- Populism, Political Parties and Party Politics, Party organization, Radical Right Populism, Comparative Politics, Italian Politics, and 20 moreSubnational Politics, Party Politics, Political Parties, Local Government, Contemporary Italian History and Politics, Electoral systems, political parties, and executive-legislative structures, European Politics, Technocracy, Radical Right, Local/Municipal government, Party members, Political Extremism/Radicalism/Populism, Australian Politics, Populismo, Leadership (Political Science), Political leadership, Euroscepticism, Radical Right-wing Populist Parties, Populisme, and Elected Mayors(Subnational Politics, Party Politics, Political Parties, Local Government, Contemporary Italian History and Politics, Electoral systems, political parties, and executive-legislative structures, European Politics, Technocracy, Radical Right, Local/Municipal government, Party members, Political Extremism/Radicalism/Populism, Australian Politics, Populismo, Leadership (Political Science), Political leadership, Euroscepticism, Radical Right-wing Populist Parties, Populisme, and Elected Mayors)edit
- I am Professor of Politics at Griffith University. Before joining Griffith in September 2014, I was a Jean Monnet Fel... moreI am Professor of Politics at Griffith University. Before joining Griffith in September 2014, I was a Jean Monnet Fellow and then a Marie Curie Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence. I received my PhD in Political Science from the University of Turin in 2008.
I am an Australian Research Council Future Fellow from May 2022 to May 2026. Over the past five years, I have held grants from the Swedish Research Council and the Australian Research Council for long-term projects on youth wings in Europe, on the relationships between populist and mainstream parties, and on Indigenous involvement in Australian parties.
My most recent book, co-authored with Annika Werner, is International Populism: The Radical Right in the European Parliament (2019), published in the UK by Hurst and in the US by Oxford University Press. Since 2015, I have published articles in journals such as Perspectives on Politics, European Journal of Political Research, Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of Common Market Studies, Democratization, and Political Studies. I tweet at @duncanmcdonnell(I am Professor of Politics at Griffith University. Before joining Griffith in September 2014, I was a Jean Monnet Fellow and then a Marie Curie Fellow at the European University Institute in Florence. I received my PhD in Political Science from the University of Turin in 2008. <br /><br />I am an Australian Research Council Future Fellow from May 2022 to May 2026. Over the past five years, I have held grants from the Swedish Research Council and the Australian Research Council for long-term projects on youth wings in Europe, on the relationships between populist and mainstream parties, and on Indigenous involvement in Australian parties. <br /><br />My most recent book, co-authored with Annika Werner, is International Populism: The Radical Right in the European Parliament (2019), published in the UK by Hurst and in the US by Oxford University Press. Since 2015, I have published articles in journals such as Perspectives on Politics, European Journal of Political Research, Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of Common Market Studies, Democratization, and Political Studies. I tweet at @duncanmcdonnell)edit
The party on the ground has traditionally enabled linkage with the party in office along with providing candidates, selectorates, and campaign volunteers. While this still occurs in cities, we do not know how party organisation changes... more
The party on the ground has traditionally enabled linkage with the party in office along with providing candidates, selectorates, and campaign volunteers. While this still occurs in cities, we do not know how party organisation changes have affected remote areas. To investigate, we examine two remote Australian electorates: the Barkly in the Northern Territory and the Kimberley in Western Australia. Based on interviews with grassroots members, representatives and officials, we conclude that, although parties still exert their traditional functions in some remote areas, in others they have disengaged, rendering membership less meaningful and weakening the chain of democratic legitimacy.
Research Interests:
One of the main supply-side explanations for women's underrepresentation in politics is the gender gap in nascent political ambition. While this has been examined in terms of electoral ambition, the aspiration to pursue non-electoral... more
One of the main supply-side explanations for women's underrepresentation in politics is the gender gap in nascent political ambition. While this has been examined in terms of electoral ambition, the aspiration to pursue non-electoral careers within parties has been overlooked. In our study, we therefore investigate whether both types of ambition-electoral and non-electoral-vary among young women and men participating in a key entry point for political careers in Western democracies: party youth wings. To do so, we surveyed almost 2,000 members of six centre-left and centre-right youth wings in Australia, Italy and Spain. We find that while, as expected, women in youth wings display lower levels of electoral ambition, they are almost as likely as men to express non-electoral ambition. Furthermore, and contrary to our expectations, we show that women in centre-right youth wings are no less interested in pursuing electoral and non-electoral political careers than women in centre-left ones. Our study thus provides new insights into the gendered nature of political ambition, highlighting that women's lower interest in electoral office does not necessarily reflect reduced interest in a political career.
