Seminar in Contemporary Theology Outline of the course. A reading seminar in the thought of selected contemporary theologians, both liberal and conservative. Among the men studied are Barth, Berkouwer, Bonhoeffer, Moltmann, Pannenberg, and others. 2 hrs.
The requirements for credit. upon
The final grade is based
the following:
(1) The reading. quired reading:
The following is a list of the re-
Stanley N. Gundry and Alan F. Johnson, eds., in Contemporary Theology
1976).
366
(Chicago:
pp.
Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, Creative Minds in
(Grand Rapids: 1966). 488 pp.
Theology
Co.,
Tensions
Moody Press,
Contemporary
Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Faith and Reality, trans, by Maxwell (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
John
1977)•
138
pp.
(2) The discussion appointments. The student will be expected to meet with the professor regularly for discussion of progress in the study and of questions regarding the material read and issues arising from it. (3) The critical report on the reading. A critical report of approximately 2,500 words on the reading is required. The details of the critique will be set out in conference with the professor. letter grade, or %he course credit basis, depending upon the
The grade will be either a
be taken on a credit/no arrangements made with the professor.
may
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Johnson, Jr., October, 1981 S. L.
Course Description
The Doctrine of the Covenants.
A study of the covenant
concept as it has developed in Cocceius and historic Covenant Theology, in Dispensationalism, in Geerhardus Vos and Biblical Theology, and in 20th century developments. The contributions of scholars such as Eichrodt, Jocz, Martens, Robertson, and Fuller are discussed, together with a consideration of the usefulness of the concept for theological construction.
Theology 501 Exam
Answer
tions "II"
question "I" and either of or
"III."
Testaments and
I
Unmarked
English Bibles
ques-
Greek New
may be used.
Set forth your theological epistemology defend it by comparing and contrasting with the scientific method. 50^
Discuss inerrancy,
II
and
it
defending it both bibli50^
cally and theologically. What test did
III
the
early church apply in the canon of Scripture? Can say that the canon is now closed? 50^
recognition of the we
S.
L.
Johnson, Jr. 8, 1977
December
7:00 P. M.
V
Theology
501 Exam
Answer questions "I" and tion "II," or "III."
I Have
"IV," and either ques-
read all of the required outside readIf not, how much? How would you classify Berkhof as a theologian? List several specific points that support your position. you
ing?
II
forth the biblical argument for the selfexistence of God. What is its practical significance? 50^
Set
III What is meant by the what is its biblical
S.
L.
support?
problems raised by
common
IV Define
immutability of God, and
the
decree
cuss
its nature.
ture
as
it?
(or decrees) Relate
50^ of God and dis-
your answer to
closely as possible.
Johnson, Jr February 16, 1978
What are the
50^
Scrip-
Theology
501 Exam
Answer any three
tions.
of the following four quesquestions have equal value. Un-
The
marked Bibles may be used. I Discuss
the
self-existence of God,
paying,,
particular attention to the normative
text
in the Old Testament. II
Cite
Scriptural evidence for the immutability
of God, are
and then discuss the problems that associated with the doctrine.
Ill Defend the doctrine of the Trinity biblically, and then explain why you think the doctrine
is
important.
IV Define
(or decrees) of God, and salient features of the doctrine. What problems dod you find with the teaching? the
decree
discuss the
Special note:
Have
you
quired outside reading?
S.
Lewis Johnson,
January 11, 1979
Jr.,
read all of the reIf not, how much?
Theolop-y
501 Exam
Answer any two of the following three questions. The questions have equal value. Unmarked Bibles may be used. I Define the term biblical eoistemolofy. and defend your own epistemolopy. II Define your view defend its main Ill
Is
the
canon
Explain
of biblical inspiration and points exefetically.
closed?
Explain and defend
your
answer.
Special note;
Have
yourread all of the required outside reading? If not, how much have
S.
you
missed?
Lewis Johnson,
November 1,
1979
Jr.
Theology
501 Exam
questions "I" and "III," and either question "II," or "IV." Unmarked Bibles,
Answer
and Hebrew testaments may
Greek
be used.
I Have you read all of the required reading? If not, how much? How would you classify Shedd as a theologian? List several specific
points that support II
your
What is the nature of the divine holiness? In what ways does it find expression? Are there practical implications (ethical impli-
cations) suggested by it? III
conclusion.
Cite
50$
Scriptural evidence for the immutability common problems associ50$
of God, and discuss the ated with the teaching. IV Define
(or decrees) of God and disRelate your answer to Scripclosely as possible. 50$
the
decree
cuss
its nature.
ture
as
S. Lewis Johnson, January 24, 1980
Jr
GOD.
MAN, AND CHRIST
(Systematic Theology 6ll) The course description. The content of the course, according to the catalog, includes a study of the decrees of God, the attributes of God, and the work of God, with particular reference to His work of creation, preservation, and providence; the existence and significance of angelic beings? man as created; and the person of Christ. Four hours of credit may be earned upon completion of it. course will cover the material described in the and in about the same proportions as is suggested
The
catalog, the
by
description. The
course
objectives.
The aims of the course are the
following:
(1) First,
to continue the development of
proficiency
theology. It the myth that theology is simply a "content oriented" subject, and to persuade the student that it is a subject designed to test and develop the critical thinking faculty, a "skill oriented" subject. Class discussions will be structured toward the development of this aspect of the student's knowledge and skills. in critical thinking in the area of systematic is the desire of the instructor to lay to rest
(2) Second, to give the student an elementary understandhistory of the doctrines discussed, as well as an exto contemporary thinking about them.
ing of the posure
(3) Third, to introduce the student to the important literature concerning the doctrine of God, man, and Christ. The considerable amount of reading is designed to accomplish this goal. The reading has been taken from the significant literature of both ancient and modern times. Each student is urged to devote a large amount of his time and preparation to
adequate reading and assimilation of the material
(4) Fourth, to relate theology to both biblical exposition of the Word of God.
and
The be
course
based upon
requirements.
The
assigned.
Christian living
grade for the course will
the following:
(1) First,
the lectures and class discussions.
class meetings will be devoted to lectures the topics listed below, followed by class
The by the professor on discussion. The pur-
of the lectures is to inform and instruct and also to inspire and incite to a deepening relationship to our great Triune God through theological study.
pose
God, Man,
(2)
and Christ—2
Second, the outside reading. The reading is an importhe course. It is ^iven below in the schedule of
tant part of class topics.
A ten minute quiz may be piven at any class meeting, so it is important that the student come to class with the reading assignments completed. The quizzes will count for 10-20$ of the final p-rade.
(3) Third, the exams. There will be two exams, a mid-term final, the latter beinp- non-cumulative. The exams, each of which will count for about 40$ toward the final p;rade, will cover the material in the lectures, the class discussions, and the important matters in the reading. and
a
course, are
The
date
The
course
of
the
first
outline.
The
in the
schedule
Division One:
of
The
Existence of God.
II
The
Knowability of God. Division Two:
I
The Attributes
The details within the divisions
lecture
The Existence
I
The
Incommunicable Attributes.
Ill
The
Communicable Attributes.
II Ill
The Doctrine
II Ill
of
God
The Holy Trinity
in History.
The Modern Doctrine. The Doctrine
in
Scripture.
Division Four: I
and Knowability
in General.
II
I
topics.
The Attributes
Division Three:
The Decrees of God
Contrasting Views refrardinfr the Decrees. The Doctrine
of
The Difficulties
the Decrees
.
following is the outline of the
with its major sections.
found
&j'll&f
is
exam
in
Scripture.
with the Doctrine.
of
God
Z—4ST-*N0
PUB
'ubm ' pot)
God, Man, and Christ—3
Division Five: I II Ill
The Creation
The
The Creation and
of the Universe and
The Providence
II III IV
The
of God.
The Doctrine
of Man
of God in Man.
Image
The Probation
of Man.
Division Seven; I
The Doctrine
of Christ
Christ and the Councils.
II
The Natures
of Christ.
Ill
The Kenosis
and its Issues.
IV
of Man
Origin of Man
The Nature The
its Problems.
Angelic World.
Division Six: I
Providence of God
The States
of Christ.
The course lecture topics and schedule of class hours. following is the schedule of the topics to be discussed in the professor's lectures during the class meetings, together with the required outside reading for each hour.
The
1.
The Existence
of God.
Reading: Herman
Bavinck,
lined by L.
The Doctrine of God,
William Hendriksen
Berkhof,
trans.,
ed., and outPP« 64-80.
TEdinburgh, 1977).
Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids,
1953)»
PP°
19-28. Eugene R. Fairweather, ed. and trans., A cellany: Anselm to Ockham, Vol. X, The tian Classics (Philadelphia, 1956), pp. John Theodore Mueller,
193*0,
PP.
143-47.
Scholastic Mis-
Library of Chris49-53> 69-96.
Christian Dogmatics (St. Louis,
C—isxaun pub ' ubw 'pod
-
-
.
God,
2
.
Man,
and Christ—4-
The Knowability
of God.
Reading: Bavinck,
pp.
4-1^64-.
Berkhof,
pp.
29-4-0. of God (1):
3. The Attributes
A General View.
Reading:
Bavinck,
pp.
113-4-2.
Berkhof,
pp.
4-1-56.
Millard J.
1983), I. Mueller,
Erickson, PP.
pp.
4-. The Attributes
Christian Theology (Grand Rapids,
263-67.
l60-75« of God
(2)
:
The Incommunicable Attributes
(1)
Reading:
Bavinck,
pp.
14-2-4-5.
Berkhof,
pp.
57-63*
Erickson,
pp.
William G.
T.
267-81. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology
(Grand Rapids,
n.
d.
/reprint of 1888 edj^/, 1, 334-54-, 5. The Attributes of God
(3)«
The Incommunicable Attributes
(2)
Reading:
Bavinck,
pp.
152-64-.
Stephen Charnock, The Existence and Attributes of York, 1859), PP. 69-87 (on the eternity of GodJT 6. The Attributes of God (4-):
The Incommunicable Attributes
Reading:-
Bavinck, Charnock,
pp. pp.
God (New
14-5-52, 164—72.
98-14-3 (on immutability).
(3)
God,
7•
Man,
ana
-f?—puT2
unrist—^
The Attributes
(5)
of God
'ubm 'poo
»
The
Communicable Attributes
(l).
(6):
The
Communicable Attributes
(2)
Reading:
Bavinck,
pp„
175-202..
Berkhof,
pp.
64—81.
Erickson,
8.
pp.
The Attributes
283-300. of
God
.
Reading:
Bavinck,
pp.
223-51*
Erickson,
pp.
Shedd,
354-92.
I,
301-19*
Richard Watson,
Theological Institutes: or a View of the Evidences, Doctrines, Morals and Institutions of Christiani ty (New York, 184-0) , I, 371-98.
9
°
The Holy Trinity (1)
The Doctrine in Scripture
:
(1)
.
Reading:
Athanasius, De Decretis Synodi Nicaenae (Defence of the Nicene Synod"]-, in A Select Library of Nicene and PostNicene Fathers of the Christian Church, Second Series, Volume IV: St. Athanasius: Select Works and Letters, ed. by Philip Schaff and Henry Wace (Grand Rapids, 1971
/reprint of 1891
Erickson,
14-9-72
0
pp.
321-4-2.
14-7-60.
Mueller,
Trinity (2):
The Holy
pp.
296-33^*
Bavinck,
30.
ed^,
The Doctrine in Scripture
(2).
Reading: Berkhof,
pp.
82-99.
Leon Morris, The Gospel Text with Introduction,
Rapids, 1971), Shedd,
I,
PP*
24-9-85.
according to John: The English Exposition and Notes (Grand 71-87, 93-115*
God,
11.
Man,
and Christ—6
Trinity (3)'
The Holy
The Doctrine in Scripture
(3)•
The Doctrine in Scripture
(4)
Reading: Shedd,
12.
285-333-
I,
The Holy Trinity
(4)
:
.
Reading:
Augustine, cle Trinitate, II.1; V. 1-16. 13
.
of God (1)
The Decrees
:
Contrasting Views
.
Reading: Berkhof,
pp.
Erickson, John
66,
I,
100-8.
345-63*
Miley, Systematic Theology (New York, or Mueller, pp. 176-78.
14. The Decrees
of God
(2):
1892)
,
II, 254-
The Biblical Teaching (1).
Reading: Martin Luther,
Classics,
1961),
ed.
pp.
Lectures
on
Christian (Philadelphia,
Romans, The Library of
by Wilhelm Pauck, Vol. XV
246-55.
Murray, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids, I960, 1965), I, 313-21.
John
15
•
The Decrees of God (3)»
The Theology and the Problems
(1).
Reading: Shedd,
I,
393-423.
Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology (Philadelphia, 1907), PP. 353-59. 16. The Decrees of God
(4):
Reading: Shedd,
I,
4-24-62.
Strong, pp. 359-70o
The Theology and the Problems (2).
9—istauo pub 'ubiat 'poo
,
and Christ--7
God, Man,
17= The Creation (l)t
The Universe.
Readingj Berkhof,
pp.
Erickson, I, Derek
Kidner,
126-^1-0, 50-6k. 365-86. Genesis
(Chicago, 1967) Mueller,
18
.
The
pp.
1
PP=
:
An Introduction and Commentary
26-31, ^3-^-6.
179-88.
Creation (2)
:
The Problems
of the Creation.
Reading: H.
I.
Leupold, Exposition of Genesis (Grand Rapids, 35-59=
C.
19^2),
Willis, ed., Origins and Change: Selected Rgadings from the Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation (Elgin, 1978), pp. 1-10, ^9-66.
David L.
19•
The Creation (3)•
The Angelic World.
Reading: Berkhof,
Erickson, Mueller,
pp.
I, pp.
1^-1-^9
•
^33-51=
196-20^. c
20.
Mid-term Exam.
21.
Mid-term Exam.
22.
The Providence
of God
(1).
Reading: Berkhof,
pp.
165-78.
C. Berkouwer, The Providence of God, Smedes (Grand Rapids, 1952), pp. 9-53=
G.
Mueller,
pp.
I89-95.
trans,
by Lewis
"vJ(J
£i |
cTT iCi
oil! X C>
23. The Providence of God
(2).
Reading; Berkouwer,
205-48.
pp.
I, 387-410.
Erickson,
24. The Origin of Man (1). Reading;
181-90.
Berkhof,
pp.
Leupold,
I,
85-98.
pp.
50-53*
Kidner,
25• The Origin of Man (2). Reading; Berkhof,
191-201.
pp.
Erickson,
II,
455-94.
26. The Origin of Woman.
Reading;
Kidner,
pp.
