Neo-Eurasianism

Throughout the course of human history, the idea of great continents have been subjected to contention and debate. The word 'Continent' does not represents the natural and objective division of the land surface, as a substitute, the idea of 'Continent' is a discursive object, which encompasses history, specific patterns of society, and signifies the existence of unique civilization. In this regard, the word 'Continent' is not a pure geographical concept rather a meta-geographical phenomenon. Moreover, in the meta-geographical version, the idea of the great continents such as Greater Europe, Great West and Greater Eurasia has been mystified, mythologized and imagined on ontological, civilizational and messianic grounds. When it comes to the idea of 'Greater Eurasia', it was the intellectual contribution of famous Eurasianists such as Nikolai Berdyaev, Vladimir Soloviev, Nikolay Danilevsky, Lev Gumilev and Alexander Dugin, who had developed the ideology of Eurasianism or the idea of Eurasia. These scholars have concealed the idea of Eurasia across political, social, theological, cultural, economic and civilizational spheres. Moreover, all these intellectuals were Russians, who pioneered the idea of 'Greater Eurasia' from the geographical standpoint. Basically, it was the concept of 'Russian Idea' with its spiritual orientation, coined by the Russian philosopher Nikolai Berdyaev that surrounded the Eurasian ideology by adjoining Russian Universalism with Russian particularism. As Berdyaev asserted; "the whole Russian idea declares Russians as people belonging to religious type and are religious in their spiritual make-up". Among the Eurasianists, it was the nineteenth century's Russian philosopher and intellectual Nikolay Danilevsky (1822-1885), who had developed the idea of Eurasia surrounding the cultural and spiritual lines.

In the wake of the 2014 Ukrainian revolution and Russia’s subsequent war on Ukraine, Russian political thinker Aleksandr Dugin has become an object of many western analyses of Russia’s foreign policy. Various media have called Dugin “the mad mystic who inspired Russia’s leader” or “Putin’s brain”. Indeed, the man behind Russia’s Neo-Eurasianism has received significant attention and his ideas have evidently entered mainstream political thought.

Bu kitabımızda Rusya ve Türkiye’nin Avrasya medeniyeti kurabilme imkânlarını mümkün olduğunca anlatmaya çalıştık. Elbette iki ülke Avrasya coğrafyasında yüzlerce yıldır rekabet içerisinde bulunmuşlardır. Fakat 21. yüzyıl iki ülkeyi beraber hareket etmeye ve ortak strateji üretmeye zorlamaktadır. Karşılıklı güven bunalımı yaşayan iki ülkenin Avrasya’da ortak medeniyet kurabilmesi önündeki engeller ve ihtimaller de bu kitapta ele alınmıştır. İlginize sunulur. .



Zbigniew Brzezinski’nin de dediği gibi Avrasya, küresel üstünlük mücadelesinin oynandığı bir satranç tahtasıdır ve mücadele jeopolitik çıkarların stratejik idaresini de içermektedir. 1940’lı yıllarda Adolf Hitler ve Joseph Stalin’in de üzerinde anlaşmaya vardıkları gibi Avrasya dünyanın merkezidir ve onu kontrol eden dünyayı da kontrol eder. Avrasya, 21. yüzyılın mücadele bölgesi olmaya adaydır. Rusya bu mücadelede başarısız BDT denemesinden sonra Avrasya Ekonomi Birliğini kurmuştur. Çin ise Yeni İpek Yolu Ekonomi Kuşağı Projesi ile bu yarışa dâhil olmuştur. Türkiye’nin de içinde bulunduğu Türk Konseyi ve ABD’nin Büyük Orta Asya Projesi Avrasya’nın diğer alternatifleridir. Günümüzde Rusya’nın dış politikasını yönlendiren Avrasyacılık aynı zamanda yeni dünyada Rusların kimlik arayışı çabasıdır. Rus Avrasyacılarının asıl planı Avrupa ve Asya’nın jeopolitik çıkarlar gereği birleşmesi sayesinde ABD öncülüğündeki NATO’nun etkisizleştirilmesidir. Rusya bu politikasını uygurlaken Türkiye’nin de kendisi ile birlikte hareket etmesini istemektedir. Avrasyacılık, Türkiye’de yeniden gündem olduğu gibi ABD/Avrupa’da da bir tehdit olarak algılanmaya başlanmıştır.



