Virtues and Vices

This article provides a critical analysis of the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology. It first outlines the details and results from 4 paradigmatic studies in psychology that situationists have heavily drawn upon in their critique of the Aristotelian conception of virtuous characteristics, including studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Darley and Batson (1973), Isen and Levin (1972), and Milgram (1963). It then presents 10 problems with the way situationists have used these studies to challenge Aristotelian moral psychology. After challenging the situationists on these grounds, the article then proceeds to challenge the situationist presentation of the Aristotelian conception, showing that situationists have provided an oversimplified caricature of it that goes against the grain of much Aristotelian text. In evaluating the situationist challenge against the actual results from empirical research as well as primary Aristotelian text, it will be shown that the situationist debate has advanced both an extreme, untenable view about the nature of characteristics and situations, as well as an inaccurate presentation of the Aristotelian view.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-013-9249-8
https://doctorcroom.com/croom-2014a

Louis Charland’s claim that DSM Cluster B personality disorders are moral rather than clinical kinds has recently triggered a lively debate. In order to deliver a reliable report of the latter, both (1) Charland’s arguments concerning the impossibility of identifying and treating personality disorders without applying a morally laden conceptual framework and (2) some critical responses they provoked are discussed. Then, in turn, the conceptual history of the notion of personality disorder is traced, including not only well-recognized contributions from (3) medical psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and DSM nosology, but also (4) an important, but often neglected, tradition of virtue and moral character. Finally, (5) the idea of a normatively neutral concept of personality disorder is scrutinized in the context of its logical dependence on the fact-value distinction. The latter dichotomy’s recent criticism, in particular, is employed to support Charland’s argument and to suggest that the normative character of personality disorders may go much deeper than this or that DSM formulation.

YouTube has been implicated in the transformation of users into extremists and conspiracy theorists. The alleged mechanism for this radicalizing process is YouTube's recommender system, which is optimized to amplify and promote clips that users are likely to watch through to the end. YouTube optimizes for watch-through for economic reasons: people who watch a video through to the end are likely to then watch the next recommended video as well, which means that more advertisements can be served to them. This is a seemingly innocuous design choice, but it has a troubling side-effect. Critics of YouTube have alleged that the recommender system tends to recommend extremist content and conspiracy theories, as such videos are especially likely to capture and keep users' attention. To date, the problem of radicalization via the YouTube recommender system has been a matter of speculation. The current study represents the first systematic, pre-registered attempt to establish whether and to what extent the recommender system tends to promote such content. We begin by contextualizing our study in the framework of technological seduction. Next, we explain our methodology. After that, we present our results, which are consistent with the radicalization hypothesis. Finally, we discuss our findings, as well as directions for future research and recommendations for users, industry, and policy-makers.

Die Psychomachia des Prudentius stellt das erste vollkommen allegorische Epos des Abendlandes dar. Es ist insbesondere in der Kunst und Literatur des Mittelalters vielfältig rezipiert worden. Magnus Frisch legt nun erstmals einen Gesamtkommentar zu diesem Werk aus der Spätantike vor, der lange ein Desiderat der Forschung war. Er berücksichtigt die Erkenntnisse der philologischen, theologischen und mediävistischen Forschung der letzten Jahrzehnte.

https://www.degruyter.com/view/title/543630

John R. Wooden (1910–2010) was the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA) basketball coach responsible for the team winning ten national championships in a twelve year period. Through his own experience, he learned a way to cover oneself in glory, to selflessly give everything to a team and thus to have obtain success — both in sports and life. In Wooden’s lifetime, his great accomplishments were only matched by an extraordinary philosophy, expressed in a number of motivational sayings and a comprehensive plan for high achievement, called the “pyramid of success.” Coach Wooden’s philosophy hinted at the secrets to his and his players’ success.

Présentation de la thèse de Sr Christine Gautier soutenue le 31/0/2014 à la PUST (Pontificia Università San Tommaso d'Aquino), Rome.
A partir de la contribution de Thomas d'Aquin sur la Providence divine, réservant une large place au concours des causes secondes et à l’efficacité de l’action humaine, l'objet de la recherche vise déterminer comment l’activité humaine libre qu’est le travail se conjugue avec l’agir divin provident, éminent et infaillible ? En d’autres termes : le travail humain peut-il contribuer à la réalisation du dessein divin par une collaboration spécifique selon un mode original d’agir humain ?

