The Third Rome

v INDICE Premessa ix Prologo. Intorno a Maometto il profeta 3 §1. Dove si apprende che Maometto, prima che profeta, am-biva essere papa di Roma, p. 3-§2. Dove si apprende che Maometto era gabellato per cristiano eretico e l'islam per un magma di eresie cristiane, p. 10-§3. A proposito di quei teologi bizantini che fra alto e basso medioevo si dilettavano a confrontare cristianesimo e islam, e ad insultarsi recipro-camente coi sapienti arabi, p. 14-§4. Si ragiona sulle con-clusioni di tanto pensare. Il rapido successo dei musulmani nel mondo si deve alla violenza e all'edonismo promossi dal Corano e suggeriti dal demonio, p. 17 I. La caduta di Costantinopoli, Mosca ' terza Roma' e le congiure dei pagani 23 §1. Dove Nestore Iskinder profetizza la caduta e il riscatto di Costantinopoli, liberamente interpretando la lotta fra un serpente e un'aquila al tempo di Costantino il Grande, p. 23-§2. Dio lo volle, non senza dolore, p. 24-§3. Enumerando utopie e distopie germinate fra i ruderi di Costantinopoli, p. 29-§4. Si spiega come sia mai possibile che in Europa da Carlo Magno in poi vi fossero due imperatori, entrambi romani, entrambi universali, p. 31-§5. Dove si ricorda la triste sorte dell'ultimo imperatore bizantino, Costantino XI Paleologo, mai incoronato secondo regola, e ci si pone il problema, non banale, dell'importanza dell'incoronazio-ne e della Chiesa nella nomina imperiale, p. 35-§6. «Due Rome sono cadute, una terza è e una quarta non sarà»: po-teva anche lo zar essere imperatore dei romani? E poteva Mosca essere la terza Roma a capo di un impero romano

One of the largest and most notable Early Russian icons “Blessed is the Host of the Heavenly King” from the Assumption Cathedral of the Moscow Kremlin is held in the art history to be the monument created in 1552 in commemoration of the capture of Kazan and victorious return of the army of Ivan IV (the Terrible) to the capital. All of the numerous academic works devoted to the icon focused on explaining the sophisticated content of the composition, on finding out its literary sources and establishing characters represented in the icon, regarded as historical figures. Meanwhile the present paper is the first survey treating the artistic style of the icon that provides an earlier date for the icon, the turn of 1520s – 1530s, with numerous parallels proving it. The concept of the programmatic icon, signal for the period of Grand Prince Vasily III, was realized in the entourage of the Grand Prince in the years that witnessed the formation of the imperial identity and of the notion of Moscow as a “Third Rome” and the Russian people as the “New Israel”.

U drugom delu teksta o Filotejevoj doktrini o Moskvi kao „Trećem Rimu“ autor se bavi njenom recepcijom u kasnijim periodima ruske intelektualne i političke istorije. Iako u svom izvornom obliku to učenje nije sadržavalo imperijalnu, spoljno-političku konotaciju, u radu su analizirane interpretacije ideje Trećeg Rima koje su imale i značajne političke konsekvence. Na unutrašnjem planu ona je poslužila knezu Kurbskom za kritiku vlasti Ivana Groznog, kao i za odbacivanje crkvenih reformi patrijarha Nikona u literaturi Staroveraca. Ipak, obnova interesovanja za ideju Trećeg Rima karakteriše ruski XIX vek u kome su vođene diskusije o odnosu Rusije i Zapada. Slovenofilski kritičari reformi Petra Velikog u prošlosti Moskovskog carstva našli su potvrdu kulturne originalnosti i superiornosti Rusije. Autor naglašava razlike između slovenofilske (religijsko-filozofske) i panslovenske (geopolitičke) interpretacije ruskog mesijanizma. U završnom delu rada mesijanska ideja dovodi se u vezu sa rađanjem nacionalizma u imperijalnom kontekstu. Na taj način, autor dovodi u pitanje raširene interpretacije o njenim distinktivno ruskim karakteristikama.

