Stoics

Рассматриваются представления Хрисиппа о космополисе через призму взаимоотношений граждан внутри космополиса. Сначала решается вопрос об основаниях предоставления гражданства в космополисе Хрисиппа. В качестве такового признается обладание совершенным разумом. Затем подробнее рассматриваются причины объединения сограждан космополиса в единый союз. Доказывается, что космополитический союз следует рассматривать как содружество мудрых существ. Последнее в свою очередь характеризуется высоким уровнем единства, основанного на согласии относительно того, что есть подлинное благо, а также на том основании, что каждый член этого содружества обладает этим подлинным благом. Единый закон, устанавливающий критерии хорошего и плохого и имеет повелительную силу, выступает надежным унификатором, следование которому делает нас частью большого единого сообщества разумных и добродетельных существ. [The paper is devoted to the analysis of Chrysippus’ cosmopolitanism through the problem of relationship between citizens of the cosmopolis. First, the author points out the main feature of Chrysippus’ citizen, which is possession of perfect reason. Then, the author discovers the causes of unity of co-citizens within cosmopolis. It is shown that a cosmopolitan union has a significant level of consent thanks to the fact that it consists of wise beings, who agree on the true good and each of whom possesses this true good. An effective unifier in the Stoic doctrine is the natural law, the established standard of good and bad obeying which makes a human being part of the community of rational and virtuous beings.]

La perspective du présent recueil d’études sur le langage n'est ni celle d'une adoption, ni celle d'un rejet du paradigme dominant de la « philosophie du langage » de tradition analytique : s’inscrire dans le paradigme aurait accrédité par principe la restriction excessive d'une réflexion sur le langage à l'un de ses objets centraux, la signification ; exclure le paradigme aurait récusé arbitrairement une tradition féconde, identifiable par le caractère spécifique de ses questions ainsi que par l’articulation de ses décisions théoriques aux théories formelles, linguistiques et logiques. G. Kévorkian étudie « L’‘invention de la proposition’ dans le Sophiste de Platon : une projection des paradigmes aristotéliciens et frégéens de la prédication ; C. Chiesa : « Les mots, les pensées et les choses chez Aristote » ; G. Verbeke : « La philosophie du signe chez les stoïciens » ; Stefano Gensini : « Leibniz sur l’arbitraire du signe » ; Bernard Mabille : « Hegel et le langage de la philosophie » ; Jean-Michel Roy : « Tournant linguistique et tournant analytique » ; Jocelyn Benoist : « Sens et performance » ; Pascal Engel : « Une théorie de la signification peut-elle être autre que modeste ? Introduction aux théories contemporaines de la signification » ; Jean-Marie Vaysse enfin : « Le langage de Heidegger à Derrida : de la poésie à la littérature ».

This paper considers the Stoic definition of chance as “a cause obscure to human reasoning”. It argues that the cause invoked in the definition of chance in¬cludes a reference to the prov¬idential plan for the cosmos. This reading is supported both by the Hellenistic cult of Agathē Tuchē and the Stoic contention that chance is the object of divination, which is it¬self connected to attempts to understand divine will. The interpretation is meant to complement the standard epistemological interpretation of chance, according to which the Stoics understanding of chance is based on human ignorance of the causal outlook of the world, and not to challenge it. However, adopting my interpretation has important consequences for a better understanding of how different parts of the Stoic system are interrelated and it shows how Stoic philosophy relates to contemporary religious views.

A modal logic with non-traditional predication theory is laid out that allows one to talk in a meaningful way about nonexistent objects and partially specified fictional objects. Description theory with an existence predicate is used for giving examples.

The logic uses an extension and an anti-extension for predicates; it remains bivalent and is not paraconsistent. It less expressive than, similar, and closely related to Priest's account and other uses of partial logics in the tradition of Belnap.

