Natural Law Theory

This was a research paper for a course entitled Feminist and Multicultural Theologies. I unpack what gender complementarianism is, examine its history, and compare it to how Scripture and earlier Christian Tradition understood gender. This allows me to establish that gender complementarianism is a recent innovation in secular and Christian thinking about gender, and that it can be described as a "trajectory" from Scripture and Tradition on gender, influenced by social, ideological, and intellectual developments in secular societies. I then pursue a critique of gender complementarianism, arguing that it is an "unsatisfactory trajectory" because it has troubling implications for orthodox theology, is not borne out by empirical experience and observation, and has harmful effects on human beings and societies and on ethical development.

İnsanlar, çoğunlukla toplum halinde yaşamayı tercih ettiklerinden dolayı devamlı birbirleriyle ilişki halindedirler. Bu toplumsal yapı içerisinde insanın benimsediği davranışlar, ahlakı meydana getirmektedir. Teolojik açıdan düşünülecek olursa dinler de insanlara birtakım ahlaki fonksiyonlar tanımlamaktadır. İslam dini de insanın ahlaklı bir yaşam sürmesini istemektedir. Ancak günümüzdeki Müslüman ülke ve toplumların ahlak konusundaki durumuna bakıldığında toplumda ahlakın hayati bir rolünün olup olmadığı şüphelidir. Bu yüzden İslami bir ahlak teorisinin mümkün olup olmadığı sorusu akla gelmektedir. Bu soruya verilecek cevap, İslam‘ı yorumlama metoduna göre değişiklik göstermektedir.
Bu çalışma, İslami bir ahlak teorisinin mümkün olup olmadığı sorusuna odaklanmaktadır. İslami modernizm geleneğinin İslam‘ı yorumlama yöntemi ahlak temelli olduğundan modernist geleneğin ahlak felsefesi ele alınarak sorunun cevabı araştırılmıştır. Birinci bölümde, İslami bir ahlak teorisi çizmeden önce İslam‘ı yorumlama metodumuzun bu teoriyi etkilediğini göstermek için radikal ve modernist geleneğin İslam‘a bakışlarına değinilmiştir. Bunlarla birlikte modernitenin ortaya çıkması sonucu ihya ve reform hareketlerinin iki gelenek üzerindeki etkisi de ele alınmıştır. İkinci bölümde, ahlak kavramına odaklanılmış ve ahlakın Batı, Doğu ve Uzak Doğu toplumlarındaki tarihsel serüveni ele alınmıştır. Böylece ahlak kavramının geçmişte nasıl ele alındığı ve günümüzde nasıl ele alınabileceği gösterilmek istenmiştir. Üçüncü bölümde, İslami modernizm geleneğinin ahlak felsefesi incelenmiştir ve araştırma sorusuna yanıt aranmıştır. Ayrıca bu bölümde çalışma bir adım daha derinleştirilerek modernist geleneğin çizmiş olduğu ahlak felsefesi ile doğal hukuk arasındaki ilişki irdelenmiştir. Sonuç olarak, İslami bir ahlak teorisinin mümkün olduğu ve modernist geleneğin ahlak felsefesinin buna bir örnek oluşturduğu sonucuna varılmıştır. Buna ek olarak modernist geleneğin ahlak felsefesinin bir doğal hukuk teorisi olduğu ileri sürülmüştür.

In Plato’s Gorgias one of Socrates interlocutors, Callicles, exposes a philosoph-ical theory based upon the supremacy of the stronger over the weaker and in therefusal to accept a moral system created by these in order to restrain the powerful. Immediately, this theory reminds Nietzsche’s moral critique. The figure of Socratesserves as a counterpoint in the confrontation of both theories, because Callicles, inthe platonic text, as well as Nietzsche in his works stand in clear opposition to him.Then, we must compare both controversies in order to find out the proximity or dis-tance between Callicles’ and Nietzsche’s positions.

In this essay I argue that religion, understood as harmony with the transcendent source of existence and meaning, is a good that practical reason grasps as an objective, distinct and important aspect of human well-being, one which reasonably takes pride of place among the various aspects of a good human life due to its architectonic role in structuring and adding a transcendent meaning to all of the other goods that we pursue. On the basis of this view of religion, I go on to suggest that religious belief and practice deserve special protection in law, above and beyond mere preferences and even other conscientious commitments. I develop this view through a dialectical engagement with Dworkin, Barry, Eisgruber and Sager.