Summary
In the second part of the text about the Filofei’s doctrine of “Moscow, Third Rome,” the author deals with its reception in later periods of Russian intellectual and political history. Although this doctrine in its original form had no explicit imperial or foreign-political connotation, this paper analyzes the interpretations of the “Third Rome idea” that had significant political consequences. Internally, this idea was used by Prince Kurbskii for the criticism of Ivan the Terrible’s politics (XVI Century), as well as the rejection of the church reforms of Patriarch Nikon in the Old Believers’ literature (XVII Century). However, the revival of interest in the idea of the “Third Rome” characterized the Russian nineteenth century when the discussions on the relationship between Russia and the West emerged. Criticizing the reforms by Peter the Great, the classical Slavophiles found confirmation of the Russian cultural originality and superiority in the past of traditional Muscovy. The author highlights the differences between religious-philosophical and geopolitical interpretations of Russian messianism in the works of Russian Slavophiles and Panslavs. In the final section of this article, Russian messianic ideas are put in a relation with the birth of nationalism in the context of the Russian Empire. In this way, the author’s findings call into question the widespread interpretation of the “Third Rome messianism” as a distinctive and exceptional Russian characteristic.

The author analyzes the historiography of the Third Rome concept and divides the attitude of scholars to this idea in contemporary scholarship into two approaches, absolutely different in their understanding of what the Third Rome is and what sources are relevant in regard to this doctrine. The first approach is close to the historical and cultural constructivism. Its adherents claim that the Third Rome is a distinct doctrine expressed in the texts of monk Philotheos and in the texts and artefacts which were receptive, under different angles, of his teaching. The second approach puts the doctrine of the monk from Pskov in relation to a contemporary situation in Moscow Rus’ and connects it to other intellectual movements of the days even if one cannot find any
direct traces of the reception. This perception lies far away from the way of thought of the Pskov author who intended to preach and instruct. According to the ideas of the monk from Pskov, the Third Rome would fall if the simple truth is not perceived: there are no other Orthodox rulers left in the universe and if the Grand Duke does not have heirs, then his kingdom would fall after his death, which necessarily leads to arguing against his fruitless marriage. During the rule of Basil III, the notion of the Third Rome remained limited exclusively to the texts of Philotheos, nor did it influence the state cult during the rule of his son, Ivan the Terrible. What is striking is that this idea was not employed in any of the dozens domestic or hundreds of diplomatic addresses by Ivan the Terrible. This suggests that, in all likelihood, Ivan the Terrible did not know about the Third Rome concept at all.

Икона "Благословенно воинство небесного царя" прочно вошла в историю искусства как
памятник, созданный в 1552 году по случаю взятия
Казани и торжественного возвращения в столицу
войска Ивана Грозного. Однако стиль живописи не соответствует этому времени, что заставляет искать иное объяснение как содержанию самой композиции, так и художественным особенностям ее письма. В работе последовательно доказывается создание выдающейся по замыслу и исполнению иконы на рубеже 1520-30-х гг., в момент становления идей "Москва - третий Рим" и имперского самосознания, совпавшие с великим княжением Василия III. Причастность ее этим десятилетиям подтверждает широкий круг произведений, написанных в первой трети столетия.

В статье на основе анализа записей на Годуновских Псалтирях рассматривается вопрос о распространении идеи «Третьего Рима» в России в конце XVI в. В этом столетии Третьим Римом именовалась либо Русская земля, либо Российское царство. Устанавливается, что одним из первых случаев (возможно, первым) соотнесения Третьего Рима непосредственно с «Москвой» были записи Годуновских Псалтирей. Этот комплекс богато иллюминированных рукописей переписывался в одном из столичных скрипториев между 1591 и 1600 гг. по заказу дяди Б. Ф. Годунова боярина Д. И. Годунова. Данные рукописи вскоре после их написания были отданы в крупнейшие соборы и монастыри России: в Успенский и Архангельский кремлевские соборы, в Чудов, Новодевичий, Троице-Сергиев, Кирилло-Белозерский, Соловецкий, костромской Ипатьевский и калязинский Макарьевский монастыри. В статье высказывается мнение о том, что с распространением Годуновских Псалтирей была связана первая попытка распространения идеи «Третий Рим» за пределами столицы. Она предвосхитила ее тиражирование в печатной Кормчей 1653 г.