52,
65-66.
I, 93-95,
Leupold,
27. The Nature
129-38.
of Man.
Reading; Carter, "Anthropology; Man, the Crown of Eivine Creation," A Contemporary Viiesleyan Theology, ed. by Charles W. Carter, General Editor, and R. Duane Thompson and Charles R. Wilson, Associate Editors (Grand Rapids, 1983)» I, 191-232.
Charles
W.
Erickson, II, 519-40.
28.
The
Image
of God
in Man.
Reading; Berkhof,
pp.
202-10.
God, Man,
n—iTrnn nnr Mtb'ii 'nnn,
and Christ—9
Erickson, II, 495-518. Mueller,
pp.
205-10.
29. The Probation of Man. Reading:
Berkhof,
pp.
211-18.
30. The Nature of Christ (1)
1
The Deity
(1).
Reading: Berkhof,
pp.
305-20.
Heick, A History of Christian Thought (Philadelphia.
Otto W.
1965), I. 1^3-90. Klaas Runia, The Present-Day Christological Debate ter and Downers Grove, 1984), pp. 9-46.
31. The Nature of Christ ( 2):
(Leices-
The Deity (2).
Reading:
Runia,
pp.
4-7-77•
David F. Wells, The Person of Christ: torical Analysis of the Incarnation pp.
A
Biblical and His-
(Westchester, 1984),
1-32.
32. The Nature of Christ (3)
«
The Deity (3).
:
The Humanity.
Reading:
Runia,
pp.
78-II5.
Wells,
pp.
33-81.
33» The Nature of Christ (4-) Reading:
Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield, "On the Emotional Life of our Lord," The Person and Work of Christ, ed. by Samuel G. Craig (Philadelphia, 195077 pp. 93-14-5. Wells,
pp.
85-109.
God, Man,
ana
cnrist—10
34. The Kenosis
and
Its
Issues
(1).
Reading*
Berkhof,
pp.
321-30.
Mueller,
pp.
263-86.
Jac. and
J. Muller, The Epistles of Paul to to Philemon (Grand Rapids,
1955)«
35* The Kenosis and Its Issues
the Philippians PP«
77-86.
(2).
Reading* Paul D.
Feinberg, "The Kenosis and Christology* An Exegetical-Theological Analysis of Philippians 2*6-11," Trinity Journal, 1 (Spring, 1980), 21-46.
Gerald F. Hawthorne, tary, Vol. 43 (Waco,
36. The
Kenosis
and
Its
"Philippians," Word Biblical 1983). pp. 71-96.
Issues
Commen-
(3)•
Reading* I.
Howard Marshall, The Origins of Hew Testament Christology (Downers Grove, 1976), pp. 97-110.
Ralph P. Martin, The Epistle of Paul to the Philippianst An Introduction and Commentary (Leicester and Grand Rapids, 1959), PP. 95-109. Wells,
pp.
110-25.
37. The Kenosis and Its Issues
(4).
Reading; C.
F.
D.
1977), Wells,
S.
Moule, The Origin of Christology
35-46T"
pp. pp.
126-79.
Lewis Johnson,
Jr.,
Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Spring Quarter, I985.
(Cambridge,
7^1X2 I.
A.
The Christian Understanding of Divine Existence: The Living God
1. 2.
ticL Avv r
God and Christ
Introduction Biblical theism
3.
Difficulties or objections to the biblical view of God Is it meaningful to talk of God?
a.
b. Can God's existence be
proven*
In the 18th
century Immanuel Kant claimed that there were three and only three rational or theistic proofs. They were: the ontological argument (a priori), depending on no experience; the cosmological argument (a posteriori), depending on minimum experience; and the teleological argument (also a posteriori), depending upon maximum experience. Since the time of Kant, it has generally been conceded that there is a fourth theistic proof, the moral argument. It is like the teleological argument in that it is a posteriori and depends upon maximum experience. Let
us
examine the
arguments and
see
what objections have been advanced
against them.
(i)
The Ontological Argument ontological argument is an argument that claims that merely from a knowledge of the idea or essence of God, it is possible to conclude that he exists. Although one could cite precursors, the father of the ontological argument is St. Anselm. His formulation of the argument is to be found in Proslogion, Ch. 2, 3i The
In the twentieth
century this argument has had defenders, the most being, Charles Hartshorne, Norman Malcolm and Alvin Plantinga. It is Hartshorne's contention that whether Anselm realized it or not, he actually formulated two arguments. Thus, I shall deal with notable
Anselm^ and Anselm
(a) Anselm
^.
This argument rest on the supposition that existence is a
^
perfection and
a
predicate.
Exposition: Anselm understands the
concept of God to be the concept of being that which none greater can be conceived. He then argues that such a God actually exists, because if he did not then he could have been conceivably greater by existing. But given the concept of God, this is impossible. For although there is no contradiction in thinking that Atlantis might have been a greater island than it is, there does seems to be a contradiction in the idea that the being than which none greater is possible is a being that might have been greater. Hence, given concept of God, we are driven to the conclusion that he actually a
exists.
N. B.:
The fundamental idea
on
which Anselm's
reason-
ing rests is that if a being does not exist, but might have existed, then it might have geen reater than it in fact is. Objections: The
objections to this argument have been many and have been The major objections are: (i) Existence It is quite different to say that God is holy, spirit, infinite, and to say that God exists. In the former instances you are attributing (predicating) things of God. In the latter no predicating is going on, one is merely stating that considered decisive. is not a predicate.
being with these attributes is capable of instantiation or being actualized. The distinction that is claimed is easy to see in classical symbolic logic. Existence is never put in the predicate position. It is a second order concept which is expressed in the quantifier, (ii) Some have questioned whether the concept of a being that which none greater is conceivable is a coherent concept, (iii) Finally, if the argument is correct, it could be used to prove a most perfect island, car, boat, etc. a
(b) Anselm
^
This argument rests existence is
a
on the supposition that necessary a predicate.
perfection and
•
Exposition: Hartshorne
I shall given the formulation of the argument by
(The translation
Premise
(1) If
mine).
from symbolic notation is
Justification
most perfect being exist, he necessarily. A most perfect being exists necessarily or doesn't exist necessarily If a most perfect being does not exist necessarily, then he must be impossible Either a most perfect being is necessary or impossible. If a most perfect being is impossible,
Anselm's principle
then he does not exist.
of modus tollens
a
exists
(2) *(3) (4) (5)
(6) Either *(7)
a most perfect being exists necessarily or it does not. A most perfect being is not impossible
Law of Logic
(excluded middle)
Becker's postulate Inference from
Inference Inference
(1), (2)
(1)- modal form (4), (5)
Intuitive postulate
or
conclusion from theistic
proofs.
(8) A most perfect being
(9) (10)
exists necessarily If a most perfect being necessarily exists a most per. being exists. A most perfect being exists!
Inference (6), Modal axiom Inference
(7).
(8), (9)
For those who have
difficulty following such an argument, let try to give you these helpful (?) comments. I have placed an asterick by the key premises. The argument seeks to establish this alternative: either a m. p. b. necessarily exists or it is impossible. That is, for God not to exist, it must be shown that he is an impossibility. Then, one claims that a m. p. b. is not impossibility, and it will follow that he necessarily exists. me
Objection: The key is premise 7• If one accepts it, then the argument goes through. This is why so much effort is expended to show that the concept (biblical) is either inconsistent or incoherent. Thus, the argument is not coercive. However, if one admits (7)» then the argument is sound.
(ii) The cosmological
argument cosmological argument has been advanced since antiquity but received classic formulation in the 13th and 18th century. The 13th century form can be seen in the writings of Aquinas and Duns Scotus, while the 18th century form is to be seen in Leibniz or thomistic writings. The
(a) The 13th century form—The argument from causality.
/
/ Exposition: an
Every effect must have a cause. There cannot be of causes. Therefore, there must be a
infinite regress
first, uncaused
cause.
Objections: The
more
common objections to this argument are Even if successful, it does not prove the God of the Bible. A first, uncaused cause is a long way from the biblical God. (ii) Even if successful, it would not show that existed now. It would show that he was necessary to get the ball rolling, (iii) It is debated as to whether an infinite regress is impossible. as
(b)
follows:
(i)
The 18th century form—The argument from continguency. Exposition: Every currently existing thing must have its explanation. The only explanation is God. Therefore, God must exist. N. B.: This formulation of the argument avoids objection (ii) above.
Objections: Objections (i) and (iii) above still are advanced. Beyond that it is further argued: (i) We should seek a cause
for God as well. In response to this criticism someone like Dr. Geisler responds that there is the need to distinguish between the Leibnizian principle of sufficient reason (anything must have a sufficient reason) and the Thomistic principle of existential
(an continguent being or thing must have a sufficient However, the difficulty here is that it is just which of these principles is appropriate that is the matter of debate. Thus, one cannot assume one without begging the question. Hence, some reasons for accepting one over the other must be given. But Geisler only say that the Thomistic principle is self-evident. Clearly, it is not so to the atheist and thus he will be unconvinced. Since he is the target of our argument, this is indeed unfortunate, (ii) It is questioned if the idea of being having the explanation causality
reason).
of his own existence within its own nature is coherent. Some facts about a thing can be explained by referring to the thing's nature (e. g. a triangle's three-sidedness), but is the existence of a thing a fact that it makes sense to think of
by the nature of the thing? if
being explained
(iii) Finally,
it has been questioned
a necessary existent were required, would it have to be God. Could the universe just be a brute fact, or could atoms
qualify
as
(iii)
necessary?
The teleological argument teleological argument has been called the argument from design. Its most famous formulation was by William Paley in the 18th century, and its most famous critic was David Hume. In the twentieth century The
its most famous defender and formulator
was
F. R. Tennet.
Like the preceding two arguments, the teleological argument may be understood in two ways: as an analogical argument or
as
(a) As
an
inductive argument.
(argument by analogy)
an analogical argument. This argument says that there is an analogous relationship between design in machines and its source in a designer and the universe and
God.
Exposition: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Machines
are produced by intelligent design The Universe is like a machine. Therefore-Probably, the universe was produced by intelligent design. Probably, God exists.
Therefore,
Objections: The major objections are as follows: (i) To argue by analogy is to argue in the weakest possible form; (ii) Not only is the form weak, but rather than many points of analogy there is only one; (iii) Since there is evil in the world, is there analogous evil in the designer; (iv) Since many projects have a multiplicity of designers and builders, is there analogous plurality in the designer, (v) Since we only know a very small fraction of the vast universe and since it might be chaotic outside what we know, how are we justified in claiming that the universe is ordered; (vi) We can think of alternaanalogies (e. g. the world is an animal; the world is a vegetable) to the machine analogy.
(b) As
an inductive argument. Exposition:
The inductive form rests the argument not on the single instance of the universe and its need for a designer, but on the numerous instances of what is called contrivence (the fitness of means to ends) within
in the universe.
Objections: While this form of the argument avoids criticisms (i) and (ii) above, the other objections seem to apply with equal force. In addition two further objections are in order: (i) since inductive arguments relate probability to repeated instances and since there is only one universe, probability and induction are not appropriate, (ii) Finally, if one accepts the theory of evolution, then, since it entail adaption and survival of the fitest, any world which survived would of necessity exhibit design. The moral
argument
Exposition: This argument involves the claim that the universal and categorical (absolute) nature of moral experience demands a transcendent Lawgiver.
Objection: The bit of this argument is lost if one denies the categorical nature of morality and substitutes in its place some form of relativism or
situational ism.
Conclusion: The arguments, when
viewed as strict deductive or inductive proofs establishing either the necessary or probable existence of God, are unsuccessful. However, they do have practical value in two ways: (i) they confirm the belief of those who already believe in God; (ii) they show the unbeliever that belief in God is not contrary to reason.
There
people who will ask you, "Have a very odd question, viewed context of the Christian, for it seems to imply that God is lost, that it takes effort on our part to find Him or to discover Him in some out-of-the-way place. On the contrary, Chrisare
some
you found God?" from within the
This is
tians assert that
it
takes
a
tremendous effort to
to ignore God, CHILD may make the
man
but it is a he does and
to deny Him. An ANGRY SMALL effort to ignore His mother, tremendous effort, because everything
reminds him of his mother. His good comes through the efforts of his mother; he is fed, washed, entertained, and put to bed by his sees
mother—the most real fact er. He still might try to
in his
life
is
his
moth-t
ignore her but it is " a fairly hopeless cause. In a far more profound way all men, the Christians say, are at all times and everywhere confronted by God. In Him all men, good and evil, and all things, important and unimportant, big and small, live and move and have their being. This is the basic fact of general revelation: God is. George W. Forell, The Protestant Faith (Englewood Cliffs, i960), p. 35.
r^)- 5->\_ <S,V ■ CLAA^
£RL, TCT-c, /06
&U ' ~
Is There
Being?,
Supreme
a
or
the Existence of God
(Genesis 1:1; Hebrews 11:6) Introduction: 1.
The study of theology, in spite of the of the "God is dead theology," begins several presuppositions, including: k.
God exists. Remarkable
claims
with
contain (validity? truth?) of God's exThe fact is accepted by almost all men,—consciously or unconsciously. ILL.: (1) Browning wrote of reality of that Bible does not
proof istence.
a
unseen
"The He
as,
feeling that there's God, reigns and rules out of this low world." v
MoT
.
(2) Bacon and "Of Atheism." (3) Child and mother. b.
'thought'
God has revealed Himself. Heb. l:l-2a. A correllate is: the revelation is auth-
oritative. c«
2.
know Him through the Scriptures. Cf. Heb. 1:1-2; John 509-/+7; 2 Pet. 1:20-21.
Yet, there is no definition of God in the Bible. An absolute one is impossible. Only a relational one may be given (Exod. 3:13-1S "I am who I am"). ILL.: Shorter Catechism (ans. "God is a spirit, infinite,
to question 4), eternal, and un-
changeable in His being, wisdom, power, holir justice, goodness and truth" (Hodge: best ever penned by man ,/Presbyterianj_7) • 3. We turn now to a discussion of the existence of God, giving particular attention to the so-called "rational proofs" for His exisness,
tence.
I
THE
INTUITIVE
N.bT: tence
it
is
PROOF
(1) Hamann: is a
a
fool,
OF THE EXISTENCE
OF
GOD.