The Theses LVI belong to a series of hitherto unpublished early manuscripts of the Dutch humanist and jurisconsult Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) that were acquired by the University of Leiden in 1864. It is not certain when the Theses were written, but preliminary research on the physical manuscript and the sources cited indicate two possible windows. The first is around 1602-1605, that is roughly at a time when Grotius was also working on his Commentary on the Law of Prize and Booty (De Iure Praedae Commentarius). The second dating places the genesis of the manuscrbipt around 1613-1615.
In the context of Grotius’ writings, the Theses LVI assume an important position for several reasons: They raise questions about state formation, the duty of citizens to the state and the right of political resistance in far greater detail than in any other work of the celebrated Dutch humanist. The Theses LVI also feature important reading notes that yield priceless insights into the sources that Grotius directly consulted and their influence on his ideas. The manuscript grants modern scholars a unique glimpse into the working mind of its author. Evidence points not only to the ferocious haste with which Grotius wrote his works, but also the occasional sloppiness of his reading and research habits."""

This book is a systematic introduction to moral philosophy (or as it is also called: ethics) that aims at raising its readers’ ethical literacy and competence. Starting from the nature and end of this science it examines the fundamental questions and concepts of ethics. The core chapters familiarise the reader with the elements of a human act, outline how these elements influence the ethical quality of such act and shed light on the standard of morality, i.e. the good. The book furthermore clarifies the concepts of duty, right as well as responsibility and explicates the moral duties and rights of the human person. In doing so it also elucidates the notions of human dignity and the common good. Last but not least, the book contains a range of practical tools that help the reader put ethical theory into practice. The comprehensive appendix contains chapters on the virtues, propositional logic and arguments.

Questo articolo parte dalla ricostruzione del modello aristotelico di amicizia fornita nel ‘Brief of the Art of Rhetorique’ e dai motivi della critica hobbesiana a questo modello per esaminare il modo in cui l’amicizia lavora nel discorso antropologico, etico e politico di Hobbes. In un primo momento mostra che l’amicizia rappresenta un potere e che la specificità dei rapporti amicali è costituita dalla loro natura egualitaria ed extra-contrattuale, nonché dalla corrispondenza di dono e gratitudine attraverso la quale si compie lo scambio di poteri e di onori. In un secondo momento si concentra sull’aspetto morale del problema, mettendo in evidenza il nesso tra l’amicizia e quella capacità di mettersi l’uno al posto dell’altro che costituisce il cuore di tutta la concezione hobbesiana della legge naturale. Infine, sottolinea il possibile pericolo politico dei vincoli particolaristici che l’amicizia è in grado di cementare e dalle forme di cooperazione che essa è in grado di promuovere nonostante e contro lo Stato.

Keywords: Hobbes, amicizia, potere, dono, legge naturale, politica

This study starts from the ‘reconstruction’ of the Aristotelian model of friendship, found in the ‘Brief of the Art of Rhetorique’, and the reasons behind Hobbes’s criticism of this model. It then moves on to examine the way friendship works in Hobbes’s anthropological, ethical and political discourse. First, Hobbes’s discourse shows that friendship represents power, and that the specificity of friendly relationships is their equalitarian and non-contractual nature, as well as, the correspondence of gifts and gratitude through which an exchange of power and honours is achieved. Second, it focuses on the moral aspect of the problem highlighting the link between friendship and the ability to put oneself in another’s shoes, which constitutes the heart of the whole of the Hobbesian conception of natural law. Finally, it emphasises the possible political danger of the bonds which friendship can cement and the forms of cooperation that it is able to promote in spite of and against the State.

Keywords: Hobbes, friendship, power, natural law, politics

This book provides the first systematic, book-length defence of natural law ideas in ethics, politics and jurisprudence since John Finnis's influential Natural Law and Natural Rights. Incorporating insights from recent work in ethical, legal and social theory, it presents a robust and original account of the natural law tradition, challenging common perceptions of natural law as a set of timeless standards imposed on humans from above. Natural law, Jonathan Crowe argues, is objective and normative, but nonetheless historically extended, socially embodied and dependent on contingent facts about human nature. It reflects the ongoing human quest to work out how best to live flourishing lives, given the natures we have and the social environments we inhabit. The nature and purpose of law can only be adequately understood within this wider context of value. Timely, wide-ranging and clearly written, this volume will appeal to those working in law, philosophy and religious studies.

