Ontotheology

Resumo: O artigo investiga o problema da teologia na filosofia crítica da Kant. Para tal, parte-se de uma determinação geral desse problema tal como recebido pela própria disciplina teológica para então se desenvolver as críticas kantianas às diferentes formas de saber teológico, da ontoteologia à ético-teologia. Nesse contexto, especial atenção é dada à ontoteologia devido à sua centralidade na argumentação de Kant. Por fim, reflete-se sobre o conceito, as determinações e os impasses da teologia (e conseguintemente da metafísica) em um ambiente filosófico pós-crítico. Palavras-chave: teologia; filosofia crítica; provas da existência de Deus; prova ontológica; fideísmo.

The text will try to show that the concept of “possibility” by John Duns Scotus plays a major role in the new way in which metaphysics begins to be considered, namely its transformation from ontotheology to ontology. Scotus is focusing his argument of God’s existence on the cross point between logic, ontology and the limits of natural reason. The stress that the Doctor Subtilisputs on the boundary of natural human intellect becomes later a major philosophical problem, reconsidered by the scotistic metaphysical tradition and later by the critical theory of Immanuel Kant.
We aim to demonstrate, that the epistemological teaching of Scotus should not be reduced simply to logics, because it has “ontological implications”, that are allowing him to make metaphysical conclusions with the help of arguments, based only on natural reasoning. We examine the usage of the concepts possibility and necessity, the logical law of Scotus and his argument on existence of God and show that the ontological implications within the logical argumentation of the Scottish master allow him to make metaphysical conclusions, which results into the shift between ontotheology to ontology, where the first known by the intellect is maintained to be the univocal concept of being qua being, that is marking the positive boundary of human natural intellect, where logic and ontology coincide and build the ground for metaphysics, understood as scientiatranscendens.


Keywords: Scholasticism; John Duns Scotus; Scotism; High Middle Ages; medieval philosophy; ontology; ontotheology; scientiatranscendens; metaphysics; possibility; modal theory; critical theory; logic.

Metafisika sebagai ontoteologi adalah dasar dari pemikiran Heidegger. Ontologi sebagai Ilmu yang memahami tentang Ada menurut Heidegger harus dipahami dalam teologi, yaitu sebagai sumber tertinggi dari segala sesuatu tentang Ada. Paper ini menjelaskan tentang pemikiran Heidegger tentang dekonstruksi sejarah tradisi metafisika yang menurutnya sebaiknya dipahami sebagai ontoteologi.

“ ‘POETS TELL MANY A LIE’: RADICAL ORTHODOXY’S POETIC HISTORIES”
Canadian Evangelical Review: Journal of the Canadian Evangelical Theological Society 26-27 (Spring 2004): 35-64.

POIÊSIS: CHRISTIAN AND POSTMODERN
As my title indicates I propose to describe and evaluate Radical Orthodoxy where it locates itself, as a form of postmodern Poiêsis. John Milbank connects Poiêsis and postmodern Christianity as follows:

If art as redemption … is modernity’s own antidote to modernity, then poesis may be the key … to a postmodern theology.  Poesis ... is an integral aspect of Christian practice and redemption.  Its work is the ceaseless re-narrating and ‘explaining’ of human history under the sign of the cross.

In another essay, he tells us:

[P]ractice cannot claim to ‘know’ the finality of what it treats as final. ... We know what we want to know, and although all desiring is an ‘informed’ desiring, desire shapes truth beyond the immanent implications of any logical order, so rendering the Christian logos a continuous product as well as a process of ‘art’.

The end of modernity ... means the end of a single system of truth based on universal reason, which tells us what reality is like.  2. [T]heology .. no longer has to measure up to accepted secular standards of scientific truth or normative rationality. ... 4. ... the point is not to ‘represent’ .. externality, but just to join in its occurrence, not to know, but to intervene, originate.