If he who denies God's existhen he who would demonstrate
greater one! There is "innate knowledge,"
(2) Hodge:
(pain), intel(part of a thing is less than the whole; straight line shortest distance between two points), moral nature (responsibility for conintuitive truths of the
lect
senses
r
acknowledge, even if religous beliefs, and religion itself, could be explained psychoanalytically in terms of sublimated, desires, projected father images, and Oedipus complexes, the question as to the truth of religion would still remain. And that is a philosophical question. Besides, someone has turned the tables on the psychoanalytic critique by observing that the hackneyed "Religion is a crutch" itself may spring from a neurotic refusal to admit that one is lame# Miller, p. 97* AS Freud himself had to
a
prio
Ontolofical Moral
Cosmologdca Teleoloffical
distinction between right and wrong; sin punishment). Such truths universal and necessary, i.e., rooted in our constitutions (moral law; sense of touch; sense of dependence). Thus, the knowledge of God. Adair
duct;
deserves
in God the moment he
believed
was
created,
for
the same reason that he believed in the external world,—apprehended by his spiritual nature (Hodge, I, 191-203). ILL.s (1) Forell on, "Have you found God?"
(2) "Psychological pro.jection" for our (cf. R. C. Sproul, The Psychology of Atheism /Minneapolis, 197i!/» PP- 9-10: we do needs?
not desire
a
sovereign! ) II THE
,
.
is holy,
fa-^7, oM
omniscient, and
"u«\e."]J
SCRIPTURAL PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE
N.B.:
We
of this A.
God who
all
OF GOD.
recognize limited apologetic value
evidence for those who reject Bible.
Genesis 1:1.
Simple statement denying materialism, atheism (Psa. l4:l), -polytheism (cf. 2ih), pantheism, agnosticism (cf. ignorot), fatalism evolution (infinite coming). B.
Hebrews
C.
Romans
Problem of
11:6. 1:19-21,
32;
2:12-16 (cf. conscience).
skepticism (primitive age supersti-
tioust middle ages credulous, contemporary
skeptical). Skepticism is internally contradictory~TN,B.: (l) its two diagonally opposed outlooks /never skeptical of his own skeptical notionsj_7; (2) its false theory of knowledge (suspects all propositions because made by finite men; but must assume objectivity to deny it! Cf. Gerstner, Reasons for Faith, 26-
28)
.
Ill THE RATIONAL PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE
OF
GOD.
N.B.:0Some as ancient as Plato, Aristotle. r£)T/A<s^fv They are, at best, probable, not demonstrative; or 6^1■ corroborative, not convincing. "Testimonia" Sic©T,
(LB), not argumenta.
G*krz3.
the most common and important ones. A.
We shall notice only
Cosmological Argument. if unwitting, argument. IN a street corner conversation, the question, "Do you believe in God?," might be answered
The A
common,
Surely the most popular complaint against the Cosmological Argument (in any of its forms) is that if everything must have a cause, then so must God. But this will not do. When the theist claims that God caused the world and everything:
else,
he
is affirming- that all thing-s
are
depend-
ent
upon a being who himself necessarily transcends space and time as well as all coming- and
going.
The
questbn "Where did God
come
from?"
thus be discarded as ill conceived, because it construes God to be, like other thing-s, the sort of being- that can come and g-o. If God him" self can come into being-, then he cannot possibly be the cause of thing's that come into being- and would not therefore be what the theist means by "God." Similarly, St. Augustine observes that the question "What was God doing before he created the world?" is non-sensical. What poscan
(35^-^30)
sible meaning can there be in asking what God was doing "then" before the creation, since before the creation there was no time and therefore no "before"? And he castigates those who, enmeshed in the temporal flux of before and after, are in-
capable of transcending time and grasping the allis-present and the all-at-once character of eternity in which God exists impassible and unmoved. (Augustine suggests that his answer is more respectable than the clever but trivial one provided bv others:
"What
the
Whv.
world?
who cry'into
God doing before lie created preparing Hell for people
was
mysteries!"). Ed. L. Killer, God and 1972), pp. 55-56. Cf. Confes-
(New York, sions, XI, 10 ff.
Reason
was he
3 "Well, here is the world (kqV and it had to come from something" Ed. L. Miller, God and Reason: A Historical Approach to Philosophical Theology /Hew York, in this way,
m
)
acoj
,
1972/, v~$3T. It
is the argument from the effect (be-
existence) to a cause. "Every effect (noi everything) must have a cause. Matter cannot
gun be
the
cause;
it is not the subject of Genesis
1:1.
"Matter has a past. That is, the ter with matter is that it had a mater"
stner,
30).
The unity of the universe
mat-
(Ger(not
pluriverse!) suggests only one cause. Raindrop--soil—plants—air and gas--
ILL.: rain
(photosynthesis; Gerstner, 33-3^)•
Common objections:
(1) If everything must hav< But theist posits a transcendent Being, above space, time, and becoming. ILLUSTRATION: Augustine (Miller, 55-56 /read/). (2) Guilty of fallacy of composition, thinking that what is true of the part is true of the whole (cf. mankind and mother; Russell a/c Miller, 56). (3) Energy abides. (^) Hume's denial of the certainty of causality (contiguity and precedence not necessarily causality); (5) Kant (causality one of a priori categories by which space and time are organized into intelligible experience; Miller, 60). a
Cause
B.
The
cause,
so
must God!
Teleological Argument.
Argument from design to Designer (Gr.). Cf. Psa. 9^:9 (material world); 95^1° (intellectual world). Roots in Plato and Aristotle Intelli(cf. Phaedo; Aquinas* Fifth Way). It may be gent stated in this way: Design indicates purCause pose, which in turn indicates intelligence. ILL.: The dandelion (purpose not the result oj need of survival, but survival result of purPose; Gerstner, 36). Cf. Paley (M, 66-67). C. Moral
and Intelli-
£en"fc Cause
The Moral Argument Ar.m,«,a«+
ct
*>.^-7?, ^
Argument from moral consciousness of man. Conscience (lat., conscientia. with knowledge): with knowledge we have moral sense. The sense of right and wrong is innate. Not, "I ought to have a sense of ought!" Already has it, then. ILL.:
Self-imposed "ought" of Golden Rule and jQb^for mathematical knowledge (G, 4-2). Kant, using this argument, argued for a Being capable of "insuring a just relation"
a
of
According to Kant, existence adds absolutely nothing to concept. Take, for example, the concept "unicorn." The idea a
is not the least bit
unicorn
augmented
or
otherwise changed
by the addition of existence, nor is it in any way diminished ^ by the subtraction of existence. Whether one says, "The unicorn exists" or "The unicorn does not exist," the concept "unj)corn" remains unaltered: "white, shaped like a horse, and having an ivory horn." Or, to use Kant's own example, a hundred actual dollars do not contain the least coin more than a hundred possible dollars. Of course, there is a difference between a hun-
^
dred. actual dollars and
a
hundred possible
dollars, as will be-
you try to spend the possible ones. Still, what is involved in the concept of a hundred dollars is not come
apparent if
different.
What is different is the relation of the concept
to the actual
world, but that has nothing to do with the predi-
attributes of the thing for these have exhausted in the concept. Miller, pp. 32-33â&#x20AC;˘
cates
or
But
Argument
as
even
Russell at
one
already been
time believed in the
Ontological
he himself relates:
precise moment, one day in 189^-, as I was walking along Trinity Lane, when I saw in a flash (or thought I ^ saw) that the ontological argument is valid. I had gone out to buy a tin of tobacco; on my way back, I suddenly threw it up in the air, and exclaimed as I caught it: "Great Scott, the ontological argument is sound." Miller, 35> citing Bertrand Russell, "My Mental Development," in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell. ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp (New York: Tudor, 1951)> PÂŤ 10* I remember the
(|
^
*
(if not in this world then in the next) hetween moral worthiness and the attainment of its reward" (M, 84). D.
The Ontological Argument. The only real a priori argument,
"being
an
argument from abstract and necessary ideas (several forms). Different reactions to it. Some, "philosophical sleight of hand," or as
Arthur
and
a
Schopenhauer, a "charming joke" "piece of scholastic jugglery" (M, 41),
Points: 1.
Anselm and aliquid quo nihil maius
cogi-
Awe*sr ri-t"tari possit, e<r
(-*<»?
aq ao -
2. wuail.
that is, the greatest possible being. To deny His existence is to deny the exis' fence of a being who must exist in order to be the very thing he is talking about. It is to say: God, a being who must exist in order to be "God," does not ist (M, 27)!
ex-
3. Gaunilo objected (monk from Marmoutier), saying we cannot argue from a concept p/ze.vicA"m" to the existence of the concept. Enter
''existca/ce. a
cHAfisssr wo«rn,6f). ^ ^
C<\.
the "lost island." Anselm admitted Gaunilo's argument was
right regarding islands, of God
tions,
but the concept
involved the sum of jill perfecwhich must include existence.
He went on to say that, if Gaunilo*s lost island turned out to be the greatest
possible being, then, he dryly remarks, it does exist, it will be found, and it will never again be lost! 5« Kant (1724-1804-) objected, saying existence is not an attribute, or predicate. It adds nothingtto a concept (cf. unicorn, "white, shaped like a horse, and having an ivory horn"; M, 32-33). $100. 6. Anselm's second argument and Malcolm's reformulation, using the predicate of necessary existence (Proslogium 3).
7. But
can
we
argue
from
a
concept of God
to the existence of God? God necessarily, p<?,exists involves God exists, the latter,
perirto
then,
ILL'.
:
being known
a
priori.
Bertrand Russell
TM. 3577 (2) Helen Keller,
and
the
argument
"Oh, Mr. Brooks,
general question before us, namely, what if anything may be accomplished by the traditional arguments for God, probably no better conclusion can be suggested than is provided in Job 26:1^: As for the
Lo, these are but the outskirts of his ways; and how small a whisper do we hear of him! A
whisper that must no doubt be given full a whisper at least. Miller, p. 97â&#x20AC;˘
voice by revelation,
but
Proofs
are
impossible for those who do not share the
(givens, presuppositions concerning knowledge, language, reality) and the same psydnological frame of reference (openness of mind). Gf. Miller, 95"97Âť same
philosophical frame of reference
It is no wonder that the reader by now may be tempted to side with the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer who regarded the Ontological Argument
"charming joke," and a "piece of scholastic jugglery." To be sure, many important philosophers have dismissed the Ontological Argument as an optical illusion of the philosophical imagination, but
as
a
those who have embraced it as a sound and forceful witness to the reality of God fjrojm an list also, including Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel, and (in their own ways) Barth and Tillich. Miller, p. 4l.
impressive
I
always knew there
not
was
a
God,
but I did
know His name."
Conclusion What can we say to the theistic proofs? We might argue that the proofs lead to an "overwhelming probability" of the existence of God, as many do (cf. Gerstner, p. 57 /rea.d/). ILLUSTRATION: Solar eclipses, Physics Today (February,
197^77
But, we desire more than "overwhelming probability," and the proofs cannot give us this. (1) First, to the man of faith God is the sheer, inescapable, GIVEN reality, not inferred, but experienced. (vjiUEg., (2) Second, and most important, it is plain that the theistic proofs do not give us a trinitarian God. true God.
And
if not,
we
do not have the
ILL.t (1) Calvin, "Unless we grasp these (the three persons), only the bare and empty name of God flits about in our brains, to the exclusion of the true God" (Institutes. I,
xiii.
2): (2) Bob Smith.
it is hard to find an adequate (of religion), we can at least point to one element linking all the religions of the world together, one common irredueible
But
if
definition
in which the
factor
to reside:
appears
very
essence
of religion
the conviction, namely,
the reality of a world unseen, the sense that Behind and beyond and above the material environment that we can touch and handle and control there lies something more, something which calls and signals to what is best withof
in us,
as
deep calls to deepâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;in short,
as
Robert Browning put it,
"The feeling that there's God, and
rule
He reigns
s
Out of this low world."
James S.
Stewart, The Gates of New Life, pp.
170-71.
lief essay
It is in G0d.
one
thing to talk about disbein his
As Bacon sagely put it
"Of Atheism," "The Scripture saith,
â&#x20AC;˘The fool hath said in his heart,
there is
'The fool hath heart.'" Clarence Edward Macartney, The Faith Once Delivered, p. 9. no
God'; it is not said,
thought in his
There is
a
story of
a
little girl who
found in a store coloring in a coloring book which had not been purchased by her mother ..he clerk, a little put out, cried out to was
JWhat in the world
drawing a know what
are you picture of God."
her,
doing?" Clerk,
Girl, "I'm
"How
do you
G0d looks like?" Girl, "I don't; I'm drawing the picture to find out!"
' "
i.
fhe_ Society oj Satan
(Continued from the July 7th issue)
THE REV. R. J. RUSHDOONY
Palo Alto,
early formally institutionalized.
ing God by means of human achievement and thereby asserting man's independence and equality in relationship to God. It was also an architectural depiction of the great chain of being, the idea of the bond or~ continuity of heaven and earth. God and
After the flood, the great institutional embodiment of the Society of Satan was the
'Tower of Babel (Genesis 11:1-9). The
significance of that structure is of inestito us because its theorctical structure is basic to modern political and religious faiths.
Jrnabio. importance 1
We have,
man were
seen
as
one
being, with
one
.
•
first, the declaration, "Go to,
us build us a city." The essence of a city was once a unity of faith ^and community in terms of t'ruit faith. The idea of
city was a religious concept a-nd'tEe city religious entity ancTcommunity. Historians speak of ancient cities as possessing, each of them, aj? articular god and being the people of that god. This is both aca
man are
man
ception of peace and order is the unquestioning acceptance of that unity and a total moral, spiritual and military disin favor of it. The United Nations is non-discriminatory with respect to race, color, creed and all else because man is its god, and all in its god must be bv definition good. Evil is that which opposes this total unity and this non-discriminatory faith. This non-discriminatory prinarmament
asserted.
yet erroneous in the
characterized this great institutionalization of the Society of Satan: "Let us make us a name," or literally, a A third step
"Sliem." A
impression
particular faith, but each city would be
a
particular cult or system of worship of lhat god, affirming its own particular form of ■
continuity with the deity. There
was no
citizenship apart from worship, and the worship was particulaFand specific, hence focalized and institutionalized in the city. The essence of thi3 faith of the ancient pagan city was,
however, its essential par-
ticipation in deity, in whom all
being
as Assyria and Babylon, as well Alexander the Great, moved in terms of this concept of oneness. The City of God, however, moves in terms of the faith held front the beginning, the discontinuity between God and man. man's ethical fall, and the'calf tb'htan 'for separation in terms
pires such as
of faith ftt God's saving power. The Tower cfBabeTwas an attempt to force this aposthesis of ultimate oneness and equality onto all mankind. There was to be no division among men, and no separatate
tion
discrimination, only an absolute unity. The religion and virtue or ethics of or
Babel
was
to be
in the fact of
humanity,
and
community was simply in the com•mon fact of humanity. In the City of God, communion is through the Redeemer in God; in the City of man, the Society of Satan, the ground of communion is a common humanity irrespective of any religious or moral differences. All differ^ences, including those of intellect and status, must be suppressed in favor of the anonymity of union. The good life and the full hfe arc in and through the State. The Theological requirement for the unity of the godhead requires in this faith the unity of humanity, its one true god. Hence, "Let build us a city," a one-world order, and usher in paradise apart from God. us
Second, they declared, they must build further "a tower whose top may reach heaven." The structure of the tower
unto
symbolic significance. Its architectural style has been carried over into many cultures, and, in New York City, crowns the top of many skyscrapers, the
had great
most notable
instance being the pyramidal
.tower which
crowned the Bankers' Trust
Building. The Tower of Babel
was
a
"stepped,
pyramid," largest in extent at the base, recessed with each story, the top floor being thus a single room, which presented, from every view, the appearance of a great
ciplc always works in favor of evil in that it forbids truth and justice in favor of unity. Its champions arc in the modernist clergy. They include also John Dewey, Henry Miller, and the "Civil Rights" champions.