Türkiye’de son dönemde Türkiye, Rusya ve İran’ın bir araya gelerek Büyük Avrasya’yı kurmaları gerektiğini savunanlar olmuştur. Fakat Rusya’daki Avrasyacılar, Avrasya Birliği stratejileri içerisinde İran ve Orta Asya ülkelerini değerlendirirken Türkiye’yi dışarıda bırakmışlardır. Türkiye, Rus Avrasyacıların bu politikalarını görmezden gelerek Rusya ile ilişkilerini sağlamlaştırıp kendi Türk Avrasyacılığını yürürlüğe sokmuştur. Türkiye’nin Avrasya politikası bazı dönemlerde Rusya tarafından kendisine karşı bir rekabet olarak algılanmıştır. 2002 sonrasında AK Parti hükümetleri döneminde Türk Avrasyacılığı veya Avrupalılarca tanımlanan biçimiyle Yeni Osmanlıcılık oldukça aktif biçimde uygulanmıştır. Türkiye yeni dönemde yüzünü sadece AB’ye değil Avrasya coğrafyasına da dönmüştür. 2002 sonrasında Türkiye ve Rusya arasında Türk işbirliği/rekabet alanları genişlemiştir.



Bu kitabımızda Rusya ve Türkiye’nin Avrasya medeniyeti kurabilme imkânlarını mümkün olduğunca anlatmaya çalıştık. Elbette iki ülke Avrasya coğrafyasında yüzlerce yıldır rekabet içerisinde bulunmuşlardır. Fakat 21. yüzyıl iki ülkeyi beraber hareket etmeye ve ortak strateji üretmeye zorlamaktadır. Karşılıklı güven bunalımı yaşayan iki ülkenin Avrasya’da ortak medeniyet kurabilmesi önündeki engeller ve ihtimaller de bu kitapta ele alınmıştır. İlginize sunulur.

BALKAN BETWEEN ATLANTISM AND (NEO)EURASIANISM

Summary: Looking at international relations at the beginning of the 21st century, we
note that the orientation of the great powers on global map „new, yet old“, which is not
suprising, since the geopolitical knots „intricate“ during the 19th and 20th centuries are not
„eradicated“, but remain as a historical destiny the burden of many nations and states.
In our focus will be the Balkans, a multi-age geopolitical knot and a link between
different civilizations, religions, peoples and continents. We will try to present this space
through two great geopolitical concepts – Atlanticism and (neo)euroasianism – and we point
out the challenges and potential threats and risks. In order to achieve this, we will first of all
make a review of the classical geopolitical teachings of the Russian and Anglo-Saxon
schools and their projection of the Balkans in a two hundred year historical context.

This dissertation attempts to critically analyse the influence of Carl Schmitt on the thought of Aleksandr Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism. It highlights Dugin’s use of Schmitt’s thought in three key ways: an analytical framework of the ‘political’, a mythopoetic understanding of space, and the role of katechon in establishing a multipolar world order. Thereafter, it suggests that Dugin’s interpretation of Schmitt has been heavily influenced by a particular reading created by the European New Right. It concludes by critically analysing this interpretation, suggesting that it indirectly undermines Dugin’s Neo-Eurasianism whilst strengthening critical readings of Schmitt’s position in contemporary political discourse.

