Law of Torts

Il commento muove dalla decisione del Collegio di Coordinamento A.B.F. sulla sorte di un contratto di fideiussione omnibus che contempla le clausole dello schema contrattuale uniforme predisposto dall’A.B.I., qualificate come anticoncorrenziali dal provvedimento della Banca d’Italia n. 55/2005. L’analisi si concentra esclusivamente sulla nullità della fideiussione stabilita dalla decisione. In questo senso, tale nullità viene fatta discendere dall’art. 2 l. 287/1990, il cui divieto abbraccia non solo le intese, ma anche i contratti attuativi, nella misura in cui ne realizzino il risultato. Con riferimento al caso in esame, la nullità investe, quindi, la fideiussione, nella parte in cui concretizza l’intento uniformatore contemplato dallo schema contrattuale A.B.I. Si tratta, pertanto, di nullità parziale, e non già di nullità «necessariamente parziale», poiché non risulta applicabile, come invece sostiene il Collegio in commento, la disciplina della nullità di protezione.

Although damage is an essential component of negligence liability, important extensions of the categories of actionable damage occur with little or no analysis or even acknowledgement of the fact. In this article, consideration is given to a number of new forms of actionable damage which appear either to have received recognition by the courts in recent years, or to be close to receiving such recognition. The article is divided into three core sections, dealing with negligent imprisonment, wrongful conception and educational negligence. The principal conclusions are that redress for negligent imprisonment is best achieved through recognition of imprisonment as actionable damage in negligence; that an unwanted pregnancy is a form of personal injury, albeit an unusual one; that the conventional sum award in wrongful conception cases is best analysed as compensation for a diminution in the parents' autonomy; and that while untreated learning disorders are now treated by the courts as a form of personal injury, in the absence of such a disorder educational under-development ought not to be recognised as actionable damage in its own right.

Keywords: negligence, damage, personal injury, negligent imprisonment, wrongful conception, educational negligence.

The development of Italian civil liability rules since the 1865 Civil Code to the present day is clearly marked by the influence of foreign models. This article tries to detect these foreign influences, starting from those of the French Code Napoléon on the 1865 Civil Code, moving on to those of Pandectist legal thinking on the 1942 Civil Code, and ending with the influences of the common law experiences and European legislation on some sectors of Italian tort law. The final results of this research is a much more complicated and nuanced picture than what is expected, as the Italian system has not only been a passive receptacle of ideas developed in other countries, but has also been able, throughout its history, to mould those foreign ideas with original concepts, so creating an original system, largely independent from its sources of inspiration.

The contention regarding insolvency and tangibles has kindled a fire in many a trust lawyer’s hearts due to the legal uncertainty it has promoted within certainty of subject matter. It will be analysed alongside two criteria – in this context formalism, meaning consistent adherence, and principle, which is a vision that must be followed; a legal bedrock. The first argument is based on the fact that the creditor hierarchy is overly formalistic as the Court strictly adheres to prescribed methods to the extent that equity suffers as a result. Secondly,  the tangible-intangible debate will be analysed by how consistent courts have been in recognizing the distinction, and it will be proven that a more benevolent stance has been taken by way of intangibles rather than tangibles as the law no longer follows the Orthodox approach. This can be taken as lacking in principle, but not being overly formalistic as it produces more workable results.