In article is considered a question of distribution of the theory «The Third Rome» in Russia of the end of the XVI century. The research is based on texts of records on the Godunov's Psalters. This century the name «The Third Rome» was applied to «The Russian land» and «The Russian tzardom». It is shown that one of the fi rst cases (perhaps, the fi rst) correlation of «the Third Rome» with «Moscow» was records Godunov's Psalters. This complex of richly illuminated manuscripts was written in one of capital monastery between 1591 and 1600 by request of the uncle Boris Godunov of the boyar Dmitry Godunov. These manuscripts soon after their writing were enclosed in the largest cathedrals and monasteries of Russia: in Uspensky and Arkhangelsk Kremlin cathedrals, in monasteries - Chudov, Novodevichij, Troitse-Sergiyev, Kirillo-Belozersky, Soloveckij, Ipatyevsky in Kostroma and Makaryevsky in Kalyazin. In article the opinion that the first attempt of distribution of idea «the Third Rome» outside the capital was connected with distribution of Godunov's Psalters is expressed. It anticipated it's distribution in printing Nomocanon (Kormchaja) of 1653.

Historical scrutiny of the myth of Moscow, Third Rome, exposes its being an ideological mainstay of Muscovite imperial autocratic pretentions since the 15th century. As Third Rome, Moscow alone inherits the universal authority of imperial Byzantium (Second Rome) over all Christians. In particular, it asserts the rule of autocracy over rule of law. The myth persists stubbornly in the popular Russian mind. There, it seems impervious to historical scrutiny. But, while the myth has withstood standard rational historical critiques, I conclude that it remains vulnerable to being replaced by an anti-autocratic counter-myth that asserts Byzantium’s role in the rise of rule of law.

Imperium and sacerdotium in sixteenth-century Russia: Filofei of Pskov and Maximus the Greek

The relationship between imperium and sacerdotium was a fundamental issue in Russia between the 15th and 16th centuries, when the autocephaly of the Russian Church was established and the great principality of Moscow became an empire. Among the most significant reflections on the relationship between imperial power and the priestly function are two works that have marked the cultural history of Russia in very different ways: the Letter of the monk Filofei of the Eleazar Monastery of Pskov to the d'jak M.G. Misyur-Munekhin, considered the manifesto of the Moscow-Third Rome doctrine, and the Discourse on Instabilities and Disorders, one of the most important writings of Maximus the Greek.
In his short treatise, in the form of an epistle, Filofei sets out to illustrate the upheavals of the cosmic and world order by articulating a complex reflection that can be reconstructed based on quotations from Holy Scripture and, more generally, from the ‘holy books’ at historical and theological level. In the Russian monk's argument, Rome's universal mission is not based on the ‘unshakeability’ of power, but rather on doctrinal orthodoxy, guaranteed by fidelity to ecclesiastical canons. The Moscow ruler has now become 'the sole emperor of Christians' and his role is to 'hold the reins of the divine holy thrones of the holy universal apostolic church, which in place of the Roman and Constantinopolitan churches, is in the city of Moscow, saved by God'.
In his Discourse, Maximus the Greek, taking his cue from the songs of Girolamo Savonarola, develops a complex argument that, in the wake of Holy Scripture and tradition, seeks to interpret the crisis of the present times by illustrating the exercise of power and the role of the ecclesiastical magisterium. His reflection, however, does not develop at historical and sacramental theological level, as philosophy does, but rather in the exegetical and moral sphere. The careful choice of passages, especially from the Old Testament, above all from the Book of Wisdom, serves to develop a radical critique of the moral behaviour of the rulers of his time. From this perspective, the function of the priest does not appear to be primarily sacred, but rather prophetic, which prompts Maximus to expound a severe criticism of the rulers. The form of the dialogue, the cogent argumentation, and above all the implicit references to themes and concepts present in modern Western thought, illustrate the development of an original reflection urging the renewal of Eastern Christian thought.
Despite their different approaches, both writers come together in the image of the widow in the desert, recalling the apocalyptic and eschatological dimension. Their different interpretations of the relationship between imperium and sacerdotium, moreover, do not appear to contradict each other, but are easy to integrate, complementing each other and illustrating enduring constants in the cultural history of Russia and, at the same time, a drive for renewal within the Eastern tradition.

