Ben Saunders

Saward briefly outlines provisional conditions of democratic legitimacy, but he argues that presumptive constituents should remain the final judges of whether someone actually represents them. And such judgements, Saward writes, are best assessed on a case-bycase basis. In this respect, The Representative Claim both offers useful insights into the concept of representation and raises important questions for empirical research.

6. Bickford, Dissonance; Dobson, Listening, 36. 7. Bennett, Vibrant Matter; Coles, Rethinking Generosity; Connolly, Ethos; Connolly, World of Becoming; Connolly, Identity/Difference; Jacques Derrida, Of Hospitality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). Dobson’s neglect of agonistic democracy might stem from his misunderstanding of it. He writes that “agonists cannot know what they are agonizing about without listening out for contending points of view” (Listening, 97). This way of posing the problem identifies agony as the fundamental experience of this sort of agonistic politics, but one does not get that sense from reading agonistic democrats, who affirm contestation, uncertainty, contingency, and risk. Something about those experiences may be agonizing, but Dobson’s characterization remains inapt. 8. Connolly, Ethos of Pluralization. 9. Coles, Rethinking Generosity. In fairness, Dobson does briefly discuss receptivity (Listening, 20), but this also undermines his claim that Bickford is the only political theorist who has emphasized listening. 10. Listening, chap. 4. 11. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 12. Listening, 172. 13. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). 14. Listening, 64–66. 15. Ibid., 67. 16. Ibid., 68. 17. Ibid., 69. 18. Ibid., 68.

The Food Additives and Contaminants-Surveillance Database is a searchable database containing all the surveillance data published in Food Additives and Contaminants Part B (FAC B) since its launch in June 2008. Search results may be viewed on screen, or ...

The Athenian practice of sortition (random selection) has inspired a number of recent proposals for democratic reform. Some theorists suggest that politicians themselves be selected randomly, thereby producing a statistically representative sample of the population (Callenbach and Phillips, 2008). Others seek ways of combining lotteries with the more familiar modern practice of voting. I shall confine my comments to two recent proposals of this latter sort. My aim is to explore similarities and differences between ex ante and ex post lottery voting, in order to clarify when each may be preferable. In a recent article in this journal, López-Guerra (2011) suggests abolishing universal suffrage, instead having only a randomly selected subset of the populace vote in elections. Though he is reluctant to endorse this policy all things considered, he argues that it would likely produce better outcomes, since it allows selected voters to participate in a programme of education and deliberation prior to the actual election. This proposal is similar to that of a national ‘deliberation day’ (Ackerman and Fishkin, 2005), except that participation is restricted to a sample of the population, largely on grounds of cost (López-Guerra, 2011: 218–9, 222). The second proposal is one that I have developed elsewhere (Saunders, 2010), namely (ex post) lottery voting. This is an alternative to majority rule; elections are held as normal, but rather than the majority winning automatically, a single, randomly selected vote determines the outcome. Consequently, each side has a chance of victory proportionate to the level of support it enjoys among the electorate. At first sight, these two policies are quite different. López-Guerra claims that democracy is possible without universal franchise, provided that all have a chance of being enfranchised. My suggestion is that democracy is possible without majority rule, provided that all have a chance of being decisive. These proposals could be combined: we could restrict the franchise to a random sample of the population and have their decision determined by a randomly selected individual. It is, however, fruitful to compare

Endörfer has recently argued that proponents of the harm principle are wrong to exempt market harms as potential justifications for state interference. I argue that – contrary to suggestions in Endörfer’s article – John Stuart Mill did not exempt market harms from his harm principle. On Mill’s view, the state can (as a matter of principle) legitimately interfere with free markets to prevent market harms where they occur but, on the whole, it is better policy not to interfere. Mill’s general preference for free trade rests on utilitarian considerations and not on his harm principle, which does not exclude market harms.

It is hard to escape the feeling that the humanities are under threat, with both politicians and the public (including the student ‘consumers’ of education) increasingly regarding education in instrumental terms. As I write, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) reports that a poll conducted by Policy Exchange found that 55% of respondents think that too many students study ‘narrowly academic’, rather than vocational, courses (Burns 2012). Those who enrol on university degrees, at considerable economic and opportunity cost, expect an economic return on their investment, which pushes them towards vocational subjects, such as medicine or engineering. Studying history, literature or philosophy appears a luxury or indulgence which cannot be afforded in an age of austerity. In Not for Profit, Martha Nussbaum seeks to defend the importance of the humanities by rejecting the increasingly dominant narrowly instrumental conception of the purpose of education. The purpose of education, she argues, is not simply to make money, but to produce rounded individuals capable not only of productive employment but also of leading meaningful lives and participating in politics (p. 9). In fact, there are two prongs to Nussbaum’s argument. First, the humanities are particularly good at serving the non-economic ends of education, enabling students to understand other ways of life and come to see others in respectful terms, as ends in themselves rather than mere objects or tools. But, second, even if one rejects these broader ends, Nussbaum also suggests that those who favour economic growth are wrong to denigrate the role of the humanities, since a successful economy requires creative, critical individuals (e.g., pp. 53 and 112). Before going on to give my own reflections on her argument, let me begin with a longer—although still brief—overview of the work in question.