Adam's task ot naming the creatures was
thus a scientific calling to identify and to classify them. When God called St man out of Chaldea, he first named bim Abrarn and then later expanded that name to Abraham in terms of the calling, task and definition His sovereign grace gave to that .man, God's "name" Jehovah, "I am that I am," or "He who is," was the rejection ; of the possibility of a name or definition
,
is
;
I
for God. He as Creator is that by Whom and in WfTom all things are defined, and, being transcended by nothing, can be defined by nothing: He is. An abstract definition of God is thus impossible; a relational one can be given, and thus when Moses asked for God's name or selfdefinition, God first denied the possibility. "I am that I am," I am beyond definition, and then gave a relational or historical definition of Himself: "The God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God ot
destruction and confusion upon them. To the men of Babel, their name meant "the Gate of God," i. e., the threshold of their greatness and total power; to visits
because to God, the true meaning remains confusion. Because Babel was a confusion of the divine order, confusion was visited upon it, and that very judgment was an act of mercy, in that it spared man from the total tyranny he sought to
us,
create.
Jacob" (Exodus 3:15), the God" of the covenant and the God of salvation. This Tatter description was made in its fullness with the new covenant in the person and work of Jesus Christ, "Jehovah saves," the Shem or name promised to man from the beginning, and, in terms of whom, and in the hope of whose coming Noah's son Shem had been named.
The warfare
of meaning
origin totally City of Man, the Society of
immanent Satan. That demonic order seeks to obscure the fact of conflict and to wage war behind the deceptive weapon of ostensible
neutrality. We must recognize that this is a holy warfare, be unafraid to wage it. and proclaim that the sentence has already gone forth, "Babylon the great is fallen, is fallen," alerting Christians with the summons, "Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues" (Rev. 1S:2, 4). Men who look for the good life in and through the State have made the
and definition. Let
there be no value above and beyond us; let man be the source of definition, not the
subject of it. Let man be beyond good and evil, and beyond meaning, since he is himself the source of all definition. "Let us
make
us a
State their mediator and redeemer and have in effect renounced Christ, and they shall be partakers of the plagues of
name!"
Babylon, of the Society of Satan.
Fourth, the reason for their labor is stated: "Lest we be scattered." This is the evil to man in the Society of Satan; dis-
_
unity, not apostasy nor rebellion against God. Again, the import is theological. It is a
:
philosophical and theological necessity
that there be no disunity in the godhead; hence, if man be our god, he cannot be divided; he must be one. Much, if not most, modern ecumenicity is premised on this faith; it seeks, not unity in Christ, but
today is between the City
of God, which is transcendental in although present in history, and the
In terms of all this the meaning of the proclamation, "Let us make us tsname," becomes clear: let us be our own blessing, our own Messiah, savior and god. Let us be our own creator, our own ultimate source
A fifth aspect of the Society of Satan noted by God as He confounds it:
"Nothing will be restrained from them." The one-world order sought by the Society of Satan means absolute dictatorship and total power. But this God will not permit. At the ostensible moment of triumph, He
'
■
was thus a logical step to try to force this total participation, arid em-
in the Old Testament,
I
par-
ticipates. "ft
name,
meant a definition; it was a summary statement of the nature of the thing named.
All the peoples of a particular area, i.e., Canaan, the Mesopotamian region, Egypt, and the like, would share a it conveys.
way,'
and there is no prospect that its Members will try to change it." The only virtue to the United Nations is unity, and its con-
a
curate and
.
by its Charter. It was 'planned that
able therefore to think creatively, ontologically. The best possible status for God in such a universe is that of an elder brother. Instead of a Creator-creature distinction, the common being of God and
flet >
the United Nations? p. 22f.): "Clearly, weakness from which the United Nations suffers is that it is not selective, either in aims or membership. In political terms, it is not limited. . This defect is written into the very nature of the United Nations
ladder or giant staircase reaching "unto heaven." It was the ladder of works by which man reached the level of God, rival-
THE FRAMEWORK of thought manifcsted in the temptation and the fall i/zas very
Ytt.vvi
£C
California
,
unity in mankind, in the fact of humanity, , and disunity rather than heresy is its great i,
problem. The United Nations also exemplifies this same faith. As V. Orval < Watts has noted (Should We Strengthen]
"
X us
The assertion that God
against
a
Forell, 88.
is a person guards pantheistic understanding of ^od.
At
the same time this assertion guards against all polytheistic notions that there are many gods. There is not one god in charge of the ocean, another in charge of fire, and other gods and goddesses, who fill the heavens. Ibid. us
26
On the Existence
of God
simply must begin hereâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;not only because there is no placd^ else to begin, but because if we think that we will not begin here, it is here that we are thinking that we will not begin. This matter is
so important that we must go into a more thorough discussion of skepticism. If credulity was common
in the medieval
and
superstition in primitive culture, the problem of knowledge from which many moderns suffer is skepticism. Proceeding from the true statement that it is the mark of a scholar at times to suspend judgment, many have jumped to the conclusion that the certain way to intellectual glory is to be uncertain about everything. Many era
modern scholars have the definite
opinion.
no
definite opinions
opinion that
one
should
on
never
anything except have
a
definite
They
seem to live in mortal fear of coming to a conclusionâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;"ever learning and never coming to the knowl-
edge of the truth." As to
catch it and then
a
turn
dog will chase tail and run,
a cat
so
until he is about
they love the pursuit
of wisdom up to
so long as they are sure that they can never catch it. "I disbelieve," they say; "help thou my belief." And
this attitude
they describe as "detached," "impartial," "ob- / jective." ÂŤ Skepticism produces two diagonally opposed outlooks, as we shall see. First, the skeptic maintains, no one can know anything (except, of course, the skeptic, who knows this much). And then he finds himself concluding that since no one knows anything, everyone's knowledge is as good as everyone else's. So very tolerantly he says your knowledge is true for you and my knowledge is true for me precisely because no one knows anything anyway. It therefore comes to pass that because no one knows anything, everyone knows everything. Going into a bit more detail, we examine first this skeptical notion (and we hope that the reader does not fail to notice that the skeptic is never skeptical of his skeptical notions)
It professes to be skeptical about everything, but, as a matter of fact, it is not at all skeptical of its own skepticism. It has no doubt that every thing is doubtful. This position is manifestly untenable. For if we accept the skeptical conclusion, we have
about skepticism, we cannot be skeptical. In other words, to be skeptical a person must not be skeptical. A theoretical house divided against itself simply cannot stand. But in the second place, skepticism is false, not only because it is internally contradictory, but also because it rests on a false theory of knowledge. It suspects all propositions because they are made by finite men. It supposes that because men are finite, they will necessarily distort truth by their own prejudices. "That's your interpretation," skeptics will say, as if that observation demonstrates its falsity. But why is it necessarily an untrue interpretation, simply because it is yours? We can see that it may be untrue but why must it be to
be
unskeptical to do
so? We
can see
ination
that
a
so.
Or if
we are
skeptical
even
student who has been flunked in an exam-
might be tempted to think his paper deserved more prejudiced in his own favor. But there
because he would be are
students who sometimes admit that their exams did not
in the case of an necessarily distort objective facts to his own advantage. It is at least possible for a person to consider something detachedlyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;even for an interested person. And when the element of obvious personal interest is removed, as it is in many judgments, an individual deserve to pass. One cannot assume, even interested person, that he will always and
would be inclined to be
objective.
skeptic could possibly disprove the objectivity of personal interpretations. He must assume objectivity to deny it. He must assume that his judgment is objective to say that yours is not. If he proves that all perIn any case, no
sonal
interpretation is subjective and unreliable, he condemns
^
;
sonal
judgment is unreliable.
Third, skepticism is It is true that
some
wholesome
be
to
ments, our own
a
confusion of
a part
with the whole.
judgments are unsound. Therefore, it is "skeptical" or, better, "critical" of all judg-
included, until verified. We should examine
judgments carefully and impartially. This is the true and wholesome element in skepticism. But the thoroughgoing skeptic confuses the part with the whole. That is, he insists that because some judgments may be proved "subjective," all are necessarily so. He throws out the baby with the bath. It would be better
to
throw
out
the bath but
keep the baby.
Very well, we are weary of skepticismâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;weary of trying to minds by our minds. It is a foolish business indeed, and we considered it only for the purpose of showing the futility of it. So we must begin here, for there is no place else to begin. But suppose someone says, "I will not begin at all; I will not think at all; I will eat, drink, and be merry and never be escape our
bothered with Christian evidences"? To such
a
person we
mind only for help in eating, drinking, and being merry, it is possible that you may some day be held responsible. It is possible that if you listen to what your mind is saying to you, you would hear it saying, 'You must not eat, drink, and be merry merely. I have higher duties and responsibilities for you. And if you are disobedient, you will some day be severely punished/ " If the person replies, "But I don't know anything about any such duty or responsibility or possible punishment," his mind may justifiably say, "Of course you don't know because you will not listen. You will be punished precisely because you do not know." Some may be inclined to shrug all this off, but they cannot do it with an easy mind. Unless they listen to the dictates of this mind or soul of theirs, they cannot very well must
say,
"If you
are
going to
use your
mrds U
>d.
p
Is u
>re
a
*ge 1
o
o
>ns.
r
ever or
he is
a
him here, it is true, as Aristotle says, that "thinking animal" and think he must. If by honest
whatever put
thinking he may properly conclude that life is eating, drinking, and being merry then let him eat, drink, and be merry. But it is rather difficult to eat, drink, and be merry when one does not know whether that is what he is here to do. We shall suggest
throughout this book that the soul or mind will and
does show man that he is not here to eat, in the usual
sense
drink, and be merry
of the term.
Very well, we must think. And we dare not need
not
think. So let
us
we have a body and the soul itself within
soul) and
think that we
think. We have the instrument (the
of material (the world around us us)
on
which the instrument may
operate.
thing we may ask about the world around us is, Why is it here? How is it here? Why is there
And the first
is, Why? That
something rather than nothing? .7^5- H
â&#x2013;
jzT
â&#x2013;
On the Existence of God
$2
is mind?"
they would
mind, mind is
answer,
not matter.
"No matter." Matter is are not father and son,
They
not
not
distantly related, not even in the same family of being,
If matter is tried for the role of creator and found wanting, what of the immaterial? Perhaps force, energy, life, spirit
brought all things
out of
nothing. Let
us see.
First off,
we
must
say that such a force or energy would have to be selfexistent. For if it were not self-existent, it would be de-
pendent
on something or someone else and so the ultimate source. It cannot depend on if it is to
account
for
could
not
be
anything but itself everything by itself. So it must be self-
existent. And of If it a
were not
course if self-existent, it must be eternal. eternal, then there would have to have been
time when it
not
and when
something or someone brought it into being. In that case, it could not be the explanation of all things and all persons. So it must be eternal. And it must be personal. For, if it were not personal it
must
be
was
impersonal. .But if it
impersonal how we ever have come into being to ask questions about something ultimately impersonal which necessarily could not understand our questions, much less answer them? Perhaps, as some like to speculate, the ultimate is superpcrsoml. Be this as it may, the ultimate can not well be sit fr personal or impersonal and still be the source of a higher kind of being than itself, a being that can ask questions which the ultimate cannot answer. There is yet another way in which effort has been made could it have
to
were
produced persons? How could
avoid the causal argument. This is the contention that
everything came into being by evolution. This view is not associated with anyone in particular because it is more in the nature of a seemingly plausible
suggestion than of an actual argument. Most evolutionists, therefore, have not appealed to it. Darwin, for example, believed that God made the original "gemmules" from which the world evolved. Evolu-
tion he cause.
saw as a
subsequent mode rather than
an
antecedent
Most other evolutionists likewise have refrained from
suggesting that evolution has anything at all to say about origins. Nevertheless, some have still professed to believe in "causal evolution/' Let us examine the position on the basis of its intrinsic merits. And this is the
question
we
would ask. "If
all evolved from evolution, from what did evolution evolve?" If it evolved from
something else, we recognize ourselves again in the coils of the infinite regress. And how can there be
an
evolution that does
not
insuperable,
were not
If evolution
were a
evolve? Even if these difficulties
we would causal power
face still another dilemma. and if it
were
self-explana-
could it explain anything else? Why is there something (besides evolution) rather than nothing? Evolution, by
tory, how
definition, does not create. But if it cannot create, how
can
it
produce an evolving world? Some would say that it does not ;produce this evolving world, it is this evolving world. This, however, is begging the question, for we have already pointed out the difficulty of assuming that the world is just "there." Considerations such
as
these reveal the wisdom of the
vast
majority of evolutionists in abstaining from making
any
causal claims for evolution. We shall have
this
more to
say on
a later chapter. Our world and our universe argue that the cause back of them is pne cause. The universe is composed of many parts
subject in
but
one
plan. A
cosmos, or
ordered whole, implies
a
single
ordering mind back of iL Take but a
one
illustration of the teamwork of the universe,
raindrop. The raindrop falls on the earth and provides the
soil with various necessary elements. It is taken up into the trees and flowers and herbs by their various root systems. There the water, by a process called photosynthesis, is transformed into
things useful to plant life and released to the air
|
m a
gaseous
form, ultimately to visit tne eartn again as a
raindrop. That is
a
single picture of the unity of
obvious concatenation of its many parts. that the universe works
as a team.