Предмет овог рада јесте расвјетљавање настанка и развоја идеје Православне цивилизације, исказивањем њене унутрашње логике, и њене историјске сукобљености са такозваном Западном цивилизацијом. Аутор указује на узроке овог сукоба, полиитичко-теолошки концепт усаглашавања центара свјетовних и духовних центара власти ван којег се овај сукоб не да правилно схватити. Аутор потом указује на историјску утемељеност овог сукоба и све оне његове манифестације које су додатно допринијеле његовом утемељивању, као и на његов допринос у стварању идеје о Трећем Риму, и начин на који се та идеја данас исказује и користи у руском друштву и држави као фактор друштвене кохезије и међународне меке моћи.

Статья посвящена исследованию аксиологической трансформации ведущей градостроительной модели русского средневековья во второй половине XII века. В статье показано, что строительная программа Андрея Боголюбского, призванная решить задачу архитектурного оформления идеи приоритета Владимира над Киевом, обусловила ориентацию на западные архитектурные образцы, претерпевшие, тем не менее, очевидную адаптацию к сложившейся русско-византийской художественной традиции. Выражая вполне определённые идеологические приоритеты князя и княжества, городская среда Владимира приобрела визуально фиксированную аксиологическую окраску. Эта новая для Руси аксиология свидетельствует о начавшейся трансформации исходной русской градостроительной модели: перенос святости постепенно теряет свой исключительный культурно-семиотический смысл, приобретая подчёркнутый политический акцент. Именно поэтому город-прототип, потеряв свой сакральный характер, утрачивает и свою прежнюю ценность, а потому подлежит безжалостному уничтожению. Целенаправленная, осмысленная попытка князя Андрея отнять у Киева характер и функцию «Иерусалима», построить новый город как альтернативу старому сакральному центру демонстрирует начавшуюся деструкцию иерусалимской урбанистической матрицы и закладывает первоначальное основание под будущую теорию «третьего Рима».

The article is devoted to the study of the axiological transformation of the leading urban planning model of the Russian Middle Ages in the second half of the 12th century. The article shows that the construction program of Andrei Bogolyubsky which was supposed to solve the problem of architectural design of the idea of Vladimir’s priority over Kiev, led to an orientation towards Western architectural samples, which, nevertheless, underwent an obvious adaptation to the established Russian-Byzantine artistic tradition. Expressing quite clear ideological priorities of Duke and dukedom, the urban environment of Vladimir acquired a visually fixed axiological peculiarity. This axiology, new for Russia, indicates start of the original Russian urban planning model transformation: the transformation of sacredness is gradually losing its exclusive cultural and semiotic meaning, acquiring vivid political emphasis. That is why the prototype-city, having lost its sacred character, loses its former value, and therefore becomes a subject to cruel destruction. The purposeful and meaningful attempt of Duke Andrei to deprive Kiev of the character and function of ‘Jerusalem’, to build a new city as an alternative to the old sacred center, demonstrates the beginning of destruction of the Jerusalem urban matrix and lays the initial foundation for the future theory of the ‘third Rome’.

