Alexander Belohlavek

International arbitration differs from domestic court litigation with respect to evidence and the burden of proof, in that there are no formal rules as to the taking of evidence, nor with respect to the burden of proof. This article focuses on certain specific issues relating to the taking of evidence in investor-state disputes connected with the rights and duties of the parties.

The expression “burden of proof” refers not to the degree of proof that is required in order for a fact to be deemed established, but rather to the question of which party has the onus of proving the given allegation. The parties present a wide range of facts to the arbitrators, and it is more or less irrelevant who has the burden of proof. Insofar as these facts are disputed, the parties will present and the tribunal will take evidence. Only if a clear and convincing answer to a factual question cannot be found will the tribunal have regard to the duty to submit evidence and the burden of proof in order to decide to whose disadvantage such non liquet situation has to be resolved.

Discovery in international arbitration is usually limited to exchanges of certain documents and has to be limited, because arbitration would otherwise be deprived of its fundamental functions and advantages. This also applies to investor-state disputes, which are also often specific for a special interest in not submitting or presenting, respectively, certain documents or facts due to a qualified public element.


Mezinárodní rozhodčí řízení se liší od vnitrostátního soudního řízení v záležitostech dokazování a důkazního břemene v tom směru, že nejsou stanovena žádná formální pravidla dokazování a žádná formální pravidla týkající se důkazního břemene. Předmětem tohoto příspěvku jsou některé specifické otázky související s dokazováním ve sporech na ochranu investic v návaznosti na práva a povinnosti stran.

Výraz „důkazní břemeno“ není výrazem označujícím to, jak přesvědčivé musí být důkazy, aby bylo možno skutkovou okolnost jimi prokazovanou označit za prokázanou, ale spíše se tím míní to, která strana je zatížena povinností prokazovat určité tvrzení. Strany předkládají rozhodcům řadu skutečností a je při tom víceméně nerozhodné, kdo má důkazní povinnost. Pokud jsou tyto skutečnosti sporné, strany budou předkládat důkazy a soud je bude provádět. Pouze v případě, že se nedaří nalézt jasnou a přesvědčivou odpověď na skutkovou otázku, zohlední soud důkazní povinnost a důkazní břemeno, aby rozhodl, k tíži které strany je nutno tuto nerozhodnou situaci vyřešit.

Proces discovery je v mezinárodním rozhodčím řízení obvykle omezen na výměnu určitých listin a je zapotřebí jej omezovat. Jinak by rozhodčí řízení ztrácelo na svých základních funkcích a výhodách. To platí i pro investiční spory, kde navíc často existuje zvláštní zájem na tom, že některé listiny a skutečnosti nebudou prezentovány s ohledem na kvalifikovaný veřejný prvek.

We can conclude that non-state rules may include both lex mercatoria, i.e. the law of international merchants, which is not perceived in any uniform way, and currently perhaps also selected rules of EU law, provided that no legal relations are involved that have no connection to the European area. Lex mercatoria can be defined as including international trade usages (such as INCOTERMS, which have become rather popular), generally recognised legal principles (for instance, pacta sunt servanda), and collections of principles governing international agreements (e.g. UNIDROIT Principles).

Lex mercatoria can be applied both in arbitration and in litigation based on four theoretical approaches. The first applicable method is subsidiary application, i.e. lex mercatoria is applied within the limits of binding provisions of applicable law – this method does not raise any problems in practice. Another possibility is application equivalent to national legal systems, i.e. based on the conflict-of-laws method. This method is currently considered controversial and is suitable for arbitration, rather than litigation. The third possibility is the preferential application of lex mercatoria – this is, however, a very extreme approach, even within international commercial arbitration, and requires the due assessment of all relevant circumstances. This category may also include negative choice of law, which postulates that the parties opted for lex mercatoria, because they did not choose any applicable law. This is, again, controversial doctrine, which may only be applied if we first take into consideration all of the circumstances of the case, and primarily the will of the parties. The fourth and last possibility is the ex post choice of law.

As concerns practical possibilities of application, the most frequently employed method is the application of non-state rules in connection with arbitration, where the courts control the proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Academics agree that the recognition and enforcement of a foreign award cannot be refused, should the sole grounds for refusal be the fact that the award is based on lex mercatoria. Another possibility of applying non-state rules in courts is application based on domestic laws. The third possibility is the application of non-state rules based on the parties’ choice, i.e. the parties may opt for non-state law. Even if some of the parties disagree, it is possible to envisage the application of non-state rules in litigation, though rather as soft law, i.e. a tool or inspiration for the resolution of the given case. This would be similar to the application of foreign law or foreign case law.

We can also imagine, subject to certain conditions, the application of non-state rules in domestic disputes: (i) if the parties agree to do so, in which case, again, non-state rules would be applied within the limits of binding rules of the applicable law, or (ii) at the court’s discretion. In such case, the court should have regard for any and all circumstances, such as the parties’ experience with international trade, as well as the method of application. The application of non-state rules as soft law can be accepted without objections. Both arbitral tribunals and courts have become more open to non-state rules – for instance, the fact that a decision or award is based on lex mercatoria is not eo ipso contrary to public policy (ordre public).
The application of non-state legal standards is intertwined with the irreplaceable role of a first-rate pre- and post-graduate system of education, and with interactions between extensive practice, on the one hand, and education and training, on the other. This is the reason why schools and other educational institutions must be addressed, and such quality of lectures and courses must be emphasised that will guarantee a high level of theoretical training and high-quality and solid incentives and information from practice. The reason is that this very requirement attains qualified dimensions in the case of trade and legal usages (international, as well as national and regional). The potential of cooperation between educational institutions and international organisations mostly remains untapped – and not only those that create and apply contract templates, unify recommendations, or formulate trade and legal principles, etc.

В заключение можно сказать, что негосударственные правила могут включать в себя, во-первых, lex mercatoria, т. е. право участников международных коммерческих отношений, относительно понимания которого отсутствует единое мнение, во-вторых, в настоящее время, очевидно, и некоторые правовые нормы ЕС, при условии, что речь идет о правоотношениях, в которых отсутствует связь с европейским пространством. Составляющей lex mercatoria можно считать международные торговые обычаи (например, ИНКОТЕРМС, которые в значительной степени стали популярными), общепризнанные правовые принципы или основы (например, pacta sunt servanda) и свод принципов международных договоров (например, Принципы УНИДРУА).

Lex mercatoria может применяться как арбитражами, так и судами общей юрисдикции на основе четырех теоретических подходов. Первым является субсидиарное применение, когда lex mercatoria применяется в рамках когентных положений применяемого права – на практике данный способ применения не встречается с какими-либо проблемами. Вторым вариантом является применение, равноценное национальным правовым системам, т. е. на основании коллизионного метода. В настоящее время данный способ является спорным и применяется скорее арбитражными судами, чем судами общей юрисдикции. Третий вариант – это преимущественное применение lex mercatoria, которое, однако, является крайним случаем даже в контексте международного торгового арбитража, требующего рассмотрения всех существенных обстоятельств. Сюда также можно включить отрицательный выбор права (negative choice), когда предполагается, что стороны, не выбрав применимое право, выбрали именно lex mercatoria. И в данном случае речь снова идет о спорной доктрине, перед применением которой необходимо взвесить все обстоятельства дела и, прежде всего, учесть волеизъявление сторон. Четвертым и последним вариантом является дополнительный выбор права.

С точки зрения практического применения на первом месте (с учетом частоты применения) находится применение негосударственных правил в связи с арбитражным разбирательством, когда суды осуществляют контрольную функцию в ходе разбирательства о признании и приведении в исполнение иностранных арбитражных решений. В этом случае доктрина признает, что нельзя отказать в признании и приведении в исполнение решения иностранного суда только по той причине, что оно основано на lex mercatoria.  Следующим возможным применением негосударственных правил в судах общей юрисдикции является применение на основании национальных правовых норм. Третьим вариантом является применение негосударственных правил на основании выбора сторон, когда стороны могут выбрать негосударственное право. Даже если не все стороны согласны, можно рассматривать возможность применения негосударственных норм судами общей юрисдикции, однако, скорее как т. н. soft law, т. е. в качестве пособия или источника инспирации при рассмотрении и разрешении спора. Аналогично применяется иностранное право или иностранные документы судебной практики.

При определенных условиях также возможно применение негосударственных правил во внутригосударственных спорах. Это, прежде всего, споры, в которых стороны согласуют применение негосударственных правил в рамках когентных положений применяемого права, или по усмотрению суда. В данном случае суд должен рассмотреть все обстоятельства, например, опыт сторон с международной торговлей, а также способ применения. Против применения негосударственных правил как soft law нельзя возражать. В контексте наблюдается растущий интерес арбитражных судов, а также судов [общей юрисдикции/государственных] к негосударственным правилам, который проявляется, например, в том, что основание решения на lex mercatoria еще не означает противоречие публичному порядку.
В связи с применением негосударственных правовых норм важную роль играет качественная вузовская и послевузовская образовательная система и взаимодействие широкой практики с воспитанием и обучением. Поэтому необходимо обращать особое внимание на воспитательные и образовательные учреждения, а также на качество содержания обучения, гарантирующее как высокий уровень теоретической подготовки, так и качественные и обоснованные стимулы и сведения из практики. Именно это требование в торговых и правовых обычаях (международных, а также национальных и региональных) приобретает важность с точки зрения квалификации. В основном остается нереализованным потенциал в области сотрудничества между образовательными учреждениями и международными организациями, причем не только теми, которые занимаются созданием и применением образцов договоров, объединяющих рекомендаций, формулировок торговых и правовых принципов и т. п.

Article 15 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on insolvency proceedings stipulates that (cit.) [t]he effects of insolvency proceedings on a pending lawsuit concerning an asset or a right of which the debtor has been divested shall be governed solely  by the law of the Member State in which that lawsuit is pending. Article 18 of the European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) No. 2015/848 only extends the effects of the particular rule explicitly also to pending arbitral proceedings. The Regulation distinguishes between (i) the effects of insolvency proceedings on the enforceability of decisions in individual cases for the benefit of individual creditors, i.e. proceedings that have been finally and conclusively terminated without, however, the decision being fulfilled, which is why the creditor opened enforcement proceedings (execution), on the one hand, and (ii) the effects on pending lawsuits, on the other hand. The former category is subject to Article 4(2)(f) of the Regulation, which determines the lex fori concursus as the applicable law; the latter category, i.e. pending finding proceedings, is subject to Article 15 of the Regulation, which prescribes the application of the lex fori processus (lex fori) as the law of the state in which the proceedings are held. The fact that certain Member States incorporate rules regulating the termination of proceedings not only in procedural law, but also in insolvency law provisions, which are exclusively or predominantly substantive, raises no problems, despite the fact that distinguishing between substantive and procedural provisions has no relevance, and it would be wrong to interpret Article 15 of the Regulation as indicating that it should exclusively concern procedural laws.

Ustanovení článku 15 nařízení Rady (ES) č. 1346/2000 z 29. května 2000 o insolvenčním řízení stanoví, že (cit.) [ú]činky insolvenčního řízení na probíhající soudní řízení týkající se majetku nebo práva náležejícího do podstaty se řídí výlučně  právem členského státu, ve kterém se probíhající soudní řízení koná.  Článek 18 nařízení Evropského parlamentu a Rady (EU) č. 2015/848 pouze rozšiřuje výslovně tuto úpravu též na probíhající rozhodčí řízení. Nařízení rozlišuje mezi účinky insolvenčního řízení na vykonatelnost rozhodnutí v individuálních věcech svědčících ve prospěch jednotlivých věřitelů, tj. na řízení pravomocně ukončená, kde však doposud nebylo rozhodnutí splněno a z toho důvodu je vedena exekuce na straně jedné, a účinky na soudní řízení doposud neukončená (probíhající) na straně druhé. Pro první skupinu se použije čl. 4 odst. 2 písm. f/ Nařízení, který určuje lex fori concursus jako právo použitelné, pro druhou skupinu, tj. pro doposud neskončená nalézací řízení, se aplikuje čl. 15 Nařízení, který normuje použití lex fori processus (lex fori) jako práva státu, v němž řízení probíhá. Skutečnost, že pravidla o zastavení řízení lze v některých členských státech nalézt nejen v procesním právu, ale také v ustanoveních insolvenčního práva, která mají buď převažující, nebo výhradně hmotněprávní charakter, nevyvolává žádné problémy, a to i přes skutečnost, že rozlišování mezi hmotněprávními a procesními ustanoveními nemá žádný význam a případný výklad dikce čl. 15 Nařízení v tom smyslu, že by se mělo jednat výhradně o předpisy procesní, by byl chybný.

International arbitration differs from domestic court litigation with respect to evidence and the burden of proof, in that there are no formal rules as to the taking of evidence, nor with respect to the burden of proof. This article focuses on certain specific issues relating to the taking of evidence in investor-state disputes connected with the rights and duties of the parties.

The expression “burden of proof” refers not to the degree of proof that is required in order for a fact to be deemed established, but rather to the question of which party has the onus of proving the given allegation. The parties present a wide range of facts to the arbitrators, and it is more or less irrelevant who has the burden of proof. Insofar as these facts are disputed, the parties will present and the tribunal will take evidence. Only if a clear and convincing answer to a factual question cannot be found will the tribunal have regard to the duty to submit evidence and the burden of proof in order to decide to whose disadvantage such non liquet situation has to be resolved.

Discovery in international arbitration is usually limited to exchanges of certain documents and has to be limited, because arbitration would otherwise be deprived of its fundamental functions and advantages. This also applies to investor-state disputes, which are also often specific for a special interest in not submitting or presenting, respectively, certain documents or facts due to a qualified public element.

Problematika rozhodčího řízení a diskuse s ní spojené v posledních letech neustávají. Hovoří se o ní na odborných fórech a setkáních právnických stavů, odborníci z praxe i z akademické sféry se snaží nalézt odpovědi na otázky, které průběžně vyvolává praxe i judikatura Nejvyššího soudu ČR i Ústavního soudu ČR. Proto není divu, že se rozhodčí řízení jako forma mimosoudního řešení sporů pravidelně objevuje také v programu Pražského právnického podzimu.

V pondělí 23. listopadu 2015 se v pražském hotelu Olšanka uskutečnila další akce IV. ročníku Pražského právnického podzimu. Jednalo se o workshop nazvaný Aktuální otázky rozhodčího řízení a jeho partnery se stali Advokát Dr. Alexander J. Bělohlávek a Česká (& Středoevropská) ročenka rozhodčího řízení a mediálním partnerem tohoto workshopu byl deník Lidové noviny. Záštitu této akci poskytl místopředseda Nejvyššího soudu ČR JUDr. Roman Fiala.

Workshop řídila advokátka a šéfredaktorka Rodinných listů JUDr. Daniela Kovářová, jednotlivé odborné panely moderovali prof. JUDr. Naděžda Rozehnalová, CSc., vysokoškolská pedagožka brněnské Právnické fakulty a její bývalá děkanka a v současnosti prorektorka Masarykovy univerzity Brno, a prof. Dr. Alexander J. Bělohlávek, advokát a vnitrostátní i zahraniční rozhodce.

Stalo se už tradicí, že z akcí v rámci Pražského právnického podzimu zaměřených na rozhodčí řízení zpracovávají pořadatelé sborník. Základem monografie, kterou čtenář právě drží v ruce, je jednak záznam prezentací hlavních přednášejících a nejzajímavějších částí diskuse, která zmíněného podzimního odpoledne v průběhu workshopu proběhla, jakož i autorské materiály zpracované a předložené účastníky pro přípravu této publikace. Tematicky byl celý program zaměřen na dvě oblasti. Tou první se stala aplikace procesních standardů v rozhodčím řízení z pohledu rozsahu autonomie rozhodců a stran. Druhou pak byla problematika použitelnosti občanského soudního řádu v rozhodčím řízení, resp. diskuze z pohledu interakce rozhodčího řízení v. řízení soudního ve věcech spadajících pod pomocné a kontrolní funkce soudů právě ve vztahu k rozhodčímu řízení a rozhodčím nálezům. Kmenovou část doplňuje přehled tuzemských titulů týkajících se rozhodčího řízení a vydaných v roce 2015 a stejně jako u loňského vydání analogické publikace především podrobné anotace aktuální judikatury Ústavního soudu ČR a Nejvyššího soudu ČR ve vztahu k rozhodčímu řízení z posledních let, včetně rozborů, komentářů a poznámek k těmto vybraným rozhodnutím. V závěru je připojen podrobný rejstřík zpracovaný editory, a to rejstřík věcný, rejstřík odkazů na předpisy tuzemského, jakož i cizozemského původu a rejstřík odkazů na judikaturu tak, jak je na tyto předpisy a judikáty odkazováno v textu.

International treaties therefore have priority over provisions of domestic origin (domestic lex arbitri). This mainly concerns two conventions, namely the New York Convention (1958) and the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1961). In the field of international arbitration, specifically the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, these two conventions were historically preceded by two international treaty acts. If it is possible to apply both the provisions of bilateral interstate treaties (as mentioned above, primarily the legal assistance treaties) and the provisions of multilateral conventions, then the bilateral treaties are usually prioritized as a quasi lex specialis. Mainly the reflection the bilateral treaties (legal assistance treaties), but often also the reflection of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (1961) will often be omitted.

Due to the popularity of arbitration in the Czech Republic as a dispute settlement method and due to the fact that about 120 to 150 Thousand arbitral awards will be rendered in the Czech Republic each year (in domestic arbitrations as well as in arbitration with cross border impacts), also the number of court decisions related to arbitration is going to grow-up. The paper presents the most important court decisions related to arbitration from the period 2013 – 2014 in annotating, analysing and commenting them.

