on the European scale (an absence largely due to the alternative misery of slavery), had focused on founding a lasting polity in the form of a constitution and had thus, with relative albeit incomplete success, alone implemented the great positive political possibility of modern revolutions: the establishment of a new public realm of civic freedom. After the totalitarian disasters had revealed the dangers inherent in a focus on ideological social mobilization, it is to the American Founding Fathers that Arendt directs us for a modern example of classical antiquity’s ideal of political founding and free participation.
The paper studies Hannah Arendt’s attempt, in On Revolution (1963) and related writings, to retrieve the “lost treasure” of the American Revolution as an outstanding act of postwar intellectual “homecoming” in political theory. In stark contrast to most European theorists, Arendt, herself a refugee from the Third Reich, thought that Europe had a vital political lesson to learn from its American offspring—not from its contemporary mass culture, consumerism, and social inequality deplored by other émigré intellectuals such as Theodor Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, but from the original political ideas of its founders. Arendt argues that the French Revolution of 1789 was turned by the Jacobins into a program of social transformation aimed at the eradication of misery and moral vice and that this social orientation subsequently became the standard model for the European revolutions of the nineteenth century, particularly with the introduction of the Marxist notion of class struggle as the motor of history. The American Revolution, by contrast, largely thanks to the absence of social misery of citizens on the European scale (an absence largely due to the alternative misery of slavery), had focused on founding a lasting polity in the form of a constitution and had thus, with relative albeit incomplete success, alone implemented the great positive political possibility of modern revolutions: the establishment of a new public realm of civic freedom. After the totalitarian disasters had revealed the dangers inherent in a focus on ideological social mobilization, it is to the American Founding Fathers that Arendt directs us for a modern example of classical antiquity’s ideal of political founding and free participation.
Millainen on naturalistis-luonnontieteellisen ja transsendentaalifenomenologisen ajattelun välinen suhde nykytilanteessa? Missä määrin ja miten näiden välille on muodostunut kuilu, joka tavallaan jakaa koko modernin ajattelun, ja... more
Millainen on naturalistis-luonnontieteellisen ja transsendentaalifenomenologisen ajattelun välinen suhde nykytilanteessa? Missä määrin ja miten näiden välille on muodostunut kuilu, joka tavallaan jakaa koko modernin ajattelun, ja millainen ongelma tämä kuilu on? Millaisia filosofisia ratkaisuja kuilun ylittämiseen on tarjottu? Lähestyn näitä kysymyksiä ns. mannermaisen perinteen piirissä viime aikoina syntyneiden uusien realististen ja materialististen suuntausten, erityisesti ranskalaisen Quentin Meillassoux’n ”spekulatiivisen materialismin”, näkökulmasta. Meillassoux’n mukaan Immanuel Kantista alkava transsendentaalisen idealismin perinne ajautuu viime kädessä syviin teoreettisiin ja kulttuurisiin ongelmiin. Ratkaisuksi hän tarjoaa aivan uudenlaista, 1600-luvun rationalistiseen metafysiikkaan nojaavaa filosofiakäsitystä, joka pohjautuu mielekkään kokemuksen fenomenologian sijasta erityisesti matemaattiseen joukko-oppiin.
Esitelmä tarkastelee venäläisen filosofin ja politiikan teoreetikon Aleksandr Duginin (s. 1962) "neljänneksi poliittiseksi teoriaksi" nimeämän ideologian filosofisia ja teoreettisia lähtökohtia. Tämä "neljäs" ideologia on tarkoitettu... more
Esitelmä tarkastelee venäläisen filosofin ja politiikan teoreetikon Aleksandr Duginin (s. 1962) "neljänneksi poliittiseksi teoriaksi" nimeämän ideologian filosofisia ja teoreettisia lähtökohtia. Tämä "neljäs" ideologia on tarkoitettu vaihtoehdoksi 1900-luvun kolmelle suurelle ideologialle, liberalismille, kommunismille ja fasismille, joista ensimmäinen ja vanhin selviytyi viime vuosisadasta voittajana. Duginin poliittinen teoria hyödyntää "postmoderneja" universalismin kritiikkejä ja venäläisen eurasianistisen liikkeen perintöä haastaakseen liberalismin ylivallan ja Francis Fukuyaman julistaman liberaalin "historian lopun". Esitelmässä kartoitetaan lyhyesti Kremlin epävirallisena neuvonantajanakin nähdyn Duginin ajattelun kaikupohjaa Putinin Venäjällä (antiliberalismi, Ukrainan kriisi), Euroopan radikaalikonservatiivisissa ja äärioikeistolaisissa liikkeissä (Unkari, Kreikka, Turkki) ja amerikkalaisessa alt-right-oikeistossa (mm. Steve Bannon, Richard Spencer).