Le mythe de la Troisième Rome connaît un nouveau développement dans l’imaginaire politique et culturel de l’Italie du XIXe siècle, par les réflexions et dans l’action du patriote Giuseppe Mazzini, qui définit au cours du Risorgimento la mission du peuple italien pour la renaissance européenne. Dans l’Italie postunitaire, la Troisième Rome devient un mythe national italien qui donne son identité au nouvel État, identifié à la Troisième Italie. Au XXe siècle, ce mythe devient un pilier de la rhétorique mussolinienne pour la mise en place du fascisme et en particulier pour son idée d’Empire. À chaque étape de l’évolution du mythe dans la rhétorique politique et poétique italienne, on remarque que l’idée de Troisième Rome n’exprime pas seulement le rapport de l’Italie avec son passé, mais également la contribution italienne à l’idée moderne de nation.

"Il contributo è dedicato alla ricostruzione e all’indagine storica degli intrecci dinastici, politici e religiosi miranti ad un progetto di “rifondazione occidentale” di Bisanzio nel XV secolo. Il progetto di un “salvataggio occidentale di Bisanzio” in Morea – sviluppato tra gli anni Venti e Settanta del Quattrocento, promosso in particolar modo da Bessarione e da Enea Silvio Piccolomini, sfociato infine nella sfortunata spedizione antiturca condotta dopo la morte del pontefice da Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta — prese avvio dall’alleanza matrimoniale fra Teodoro II Paleologo e Cleopa Malatesta. La sepoltura di quest’ultima, dedicataria di un tombeau poetico bessarioneo conservato nel codice Marc. gr. 533, si lega fra l’altro all’enigmatica identificazione della cosiddetta “mummia di Mistrà”. L’analisi della vicenda politico-dinastica interessa successivamente la permanenza in Italia di Tommaso Paleologo: legittimo erede e sovrano in pectore della Nuova Bisanzio immaginato nel progetto per la riconquista della Morea promosso da Pio II, fu oggetto, oltreché di cruciali aspettative politiche, di committenze artistiche di peculiare pregnanza simbolica. In effetti non solo la figura di Tommaso, ma l’insieme delle vicissitudini politiche e dinastiche di cui sopra trovano riflesso nella maggiore pittura italiana coeva: gli elementi storici ricordati permettono in particolare un’approfondita analisi iconografica (supportata dalle tavole illustrative in appendice) del più importante prodotto dell’atmosfera filobizantina dell’epoca – e manifesto dell’impresa politico-religiosa occidentale contro i turchi –, la Flagellazione di Piero della Francesca.
L’impresa sarà tuttavia destinata a fallire e sarà così che, dopo il mancato “salvataggio occidentale” di Bisanzio, l’eredità giuridico-istituzionale, politica, ecclesiastica, ideologica e per certi versi lo stile di vita stesso di Bisanzio si trasmetteranno al granducato di Mosca: le nozze tra Zoe Paleologina e Ivan III Vasilevič segneranno il definitivo tramonto del progetto di unificazione tra prima e seconda Roma e la nascita della Terza Roma.