In its decision Case No. 23 Cdo 2166/2012 of June 24, 2013 the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic explained its view to the scope of autonomy of arbitrators as follows. The law of civil procedure is public law, not private law; consequently, the interpretation and application of the law of civil procedure is not automatically governed by the principle that “everything is allowed which is not prohibited”. This means, inter alia, that we cannot conclude that arbitrator(s) may render decisions in summary proceedings because it is not explicitly prohibited under any laws or regulations; conversely, it is necessary to consider the wording of the procedural laws and subsequently conclude, on the basis of the individual provisions incorporated in the applicable regulations, which authorities are entitled to resolve specific types of disputes in summary proceedings.

A crucial discussion currently lead in the Czech Republic in respect to arbitral proceedings relates the parties´right to be heard in arbitration and the scope of this right. It is therefore not surprising that a lot of decisions of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic deals in particular with the mentioned issue. So it was for instance in the judgment of June 25, 2013 in Case No. 23 Cdo 3285/2012. The court took (i.a.) the following decision. Considering the principle of the equality of arms between the parties, which also applies in arbitration, both parties must be provided with the opportunity to make statements (pleadings) in the arbitral proceedings, prove their own statements, and contest the statements of the counterparty. The parties also have the right to demand that the arbitral tribunal address the merits of their pleas (objections). If a claim has been made in arbitration, the respondent must have a right to raise in the arbitral proceedings any and all objections against the claim that could influence the decision in the case. If the party pleads set-off in the proceedings properly, the decision-making authority could conclude that the claimant’s claim was extinguished by set-off. In such case, the request for arbitration (statement of claim) would have to be dismissed. Consequently, the respondent cannot be denied the opportunity to assert their claim for set-off against the claimant’s claim. The rbitrator must assess the merits of the respondent’s defense, whereby they assert their claim for set-off against the claimant’s claim, i.e. determine whether the act resulted in the extinguishment (partial or total) of the claimant’s claim. The arbitrator is not allowed to refuse such material assessment, arguing that the arbitrator does not have jurisdiction to do so, because the claim was not the subject matter of the parties’ arbitration agreement; otherwise, the arbitrator would be denying the party the opportunity to state (plead) their case before the arbitrators.

Other decisions annotated, analysed and commented in the paper target another very important issues as for instance the appointment and nomination of arbitration in proceedings with permanent arbitral institutions vs. in arbitrations „ad hoc“, use of Rules of arbitral institutions, invalidity of an arbitration clause, separability, consumer protection, EU law in respect to arbitration, essentialia of arbitration agreement, fnality of arbitral awards etc. Subject of the paper is analyse of 24 of the most important decisions (mostly but not only) of the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic as from the period indicated above.

Pезюме:
Арбитраж должен быть максимально эффективным, гибким и быстрым, что должно быть одним из его главных преимуществ по сравнению с судебными разбирательствами. На самом деле мы все чаще сталкиваемся с усилиями сторон, направленными на создание максимальных препятствий, которые часто граничат со злоупотреблением процессом или, по меньшей мере, свидетельствуют о неэтичном поведении. Интенсивность таких действий иногда настолько высока, что на практике для таких действий прижилось название «партизанской тактики». Арбитражные суды, а также суды, реализующие контрольную и вспомогательную функцию в отношении арбитража, вполне логично стремятся такие действия ограничивать или бороться с ними и налагать штрафы на стороны и, все чаще, на адвокатов сторон, которые искусственно создают препятствия. Суды в некоторых государствах (например, Швейцарии, США и т. д.) даже прямо наказывают адвокатов сторон за рекомендации, которые были явно бессмысленными и без шансов на успех, учитывая соответствующее законодательство и правовую практику, знание которых у лиц с юридической квалификацией предполагается (например, в случае ходатайства об отмене арбитражного решения, возражений об отсутствии компетенции арбитров или возражений против арбитров). У арбитров обычно ограничены возможности налагать санкции за такие действия. Наиболее распространенной и наилучшей применимой возможностью является учет факта создания искусственных препятствий сторонами и адвокатами в решении о праве на возмещение судебных издержек. В определенной степени, и в зависимости от права, применимого к арбитражному соглашению, и от процессуального права, применимого к разбирательству, в некоторых случаях они могут исключить или ограничить использование некоторых утверждений сторон или доказательств, связанных с неэтичными или даже незаконными действиями сторон и их адвокатов. Однако возможности арбитров часто сталкиваются с ограничениями их полномочий, а также с конфиденциальностью арбитража, которая, как правило, не позволяет арбитрам направить жалобу в соответствующий профессиональный орган, который осуществляет надзор за деятельностью адвоката, или даже возбудить уголовное дело в отношении стороны и/или ее адвоката. В отношении адвокатов также важным является вопрос о том, какими нормами они должны руководствоваться, если разбирательство происходит на территории другого государства, а не в государстве, в котором адвокат имеет лицензию на осуществление юридической практики. В качестве универсально применимых видятся т. н. прагматические санкции в ходе разбирательства, к которым относятся, прежде всего, замечание стороне и её адвокату в виде мотивированного предупреждения о недостойном или неэтичном действии, а в случае необходимости также указание на действия, которые противоречат применимым правовым нормам.

Summary:
Arbitration should be effective, flexible and expeditious to the utmost extent; these qualities should represent one of the main advantages of arbitration over litigation. In practice, however, we have often and with increasing frequency witnessed attempts of the parties to cause maximum obstacles which often border on abuse of proceedings, or which can be at least considered unethical. The intensity of such procedures is sometimes so high that the practice has coined the term “guerrilla tactics" to describe such conduct. Consequently, arbitral tribunals logically attempt to restrict or eliminate such behaviour and impose sanctions on the parties and, more and more often, on the parties' legal counsel who cause such obstructions; the same applies to courts in the exercise of their auxiliary and supervisory function vis-à-vis arbitration. Courts in certain states (such as Switzerland, the USA and others) even directly penalise legal representatives of the parties for any motions which were obviously groundless and without any hope of success considering the applicable law and legal practice, the knowledge of which is presumed with individuals who possess legal qualification (for instance motions for annulment of an arbitral award, jurisdictional challenges against arbitrators or challenges to arbitrators). The arbitrators themselves usually have only limited possibilities of penalising such behaviour. The most frequently employed and best applicable option is to reflect the obstructions made by the parties and their legal counsel in decisions on claims for compensation of the costs of proceedings. Another possibility is to exclude or limit the application of certain statements made by the parties or evidence which are related to unethical or even unlawful conduct of the parties and their legal representatives, although this option is open to the arbitrators only in selected cases, to a certain extent and depending on the law applicable to the arbitration agreement and the procedural law applicable to the proceedings. However, the options available to the arbitrators frequently collide with the limits of their jurisdiction and the confidentiality of arbitration, which often prevents the arbitrators from filing a motion with the competent professional association which supervises the attorney, or even from initiating criminal prosecution of the party and/or the party's legal counsel. The standards governing legal counsel are also a major issue because the proceedings are often conducted in the territory of a state different from the state in which the attorneys are licensed to practice law. It appears that universally applicable instruments include pragmatic sanctions in the course of the proceedings, which primarily include reprimanding the parties and their legal counsel in the form of a reasoned warning of inappropriate or unethical conduct and, as applicable, of the conduct which is contrary to the applicable legal standards.

Третейська процедура має бути максимально ефективною, гнучкою та швидкою – в цьому, зокрема, полягають її основні переваги в порівнянні з розглядом у судах. Проте в дійсності ми дедалі частіше зустрічаємося з намаганням сторін чинити максимальні обструкції, що в багатьох випадках межують із зловживанням процедурою або, як мінімум, є неетичними. Інтенсивність таких дій подеколи буває настільки високою, що на практиці для визначення таких дій увійшов в ужиток вислів «тактика герильї». Тому третейські суди – так само, як і суди загальної юрисдикції при здійсненні допоміжних та контрольних функцій стосовно третейської процедури, – цілком логічно прагнуть обмежувати або виключати такі дії, а також накладати санкції на сторони, а, дедалі частіше, – і на повірених сторін, що спричиняють обструкції. Суди деяких держав (наприклад, Швейцарії, США та інших) навіть безпосередньо накладають санкції на повірених за позовні заяви, що є явно безпідставними та не мають шансів на успіх з урахуванням відповідних правових норм та юридичної практики, знання яких є презумпцією для осіб з кваліфікацією юристів (наприклад, заяви на анулювання арбітражної постанови, заперечення щодо недостатності повноважень арбітрів або протести проти арбітрів). У свою чергу, арбітри, як правило, мають лише обмежені можливості щодо накладання санкцій за такі дії. Найчастіше та найкраще застосовується можливість урахування обструкцій сторін та їх повірених під час винесення рішення про відшкодування судових видатків. Певною мірою, залежно від права, застосовного щодо третейського договору, та процесуального права, застосовного до процедури, у деяких випадках вони можуть виключати або обмежувати застосування деяких тверджень сторін або доказів, що пов’язані з неетичними або навіть протиправними діями сторін та їх повірених. При цьому можливості арбітрів часто наштовхуються на обмеженість їх повноважень, а також конфіденційність третейської процедури, що, як правило, не дозволяє арбітрам звернутися до відповідного професійного органу, що здійснює нагляд за адвокатом, або навіть ініціювати порушення проти сторони та/або її повіреного кримінальної справи. Стосовно повірених важливим є також питання про стандарти, які на них поширюються, якщо враховувати, що провадження часто здійснюється на території не тієї держави, де адвокатам надано ліцензію на здійснення юридичної практики. Нарешті, універсально застосовними протягом розгляду виявляються так звані «прагматичні санкції», до яких належать, переважно, висловлення зауважень стороні та її повіреному у вигляді аргументованого попередження про недоречність або неетичність їх дій, а в разі необхідності – також про дію, що суперечить застосовним правовим стандартам.

Arbitration has become an increasingly popular alternative method of dispute resolution, primarily employed in international commerce. From the procedural perspective, the issues most frequently associated with arbitration include: issues concerning the proper execution and validity of the arbitration agreement, or as applicable, the observance of the requirements for conducting arbitral proceedings and of fundamental procedural principles (asserted through the medium of a motion to set aside an arbitral award). Nonetheless, the scope of issues that our contemporary practice has to handle with respect to arbitration is substantially broader.

Let us imagine a situation in which an alleged creditor is confronted with an arbitral award, without being at all aware that arbitration has taken place. Impossible? Not in the least. It is not possible to exclude the possibility that an arbitral award will be used as a means of unlawfully eliciting particular performance, just like other deeds are not immune to attacks by falsifiers, including documents issued by state authorities. Indeed, this phenomenon is becoming more and more common in our current practice, even though the issue has only scarcely been dealt with in legal theory, which can certainly be attributed to the fact that parties make extensive use of arbitration. Arbitral awards are typically falsified in domestic arbitral proceedings, although cases with an international dimension are not unheard of either.

Příspěvek obsahuje rozbor právní úpravy daňových skladů, problematiky vlastnických práv (zejména, avšak nikoliv jen, na příkladu skladování minerálních olejů), jakož i otázek naskladnění, vyskladnění, přiznání a odvodů nepřímých daní (jak DPH tak spotřební daně) v tomto režimu, obchodování se zbožím v režimu daňového skladu apod. Jako jeden z příkladů je podrobně rozvedeno i srovnání s režimem celního skladu.

Daňový sklad představuje ze soukromoprávního hlediska nepřímou úschovu. Naskladněním zboží do daňového skladu dochází k přechodu vlastnického práva na rovozovatele.Z hlediska daňového je významná otázka postoupení práv na vyskladnění.Spotřební daň se odvádí teprve tehdy, kdy je výrobek uveden do volného daňového oběhu. Pohyb vybraných výrobků v daňových skladech a mezi daňovými sklady navzájem není spotřební daní zatížen. Je však monitorován celní správou až do okamžiku, kdy jsou výrobky uvedeny do tzv. volného daňového oběhu v tuzemsku.Režim podmíněného osvobození od daně je velmi podobný režimu podmíněného osvobození od cla. Tyto dva režimy se navzájem vylučují – na výrobky v režimu podmíněného osvobození od cla se nevztahují ustanovení o podmíněném osvobození od daně. Nelze všakzaměňovat pojmy „vyskladnění“, „uvedení do volného daňového oběhu“ a důsledné rozlišení je často klíčové klíčové. Přitom legální definice existuje jen ve vztahu k „uvedení zboží do volného daňového oběhu“.

V případě DPH je nutno pojmy „dodání zboží“ (jako převod práva nakládat se zbožím jako vlastník“) a „poskytnutí služby“vykládat též v souvislosti se směrnicí 2006/112/ES jako autonomní pojem evropského práva.

Zásadní zlom představovala novelizace zákona o DPH provedená zákonem č. 47/2011 Sb., když do 1. dubna 2011 nebyly obchody v rámci daňového skladu zatíženy spotřební daní. Přitom mezeru v  úpravě DPH lze nejlépe prezentovat na srovnání s daňových skladů a celních skladů. Přitom do r. 2011 zákon o DPH neupravoval, že by při uvolnění zboží do volného daňového oběhu u daňových skladů docházelo ke zdanitelnému plnění, do jehož základu je nutné započítat spotřební daň. Zákon o DPH tak do roku 2011 obsahoval mezeru, kterou nebylo možné nahradit smluvním ujednáním stran.

Dne 23. července 2011 nabyl účinnosti zákon č. 186/2011 Sb., o poskytování součinnosti pro účely řízení před některými mezinárodními soudy a jinými mezinárodními kontrolními orgány a o změně zákona č. 99/1963 Sb., občanský soudní řád, ve znění pozdějších předpisů (dále též jen „Zákon“, příp. „zákon č. 186/2011 Sb.“), který nahradil zákon č. 318/2001 Sb., o poskytování informací a další součinnosti pro účely řízení před Evropským soudem pro lidská (dále jen „ESLP“) a před Výborem OSN pro lidská práva (zákon č. 318/2001 Sb., dále též jako „původní zákon“).

Předmětem této nové úpravy (Zákona) jsou především povinnosti dotčených orgánů, jejichž poměrně široké definiční vymezení Zákon upravuje, poskytovat bezúplatně úplné, přesné a objektivní informace a další součinnost ministerstvu spravedlnosti pro účely zastupování ČR v řízení před ESLP a Výborem OSN pro lidská práva a ministerstvu zahraničních věcí pro účely zastupování ČR v řízení před SDEU, resp. EK. Výčet orgánů zastupujících ČR v řízeních o dodržování mezinárodních závazků plynoucích pro ČR v oblasti lidských práv ovšem není taxativní, a umožňuje tak aplikaci tohoto předpisu v dalších případech ad hoc.

Subjekty povinné poskytovat součinnost podle Zákona jsou členěny do čtyř kategorií: (i) soudy, státní zastupitelství a orgány státní správy a samosprávy, jakož i další orgány veřejné moci; (ii) osoby, které vykonávají působnost v oblasti veřejné správy, a (iii) osoby, kterým byla zákonem nebo smlouvou svěřena pravomoc závazně rozhodovat o právech a povinnostech jiných osob. Pod tuto třetí kategorii spadají také rozhodci. (iv) Vedle těchto kategorií subjektů jsou za povinné dále označovány osoby, jejichž jednání či opomenutí je předmětem jednání před ESLP či SDEU (analogicky též v případě řízení u jiných mezinárodních fór). Může se tedy jednat například o jakoukoliv osobu, která jedná při výkonu přenesené pravomoci státu, při výkonu pravomocí profesní a jiné odborné nebo teritoriální samosprávy, včetně profesních komor, notářů, exekutorů apod.

Zákon vymezuje především povinnost a rozsah povinnosti poskytnout informace danému orgánu. Ta zahrnuje jak sdělení informací o okolnostech případu, předložení listin či přímé konzultace s osobami a podporami, které se případem zabývaly, ale taktéž zaslání spisů včetně soudních spisů, umožnění nahlédnutí do spisu a podobně. Jde o přímé prolomení zákonné a často velmi striktní povinnosti mlčenlivosti osob vykonávajících ať již přenesené veřejnoprávní pravomoci nebo vykonávajících na základě zákona a volního aktu účastníků (na základě konsensu stran) mocí výkonnou, aniž by byla například chráněna práva jiných účastníků těchto řízení, v jejichž prospěch je povinnost mlčenlivosti obvykle zákonem stanovena. Zákon bohužel ani nedefinuje, zda k tomuto prolomení dochází na základě správního rozhodnutí příslušného mechanismu, a s výjimkou jediného oddílu věcného rozsahu Zákona, totiž v souvislosti s předběžnými opatřeními, nestanoví ani ingerenci nezávislého soudu, u něhož by se dotčené osoby mohly domáhat ochrany proti takovému prolomení mlčenlivosti. Dále se předpis zabývá mechanismy pro efektivní ukončení porušování práva EU či Úmluvy o ochraně lidských práv a svobod, k čemuž slouží primárně inkorporace nástrojů, zahrnujících i řádný výkon předběžných opatření vydaných SDEU či ESLP na území ČR.

Je jen překvapivé, že tento Zákon doposud nevyvolal diskusi v odborných kruzích, byť je jím předvídán nebývalý rozsah oprávnění orgánů moci výkonné k zásahům do řízení a ve svém důsledku i rozhodovací činnosti jakýchkoliv jiných orgánů a osob bez odpovídající soudní nebo jiné adekvátní a ústavně konformní kontroly. Přitom za vysoce sporný lze označit i legislativní postup, v němž byl Zákon zpracován a předložen Parlamentu ČR, který podle názoru autorů porušuje základní legislativní principy a je excesem v činnosti Vlády ČR. Navíc předmětná úprava nemá oporu v žádném explicitním mezinárodním závazku ČR, který by třeba byl Zákonem implementován do tuzemského právního řádu.

