Jose Antonio Gimenez

Diese Arbeit verfolgt das Ziel, die späte platonische Ethik aus dem Philebos zu rekonstruieren, indem eine besondere Beziehung von theoretischen und praktischen Fragen entwickelt wird.
Im Philebos fallen zwei Problemen zusammen, deren Entwicklung in den unterschiedlichen Perioden des platonischen Werkes zu finden sind. Es geht um das Problem der Einheit jeder Vielheit und das Problem der Motivation zum Handeln. Der Zusammenhang beider Probleme zeigt also den Zusammenhang zwischen Dialektik und Ethik, oder aristotelisch ausgedrückt, zwischen Theorie und Praxis. Das Modell des gemischten Lebens im Philebos zeigt sowohl das Ideal der Einheit der Vielheit als auch die Integration des affektiven Teils des Menschen in einem durch die Vernunft geführten Leben.
Der Philebos stellt ein Modell der Beziehung zwischen Theorie und Praxis dar, das einerseits durch die aristotelische Kritik der platonischen Ethik nicht betroffen wird und andererseits sowohl für die moderne Rehabilitierung der praktischen Philosophie als auch für das gegenwärtige Interesse an der Frage nach dem guten Leben von großer Bedeutung sein kann.

By drawing a close link between theoretic and practical questions, the present work aims to reconstruct Plato's later ethics against the backdrop of the Philebus.
In the Philebus, two issues - the development of which transpires throughout the different stages of the Platonic opus - come together: one concerns the problem of the unity of the manifold; the other one, the problem of action-motivation. As such, the relationship between both problems displays the link between the dialectical and the ethical - or again, in Aristotelian terms, between theory and praxis. The Philebus's model of the mixed life displays an ideal of the unity of the manifold as well as the incorporation of man's affective part into a rationally oriented life.
The Philebus advances a model of the theory-praxis relationship which, on the one hand, resists the Aristotelian critique of Platonic ethics; and, on the other, bears on the modern rehabilitation of practical philosophy as well as on current concerns regarding the question about the good life.

Section 291c-303c of Plato's Politicus states that the "second-best constitution" is a constitution of laws, which is an imitation (mimêsis) of the ideal constitution established by an individual with real political knowledge. The interpretation of this doctrine has led to a debate between scholars, as it is unclear in which sense a constitution of laws could be a mimesis of the best constitution. In this paper I argue that the mimesis of laws in Statesman should be understood as the exclusion of the real statesman's false imitators. Thus, this mimetic constitution can be considered as the second best, as long as the laws are understood by their substitute function. The statesmen governing such a constitution should submit to the laws, lest they turn out to be false statesmen. I.e., they can avoid false imitations by conceding that, rather than ruling, they have to obey the laws.

El hombre justo controla sus apetitos por medio de una alianza entre sus partes racional y colérica: mientras la primera determina el objeto de la acción, la segunda da estabilidad y fuerza a la prescripción de la razón. Este trabajo intenta mostrar que la parte colérica puede dar fuerza a las órdenes de la razón, solo si, al mismo tiempo, recibe ella también valor (i.e. la restauración de su imagen dañada). A partir de esto, defenderé que la parte colérica (i) siempre toma partido por la razón en la confrontación con los apetitos (en cuanto enemigos de la libertad del sujeto) y, sin embargo, (ii) puede entrar en conflicto con la razón cuando la parte apetitiva no está en juego (y la pretensión de restauración, i.e. venganza, es reprimida por la razón).

In Book v of Plato’s Laws, he defends that a virtuous life is better than a vicious one, based on the idea that the former involves more pleasure than the latter (733a-734e). The use of this kind of argumentation seems to contradict other passages of the Laws, in which it will be objected that pleasure can work as a criterion of election. This essay aims to show that this recourse does not presuppose any kind of hedonism. In order to prove this, I hold that in the Laws (i) education tries to integrate our natural tendencies in the good life; (ii) this integration is possible because some pleasures can be pursued for their own sake because they are harmless. Based on these principles, I argue that (iii) the argument of Book v appeals to the possibility of choosing pleasure if they are not involved in other criteria of election.