The chapter argues that Malthus’s ethics was a rather traditional kind of Christian morality, far from the ‘new morality’ announced by Bentham.
He argued for consistent application of traditional virtues as the keystone of a new moral and political construction that was called forth to limit and control most evils arising from the principle of population; what is new in Malthus’s approach to ethical issues is instead something almost opposite to Bentham’s spirit. Its mark is modesty, an awareness that there are indeed virtues and moral precepts but there are also greater and lesser evils, and the moral and political science is indeed a moral science not only in the sense that is science of man but also in the sense that it is a applied moral theology, and yet, in so far as it applied, it cannot turn out to be abstract moralizing, the highest the value preached the better. On the contrary Malthus insists that there are indeed consequences of lines of action and policies, and there greater and lesser evils, and policies should be designed for a world made of human beings as they are, not as they ought to be.

Questo articolo parte dalla ricostruzione del modello aristotelico di amicizia fornita nel ‘Brief of the Art of Rhetorique’ e dai motivi della critica hobbesiana a questo modello per esaminare il modo in cui l’amicizia lavora nel discorso antropologico, etico e politico di Hobbes. In un primo momento mostra che l’amicizia rappresenta un potere e che la specificità dei rapporti amicali è costituita dalla loro natura egualitaria ed extra-contrattuale, nonché dalla corrispondenza di dono e gratitudine attraverso la quale si compie lo scambio di poteri e di onori. In un secondo momento si concentra sull’aspetto morale del problema, mettendo in evidenza il nesso tra l’amicizia e quella capacità di mettersi l’uno al posto dell’altro che costituisce il cuore di tutta la concezione hobbesiana della legge naturale. Infine, sottolinea il possibile pericolo politico dei vincoli particolaristici che l’amicizia è in grado di cementare e dalle forme di cooperazione che essa è in grado di promuovere nonostante e contro lo Stato.

Keywords: Hobbes, amicizia, potere, dono, legge naturale, politica

This study starts from the ‘reconstruction’ of the Aristotelian model of friendship, found in the ‘Brief of the Art of Rhetorique’, and the reasons behind Hobbes’s criticism of this model. It then moves on to examine the way friendship works in Hobbes’s anthropological, ethical and political discourse. First, Hobbes’s discourse shows that friendship represents power, and that the specificity of friendly relationships is their equalitarian and non-contractual nature, as well as, the correspondence of gifts and gratitude through which an exchange of power and honours is achieved. Second, it focuses on the moral aspect of the problem highlighting the link between friendship and the ability to put oneself in another’s shoes, which constitutes the heart of the whole of the Hobbesian conception of natural law. Finally, it emphasises the possible political danger of the bonds which friendship can cement and the forms of cooperation that it is able to promote in spite of and against the State.

Keywords: Hobbes, friendship, power, natural law, politics

Theorists have recently been exploring the prospects for a virtue-centred approach to aesthetics. Virtue aesthetics encourages a re-focusing of philosophical attention onto the aesthetic character traits of agents, in the same way that virtue ethics and virtue epistemology have encouraged us to focus on moral and intellectual traits. In this paper, I aim to contribute to the development of virtue aesthetics by discussing aesthetic courage, the aesthetic analogue of one of the most widely acknowledged moral virtues. In addition to proposing an account of the nature of this trait, I also argue that aesthetic courage is vital for any sort of aesthetically virtuous life. It is not possible to possess any aesthetic virtue without possessing aesthetic courage. It is important, therefore, for any future development of virtue aesthetics to acknowledge the central importance of aesthetic courage.

Fuller Theological Seminary Based on insights from the psychology of religion, positive psychology, personality psychology, and theology, a theoretical model relating the virtue of patience to religion and spirituality is proposed. Patience is conceptualized as a hybrid personality construct related to effective emotion regulation strategies coupled with transcendent narrative identity. An initial empirical test of the model is conducted in a sample of ethnically diverse adolescents (N ϭ 406) who are primarily Christian or nonreligious. Religiousness and spirituality are predictors of the virtue of patience, which then predicts use of the emotion regulation strategy of cognitive reappraisal; all these variables are then tested as direct and indirect predictors of regulated behavior and well-being. Overall, results support our theoretical model that spirituality and religion predict higher patience, which facilitates the employment of adaptive emotion regulation strategies that predict better life outcomes. Implications and future research questions stemming from the theoretical model are discussed.

What should a virtue theory of argumentation say about fallacious reasoning? If good arguments are virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of bad argumentation to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through analysis of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad misericordiam.