1962 yılında Moskova’da doğan Dugin’in entelektüel dünyada ilk adımlarını Rus gelenekçiliğinin önemli isimlerinden R.Guenon, J.Evola ve G.Meyrink’in çeşitli eserlerini Rusça’ya kazandırarak atmıştır. Strateji, jeopolitik gibi konulardaki yazılarıyla ilgi gören Dugin, 1998-2004 arasında Federal Meclis’in alt kanadı olan Devlet Duması Başkanlığı’nda strateji ve jeopolitik danışmanlığı yapmıştır. 2002-2003 yıllarında Avrasya Birliği Partisi’nin liderliğini yürüten yazar, ardından Uluslararası Avrasya Hareketi’ni kurmuştur. Izvestiya, Literaturnaya Gazeta, Vremya Novostey gibi ulusal yayın organlarında boy gösteren yazar 2008-2014 arasında Moskova Üniversitesi Sosyoloji Fakültesi’nde öğretim üyeliği yapmıştır. Fransız Actuel dergisinin “Sovyet sonrası dönemde en etkin Rus düşünür” olarak tanımladığı Dugin, günümüzde Avrasyacılık ideolojisinin en etkili liderlerinden biri olarak görülmektedir. İncelenen Rus Jeopolitiği: Avrasyacı Yaklaşım adlı kitabı Dugin’in Avrasyacı yaklaşımını en net ve kapsamlı biçimde anlattığı kitabıdır.

If you request the paper, please email me at dk406@cam.ac.uk and I will send you a PDF copy.

The article analyzes the political and social discourses towards the Eurasian integration in Central Asia. I focus on the independent non-Russian political elites and wider popular response to the integration in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan and on the motivations leading these decision makers and societies into the further Eurasian economic integration. The focus is on Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan – the only Central Asian countries in the Eurasian Economic Union, and on their respective populations. I demonstrate how post-Soviet Kazakhstani and Kyrgyz regimes facilitated ideas and ideals of Eurasianism so closely connected to their own economic but also socio-political contexts. But the focus is also to unveil the complex web of interests, identities and mobilities of groups and individuals behind the political façade of integration talks in Central Eurasia. In doing so the study focuses on the historical approach and elite-led discourses combined with the sociological data of social response to the integration projects at different stages of its development.

Keywords: Eurasia, Eurasian Economic Union, elites, integration, migration.

This article is an argument that the 2014-5 Ukraine Crisis can only be properly understood when observed from a (Classical) Realist position. The essay briefly introduces the Theory of Realism for the uninitiated, then moves to a quick precis of the main events as they unfolded, and then conducts a detailed examination of the actions and motivations of Putin's Russia in the crisis. This examination includes Russia's National Egoism, Russia's strategy of "Non-Linear War" that was employed, and the rise of the revanchist ideology of "Putinism" and the threat it poses to the  Westphalian international system of states and thence to global peace.

Since the illegal annexation of Crimea, the governments of NATO and EU countries have been struggling to define their attitude towards the Russian government. Whereas they unanimously condemned Moscow’s aggression, the sanctions imposed failed to reverse Moscow’s increasingly assertive foreign policy. The Putin administration has been using the resulting political isolation to justify an even more aggressive stance in other regions of the world, some of which are of direct concern to EU and NATO members.
Targeted economic and financial sanctions rather than a demonstration of military force are inspired by the Kantian liberal principles that govern our Western societies. Economic measures have a limited controversial impact on public opinions; they are easy to reverse and they preserve long-term interests of Western companies.
However, the Russian government, which is the target of these sanctions, fails to perceive their relevance. Its realistic approach to international relations focuses on relative power positions that mainly materialise through military capacities rather than absolute power increase through economic cooperation. That vision is complemented by the revival of Neo-Eurasianism, an ideology that seeks to restore Russia’s position as the dominant power on the Eurasian continent and that has seduced a significant majority of Russians.

Die „Neoeurasier“ sind lediglich ein Teil einer weit größeren und hochaktiven „unzivilen Gesellschaft“ im heutigen Russland. Dugin agiert im Kontext der enormen Text-, Audio- und Videoproduktion verschiedener antiliberaler Publizistengruppen stärker auf der philosophischen Meta- als politischen Praxisebene. Er spielt eher eine Vorreiter- als Führungsrolle. Die 1968 entstandene Neue Europäische Rechte ist mit ihrem Projekt der Erlangung einer „kulturellen Hegemonie“ in Westeuropa bislang weitgehend gescheitert. Dagegen ist es Dugin und hunderten ähnlichen postsowjetischen Agitatoren seit 1991 gelungen, das politische und intellektuelle Zentrum Russlands nachhaltig nach rechts zu verschieben.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a lot of books including “geopolitics” in their titles started to be published in Russia. Some academicians and political philosophers tried to introduce the Russian public with the basic tenets and the founding fathers of geopolitical theory. Politicians did not remain indifferent to these publications either. The Russian Foreign and Defence Ministries, the military and Russian Duma increasingly embraced geopolitical theories, mostly in their traditional forms. Geopolitics attracted significant attention from the opposition parties in the Duma, and for some time it was almost “monopolized by the so-called national-patriots and left-wing activists.” It has almost become an indispensable vision for Russian politicians from different parts of the political spectrum as observed in several popular political ideas of the time: Gennady Zyuganov’s communist “Derzhava”, Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s nationalist “Last Re-partition”, Yevgeny Primakov’s realist “Multipolarity” and Alexander Dugin’s expansionist “Russian/Eurasian Empire”.

