- https://ancagheaus.com
Anca Gheaus
Central European University, Political Science, Faculty Member
- Equality Studies, Gender Equality, Gender, Family, Children's Rights, Children and Families, and 28 moreNormative Ethics, Theories of Justice, Philosophy, Ethics, Feminist Ethics, Distributive Justice, Applied Ethics, Reproductive Ethics, Meta-Ethics, Political Theory, Emotions And Political Theory, Bioethics, Political Philosophy, Feminism, Children, Marriage, Philosophy of Love, Parent Child Relationships, Feminst Political Theory, Parental Rights, Egalitarianism, Parenting, Family Law, Family studies, Egalitarian distributive justice, Social Justice, Basic Income, and Applied Philosophy(Normative Ethics, Theories of Justice, Philosophy, Ethics, Feminist Ethics, Distributive Justice, Applied Ethics, Reproductive Ethics, Meta-Ethics, Political Theory, Emotions And Political Theory, Bioethics, Political Philosophy, Feminism, Children, Marriage, Philosophy of Love, Parent Child Relationships, Feminst Political Theory, Parental Rights, Egalitarianism, Parenting, Family Law, Family studies, Egalitarian distributive justice, Social Justice, Basic Income, and Applied Philosophy)edit
- http://www.demographyethicsandpublicpolicy.org/posts/featured-profile-anca-gheausedit
Research Interests:
There is wide agreement that children have human rights, and that their human rights differ from those of adults. What explains this difference which is, at least at first glance, puzzling, given that human rights are meant to be... more
There is wide agreement that children have human rights, and that their human rights differ from those of adults. What explains this difference which is, at least at first glance, puzzling, given that human rights are meant to be universal? The puzzle can be dispelled by identifying what unites children’s and adults’ rights as human rights. Here I seek to answer the question of children’s human rights – that is, rights they have merely in virtue of being human and of being children – by exploring how children’s interests are different from adults’, and how respect for children’s and adults’ moral status yields different practical requirements. If human rights protect interests, then children have many, but not all, of the human rights of adults, and, in addition, have some human rights that adults lack. I discuss the way in which children’s human rights, as I conceive of them here are, or fail to be, reflected in the law; as an illustration, I use the most important legal document listing children’s rights, namely the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Research Interests:
What would the institution of the family look like if it were reformed according to republican desiderata? Would it even survive such re-shaping? This chapter examines the charges that the family dominates women and children in what is... more
What would the institution of the family look like if it were reformed according to republican desiderata? Would it even survive such re-shaping? This chapter examines the charges that the family dominates women and children in what is taken to be their most convincing interpretations, and considers the theoretical and practical implications. The deepest source of women's domination within the family is the gendered division of labour. Surprisingly perhaps, an analysis of how the gendered division of labour generates domination yields the conclusion that not only women, but also men who engage in very pronounced forms of gendered specialization, can be dominated; this raises the interesting questions of whether mutual (and potentially equal) dependencies can count as domination, and if yes, whether they are less or more objectionable than one-sided domination. Achieving non-domination in upbringing doesn't seem, all things considered, in children's interests. If so, justified child rearing should merely seek to minimize domination. Indeed, it is undesirable, and maybe impossible, to eliminate it not only from the family but from any imaginable form of upbringing-such as an orphanage or a kibbutz. The reason is that children need intimate relationships that can only exist in the absence of proper mechanisms that check the exercise of parental power; further, the kind of vulnerability that concerns republicans may be constitutive of the emotional intimacy that is essential to children's well-being. Finally, the chapter argues that full eradication of domination from close relationships in general is undesirable.
Research Interests:
John Tillson argues, on grounds of children's wellbeing, that it is impermissible to teach them religious views. I defend a practice of pluralistically advocating religious views to children. As long as there are no monopolies of... more
John Tillson argues, on grounds of children's wellbeing, that it is impermissible to teach them religious views. I defend a practice of pluralistically advocating religious views to children. As long as there are no monopolies of influence over children, and as long as advocates do not use coercion, deceit, or manipulation, children can greatly benefit without having their rational abilities subverted, or incurring undue risk to form false beliefs. This solution should counter, to some extent, both perfectionist and anti-perfectionist reasons against initiating children into religions.
Research Interests:
This chapter explores a so-far neglected way of avoiding the bads of loneliness: by learning to value solitude, where that is understood as a state of 'keeping oneself company', as J. David Velleman puts it. Unlike loneliness, solitude... more
This chapter explores a so-far neglected way of avoiding the bads of loneliness: by learning to value solitude, where that is understood as a state of 'keeping oneself company', as J. David Velleman puts it. Unlike loneliness, solitude need not involve any deprivation, whether subjective or objective. This chapter considers the various goods to which solitude is constitutive or instrumental, with a focus on the promise that proper valuing of solitude holds for combating loneliness. The overall argument is this: If loneliness significantly detracts from individual wellbeing, and if the ability to value solitude protects against loneliness, then such an ability is obviously valuable to human flourishing. If, further, loneliness raises concerns of justice, then supporting people's ability to value solitude is a way to implement a desideratum of justice. Individuals can cultivate their ability to value solitude, an ability that others can promote or hinder.
Research Interests:
Talk of gender identity is at the core of heated current philosophical and political debates. Yet, it is unclear what it means to have one. I examine several ways of understanding this concept in light of core aims of trans writers and... more
Talk of gender identity is at the core of heated current philosophical and political debates. Yet, it is unclear what it means to have one. I examine several ways of understanding this concept in light of core aims of trans writers and activists. Most importantly, the concept should make good trans people’s understanding of their own gender identities and help understand why misgendering is a serious harm and why it is permissible to require information about people’s gender identities in public life. I conclude that none of the available accounts meets these essential criteria, on the assumption that the gender norms of femininity and masculinity are unjustified. But we can, and should, pursue the feminist project without “gender identity”. Such feminism can include trans people because it is possible to account for the specific harm of misgendering without assuming a claim to the recognition of our gender identities. I conclude that we should eliminate the concept of “gender identity.” To understand the phenomena that are putatively captured by “gender identity,” we are better off employing other concepts, such as “sexual dysphoria,” (assigned or aspirational) “gender roles,” and (internalised or endorsed) “gender norms”. These concepts can usefully replace “gender identity” in an individual evaluation of each of the trans people’s claims to inclusion into particular spaces.
Research Interests: Self and Identity, Feminist Theory, Social Identity, Feminist Philosophy, Women's Rights, and 15 moreGender and Sexuality, Gender, Gender Equality, Women's Right to Equality, Women, Feminism, Feminist Ethics, Constructions of femininity, Feminism(s), Gender Identity, Feminism and Social Justice, Women and Gender Studies, Political Identity, Feminismo, and Gender Identities
Women continue to be in charge of most childrearing; men continue to be responsible for most breadwinning. There is no consensus on whether this state of affairs, and the informal norms that encourage it, are matters of justice to be... more
Women continue to be in charge of most childrearing; men continue to be responsible for most breadwinning. There is no consensus on whether this state of affairs, and the informal norms that encourage it, are matters of justice to be tackled by state action. Feminists have criticized political liberalism for its alleged inability to embrace a full feminist agenda, inability explained by political liberals' commitment to the ideal of state neutrality. The debate continues on whether neutral states can accommodate two feminist demands: to enact policies aimed at dismantling the feminization of caregiving, especially childrearing, and to compensate women for some of the disadvantages they incur by being primary care-givers. I contribute to this debate with three arguments in support of policies meant to de-gender care-giving and compensate care-givers. The first appeals to equality of opportunity to positions of advantage and justifies policies that prevent or mitigate statistical discrimination and implicit biases. The second draws attention to a possible causal relationship between the specialization of women in early childcare and misogyny; since the latter is incompatible with political liberal justice, it yields the conclusion that political liberals ought to further investigate the causal hypothesis with the aim of establishing or refuting it. The third argument concludes that legitimate childrearing prohibits adults from socializing children or, at least girls, into gender norms; it justifies duties of justice on the side of parents, educators, and economic agents, and state policies meant to offset foreseeable breaches of some of these duties.
Research Interests: DISCRIMINATION AT WORK, Discrimination, Gender, Gender Equality, Public Reason, and 15 moreGender and Work, Equality, Women and Politics, Women's Empowerment, Gender Discrimination, Employment Discrimination, Equal Opportunities, Work-Life Balance, Gender equality policy, Prejudice and Discrimination, Equality and Non Discrimination, Equality of opportunity, Gender equality policies, Equal Employment Opportunitiess, and Statistical discrimination(Gender and Work, Equality, Women and Politics, Women's Empowerment, Gender Discrimination, Employment Discrimination, Equal Opportunities, Work-Life Balance, Gender equality policy, Prejudice and Discrimination, Equality and Non Discrimination, Equality of opportunity, Gender equality policies, Equal Employment Opportunitiess, and Statistical discrimination)
(Gender and Work, Equality, Women and Politics, Women's Empowerment, Gender Discrimination, Employment Discrimination, Equal Opportunities, Work-Life Balance, Gender equality policy, Prejudice and Discrimination, Equality and Non Discrimination, Equality of opportunity, Gender equality policies, Equal Employment Opportunitiess, and Statistical discrimination)
I explore how recent developments in the philosophy of childhood can be made to bear on debates about lowering the voting age. I don’t argue for any particular conclusion. Rather, I offer a map of how arguments for and against... more
I explore how recent developments in the philosophy of childhood can be made to bear on debates about lowering the voting age. I don’t argue for any particular conclusion. Rather, I offer a map of how arguments for and against enfranchising children, or at least adolescents, can be enriched by reflecting on what, according to several contemporary philosophers, is uniquely good or bad about being a child.