Before describing Radical Orthodoxy and its poiêsis, we should begin by thinking about poetry, Christianity, and religion in a way that Radical Orthodoxy would generally approve. The divine - human poetry essential to Christianity and, mutatis mutandis, to religion generally is:
a) first, simply liturgy, roughly the prayer of the religious community, which embraces everything from the dance of cultic movement, hymns, and music to architecture, as well as the verbal prose and poetry we ordinarily associate with liturgy,
b) second, the myth-making or story-telling which is reflected in but by no means confined to what is called Holy Scripture, and includes the stories of the saints great and small, and recounting the on-going supernatural or miraculous (the non prosaic), revelation which constitutes the Church,
c) third, making and being the Church, which is everything from entrance into, life in, and extension of the sacred community, the edifying care it extends to its members, to humanity, and to the world as the steward of God’s reign, and even extends to the projection of its appropriate political communities (“states”) both as the secularization of the church and as its antipode.
It is easily seen that poiêsis is the normal and ordinary religious activity, perhaps even the essential character of religious life. Although some of the language I have used here is current, John Milbank is not wrong to see Patristic and Medieval Christian writers representing the life of the Church as poetic in the ways I have listed. Certainly, the Radically Orthodox are right to judge that these forms of poiêsis are united in works of Christian theology within the Platonic tradition like the Confessions of Augustine (especially when the first ten books are considered in light of the last three) and the Periphyseon of John Scottus Eriugena. Radical Orthodoxy is the reassertion of what is normal in the present circumstances. As such it should be and would be unremarkable.
Radical Orthodoxy, however, is neither unremarkable nor uncontroversial because it self-consciously makes this reassertion in the context of what we may generally identify as a Heideggerian understanding of our world, and of the role of philosophy in constructing it. Within the metaphysics of the will to power which, for Heidegger, constructs modernity and concluded metaphysics as a whole, the West witnessed the death of God, and either endeavoured to annihilate religion and the gods as a consequence, or ushered them to the ineffectual margins. Heidegger assumes the death, witnesses to it, and seeks in poiêsis a way beyond it.  In fact, we now face the survival of both religion and the gods, and we witness the return of gods who have immunized themselves from the rationality of the old metaphysics. As a result, much at the end of the last millennium and in the beginning of the new may make us ask whether it is poetry as religion, or whether it is rather modernity itself that are the more embattled in the postmodern world, and, therefore, whether the mixture of assertive arrogance and defensiveness which so mutilates Radical Orthodoxy is the right reaction of Christian theology to the present. However, the fact that it may come as a surprise to many that religion generally, and Christianity particularly, count as poiêsis and, indeed, the primary poiêsis, makes Radical Orthodoxy’s reassertion of these against modernity of some real importance and use.

Parmenides had identified speech and thought with Being itself, but could not explain the contrary opposition between Non-Being inscribed in every determination of Being. Heraclitus purported to explain this opposition as the coincidence of contrary opposite properties in all beings, but could not explain the possibility of non-contradictory knowledge of beings. Socrates answered that, by exposing and rejecting false definitions, we might come to know the definitions of all beings; and Plato individuated Parmenides’ Being into a plentitude of universal Ideas, each of which perfectly unites the thought and being of some predicate-property. Plato’s logic of Ideas may re-construct Aristotle’s syllogistic logic on the basis of universal Ideas of subject and predicate terms, which flow from universal Ideas to particular instances according to the higher-order Ideas of the laws of logic. This logic of Ideas is grounded, unlike Aristotle’s formal logic, in Plato’s ‘unwritten’ ontology: the original opposition of the One and the Dyad is mixed in the Triad to generate the numerical dyad, the Idea-numbers, and all complex mathematical and geometrical forms which comprise the World-Soul. This original opposition of the Dyad motivates the division of genera into many species, as well as the exclusion, opposition, and contradiction between the various assumptions of Socratic dialectic; even as the One unites these differences into ever richer triadic mixtures.

Derrida’s deconstructive strategy of reading texts can be understood as a way of highlighting the irreducible plurality of discursive meaning that undermines the traditional Western “logocentric” desire for an absolute point of reference. While his notion of logocentrism was modeled on Heidegger’s articulation of the traditional ontotheological framework of Aristotelian metaphysics, Derrida detects a logocentric remnant in Heidegger’s own interpretation of gathering (Versammlung) as the basic movement of logos, discursiveness. However, I suggest that Derrida here touches upon a certain limit of deconstruction. As Derrida himself points out, the “decentering” effect of deconstruction does not simply abolish the unifying and focalizing function of discourse. Insofar as deconstruction involves reading and interpreting, it cannot completely evade narrative focalization. Rather, both Heidegger and Derrida can be understood as addressing the radical contextuality of all discursive centers and focal points as well as the consequent impossibility of an ultimate and definitive metanarrative.