Our subject of investigation is the new geopolitical doctrine developed by Neo-Eurasians and Russian president Vladimir Putin’s wishes to implement it in his political practice. Our purpose is to study the views of Neo-Eurasian based on the works of their predecessors in this context to identify Putin’s real intention. In contemporary world politics, Eurasian issue is represents as one of the most actuality issues and it has various aspects.
The end of confrontation between Russia and the USA and the end of “Cold War” led to formation of two ideological blocks – the Atlantic and the Eurasian conflict. These concepts have geographical and civilization importance which help to create a new geopolitical situation and the necessity of the arrangement of a new world order. Vladimir Putin after returning to the post of the president informed the world about his “Great Strategy” in which he meant the creation of Eurasian Union by the end of 2015 where he intended to unite former Soviet Union states. Thus, Putin’s aspiration caused a new puzzle to the world leaders and we have already seen to succeed in this he will even use military forces. In Eurasian block, we must take into consideration the interests of such countries as West European ones, Turkey, Iran and China because this space is also strategically important for them to gain influence.
Therefore, the main object of our research is the New-Eurasians new geopolitical doctrine, which is based on the researches of the Russian predecessors and which was developed by a Russian philosopher Alexandr Dugin. This doctrine represents the Kremlin’s action plan. We also study the role and place of the South Caucasus in Eurasian space. Our task is to determine and analyze the problem of Eurasian in the world politics and to observe the problems and innovations connected to this issue.

An east-west axis of Azerbaijan and Turkey has grown into prominence within the broader structure of regional dynamics in Eurasia over the past two decades. Yet few, including among policy advisors and policy makers in either of the two states, have attempted to look deeper into the forces that lie behind the workings of this important regional nexus, a reality that resulted in a dual crisis in bilateral relations towards the end of the second decade of interaction.

This volume investigates the underlying causes that shaped the dynamics within the structure of the bilateral relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey. It features chapters by both scholars from the region and international experts in the field, and therefore provides both in-house and outside perspectives on developments within the complex structure of the relationship. With its analysis portfolio including historical, political, economic, socio-cultural, ideological, and international underpinnings of this regional alliance, the volume offers the most systematic and broad ranged analysis of the matter available to date.

The book will serve as an important resource for students and scholars of post-Soviet Studies, Central Asia and the Caucasus, and the Middle East, while also being of interest to those of International Relations and political science disciplines.

In this article, Dugin contrasts three theories: the globalist optimist vision of Fukuyama, the globalist pessimist vision of Huntington, and the multipolarist, anti-globalist view of the Eurasianists. He asserts that, in contrast to Huntington's "clash of civilizations", Eurasianism offers the possibility of harmonious relations between different civilizations by overthrowing the U.S.-centered Western hegemony.

Review article on the books:
Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism. By Charles Clover. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2016.
The Gumilev Mystique: Biopolitics, Eurasianism, and the Construction of Community in Modern Russia. By Mark Bassin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016.
Eurasianism and the European Far Right: Reshaping the Europe-Russia Relationship. Edited by Marlene Laruelle. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2015.
Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir. By Anton Shekhovtsov. Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017.