Research Interests:
This article brings into relief two desiderata in childrearing, the importance of which the pandemic has made clearer than ever. The first is to ensure that, in schools as well as outside them, children have ample opportunities to enjoy... more
This article brings into relief two desiderata in childrearing, the importance of which the pandemic has made clearer than ever. The first is to ensure that, in schools as well as outside them, children have ample opportunities to enjoy goods that are particular to childhood: unstructured time, to be spent playing with other children, discovering the world in company or alone, or indeed pursuing any of the creative activities that make children happy and help them learn. I refer to these as "special goods of childhood." The second desiderata is to turn childrearing into a more communal practice, with lesser parental monopoly of care. For this, we need to give children access to multiple caring adults, and thus more opportunities to form secure and protected relationships.
Research Interests:
In philosophy, there are two competitor views about the nature and value of childhood: The first is the traditional, deficiency, view, according to which children are mere unfinished adults. The second is a view that has recently become... more
In philosophy, there are two competitor views about the nature and value of childhood: The first is the traditional, deficiency, view, according to which children are mere unfinished adults. The second is a view that has recently become increasingly popular amongst philosophers, and according to which children, perhaps in virtue of their biological features, have special and valuable capacities, and, more generally, privileged access to some sources of value. This article provides a conceptual map of these views and their possible interpretations, and notes their bearing on issues of population ethics and on the duties that we are owed during childhood.
Research Interests:
Rationing health care by ordeals is likely to have different effects on women and men, and on distinct groups of women. I show how such putative effects of ordeals are relevant to achieving gender justice. I explain why some ordeals may... more
Rationing health care by ordeals is likely to have different effects on women and men, and on distinct groups of women. I show how such putative effects of ordeals are relevant to achieving gender justice. I explain why some ordeals may disproportionately set back women’s interest in discretionary time, health and access to health care, and may undermine equality of opportunity for positions of advantage. Some ordeals protect the interests of the worse-off women yet set back the interests of better-off women in equal opportunities. I suggest how we can use ordeal design to advance particular aims of gender justice.
Research Interests: Health Care, Health Care Policy, Social Justice, Economic Justice, Health Care Service Access and Utilization, and 12 moreGender, Gender Equality, Distributive Justice, Feminism, Health Care and Social Service Access and Utilization, Health, Prioritarianism, Egalitarian distributive justice, Access to Health Care, Prioritization, Priority, and Gender justice
In "Tragedy and Resentment" Ulrika Carlsson claims that there are cases when we are justified to feel non-moral resentment against someone who harms us without wronging us, when the harm either consists in their attitude towards us or in... more
In "Tragedy and Resentment" Ulrika Carlsson claims that there are cases when we are justified to feel non-moral resentment against someone who harms us without wronging us, when the harm either consists in their attitude towards us or in the emotional suffering triggered by their attitudes. Since they had no duty to protect us from harm, the objectionable attitude is not disrespect but a failure to show love, admiration or appreciation for us. I explain why unrequited love is the wrong example to use when arguing for the possibility of justified non-moral resentment-and why, therefore, Carlsson's claim remains unsubstantiated. Pace Carlsson, people who fail to return our love are not best described as harming us, but as merely failing to benefit us by saving us from harm. Moreover, their role in the causal chain that results in our coming to harm is insufficient to warrant our resentment; more plausibly, we ourselves play a greater and more direct causal role in this process. This is a welcome result: Responding with (non-moral) resentment to someone's failure to return our love indicates that our love has not taken the form of a genuine gift. When we put conditions on successful gifting by allowing for justified resentment if the gift is not returned we are not in fact giving gifts but making a bid for an exchange: I love you so that you love me back.
Research Interests:
This case study explores one instance of how gender norms continue to inform institutional treatment of parents regarding care for children—specifically, how the exercise of fathers’ responsibilities for their children can be discouraged... more
This case study explores one instance of how gender norms continue to inform institutional treatment of parents regarding care for children—specifically, how the exercise of fathers’ responsibilities for their children can be discouraged or altogether blocked. Expectations about fatherhood have changed significantly in Europe in the last decades in the direction of closer involvement in the lives and hands-on care of their children. At the same time, moral and political philosophers have for many years been stressing the value of family relationships, and some offer accounts of why individuals of any sex are entitled to have opportunities to develop flourishing relationships with their children.
Research Interests:
There is a broad philosophical consensus that both children's and prospective parents' interests are relevant to the justification of a right to parent. Against this view, I argue that it is impermissible to sacrifice children's interests... more
There is a broad philosophical consensus that both children's and prospective parents' interests are relevant to the justification of a right to parent. Against this view, I argue that it is impermissible to sacrifice children's interests for the sake of advancing adults' interest in childrearing. Therefore, the allocation of the moral right to parent should track the child's, and not the potential parent's, interest. This revisionary thesis is moderated by two additional qualifications. First, parents lack the moral right to exclude others from associating with the child. Second, children usually come into the world as part of a relationship with their gestational mother; often, this relationship deserves protection.
Research Interests: Legitimacy and Authority, Children and Families, Family Law, Parenting, Family, and 14 moreJustice, Children and Youth, Parent Child Relationships, Children's Rights, Children, Parental Rights, Surrogacy, Child custody, Authority, Parents, Fiduciary Relationships, Parental Authority, Family Justice, and Child Custody Law
Care-supporting policies incentivise women’s withdrawal from the labour market, thereby reinforcing statistical discrimination and further undermining equality of opportunities between women and men for positions of advantage. This, I... more
Care-supporting policies incentivise women’s withdrawal from the labour market, thereby reinforcing statistical discrimination and further undermining equality of opportunities between women and men for positions of advantage. This, I argue, is not sufficient reason against such policies. Supporting care also improves the overall condition of disadvantaged women who are care-givers; justice gives priority to the latter. Moreover, some of the most advantageous existing jobs entail excessive benefits; we should discount the value of allocating such jobs meritocratically. Further, women who have a real chance to occupy positions of advantage have most likely already enjoyed more than their fair share of opportunities; they lack a claim to more. Women can have a complaint grounded in the expressive disvalue of sexist discrimination. This gives them special claims against men occupying the vast majority of top positions and against their higher share of opportunities for positions of advantage. But their claim does not speak against care-supporting policies.
Research Interests: Gender Studies, Feminist Economics, Feminist Theory, Discrimination, Gender Equality, and 15 moreDistributive Justice, Feminism, Equality, Feminism and Social Justice, Gender Discrimination, Equal Opportunities, Gender and Social Justice, Gender equality policy, Equality and Non Discrimination, Equality of opportunity, Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory, Ideal and nonideal theory of justice, Gender justice, Equality of Opportunity and Fair Competition, and Feminist Economics, Social Justice, Inclusion(Distributive Justice, Feminism, Equality, Feminism and Social Justice, Gender Discrimination, Equal Opportunities, Gender and Social Justice, Gender equality policy, Equality and Non Discrimination, Equality of opportunity, Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory, Ideal and nonideal theory of justice, Gender justice, Equality of Opportunity and Fair Competition, and Feminist Economics, Social Justice, Inclusion)
(Distributive Justice, Feminism, Equality, Feminism and Social Justice, Gender Discrimination, Equal Opportunities, Gender and Social Justice, Gender equality policy, Equality and Non Discrimination, Equality of opportunity, Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory, Ideal and nonideal theory of justice, Gender justice, Equality of Opportunity and Fair Competition, and Feminist Economics, Social Justice, Inclusion)
Parenting involves an extraordinary degree of power over children. Republicans are concerned about domination, which, on one view, is the holding of power that fails to track the interests of those over whom it is exercised. On this... more
Parenting involves an extraordinary degree of power over children. Republicans are concerned about domination, which, on one view, is the holding of power that fails to track the interests of those over whom it is exercised. On this account, parenting as we know it is dominating due to the low standards necessary for acquiring and retaining parental rights and the extent of parental power. Domination cannot be fully eliminated from childrearing without unacceptable loss of value. Most likely, republicanism requires that we minimise children’s domination. I examine alternative models of childrearing that are immune to republican criticism.