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Parties, Australian politics (Australia), Italian Politics, Women and Politics, and 13 moreAustralian Politics, Gender and Politics, Young People, Youth Political Participation, Spanish politics, Party members, Youth Politics, Party Politics, Women in Politics, Contemporary Italian History and Politics, Political Party, Political Parties and Party Politics, and Political Ambition
While India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has become recognized as a populist radical right (PRR) party under the leadership of Narendra Modi, we do not know whether this PRR supply is matched yet by PRR attitudes among its supporters.... more
While India's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has become recognized as a populist radical right (PRR) party under the leadership of Narendra Modi, we do not know whether this PRR supply is matched yet by PRR attitudes among its supporters. Using an original survey, we therefore investigate: Do BJP supporters display PRR attitudes? We find that those who feel close to the BJP have stronger populist and nativist attitudes than other Indian citizens. However, authoritarianism is not a distinguishing feature of BJP supporters. We argue that the similarities between the drivers of support for European PRR parties and for the BJP reinforce the idea that radical right populism is a coherent global phenomenon both in terms of supply and demand. Finally, we discuss how our study shows that party support in India is more ideologically rooted than has previously been thought.
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Extremism/Radicalism/Populism, Populism, South Asian Politics, Indian Politics, and 10 moreRadical Right, Radical Right Populism, Indian Government and Politics, Nativism, Party Politics, Radical Right-wing Populist Parties, Populismo, Right Wing Populism, Narendra Modi, and Populisme
While the number of elected Indigenous representatives has increased over the past two decades, we know little about their pathways to candidature, which parties they stand for, the winnability of seats they stand in, and whether they are... more
While the number of elected Indigenous representatives has increased over the past two decades, we know little about their pathways to candidature, which parties they stand for, the winnability of seats they stand in, and whether they are successful. Using election data from 2001 to 2021, and interviews with 50 (or 80%) of all Indigenous candidates between 2010 and 2019, this study provides answers to these questions. It finds, first, that Indigenous candidates are usually winners, as 53.2% of candidatures have resulted in an election victory. Second, most candidates are from the ALP and Indigenous women tend to do better than men. Third, despite some high-profile ‘parachutes’, most Indigenous candidates are ‘partisans’ (i.e. party members for at least a year before standing).
Research Interests:
The Australian House of Representatives contains far fewer women than men. But is this because parties of left and right discriminate against women or because voters do? Using a new dataset comprising 7271 House candidates from 2001 to... more
The Australian House of Representatives contains far fewer women than men. But is this because parties of left and right discriminate against women or because voters do? Using a new dataset comprising 7271 House candidates from 2001 to 2019, firstly, we find that the percentage of women candidates is increasing, but is consistently higher for parties of the left than the right. Secondly, women tend to be selected more by parties of both left and right in unsafe seats. Thirdly, all else being equal, voters reward women running for Labor with over 1400 votes more, are neutral towards those of the Liberals and Greens, but tend to penalise women standing for the Nationals. We conclude that, overall, it is parties, not voters, driving under-representation of women in Australia's lower house.
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Parties, Parliamentary Studies, Women and Politics, Australian Politics, and 9 moreGender and Politics, Women Candidates, Political Representation, Candidate Selection, Parliament, Women's political representation, Parliamentary Politics, Gender Issues and Politics, and Political Parties and Party Politics
Sweden and Denmark have presented contrasting relationships between centre-right and populist radical right (PRR) parties. In Sweden, the centre-right has refused cooperation with the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) (SD), even when... more
Sweden and Denmark have presented contrasting relationships between centre-right and populist radical right (PRR) parties. In Sweden, the centre-right has refused cooperation with the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) (SD), even when this cost the centre-right office. However, in Denmark, coalitions led by centre-right parties have cooperated with the Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti) (DF) on multiple occasions. Through a controlled comparison, we examine what explains these different outcomes. Using Chapel Hill Expert Surveys and public opinion data, we firstly look at the policy congruence between parties and the social acceptability of cooperation. We then examine interview material with representatives from centre-right and PRR parties in Sweden and Denmark to see their explanations of cooperation and non-cooperation. We conclude that, while the office goals of Danish centre-right parties, along with the policy focus and uncontroversial past of DF, explain that case, the reputation and past of SD has precluded a similar outcome.