El análisis económico del Derecho (AED) estudia los fenómenos jurídicos sirviéndose de las teorías y las herramientas metodológicas proporcionadas por la economía. El AED puede cumplir una función normativa (señalar qué decisiones jurídicas deberían adoptarse con el fin de maximizar ciertas preferencias), una función predictiva (determinar las consecuencias sociales que pueden tener las decisiones jurídicas) y una función explicativa (poner de manifiesto los factores que determinan la forma y el contenido las decisiones jurídicas). El AED ha recibido innumerables críticas. En este trabajo consideramos y tratamos de refutar, en la medida en que lo merezcan, aquellas que impugnan su valor explicativo en general y del Derecho de daños en particular, que es el ámbito jurídico donde esta cuestión se ha discutido más profusa e intensamente. En particular, ponemos de relieve que el AED ofrece explicaciones del Derecho de daños realmente practicado más exactas, amplias, simples, fecundas, unificadoras y coherentes que las propuestas por otras teorías alternativas, como la de la «justicia correctiva».
Law and Economics (L&E) applies the tools of economic theory to the analysis of legal rules and institutions. L&E can have a normative function (i.e. show which legal decisions ought to be made in order to maximize certain preferences), a predictive function (i.e. determine the social consequences legal decisions might have), and an explanatory function (i.e. show the causal factors determining both the form and the content of legal decisions). L&E has been heavily criticized. Taking Tort law as an illustrative example, this paper reviews and tries to refute scholarly opinions challenging the explanatory power of L&E. We show that L&E actually explains several Tort law rules and principles in a more accurate, comprehensive, simple, fruitful, unifying and consistent way than other alternative theories, such as that of "corrective justice".

This article identifies the chief impediment to a tortious response to mischief of the kind seen in _Bhasin v. Hrynew_, and goes on to explain the nature of the impediment before then considering how the problem may be ultimately overcome. The essence of the present obstacle according to the author is that the nascent notion of “damage” and what it means to suffer “damage” in tort is at odds with recognizing the fact of a justiciable wrong having happened to Bhasin at all. The author’s ultimate conclusion as such is that there is an avenue to address “wrongs” like that done to Bhasin in tort, but that tort must first reconceptualize damage in order to embrace invasions of interests that go beyond the contravention of express rights.

O presente texto examina decisao proferida pelo STJ no REsp 1.581.505-SC, de relatoria do Ministro Antonio Carlos Ferreira, que negou a aplicacao da Doutrina do Adimplemento Substancial em caso de inadimplemento incontroverso de mais de 30% do valor do contrato. O comentario analisa a origem da referida doutrina no direito ingles, destacando a necessidade de estabelecimento do correto fundamento da doutrina no direito brasileiro.

Les systèmes d’intelligence artificielle sont susceptibles de générer d’importants dommages matériels
et immatériels, résultant notamment de décisions
individuelles automatisées. Selon leur degré d’autonomie et l’intensité du risque qu’ils représentent
pour le grand public, le droit positif n’offre pas une
protection suffisante aux victimes. La contribution
postule que les opérateurs des systèmes qui présentent un risque élevé devraient être soumis à une
responsabilité civile objective aggravée à l’instar
du régime en place en matière de circulation routière, complétée par une assurance responsabilité
civile obligatoire assortie du droit d’action directe
contre l’assureur. Elle postule également que le régime préconisé s’étende à la réparation de la perte
d’une chance.

The author develop and briefly distinguish the principles of prevention and precaution, in particular reference to the current Argentine Civil Liability Law, verifying the possibility of application of both principles in the new Argentine Civil and Commercial Code. Likewise, he highlight the true reciprocal nature of prevention as opposed to its unilateral and narrow vision. Finally, he will observe how the distribution of the burden of proof may contribute to this bilateral vision of prevention.

Sumario: I. Breve aproXimación del tema; II. Marco normativo. l. El convenio bilateral argentino-uruguayo sobre accidentes de tránsito de 1991. 2. Los Tratados de Montevideo de Derecho Civil de 1889 V 1940. 3. Las normas de dimensión autónoma; III. Los hechos del caso; IV. La decisión judicial; V. Análisis del caso. 1. Fuente normativa. 2. Ambitos de aplicación de las fuentes. 3. Jurisdicción internacional. 4. Derecho aplicable. 5. Cuestiones de cooperación; VI. Conclusiones.

This paper analyzes which liability may arise from the publication of a retweet, if at all. (...)

