Historical Sociology

[PL]
Zdecydowana większość systemów politycznych na Bliskim Wschodzie jest sklasyfikowana jako autorytaryzmy lub reżimy hybrydowe, tj. łączące elementy demokratyczne i autorytarne. Jak dotychczas klasyczne teorie demokratyzacji nie były w stanie w pełni wyjaśnić zjawiska trwałości autorytaryzmu w tym regionie, co doprowadziło do wykształcenia się tzw. nurtu post-demokratyzacji. Niniejszy artykuł pokrótce wyjaśnia przyczyny deficytu demokracji na Bliskim Wschodzie oraz wskazuje jak model analityczny Hinnebuscha (2010, 2014), traktujący o procesach państwotwórczych z perspektywy socjologii historycznej, może przyczynić się do lepszego zrozumienia problemu. Artykuł konkluduje, że demokratyzacja lub jej brak jest reakcją decydentów politycznych na impulsy (możliwości, ograniczenia i zagrożenia) krajowe oraz międzynarodowe. Demokratyzacja jest tylko jedną z opcji, jaką dany reżim może obrać w procesie państwotwórczym, który z kolei opiera się na trzech filarach: procesie narodotwórczym, rozwoju gospodarczym oraz procesie budowania władzy.

[ENG]
The vast majority of political systems in the Middle East is classified as authoritarian or hybrid, i.e. entailing both democratic and authoritarian features. So far the classical democratisation theories have failed to explain the problem of authoritarian resistance in the region which resulted in the emergence of so-called post-democratisa-tion. This article briefly explains the democracy deficit in the Middle East and indicates how the analytical model of historical sociology of state formation, as advanced by Hinnebusch (2010, 2014), can contribute to our understanding of the problem. The analysis concludes that democratisation, or lack of thereof, is a reaction of decision-makers to impulses reaching them from both national and international environments: possibilities , constraints, and threats. Democratisation is only one of the multiple options available , which the regime can select in the state-formation process, which in and of itself is based on three pillars: nation-building, economic development, and authority-building.

Most ―mainstream accounts of the West-East divergence gain theoretical inspiration from Max Weber and/or Karl Marx, and have therefore traced the ―rise of the West to the unique social processes that apparently fostered capitalism in Europe. Critics have labelled these accounts ―Eurocentric insofar as they imply the inherent superiority of the West over the East,1 and they have offered alternative ―anti-Eurocentric narratives which ostensibly avoid such analytical and normative pitfalls. These critics have succeeded in directing our attention to experiences in the non-European world. However, they have sought to validate these experiences by simply extending (in space and time), rather than transcending, the problematic concepts and assumptions that plagued the ―Eurocentric Weberian and Marxist accounts of the origins of capitalism. This paper argues that a truly non-Eurocentric approach requires a definitive break with these assumptions and the adoption of an alternative historical materialist understanding of the origins of capitalism pioneered by Robert Brenner. While not explicitly conceived as non-Eurocentric, Brenner‘s concept of social-property relations offers the surest foundation for understanding ―the great divergence‖ without doing violence to history or succumbing to European triumphalism.

Not-guilty verdicts, mistrials, and impunity for the Bundy family and many of their supporters in the armed confrontations over public land use in Nevada and Oregon. Expanded access for private oil, gas, mining, and logging industries and the downsizing of national monuments such as Bears Ears lead by Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke. A number of highly contentious debates and sensationalized events have again focused attention on land held in the public domain by the United States. This essay argues that federal land policy as a form of colonial administration has been constitutive for the logic of expectation as property in what is now the United States. From the state land cessions negotiated on behalf of the Articles of Confederation to the preemption acts (1830–1841) to the homestead acts (1862–1916) to present-day demands for land transfer, the acquisition and disposal of the so-called public domain have been central to westward colonization, the consolidation of the nation-state, and the promise of land ownership as the ostensible foundation of individual liberty. These dynamics are evident in contemporary conflicts over public lands and arguments for the transfer of public lands to either state or private ownership. Approaching the Bundy occupations as flashpoints that illuminate competing interpretations and claims to land within the history of westward colonization, this essay seeks to demonstrate the ways in which expectation emerges from particular economies of dispossession of indigenous peoples that have historically worked through and across the division of public and private property.

