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- Craig Bourne has his own website. Visit www.bournecaddickbourne.com for something more interesting to read. Short bio... moreCraig Bourne has his own website. Visit www.bournecaddickbourne.com for something more interesting to read. Short biog: Craig went to Pembroke College, University of Cambridge to study Philosophy BA (Hons) (1995-1998); M.Phil. (1998-1999); PhD (1999-2002) and in 1999 began a BSc (Hons) degree in Mathematics and Physics. During 2002-2006, he was a Research Fellow at St.Catharine's College, University of Cambridge (being, in 2004-2005, a Lecturer in the Cambridge Philosophy Faculty). During 2006-7, he was a College Lecturer in Philosophy at Pembroke College and New Hall, Cambridge. He is currently Reader in Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire.(Craig Bourne has his own website. Visit www.bournecaddickbourne.com for something more interesting to read. Short biog: Craig went to Pembroke College, University of Cambridge to study Philosophy BA (Hons) (1995-1998); M.Phil. (1998-1999); PhD (1999-2002) and in 1999 began a BSc (Hons) degree in Mathematics and Physics. During 2002-2006, he was a Research Fellow at St.Catharine's College, University of Cambridge (being, in 2004-2005, a Lecturer in the Cambridge Philosophy Faculty). During 2006-7, he was a College Lecturer in Philosophy at Pembroke College and New Hall, Cambridge. He is currently Reader in Philosophy at the University of Hertfordshire.)edit
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We argue that some fictional truths are fictionally true by default. We also argue that these fictional truths are subject to being undermined. We propose that the context within which we are to evaluate what is fictionally true changes... more
We argue that some fictional truths are fictionally true by default. We also argue that these fictional truths are subject to being undermined. We propose that the context within which we are to evaluate what is fictionally true changes when a possibility which was previously ignorable is brought to attention. We argue that these cases support a model of fictional truth which makes the conversational dynamics of determining truth in fiction structurally akin to the conversational dynamics of knowledge-ascription, as this is understood by David Lewis’s contextualist approach to knowledge. We show how a number of the rules which Lewis proposes for the case of knowledge-ascription can be employed to develop a novel and powerful framework for the case of truth in fiction.
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Is there anything more certain than the knowledge we have that we are present? It would be a scandal if our best theory of time could not guarantee such knowledge; yet I shall show that certain theories of time (such as Tooley's... more
Is there anything more certain than the knowledge we have that we are present? It would be a scandal if our best theory of time could not guarantee such knowledge; yet I shall show that certain theories of time (such as Tooley's growing block model and McCall's branching model) cannot guarantee it. Only Presentism and the tenseless theory survive. The rest must be rejected. I: The Present Problem There is a clear partition between tensed and tenseless theories of time: essentially, tense theorists assert that in some objective, mind-independent sense, the present is privileged, whereas tenseless theorists assert that all times are real, no one of which is ontologically privileged. Many tense theorists hold that more than one time is real, yet one among them is privileged, namely the present. This, however, raises the question of how we can know that we are present and not past (or future). I shall call this the Present Problem: Given that we do know we are present, and tha...
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,... more
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.In ‘An Insoluble Problem’ (2010), Storrs McCall presents an argument which he takes to reveal the real problem with backwards time travel. McCall asks us to imagine a scenario in which a renowned artist produces his famous works by copying them from reproductions brought back to him by a time-travelling art critic. The novelty of the scenario lies in its introduction of aesthetic constraints on the possibility of time travel, something which sets it apart from other time travel cases. McCall states that ‘The puzzle lies ... in finding where artistic creativity enters the equation’, and that ‘Unlike the traditional “paradoxes of time travel”, this problem has no solution’. We offer four responses to McCall’s puzzle. Whilst we show that the puzzle is not insoluble, we also argue that it reveals something about the proper relationship between copying and creativity, which may not have been apparent without considering time travel.Peer reviewe
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Close attention to the nature of fiction reveals a number of issues which bear on mental fictionalism, here understood as a view that proposes a fictionalist treatment of folk psychology. After sketching a few such issues, the chapter... more
Close attention to the nature of fiction reveals a number of issues which bear on mental fictionalism, here understood as a view that proposes a fictionalist treatment of folk psychology. After sketching a few such issues, the chapter unearths difficulties for a figurative fictionalist approach, concentrating on Adam Toon’s recent attempt to understand folk psychology in terms of Kendall Walton’s notion of prop-oriented make-believe and its relationship to metaphor. But while attention to the nature of fiction creates obstacles for those sympathetic to mental fictionalism, it also suggests opportunities. Utilizing a distinction between being true in a fiction and being true to a story, the chapter sketches the beginnings of a brand of mental “storyism” that departs from mental fictionalism but may do justice to some fictionalist ambitions. Finally, it is suggested that attention to the nature of fiction offers a potential new solution to the so-called “fictionalist suicide” problem.
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Arthur Prior states that 'It will be/was/is that p'is true iff 'p'will be/was/is true, and that is all that needs to be said about the matter. This appears to avoid any need to invoke... more
Arthur Prior states that 'It will be/was/is that p'is true iff 'p'will be/was/is true, and that is all that needs to be said about the matter. This appears to avoid any need to invoke the existence of non-present entities and accounts for tensed truths with very little ontological cost. ...
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... So, there am I as I was yesterday, as real as I am now, believing that I am *present*, and thinking pretty Page 9. ... Furthermore, the position that I have just forced is clearly one successful interpretation of McTaggart's... more
... So, there am I as I was yesterday, as real as I am now, believing that I am *present*, and thinking pretty Page 9. ... Furthermore, the position that I have just forced is clearly one successful interpretation of McTaggart's argument.1 (Note that it does not help to relativize the ...
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If the future is real, and the outcomes of chancy processes are “already” occurrent, then in what sense is the chancy process genuinely chancy? This topic is the fatalism issue. Discussed by Aristotle more than two millennia ago, the... more
If the future is real, and the outcomes of chancy processes are “already” occurrent, then in what sense is the chancy process genuinely chancy? This topic is the fatalism issue. Discussed by Aristotle more than two millennia ago, the question is whether various logical principles, when applied to propositions about future events, imply that the future is in some sense fixed. If the future is like the past, and the past is fixed, then are future events fixed in the same sense? This chapter gives the latest on this traditional topic, carefully surveying various works and trying a new tack that steers away from fatalism. It concludes that it is difficult to find ways to rule out causal loops, and gives an account of the direction of causation.