The purpose of this paper is to exemplify the outstanding potential of literary narrations, and particularly the fairy tales, to foster resilience among primary school students. The starting point of these reflections is the mimetic-cathartic vision of a literary narration proposed already by Aristotle and then developed by such contemporary authors as Paul Ricoeur, Alasdair MacIntyre, David Carr, etc. The specific application of the general idea, according to which great literary stories have a powerful intrinsic pedagogical potential, is depicted with the use of the example of a classic tale by the Grimm brothers, The Girl Without Hands, which is a clear mimesis in both textual and figurative sense of a resilient character. Moreover, the traumatizing circumstances against which the resilient attitude develops in the protagonist are related to family background, which makes the story particularly up-to-date at present times in which we observe an outstandingly high divorce rate as well as many other types of problems affecting large numbers of children in relation with their families. A variety of “pillars” or “factors” of resilience are easily observable in the behaviour of the “girl without hands,” which converts the story into a remarkable and encouraging example of overcoming all sort of difficulties and obstacles which our students encounter on their own way towards a more complete integration and happiness.

“Vicious Art or Vicious Audience? Understanding the Effects of Art on the Youthful and Vicious Audience in Aristotle’s Poetics”

According to Aristotle, tragedy can be morally instructive if managed correctly. We believe that this qualification—correct management of the instructive capacity of art—requires further investigation. In particular, Aristotle’s apparent acceptance of the arts must be critically reviewed through the lens of his moral psychology. This paper examines an Aristotelian analysis of the effects of tragic art on the moral psychology of persons of different character types. We contend that two distinct groups of people who lack keen moral perception—the youth and vicious people—render the efficacy of moral education through tragedy a delicate matter.
Those who benefit most directly from watching tragedy are what we shall call morally knowing subjects. A morally knowing subject is one who already recognizes the good in general (e.g., it is usually wrong to steal from and murder other people, and it is usually good to be charitable and truthful). Morally knowing subjects include the virtuous, continent, and incontinent characters (and, as we shall discuss, possibly older youths on the brink of developing one of these character types). Such a person has some knowledge of the good and, for that reason, can correctly identify and compare instances of injustice in the plot of a tragedy. The virtuous person is most keen to judge, as she already knows and loves the good. For her especially, tragedy is cathartic. Tragedy allows her to rehearse her moral knowledge while putting it into the context of orthogonal fear and pity. The continent and incontinent persons, like the virtuous, can easily identify sympathetic characters. Watching tragedy helps them to rehearse aligning their emotional responses with their moral knowledge. For them, tragedy can be most instructive. However, this educative value seems contingent upon the subject’s moral knowledge. For example, a morally knowing subject knows, prior to viewing a performance of Medea, that while adultery is wrong, filicide is worse. Such a subject might feel pity for Medea initially when her husband, Jason, betrays her. However, upon the realization that Medea will murder their children in retaliation, the morally knowing subject experiences fear for the children’s welfare, and no longer sympathizes with Medea. Inept moral perception might preclude one from having this morally correct emotional response.
Youths and vicious people each have, in a way, inept moral perception. Youths are uninformed and the vicious misidentify the good. At first blush, it might appear that tragedy would not help such people develop (or improve) their moral character. However, we argue that the spectacle relevant to youths and the vicious is much broader than the stage. Provided the vicious and very young playgoers are surrounded by mostly morally knowing subjects, they too can learn from tragedy. For instance, if a youth or a vicious person were to continue to identify with Medea even after her plans for filicide are apparent, but it is obvious that the majority of people in the audience feel differently, then the youth or vicious person might come to question their own moral judgment.

Sujet de leçon de philosophie type oral de l'épreuve du CAPES Externe de Philosophie.