There are many histories of the police as a law-enforcement institution, but no genealogy of the police as a form of power. This book provides a genealogy of the modern police by tracing the evolution of ‘police science’ and of police institutions in Europe, from the ancien régime to the early 19th century. Drawing on the theoretical path outlined by Michel Foucault at the crossroads between historical sociology, critical legal theory and critical criminology, it shows how the development of police power was an integral part of the birth of the modern state’s governmental rationalities and how police institutions were conceived as political technologies for the government and social disciplining of populations. Understanding modern police not as an institution at the service of the judiciary and the law, but as a complex political technology for governing the economic and social processes typical of modern capitalist societies, this book shows how the police have played an active role in actually shaping order, rather than merely preserving it.

This paper explores changing representations of the nation in 19th and 21st century Serbia and Croatia. I analyse how the changed structural conditions influence different visualisation strategies of a nation over long periods of time. More specifically I attempt to show how the dominant 19th century visual representations of nationhood in Croatia and Serbia were centred on violent images: representations of battlefields, personal sacrifices, national martyrdom, large-scale forced migrations of the nation, the past military glories of medieval kingdoms, and the production of maps depicting more expansive future states. In contrast to this mode of representation, the imagery of 21st century nationalist tends to focus on the nation’s international achievements in the fields of economy, science, technology, art and sports. Whereas the 19th century was saturated with violent images of the nation, in the 21st century such representations are less visible. On the surface this significant visual shift would indicate that nationalism was a far more influential force in 19th Serbian and Croatian societies than is the case today. However I argue that the opposite is the case: the changing representations of the nation in fact reflect a greater organisational and ideological penetration of nationalism in present-day Serbia and Croatia. While in the 19th century violent images of the past largely served as a didactic tool for the socialisation of mostly peasant, and thus nationally ambiguous populations, in the 21st century there is no need to perform such a role, as most citizens are already highly nationalised. Instead the visualisation of national success in sports or science and the relative absence of violent images reflect the organisational and ideological strength of nationalism in both cases.

Méprises et tentatives d’annexion n’ont cessé de marquer la réception de l’œuvre du sociologue. Avec leur lot de contresens et de parti-pris. N’est-ce pas ce qui attend tout penseur qui se veut à contretemps, mieux qui se considère lui-même comme un « révolutionnaire » ou un « fondateur »  ? Sans doute. Mais le « cas Elias » paraît multiplier les difficultés. La perception étroitement disciplinaire de ses travaux ? Elle continue de faire obstacle à sa compréhension véritable. D’où la tentation de ravaler ses audaces analytiques à quelques poncifs.

Resumen Este artículo presenta un mapa del giro a la derecha en América Latina en el siglo XXI para luego repensar el con-cepto "derecha" y sus referencias histórico-empíricas más recientes. El concepto ha sido muy utilizado en las ciencias sociales, sin embargo creemos que hay una especificidad en su utilización cuando se le adosa el adjetivo "nueva". Este artículo ofrece una reflexión sobre la novedad que la derecha, o las derechas, en plural, traen desde el fin de las dictaduras institucionales de las Fuerzas Armadas hasta el presente. Desde una perspectiva de sociología histórica de la formación de conceptos, en la coyuntura estudiada se identifican como elementos nuevos de la derecha: la apel-ación a la democracia liberal y a la movilización social (aun-que se observan matices); además se señala como elemen-to de larga duración el combate al igualitarismo. Asimismo, el artículo ofrece una reflexión sobre una posible agenda de investigación acerca de las estrategias no electorales que las derechas emplean para la construcción de hegemonía. Hacia una agenda de investigación en torno a las derechas de América Latina en el siglo XXI

