Moral Psychology

How should addictive behavior be explained? In terms of neurobiological illness and compulsion, or as a choice made freely, even rationally, in the face of harmful social or psychological circumstances? Some of the disagreement between proponents of the prevailing medical models and choice models in the science of addiction centres on the notion of " loss of control " as a normative characterization of addiction. In this article I examine two of the standard interpretations of loss of control in addiction, one according to which addicts have lost free will, the other according to which their will is weak. I argue that both interpretations are mistaken and propose therefore an alternative based on a dual-process approach. This alternative neither rules out a capacity in addicts to rationally choose to engage in drug-oriented behavior, nor the possibility that addictive behavior can be compulsive and depend upon harmful changes in their brains caused by the regular use of drugs.

In this chapter, I reflect on the implications of Mencius' conception of compassion for one of the most important problems that defines the Western philosophical tradition: the relationship between reason on the one hand and desire and emotion on the other, especially in the development of moral character. I articulate what philosophers working within the Western tradition could learn from the Mencius text, drawing from some contemporary scientific studies to support my suggestions that this text provides fruitful directions of thought. Western philosophers and many psychologists continue a tendency to construe reason, desire, and emotion in dichotomous and overgeneralized terms. I argue that we need to take a more particularized and discriminating approach to the phenomena covered by these terms. Finally, I discuss what I believe are some limitations in Mencius' approach and then show how the Analects and the Xunzi indicate ways the early Confucian tradition pointed beyond Mencius' limitations.

In her influential and challenging paper “Skepticism about Practical Reason” Christine Korsgaard sets out to refute an important strand of Humean scepticism as it concerns a Kantian understanding of practical reason.1 Korsgaard distinguishes two components of scepticism about practical reason. The first, which she refers to as content scepticism, argues that reason cannot of itself provide any “substantive guidance to choice and action” (SPR, 311). In its classical formulation, as stated by Hume, it is argued that reason cannot determine our ends. Our ends are determined by our desires and reason is limited to the role of identifying the relevant means to these ends. The second component, which Korsgaard calls motivational scepticism, suggests doubt about the scope of reason as a motive. The claim here, as Korsgaard interprets Hume’s view on this matter, is that “all reasoning that has motivational influence must start from a passion, that being the only possible source of motivation” (SPR, 314).2 Korsgaard’s fundamental objective in “Skepticism about Practical Reason” is to show that motivational scepticism must always be based on content scepticism. In other words, according to Korsgaard, motivational scepticism has no independent force. In this paper I argue that Korsgaard’s attempt to discredit motivational scepticism is unsuccessful.


Reprinted in P. Russell, THE LIMITS OF FREE WILL: SELECTED ESSAYS (Oxford: 2017): 121-133.

In order to better cope with the pressures and stresses of the current day, modern psychology is anxiously seeking to find new therapies to address the increasing disorders within the human psyche. In the process new fields of research, such as humanistic and transpersonal psychology, curiously appear to borrow more and more from the wisdom of the ages. This volume, containing eighteen articles by noteworthy expositors of the perennial philosophy such as Huston Smith, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, and Frithjof Schuon, presents the spiritual psychology of the wisdom traditions as a much-needed antidote to the current impasse in modern psychology.

Some Endorsements for Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy:

“[Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy] is more than an anthology. It is a wisely crafted collection of classic and contemporary scholarship noting that what many are seeking is what has always been, a perennial philosophy, that remains foundational. As one of the authors, Tage Lindbom, properly notes, ‘Secularization is a fish in troubled waters.’ This book claims the waters and is essential reading for all those who may have forgotten or are simply ignorant of the rich foundation provided by the perennial philosophy.”
—Ralph W. Hood, Professor of Psychology at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga, past president of the Psychology of Religion division of the American Psychological Association, co-founder of The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion and co-author of The Psychology of Religion

“A necessary and bracing critique of the assumptions and limitations of contemporary Western psychology, this generous volume is also a passionate call and learned guide towards a truer perspective that embraces man's spiritual nature.”
—Gabor Maté, M.D., and author of In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts: Close Encounters with Addiction