En première approche, le dictionnaire définit simplement le vaniteux comme celui qui fait preuve de vanité, personnage prétentieux et suffisant. Mais deux questions, deux problèmes se posent d'ores et déjà à ce stade... A quoi le vaniteux prétend-il au juste ? Ou de quoi se réclame-t-il tandis qu'il n'est pas légitime à le faire, car la vanité que nous étudions et bel et bien reconnue comme un vice ? D'autre part, quelle pourrait bien être la valeur d'une vanité qui se suffit à elle-même, ce que nous retrouvons dans le terme de suffisance ? Il apparaît fort paradoxal de soutenir que la vaniteux est suffisant alors même que faire preuve de vanité nécessite la présence d'autrui ! De quoi peut bien se vanter le vaniteux ? Les réponses sont multiples ! On peut se vanter de ses biens extérieurs, de ses propres qualités, voire même de certains de ses défauts, à la manière de ceux qui affirment que la franchise ou l'honnêteté en sont un ! Ils sont nombreux ceux-là, en effet, qui font « comme si » leur trop grande franchise les accablait et coupait toute possibilité de communication avec autrui. Cependant, il y a quelque chose de mensonger à ces lieux communs et cela nous autorise à poser sans délai cette question : que cache le vaniteux qui tient de tels propos ? Ne fait-il pas le jeu du voile de fumée en affirmant l'inconvénient être trop franc tandis que sa véritable attente est ailleurs, dans un compliment en l'occurence ? La vanité nous renvoie de la sorte à un première différence entre être et paraître, ou plus finement à leurs étroites relations, du moins plus complexes qu'une pensée d'allure manichéenne ne pourrait le tenir comme évident de prime abord ! Mais, cette question de se vanter de quoi doit faire place à celle-ci : se vanter à qui ? L'action même de se vanter de ce que l'on a fait, dit ou pensé n'a de sens qu'à être l'occasion de « tirer la couverture à soi » (selon l'adage populaire), de demander à autrui de reconnaître notre mérite, réel ou apparent, pour satisfaire quelque désir de « gloire » dont le philosophe, tout aussi vaniteux peut-être (nous aurons à nous poser cette question aussi), dirait qu'il est humain... trop humain. En somme, « tirer la couverture à soi » ne fait aucun problème quand on est seul dans le lit et c'est bien sur la fond de sociabilité que la vanité émerge. Qu'a-t-elle donc à nous dire sur l'homme et sur les termes de son appartenance à la société ? Qu'a-t-elle de plus philosophiquement valorisable que l'orgueil dont nous devrons la différencier ? Car, oui, l'orgueil, l'hubris

Aristotle’s treatment of the Lazy Argument in Chapter 9 of De Interpretatione has received much attention from philosophers for being a solution to an intellectual problem about fatalism and free will. However, little scholarly work has been done on the possibility that reflecting on and accepting the Lazy Argument could be a moral failure according to Aristotle’s ethics. Drawing on the work of Richard Moran and Jonathan Cohen, in this paper I argue that, on Aristotle’s view, if an agent thoughtfully reflects on and accepts the Lazy Argument, they are acting viciously. This is because thoughtfully reflecting on and accepting the Lazy Argument turns on engaging in a type of self-reflection that is deceptive. I argue that such an action is vicious because it misses hitting the mean of truthfulness in self-reflection. In response to this argument, I consider an objection, and show that, while not all cases of acceptance are moral failures, cases of acceptance like these can never be virtuous.

This essay juxtaposes two senses given to the concept of “market economy”: economizing the market, as suggested by Aristotle, and marketing the economy, as suggested by modern economists. The essay argues that Aristotle identified the market as arousing excessive desires in people, and by doing so it poses a threat to the mere existence of the polis. As suggested, the solution offered by him was economizing the market by subjecting it to the mode of sound-minded conduct. By following the different definitions of prominent modern economists to the scope and method of economic science, I argue that what Aristotle did not foresee was that the economy may be marketed by prudently economizing bodily desires as self-aroused by the market. Juxtaposing Aristotelian and market economy sheds light on the fact that we are free to choose between vicious and virtuous economy. Whether practicing economic virtue or its corresponding vice, prudence is kept unharmed, and both the sound-minded and the licentious person are liable to slip into some sort of bondage.

Although it does not appear on many traditional lists of the virtues, respect for human dignity is an important virtue in its own right that is characterized as much by emotions as by other mental states and actions. The virtue of respect for human dignity essentially involves the dispositions to feel the emotion of respect for the dignity of others and an emotional sense of one's own dignity. As exemplified by Nelson Mandela, this virtue also involves a keen perceptual sensitivity to humiliating and degrading treatment, along with dispositions to protest, correct, and prevent such treatment. The person with the virtue of respect for human dignity also will be disposed to feel indignation toward willful violations of human dignity, compassion for their victims, and various positive emotions in response to victories for human dignity. Although this virtue closely resembles other, more widely recognized, virtues, such as justice and love, it nevertheless is appropriate to treat respect for human dignity as a distinct virtue, as well as an emotion.

While the teaching of intellectual virtue is receiving growing attention, little research exists on how to assess the development of intellectual virtue in students. This is not without reason. Some may think that the development of intellectual virtue should not (or perhaps cannot) be assessed. Furthermore, standard forms of assessment – especially as we encounter them in the high stakes graded exams common in schools and universities – seem to encourage an instrumental rather than a virtuous orientation towards the value of knowledge. In this paper, I review the challenges that exist for teachers in assessing intellectual virtue. I review attempts that have been made to assess something like intellectual virtue in (1) research on moral development, (2) research on ‘personal epistemology’ and (3) research into critical thinking. I conclude that while it is possible to assess the development of intellectual virtue with enough precision to demonstrate the effectiveness of teaching for intellectual character, this does not imply that virtue must be graded.