It is
a
our
world, the
There is evidence universe and
not a
"pluriverse." And since we have seen that it must have a the uniformity of it all would suggest the unity of this cause, would it not? Well, not necessarily. cause,
appear conceivable that in unison to produce the hypothesis that this universe is the product of many forces or gods working together in perfect unity. How do we find out whether that is so? First, we have already shown that there can be only one cause behind the universe. Only one independent ultimate cause. That rules out the possibility of there being many. Not
necessarily, because it would
there may be many agents working cosmos. It is a perfectly admissible
ÂŤ
And
so
while it would be conceivable,
so
far
as
the order of
the universe alone is considered, that it is the
product of
working in harmony, this otherwise valid possibility is ruled out by the fact that there can be but one cause. If there should be many causes actually at work producing the unity of the universe, these causes would have to be derivative and therefore but expressions of the purpose of this one cause. But then, has this "cosmological argument" advanced us? Only in confirming the previous argument. That is, the unity
many causes
of the world confirms the notion that there is but
one cause
that there is, since there working in co-operation. world is strictly consistent with the fact that there
behind it. In itself it cannot prove could be many harmonious causes But the
This argument, but corroborative. is but
one cause.
therefore, is not independent
"There is also much evidence of oursâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;at
purpose
in this world of
least, things that suggest intelligence. The dandelion
sends up a
little parachute to carry its seed along on the wind
ana tina a
piace 10 germinate. 1 nai cciiaiiiiy spciis iiilciiliuii. We know from our own experience that we do things like that. We build a house to live in; we make bread to eat. We do things for
fined
purposes all the time. William "fighter for ends." He is a
James has depurposive animal.
man as a
We therefore recognize purpose in vain to find our
when we see it. But we search anything in the dandelion that corresponds to
brain, the brain that enables us to think up useful plans. dandelion does things that are every bit as well
And yet the suited to its
purposes as our plans are to ours. Although we find the purpose in the dandelion itself, we do not deny that purpose. We look for it elsewhere. And that "elsewhere" must be the ultimate cause which cannot
we^
behind everything that is. Indeed, when we consider this very we immediately realize that it is not
display it. We which
was
are
given
purposive,
us.
We did
to
not
have
seen
lies
purposiveness of ours, really ours at all. We be sure. But it is a capacity decide
to
be
so.
We did not
design design. We find ourselves purposive. And while our purposiveness is in ourselves in a sense that the dandelion's purposiveness is not in itself, this is only "in a sense," after
all. Our
purposive faculty is_y? us, and it is outside of the dandelion. But we did not put it in ourselves any more than the dandelion put it outside of itself. There is a
lying back of both
purposiveness
and dandelion. And where does it come from? Well we know that it is not in the dandelion itself and that we did not put it in ourselves. It must have come from some other source. We have already shown that the source of all must
man
therefore be the
things is the ultimate cause. It everything purposeful
of purpose as well as else. But if it is the author of purpose, it must be
itself; that is, it
must
cause
be
a
purposeful
another way, the first cause must be But the legitimate
cause.
Or to put
intelligent. question arises, "May not the
jt
ultimate
cause
nave
ueen
tne
source
or
an
mere
existence, ana tnese
existences have
simply developed, under necessity, their purposiveness?" Must we conclude that the cause was purposeful because things which originally sprang from it are purposeful? Or to put the question another way, is it not possible that this cause made dandelions and they developed their own method of reproducing themselves? Of course, stating it this way makes the question appear absurd. But do we make it appear any more absurd than it actually is? Do we put the question any other way than the way it must be when we comprehend the nature of the question itself? If this, cause did not put a teleological tendency in the things made, must the things made not have developed it themselves? But, if mere
own
they had to develop it themselves under the exigencies of their situation, they would never have survived the situation in the first place. That is, things need this purposeful
activity
to
survive. Without it in the first place, they could not survive
long enough to develop it. Purpose is
not the result of the
need to survive; survival is the result ot purpose. IT is also interesting to consider that~for~
nonpurposive
agents to develop purpose, which they did not have to begin with, would be self-contradictory. If they did not have purposive tendencies to begin with why would they develop them? Can you develop intention unintentionally? Can you
develop"purpose unpurposively?~~The unpurposing agent would, according to the hypothesis, have unpurposively developed purpose; the unintending agent would unintentionally have developed intention. The opposite must be the case; if the agent was supposed not to have purposiveness, but to have proceeded intentionally to develop it under the exigencies of the situation (in order to survive, for example), the presence of purpose would be proven. But will
say that things may have developed purposiveness unpurposefully or accidentally? The very hysomeone
potnesis, ana liic amy puoaiuic ny^uuxv,ou, xuiw mu out. That is, we are thinking of nonpurposive agents
develop-
ing purposeful actions that suit them for survival. That is the saying that unpurposing agents develop purposive action for the purpose of surviving. The agent is surrounded with a problem, survival. It responds in one way rather than another. Why? Obviously in order to survive. Would some one say it just adapted to its environment without the purpose of surviving? But if it did so adapt itself, we repeat, it must have been a purposeful being at the first. So then, we know that this ultimate cause is a purposive cause. We know this because everything that comes to pass comes ultimately from this cause, and since purpose or intention come to pass, they must have come ultimately from this cause. And if they came from this cause, this cause must have been purposive for purpose came from it. Could it be possible that purpose came from some other source? It could beâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;if there were some other source. But we have already shown
same as
that there could be from this our on
other
source.
argument from cause, but
nature
of this cause;
it throws further light
namely, that it is
0
cause.
So it must have come
only possible source. Thus the argument rests on
earlier the
no
a
"
purposive â&#x2013;
5
The Theistic
Another is
morality
or
Argument (2)
thing which
we notice in this world of ours moral consciousnessâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a sense of right and
Suppose someone attempts to deny this almost universally admitted statement, what then? Well, let us ask him a question. Is our statement that there is a sense of right and wrong, right or wrong? He will reply it is wrong. And if we ask him if his statement that there is no such sense of right and wrong, is right or wrong, he will reply that it is right. So he who denies the sense of right or wrong exercises it himself. Is it right or wrong, reader, to use a sense of right and wrong to deny the existence of a sense of right and wrong? At this point such a person will protest loudly, saying the above argument is the purest sophistry; that is, it is something that sounds right but is very wrong. So his sense of right and wrong will be further exercised in his denial of the argument for the sense of right and wrong. But overlooking that inconsistency, we will listen as he takes exception to our initial wrong.
statement
that there is such
a sense
is
and that his
own
protest
proof of it. He will say, It is proof of something entirely different; it is proof of a knowledge of right and wrong, not &
Ui a 3CUOC Ul.
Xigut unu Ttxvxx^j.
ÂŁ
intellectual judgment, a judgment of "true and false." Now, we will grant that it is proof of a knowledge of right and wrong as intellectually true or false. But if we look more closely, we will see it to be more than that. Granted that we may say of any statement, including the statement that there is a moral sense of right and wrong, that it is right or wrong and mean it in reference to knowledge. Suppose the objector says of our statement (that there is a moral sense of right and wrong) that it is wrong, inasmuch as the supposed "sense" does not exist. Suppose our reply is, "So what? I know that there is no such thing as a moral sense, but I will go on saying there is just the same." Then what? Will our objector let the matter rest? If he wants to be ornery he may; but if he wants to be human, he will say, "It is wrong to say that there is a moral sense of right and wrong when there is none." Now he is not giving a merely intellectual judgment anymore. He is now saying it is wrong as a moral judgment and a matter of feeling. He is not merely coldly intellectual, but warmly moral. Therefore, in any intellectual judgment concerning right and wrong the moral sense is also present. So to make the intellectual statement that there is no sense of right and wrong is self-contradictory because this statement carries with it the moral sense of right and wrong. What is true in the illustration above is true of all situations. As intellectual beings we judge that certain things are right or wrong. But with that judgment always comes the notion that what we judge to be right, we ought to judge to be right; and what we judge to be wrong, we ought to judge to be wrong. And it would be morally right for us to endorse what is an intellectually right judgment, and it would be morally wrong for us to oppose an intellectually right judgment. As we said, it becomes a matter of feeling, moral feeling. When we see something that we think to be right, we but
merely of
an
1CC1
U11ULX
UUllgCltiViA
cvr u "I'f" â&#x20AC;&#x201D; **7
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think to be wrong, we feel under obligation to oppose it. If we support what we think to be wrong and oppose that which we think to be right, something in us accuses us; but if we support what we think to be right and oppose what we think to be wrong, something in us gratifies thing that
we
us.
This is the basic
scientia
means
meaning of the word "conscience." Con-
"with knowledge." There is something in the
make-up that goes along with knowledge, and this commonly called conscience. It does not add any information, but it gives color to the information possessed or thought to be possessed. The knowledge may be sound or unsound,
human is
well-grounded or ill-grounded, but whatever that knowledge appears to be, this something in man evaluates it in terms of duty. Thus the conscience may be enlightened or it may be unenlightened, depending entirely on the character of the knowledge on which it operates. It in itself, however, is infallible in the sense that it accompanies every judgment. It may be "seared" (that is, one's desires may so incline to a given course of wrong action that they tend to shout down or silence this still small voice of conscience), but the voice is always there and it can always be heard. What shall we make of this moral consciousness, this conscience of man? Where did it come
from? It is in
man now,
granted. Was it in him at the beginning? Or did he develop it, as he learned to build houses to meet his physical needs? There is a learned symposium entitled The Dawn of Conscience (1934), which argues that there was a particular time in human history when conscience first appeared; and those who agree also think that there is a particular time in every individual's life when conscience appears or dawns. We need not pursue any further just how this conscience is thought to dawn. Sufficient for our purposes to note that some think
So
that
think that the
development ot conman's part. He develops conscience because he needs it. We have attempted to show above that purpose itself must come from an ultimate being. If, therefore, there is in man a purpose or tendency to develop we see
science is
a
a
some
purposeful activity
moral nature,
on
it must itself have
come
from the ultimate
It may, theoretically, have come through man, but it must have come from the ultimate cause. So on this hypothecause.
sis, conscience must be by man but not from man. As he builds a house, he builds his conscience, maybe. In any case, the
tendency to build
cause,
the
just
as
a
conscience would be from ultimate
the tendency to self-preservation would be from
same source.
But does
man
need for shelter dawns to
have
a sense
a conscience as he builds a conscience dawn on man as his
really build
house? Does the need for on
a
him? Does he
some
day
say,
"I ought
of 'ought' "?
the putting of the question we have let bag. It really isn't possible to develop a conscience as our hypothesis supposes, because it would re present man as saying, "I ought to have a sense of 'ought.' " Of course, if he ought to have a sense of "ought," it looks as if he already has a sense of "ought." His sense of "ought" is what is actually suggesting" to him that he ought to have a But there
again
in
the cat out of the
sense
of "ought." No one likes to put
because it does
no
credit
to
the question this
way,
his intelligence. So, seeking to
justify himself, a man may say, "What I mean is that men come to sense a need of an 'ought' faculty. They don't feel they ought to have a sense of 'ought'; that would be contradictory, admittedly. They just come to think it would be good or useful to have a sense of 'ought.' They do not feel a sense
developing a sense of 'ought'; only a sense admit that the statement made that way is not
of 'ought' in
of utility." We
manifestly contradictory ana ausuru. dui Id XL U Ctv.* Suppose a conscienceless man does say, more or less consciously, "I am going to develop a sense of 'ought' and by this sense judge what things should and should not be done." Is that thinkable? Rather than analyze this in the abstract, let us take a concrete instance. Suppose a person created a sense of the "ought-ness" of doing to others as he would that they, should do to him. Applying this self-imposed "ought," he is confronted with this situation: A person who has always hated him, told abominable lies about him, caused him to be demoted, and finally made him lose his job and his reputation, is the only person he knows who has a better knowledge of mathematics than he has. An employer offers him a job with a fabulous salary and great distinction because he thinks him
certain territory. The man knows that his enemy is the only better one, but that he is better. According to the golden rule, he is under obligation to tell the employer of that fact, because he would want his enemy to do so if the situation were reversed and he were the better of the two mathematicians. The fact that his enemy would not do so, the fact that the last thing in the world he would think of would be the golden rule, is beside -1 the point. The man in question has bound himself by a rule. But the question is, Would the rule hold? Could it be expected to hold? The man would be straining hard. Would the ropes break or not? They would snap like light string. He would not want to be bound, and if he felt for a fleeting moment that he were bound, he would immediately say to himself, "Why should I? I have no obligations except those which I have imposed on myself. Why should I? Why ought I to keep my self-imposed obligation? What obligation have I to keep my obligation?" None at all, of course. He has no obligation to keep self-imposed obligations. If he does feel an obligation to keep self-imposed obligations, the obligation he to
be the most competent
mathematician in
a
lccia
xo nui
r
unless it is buttressed by a sense of "ought" which he has not invented. Or, to put it the other way, the only hypothesis on which a man's sense of "ought" is binding on him is that which holds that it is not jms jsense of "ought" at all. "Once again, then, we find that the moral faculty which is in man was not put there by man. Our great and recurring question is, "Whence came this conscience?" And our great and recurring answer is, "It must have come from the first and ultimate cause. Where else?" So then our first cause is first, ultimate, independent, intelligent and moral in character. "But wait!" someone says. "Why does it follow, because the moral conscience comes from this cause, that the cause itself is moral? Is it not possible that the cause could have produced conscience without
has
no sense
of "ought" at all,
possessing it itself? After all, the cause is different from many of the things which have come from it." Let us suppose that this first cause is itself nonmoral, and that it would say or decree that there should be moral beings in the universe different from itself. This would mean that the cause at least has the idea of conscience in its make-up. It can conceive, at least, of right and wrong and of an agent whose actions are right and wrong. Now, is it possible that it could conceive of such beings and not itself be such a being? If so, it would act without any consciousness of whether it should act or not. It would act intelligently as we have already shown, but it would act without regard to whether the particular action was moral or not. So far as the being is concerned, the action would be action and that is all, not right action. Right action would have no meaning with respect to it. Its creatures could say of their actions that they were right, but that could only mean right with respect to the creature and not with respect to the creator. The creature could pass
a
judgment on tne acuuiia UI tuv, could not pass. Could there be any
creator
incentive for the cause to bring anything else into being if it had no moral consciousness? Granted that it would know how to do so and would have the power to do so. But would it have any incentive to do it if it did not feel that it should do it? Or is this the wrong line of
the
thinking? Anthropomorphic thinking attributing same kind of functioning to the cause that we are familiar with in men? We must, on the supposition before us, assume that the cause may just do what it does without incentive. It has power and it exerts it; it has intelligence and it uses it. It has no incentive
perhaps, but why need
it have? Is this conceivable?