“Knowing the nature of the mind is perhaps the most difficult undertaking, especially in today’s world. To comprehend the nature of mind one needs to turn to the domain of religion and spirituality. Yet the truth of the mind and its complexity cannot explicitly be defined in words. Inner or transcendent wisdom sees the mind’s own nature without the duality of the seer. Suchness (tathatā) of mind is only experiential and not expressible. The words used to describe thought are themselves a product of thought, which is conditioned and limited. Thus, differences and contradictions are unavoidable. Therefore, a comparative study of different viewpoints and commentaries is immensely important to awaken the inner intelligence to see the mind as it is. Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy: Studies in Comparative Religion edited by Samuel Bendeck Sotillos is an outstanding effort in this direction.”
—Samdhong Rinpoche, former Prime Minister (Kalon Tripa) of the Tibetan Government-in-exile, author of Uncompromising Truth for a Compromised World: Tibetan Buddhism and Today’s World

“The rise of psychology has impacted the study and practice of spirituality, the experiences and attitudes relevant to ultimate human values that transcend ordinary behavior. Each chapter of this remarkable book demonstrates this interaction in a unique and provocative way. But rather than using psychology to reduce and ‘psychologize’ spiritual topics, its authors demonstrate how directives from the spiritual traditions can enhance and even illuminate the enduring importance of psychology in the 21st century.”
—Stanley Krippner, Saybrook University, co-author of Spiritual Dimensions of Healing

“The work at hand is a thinking and debating man’s delight. If you have any interest at all in attempting to include an educated and enlightened view of man’s higher functions in your purview of the world, you will learn from and enjoy this collection of essays. If you already have some knowledge in this area, brace yourself: you may see some of your favorites sharply criticized. A thought-provoking work.”
—Bruce W. Scotton, University of California, San Francisco, co-editor of Textbook of Transpersonal Psychiatry and Psychology

“This book, superbly edited by Samuel Bendeck Sotillos, is a masterful critique of the field of psychology and its loss of the sacred ground in which it once was rooted. It offers depth psychologists an opportunity to contemplate timeless truths echoed through the centuries by perennial philosophers who have always claimed psyche is subordinate to Spirit. Although ignored in depth psychology’s early years due to prejudice and lack of understanding, this is a message today’s psychotherapists must take seriously. Human beings need a deeper and wider transpersonal vision of who and what we are, which the saints and sages of the world’s spiritual traditions have always pointed to. In psychotherapy with a therapist committed to such a vision, patients penetrate into their unconscious depths and not infrequently awaken to the Ground of all Being. Their suffering itself occurred because they had turned away from Spirit. Above all, this volume passionately calls upon depth psychology to remember its origin in the perennial wisdom at the core of the great religions. There is something of a polemic in these pages. It deserves to be considered by depth psychologists of all persuasions.”
—Bryan Wittine, Transpersonal psychologist and Jungian psychoanalyst

“This anthology from Samuel Bendeck Sotillos is a must reference for anyone who is interested in psychology and its relationship to spirituality, and in developing an inclusive dialogue between disciplines that favor an integral outlook on the person and his or her potential. Selections in this anthology will inspire us to reexamine the metaphysical underpinnings of psychology, and remind us how important it is to rise above science’s attempt to reduce the human being to an epistemic object.”
—Sangeetha Menon, National Institute of Advanced Studies (Bangalore, India), Board Member of the International Transpersonal Association (ITA), author of The Beyond Experience: Consciousness in Bhagavad Gita

“This anthology has some of the most discerning essays and reviews on spirituality and psychology, which provide much-needed care and caution to all those engaged in bringing them together or who wish to do so in future. Therefore, it is a must-read for all those who teach, research, consult, or study in such frontier areas as transpersonal psychology, states of consciousness, mind-body relation, holistic health, Indian psychology, and so on. It will be an invaluable textbook for courses in these and other related areas. I congratulate the editor of the book.”
—Kiran Kumar K. Salagame, University of Mysore (India), Board Member of the International Transpersonal Association (ITA), author of The Psychology of Meditation: A Contextual Approach