Взаимодействие международного и национального права в связи с доказыванием в ходе разбирательств в международных судах

Очевидно, что процессуальные правила международных судебных органов не являются когерентными. Тем не менее, важно осознавать, что существует другой режим для международных судебных разбирательств с участием государств и для международных судебных разбирательств, касающихся защиты прав человека, а также для международных уголовных процессов, которые в отличие от судебных разбирательств с участием государств основаны на несколько иных принципах. Каждый из международных процессуальных режимов в некоторой степени отличается в вопросах получения доказательств и их представлении. Однако можно наблюдать определенное сходство, прежде всего, с состязательным процессом, включая сходство с различными формами разбирательства на национальном уровне. Довольно распространенным стандартом считается возможность того, чтобы международный суд призвал государства, участвующие в этих судебных процессах, найти и представить доказательства, а в случае необходимости, дополнить, прежде всего, утверждения по делу, а, следовательно, найти дальнейшую информацию по делу. По мнению авторов, недопустимо, чтобы государства такое обязательство переносили на плечи своих граждан или других частноправовых субъектов. Они, конечно, могут использовать все механизмы, которыми обладают для того, что обязать оказывать содействие собственные государственные органы, в частности, органы исполнительной власти. В конце концов, именно органы исполнительной власти (либо в рамках полномочий министерств юстиции, министерств иностранных дел, либо других высших органов [исполнительной] государственной власти) государство представляет в таких международных разбирательствах. При этом государства должны обеспечивать, чтобы при получении доказательств и информации по требованию судебного органа, не нарушали, например, обязанность соблюдать конфиденциальность, если раскрытие информации может затронуть частноправового субъекта, или если государственный орган получил эти доказательства и информацию в судебных разбирательствах, которые являются закрытыми и конфиденциальными. По мнению авторов, является спорным вопросом и, скорее, исключено, чтобы государства реализовали обязанность получить доказательства и информацию для разбирательств в международных судах путем возложения обязанности по представлению доказательств и информации на своих граждан или других частноправовых субъектов. Тот факт, что государство является участником какого-либо международного процесса, еще не означает, что граждане этого государства обязаны оказывать содействие этому государству. По мнению авторов, также неприемлемо, чтобы в этих целях государства использовали внутригосударственные процессуальные механизмы на национальном уровне. Следует подчеркнуть, что интересы государства и гражданина (или другого частноправового субъекта) одного и того же государства иногда бывают диаметрально противоположными. Кроме того, гражданин и частноправовой субъект могут выдвигать требования к государству.

Взаємодія міжнародного та національного права у контексті оформлення доказів при процесах у міжнародних судах

Є очевидним, що процесуальні правила міжнародних судових органів є некогерентними. Проте слід усвідомлювати відмінність у режимах міжнародних судових розглядів між державами та міжнародних судових розглядів, що стосуються захисту прав людини, а також міжнародного кримінального судочинства, які у порівнянні з міждержавними процесами побудовано на дещо відмінних принципах. Кожен з міжнародних процесуальних режимів певною мірою відрізняється у питаннях забезпечення доказів та їх оформлення. Незважаючи на це, можна спостерігати значну подібність, перш за все, до контрадикторного процесу, включаючи подібність до різних форм розгляду на національному рівні. Цілком звичним стандартом вважається, коли міжнародний суд вимагає від держав, що є учасниками таких розглядів, забезпечення та пред’явлення доказів або доповнення, головним чином, фактичних тверджень, тобто забезпечення додаткової фактичної інформації. Проте, на думку авторів, передача державами таких обов’язків своїм громадянам або іншим суб’єктам приватного права є недопустимою. Зрозуміло, вони можуть скористатися усіма наявними у них механізмами, аби зобов’язати до взаємодії власні державні органи – передусім органи виконавчої влади. Зрештою, саме органи виконавчої влади (у межах повноважень міністерств юстиції, міністерств іноземних справ та інших верховних органів [виконавчої] державної влади) представляють інтереси держави при таких міжнародних розглядах. Проте і при цьому держави повинні дбати про те, аби при забезпеченні доказів та інформації на вимогу міжнародного судового органу не порушувати, зокрема, обов’язок секретності, якщо оприлюднення інформації може зачепити інтереси будь-якого суб’єкту приватного права або якщо такі докази та інформацію державним органом отримано у ході процесів, що за своїм характером є закритими та конфіденційними. При цьому, на думку авторів, є спірним та, скоріше, виключається, аби держави виконували свій обов’язок по забезпеченню доказів та інформації для розглядів у міжнародних судах шляхом покладення обов’язків пред’явити докази на своїх громадян або інші суб’єкти приватного права. Та обставина, що держава є учасником деякого міжнародного розгляду, ще не означає, що її громадяни повинні надавати цій державі будь-яке сприяння. Автори вважають, що застосування державами з цією метою внутрішніх процесуальних механізмів на національному рівні є також неприйнятним. Адже слід підкреслити, що інтереси держави та інтереси громадянина (або іншого суб’єкту приватного права) тієї ж держави нерідко можуть навіть діаметрально відрізнятись. Крім того, громадянин та суб’єкт приватного права можуть висувати до держави претензії.

The breach of public policy is the sole reason in terms of the Regulation that justifies the exceptional refusal of an EU Member State to recognize the main insolvency proceedings and grant their effects. However, the application of ordre public in this connection is more than questionable. It is doubtful whether the EU Member States may in an individual case deny effects to a European regulation as a significant and directly applicable source of European law, which is simultaneously a source of its own law, and whether such approach would not rather be an attempt to evade the regulation, which would be prohibited according to the principles of EU law. Moreover, Article 26 of the Regulation only provides for the procedural ordre public, not the substantive ordre public. The latter could apply in connection with the determination and, especially, the effects of the applicable substantive law of national origin as the lex fori concursus; the ordre public exception could in such case at least theoretically be possible from the substantive-law perspective. However, the substantive-law aspects of the situation are already reflected in Article 5 of the Regulation, which provides for the conflict-of-laws exceptions to Article 4 of the Regulation (and, indeed, in substantially all immunity and special provisions of the Regulation, i.e. Articles 5 to 15 of the Regulation). Consequently, it is more than appropriate to examine the purpose of the rule enshrined in Article 26 of the Regulation, i.e. in which situation the recognition and enforcement would have a result that is principally incompatible with the public policy of the respective Member State. No problems arise if the recognition concerns an individual normative act, i.e. an individual court decision rendered in connection with specific insolvency proceedings, for instance, in connection with a creditor’s claim or the bankrupt’s obligation. It is unclear whether the liquidator’s powers in the main insolvency proceedings can be contested and, for instance, their registration be denied in public registers in terms of Article 21 of the Regulation, such as the Land Register, the Companies Register, etc. We may probably agree that the ordre public exception is not applicable in such cases, as it is not applicable for instance in connection with the debtor’s eligibility as a party to the insolvency proceedings (cf. Article 16(2) of the Regulation, or here in the entire context of the Regulation, i.e. especially, though not exclusively, in terms of Articles 3 and 4 of the Regulation, etc.). Similarly, the ordre public exception is also not applicable if, for instance, the rescue plan relating to the bankrupt’s assets (estate) impairs the creditor’s status compared to the option of liquidating, i.e. selling, the estate. Besides, the rescue plan must still rest on the principles that guarantee due procedure, primarily the following principles: (i) each creditor must obtain at least as much as they would obtain if the estate were liquidated, (ii) further operation of the enterprise must be based on a sufficient estate, so that obligations that arise in the future in connection with the due operation of the business will be satisfied, (iii) the absolute priority rule is observed, which requires that the priority satisfaction rights are honored, or that the payment of benefits to lower classes of creditors before satisfaction of the higher classes of creditors is contingent on the latter’s consent, and (iv) the rescue plan for the bankrupt’s enterprise is subject to the court’s consent, and such consent must be withheld if the plan is contrary to laws or good morals, provided that it is approved by the majority of creditors during a separate vote within the individual classes of creditors.

Dne 5. prosince 2013 uskutečnila v Praze na půdě České advokátní komory a za její podpory, jakož i za podpory dalších institucí závěrečná odborná akce Pražského právnického podzimu, který se stal tradicí české právnické scény. Jednalo se o historicky druhou akci, na které se k tématu náhradních způsobů řešení sporů, zejména rozhodčího řízení a do jisté míry též mediace, podařilo shromáždit excelentní představitele tuzemské právní praxe a vědy průřezově ze všech sektorů, tj. justice, advokacie, rozhodců a mediátorů, právní vědy, zástupců profesní samosprávy, podnikových právníků apod. První akce tohoto druhu se konala na podzim roku 2005, od té doby se na ni podařilo navázat teprve právě v závěru roku 2013, kdy se v pražském Paláci Dunaj, zařízení České advokátní komory určeném pro vzdělávání, uskutečnil kulatý stůl zaměřený na soudní a mimosoudní projednávání sporů. Kulatý stůl organizovaný nakladatelstvím Havlíček Brain Team v rámci Pražského právnického podzimu 2013 se uskutečnil za podpory významných partnerů – vedle České advokátní komory (ČAK)1) jimi byly Unie podnikových právníků,2) Ústav práva a právní vědy a CYArb - Česká (& Středoevropská) ročenka rozhodčího řízení. Záštitu nad kulatým stolem převzal předseda České advokátní komory JUDr. Martin Vychopeň. Nutno podotknout, že se ihned na počátku tohoto kulatého stolu vytvořila profesionální a otevřená atmosféra a bylo poněkud na škodu, že neúprosný čas přinutil mnohé diskusní příspěvky zkrátit.

Tento sborník je tedy editovaným přepisem záznamu celého průběhu kulatého stolu o náhradních způsobech řešení sporů, přičemž všichni účastníci současně s publikováním svých příspěvků a diskusních poznámek vyslovili souhlas. Editoři, kteří kulatý stůl moderovali, však upozorňují, že jde o přepis upravený, tedy nikoliv doslovný. Těmito úpravami samozřejmě nebyl záznam nikterak zkracován a ani názory jednotlivých přednášejících modifikovány. Celá diskuse byla velmi živá, a proto se nelze divit, že přednášející reagovali na aktuální situaci, která se v průběhu kulatého stolu vyvinula. Snahou moderátorů a editorů této publikace tak bylo přizpůsobit záznam standardům pro psané projevy, na druhou stranu však nic neubrat na autenticitě. Mnohdy proto bylo nutno sáhnout k řešením kompromisním. Řada ojedinělých a snad i unikátních názorů a informací, které na akci zazněly, si skutečně publikaci zaslouží, což koneckonců potvrdili i recenzenti tohoto sborníku. Výlučně z dílny editorů a moderátorů pak pocházejí poznámky pod čarou, věcný rejstřík, rejstřík odkazů na předpisy, na státy a na judikaturu. Při doplnění této části bylo účelem dodat publikované verzi záznamu z kulatého stolu rovněž charakter odborného materiálu, použitelného pro teorii i odbornou praxi. Proto bylo na závěr připojeno několik judikátů, o nichž se v diskusi nejčastěji hovořilo.

The seat of arbitration has essential practical importance in arbitration, and it directly determines a number of issues: arbitrability, determination of governing law, whether substantive, or (mainly) procedural, and annulment of the arbitral award or its recognition and enforcement etc. Pursuant to author´s opinion the seat of arbitration is the main factor determining arbitration, while denationalization of arbitration seems to be a myth widely remote from international reality. The seat of arbitration need not be the place in which the individual procedural acts are conducted. From the seat of arbitration has to be distinguished also the place, where the arbitral award has been rendered and/or signed. Consequently, the place where the arbitral award is made usually determines whether the award is a domestic or a foreign award. The seat of arbitration can exceptionally be changed in course of arbitration, but not after an arbitral award has been rendered. International arbitration is usually subject to a two-tier control exercised by courts. The first control is exercised by the state of the seat of arbitration, and the second control is exercised by the state in which the parties seek recognition and enforcement. Consequently, if the parties internationalize their dispute (both parties from the same country agree on a seat of arbitration in a different country) and the arbitral award is rendered abroad (foreign arbitral award vis-à-vis the country of parties’ origin/domicile), the award has no effects in the country of parties´ origin/domicile until its recognition.

The Czech courts do often deal with transportation matters. For example the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic decided on 28 March 2012 about the Scope of the CMR Convention. The court concluded that the Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR Convention) shall apply to every contract for the carriage og consignments by road vehicles for remuneration, when the place of taking over the consignment and the place designated for delivery thereof, as specified in the contract, are situated in two different countries, of which at least one is a contracting party to the CMR Convention. The court concluded further in the same decision that a contract does not qualify as a contract of carriage if the person designated as consignor in the international consignment notes is not simultaneously the person or entity that ordered the carriage.

In another decision, namely in the judgment of 10 October 2012 the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic concluded that the CMR Convention does not regulate all issues related to international carriage by road. The Convention does not regulate the process of formation of the contract for carriage of things (consignment, goods) and its essential components. These issues, which are not regulated under the CMR Convention, must be examined according to domestic regulations as the governing substantive law determined according to the rules of private international law. The Convention on the Contract for the International Carriage of Goods by Road (CMR), binding on the Czech Republic, shall apply to a contract that entails the carriage of consignments by road vehicles for remuneration, when the place of taking over of the consignment and the place designated for delivery thereof, as specified in the contract, are situated in two different countries, of which at least one is a contracting party to the CMR Convention, irrespective of the states in which the registered office, place of business or place of residence of the parties is situated.27 If the parties entered into a contract of carriage,28 the liability for damage and losses incurred in the course of the carriage must be assessed according to the CMR Convention. Article 4 of the CMR Convention stipulates that the contract of carriage shall be confirmed by the making out of a consignment note. The absence, irregularity or loss of the consignment note shall not affect the existence or validity of the contract of carriage, which shall remain subject to the provisions of the CMR Convention. Article 9 of the CMR Convention stipulates that, unless proven otherwise, the consignment note shall be prima facie evidence of the making of the contract of carriage, the contents of the contract and the receipt of the consignment by the carrier. Information provided in the consignment note therefore establishes a refutable legal presumption regarding the existence or the contents of the contract of carriage, as applicable. Article 3 of the Convention on the Contract for the
International Carriage of Goods by Road [CMR Convention] must be interpreted in conjunction with Article 29 of the CMR Convention. Article 3 of the CMR Convention stipulates that the carrier is responsible for the acts and omissions of their agents and servants, and of any other persons of whose services they make use for the performance of the carriage, as well as for the acts and omissions of the agents, servants and any other persons whose services are used by the carrier’s subcontractor or the subcontractor’s subcontractor, as long as such agents, servants or other persons are acting within the scope of their employment. Acts within the scope of one’s employment also include any acts of the person whereby he or she committed a criminal offence, thereby advancing only his or her own interests or the interests of a third party, not the interests of the carrier. In terms of Article 3 of the CMR Convention, the carrier is liable for the acts of their employees or, as applicable, persons of whose services they have made use in the carriage of the vehicle, even if these persons act contrary to the orders given by the employer; the reason is that the carrier is also liable for the proper choice of their employees or subcontractors, as applicable. The carrier is therefore also liable for any theft or embezzlement of goods, as the case may be, committed by the ‘persons used’ if the goods were entrusted to them in the performance of the contract of carriage. The carrier’s liability under Article 17(1) of the CMR Convention is strict liability. The carrier cannot be relieved of this liability by proving a lack of fault, but only by proving the existence of grounds for liberation. Liability for damage to the goods or losses caused during the carriage as a result of a criminal offence committed by the driver who participated in the theft of the goods rests with the carrier in compliance with Article 17(1) of the CMR Convention. Information provided in the consignment note establishes a refutable legal presumption regarding the existence or the contents of the contract of carriage, as applicable. This does not mean, however, that Section 610 of the Czech Commercial Code could not apply. Determination of the amount of damage under Article 23(2) and (3) of the CMR Convention is principally made by reference to the invoice (or any similar document) issued and submitted by the supplier (here the foreign supplier), without exceeding the limits of damages under Article 23(3) of the CMR Convention. When interpreting international treaties or agreements as the source of law, the national court may also invoke the case law of foreign courts that examined the same or a similar issue.

In its Resolution of 9 January 2013 the Czech Supreme Court concluded that International jurisdiction in international disputes from carriage that fall within the CMR Convention is governed by Article 31(1)(b) of the CMR Convention. Agreement of the parties (choice-of-court agreement/ prorogatio fori) takes precedence in the determination of the international jurisdiction of court in disputes from carriage that fall within the CMR Convention. In the absence of the parties’ agreement, the jurisdiction is vested in the courts of the state in whose territory the place is located in which the  consignment was received for carriage, or in whose territory the place is located in which the consignment was designated for delivery. As concerns international jurisdiction of courts, the CMR Convention does not rule out the application of EU law, namely Council Regulation (EC) No. 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. If the consignment was released in the territory of the Czech Republic (Cheb), the courts of the Czech Republic have international jurisdiction. But if the conditions for territorial jurisdiction are absent (the respondent company does not have its registered office, or enterprise or branch in the Czech Republic and the circumstances are absent that would establish optional territorial jurisdiction), the territorial jurisdiction shall be determined by the Supreme Court of the Czech Republic following the principle of economy of the proceedings. The place (court) that best corresponds to this principle is the jurisdiction of the district court in whose district the transported consignment was released (delivered). In the case at hand, the respective principle is best fulfilled by the determination of the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court in Cheb [Czech Republic], before which the proceedings were commenced and in whose district the transported consignment was released (delivered) to the respondent.

Together with international treaties the main source of law on contracts is in the Czech Republic the Civil Code in effect as of 1 January 2014, which has replaced the previous Civil Code of 1964 as amended and the Commercial Code of 1991 as amended. The paper analyzes in its second part the Czech law on contracts in detail and comparing at the same time both regulations.