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Parties, Political Coalitions, Political Extremism/Radicalism/Populism, Populism, and 13 moreEuropean Politics, Radical Right, Radical Right Populism, Coalition Formation, Populist Movements, Radical Right-wing Populist Parties, Coalition Government, Populismo, Right Wing Populism, Political Party, Coalition Politics, Political Parties and Party Politics, and Populisme
Political scientists have long asserted that populists use simpler language than their mainstream rivals to appeal to ordinary people and distance themselves from elites. However, there is little comparative evidence in support of that... more
Political scientists have long asserted that populists use simpler language than their mainstream rivals to appeal to ordinary people and distance themselves from elites. However, there is little comparative evidence in support of that claim. In this study, we investigate the linguistic simplicity of four right-wing populists compared to their principal opponents in the United States, France, United Kingdom, and Italy. We do so by analysing a corpus of approximately one million words from leaders’ speeches, using a series of linguistics measures for evaluating simplicity. Contrary to expectations, we find that Donald Trump was only slightly simpler than Hillary Clinton, while Nigel Farage in the UK and Marine Le Pen in France were more complex than their main rivals, and Italy’s Matteo Salvini was simpler on some measures but not others. We conclude that the simple language claim is not borne out and that other aspects of the received wisdom about populism should be re-examined.
Research Interests:
Conceptualizations and measurements of Euroscepticism tend to assume that, while parties may change positions from one period to another, they unequivocally espouse hard or soft euroscepticism at a given point in time. However, there are... more
Conceptualizations and measurements of Euroscepticism tend to assume that, while parties may change positions from one period to another, they unequivocally espouse hard or soft euroscepticism at a given point in time. However, there are good theoretical reasons for some parties not to do so, in order to speak to different audiences and keep their decision-making options open. Through an analysis of manifestos and leaders’ speeches we show how two populist radical right parties, the Italian Northern League and the Austrian Freedom Party, espoused what we term ‘equivocal euroscepticism’ in the years around the 2014 European Parliament elections. Specifically, these parties articulated a distinct, albeit ambivalent, stance by combining elements of both soft and hard euroscepticism at the same time. We argue that ‘equivocal euroscepticism’ can give these parties strategic advantages, including the freedom to cooperate both with other radical right, hard eurosceptic, parties at European level and more moderate parties at the national one.
Research Interests: European Studies, Comparative Politics, European integration, Political Extremism/Radicalism/Populism, Populism, and 11 moreEuropean Union, European Parliament, European Union Politics, Radical Right, Radical Right Populism, Euroscepticism, Radical Right-wing Populist Parties, Populismo, Right Wing Populism, Populisme, and Italian Populism
For over a decade, the Australian Political Studies Association (APSA) has maintained a list ranking journals into A*, A, B and C bands. However, we know little about how Politics scholars use and view the list. In this study, we firstly... more
For over a decade, the Australian Political Studies Association (APSA) has maintained a list ranking journals into A*, A, B and C bands. However, we know little about how Politics scholars use and view the list. In this study, we firstly discuss the history of the APSA list, before then presenting the results of an original survey conducted in March 2017 with over 250 members of the discipline. While the APSA list seems to enjoy overall support, we find that there are concerns about its purpose, its assessment of journal quality and how it treats different subfields and methodologies. In the discussion section, we address some of the main criticisms that have been made of the list and offer a number of suggestions for revisions. These include widening the consultation process, making submissions to the ranking committee public and extending the range of journals included in the list.
Research Interests:
Since the 2008 crisis, radical right populist (RRP) party positions on European integration have hardened and/or increased in salience. But do their supporters align with them on this? And what role does Euroscepticism play in driving... more
Since the 2008 crisis, radical right populist (RRP) party positions on European integration have hardened and/or increased in salience. But do their supporters align with them on this? And what role does Euroscepticism play in driving support for these parties? Using data from the ‘euandi’ voting advice application, we examine how close over 8000 RRP supporters in the UK, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Belgium were in 2014 to their parties on European integration and, for comparison, immigration. We find that, while they closely aligned on immigration, which remains a stronger predictor of support, they did not on European integration. We conclude, firstly, that increased salience of this issue does not necessarily lead to stronger linkages between parties and voters and that the consequences of positional congruence depend on salience congruence. Secondly, our findings suggest that RRP parties enjoy flexibility on European integration and can shift positions if necessary.
Research Interests:
Despite the vast amount of comparative research on right-wing populist parties over the past decade, there has been little work on non-European parties (as opposed to leaders). In this article, we argue that the international literature... more
Despite the vast amount of comparative research on right-wing populist parties over the past decade, there has been little work on non-European parties (as opposed to leaders). In this article, we argue that the international literature on populist parties has largely overlooked a significant non-European case: India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP – Indian People’s Party). Following the ideational approach to understanding populism, we examine whether the three distinguishing features of right-wing populism – its conceptions of “the people”, “elites” and “others” – are reflected in the views from interviews we conducted with BJP officials and representatives. We find that they are and so then consider whether they have been manifest in actions and statements while in power or whether, as some scholars claim, governing parties like the BJP moderate their populism. We conclude that the BJP can be very fruitfully included in comparative research on right-wing populist parties and propose a series of concrete ways in which this could be pursued.