The essay investigates and reconstructs the dynastic, political, and religious intricacies involved in the “Western re-foundation” of Byzantium project in the 15th century.  The plan for the “Western salvage of Byzantium” in Morea – developed between the 1420s and 1460s, promoted with particular energy by Bessarion and Aeneas Sylvius Piccolomini (Pius II), and resulting in the failed anti-Turk expedition led by Sigismondo Pandolfo Malatesta after the Pope’s death – began with the marriage of Theodore II Palaeologus and Cleopa Malatesta. The death and burial of the latter, dedicatee of a verse tombeau by Bessarion preserved in M. Marc. gr. 533, may be connected to the mysterious identification of the so-called “Mystras mummy.”  Analysis of the political and dynastic events focuses subsequently on the Italian sojourn of Thomas Palaeologus.  As legitimate heir and sovereign in pectore of the New Byzantium envisaged in the plan to re-conquer the Morea promoted by Pius II, he was the subject of both crucial political expectations and artistic commissions laden with unusual symbolism. In effect, the figure of Thomas and concomitant political and dynastic events are reflected in the major Italian paintings of the period. The historical elements allow us, in particular, a deeper iconographic analysis (documented by illustrations in the appendix) of the most important product of the philo-Byzantine atmosphere of the period – and manifest in the Western political and religious enterprise against the Turks – Piero della Francesca’s Flagellation of Christ.
The undertaking, however, was destined to fail and so, after the abortive “Western salvage” of Byzantium, this is how the juridical, institutional, political, ecclesiastical, and ideological legacy - and, in certain ways, the very Byzantine way of life - moves to the Grand Duchy of Moscow.  The marriage of Zoe Palaeologina and Ivan III (The Great) Vasilyevich marks the definitive decline of the plan to reunite the First and Second Rome with the birth of the Third Rome.
"

Après un bref rappel des modalités de l’usage public de l’histoire  en Italie à la fin du 19e siècle, la communication examine plus particulièrement l’usage du passé romain dans les discours de célébration de la prise de Rome, avant d’ouvrir sur la question de l’usage de l’idée de « race latine » ou romaine pour définir l’identité italienne et pour justifier l’expansion du Royaume d’Italie au-delà de ses frontières de 1870, vers les territoires « irrédents » du Nord-Est et surtout vers l’Afrique.

Nikolai Poppel’s second visit to Moscow in 1489 and the unexpected proposals that he addressed to Grand Duke Ivan III encouraged the Moscow court to examine the political structure of the Holy Roman Empire. This required the help of an unknown expert, who, however, was not always accurate in his comments. To legitimize the Moscow ruler in the eyes of the German emperor, a theory was elaborated about the primordial «brotherhood» between the Moscow dynasty and the Roman-Byzantine emperors. The crucial point in it, along with some «historical» dates from the Donation of Constantine, took the marriage of John VIII Palaiologos to the princess Anna Vasilievna of Moscow.

Few events have had a bigger impact in the Christian world than the siege of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottomans under Sultan Mehmet II. Curiously, one and the same obscure prophecy – about a fair-haired (Russian?) race liberating the city – has served, from the sixteenth century onwards, the national(ist) cause of nations as different as Russia and Greece. By inserting this and other prophecies into more or less dubious authoritative (historiographical) texts, the tragic narrative of the actual fall of the Byzantine capital is reinterpreted by providing the fateful events with a new (epic) plot. The two texts under discussion, Nestor-Iskinder’s Russian Tale of Constantinople (late 15th cent.) and the Greek Vision of Agathangelos (a falsification dating from the 1750s), are approached by Hayden White- and Mikhail Bakhtin-inspired (em)plot(ment) theory. In their ‘replotting’ of history, both texts reserve a role for (the heroic death of) Byzantium’s last emperor, Constantine XI.

[Nur wenige Ereignisse hatten einen größeren Einfluss auf die christliche Welt als die Belagerung und Eroberung Konstantinopels 1453 durch die Osmanen unter Sultan Mehmed II. Ein und dieselbe Prophezeiung – über die Befreiung der Stadt durch ein blondes (russisches?) Volk – diente seit dem 16. Jahrhundert national(istisch)en Bestrebungen so unterschiedlichen Ländern wie Russland und Griechenland. Indem diese und andere Prophezeiungen in mehr oder weniger maßgebende (historiografische) Texte eingebunden wurden, wurde die tragische Erzählung vom Fall Konstantinopels durch einen neuen (epischen) Plot umgedeutet. Die zwei hier diskutierten Texte, Nestor-Iskinders russischer Bericht über den Fall Konstantinopels (spätes 15. Jahrhundert) und die griechische Visionen des Agathangelos (eine Fälschung der 1750er Jahre), werden mithilfe der von Hayden White und Michail Bachtin inspirierten (Em)plot(ment)theorie untersucht. In ihrem Umschreiben der Geschichte betonen beide Texte die Rolle von Byzanzs letztem Kaiser, Konstantin XI. und seinem Heldentod.]