Pääpaino on kuitenkin Duginin teoreettisessa ja filosofisessa viitekehyksessä, jossa keskushahmoksi nousee saksalainen Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), erityisesti tämän teesi länsimaisen modernin aikakauden ja koko länsimaisen metafysiikan perinteen huipentumisesta ja päättymisestä moderniin globaalin teknisen hallinnan aikakauteen. Heideggerin silmissä tämä länsimaisen perinteen kulminaatio mahdollistaa tulevan jälkimetafyysisen ja jälkimodernin "ajattelun toisen alun", joka korostaa kaiken ajattelun paikallisuutta, historiallista muuttuvuutta sekä kieli- ja kulttuurisidonnaisuutta. Juuri tämä Heideggerilta omaksuttu historiallinen malli tekee Duginin poliittisesta teoriasta "radikaalikonservatiivisen": se ei haikaile nostalgista paluuta menneeseen tai tavoittele status quon ylläpitämistä vaan tähtää henkis-kulttuuris-poliittiseen "konservatiiviseen vallankumoukseen", jossa länsimaisen liberaalin paradigman hegemonia korvautuisi paikallisiin kulttuurisiin, uskonnollisiin ja poliittisiin paradigmoihin nojautuvalla moninapaisella maailmanjärjestyksellä. Tällaiselle geopoliittiselle mallille Dugin löytää teoreettista tukea Carl Schmittin ajatuksesta "suuralueista" (Grossräume) muodostuvasta politiikasta sekä Samuel Huntingtonin "sivilisaatioiden yhteentörmäystä" koskevasta teesistä.
Pääpaino on kuitenkin Duginin teoreettisessa ja filosofisessa viitekehyksessä, jossa keskushahmoksi nousee saksalainen Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), erityisesti tämän teesi länsimaisen modernin aikakauden ja koko länsimaisen metafysiikan perinteen huipentumisesta ja päättymisestä moderniin globaalin teknisen hallinnan aikakauteen. Heideggerin silmissä tämä länsimaisen perinteen kulminaatio mahdollistaa tulevan jälkimetafyysisen ja jälkimodernin "ajattelun toisen alun", joka korostaa kaiken ajattelun paikallisuutta, historiallista muuttuvuutta sekä kieli- ja kulttuurisidonnaisuutta. Juuri tämä Heideggerilta omaksuttu historiallinen malli tekee Duginin poliittisesta teoriasta "radikaalikonservatiivisen": se ei haikaile nostalgista paluuta menneeseen tai tavoittele status quon ylläpitämistä vaan tähtää henkis-kulttuuris-poliittiseen "konservatiiviseen vallankumoukseen", jossa länsimaisen liberaalin paradigman hegemonia korvautuisi paikallisiin kulttuurisiin, uskonnollisiin ja poliittisiin paradigmoihin nojautuvalla moninapaisella maailmanjärjestyksellä. Tällaiselle geopoliittiselle mallille Dugin löytää teoreettista tukea Carl Schmittin ajatuksesta "suuralueista" (Grossräume) muodostuvasta politiikasta sekä Samuel Huntingtonin "sivilisaatioiden yhteentörmäystä" koskevasta teesistä.
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As Hannah Arendt has shown, the political realm, understood as the sphere of freedom from necessity, has been in perpetual conflict with the realm of incontrovertible truth. In modernity, the clash between truth and politics has primarily... more
As Hannah Arendt has shown, the political realm, understood as the sphere of freedom from necessity, has been in perpetual conflict with the realm of incontrovertible truth. In modernity, the clash between truth and politics has primarily become one between empirical truths of fact and transformative social ideologies with their narratives of historical progress. This clash culminates in twentieth-century totalitarianisms and their systematic distortion of facts through ideological fiction. However, Arendt notes, the border between facts and opinions has become increasingly blurred even in liberal democracies; this perspective is theoretically bolstered by post-Nietzschean analyses of truths and facts as transient constructs of varying power interests. The recent proliferation of “alternative facts” through the rise of the social media has given rise to the notion of a “post-truth” or “post-factual” politics.
The presentation discusses two influential contemporary theoretical models of the relationship between truth and politics. First, it studies Arendt’s analysis of the disregard for facts in modern politics and its extreme totalitarian manifestations, based on the total transformation of reality to fit an ideological fiction. In order to rehabilitate politics in the sense of a non-instrumental, agonistic realm of value-judgments, Arendt emphasizes that the political must carefully delimit itself from the factual—not everything should be politicized. This is contrasted with the “metapolitics” of Alain Badiou, which sees politics as a progressive process of rearticulating the entire historical and social world in terms of a political idea, in such a way that a new “truth,” a new category is produced, thus making new factual statements meaningful and veridical. Thus, while both see politics as “transfactual,” as transcending prevailing facts, in Arendt’s “republican” model this is accomplished by exhibiting communally shared values in words and deeds, while in Badiou’s “communist” model, politics is a transformative production of new historical truth.
The presentation discusses two influential contemporary theoretical models of the relationship between truth and politics. First, it studies Arendt’s analysis of the disregard for facts in modern politics and its extreme totalitarian manifestations, based on the total transformation of reality to fit an ideological fiction. In order to rehabilitate politics in the sense of a non-instrumental, agonistic realm of value-judgments, Arendt emphasizes that the political must carefully delimit itself from the factual—not everything should be politicized. This is contrasted with the “metapolitics” of Alain Badiou, which sees politics as a progressive process of rearticulating the entire historical and social world in terms of a political idea, in such a way that a new “truth,” a new category is produced, thus making new factual statements meaningful and veridical. Thus, while both see politics as “transfactual,” as transcending prevailing facts, in Arendt’s “republican” model this is accomplished by exhibiting communally shared values in words and deeds, while in Badiou’s “communist” model, politics is a transformative production of new historical truth.