Сборникът съдържа статии от международна научна конференция в памет на доц. д-р Кристиан Таков (1965–2017), организирана от катедра „Гражданскоправни науки“ на Юридическия факултет на Софийския университет „Св. Климент Охридски“, катедра „Частноправни науки“ на Юридическия факултет на Великотърновския университет „Св. св. Кирил и Методий“ и фондация „Кристиан Таков“, 07.06.2018 г., гр. София.

The present work refers to homogeneous judicial practice from 2010 to August 2017 regarding “medical tort,” under Article 1007 of the Civil Code of Georgia (hereinafter–CCG). Since the problem is related to the general grounds of tort liability, in order to identify the specific features of Article 1007, it would be advisable to determine what kind of relationship exists between the general delict reflected in Article 992 of the CCG and the medical tort identified in Article 1007 of the CCG. Accordingly, it is necessary to clarify the methodological basis of the problem, on the one hand, and the specifics of the medical tort itself, on the other. The question is also of great interest in terms of the distribution of the burden of proof between the parties. This work is a definite attempt to study the specifics of medical delicts based on an analysis of judicial practice.

Companies form a very significant pillar for our country's growth and development. However, companies are not a physical or natural entity but a legal entity run by natural persons. In such cases, there are certain duties, liabilities and privileges imparted to a company, like a natural entity. Hence, if there is any anomaly within the company, there should be some mechanism to hold the company liable and make it compensate for the damage or injury it has caused to a party. The concepts of lifting of the corporate veil, which emphasises on the separate personalities of the company and its members, and the liabilities imposed on the directors and shareholders of the company come into the scene to resolve the disputes effectively. These liabilities can be of two types namely, civil liability and criminal liability. In this research paper, we will focus only on the tortious liability of the company and will try to connect it to the various jurisprudential aspects.

Mi objetivo en este trabajo es defender la idea según la cual el principio de justicia correctiva contiene una dimensión restaurativa que permite acomodar la existencia de remedios no-compensatorios en la práctica de la responsabilidad extracontractual. Argumento que ello es posible en virtud del mandato de la justicia correctiva, según el cual el sistema de responsabilidad debe otorgar a las víctimas la siguiente mejor opción a no haber sido víctima del ilícito desde un comienzo. La primera sección se hace cargo de la objeción de la diversidad de remedios formulada con frecuencia en contra de la justicia correctiva. La segunda sección defiende la dimensión restaurativa de la justicia correctiva, analizando en la tercera sección las consecuencias que se derivan de ello para la concepción de remedios o mecanismos de reparación que la justicia correctiva exige bajo esta lectura. Finalmente, en la cuarta sección exploro la compatibilidad de este modelo de comprensión de la justicia correctiva con la indemnización del daño moral, tratándose del remedio no-compensatorio contemplado por la mayoría de los sistemas de tradición civil continental. Por último, la quinta sección plantea algunas conclusiones.

The advent of transportation network companies (TNC) — such as Uber and Lyft — has presented the TNCs with tremendous legal issues. These companies face civil actions in numerous jurisdictions across the nation. Most significant are the class action suits in California federal courts; these courts have been asked to determine the employment relationship between a TNC and its drivers. TNCs claim the drivers are independent contractors, but drivers allege they are employees and as such are entitled to certain protections accorded by federal and state law. The purpose of this article is to analyze and compare California and Texas case law to predict each respective state’s court or jury’s determination; the implications of such a decision are also discussed. The law of both states would show the relationship between TNCs and their drivers to be that of an employer and employee, but for differing reasons.