“One of the finest collections of essays on the Perennial Philosophy—a must-read for all psychologists who are engaged with spirituality and transpersonal psychology. The essays which critique modern psychology (including transpersonal psychology, and the framework of Carl Jung), in the light of the Perennial Philosophy are a revelation and make compelling reading. The book serves as a corrective to the excesses of modern psychology, and to this end Sotillos has done a commendable job. I for one will include the book in some of the graduate courses that I teach.”
—Suneet Varma, University of Delhi, co-editor of Foundations of Indian Psychology

“To its credit modern science by-and-large is becoming more cognizant of the essential connection between spirituality and psychological health and well-being and most of all its positive implications within the field of psychology. While there is ample data to document this in a plethora of academic journals and books, this new book Psychology and the Perennial Philosophy adds a novel contribution to the dialogue between psychology and spirituality, which captures many nuances that for the most part go unnoticed within these discussions, and last but not least, it provides a keen eye of discernment to understand this intricate relationship on a deeper level that is crucially needed. This work will be a valuable asset to students and long term mental health practitioners and professors alike who seek to better understand the relationship between psychology and spirituality.”
—Harold G. Koenig, Duke University, Director of the Center for Spirituality, Theology and Health, co-author of The Handbook of Religion and Health

This milestone text provides a comprehensive and state-of-the art overview of perfectionism theory, research, and treatment from the past 25 years, with contributions from the leading researchers in the field. The book examines new theories and perspectives including the social disconnection model of perfectionism and the 2 × 2 model of perfectionism. It also reviews empirical findings, with a special focus on stress, vulnerability, and resilience, and examines perfectionism in specific populations. Finally, it considers how perfectionism relates to physical health and psychophysiological processes and introduces new approaches to effective prevention and treatment. By increasing our understanding of perfectionism as a complex personality disposition and providing a framework for future explorations, this landmark publication aims to promote further research in this field. It will be invaluable reading for academics, students, and professionals in personality psychology, clinical and counselling psychology, applied psychology and related disciplines.

El hombre justo controla sus apetitos por medio de una alianza entre sus partes racional y colérica: mientras la primera determina el objeto de la acción, la segunda da estabilidad y fuerza a la prescripción de la razón. Este trabajo intenta mostrar que la parte colérica puede dar fuerza a las órdenes de la razón, solo si, al mismo tiempo, recibe ella también valor (i.e. la restauración de su imagen dañada). A partir de esto, defenderé que la parte colérica (i) siempre toma partido por la razón en la confrontación con los apetitos (en cuanto enemigos de la libertad del sujeto) y, sin embargo, (ii) puede entrar en conflicto con la razón cuando la parte apetitiva no está en juego (y la pretensión de restauración, i.e. venganza, es reprimida por la razón).

