- Kuwait
Andrei Zavaliy
American University of Kuwait, Philosophy, Faculty Member
- Professor of Philosophyedit
Research Interests:
Contrary to Greek tradition, Aristotle condemns suicide without qualification, citing two reasons for moral disapproval. First, suicide is an act of cowardice. Second, suicide involves an act of injustice toward the state. It is argued... more
Contrary to Greek tradition, Aristotle condemns suicide without qualification, citing two reasons for moral disapproval. First, suicide is an act of cowardice. Second, suicide involves an act of injustice toward the state. It is argued that the charge of cowardice is too strong even by Aristotle’s own standards. There is evidence that the philosopher recognized a distinction between the cases of self-murder that testify to a cowardly character and the cases when one may be pardoned. It is shown that a suicide acts unjustly toward the polis in a way analogous to desertion from an army.
Research Interests: Jstor()
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Plato’s views on the nature of courage have been developing over the course of his long philosophical career, but both the Early and the Late Dialogues are important for understanding the dominant views on this virtue in the fourth... more
Plato’s views on the nature of courage have been developing over the course of his long philosophical career, but both the Early and the Late Dialogues are important for understanding the dominant views on this virtue in the fourth century Athens. Contrary to the mainstream approach, it is suggested that the most interesting aspect of the Laches and the Protagoras, the two early works where courage is discussed, are the views of Socrates’ interlocuters rather than those of Socrates himself. A relation between courage, self-confidence and knowledge is the focus of the analysis of these two Dialogues. It is also argued that the most significant argument of the Laches is an attempt to extend the range of courageous actions beyond the military context. The chapter further traces the evolution of Plato’s views in the Republic, where a non-rational inner drive, thumos, rather than knowledge, once again becomes a prerequisite for martial courage of the guardians. Finally, the chapter ends by looking at Plato’s indirect debate with Tyrtaeus in the Laws, which shows the philosopher’s disappointment with the value of courage for an orderly society, and his attempt to demote this virtue to the least important place.
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The first half of the chapter explores the earliest extant examples of post-Homeric poetry, the martial elegies of Tyrtaeus and Callinus. The analysis of their poetic legacy aims at identifying both the obvious Homeric themes and imagery... more
The first half of the chapter explores the earliest extant examples of post-Homeric poetry, the martial elegies of Tyrtaeus and Callinus. The analysis of their poetic legacy aims at identifying both the obvious Homeric themes and imagery in their respective conceptualizations of courage and the original developments in these seventh century authors. A special attention is paid to the announced assurance of postmortem glory for the fallen heroes, and the kind of earthly benefits that the poets promise to the surviving warriors. Psychological endurance of the gory sights of war, one’s willingness to engage the enemy in a close-range fighting and unquestionable loyalty to the city are all seen by the poets as prerequisites for genuine martial excellence. The discussion of the images of courageous agents from the seventh century poetry is further complemented by the analysis of the several excerpts from fifth century author, Simonides, and his famous ‘Homer-style’ dirges for the fallen heroes of the Persian wars. The conspicuous affinity between the authors divided by almost two centuries is best explained by their common source of poetic inspiration, namely the Homeric tradition.
Research Interests: History()
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Research Interests: Courage()
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Aristotle’s attitude toward the virtue of courage is best characterized as a strong reaction toward Plato’s overly inclusive definition of this virtue in the early Dialogues as well as an attempt to reverse the semantic distortions of the... more
Aristotle’s attitude toward the virtue of courage is best characterized as a strong reaction toward Plato’s overly inclusive definition of this virtue in the early Dialogues as well as an attempt to reverse the semantic distortions of the age and to restore the concept to its proper semantic place within language. By demarcating genuine virtue from its multiple imitators, Aristotle effectively returns to the Homeric understanding of courage as a virtue shown exclusively in war. Aristotle’s theoretical account takes into consideration not only the external circumstances of a risky behavior, but also the psychological motivation of the agent, which he captures by the term “the noble goal of courage.” The ambiguity of this expression is discussed, and a plausible interpretation is offered. It is also observed that one’s willingness to give up one’s life is not yet sufficient for genuine courage for the philosopher, as the case of a suicide clearly shows. The discussion of Aristotle’s designation of suicide as a cowardly act is set against his general theory of courage, and it is argued that, with rare exceptions, a person who takes his own life shows a blameworthy form weakness, typical of a cowardly character.