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The paper focuses on Hannah Arendt's account, inThe Life of the Mind, of the twofold relationship between the activity of thinking and politics that she discovers in Greek philosophy. From its initial stages, she claims, philosophy... more
The paper focuses on Hannah Arendt's account, inThe Life of the Mind, of the twofold relationship between the activity of thinking and politics that she discovers in Greek philosophy. From its initial stages, she claims, philosophy offered a radical alternative to what she sees as the prephilosophical and essentially political Greek ideal of life that consisted in undertaking great and beautiful actions and thus achieving the immortal fame of the Homeric heroes. The philosophers, however, depreciated fame and honor, which depend on intersubjective recognition; only the philosophical contemplation of things in the light of their ultimate and timeless principles would bring truly "immortal" self-sufficiency, albeit only for a small intellectual elite. Thus, Platonic philosophy signals, for Arendt, the start of a long philosophical tradition of subordinating the political realm to higher, "metapolitical" ideals and ends.
For Plato and Aristotle, philosophical thought begins from wonder and culminates in contemplation. However, Arendt maintains, the Platonic dialogues also reveal another function of thinking, voiced by the figure of Socrates: self-examination. As discourse with oneself that presupposes a certain distance to oneself, thinking turns the human individual into a "two-in-one" and allows her to avoid mute loneliness through being "by herself." Since discursive self-reflection seeks to avoid contradiction with oneself not only on the logical but also on the moral level, it can also function as conscience by judging the intrinsic value of one's own actions. This internal judging can be further materialized in the interpersonal space of politics in the capacity of judging the acts of others; in this way, thinking can serve as a starting point for politics in the Arendtian sense.
Together with Kant's Critique of Judgment, the Socratic "two-in-one" thus forms the basis for Arendt's own, unfinished theory of judging. The paper concludes by briefly developing the implications of this largely missing theory and arguing that it would have been a crucial complement to Arendt's theory of totalitarianism and her disputed notion of the "banality of evil" of totalitarian subjects such as Adolf Eichmann, characterized by an "inability to think" (and, hence, to judge).
For Plato and Aristotle, philosophical thought begins from wonder and culminates in contemplation. However, Arendt maintains, the Platonic dialogues also reveal another function of thinking, voiced by the figure of Socrates: self-examination. As discourse with oneself that presupposes a certain distance to oneself, thinking turns the human individual into a "two-in-one" and allows her to avoid mute loneliness through being "by herself." Since discursive self-reflection seeks to avoid contradiction with oneself not only on the logical but also on the moral level, it can also function as conscience by judging the intrinsic value of one's own actions. This internal judging can be further materialized in the interpersonal space of politics in the capacity of judging the acts of others; in this way, thinking can serve as a starting point for politics in the Arendtian sense.
Together with Kant's Critique of Judgment, the Socratic "two-in-one" thus forms the basis for Arendt's own, unfinished theory of judging. The paper concludes by briefly developing the implications of this largely missing theory and arguing that it would have been a crucial complement to Arendt's theory of totalitarianism and her disputed notion of the "banality of evil" of totalitarian subjects such as Adolf Eichmann, characterized by an "inability to think" (and, hence, to judge).
Research Interests:
The paper will discuss Hannah Arendt's interpretation, in The Life of the Mind, of the double function of thinking that she discovers in Greek philosophy. From its initial stages, she maintains, philosophy offered a radical alternative to... more
The paper will discuss Hannah Arendt's interpretation, in The Life of the Mind, of the double function of thinking that she discovers in Greek philosophy. From its initial stages, she maintains, philosophy offered a radical alternative to the "prephilosophical" and essentially political Greek ideal of human life. For the classical age personified by Pericles, the supreme way of life for the free citizen was to undertake in public great and beautiful actions and thus achieve the immortal fame of the Homeric heroes. The philosophers, however, criticized public and political life for being dependent on the recognition of others; only philosophical insight into perfect and divine truths would bring truly "immortal" and superhuman self-sufficiency, albeit only for a small intellectual elite. Thus, Platonic philosophy signals, for Arendt, the start of a long philosophical tradition of subordinating political life and action to higher, "metapolitical" ideals and ends.
However, Arendt claims, the Platonic dialogues also reveal another basic function of thinking, voiced by the figure of Socrates. This is a more mundane sense of thinking of which every human being is capable: an internal dialogue with oneself that turns the human individual into a "two-in-one" and allows her to avoid mute loneliness through being "by herself." This type of thinking has a profound moral dimension, since it requires harmony and lack of contradiction with oneself - this is, in effect, the discovery of conscience, of moral self-examination. The Socratic two-in-one is thus an alternative to the fundamentally antipolitical philosophical mode of thinking: it has an important but implicit political potential, as it can give rise to the capacity of judging the intrinsic value of individual acts and thus found political action. However, according to Arendt, this aspect of the Socratic legacy remained largely neglected until Kant's Critique of Judgment, which forms the basis for Arendt's own, unfinished theory of political thinking.
However, Arendt claims, the Platonic dialogues also reveal another basic function of thinking, voiced by the figure of Socrates. This is a more mundane sense of thinking of which every human being is capable: an internal dialogue with oneself that turns the human individual into a "two-in-one" and allows her to avoid mute loneliness through being "by herself." This type of thinking has a profound moral dimension, since it requires harmony and lack of contradiction with oneself - this is, in effect, the discovery of conscience, of moral self-examination. The Socratic two-in-one is thus an alternative to the fundamentally antipolitical philosophical mode of thinking: it has an important but implicit political potential, as it can give rise to the capacity of judging the intrinsic value of individual acts and thus found political action. However, according to Arendt, this aspect of the Socratic legacy remained largely neglected until Kant's Critique of Judgment, which forms the basis for Arendt's own, unfinished theory of political thinking.