Modern psychological research has devoted considerable attention to physiological disgust and “moral” disgust, finding both similarities and significant differences between them. Of particular interest is the plausible evolutionary hypothesis that physiological disgust provides the phylogenetic basis for social or moral disgust. To a considerable extent, these distinctions are comparable to the different categories of pollution which have been identified in the Hebrew Bible, specifically the distinction between so-called “ritual” and “moral” impurities. It will be argued that the evolutionary framework employed for the study of disgust can shed light on the role of pollution beliefs in shaping moral discourse in ancient Israel. This evolutionary perspective will serve as the basis for a renewed examination of the social implications of purity, duly stressed in Mary Douglas’ influential treatise Purity and Danger (1966). However, in contrast with Douglas’ symbolic approach to pollution, which presupposed a top-down process rooted in disembodied rationality, this paper outlines a bottom-up account grounded in physiological concerns related to disgust and infectious disease. This embodied framework enables the identification of two distinct mechanisms by which pollution can take on broader socio-moral implications, specifically those embedded in purity practices themselves and those emerging from the rhetorical extensions of purity language. The article concludes with discussion of how this historical evidence can encourage a reconsideration of some prevalent assumptions in modern experimental research of moral disgust.
online: http://journals.equinoxpub.com/index.php/JCH/article/view/30290
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Does morality depend on the time of the day? The study The Morning Morality Effect: The Influence of Time of Day on Unethical Behavior (1) published in October of 2013 by Maryam Kouchaki and Isaac Smith suggested that people are more honest in the mornings and that their ability to resist the temptation of lying and cheating wears off as the day progresses. In a series of experiments, Kouchaki and Smith found that moral awareness and self-control in their study subjects decreased in the late afternoon or early evening.  The researchers also assessed the degree of “moral disengagement,” i.e. the willingness to lie or cheat without feeling much personal remorse or responsibility, by asking the study subjects to respond to questions such as, “Considering the ways people grossly misrepresent themselves, it’s hardly a sin to inflate your own credentials a bit,” or “People shouldn’t be held accountable for doing questionable things when they were just doing what an authority figure told them to do” on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Interestingly, the subjects who strongly disagreed with such statements were the most susceptible to the morning morality effect. They were quite honest in the mornings but significantly more likely to cheat in the afternoons. On the other hand, moral disengagers, i.e. subjects who did not think that inflating credentials or following questionable orders was a big deal, were just as likely to cheat in the morning as they were in the afternoons.

Given the prominence of Muslim veils—in particular the hijab and full-face veil—in public discourse concerning the place of Muslims in Western society, we examined their impact on non-Muslims’ responses at both explicit and implicit levels. Results revealed that responses were more negative toward any veil compared with no veil, and more negative toward the full-face veil relative to the hijab: for emotions felt toward veiled women (Study 1), for non-affective attitudinal responses (Study 2), and for implicit negative attitudes revealed through response latency measures (Studies 3a and 3b). Finally, we manipulated the perceived reasons for wearing a veil, finding that exposure to positive reasons for wearing a veil led to better predicted and imagined contact (Study 4). Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.

People abused by angry discipline as children, may tend to abuse or overly punish other people or themselves for perceived wrongs in their adult life. In some individuals, aggressive personality traits may be genetically inherited. The aggressive personality may feel weakened by having guidelines or boundaries for anger. Anger is a normal human emotion, and these guidelines can help express anger in a healthy way.

Referencia en Formato APA:
Rubio-Garay, F., Carrasco, M.A., Amor, P., & Rojas-Solís, J. L. (2019). Desconexión moral y violencia en parejas jóvenes. En E. García-López (Ed.), Psicopatología de la violencia. Repercusiones forenses (pp. 199-218). Ciudad de México: Manual Moderno y Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

Many researchers believe that the proper identification of psychology variables depends on using accurate tools that function beyond cultural, political and social attachments for measuring the psychological features in human societies. In this regard, the present study has been conducted to examine the psychometric properties and factor structure of Black’s Moral Agency Scale (2016) in Iranian population. This scale has 15 items with three subscales of responsibility, external attribution and group pressure that has been validated with a desirable validity and reliability in American-European society. In the present study, to use this scale first the Persian version was prepared using back translation and then it was distributed among a sample of 381 male and female students of the University of Mazandaran, who were selected through multi-stage cluster sampling to participate in this study. In the next step, the construct validity of the scale was examined by exploratory factor analysis method. The results showed that after removing 2 items due to loading onto a factor other than the main factor, the scale has a three-factorial structure such as the original version. Then, to examine the confirmatory factor analysis, the model's fit was evaluated using Amos software, which confirmed the results of the structure obtained from the exploratory factor analysis. Moreover, for further evaluation of the validity of the scale, the correlations between the factors and the total score was examined through Pearson's correlation, and results indicated a good correlation between the subscales with the total score of the scale. To assess the reliability of the scale, the Cronbach's alpha coefficient was adopted. The Cronbach's alpha for responsibility, group pressure, external attribution and total scale scores were 0.53, 0.57, 0.55, and 0.60, respectively. Finally, with due regard to the data obtained from this research, it can be said that the present scale has an acceptable reliability and validity and is suitable for use by Iranian researchers in future studies.