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Research Interests: Art()
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The purpose of this paper is to defend a position in metaethics, saving morality from certain reductionist attempts, and arguing that a moral point of view denotes a distinct attitude toward the world with a set of relatively stable... more
The purpose of this paper is to defend a position in metaethics, saving morality from certain reductionist attempts, and arguing that a moral point of view denotes a distinct attitude toward the world with a set of relatively stable conditions. I discuss the problem of demarcation between the moral and the non-moral domains, and contrast the two basic approaches – moral neutralism and moral descriptivism. Moral neutralism is defined as a view which builds no content requirements into the definition of moral rules, whereas moral descriptivism or essentialism places identifiable constraints on the content of an action-guiding principle if such a principle is to count as a moral, as opposed to a non-moral, rule. I show that adopting neutralism is tantamount to giving up ethical theory as a scholarly activity with a distinct subject matter altogether. It is further argued that W. Frankena’s essentialist definition of morality, as well as a more recent view of Catherine Wilson, share a s...
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My primary goal in this article is to address the question of philosophy’s role as a core discipline in the curriculum of most Liberal Arts institutions. Of necessity, the discussion below will hardly be exhaustive, and will at best... more
My primary goal in this article is to address the question of philosophy’s role as a core discipline in the curriculum of most Liberal Arts institutions. Of necessity, the discussion below will hardly be exhaustive, and will at best highlight a direction for a more comprehensive answer. But any attempt to discuss the relevance of philosophy in whatever context inevitably leads to a more general and traditional question of the nature of philosophy itself. Philosophy is quite notorious among other disciplines for its never-ending self-reflective speculations, at all times trying to define itself and find its proper place in the family of other academic subjects. Indeed, this perennial feeling of insecurity about its proper status is what initially sets philosophy apart from the disciplines exhibiting a much more confident posture. Moreover, philosophy’s ongoing crisis of identity, which one could perhaps tolerate in a new and immature discipline, seems to get worse with age. Yet, before we can decide whether this apparent lack of confidence in the pronouncements of the philosophers regarding their own subject matter is philosophy’s serious flaw or its special advantage, it will be helpful to briefly outline several important developmental tendencies that philosophy has shown during its long history.
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Courage and cowardice are familiar moral terms which yet require greater clarification. The application of these terms in modern culture seems haphazard and is often overly inclusive. As a result, the number of courageous agents is... more
Courage and cowardice are familiar moral terms which yet require greater clarification. The application of these terms in modern culture seems haphazard and is often overly inclusive. As a result, the number of courageous agents is multiplied beyond reasonable limits, and the original value of what seems to be a rare character trait is deflated. One way to remedy the situation is to look closely at the conceptions of courage and cowardice among the ancients and to take their views seriously. Homer and Aristotle are further introduced as the two major figures who limit the present research chronologically, and a justification is given for choosing this particular historical timeframe. Basic methodological assumptions of the whole inquiry are spelled out and a brief outline of the subsequent chapters is provided.
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The Philosophical Assumptions behind the Non-Cognitive Use of Scriptures in Eastern Religions
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Even though Hegel rejects Kant’s criticism of the classical proofs for God’s existence, he is far from joining the followers of St. Anselm. What is needed, he suggests, is the rational account of the transition from the final notion to... more
Even though Hegel rejects Kant’s criticism of the classical proofs for God’s existence, he is far from joining the followers of St. Anselm. What is needed, he suggests, is the rational account of the transition from the final notion to the infinite Being. The Lectures in its central treatment of the Cosmological proof present us with an explanation in rational terms of the fact of religion, i.e., the elevation of the finite spirit to infinite God, rather than with a proof in a narrow logical sense. Hegel is not so much asking the question ‘Does God exist?’, but rather ‘How is the elevation of the finite spirit to God possible?’ The Hegelian ‘proof’, I argue, consists in a demonstration of the necessity of movement from finiteness to infinity, that is, the demonstration of the necessity of religion itself. Religious faith in this context is not juxtaposed to reason, but appears as a mode of imperfect knowledge, which is superseded by the further development of the rational concept.