The applicable jurisdiction for insolvency proceedings, as provided by the Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, is the court of the Member State where the debtor’s centre of main interest (COMI) is located (Article 3(1)). The Regulation, however, does not provide a comprehensive definition of the COMI. This paper seeks to explore the meaning and developments behind the meaning of COMI as influenced by judicial reasoning and conflicts across Member States. The study centres around the emerging jurisprudence and analyses case law across Member States in order to draw conclusions on the meaning of COMI and the emerging concepts. Extensive consideration of statutory interpretation, case reports and judicial comment is present in order to inform and develop conclusions. In the absence of a definition it appears that the only relevant European guidance emerges from recital 13 and Article 3 (1). With little guidance in the Regulation, it has therefore been left to national courts to decide how the notion of COMI should be interpreted. Determining the COMI has emerged as one of the most controversial aspect and the principle point of legal conflict, with some highly debated cases within member states’ courts. On the basis of the case law, it is suggested that the interpretation of COMI is more flexible in UK and Italian courts. The approach adopted in continental Europe is referred to as the “centre of operations approach”, i.e., the debtor’s COMI has to be determined by the place where he is “ascertainable by third parties”. The Anglo Saxon approach, on the other hand, is known as the “mind of management approach”, i.e., the debtor’s COMI must be situated where decisions are actually made. The latter seems to enjoy a more practical and accessible approach.

The main source of EU Law regarding law applicable to international carriage is Rome I Regulation of 17 June 2008, replacing the Convention on Law Applicable to Contractual Obligation of 19 June 1980/EEC. Article 5 of the EU Regulation introduces special (autonomous) conflict of law provisions for contracts of carriage and it does extend these  special provision also to the transport of persons. Special provisions of Article 5 of the Regulation distinguish between special rules for contracts for the carriage of goods (Article 5(1) of the Regulation) and for contracts for the carriage of persons (Article 5(2) of the Regulation). The Convention, as opposed to the Regulation, nevertheless contains one provision that has been quite important and this is the third sentence of Article 4(4) of the Convention. It is clear from the concept of the Regulation that the latter has chosen to use a relatively very wide foundation for the qualification of contact of carriage. Pursuant to Regulation if the country of the habitual residence of the carrier and the place of receipt (into the custody of the carrier) or the place of delivery or the habitual residence of the consignor is also situated in that country, then the law of the country of the habitual residence of the carrier shall be used (Article 5(1) sentence 1 of the Regulation). If the place of receipt or the place of delivery or the habitual residence of the consignor  are located in a country different from that of the habitual residence of the carrier, then the law of the country where the place of delivery as agreed by the parties is situated shall apply.

Především rozvoj obchodních vztahů ruku v ruce s celosvětovou globalizací nás konfrontuje v podstatě v každodenní právní a obchodní praxi s celou řadu institutů, která jsou některým právním řádům buď zcela neznámé nebo tyto dokonce s ohledem na některé základní principy takových institutů často nemohou být aprobovány (nebo jen s obtížemi), a to ani v případě použití cizího práva jako práva rozhodného, je-li dán prostor pro takové použití cizího práva. Jedním z těchto, pro řadu právních řádů poněkud kontroverzních, institutů je bezesporu trust, který je v mezinárodní (především, avšak nikoliv jen obchodní) praxi poměrně běžně používanou konstrukcí, a to ať již z pohledu osobního statusu jako typ právnické osoby či quazi právnické osoby nebo jako smluvní typ, tedy jako institut práva závazkového. Předem je zapotřebí poznamenat, že předmětem tohoto příspěvku je trust z pohledu mezinárodního práva soukromého – závazkového / smluvního, když podrobné pojednání o tomto institutu včetně (avšak nikoliv jen) z pohledu statusového, by zcela jistě vybočil z rámce pro tento příspěvek přijatelný. Na druhou stranu všechny tyto roviny přirozeně v řadech ohledů navzájem kolaborují a významně se prolínají, či dokonce se vzájemně podmiňují. Právě neschopnost komunitární legislativy jednoznačně trust identifikovat buď jako institut používaný v souvislosti s osobním statutem (tak, jak je tomu typicky v common law) a jeho porovnání s celou řadou bezesporu analogických institutů kontinentálních, které ovšem jednotlivé národní právní řády řadí do oblasti smluvního závazkového práva vedl k  k vyloučení trustu (expresis verbis) z věcného rozsahu Nařízení č. 593/2008 ze 17. června 2008 o právu rozhodném pro smluvní závazkové vztahy (Řím I.) (dále v rámci tohoto příspěvku Nařízení Řím I.), které v rámci své věcné, subjektivní a především teritoriální působnosti nahrazuje od 17. prosince 2009 Úmluvu o právu rozhodném pro smluvní závazkové vztahy, uzavřená v Římě dne 19. června 1980 / dokument EHS zn. 80/934/EHS a který se tak zcela bezesporu v brzké době stane nejdůležitějším nástrojem (komunitárního původu) mezinárodního práva soukromého v rámci kolizní úpravy práva rozhodného pro smluvní závazkové vztahy. Vyloučení trustu ve smyslu čl. 1 odst. 2 písm. h./ Nařízení Řím I. (analogicky jako v případě úpravy dle čl. 1 odst. 2 písm. f./ Římské úmluvy) však není tak jednoznačné, jak by se mohlo na první pohled zdát a jak se to (bohužel poněkud zjednodušeně) snaží podat určitá část jak zahraničních tak tuzemských komentátorů. To je pak o to významnější, že obchodní a právní praxe je i u nás s trustem konfrontována ve skutečnosti velmi často, a to i přesto, že odpovídající analogii v tuzemském právu nenalezneme.

Franchising has to be understood primarily as a special contractual concept resulting from a business practice and reflecting in some special laws even if domestic regulations of particular countries only exceptionally reflect it as a special kind (type) of a contract. Exceptions may be found in some countries as for example Loi Doubin in France, which is obviously (in France) of overriding mandatory nature but which is subject to various critical comments as from international commercial law point of view. Franchising is not a simple junction of separate contracts. It is an original contractual creation using advantages of various legal institutes and terms used in and typical for a number of another (often simplier) contracts. It is therefore necessary to look for a purpose of this creation.

Very strong influence to the concept of Franchising have often licences for use of industrial property and other intangible property rights. Their connection to the country of a Franchisee is obviously the strongest one, as the laws of Franchisee´s country usually provides the relevant frame of protection for such rights (principle of territoriality). It is therefore not too surprising that the Rome I Regulation provides the law of Franchisee as the law applicable to Franchising Contracts (Art 4). The choice of law pursuant to Art 3 Rome I regulation is not excluded. The concept provided for conflict of law rules pursuant to Art 4 Rome I Regulation in respect to Franchising is therefore of a very objective nature (in the opposite to some German commentators but fully in accordance for example with the Austrian case law etc.). The Author fully agrees with this concept, even if due to its objectivity only and not due to a necessarity to protect the Franchisees. The need to protect the Franchisee by a special conflict of laws concept will be fully negated by the Author.

The ECJ West Tankers judgment has been the subject to turbulent discussions. The decision follows the line of argumentation expressed in the previous “arbitration” ECJ decisions (namely in the Turner case) in terms of the exclusion of arbitration from the scope of the Brussels I Regulation and the consequences on the practice of arbitration in the UK of the doctrine of incompatibility of anti-suit injunctions. The author believes that it is ill-conceived and inappropriate to determine the scope of application of the Regulation based upon the subject matter of the dispute (as in the Marc Rich case or the Van Uden case). In West Tankers, it was held that the subject matter of the dispute was the compensation for the damage caused by unlawful acts, which fell within the scope of the Regulation, and that the existence and application of the arbitration clause was merely a procedural objection, to be addressed by the court when reviewing its own jurisdiction. The argument appears unconvincing. Even though one can agree with the application of the New York Convention and its interrelation with the Regulation, as presented e.g. by the Advocate General in the opinion on West Tankers, reference was not made to an ‘exemption’ from the scope of the Regulation for arbitration proceedings merely because of the New York Convention. In no way may Article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation be understood as an exemption. It is merely the negative part of the definition of the scope of the Regulation. Using the term exemption means that the Regulation has usurped the authority to interfere with practically all spheres of jurisdictional authority of the individual member states, leading to a denial of their sovereignty. Such an approach denies the very principle of arbitration, which is based on the freedom of contract and on the legis arbitri.
The concept endorsed by the ECJ in West Tankers may indeed give a foretaste of the future of arbitration in the EU. The West Tankers judgment is relevant not only for the institution of anti-suit injunctions. Its significance is substantially broader and highly alarming, since it is nothing less but an implied (though in no way concealed) move to apply all Community principles to arbitration and to subject arbitration proceedings (more or less completely) to Community law.

ENGLISH SUMMARY:
One of the numerous obligations of an arbitrator is to ensure that the course of proceedings be efficient, systematic, and fair.  Over time, each arbitrator will usually arrive at their own approach towards fulfilling this purpose, and at their own methods for conducting fair proceedings [i.e., for giving due process].  This author believes that the arbitrator is also obliged to do everything in their power to ensure the enforceability of the arbitral award, i.e., they should not deliberately allow the passage of an award of whose non-enforceability they are convinced.  Of course, the implementation of the award is primarily in the hands of individual parties to the proceedings, and the arbitrator is not in a position to prejudice that the obliged party will not perform under the award, or to anticipate where and in what form enforcement is to take place for the event that the obliged party should not voluntarily fulfill its obligation.  However, the arbitrator should at the very least refrain from consciously giving room for the introduction of a procedural defect to the proceedings and/or the award that would allow for setting aside (or suspend in any manner) the arbitral award, and from consciously giving rise to circumstances that would prevent the arbitral award from becoming final (non-appealable) and enforceable. 

That being said, the subject matter of this article are neither the rules of conduct of arbitrators nor the procedural rules applied by them in the course of proceedings, but the approach taken by the parties to proceedings themselves, and here in particular their "attorneys at record", i.e., representatives recruited from the legal profession, and their liability for certain motions in proceedings, as well as their relation vis-à-vis the parties, vis-à-vis the arbitrators, but also vis-à-vis judicial proceedings insofar as the general courts' role of support and supervision of arbitration is concerned.  This article also addresses certain trends that have surfaced in the practice of individual arbitration courts (and especially in the practice of general courts) regarding the liability of parties to the proceedings, and in particular of their attorneys at record, for the procedural motions which they recommend and implement in the name and account of their clients (i.e., the litigants), with respect to those motions which are inappropriate or undesirable as they frustrate the interest in a fast and effective dispensation of justice.  These are trends that originally took root in the U.S., but have in recent years begun to spread in Europe, and here even in environments marked by the traditions and principles of continental law. 

For the practitioner in the area of continental law, and here in particular civil law, the mere thought of such an approach will draw at the very least a baffled response, in the form of a confounded enquiry how an award could possibly be rendered against someone who is not even a party to the proceedings.  A U.S. court resolved this question in a most pragmatic manner when it ruled that the engagement of legal counsel in arbitration on behalf of parties who are subject to the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal likely implies the consent of such counsel (who are not a party to the arbitration agreement) to also be bound by the outcome of arbitration.  In the realm of common law, decisions which sanction the parties themselves for protracting proceedings or for filing obstructive motions are very rare, but nonetheless on the increase, and they affect in certain cases also their legal counsel representing them in court or arbitration, whereas the reasons that are given for such sanctions are usually based on the principle of protecting justice (or, as it were, protection against defiance of justice – especially in the U.S.), or they cite contempt of court (as an institution concerned with safeguarding justice – the latter being more typical in England).  Where this sanctioning approach appears in continental practice, it is usually exclusively based on the principles of arbitration as such (in the sense of finding and dispensing justice fast and efficiently).

In this article, the author has deliberately refrained from an in-depth analysis of the pertinent aspects of constitutional law, but merely mentions them in passing, in particular in terms of ● the guarantee of judicial protection of essentially any and all rights, and at the same time ● the right to due process, a natural part of which is of course the right to invoke procedural defenses of essentially any kind that is generally recognized by the law.  But the approach under which parties (in fact, even their legal representatives – attorneys at record) are being sanctioned for objections that are clearly frivolous (obstructive) upon even the most cursory knowledge of the law and of established practice is informed by the principle that both litigants afford the same rights, so that it is always necessary to strike the proper balance, in the interest of a fair, but also swift and effective dispensation of justice.  What gives, and where to draw the line?  The legal practitioner is asked to contemplate and discuss these issues – and above all, to delineate the said proverbial limits for such behavior.  After all, it is a given fact that the efficiency of judicial proceedings (as well as of proceedings before arbitration tribunals, for that matter) is regularly compromised because of the enormous degree of formalization.  In any case, one must reckon with the above-mentioned trends, which have gained traction in arbitration in many countries; it is self-evident that the said influences have in certain cases infected even the realm of continental law.  For this reason, the time has clearly come to map and analyze the leeway that is given in this respect, in the form of a rational and open discussion within the professional community.  After all, none of the two sides of the proverbial coin of due process, which has currency both before (general) courts and arbitration tribunals, can be denied its logical ratio and equitable significance.  In any case, the protection against obstructive conduct within the systems for finding justice and for the resolution of disputes has become stronger, and the trends in this regard are easily distinguished, and are today making significant inroads into the continental context as they move beyond the realm of common law.

CZECH SUMMARY:
Jednou z řady povinností rozhodce je zajistit, aby průběh řízení byl efektivní, systematický a spravedlivý. Za tímto účelem si obvykle každý rozhodce časem vypracuje svůj vlastní přístup a metody vedení řádného (spravedlivého) procesu. Autor zastává názor, že rozhodce má též povinnost učinit vše pro to, aby bylo rozhodnutí vykonatelné a neměl by vědomě připustit rozhodnutí, o němž je přesvědčen, že vykonatelné nebude. Výkon rozhodnutí je ovšem přirozeně primárně věcí každého účastníka, a rozhodce nemůže prejudikovat to, že povinný dobrovolně nesplní, ani předvídat, kde a jakým způsobem bude veden výkon v případě, že povinný dobrovolně nesplní svou povinnost. Neměl by však minimálně vědomě připustit, aby bylo řízení a/nebo rozhodnutí stiženo takovou vadou, která by připouštěla buď zrušení rozhodčího nálezu nebo jeho jakoukoliv suspenzi, či vznik okolnosti, která by zabránila tomu, aby rozhodčí nález nabyl účinnosti (právní moci) a vykonatelnosti.

Předmětem tohoto příspěvku však nejsou pravidla chování rozhodců, ani procesní pravidla aplikovaná rozhodci v průběhu řízení, nýbrž přístup účastníků k tomuto řízení, zejména ovšem jejich procesních zmocněnců, profesionálních zástupců, jejich odpovědnost za některé procesní kroky, jakož i vztah těchto profesních zmocněnců vůči stranám, vůči rozhodcům a ostatně i vůči řízení soudnímu pokud jde o podpůrnou a kontrolní funkci obecných soudů vůči řízení před rozhodci. Dále jsou předmětem tohoto příspěvku některé trendy objevující se v praxi některých rozhodčích soudů a zejména v praxi obecných soudů pokud jde o odpovědnost účastníků a především jejich procesních zmocněnců za procesní kroky jimi doporučované a jimi realizované jménem a na účet klienta (účastníka řízení), jde-li o postup nevhodný či nežádoucí ve smyslu postupu poškozujícího zájem na rychlé a efektivní prosaditelnosti práva. Jde o trendy, které se původně začaly prosazovat v USA, v posledních letech se však začínají šířit v Evropě, a to dokonce v prostředí kontinentálních právních tradic a principů.

Již jen pomyšlení právníka praktikujícího v oblasti kontinentálního práva, resp. v oblasti civil law vůbec na takový přístup, vyvolává často minimálně alespoň poněkud zarážející reakce ve smyslu otázky, jak může být vydán výrok vůči účastníku, který vůbec není účastníkem řízení. S touto otázkou si americký soud poradil velmi pragmaticky, když dospěl k závěru, že účast právních poradců v rozhodčím řízení jménem účastníků, na které se vztahuje pravomoc rozhodčího senátu, pravděpodobně představuje souhlas právních poradců (kteří nejsou stranami dohody o rozhodčím řízení), že budou vázáni výsledky rozhodčího řízení. V oblasti common law jsou rozhodnutí, kterými jsou sankcionováni za průtahy v řízení a obstruktivní návrhy sami účastníci, zcela výjimečně, byť stále častěji však v některých případech také jejich procesní zmocněnci, opřena jednak o princip ochrany (resp. obrany proti znevažování) spravedlnosti (to zejména v USA) či za znevažování soudu jako instituce ochrany spravedlnosti (především v Anglii). Kontinentální projevy takových sankčních přístupů jsou opřeny většinou výlučně o samotné principy rozhodčího řízení ve smyslu efektivního a rychleného nalezení a prosazení práva.

Substantive law (to the extent that set-offs are an institution of substantive law under the circumstances of the specific case) primarily stipulates the criteria of eligibility for set-off, which is to say, whether, when, and on what terms a debtor may compensate obligations vis-à-vis their creditor by invoking their own receivable, and thus achieve the fulfillment of their obligation and the satisfaction of their own claim at the same time. The governing law that applies to the set-off also determines the consequences thereof, as well as a host of other, related issues. The approach to determining the conflict-of-laws status of set-offs may vary: while it has been standard practice for some time now in German law to accentuate the law-of-obligations status of the claim against which a set-off is asserted (and which also determines the conflict-of-laws status of the set-off; the main obligation), as a consequence of the broadly applied principle of protection of the weaker party (here in the form of protection extended to the passive participant in a unilateral set-off), the Romanic understanding favors a cumulative approach, under which the status of both mutually set-off obligations must necessarily be reflected when determining the prerequisites and consequences of the set-off. In this respect, it is with some hesitation that we accept the conclusion reached by the European Court of Justice in 2003 in Commission v. CCRE, where the court opted for the application of the Romanic cumulative principle. However, for a modern approach to resolving the conflict-of-laws status of set-offs of contractual obligations, the above-cited decision is of diminishing significance. This author is inclined to also find support for a conflict-of-laws determination of the compensatory status within the scope of the Rome Convention in Article 10 (1) (d) and in Article 10 (2) of the Rome Convention. Article 17 of the Rome I Regulation, which does provide an explicit choice of governing law for set-offs, takes as its point of departure the status of that claim against which the right to set-off is asserted (i.e. the claim of what is known as the passive party). This concept preserves one of the core ideas of the Rome I Regulation, namely, that the weaker party - here, that party which did not initiate the unilateral set-off - is deserving of protection. In terms of its subject matter, the scope of the above-referenced provision exclusively covers set-offs performed in the wake of a unilateral expression of will. At the same time, the above-discussed arrangement unequivocally confirms that within the EU’s concept of law of autonomous qualification, set-offs primarily serve as a means of discharging oneself of an obligation. 