Research Interests:
Scholars in recent decades have discussed the emergence of a new leader-dominated party type, variously described as 'personal', 'personalistic' and 'personalist'. However, there has been no original comparative research examining whether... more
Scholars in recent decades have discussed the emergence of a new leader-dominated party type, variously described as 'personal', 'personalistic' and 'personalist'. However, there has been no original comparative research examining whether (and how) such parties resemble one another organizationally and whether they constitute a distinct organizational type. This article does so by comparing the parties of Silvio Berlusconi in Italy and Clive Palmer in Australia. Based on interviews with those in the parties and party documents, we find our cases share two distinctive organizational features: (1) the founder-leader's dominance of the party and perceived centrality to its survival and (2) the relationship between the party and members saw active members discouraged and organization at the local level was extremely limited/non-existent. Building on this analysis, we then propose three criteria for identifying other personal parties and point to the existence of a possible subtype. We conclude that the emergence of personal parties requires us to reconsider our understanding of contemporary party organizations in advanced democracies.
Research Interests: Political Parties, Populism, History of Political Parties, Italian Politics, Australian Politics, and 8 moreCharisma, Leadership (Political Science), Party organization, Contemporary Italian History and Politics, Political leadership, Parties and Party System, Populismo, and Political Parties and Party Politics
Policy congruence has been identified as the main driver of European Parliament (EP) alliances. Yet, radical right parties are divided between three EP groups: European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR); Europe of Freedom and Direct... more
Policy congruence has been identified as the main driver of European Parliament (EP) alliances. Yet, radical right parties are divided between three EP groups: European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR); Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD); Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF). This article investigates why four radical right parties in the ECR and EFDD – the Danish People’s Party, the Finns Party, the Sweden Democrats and UKIP – neither joined the apparently more ideologically homogenous ENF nor allied all with one another in 2014. Using Chapel Hill data, we find no policy logic explaining their alliance behaviour. Rather, our interviews with those in the parties indicate that they privileged national ‘respectability’ calculations when deciding alliance strategies. We therefore propose an alternative theory of EP group formation that sees some radical parties play a two-level game in which the perceived domestic ‘office’ and ‘votes’ benefits of European alliances outweigh those of ‘policy’.
Research Interests:
Chapter in "Understanding Populist Party Organisation: The Radical Right in Western Europe", edited by Reinhard Heinisch and Oscar Mazzoleni (Palgrave, 2016)
Research Interests:
Right-wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to... more
Right-wing populist parties tend to combine criticism of how liberal democracy functions with calls for greater direct democracy. But do their voters share that support for direct democracy? In this article, survey data is used to examine, first, whether right-wing populist candidates in Australia, Canada and New Zealand were more supportive of direct democracy than candidates of other parties. Second, the views of right-wing populist voters about the functioning of democracy and direct democracy are investigated. While right-wing populist candidates turned out to be far more likely to support direct democracy, right-wing populist supporters did not mirror the candidates. Although these were among the most dissatisfied with how democracy worked, they did not necessarily favour referendums more than other voters. The findings have implications both for how we conceive of the relationship between populism and direct democracy and the remedies proposed for redressing populist discontent.
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Extremism/Radicalism/Populism, Australian politics (Australia), Populism, Canadian Politics, and 11 morePolitics of New Zealand, Australian Politics, Direct Democracy, Radical Right, Radical Right Populism, Referendums, Radical Right-wing Populist Parties, Populismo, Satisfaction with Democracy, Right Wing Populism, and Populisme
Does right-wing populist discourse change when parties move from opposition to government? How do different ideological types of right-wing populist parties express this discourse? Through an analysis of the Lega Nord and Forza... more
Does right-wing populist discourse change when parties move from
opposition to government? How do different ideological types of
right-wing populist parties express this discourse? Through an analysis
of the Lega Nord and Forza Italia/Popolo della Libertà between 2006
and 2013, we find that while the switch to office does bring some
changes, the main elements of their populist discourse remain largely
the same. We also show how their respective emphases on ‘elites’ and
‘others’ distinguish the parties: FI/PDL focuses overwhelmingly on
‘elites’ while the LN places similar emphasis on both ‘elites’ and ‘others’
opposition to government? How do different ideological types of
right-wing populist parties express this discourse? Through an analysis
of the Lega Nord and Forza Italia/Popolo della Libertà between 2006
and 2013, we find that while the switch to office does bring some
changes, the main elements of their populist discourse remain largely
the same. We also show how their respective emphases on ‘elites’ and
‘others’ distinguish the parties: FI/PDL focuses overwhelmingly on
‘elites’ while the LN places similar emphasis on both ‘elites’ and ‘others’
Research Interests:
Founded and led by the billionaire businessman, Clive Palmer, the Palmer United Party (PUP) achieved what was arguably the best debut result of recent decades at the 2013 Australian federal election. This article examines PUP's ideology,... more