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Adherence to certain religious beliefs is often cited as both an efficient deterrent to immoral behavior and as an effective trigger of morally praiseworthy actions. I assume the truth of the externalist theory of motivation, emphasizing... more
Adherence to certain religious beliefs is often cited as both an efficient deterrent to immoral behavior and as an effective trigger of morally praiseworthy actions. I assume the truth of the externalist theory of motivation, emphasizing emotions as the most important non-cognitive elements that causally contribute to behavioral choices. While religious convictions may foster an array of complex emotions in a believer, three emotive states are singled out for a closer analysis: fear, guilt and gratitude. The results of recent empirical studies are examined to evaluate the relative motivational efficiency of all three emotions, as well as the likely negative psychological side-effects of these affective states, such as aggression and depression. While an action motivated by fear of punishment can be seen as a merely prudential strategy, the reparatory incentive of a guilty subject and a desire to reciprocate of the one blessed by undeserved favors are more plausible candidates for th...
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Since all subsequent poetic, historical and philosophical conceptions of courage were strongly influenced by the examples of courageous and cowardly behavior from the two epics, elucidating the Homeric understanding of this virtue is... more
Since all subsequent poetic, historical and philosophical conceptions of courage were strongly influenced by the examples of courageous and cowardly behavior from the two epics, elucidating the Homeric understanding of this virtue is fundamental for the success of the whole project. While Homer intended to present the readers with a comprehensive theory of courage, certain key elements of a theoretical account of courageous behavior can be elicited from the paradigm cases of bravery and cowardice described in the Iliad and the Odyssey. The chapter explores the role of thumos in heroic behavior, identifies the typical incentives for risky actions, lists physiological signs of courage and cowardice, and traces the connection between one’s social status in the Homeric world and the duties to excel in warfare. A separate discussion is devoted to the gender issue and an argument is made that the virtue of courage is not limited to males only in the semantic space of Homeric language, eve...
Research Interests: History()
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While instances of shame are plenty in Ancient Greek sources, it is notoriously difficult to identify a case of a wrongdoer who exhibits a reaction approximating our modern concept of guilt. Adopting a behavioural criterion for... more
While instances of shame are plenty in Ancient Greek sources, it is notoriously difficult to identify a case of a wrongdoer who exhibits a reaction approximating our modern concept of guilt. Adopting a behavioural criterion for demarcating shame from guilt, I examine the most promising description of a guilt-feeling from Aristotle’s Ethics. The description stands out from the earlier tradition by reversing the pattern of the behavioural tendencies of a wrongdoer, but fits well with the phenomenon of inner shame. The condition described by Aristotle can thus be conceived as self-shaming, but one that exhibits some of the features that have more in common with guilt.
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ABTRACT: When Aristotle limits the manifestation of true courage to the military context only, his primary target is an overly inclusive conception of courage presented by Plato in the Laches. At the same time, Aristotle explicitly tries... more
ABTRACT: When Aristotle limits the manifestation of true courage to the military context only, his primary target is an overly inclusive conception of courage presented by Plato in the Laches. At the same time, Aristotle explicitly tries to demar-cate his ideal of genuine courage from the paradigmatic examples of courageous actions derived from the Homeric epics. It remains questionable, though, whether Aristotle is truly earnest in his efforts to distance himself from Homer. It will be argued that Aristotle's attempt to associate with Homer the two forms of specious courage—courage of the citizen troops and spirit-caused courage—fails to provide sufficient criteria for the demarcation in question. All the essential elements of the Aristotelian account of courage, such as a voluntary choice, a noble goal, and a thumos-driven reaction guided by reason are exemplified by a number of Homeric characters as well. It is thus likely that the philosopher's account of courage largely incorporates the poetic tradition at a new level, rather than supersedes it.