This paper deals with the influence that Thucydides’ political thought and the cosmopolitanism of the Stoics exercised on the formation of the current theories in the field of International Relations.
    The dominant theories in the modern discipline of International Relations are mainly two: political realism and liberal idealism. Father of modern political realism is considered to be Thucydides. The Athenian historian is the originator of the concept of interest as a determinant factor in the international behaviour of the states as well as of the concept of balance of powers as an explanatory tool of the greater international rivalries.
    On the contrary, the liberal idealistic theory supports the peaceful life and cooperation among the world citizens without any nationalism and state ideology. The roots of this theory go back to the cosmopolitan ideas of the stoic philosophers, par excellence Zenon from Kition.
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This thesis examines the notion of Love (Eros) in key texts of the
Neoplatonic philosophers Plotinus (204/5–270 C.E), Proclus (c.412–485
C.E.) and Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (late 5 th -early 6 th  cent.).  In
the  first  chapter  I  discuss  Plotinus’  treatise  devoted  to  Love
(Enneads,III.5) and I attempt to show the ontological importance of Eros
within  the  Plotinian  system.    For  Plotinus  for  an  entity  (say  Soul)  to
be/exist is to be erotic, i.e. be directed to the intelligible realm.  Hence,
one  of  the  conclusions  is  that  Love  implies  deficiency,  and,  thus,  it
takes place in a vertical scheme, where an inferior entity has eros for its
higher progenitor.  If this is so, then Proclus apparently diverges greatly from Plotinus,
because in his Commentary on the First Alcibiades Proclus clearly states
that inferior entities have reversive (/upwards) eros for their superiors,
whereas  the  latter  have  providential  (/downwards)  eros  for  their
inferiors.  Thus, the project of my second chapter is to analyze Proclus’
position and show that in fact he does not diverge much from Plotinus;
the  former  only  explicates  something  that  is  already  implicit  in  the
latter.    The  first  part of  my  discussion  emphasizes  the  ethical  aspect,
whereas the second deals with the metaphysical aspect. Finally, in the third chapter I examine pseudo-Dionysius’ treatment
of God as Eros in his work On the Divine Names.  One motivation was
the  verdict  of  a  number  of  old  scholars  that  the  Areopagite  is  a plagiarizer of Proclus.  Still, the examination of Eros is a characteristic
case,  where  one can ascertain Dionysius’  similarities and divergences
from  Proclus.    Supported  by  recent  literature,  we  can  suggest  that
Dionysius  uses  more  of  a  Proclean  language  (cf.  providential  and
reversive  eros),  rather  than  Proclean  positions,  owing  to  ontological
presuppositions  that  differentiate  the  Neoplatonic  philosopher  from
the  Church  Father.    Proclus  forms  the  bridge  between  pagan
Neoplatonism  (Plotinus)  and  Christian  philosophy  (pseudo-
Dionysius).

Another thing is that Abelard Reuchlin not only passed along Inner-Circle knowledge that he was told, but he expounded upon it so that it could be more clearly understood by those who otherwise would not. He put forth a viable means in which to examine the texts of the time which includes those who were the witnesses to the creation of Christianity, those Jews who were writing the Talmud. In addition, he caused others, like me, to examine this further and allowed us to realize just how valuable it is in our studies to look much closer at the involvement of the Jews in trying to prevent the rise of those who would go on to create and promote Christianity. For, the Jews of the time, saw it (Christianity) for what it was truly was, an effort or tactic used by their enemies, as a part of the war that they had been fighting. And therefore, a fraud which needed to be exposed as such. The cause of the Pharisees and Scribes was for basic human rights, the end of slavery, and the foundation of a new fair democratic government. And, instead of teaching irrational and superstitious religion, they were trying to wean people off of that and replace it with sound, rational, practical, ethical reasoning. While Christianity, by contrast, was created to do the opposite of that. And that is because some greedy Roman rulers whose lives of luxury would be drastically changed, if the Pharisees and Scribes accomplished their goals for the people. Of course, to get people to believe in Christianity, the creators of Christianity had to make it appear to be something 'good', in much the same way that trappers set traps for dumb animals. Which, is exactly how those ancient royal rulers (the less than 1% of the time) saw non-royals, as nothing more than their own chattel which was there for no other reason than their own use for whatever purposes that they saw fit. Thus, Christianity was created as a means for them to better secure, control and manipulate the people, that they saw as their own sheep or chattel. This paper highlights the course that Abelard Reuchlin had taken in order to reach the conclusions that he was able to in order to advance our understanding of what the world was really like during the time in which the New Testament was being written and just who had motive to do so. And, his work also reminds us that we must consider all of the evidence of the time (that means the Jewish texts, the Jews of the time, and the Jewish war that was involved in the creation of Christianity). Reuchlin's work underscores our need to better understand what we study in the correct context in order to find out just who was actually writing at the time, and why. It is because of Abelard Reuchlin's work (and that of others, or course), that my own work was made more complete. I urge everyone to read and learn from the work that Reuchlin had devoted his life to in order that future generations could have that extremely important information.