Research Interests: Republicanism, Children and Families, Family Law, Parenting, Family, and 15 moreChildren's Voices, Justice, Children's Rights, Parenting/childcare, Power and domination, Children, Parental Rights, Family ethics, Ethics and Family Law, Parents, Domination, Freedom as Non-domination, Ethics of Family, Family Justice, and Ethics of the Family
Some philosophers argue that we should limit procreation – for instance, to one child per person or one child per couple – in order to reduce our aggregate carbon footprint. I provide additional support to the claim that population size... more
Some philosophers argue that we should limit procreation – for instance, to one child per person or one child per couple – in order to reduce our aggregate carbon footprint. I provide additional support to the claim that population size is a matter of justice, by explaining that we have a duty of justice towards the current generation of children to pass on to them a sustainable population. But instead of, or, more likely, alongside with, having fewer children in in each family, we could also create families with more than two parents. I explore this possibility by pointing out the ways in which multi-parenting can advance children’s interests: in higher levels of well-being, in non-monopolistic child-rearing, and in a future opportunity to become themselves parents.
Research Interests: Environmental Studies, Children and Families, Family Law, Parenting, Family, and 15 moreEnvironmental Ethics, Justice, Intergenerational Relationships, Environmental Sustainability, Children's Rights, Environmental ethics (Philosophy) (Philosophy), Children, Population, Intergenerational justice, Family ethics, Population Studies, Overpopulation, Intergenerational Relations, Parents, and Sustainability(Environmental Ethics, Justice, Intergenerational Relationships, Environmental Sustainability, Children's Rights, Environmental ethics (Philosophy) (Philosophy), Children, Population, Intergenerational justice, Family ethics, Population Studies, Overpopulation, Intergenerational Relations, Parents, and Sustainability)
(Environmental Ethics, Justice, Intergenerational Relationships, Environmental Sustainability, Children's Rights, Environmental ethics (Philosophy) (Philosophy), Children, Population, Intergenerational justice, Family ethics, Population Studies, Overpopulation, Intergenerational Relations, Parents, and Sustainability)
I propose a speculative, debunking explanation for the widespread tendency to attribute special value to family relationships. Instead, I suggest, the value of family relationships between adults flows from the same source as the value of... more
I propose a speculative, debunking explanation for the widespread tendency to attribute special value to family relationships. Instead, I suggest, the value of family relationships between adults flows from the same source as the value of intimate relationships between people who are not related by kinship: that of love. This is important because social expectations and (contested) pieces of legislation often privilege family over non-family close relationships, and often seek to preserve family relationships that, if my suggestion is correct, would be better dissolved. Moreover, if love is the source of value of all intimate relationships, this can help reframe debates such as that concerning same-sex marriage in more constructive ways. We often assume that family relationships, even with second or third degree relatives, have a special kind of value that other intimate relationships, such as friendships with non-family members, lack. I want to challenge this belief and suggest that, ultimately, the value of friendship and kinship alike flows from the same source: that of the love that bounds people. This, as I explain in due course, is part liberating and part threatening. A few terminological clarifications: I am talking about love in its broad sense, beyond the usual divides between companionate and passionate love, love for parents or for children, etc. I assume that emotional attachments to others play a huge role in our wellbeing 1 , making close relationships indispensable to the leading of a good life. When I talk about "friendship", I refer here to all close relationships based on affection and intimacy that, unlike family relationships, are chosen, rather than given. (Understood in this way, friendship and family relationships obviously intersect insofar as we choose whom to marry.
Research Interests:
This chapter discusses the question of how to design public policies that are informed by gender justice. It looks at the main policies that have been proposed by feminists and whose aim is to achieve a more just distribution of the... more
This chapter discusses the question of how to design public policies that are informed by gender justice. It looks at the main policies that have been proposed by feminists and whose aim is to achieve a more just distribution of the burdens of social cooperation between women and men. Some of these have been defended as a way of giving due recognition to care work and freeing women from economic dependency on their spouses. Others have been defended as a way of resisting the traditional division of labour between women and men and getting closer to a gender-egalitarian society.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Introduction to the Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children
Research Interests: Education, Family studies, Disability Studies, Children and Families, Family Law, and 18 moreWar Studies, Parenting, Child Development, Family, Gender, Gender Equality, Justice, Health, Philosophy of Punishment, Parent Child Relationships, Children's Rights, Voting, Disability, Children's Play, Children, Child, Parents, and Parent‐child Relations
Liam Shields’ sufficientarian commitments mean that he should subscribe to a child-centred account of the right to parent. This point most likely generalises: sufficientarians who acknowledge children’s full moral status must embrace a... more
Liam Shields’ sufficientarian commitments mean that he should subscribe to a child-centred account of the right to parent. This point most likely generalises: sufficientarians who acknowledge children’s full moral status must embrace a child-centred account of the right to parent.
Research Interests:
Because families disrupt fair patterns of distribution and, in particular, equality of opportunity, egalitarians believe that the institution of the family needs to be defended at the bar of justice. In their recent book, Harry Brighouse... more
Because families disrupt fair patterns of distribution and, in particular, equality of opportunity, egalitarians believe that the institution of the family needs to be defended at the bar of justice. In their recent book, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift have argued that the moral gains of preserving the family outweigh its moral costs. Yet, I claim that the egalitarian case for abolishing the family has been over-stated due to a failure to consider how alternatives to the family would also disturb fair distributions and, in particular, equality of opportunity. Absent the family, children would continue to be exposed to care-givers of different levels of ability, investment in child-rearing and beneficial partiality. In addition, social mechanisms other than the family would lead to the accumulation of economic inequalities. Any kind of upbringing will fail to realise equality for reasons that go deeper than the family: our partiality and unequal abilities to nurture.
Research Interests: Children and Families, Social Justice, Family, Distributive Justice, Justice, and 23 moreJohn Rawls, Feminism and Social Justice, Egalitarian distributive justice, Children, Parental Rights, The Ethics of Care, John Rawls's theory of justice, Orphanages, Parental involvement, Orphanage, Parents, Ethics of Care, Design of Orphanages, Orphanage Child, Rawlsian Theory, Parental Partiality, Partiality, Childrearing, Ethics, ethics of care and feminist theory, Social Class Differences In Childrearing, Justice and the Family, Childrearing rights, and Care and the Ethics of Care(John Rawls, Feminism and Social Justice, Egalitarian distributive justice, Children, Parental Rights, The Ethics of Care, John Rawls's theory of justice, Orphanages, Parental involvement, Orphanage, Parents, Ethics of Care, Design of Orphanages, Orphanage Child, Rawlsian Theory, Parental Partiality, Partiality, Childrearing, Ethics, ethics of care and feminist theory, Social Class Differences In Childrearing, Justice and the Family, Childrearing rights, and Care and the Ethics of Care)
(John Rawls, Feminism and Social Justice, Egalitarian distributive justice, Children, Parental Rights, The Ethics of Care, John Rawls's theory of justice, Orphanages, Parental involvement, Orphanage, Parents, Ethics of Care, Design of Orphanages, Orphanage Child, Rawlsian Theory, Parental Partiality, Partiality, Childrearing, Ethics, ethics of care and feminist theory, Social Class Differences In Childrearing, Justice and the Family, Childrearing rights, and Care and the Ethics of Care)
Research Interests: Family studies, Family, Labor Migration, Migration Studies, Transnational migration, and 13 moreChildren's Rights, Family ethics, The Ethics of Care, Family and Migration, Migration studies, Gender Studies, Sociology of the Family and Intimate Lives, Family Migration, Effects of migration to children left behind, children and Migration, Gender and Family Migration, Care Drain Hochschild, Care Drain, Effects of Parents Migration to Children, and Parental Duties(Children's Rights, Family ethics, The Ethics of Care, Family and Migration, Migration studies, Gender Studies, Sociology of the Family and Intimate Lives, Family Migration, Effects of migration to children left behind, children and Migration, Gender and Family Migration, Care Drain Hochschild, Care Drain, Effects of Parents Migration to Children, and Parental Duties)
(Children's Rights, Family ethics, The Ethics of Care, Family and Migration, Migration studies, Gender Studies, Sociology of the Family and Intimate Lives, Family Migration, Effects of migration to children left behind, children and Migration, Gender and Family Migration, Care Drain Hochschild, Care Drain, Effects of Parents Migration to Children, and Parental Duties)
L’argument que defenso té la forma següent, de les premisses (P1 a P5) a les conclusions (C1 a C4): P1. Unes persones no haurien d’estar en pitjors condicions que les altres sense que en tinguin cap culpa o per eleccions alienes (=... more
L’argument que defenso té la forma següent, de les premisses (P1 a P5) a les conclusions (C1 a C4):
P1. Unes persones no haurien d’estar en pitjors condicions que les altres sense que en tinguin cap culpa o per eleccions alienes (= igualitarisme de la sort).
P2. L’accés condicional als serveis sanitaris essencials vol dir desatendre les persones irresponsables, i per tant soscavar la solidaritat.