Research Interests:
An other-directed moral judgement is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behavior; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgments is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of... more
An other-directed moral judgement is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behavior; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgments is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition on the part of a mature individual to judge others is indicative of the corresponding lack with regard to the self-directed evaluations. Our readiness to evaluate the behaviour of others measures the level of our commitment to a system of morality. Consistent nonjudgementalism subverts the interpersonal nature of moral values and points to a deeper issue – an unwillingness of a nonjudgementalist to apply moral categories to her own choices.
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An other-directed moral judgement is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behavior; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgments is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of... more
An other-directed moral judgement is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behavior; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgments is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition on the part of a mature individual to judge others is indicative of the corresponding lack with regard to the self-directed evaluations. Our readiness to evaluate the behaviour of others measures the level of our commitment to a system of morality. Consistent nonjudgementalism subverts the interpersonal nature of moral values and points to a deeper issue – an unwillingness of a nonjudgementalist to apply moral categories to her own choices.
Research Interests:
An other-directed moral judgment is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behavior; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgments is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition... more
An other-directed moral judgment is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behavior; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgments is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition on the part of a mature individual to judge others is indicative of the corresponding lack with regard to the self-directed evaluations. Our readiness to evaluate the behaviour of others measures the level of our commitment to a system of morality. Consistent nonjudgementalism subverts the interpersonal nature of moral values and points to a deeper issue – an unwillingness of a nonjudgementalist to apply moral categories to her own choices.
Research Interests:
The purpose of this paper is twofold: to demystify the ancient concept of courage making it more palpable for the modern reader, and to suggest the reasonably specific constraints which would restrict the contemporary tendency of... more
The purpose of this paper is twofold: to demystify the ancient concept of courage making it more palpable for the modern reader, and to suggest the reasonably specific constraints which would restrict the contemporary tendency of indiscriminate attribution of this virtue. The discussion of courage will incorporate both the classical interpretations of this trait of character, and the empirical studies into the complex relation between the emotion of fear and behavior. The Aristotelian thesis that courage consists in overcoming the fear of significant harm for a worthy cause will be further developed by exploring its relevance for the military professionals today. The specific criteria will be offered in order to restrict the application of the term ‘courageous’ to a certain type of action, as well as to demarcate this virtue from the related vices, such as recklessness. The normative aspect of our study aims at making sense of what could qualify as a worthy goal of a fearless action in the modern world. It will be argued that a courageous agent aims at alleviating or preventing harm for others in a situation of potential risk for the agent himself, while respecting the factual conditions which determine the probability of success.
Research Interests:
Contrary to Greek tradition, Aristotle condemns suicide without qualification , citing two reasons for moral disapproval. First, suicide is an act of cowardice. Second, suicide involves an act of injustice toward the state. It is argued... more
Contrary to Greek tradition, Aristotle condemns suicide without qualification , citing two reasons for moral disapproval. First, suicide is an act of cowardice. Second, suicide involves an act of injustice toward the state. It is argued that the charge of cowardice is too strong even by Aristotle's own standards. There is evidence that the philosopher recognized a distinction between the cases of self-murder that testify to a cowardly character and the cases when one may be pardoned. It is shown that a suicide acts unjustly toward the polis in a way analogous to desertion from an army.
Research Interests:
Adherence to certain religious beliefs is often cited as both an efficient deterrent to immoral behavior and as an effective trigger of the morally praiseworthy actions. I assume the truth of the externalist theory of motivation,... more
Adherence to certain religious beliefs is often cited as both an efficient deterrent to immoral behavior and as an effective trigger of the morally praiseworthy actions. I assume the truth of the externalist theory of motivation, emphasizing emotions as the most important non-cognitive elements that causally contribute to behavioral choices. While religious convictions may foster an array of complex emotions in a believer, three emotive states are singled out for a closer analysis: fear, guilt and gratitude. The results of recent empirical studies are examined to evaluate the relative motivational efficiency of all three emotions, as well as the likely negative psychological side-effects of these affective states, such as aggression and depression. While an action motivated by fear of punishment can be seen as a merely prudential strategy, the reparatory incentive of a guilty subject and a desire to reciprocate of the one blessed by undeserved favors are more plausible candidates for the class of genuine moral reactions. The available evidence, however, does not warrant a conclusion that a sense of guilt before God or as a sense of gratefulness to God, may produce a statistically significant increase in the frequency of prosocial actions aimed at other humans.