Nykypäivänä kokemus asetetaan usein vastakkain faktojen tai tutkitun totuuden kanssa - "oli totta tai ei, näin nämä asiat koetaan". Toisaalta kokemus (empeiria, experientia, Erfahrung) on länsimaisessa filosofisessa perinteessä antiikista... more
Nykypäivänä kokemus asetetaan usein vastakkain faktojen tai tutkitun totuuden kanssa - "oli totta tai ei, näin nämä asiat koetaan". Toisaalta kokemus (empeiria, experientia, Erfahrung) on länsimaisessa filosofisessa perinteessä antiikista alkaen nähty tiedon ja ymmärryksen kulmakivenä. Aristoteleelle kokemus erottaa ihmisen muista eläimistä - kokemus on kyky muodostaa havainnoista ja muistoista yhä laajempia synteesejä, joista on mahdollista johtaa universaaleja sääntöjä ja periaatteita, ja on näin askel kohti todellisuuden kattavaa ymmärtämistä. Uuden ajan alussa aristoteelisen intuitiota ja deduktiivista päättelyä korostavan tiedemallin kyseenalaistaminen
teki kokemuksesta yhä vahvemmin kaiken tietämisen lähtökohdan. Teoksessaan Novum Organum (1620) Francis Bacon esittelee suuntaa-antavan mallin modernista kokemuslähtöisestä ja kokeellisesta tieteellisestä metodista: siinä arkinen, sattumanvarainen kokemus korvataan järjestelmällisellä ja aktiivisella kokeilemisella (experimentum), joka ottaa luonnon ilmiöt haltuunsa paljastamalla niiden syvimmät perustat.
Seurailen näitä kokemuksen käsitehistorian pääpiirteitä ja kiinnitän huomiota niihin konkreettisen kokemuksen rajoituksiin ja riskeihin, jotka tieteellinen metodi pyrkii voittamaan: kokemuksen satunnaiseen ja hallitsemattomaan luonteeseen, sen ainutkertaisuuteen ja tilannesidonnaisuuteen ja sen negatiiviseen ja transformatiiviseen luonteeseen. Nämä kokemuksen piirteet painottuvat erityisesti Hans-Georg Gadamerin esittelemässä hermeneuttisessa kokemuksen käsitteessä. Hermeneutiikassa kokemus on uuden ja ennakoimattoman kokemista. Aito kokemus on jotain, joka ylittää odotuksemme, murtaa olemassaolevan käsitteellisen viitekehyksemme ja saattaa meidät näin
kasvotusten oman äärellisyytemme ja rajallisuutemme kanssa. Toisin kuin populistinen kokemus, joka pitkälti tarkoittaa ennakkoluuloja, ja tieteellinen kokemus, joka metodisen haltuunoton avulla pyrkii maksimaaliseen ennakoitavuuteen ja varmuuteen, hermeneuttinen kokemus merkitsee toiseuden ja vierauden kohtaamista, käänteentekevää tapahtumaa, joka pakottaa meidät ajattelemaan ennakkokäsityksemme uudestaan ja näin uudistumaan itse.
teki kokemuksesta yhä vahvemmin kaiken tietämisen lähtökohdan. Teoksessaan Novum Organum (1620) Francis Bacon esittelee suuntaa-antavan mallin modernista kokemuslähtöisestä ja kokeellisesta tieteellisestä metodista: siinä arkinen, sattumanvarainen kokemus korvataan järjestelmällisellä ja aktiivisella kokeilemisella (experimentum), joka ottaa luonnon ilmiöt haltuunsa paljastamalla niiden syvimmät perustat.
Seurailen näitä kokemuksen käsitehistorian pääpiirteitä ja kiinnitän huomiota niihin konkreettisen kokemuksen rajoituksiin ja riskeihin, jotka tieteellinen metodi pyrkii voittamaan: kokemuksen satunnaiseen ja hallitsemattomaan luonteeseen, sen ainutkertaisuuteen ja tilannesidonnaisuuteen ja sen negatiiviseen ja transformatiiviseen luonteeseen. Nämä kokemuksen piirteet painottuvat erityisesti Hans-Georg Gadamerin esittelemässä hermeneuttisessa kokemuksen käsitteessä. Hermeneutiikassa kokemus on uuden ja ennakoimattoman kokemista. Aito kokemus on jotain, joka ylittää odotuksemme, murtaa olemassaolevan käsitteellisen viitekehyksemme ja saattaa meidät näin
kasvotusten oman äärellisyytemme ja rajallisuutemme kanssa. Toisin kuin populistinen kokemus, joka pitkälti tarkoittaa ennakkoluuloja, ja tieteellinen kokemus, joka metodisen haltuunoton avulla pyrkii maksimaaliseen ennakoitavuuteen ja varmuuteen, hermeneuttinen kokemus merkitsee toiseuden ja vierauden kohtaamista, käänteentekevää tapahtumaa, joka pakottaa meidät ajattelemaan ennakkokäsityksemme uudestaan ja näin uudistumaan itse.
The paper studies two perspectives on the global order that, it argues, can be regarded as paradigmatic instances of a “Right Heideggerian” approach that also qualifies as “radical conservatism”: that of Martin Heidegger himself and that... more
The paper studies two perspectives on the global order that, it argues, can be regarded as paradigmatic instances of a “Right Heideggerian” approach that also qualifies as “radical conservatism”: that of Martin Heidegger himself and that of the Russian theorist Alexander Dugin, who in recent years has declared himself a Heideggerian thinker and sees Heidegger as the quintessential philosopher of radical conservatism. Both thinkers see the late modern process of globalization, in the sense of the increasingly comprehensive economic, social, as well as cultural integration of different communities into a universal “world order,” as an increasingly comprehensive Westernization of the planet and, simultaneously, as a culmination of the universalistic ambitions of the Western tradition of metaphysics.