The Rome II Regulation on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations contains no explicit conflict-of-laws rule for set-offs. The author repudiates the opinion that Article 15 (h) of the Rome II Regulation should be applicable to a set-off of two non-contractual obligations. While it is true that, in wording, it resembles Article 10 of the Rome Convention, Rome II concerns obligations that are, by their very nature and in particular in terms of their origin, highly incompatible (by contrast to contractual obligations). While set-offs of non-contractual obligations will often have to be resolved on a case-by-case basis, this author is nonetheless sympathetic to the view that, in a number of cases, one will have to use the cumulative approach for set-offs of non-contractual obligations, which is characteristic of the Romanic concept of determining the conflict-of-laws status of set-offs. The same approach must, for the most part, be required in the case of a set-off of contractual obligations against non-contractual obligations. 

Hmotné právo, je-li za konkrétních okolností započtení institutem hmotného práva, stanoví především podmínky započitatelnosti, tedy zda, kdy a za jakých podmínek je dlužník oprávněn kompenzovat svou vlastní pohledávkou závazek vůči věřiteli a dosáhnout zániku své povinnosti a současně stejným způsobem dosáhnout uspokojení vlastního nároku. Právo rozhodné pro započtení také určuje důsledky započtení a celou řadu dalších otázek se započtením souvisejících. Lze se setkat s různými přístupy při určování kolizního statusu započtení. Zatímco v německém právu se již po delší dobu většinou prosazuje v důsledku široce aplikovaného principu ochrany slabší strany (zde v podobě ochrany pasivního účastníka jednostranného zápočtu) převaha obligačního statusu pohledávky, proti níž zápočet směřuje, a který určuje také kolizní status započtení, románské pojetí prosazuje kumulativní přístup, podle něhož je pro podmínky a účinky započtení nutné zohlednit status obou započítávaných závazků. Poněkud rozpačitě lze v tomto směru přijmout závěr, k němuž dospěl ESD v roce 2003 ve sporu Komise v. CCRE, když soud se v této věci přiklonil k aplikaci románské zásady kumulativní. Pro aktuální přístup ke koliznímu řešení statusu zápočtu smluvních závazků má však toto rozhodnutí z dnešního pohledu jen minimální význam. Autor se přiklání k tomu, že v čl. 10 odst. 1 písm. d) a v odst. 2 téhož článku Římské úmluvy lze nalézt též oporu pro kolizní řešení kompenzačního statusu v režimu tohoto předpisu. Článek 17 Nařízení Řím I, které již explicitní úpravu kolizního statusu započtení upravuje, vychází z navázání na status pohledávky, proti níž započtení směřuje (pohledávka tzv. pasivní strany). Tato koncepce zachovává jednu z hlavních myšlenek Nařízení Řím I, totiž ochranu tzv. slabší strany, zde strany, která jednostranný zápočet neiniciuje. Věcný rozsah předmětné úpravy se vztahuje výlučně na započtení v důsledku jednostranného projevu vůle. Současně ovšem předmětná úprava jednoznačně potvrzuje charakter započtení v autonomním kvalifikačním pojetí práva EU primárně jako způsobu splnění závazku.

Nařízení Řím II o právu rozhodném pro mimosmluvní závazky žádnou výslovnou úpravu kolizního režimu započtení neobsahuje. Autor odmítá názor, podle něhož lze čl. 15 písm. h) Nařízení Řím II použít na započtení dvou mimosmluvních závazků. Jeho dikce je sice obdobná té v čl. 10 Římské úmluvy, Nařízení Řím II se však týká závazků svým charakterem, a především způsobem vzniku značně nekompatibilních (narozdíl od závazků smluvních). Ačkoliv bude u započtení mimosmluvních závazků nutné často postupovat diferencovaně, autor se přiklání k tomu, že v řadě případů bude nutno u zápočtů mimosmluvních závazků volit přístup kumulativní, který je vlastní románské koncepci kolizního řešení statusu započtení. Stejný postup je nutné většinou vyžadovat v případě započtení smluvních a mimosmluvních závazků.

The role and significance of foreign investment has grown in modern times in some major waves. This new outburst of foreign investment was accompanied by a number of bilateral treaties which grew from 500 in 1990 to about 2,000 in the year 2000.  Over 2,500 bilateral investment treaties have been concluded since the first such treaty in 1959. The result of the proliferation of investment treaties is that the investment arbitration system is now fairly elaborate and well entrenched, with a wide geographic scope. In the multilateral domain, the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID Convention) establishing the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) was adopted in 1965. The current state of international investment law is shaped and characterized by the texts of investment treaties, by rulings of international investment tribunals, and by rules of general international law.  The international law of foreign investment has become a specialized area of the legal profession.

Overall, ICSID tribunals have found the project or transaction in question to qualify as an investment for purposes of the Convention where the project or transaction: (a) had a significant duration; (b) provided a measurable return to the investor; (c) involved an element of risk on both sides; (d) involved a substantial commitment on the part of the investor; and (e) was significant to the State’s development. However, as set out below, these conditions operate as general benchmarks rather than as strict jurisdictional requirements. Article 25 provided for a broad framework for the definition of investment. Nonetheless, these criteria have been restated clearly in Salini v. Morocco in 2001 and have also been applied in subsequent decisions. Once the first three criteria are met, some tribunals may require that a significant contribution to the host State’s development should be established. This criterion is the most controversial. In Mitchell v. Congo, an ICSID ad hoc committee went as far as annulling an award on the ground that the activities of a US law firm in the Congo did not contribute to the country’s development and hence were not an investment. However, this is a controversial requirement, as shown by the recent findings of the Phoenix Action v. Czech Republic: “It is the Tribunal’s view that the contribution of an international investment to the development of the host State is impossible to ascertain – the more so as there are highly diverging views on what constitutes development. A less ambitious approach should therefore be adopted, centered on the contribution of an international investment to the economy of the host State, which is indeed normally inherent in the mere concept of investment as shaped by the elements of contribution/duration/risk, and should therefore in principle be presumed.” This judgment presents obviously one of the major trends in investment arbitration regarding the contribution of the investor in favour of the host State, to may qualify it as an investment for the purposes of international protection.

Standards of investor protection under investment protection instruments of international law include: (i) the prohibition of expropriation; (ii) fair and equitable treatment; (iii) national treatment; and (iv) the most favoured nation clause. Standards of protection also encompass (v) the prohibition of arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory measures that may appear relatively independent, but the particular form of which typically falls under one of the main standards of treatment. The same applies to (vi) the standard of full protection and security. One further standard is (vii) the prohibition of performance requirements. Distinguishing between these standards and identifying the characteristics thereof is an essential part of each individual case.

Expropriation, in the traditional form of the deprivation of property rights, is rare. Rather more widespread, however, is indirect expropriation, against which protection is also provided. This is protection against measures that are similar in effect to expropriation or are equivalent to expropriation. The most common types of actions leading to claims of indirect expropriation are: (•) the takeover of control over the management of a business; (•) taxation; (•) regulation; and (•) the forced restructuring of investment contracts. In order for protection to be granted, it is necessary for state intervention to have been serious and to have deprived an investor of all or most of the advantages and benefits accruing from the investment. International law, however, also approbates expropriation if it is in the public interest, is not arbitrary and discriminatory, is associated with immediate, adequate and effective compensation, and if due process in defending against these measures is also guaranteed at the national level. Government (state) action may also result in indirect expropriation. These measures include tax increases to such an extent that an investment becomes economically unsustainable, the withdrawal of an operating licence or permit, the nationalisation of land such that the investor is no longer able to operate its power plants, and the issue of government regulation prohibiting certain activities that are essential for the investor to make a profit.

The investor’s legitimate expectations, the denial of justice, and the transparency and stability of the investment environment, which must be guaranteed by the host state, are associated, in particular, with fair and equitable treatment as the standard most frequently applied in disputes over the protection of investments. Fair and equitable treatment must be distinguished from the standard of national treatment. The standard of fair and equitable treatment may also be violated even in cases in which a foreign investor receives the same treatment as investors - nationals of the host country.

Příspěvek obsahuje rozbor právní úpravy daňových skladů, problematiky vlastnických práv (zejména, avšak nikoliv jen, na příkladu skladování minerálních olejů), jakož i otázek naskladnění, vyskladnění, přiznání a odvodů nepřímých daní (jak DPH tak spotřební daně) v tomto režimu, obchodování se zbožím v režimu daňového skladu apod. Jako jeden z příkladů je podrobně rozvedeno i srovnání s režimem celního skladu.

Daňový sklad představuje ze soukromoprávního hlediska nepřímou úschovu. Naskladněním zboží do daňového skladu dochází k přechodu vlastnického práva na rovozovatele.Z hlediska daňového je významná otázka postoupení práv na vyskladnění.Spotřební daň se odvádí teprve tehdy, kdy je výrobek uveden do volného daňového oběhu. Pohyb vybraných výrobků v daňových skladech a mezi daňovými sklady navzájem není spotřební daní zatížen. Je však monitorován celní správou až do okamžiku, kdy jsou výrobky uvedeny do tzv. volného daňového oběhu v tuzemsku.Režim podmíněného osvobození od daně je velmi podobný režimu podmíněného osvobození od cla. Tyto dva režimy se navzájem vylučují – na výrobky v režimu podmíněného osvobození od cla se nevztahují ustanovení o podmíněném osvobození od daně. Nelze všakzaměňovat pojmy „vyskladnění“, „uvedení do volného daňového oběhu“ a důsledné rozlišení je často klíčové klíčové. Přitom legální definice existuje jen ve vztahu k „uvedení zboží do volného daňového oběhu“.

V případě DPH je nutno pojmy „dodání zboží“ (jako převod práva nakládat se zbožím jako vlastník“) a „poskytnutí služby“vykládat též v souvislosti se směrnicí 2006/112/ES jako autonomní pojem evropského práva.

Zásadní zlom představovala novelizace zákona o DPH provedená zákonem č. 47/2011 Sb., když do 1. dubna 2011 nebyly obchody v rámci daňového skladu zatíženy spotřební daní. Přitom mezeru v  úpravě DPH lze nejlépe prezentovat na srovnání s daňových skladů a celních skladů. Přitom do r. 2011 zákon o DPH neupravoval, že by při uvolnění zboží do volného daňového oběhu u daňových skladů docházelo ke zdanitelnému plnění, do jehož základu je nutné započítat spotřební daň. Zákon o DPH tak do roku 2011 obsahoval mezeru, kterou nebylo možné nahradit smluvním ujednáním stran.

Prawo szwajcarskie nie wywiera bezpośredniego wpływu na system wspólnotowy. Nie chodzi ani o prawo państwa członkowskiego UE, ani o prawo członka Europejskiego Obszara Gospodarczego. Prawo szwajcarskie, dzięki swojemu mieszanemu podejściu do rozwiązywania tradycyjnych materialnoprawnych, kolizyjnych a również niektórych procesowych zagadnień, nie pełni już dzisiaj w tak dużym stopniu funkcji prawa neutralnego, jaką pełniło jeszcze trzydzieści lat temu. W pierwszej połowie minionego stulecia, prawo szwajcarskie wraz z prawem francuskim były podstawowymi wyznacznikami w praktyce umownej krajów europejskich, a zarazem jeżeli chodzi o prawo Szwajcarii to było ono prawdopodobnie najczęściej wybieranym neutralnym prawem właściwym. Aktualnie Szwajcaria zachowała znaczenie bardziej jako miejsce rozstrzygania sporów, zwłaszcza zaś jako miejsce, w którym odbywają się postępowania arbitrażowe. Z tych powodów znaczenie szwajcarskiego prawa materialnego jak również  kolizyjnego nie jest już tak duże jak w przeszłości, a nawet często w zakresie europejskiej wymiany handlowej i stosunków prawnych  uważa się, że jest ono raczej bardzo ograniczone. Do pewnego stopnia zachowuje ono jednak swoje znaczenie jako stosunkowo często wybierane prawo właściwe w ramach stosunków w handlu światowym. W tym przypadku jednak nie zawsze istotną rolę odgrywa rzeczywiście dane prawo, ale na przykład czynniki językowe, gdyż w niektórych krajach nadal, wbrew rosnącemu znaczeniu języka angielskiego, komunikacja w języku francuskim jest istotna a wielojęzyczność środowiska (a zarazem fakt, że język francuski jest językiem wielu systemów prawa krajowego) jest przez niektóre z nich uważana za atut. W każdym przypadku Szwajcarii i jej prawo krajowe odgrywa istotną rolę w europejskim środowisku prawnym. Również kultura prawa prywatnego międzynarodowego jest właśnie w Szwajcarii na bardzo wysokim poziomie. Podczas gdy odwołanie się do standardów szwajcarskiego prawa materialnego jest w praktyce umownej rzadkie, to szwajcarska ustawa o prawie prywatnym międzynarodowym [IPRG] nadal pozostaje znaczącym i interesującym wzorcem, który jest nieodzowną częścią europejskiej, chociaż nie wspólnotowej kultury prawnej.

Wreszcie prawo Szwajcarii jest jednym z praw krajowych, które implementowało do swojej regulacji normatywnej zasadę świadczenia charakterystycznego jako łącznik, dzięki czemu art. 117 IPRG stanowi pewnego rodzaju nowoczesną próbę połączenia czynników obiektywnych i subiektywnych przy określeniu kolizyjnego (łącznika). Szwejcaria i jej prawo ze względu na położenie geograficzne, miejsce rozstrzygania sporów, stosunki finansowe i świadczenie usług bankowych jest dodatkowo jednym z najbardziej znaczących państw (praw krajowych)  na kontynencie europejskim, które nie są nawet członkami EOG. Nie jest także bez znaczenia rola Szwajcarii w handlu i stosunkach prawnych z państwami spoza Wspólnoty, przede wszystkim zaś w pozaeuropejskich stosunkach handlowych i finansowych. Nie chodzi wprawdzie o prawo, które byłoby na poziomie wspólnotowym formalnie uwzględniane, to jednak pro futuro ma ono doniosłe znaczenie dla środowiska wspólnotowego. Co więcej, szwajcarskie prawo prywatne międzynarodowe naturalnie nadal zachowuje charakter kompleksowej i uniwersalnej kodyfikacji kolizyjnej oraz kodeksu międzynarodowego postępowania  cywilnego, gdyż ich zakres nie jest dotknięty żadnymi normami wspólnotowymi i na ich stosowanie nie ma wpływu żadna uniwersalna regulacja międzynarodowa z zakresu prawa kolizyjnego.  Szwejcaria nie była bowiem i nawet nie może być umawiającym się państwem konwencji rzymskei. Kolizyjny system europejskiego prawa prywatnego międzynarodowego, w odróżnieniu od dziedziny procesowej w postaci konwencji lugańskie, w chwili obecnej nie oferuje żadnego odpowiednika dla krajów nieczłonkowskich. Niewątpliwie szwajcarskie prawo prywatne międzynarodowe może więc w przyszłości odegrać interesującą rolę, co najmniej jako tło prawnoporównawcze dla autonomicznego wspólnotowego systemu prawnego. Struktura krajowego prawa kolizyjnego naruszona wskutek wpływów europejskiego (wspólnotowego) prawa prywatnego międzynarodowego, takiej roli z oczywistych względów pełnić już nie może. Szwajcarskie prawo prywatne międzynarodowe może więc w przyszłości - z punktu widzenia praktycznego (stosowanie kolizyjnej legis fori w przypadku sporów rozwiązywanych w Szwajcarii), podobnie jak na płaszczyźnie prawa porównawczego i nauki prawa - odegrać może nie zasadniczą, ale i tak stosunkowo istotną rolę.

Protection of consumers became a phenomenon of many governmental politics. Retrieval of a balance between privat autonomy and protection of a weaker party is very sensitive. The particular degree of consumers protection through limitation of contractual autonomy (in B2C contracts) as well as procedural autonomy (regarding B2C dispute resolution mechanisms), as chosen by particular governments, has both legal and economic effects, in positive and negative sense. The European Court of Human Rights adjudicated repeatedly that traditional court litigation is not capable to grant effective protection to contractual claims in many countries. Arbitration is therefore one of possible tools for B2C dispute resolution, even if many countries and obviously the EU Commission followe rather an opposite strategy (keeping down arbitrability of B2C disputes in the opposite to US trends). Arbitration is not a cure-all and definitely not a method suitable for the resolution of any and all types of disputes. It has its proponents as well as opponents. Indeed, it is hard to claim that a particular type (class) of disputes is a priori fit to be resolved in arbitration, rather than litigation, or vice versa. This also applies to consumer disputes (disputes from consumer contracts). It is fairly undisputable that consumers deserve a certain degree of specific protection in cases in which they are forced to enter into a particular contract and have no other option than to accept the conditions stipulated by the other party (the professional). But we cannot principally claim that the resolution of these disputes in court would be more suitable than arbitration or any other, the so-called alternative, dispute resolution method (ADR).