To what extent did German historians in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries aspire to be “a whole man” (ein ganzer Mann)? Historians used the phrase on numerous occasions, as shorthand for a mode of masculinity that sought to reconcile demands of reason and emotion by combining astuteness, industry, and determination with imagination, love of country, and “human warmth”. This persona, however, was not as widely shared as recent literature on German historical scholarship suggests. As a contrastive ideal that was invoked especially by historians who were critical of increased specialization, “the whole man” was a counter-hegemonic persona, imbued with a distinct sense of masculinity.

Trial of Chicago Police Capt. related to the vice districts and their political protection. Primary source documenting the corruption of the Chicago Police Department and their direct role in prostitution rackets in the city. Court transcript Abstract: Trial of Chicago Police Capt. related to the vice districts and their political protection Primary source documenting the corruption of the Chicago Police Department and their direct role in prostitution rackets in the city. Civil Service investigative files

“Nunchi” is a Korean term that indicates an expert facility in social interactions and especially the ability to interpret and utilize indirect communication with ease and alacrity. In this paper, I introduce and discuss the concept of nunchi with a focus on two main senses in which it is used: as a skill and as a burden. Then, I discuss the relation of nunchi to well-being and flourishing, both in specifically Korean cultural contexts and in social contexts more generally. Finally, I argue that because of nunchi’s close relation to well-being and flourishing, that there is a strong case to be made for treating it as a virtue.

Governments and companies are increasingly promoting and organizing Responsible Innovation. It is, however, unclear how the seemingly incompatible demands for responsibility, which is associated with care and caution, can be harmonized with demands for innovation, which is associated with risk-taking and speed. We turn to the tradition of virtue ethics and argue that it can be a strong accomplice to Responsible Innovation by focussing on the agential side of innovation. Virtue ethics offers an adequate response to the epistemic and moral complexity in innovation and encourages moral behaviour. We enumerate a number of virtues that people involved in Responsible Innovation would need to cultivate both related to responsibility, such as justice, anticipation, civility and inclusion, and virtues related to innovation, such as courage, dedication, curiosity and creativity. We put forward practical wisdom (phronesis) as a key virtue to regulate relevant virtues and to deal with the tension between responsibility and innovation. Practical wisdom helps an agent to find an appropriate mean in exercising and expressing the other virtues—where the mean is relative to the specific context of action and the role and abilities of the agent.

The crowning virtue Magnanimity has long been recognized as a key virtue for leaders and for everyone who desired to do great and honorable deeds for the people they served, even in the face of difficulty, and at the cost of great personal sacrifice. It is an essential virtue for parents and those who work with young people, for teachers, mentors, and pastoral workers who aspire to excellence in training and helping others grow in maturity and strong character. Aristotle called it " the crowning virtue. " Like a magnificent crown adorned with numerous jewels and precious gems, magnanimity ennobles all of the virtues and directs them to the generous service of others – to many great and noble deeds.

ABTRACT: When Aristotle limits the manifestation of true courage to the military context only, his primary target is an overly inclusive conception of courage presented by Plato in the Laches. At the same time, Aristotle explicitly tries to demar-cate his ideal of genuine courage from the paradigmatic examples of courageous actions derived from the Homeric epics. It remains questionable, though, whether Aristotle is truly earnest in his efforts to distance himself from Homer. It will be argued that Aristotle's attempt to associate with Homer the two forms of specious courage—courage of the citizen troops and spirit-caused courage—fails to provide sufficient criteria for the demarcation in question. All the essential elements of the Aristotelian account of courage, such as a voluntary choice, a noble goal, and a thumos-driven reaction guided by reason are exemplified by a number of Homeric characters as well. It is thus likely that the philosopher's account of courage largely incorporates the poetic tradition at a new level, rather than supersedes it.

Philosophers often give procrastination an anemic description—a preference, a conflict, a case of irrationality. Presumably, this is done in order to make it susceptible to analysis. But if one makes use of ethical theory, particularly one with an accompanying account of moral psychology, no arid depiction of procrastination is necessary. An ethical theory that is robust enough—such as traditional virtue ethics—can meet procrastination head on, unhindered by its complex emotionality and opaque intentionality.
It can then place it alongside similarly complex behavior, comparing
and contrasting until we have some account of the darker alleyways of our nature and the limits of our self-control.
That the term vice is out of favor gives us no reason to deny that procrastination is a moral phenomenon.