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Starting from Hans-Georg Gadamer’s account of hermeneutic experience (Erfahrung) as an encounter with foreign horizons of meaning that have the power of transforming our own horizon and its implicit prejudices, and from his claim that... more
Starting from Hans-Georg Gadamer’s account of hermeneutic experience (Erfahrung) as an encounter with foreign horizons of meaning that have the power of transforming our own horizon and its implicit prejudices, and from his claim that “experience” is one of our most unexamined concepts, the paper studies certain key phases in the conceptual history of experience. For Aristotle, experience (empeiria) is a practical readiness to cope with particular things based on cumulative individual encounters, and thus a precondition for prudence (phronēsis) as the capacity for interpreting and acting on concrete singular situations. However, as a familiarity with the
singular, experience is subordinated by the Aristotelian tradition to the instrumental and the theoretical knowledge of general principles (technē, epistēmē). In the empirical method of modern science outlined by Francis Bacon, the random experiencing of ordinary life (experientia vaga) is contrasted with the systematic and methodical experiencing of scientific observation (experientia ordinata) that inductively extracts regularities and general principles from nature and thus gains the ability to master future phenomena. Even though Hegel’s dialectic emphasizes the transformative role of the spirit’s experiences as its historical encounters with its inherent limitations, it ultimately regards experience as only a means for attaining absolute, limitless knowledge. For Hannah Arendt,
totalitarian ideologies, as post-Hegelian determinations of the teleological “logics of history,” precisely seek to immunize human beings against experience, eliminating their capacity for being transformed by the singular and the concrete. The paper concludes that it is only in the radically historical approach of philosophical hermeneutics, elaborated by Heidegger and Gadamer, that experience, as the acknowledgment of the irreducible finitude of one’s horizon, gains true epistemic
priority as the basic dynamic principle of the historical transformation and renewal of finite thoughts and discourses in concrete, singular, and ever unpredictable historical situations.
singular, experience is subordinated by the Aristotelian tradition to the instrumental and the theoretical knowledge of general principles (technē, epistēmē). In the empirical method of modern science outlined by Francis Bacon, the random experiencing of ordinary life (experientia vaga) is contrasted with the systematic and methodical experiencing of scientific observation (experientia ordinata) that inductively extracts regularities and general principles from nature and thus gains the ability to master future phenomena. Even though Hegel’s dialectic emphasizes the transformative role of the spirit’s experiences as its historical encounters with its inherent limitations, it ultimately regards experience as only a means for attaining absolute, limitless knowledge. For Hannah Arendt,
totalitarian ideologies, as post-Hegelian determinations of the teleological “logics of history,” precisely seek to immunize human beings against experience, eliminating their capacity for being transformed by the singular and the concrete. The paper concludes that it is only in the radically historical approach of philosophical hermeneutics, elaborated by Heidegger and Gadamer, that experience, as the acknowledgment of the irreducible finitude of one’s horizon, gains true epistemic
priority as the basic dynamic principle of the historical transformation and renewal of finite thoughts and discourses in concrete, singular, and ever unpredictable historical situations.
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Starting from Quentin Meillassoux’s account of the unfolding of late modern “correlationism” from Kant’s transcendental idealism to Heidegger’s hermeneutics of finitude, the paper briefly situates Heidegger within the Kantian... more
Starting from Quentin Meillassoux’s account of the unfolding of late modern “correlationism” from Kant’s transcendental idealism to Heidegger’s hermeneutics of finitude, the paper briefly situates Heidegger within the Kantian transcendental tradition. It then shows in what sense Meillassoux’s own speculative thesis of absolute contingency can present itself as a kind of conceptual Aufhebung of what Meillassoux calls Heidegger’s “strong correlationism” and thus as a fundamental critique of certain presuppositions of the entire post-Kantian legacy. This will enable us to understand, and eventually to evaluate, the claim of Meillassoux’s speculative materialism to be a “postmetaphysical” reappropriation of classical, pre-Kantian modernity.
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Dans sa conférence de 1980 intitulée "D'un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie", faisant référence à l'opuscule de Kant, "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (1796), Jacques Derrida remarque que... more
Dans sa conférence de 1980 intitulée "D'un ton apocalyptique adopté naguère en philosophie", faisant référence à l'opuscule de Kant, "Von einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie" (1796), Jacques Derrida remarque que même si Kant dénonce les partisans "mystagogues" de l'intuition intellectuelle qui proclament la mort de la philosophie en tant qu'entreprise rationnelle, "il [Kant] a lui-même, en marquant une limite, voire la fin d'un certain type de métaphysique, libéré une autre vague de discours eschatologiques en philosophie. [...] depuis lors, compte tenu de multiples et profondes différences, voire de mutations, l'Occident a été dominé par un puissant programme qui était aussi un contrat intransgressible entre des discours de la fin".