conceivable, power controlled only by intelligence, which would say, "Since you must necessarily Is
unmotivated power
this way"? Suppose that this power
function, do it
is inertiate, and reason has to say, and do something." Then power asks, "What?" and reason says, "So and so," and power does it. This would make intelligence determinative of the action of our cause. And so it would have to be, because if power
"You
should get a move on
without intelligence. Since it has intelligence as we have seen, it must evidence it. And therefore it would seem that intelligence would set what wheels are set in motion, in motion. But can account for motivation? Reason can say, for example, that power can be exerted in the production of moral agents. Can it do any more than that? Can it somehow say that bepower can be so exerted, it shall be? How will it persuade power to act? Merely having a plan along which it can operate would not seem to assure that power will therefore operate. There could be other plans or there could be
were
blind, it would
follow that the cause was
reason
cause
so
what would determine? There seems to be nothing in power or intelligence which provides the necessary inertia. Then
ought to do such and such." It is conceivable that beings made by this cause which can operate by mere instinct, but how can an intelligent cause act by mere instinct? That would not be intelligent action. Nor would merely intelligent action really be intelligible or intelligent action. There must be some reason or incentive for using intelligence and power in a particular way. Therefore, it would appear that this cause not only is the source of the "ought," but that it must possess an "ought" itself. Furthermore, if this cause were not moral, then it would have to be indifferent to moral beings. Although it had made them moral, it would have to be indifferent to whether they function morally or not. They might have a sense that they should do certain things and not do other things, but their author would not care in the slightest what they did. The "ought" in creatures must have a reference outside themselves as we have shown, or else it has no meaning. But to what outside themselves? Hardly to the source from which they came if it is morally disinterested. As a matter of fact, the cause would not even be able to understand what it had produced. If it did understand the sense of "ought," it would have to enforce it. That is, the cause would have to punish the disobedience of conscience. It ought to do that. Not to do so would be a violation of the nature of the creature which the creator had made. And that would be cosmic confusion of the worst sortâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;unthinkable, unbelievable, immoral, and unintelligent. But let us go back to the statement, "The cause would have to punish the disobedience of conscience." Not necessarily, someone argues. The cause could have instilled the moral factor in man as an automatic thing. When man obeyed it he would feel good, and when he disobeyed it he would feel bad. The one would be his reward for obedience, and the
cause
you
there
are
anytning more, leaving mc uu^ xca^u. w creature's behavior. But out of this supposition two ties arise.
First, if
I
moral
one
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
difficul-
of the creatures who constantly disregards his to avoid the consequences by searing his
sense were
silence his conscience, he would not feel bad, but only indifferent to his violations of it. This would make it possible for him to do evil and not reap any consequence. It would render the moral faculty insignificant and useless. And it would immediately reflect on the intelligence of the cause who, having made a faculty to control men automatically, allowed them to jam it and prevent the thing from working as it was intended. Would not the vast majority of men, if not all, then jam their moral works too, so that they could sin with impunity? Even on our supposition that the cause is^ not itself moral but is wholly indifferent to morality, it would now be embarrassed as unintelligent. The supreme intelligence would here be outwitted by mere creaturesâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;an inconceivable state of affairs. conscience, what then? That is, if he were to
^
But there is a second problem: the prosperity of the wicked. and indeed do prosper so far as this world is concerned. The racketeer takes
Many of those who stifle their consciences can
liquidating any who, in the interests of conscience, oppose him. Now if the intelligent cause were morally indifferent to all this, it would appear that the person who what he wants,
thoroughly violates the moral faculty with which he is The stars in their courses now fight for, rather than against, Sisera. Therefore the cause would be doubly embarrassed: the violator of its moral built-in regulator could not only stifle this regulator but would be rewarded by the outside order of things for so doing. It would seem, therefore, that if the cause is not moral it most
endowed has the universe on his side.
without
possessing it in lLsen, men n is 11U L VV lOV- â&#x20AC;˘ u. 10 r r v, AJ.U. Âť
attempted to show, the creatures would be able to function better by disregarding their consciences. So if the cause is intelligent, it cannot be nonmoral. Or, positively speaking, if the cause is intelligent it must be moral also. And so we come to our composite pictureâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;there must be an ultimate cause which is intelligent and moral. The great question now before us is: Is this cause personal? We already have shown it to have various qualities that~are essential to personality: power to act, intelligence, and moral consciousness. It would seem that there is but one thing essential to personality that we have not yet found the cause possessing. That is self-consciousness. Is the cause
self-conscious? Is it aware of what it is
doing?
its actions? Does it pass judgments on its thoughts and actions and moral feelings? Well, it either does or it does not. Let us suppose that it does not and therefore lacks an essential part of personality. This would mean that the cause does intelligent acts without an awareness that it does them. Now is that possible? Can anything do an intelliDoes it reflect upon
without being aware that it is doing it? "Yes," you reply, "take your dandelion as an example. It grows and reproduces in a very intelligent manner, yet there is no evidence that it is conscious of it. May not the cause be like the dandelion which it made?" Hardly, because, as we have earlier shown, the very fact that the dandelion itself does not show signs of deliberate intelligence makes us look elsewhere for the secret of its intelligent actions. There must be some other gent act
explanation of intelligence if it is not found in the dandelion like the dandelion, it too would have to be explained. There would have to be a cause back of it from which its intelligent acts came since it itself is thought of as not deliberately doing them. Since there can be no
itself. Now if the cause were
aeiiperate in
itselt, which is the same as to say
that the cause
is conscious of its intelligent actions. The
be shown with respect to the moral actions morally and also unconsciously would be a contradiction in terms. How can anything be unconsciously moral? How can anything unconsciously do something right or unconsciously do something wrong? We have already shown that a "conscience-act" is a conscious same
of the first
act.
may
cause.
To function
Conscience is the moral consciousness that is
an
action
in accord with moral
judgment. A bad congood conscience comforts. But to speak of an unfeeling moral sense or an unconscious conscience is to convey no meaning. A cause which does right and feels no pleasure in it would be unthinkable. It might conceivably do something powerful or wise without having feeling, but we cannot comprehend its doing right without feeling. The very notion of doing right implies conscientiously conforming to the moral judgment. And conscientiously conforming to the right is consciously conforming to the right. And consciously is
or
not
science hurts and
conforming
a
means
that the first
cause
is
a
moral Person.
Summary and
Criticisms of the Theistic Argument
recapitulate, gathering the theistic arguments together and looking at the criticisms of them which have been made. We began our reasoning as follows: Man is a thinking animal. That is fundamental. There is no criticism of the fact which does not assume the fact. No one can say that man is not a thinking animal without thinking. He must rely on thought to deny thought. Thus our minds are our inevitable starting points. There is no going beyond them. There can be no other starting point. This argument in and of itself is not a theistic argument. But combined with the causal argument, it becomes, we think, a powerful one. That is to say, the inevitability of relying on our own mind proves nothing but that we must rely on our own mind and that there can be no other starting point. But if it can be shown that we are creatures and that God made us, then our observation becomes significant. For if God made us so that thinking is our inevitable source of knowledge, then it would have to be a reliable source of Let
us
49
D"
of insight into the nature of things. of the causal argument. We have attempted to show that matter cannot aspire to the role of cause of all things because it needs a cause itself. Nothing in the nature of an effect can be the first cause, for that must be pure or uncaused cause. It must be independent and eternal, for if it depended on anything else it would not be the ultimate cause, and if it came into being in time it would have had to be dependent on something else which brought it into being in time. Then there would have had to be some reason for its coming into being, and this reason must have been its cause so that it could not have been the ultimate cause. We argued, therefore, that there must have been a spiritual first cause, an "unmoved mover." By the teleological argument we attempted to prove that this universe, as we know it, gives evidence of purpose. And since we had previously noted in the causal argument that the first cause must have been the author of things, this purposiveness must be attributed to that cause. Thus, the cause must be rational or intelligent. Given the first cause and given the fact of the purposiveness of things which have come from this first cause, we are led to the conclusion that the origi-
knowledge, Now for
a true means
a
summary
intelligent cause. which we presented grew out of our observation of man as he exists in this universe. In addition to being a purposive creature and thereby confirming the
nator
of the universe is an
The moral argument
purposive character of his creator, he is also a personal, moral creature. His morality, we indicated, could not have come from him himself (though even if it had it must have been from the one who made him himself), but had to have been a natural endowment or, in other words, a creator-implanted characteristic. Since it is inconceivable, we argued, that the creator should implant such a faculty without having it, we concluded that the first and intelligent cause was also moral.
â&#x2013; 1 _
We will
,
consider
of the
objections which have against these proofs. The Scriptures say that "men not have God in their thinking." This hasjbeen nomore apparent than in the objections raised against now
some
been raised
would where
a divine being. ontological argument has usually taken
the evidences for the existence of The attack
on
the
the
following form: The fact that man has an idea of God is no proof that there is such a God. The medieval monk Gaunilo observed that he might have an idea of a perfect island but that did not guarantee the existence of such an island. In modern times, Immanuel Kant pointed out that his idea of the presence of certain talers (dollars) in his pocket unfortunately did not assure him that they were actually there. These are essentially rejoinders to the ontological argument as Anselm gave it, though not really adequate replies even to that form of it. Anselm had said that
11
we
have
an
idea of
a
perfect being than which none higher can be conceived. regarded such rejoinders about perfect islands in the sea or dollars in the pocket as relevant, inas-
most
He would not have
much
as
neither of them
of "most
can
be included within the category
perfect of existences than which nothing greater
be conceived." Furthermore, if anyone objected to Anselm that he could think of a most perfect being but that that did
can
guarantee the existence of such a being, Anselm had a ready reply. If, he would say, you have an idea of a most perfect being which does not exist, it is not the most perfect being than which none higher can be conceived. The most perfect being which does exist is higher than the most perfect being which does not exist. Existence, after all, is greater than nonexistence. Therefore, a being which does exist is greater than one which does not exist. Consequently, the most perfect being than which none greater can be conceived not
must
exist, because if it did not exist it would not be the
being than which none greater can be conceived.
Thus the usual refutations of the usual form of the onto-
logical argument are not successful. Anselm really had the last against most of his opposers through the centuries. But probably he does not have the last word against all of them.
word
It still
seems to be impossible to prove that God exists simply the ground that we have an idea that God exists. Granted that we do have an idea of a most perfect being than which
on
greater can be conceived, how does this prove that such being does actually exist? All the argument seems to prove is that we can have the idea of a most perfect being than which none greater can be conceived. But that the idea guarantees that such a being does actually exist we do not see. If there were indeed such a being, it would be greater f than one which does not exist, just as the idea of such a being is a greater idea than the idea of a being that does not exist. none a
But how more
can more
be said? How
than thisâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;that this
can
this argument prove
being does actually exist?
The Anselmian form of the argument most of the supposed refutations of it, but
is invulnerable to in its most careful
formulation still falls short of demonstration. In any case, this is not the form of the ontological argument which seems
Cartesian form which we have presented may not properly be called the ontological argument, but be that as it may, it is not exposed to the criticisms urged against the cogent. The
classical Anselmian form. Nor have which refutes it. Indeed
we
seen
any argument
have
attempted to show that it is incapable of refutation because its critic must assume its position in order But
to
we
attack it.
will say,
"Granted that we cannot think without using our thinker, and granted that we did not make ourselves thinking animals, and granted that if there is a creator he must have made us this way, and therefore the ontological argument is in that sense valid; stillâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;and this is the great objectionâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;what proof do we have that there really is any some
Summary and Criticisms such first
cause
oj mc
J flOUVLL,
^^
this argument must have to acquire cowords, the attack is really mounted
as
gency?" In other
against
the causal argument to
which we now come. One objection against the, causal argument is that it is inconsistent with itself. It rests on the supposition, the criticism goes, that everything must have a cause. On this principle it traces all things back and back to one final cause. And then and there it suddenly stops. But how may it consistently do that? Why does the principle that everything needs a cause suddenly cease to be true? That is, why is it that this so-called first cause does not need a cause? If everything else needs an explanation, why does this not need one? If. this does not need an explanation, why do other things need one?^^*-****^ This is
not a
though it is
of it. That is, if a
valid refutation of the causal argument al-
valid objection to
a
some
someone were to
careless formulations
"Everything must have completely relevant and
say: cause," this criticism would be
telling. The that
argument,
manner.
cause,
effect
however, is
It maintains not that
not
accurately stated in everything must have a
but that every effect must have a cause. Because every have a cause, there must ultimately be one cause
must
that is
not an
effect
explain effects? A
butjpure
cause
cause, or how, indeed, can one that is itself an effect would not ex-
plain anything but would require another explanation. That, in turn, would require a further expTaiiation,~and there
would be
a
deadly infinite
shown that the universe be self-explanatory; it
regress. But the argument has know it is an effect and cannot
as we
requires something to explain it which
is not, like itself, an effect. There That point stands. Immanuel Kant which
we
have
must
be
an
uncaused
replies that from the line followed there must needs be
cause.
of
reasoning
an
uncaused
first cause, the author of all effects. Well and good. But, he continues, there is that other line of
cause, a
reasoning which
itself
have its
explanationâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; the thinking that leads to the infinite regress. Consequently, his position is that this theistic proof ends in an antinomy, or contradiction, and is therefore futile. But we have indicated above what is wrong with this criticism. One part of the antinomy simply is not true. We grant that if each were true, we would have a contradiction, and the argument would be futile. But we have shown that only one line of reasoning is accurate. The notion that there is an argument for infinite regress is based on the mistaken maintains that this
its
cause.
cause
must
There is, he says,
[supposition must have a cause. There is no proof for thisthat andeverything we certainly have not appealed to it in the causal argument. It the first cause is, by can
is,
as a matter
definition, not
of fact, an irrelevancy; for an effect at all nor indeed
be.
has had two main criticisms ^urged against it. One is rather technical in character and the :ÂŁbther popular. According to the technical argument, teleology pertains only to this world and therefore can tell us nothing about any cause beyond this world. The popular argument focuses its attention on the presence of apparently ^honteleological aspects of the universe. That is, there seem to be many things which do not bear the stamp of purpose; they are, indeed, quite inconsistent with any purpose and seem to militate against it. Kant, again, has been the most redoubtable champion of the technical objection to the teleological argument. He had a very distinct preference for this argument among all the theistic proofs. He was much impressed with the "starry skies" above his head, but they do not, he felt, demonstrate the existence of purpose beyond this world. It is a transcendental leap to jump from observations in this world to existences in the world beyond, he argued. But, we may ask, what is wrong with the transcendental The teleological argument
find things "which have no explanation in this give up seeking an explanation or are we to look for it elsewhere? Which is more rational, to say there is no explanation or to say that there must be an explanation and to look for it where it may be found? It would seem evident that there must be an explanation either in this world leap? If
world,
or
we
are we to
in another. If it cannot be found in this world, we must
conclude that it may
be found in another. There seems to be nothing intrinsically irrational in such a conclusion. And if we are proceeding from a finite effect to an infinite cause, what is the fallacy in that? Is it not rather eminently rational to suppose that if a finite cause cannot explain, an infinite cause
must?