On the one hand, Hume accepts the view—which he attributes primarily to Stoicism—that there exists a determinate best and happiest life for human beings, a way of life led by a figure whom Hume calls “the true philosopher.” On the other hand, Hume accepts that view—which he attributes to Scepticism—that there exists a vast plurality of good and happy lives, each potentially equally choiceworthy. In this paper, I reconcile Hume’s apparently conflicting commitments: I argue that Hume’s “Sceptical” pluralism about the character of the happiest life need not conflict with his “Stoic” advocacy of the supreme happiness of the true philosopher, given Hume’s flexible understanding of how one might live as a true philosopher.

ABSTRACT: An introduction to Stoic logic. Stoic logic can in many respects be regarded as a fore-runner of modern propositional logic. I discuss: 1. the Stoic notion of sayables or meanings (lekta); the Stoic assertibles (axiomata) and their similarities and differences to modern propositions; the time-dependency of their truth; 2.-3. assertibles with demonstratives and quantified assertibles and their truth-conditions; truth-functionality of negations and conjunctions; non-truth-functionality of disjunctions and conditionals; language regimentation and ‘bracketing’ devices; Stoic basic principles of propositional logic; 4. Stoic modal logic; 5. Stoic theory of arguments: two premisses requirement; validity and soundness; 6. Stoic syllogistic or theory of formally valid arguments: a reconstruction of the Stoic deductive system, which consisted of accounts of five types of indemonstrable syllogisms, which function as nullary argumental rules that identify indemonstrables or axioms of the system, and four deductive rules (themata) by which certain complex arguments can be reduced to indemonstrables and thus shown to be formally valid themselves; 7. arguments that were considered as non-syllogistically valid (subsyllogistic and unmethodically concluding arguments). Their validity was explained by recourse to formally valid arguments.

Modern human rights proclaimed at the end of the eighteenth century are based on a specific image of humanity that has developed through a process of subjectivisation that begins in Greek antiquity. The present study argues that the respective advances in human rightshistory–in the field of juridical, moral-philosophical and political thinking–cannot be adequately correlated and understood without a reflection on this process.

Even though there were some contributions from Plato and Aristotle, a more developed linguistic thinking does not evolve until the time of the Stoics; some even argue that linguistics in the modern sense started only with the Stoics. The central notions of their understanding of time, language and the Greek tenses are found and preserved in the doxographies of others, such as Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus and in the scholia (a commentary on grammar etc) of the commentator Stephanos.This paper looks into the Stoic philosophy of time and briefly how it relates to their tense system.

[Update] The book appeared in 2015 entitled Plato's Republic as a Philosophical Drama on Doing Well, published by Lexington Books.

[Original Abstract] This is part of a forthcoming book analysing Plato’s Politeia as a philosophical drama, in which the participants turn out to be models of various types of psychic constitution, and nothing is said by them which may be considered to be an opinion of Plato himself (with all that that entails for Platonism). The debate in Book I between Socrates and Thrasymachus serves as a test case for the assumptions that the Socratic method involves searching for truth or examining the opinions of interlocutors and that Socrates is the mouthpiece of Plato. Socrates and Thrasymachus are usually assumed to be arguing about justice. In fact, they are going through the motions of an eristic debate, where the aim is not to discover the truth about the matter under discussion but to defeat the opponent by fair means or foul, but especially foul. The outrageous wordplay used by both men is not so obvious in translation, and in any case tends to be ignored or explained away by scholars who assume that Plato the philosopher was writing a philosophical treatise (an exposition of philosophical ideas) and not a philosophical drama (a presentation of philosophically interesting models, to be compared and contrasted by the reader).