P3. La solidaritat és un bé no excloïble.
P4. La solidaritat contribueix al benestar.
C1. Per tant, de P2, P3 i P4 es desprèn que no podem sotmetre a condicions l’accés als serveis sanitaris essencials sense empitjorar, alhora, un aspecte que afecta les persones responsables.
C2. Però de P1 es desprèn que l’igualitarisme de la sort no pot demanar que les persones responsables estiguin pitjor.
P5. L’increment del benestar és desitjable (= eficiència).
C3. Per tant, de C2 i P5 es desprèn que la justícia demana que de vegades rescatem les persones irresponsables.
C4. Per tant, de P2 i C3 es desprèn que condicionar l’accés als serveis
sanitaris essencials de vegades és injust.
P1. Unes persones no haurien d’estar en pitjors condicions que les altres sense que en tinguin cap culpa o per eleccions alienes (= igualitarisme de la sort).
P2. L’accés condicional als serveis sanitaris essencials vol dir desatendre les persones irresponsables, i per tant soscavar la solidaritat.
P3. La solidaritat és un bé no excloïble.
P4. La solidaritat contribueix al benestar.
C1. Per tant, de P2, P3 i P4 es desprèn que no podem sotmetre a condicions l’accés als serveis sanitaris essencials sense empitjorar, alhora, un aspecte que afecta les persones responsables.
C2. Però de P1 es desprèn que l’igualitarisme de la sort no pot demanar que les persones responsables estiguin pitjor.
P5. L’increment del benestar és desitjable (= eficiència).
C3. Per tant, de C2 i P5 es desprèn que la justícia demana que de vegades rescatem les persones irresponsables.
C4. Per tant, de P2 i C3 es desprèn que condicionar l’accés als serveis
sanitaris essencials de vegades és injust.
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Family studies, Children and Families, Family Law, Early Childhood Education, Parenting, and 14 moreFamily, Distributive Justice, Justice, Value Theory, Children's Rights, Parenting/childcare, Children, Childhood studies, Family ethics, Parents, Early Childhood Education, Hidden Curriculum, Social Justice, Ethics of Family, Family Justice, and Ethics of the Family
Common sense morality and legislations around the world ascribe normative relevance to biological connections between parents and children. Procreators who meet a modest standard of parental competence are believed to have a right to rear... more
Common sense morality and legislations around the world ascribe normative relevance to biological connections between parents and children. Procreators who meet a modest standard of parental competence are believed to have a right to rear the children they brought into the world. I explore various attempts to justify this belief and find most of these attempts lacking. I distinguish between two kinds of biological connections between parents and children: the genetic link and the gestational link. I argue that the second can better justify a right to rear.
Research Interests: Family studies, Children and Families, Family Law, Parenting, Family, and 13 moreJustice, Parent Child Relationships, Children's Rights, Children, Family ethics, Surrogacy, Surrogate Motherhood, Parents, Children's Rights, the Family, Parents Rights, Surrogate Mother, Gestation, Family Justice, and right to parent
Research Interests:
Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox: (1) Love is a matter of justice. (2) There cannot be a duty to love. (3) All matters of justice are matters of duty. The first claim is more... more
Three claims about love and justice cannot be simultaneously true and therefore entail a paradox:
(1) Love is a matter of justice.
(2) There cannot be a duty to love.
(3) All matters of justice are matters of duty.
The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox.
(1) Love is a matter of justice.
(2) There cannot be a duty to love.
(3) All matters of justice are matters of duty.
The first claim is more controversial. To defend it, I show why the extent to which we enjoy the good of love is relevant to distributive justice. To defend (2) I explain the empirical, conceptual and axiological arguments in its favour. Although (3) is the most generally endorsed claim of the three, I conclude we should reject it in order to avoid the paradox.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Children's vulnerability gives rise to duties of justice towards children and determines when authority over them is legitimately exercised. I argue for two claims. First, children's general vulnerability to objectionable dependency on... more
Children's vulnerability gives rise to duties of justice towards children and determines when authority over them is legitimately exercised. I argue for two claims. First, children's general vulnerability to objectionable dependency on their care-givers entails that they have a right not to be subject to monopolies of care, and therefore determines the structure of legitimate authority over them. Second, children's vulnerability to the loss of some special goods of childhood determines the content of legitimate authority over them. My interest is in the so far little discussed goods of engaging in world discovery, artistic creation, philosophical pursuits and experimentation with one's self. I call these "special goods of childhood" because I individuals, in general, only have full access to them during childhood and they make a distinctive and weighty contribution to well-being. Therefore, they are part of the metric of justice towards children The overall conclusion is that we ought to make good institutional care part of every child’s upbringing.
Research Interests: Legitimacy and Authority, Children and Families, Parenting, Family, Risk and Vulnerability, and 18 moreJustice, Vulnerability, Parent Child Relationships, Children's Rights, Social vulnerability, Children, Intergenerational justice, Parental Rights, Family ethics, Authority, Parents, Children's Best Interests, Children's Rigths, Childrearing, Ethics of Family, Family Justice, Ethics of the Family, and Childrearing rights(Justice, Vulnerability, Parent Child Relationships, Children's Rights, Social vulnerability, Children, Intergenerational justice, Parental Rights, Family ethics, Authority, Parents, Children's Best Interests, Children's Rigths, Childrearing, Ethics of Family, Family Justice, Ethics of the Family, and Childrearing rights)
(Justice, Vulnerability, Parent Child Relationships, Children's Rights, Social vulnerability, Children, Intergenerational justice, Parental Rights, Family ethics, Authority, Parents, Children's Best Interests, Children's Rigths, Childrearing, Ethics of Family, Family Justice, Ethics of the Family, and Childrearing rights)
Research Interests:
A short piece criticising the dual interest account of how we acquire the right to parent, as defended by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift.
Research Interests:
Analytic philosophers tend to agree that intentional parental genetic shaping and intentional parental environmental shaping for the same feature are, normatively, on a par. I challenge this view by advancing a novel argument, grounded in... more
Analytic philosophers tend to agree that intentional parental genetic shaping and intentional parental environmental shaping for the same feature are, normatively, on a par. I challenge this view by advancing a novel argument, grounded in the value of fair relationships between parents and children: Parental genetic shaping is morally objectionable because it unjustifiably exacerbates the asymmetry between parent and child with respect to the voluntariness of their entrance into the parent-child relationship. Parental genetic shaping is, for this reason, different from and more objectionable than parental environmental shaping. I introduce a distinction between procreative decisions one makes qua mere procreator – that is, without the intention to rear the resulting child – and procreative decisions one makes qua procreator-and-future childrearer. Genetic shaping is objectionable when undertaken in the latter capacity: Both selection and enhancement are objectionable because they introduce an unnecessary and avoidable inequality in the parent-child relationship; in the case of enhancement this also results in harm to the future child.
Research Interests:
Luck egalitarianism provides a reason to object to conditionality in health incentive programs in some cases when conditionality undermines political values such as solidarity or inclusiveness. This is the case with incentive programs... more
Luck egalitarianism provides a reason to object to conditionality in health incentive programs in some cases when conditionality undermines political values such as solidarity or inclusiveness. This is the case with incentive programs that aim to restrict access to essential health care services. Such programs undermine solidarity. Yet, most people’s lives are objectively worse, in one respect, in non-solidary societies, because solidarity contributes both instrumentally and directly to individuals' well-being. Because solidarity is non-excludable, undermining it will deprive both the prudent and the imprudent citizens of its goods. Thereby, undermining solidarity can make prudent citizens worse off than they would have otherwise been, out of no fault or choice of their own, but rather as a result of somebody else's imprudent choice. This goes against the spirit of luck egalitarianism. Therefore, (luck-egalitarian) justice can require us to save the imprudent and avoid conditionality in access to essential health care services.
Research Interests:
Birth mothers usually have a moral right to parent their newborns in virtue of a mutual attachment formed, during gestation, between the gestational mother and the fetus. The attachment is formed, in part, thanks to the burdens of... more
Birth mothers usually have a moral right to parent their newborns in virtue of a mutual attachment formed, during gestation, between the gestational mother and the fetus. The attachment is formed, in part, thanks to the burdens of pregnancy, and it serves the interest of the newborn; the gestational mother, too, has a powerful interest in the protection of this attachment. Given its justification, the right to parent one's gestated baby cannot be transferred at will to other people who would wish to function as social parents of the child in question. This indicates that surrogacy contracts are illegitimate, and therefore should be void.