The Heideggerian account of the ontotheological constitution of Western metaphysics has been extremely influential for contemporary philosophy of religion and for philosophical perspectives on theology and the divine. This paper introduces and contrasts two central strategies for approaching the question of the divine in a non- or post-ontotheological manner. The first and more established approach is that of post-Heideggerian hermeneutics and deconstruction, inspired by Heidegger’s suggestion of a “theology without the word ‘being’ ” and by his later notions of an “ultimate god” and of “divinities” as one of the four axes of the fourfold (Geviert). Here, the divine is no longer articulated in terms of the supreme or absolute being, but as one of the interdependent dimensions of finite and contextual meaningful presence. The more recent approach introduced by Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux dissociates itself from the Heideggerian hermeneutics of finitude and adopts mathematics as its basic ontological model. Rather than focusing on meaning and sense, Badiou and Meillassoux replace ontotheological metaphysics with materialist frameworks. With regard to the divine, this approach leads either to a contemporary version of atheism (Badiou) or to the reintroduction of a divine entity, but now a merely possible and contingent one (Meillassoux).

Recent developments within phenomenology have brought to light the indebtedness of phenomenological scientific philosophy to Ancient Greek philosophy. The recent trend that builds on the ancient precedents found in the theories of forms, for example, has demonstrated the importance of the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle for contemporary manifestations of the development of phenomenological eidetic science. This thesis builds on three parallel developments in the phenomenology of time that equally indicate the significance of the ancient Hellenic exact mathematical science of spherical cosmology for the further propagation of phenomenological philosophy. The hypothesis of the infinite sphere gives phenomenology an external foundation capable of accounting for the constitution of the phenomenal universe, possible worlds, and the harmonic continuum of life spanning the inner and outer cosmos. Phenomenological cosmology offers a unified metaphysical framework for first philosophy and the special sciences, with particularly interesting implications for empirical cosmology and theoretical physics. Phenomenology of the spheres brings these phenomenological cosmological insights together in the geometric comprehension of the infinite sphere.

Merold Westphal's new publication, Kierkegaard's Concept of Faith, gives us an opportunity to explore the many ways in which Kierkegaard has influenced Westphal's thinking as a whole. This present contribution seeks to show how Kierkegaard helps Westphal discover a concept of faith which holds no 'reasonable' foundation as it is entirely dependent upon two diierent aspects of revelation in tension with each other. Moreover, faith is seen as a willing assent by the believer, and thus it becomes a task and not merely a proposition to behold or to which one's life conforms. In addition to explicating this notion of faith within his work, this present contribution seeks to situate this faith within Westphal's philosophy of religion, showing how it is integral to Westphal's entire project. Westphal's most recent text, Kierkegaard's Concept of Faith, is an astounding text which explores how Kierkegaard develops his notion of faith through three pseudonyms (Johannes Silentio, Johannes Climacus, and Anti-Climacus) and their respective texts. The work itself is scholarly and sticks closely to the texts. While he does show in various places how Kierkegaard's concept of faith relates to contemporary issues in philosophy and theology, such as the critique of onto-theology, Westphal displays great restraint by never furthering these points beyond pointing toward how Kierkegaard's concepts are still relevant. However,

With reference to Heidegger's history of being, this paper offers a critical examination of the political thinking of Alain Badiou, focused on his appropriation of St Paul as thinker of subjectivity. Badiou seeks to integrate Paul's "theological virtues" of faith, hope, and charity into a revolutionary philosophy of an "uprising" against the technological determination of mankind and nature, understood as the destiny  of metaphysics.

This article examines the extent to which two of Meister Eckhart's Latin writings fall prey to Heidegger's charge of ontotheology. It argues that the intellectualist, 'meontological' approach to God in Eckhart's First Parisian Question and the analogical, ontological approach in his Opus tripartitum are not as different as may initially appear. Not only do both rest on Eckhart's peculiar doctrine of analogy; both serve to dismantle the ontotheological architecture. Indeed, rather than an intellectualist alternative to ontotheology, Eckhart's First Parisian Question presents a meticulously crafted dialectic designed to explode rational distinctions. Rather than a traditional account of God as the highest being, Eckhart's Opus tripartitum obliterates hierarchies with its appeal to treat all being as God. Still, although both approaches contribute to an appreciation of Eckhart's principal concern—the basic unity of the soul and the Godhead in Gelassenheit—neither suffices for unfolding its deepest implications. An ontotheological residue remains.