If the greatness of a philosophical work can be measured by the volume and vehemence of the public response, there is little question that Rousseau's Social Contract stands out as a masterpiece. Within a week of its publication in 1762 it was banished from France. Soon thereafter, Rousseau fled to Geneva, where he saw the book burned in public. At the same time, many of his contemporaries, such as Kant, considered Rousseau to be “the Newton of the moral world,” as he was the first philosopher to draw attention to the basic dignity of human nature. The Social Contract has never ceased to be read in the 250 years since it was written. Rousseau's “Social Contract”: An Introduction offers a thorough and systematic tour of this notoriously paradoxical and challenging text. David Lay Williams offers readers a chapter-by-chapter reading of the Social Contract, squarely confronting these interpretive obstacles, leaving no stones unturned. The conclusion connects Rousseau's text both to his important influences and those who took inspiration and sometimes exception to his arguments. The book also features a special extended appendix dedicated to outlining his famous conception of the general will, which has been the object of controversy since the Social Contract's publication.

Este libro del profesor de la Facultad de Derecho de la Universidad Católica San Pablo de Arequipa-Perú, José Chávez-Fernández Postigo, se trata de un trabajo temáticamente profundo, porque su materia es el fundamento último del Derecho, de ese modo no se queda el profesor peruano en la fenomenología del Derecho, sino que se interesa por las causas últimas del mismo. Esa búsqueda a través de la raíz del Derecho, el autor la realiza auxiliado por el profesor español Javier Hervada, y así le permite reconocer que el fundamento último del Derecho está en la misma persona humana, entendida en términos ontológicos, con la consecuencia de reconocer en cada individuo de la especie humana a una persona. El mismo subtítulo del libro: Un dialogo con la filosofía jurídica de Javier Hervada, importa un justo reconocimiento para el profesor español, de cuya teoría Chávez-Fernández afirma que es "una de las propuestas iusnaturalistas realistas más coherentes y renovadoras de la iusfilosofía contemporánea". Pero el autor no se limita a glosar a Hervada, sino que llega a criticarlo, reinterpretarlo y a proyectar sus tesis centrales a nuevos terrenos. Un libro ordenado y bien escrito satisface una exigencia formal que, seguramente, todo lector suscribe sin ambages, y el presente libro logra con amplitud esa pretensión. No sólo en el orden de los cinco capítulos que integran la obra, sino también hacia el interior de cada uno de ellos, se comprueba esa apropiada estructura que facilita enormemente la lectura y comprensión. La obra explícita el gran tema del actual Estado de Derecho Constitucional y democrático, o sea, el problema antropológico.

This study, first published by the Academy of Athens in 1998, subsequently formed a chapter in the book: Exopolitics (Nova, N.Y. 1999).
The excerpt here focuses on the effects of the classical theories of Plato and Aristotle relating to war and peace. The Greek philosophers searched for the root causes of war and the conditions of peace, including power politics, natural law, and world order. Thus, we shall describe and explain their conclusions about the causes for large scale organized violence, as well as their proposals of the way to establish a more lasting peace.
Although they only know their microcosm twenty-five centuries ago, their philosophic ideas are so fundamental as to be still pertinent and may help us resolve or attenuate these perennial problems in our global world.

Natural law theories hold that human action is oriented towards certain intrinsic goods and governed by practical principles accessible to us by virtue of our nature. These goods and principles make up the content of natural law. This essay argues that both the content of natural law and our understanding of its requirements evolve throughout human history. This represents a diachronic, rather than synchronic, understanding of natural law. This perspective is contrasted with the ‘new natural law theory’ of Germain Grisez and John Finnis, which depicts natural law as timeless and unchanging. Finnis seems to think that natural law does not change because it exists in the mind of God; however, a belief in God as the source of natural law is equally consistent with a diachronic perspective. I defend this view through reference to the writings of Thomas Aquinas and the structure of the biblical narrative.

In this essay I argue that religion, understood as harmony with the transcendent source of existence and meaning, is a good that practical reason grasps as an objective, distinct, and important aspect of human well-being, one that reasonably takes pride of place among the various aspects of a good human life due to its architectonic role in structuring and adding a transcendent meaning to all of the other goods that we pursue. On the basis of this view of religion, I suggest that religious belief and practice deserve special protection in law, above and beyond mere preferences and even other conscientious commitments. I develop this view through a dialectical engagement with Ronald Dworkin, Brian Barry, and Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager.