Then there is the
popular objection. So much of the world
be
nonpurposive. There seems to be so much chance or "happenstance." The sperm fertilizes the ovum, but so many more sperms are used than are needed for the purpose. Hence if purpose is evident in the process, what about these nonpurposive aspects of it? The dandelion seed has a parachute that is eminently adapted for purposes of transportation. Still, many of these seeds land where they cannot germinate. What of them? And speaking of moral purpose, is seems to
evident that whatever purpose
there be in human affairs, the sun does shine on the unjust and disaster does come upon the just? Do not the ungodly often prosper and the godly often suffer? it
not
Let
us
comment
first
on
the apparent evidence of
nonpur-
posiveness in the natural world. Take the excess of sperms that are "wasted" in the process of fertilization. Note first that if it be so (that is, if they be wasted), that fact does not prove that the one which did fertilize the egg was not so intended. That is, factors which are not evidently purposive do not militate against those which obviously are. As long as it is clear that the sperm
which fertilizes the
ovum
and the
dandelion seed that does take
root
in the earth
adapted universe. recurring
were
for those ends, we have evidence of purpose in the A million instances to the contrary cannot offset this fact.
Second, there is evidence of purpose even in which do there
are
such_a
not
fertilize the
many
case,
ovum.
obstacles to
what could be
sperm's reaching the
more
intelligent than
to
egg.
In
provide
least is bound to accomplish the trying to catch a wild animal that °was molesting his neighborhood, it would be considered a mark of intelligence for him to set a number of traps and not just one. Only one would actually be used, but to insure the accomplishment of his purpose he would be wise to set many. Someone may demur at this analogy, saying, "This is true enough of finite man, but God who knows all things cannot be ignorant." But we forget that God is working with finite things. For example, the trapper is finite, and we admit that his action in setting many traps is intelligent. Do we forget many sperms so
Cpurpose? If
that
any
those sperms The situation is such that
one at
a man were
that he is God's creation and that God could have made him
that, knowing in advance where the animal would come, he only to set one trap? If it is no reflection on the intelligence of God to make a man who is less intelligent than He is, would it be a reflection on the purposive intelligence of so
need
God to make a sperm that is less intelligent than He is, but which nevertheless is remarkably adapted to its environment?
examine the major criticisms of the moral arguthat there appear to be conscience and morality. They would turn the edge of this admission as an argument for God, however, by saying that it shows nothing about God, but only about a man's own environment. The moral law is no absolute thing, they say; it is merely a reflection of the prevailing mores and traditions of a given community. Conscience varies with the climate; moral law Finally,
ment.
we
Some grant
fluctuates with the century; right and wrong are as various as the individuals who profess to know what they are. Such
persons will science and
tell an
me that I write in favor of an absolute coninflexible moral law because that is what I
taught. Very well, let
was
write
as
us speak to this position. If they say that I I do because I have been trained as I have been
trained, then I suppose that I may say to them, "You write as you do because you trained." And if they
have been trained as you have been take the position they do, not because it is right, but because it happens to be what they were taught was right, then it is not necessarily right after all. That is, they are not necessarily right when they say that I am not necessarily right. They are only reflecting their own provincial backgrounds when they say that I am only reflecting my own provincial background. Their remarks on their own theory are utterly subjective and without validity. Of course, they make them thinking that they are objective and possessing validity. But, when they assume that they are objective, they are assuming our position not their own. In other words, in order to criticize our position "thTylhust assume our position. If they are consistent with their own position, they cannot criticize ours
or
anybody else's. They
are
obliged
to
keep
a
polite
silence while the discussion goes on among persons who have reason to believe that there are absolute consciences, rules of
right and things.
wrong,
universal laws, and other such objective
We do not
profess to have considered every criticism that against the theistic proofs nor to have said everything that has ever been said in defense, but perhaps enough has been said to justify Paul's words, "The invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). has
ever
been offered
^^The chief intellectual difficulties relate to the follo^mg; (1) D enial or doubt as to the existence of God. (2) Doubt or disbelief as to the deity of Christ. (3) The problem of evil or the origin of sin. (4) The problem of suffering. (5) Denial of the divine inspiration of the Bible. t_____
•'
'
'
-
I. The Existence
of
God.
This is the problem that emerges when the person dealt with says, "I am an atheist" or "I am an agnostic" or vjii viv
-■
draw
a
.
line
www
—
.
—
j
ux^iv
jto
through the circle. One side
iu
hlluw.
represents
being words
1n0w j. 11
what
you
know, the other side represents what you do not know. Will you not admit that God could exist in the area of that which you do not \now?" The answer obviously must be "Yes," hence he can no longer flatly assert, "There is no God," for he has admitted the possibility of the existence of God. The probability of God's existence may be adduced from the three arguments or reasons given below. 2.
The
cosmological ence) to cause}
reason: argument
The human mind demands
a cause
from result (exist-
great
given result. To say that a chair made satisfy the human intellect. The mind of man any
enough a
to
explain
chair does
cannot
be
not
content
with the assertion that a watch made itself or was made by another watch. It can, however, find an adequate cause in the statement that a human being, possessing life,
intelligence and specialized skills, made the watch. The only cause great enough to account for this amazing universe is the great Uncaused Cause, namely, God. As James Clark Maxwell said, "There never was a theory of the universe that did not need a God to make it 3.
signer.
go*"2 The
teleological
reason: argument
from design
1On9 James, The Christian View of God and the World, 2Graebner, Theodore, God and the Cosmos, p. 91.
p.
to
7Sff.
de-
to that effect. intellectual.
1.
The
Usually the
person
considers himself
epistemological approach
to
be quite
You may dedegree of intellec-
or reason.
flate the person's egotism or at least induce tual humility by the ensuing method.
a
"My friend, do
know everything?" He will be obliged a circle on a piece of paper and say, "This circle represents everything there is to know. Now I'll draw a line through the circle. One side represents what you know, the other side represents what you do not know. Will you not admit that God could exist in the area of that which you do not \now?" The answer obviously must be "Yes," hence he can no longer flatly assert, "There is no God," for he has admitted the possibility of the existence of God. The probability of God's existence may be adduced from the three arguments or reasons given below. to answer
2.
"No."
you Draw
The
cosmological ence) to cause}
reason: argument
The human mind demands
a cause
from result (exist-
great
given result. To say that a chair made satisfy the human intellect. The mind of man any
enough a
to
explain
chair does
cannot
be
not
content
with the assertion that a watch made itself another watch. It can, however, find an
or was made by adequate cause in the statement that a human being, possessing life, intelligence and specialized skills, made the watch. The only cause great enough to account for this amazing universe is the great Uncaused Cause, namely, God. As lames Clark Maxwell said, "There
theory of the universe that did go."2
never was a
make it 3.
signer.
The
teleological
reason: argument
not
need
a
God
to
from design to de-
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;â&#x20AC;&#x201D;1
1Orr, James, The Christian View of God and the World, 2Graebner, Theodore, God and the Cosmos, p. 91.
p.
7Sff.
As indicated
adequate
cause.
above, the fact of the universe demands
an
Moreover, the evidences of design in the uni-
whole and its component parts, demand an explanation. A beautiful design (pattern) in a rug or piece of needlework calls for a designer. Can chance or a blind evolutionary
verse as
process
a
provide
a
rational explanation of
a
bird's wings,
a
fish's
camel's equipment as an animal of the desert (capacity for water, feet that are padded to stand the terrific heat of the sand, etc.), the order and precision of the planets, the beauty of sunsets and starry heavens, the miracles of adaptation and utility in the human body? Design indicates purpose, which in turn indicates intelligence. Back of the manifold evidences of intelligence is the Supreme Mind. Back of the designs, so numerous and astounding, is the Great Designer, God Himself. fins,
a
The instincts of birds and animalsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a
fascinating field of
many striking illustrations of providential purpose. Emerson said: "I hold that God, who keeps His word with
studyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;reveal
birds and fishes in their migratory instincts, will keep His word with man."3 4.
The ontological reason: argument from the
moral and
spiritual nature of
man to a divine source. Immanuel Kant was profoundly inmpressed by "the heavens above and the moral law within"; that is, by the orderliness of the planets and the moral nature of man. The -hypothesis of evolution cannot explain how man is the only creature that has
consciousness of
right and
that prays and worships, spiritual values and of immortality. That which distinguishes man from the animal realm, relates him to the realm of the supernatural. That which is divine in man must have a divine source. Man's moral and spiritual nature has its origin and explanation in a personal, eternal, holy God. "In the beginningâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;GOD" (Gen. 1:1).
a
that thinks in
terms
Op. citForeword,
of
p.
vi.
wrong,
.Helen
Keller, who
her
handicaps that she atindependent, useful citizen, was born blind and deaf; moreover, she remained speech^ less long after the age when most children learn to talk. Little Helen's teacher, a very wise and kind lady, sought to teach her to understand messages and to communicate with the world of persons she could not see or hear. With infinite patience, she taught her an alphabet by pressures on the hand. At length she began to tell her about the things and persons around her, and eventually taught her to talk. Then she decided that Helen tended Harvard
so overcame
University and became
an
should be told about God and Christ, about salvation and heaven. One day the great preacher, Phillips Brooks, came to the home and told Helen the sublimest of all stories—the story of God's love and of Christ's cross. When the teacher had finished interpreting the message, Helen looked
up with her and said, "Oh, Mr. Brooks, I always knew there was a God but I didn't know His name." Here was a.girl,who had never been to church, had never heard a song or sermon, had never read the Bible or heard a Bible story. How did she ™Always know there was a God?" Because God made her in
sightless
eyes
His
own image, with a nature that was capacitated for Him and yearned after Him. All human beings are similarly constituted. The universality of prayer, the persistent belief in im-
mortality, the intensity of man's religious quest—these and other facets of man's moral and religiou nature constitute powerful evidence of the existence of the God of the Bible, who declares, "I have made the earth and created man" (Isa. 45:12). 5.
The
pragmatic
The human
or
experimental
reason.
show the reasonableness of belief in the existence of God and that God's existence as a fact is at reason
can
least possible, if not probable.
But
no
amount
or
kind of
reasoning can make God real to a human soul. God becomes a reality only when the concept or idea of God leads to an experience with God that is vital and transforming.
The
try-and-see method is valid both in science and in
Christianity. A chemical formula is proved or disproved by means of an experiment. In effect Christianity says to the individual, "God exists. Moreover, God longs to make Himself known
in the person of His Son, to cleanse your heart, His peace and His presence. If you will honestly rjgive Him a chance, He will enable you to experience His reality and life-giving power." "Come and see" is the invita'i tion found in the first chapter of John. "O taste and see that p the Lord is good" urges the psalmist (Ps. 34:8). "Come unto me" is Christ's entreaty (Matt. 11:28). "Be still and know that I am God" is the divine admonition (Ps. 46:10). More than 100 years ago a young minister was conducting a series of evangelistic meetings at Yale. For several days his messages fell flat and the only reaction was a scornful indifference. The reason for this, he soon found out, was that almost the entire college, students and faculty alike, had come under the spell of a brilliant professor who was an outspoken atheist. The professor's name was Bushnell. After much prayer, the young minister went to professor Bushnell and had a frank talk with him. Among other things, he said, "If it is a fact that God exists, that Christ is the only Saviour and that the claims of Christianity are true, is not that the supremely important fact of life?" "Yes," agreed the professor, "// Christianity^) is true, it is supremely important." "Moreover," continued the) minister, "in view of the possibility that Christianity is true and in view of the testimony of untold millions that God is real and that Christ transformed their lives, don't you think you should be scientific enough and fair enough to yourself to make an honest investigation of the claims of the Christian faith?" When Bushnell agreed and asked how he should go about it, the minister told him to begin reading the Gospel of John and to pray in sincerity, "O God, if you exist and if the Bible is your message to men, reveal yourself to me as I read to.
give
to
you
you
-
ana ju win waiK in tne
/ A few
ngnt ot any truth you may
reveal
to me."
days later Bushnell astounded the college by relating this interview, by telling of his conversion, by testifying of God's life-changing power through Christ, and by urging his skeptical
auditors
to
let God have
a
fair chance in their lives.
Evangelist Bill Rice relates an atheist
helpful in dealing with
an
or
incident that may prove skeptic of the blatant type.
In the course of his lectures denouncing God and the Bible, Robert Ingersoll would take out his watch, lift his face toward the ceiling and dramatically declare, "God, are you up there somewhere? I don't belieye_you_exist, but if
you do, I hate you If there is a GodT I dare up." A number of "little Ingersolls" went around the country subsequently doing the same thing. One day an atheistic lecturer went to Bughouse Square in Chicago, mounted a soap box, delivered a tirade against God and ended his lecture a la Ingersoll by holding his watch in his hand and daring God to kill him. Before stepping down from the improvised rostrum, he shouted to his hearers, "Unless you can give a valid reason for my still being alive, you can never again believe there is a God." A student of the Moody Bible Institute, who happened to be present, immediately mounted the box and said: "Friends, just a few minutes ago as I was walking down Clark Street, a small boy came out of an alley and stepped in front of me. Though I had never seen him before, he doubled up his fists, and, with hatred in his eyes and anger in his voice, he yelled, If you wanna fight, just start something. I ain't scared of you, ya big coward! G'wan an' hit me! I dare ya to!' "The boy began to swear and call me vile names, as he con-
and will defy you as long as I live. him to kill me before this minute is
tinued to dare me to hit him. Of course I-could have him heels-over-head with one blow, but
slapped further from my mind. He was dirty from head to foot, his clothing was nothing but rags, he was evidently hungry and miserable. nothing
was
A statement in a volume of the latev Professor Machen, . . . has always impressed me as one of significance, . . . "You say, my friend, that you have never seen a man who rose from the dead after he had been laid really dead in the tomb? Quite right. Neither have I. You and I have never seen a man who rose from the dead. That is true. But what of it? You and I have never seen a man who rose from the dead; but then you and I have never seen a man like Jesus. Do
not see, my friends? Whattwe are trying to establish is not the resurrection of any ordinary man nor the resurrection of a. man 1who is to us a mere X or Y, nor the you
resurrection
of
a.
man
about whomswe know
nothing, but the Resurrection of Jesus. It i"s unlikely that any ordinary man should rise; it may be said of this man thatit was .