Jakiej filozofii warto być wiernym, zwłaszcza w sofistopolis? Prolegomena do książki Seweryna Blandziego Między aletejologią Parmenidesa a ontoteologią Filona

Artykuł unaocznia potrzebę wierności kilku ponadczasowym postulatom filozofii, które pobrzmiewają głośnym echem w książce Seweryna Blandziego Między aletejologią Parmenidesa a ontoteologią Filona. Służąc bezinteresownie prawdzie, rzetelny historyk filozofii musi – zarówno w samym sobie, jak i w kręgu osób sobie najbliższych – pielęgnować nie tylko dar uważnej obserwacji, bez którego nie nabywa nikt mądrości, lecz i cnotę męstwa, bez którego ani w czynie, ani w słowie nie znajduje mądrość odzwierciedlenia.
Słynne pytanie Leopolda von Rankego: Wie es eigentlich gewesen? powinien każdy współczesny badacz historii filozofii rozszerzyć: (1) jako filolog – do postaci: Wie es eigentlich geschrieben ist?; (2) jako filozof – do problemu: Wie es eigentlich gemeint ist? Jak długo historia filozofii będzie się wyrzekać ambicji ustalania jasnych i jednoznacznych odpowiedzi na pytania tego rodzaju, tak długo nie wydźwignie się z kryzysu, w jaki popadła zakwestionowawszy wartość i status prawdy.

***

What kind of philosophy is deserving of our loyalty – especially in the sophistopolis? Prolegomena to Seweryn Blandzi’s book Between Parmenides’ Aletheiology and Philo’s of Alexandria Ontotheology

The article reveals that one must be faithful to several timeless demands of philosophy, demands that resound loudly in Seweryn Blandzi’s book Between Parmenides’ Aletheiology and Philo’s of Alexandria Ontotheology. Serving the truth selflessly, a reliable historian of philosophy ought – both in himself and in the circle of his intimates – cultivate not only the gift of careful observation, without which nobody acquires wisdom, but also the virtue of courage, without which wisdom will not be expressed in deed or in word.
Every modern researcher of the history of philosophy should broaden the famous question of Leopold von Ranke: Wie es eigentlich gewesen?: (1) as a philologist – to the form: Wie es eigentlich geschrieben ist?; (2) as a philosopher – to the problem: Wie es eigentlich gemeint ist? As long as the history of philosophy abdicates from providing clear and unambiguous answers to questions of this kind, it will not overcome the crisis it suffered after questioning the value and status of truth.

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Słowa kluczowe:
Seweryn Blandzi, filozofia starożytna, Heraklit, Parmenides, Platon, Arystoteles, von Ranke, Heidegger, aletejologia, prawda, ontoteologia, byt, Bóg, hermeneutyka filozoficzna

Keywords:
Seweryn Blandzi, ancient philosophy, Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, von Ranke, Heidegger, aletheiology, truth, ontotheology, being, God, philosophical hermeneutics

Neste artigo sáo apresentadas as origens do diagnóstico crítico de Heidegger sobre a constituiçáo ontoteológica da metafísica. Argumenta-se que o diagnóstico realiza-se já no período imediatamente posterior à publicaçáo de Ser e tempo (1927), especialmente por meio de uma reinterpretaçáo da filosofia primeira de Aristóteles delineada na preleçáo do semestre de veráo de 1928 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz e consumada nos Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (1929/30). Mostra-se como Heidegger identifica o que se pode denominar uma interpretaçáo bipartida do ente: a bifurcaçáo da interpretaçáo do ente nos questionamentos sobre o ente como ente (ontologia) e o ente no todo (teologia). Por fim, argumenta-se que a reinterpretaçáo da metafísica da tradiçáo como ontoteologia associa-se inicialmente a uma virada metafísica, cuja implicaçáo é um projeto de filosofia denominado metafísica do Dasein, orientador das tarefas de pesquisa de Heidegger no período de 1927-1930.

In the light of Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as the “forgetfulness of being,” I explain and defend Lonergan’s “transcendental notion of being,” which I argue gives us an understanding of Lonergan’s achievement that may be suitably characterised as the “remembering of being.” I revisit Lonergan’s response to the criticisms of a leading Heidegger scholar, William Richardson, and show how certain key distinctions (regarding the notion and concept of being) may help us get some insight into Lonergan’s strategy in Insight. I end by considering Lonergan’s remote and proximate criteria for truth.