Thomas Hobbes was an English philosopher in the Late Sixteenth to Early Seventeenth Centuries and he is best known for his book Leviathan. In this book he presents what is commonly referred to as the first ‘Social Contract Theory,’ rather ‘Social Covenant Theory.’ He also compares the notions of ‘Justice’ and ‘Injustice’ within a state of nature to a state under a sovereign. In this essay, I shall define Hobbes’ social theory and provide contextual differences of his view of nature versus a state of a single sovereign government. Lastly, I will provide my contentions with Hobbes’ philosophical positions.

Natural law ethics holds that practical rationality consists in engaging in non-defective ways with a range of fundamental goods. These basic goods are characteristically presented as reflecting the natural properties of humans, but the details of this picture vary widely. This article argues that natural law ethics can usefully be understood as a type of dispositional theory of value, which identifies the basic goods with those objectives that humans are characteristically disposed to pursue and value for their own sake. Natural law theories of practical rationality can then be understood as attempts to capture the principles that would govern engagement with the basic goods under ideal conditions. The article begins by offering an account of normative inclinations as human dispositions both to act in certain ways and to believe that the actions are worthwhile or required. It then explores the implications of this account for natural law ethics, discussing the role of the basic goods in practical rationality, whether the goods may change over time and the connection between the goods and human nature.

Дидикин А.Б. Аналитическая философия права: истоки, генезис и структура. Монография. Томск, Изд-во ТГУ, 2016. - 244 с. В приложении к монографии - переводы статей Г. Кельзена "Абсолютизм и релятивизм в философии и политике", "Причинность и вменение", "Об основной норме", выполненные автором.

The objective of this research is to explore the different facets of Grotius’ system of moral rights; to offer a detailed demonstration of its mechanism; and to reconcile different scholarly views wherever possible. It explains how Grotius managed to create a system of moral rights which could govern non-institutionalised property rights for all agents, regardless of time, region or religion. But more importantly, it seeks to reframe Hugo Grotius in a grander debate than that of narrow scholarly disputes. His insight on the framework of moral rights not only redefined the study of moral philosophy for the centuries that would follow, but founded the modern system of international law which still holds firm today, particularly in the realm of international maritime law.

The title alludes, of course, to Herbert Hart’s classic study ‘Are There any Natural Rights?’, but all (or almost all) parallels end here.
In my paper, I will examine whether or not Aquinas complemented his theory of natural law with a conception of natural rights. First I shall present a kind of ‘conceptual algebra’, describing Aquinas’s different usages of the term ius, and then I will turn to the very question of my investigation.

This article reviews Mark Murphy's book, Natural Law in Jurisprudence and Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2006). I present a generally sympathetic account of Murphy’s natural law theory. However, I argue that his account could be improved in three key areas. First, Murphy is wrong to reject John Finnis’s hermeneutic strategy for analysing the concept of law. Second, Murphy fails to provide a convincing defence of his consent-based conception of political authority. The clearest route to establishing the possibility of non-defective law remains the salient co-ordinator account. However, this account does not establish that law has authority; rather, it supports the weaker conclusion that law claims authority and is backed by decisive reasons for compliance. Finally, Murphy is wrong to resist the super-political challenge to the common good principle. The argument from the super-political is not only logically sound, but also morally compelling.

'Universalist' moral principles have fallen into disfavour because too often they have been pretexts for unilateral impositions upon others, whether domestically or internationally. Too widely neglected has been Kant's specifically Critical re-analysis of the scope and character of rational justification in all non-formal domains, including the entirety of epistemology and moral philosophy, including both justice and ethics. Rational judgment is inherently normative because it is in part constituted by our self-assessment, of whether the considerations we now integrate into a candidate judgment have been integrated as they ought, so as to form a cogent, justifiable judgment. Constitutive of this self-assessment is that rational judgments must be based upon considerations which can be communicated to all others, such that they too can assess them as sufficiently cogent justification; also constitutive of this rational self-assessment is that we actually engage with others who do assess our judgments. Kant's Critical principles rule out in principle any unilateral imposition upon others, whether in cognition or morals. Using Kant's Critical principles and methods in connection with 'practical anthropology' and the enormously important domain of acquired rights and obligations shows how Kant had already justified fundamentally universal principles of justice which can be institutionalised in variously distinctive cultures, and which form the proper bases for our acquired, specifically social rights and obligations, including those of friendship and community. (7.04.16)