Ibn Tufayl's Hayy Ibn Yaqzan is a remarkably creative piece of writing that came down to us from the middle ages. It has been considered a classic of medieval Islamic philosophy, and a classic of Arabic novels that had a great influence on the medieval and renaissance west.
The theme of East and West is given prominence in this paper. The first part of my argument concerns the ideological and cultural coloring of the context in which this novel was written. The second part deals with the point of intersection of contesting ideologies in the novel. It also deals with the astonishing variety of conclusions the novel has yielded.
In estimating the novel as both philosophical literature and literary philosophy, which as I argue, cannot be studied in isolation from the famous translation movement (from Greek into Arabic in the middle ages), I would not exclude another possibility that Ibn Tufayl benefited from stoicism. This presupposes Ibn Tufayl's acquaintance with the stoics.
There are also similarities between Hayy Ibn Yaqzan and the cosmogony of the first book of Ovid's Metamorphoses, in relation to his account of the creation and early history of man, which was influenced by the Epicurean Roman poet Lucretius.
I would suggest that there might have been a common Greek source, read by Lucretius, Ovid and Ibn Tufayl (in translation in the last case).
Although, in a way, Hayy Ibn Yaqzan was a direct consequence of Greek thought translated into Arabic, Ibn Tufayl, however, pursued his own Islamic way of reconciling philosophy with religion.

Vico's historicist claims (1) that different ages are intelligible only in their own terms and (2) that the certainty and authority of history depend on its narrative formulation seem at odds with his doctrines of ideal eternal history and divine providence. He resolves these issues, however, in his treatment of ideal eternal history by using the distinction between the certain and the true to show how rhetorical expression generates meaning in and as history. Specifically, by appealing to an ontology that informs the propositional logic of the early Stoics and the ideas of Peter Ramus and his followers, Vico treats historical events as legal pronouncements and grammatical reformations of syntax. In this way he displaces the predicate logic of ancient and modern thinkers who treat rhetoric as a mere embellishment of argumentation.

This paper looks at the history of the problem of individuation from Plato to Whitehead. Part I takes as its point of departure Reiner Wiehl’s interpretation of the different meanings of “abstract” in the metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead and arrives at a corresponding taxonomy of different ways things can be called concrete.  Part II compares the way philosophers in different periods understand the relation between thought and intuition.  The view mostly associated with ancient philosophy is that thought and sense-perception target different kinds of objects.  The view mostly associated with modern philosophy (although it was introduced by the Stoics) is that thought and sense-perception are different ways of targeting the same objects.  These differences have specific consequences for theories of individuation, which are assessed historically in Part III and then applied to Whitehead’s difficult texts in part IV.

The goal of this essay is to show how we might gain new insight into the meaning of Nietzsche's metaphilosophical lessons at the start of Beyond Good and Evil. Maudemarie Clark's interpretation of these lessons is prima facie plausible and has gained widespread acceptance in the Anglophone community of Nietzsche scholars. According to this reading, Nietzsche thinks that philosophers cannot help but project their preferred values into their theories of the world and he thinks that this is true of his own theory of the world as will to power. I argue that there are severe problems with Clark's supporting textual evidence and that we should therefore reconsider how we usually think today about the role of values in Nietzsche's conception of philosophy and about the epistemic status that he grants to his own philosophical theories.

With Zeno's study in Athens as a focal point, my work aims at: 1. To outline life in Athens late in 4 th Century BC in connection to the prevailing political situation and the philosophical schools and 2. To trace the influences Zeno received during his attendance at these schools and the tutors of the time so that the origins of stoic philosophy can be seen.