The chapter examines Russian political theorist Aleksandr Dugin's (b. 1962) attack on the perceived Western liberal order. The chapter introduces Dugin's role on the Russian right-wing political scene and his international networks, Russian neo-Eurasianism as his ideological footing, and his more recent "fourth political theory" as an attempt to formulate a new ideological alternative to the key twentieth-century ideologies, for him, liberalism, communism, and fascism. Dugin's "fourth" ideology draws inspiration from the German conservative revolutionary movement of the Weimar era. In particular, Martin Heidegger's philosophy of history, with its thesis of the end of modernity and another beginning of Western thought, and Carl Schmitt's pluralistic model of geopolitics are highlighted as key elements of Dugin's eclectic political thought, which is most appropriately characterized as a form of radical conservatism.

Russian political scientist Aleksandr Dugin has been described as the evil genius of President Vladimir Putin. Dugin's writings on Neo-Eurasianism call for a final apocalyptic showdown between the forces of Eurasianism and Atlanticism. Dugin is not a particular original thinker. This paper examines how Dugin and Neo-Eurasianism are the creations of certain trends in  Russian history that go back to the nineteenth century.

O presente trabalho tem como objeto de estudo as políticas e mecanismos adotados no mandato do presidente russo Vladimir Putin (2000 – 2008), e sua “diarquia” com Dmitry Medvedev (2008 – 2012) com a finalidade de realocação das receitas obtidas pela indústria extrativa – sobretudo a exploração de petróleo e gás natural – para impulsionar a modernização e diversificação econômica, sobretudo no seu complexo industrial-militar e aeroespacial. Por consequência, essas medidas contribuíram para a retomada do protagonismo geopolítico experimentado pela Federação Russa nessa primeira década do século XXI. O objetivo é verificar o impacto dessas políticas públicas como catalisadores para impulsionar o desenvolvimento estratégico, tecnológico e militar russo; E como essas medidas contribuíram para a reinserção geopolítica e estratégica no sistema internacional.

The present work has as object of study the policies and mechanisms adopted in the mandate of Russian President Vladimir Putin (1999-2008), and his "diarchy" with Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012) for the purpose of reallocating the revenue obtained by extractive industry – especially oil and natural gas exploration – to boost modernization and economic diversification, especially in its aerospace and military-industrial complex. Consequently, these measures contributed to the resumption of the geopolitical role experienced by the Russian Federation in this first decade of the 21st century. The goal is to verify the impact of these public policies as catalysts to boost the strategic, technological and military development of Russian Federation; And as these measures have contributed to their geopolitical and strategic reinsertion in the international system.

Can Putin really be considered a neo-Eurasianist? Is his policy of ‘multipolarism’ a direct consequence of his neo-Eurasianist inclinations? If so, why did he try to construct closer relations with the US in the post-September 11 period? Is this a real pro-Atlanticism or did Putin’s pro-Atlanticism simply result from the pragmatist tendencies in his foreign policy? Could it be that he had suspicions - from the very beginning of his tenure - about the chances of Russia in following a more neo-Eurasianist foreign policy? These are some of the questions this study will try to concentrate on. Only by finding responses to these questions, one can make judgements about Putin’s neo-Eurasianist inclinations in his foreign policy. However, in order to find such responses, one should also try to take a closer look at neo-Eurasianism’s views about Russian foreign policy. Thus, first of all it is necessary to note down some key elements of the neo-Eurasianist paradigm regarding Russia’s position in the new context of international relations, and to consider the views of two significant figures, Aleksandr Dugin as a theorist and Yevgenii Primakov as a practitioner, about the Russian foreign policy in order to evaluate Putin’s relationship with neo-Eurasianism in his foreign policy.

This article is a commentary addressing common misconceptions about Alexander Dugin and his thought in the Right-wing sphere. The following points are argued: While it is likely that Dugin dismisses the concept race he still is very much concerned with ethnicity and advocates ethnic separatism; he distinguishes between the modern liberal "West" and true traditional European culture; he is not imperialist but advocates an anti-imperialist form of imperial state; he does not support a revival of Soviet policy but advocates an entirely new one; he is critical and therefore does not blindly support the current Russian state, even if he respects Putin; he rejects both Marxism and Fascism even though he uses ideas from both groups; he is not a reactionary traditionalist but a Revolutionary Conservative. The conclusion is that Dugin is a genuine Right-wing thinker whose contributions have value to the New Right, even if he has imperfections.