Research Interests: Children and Families, Family Law, Parent Child Relationships, Children's Rights, Surrogate Mothering, and 15 moreChildren, Family ethics, Surrogacy, Surrogate Motherhood, Commercial Surrogacy, Intercountry Adoption, Trafficking, Birth and Surrogacy, Parents, Surrogates, Surrogate Mother, Altruistic Surrogacy, Surrogacy Ethics, Transnational Surrogacy, Gestational Surrogacy, Commercial Surrogacy, and Crossborder Surrogacy(Children, Family ethics, Surrogacy, Surrogate Motherhood, Commercial Surrogacy, Intercountry Adoption, Trafficking, Birth and Surrogacy, Parents, Surrogates, Surrogate Mother, Altruistic Surrogacy, Surrogacy Ethics, Transnational Surrogacy, Gestational Surrogacy, Commercial Surrogacy, and Crossborder Surrogacy)
(Children, Family ethics, Surrogacy, Surrogate Motherhood, Commercial Surrogacy, Intercountry Adoption, Trafficking, Birth and Surrogacy, Parents, Surrogates, Surrogate Mother, Altruistic Surrogacy, Surrogacy Ethics, Transnational Surrogacy, Gestational Surrogacy, Commercial Surrogacy, and Crossborder Surrogacy)
Several philosophers argue that individuals have an interest-protecting right to parent; specifically, the interest is in rearing children whom one can parent adequately. If such a right exists it can provide a solution to scepticism... more
Several philosophers argue that individuals have an interest-protecting right to parent; specifically, the interest is in rearing children whom one can parent adequately. If such
a right exists it can provide a solution to scepticism about duties of justice concerning distant future generations and bypass the challenge provided by the non-identity problem. Current children - whose identity is independent from environment-affecting decisions of current adults - will have, in due course, a right to parent. Adequate parenting requires resources. We owe duties of justice to current children, including the satisfaction of their interest-protecting rights; therefore we owe them the conditions for rearing children adequately in the future. But to engage in permissible parenting they, too, will need sufficient resources to ensure their own children's future ability to bring up children under adequate conditions. Because this reasoning goes on ad infinitum it entails that each generation of adults owes its contemporary generation of children at least those resources that are necessary for sustaining human life indefinitely at an
adequate level of wellbeing.
a right exists it can provide a solution to scepticism about duties of justice concerning distant future generations and bypass the challenge provided by the non-identity problem. Current children - whose identity is independent from environment-affecting decisions of current adults - will have, in due course, a right to parent. Adequate parenting requires resources. We owe duties of justice to current children, including the satisfaction of their interest-protecting rights; therefore we owe them the conditions for rearing children adequately in the future. But to engage in permissible parenting they, too, will need sufficient resources to ensure their own children's future ability to bring up children under adequate conditions. Because this reasoning goes on ad infinitum it entails that each generation of adults owes its contemporary generation of children at least those resources that are necessary for sustaining human life indefinitely at an
adequate level of wellbeing.
Research Interests:
The evaluation of labour markets and of particular jobs ought to be sensitive to a plurality of benefits and burdens of work. We use the term 'the goods of work' to refer to those benefits of work that cannot be obtained in exchange for... more
The evaluation of labour markets and of particular jobs ought to be sensitive to a plurality of benefits and burdens of work. We use the term 'the goods of work' to refer to those benefits of work that cannot be obtained in exchange for money and that can be enjoyed mostly or exclusively in the context of work. Drawing on empirical research and various philosophical traditions of thinking about work we identify four goods of work: 1) attaining various types of excellence; 2) making a social contribution; 3) experiencing community; and 4) gaining social recognition. Our account of the goods of work can be read as unpacking the ways in which work can be meaningful.
The distribution of the goods of work is a concern of justice for two conjoint reasons: First, they are part of the conception of the good of a large number of individuals. Second, in societies without an unconditional income and in which most people are not independently wealthy, paid work is non-optional and workers have few, if any, occasions to realize these goods outside their job. Taking into account the plurality of the goods of work and their importance for justice challenges the theoretical and political status quo, which focuses mostly on justice with regard to the distribution of income. We defend this account against the libertarian challenge that a free labour market gives individuals sufficient options to realise the goods of work important to them, and discuss the challenge from state neutrality. In the conclusion, we hint towards possible implications for today’s labour markets.
The distribution of the goods of work is a concern of justice for two conjoint reasons: First, they are part of the conception of the good of a large number of individuals. Second, in societies without an unconditional income and in which most people are not independently wealthy, paid work is non-optional and workers have few, if any, occasions to realize these goods outside their job. Taking into account the plurality of the goods of work and their importance for justice challenges the theoretical and political status quo, which focuses mostly on justice with regard to the distribution of income. We defend this account against the libertarian challenge that a free labour market gives individuals sufficient options to realise the goods of work important to them, and discuss the challenge from state neutrality. In the conclusion, we hint towards possible implications for today’s labour markets.
Research Interests: Sociology of Work, Social Justice, Workplace Studies, Egalitarianism, Distributive Justice, and 15 moreJustice, Autonomy, Work and Labour, Egalitarian distributive justice, Liberal Egalitarianism, Workplace, Work-Life Balance, Workplace Democracy, Egalitarian Societies, Democratic Workplaces and Organization Frameworks, Egalitarian currencies: Welfare, Resources, Capabilities, Egalitarian, Democratic Principles in the Workplace, Political Theory (Esp. Egalitarianism, and Metric of Justice(Justice, Autonomy, Work and Labour, Egalitarian distributive justice, Liberal Egalitarianism, Workplace, Work-Life Balance, Workplace Democracy, Egalitarian Societies, Democratic Workplaces and Organization Frameworks, Egalitarian currencies: Welfare, Resources, Capabilities, Egalitarian, Democratic Principles in the Workplace, Political Theory (Esp. Egalitarianism, and Metric of Justice)
(Justice, Autonomy, Work and Labour, Egalitarian distributive justice, Liberal Egalitarianism, Workplace, Work-Life Balance, Workplace Democracy, Egalitarian Societies, Democratic Workplaces and Organization Frameworks, Egalitarian currencies: Welfare, Resources, Capabilities, Egalitarian, Democratic Principles in the Workplace, Political Theory (Esp. Egalitarianism, and Metric of Justice)
Many instances of parental enhancement are objectionable on egalitarian grounds because they unnecessarily amplify one kind of asymmetry of power between parents and children. Because children have full moral status, we ought to seek... more
Many instances of parental enhancement are objectionable on egalitarian grounds because they unnecessarily amplify one kind of asymmetry of power between parents and children. Because children have full moral status, we ought to seek egalitarian relationships with them. Such relationships are compatible with asymmetries of power only to the extent to which the asymmetry is necessary for (i) advancing the child's level of advantage up to what justice requires or (ii) instilling in the child morally required features. This is a ground to oppose parental enhancements whose purpose is either to merely satisfy parents' preferences or to confer on the child advantages above and beyond what the child is owed by justice.
Research Interests: Children and Families, Parenting, Egalitarianism, Equality, Enhancement, and 11 moreChildren's Rights, Human Enhancement, Parenting/childcare, Genetic Engineering, ASSISTED PROCREATION/PROCREATION MEDICALEMENT ASSISTEE, Children, Relational Equality, The Morality of Procreation, Parents, Medically Assisted Procreation and Biotechnology, and Parental Duties
The paper has two aims. First, to show that a version of luck egalitarianism that includes relational goods amongst its distribuenda can, as a matter of internal logic, account for one of the core beliefs of relational egalitarianism.... more
The paper has two aims. First, to show that a version of luck egalitarianism that includes relational goods amongst its distribuenda can, as a matter of internal logic, account for one of the core beliefs of relational egalitarianism. Therefore, there will be important extensional overlap, at the level of domestic justice, between luck egalitarianism and relational
egalitarianism. This is an important consideration in assessing the merits of and the relationship between the two rival views. Second, to provide some support for including relational goods, including those advocated by relational egalitarianism, on the distribuenda of justice and therefore to put in a good word for the overall plausibility of this conception of justice. I show why relational egalitarians, too, have reason to sympathise with this proposal.
egalitarianism. This is an important consideration in assessing the merits of and the relationship between the two rival views. Second, to provide some support for including relational goods, including those advocated by relational egalitarianism, on the distribuenda of justice and therefore to put in a good word for the overall plausibility of this conception of justice. I show why relational egalitarians, too, have reason to sympathise with this proposal.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Worldwide, many impoverished parents migrate, leaving their children behind. As a result children are deprived of continuity in care and, sometimes, suffer from other forms of emotional and developmental harms. I explain why coercive... more
Worldwide, many impoverished parents migrate, leaving their children behind. As a result children are deprived of continuity in care and, sometimes, suffer from other forms of emotional and developmental harms.
I explain why coercive responses to care drain are illegitimate and likely to be inefficient. Poor parents have a moral right to migrate without their children and restricting their migration would violate the human right to freedom of movement and create a new form of gender injustice.
I propose and defend an institutional solution. Taxes levied on the remittances sent by temporary migrants ought to be used to provide migrants' children with psychological counseling in order to mitigate the harm resulted from discontinuity in care.
I explain why coercive responses to care drain are illegitimate and likely to be inefficient. Poor parents have a moral right to migrate without their children and restricting their migration would violate the human right to freedom of movement and create a new form of gender injustice.