Türkiye, her iki dünya savaşı ertesi köklü dönüşümler geçirdi. İlki 600 yıllık Osmanlı hanedanına son verdi. İkincisi ise Tek Parti döneminin sonu oldu; Türkiye’de siyasi demokrasinin yolunu açtı. İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye tarafsız kaldı. Ancak, savaşın tüm olumsuzluklarını bilfiil yaşadı. Tek Parti döneminin toplumsal dengeleri büyük ölçüde hasar gördü. Milli Korunma Kanunu, Varlık Vergisi, Toprak Mahsulleri
Vergisi, İş Mükellefiyeti gibi uygulamalar toplumsal katmanları iktidara karşı tavır almaya sevk etti. Devletin savaş içinde kararlarını hayata geçirme konusundaki zaafları belirginleşirken; kitlelerin gündelik yaşamda tepki ve direnişleri de çığ gibi arttı. Gerek çok partili sisteme geçişte, gerekse 1940’ların ikinci yarısında gündeme gelen sosyal politika alanındaki reformlarda toplum tabanında gözlenen yılgınlık ve
tepkiler önemli bir rol oynadı.
Murat Metinsoy’un kitabı işte bu zor yılların toplumsal öyküsünü gündeme getiriyor. Olaylar dizinini tabandan irdeleyerek; kitlelerin yaşam deneyimlerini, serzenişlerini, gündelik yaşamdaki direnişlerini vurgulayarak… Otoriter dönemlerde bile toplumun
gündelik mücadelelerinin ve taleplerinin siyasete etki edebileceğini
ortaya koyarak…
Zafer Toprak, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi

Selefilik beşe ayrılır. Sahabiler, Tabin, tebeyi tabinle, Selefi Salihin ilk saf çeşidi idi. Hakiki Müslümanlardı. Bu dönemin Abdülkadir Geylani’nin tarikatları kurumsallaştırmasına kadar sürdüğü varsayılabilir. İslam’ın altın çağındaki alimler, ‘2. Selefi Türü’ oluşturuyor. İbni Arabi bir selefi idi. Mevlana Rumi'ye, İmam Rabbani'ye kadar devam etti. Suudi devleti 3. Tür üzerine devletleşti ve İngiliz istihbaratı altınlarıyla Osmanlı nefreti ve aşırı Arap milliyetçiliği doktrini üzerine bir dikta rejimi kurdu. Şiddet Vehhabisi, 4. çeşididir ve kaynağını Hanbeli ekolünden gelen Şii karşıtlığına dayalı İbni Teymiye Kur’an yorumundan alır! ABD'nin Suudi Arabistan'da 5 askeri üs kurması, 1979'de Sovyetlerin Afganistan'ı işgali ve Humeyni'nn İran'da Şii darbesi ile başlar. Üsame Bin Ladin gibi zengin ve eğitimli Selefi çocuklarını CIA ustalıkla kullanmıştır. El Kaida bu projenin adıdır. Bağdat’ı işgal eden Hülagu komutasındaki Moğol ordusunda Şii alim Nasreddin Tusi’nin başdanışman olması Hanbeli Sünni İslam’ın da keskin tepkilere neden oldu. İbni Teymiye tefsiri bu travmanın ürünü olduğu için aşırı Şii karşıtıdır. Ladin ise Şii karşıtı değildi, batı karşıtı idi.
Selefeliğin ilk iki çeşidi Asrı Saadet İslam’ına dönme ve ayakta tutma, İslam’ı evrensel kılma akımlarıdır. Vehhabi İslam’ı İngiliz ürünüdür. IŞİD, bir Vehhabi İslam’ı öcüsüdür. IŞİD, ‘petrodolarlar’la 1980’lerde CIA’nın devletsiz yapıda kurdurduğu El Kaida’nın devlete dönüştürülmüş son global ve yerel kötü silahıdır. 5. türrdür, 2009'da Ürdün'de tezgahlanmıştır. Suudi Arabistan  kraliyet Vehhabi rejimi ile uzun yıllara dayanan ilişkiler sonucu Abdullah Gül, Ahmed Davutoğlu ve Erdoğan üçlüsünün hastalıklı siyasal İslam çizgisinden böyle bir anomali doğması destek çıkması normaldi. Ancak herkesin desteklediği ayrı bir IŞİD öcüsü var! IŞİD, yeni kolonicilerin haritaları petrol, gaz ve su kaynaklarına göre aralarında paylaşırken, Müslümanları bölme, parçalama ve yutma projesinin kirli adıdır. Sünni İslam'a saldırı ve ihanet projedisidir.  Büyük Kürdistan'ı kurmakla neticelenecek IŞİD projesi, bir mezhep savaşıyla Müslümanları birbirine kırdırmayı da amaçlıyor. Batılı kolonicilerin yeni imtiyazlar alarak bölgeyi sömürmesine yol açan IŞİD projesine destek verenler, büyük bir ihanet içinde olan Batılı kolonicilerin kuklalarıdır. Gerisi lafı güzaf...