Nhận thấy có nhiều anh chị thắc mắc về giải pháp cải thiện độ sáng cho đèn pha xe Toyota Innova quá nên em viết bài này mong đem đến cho những cụ cái nhìn tổng quan về phương pháp nâng cấp độ sáng cho đèn pha led ô tô, xe hơi. Nội dung dưới đây được phân cấp độ từ đơn giản, chi phí thấp tới phức tạp hơn. Đương nhiên chi phí đầu tư cao trên thì sẽ được rất nhiều công dụng hơn (xét cả trên phương diện cường độ sáng và các thuận lợi khác). Phương pháp : lắp bóng xenon Một vài hãng xe đã có bi (projector) sẵn nhưng bóng đèn nguyên bản theo xe lại là halogen cũng như Carens, i30, Fortuner…hoặc một số ít những xe không có bi vẫn lắp bóng xenon. khả năng chiếu sáng tăng khoảng 250-300% so với bóng halogen nguyên bản Ưu điểm: ánh sáng nâng giá trị lên đáng kể, có khả năng lựa chọn được màu ánh sáng như (3000K-ánh sáng vàng, 4300K-ánh sáng trắng vàng, 6000K-ánh sáng trắng xanh). Khuyết điểm: lúc lắp vào các xe không hề có bi (projector) ánh sáng sẽ bị toé ra do choá nguyên phiên bản của xe có cấu tạo phạn xạ ra nhiều hướng, sẽ khiến lóa mắt người đi trái hướng. Vấn đề này rất nguy hiểm nếu di chuyển trên mặt đường hẹp có khả năng gây ra tai nạn va chạm giữa 2 xe nên Dukoto lời khuyên chỉ nên lắp bóng xenon cho các xe đã có rất nhiều projector. Giá tiền cho một bộ bóng xenon (gồm 2 bóng + 2 ballasts) dao động từ 2triệu (hàng phổ thông)->6,5tr (xenon Philips chính hãng) Biện pháp : độ bi-xenon Đây chính là giải pháp tuyệt đối hoàn hảo để cải thiện độ sáng của đèn chiếu pha. Điểm nổi bật:-Khả năng chiếu sáng tôn lên gấp nhiều lần so với đèn nguyên phiên bản (khoảng 1000%).-Ánh sáng rất đẹp, xuất hiện cắt cắt đi phần ánh nắng ở bên trên theo 1 mặt phẳng nằm hướng ngang.-Những bi-xenon có cả chế độ pha cos nên nếu độ vào bên thì khi bật pha xe sẽ có được 4 cụm đèn pha sáng cùng 1 khi (2 cụm đèn pha nguyên thủy + 2 đèn pha của bi-xenon), nếu độ vào bên pha thì lúc bật cos sẽ có 4 đèn cos sáng cùng 1 lúc (2 đèn cos gốc + 2 đèn cos của bi-xenon).-Có nhiều chọn lựa cho những gói độ bi với các thông số kỹ thuật không giống nhau. Nhược điểm: Giá thành cao. Dukoto xin tư vấn qua 1 chút về băn khoăn độ bi-xenon với tư cách là một trong những người làm việc khá nhiều năm , con số những bộ đèn đã độ đã lên đến hàng triệu bộ với hàng trăm mẫu không giống nhau (Tìm hiểu thêm các mẫu tại website: dodenotoduk.com)

The EU Product Liability Directive (Directive 85/374/EEC-PLD) provides for strict liability of producers for defective products. This paper examines its applicability de lege lata and de lege ferenda to software updates of automated vehicles. It is concluded that to regard software updates as 'products' under the PLD entails many legal and practical challenges. These relate to the notion of 'product', the time that the update is put into circulation, the notion of 'defect', the burden of proof especially as to causation, and the calculation of time bars. Applying the PLD to software updates seems to create more problems than the ones the Directive is meant to solve. Therefore, it is submitted that the PLD is inapplicable both de lege lata and de legel ferenda to software updates. It is simpler and more logical to consider software updates of automated vehicles as a maintenance service.