Se indaga el sentido de la conferencia de Sloterdijk
“Normas para el Parque humano” así como las
polémicas por ella suscitada. Se realiza un diagnóstico
de la capacidad crítica del humanismo tradicional. En el
marco del naufragio del humanismo como escuela y
utopía domesticadora humana -marco en el que
Sloterdijk reclama una revisión genético-técnica de la
humanidad- se indaga ¿qué criterios pueden
establecerse para normar las inevitables luchas por los
derechos de la crianza humana? ¿Quiénes y sobre qué
bases debieran hoy detentar el derecho a la crianza?
¿Cómo determinar quiénes son los que educan y los que
son educados? Se proponen nuevos caminos que
tienen en la mediación de la técnica su formulación
discursiva y sus orígenes en las disidencias que, desde
la propia tradición filosófica, reducían la estancia del
hombre en el mundo a su expresión leída y escrita.

For Machiavelli,  it is almost impossible to reform a deeply corrupt state. Because the powerful create political patronage and form factional interests in the people which corrupt people's morals. And the current dysfunctional institutions and laws cannot restrain this universal corruption, which are also hard to be reformed piece by piece. For either of the potential political agents to undertake this task of reform, the people, a enlightened king, a small group of aristocrats, each has its weaknesses. Overall, the entire task depends on luck, since for Machiavelli, in this realm where there is no law to reign, which makes doing good unnecessary for humans, to expect any people to be sufficiently wise and moral to undertake this task needs an unrealistic optimism in human nature.

Sexting is a new term used in Cyberpsychology. The term sexting was first used in 2005 by the Daily Telegraph, to unify the terms "sex" and "texting" and became an official word in 2009. In the present paper we have tried to define the term. It is highlighted that it is a recent phenomenon in the world of psychology. We have discussed the term sexting and sexting addiction in the light of available literature. We have concluded that sexting is one subdivision of Cyberpsychology and with the growing literature on the area, more epidemiological research in the future should be done to explain these mechanisms.

La ricerca indaga il ruolo del profitto personale e
delle norme di gruppo sulla scelta di una strategia
individuale vs. collettiva per gestire l’identità
sociale nei membri di un gruppo di basso status.
I risultati confermano che sia le norme di gruppo
sia il profitto personale rappresentano incentivi
importanti per il comportamento dei membri di
un gruppo. Inoltre, quando il profitto individuale
confligge con le norme di gruppo, si genera un
dilemma che si riflette nel tempo impiegato per
scegliere la strategia da seguire. I risultati sono
discussi in termini di processi di influenza sociale
e strategie di gestione dell’identità.

At the beginning of Book III of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that the emotions (pathê) are praised and blamed when they are voluntary (hekousion). However, Aristotle does not elaborate on how an emotion can be voluntary. In this paper I try to provide an account of what Aristotle might have meant by this claim. I consider both reasons to deny this claim and the dominant qualified reinterpretation of this claim, an interpretation I call the 'derivative approach,' which maintains that we are to be praised or blamed for emotions only if they are consequences of our voluntarily acquired characters. I argue that 1) Aristotle was sincere when he said that there are voluntary pathê and 2) the derivative approach to accepting Aristotle's claim is motivated by misunderstandings of Aristotle's notion of the voluntary. In conclusion, I argue that Aristotle's notion of the voluntary is sufficiently broad to include pathê non-derivatively.