This is the first in a series of blog posts on realism and social movements. The purpose of it is to refine the explanatory purchase of realist thought within social movement studies and consider what it means ‘to be realist’ about social movements. This first post is dedicated to fleshing out realist thought and making my own argument(s) a little more accessible to social movement theorists.

The central contention of this article is that early nineteenth-century Irish landlords were constrained in their ability to control their estates by the prospect of peasant resistance. The apex of that resistance took the form of what are generically known as whiteboy movements, and this article examines the impact of one particular such movement, the Whitefeet, active in the East Midlands and SouthEast in the early 1830s. The article argues that two forms of landlord versus tenant conflicts can be identified: an absolute form, in which landlords (or subletting rentiers called middlemen) behaved as if they had absolute rights over their properties and were the victims of retaliatory violence; and a negotiated form, in which landlords (or their agents) proceeded in a more restrained, and piecemeal fashion, and compromised in the face of opposition. The fact that the magistracy, at least in some instances, condemned the practitioners of absolute conflict would suggest that more measured approaches were the socially accepted norm, precisely because of the potential for retaliatory violence. The article will conclude with a discussion framing the foregoing in terms of moral economy. It will be argued that the balance between landlord power and tenant resistance created a grudging acceptance of respective rights.

Le citoyen britannique tel qu’il apparaît au seuil de la modernité, dans l’Angleterre du 17ème siècle est un individu naturellement propriétaire. Il est avant tout propriétaire de sa propre personne. C’est ce que Macpherson a appelé « l’individualisme possessif », c’est à dire « l’individualisme conçu comme l’affirmation d’une propriété » (1971 : 7). Cette idée de l’individualisme possessif est exprimée pendant la Révolution anglaise (1640-1649) par les radicaux : les Nivelleurs. Ainsi l’un de leurs leaders, Overton, écrit-il en 1647 « chaque personne reçoit, de par la nature, une propriété individuelle qui ne doit ni être envahie ni usurpée ; car chacun a en sa personne une propriété (self property) sans laquelle il ne pourrait être lui-même, et qu’on ne peut lui ôter sans violation et affront aux principes de la nature »[1]. Tous les hommes ont cette propriété en eux-mêmes et c’est en cette qualité de propriétaire de soi-même, maître de sa propre destinée, que les Nivelleurs réclament le droit de vote, pour tout homme de plus de 21 ans – sans obligation d’être propriétaire de biens matériels – à condition toutefois qu’il ne soit pas domestique. Le domestique, en effet est dans une relation de travail non « libre » car il vend plus que sa simple force de travail : il vit au domicile de son employeur, dans sa sphère privée, et ce dernier a droit de regard sur lui. Par contre, tout homme libre possédant la pleine jouissance de la propriété de sa propre personne doit pouvoir décider pour ce qui le concerne. Il est censé consentir à être gouverné. C’est l’idée de contrat, dont la matérialisation, pour les Nivelleurs, est le suffrage. Plus radicaux que les Nivelleurs, moins sophistiqués aussi, les Diggers (bécheux) qui se nommaient eux-mêmes les « True Levellers » ou vrais Nivelleurs, ne disent pas vraiment autre chose, tant en ce qui concerne la propriété de sa propre personne, que le consentement à être gouverné. En 1649, après l’exécution du roi, ils avaient squatté – et appelé à squatter – les terres « communes » et y avaient installé une société communiste avec propriété collective des moyens de production, la terre, et partage des