Recent discussion has focused on whether or not to teach moral theories, and, if yes, to what extent. In this piece the author argues that the criticisms of teaching moral theories raised by Rob Lawlor should lead us to reconsider not whether but how to teach moral theories. It seems that most of the problems Lawlor identifies derive from an uncritical, theory-led approach to teaching. It is suggested that we might instead start by discussing practical cases or the desiderata of a successful moral theory, and then build up to comparing theories such as consequentialism, deontology, and so on. In this way, theories are taught but students do not take them to be the alpha and omega of moral thinking.

The three most common responses to Taurek’s ‘numbers problem’ are saving the greater number, equal chance lotteries and weighted lotteries. Weighted lotteries have perhaps received the least support, having been criticized by Scanlon What We Owe to Each Other (1998) and Hirose ‘Fairness in Life and Death Cases’ (2007). This article considers these objections in turn, and argues that they

Endörfer has recently argued that proponents of the harm principle are wrong to exempt market harms as potential justifications for state interference. I argue that – contrary to suggestions in Endörfer’s article – John Stuart Mill did not exempt market harms from his harm principle. On Mill’s view, the state can (as a matter of principle) legitimately interfere with free markets to prevent market harms where they occur but, on the whole, it is better policy not to interfere. Mill’s general preference for free trade rests on utilitarian considerations and not on his harm principle, which does not exclude market harms.

The spread of vaccine misinformation may contribute to vaccine refusal/hesitancy and consequent harms. Nonetheless, censorship is often rejected on the grounds of free expression. This article examines John Stuart Mill’s influential defence of free expression but finds that his arguments for freedom apply only to normal, reasonably favourable circumstances. In other cases, it may be permissible to restrict freedom, including freedom of speech. Thus, while Mill would ordinarily defend the right to express false views, such as that vaccines cause autism, he might have accepted restrictions on anti-vaccine misinformation during the present pandemic. This illustrates that even the staunchest defenders of free speech can permit temporary restrictions in exceptional circumstances.

The novel coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2) pandemic has refocused attention on the issue of mandatory vaccination. Some have suggested that vaccines ought to be mandatory, while others propose more moderate alternatives, such as incentives. This piece surveys a range of possible interventions, ranging from mandates through to education. All may have their place, depending on circumstances. However, it is worth clarifying the options available to policymakers, since there is sometimes confusion over whether a particular policy constitutes a mandate or not. Further, I illustrate a different kind of alternative to mandatory vaccination. Rather than seeking less coercive alternatives to a mandate, we might instead employ an alternative mandate, which requires people to do something less than get vaccinated. For instance, we might merely require people to attend an appointment at a vaccine clinic. Whether this mandatory attendance policy is justified will depend on specific circumstances, but it...

Compulsory voting involves a legal obligation to vote (or attend the polls), but we might instead require those who do not to pay a charge, without any legal obligation for them to do so. This nonpunitive price creates an incentive for all citizens to participate and prevents free riding, but permits nonvoting and avoids condemning nonvoters. Thus, this proposal delivers what at least some advocates and opponents of compulsory voting want. Moreover, considering this possibility helps to clarify the disagreement over compulsory voting. Those who wish to reject this proposal need further arguments for their respective positions.