The attack on natural right in the name of history takes in most cases the following form: natural right claims to be a right that is discernible by human reason and is universally acknowledged; but history (including anthropology) teaches us that no such right exists; instead of the supposed uniformity we find an indefinite variety of notions of right or justice. Or, in other words, there cannot be natural right if there are no immutable principles of justice, but history shows us that all principles of justice are mutable. One cannot understand the meaning of the attack on natural right in the name of history, before one has realized the utter irrelevance of this argument. In the first place, “consent of all mankind” is by no means a necessary condition of the existence of natural right. Some of the greatest natural right teachers have argued that, precisely if natural right is rational, its discovery presupposes the cultivation of reason, and therefore natural right will not be known universally: one ought not even to expect any real knowledge of natural right among savages. In other words by proving diat there is no principle of justice diat has not been denied somewhere or at some time, one has not yet proven that any given denial was justified or reasonable. Furthermore, it has always been known that different notions of justice obtain at different times and in different nations. It is absurd to claim diat the discovery of a still greater number of such notions by modern students has in any way affected the fundamental issue.

Finnis’ seminal work ‘Natural Law and Natural Rights’  is an extensive and impressive defence of natural law theory. Through a complex and well-crafted series of arguments Finnis sets out a general code of ethics for humanity. However, there is an implicit scepticism present within the book of claims that animals are deserving of any serious moral consideration. This essay will examine the distinction Finnis draws between animals and humans and question its accuracy and consistency with regards to his work as a whole.

At the start of Plato's 'Minos' an anonymous comrade argues that the variability of law according to time and place undermines the claim that it conveys moral truth. But by the end he has accepted Minos as the greatest of lawgivers because of his education by Zeus. How does he manage to slide so quickly from the moral laxity of conventionalism to the moral absolutism of divine revelation? Guided by this question, the author considers how the two divergent parts of the 'Minos' form one whole, and so what Plato suggests is the common basis to conventionalism and piety. Plato's 'Minos' thus ends up having an unexpectedly close relationship to his 'Euthyphro'.

In this paper, I shall address the important role of the rule of law as an ideal of political morality. I will be outlining the virtues and limits of the rule of law. My central thesis is that the rule of law is crucial for the moral legitimacy of a political system and for an open society, understood in the Popperian sense. Its limits, however, are similar to the limits of positive law in general. Ultimately, the virtues of the rule of law depend on the moral virtues of people and on the moral quality
of positive law. In this respect, the benefits of the rule of law ultimately depend on natural moral law and its realization in human affairs.

Este trabajo se enfoca en demostrar que la Filosofía de la interpretación del derecho de Luis Recaséns Siches, al ser un ensayo de caracterización y de fundamentación del derecho como saber práctico de lo justo y lo equitativo, acierta no sólo porque puede ser considerada una precursora hispana de la teoría estándar de la argumentación jurídica, sino porque, en cierto sentido, la aventaja. En ella se encuentra el germen de una Ciencia acerca de la determinación prudencial del derecho que, partiendo de la experiencia vital de lo humano, entienda al derecho como una práctica institucional eminentemente moral-valorativa que encuentre en la realización histórica de la justicia —concretada a través de la dignidad y los derechos humanos— su valor determinante por excelencia, capaz de conjugar tanto lo permanente como lo histórico de la realidad jurídica en cada caso concreto.

Loi naturelle et révélation chrétienne L a référence à la loi naturelle comme norme pour l'enseignement moral de l'Église est contestée sur deux fronts. « À droite », elle est accusée de naturalisme par ceux qui veulent y soupçonner une contamination de l'Évangile par la philosophie. La loi naturelle serait un corps étranger dans la doctrine chrétienne, une des innom-brables métastases de l'hellénisation du christianisme. En plaçant le débat éthique sur le plan naturel et rationnel, sous prétexte d'univer-salité et de dialogue, le recours à la loi naturelle engendrerait chez le chrétien une forme de schizophrénie, une double personnalité, et il priverait du même coup la prédication évangélique de sa spécificité et par conséquent de sa force. « À gauche », la pensée laïque dénonce dans la loi naturelle un cheval de Troie manipulé par l'Église catho-lique pour faire passer en contrebande dans le débat éthique et politique, sous couvert d'universalité, les options très particulières de la révélation chrétienne. La réponse à ces critiques passe par une juste compréhension des rapports entre loi naturelle et Évangile, qui est, en fait, une application à la morale fondamentale de la question architecto-nique de l'articulation entre nature et grâce, entre foi et raison. Pour l'exposer, je procéderai en trois étapes. Dans la première, j'envisagerai les modalités de notre connaissance de la loi naturelle (1). Dans la deuxième, je manifesterai, à l'école de saint Thomas, la haute convenance de la révélation par Dieu de certaines exigences de la loi naturelle (2). Enfin, dans la troisième, je considérerai la manière dont la loi naturelle est assumée par la révélation évangé-lique sans perdre son autonomie structurelle (3). 1046-Études thomasiennes.indd 257 28/11/2018 15:03