fruits du travail de la communauté. Pour Winstanley, leur leader, le citoyen reste propriétaire de sa maison et de ses objets personnels : sa société communiste est une société dans laquelle existe une sphère privée qui équivaut à une propriété privée. Cette sphère est celle de sa liberté. Liberté et propriété sont un couple inséparable dans l’individualisme possessif, même pour le communiste Winstanley. Il s’agit de la propriété et de la liberté du chef de famille qui exerce son autorité bienveillante sur sa femme et ses enfants. L’influence des radicaux apparaît dans le dernier écrit de John Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1689). Son père avait, en effet, servi comme Capitaine dans l’Armée Modèle de Cromwell et ces idées, véhiculées par les soldats de la Model Army, lui étaient familières. Locke reprend l’idée selon laquelle « l’Homme a une Propriété dans sa propre Personne. A cela personne n’a droit sauf lui-même. Le travail de son Corps et le Travail de ses Mains, lui appartiennent en propre » (Locke, 1993 : 287). Les hommes auraient quitté l’état de nature et inventé l’Etat afin que leurs propriétés soient préservées. Pour se faire ils auraient établi entre eux un contrat de non agression, renonçant à assurer eux-mêmes la sécurité de leur personne et de leurs biens et consentant du même coup à transférer le pouvoir exécutif qu’ils détenaient jusque-là, dans les mains d’un Etat qui ferait les lois auxquelles ils se soumettraient. La tradition libérale maintiendra le lien entre liberté et propriété. 

The reverence for Stalinism by the main kibbutz movements, which through revolutionary rhetoric helped perpetuate leaders who had reached the dysfunctional phase, was wrongly interpreted. Historians missed leaders’ efforts to induce reverence and its use for their domination, while social researchers missed its enhancement of oligarchic rule. These are explained by the suppression of critics at the hands of a co-opted functionalist scientific coalition, by ethnographers
missing the impact of inter-kibbutz organizations, and by the differentiation of disciplines. Multiple ethnographies of kibbutzim (pl. of kibbutz) and inter-kibbutz organizations and the integration of various findings by a good theory exposed
these failures. They point to the required integration of disciplines and to the need for reform of scientific publication decision-making aimed at preventing such failures.

Since the end of the Cold War, religion has become an ever more explicit and systematic focus of US foreign policy across multiple domains. US foreign policymakers, for instance, have been increasingly tasked with monitoring religious freedom and promoting it globally, delivering humanitarian and development aid abroad by drawing on faith-based organizations, fighting global terrorism by seeking to reform Muslim societies and Islamic theologies, and advancing American interests and values more broadly worldwide by engaging with religious actors and dynamics. Simply put, religion has become a major subject and object of American foreign policy in ways that were unimaginable just a few decades ago.

In Finding Faith in Foreign Policy, Gregorio Bettiza explains the causes and consequences of this shift by developing an original theoretical framework and drawing upon extensive empirical research and interviews. He argues that American foreign policy and religious forces have become ever more inextricably entangled in an age witnessing a global resurgence of religion and the emergence of a postsecular world society. He further shows how the boundaries between faith and state have been redefined through processes of desecularization in the context of American foreign policy, leading the most powerful state in the international system to intervene and reshape in increasingly sustained ways sacred and secular landscapes around the globe.