Sin duda, la Responsabilidad Civil al día de hoy sigue siendo la <<niña bonita>> del Derecho Civil en Chile. Hemos querido crear un pequeño aporte a la cuestión, pero desde una perspectiva nueva: La del Common Law. En efecto, ante la incansable tarea de <<conquistar>> la Responsabilidad Civil, nos asaltó la legítima duda de si acaso ella en nuestro país se bastaba a sí misma con la actual composición doctrinaria y teórica. Es de nuestra consideración que, caprichosa, no lo está. Hemos elegido tratar el Common Law en parte arrastrados por la novedad, y por otra de que no se ha tenido a la vista ningún artículo de doctrina que explique cual es el sistema de responsabilidad extracontractual en él. Este texto, propone aventurarse a descubrir si acaso los principios y las formas jurídicas de los Torts pueden ser <<exportados>> o <<traducidos>> al derecho nacional, perfeccionando el entendimiento de la Responsabilidad Civil. Desde luego que creemos que sí, lo que se intentará defender en esta oportunidad. El plan, consistirá primero en hacer una exploración panorámica de los Torts en el Common Law (I), para posteriormente avocarnos al entendimiento de algunas figuras de los Torts, concluyendo con una perspectiva para su aplicación (II).

The United States Supreme Court has heard oral arguments in the case Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, No. 19-1392 (cert. granted May 17, 2021). During said arguments, by many accounts, the majority of the justices seemed to be showing their cards in favor of a pro-life ruling of some manner. This paper speculates on what pro-life litigation may look like in the future.

Las plataformas de economía colaborativa actúan en general poniendo en contacto a usuarios para que intercambien servicios u otras prestaciones entre ellos. En el caso de Uber, por ejemplo, el usuario que quiere un servicio de transporte es puesto en contacto con un conductor, que le presta luego ese servicio gracias a la intermediación de la plataforma, a cambio de un precio. Este trabajo se plantea cómo opera la responsabilidad civil en ese contexto, pongamos por caso en el su-puesto en el que el conductor puesto a disposición por Uber cause un daño al usuario de la plataforma o a un tercero. En particular, conviene determinar si existe o no la dependencia que es presupuesto de la responsabilidad por hecho ajeno según nuestro Derecho civil. Se comparan a este respecto las soluciones del Derecho español y el extranjero.

Fruto das pesquisas desenvolvidas pelo autor durante o curso de mestrado em Direito Civil junto à Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de São Paulo no Largo de São Francisco, sob a orientação do Professor Doutor Marco Fábio Morsello, a obra nos permite refletir sobre os acertos e desacertos deste caminhar e, longe de buscar uma uniformização dos direitos nacionais, possibilita conhecer as diferenças entre os modelos jurídicos adotados por cada sistema, com riqueza de dados e detalhes provenientes do Master of Comparative Law concluído junto à Cumberland Law Of School, na Stanford University, sob orientação do Professor Michael D. Floyd.

On a l'habitude d'aller directement aux solutions indiquées par nos anciens juristes. On a moins celle d'interroger leur manière de les présenter, c'est-à-dire de parler du droit, notamment du droit de la responsabilité. Tel sera l'objet de ce propos, s'agissant d'un juriste que tous nous connaissons : Pothier. Pas vraiment d'ailleurs le Pothier du Traité des obligations (qui consacre peu de mots à la responsabilité) 1 , mais celui qui, dans un travail inaugural qui consiste davantage en une remise en ordre qu'une simple édition, donne une nouvelle publication du Digeste. Certes, en raison de la nature même de ce travail, notre auteur paraît s'effacer comme auteur. Il ne parle pas-il ne commente pas-mais fait parler un texte (D. 9.2, ad legem aquiliam) dont il n'est pas l'auteur. Il est pourtant bel et bien présent, puisque, pour faire parler ce texte, il en ré-agence les éléments. Il se démarque ainsi de la plupart des autres éditions du Digeste. Cl. de Ferrière par exemple, dans Jurisprudence du Digeste, ne consacre que quelques lignes à D. 9.2, au motif « qu'il y a peu de choses de ce qu'il contient, qui puisse s'accommoder à nôtre Jurisprudence » 2. Une telle affirmation, prise 1 Les n° 116 et suiv. consacrés aux délits et quasi-délits définissent ces deux termes (en les opposant entre eux et aux quasi-contrats), puis posent comme condition de la responsabilité civile pour fait personnel l'usage de la raison. Ils finissent par évoquer les cas de responsabilité du fait d'autrui, mais jamais ils ne précisent la structure de la responsabilité civile (comment ses différents éléments sont-ils liés les uns aux autres ?) ni les notions essentielles. Que faut-il entendre par tort ou faute ? Le Traité des obligations ne le dit pas et, d'ailleurs, il fait un emploi plutôt parcimonieux du terme faute (à propos de l'ivresse, n° 119, et des mineurs, n° 120), préférant parler de fait, de malignité ou d'imprudence. 2 Paris, 1677, t. I, p. 276. Ferrière ne signale, comme emprunts au droit romain, que la légitime défense et la nécessité d'une faute (qui apparaît à travers l'exemple de la tuile qu'un couvreur a fait tomber, dont le dommage