Agent-regret seems to give rise to a philosophical puzzle. If we grant that we are not morally responsible for consequences outside of our control (the 'Standard View'), then agent-regret—which involves self-reproach and a desire to make amends for consequences outside one's control—appears rationally indefensible. But despite its apparent indefensibility, agent-regret still seems like a reasonable response to bad moral luck. I argue here that the puzzle can be resolved if we appreciate the role that agent-regret plays in a larger social practice that helps us deal with bad moral luck. That agent-regret is a component in a social practice limits the questions that we can reasonably ask about it. While we can ask whether an experience of agent-regret is rational given the norms of this practice, we cannot ask the question that motivates the puzzle of agent-regret, viz. whether agent-regret is rationally defensible according to the Standard View.

According to recent research in moral psychology the disposition to form consequentialist moral judgments is positively correlated to the degree of psychopathy: the more consequentialist you are, the more psychopathic tendencies you have. This claim rests on the assumption that consequentialism is a character trait. In this paper, I reject both the claim itself and this assumption on the basis of a study I ran in collaboration with Florian Cova.

This article provides a critical analysis of the situationist challenge against Aristotelian moral psychology. It first outlines the details and results from 4 paradigmatic studies in psychology that situationists have heavily drawn upon in their critique of the Aristotelian conception of virtuous characteristics, including studies conducted by Hartshorne and May (1928), Darley and Batson (1973), Isen and Levin (1972), and Milgram (1963). It then presents 10 problems with the way situationists have used these studies to challenge Aristotelian moral psychology. After challenging the situationists on these grounds, the article then proceeds to challenge the situationist presentation of the Aristotelian conception, showing that situationists have provided an oversimplified caricature of it that goes against the grain of much Aristotelian text. In evaluating the situationist challenge against the actual results from empirical research as well as primary Aristotelian text, it will be shown that the situationist debate has advanced both an extreme, untenable view about the nature of characteristics and situations, as well as an inaccurate presentation of the Aristotelian view.

https://doi.org/10.1007/s12124-013-9249-8
https://doctorcroom.com/croom-2014a

... a typical naive set of assumptions about "group oriented" cultures it that the participants within them are basically altruistic, self-effacing, self-sacrificing and sociable. A society of such individuals should exhibit the very best of human civilization working in equitable, democratic communities. By contrast, those from individualistic cultures should be cold, grasping, selfish, egotistical and almost incapable of the cooperation demanded by a civil society. Indeed, a society of individualists, by this stereotype would be a dog eat dog affair, dedicated to conflict, riven with disloyalty and betrayal, forever failing to build a stable and humanistic community.

Martha Nussbaum’s recent book, The Cosmopolitan Tradition: A Noble but Flawed Ideal, is profound and insightful. Humility and dignity are two central virtues in all major religions and ethical systems, which express the equal status of human beings. Nussbaum emphasizes the value of dignity in the spheres of morality and human behavior. While agreeing with her on this issue, I also stress the value of humility in these areas.

Planetary defense scientists frequently consider nuclear explosive devices (NEDs) among the suitable tools for deflection of an asteroid or comet that threatens to impact Earth, and absolutely necessary to stop one that is large or gives us only short warning. However, the development of any options in this direction has several negative implications for the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the global nuclear order as such. In his presentation, Michal Smetana critically unpacks the seemingly objective scientific rationality of nuclear deflection and discusses how the support for NED development de-stigmatizes technology that, similarly to the impact of a large asteroid or comet, also carries the risk of destroying human civilization with a non-zero probability. Humanity thus appears to be facing an existential dilemma: a necessary instrument of our security has the potential to wipe us out. Can we hope to resolve this? In the second half of his presentation, Smetana presents findings of his latest research into attitudes to nuclear weapons use, suggesting that the U.S. public is much more supportive of the use of nuclear weapons than previously assumed. Does this have implications for deciding planetary defense policy?

"Naked" is a worthwhile read for anyone interested in shame and its role in morality. The book is particularly timely given how common public shaming has become in online settings. Krista K. Thomas argues that, even though shame is a negative emotion with potentially damaging consequences, its dark side is outweighed by its moral benefits insofar as shame is constitutive of desirable moral commitments. According to the author, being liable to shame is constitutive of respecting other people's points of view, acknowledging others' moral standing, and accepting that our identities are not only set by what we think of ourselves, but also by factors outside of our control that include our personal histories and other people's opinions of us.