PIRES, Frederico Pieper. Ontology, Theology and Metaphysics in Martin Heidegger’s Transcendental Project. 2013. 259f. Thesis (Doctoral) — Faculdade de Filosofia, Letras e Ciências Humanas. Departamento de Filosofia, Universidade de São Paulo, São Paulo, 2013.


This thesis aims to show how the notion of ontotheology is a concept that indicates important movement in Heidegger's thinking in the early 1930s. To do so, we start with the analysis of the tension between ontology and theology emphasized by Heidegger in his phenomenological interpretations of ancient philosophy. From 1927, when he is engaged with the project of laying ground of metaphysics from the finitude of Dasein, this tension is incorporated in the concept of metaphysics, understood as knowledge of beings as such and as a whole. However, due to the conflict that breaks out between the increasing emphasis on the finitude of Dasein and the universalist pretensions of metaphysics, that becomes evident with the confrontation with Hegel, Heidegger abandons this transcendental perspective of a scientific metaphysics. The expression ontotheology is indicative of the abandoning of this project by pointing out the metaphysic’s failure to consider the finitude of Dasein properly and simultaneously to promote an overlap between ontic and ontological.

The essay deals with a passage of De Antiquissima Italorum sapientia in which Vico, inverting a well-known thesis placed at the beginning of Aristotle's De interpretatione, sketches a semantic-linguistic conception of the human mind. In the same passage, Vico establishes a singular relationship between the human mind and the divine mind, according to which God's thought is analogous to the asemantic way of reading the words that is proper to the child in the learning phase of reading. The reason for this analogy is to be traced back to the Cartesian problem of the regula veri: the "asemantic signs" of the child's mind, since they are not representations of something, satisfy the condition of infallibility on which any criterion of truth stands or falls.

In this article I attempt to present Heidegger's conception of the ontotheology in his late thought. I based mainly on his famous book "Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)." In ontotheology Heidegger needs the figure of "the last god" to show the very path to being itself. It is not the God of religion, but the proper god of metaphysics, the god of other beginning, which using a sign (Wink) points Dasein the right direction. It seems to be a key to the meaning of ontotheology itself. The problem of ontotheology is presented against the backdrop of several of the most important contexts of Heidegger's thought manifested in "Contributions...": the problem of being itself and the path to it or the problem of the last god and his sign.

Robert Rauschenberg is a well-known case of critique of
Abstract Expressionism. The targeted main tenet is that the
unique gestural trace of the Abstract Expressionist cannot be
repeated. Rauschenberg performs experiments to test the tenet,
experiments he would name <Erased de Kooning Drawing>
and <Factum I, II>, where his repetitions work to split the
absolute singularity of the expressed. What is revealed to be
singular is the fact of having repeated and that the third party
must capture a difference out of this repetition. The ‘first
difference’ born out of ‘my own’ repetition becomes expanded
through crudely mixed media installations among which figures
his signature <Combines> series as well as in Pop, Minimalism
and more largely Conceptualism. Meanwhile, his <White
Paintings>, considered to be of seminal importance have long
been interpreted as a neo-avant-garde critique of modernism and
formalism by the likes of Hal Foster and Branden W. Joseph,
and explained through the Deleuzian philosophy of difference.
This article offers an alternative viewpoint by arguing that his
repetitions originate from his “theological” works intended to
break from the (Deleuzian) theater of difference and intensity
and also by focusing on his transcendentalism in works such as <First-time Painting>.