In this paper, I argue that a classical theist cannot be a universalist. I begin with two central assumptions. The first is that classical theism is true, meaning it cannot be false. The second is that intuitions alone cannot settle the universalism debate. Instead, we must appeal to metaphysical and logical standards, even if our intuitions are shown to be mistaken. I proceed with three distinct arguments. The first problem is Mackie’s dilemma. J.L. Mackie argued that God could have created a free and morally perfect world, and it is the theist's burden to demonstrate why God did not do so. I argue here that Mackie is correct and that the universalist answers to this question can be co-opted by Mackie each time such that theism is defeated. Instead, I counter Mackie with my own theodicy, developed from the philosophy of St. Augustine, which argues that God will create worlds with the maximal compatible set of moral perfection and genuineness. In so doing, God allows the maximal range of good and evil. This all-or-nothing approach helps divert Mackie's dilemma and other atheistic objections. However, universalists will insist or modify this theodicy to avoid its ramification that there will be some who participate in the maximal evil of eternally rejecting God. But, when the universalist does this, I argue that Mackie can still co-opt each of their answers. Any universalist answer will have to appeal to mystery or brute contingency when rejecting the all-or-nothing approach of my theodicy. Third and finally, when we compare whether the traditional or universalist view is the best explanation of our world based on the resources of classical theism and experience, we find that the traditional view is superior to universalism.

Predkladaný príspevok analyzuje dva fundamentálne prístupy k definovaniu práva s ohľadom na vzťah práva a morálky. Jednotlivé prístupy oboch smerov právneho uvažovania reprezentujú téza oddelenosti alebo téza spojitosti. Nadväznosti na to sa obsah príspevku zameriava na charakteristické znaky právneho pozitivizmu a právneho naturalizmu v súvislosti s tézou oddelenosti a tézou spojitosti a identifikuje ich stupne, ktoré sa premietajú do konkrétnych podôb súčasných vetiev právneho pozitivizmu a právneho nepozitivizmu.

This article considers natural law perspectives on the nature of law. Natural law theories are united by what Mark Murphy calls the natural law thesis: law is necessarily a rational standard for conduct. The natural law position comes in strong and weak versions: the strong view holds that a rational defect in a norm renders it legally invalid, while the weak view holds that a rational defect in a legal norm renders it legally defective. The article explores the motivations for the natural law position, before considering three lines of natural law argument found in the literature. I conclude by examining the arguments offered by John Finnis and Murphy in support of the weak natural law view. I suggest that these arguments fail to impugn the strong natural law thesis. Indeed, the functional argument outlined by Murphy provides a plausible route to a hybrid natural law view that incorporates both weak and strong claims.

“Are there objective moral values which can unite human beings and bring them peace and happiness?” People seem to assume there are indeed such values when they recoil against genocide, rape, child abuse, slavery and human trafficking, senseless destruction of the environment, involuntary “medical” testing, corruption, and terrorism. This recoil is generally perceived to be not merely some learned or innate moral sentiment, but an indicator that some actions are truly wrong — wrong not merely because of the emotional responses they arouse; wrong not merely on the basis of a consensual agreement between people or societies; but truly wrong, meaning in violation of some standard for human action that is applicable to and (at least in principle) accessible to all human persons. Even if there is great difficulty specifying norms about wrong human actions, and even if the norms have needed revision, there is a common conviction that certain moral norms exist. This fundamental conviction that there is some sort of standard against which human actions can be evaluated, and that it is accessible and applicable to all, is the essence of the view that there is a universal ethic.