Bu araştırmada farklı materyallerin öğretim ortamına heyecan kattığı, öğrencilerin derse olan ilgi ve motivasyonlarını yükselttiği, akademik başarıyı artırdığı gerçeğinden hareketle düşünsel ve edebi bir ürün olan ahlak mektuplarının değer eğitiminde bir kaynak olarak kullanılabilirliği ortaya çıkarılmaya çalışılmıştır. Araştırma nitel desende yürütülmüştür. Araştırmada nitel araştırmalarda sıkça kullanılan bir araştırma yöntemi olan doküman inceleme yöntemine başvurulmuştur. Araştırmanın veri kaynağını Lucius Annaeus Seneca tarafından dönemin Sicilya Valisi Lucilius'a yazılan felsefi içerikli mektuplar oluşturmaktadır. Bahse konu veri kaynağından veri toplamak için araştırmacı tarafından hazırlanan Değer İnceleme Formu "DİF" kullanılmıştır. Toplanan veriler Maxqda 18 nitel veri analiz programına girilerek analiz edilmiş, verilerin analizinde içerik analizi yönteminden yararlanılmıştır. Yapılan analiz işlemi sonucunda anlamlı kelime grupları ve cümle/cümleler temalar etrafında kodlanmıştır. Araştırma sonucunda Ahlak mektuplarının hayatı anlamlı kılan, toplumları ve insan neslini ayakta tutan, insan ilişkilerini düzenleyen ve kolaylaştıran altmış dört farklı değerin öğretiminde kullanılabileceği, Türk Milli eğitim programında kök değerler olarak geçen, ulusların tamamının bireylerinde görmeyi amaçladığı “adalet”, “dostluk”, “dürüstlük”, “özdenetim”, “sabır”, “sevgi”, “saygı”, “sorumluluk”, “vatanseverlik”, “yardımseverlik” gibi değerlerin tamamını sıkça işlediği ve bu sebeple değer eğitiminde kullanılabilecek oldukça zengin bir kaynak olduğu sonucuna ulaşılmıştır. Öneriler bölümünde ahlak mektuplarının okul içi ve dışında değer eğitimi amaçlı kullanılmasına ve bu mektuplarda yer alan değer içerikli kısımların öğretim programlarının amaçlarına uygun olarak ders kitaplarının içerisinde kısmi alıntılar biçiminde yer verilmesine dair önerilerde bulunulmuştur.

Probably the final pre-print version of my edition of Antipater of Tarsus. The testimonia for physics and logic are not clearly about Antipater of Tarsus and they have been excluded from this edition, unlike the testimonia for his life and logic. This supersedes the revised version of my doctorate. The main differences are in the later parts of the Dialectic section.

Resumo: O hábito para os estoicos deve ser entendido de modo diferente da maneira descrita por Platão ou Aristóteles. Dado que, para estes, a formação do caráter é considerada a partir de uma psicologia que aborda a alma por meio de partes distintas, tal interpretação os levou a descrever o hábito como um elemento fundamental para a educação da parte irracional da alma, enquanto a parte racional é educada por meio da razão. Para os estoicos, no entanto, o hábito se faz importante para a alma como um todo, sem distinção entre racional e irracional. Seguindo essa perspectiva, Epicteto não trata da habituação de qualquer elemento irracional. Quando o filósofo fala em " habituar-se " a determinadas ações, ele não se refere a uma atividade de repetição que condiciona aspectos distintamente irracionais, mas, ao contrário, refere-se a uma atividade autonomamente filosófica, que envolve a razão, com atenção especial ao cuidado com as representações.

Abstract: The habit for stoics must be treated differently from the manner described by Plato or Aristotle. Given that for the latter the formation of character is considered from a psychology that approaches the soul through distinct parts, such an interpretation led them to describe habit as a fundamental element for education of the irrational part of the soul, while the rational part is educated through reason. For the Stoics, however, habit is important for the soul as a whole, without distinction between rational and irrational. Following this perspective, Epictetus does not discourse about the habituation of any irrational element. When the philosopher speaks of "becoming accustomed" to certain actions, he does not refer to a repetitive activity that conditions distinctly irrational aspects, but instead refers to an autonomously philosophical activity involving reason, with special attention to the care with representations.

Gilles Deleuze, from the « effect of language » to the concept of « speech act »
– issues of a pragmatics of expression.
Is there room for something like a philosophy of language in the work of G. Deleuze? Looking back to his 1969 piece, Logique du sens, what seems to be primarily at stake for him in the analysis of language is the problem of the ontological nature of sense, which he describes, referring to the Stoics, as an « incorporeal event » or a « surface effect ». At the time, Deleuze seeks to distance himself, according to a view that still owes much to structural linguistics, from a propositional picture of logic that he locates in the analytical tradition. The relevant issue is not to investigate the grounds of logic, but to understand how meaning can take effect at the shared surface of propositions and things. Eleven years later however, in Mille Plateaux, his views on the efficiency of expression seem to have shifted: departing from a picture of meaning as an incorporeal "language effect", it evolves to that of an incorporeal act of speech, in reference to pragmatics and to J.L. Austin's illocutionary force. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the consequences of such a conceptual shift, in order to clarify Deleuze's relationship to philosophy of language.

