International Journal of Water Resources Development ISSN: 0790-0627 (Print) 1360-0648 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cijw20 Drivers of water governance reforms in the Philippines Agnes C. Rola, Corazon L. Abansi, Rosalie Arcala-Hall, Joy C. Lizada, Ida M.L. Siason & Eduardo K. Araral Jr To cite this article: Agnes C. Rola, Corazon L. Abansi, Rosalie Arcala-Hall, Joy C. Lizada, Ida M.L. Siason & Eduardo K. Araral Jr (2016) Drivers of water governance reforms in the Philippines, International Journal of Water Resources Development, 32:1, 135-152, DOI: 10.1080/07900627.2015.1060196 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2015.1060196 Published online: 17 Jul 2015. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 149 View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=cijw20 Download by: [121.58.218.4] Date: 14 December 2015, At: 18:47 International Journal of Water Resources Development, 2016 Vol. 32, No. 1, 135–152, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2015.1060196 Drivers of water governance reforms in the Philippines Agnes C. Rolaa*, Corazon L. Abansib, Rosalie Arcala-Hallc, Joy C. Lizadad, Ida M.L. Siasonc and Eduardo K. Araral Jre a Institute for Governance and Rural Development, College of Public Affairs and Development, University of the Philippines Los Baños, Los Baños, Philippines; bInstitute of Management, University of the Philippines Baguio, Baguio City, Philippines; cCollege of Arts and Science, Division of Social Sciences, University of the Philippines Visayas, Miagao, Philippines; dCollege of Management, University of the Philippines Visayas, Iloilo City, Philippines; eLee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, Singapore Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 (Received 8 October 2014; accepted 2 June 2015) This paper analyses the enabling conditions for a water governance model responsive to future Philippine water requirements. Using the stage-based approach to institutional reforms, it assesses the outcomes of previous water governance reforms, such as conflicts in customary and formal rules; urban and rural; upstream and downstream; and the contestations in water supply privatization in Metro Manila. The analysis suggests that past water governance reforms were symbolic and procedural, and structural changes to support the legal frameworks were not achieved. Based on the case findings, the authors support the current reform agenda of implementing a decentralized framework of water governance at a watershed scale. Keywords: water governance; customary rules; privatization; integrated water resources management; Philippines Introduction The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Water Governance Facility (2013) defines water governance along two dimensions: (1) as a subscription to principles of equity and efficiency, catchment-based water administration, the need for integrated water management approaches, and the need for balancing water use between different sectoral uses and ecosystems; and (2) a balancing of the roles of government, the private sector and civil society in the ownership, management and delivery of water resources at all levels. Saleth and Dinar (2005) meanwhile consider the formal institutional arrangements governing the water sector as the unbundled linkages and interactions between water law, policy and administration, informed by the political system, the legal system, demographics, economic development policies and resources of a given country. Following Saleth and Dinar, institutional reforms in the water sector tend to vary across country cases and depict the differential effects of political, economic and environmental conditions as well as the external push (i.e. donor pressure and external agreements). In developing countries, water governance reforms are pursued as a way to rationalize the use of water for economic goals. Whether in support of intensive commercial agriculture or for energy generation, reforms often come in conjunction with the centralization of power and the privileging of the state as the owner of water resources and as a trustee of water as a public good. Reforms are often met with opposition from local *Corresponding author. Email: acrola@up.edu.ph q 2015 Taylor & Francis Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 136 2 A.C. Rola et al. communities, whose traditional governance structures and mindsets are premised on water being a common pool resource. In Thailand, attempts by the state to impose user costs on irrigation water were met with widespread opposition from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and communities that consider such policy as a tax on the poor (Hirsch, 2006). In Vietnam, the weakness of provincial governments’ legal and administrative capabilities pertaining to irrigation elevates dispute settlement to the Central Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development level, where many local communities find they have no access to irrigation water (Turral & Malano, 2002). Communities attend meetings on irrigation water projects in Cambodia and Uzbekistan, but consider directives from government agents as top-down, an imposition and otherwise threatening (Abdullayev, Nurmetova, Abdullaeva, & Lamers, 2008; Cambodia Development Policy Research Institute (CDRI), 2008). Water governance reforms often translate to formalization of the water economy – that is, the adoption of rules and complementary enforcing institutions – which is proving to be more difficult, particularly in remote rural areas where household and farmers have engaged in self-provisioning for a very long time (Molle, 2001; Shah and Van Koppen, 2006). In this scenario where rural people get their water from domestic wells and also have no contact with water agencies in the public sector, formal articulation of water rights, policy and administration has no bearing on their use of and access to water. The formalization of the water economy comes inevitably as communities become more urbanized and cannot be prematurely imposed through sweeping reforms. Water governance in the Philippines There are at least seven legal frameworks that govern the water sector in the Philippines: Presidential Decree 1067 Water Code (1976); Presidential Decree 198 Provincial Water Utilities Act (1973); Presidential Degree 522 (1974); Republic Act 7586 National Integrated Protected Area System Act (1992); Republic Act 8041 National Water Crisis Act (1995); Republic Act 8371 Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (1997); and Republic Act 9275 Clean Water Act (2004). The seven laws cover: (1) the legal treatment of water resources (ownership, rights and distinction between types of surface or groundwater and sectors/uses); (2) property rights (basis, i.e. permits/licence/franchise for collection and distribution; private rights granted to individual versus collective; whether rights can be leased, transferred or recalled by the granting authority; the right to water quality) and their enforcement; (3) legalized inter-sectoral prioritization and basis for prioritization; (4) legal linkages between the land and surface water, and between the land and forest and/or the environment; (5) inter-governmental responsibility for the water law, meaning many agencies promote the law; (6) combining the water law with other laws on land, forest and the environment, and for water planning and development; (7) favouring the private sector and NGO participation in water planning and development; and (8) an openness to market solutions (as opposed to state and/or government ownership or intervention) (Hall et al., 2014). All these laws are implemented by at least a dozen national agencies (Elazegui, 2004) and 1634 local government units (World Bank 2005). The sheer number of agencies involved in the water sector leads to fragmented decisions in terms of water planning, implementation and compliance. The Water Code of the Philippines (NWRB, n.d.) is the overarching law that governs the access, allocation and use of water and assigns the National Water Resources Board (NWRB) a key regulatory role. It stipulates rules on the appropriation and utilization of all waters: the control, conservation and protection of waters, the watershed and related land Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 International Journal of Water Resources Development 1373 resources; and the administrative and enforcement of these rules. It defines requirements for the application of water permits and conditions of its use. It also sets charges per rate of withdrawal based on the permits. During periods of drought or water scarcity, the Water Code prioritizes the use of water for domestic use, followed by irrigation and other uses. The NWRB is supposed to coordinate all water resource-related development. But with few staff and a low budget (Paragas, 2012), the NWRB has become ineffective in its mandate. The Philippines legal framework allows some subsidiarity in terms of functions and jurisdiction in water resource governance. Local governance functions by the Local Government Units include community-based forest management, a waterworks system and water quality monitoring, but local government decisions and actions are still bounded by powers at the national level. Other local water organizations such as water districts, irrigation associations and communal-based waterworks systems are overseen by national agencies such as the Local Water Utilities Administration, the National Irrigation Administration and the Cooperative Development Authority. Conflicts have emerged between national and local authorities and between local authorities and indigenous communities over the ambiguity of local government remits in water governance and source-use discordance across sectors. The fight over the rights to the use of water between indigenous communities and local governments representing the state is a concrete example of tensions in water governance in the Philippines (Catacutan, Duque, Garrity, & Mirasol, 2001). While the law provides public information about water permit application, mechanisms for doing this has not been instituted. Thus, in practice, an entity securing a water permit does not necessarily ask the permission of local communities where said water source is located. This practice is not consistent with the customary laws and other national laws. For example, as supported by the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997 and implemented by the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), any use of resources within the ancestral domain should obtain permission from the community following the principle of free and prior informed consent (Republic Act 8371). Ancestral domain refers to all areas generally belonging to indigenous communities comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by indigenous people themselves or through their ancestors, This paper traces the history and drivers of water governance reforms in the Philippines and how such reforms were fuelled by internal and external dynamics interacting with the country’s unique hydrologies and plural structures for water provisioning. The country’s water governance can be characterized by both formal and informal structures (Shah, 1993). It is informal in that self-supply predominates, especially in rural areas. There are vast numbers of tiny, primary water diverters from nature; water institutions are local, fragmented and informal; intermediation in water services is still low or absent. In the urban centres water economy is formal, characterized by the presence of predominant service providers; water institutions are few, but formal legal bodies exist. Some outcomes of the governance reforms in the contemporary times are the conflicts between formal and informal rules; rural –urban water conflicts; downstream – upstream conflicts; and contestations in the privatization mechanisms of the Manila domestic water supply. The paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the framework used in the study, of a stage-based institutional change process as adopted from Saleth and Dinar (2004) and the multiple loci of governance of Malayang (2004), that describes actors of 138 4 A.C. Rola et al. water governance in the country. The third section analyses the evolution of water governance in the Philippines and its drivers of reform, The fourth section examines the contemporary issues in water governance as an outcome of the current institutional arrangements. The fifth section analyses the fundamental conditions of an improved water governance. The last section contains conclusions and recommendations. Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 Framework of analysis The literature suggests that frameworks of adaptive learning and participation can enhance water governance effectiveness and efficiency (Huitema et al., 2009; Neef, 2009; Paneque Salgado, Corral Quintana, Guimarães Pereira, Del Moral Ituarte, & Pedregal Mateos, 2009; Wesselink, Paavola, Fritsch, & Renn, 2011). As previously mentioned, the authors use the stage-based approach of institutional reform developed by Saleth and Dinar (2004). This reform is described as a circular process, subject to constant subjective and objective feed backs and adaptations, and composed of four stages: from changing the mindset to obtaining political agreement to reform implementation and, finally, actual impact (Figure 1). Each stage has its own set of challenges and its own theoretical frameworks or basis. The circular process is influenced by subjective factors such as ideology, bias and lack of knowledge; and by objective factors such as relative prices, technological change, and other economic and political factors. Furthermore, the circular process is also influenced by the intervening roles of other factors such as political lobbying and bargaining, information flow and learning externalities, and behavioural changes and performance expectations. Existing institutions also influence the reform process including path dependency. Saleth and Dinar (2004) observe that most of the initial changes following a reform programme, especially in democratic countries, are ceremonial and procedural in nature; Figure 1.. Subjective theory of institutional change. Source: Saleth and Dinar (2004, p. 79). Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 International Journal of Water Resources Development 1395 such can take the form of a policy declaration, legislation enactment, and renaming or merging of organizations. In a strongly pro-reform environment, institutional change gradually moves from the stage of procedural changes to the stage of substantive changes such as legal reform, policy changes and organizational restructuring. However, as long as expectations of a majority of the population are not fulfilled, the circular process will continue to create new and additional demand for these reforms. The Malayang (2004) model of multiple loci of water governance adds value to the work of Saleth and Dinar (2004) as it guides one into the roles of the various actors to be considered in the reform process, specifically for the set-up of the Philippines. The framework identified four loci of water governance: national government, national nongovernment, local government and local non-government (Table 1). The national government locus is strong for its legal basis, and the coercive capabilities of the state to enforce government decisions, but it is weak where its presence is low such as in the more remote countryside. The national non-government is strong when the constituency is wide and can command high moral and political legitimacy. However, it is weak due to its extreme dependence on consensus among its parties. The two loci on local governance are strong as both have their decisions and actions anchored on local practices. While the government locus of governance has the backing of