Founded and led by the billionaire businessman, Clive Palmer, the Palmer United Party (PUP) achieved what was arguably the best debut result of recent decades at the 2013 Australian federal election. This article examines PUP's ideology, organisation and campaigning strategies along with the implications of its experiences to date for Australian party politics. Based on an analysis of original party documents, policies, media communications and semi-structured interviews with PUP candidates and key figures across Australia, we find evidence of a party which is utterly dominated by its leader, which was deliberately never built to last, whose ideology cannot be easily classified and whose campaigning was well-funded but extremely disorganised. We conclude that its experience shows how more professionalised new personal parties in Australia should be able to do even better electorally in the future.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
Is the relationship between populist leaders and those in their parties always charismatic? Although many scholars of populism assume this, the attribution of ‘charisma’ is invariably based on how leaders present themselves rather than... more
Is the relationship between populist leaders and those in their parties always charismatic? Although many scholars of populism assume this, the attribution of ‘charisma’ is invariably based on how leaders present themselves rather than how purported followers within parties perceive them. In line with the literature on charisma, this article takes the latter approach, using interviews conducted between 2009 and 2011 with 111 elected representatives and grassroots members (i.e. ‘the coterie’) to examine how three European populist leaders regularly termed ‘charismatic’ – Silvio Berlusconi, Christoph Blocher and Umberto Bossi – were viewed within their parties. The article finds evidence of three different leadership types, with Bossi very clearly satisfying the conditions for coterie charisma, Berlusconi largely (but not entirely) fulfilling them, and Blocher only partially doing so. Finally, it presents new data showing the very damaging effects of Bossi's subsequent downfall on his party's organisation.
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Parties, Italian Studies, Italian Politics, European Politics, and 18 moreCharisma, Leadership (Political Science), Party organization, Radical Right, Radical Right Populism, Charismatic leaders, Swiss politics, Charismatic leadership, Contemporary Italian History and Politics, Political leadership, Radical Right-wing Populist Parties, Populismo, Right Wing Populism, Populismo Clásico, Movimiento Carismático, Political Parties and Party Politics, Populisme, and Italian Populism(Charisma, Leadership (Political Science), Party organization, Radical Right, Radical Right Populism, Charismatic leaders, Swiss politics, Charismatic leadership, Contemporary Italian History and Politics, Political leadership, Radical Right-wing Populist Parties, Populismo, Right Wing Populism, Populismo Clásico, Movimiento Carismático, Political Parties and Party Politics, Populisme, and Italian Populism)
(Charisma, Leadership (Political Science), Party organization, Radical Right, Radical Right Populism, Charismatic leaders, Swiss politics, Charismatic leadership, Contemporary Italian History and Politics, Political leadership, Radical Right-wing Populist Parties, Populismo, Right Wing Populism, Populismo Clásico, Movimiento Carismático, Political Parties and Party Politics, Populisme, and Italian Populism)
Governments led by technocrats remain a nebulous category in political science literature, with little clarity about how they differ from party governments, how many have existed and how we can differentiate between them. This article... more
Governments led by technocrats remain a nebulous category in political science literature, with little clarity about how they differ from party governments, how many have existed and how we can differentiate between them. This article aims to provide that conceptual and empirical clarity. Having proposed an ideal type definition of ‘technocratic government’, it sets out three conditions for an operational definition of a ‘technocrat’ and, on that basis, lists the 24 technocrat-led governments that have existed in 27 European Union (EU) democracies from the end of the Second World War until June 2013. It then classifies these according to their partisan/technocrat composition and remit. This allows for the presentation of a typology of four different types of technocrat-led governments and the definition of ‘full technocratic governments’ as those which contain a majority of technocrats and – unlike caretaker governments – have the capacity to change the status quo. The article concludes that full technocratic governments remain extremely rare in EU democracies since there have been only six cases – of which three have occurred in the last decade.
Research Interests:
While the literature on directly elected mayors has largely neglected the relationship between mayors and their parties, studies of party transformation have generally ignored how changes in local democratic rules and practices affect... more
While the literature on directly elected mayors has largely neglected the relationship between mayors and their parties, studies of party transformation have generally ignored how changes in local democratic rules and practices affect parties. This article addresses these questions using a qualitative case study of the relationship between mayors and the three faces of their parties (in local public office, local central office and on the ground) in Genoa and Lausanne. Based on interviews with the mayors, elected representatives and party members, it finds in the two cases that, as long as these mayors can count on high levels of popularity and are not nearing the end of their term, they are ‘party detached’. When these factors do not apply and/or party institutionalization increases, the relationship with the party in local central office (although not with the party in local public office or on the ground) becomes more significant.