Drawing from a rich evidentiary base spanning twenty-five years, Finding Faith in Foreign Policy details how a wave of religious enthusiasm has transformed not just American foreign policy, but the entire international system.

http://shcyhome.org/2015/01/chc-episode-4-developmental-thinking/
Episode 4 of CHILDHOOD: History & Critique offers a brief review essay of the 2008 book _A Historical Sociology of Childhood_ and an extended conversation with its author - André Turmel, professor emeritus at Laval University.

CHC is a series of interviews, essays, and happenings in historical studies of childhood presented for the Society for the History of Children and Youth.

Concern about high rates of mental health disorders amongst young people has underwritten a proliferation of social and educational policy aimed at improving youth wellbeing. This chapter examines educational concerns with mental health through a critical analysis of wellbeing as an object of educational policy and practice. It begins by considering the construction of mental health as an educational problem, in the past and in the present, and the policy solutions that have been developed in order to address this. It then explores how rising concern with the wellbeing of young people has fostered a shift from the historically narrow educational focus on targeted interventions – for students experiencing problems or identified as being at risk of mental health difficulties – to the more recent emphasis on universal approaches and preventative programs. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the seductive power of ideas of prevention and “psychological immunization” and considers the implications of this for contemporary educational policy and practice, and ultimately for understanding and promoting youth wellbeing.

Beyond the “Sick Man” Metaphor: Ottoman Modernisation and State Capacity

Abstract
This article focuses on the question of how to balance the internal and external factors in understanding the Ottoman modernisation. While the emphasis is on the fact that the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire was subjugated by the pressure of informal colonialism and an important internal pressure for modernisation was an attempt to resist this pressure, it is argued that the impact of internal and external factors in shaping the modernisation process can be better understood by using the framework of state capacity. By following Michael Mann’s perspective in defining the state power as the sum of despotic power and infrastructural power, throughout the article the state capacity is operationalised by four items, namely army, education, coinage and transportation systems.  It is suggested that the Ottoman modernisation should be seen as a series of efforts to increase the state capacity. At the same time, the dependency of these efforts to informal colonialism is emphasised.

Keywords: Ottoman modernisation, state capacity, despotic power, infrastructural power, informal colonialism

“Hasta Adam” Metaforunu Aşmak: Osmanlı Modernleşmesi ve Devlet Kapasitesi

Özet
Bu çalışma Osmanlı modernleşmesinin anlaşılmasında iç dinamiklerle dış dinamiklerin nasıl dengelenebileceği sorusuna odaklanıyor. Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun on dokuzuncu yüzyıl boyunca informel sömürgeciliğin baskısına maruz kaldığı ve Osmanlı modernleşmesinin önemli bir içsel dinamiğinin bu baskıya karşı direnme çabası olduğu vurgulanırken, içsel dinamiklerle dışsal dinamiklerin modernleşmedeki etkilerinin devlet kapasitesi çerçevesiyle daha iyi anlaşılabileceğini iddia ediliyor. Micheal Mann’ın devlet iktidarını despotik güç ve altyapısal güç üzerinden tanımlayan yaklaşımından esinlenerek, devlet kapasitesi ordu, eğitim, para ve taşımacılık sistemleri ekseninde tanımlanıyor. Osmanlı modernleşmesini devletin kapasitesini arttırma çabalarına ilişkin bir süreç olarak okumak önerilirken, aynı zamanda bu sürecin informel sömürgeciliğe fazlasıyla bağımlı olduğu iddia ediliyor. 