I propose and defend an institutional solution. Taxes levied on the remittances sent by temporary migrants ought to be used to provide migrants' children with psychological counseling in order to mitigate the harm resulted from discontinuity in care.
Research Interests:
I argue that children who were selected for particular traits or genetically enhanced might feel, for this reason, less securely, spontaneously and fairly loved by their parents, which would constitute significant harm. ‘Parents’ refers,... more
I argue that children who were selected for particular
traits or genetically enhanced might feel, for this reason, less securely, spontaneously and fairly loved by their parents, which would constitute significant harm. ‘Parents’ refers, throughout this chapter, to the people who perform the social function of rearing children, rather than to procreators. I rely on an understanding of adequate parental love which includes several characteristics: parents should not make children feel they are loved conditionally, for features such as intelligence, looks or temperament; they should not burden children with parental expectations concerning particular achievements of the child; and parental love is often expressed in spontaneous enjoyment and discovery of children’s features. This understanding of parental love provides a reason to question the legitimacy of parental use of selection and enhancement and to explain why parents should not engage on a quest for the ‘best child’.
traits or genetically enhanced might feel, for this reason, less securely, spontaneously and fairly loved by their parents, which would constitute significant harm. ‘Parents’ refers, throughout this chapter, to the people who perform the social function of rearing children, rather than to procreators. I rely on an understanding of adequate parental love which includes several characteristics: parents should not make children feel they are loved conditionally, for features such as intelligence, looks or temperament; they should not burden children with parental expectations concerning particular achievements of the child; and parental love is often expressed in spontaneous enjoyment and discovery of children’s features. This understanding of parental love provides a reason to question the legitimacy of parental use of selection and enhancement and to explain why parents should not engage on a quest for the ‘best child’.
Research Interests: Family studies, Children and Families, Parenting, Reproduction, Family, and 10 moreParent Child Relationships, Children's Rights, Children, Procreation, Assisted Reproduction, Acceptance of Parents Affect Development of Child, Parents, Parents’ Expectation, Medically Assisted Procreation and Biotechnology, and Regulation of Procreation Technologies
Traditionally, most philosophers saw childhood as a state of deficiency and thought that its value was entirely dependent on how successfully it prepares individuals for adulthood. Yet, there are good reasons to think that childhood also... more
Traditionally, most philosophers saw childhood as a state of deficiency and thought that its value was entirely dependent on how successfully it prepares individuals for adulthood. Yet, there are good reasons to think that childhood also has intrinsic value. Children possess certain intrinsically valuable abilities to a higher degree than adults. Moreover, going through a phase when one does not yet have a “self of one’s own,” and experimenting one’s way to a stable self, seems intrinsically valuable. I argue that children can have good lives, on several understandings of well-being – as a pleasurable state, as the satisfaction of simple desires or as the realization of certain objective goods. In reply to the likely objection that only individuals capable of morality can have intrinsic value, I explain why it is plausible that children have sufficient moral agency to be as deserving of respect as adults.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190205072.003.0010The chapter advances two claims: first, that commitment to one’s spouse is only instrumentally valuable, adding no intrinsic value to the relationship. Moreover, commitment has costs: it partially... more
10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190205072.003.0010The chapter advances two claims: first, that commitment to one’s spouse is only instrumentally valuable, adding no intrinsic value to the relationship. Moreover, commitment has costs: it partially forecloses the future, thus making one less attentive to life’s possibilities; therefore, it would be desirable for people to achieve the same goods without commitment. The second, more ambitious, claim is that commitment in general, and marital commitments in particular, are problematic instruments for securing the good of romantic and sexual love. It makes sense to prefer that another person’s (perhaps especially, romantic or sexual) love for you is sustained by inclination rather than commitment. In addition, the pragmatic reasons for commitment are weak in relation to activities that, ideally, are process-oriented rather than goal-oriented—such as loving another person.
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This chapter argues that there is a collective responsibility to have enough children in order to ensure that people will not, in the future, suffer great harm due to depopulation. Moreover, if people stopped having children voluntarily,... more
This chapter argues that there is a collective responsibility to have enough children in order to ensure that people will not, in the future, suffer great harm due to depopulation. Moreover, if people stopped having children voluntarily, it could be legitimate for states to incentivize and maybe even coerce individuals to bear and rear children. Various arguments against the enforceability of an individual duty to bear and rear children are examined. Coercing people to have children would come at significant moral cost; however, none of the arguments against enforceability seem decisive. The existence of a collective responsibility to have children bears on the question of whether parents and non-parents ought to shoulder the costs of childbearing and child rearing together.
Research Interests:
The gendered division of labour in combination with the feminisation of international migration contribute to shortages of care, a phenomenon often called ‘care drain’. I argue that this phenomenon is an issue of global gender justice. I... more
The gendered division of labour in combination with the feminisation of international migration contribute to shortages of care, a phenomenon often called ‘care drain’. I argue that this phenomenon is an issue of global gender justice. I look at two methodological challenges and favourably analyse the suggestions that care drain studies should include the effects of fathers’ and other male caregivers’ migration and, in some cases, the effects of migration within national borders. I also explain why care drain is a problem of distributive justice, by looking at the background conditions that result in much of the caregivers’ migration.
Research Interests:
I refer to the criticism that, conceptually, justice cannot require what we cannot achieve as 'the feasibility constraint on the concept of justice' and argue against it. I point to its various implausible implications and contend that a... more
I refer to the criticism that, conceptually, justice cannot require what we cannot achieve as 'the feasibility constraint on the concept of justice' and argue against it. I point to its various implausible implications and contend that a willingness to apply the label 'unjust' to regrettable situations that we cannot fix is going to enhance the action-guiding potential of a conception of justice, by providing an aspirational ideal. This is possible on the condition that, at all times, we cannot specify with certainty the limits of what is feasible for us collectively. The rejection of the feasibility constraint entails that there can be injustice without perpetrators; this is a theoretical price worth paying.
Research Interests:
Concerns about the under-representation of female academic philosophers and about the stereotype that philosophy is best done by men have recently led to efforts to make academic philosophy a more inclusive discipline. An example is the... more
Concerns about the under-representation of female academic philosophers and about the stereotype that philosophy is best done by men have recently led to efforts to make academic philosophy a more inclusive discipline. An example is the Gendered Conference Campaign, encouraging event organisers and volume editors to include women amongst invited speakers and authors.
Initiatives such as the GCC raise worries about tokenism. Potential invitees may be concerned about unfairness towards whose who would have been invited in their place in the absence of affirmative action and about the way in which affirmative action can (be perceived to) affect the quality of the conference or volume in question. And women philosophers often worry that, if
formal rules or significant social pressures towards gender inclusiveness play a role in selection
processes, their achievements will be discounted.
I argue there is no good reason for these fears: there is no pure meritocracy in academia, nor
is the ideal of pure meritocracy either feasible or desirable.There are several legitimate grounds
— independent of professional competence — for including people in positions of visibility and
prestige; gender is such a legitimate reason.
Initiatives such as the GCC raise worries about tokenism. Potential invitees may be concerned about unfairness towards whose who would have been invited in their place in the absence of affirmative action and about the way in which affirmative action can (be perceived to) affect the quality of the conference or volume in question. And women philosophers often worry that, if
formal rules or significant social pressures towards gender inclusiveness play a role in selection
processes, their achievements will be discounted.
I argue there is no good reason for these fears: there is no pure meritocracy in academia, nor
is the ideal of pure meritocracy either feasible or desirable.There are several legitimate grounds
— independent of professional competence — for including people in positions of visibility and
prestige; gender is such a legitimate reason.
Research Interests:
I propose, defend and illustrate a principle of gender justice meant to capture the nature of a variety of injustices based on gender: A society is gender just only if the costs of a gender-neutral lifestyle are, all other things being... more
I propose, defend and illustrate a principle of gender justice meant to capture the nature of a variety of injustices based on gender:
A society is gender just only if the costs of a gender-neutral lifestyle are, all other things being equal, lower than, or at most equal to, the costs of gendered lifestyles.
The principle is meant to account for the entire range of gender injustice: violence against women, economic and legal discrimination, domestic exploitation, the gendered division of labor and gendered socialization. The sense of “costs” employed is similarly wide. Costs can be material (such as financial, time or effort), psychological (such as self-respect, a good relationship with one’s body and emotions) and social (such as reputation, social acceptance and valuable social relationships).
I defend the principle by appeal to the values at the core of liberal egalitarian justice: equality of access and the good of individual choice. I illustrate my case through a discussion of the injustice of a gendered division of labor. Some feminists doubt that liberal egalitarianism has the theoretical resources to recognize the unjust nature of the gendered division of labor. I argue that it does.
If the principle advanced here is correct, then gender injustice is pervasive. At the same, it does not affect only women but also men. Liberal egalitarianism is capable of acknowledging this fact without denying that, overall, gender norms oppress women more than they oppress men: Arguably, women who wish to lead a gender-neutral lifestyle have to pay higher costs that men who wish to do the same.