Eind januari vierde privaatrechtelijk Nederland drie verjaardagen: op 25 januari was het negentig jaar geleden dat de Hoge Raad het arrest Bos/Heineken  (ook bekend als Brouwerij I) wees, op 30 januari vierde Quint/Te Poel  zijn zestigste verjaardag en op 31 januari was het arrest Lindenbaum/Cohen  maar liefst honderd jaar oud. Met name het eeuwfeest van Lindenbaum/Cohen was reden voor een feestje: de Universiteit Leiden organiseerde een symposium erover en de Hoge Raad heeft zelfs een mini-opera – getiteld ‘NJ 1919, p. 161’, naar de vindplaats in de Nederlandse Jurisprudentie – gecomponeerd. In dit artikel zal ik ingaan op wat vooraf ging aan Lindenbaum/Cohen, en dan met name op de legistische en antilegistische stromingen in Nederland in de negentiend eeuw.

In this article we report the results of an empirical study of 368 first instance decisions on the contributory negligence doctrine handed down in England and Wales between 2000 and 2014. The two central questions at which we looked were: how often a defendant’s plea of contributory negligence was successful; and by how much a claimant’s damages were reduced when a finding of contributory negligence was made. We also considered the extent to which the answers to these questions depended on the following variables: the claimant’s age; the claimant’s gender; the type of damage suffered by the claimant; the contextual setting of the claim; and the year of the decision. Our study uncovered several important truths about the contributory negligence doctrine hidden in this mass of case law, some of which cast significant doubt on the accuracy of widely held views about the doctrine’s operation.

Keywords: Negligence, contributory negligence, apportionment of damages, Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945, first instance decisions, empirical study.

Ante las dificultades probatorias del nexo causal en supuestos de responsabilidad civil o patrimonial el Derecho obliga a que el peso de la incertidumbre recaiga en su conjunto sobre uno solo de los sujetos implicados: sobre el agente (posiblemente) dañoso, cuando el juzgador rebaja el estándar ordinario de prueba para afirmar un nexo causal dudoso y ordena la reparación total del daño padecido; o sobre la víctima, cuando el órgano judicial mantiene ese estándar ordinario y niega el nexo causal y con ello la responsabilidad. Es el principio del " todo o nada ". La teoría de la pérdida de oportunidad o " chance " altera este planteamiento, pues distribuye el peso de la incertidumbre causal entre las dos partes implicadas: el agente responde sólo en proporción a la probabilidad de que fuera autor del menoscabo; y, correlativamente, la víctima obtiene una reparación acomodada a la probabilidad de no haber padecido el daño de no haber mediado el hecho lesivo. De este modo se brinda una solución equilibrada que pretende adaptarse a una sensibilidad justicial a la que repugna la liberación del agente (posiblemente) dañoso por las dificultades probatorias, pero también que se le conmine a reparar la totalidad de un daño que pudo no haber causado. La profesora de filosofía del derecho Marina Gascón Abellán y el profesor de derecho administrativo Luis Medina Alcoz debaten en torno al fundamento de esta solución, empleada cada vez con más frecuencia (pero con poco rigor) por nuestros jueces y tribunales. La primera acude a la teoría de la prueba y el segundo a la teoría de la causalidad. Para la primera la doctrina de la pérdida de oportunidad no entraña ningún cambio significativo en los planteamientos causales tradicionales; para justificarla basta asumir que el conocimiento judicial de los hechos debe basarse en juicios razonados de probabilidad y acudir a la figura de la presunción iuris tantum del nexo causal. Para el segundo esa doctrina implica una corrección parcial de los planteamientos causales tradicionales traducida en una complicación de los sistemas de imputación causal; junto al " todo o nada " basado en la afirmación o negación vínculo etiológico opera el " ni todo ni nada " basado en la afirmación de causalidades solamente posibles. Palabras clave: Responsabilidad por daños; causalidad; responsabilidad patrimonial de la Administración; responsabilidad proporcional; teoría de la pérdida de oportunidad; causalidad; prueba; incertidumbre; causalidad probabilística.