로버트 라우셴버그는 추상표현주의를 비판한 작가로 잘 알려
져 있다. 그가 비판한 추상표현주의의 주장은 작가에게만 고유한 행위의
흔적은 절대 사후 반복될 수 없다는 것이다. 라우셴버그는 이 주장을 실
험에 부쳐 <지워진 드 쿠닝의 그림>과 <사실 I, II>을 통해 추상표현
주의, 더 크게는 추상예술이 그토록 옹호하는 주체 행위의 절대성을 반
복 실험으로 분화시킨다. 여기서 절대적인 것은 반복 이후 남는 흔적의
고유성이 아닌 나의 의도가 반복되었다는 사실 그 자체이며, 제삼자는
반복된 흔적에서 차이를 찾을 수밖에 없다는 사실도 함께 드러난다. 이
실험들에서 발견되는 ‘나만의’ 반복으로서의 작품 제시, 그리고 거기에서
발생하는 ‘최초의 차이’는 라우셴버그를 널리 알린 <콤바인>과 같은 매
체 혼합 작업을 통해 확산되며, 이 레디메이드적 혼합은 이후 미니멀리
즘과 팝은 물론 개념예술에 지대한 영향을 끼친다. 이러한 일련의 과정
들의 근원이라 평가되어온 <백색 회화> 등은 할 포스터와 브랜든 조셉
과 같은 학자들에 의해 모더니즘과 형식주의에 대한 네오아방가르드적 비판으로 읽혀왔으며, 들뢰즈의 차이의 철학을 통해 해석되어 왔다. 그
의 반복 실험에서 발견되는 차이는 혼합과 확산 작용으로 예술과 산업
사회 간의 무한한 전유 가능성을 열어젖히는 중요한 근거다. 그러나 본
논문은 이 반복 실험의 근원을 차이짓기를 벗어나려는 “신학적” 작품들
에서 찾고, 그의 <처음 하는 회화> 등에서 엿볼 수 있는 초월성을 근거
로 그의 예술에 대한 새로운 해석을 제시하려 한다.

Conor Husbands' defense and expansion of Elena Esposito's temporality of finance is a much-needed intervention. However, in this response essay, I will show a few of the fundamental weaknesses of Esposito's project, and by extension will highlight some shortcomings of Husbands' defense-expansion. The point is not to dismiss either project; the goal is rather to bring attention to certain philosophical presuppositions that ground both, and that enclose each in what Markus Gabriel would call an ontotheological orientation. In short, Esposito and Husbands operate via an orientation that attempts to think 'the world' as an all-encompassing domain, despite claims to the contrary. How this occurs will be explained below, paying particular attention to the stakes of thinking from such an ontotheological orientation in and to the world. After first presenting Husbands' argument, I develop some critiques of Esposito and Husbands via the work of Suhail Malik, Ray Brassier, Elie Ayache, Jon Roffe, and Quentin Meillassoux. I then open the aperture towards emerging trends in philosophy that contest the foundations upon which Esposito's project is built, in order to suggest more robust readings of finance and society. The work of Sergei Prozorov and Markus Gabriel will be the focus here, but these thinkers merely serve as stand-ins for larger trends in speculative-and neo-realism.

Деконструктивизм объявляет войну многовековой традиции европейской онто-теологии. Что это значит для христианской богословской рефлексии? Возможно ли позитивное богословское творчество в эпоху краха глобальных нарративов? В пред-ложенной статье мы даем перечень наиболее известных рецепций постметафизической мысли постструктурализма представителями христианской теологии.

A. S. Volchkov
POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIAN METAPHYSICS // Poststructuralism declares war on the tradition of European philosophical metaphysics. What does it mean to Christian theology? Is it possible to produce positive theological knowledge at times, when " all grand narratives died " (Lyotard)? In this article, we present an outline of all receptions of poststructuralist post-metaphysics thought by Christian theologians.

I review and briefly comment on Jean Vioulac's recently translated monograph, "Apocalypse of Truth: Heideggerian Meditations." I argue that the book's main claim, that kenosis offers an alternative ontology to the one critiqued by Heidegger as "metaphysical," offers interesting vistas while leaving kenosis conceptually and historically underdeveloped.

There has been no challenge to ‘the tradition of philosophy’ in contemporaneity: philosophy has since evolved past the criticisms of the twentieth century. Indeed, contemporary philosophy is such a diverse pursuit that it is impossible to identify ‘the tradition of philosophy’. There is, however, an ontological philosophic metatradition. This ontological philosophy is inchoate, lacking a meontological pole. This pole can be provided by the spirituality of the east in the form of the philosophy of the Kyoto School, but first, philosophy must recognise this Zen meontology as ‘philosophy’ (哲学) rather than some other ‘thought’ (思想史).

This is my contribution to published symposium on the thesis of Dieter Hattrup concerning Bonaventure's *On the Reduction of the Arts to Theology*. Hattrup notoriously has argued that the *Reduction* cannot be a work of Bonaventure's because its theological vision is inconsistent with the Seraphic Doctor's other works.  I am grateful for Hattrup's question, but I aim to defend the consistency of Bonaventure's *Reduction* within his larger oeuvre.  The implications of what might seem like a petty medievalists' squabble over manuscripts and dating are significant for larger questions of faith and reason.  So my article is an appreciative theological refutation, of sorts.