Despite the basically undisputed importance of and the need for special consumer protection (whether provided by special laws, typically in Europe, or on the basis of general legal principles and the application of general contract law, like in the USA), the degree of such protection can be considered as somewhat controversial. The weaker party does deserve special protection within the regime of the equal status of the contracting parties. But the intensification of this protection often results in the possibility of the consumer to abuse this standard; abuse of the consumer’s right should naturally no longer enjoy any protection. Typically, consumers have grown accustomed to the practice of exercising their right to rescind (cancel) the contract by the statutory deadline while, in the meantime, they actively use the goods and thereby fulfill the purpose of the purchase (this specifically applies to seasonal goods). Besides, even a consumer ought to be required to exhibit a reasonable and usual degree of responsibility for his or her legal (juridical) acts, including the conclusion of contracts and assumption of obligations.

The fact that the procedural theory in connection with the arbitration agreement has certain deficiencies becomes especially apparent when examining the formation of the parties’ consensus to conduct arbitral proceedings. Although the position of the parties in civil litigation allows bilateral legal acts, procedural law does not regulate them. The purpose of procedural law is to regulate the trilateral procedural relationship involving the court as the third superior entity. The notional intergrade between substantive and procedural law, or the regulation of relationships of a procedural nature exclusively inter partes, is missing. Negotiations between litigants are not regulated under procedural law. If the formation of bilateral legal acts, including arbitration agreements and agreements on the choice of court or judicial settlement agreements, is not regulated under procedural law, the employment of the principle of analogia juris and the application of substantive law is justified, especially considering the fact that the existence of the arbitration agreement (and the choice of court agreement, as the case may be) prior to commencing any contentious proceedings (whether in court or before an arbitration tribunal) cannot be denied. The existence of such agreements also has a significant impact on the quality of the substantive law obligations from the perspective of their future enforceability. Procedural laws ought only to be applied after a dispute arises. Until that moment, it is logical to apply, unless special rules stipulate otherwise, substantive rules per analogiam juris. Such application is possible to the extent any particular issue is not subject to different regulation under special laws. Special laws applicable to arbitration agreements are specific rules regulating arbitration (lex arbitri). Lex arbitri provides for, especially, the scope of the objective and subjective arbitrability, but often for other issues too, for instance, the form and terms of arbitration agreements. Naturally, we may still argue about the degree to which any analogous application of substantive laws deprives arbitration agreements of their potential character. The answer to this question is to be found in the nature of the concept of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in countries with civil law tradition (as opposed to common law) is usually perceived as a procedural requirement. Due to the fact that rules regulating jurisdiction are the material manifestation of state sovereignty and state power, it is necessary, from this perspective, to primarily subject arbitration agreements (as well as choice of court agreements) to procedural laws. Substantive laws can, and often must, be applied by analogy only to the extent not explicitly regulated by special laws (lex arbitri) or procedural laws.

In any case, the examination of jurisdiction under civil law, or rather in most countries the laws of which do not accept the principles of common law, is rather procedural in nature. In most situations, it is the so-called procedural requirement. The examination of jurisdiction involves, at least, some public law elements. Although the examination of jurisdiction vested in the arbitral tribunal depends on the preliminary examination of the validity of the arbitration agreement, and it is necessary to apply substantive law (usually per analogiam) together with the (often insufficient) rules of lex arbitri, it represents an examination of an exception to the jurisdictional monopoly of the state. Under civil law, the state and only the state determines when, to what extent and under what conditions the jurisdictional power of the state can be restricted or even excluded. Despite the potential application of substantive law, the arbitration agreement cannot be classified as a substantive law instrument. The arbitration agreement therefore remains an agreement with effects for future disputes; in other words, despite its specific and rather mixed nature, the arbitration agreement remains a procedural contract in the broader sense. Consequently, the examination of the validity of the arbitration agreement, i.e. of the jurisdiction vested in the arbitral tribunal, does not (under civil law) constitute res judicata. Employing the instrument of a partial arbitral award for decisions on jurisdiction vested in the arbitral tribunal is therefore very dangerous in cases where the decision of the arbitral tribunal is also intended to have effects in civil law countries. Irrespective of whether, and to what extent, substantive laws apply to the examination of an arbitration agreement, it is still an examination of a procedural requirement. Employing the instrument of a partial arbitral award for decisions on jurisdiction is therefore very dangerous in cases where the decision is intended to have effects in civil law countries (or also in civil law countries, as the case may be). Instead of offering legal and procedural security to the parties, it raises doubts as to when and under what conditions it is possible to challenge such a decision on jurisdiction (rendered in the form of a partial arbitral award) by means of a motion for the annulment of the arbitral award. Consequently, it is much more suitable to resolve such situations differently (for instance, by issuing a procedural resolution or order whereby the parties are clearly informed of the opinion held by the arbitral tribunal) and elaborate on the respective issue later, in the arbitral award on the merits. The reason for such procedure is that most civil law legal systems do not allow motions to set aside partial arbitral awards on jurisdiction, and conversely, do allow such motions filed against arbitral awards on the merits, even if the arbitral tribunal had rendered a partial arbitral award on jurisdiction earlier in the proceedings. Some of them do allove it, but due to explicit regulation by law (as the Austrian law) or due to another specific reasons set by law and / or confirmed by the case law (as in Germany), but still the Jurisdiction remains procedural category. Such procedure is certainly also correct under civil law, where jurisdiction is a procedural requirement and decisions on jurisdiction do not constitute decisions on substantive rights. In that connection, we should also mention that under civil law, a decision on jurisdiction should be made in the form of an interim arbitral award, rather than a partial arbitral award. Interim arbitral awards are not final decisions on the rights and obligations of the parties, i.e. on substantive law; these awards represent decisions that only enable subsequent decisions on all or some of the rights and obligations of the parties subject to dispute.

The nature of the arbitration agreement in most legal systems (at least legal systems other than common law) is somewhat unclear. Presently, it is not possible to make any decisive statements as to which theory is the only correct one. On the other hand, it is necessary to examine each arbitration agreement invoked by the parties at the beginning of the proceedings and choose one of the current theories mentioned above. The classification of the arbitration agreement might, under certain circumstances, be the decisive element in determining the rules, i.e. procedural or substantive rules, applicable to the arbitration agreement.

The seat of arbitration seems to be one of the most important issues to be agreed within an arbitration agreement. It directly influences a number of issues: arbitrability, determination of the governing law, whether substantive or procedural, and determination of the place for the proceedings on annulment of the arbitral award (and for the exercise of the juge d´appui and supervisory functions of courts with respect to arbitration). The examples of many countries clearly illustrate that the ideas of the denationalization of arbitration are somewhat chimerical, especially because the states desire to preserve a certain degree of control over arbitration; it also demonstrates the fact that the denationalization of arbitration generally does not even correspond to the actual interest of the parties. The reason often inheres in the greater security guaranteed in localized proceedings. Consequently, the denationalization of arbitration has never been fully implemented, and it appears that it has become a very marginal issue.

Поскольку вопрос о таможенных процедурах в значительной степени связан с областью регулирования цен, необходимо уделить внимание регулированию цен в соответствии с правовыми нормами ЕС, которые в рамках регулирования единого рынка характеризуются значительной активностью. Согласно законодательству ЕС, а также документам судебной практики Суда Европейских Сообществ (в настоящее время Суд Европейского Союза), одной из основных целей ЕС является устранение всех препятствий в области свободного перемещения товаров, в том числе таможенных пошлин. В работе рассматриваются как правовые нормы ЕС в области регулирования цен в первичном праве и его взаимосвязями с вторичным  правом (особенно в директивах ЕС), так и их толкованием Судом ЕС. В области таможенных мер государств-членов имеет решающее значение положение статьи 30 ДФЕС, которая между государствами-членами запрещает все таможенные пошлины на импорт и экспорт или равнозначные им сборы. Цель данной работы заключается в том, чтобы установить, является ли каждая мера в области регулирования цен сама по себе ограничением торговли в рамках ЕС, и при необходимости определить, при каких условиях и с учетом каких документов судебной практики Европейского Союза, запрещены меры в области регулирования цен, принятые государствами-членами.

The interference between insolvency law and the law applicable to arbitration is inevitable. Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000, on insolvency proceedings (Regulation), deals with proceedings being conducted in one EU Member State, while an insolvency proceedings involving one of the parties to the arbitration agreement was opened in another Member State. The present article describing impacts of opening an insolvency proceedings (within the scope of Regulation) and declaration of bankruptcy on pending arbitration in light of recent decisions of the Czech, English and Swiss arbitral tribunals and courts dealing with the insolvency of one of the parties in pending international arbitrations. Some case law of particular Austrian, Dutch, French and German courts will be reflected as well.

The formulation pending lawsuit within the meaning of Art 15 of the Regulations is broader than a lawsuit pending within the jurisdiction of the courts and it covers all proceedings, which might have the same or similar effect as a court judgment. The wording of Art 15 covers therefore pending arbitrations seating within the Member States applying the Regulation as well. Irrespective of the duty to apply all EC regulations within their territorial scope as a part of the law of all Member States (excl Danmark) the acceptance of the principle of suspension of ongoing proceedings, if being a part of the national law within the seat of any finding and contradictory dispute resolution mechanism, forms part of internal public policy.

Neither arbitration (arbitration clause) nor any other jurisdictional clause create a security of an contractual obligation. Trying to take out arbitration from the scope of the Insolvency Regulation or any law applicable on the effect(s) of insolvency proceedings within the seat of arbitration is a breach of the public policy principle prefering the equal and partial distribution of the bankruptcy assets to all (registered) creditors under a public supervisory. A reliance on the arbitration clause as a principle can not prevail the equality of all unsecured creditors of the debtor. The prevalance of the later principle over a reliance on the arbitral clause has furthermore to be understood as a part of international public policy (ordre public).

The determination of the applicable law may never exceed the limits of the contract entered into by the parties and their expectations and legal certainty. This criterion is to be understood as the main dogma. The global financial and economic crisis only confirmed that commercial practices became extremely brutal, and the current global situation confirms that any arbitral or choice-of-forum clause, i.e., an authorisation of the tribunal to choose any law or rules or even principles of law, does not indicate a greater willingness of the parties to settle potential disputes in a fair manner. The tribunals have to determine the applicable law as a legal system of a particular country using standard conflict-of-laws methods and conflict-of-laws rules as prescribed by applicable lex arbitri or (if authorised by lex arbitri and/or by the parties themselves) to first determine the relevant choice-of-law methods and rules. They have to reflect on the contract as well as potentially applicable lex arbitri if these contain binding instruction for conflict-of-laws resolution. In respect to the applicability of the Rome I Regulation in arbitration, the author‘s opinion is that the tribunals must apply it at once if they have to apply particular conflict-of- laws rules (as adapted by a number of national lex arbitri rules) and such conflict-of-laws rules are those of a country bound by the Regulation. The refusal to apply it would endanger certainty and foreseeability. Nevertheless, the arbitrators might do so, and they often have to find a more rational and commercially practical approach in interpreting the Regulation. In addition, they often determine the limits of the parties‘ autonomy, which in EC law are in fact (de iure) rather broad. And this occurs even though EU administrative structures usually attempt to subordinate arbitration conducted in EU countries under the ECJ (EU Tribunal) adjudicated standards, which are (in contrast to the Rome I Regulation itself) not binding for the arbitrators if determining substantial law issues.

Arbitration is usually defined as a manner of dispute resolution. While in most legal systems the arbitration agreement is considered a type of procedural agreement, it is more closely connected with substantive law than procedural agreements stricto sensu, i.e. agreements entered into between parties related to particular pending or immediate proceedings with the intention of directing the course thereof. If one accepts the definition of procedural agreement as an agreement that induces its direct effect in the area of procedure, in relation to a certain formal procedure (whatever the kind), i.e. that these agreements are effective in relation to such procedure, such definition is evidently correct and relatively broad and is a definition of procedural agreement in the broad sense. The term procedural agreement so broadly defined can no doubt cover also arbitration and prorogation agreements, as arrangements on the manner of resolving potential disputes arising from substantive legal relations based either on a contract or otherwise (for example within extra-contractual obligations and on jurisdiction of a particular forum/tribunal or the manner of constituting tribunal to hear and to resolve such disputes, as well as other procedural terms relating to the particular procedure. It is an arrangement on a potential [future] procedure (approved and regulated at least in its basic principles by law) in its broadest sense, usually a procedure in the sense of an adversary fact-finding proceeding. Therefore there is no need for such an agreement to be made in respect of one specific proceeding. The basic typical feature of procedural agreement in the above-defined broad sense is its ability to induce effects approved by procedural law, including establishing the jurisdiction of particular forum (tribunal) before which a certain proceeding may be commenced and held. Besides, there is also another type of procedural agreement which I call procedural agreement in the narrow sense (or narrow procedural agreement) and which are entered into only in the course of a particular proceeding. The effects of these agreements are operative solely and exclusively within such particular proceeding or with respect to the subject of the proceeding, whether to the subject in its entirety or partially, when the subject matter scope delimited by the relevant procedural agreement is more narrow than the scope of the subject of the given proceeding. Thus the subject of such procedural agreement in the narrow sense cannot in any situation exceed the scope of the subject of the proceeding. If such situation occurs, it has to be considered according to the relevant applicable law whether such subject matter excess of the procedural agreement brings about some qualified effect (such as invalidity/nulity or simply ineffectiveness of the agreement) in respect of the procedural agreement in its entirety or to the part exceeding the subject of the procedure only. This category of procedural agreements includes for instance reconciliation agreements concluded in the course of proceedings, agreements on withdrawal of action, agreements on withdrawal of a remedy already filed, evidentiary agreements (on types of evidence and manner of taking evidence) etc. It is not only possible but in the author‘s opinion also necessary to apply substantive law to procedural agreements, at least as supportive instruments in questions not regulated by procedural law, the effect of procedural agreements (in any case at least of narrow procedural agreements and as a rare exception possibly also in broad procedural agreements in some countries according to their legal approach under the theory of extensive effect) is limited solely to the area of procedure. For a narrow procedural agreement to be valid and binding for parties, the parties must act within their respective procedural capacities, that is, within their respective procedural personalities. It is an agreement entered into by parties in civil proceedings in which they agree certain procedural legal effects. The subject-matter of the agreement is all relations that are subject to discretionary freedom of the parties in compliance with the law and rules applicable to a given specific proceeding and to the manner and course of the proceeding. In any case the procedural agreements in terms arbitration agreement (arbitration clause) will commonly be evaluated pursuant to substantial law and its institutes, at least in civil law, while in the common law the judges dispose of a broad range of possibilities to evaluate such agreements abstractedly from the substantive law. This close link between arbitration agreements and substantive law arises from the fact that arbitration clauses are entered by the parties before any particular proceedings are initiated, and in most cases, simultaneously with the establishment of a substantive legal relation itself, i.e. a particular contract or legal relation similar in nature, and they are intended to serve as a dispute resolution mechanism in order to settle disputes concerning the main agreement in cases concerning arbitration clauses, or a separate contract in cases of formally separate arbitration agreements. The purpose of the arbitration agreement is purely procedural, i.e. designating the method of dispute resolution for the main agreement.

The theoretical problem of distinguishing between the procedural and substantive nature of dispute resolution agreements becomes very real in practice when it comes to the question of determining the nature and legal effect of multi-step (called as combined or multi-tiered as well) agreements. The determination of the substantive or procedural nature of such agreements directly affects their enforcement in practice. The effect of the initial tiers of the MDR agreement is limited mean that MDR clauses are unsuitable as efficient means of dispute resolution? It has to be stated that by saying that the MDR clause is not suitable to prevent resorting to the arbitration or court proceedings, it does not mean that it is of no effect. The nature of the clause as a substantive agreement does indeed affect the position of the parties in the dispute. The question of the effectiveness and nature of MDR clauses has to be separated.

Civil law jurisdictions generally tend to provide a less rigorous approach to jurisdictional awards, which means that the judicial review of such awards is performed at the outset, i.e. the court is authorized to fully remit the arguments of the arbitral tribunal related to jurisdiction and in turn overturn the arbitral tribunal’s decision on grounds of improper justification of the award or inconsistency with applicable law. In other civil law jurisdictions the rigid nature of the jurisdictional ruling is softened by the possibility of the continuous review of the issue of jurisdiction, which can be addressed throughout the proceedings. In the Czech arbitration law and in other jurisdictions there is also an otherwise rarely recognized duty of arbitrators to address the issue of jurisdiction ex officio. On the other hand, common law jurisdictions only provide limited possibility for the review of jurisdictional decisions. This solution gives the arbitrators great autonomy to acquire jurisdiction over disputes, or more precisely, it enables parties to the arbitration agreement to transfer their fate fully into the hands of arbitrators. This situation is both criticized and praised at the same time. From the above, it seems obvious that a large number of civil law jurisdictions that have been examined do not consider the decision on jurisdiction to be a decision on the merits, or a substantive decision. This decision, in terms of the definitions presented, is of a purely procedural nature, and in turn does not constitute a res iudicata objection. One of the consequences is that for example the rendering of an award on jurisdiction as a kind of interim award does not limit the court to set-aside the final award in the same proceedings, even if any setting-aside has not been applied specifically regarding the [interim] award on jurisdiction, if rendered. The jurisdictional issue is, as a matter of principle, to be understood in the particular jurisdictions as a spine of the whole proceedings (arbitration).