En effet, c'est bien Kant qui est le précurseur le plus important du thème contemporain de la "fin de la métaphysique". En tant que fondateur de la philosophie critique, il est aussi, comme l'exprime Alain Badiou, "l'inventeur désastreux de notre ' finitude ' ". Pour les héritiers postmétaphysiques de Kant, surtout Heidegger, c'est justement l'acceptance de la finitude radicale (la facticité, la contextualité, la situationalité) de notre pensée, et de tout être donné à cette pensée, qui annonce la fin de la métaphysique "ontothéologique", préoccupée par la recherche d'un point de référence absolu (Dieu, subjectivité transcendantale) pour l'être et pour la pensée. Face à la possibilité constante de sa propre fin, la pensée humaine ne peut plus se vouloir absolue.
La présente conférence va étudier le récent "tournement spéculatif" de la philosophie, introduit surtout par Quentin Meillassoux dans Après la finitude (2006). Pour Meillassoux, la philosophie de la finitude radicale n'est qu'une version forte du "corrélationnisme" kantien qui insiste sur l'incontournabilité de la corrélation entre l'être et la pensée. Dans l'intérêt de la cohérence logique, soutient Meillassoux, la désabsolutisation postmétaphysique de la corrélation doit être menée au bout ; la corrélation doit se concevoir non seulement comme facticielle mais surtout comme radicalement contingente. Il s'agit pour Meillassoux de montrer que la pensée n'est nullement finie mais bien capable de penser l'être du point de vue d'un principe absolu, à savoir celui de la contingence absolu de tout être, y compris l'être de la pensée elle-même. Pour la pensée spéculative, sa propre fin, la fin de l'homme en tant qu'être pensant, n'est plus une limite infranchissable et eschatologique, mais un événement contingent et possible parmi les autres. Comme l'a souligné Ray Brassier dans Nihil Unbound (2007), cette stratégie introduit des nouvelles possibilités "nihilistes" pour la philosophie en faisant de la possible extinction de l'espèce humaine et de la fin du monde humain des thèmes philosophiquement pertinents. Néanmoins, Meillassoux entend montrer que le principe de la contingence absolue nous permet également de penser une nouvelle "fin de l'homme" au sens téléologique : avec la pensée spéculative, l'espoir eschatologique du fin du monde présent et de l'avènement (contingent) d'un nouveau monde de justice "divine" devient de nouveau, et d'une façon radicalement nouvelle, une attitude rationnelle et légitime.
En effet, c'est bien Kant qui est le précurseur le plus important du thème contemporain de la "fin de la métaphysique". En tant que fondateur de la philosophie critique, il est aussi, comme l'exprime Alain Badiou, "l'inventeur désastreux de notre ' finitude ' ". Pour les héritiers postmétaphysiques de Kant, surtout Heidegger, c'est justement l'acceptance de la finitude radicale (la facticité, la contextualité, la situationalité) de notre pensée, et de tout être donné à cette pensée, qui annonce la fin de la métaphysique "ontothéologique", préoccupée par la recherche d'un point de référence absolu (Dieu, subjectivité transcendantale) pour l'être et pour la pensée. Face à la possibilité constante de sa propre fin, la pensée humaine ne peut plus se vouloir absolue.
La présente conférence va étudier le récent "tournement spéculatif" de la philosophie, introduit surtout par Quentin Meillassoux dans Après la finitude (2006). Pour Meillassoux, la philosophie de la finitude radicale n'est qu'une version forte du "corrélationnisme" kantien qui insiste sur l'incontournabilité de la corrélation entre l'être et la pensée. Dans l'intérêt de la cohérence logique, soutient Meillassoux, la désabsolutisation postmétaphysique de la corrélation doit être menée au bout ; la corrélation doit se concevoir non seulement comme facticielle mais surtout comme radicalement contingente. Il s'agit pour Meillassoux de montrer que la pensée n'est nullement finie mais bien capable de penser l'être du point de vue d'un principe absolu, à savoir celui de la contingence absolu de tout être, y compris l'être de la pensée elle-même. Pour la pensée spéculative, sa propre fin, la fin de l'homme en tant qu'être pensant, n'est plus une limite infranchissable et eschatologique, mais un événement contingent et possible parmi les autres. Comme l'a souligné Ray Brassier dans Nihil Unbound (2007), cette stratégie introduit des nouvelles possibilités "nihilistes" pour la philosophie en faisant de la possible extinction de l'espèce humaine et de la fin du monde humain des thèmes philosophiquement pertinents. Néanmoins, Meillassoux entend montrer que le principe de la contingence absolue nous permet également de penser une nouvelle "fin de l'homme" au sens téléologique : avec la pensée spéculative, l'espoir eschatologique du fin du monde présent et de l'avènement (contingent) d'un nouveau monde de justice "divine" devient de nouveau, et d'une façon radicalement nouvelle, une attitude rationnelle et légitime.
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Research Interests:
Since the later Plato’s attempts to reappropriate the thought of the Eleatic master, Parmenides has been known primarily for the thesis that being is one. How this unity of being is to be understood remains, however, as problematic as it... more
Since the later Plato’s attempts to reappropriate the thought of the Eleatic master, Parmenides has been known primarily for the thesis that being is one. How this unity of being is to be understood remains, however, as problematic as it was for Plato. Using the “phenomenological” tradition of Parmenides scholarship (Karl Reinhardt, Martin Heidegger, Hans Schwabl, Mitchell Miller) as its main framework, this paper argues that the Parmenidean unity is not to be understood as that of a supremely existent “superentity.” Rather than a simple denial or reduction of the manifold reality of everyday experience, Parmenides’ Poem is an attempt to derive this relative level of discursively articulated perspectives or “acceptances” (Doxai) from a prediscursive experience of an absolute level of truth or evidence (Alētheia), consisting in pure intelligible presence.