Democracy is commonly understood to require universal and equal inclusion in decision making, but neither universality nor equality is straightforward. James Lindley Wilson’s new book addresses the latter. Its first part (chapters 1–6) offers a general theory of political equality, and its second part (chapters 7–11) considers the implications of this theory for institutional design. This organization recalls Charles Beitz’s classic Political Equality: An Essay in Democratic Theory (1989). Moreover, both books proceed by applying theories developed elsewhere to the realm of democracy. However, whereas Beitz took inspiration from Scanlon’s contractualism, Wilson’s account of political equality is more indebted to “relational” egalitarianism. According to relational egalitarians such as Elizabeth Anderson, it matters little—if at all—whether citizens enjoy exact equality of economic or material goods. Rather, what is important is that all enjoy equal status. This might rule out extremes of material inequality, on the basis that they are likely to lead to status hierarchies, but it is compatible with some being richer than others, provided these differences of wealth do not upset equal relations. Wilson takes a similar approach toward political equality. He argues that it is a mistake to think of it simply as an equal distribution of political power, as embodied in slogans like “one person, one vote.” These attempts to understand political equality in terms of equal power are dogged by problems, such as accounting for the inequality between ordinary citizens and their elected representatives. One approach to resolving this difficulty is to focus only on equality during electoral moments, but Wilson argues that this is unsatisfactory, because it neglects the periods of deliberation and agenda formation that occur between elections. Suppose, for instance, that all citizens have equally weighty votes, but the voices of ethnic minorities are routinely ignored in deliberation and media coverage. Such violations of political equality are not easily captured by equal power approaches. Having criticized those who focus on some form of equal power, Wilson turns to developing a positive picture of democratic equality, requiring equal consideration of all citizens at all points in the political process. Again, “equality” here should not be understood as meaning that there is something—consideration, rather than power—that citizens have equal shares of. Some inequalities are permissible, and perhaps even desirable, in a democratic system. For instance, if there are certain judgments that are particularly urgent or likely to be neglected, then it may be appropriate to design institutions to ensure that these views do get an adequate hearing (p. 162). Conversely, the views of a numerical majority may not need airtime in proportion to their popular support, once they have had an adequate hearing. In some respects, this view is sufficientarian, but it requires relations of equality: all citizens are taken, equally, as authoritative judges, and none are degraded or dismissed. What does this mean in practice? That is the focus of the second part of the book. It is worth noting that, although this is a work of political theory, the concerns explored here are largely US ones: the Electoral College, judicial review, and racial gerrymandering all figure. This might not be entirely bad, because the US system is probably at least somewhat familiar even to non-American readers. However, there is a certain parochialism about these debates. The absence of other things that might have been discussed, such as regional autonomy or compulsory voting, may largely be down to their not figuring very highly in the US consciousness. Moreover, although Wilson also discusses proportional representation and the influence of money on elections, which are topics of wider concern, even these issues seem to be considered in a US context. The choice of some of his examples may seem strange for other reasons. For instance, it probably strikes many readers, American and non-American alike, that the Electoral College is obviously contrary to political equality and therefore not requiring extensive discussion. As it happens, Wilson agrees that it violates political equality, but the purpose of discussing it is to show that his general theory of political equality can accommodate this intuition. Recall, Wilson thinks that departures from equal power are sometimes justifiable; in particular, they may be required to prevent certain minority viewpoints from being neglected. Thus, one may think that this validates the composition of the US Senate and Electoral College. However, although inequalities of power can be justified sometimes, this does not mean that such inequalities always are justified. Wilson argues that there is no particular reason to think inhabitants of small states are more likely to have their views neglected than inhabitants of larger…

Donald Trump promised to build a wall along the US–Mexico border and to make Mexico pay for it, but this seems to violate the principle of ‘no taxation without representation’ on which the United States was founded. Some democratic theorists propose even more radical principles of inclusion, such as that all those affected by or subject to a decision should have a say in it. But even a more moderate principle, requiring that those who pay must be represented, is sufficient to show that Trump's proposed border wall lacks democratic legitimacy.

In a recent article, Fiona Woollard draws attention to a number of problems, both theoretical and pragmatic, with current discourse around infant feeding. References both to the ‘benefits of breastfeeding’ and ‘harms of formula’ are problematic, since there is no obvious baseline of comparison against which to make these evaluations. Further, she highlights the pragmatic consequences of these linguistic choices. Saying that formula feeding harms babies, for instance, is likely to exacerbate feelings of guilt and shame felt by many mothers who use formula, for various reasons. Since I agree with much that Woollard says, this response is mostly sympathetic, but I wish to draw attention to one point that is largely missing from her analysis. The pragmatic effect of an utterance depends significantly on who is speaking, to whom, and in what context. Thus, we might differentiate between what it is appropriate to say in a professional context, such as an academic journal, from what one mi...

New reproductive technologies allow parents some choice over their children. Various moral principles have been suggested to regulate such choices. This article starts from a discussion of Julian Savulescu's Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PPB), according to which parents ought to choose the child expected to have the best quality of life, before combining two previously separate lines of attack against this principle. First, it is suggested that the appropriate moral principles of guiding reproductive choices ought to focus on general wellbeing rather than prioritizing that of the child and, second, that they ought to be non-maximizing (e.g. seeking the 'good enough' or to avoid harm). Though neither of these suggestions is entirely novel, combining them results in a new, and arguably more plausible, principle to regulate procreative choices, which I call the Principle of Generalized Procreative Non-Maleficence (PGPNM). According to this principle, the primary obl...