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ABTRACT: When Aristotle limits the manifestation of true courage to the military context only, his primary target is an overly inclusive conception of courage presented by Plato in the Laches. At the same time, Aristotle explicitly tries... more
ABTRACT: When Aristotle limits the manifestation of true courage to the military context only, his primary target is an overly inclusive conception of courage presented by Plato in the Laches. At the same time, Aristotle explicitly tries to demar-cate his ideal of genuine courage from the paradigmatic examples of courageous actions derived from the Homeric epics. It remains questionable, though, whether Aristotle is truly earnest in his efforts to distance himself from Homer. It will be argued that Aristotle's attempt to associate with Homer the two forms of specious courage—courage of the citizen troops and spirit-caused courage—fails to provide sufficient criteria for the demarcation in question. All the essential elements of the Aristotelian account of courage, such as a voluntary choice, a noble goal, and a thumos-driven reaction guided by reason are exemplified by a number of Homeric characters as well. It is thus likely that the philosopher's account of courage largely incorporates the poetic tradition at a new level, rather than supersedes it.
Research Interests:
An other-directed moral judgement is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behavior; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgments is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition... more
An other-directed moral judgement is contrasted with a moral evaluation of one's own behavior; it is argued that having a capacity to make self-directed moral judgments is at the core of being within morality, while a lack of disposition on the part of a mature individual to judge others is indicative of the corresponding lack with regard to the self-directed evaluations. Our readiness to evaluate the behaviour of others measures the level of our commitment to a system of morality. Consistent nonjudgementalism subverts the interpersonal nature of moral values and points to a deeper issue – an unwillingness of a nonjudgementalist to apply moral categories to her own choices.
Research Interests:
My primary goal in this article is to address the question of philosophy’s role as a core discipline in the curriculum of most Liberal Arts institutions. Of necessity, the discussion below will hardly be exhaustive, and will at best... more
My primary goal in this article is to address the question of philosophy’s role as a core discipline in the curriculum of most Liberal Arts institutions. Of necessity, the discussion below will hardly be exhaustive, and will at best highlight a direction for a more comprehensive answer. But any attempt to discuss the relevance of philosophy in whatever context inevitably leads to a more general and traditional question of the nature of philosophy itself. Philosophy is quite notorious among other disciplines for its never-ending self-reflective speculations, at all times trying to define itself and find its proper place in the family of other academic subjects. Indeed, this perennial feeling of insecurity about its proper status is what initially sets philosophy apart from the disciplines exhibiting a much more confident posture. Moreover, philosophy’s ongoing crisis of identity, which one could perhaps tolerate in a new and immature discipline, seems to get worse with age. Yet, before we can decide whether this apparent lack of confidence in the pronouncements of the philosophers regarding their own subject matter is philosophy’s serious flaw or its special advantage, it will be helpful to briefly outline several important developmental tendencies that philosophy has shown during its long history.
Research Interests:
It is well-known that sacred scriptures play a dual function in many religions – the cognitive (or informative) and the non-cognitive (or performative) one. Arguably, the non-cognitive use of scriptures is especially prominent in Eastern... more
It is well-known that sacred scriptures play a dual function in many religions – the cognitive (or informative) and the non-cognitive (or performative) one. Arguably, the non-cognitive use of scriptures is especially prominent in Eastern Religions, such as Hinduism and Buddhism. The use of a text as a talisman to ward off evil forces, the uttering of mantras and sacred formulas, and the spinning of the “prayer wheels” containing scrolls of paper with excerpts from various sutras, are all examples of the use of the religious text in a non-cognitive manner. The paper aims to examine the philosophical background of such practices, and to identify the implicit metaphysical assumptions that allow the practitioners to use the word, whether in its written or uttered forms, as a sacred ritual object with real powers. The Mimamsa school from the Hindu tradition and the Shingon sect of Japanese Buddhism are selected as representative examples, and their respective approaches to language are examined. My further goal is to encourage a fresh look at the eastern religious traditions, where local practices are not evaluated and categorized using the western standards, but are rather approached from within the philosophical background of an indigenous tradition itself.