A society is gender just only if the costs of a gender-neutral lifestyle are, all other things being equal, lower than, or at most equal to, the costs of gendered lifestyles.
The principle is meant to account for the entire range of gender injustice: violence against women, economic and legal discrimination, domestic exploitation, the gendered division of labor and gendered socialization. The sense of “costs” employed is similarly wide. Costs can be material (such as financial, time or effort), psychological (such as self-respect, a good relationship with one’s body and emotions) and social (such as reputation, social acceptance and valuable social relationships).
I defend the principle by appeal to the values at the core of liberal egalitarian justice: equality of access and the good of individual choice. I illustrate my case through a discussion of the injustice of a gendered division of labor. Some feminists doubt that liberal egalitarianism has the theoretical resources to recognize the unjust nature of the gendered division of labor. I argue that it does.
If the principle advanced here is correct, then gender injustice is pervasive. At the same, it does not affect only women but also men. Liberal egalitarianism is capable of acknowledging this fact without denying that, overall, gender norms oppress women more than they oppress men: Arguably, women who wish to lead a gender-neutral lifestyle have to pay higher costs that men who wish to do the same.
Research Interests:
There is wide agreement that children have human rights, and that their human rights differ from those of adults. What explains this difference which is, at least at first glance, puzzling, given that human rights are meant to be... more
There is wide agreement that children have human rights, and that their human rights differ from those of adults. What explains this difference which is, at least at first glance, puzzling, given that human rights are meant to be universal? The puzzle can be dispelled by identifying what unites children’s and adults’ rights as human rights. Here I seek to answer the question of children’s human rights – that is, rights they have merely in virtue of being human and of being children – by exploring how children’s interests are different from adults’, and how respect for children’s and adults’ moral status yields different practical requirements. If human rights protect interests, then children have many, but not all, of the human rights of adults, and, in addition, have some human rights that adults lack. I discuss the way in which children’s human rights, as I conceive of them here are, or fail to be, reflected in the law; as an illustration, I use the most important legal document listing children’s rights, namely the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (henceforth CRC).
Research Interests: Human Rights, Children and Families, Children and Youth, Children's Rights, Children's rights (Political Science), and 6 moreChildren, Moral rights, Parents, Children's Rights, the Family, Parents Rights, Children's human rights especially in Family Law and Child protection systems, and Children's rights to be nurtured and loved by their parents
What would the institution of the family look like, if it were reformed according to republican desiderata? Would it even survive such re-shaping?
Research Interests:
Feminists have always been divided about the desirability of a basic income. A basic income would netly benefit many of the worse off women. Yet, feminists argued that its introduction would also result in a further set-back of equal... more
Feminists have always been divided about the desirability of a basic income. A basic income would netly benefit many of the worse off women. Yet, feminists argued that its introduction would also result in a further set-back of equal opportunities between women and men for the best social positions. I explain why this is a valid feminist criticism to basic income; yet, we should not give it much weight. The reason is that either (1) the best social positions come with benefits to which nobody has a claim of justice; or (2) people who have a shot at the best social positions already have more than their fair share of opportunity for them. If a basic income will stably improve the situation of the worst off, a large proportion of whom are women, egalitarian feminists have more reason to support than to oppose it.
Research Interests: Feminist Theory, Equality Studies, Feminist Philosophy, Gender Equality, Women's Right to Equality, and 19 moreEgalitarianism, Feminism, Equality, Feminism(s), Feminism and Social Justice, Egalitarian distributive justice, Feminist Political Theory, Gender equality policy, Opportunity, Gender and Equality, Universal Basic Income, Equality of opportunity, Gender equality policies, Basic Income Guarantee, Egalitate De Sanse, Unconditional Basic Income, Equality of Opportunity and Fair Competition, Welfare State and Basic Income, and Political Theory (Esp. Egalitarianism(Egalitarianism, Feminism, Equality, Feminism(s), Feminism and Social Justice, Egalitarian distributive justice, Feminist Political Theory, Gender equality policy, Opportunity, Gender and Equality, Universal Basic Income, Equality of opportunity, Gender equality policies, Basic Income Guarantee, Egalitate De Sanse, Unconditional Basic Income, Equality of Opportunity and Fair Competition, Welfare State and Basic Income, and Political Theory (Esp. Egalitarianism)
(Egalitarianism, Feminism, Equality, Feminism(s), Feminism and Social Justice, Egalitarian distributive justice, Feminist Political Theory, Gender equality policy, Opportunity, Gender and Equality, Universal Basic Income, Equality of opportunity, Gender equality policies, Basic Income Guarantee, Egalitate De Sanse, Unconditional Basic Income, Equality of Opportunity and Fair Competition, Welfare State and Basic Income, and Political Theory (Esp. Egalitarianism)
Short blog about how to make sense of the wrong of attributing to someone, and treating them according to, a gender that’s different to the one they say they have.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Social Policy, Equality Studies, Gender, Gender Equality, Distributive Justice, and 15 moreFeminism, Equality, Marxist Feminism, Socialist Feminism, Feminism and Social Justice, Marxist and Materialist Feminism, Egalitarian distributive justice, Social Inequality, Poverty and Inequality, Gender inequality, Gender equality policy, Equality and Non Discrimination, Gender and Poverty, Gendered Division of Labor, and Poverty and Gender(Feminism, Equality, Marxist Feminism, Socialist Feminism, Feminism and Social Justice, Marxist and Materialist Feminism, Egalitarian distributive justice, Social Inequality, Poverty and Inequality, Gender inequality, Gender equality policy, Equality and Non Discrimination, Gender and Poverty, Gendered Division of Labor, and Poverty and Gender)
(Feminism, Equality, Marxist Feminism, Socialist Feminism, Feminism and Social Justice, Marxist and Materialist Feminism, Egalitarian distributive justice, Social Inequality, Poverty and Inequality, Gender inequality, Gender equality policy, Equality and Non Discrimination, Gender and Poverty, Gendered Division of Labor, and Poverty and Gender)
Research Interests:
Research Interests: Gender Studies, Women's Studies, Discrimination, Gender, Gender Equality, and 12 moreWomen's Right to Equality, Equality and Diversity, Distributive Justice, Equality, Feminism and Social Justice, Gender Discrimination, Egalitarian distributive justice, Social Inequality, Inequality, Gender inequality, Gender equality policy, and Equality and Non Discrimination
Research Interests: Climate Change, Climate Change Adaptation, Children and Families, Adaptation to Climate Change, Climate change policy, and 15 moreParenting, Population ecology, Intergenerational Relationships, Climate Change Adaptation And Mitigation Strategies, Children's Rights, Climate Change Impacts, Parenting/childcare, Children, global Climate change, Population, Intergenerational justice, Population Studies, Intergenerational Relations, Climate change adaptation measures, and Childrearing(Parenting, Population ecology, Intergenerational Relationships, Climate Change Adaptation And Mitigation Strategies, Children's Rights, Climate Change Impacts, Parenting/childcare, Children, global Climate change, Population, Intergenerational justice, Population Studies, Intergenerational Relations, Climate change adaptation measures, and Childrearing)
(Parenting, Population ecology, Intergenerational Relationships, Climate Change Adaptation And Mitigation Strategies, Children's Rights, Climate Change Impacts, Parenting/childcare, Children, global Climate change, Population, Intergenerational justice, Population Studies, Intergenerational Relations, Climate change adaptation measures, and Childrearing)
The meaning of personal, intimate relationships for ethical and political thinking has been fascinating me for a long time. I wrote a doctoral dissertation about distributive justice and the ethics of care, then I shifted my focus to... more
The meaning of personal, intimate relationships for ethical and political thinking has been fascinating me for a long time. I wrote a doctoral dissertation about distributive justice and the ethics of care, then I shifted my focus to normative questions in childrearing and to the nature and value of childhood. My general interest in caring relationships has initially led me to explore the value of non-parental care for children; to my surprise, I concluded not only that it is valuable for children to experience long-term caring relationships with other adults than their parents, but that, moreover, we owe them such relationships. Because they are not yet fully autonomous, children need to be paternalised; because they are particularly vulnerable, they need to be protected from potentially detrimental monopolies of care. If we ensure that each child can relate to, and rely on, some other adults in addition to her parents, this will diminish the risk of abuse and neglect. And it will give children with less good parents a chance to experience adequate care from an adult who can take personal interest in the child and her development; these are powerful prioritarian arguments in favour of partial socialisation of childrearing. Finally, given how extremely demanding it is to parent well, and how likely we are to have personal flaws, I assume that even the best of parents make systematic mistakes with their children; care from additional adults might be able to correct some such mistakes, by giving children a chance to recalibrate their understanding of good relationships. But an interest in child wellbeing doesn't exclusively motivate my account. I believe that, in spite of their immaturity, children have full moral status. We owe them duties and it seems unjust to impose on them those relationships that best suit our, rather than their, interests; many forms of parental monopolies are unlikely to be justifiable by appeal to the children's interests. Children's moral status also imposes limits on the reasons that can legitimately guide parental action even before the relationship with the child starts. Seeking to have a child who displays a particular characteristic merely because this would please the parent is unfair: Children cannot choose their parents and, if they have the same moral status as adults, this provides a reason why would-be parents do not choose their children for self-interested reasons, either. Another stream of my work concerns the right to parent. This is intriguing: the most plausible understanding of parental authority is fiduciary – exercised for the sake of the child's interest. And yet, we allow adults to take charge of the lives of children merely because they could procreate them and in the privacy of familial spaces, mostly unregulated. For a while, I was convinced by theories that ground the right to parent by appeal to both the child's interest in having parents and the adults' interest in rearing. I noticed these accounts failed to explain why adults have the right to parent particular children and tried to fill this gap: We come into the world through the bodies of other human beings, a.k.a. mothers, with whom we are, at birth, already in an intimate albeit unusual sort of relationship. If breaking such relationships would harm the newborn-as well as the gestational mother!-this is a good reason to give the right to rear particular
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Research Interests: Children and Families, Parenting, Labor Migration, Child Care, Migration Studies, and 19 moreTransnational migration, Transnational Labour Migration, Children's Rights, Parenting/childcare, Childhood and Migration, Female Labor Migration, Transnational Families, Childcare, Family and Migration, Transnational Family Studies, Migration and families, Transnational Family Life, Gender, Family and Migration, Migration and translocal family lives, children and Migration, Gender and Family Migration, International Migration of Female Labor, Care Drain, and Transnational Family(Transnational migration, Transnational Labour Migration, Children's Rights, Parenting/childcare, Childhood and Migration, Female Labor Migration, Transnational Families, Childcare, Family and Migration, Transnational Family Studies, Migration and families, Transnational Family Life, Gender, Family and Migration, Migration and translocal family lives, children and Migration, Gender and Family Migration, International Migration of Female Labor, Care Drain, and Transnational Family)
(Transnational migration, Transnational Labour Migration, Children's Rights, Parenting/childcare, Childhood and Migration, Female Labor Migration, Transnational Families, Childcare, Family and Migration, Transnational Family Studies, Migration and families, Transnational Family Life, Gender, Family and Migration, Migration and translocal family lives, children and Migration, Gender and Family Migration, International Migration of Female Labor, Care Drain, and Transnational Family)
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There are many grounds to object to tokenism, but that doesn’t mean we should always avoid being the token woman.
