The distinction between presentism and eternalism is usually sought in some formula like ‘Only presently existing things exist’ or ‘Past, present, and future events are equally real’. I argue that ambiguities in the copula prevent these... more
The distinction between presentism and eternalism is usually sought in some formula like ‘Only presently existing things exist’ or ‘Past, present, and future events are equally real’. I argue that ambiguities in the copula prevent these slogans from distinguishing significant opposed positions. I suggest in addition that one can find a series of significant distinctions if one takes spacetime structure into account. These presentisms and eternalisms are not contradictory. They are complementary elements of a complete naturalistic philosophy of time.
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In this paper I argue that the clash of the Sellars' two images is particularly acute in the case of time. In Time and the World Order Sellars seems embarked on a quest to locate manifest time in Minkowski spacetime. I suggest that he... more
In this paper I argue that the clash of the Sellars' two images is particularly acute in the case of time. In Time and the World Order Sellars seems embarked on a quest to locate manifest time in Minkowski spacetime. I suggest that he should have argued for the replacement of manifest time with the local, path-dependent time of the "scientific image", just as he suggests that manifest objects must be replaced by their scientific counterparts.
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I present an account of the passage of time and the present in relativistic spacetimes, and I defend these views against recent criticism by Oliver Pooley and Craig Callender.
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ABSTRACT It is often claimed that features of the spacetime of special relativity are inimical to the passage of time. In opposition to this view, I show how the passage of time is to be understood in Minkowski spacetime. A (local,... more
ABSTRACT It is often claimed that features of the spacetime of special relativity are inimical to the passage of time. In opposition to this view, I show how the passage of time is to be understood in Minkowski spacetime. A (local, specious) present is construed as an open set in the Alexandroff topology and the passage of time is a succession of presents along a timelike curve. Temporal becoming is a local, ratherthan a global, phenomenon. I offer some motivations for the view I propose, and I consider five objections that might be raised against it. For instance, one general objection to the notion of the “flow” or passing of time is that one can not answer the natural question ‘How fast does time “flow” or pass?’ I claim that Minkowski spacetime provides a natural answer to this question.
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... When am I? A tense time for some tense theorists? Australian Journal of Philosophy 80: 35971. Braddon-Mitchell, D. 2004. How do we know it is now now? Analysis 64: 199203. Dummett, M. 1960. A defence of McTaggart's proof of the... more
... When am I? A tense time for some tense theorists? Australian Journal of Philosophy 80: 35971. Braddon-Mitchell, D. 2004. How do we know it is now now? Analysis 64: 199203. Dummett, M. 1960. A defence of McTaggart's proof of the unreality of time. ...
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Time's Arrows Today Recent Physical and Philosophical Work on the Direction of Time Page 2. ... All change, and time's arrow, point in the direction of corruption. ...
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Hilary Putnam (et al.) argued that the special theory of relativity shows that there can be no temporal becoming. Howard Stein replied by defining a becoming relation in Minkowski spacetime. Clifton and Hogarth extended and sharpened... more
Hilary Putnam (et al.) argued that the special theory of relativity shows that there can be no temporal becoming. Howard Stein replied by defining a becoming relation in Minkowski spacetime. Clifton and Hogarth extended and sharpened Stein’s results. Game over? To the contrary, it has been argued (Saunders, Callender) that the Stein-Clifton-Hogarth theorems actually support Putnam’s contention, in that if an apparently minimal condition is put on the becoming relation (the condition that two distinct events are able to “share a present”), then these theorems entail that the becoming relation must be the universal relation. I recount this dialectic in some detail and then try to define and defend a becoming relation based on a present that does indeed consist of more than one point or event but still satisfies the sort of objectivity requirements that Stein-Clifton-Hogarth require of a becoming relation. This present is not a global hyperplane or surface, however; it is a local struc...
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The papers in this issue descend, for the most part, from papers presented at one of two conferences. The papers of Atkinson, Dorato, Frisch, and Price were presented at the ESF International Workshop “The Arrow of Time: Physics and... more
The papers in this issue descend, for the most part, from papers presented at one of two conferences. The papers of Atkinson, Dorato, Frisch, and Price were presented at the ESF International Workshop “The Arrow of Time: Physics and Philosophy” which took place at Louvain-la-Neuve on 7-8 May 2004. The workshop was organized by Michel Ghins and sponsored by the ESF Network for Philosophical and Foundational Problems of Modern Physics. The papers of Earman, Eckhardt, Pitowsky, Stamp and Wald were prepared for “The Arrows of Time, 2004”, a conference organized by the Pacific Institute of Theoretical Physics (PITP) that was held at the Seven Pines Institute in Minnesota on 17-20 December 2004. This conference was organized by A.J. Leggett, P.C. E. Stamp, W.G. Unruh, and R. Wald and funded by PITP, with additional contributions from CITA and the Seven Pines Institute. John Earman’s paper was scheduled for, but not actually presented, at the conference.
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The distinction between presentism and eternalism is usually sought in some formula like ‘Only presently existing things exist’ or ‘Past, present, and future events are equally real’. I argue that ambiguities in the copula prevent these... more
The distinction between presentism and eternalism is usually sought in some formula like ‘Only presently existing things exist’ or ‘Past, present, and future events are equally real’. I argue that ambiguities in the copula prevent these slogans from distinguishing significant opposed positions. I suggest in addition that one can find a series of significant distinctions if one takes spacetime structure into account. These presentisms and eternalisms are not contradictory. They are complementary elements of a complete naturalistic philosophy of time.
ABSTRACT In a recent book, Asymmetries in Time, Paul Horwich presents a systematic account of various temporal asymmetries, including a neo-Reichenbachian account of the (apparent) fact that we know more about the past than the future,... more
ABSTRACT In a recent book, Asymmetries in Time, Paul Horwich presents a systematic account of various temporal asymmetries, including a neo-Reichenbachian account of the (apparent) fact that we know more about the past than the future, the epistemological time asymmetry. I find some obscurities in Horwich's presentation, however, and I argue that when his view is understood in a way that I shall propose, it does represent an advance on Reichenbach's, but it fails to vindicate Horwich's "main point...that our special knowledge of the past derives from the fork asymmetry.
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On Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage STEVEN F. SAVITT In the literature on time in the twentieth century stemming from J. ME McTaggart's famous argument for the unreality of time, 1 two gems stand out. The first is CD... more
On Absolute Becoming and the Myth of Passage STEVEN F. SAVITT In the literature on time in the twentieth century stemming from J. ME McTaggart's famous argument for the unreality of time, 1 two gems stand out. The first is CD Broad's patient dissection of McTaggart's ...
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UNDERSTANDING SPACE-TIME This book presents the history of space-time physics, from Newton to Einstein, as a philosophical development reflecting our increasing understanding of the connections between ideas of space and time and our... more
UNDERSTANDING SPACE-TIME This book presents the history of space-time physics, from Newton to Einstein, as a philosophical development reflecting our increasing understanding of the connections between ideas of space and time and our physical knowledge. It ...
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Newton's Principia introduced conceptions of space and time that launched one of the most famous and sustained debates in the history of physics, a controversy that involves fundamental concerns in the foundations of physics,... more
Newton's Principia introduced conceptions of space and time that launched one of the most famous and sustained debates in the history of physics, a controversy that involves fundamental concerns in the foundations of physics, metaphysics, and scientific epistemology.