Anahtar Kelimeler: Osmanlı modernleşmesi, devlet kapasitesi, despotik güç, altyapısal güç, informel sömürgecilik

In diesem Aufsatz wird untersucht, wie Tiernutzung und Fleischkonsum zu einer umstrittenen Praxis werden konnten. Erst eine Analyse der Genese dieser moralischen Problematisierung ermöglicht ein Verständnis der komplexen soziokulturellen Hintergründe jener Dissonanz, die in der Sozialpsychologie unter dem Schlagwort des »Fleischparadoxes« untersucht wird. Die Geschichte dieser Problematisierung wird in vier Schritten nachvollzogen: 1) Zunächst wird argumentiert, dass das Auftreten des Paradoxes vor dem Hintergrund von Spannungen und Verschiebungen innerhalb des spezifisch modernen Diskurses über die Mensch-Tier-Differenz verstanden werden muss. Im Anschluss an Philippe Descola wird gezeigt, dass das Fleischparadox keinen grundsätzlichen ontologischen Bruch anzeigt, sondern mit sich verschärfenden Konflikten innerhalb der modernen naturalistischen Weltsicht einhergeht. Ergänzt wird dies durch Argumente Gesa Lindemanns, die auf den konstitutiven wie umkämpften Stellenwert der Tier-Mensch-Grenze für die Konzeption sowohl des modernen Individuums als auch der modernen Rechts-, Moral- und Gewaltordnung verweist. 2) In einem zweiten Schritt werden die zunehmenden Spannungen an der Tier-Mensch-Grenze mit Norbert Eliasʼ Theorie des Zivilisationsprozesses verknüpft. Eine solche Verknüpfung hat den Vorteil, dass die Veränderungen im Mensch-Tier-Verhältnis auf ein breites Spektrum historischer makro- und mikrosozialer Transformationen zurückgeführt werden können. Mit Elias lässt sich die wachsende affektive Aversion gegenüber Gewalt im Allgemeinen, aber auch die Verlagerung der Fleischproduktion »hinter die Kulissen« verstehen. Zugleich kann durch die Verortung der Zivilisationsdynamik in einem spezifischen sozialontologischen Rahmen der im Hinblick auf Elias vorgebrachte Ethnozentrismusvorwurf umgangen werden. 3) In einem dritten Schritt werden Transformationen der Wirtschaftsstruktur und die mit ihnen verbundenen Veränderungen der Kontaktmuster zwischen Menschen und Tieren betrachtet. Im Zuge von Urbanisierung und Industrialisierung ging der Kontakt zu Nutz- und Wildtieren für viele Menschen deutlich zurück, während sich parallel die Heimtierhaltung verbreitete. Im Verein mit einem generellen Wandel des Naturverhältnisses ermöglichte dieser Prozess eine zuvor ungekannte Sensibilisierung gegenüber Tierleid. 4) Das Aufkommen der Tierschutz-, später auch der Tierrechtsbewegung, sowie von vegetarischen und veganen Lebensstilen kann schließlich als ein Ausdruck der ontologischen Spannungen und der wachsenden Sensibilisierung gegenüber Gewalt und Tierleid interpretiert werden, der jedoch nur durch Vorstellungen gesellschaftlicher Veränderbarkeit und politischer Gestaltbarkeit sowie durch die Entstehung demokratischer Öffentlichkeiten möglich wurde. Nach ihrer Konstituierung und organisationalen Verankerung konnten diese Protest- und Lebensstilbewegungen dann selbst Motor einer weiteren Sensibilisierung und Problematisierung von Tierleid und Fleischkonsum werden.

This article explores the historiographical,
empirical, and theoretical challenges of combining
ethnographic methods with sociohistory.
It shows why and how the unity of
the social sciences displays itself in the active
complementarity of ethnography and sociohistory.
The analysis of the concrete aspects
of this complementarity allows us to reformulate
the issue of interdisciplinarity beyond
the discourse of “alliances” or “exchanges”
between the disciplines. Against the prejudice
that archives belong only to historians and the
“field” to anthropologists and sociologists, we
attempt to answer the following question: in
what kind of historiographic work does this
complementarity of methods originate, and
what uses and categories does it refer to today
concretely?