This general argument is presented in the form of a close reading of three key passages in the Parmenides fragments. A reading of fragments B 16—which, it is argued against the traditional interpretation based on Theophrastus, can be read as part of the Alētheia part of the Poem—and B 4 reveals that the Parmenidean move from Doxai to Alētheia is the incorporation of all relative and determinate instances of temporal and spatial presence and absence in an absolute presence and accessibility for intuitive apprehending (noein). The being-ness (to eon) inherent in the manifold beings (ta eonta) is their intelligibility as such. A study of B 8.5–6 further shows that as absolute intelligibility, being is also the absolute temporal presence that precedes all tensed discourse. This indication of the unity of being as an undifferentiated and homogeneous presence prior to the heterogeneous plurality of differentiated entities, as phenomenality prior to phenomena, can be regarded as a “protometaphysical” prelude to the Platonic “metaphysics of presence” narrated by Heidegger.
This general argument is presented in the form of a close reading of three key passages in the Parmenides fragments. A reading of fragments B 16—which, it is argued against the traditional interpretation based on Theophrastus, can be read as part of the Alētheia part of the Poem—and B 4 reveals that the Parmenidean move from Doxai to Alētheia is the incorporation of all relative and determinate instances of temporal and spatial presence and absence in an absolute presence and accessibility for intuitive apprehending (noein). The being-ness (to eon) inherent in the manifold beings (ta eonta) is their intelligibility as such. A study of B 8.5–6 further shows that as absolute intelligibility, being is also the absolute temporal presence that precedes all tensed discourse. This indication of the unity of being as an undifferentiated and homogeneous presence prior to the heterogeneous plurality of differentiated entities, as phenomenality prior to phenomena, can be regarded as a “protometaphysical” prelude to the Platonic “metaphysics of presence” narrated by Heidegger.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
The paper first studies Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the role of ideology in totalitarianism and of the nature of an ideological “idea.” Arendt’s account is then contrasted with Alain Badiou’s attempt to redeem an ideological “politics of... more
The paper first studies Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the role of ideology in totalitarianism and of the nature of an ideological “idea.” Arendt’s account is then contrasted with Alain Badiou’s attempt to redeem an ideological “politics of the Idea.” It is argued that Arendt and Badiou are both concerned with articulating politics as a realm for the deployment of novelty in history, for the human capacity to transform the world through engagement in new ventures. However, their fundamental disagreement concerns the form of the activity that accomplishes this transformation. For Arendt, politics has the form of action (praxis), judged in terms of its inherent quality; for Badiou, politics is essentially a process of production (poiēsis) aiming at an ideal end beyond the political procedure itself. This is shown to have important ramifications for their notions of politics: Badiou’s “ideological” notion remains exposed to the Arendtian critique that the traditional instrumental conception of politics in terms of means and ideal ends is unable to exclude terror.
In a recent influential work (After Finitude, 2006), Quentin Meillassoux gives a novel account of “correlationism”—i.e., the idea that “we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term... more
In a recent influential work (After Finitude, 2006), Quentin Meillassoux gives a novel account of “correlationism”—i.e., the idea that “we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other”—as a predominant paradigm of post-Kantian philosophy. My paper studies Meillassoux’s analysis of correlationism as a critique of phenomenology, particularly of its Heideggerian version, which he regards as an ultimate, “strong” form of correlationism. Like Michel Foucault (The Order of Things, 1966), Meillassoux identifies Heidegger’s account of the constitutive significance of human mortality as the final breakdown of the Kantian and Husserlian transcendental projects. While retaining the correlation between being and thinking as the fundamental topic of philosophy, Heidegger radically divests philosophy of all claims to absoluteness or even universality by insisting on the factical, finite, and historically situated character of the correlation. According to Meillassoux’s core argument, Heidegger’s phenomenology of mortality and finitude entails not only the facticity but the ultimate contingency of human thinking and experience, thus implicitly committing itself to a non-phenomenological, “speculative” principle of absolute contingency. I conclude by critically studying the presuppositions of this argument as well as its implications for phenomenology.
In his later work, Heidegger’s elaborates a notion of the Western Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysical tradition as based on an approach to being (Sein) in terms of beings (das Seiende), i.e., as the absolutely universal being-ness... more
In his later work, Heidegger’s elaborates a notion of the Western Platonic-Aristotelian metaphysical tradition as based on an approach to being (Sein) in terms of beings (das Seiende), i.e., as the absolutely universal being-ness (Seiendheit) common to all determinate beings. In this paper, I will study Aristotle’s critique, particularly in Physics I.3, of Parmenides and Eleatic thought in the light of this Heideggerian notion. I argue that the premises of Aristotle’s critique demonstrate the essential difference between Aristotle’s metaphysical framework and what Heidegger regards as Parmenides’ “protometaphysical” approach. Parmenides seeks to “think being without beings,” i.e., to indicate being as such in the sense of the pure, indeterminate, and undifferentiated “is there/there is” (τὸ ἐὸν), as the intelligible accessibility or presence of meaningful reality to thinking, prior to its articulation into determinate beings. For Aristotle, on the contrary, “being itself” (αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν) has no other plausible meaning than “being-something-determinate as such” (τὸ ὅπερ ὄν τι)—“to be” has for him no other meaning than to be a specific, determinable substance or a specific, determinable attribute or modality of a substance.