law, the non-government version has a clearly defined constituency. Malayang (2004) also warns that the local government locus becomes weak if it is closely identified with the national government locus; the non-government option becomes weak when local water practices are not compatible with statutory prescriptions. The Malayang model suggests, however, that the strengths of each option are enhanced and the weaknesses controlled if all four centres of water governance are able to produce a consensus. They are weakened whenever one or more centres are unable to concur with (more so oppose) the decisions and actions of the others. The model implies that water governance in the Philippines would likely become more effective and efficient if they were to be the product of multisectoral participation. Evolution and drivers of water governance reform in the Philippines: an analysis The institutional arrangements for managing water in the Philippines, like in many developing countries, are embedded within shifting political and economic contexts that closely follow international trends (see Table A1 in Appendix A in the Supplemental data online). Pre-colonial customary rules on water and land ownership continue to shape collective management arrangements among indigenous communities largely untouched by formalization. In towns and cities, water supply and provisioning followed the understanding that as water is a public good the government takes the lead role in ensuring supply and distribution. Thus, the government has to put in money for water projects, dams and waterworks system. This duality (formal – government centred; informal –collective – customary) of institutional arrangements makes reforms particularly challenging. As an example, two legal cases were filed by indigenous peoples and by opponents to the sale of Angat dam to a Korean firm against the state’s claim of water ownership (Remo, 2012).1 During the Marcos dictatorship (1965 – 86), the plural and diverse water resources of municipality-based waterworks and irrigation systems were put under the state’s regulatory reach with the formation of water districts (under a Local Water Utility Administration – LWUA) and irrigation associations (under the National Irrigation Administration – NIA). Accordingly, the government set sectoral priorities for water use, giving agriculture, especially rice cultivation, a significant share of the water supply from Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 140 6 A.C. Rola et al. Table 1. Summary features of four loci of water governance in the Philippines. Loci of water governance Producer of water policy Scope of the policy Participation opportunities Basis of policy As prescribed by law Statutes National National government water National government agencies National nonNational non-government water National government institutions Local government Local government units Local As allowed by social arrangements As prescribed by law Local nongovernment As allowed by social arrangements Local water users Source: Malayang (2004, p. 78). Local Resolution of oppositions Mainly through prosecution and litigation National demand and stakes Negotiations and litigations on water Interests and influence of Negotiations and litigation local users Local dependence on and use Mainly through negotiations of water Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 International Journal of Water Resources Development 7 141 major dams built during the period. The state claims exclusive ownership of water inside the territory, but grants property rights or the privilege to appropriate and use ground and surface water for private and municipal (collective) use through water permits issued by the National Water Resources Council (NWRC),2 now the NWRB, which is the national governments’ principal regulatory agency for water. There are also cases of self-installed private water systems for domestic supply in residential and industrial parks, which effectively regulate themselves (Dayrit, 2000). With democratization after 1986 and through the Local Government Code of 1991 (DILG 1991), the management of water was decentralized as local governments (towns and barangays – the smallest political unit) were once again given the task of financing and operating their own water supply systems; to address pollution, watershed degradation and water quality at their level. For irrigation, the National Irrigation Administration slowly divested agency responsibility over irrigator associations and introduced graduated stage contacts and participatory management approaches in its dealing with farmers’ groupings. Since 1995, a discernible shift occurred with the admittance of private sector participation in water provisioning as concessionaires, bulk suppliers or even competitor to water districts.3 The shifts in institutional arrangements coincided with an international public financing environment that supported reforms. In the 1970s and 1980s, International Financial Institutions such as the World Bank favoured state investments in hydroelectric projects, and for water districts and irrigation associations to operate with generous subsidies from the national government. Thus, the institutional arrangement came with the ideological complement supporting the state’s key economic role for public goods provisioning. From 1990s onwards, the international environment has shifted towards a more neoliberal stance. International financing has gone in another direction in support of water privatization schemes. From the landmark public – private partnership scheme that saw the division of Manila into two concession areas, market fever has also caught on with the water districts. Water districts have been slowly ‘marketizing’ their operations – that is, they are striving to operate in ways proximate to that of a private company by adopting measures like performance benchmarks for financing access and employee benefits. Accordingly, the international financing organizations have started supporting water development projects by water districts and local government-run waterworks. Official development assistance (ODA) and private international NGO efforts have also been directed towards local, small-scale collective water provisioning for poor communities. The market shift was paralleled by a growing focus towards community participation and partnership in the early 2000s and beyond. In similar fashion with other Southeast Asian and developed countries, the Philippines has also committed to addressing national concerns towards a coordinated integrated water resources management framework as proposed by the Global Water Partnership (n.d.). A more localized partnership occurs through co-management schemes, which were initiated where applicable with government and local communities undertaking joint action to address the development and use of water resources. The market shift was paralleled by a growing focus towards community participation and partnership in the early 2000s and subsequent years. The rise of civil society movements coincided with governance and agenda-setting jointly done by government agencies and residents of a local community with private or NGO partners. The drivers of water governance reforms in the Philippines conform to those found in the other countries (Araral, 2010; Saleth and Dinar, 2005): political (central state dominated); environmental (the drought), as in Morocco; fiscal (privatization can ease public sector investment), as in Australia; financial, as in the case of Sri Lanka and Namibia; and 142 8 A.C. Rola et al. Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 international pressures (decentralized governance, increased role of civil society in governance), as in Chile. Furthermore, Araral and Yu’s (2013) findings also showed that the governance practices evolved according to the political, historical, legal, administrative, geographic and economic circumstances of the country. According to these authors, one needs to define the context before adopting so-called water governance best practices. Outcomes of the various Philippine water governance reforms Despite opening itself to various paradigms of governance, the Philippine water sector has been beset by various issues such as: (1) the conflict between formal and customary rules in water governance, (2) rural – urban conflicts as the water demand increases, (3) upstream – downstream conflicts due to multiple use of water and upland degradation, and (4) the contestations in the privatization of the Manila water supply. These problems have persisted because of the current complex but fragmented institutional set-up in state rules of water governance (Dayrit, 2000; Elazegui, 2004; Paragas, 2012; Tabios, 2012) and the weaknesses of the institution charged with water rights assignation (Paragas, 2012). For instance, a significant water governance reform was the declaration in 1976 that all waters belong to the state; that the state may allow the use or development of waters by administrative concessions and that the utilization, exploitation, development, conservation and protection of water resources shall be subject to the control and regulation of the government. (NWRB n.d., Article 3, p. 2). The government agency tasked to regulate the water sector is the NWRB. However, the office has few personnel, has a very low budget and is only contained in Metro Manila. On the other hand, a dozen or so other agencies are still involved in the planning, management and regulation of the water resources in the country (Elazegui, 2004). These conditions seem to reveal that the past water governance reform process was symbolic and procedural and short of substantive changes. True organizational change did not take place, while investments in strengthening regulatory processes were not forthcoming. Conflict between formal and customary water rules The formal system of water management used by the government is based on a paradigm where water is priced and assigned rights to access. This is true for domestic water supplied by the water district and irrigation water as governed by the national agency. On the other hand, indigenous communities perceive natural resources as a communal resource and an integral part of their everyday life, culture and traditions. Water is a central element in the varied and complex social relations of production and consumption within which conflicts between individuals and groups arise. Far from being clearly delimited and mutually exclusive, the customary and statutory are usually intertwined in complex mosaics of resource ownership systems (Cotula & Toulmin, 2007). In the past, arguments were posed that with time and modernization, customary systems can be replaced by formal and/or statutory systems; however, experience shows that this is not realistic and neither is it desirable since customary tenure systems have attributes and strengths that respond to real needs in many communities (USAID, 2012). Thus despite the existence of formal rules on the use of water resources in the Philippines, the indigenous communities are guided by customary laws and practices in the use of water and natural resources. Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 International Journal of Water Resources Development 1439 Some of the customary practices cited in the literature address sharing a common water source for irrigation use such as the dumapat system, the lampisa system and the zanjera cooperative irrigation system (Bang-oa, 2003). These practices ensure that water is adequately and fairly shared by farmers in the group who volunteer labour and contribution in kind to maintain the source. Indigenous forest practices emphasizing watershed protection include the lapat which regulates resource use by declaring periods of no harvesting in thinning communal forests (CHARM (Cordillera Highland Agricultural Resources Management) Project, 2009) and the muyong agro-forestry system that promotes the cultivation of hilly slopes with timber, fruit trees and palms for food and fuel and to protect lower farmlands from run-off and erosion (Bernardo, 2010). Precisely because they are community based, customary rules are inherently unique to the locality in which they operate, they frequently entail complexities not found in formal systems that address more general principles and concerns. For example, conflicts between the Ibalois, an indigenous community in Baguio City, Northern Philippines, arose when the local government on account of diminishing water generation and encroachment by informal settlers and migrants proposed to fence the Busol watershed, which provides 55,000 m3 of water per day to the city. The Busol watershed was declared a forest reservation area in 1917, administered by the main city’s water district and designated ‘inalienable’ (i.e. state property) in 1922. The Ibalois claimed that several parcels of land within the watershed were inherited from their ancestors; and that the fencing project would impede access to and from their residences, farmlands and water sources within the reservation, and dispossess them of the space where tribal rituals and ceremonies were usually held. In this case, the conflict arises because dual systems co-exist and, most often, educated urban elites tend to use the statutory system while the less educated and indigenous groups typically rely on the customary system. Furthermore, the clash between the two groups is due to the failure of the government to recognize the traditional water rights, as practised by the indigenous people, combined with the failure to recognize the unique relationship of indigenous peoples with their water resources (Ekid, 2011), as well as the lack of information by the indigenous peoples on formal rules. Water governance in the Philippines needs to recognize both sets of rules because as customary systems are undermined they leave a void that statutory systems are illequipped to fill, given the limited administrative capacity in the country. There are cases where statutory and customary systems coexist in harmony and provide a reasonable degree of stability. In Southern Philippines, a case of a local government unit that initiated a domestic rural water supply found it difficult to access water from the springs as these sources were claimed exclusively by the indigenous peoples. Legal steps were taken by the local leader. But the more effective strategy was by cultivating social capital with the indigenous peoples, and a promise that they will also be part of the beneficiaries of a piped-in water supply. Ultimately, the local government was given water access by the indigenous peoples (Rola, 2011). This is an example of a local government – community partnership to achieve a desirable outcome. A village in rural Benguet in Northern Philippines is the host community to a run-ofriver mini-hydro power plant and receives income under a ‘Payment for Environmental Services’ scheme by generating positive externality from its judicious use and care of its watershed and water resources. The village shares this income with two nearby non-host villages, an arrangement which is not the norm in a market-driven economy. However, the local officials and community-based organizations claimed it was an arrangement reached with the elders in the spirit of sharing one’s blessings from a valuable resource, when the 144 10 A.C. Rola et al. Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 Memorandum of Agreement among the local government, host village and power company was signed in 1991. Water policy-makers must therefore seek guidance and experiences in polycentric governance arrangements (Ostrom, 2010) and consensus-creating decision-making. While customary tenure is associated with age-old practices, how far these are rooted in the practices of past generations is hardly relevant, but they stem from and are sustained by the living community. Implementing a hybrid model that combines and effectively integrates the elements of customary and statutory systems is therefore an important governance challenge. Rural – urban water conflicts The state law has prescribed for sectoral priorities in the case of water scarcity, such as during a drought. However, this is just one of the symbolic changes in the water law as there are no explicit rules and regulations to guide implementation. Rural –urban conflicts arise because of this. A vivid illustration of this conflict is the experience of the Angat Reservoir in Bulacan, Philippines, during a severe drought in 1996– 97. The major consumers of the water in the reservoir are households of Metro Manila, the agricultural sector for irrigation and the hydropower sector. The source of agricultural water demand is the rice farm households in the service area of the irrigation system in Bulacan. The source of urban water demand is the domestic and other water users in the highly urbanized Metro Manila. The water level of the reservoir and the climate conditions at different times of year are critical factors for water allocation among these various users. The water allocation policies that serve as a basis for decision-makers and the process of making decisions in the context of rural – urban competition for water is seen to be biased for the urban centres. For instance, during said drought period, where water crisis was experienced, domestic water is given priority over irrigation. Bulacan farmers were not able to plant rice during this year (Rola & Elazegui, 2008), but were promised fair compensation. This is consistent with the stipulation of the Philippines’ Water Code that the water user who is favoured in allocation decisions should compensate the water user whose allocation was foregone (NWRB n.d., Article 30, p. 7). However, a number of issues were not clarified, e.g., who will be compensated – farmers, farm workers, irrigators’ associations, landlords or National Irrigation Administration? Other issues not clarified in the law included the basis of the compensation and the funding mechanisms to be instituted. Due to the lack of operational policies, no farmer compensation took place (Rola & Elazegui, 2008). This situation also demonstrated the lack of clear policy implementation procedures to counter these multi-use conflicts. As impacts of climate change intensify, such that drought events will likely be more frequent, the rural –urban conflicts are expected to worsen. A clear operational policy as a consequence of the Water Code’s provision prioritizing the domestic water supply in times of drought should be crafted. With this proviso, a real and substantial change in the governance arrangement will ensue. Upstream –downstream water conflicts In addition to conflicts in water use between indigenous peoples and local governments in the uplands, and rural and urban conflicts as discussed in the previous sections, upstream – downstream water use conflicts are evident in the country, mainly due to absence of transvillage agreements and unclear property rights’ assignation. For instance, irrigation water Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 International Journal of Water Resources Development 11 145 has become a problem with downstream farmers suffering from irrigation water scarcity due to the diversion of water upstream by plantation companies (Rola, 2011) or by domestic water providers to supply the urbanizing areas downstream. Unclear water rights caused inequitable water allocation and distribution along the river wherein people in the upstream are in a favourable position in view of geographic location using water resources without any interference. People downstream have no choice but take the consequences of the misuse of water upstream, especially when the water is of poor quality (Yang & Zhang, 2005). Trans-village conflict across the watershed is commonly observed. This is evident in remote areas, occurring between villages fighting over a single spring or forest area to provide for their needs which can no longer be provided within the village’s territory. Conflict is often between one village with a degraded ecosystem and a village whose ecosystem has remained intact (Alipio, 2009). There are also cases of water being extracted for sale by commercial water enterprises to the residential areas, but resulting in an impending water scarcity situation downstream. These were reported in at least three provinces in the Philippines (Hall et al., 2014). The aforementioned upstream – downstream as well as trans-village conflicts are exemplified by the Tigum-Aganan River in Panay Island in the province of Iloilo. The river supplies water for use in agriculture of the upstream and midstream communities, for use in agro-industries of midstream and downstream communities, as well as for domestic use of the growing urban population in downstream Metro Iloilo. Its surface water is utilized for domestic water, servicing around 20% of the population of Iloilo City, and for agriculture, servicing about 7500 hectares of agricultural lands. The Metro Iloilo Water District sources its water supply from the river for domestic use through an intake dam with a capacity of about 30,240 m3 of water per day. On the other hand, the National Irrigation Administration has intake facilities for irrigation. The municipalities along the river are governed by their respective local government units. Conflicts arise because of unharmonized and fragmented plans of different institutions involved in the management within the watershed,4 as well as with a lack of transparent water cooperation agreements among parties. There are no appropriate data at the watershed level that can facilitate water planning that accounts for future demand within the watershed. The apprehension as water is provided to other areas is that communities where the water source is located may be further deprived of the use of their own water. Objective factors of changing mindsets such as the need for scientific information for decision-making at the watershed scale can temper future upstream – downstream conflicts. Contestations of the Manila urban water supply privatization From the rural setting as above, the urban area of Metro Manila has its own water woes. Prior to 1997, Metro Manila was facing a looming water crisis and was burdened by the failure of the state-run Metro Manila Waterworks and Sewerage System to provide universal access, efficient service and resources to finance waterworks systems. In this light, then Philippine President Fidel Ramos succeeded in galvanizing public support for the option of water privatization. Political lobbying as an intervening factor was seen to promote the concept of the privatization of water service delivery in the metropolis. Privatization was expected to secure Manila’s water supply, promising a better service, more connections, thus more inclusion especially for the poor, cheaper water, and less Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 146 12 A.C. Rola et al. wastage. The privatization of Manila’s water was implemented in 1997 and touted as the largest water privatization project in the world, affecting a population of 11 million individuals or around 2 million households (Montemayor, 2003). The concession model was adopted and two private firms were awarded concessions to operate, distribute, and refurbish the water and wastewater system of Metro Manila and the adjacent Rizal province. In the first five years of operation, much improvement was noted on service indicators and there was an initial price drop between 1996 and 1997 (Chia, Chua, Kim, Teo, & Toh, 2007; Montemayor, 2003). This was due to the low water tariffs offered by the concessionaires. However, starting in 2002, tariffs increased significantly (Table 2) (Freedom from Debt Coalition, 2009). One of the concessionaires terminated its agreement with the government due to financial losses and was consequently taken up by another