Este artículo explora los retos historiográficos,
empíricos y teóricos de la combinación de los
métodos etnográficos con la sociohistoria.
Muestra por qué y de qué manera la unidad
de las ciencias sociales se despliega en la
complementariedad activa de la etnografía
y la sociohistoria. El análisis de los aspectos
concretos de esta complementariedad permite
explorar la cuestión de la interdisciplinariedad,
más allá del discurso de las “alianzas” o
del “intercambio” entre las disciplinas. Contra
el prejuicio de que los archivos les pertenecen
a los historiadores y el “campo” a los antropólogos
y sociólogos, se trata de contestar
la siguiente pregunta: ¿en qué tipo de trabajo
historiográfico se origina esta complementariedad
de métodos y a qué usos y categorías
se refiere concretamente hoy en día?

In this essay I examine the racial achievement gap in American education in terms of an impaired psychosocial developmental process. I argue that the well-documented academic underperformance of certain minority groups may stem from the unfavorable resolution of a key developmental crisis in constituent members’ early scholastic experience. I go on to suggest that individual educators can play an important role in eliminating the achievement gap by changing the way they teach in their own classrooms. In part, they may do so by adopting a "transcultural" pedagogy or teaching style, according to which both teachers and their minority students develop (at minimum) transcultural proficiencies and (at maximum) transcultural identities, as a promising way to achieve two important ends. First, the fostering of an academically-industrious self-concept in members of historically underachieving minority groups and hence, second, the closing of the achievement gap "from the bottom up"—one classroom at a time.

In order to map out the extent to which the interplay between professional creationist and anti-creationist organizations in the United States determines the state of the creation/evolution debates, I shall proceed in three steps. First, I will present an example that characterizes the way in which professional creationism works in the United States. Second, I will review some key aspects of the history of professional creationism and anti-creationism in America. Third, I will present a sociological model that helps explain why creationism in the United States has developed in the way it has. This model is based upon the theory of social fields as developed by Pierre Bourdieu. Its main function is to make visible the way in which professional creationists and anti-creationists are attuned to each other with regard to their arguments, strategies, and the concepts they apply to Interpret their own actions and those of their opponents.

Avec la mise en place progressive d’un véritable marché électoral et d’une professionnalisation de l’activité politique, la Troisième République consacre le succès ou l’échec à l’élection comme le moment déterminant du cursus politique. De fait, dans la plupart des cas, sous la Troisième République, la défaite électorale marque la fin d’une carrière politique, surtout lorsqu’elle intervient à l’issue d’un premier mandat . Ce moment de la Troisième République, pendant lequel se construit donc largement l’expérience de la défaite électorale, paraît ainsi un moment particulièrement intéressant à étudier pour saisir les incidences socio-biographiques de cette dernière sur les trajectoires des battus.
Le texte propose d’approcher cette question à travers un cas spécifique : celui de la défaite électorale de Clemenceau aux élections de septembre 1893.  Figure majeure de la Troisième République, connue comme le « tombeur des ministères », Clemenceau est, en effet, battu au second tour des élections législatives de 1893. Cet échec électoral le conduit à abandonner l’activité politique professionnelle au profit d’une activité littéraire et journalistique. Elle marque ainsi l’entrée dans une « traversée du désert » qui dure jusqu’en 1902 et son élection comme sénateur.
Le cas de Clemenceau permet d’interroger, sur la base de différents matériaux historiques (articles de presse, correspondance notamment), les modalités de reconversion et de repositionnement, à court et à plus long terme, de ces nouveaux entrepreneurs politiques dans ce contexte de la Troisième République encore caractérisé par une forte porosité des champs politique, littéraire et journalistique.

The paper focuses on the (re)emergence in the late twentieth century of a specific form of cross-border labour migration--viz. guest-work or circular/managed migration--that is designed to keep migrants from settling in receiving countries. The paper is part of a larger project that situates this form of transnational work-mobility regimes within the larger historical debates over the slippery line between free labour and forced labour. Specifically, it traces the genealogy of guest-work, and makes some preliminary observations about the specificity of contemporary circular / managed migration as it becomes incrementally normalized as a desirable policy tool across the world.