With the help of Quentin Meillassoux’s (After Finitude, 2006) recent and influential account of the predominance of “correlationism”—i.e., the idea that “we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to... more
With the help of Quentin Meillassoux’s (After Finitude, 2006) recent and influential account of the predominance of “correlationism”—i.e., the idea that “we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other”—in Post-Kantian philosophy, the paper looks at Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger as representatives of the three main forms of correlationism distinguished by Meillassoux: (1) weak correlationism, (2) absolute idealism, and (3) strong correlationism. “Correlationism” largely coincides with “transcendental idealism.” However, while Heidegger’s fundamental ontology in many important ways builds upon and radicalizes the transcendental idealisms of Kant and Husserl, it also moves toward a break with the wider tradition of transcendental philosophy, of which transcendental idealism is only a final phase. As Meillassoux puts it, Heideggerian “strong correlationism” is an inherently “postmetaphysical” form of thought in the sense that it no longer points to any absolute principle. Like classical transcendental philosophers, Heidegger seeks to articulate the fundamental structures of reality insofar as it appears as meaningful. However, his later work can be understood as an attempt to do this in terms of the irreducible heterogeneity and context-specificity of concrete singular situations of meaningful presence, without referring them back to any “transcendental signified,” i.e., to a universally identical point of reference. I conclude by taking a critical look at Meillassoux’s argument that strong correlationism does, in fact, presuppose an absolute principle, namely, that of absolute contingency.
The paper will study the fragments of Parmenides’ Poem as a key expression of what Heidegger regards as the “first beginning” of Western thought. Against established doxography, I argue that Parmenides’ approach is basically... more
The paper will study the fragments of Parmenides’ Poem as a key expression of what Heidegger regards as the “first beginning” of Western thought. Against established doxography, I argue that Parmenides’ approach is basically phenomenological. Rather than a simple denial of the differentiated and manifold reality of everyday experience, the Poem is an ante litteram “transcendental reduction,” with the help of phenomenological “indications,” to a fundamental experience of an absolute level of philosophical evidence, consisting in a pure presence to awareness. Pure intelligible phenomenality as such, prior to particular and determinate phenomena, is regarded as simple, unique, and total. This experience involves an inaugural philosophical “crisis” in the literal sense: a de-cision (Greek krisis) in which presence is cut off from all relationships to any absolute un-presence, i.e., to that which cannot be directly intended in speech or thought. I finally contrast Parmenides’ decision with the decision (Ent-scheidung) faced by the later Heidegger’s “phenomenology of the unapparent.” Here, the crisis is no longer overcome: philosophy is compelled to dwell upon the differentiation as well as the indissoluble correlation between explicit presence to awareness and its respective implicit and withdrawing background context as the source of finite and situated contextual meaningfulness.
The paper reconsiders Derrida’s attempts to identify, in Heidegger’s works, instances of “logocentrism,” a hallmark feature of the traditional “metaphysics of presence” as Derrida understands it. Through a comparison with the Aristotelian... more
The paper reconsiders Derrida’s attempts to identify, in Heidegger’s works, instances of “logocentrism,” a hallmark feature of the traditional “metaphysics of presence” as Derrida understands it. Through a comparison with the Aristotelian notion of logos, Derrida’s somewhat ambivalent notion of logocentrism is interpreted to mean the attribution of an absolute center—a “transcendental signified”—to discourse. However, the later Heidegger’s interpretation of logos as “reading” or “collecting” (Lese), together with his Proto-Derridean reference to Being as an original difference, suggests that he is concerned precisely with a “textual” notion of a discursivity, based on referentiality and differentiation and lacking an ultimate reference point. I conclude that Derrida and Heidegger ultimately share a post-logocentric, radically contextual view of discursive meaning.
Dieser Aufsatz erörtert Heideggers Auffassung vom ‚metaphysischen‘ Charakter des abendländischen Humanismus mittels einer Hervorhebung einiger Grundzüge der Geschichte des philosophischen Bildungsbegriffes. Nach Heidegger sind die... more
Dieser Aufsatz erörtert Heideggers Auffassung vom ‚metaphysischen‘ Charakter des abendländischen Humanismus mittels einer Hervorhebung einiger Grundzüge der Geschichte des philosophischen Bildungsbegriffes. Nach Heidegger sind die Bildungsideale der europäischen Humanismen von den metaphysischen Grundauffassungen vom idealen Sein des Seienden bestimmt. Außerdem ist für Heidegger der Bildungsbegriff mit der Tradition der Bildmetaphysik – sowohl mit der platonisch-christlichen Vorstellung des Menschen als Abbild eines göttlichen Vorbilds als auch mit der neuzeitlich-subjektivistischen ‚Eroberung der Welt als Bild‘ – verbunden. Schließlich wird die Möglichkeit eines Heideggerschen nachmetaphysischen, nicht mehr ‚idealistischen‘ Bildungsbegriffes mit Rücksicht auf seinen späteren Begriff des ‚Wohnens‘ behandelt.
I invited several experienced readers of Heidegger to submit brief statements on the topic of presence, and to compose even briefer reflections after reading each other’s initial statements. Their texts are followed by a few words from me... more
I invited several experienced readers of Heidegger to submit brief statements on the topic of presence, and to compose even briefer reflections after reading each other’s initial statements. Their texts are followed by a few words from me on the theme. The questions for this symposium are: Do we need an alternative to presence as an understanding of being? If not, why not? If so, why, and what could the alternative be?