В завершении своей рецензии могу сказать, что книга болгарской исследовательницы доставила мне удовольствие, которое редко появляется от чтения иных исторических трудов. И, безусловно, исследование вносит свой значимый и весомый вклад в разработку проблематики, поставленной и исследуемой Константином Николаевичем Леонтьевым, имя и мысли которого продолжают жить во времени.

The Claim of Russian Distinctiveness as an Ideational Foundation for Putin's Neo-Authoritarian Regime: Guest Editor's Introduction

By Andreas Umland

During the past years, M.E. Sharpe's Russian translation journals have devoted a number of their individual contributions as well as some special issues to the past and present of Russian anti-Westernism. For instance, Russian Studies in Philosophy (vol. 47, no. 1) published in 2008 a collection of essays on classical Eurasianism  while Russian Politics and Law (vol. 46, no. 4 & vol. 47, no. 1), in 2008  and 2009,  offered two special editions with research papers focusing on extremely right-wing tendencies in post-Soviet political and intellectual life. These themes were already politically topical at the end of the last decade. Yet, they have become even more salient during the last two years. Especially, since the return of Vladimir Putin to the post of President of the Russian Federation in 2012, non-nationalist modes of legitimation for Russia's re-centralized governmental system have been relegated to the back again.
During the presidency of Dmitrii Medvedev in 2008-2012, the promise of a state-led political, social and economic modernization - an idea already exploited, to a lesser degree, under Putin before - had come to the fore as one of the primary ideational foundations for a supposedly temporary semi-authoritarian governmental system. It appeared as if the duumvirate's peculiar form of rule was, by Medvedev and Putin, seen as a transitional stage on the way on Russia's gradual transformation into a "normal" liberal, rule-based and democratic state. According to that script, Putin's centralizing drive from 1999 to 2008 would have appeared as a politically illiberal intermezzo that was unavoidable in order to bring about an urgent consolidation of Russia's administrative system and civil society, after the chaos of the 1990s. Even the manifest escalation of anti-Americanism and various mobilizational measures, such as the creation of state-sponsored youth organizations, in the aftermath of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine of late 2004 could have, within such a scenario, be seen as pragmatic responses to certain destabilizing foreign and domestic impulses which could have threatened the eventually modernizing trajectory of Russia's post-Soviet developmental project.
However, since the announcement, in September 2011, of Putin's re-assumption of the post of RF-President and the impudent electoral falsifications in Moscow and other Russian cities, in December 2012, this narrative of Putinism has lost legitimacy not only as an adequate approach to a historical understanding of the Putin phenomenon in the context of Russia's specifically post-totalitarian situation. The growing confrontation, during 2012, between Putin and Co., on the one side, and the political opposition, civil society and non-conformist artists, on the other, illustrates that the story about Putin as a sort of second Peter the Great does also not fly with many Russians anymore. The officially announced aim of overcoming socio-political backwardness was contradicted by the distinctly pre-modern mode of returning the presidency from Medvedev back to Putin in 2011-2012 as well as the surprisingly primitive methods of falsifying the parliamentary elections of December 2012. Ever since, the peculiar "Putin System" that had emerged in the first decade of the new century has been in crisis, and the Kremlin's political technologists have been in search for a new mode of legitimation of their master's power. 
It is almost "natural" that the Russian authoritarian regime is, under such circumstances, turning to history and the experience of Russia's earlier autocracies. And it is also no surprise that the age-old idea of Russia's "special path" that, supposedly, not only sets her apart from the West, but also entails considerable conflict and, in the worst case, even military confrontation with certain Western countries is gaining popularity again with the current authorities as well as among their various supporters. Since the start of the new Russian protest movement in December 2011, the spread, among the pro-Putinist forces, of ideas about the Russian nation's cultural distinctiveness, historical mission, imperial destiny, Orthodox nature, Eurasian essence, and non-Western character, i.e. ideas closely linked to the vision of Russia's "special path," has been growing by the month.