Subject of the Article is the interesting judgment of the Czech Supreme Administrative Court as of 20 May 2010 dealing with the interpretation of international treaties on social security. The judgment is remarkable for the scope of resources of international (or Community) origin of which it takes account, at least for the purposes of comparison; it also concentrates on the difference between domicile and habitual residence, and the significance of the subjective and the objective element of the connection to a particular territory. By contrast to the prevailing practice in Czech courts, the judgment offers a detailed comparison with the domestic (national) laws of other countries. The judgment also repeatedly refers to a “centre of all living conditions”, or “centre of interests”, etc. In the circumstances of the present case, though, i.e. as concerns the general personal status of a natural person or in connection with the specific branch of social security, these concepts lack any qualified meaning or legal definition. They are therefore an expression of the general dislocation of a natural person’s connections to a place in a particular state in which the person intends to reside and establish all of his or her personal and professional connections. However, we must strictly distinguish between that concept and, for instance, the centre of the debtor’s main interests within the meaning of jurisdiction laws in insolvency proceedings with international elements in EU law, as introduced by Article 3 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 1346/2000, on insolvency proceedings. Th at is a sui generis concept introduced by said Regulation in so-called cross-border insolvency in EU law. One of the differences distinguishing the “centre of main interests” from the general definition of a natural person’s main living and other connections is, for instance, the fact that such concept, in terms of European insolvency law, applies to legal persons as well, takes special account of economic relations and accentuates (according to the existing case law) the way such economic relations are perceived and viewed by third parties, i.e. the debtor’s creditors. We have to point out that the logical structure, as well as the reasons for the decision, contributes to it being a very modern and highly professional decision, with balanced reasons. The reasons take account of both domestic resources and resources of international origin, which were very well chosen in their historical connotations. The court articulated a politically very careful, yet pertinent and fitting description of the correct approach to the interpretation of international treaties after the political and social changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which resulted in radical changes both inside these countries and in the mutual relations between these countries. This international political and international legal reality was masterfully exposed by the court on the platform of the traditional foundations of the international law of treaties, as primarily expressed in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). This decision definitely deserves attention, even international attention.

In the course of time, several approaches to the nature and the legal basis of arbitration have evolved. These include the jurisdiction theory and then the contract, mixed and the autonomous theory. While the contract theory claims that arbitration is based exclusively on the agreement between the parties, the jurisdiction theory argues that arbitration is based on the delegation of the decision making power from the courts to the arbitrators based on the law and the legal system of the state where the arbitration takes place. Although the author does not deny the significance of agreement in arbitration, he considers the arbitration agreement to be only a condition for initiation of the arbitrators’ jurisdiction, but always only on the basis of the legal framework of the state in which the dispute takes place. Arbitration cannot be held in any abstract environment. Such a regime would seriously endanger the legal certainty of the parties who must always know under what conditions the arbitration proceedings will take place and under what conditions they can exercise their rights. This regime is determined exclusively by law as the manifestation of state sovereignty. Theories about the so-called denationalization of arbitration are, according to the author, very dangerous and reveal the lack of arguments on the part of certain authors as concerns the significance of the prescribed legal framework regulating arbitration in a particular country.

Arbitration has been undergoing a massive expansion in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. The underlying cause is the fact that arbitration proceedings are often much more flexible, less formal and most of all cheaper than litigation in court. The development of arbitration in, for instance, the countries of Western Europe, or the so-called Western legal cultures, must be viewed rather critically. In these countries, on the contrary, arbitration is becoming extremely formal and, especially, very expensive. It is essential that the countries of Eastern and Central Europe maintain this standard of the so-called traditional advantages of arbitration. It is indeed a very interesting alternative to the finding of the law and the resolving of disputes through the mediation of courts [of law, state courts] as public authorities.

Arbitration is a very popular mechanism of dispute settlement in the Czech Republic. There are no statistics on the number of awards rendered in the country. The arbitral awards are enforseble after delivery to parties. Domestic awards are not subject of any recognition proceedings (similar rules as for example in Austria). The only exact figures may result for example from the number of executions (enforsements) applied on the arbitrla awards. It will be anticipated that around 150 Thousands awards will be rendered in a year. Substantial number of arbitrations are consumer disputes (B2C), for the most part when business collects receivables. A comment has to be made that significant legislative changes just regarding consumer arbitration is to be expected within the second half of 2011.

The large number of arbitrations conducted and arbitral awards rendered in the Czech Republic also means that the courts deal very often with arbitral issues, mostly in annulment proceedings. The paper summarises and analyses some significant decisions of the Czech courts rendered in course of past three years.

The Czech law on arbitration does not follow exactly the UNCITRAL Model Law, although it follows the main principles of the Model Law. No review in merits is allowed, as this principle has been confirmed for example in the Judgment of the Czech Supreme Court as from 2009. The court stated that the fact that the obligation to perform as imposed by an arbitral award is in conflict with good morals is not sufficient grounds to set aside the arbitral award, as reviewing this issue would be tantamount to a review “on the merits”, i.e., of the factual correctness of the arbitral award, which is inadmissible. The Supreme Court decided similarly in another case (decision as from 2010) again, when it stated that the Supreme Court is not authorized to assess the arbitration proceedings in terms of their substance [i.e., the content of the course of proceedings and of the arbitral award], but may only address the issue of whether the court of appeals properly assessed whether or not the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award were given in the particular case. At the same time, the court of appeals is bound by the reasons which were given for the appeal on questions of law [the latter being an extraordinary remedy] and by how these reasons were defi ned in terms of substance (Sec. 242 (3) First Sentence of act No. 99/1963 Coll., as amended, Code of Civil Procedure of the Czech Republic).

Substantive review in respect to arbitration clause in a consumer contract (B2C) is, however, allowed pursuant to the relevant EU Law on consumer protection incorporated into the Czech Law. The Supreme Court of the Czech Republic therefore decided in the judgment of June 29, 2010 that if, in proceedings on the annulment of an arbitral award, a court finds that the relation between the parties constitutes a consumer contract, then the court must base its findings regarding the purported conflict with consumer protection laws (and the ensuing nullity of the arbitration clause) on an application of these very laws on the protection of consumers (i.e., in the present case, on Sec. 55 (1) and Sec. 56 (1) of the Civil Code of the Czech Republic), as opposed to the general requirements for arbitration agreements pursuant to Sec. 3 (2) of act No. 216/1994 Coll. [CZE] / [of the Czech Republic], on arbitration and on the enforcement of arbitral awards, as amended. In the same decision the court distinguished between formal and substantive requirements of arbitral agreements and the particular provisions of law applicable for those requirements.

In another decision from 2010 the Czech Supreme court defined rules, which are applicable to the interpretation of arbitration agreements. The main rule is to be found in the Sec. 35 (2) of the Czech Civil Code. Pursuant to the provision cited legal acts that are expressed verbally must be construed not only based on the verbal expression, but in particular pursuant to the will of the party who engaged in the legal act (unless the will were in conflict with the verbal expression). Sec. 35 (2) of the Civil Code anticipates that doubts may arise as to the contents of legal acts, and formulates rules of interpretation for this event which determine how the court must remove these doubts through interpretation. The verbal expression of legal acts as recorded in a contract must primarily be interpreted by means of grammatical, logical, and systematic interpretation. In addition, the court is to determine, based upon the evidence heard, the true will of the parties at the time at which they entered into the contract, whereas this will of the parties shall be taken into consideration only to the extent to which it is not in conflict with the verbal expression of the legal act. Pursuant to Sec. 35 (2) of the Civil Code, the interpretation of the substance of a legal act by the courts must not replace or change previously made declarations of will; the application of statutory rules of interpretation is solely to ensure that the contents of a verbally expressed legal act in which the parties concordantly engaged are construed in accordance with the state of affairs at the time of contracting. Where the contents of a legal act are recorded in writing, the determinateness of the expression of the parties’ will is inherent in the contents of the deed in which it is recorded.

The paper analyses the current case law, comparing this court practise with international practise as well as with the law on arbitration in another countries. Provisions of law applied in the particular decisions are also cited in the published paper.

The fact that a state is a party to arbitration does not give the arbitrators the status of public officers or subjects of public law, let alone [public] international law. Arbitration is, above all, a universal procedural mechanism. The principal specifics of investment arbitration become especially apparent in connection with the application of substantive standards.

Confidentiality and publicity/privacy are predominantly procedural issues. Opinions that argue that there exists any global, internationally recognized principle of confidentiality as an intrinsic feature to arbitration are illusory. Standards of confidentiality are subject to important territorial differences that depend on the seat of arbitration. The only universally accepted principle is probably the principle of confidentiality of hearings and the obligation of confidentiality binding on the arbitrators. This applies not only to international commercial arbitration, but also to investment disputes. Even in investment disputes, the parties enjoy a high standard of autonomy when it comes to confidentiality and the disclosure of information. Although we cannot deny the existence of a qualified public interest in investment disputes, this aspect should not influence confidentiality, publicity or the disclosure of information, because the ultimate interest in the disclosure of information in investment protection cases principally benefits the nationals of the host state. The author is of the opinion that these nationals could demand the disclosure of information regarding a particular dispute directly upon the host state and according to the mechanisms that the particular state employs for the purpose of the disclosure of information by the state (legislation regulating access to information, etc.). The author has serious doubts as to the power and the entitlement or authorization of arbitrators to make broad decisions on the disclosure of information concerning the particular proceedings by one of the parties. They cannot assess the interests of a third party (a person who is not a party to the proceedings). This does not apply in exceptional cases where the arbitrators restrict the right of the parties to disclose a specific piece of information in procedural situations that could jeopardize the course and the purpose of the proceedings. This is the only aspect within the power of arbitrators as concerns publicity. Nonetheless, such measures ought to be exceptional and adopted only in cases of specific and imminent danger.

Arbitration in Hungary has a long standing tradition and there is also available extensive case law of Hungarian national courts regarding arbitration. It was confirmed repeatedly that courts may not intervene in arbitral proceedings in the event a valid arbitration clause exists and that arbitration courts and arbitral institutions are not a part of the judiciary and not subject to the oversith authority of the Supreme Court of Hungary (for instance decision of the Supreme Court of Hungary as from 2001). A full authonomy of the Parties has been confirmed by the court practise in respect to the annulment proceedings as a demand for the annulment of an arbitral award may only be made by a party to the particular arbitral proceedings or by a person that is subject to an abligation imposed by the arbitral award, provided that the arbitral award has been delivered to such a person. The Hungarian courts (or any authority) are therefore not entitled to set-aside an award ex officio (Ruling of the Péct Reginal Court as of 2006). The same decision confirmed inter partes effects of arbitral awards.

Very interesting judgment has been issued by Debrecen Regional Court in 2006. The court stated that If an enforceable arbitral award has the nature of a court judgment for the purposes of its enforcement, regulations pertaining to the enforcement of court rulings may be applied to such an award, including a mutual legal assistance (rogattory) treaty (in this case, an agreement between Hungary and Ukraine) that guarantees the enforceability of court judgments. Due to the nature of an arbitral award, which is qualified as identical to a court judgment for enforcement purposes, regulations pertaining to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards (in this case, the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards) are used together with regulations pertaining to the enforcement of court judgments, where those regulations apply that allow recognition and enforcement to a larger extent.

Extraordinarity of public policy issues has confirmed the Supreme Court of Hungary in 2006 when ruling that in arbitral proceedings, it is permissible to restrict some constitutional rights with regard to the process of law finding. Public policy violation only as an especially serious violation of rights. Arbitration restricts or excludes, in a constitutionally conforming manner, certain fundamental rights guaranteed by the constitution with regard to legal protection. An assertion claiming the absence of fair and impartial trial in arbitration does not mean that the public policy of [Hungary] has been violated at the same time. A violation of fundamental rights may represent a violation of the public policy of [Hungary]. However, a violation of public policy is committed only if fundamental principles of law are violated.

Arbitration is very popular in Poland, like in almost all countries of Central and Eastern Europe. This corresponds with extensive case law of Polish courts. Polish Law on Arbitration, which is part of the Code on Civil Procedure (as amended in 2005) and which is based on UNCITRAL Model Law, provides for a high degree of autonomy in arbitration and for a broad interpretation of the arbitrability. The scope of arbitrability has been confirmed in certain Polish court decisions. For example the decision of the Polish Supreme Court of May 21st 2010 stated that The wording “may be subject to settlement” applies to disputes on both property and non-property rights. It is common ground under doctrine and case-law that the parties may seek the award of certain enforcement, a declaration of the existence of a relationship or a right (a declaration of whether or not a right exists here) or the establishment of a particular legal relationship before an arbitral tribunal. In another decision the Polish Supreme Court (decision of June 18th 2010) explained that the subject-matter of an arbitration agreement is legal relationships, not specific claims arising from such relationships. The possibility of subjecting a dispute to the jurisdiction of arbitrators is abstractly defined for legal relationships, not for the types of claims arising from such relationships (enforcement, a declaration of whether or not a legal relationship or right exists here). The [objective] arbitrability of a dispute depends on the type of legal relationship. A precondition of [objective] arbitrability is the abstract possibility of the parties to the dispute to dispose of rights arising from the legal relationship between those parties. In this regard, arbitrability is not dependent on whether the parties can reach a particular settlement. It is therefore irrelevant, whether a party itself could conclude and declare that a contract is null and void; the material factor is whether the parties can reach an amicable settlement.

In Europe generally the issue of arbitrability of competition and tort claims is relatively sensitive and the doctrines of particular European countries are fairly different. Many countries of Europe did not express any clear view on this issue as of yet. The Polish Supreme Court decided on this issue by its Judgement of December 2nd 2009 expressing that a claim for unjust enrichment, as a dispute on a property right which may be disposed of by the parties, may be subject to settlement. As such, it may constitute the subject-matter of an arbitration agreement. Arbitration agreements clearly relate to disputes arising from or connected with agreements on cooperation in the purchase of goods. The respondent’s unfair competition, consisting of the receipt of additional consideration, was not connected [...] with performance under such an agreement, nor did it constitute part of any relationship to the performance thereof, but took place only in parallel to the performance of such an agreement. The claim sought by the party claims hence is not contractual in nature and is unrelated to the content of the agreement, but concerns unfair competition. The parties, upon entering into an arbitration agreement, could hardly be expected to have envisaged such conduct and entered into an arbitration agreement on that matter. It clearly follows from the content of the arbitration agreement that it concerned disputes related to the implementation of the agreement, rather than all disputes arising during the implementation thereof.

Available is also new case law on effects of foreign court decisions to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitration award from the perspective of the New York Convention. This topic counts also as a hot topic in many international discussions. The Polish Supreme Court decided on November 6th 2009 that A decision on the legal relevance of a particular decision of a foreign court cannot be taken during exequatur procedure as it is impossible to predict what effects of such a decision will be claimed by any applicant (party) in the future and under what circumstances. In this respect the Polish Law on Arbitration does not form a basis to dismiss [an application for] the recognition of a decision of a foreign court merely because, in the opinion of the court adjudicating on recognition (in exequatur procedure), the decision will not induce any effects in Poland. If the applicant in exequatur procedure (i.e. the person seeking recognition of the decision) was the same party in the [main] action before the Austrian court, it has a legal interest not only in being entitled to bring proceedings in exequatur procedure in Poland, but also, if the conditions laid down in Polish Law on Arbitration are not met, in being able to claim the recognition of such a decision, i.e. the recognition of the legal effects thereof, in Poland. The decision dismissing the application for the annulment of an arbitral award by the court, from a formally procedural perspective, is a decision on the merits and not just a procedural decision. The decision on the application for the annulment of the arbitration award by the court was therefore generally eligible for recognition (it may be subject to exequatur procedure). It should be noted, however, that, from the substantive aspect, the dispute was resolved by the award of an arbitral tribunal, the basis of which was the will of the parties expressed by the arbitration agreement. In this regard, a decision on an application for the annulment of an arbitral award is only a decision by which the State exercises supervision of (control over) arbitral awards and arbitration in general. A decision rendered by a Polish court in proceedings brought by an application for the annulment of an arbitral award must be taken into account in procedure on the recognition of a foreign arbitral award only if so provided by the law applicable to such procedure. According to the Polish Code on Civil Procedure and on the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958), a court adjudicating on the recognition of a foreign decision shall take into account, on a motion from a party, a decision annulling an arbitral award. It does so when examining the existence of any grounds for refusal of recognition. The basis for the rendering of an arbitral award is the will of the parties. It follows from the nature of the arbitral award and from the role played by the foreign court’s decision dismissing the application for the annulment of the arbitral award that there is an insufficient legal basis for the recognition of the foreign court’s decision, which is essentially only of a supervisory, rather than a substantive, nature. The connection with an arbitral award and, consequently, not the absolutely individual nature of such a decision of a foreign court on an application for the annulment of such an arbitral award, is primarily an obstacle hindering its assessment as a decision which may be recognized in Poland under the existing Law on Arbitration.

There are available also many other current decisions of Polish court related to highly interested topics, which create usually an important part of the discussions during leading international events on arbitration.

Bulgaria is country, which intensively support arbitration reflecting very broad autonomy, often broader than in many countries of Western Europe. Bulgaria therefore follows the trend of almost CE countries recording rapid growth of arbitration. It is one of few countries, which introduced one instance annulment proceedings like for instance Switzerland. The number of instances in annulment proceedings was subject of Constitutional Court of Bulgaria judgment of 2002, which decided that the number of instances (the structure of court instances) depends on the structure of the judicial system, which is subject to special procedural and other laws. The Constitution does not stipulate a three-instance judicial system as an overriding mandatory constitutional principle. There is no constitutional obstacle preventing the resolution of certain selected civil and criminal matters within the framework of a different system of court instances. A single-instance judicial system for proceedings on the annulment (setting aside) of arbitral awards does not violate constitutional rights to legal protection. The Supreme Court of Cassation is merely a supervisory and appellate court. It does not have jurisdiction to review arbitral awards on the merits. The Supreme Court of Cassation only renders decisions on motions for the annulment (setting aside) of arbitral awards on the grounds expressly specified in the International Commercial Arbitration Act of Bulgaria.