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Parties, Italian Politics, Local Government and Local Development, Leadership (Political Science), and 11 moreParty organization, Party members, Swiss politics, Elected Mayors, Party Politics, Contemporary Italian History and Politics, Political leadership, Municipalities, Local Democracy, Local Politics, and Political Parties and Party Politics
Despite the electoral success of Silvio Berlusconi's two political parties, little theoretical and empirical work has been done on Forza Italia (FI) and the Popolo Della Libertà (PDL – People of Freedom). This article aims to fill these... more
Despite the electoral success of Silvio Berlusconi's two political parties, little theoretical and empirical work has been done on Forza Italia (FI) and the Popolo Della Libertà (PDL – People of Freedom). This article aims to fill these gaps. Following a short overview of the history of FI and the PDL, it discusses how scholars have conceived of Forza Italia. Building on the criteria of Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner for the definition of a political party, a first operational definition is then offered of the term most used to classify FI and the PDL: the ‘personal party’. On the basis of this, the article considers whether the PDL is another personal party akin to Forza Italia. This is done, first, by briefly considering the party statute and communications and, second, by examining the views expressed in interviews conducted across Italy with PDL elected representatives and ordinary party members.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
In recent decades, a growing number of ‘outsider parties’ have entered governing centre-left and centre-right coalitions across Western Europe. Here the authors define outsider parties as those which – even when their vote-share would... more
In recent decades, a growing number of ‘outsider parties’ have entered governing centre-left and centre-right coalitions across Western Europe. Here the authors define outsider parties as those which – even when their vote-share would have enabled it – have gone through a period of not being ‘coalitionable’, whether of their own volition or that of other parties in the system. The authors then discuss the problems which outsider parties encounter when entering government and suggest some reasons for their success and failure in office. Finally, we propose avenues for further research, in particular that of examining differences between the first and subsequent experiences of office for such parties.
Research Interests:
Since 1994, Italian politics has seen a number of coalitions including parties whose identity has been strongly based on their ‘outsider’ status as uncompromising opposition movements which would not previously consider government... more
Since 1994, Italian politics has seen a number of coalitions including parties whose identity has been strongly based on their ‘outsider’ status as uncompromising opposition movements which would not previously consider government participation. This article examines the contrasting experiences in office of two such parties: the regionalist populist Lega Nord (LN) and the radical left Rifondazione Comunista (RC). While the Lega confounded expectations not only simply by remaining in the centre-right coalition from 2001 to 2006, but by influencing policy, increasing its vote-share and maintaining its 'outsider’ identity, RC was unable to match its fellow outsider’s success when it served in the centre-left government from 2006 to 2008. Looking at the experiences in office of the RC and the LNin terms of the three temporal divisions ‘before’, ‘during’ and ‘after’, this article seeks to analyse and explain the differing experiences and effects of government on both parties.
Research Interests:
Following the 2008 general election, the Italian regionalist populist party Lega Nord returned to government as part of a centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi. Since then, the party has been able to thrive thanks to its... more
Following the 2008 general election, the Italian regionalist populist party Lega Nord
returned to government as part of a centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi. Since
then, the party has been able to thrive thanks to its holding of key ministries and its
consolidation of ‘issue ownership’ over its main themes of federal reform and immigration/law and order. In this period, it has also made major gains in the 2009 European Parliament and 2010 regional elections. This article analyses the Lega’s success since 2008 by considering the actions of the party (in particular the legislation it has sponsored and the narrative offered of its time in government) as well as the reactions of mid-ranking leaders and activists. The authors argue that, contrary to the expectations of scholars, populists serving as junior coalition partners are not necessarily destined to tame their rhetoric, face splits or see their electoral support decline. On the contrary, by focusing on selected themes and policies and adopting effective communication strategies, the Lega has continued to enjoy electoral success and seen its membership grow. The article concludes, therefore, that claims about populists being inherently unable to survive in government and enjoy success seem to have been premature.
returned to government as part of a centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi. Since
then, the party has been able to thrive thanks to its holding of key ministries and its
consolidation of ‘issue ownership’ over its main themes of federal reform and immigration/law and order. In this period, it has also made major gains in the 2009 European Parliament and 2010 regional elections. This article analyses the Lega’s success since 2008 by considering the actions of the party (in particular the legislation it has sponsored and the narrative offered of its time in government) as well as the reactions of mid-ranking leaders and activists. The authors argue that, contrary to the expectations of scholars, populists serving as junior coalition partners are not necessarily destined to tame their rhetoric, face splits or see their electoral support decline. On the contrary, by focusing on selected themes and policies and adopting effective communication strategies, the Lega has continued to enjoy electoral success and seen its membership grow. The article concludes, therefore, that claims about populists being inherently unable to survive in government and enjoy success seem to have been premature.