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In this paper I look at Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul (psyche) as it is presented in the De Anima, and argue that the conceptual framework of his ‘solution’ to the mind/body problem is broad enough to cover the ‘traditional’ questions... more
In this paper I look at Aristotle’s doctrine of the soul (psyche) as it is presented in the De Anima, and argue that the conceptual framework of his ‘solution’ to the mind/body problem is broad enough to cover the ‘traditional’ questions of the contemporary philosophy of mind. Aristotle faces essentially the same problems in the field of philosophical psychology as the moderns do, even though his account of the soul is perhaps unique in the history of philosophy. As such, he stands firmly within the mainstream philosophical development, and presents a genuine alternative to the existing theories of mind.
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The purpose of this paper is twofold: to demystify the ancient concept of courage making it more palpable for the modern reader, and to suggest the reasonably specific constraints which would restrict the contemporary tendency of... more
The purpose of this paper is twofold: to demystify the ancient concept of courage making it more palpable for the modern reader, and to suggest the reasonably specific constraints which would restrict the contemporary tendency of indiscriminate attribution of this virtue. The discussion of courage will incorporate both the classical interpretations of this trait of character, and the empirical studies into the complex relation between the emotion of fear and behavior. The Aristotelian thesis that courage consists in overcoming the fear of significant harm for a worthy cause will be further developed by exploring its relevance for the military professionals today. The specific criteria will be offered in order to restrict the application of the term ‘courageous’ to a certain type of action, as well as to demarcate this virtue from the related vices, such as recklessness. The normative aspect of our study aims at making sense of what could qualify as a worthy goal of a fearless action in the modern world. It will be argued that a courageous agent aims at alleviating or preventing harm for others in a situation of potential risk for the agent himself, while respecting the factual conditions which determine the probability of success.
Research Interests:
I explore here the implications of the idea that morality is scalar, that the moral perspective admits of degrees, and that assuming a moral point of view is not an all-or-nothing matter. I am interested in spelling out in what sense a... more
I explore here the implications of the idea that morality is scalar, that the moral perspective admits of degrees, and that assuming a moral point of view is not an all-or-nothing matter. I am interested in spelling out in what sense a given action-guiding policy may have increasingly greater moral intensity than its competitors, and pointing to the theoretical advantages this idea has for our conceptualizing of the phenomenon of amoralism.
Admitting the scalar nature of morality presupposes a certain account of the proper function of moral rules. I follow Catherine Wilson in defining morality as a system of advantage-reducing imperatives. This is further detailed by introducing the three dimensions along which one may measure the overall force of moral regulation, both on the individual and communal levels. We increase the intensity of moral regulation in so far as we move from the prohibition on causing ‘substantial’ physical harm to competitors to the more liberal requirement to abstain from causing any harm whatsoever, and further, to the requirement of giving up one’s advantages to improve the lot of the less fortunate individuals. We increase the strictness of a moral prohibition on causing harm by reducing the number of exceptions that the rule admits of. And we increase the scope of a moral prohibition by including under its protection the ever widening groups of sentient creatures. Correspondingly, a person or a community may become less moral either by restricting the application of the advantage-reducing imperatives to a smaller group, by allowing more exceptions to a rule, or by lowering the standards of the acceptable aggressive behavior towards the competitors and the less fit individuals or communities. This theoretical background allows us to look at the phenomenon of amoralism in a new light. The extreme amoralist (e.g., a psychopath) is no longer seen as different type of human agent, but rather as occupying a certain point on a continuous three-dimensional scale of morality, and whose condition is commensurable with that of the morally concerned agents.