Plato’s characterization of philia in Lysis, on one hand, as one-sided belonging to the ultimate object of our desire and, on the other, as interpersonal reciprocal belonging appears problematic. Yonesawa has recently claimed that one can make sense of both uses of “belonging” if we assume that one is the other’s friend when each one coincides in being the ultimate object of the other’s desire. This paper proposes instead that Lysis’ ‘reciprocity’ of friendship results from friends’ right wanting, which presupposes their souls are well-disposed to a true object of desire. To prove this, I will argue that (i) the action and the argument of the dialogue exhibit this kind of reciprocity, (ii) there is a ‘unique’ ultimate object of desire (‘teleological monism’), that consists of a ‘knowledge about the good life’ and (iii) only the common longing for such knowledge can make possible friends’ reciprocal belonging.

This paper offers a model of moral psychology based on the analysis of the Book I of Plato’s Laws and, particularly, of the puppet image. Contemporary interpreters debate whether this image involves a notion of moderation as “victory” over pleasures, or as “agreement” between these and reason. In order to settle this question, the Philebus’ bipartite psychology will be called upon. This approach will allow us to recognize “conflict” between affections in the education of virtue, and agreement between reason and affectivity in the outcome of this educational process.

In this paper I examine Socrates’ hopeful and confident attitude in the Phaedo in order to show, on the one hand, that the ascetic interpretation of the Socratic doctrine of the purification of affections must be understood in a restricted sense and, on the other, that a dramatic reading of the dialogue – that is, one that recognizes the emotional effects the author seeks to awake in the reader – must primarily take into account Socrates’ intention to communicate to his friends his own affective disposition, and, only secondarily, the emotional reaction the audience in fact holds. To prove this, I will argue that Socrates’ success in calming down his friends’ discouragement does not depend exclusively on the compelling character of his arguments in favor of the immortality of the soul, but also on his friends’ being capable of experiencing by themselves an attraction for wisdom. Socrates looks for this effect through the same experience of the conversation, by trying to awaken in the others the anticipatory pleasure of the hope in post-mortem life. Plato would thus aim to prompt in the reader affections that do not disrupt the intellectual activity and that, alongside his arguments, are capable of counteracting the affections that reduce the horizon of expectations to the corporeal world.

Una de las cuestiones más discutidas en el debate contemporáneo sobre el Filebo de Platón, es sin duda la de la posibilidad de los placeres falsos. En el contexto de esta discusión ha sido el pasaje 36c-41b, referido en particular a la falsedad de los placeres de expectativa, el que ha suscitado la mayor controversia y una gran variedad de interpretaciones. Las distintas posiciones se distinguen según hagan uso del criterio de verdad “ontológico”, “epistemológico” o “moral” para la comprensión de la falsedad de las expectativas. En este trabajo intento mostrar que una comprensión correcta de los placeres de expectativa debe considerar la interacción de los distintos criterios de verdad y no hacer uso exclusivamente de uno de éstos. Mientras que la verdad ontológica de los placeres sirve a la determinación del contenido de las expectativas, la verdad epistemológica (la corrección del estado de creencias) y la verdad moral (la bondad del estado afectivo-disposicional) confluyen en el tipo de verdad específico de este tipo de placeres. Para explicar este concepto de verdad consideraré como modelo la “verdad práctica” de Aristóteles.

Parmenides describes his final objection to Plato’s Theory of Forms (133b-134e) as having the “greatest difficulty” (133b4: μέγιστον) (GD) of all those indicated; it carries the worst consequences and could only be resolved by someone sufficiently gifted and willing to follow a “long and laborious demonstration” (133b7-c1). This judgment, however, contrasts with the widespread interpretation of the objection as a series of sophisms. If this were the case, Parmenides’ words would have a superficial meaning, presenting a false problem as a difficult one. In this paper, I analyze the GD again, taking into account both Parmenides’ words and the critiques of the argument. In order to do this, (I) I will reconstruct the argument and present some of his difficulties; (II) I will try to show that the term ‘power’ (δύναμις) is explicitly used by Parmenides in a purely ‘definitional’ sense that contrasts with the more proper sense of power as ‘capacity.’ This second sense would, however, implicitly be present in the argument, as the power to know and govern existing in human souls and divine intelligence. As a result of this differentiation, I will propose to explain the possibility that we know the Forms, even if they do not need to be known by us to exist; (III) finally, I will apply this criterion to the second part of the argument and try to show to what extent the soul fulfills a fundamental mediating function in Platonic architecture both to make it possible for us to acquire ‘divine’ knowledge and to let the divinity to know and govern the universe.