Research Interests:
Research Interests:
"For the Lega Nord, participation in coalition at national level requires striking a delicate balance between being a party of government and a movement of opposition. The key to this is choosing the right ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’... more
"For the Lega Nord, participation in coalition at national level
requires striking a delicate balance between being a party of government and a
movement of opposition. The key to this is choosing the right ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’
within government. In contrast to its previous time in power in 1994, in the second
Berlusconi government (2001–05) the Lega cast itself as the Forza Italia leader’s most
faithful ally, while being seen to be in almost constant conflict with its fellow junior
coalition partners: Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the UDC. Indeed, as AN repositions
itself within a respectable governmental ‘European’ Right, so the Lega appears ever
more in a league of its own within the Italian centre-right. Based on exclusive recent
interviews, this article examines the Lega’s relationship to its heartland and its positions
on issues such as immigration, Europe, globalisation and constitutional reform. We
argue that the party has transformed itself into an ‘institutionalised’ populist movement
that has successfully walked the tightrope of being seen to have ‘one foot in and one foot
out’ of government.
"
requires striking a delicate balance between being a party of government and a
movement of opposition. The key to this is choosing the right ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’
within government. In contrast to its previous time in power in 1994, in the second
Berlusconi government (2001–05) the Lega cast itself as the Forza Italia leader’s most
faithful ally, while being seen to be in almost constant conflict with its fellow junior
coalition partners: Alleanza Nazionale (AN) and the UDC. Indeed, as AN repositions
itself within a respectable governmental ‘European’ Right, so the Lega appears ever
more in a league of its own within the Italian centre-right. Based on exclusive recent
interviews, this article examines the Lega’s relationship to its heartland and its positions
on issues such as immigration, Europe, globalisation and constitutional reform. We
argue that the party has transformed itself into an ‘institutionalised’ populist movement
that has successfully walked the tightrope of being seen to have ‘one foot in and one foot
out’ of government.
"
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This article argues that the Lega Nord is best understood, first and foremost, as a regionalist populist party. Following a brief discussion of the importance of the territorial reference in explaining the Lega, the article examines its... more
This article argues that the Lega Nord is best understood, first and foremost, as a regionalist populist party. Following a brief discussion of the importance of the territorial reference in explaining the Lega, the article examines its populist discourse using material from the party's newspaper La Padania over the three days in June 2005 around the annual Lega rally in Pontida.
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The 2014 European Parliament elections were hailed as a "populist earthquake," with parties like the French Front National, UKIP and the Danish People's Party topping the polls in their respective countries. But what happened afterwards?... more
The 2014 European Parliament elections were hailed as a "populist earthquake," with parties like the French Front National, UKIP and the Danish People's Party topping the polls in their respective countries. But what happened afterwards?
Based on policy positions, voting data, and interviews conducted over three years with senior figures from fourteen radical right populist parties and their partners, this is the first major study to explain these parties' actions and alliances in the European Parliament. International Populism answers three key questions: why have radical right populists, unlike other ideological party types, long been divided in the Parliament? Why, although divisions persist, are many of them now more united than ever? And how does all this inform our understanding of the European populist radical right today?
Arguing that these parties have entered a new international and transnational phase, with some trying to be "respectable radicals" while others embrace their shared populism, McDonnell and Werner shed new light on the past, present and future of one of the most important political phenomena of twenty-first-century Europe.
Based on policy positions, voting data, and interviews conducted over three years with senior figures from fourteen radical right populist parties and their partners, this is the first major study to explain these parties' actions and alliances in the European Parliament. International Populism answers three key questions: why have radical right populists, unlike other ideological party types, long been divided in the Parliament? Why, although divisions persist, are many of them now more united than ever? And how does all this inform our understanding of the European populist radical right today?
Arguing that these parties have entered a new international and transnational phase, with some trying to be "respectable radicals" while others embrace their shared populism, McDonnell and Werner shed new light on the past, present and future of one of the most important political phenomena of twenty-first-century Europe.