O presente texto divide-se em quatro partes e uma conclusão. Na primeira
parte, consideramos a crítica de Tillich ao supranaturalismo e ao teísmo
e a sua superação no “teísmo transcendido” e na “fé absoluta”, que se
expressa na metáfora do “Deus acima de Deus”. A crítica do teísmo exige
uma reinterpretação das chamadas “provas da existência de Deus”, objeto
da segunda parte. A terceira parte pretende mostrar que só se pode falar
de Deus numa linguagem simbólica, mas que os símbolos do divino se
fundamentam no conceito não simbólico de “ser-em-si” (being itself).
Na quarta parte, discutimos a concepção ontológica de Deus em Tillich,
as dificuldades que ela apresenta e as possibilidades que ela oferece em
vista de uma superação da ontoteologia em que se apoiou a maior parte
da teologia cristã. Enfim, na conclusão, procuramos mostrar a antecipação,
no pensamento de Tillich, do projeto de uma espiritualidade leiga, sem
crenças, sem religiões, sem deuses (Marià Corbí).
This text is divided into four sections and a conclusion. In the first part,
we consider the criticism of Tillich to Supranaturalism and to Theism,
and its overcoming in the “transcended theism” and on “absolute faith”,
which is expressed in the metaphor of “God above God”. The criticism
of Theism requires a reinterpretation of the so-called “proof of the existence
of God”, object of the second part. The third part intends to showthat one can only speak of God in means of a symbolic language, but
the symbols of the divine are based on the non-symbolic concept of
“being-itself”. In the fourth part, we discuss the ontological conception
of God in Tillich, the difficulties that it presents and the possibilities that
it offers to an overrun of ontotheology in which the majority of Christian
theology is found of. At least, in the conclusion, we show the anticipation
of a spirituality project, lay, without beliefs, without religions, without
gods (Marià Corbí) within Tillich’s thought.

The existence of God is one of most fundamental themes which has always theologically and philosophically debated. From those context, Jean-Luc Marion has argued that it is mistaken and useless to prove the existence of God. Therefore, he proposes a new method to talk about God phenomenologically. In order to do so, he has constructed his notion on Heidegger's ontotheology critics in history of Western metaphysics, and wanted to overcome Heidegger's "Being." As a result, Marion's phenomenology emphasizes alterity which is divine and ineffable. Marion has argued that the icon speaks of vision of God that does not describe or even see the divine, but instead opens itself to God's generous self-giving. In fact, the gaze is returned not as the idolatrous, as is the case for the idol, but as a being envisaged by the divine. The icon therefore provides an encounter with God that does not reduce the divine to a mere concept or an image of oneself.

In this article I attempt to present Heidegger&#39;s conception of the ontotheology in his late thought. I based mainly on his famous book “Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning).” In ontotheology Heidegger needs the figure of “the last god” to show the very path to being itself. It is not the God of religion, but the proper god of metaphysics, the god of other beginning, which using a sign (Wink) points Dasein the right direction. It seems to be a key to the meaning of ontotheology itself. The problem of ontotheology is presented against the backdrop of several of the most important contexts of Heidegger&#39;s thought manifested in “Contributions...”: the problem of being itself and the path to it or the problem of the last god and his sign.

Editio princeps of Peter Thomae’s De ente

It is generally acknowledged by historians of philosophy that medieval philosophers made key contributions to the discussion of the problem of being and the fundamental issues of metaphysics. The Quaestiones de ente of Peter Thomae, composed at Barcelona ca. 1325, is the longest medieval work devoted to the problem of being as well as the most systematic. The work is divided into three parts: the concept of being, the attributes of being, and the descent of being. Many of the philosophical tools that Peter pioneered in this work, such as the distinction between objective being and subjective being, and various modes of quiddities and abstraction, were adopted by later thinkers and discussed up to the eighteenth century. Apart from defending and further extending Scotistic doctrine, one of Peter’s achievements in the De ente is to fully reconcile Scotistic univocity with the traditional doctrine of the analogy of being.

In addition to the critical edition, the present volume also contains a detailed introduction and study of the philosophy and the manuscripts of the De ente, with an appendix containing the question on univocity by Francis Marbres (John the Canon), who copied extensively from the De ente.