concessionaire. In 2013 both private firms sought another round of increases in their tariffs, which was opposed by government. In response, the concessionaires resorted to arbitration at the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris, France. The respective arbitration panels had opposite decisions, approving Maynilad’s request but denying the same for Manila Water; these contradicting rulings have delayed the government’s implementation of the decisions (IBON Networks: Water for the People Network, 2015; Valencia, 2015). An expert in privatization also says that while Manila may be the largest privatization project, with hindsight it could have first experimented this on a smaller scale (Chia et al., 2007). Many people still see water as a public good and therefore the privatization of services is a highly political issue (Budds & McGranahan, 2003; Castro, 2007). Chia et al. (2007) observed that had this been started on a smaller scale, local conditions could have been identified relating to disparities in water access, quality, and pricing across privatized and publicly served areas, as well a the challenges inherent in regulation and enforcement. To ensure success and acceptability, the privatization process may need to be sensitive to local conditions that could give rise to local innovations. Instead of an enforcement approach, a cooperative approach may be more effective (Chia et al., 2007). These suggested guidelines will be useful as other smaller cities in the country propose privatization. On the other hand, both water companies in Manila have made efforts to reach the poor who can ill-afford a private water connection. The issue of illegal settlers had to be addressed inasmuch as private utilities are not allowed to connect illegal settlers to the network. Consequently, community-based innovative solutions, such as the provision of a water system for clustered low-income communities (Manila Water’s Tubig sa Barangay Program) and the installation of a bulk water system or public faucet with a mother meter (Maynilad), have been found to overcome this problem and ensure sustainable solutions that develop self-reliance in some areas of the city (Gazmen, 2012). Table 2. Evolution of the average nominal water tariff in Manila (pesos/m3). Year East Manila West Manila 1996 1997 2000 2002 2004 2006 8.6 2.3 4.5 14.5 18 27 8.6 5.0 6.5 20 30 32 Source: Freedom from Debt Coalition (2009, p. 23). Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 International Journal of Water Resources Development 13 147 Towards an improved water governance in the Philippines In recent Philippine history, at least two episodes of water governance reforms were considered significant. These were the reforms during the era of the Marcos presidency where the state asserted its rights over all water resources in the Philippines. If provisions of the Water Code were known and implemented, then the water governance reform outcomes may have been minimized. If integration of all other water agencies was done, conflicts may have not occurred. In addition, the regulatory agency is much undermanned and under-funded to realize its mandate. Thus, following the stage-based process of institutional reform, there was a mind change that could be brought about by both internal (the political regime at the time) and external (the availability of funds for public sector water infrastructure development) dynamics; there was political articulation as political entrepreneurs (Marcos) supported the reform; and there was the beginning of the practical implementation of a reform programme through the legal instrument (the Water Code) and procedural changes, i.e. the establishment of the regulatory body. However, the last stage – which is the actual reform to be driven by behavioural change of policy-makers, for instance in prioritizing building capacities of the agency and the regulators, and the establishment of a water database for planning and for water allocation decisions – were not realized. Outcomes include weak water rights’ assignation and information asymmetry, i.e. only those informed about the existence of water permits were granted water rights. The second wave of water governance reforms came in 1996– 97 with the decision to privatize water provisioning in Metro Manila. There was political lobbying from then President Ramos towards privatization. The objective factor that could have influenced this mindset was the inability of the public sector to perform this water provisioning and the attractiveness of pro-market measures. Practical implementation took place, but government regulations, especially on water tariffs, were not clear and transparent to consumers. The perception was that there was collusion between concessionaires and regulators. The perceived impact of privatization at this time is the high water tariffs experienced in Metro Manila, such as high water prices relative to other countries. With the above two cases, seemingly the expectations of these reforms were not met, and so the circular process of the stage-based approach to institutional reform will continue to create new additional demand for more reforms. The behavioural changes to reform the institution did not prosper, despite the political entrepreneurship. It could be because there was no adaptive evaluation that happened after these changes took place. The analysis above justifies the need to seek for a more proactive water governance mechanism in the Philippines to address the increasing population, urbanization and high economic growth. Because the Philippine government is departmentalized, decentralized and layered (national, regional, local), any solution to the water problem must necessarily arise beyond the boundaries of one government layer, unit or even beyond the government as a whole (Teisman & Edelenbos, 2011). Some fundamentals of improved water governance are as revealed in the integrated water resources management. It can be articulated through (Teisman & Edelenbos, 2011): (1) the adoption of a single structure and level of government with clear lines of demand that links local and national levels; (2) connecting the institutions of water with other networks of organizations (government and non-government) in related policy fields; and (3), according to Bach, Clausen, and Dang (2011), integration at the management level to encompass ‘scaling up’ or linking the sub-national with national (e.g. creation of a watershed management structure). A.C. Rola et al. Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 148 14 Conclusions and recommendations The history of policy reforms in the Philippines is similar to those in other countries. The drivers of these reforms were mostly external to the sector, and the lack of an integrated view of the sector has resulted in unfavourable policy outcomes. The outcomes of these past reforms such as clashes between customary and formal rules; rural – urban conflicts, upstream –downstream conflicts; and the contestations in the privatization in the case of Manila have led to serious challenges that can jeopardize water sustainability in the country. Among these outcomes, the customary and formal rules will not be harmonious when the formal rule dominates. Instead, the former should be given due recognition in its less modernized and natural functioning than purposive reform (Saleth & Dinar, 2005). The country is poised for major governance reform to meet future water requirements. The authors support the proposal of the reform agenda, which is to strengthen the leadership and capacity of the national regulatory agency and transform the agency to manage effectively the country’s water resources, optimize the use of this resource, and ensure water security for the different purposes and/or uses of water. In addition to sector governance, according to Tabios and Villaluna (2012), the priority policy imperatives were also identified to facilitate the creation of enabling environments, institutional arrangements and management instruments to allow the new agency to implement a decentralized framework of good water governance at the watershed level. However, institutional reforms are slow (Saleth & Dinar, 2005); these will need adaptive learning, political entrepreneurs and targeted actions (Saleth & Dinar, 2004). The Philippines should learn from past reform processes. To complete the cycle, there must be ex ante assessment of impacts of these reforms, and an understanding of the nature and extent of resource inputs, policy processes, legal and institutional frameworks, and other outputs that will be required to realize the impact, which is water for all at all times. Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge the inputs of Dr Juan M. Pulhin, Dr Myra E. David and Dr Maria Helen F. Dayo all from the University of the Philippines Los Baños (UPLB). The final manuscript benefitted from the research assistance of Ms Aira Mendoza of the UPLB. Disclosure statement No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors. Funding This work was supported by Emerging Interdisciplinary Research Program (EIDR) of the University of the Philippines System [OVPAA – EIDR Code 2-003-121010]. Supplemental data Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/ 07900627.2015. 1060196 Notes 1. Supreme Court of the Philippines. G.R. No. 180882. Baguio Regreening Movement Inc vs Atty Brain Masweng. February 27, 2013. Retrieved July 1, 2014, from http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ jurisprudence/2013/february 2013/180882.pdf International Journal of Water Resources Development 2. 3. Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 4. 149 15 The NWRC was envisioned to fulfil more than the task of issuing water permits; it is also supposed to regulate the whole water sector (akin to energy). However, its relatively modest budget and lack of presence outside Manila (it has neither regional nor local offices) meant that institutionally it is a weak institution compared with NIA and LWUA. Municipal waterworks, water collectives/cooperatives and local private enterprises dealing with water provisioning do not have a regulatory body assigned to oversee their operations. Supreme Court of the Philippines. G.R. No. 168914. Metropolitan Cebu Water District vs Margarita Adala. July 4, 2007. Retrieved February 25, 2013, from http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/ jurisprudence/2007/july2007/168914.htm Watershed and river basin are essentially the same, except that river basin is used to describe a region drained by a larger river system, implying a very large watershed (see http:// milwaukeeriverkeeper.org/whats-a-river-basin-whats-a-watershed/). The Philippines refers to a watershed as a socio-economic and socio-political unit for planning and implementing resources management activities (Francisco, 2004). References Abdullayev, I., Nurmetova, F., Abdullaeva, F., & Lamers, J. (2008). Central Asian waters: Social, economic, environmental and governance puzzle. (Muhammad Mizanur Rahaman & Olli Varis Eds.), Water & Development Publications – Helsinki University of Technology. Alipio, J. P. (2009). A report on the people and environment of central Cordilleras of the Philippines CAR (Cordillera Administrative Region). Philippines: National Geographic Expeditions Council, The Philippine Central Cordillera Traverse. Araral, E. (2010). Reform of water institutions: Review of evidences and international experiences. Water Policy, 12, 8 – 22. doi:10.2166/wp.2010.011 Araral, E., & Yu, D. J. (2013). Comparative water law, policies, and administration in Asia: Evidence from 17 countries. Water Resources Research, 49, 5307– 5316. doi:10.1002/wrcr. 20414. Retrieved from: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/wrcr.20414/full Bach, H., Clausen, T. J., & Dang, T. T. (2011). From local watershed management to integrated river basin management at national and transboundary levels. Lao PDR: Mekong River Commission. Bang-oa, E. (2003, March). Traditional water management in Besao, Mt. Province. Paper presented during the World Water Forum, Kyoto, Japan. Bernardo, E. (2010, May). Indigenous knowledge scales the ivory tower of NRM Science UPLB Research and Extension News, 12 May 2010. College, Laguna, Philippines: University of the Philippines Los Baños. Budds, J., & McGranahan, G. (2003). Are the debates on water privatization missing the point? Experiences from Africa, Asia and Latin America. Environment and Urbanization, 15: 87 –113. doi: 10.1177/095624780301500222. Online version of this article can be found at: http://eau. sagepub.com/content/15/2/87 Cambodia Development Policy Research Institute (CDRI). (2008). Framing research on water resource management and governance in Cambodia: A literature review (Working Paper 37). Castro, J. E. (2007). Water governance in the twentieth-first century. Ambiente & Sociedade. Campinas. v.X, n.2, 97 –118. Catacutan, DC, Duque, CE, Garrity, DP, & Mirasol, FS (2001). The preventive systems approach to protected area management: The case of Mt. Kitanglad Range Natural Park, Bukidnon, Philippines. Bukidnon, Philippines: International Center for Research in Agroforestry and the Integrated Protected Areas System for Mt. Kitanglad. CHARM (Cordillera Highland Agricultural Resources Management) Project. (2009). The way of the Lapat, An effective indigenous natural resource management system of the Tinggians in Abra, Philippines CAR (Cordillera Administrative Region). Philippines: Department of Agriculture. Chia, P. G., Chua, C. K., Kim, F. C., Teo, S., & Toh, K. L. (2007). Water privatization in Manila, Philippines-should water be privatized? A tale of two water concessionaires in Manila. Economics and Management in Developing Countries (7 May 2007, pp 21). INSEAD. Retrieved from http://www.circleofblue.org/waternews/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Insead_Water_ Privatization_Manila_Philippines.pdf Cotula, L., & Toulmin, C. (2007). Conclusion. In L. Cotula (Ed), Changes in customary land tenure systems in Africa (p. 109). IIED. Retrieved from http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/12537IIED.pdf Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 150 16 A.C. Rola et al. Dayrit, H. Case study on the formulation of a national water vision: the Philippines, July 2000. National Water Resources Board, Manila (2000). Ekid, L. (2011, August 16). In Cordilleras, water becomes a source of feuds. Northern Dispatch Weekly. Elazegui, D. (2004). Water resource governance: Realities and challenges in the Philippines. In A. C. Rola, H. Francisco, & J. P. T. Liguton (Eds.), Winning the water war: Watersheds, water policies and water institutions (pp. 85 – 104). Makati City, Philippines: Philippine Institute of Development Studies and Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources Research and Development. Francisco, H. (2004). Watershed-based water management strategy: Why push for it? In A. C. Rola, H. Francisco, & J. P. T. Liguton (Eds.), Winning the water war: Watersheds, water policies and water institutions (pp. 27 – 58). Makati City, Philippines: Philippine Institute of Development Studies and Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources Research and Development. Freedom from Debt Coalition. (2009, March). Recalibrating the meter, (p.23). Philippines: Freedom from Debt Coalition. Retrieved August 30 2014 from: http://fdc.ph/resources/category/21monographs?download=61:recalibrating-the-meter Gazmen, P. G. (2012, January 26). Tubig para sa barangay: Providing clean and affordable water to poor communities using a sustainable model and community participatory approach. Paper presented during the roundtable discussion on water rights and water wrongs: Toward good water governan7ce for development, Social Sciences Division-NAST PHL, Hyatt Hotel and Casino Manila, Manila, Philippines. Global Water Partnership. n.d. Towards a Secure Water World, What is water security?. Retrieved from http://www.gwp.org/The-Challenge/What-is-water-security/ Hall, R., Lizada, J. C., Rola, A. C., Abansi, C. L., Dayo, M. H. F., & David, M. (2014, March 1). To the Last Drop: The political economy of Philippine water policy. Presented at the Philippines Studies Conference, CSEAS, Kyoto University, Japan. Hirsch, P. (2006). Water governance reform and catchment management in the Mekong region. The Journal of Environment & Development, 15, 184– 201. doi:10.1177/1070496506288221 Huitema, D., Mostert, E., Egas, W., Moellenkamp, S., Pahl-Wostl, C., & Yalcin, R. (2009). Adaptive water governance: Assessing the institutional prescriptions of adaptive (co-)management from a governance perspective and defining a research agenda. Ecology and Society, 14, 26, [online] URL:http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss1/art26/ accessed March 8 2015. IBON Networks: Water for the People Network. 