The nature of arbitration was for example subject of the Bulgarian Supreme Court judgment of 1992 specifying than An arbitral tribunal in voluntary arbitration is not a judicial authority (such as authorities with special jurisdiction), because of the contractual basis of arbitration. Authorities with special jurisdiction are different, because they were founded by the state (a state authority). This is not the case with commercial arbitration. Awards rendered in [voluntary] arbitration need not comply with judicial practice and are not subject to any ordinary or extraordinary judicial review, nor are they subject to the laws regulating extraordinary review and the annulment of final and binding decisions of public authorities. Arbitral tribunals resolve disputes in accordance with their own (internal) rules. The court is not allowed to review arbitral awards from the perspective of their [material] validity, because they were rendered under rules different from the Bulgarian Code of Civil Procedure [rules applicable to court proceedings], and the parties [having agreed on the arbitral clause] intentionally refused intervention by the courts (prohibition of judicial review of arbitral awards/prohibition of revision au fond). Another difference between the two types of proceedings consists of the fact that courts have a varying status within the judicial system (system of public authorities). This line followed another judgment of the Bulgarian Supreme Court of 1994 deciding that According to the amendment to the International Commercial Arbitration Act of November 2, 1993, extraordinary remedies against court decisions on the annulment of arbitral awards rendered by the Bulgarian Court of International Commercial Arbitration are inadmissible. An arbitral tribunal constituted as a result of party autonomy hears and decides disputes pursuant to its own (internal) rules. An arbitral tribunal is not a state authority, and its decisions are not subject to extraordinary remedies; the same applies to court decisions on the annulment of arbitral awards. The only remedy against an arbitral award is a motion for the annulment of the award by court. The court decision rendered in the annulment proceedings is final.

Jurisdiction as procedural condition (procedural issue) and not as substantive issue has been defined for example in the judgment of the Bulgarian Supreme Court of 1995. The particular decision stated that Jurisdiction is a procedural conditio sine qua non; it is considered to be a prejudicial (preliminary) question. The jurisdiction of courts in civil cases can be excluded by an arbitration agreement pursuant to Section 9(3) of the CPC. The existence of such an arbitration agreement constitutes a procedural obstacle, which prevents the court from ruling on any substantive issues, including such issues on which the court would otherwise be obliged to rule (sua sponte). A conflict of jurisdiction between a court and another authority shall be assessed by the court sua sponte at any point during the proceedings. An arbitral tribunal is not another authority. A lack of jurisdiction of a court due to the existence of an arbitration agreement is therefore considered by the court exclusively upon request, which must be submitted by the end of the first hearing in the case. If the jurisdictional challenge is not raised by the stipulated deadline, the objection is precluded. This is characteristic decision for almost CE Countries doctrine as well as for the doctrine of the majority of civil law countries. It is therefore highly dangerous to try to implement common law principles into arbitration proceedings conducted in those countries or having important relationship to those countries as for example to handle the jurisdiction as substantive issue.

There is a number of another decisions of Bulgarian Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court as well as the Supreme Court of Cassation expressing important opinions on matters, which have closed relation to both, arbitration as well as constitutional principles. The Bulgarian case law well reflect traditions inherent to almost CE Countries and to the majority of civil law countries known with a long and intensive tradition of arbitration.

Arbitration is defined in the Czech Republic in Act No. 216/1994 Coll. of 1 November 1994 on Arbitration and on Enforcement of Arbitration Rulings, as amended ("ArbAct [CZE]"). According to Section 2, paragraph 1 of ArbAct [CZE], parties may agree that matrimonial disputes between them, with the exception of disputes arising in connection with the execution of a judgment in incidental disputes, the hearing and settlement of which would otherwise be in the jurisdiction of a court, is to be decided by one or several arbitrators or a permanent court of arbitration (arbitration agreement).

Defining and approaching arbitration this way suggests that the law entrusts/delegates to private entities, under the applicable regulations, the exercise of some of its powers relating to the settlement of disputes. Incidentally, this conclusion is accepted by the majority (save for exceptions) of professionals in the Czech Republic. Some authors do not deny the effects of the role and function of the state on arbitration in the Czech Republic, but they lean toward a mixed theory of arbitration, mainly pointing out that even though the appointment of an arbitrator or an arbitration tribunal has a private nature and arbitration may only be initiated and conducted based on an existing agreement of the parties, arbitration itself retains its "public-law character." The state on the one hand exercises its oversight powers vis-à-vis arbitration courts and helps through state courts wherever arbitrators are unable to complete certain tasks, and, on the other hand, it confers the same effects, subject to certain conditions, to arbitration rulings as to judgments delivered by courts.

Despite the above mentioned relatively intensive discussions about the prospects of instituting greater control over arbitration, it needs to be said that the official case law of Czech courts attributes clearly contractual nature to arbitration (as of yet). According to the rulings (referred to in the published paper), activities conducted by arbitrators cannot be classified as law finding; they consist of clarifying/rectifying an existing contractual relationship in representation and based on the free will of the parties. As regards this issue, however, the Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic failed in 2002 to determine whether on this basis, a "simple" agreement between parties may gain the status of an enforceable ruling (the Czech law does not require any exequatur decision).

The authors believe that no matter what effort is used to separate in any way arbitration from state power, it is always state power (public authority) that defines the legal framework within which it is willing to accept arbitration. Attempts to portray arbitration as a sort of denationalized process are chimerical. Although the authors do not consider this trend positive, it is necessary to acknowledge the actual state of the legal and commercial environment on the global scale, where it may be somewhat upsetting to conclude that the willingness to fulfill one's obligations in today's world is very distant from the model state of affairs. For this reason, it is difficult to imagine that a claimant would initiate formal action (whether court litigation or arbitration) without a guarantee that a decision in the matter in question will be enforced by the public power for the needs of [the possible] future enforcement (execution) of such a decision. It is only public authority that, through a country's legal system, determines whether and under what conditions the powers of arbitrators are recognized and, more importantly, whether and under what conditions the enforcement of rulings delivered by arbitrators is accepted. Such a legal framework, which derives exclusively from national laws (i.e. a country's lawmaking power and the political and legal standpoint of every individual state as regards the enforcement of justice and law finding, is often of fundamental importance for deciding the country where international arbitration is to take place in the sense of the seat of arbitration.

The arbitral tribunal (within the Arbitration Court attached to the Economy Chamber of the Czech Republic and Agrarian Chamber of the Czech Republic) rendered interesting arbitral award dealing with multi-tier clauses and conditions set in arbitration clause and arbitrability. The tribunal decided that a condition, if applicable, in an arbitration clause requiring the parties to attempt to settle a dispute in an amicable manner prior to filing a complaint is a prerequisite for the substantive-law maturity (suability) of a claim. It is not a condition concerning authority (arbitrability), which is in the Czech Republic as well as in most other Central and Eastern European countries an exclusively procedural issue as opposed to being an issue of substantive law. The claim suability condition must be sufficiently definite and must identify a specific mechanism for such an action of the parties, so that its potential non-fulfillment could result in the rejection of a claim on the grounds of non-maturity (premature claim). Accepted as evidence that a party has attempted to settle a dispute in an amicable manner may be any fact, for instance, the Claimant’s notice requesting the payment of debt to which the Respondent fails to respond.

Arbitrators must take into account the standard business practice not only in view of the governing law, but, primarily, also in consideration of the European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of 1961, provided that the registered office/domicile of both contracting parties is located in a country that is a signatory of this Convention.

Arbitrators are entitled to examine the adequacy of the amount of a contractual fine even if no objection is raised with regard to this issue. The possibility to examine the adequacy of a contractual fine particularly (but not only) from the viewpoint of the customary commercial practice and business ethics is a part of the application of substantive law to the subject of the dispute. Arbitrators apply substantive law in their position as an official authority and, for this reason, they are entitled and obligated to examine the amount of a contractual fine within the confines of substantive law.

Consumer protection has become a legal phenomenon to reckon with on a global scale, with repercussions for, among others, contracts concluded between consumers and business entities – i.e., B2C contracts. While the path chosen by EU law is one of special legal protection (on the basis of special legislation) and the introduction of restrictions, the model applied in the United States is based on protection afforded according to general law of contract principles. The author maintains that the model applied in the United States is more efficient as it does not prevent markets which are based on a high degree of autonomy (but also responsibility) on the part of all contractual partners, including the consumer, from prospering. He argues that “liability” is the other side of the coin labeled “autonomy” and must be applied with a broad brush, both in terms of substantive-law aspects and procedural aspects. This also extends to arbitration agreements concluded between consumers and business entities. He maintains there is no need for special restrictions when it comes to incorporating arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, and that instead, the lawmaker should focus on seeing to it that the basic principles of arbitration are observed. In concluding he finds that the European model often leads to the abuse of the system of consumer protection by the consumers themselves and that the German model represents an interesting and efficient model, striking a compromise between the restrictive system established under EU law and the U.S. model.

Whereas civil law understands the [principles] of order public to be the pillars of legal and social order, forming a long-term constant, public policy in the common-law understanding is a markedly broader category. In this respect, public interest and public policy, as categories, are much closer to one another than is the case in civil-law systems. Even so, they remain separate categories. The increasing trend of making one’s case by taking recourse to public interest and the conflation of the latter with public policy (order public) (often owed to terminological inaccuracies) is alarming, as it leads to a broadening of the public policy defense, and increased application of the public policy objection, which is at odds with the interests of the international community. Public interest is not an indeterminate legal term. It is an abstract category that can only be identified against the backdrop of specific legal rules (laws, standards). Its subject are persons who form a loosely defined, but essentially identifiable circle, and it is usually expressed in [absolute] mandatory rules (which in private international law customarily take the character of what is known as overriding mandatory rules). In contrast to the negative operation of public policy, mandatory rules operate as positive rules. However, it is only in exceptional case that public interest becomes pervasive to such a degree that it may be protected as public policy. In contrast to the [absolute] overriding mandatory rules, public policy does not require the identification of the public interest and its specific subject, or vehicle.

The Albanian practice regarding arbitration is cited or anotated just exceptionally. Although arbitration is not really a common mechanism for dispute resolution, it is not an unknown term mainly in international trade (commercial) contracts. The Albanian practice tries to follow the good international standards mainly in terms of separability of an arbitral clause, exclusion of court review in merits etc. The practice follows the concept that an arbitration clause excludes the jurisdiction of courts (SC decision of 13 April 2005). The available adjudicated practice in Albania concerns mainly the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. The case law of Albanian courts (mainly Supreme Court of Albania decisions) however shows that the scope of arbitral agreements is limited to the disputes specifically provided in the arbitration clause and not to related disputes (see SC decision of 9 March 2004). It is therefore necessary to draft an arbitral clause as broad as possible. A dispute over the invalidity of the [main] contract can be heard and resolved on condition that the issue is explicitly encompassed by the scope of the arbitration clause. At the same time the arbitration clause must precisely identify the arbitral tribunal and the seat of arbitration, or otherwise the arbitration clause is invalid (SC decision of 31 May 2005).

Another decision of the Albanian SC seeks for necessity to notify the commencement of the proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award to the other party. The proceedings for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award must guarantee equal procedural rights to all parties (see SC decision of 26 September 2007).

The Albanian practice acknowledges that the recognition of a foreign arbitral award has a functional connection with the enforcement thereof. The decision regarding enforcement therefore inherently implies the recognition of the arbitral award. The limitation (refusal) of the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award is governed by the laws of the state in which recognition/enforcement is sought, as applicable at the time the arbitral award was issued. The recognition/enforcement of a foreign arbitral award cannot be granted if the time limit for the commencement of the proceedings for recognition / enforcement has expired under applicable law. (SC decision of 21 December 2006).

Arbitration has a large tradition in the Czech Republic and it is the most popular alternative method of civil disputes´ settlement, both in domestig and international issues. As domestic arbitral awards are enforceable without exequatur, there are no exact statistics on the number of arbitrations conducted within the country. However the Ministry of Justice of the Czech Republic extects at least 150 thousand of arbitral awards rendered within the Czech Republic per year. It is therefore easy to understand that the Czech courts reporting wide range of decisions, mainly in set-aside proceedings.

Probably the most important decision of 2011 is the judgment of the the Constitutional court of March 8, 2011 switched from contractual nature of arbitration to the jurisdictional one. The same decision as well as a number of another judgments placing stress on predictability of arbitral decisions, while predictability will be qualified as subject of procedural public policy.

Pursuant to Supreme Court decision of 11 May 2011 the principle of party autonomy must not be (mis-)used to negate [the consequences consisting in the invalidity] of arbitration clauses that violate the law and that clearly indicate an intention to harm the “weaker” contracting party (a party to the contractual relationship). A democratic country honouring the principle of the rule of law must not give up on the protection of rights and legitimate interests that could be jeopardized in alternative proceedings conducted instead of litigation. If the arbitration agreement lacks any direct identification of an ad hoc arbitrator, or a specific description of the method of his or her appointment, and refers to “Rules on Arbitration” issued by a legal entity (corporation) other than a permanent arbitral institution established under the law, the arbitration agreement is invalid pursuant to the particular provisions of the Civil Code.

Nevertheless the Constitutional Court [of the Czech Republic has repeatedly stressed the principle of freedom of contract, also in relation to arbitration clauses, which – when incorporated in laws and regulations – are not considered a restriction of the access to court (judgmenet of 5 October 2011), i.e. not a violation of Article 36(1) of the Charter of Constitutional Rights. However, it is desirable for the waiver of the right to have the dispute reviewed by a court to be permissible, unambiguous and made out of one’s own free will. This requirement entails the obligation of the court to examine the arbitration clause, in each particular case, from the perspective of the reasonability of the clause (see the Directive), taking into account the unequal position of the consumer as a party to the arbitration agreement. the published paper contains detailed summaries of all reported court decision related to arbitration of the end 2010 until the end of 2011.

The nature of the arbitration agreement in most legal systems (at least legal systems other than common law) is somewhat unclear. Presently, it is not possible to make any decisive statements as to which theory is the only correct one. On the other hand, it is necessary to examine each arbitration agreement invoked by the parties at the beginning of the proceedings and choose one of the current theories mentioned above. The classification of the arbitration agreement might, under certain circumstances, be the decisive element in determining the rules, i.e. procedural or substantive rules, applicable to the arbitration agreement. In civil law tradtion arbitration agreements may be defined as procedural agreements in broader sense, which does not have effects in proceedings only, but which are of substantial significance for qualitative evaluation of the substantive contractual relation between parties. Nevertheless, despite a mixed nature of arbitration agreements (as well as all jurisdictional agreements), jurisdiction is a procedural and not substantive category in the civil law tradition and jurisdiction remains the procedural condition (procedural requirement). Taking decision on jurisdiction in arbitration by partial award is in contradiction to the concept of jurisdiction as a procedural category, rather an interim award may be used for such decisions. Jurisdictional decisions taken in course of arbitration are, however, not substantive decisions and do not effect any Res Judicata. Some of civil law jurisdictions, completely in compliance with the concept of jurisdiction as procedural category, therefore deny to set-aside jurisdictional awards rendered prior to rendering award(s) on the merits of the dispute. Having any civil law dimension in arbitration, it may cause significant problems to the parties, if the arbitral tribunal decides on jurisdiction by a separate jurisdictional award.

The article analyses the fundamental premises of the differentiation between substantive and procedural rules in private international law and arbitration. The author opens the paper with the general differentiation between substantive and procedural rules and the reasons for such differentiation. The opening paragraphs are followed by a chapter dealing with the fundamental issues and premises of the differentiation between substantive and procedural rules in private international law. At the same time, the author endeavours to define a general approach applicable to such differentiation. Attention is devoted primarily to the specifics of such differentiation in arbitration and to a comparison with litigation. The general comments are followed by an analysis of the legal nature of limitation of actions and offset (set-off), the classification of which is significantly different in civil law countries (especially from the continental European approach) and in common law countries. The author also deals with the conflict-of-laws premises and the consequences of their nature, as they are perceived differently under the individual legal systems. Analysing the nature of these legal institutions and their conflict-of-laws implications helps to outline the general theoretical premises and the practical consequences of differentiation between the nature of substantive and procedural rules.
Procedural and substantive rules in private international law and in arbitration ought to be distinguished according to the lex loci arbitri/fori (based on the classification according to the lex fori/arbitri), with the potential possibility of correcting inappropriate and manifestly unjust solutions using functional classification. We must neither forget that the classification according to the lex fori / lex arbitri is sometimes replaced with a contractual or autonomous classification with respect to certain legal instruments of international law and instruments of a cross-border nature (such as European Union law), depending on the type of legal instrument and the specific arrangements agreed by the signatories.

The Czech recodification brought a new concept of statutory body. The Civil Code and the Business Corporations Act contain an explicit enumeration of the necessary essentials of the due care. The Author is of the opinion that the new definition is not revolutionary. Besides the refined definition of the duty to act with due care, the business judgement rule is a novelty. It  is unjust to hold the statutory body liable for the result of its decisions, if it duly abides to all of its obligations when making it. The legislator did not define objective criterions enabling to fully determine all operative aspects of the duty to act with due care. Overall, the changes in the concept of the duty to act with due care are not that significant to impugn the interpretative authority of the earlier case law.

Rekodifikace v ČR přinesla nové pojetí povinností statutárního orgánu. Občanský zákoník a Zákon o obchodních korporacích provádí výčet náležitostí jednání s péčí řádného hospodáře. Nové české korporátní právo však podle autora tohoto posudku nepředstavuje přelom. Jde jen o upřesnění a výslovnou kodifikaci existujících principů. Nově však byl zaveden institut podnikatelského úsudku. Po statutárním orgánu však nelze spravedlivě požadovat, aby byl odpovědný za výsledek každého jednotlivého rozhodnutí, pokud statutární orgán dodržel veškeré své povinnosti.  Zákonodárce ovšem neurčil objektivní kritéria, jejichž pomocí by bylo možné institut péče řádného hospodáře obsahově vymezit.  Nedošlo však k takovým koncepčním změnám, které by zpochybnily dřívější závěry judikatury.