Fortunately for Russian studies, Emil' Pain, professor of political science at the Higher School of Economics, started already before the latest developments, with the support of the Moscow offices of the Kennan Institute and Friedrich Naumann Foundation, an ambitious project that brought together a number of experts working on ideas of national distinctiveness in Russia and Germany.  On November 20th, 2009, he assembled a binational group of scholars and other researchers at St. Petersburg's Lermontov Library for the Sixth Starovoitova Readings that were devoted to the "Ideology of the 'Special Path' in Russia and Germany."  The literary critic and prolific journalist Aleksandr Arkhangelskii moderated the first session with papers by A. Melikhov, E. Zemskova, M. Maiofis, L. Luks, J. Zarusky, A. Dmitriev, A. Makushinskii, V. Vul'fovich, A. Kubyshkin, M. Gutbrod as well as Iu. Kantor. Pain led the second session consisting of papers by D. Travin, B. Dubin, myself, M. Sokolov, B. Firsov and Pain. Out of this meeting came the collected volume from which the papers of these two special issues of RPL have been drawn.
Sergei Magaril highlights in his broad historical survey some of the sources of Moscow's anti-Westernism, isolationism and provincialism within Russian intellectual, academic, civic and spiritual life. Aleksandr Verkhovskii and Pain provide an exhaustive overview of current ideological trends and political groups espousing the varieties of civilizational nationalism that see the Russian nation as the bearer of some larger supra-national mission. Boris Dubin presents an extensive investigation into the changes and continuities in Russian public opinion about an exceptional distinctiveness of Russia, if compared to other European and non-European nations.
These three papers provide already considerable insight into the origins and nature of contemporary permutations of the idea about Russia's "special path." In combination with the contributions to the following second special issue on the same topic, they constitute a comprehensive illustration for why anti-Western, sometimes radically right-wing ideas have been so tenacious and might become prominent again in Russia. Moreover, the English versions of these investigations have benefited greatly from the fact that their translator, Dr. Stephen D. Shenfield, is himself an accomplished researchers of Russian nationalism, and has thus approached the Russian-language originals of these texts with an especially deep understanding of their substance matter. This translation project should, therefore, contribute to a better understanding, in the West and elsewhere, of the multifarious theoretical foundations, deep historical roots, and varying political consequences of the idea of Russia's "special path."
CONTENTS: "The Claim of Russian Distinctiveness as Justification for Putin s Neo-Authoritarian Regime: Guest Editor's Introduction" by Andreas Umland; "The Mythology of the 'Third Rome' in Russian Educated Society" by Sergei Magaril; "The Myth of the 'Special Path' in Contemporary Russian Public Opinion" by Boris Dubin; "Civilizational Nationalism: The Russian Version of the 'Special Path'" by Aleksandr Verkhovskii and Emil Pain.

Le mythe de la Troisieme Rome connait un nouveau developpement dans l’imaginaire politique et culturel de l’Italie du XIXe siecle, par les reflexions et dans l’action du patriote Giuseppe Mazzini, qui definit au cours du Risorgimento la mission du peuple italien pour la renaissance europeenne. Dans l’Italie postunitaire, la Troisieme Rome devient un mythe national italien qui donne son identite au nouvel Etat, identifie a la Troisieme Italie. Au XXe siecle, ce mythe devient un pilier de la rhetorique mussolinienne pour la mise en place du fascisme et en particulier pour son idee d’Empire. A chaque etape de l’evolution du mythe dans la rhetorique politique et poetique italienne, on remarque que l’idee de Troisieme Rome n’exprime pas seulement le rapport de l’Italie avec son passe, mais egalement la contribution italienne a l’idee moderne de nation.