5 March 2015. https://waterforthepeople.wordpress. com Malayang, III, B. (2004). A model of water governance in the Philippines. In A. C. Rola, H. Francisco, & J. P. T. Liguton (Eds.), Winning the water war: Watersheds, water policies and water institutions (pp. 59 – 83). Makati City, Philippines: Philippine Institute of Development Studies and Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural Resources Research and Development. Molle, F. (2001). Economic tools for water demand management in Thailand: Conventional wisdom and the real world. Proceedings of an International workshop held in Bangkok, Thailand, 8 – 9 June. ACIAR Proceedings No. 106 In D. Brennan (Ed.), Water policy reform: Lessons from Asia and Australia (pp. 209– 223). Montemayor, C. (2003, May 20). The manila water privatization fiasco and the role of Suez Lyonnaise/Ondeo. Presentation for the Summit for Another World (during G8 summit in Evian, 2003). Retrieved from http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/archives/altreg-docs/manila.pdf National Water Resources Board (NWRB). Water Code of the Philippines and the Implementing Rules and Regulations, NWRB, Republic of the Philippines, Quezon City, Philippines n.d.. Neef, A. (2009). Transforming rural water governance: Towards deliberative and polycentric models? Water Alternatives, 2, 53 – 60. Ostrom, E. (June 2010). Beyond markets and states: Polycentric governance of complex economic systems. American Economic Review, 100, 133. Paneque Salgado, P., Corral Quintana, S., Guimarães Pereira, Â., Del Moral Ituarte, L., & Pedregal Mateos, B. (2009). Participative multi-criteria analysis for the evaluation of water governance alternatives. A case in the Costa del Sol (Málaga). Ecological Economics, 68, 990–1005. doi:10. 1016/j.ecolecon.2006.11.008 Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 International Journal of Water Resources Development 17 151 Paragas, V. S. (2012, January 26). Water regulatory policies. Paper presented during the Roundtable Discussion on Water Rights and Water Wrongs: Toward good water governance for development, Social Sciences Division-National Academy for Science and Technology (NASTPHL), Hyatt Hotel and Casino Manila, Manila, Philippines. Remo, A. (2012). SC asked to reverse ruling upholding sale of Angat power plant to Korean firm’. Philippine Daily Inquirer. November 8, 2012. Rola, A. C. (2011). An upland community in transition: Institutional innovations for sustainable development in rural Philippines. College, Los Baños, Laguna, Philippines: Southeast Asia Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture (SEARCA, Philippines) and the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS, Singapore). Rola, A. C., & Elazegui, D. D. (2008). Role of institutions in managing agriculture-related climate risks: Angat reservoir case study, Bulacan, Philippines. Journal of Environmental Science and Management, 11, 26 – 39. Saleth, R. M., & Dinar, A. (2004). The institutional economics of water: A cross-country analysis of institutions and performance. United Kingdom (UK): Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, Cheltenham. Saleth, R. M., & Dinar, A. (2005). Water institutional reforms: Theory and practice. Water Policy, 7, 1 – 19. Shah, T. (1993). Groundwater markets and irrigation development: Political economy and practical policy. England, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. Shah, T., & Van Koppen, B. (2006). Is India ripe for integrated water resources management? Fitting water policy to national development context. Economic and Political Weekly, 41, 3413– 3421. Tabios, III, G. Q. (2012, January 26). A proposed water resources management framework. Paper presented during the roundtable discussion on Water rights and water wrongs: Toward good water governance for development, Social Sciences Division-National Academy of Science and Technology (NAST-PHL), Hyatt Hotel and Casino Manila, Manila, Philippines. Tabios, III, G. Q., & Villaluna, R. A. L. (2012). Development of the implementation and operational plan for the National Water Resources Management Office (NWRMO). Submitted to the Interagency Committee on Water, NEDA, Quezon City, Philippines. Teisman, G. R., & Edelenbos, J. (2011). Towards a perspective of system synchronization in water governance: A synthesis of empirical lessons and complexity theories. International Review of Administrative Sciences, 77, 101 – 118. doi:10.1177/002085231039012110.1177/ 0020852310390121 Turral, H., & Malano, H. (2002). Water policy in practice —A case study from Vietnam. In D. Brennan (Ed.), Water policy reform: Lessons from Asia and Australia Proceedings of an International workshop held in Bangkok, Thailand, 8 – 9 June 2001. ACIAR Proceedings No. 106 (pp. 189– 205). UNDP Water Governance Facility. (2013). What is water governance?. UNDP WGF Web. Retrieved form http://www.watergovernance.org/whatiswatergovernance USAID. (2012). The future of customary tenure: Options for policymakers. Property Rights and Resource Governance Briefing Paper #8.Retrieved from http://usaidlandtenure.net/sites/ default/files/USAID_Land_Tenure_2012_Liberia_Course_Module_1_Future_of_Customary_ Tenure.pdf Valencia, C. The Philippine Star, February 17, 2015 (2015). Wesselink, A., Paavola, J., Fritsch, O., & Renn, O. (2011). Rationales for public participation in environmental policy and governance: Practitioners‘ perspectives. Environment and Planning A, 43, 2688– 2704. doi:10.1068/a44161 Yang, Z., & Zhang, W. (2005). Upstream-downstream cooperation approach in Guanting Reservoir watershed. Journal of Environmental Sciences, 17, 676– 680. Downloaded by [121.58.218.4] at 18:47 14 December 2015 152 18 Appendix A Evolution and drivers of water governance reforms in the Philippines. Period Enabling law Post war, 1946– 55 Customary rule Constitution; water is a right Implementing agencies Community based Local authorities; National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (NAWASA) Pre-martial law, Republic Act 6234 Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS, 1955– 71 formerly NAWASA) Martial law, 1972– 85 PD 198 or the Provincial Water Utilities Local Water Utilities Authority (LWUA) Act of 1973 National Water Resources Board (NWRB, formerly PD 1067 or the Water Code of the Philippines of 1976 National Water Resources Council – NWRC); Rural Waterworks Development Corporation (RWDC) Post-martial law, Local Government Code of 1991; Water Local government units; privatization of the MWSS; Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); 1986– present Crisis Act 1997; RA 9275 or the water quality and pollution control Clean Water Act 2004 Source: Authors’ analyses. Drivers of reform Spirit of collectivism Economic development; recovery from war damages Economic development; demographic growth National – local partnership Need for water right assignment; solutions for water conflict; international pressure Market-based mechanisms such as pollution permits; comanagement; privatization Drought; decentralization Partnership A.C. Rola et al. Table A1.