Controversy has been rife over the extent to which Stoic hermeneutical efforts can be categorized as “allegorical.” This paper shows that much of the disagreement arises from incommensurate definitions of allegoresis and that modern categories frequently fail to do justice to the idiosyncrasies of the Stoic perspective. Thus, this article demonstrates the usefulness of distinguishing between allegory, allegoresis, exegesis, and rationalization when classifying Stoic interpretations. Subsequently, it is argued that Stoic etymologies and exegetical comments should not be adduced as evidence against Stoic allegoresis, which further should not be anachronistically viewed in terms of the modern opposition between allegory and symbol.

Unlike their hero Socrates, who in one of antiquity's taller war stories, warded off enemies in the Athenian retreat from Potidaea with a mere goose-like glance (Symposium 221b), Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus, the founding fathers of Stoicism, were foreign metics who never served Athens in any military capacity. Moreover, what we have of their political theory suggests they were the original commie peaceniks. They were dead set against currencies, law courts, and private property, and gung ho for same sex dressing, incest, Zeus's universal laws, and world peace. How is it, one might well wonder, that Stoicism seems to have achieved such a vogue among America's military elite, not to mention among legions of vicarious warriors on Wall Street? Sherman claims that there is a natural and deep relation between military values and those attitudes that in common parlance we take to be "stoic". But I doubt this gets us very far toward an adequate explanation of the recent buzz, since a quick shake out of our conceptions shows rather more tenuous and contingent connections. We can easily imagine Gandhi, for instance, taking slaps from British officers "stoically" or generations of downtrodden, starving peasants enduring nature's blows with "stoicism". In this sense, "stoic" is just as readily associated with peace, agriculture, and stray dogs faced with fleas. By the same token, Achilles, Alexander,

I examine the Stoics' initial account of the cognitive (cataleptic, apprehensive) impression and the response they made to the Academics' objections to it. First, I take up a weak interpretation of the Stoics' response, which holds that they were not modifying their initial account but merely clarifying it. Next, I consider a strong interpretation, which holds that the Stoics were in fact modifying their account and came to hold a form of epistemic externalism. I argue that both interpretations are inadequate because they fail to provide a charitable reading of the debate between the Stoics and the Academics. I then suggest that, in responding to the Academics' objections, the Stoics came to hold a view that is similar to a modern version of direct realism known as disjunctivism.

Cicero's account of the emotions in the "Tusculan Disputations" has been central to most recent reconstructions of the Stoic theory of emotions (pathê). Sometimes in the Tusculans Cicero reports definitions of the emotions that incorporate references to magnitude, and sometimes he reports definitions in which magnitude is not of the essence. What role does magnitude play in the Stoic theory of emotions?
I argue that the references to magnitude did not feature in the original Stoic definitions, and to that extent Cicero's discussions in the Tusculans do not provide evidence for the old theory. However, Cicero has good and interesting reasons for including the references to magnitude where he does -- reasons that tell us about his own stance as an Academic, and about his aims in the Tusculans.

This article looks at the role of Hellenistic thought in the historical narratives of Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt. To a certain extent, both see—with G. W. F. Hegel, J. G. Droysen, and Eduard Zeller—Hellenistic and Roman philosophy as a “modernity in antiquity,” but with important differences. Heidegger is generally dismissive of Hellenistic thought and comes to see it as a decisive historical turning point at which a protomodern element of subjective willing and domination is injected into the classical heritage of Plato and Aristotle. Arendt, likewise, credits Stoic philosophy with the discovery of the will as an active faculty constituting a realm of subjective freedom and autonomy. While she considers Hellenistic philosophy as essentially apolitical and world-alienated—in contrast to the inherently political and practical Roman culture—it nonetheless holds for her an important but unexploited ethical and political potential.