The article describes the problem of tortious liability for failure to render assistance. There are no legal systems that establish a duty to render assistance in the provisions of civil law. This stems from the fact that in most of them, the obligation to take actions derives from criminal law that imposes direct sanctions on those who do not render assistance (e.g. France, Germany, Austria and Switzerland). Nevertheless, even the tortious liability of a person who could easily and without risk rescue another but fails to do so is highly controversial from the comparative perspective. Some legal systems (mainly in common law countries) reject tortious liability in similar cases.  ome authors argue that the failure to act in those cases does not cause direct damage and that the pure omission should not provide a basis for liability. There are also opinions that this issue should remain the subject of morality rather than law, and therefore a moral sanction, not a civil one, is appropriate in this respect. For that reason, the draft amendment to Austrian tort law and the Principles of European Tort Law include explicitly such a duty to act in the draft provisions. In Polish law, Article 162 of the Polish Criminal Code of 1997 governs the obligation to render assistance. According to the legal literature, the qualification of an act or omission as wrongful in criminal law prejudges that it is also unlawful in civil law. The scope of criminal liability established on the basis of Article 162 of the Polish Criminal Code covers most cases regarded in the comparative literature as potential grounds of tortious liability. The obligation to act can also potentially arise outside the scope of the situations covered by Article 162 of the Polish Criminal Code. It is possible when the omission would be contrary to the so-called rules of social coexistence (rules of morality). In such case, the potential existence of an obligation to render assistance should depend on several circumstances. Firstly, the omission of the potential rescuer must be intentional. Secondly, potential liability should be limited only to situations where the existing danger could lead to serious bodily injury or death to the person at risk. Thirdly, the cost of preventing or removing the threat on the part of the potential rescuer should be significantly lower than the importance of legal interests of the endangered person. Fourthly, the potential rescuer needs to have a real opportunity and appropriate skills to prevent or eliminate the existing threat, whether by providing help or support to the person at risk or informing those who could do so. Moreover, the obligation to render assistance may exist in situations where there is a specific relationship (even a factual one) between the parties that justifies providing aid to each other.

This paper analyses whether and under which conditions the State ought to compensate for the losses caused when managing the COVID-19 crisis. It focuses, firstly, on instances where public authorities have accidentally caused the damage at issue either through actions or omissions. Secondly, it considers cases of State liability for lawful conduct, where public authorities deliberately have inflicted some damage on a person or a group of people for the sake of the public interest. The paper takes Spanish law as a reference, which does not prevent our analysis from being extended to other legal systems based on similar principles.

Hong Kong courts currently use the double actionability rule to determine whether a party has an international tort claim-the double actionability rule is lagging behind many common law jurisdictions. The purpose of this article is to argue why the double actionability rule must be abolished. The article then explores the three approaches in international tort actions, namely (a) the 'proper law' of tort; (b) lex loci deliciti commissi; and (c) the 'most favourable law' approach. All three approaches to international torts have their shortcomings, and there is no fast solution in solving choice of law issues in international torts. However, it is suggested that Hong Kong should adopt the 'most favourable law' approach, as all of the drawbacks with this approach have been attended to in this article.