The essential difficulty about Computer Ethics’ (CE) philosophical status is a methodological problem: standard ethical theories cannot easily be adapted to deal with CE-problems, which appear to strain their conceptual resources, and CE requires a conceptual foundation as an ethical theory. Information Ethics (IE), the philosophical foundational counterpart of CE, can be seen as a particular case of ‘environmental’ ethics or ethics of the infosphere. What is good for an information entity and the infosphere in general? This is the ethical question asked by IE. The answer is provided by a minimalist theory of deserts: IE argues that there is something more elementary and fundamental than life and pain, namely being, understood as information, and entropy, and that any information entity is to be recognised as the centre of a minimal moral claim, which deserves recognition and should help to regulate the implementation of any information process involving it. IE can provide a valuable perspective from which to approach, with insight and adequate discernment, not only moral problems in CE, but also the whole range of conceptual and moral phenomena that form the ethical discourse.

Following the death of 17-year-old Leelah Alcorn, a transgender teen who committed suicide after forced “conversion therapy,” President Barack Obama called for a nationwide ban on psychotherapy aimed at changing sexual orientation or gender identity. The administration argued that because conversion therapy causes substantial psychological harm to minors, it is neither medically nor ethically appropriate. We fully agree with the President and believe that this is a step in the right direction. Of course, in addition to being unsafe as well as ethically unsound, current conversion therapy approaches aren’t actually effective at doing what they claim to do – changing sexual orientation. But we also worry that this may be a short-term legislative solution to what is really a conceptual problem. The question we ought to be asking is “what will happen if and when scientists do end up developing safe and effective technologies that can alter sexual orientation?”

Iris Murdoch fait partie des philosophes qui, durant la deuxième partie du 20eime siècle, questionnèrent et critiquèrent la place du raisonnement en philosophie morale. Murdoch propose d'insister sur d'autres aspects de notre psychologie morale, qui sauront mettre en lumière notre sensibilité à ce qui est pertinent moralement, mais qui ne relève pas de notre raisonnement. Elle questionne aussi ces philosophies morales qui considèrent que ce qui compte moralement peut se réduire au choix et à l'action. Elle déplore cette approche qui laisse peu, ou pas, de place pour considérer la psychologie et le caractère de l'agent dans son entièreté et sa complexité. Murdoch propose plusieurs métaphores de vision pour montrer de quelle façon nous accumulons, d'une certaine façon, constamment une certaine forme de connaissance morale tout au long de nos vies éveillées. Nous voyons, percevons, recevons, nous sommes frappés par le flow continu de la vie et ceci n'est pas une mince affaire. D'ailleurs Murdoch suggère que bien souvent, au moment du choix, la décision est déjà prise et notre raisonnement y est pour bien peu dans le fait de diriger notre action. Son idée d'attention, ou d'attention morale, sera centrale pour comprendre son propos, puisqu'elle considère cette forme d'attention comme la bonne façon de voir le monde et de se disposer pour se rendre compte de ce qui importe moralement. Dans cette présentation, je vais principalement présenter ce qu'est l'attention morale pour Murdoch, sa pertinence et la place que cette notion tient dans le plus grand contexte de la psychologie morale d'aujourd'hui. Comme nous le verrons, l'attention morale de Murdoch a beaucoup influencé les recherches faites sur la perception morale et en éthique du Care.

What is morality? What explains its content and structure? And how is it best measured? The theory of morality-as-cooperation (MAC) argues that morality consists of a collection of biological and cultural solutions to the problems of cooperation and conflict recurrent in human social life. MAC uses evolutionary biology and nonzerosum game theory to identify seven distinct types of cooperation – helping family, helping group, reciprocating, hawkish displays of dominance, dove-ish displays of submission, dividing disputed resources, and respecting property. And MAC predicts that each type of cooperation will be considered relevant to morality, be judged morally good, and will constitute a distinct moral domain. The present study tests MAC’s predictions by developing a new self-report measure of moral values, examining its psychometric properties on a sample of UK adults (Study 1: N=1,392), and comparing them to the properties of the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ; Study 2: N=1,042). The results provide strong support for MAC’s predictions; the MAC questionnaire outperforms the MFQ on every criterion. Our results suggest that morality-as-cooperation has the potential to provide the rigorous and systematic theoretical footing that the study of morality has hitherto lacked.