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Parties, Populism, European Politics, European Union, and 14 moreEuropean Parliament, European Union (International Studies), European/EU Politics, European Union Politics, Radical Right, Radical Right Populism, Party Politics, *Comparative Government (Political Systems) and Politics, Populismo, Political Party, Populismo Clásico, European Parliament elections, Political Parties and Party Politics, and Populisme(European Parliament, European Union (International Studies), European/EU Politics, European Union Politics, Radical Right, Radical Right Populism, Party Politics, *Comparative Government (Political Systems) and Politics, Populismo, Political Party, Populismo Clásico, European Parliament elections, Political Parties and Party Politics, and Populisme)
(European Parliament, European Union (International Studies), European/EU Politics, European Union Politics, Radical Right, Radical Right Populism, Party Politics, *Comparative Government (Political Systems) and Politics, Populismo, Political Party, Populismo Clásico, European Parliament elections, Political Parties and Party Politics, and Populisme)
Western democracies are experiencing a new wave of right-wing populism that seeks to mobilize religion for its own ends. With chapters on the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Poland and Israel, Saving the... more
Western democracies are experiencing a new wave of right-wing populism that seeks to mobilize religion for its own ends. With chapters on the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Poland and Israel, Saving the People asks how populist movements have used religion for their own ends and how church leaders react to them. The authors contend that religion is more about belonging than belief for populists, with religious identities and traditions being deployed to define who can and cannot be part of 'the people'. This in turn helps many populists to claim that native Christian communities are being threatened by a creeping and highly aggressive process of Islamization, with Muslims becoming a key 'enemy of the people'. While Church elites generally condemn this instrumental use of religions, populists take little heed, presenting themselves as the true saviours of the people.
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Over the last decade, the main area of sustained populist growth has been Western Europe, with populist movements reaching new heights in countries such as France, Italy, Austria and Holland. Twenty-First Century Populism analyses this... more
Over the last decade, the main area of sustained populist growth has been Western Europe, with populist movements reaching new heights in countries such as France, Italy, Austria and Holland. Twenty-First Century Populism analyses this phenomenon by looking at the conditions facilitating the emergence and success of populism in specific national contexts and then examining why populism has flourished or floundered in those countries. The book also discusses the degree to which populism has affected mainstream politics in Western Europe and examines the inter-relationship between populism, political parties, the media and democracy. Containing chapters by a series of country experts and renowned political scientists from across the continent, this volume is the first to offer an in-depth account of the reasons behind the populist wave in twenty-first century Europe.
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Il 2011 è stato l’anno che ha visto la classe politica della Seconda Repubblica «declassata» dall’Europa, dai mercati, dai principali attori nazionali e dai cittadini italiani. Partiti e leader politici sono apparsi deboli e senza un... more
Il 2011 è stato l’anno che ha visto la classe politica della Seconda Repubblica «declassata» dall’Europa, dai mercati, dai principali attori nazionali e dai cittadini italiani. Partiti e leader politici sono apparsi deboli e senza un progetto, capaci solo di riproporre il collaudato schema pro/anti Berlusconi. A giocare un ruolo chiave in tutti i principali eventi dell’anno sono stati, invece, gli attori non partitici: dal presidente della Repubblica, Giorgio Napolitano, al nuovo presidente della Banca centrale europea, Mario Draghi, dal movimento delle donne alla Confindustria di Emma Marcegaglia, dai sindaci di Milano e Napoli eletti a maggio ai promotori dei referendum di giugno. Un default sancito dall’insediamento di un governo tecnico, guidato da Mario Monti, che ha ottenuto livelli record di consenso e introdotto nuove regole del gioco politico.
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Research Interests: Political Parties, Australian society, Australian politics (Australia), Australian Politics, Leadership (Political Science), and 5 moreElectoral systems, political parties, and executive-legislative structures, Minor Parties, Party Politics, Political leadership, and Political Parties and Party Politics
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Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Parties, Australian politics (Australia), Italian Politics, Australian Politics, and 7 moreLeadership (Political Science), Party organization, Party Politics, Contemporary Italian History and Politics, Political leadership, Parties and Party System, and Political Parties and Party Politics
Research Interests: Comparative Politics, Political Parties, Populism, Italian Politics, European Politics, and 10 moreLeadership (Political Science), Party organization, Party members, Swiss politics, Contemporary Italian History and Politics, Political leadership, Radical Right-wing Populist Parties, Populismo, Political Parties and Party Politics, and Populisme
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Right-wing populists are said to employ distinctive language to differentiate themselves from mainstream politicians. However, we know little about what makes their language distinct. We investigate this by assembling a novel corpus of... more
Right-wing populists are said to employ distinctive language to differentiate themselves from mainstream politicians. However, we know little about what makes their language distinct. We investigate this by assembling a novel corpus of speeches and using an automated text analysis tool to identify the keywords used by three right-wing populist leaders (Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini) and three of their mainstream opponents (Hillary Clinton, Emmanuel Macron and Matteo Renzi). We then examine the contexts in which those keywords are used. We find that, while Trump and Salvini are stylistically populist in different ways to Le Pen, what distinguishes all of them is the clarity of the populist message (people vs elites and others) compared to their vaguer opponents. Our results have implications for how we understand populism as both ideology and style across linguistic contexts, in addition to how we conceive of its specificity compared to the mainstream.