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The case of Germany is special when it comes to gender in the academia not only because of the magnitude of the problems but also because they are entrenched by the job structure and legislation on temporary contracts.
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Margret Urban Walker's book is, in the author's own words," an examination of an unavoidable human task: moral repair"(6) and at the same time a contribution to timely themes of the moral emotions and attitudes... more
Margret Urban Walker's book is, in the author's own words," an examination of an unavoidable human task: moral repair"(6) and at the same time a contribution to timely themes of the moral emotions and attitudes involved in sustaining or reconstructing moral ...
One illusion is to take our own particular, historically contingent concatenation of governing concepts and practices as ordained by nature or, for that matter, by any other transcendent source. Another related illusion is to... more
One illusion is to take our own particular, historically contingent concatenation of governing concepts and practices as ordained by nature or, for that matter, by any other transcendent source. Another related illusion is to underestimate the deeply conflictual nature of political and social ...
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Martha Nussbaum's new book, Frontiers of Justice, is both a criticism of the tradition of social contract theory and a defense of Nussbaum's version of the capabilities approach. The book, based on a series of Tanner... more
Martha Nussbaum's new book, Frontiers of Justice, is both a criticism of the tradition of social contract theory and a defense of Nussbaum's version of the capabilities approach. The book, based on a series of Tanner Lectures given by Nussbaum in 2002 in Australia and in ...
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... Pour référencer ce document, veuillez utiliser le lien suivant : http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/ 37979. The road to autonomy: Feminist political theories. Auteurs. Gheaus, Anca. Informations complémentaires. Date de publication : 2007.... more
... Pour référencer ce document, veuillez utiliser le lien suivant : http://hdl.handle.net/2078.1/ 37979. The road to autonomy: Feminist political theories. Auteurs. Gheaus, Anca. Informations complémentaires. Date de publication : 2007. Entité : UCL. ...
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Childhood looms large in our understanding of human life, as a phase through which all adults have passed. Childhood is foundational to the development of selfhood, the formation of interests, values and skills and to the lifespan as a... more
Childhood looms large in our understanding of human life, as a phase through which all adults have passed. Childhood is foundational to the development of selfhood, the formation of interests, values and skills and to the lifespan as a whole. Understanding what it is like to be a child, and what differences childhood makes, are thus essential for any broader understanding of the human condition. The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is an outstanding reference source for the key topics, problems and debates in this crucial and exciting field and is the first collection of its kind. Comprising over thirty chapters by a team of international contributors the Handbook is divided into five parts:
· Being a child
· Childhood and moral status
· Parents and children
· Children in society
· Children and the state.
Questions covered include: What is a child? Is childhood a uniquely valuable state, and if so why? Can we generalize about the goods of childhood? What rights do children have, and are they different from adults’ rights? What (if anything) gives people a right to parent? What role, if any, ought biology to play in determining who has the right to parent a particular child? What kind of rights can parents legitimately exercise over their children? What roles do relationships with siblings and friends play in the shaping of childhoods? How should we think about sexuality and disability in childhood, and about racialised children? How should society manage the education of children? How are children’s lives affected by being taken into social care?
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of childhood, political philosophy and ethics as well as those in related disciplines such as education, psychology, sociology, social policy, law, social work, youth work, neuroscience and anthropology.
· Being a child
· Childhood and moral status
· Parents and children
· Children in society
· Children and the state.
Questions covered include: What is a child? Is childhood a uniquely valuable state, and if so why? Can we generalize about the goods of childhood? What rights do children have, and are they different from adults’ rights? What (if anything) gives people a right to parent? What role, if any, ought biology to play in determining who has the right to parent a particular child? What kind of rights can parents legitimately exercise over their children? What roles do relationships with siblings and friends play in the shaping of childhoods? How should we think about sexuality and disability in childhood, and about racialised children? How should society manage the education of children? How are children’s lives affected by being taken into social care?
The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Childhood and Children is essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of childhood, political philosophy and ethics as well as those in related disciplines such as education, psychology, sociology, social policy, law, social work, youth work, neuroscience and anthropology.
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Care-supporting policies incentivise women's withdrawal from the labour market, thereby reinforcing statistical discrimination and further undermining equality of opportunities between women and men for positions of advantage. This, I... more
Care-supporting policies incentivise women's withdrawal from the labour market, thereby reinforcing statistical discrimination and further undermining equality of opportunities between women and men for positions of advantage. This, I argue, is not sufficient reason against such policies. Supporting care also improves the overall condition of disadvantaged women who are care-givers; justice gives priority to the latter. Moreover, some of the most advantageous existing jobs entail excessive benefits; we should discount the value of allocating such jobs meritocratically. Further, women who have a real chance to occupy positions of advantage have most likely already enjoyed more than their fair share of opportunities; they lack a claim to more. Women can have a complaint grounded in the expressive disvalue of sexist discrimination. This gives them special claims against men occupying the vast majority of top positions and against their higher share of opportunities for positions of advantage. But their claim does not speak against care-supporting policies.
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Surrogacy involves a private agreement whereby a woman who gestates a child attempts to surrender her (putative) moral right to become the parent of that child such that another person (or persons), of the woman’s choice, can acquire it.... more
Surrogacy involves a private agreement whereby a woman who gestates a child attempts to surrender her (putative) moral right to become the parent of that child such that another person (or persons), of the woman’s choice, can acquire it. Since people lack the normative power to privately transfer custody, attempts to do so are illegitimate, and the law should reflect this fact.
Research Interests: Reproductive Ethics, Children's Rights, Reproductive Justice, Children, Parental Rights, and 10 moreSurrogacy, Reproduction and human fertility, Sexual and reproductive health and rights, Surrogate Motherhood, Parents, Artificial reproductive Technology, Parenthood, Reproductive rights, Medically Assisted Procreation and Biotechnology, and Children's Social and Emotional Wellbeing
John Tillson argues, on grounds of children's wellbeing, that it is impermissible to teach them religious views. I defend a practice of pluralistically advocating religious views to children. As long as there are no monopolies of... more
John Tillson argues, on grounds of children's wellbeing, that it is impermissible to teach them religious views. I defend a practice of pluralistically advocating religious views to children. As long as there are no monopolies of influence over children, and as long as advocates do not use coercion, deceit, or manipulation, children can greatly benefit without having their rational abilities subverted, or incurring undue risk to form false beliefs. This solution should counter, to some extent, both perfectionist and anti-perfectionist reasons against initiating children into religions.