The Genealogy takes a historical form. But does the history play an essential role in Nietzsche's critique of modern morality? In this essay, I argue that the answer is yes. The Genealogy employs history in order to show that acceptance of modern morality was causally responsible for producing a dramatic change in our affects, drives, and perceptions. This change led agents to perceive actual increases in power as reductions in power, and actual decreases in power as increases in power. Moreover, it led agents to experience negative emotions when engaging in activities that constitute greater manifestations of power, and positive emotions when engaging in activities that reduce power. For these reasons, modern morality strongly disposes agents to reduce their own power. Given Nietzsche’s argument that power has a privileged normative status, these facts entail that we have a reason to reject modern morality.

Objective We examine whether affective, verbal, and restitutive displays of remorse are associated with perceived offender immorality, as well as whether displays of remorse exert indirect effects on preferences for criminal sentencing via perceived offender immorality. Method Data are from an online survey, which included a sentencing vignette with experimental manipulations for offender remorse and items measuring sentencing preferences, perceived offender and offense immorality, and controls (N = 352). OLS regression and bias-corrected bootstrap confidence intervals were used to estimate direct and indirect effects. Replication analyses were conducted with two student samples (N = 103 and N = 131). Results Displays of remorse were associated with perceived offender immorality. Displays of remorse also exerted indirect effects on preferences for sentencing severity and support for particular sentencing goals (including incapacitation, rehabilitation, and restoration). Conclusions Affective, verbal, and restitutive displays of remorse may be associated with sentencing preferences via perceived offender immorality.

Eğitim ve öğretim, insanın biyolojik oluşumuna ve vücudunun bütünlüğüne dokunmadan insanın doğasına doğrudan müdahale eden tek bilim alanıdır ve tek insan sanatıdır. Bu bilim ve sanat alanında malzeme de, malzemeyi işleyen de, sanatçı da, sanat eseri de, yaratan da yaratılan da insandır. Bu nedenle eğitim ve öğretim zorunlu olarak hep bir insan düşüncesine dayanmak zorundadır.
İlginç ve bu yazıda bu nedenle üzerinde özellikle durmaya çalıştığım gözlem, eğitilmesine henüz başlamış olan insan açısından bakıldığında insanın doğasına olan bu müdahalede henüz olmamış bir insanın yaratılmak zorunda olmasıdır. Zira eğitimi daha yeni başlamış insan, henüz olmamış veya olacak olan insandır. Öyleyse, eğitim ve öğretimin konusu zorunlu olarak hep yeni tip insan yaratmaktır denebilir. Fakat çok daha ilginç olanı, bu çabanın eski bilgi, beceri ve deneyime dayalı olarak yapılmak zorunda olmasıdır; çünkü eğitilmek istenen kişinin eğitimi başladığı anda, ona dair edinilmiş herhangi bir bilgi, deneyim ve beceri bulunmamaktadır. Bu durumda, henüz eğitilmek istenen ve dolayısıyla yeni yaratılacak olan insana dair henüz doğrudan hemen hiçbir bilgi yokken, yeni insan nasıl eğitilecek ve yaratılacaktır? Bu gerçek, eğitim ve öğretim yöntemi, eğitim felsefesi ve politikaları açısından üstesinden gelinmesi gereken tahmin edilemeyecek kadar önemli sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Bu en başta eğitim felsefesinin, eğitim yöntemi ve tekniklerinin ve eğitim psikolojisinin çözümlemesi ve çözmesi gereken en büyük soru ve problemlerden biridir.