Admitting the scalar nature of morality presupposes a certain account of the proper function of moral rules. I follow Catherine Wilson in defining morality as a system of advantage-reducing imperatives. This is further detailed by introducing the three dimensions along which one may measure the overall force of moral regulation, both on the individual and communal levels. We increase the intensity of moral regulation in so far as we move from the prohibition on causing ‘substantial’ physical harm to competitors to the more liberal requirement to abstain from causing any harm whatsoever, and further, to the requirement of giving up one’s advantages to improve the lot of the less fortunate individuals. We increase the strictness of a moral prohibition on causing harm by reducing the number of exceptions that the rule admits of. And we increase the scope of a moral prohibition by including under its protection the ever widening groups of sentient creatures. Correspondingly, a person or a community may become less moral either by restricting the application of the advantage-reducing imperatives to a smaller group, by allowing more exceptions to a rule, or by lowering the standards of the acceptable aggressive behavior towards the competitors and the less fit individuals or communities. This theoretical background allows us to look at the phenomenon of amoralism in a new light. The extreme amoralist (e.g., a psychopath) is no longer seen as different type of human agent, but rather as occupying a certain point on a continuous three-dimensional scale of morality, and whose condition is commensurable with that of the morally concerned agents.
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An influential tradition in moral philosophy attempts to explain an immoral action by reference to the defect in reasoning on the part of an immoral agent. On this view, the requirements of morality are not only sanctioned by the more... more
An influential tradition in moral philosophy attempts to explain an immoral action by reference to the defect in reasoning on the part of an immoral agent. On this view, the requirements of morality are not only sanctioned by the more general requirements of rationality, but the violations of the moral requirements would be indicative of a rational failure. In this article I argue that ascription of irrationality to amoral individuals (e.g., psychopaths) is either empirically false, or else, conceptually problematic. An interpretation of irrationality in its instrumental sense fails to do justice to the results of the research concerning the intelligence of some amoralists, whereas the suggestion that the alleged cognitive deficiency lies at the level of final ends and ultimate values faces serious theoretical difficulties. All attempts to construe the notion of an external reason for action without reference to the agent’s actual goals and values bespeak an objectivist’s bias, rest on controversial assumptions, and tend to alienate the agent from the proposed set of reasons. The argument is partly based on the analysis of reasoning of Ted Bundy, a notorious serial murderer, who presents a rather sophisticated justification for his criminal behavior.
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... Walter Glannon in his relatively recent contribution to the debate makes a strong case against Murphy, Deigh and other philosophers who want to exempt psychopaths from responsibility altogether, but stops half ... To clarify this, we... more
... Walter Glannon in his relatively recent contribution to the debate makes a strong case against Murphy, Deigh and other philosophers who want to exempt psychopaths from responsibility altogether, but stops half ... To clarify this, we may imagine two individuals, Harold and Steve. ...
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Even though Hegel rejects Kant’s criticism of the classical proofs for God’s existence, he is far from joining the followers of St. Anselm. What is needed, he suggests, is the rational account of the transition from the final notion to... more
Even though Hegel rejects Kant’s criticism of the classical proofs for God’s existence, he is far from joining the followers of St. Anselm. What is needed, he suggests, is the rational account of the transition from the final notion to the infinite Being. The Lectures in its central treatment of the Cosmological proof present us with an explanation in rational terms of the fact of religion, i.e., the elevation of the finite spirit to infinite God, rather than with a proof in a narrow logical sense. Hegel is not so much asking the question ‘Does God exist?’, but rather ‘How is the elevation of the finite spirit to God possible?’ The Hegelian ‘proof’, I argue, consists in a demonstration of the necessity of movement from finiteness to infinity, that is, the demonstration of the necessity of religion itself. Religious faith in this context is not juxtaposed to reason, but appears as a mode of imperfect knowledge, which is superseded by the further development of the rational concept.
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The book offers the first comprehensive account of the debate on true courage as it was raging in ancient Greece, from the times when the immensely influential Homeric epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, were composed, to the writings of... more
The book offers the first comprehensive account of the debate on true courage as it was raging in ancient Greece, from the times when the immensely influential Homeric epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, were composed, to the writings of the equally influential philosopher, Aristotle. The many voices that contribute to this debate will include poets, authors of ancient dramas and comedies, historians and philosophers. The book traces the origin of the earliest ideal of a courageous hero in the writings of Homer (8th century BCE), and faithfully records its transformations in later authors, ranging from a complete denial of the Homeric standard of courage (as, for instance, in comedies of Aristophanes and Dialogues of Plato) to the strong revisionist tendencies of Aristotle, who seeks to restore true courage to its traditional place as an exclusively martial, male virtue.