.
impossible that He should be holden of death." WMS, TS, 415.
be
j_
Phillips asks three questions which must if historical fact of resurrection
answered
Is rejected: 1. What desertion to rection in
changed the early disciples? From steady flame of belief in resurspite of personal loss.
2. If resurrection did not happen, who Christ? Christ, then, a. lunatic, an ideal-
was
suffering from "folie de grandeur" (Lew'of one who says he is a "poached egg") on biggest scale. In face, He may have ist
on
level
been
a
revere
5.
fraud
His
Why
and
an
impostor.
How
can we
teaching?
are so many Christians sure that only rose, but is alive today? "Though this question may enra,ge the critic it is a fair one." "A man may find difficulty in writing a poem, but if he cries, "Oh, William Shakeseare, help me!' nothing whatever happens. A man may be terribly afraid, but if he cries, 'Oh, Horatio Nelson (or, ROBERT E. LEE), help me!' there is no sort of reply. But if he is at the end of his moral resources or cannot by effort of will muster up sufficient positive love and goodness and he cries, 'Oh, Christ, help me!' something happens at once." JBP, YGTTS, 124-27. Christ not
PEANUTS
w.4
'/perhaps <rt)u
CHARLES 1
.WV / can 6ive me an J
\
Av11
:
\Answer, linusy7
SCHUIfZ
what would vou do if w felt that no one liked vou ?
|| tc 'j 0 oc^ \ \l
id
trvto look at myself
I hate hhatAnswer;
objectively and see what i could do to improve...that's
mv answer, charlie brown
''
leal
r
"r
~
1. The Christian cannot p/d3ve "by logi-' demonstration the existence of God;
therefore,
his choice to believe in the
affirmative is an act of his faith. 2. The skeptic cannot disprove the existence of God; therefore, his choice to believe in the negative is an act of his faith.
3. Failure to prove a proposition does not constitute a disproof. After all, for thousands of years nobody could prove that the earth was round; but their failure to do so did not constitute proof that the world flat. John Alexander, "What is
Christianity?," His, Vol. 27, Ho. 6 (March, 1967),
PP.
3-4.
iGod exists?
t /s~ '•
The proof of the existence of God offered by Michael Mendillo and Richard jHart (February, page 73) would appear to settle this matter. We have here a mathematical proof that a widely ob-
If this added piece of data is now incorporated into the logic structure of Mendillo and Hart's original proof, the necessary modifications lead to some rather surprising conclusions. Since it
served
phenomenon, exactly total eclipses, is a miracle, and hence that God exists.
No doubt
as
soon
as
this
seeps down to all those people who do not read physics today, skepnews
will
tics
become an endangered Theologians who claim that God is dead are premature in their judgment. I see only one slight blemish. Arguments based on conservation of angular
in order to obQuite reMaybe someone should tell
tremely long life
species.
momentum and the
tonances
follows that there must be observers to witness an exactly total solar eclipse, extraterrestrial life will be found to exist on both Neptune and Pluto. In addition these beings will have exserve
even one
markable. NASA.
spans
Neptune, there are both partial otal eclipses; at Uranus's position, clipses are total. ; i interpret these results as follows: jht of the new realization of the icance of the exactly total solar $ ;e, we suggest that the statements in the textbooks concerning the "remarkableness" of the phenomenon be strengthened to a fully fledged proof. The fact that from only our planet is it possible to study the chromosphere and corona during totality is too important an opportunity to be called coincidence. Thus, we suggest the fol-
such eclipse.
Stephen W. Behnen Glendora, Calif.
mechanical energy
loss arising from tidal action have es- the tablished that the Earth-Moon dis- ail. tance is increasing by about five inches acper year. This means, by the Men- )lCir dillo-Hart formula, that the eclipse the ratio is
decreasing. In fact, the time Y, required to reduce the eclipse ratio Er to E/ is given by in years,
ors
iel(Dm/5)[(Er/Er')1/2 - 1] •lar where 5 is the increase in distance each ith. Y
=
When E/ is equal to 1, we will Illhave no more exactly total eclipses. zes When we put in the present maxi- ;he mum value of Er, which is 1.09, and la" the other numerical data, the formula says that after 1.3 x 108 years there ;uwill be no exactly total eclipses. Now to my question. Could skeptics as possibly be mean enough to conclude )St year.
> rj
that the existence of God will be terminated in a paltry 130 million years? There is another consideration that I find bothersome. The lower limit on the eclipse ratio is 0.82. If one puts this number into the above formula, one finds that there were no exactly total eclipses until about two hundred and eighty million years ago. Is there a
danger that
someone
might infer that
God did not exist until 280 million BC? Enos R. Wicher
Harvey Mudd College Claremont, Calif.
10-
is
lowing: Theorem
Er > 1 is a total eclipse and Er = 1 is an exactly total eclipse. We have calculated Er for the 32 planetary satellites of the solar system, obtaining in each case maximum and minimum eclipse ratios at the surface of the appropriate planet. Values of Er range all the way from 1151.82 for the Triton/Neptune maximum, to 1.0 x 10~7 for VHI/Jupiter. Only for Moon/Earth (0.82 < Er < 1.09) does
pse
the ratio span unity; so only from Earth is it possible to view an exactly total solar eclipse. For the other planets there are 14 cases of partial (annu-
;re-
lar) eclipses and 17
lys-
total
>ut ,ie-
the
ec-
the fundamental theorem advanced by the authors, that the phenomenon of an exactly total solar eclipse is unique in our solar sysproofs.
In this
2C-
planet serves as the occluding body. Admittedly, these circumstanc-
es are
will
extremely
occur.
rare,
actly total solar eclipses is too remarkable an occurrence to be due entirely to chance.
Therefore, there is
a
God.
We probe the riddles of this barren sphere That haunts the outer limits; whether star Condensed to atoms, shunned with deadly fear, Or satellite of Neptune strayed afar;
iet
We ask if this mute prowler of the night Was found by sheerest accident, a chance
?ts Dr-
That only offers to our puzzled sight Still further questions, nothing to advance
ne
ir: a
Our cosmic view; yet some today believe This errant boulder may in future dock In Neptune's orbit, bearing home to cleave
at •
a
at
With Triton
he tern, is incorrect. Because of the pe- he culiar circumstance that the orbit of Pluto passes Within the orbit of Nep-
other
Conclusion A planet/moon system will have exactly total solar eclipses only if there is someone there to observe them. As only Earth meets this requirement, there is no extraterrestrial life in the solar system. Corollary In a system composed of nine planets and 32 moons, for only Earth with its single moon to have ex-
Mysteries of Pluto
in-
case
tune, exactly total solar eclipses may be viewed from either planet while the
solar system. Lemma There are observers on Earth to witness the remarkable event of an exactly total solar eclipse.
er-
on
chael Mendillo and Richard Hart contains errors even more severe than the usual logic errors associated with such
An exactly total solar ecunique phenomenon in the
a
hat
iet
always interesting to read another "proof" of the existence of God. Unfortunately, the proof offered by Mi-
of massively
eclipses. Only Mars has no total eclipses, whereas from Jupiter, Saturn
inhe
It is
cases
lipse is
as
before,
a
jagged rock
Of cosmic mystery, a sometime guest That will come back to Neptune's regal nest. Wade Wellman ment that the
of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, sent us this poem with the comsuggestion referred to at the end is due to Harold Urey.
but such eclipses PHYSICS
TODAY/FEBRUARY
1974
73
resonances Two
solar eclipses
observable of the North American plus last year's well observed event in North Africa, have prompted Michael Mendillo and Richard Hart, of the astronomy department at Boston University, to examine the total-eclipse situation in some detail. Here is a (somewhat abbreviated) account of their paper on "Total Solar Eclipses, Extraterrestrial Life, and the Existence of God": recent
wide continent,
over
and Neptune, there are both partial and total eclipses; at Uranus's position, all eclipses are total.
areas
We In
Almost without exception, the authors of astronomy textbooks express a feel-
ing of wonderment that a total solar eclipse can occur. Some say it with, amazement, some drily, some gratefully; the similarity in the apparent sizes of the Sun and Moon is "one of the
surprising coincidences of nature," "... a peculiar quirk of fortune," or ". an extraordinary and very fortumost
.
.
nate occurrence."
Because the
taught
us
History of Science has
not to harbor as
even a
most
and innermost thought the notion that our place in the Universe is secret
something special,
we
decided to put
these emotional reactions
to
a
mathe-
matical
test—that is, we tested the "remarkableness" of the solar-eclipse phenomenon. As we see it, the "remarkableness" of our Earth-Moon systern is not merely that total solar eclipses occur, but rather the fact that the eclipses are exactly total.
The process of computing
the
lipsed by a moon moving about a planet is a simple geometrical problem involving the radius of the Sun (7?s), the distance to the Sun from the planet (Ds), the radius of the planet's moon (Rm) and the distance from the planet to the moon (Dm). Because the planets and their moons move in elliptical orbits, there are clearly two extreme cases for each satellite/planet pair: planet
occurs
with
a
aphelion and its satellite at pericenter, minimum obscuration for a planet at perihelion and its satellite at apocenter. At such configurations, the eclipse ratio Er can be obtained by the following simple expression at
»where Er < 1
[§4£T
L rvs/ JJs J
means a
an
a total eclipse and Er exactly total eclipse.
We
have calculated
=
1 is
Er for the 32
planetary satellites of the solar system, obtaining in each case maximum and minimum eclipse ratios at the surface of the appropriate planet. Values of Er range all the
way
from 1151.82 for
the
Triton/Neptune maximum, to 1.0 x 10"7 for VIII/Jupiter. Only for Moon/Earth (0.82 < Ev < 1.09} does the ratio span unify; so only from Earth is it possible to view an exactly total solar eclipse. For the other planets there are 14 cases of partial (annu-
lar) eclipses and 17 cases of massively total eclipses. Only Mars has no total eclipses, whereas from Jupiter, Saturn
significance of the exactly total solar eclipse, we suggest that the statements in the textbooks concerning the "remarkableness" of the phenomenon be strengthened to a fully fledged proof. The fact that from only our planet is it possible to study the chromosphere and corona during totality is too important an opportunity to be called coincidence. Thus, we suggest the following: Theorem An exactly total solar eclipse is a unique phenomenon in the solar system. Lemma There are observers on Earth to witness the remarkable event of an
exactly total solar eclipse.
Conclusion A planet/moon system will have exactly total solar eclipses only if there is someone there to observe them. As only Earth meets this requirement, there is no extraterrestrial life in the solar system. Corollary In a system composed of nine planets and 32 moons, for only Earth with its single moon to have ex-
actly total solar eclipses is too remarkable an occurrence to be due entirely to chance.
Therefore, there is
a
God.
per-
centage of the solar disk that is ec-
maximum obscuration
Er > 1 is
interpret these results as follows: light of the new realization of the
Mysteries of Pluto We probe the riddles of this barren sphere That haunts the outer limits; whether star
Condensed to atoms, shunned with deadly fear, Or satellite of Neptune strayed afar; We ask if this mute prowler of the night Was found by sheerest accident, a chance
That only offers to our puzzled sight Still further questions, nothing to advance
Our cosmic view; yet some today believe This errant boulder may in future dock In Neptune's orbit, bearing home to cleave With Triton as before, a jagged rock Of cosmic mystery, a sometime guest That will come back to Neptune's regal nest.
Wade Wellman of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, sent us this poem with the comment that the suggestion referred to at the end is due to Harold Urey.
partial eclipse, PHYSICS TODAY
/ FEBRUARY 1974
73
fo
K
Go
of
Knowability
God
This Is the most difficult of all the corroborative proofs of God's existence. Indeed, it is so obscureâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;so obscure that many keen minds confess their inability to comprehend it. It has been ened to the Scotchman's definition of metaphysics:
lik-^^
"one
talking about something of which he knows () nothing to another man who does not understand him!1 man
Pardington, 69.
1M. Knowa-bllltX oÂŁ &Qd
Introduction: 1.
In
our first two studies we stressed necessity, and method of theology.
the
Idea.
We have
learned: a.
Theology is the science of God. and that systematic theology presents this material
b.
in the
form of
a
system.
Theology is grounded in certain
presup-
positions,
such as the existence of the Triune God who has revealed Himself in the Scriptures. All understanding of
them comes through the believing men. c.
Spirit of God
to
Theology id possible by virtue of these presuppositions.
d.
Theology
may be divided into historical. biblical, systematic, and practical theology. Its limitations are related to the nature of man and sin, as well as the illumination of the Spirit. exegetlcal.
e.
f.
Theology is a necessirv: both logically (instinct of the mind; error; helpful to memory) and biblically (cf. Horn. 6:17).
Theology's
method is inductive, generally speaking, for the theologian collects.
arranges,
ted facts another.
2.
and exhibits the God-interprein their relations to one
Cf. Van TilylAITST. 8-9. Iil-our third study we looked at the existence of God. concluding: a. There is an innate knowledge of God in man, which is universal and necessary. Cf. Rom. 1:19-21; 2:14-15. b. There are rational testimonies to God, but there is no'convincing proof from the arguments, due to thg, noetic effects of iin. Cf. John 7:17 /read/. We do in-
sist, however, that Christianity, to a believing man, has ample evidence for its position (cf. Acts 1:3, etc.). : g.ff<?t's definition pf metaphysics. 3.
But, can we KNOW God? How shall we answer Job's questions, "Canst thou by searching find
out
mighty
God?
Canst thou find out the Al-
tmtb-perfection?" (11:7).
These
ques-
1 Kings
8:27
But will God in very deed dwell on the earth? behoh , heaven and heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; how much less this house that I have buildedJ
ASV.
Chemnitz maintains that the
summation of all
theology is simply man's knowledge of God; and the knowledge of God is of such importance to man that eternal life is contingent upon it (John 17:3)â&#x20AC;˘ Preus, 11,119. citing Chemnitz' Loci Theologici, I, 19.
^
2
tions
of
fundamental
importance for the knowledge of God is the.'1 essence of theology and life (cf. John 17:3 /read/). Without it no one can be saved. Cf. Preus,H, 19. are
THE INCOMPREHENSIBILITY OF
N.B.: the
GOD.
We shall begin with a related
conception,
incomprehensibility of God.
The Meaning of the Term. The term incomprehensibility comes from the Latin lncoftprehensi'cbills. It has two forces:
(l) that which cannot be seized, or held. Applied spatially it refers to God's immenslty (cf. i Rings 8:27). (2) Applied metaphyslcally, it means that which cannot be grasped. that is, incomprehensible. By this it is not meant that God cannot be known, but that He cannot be known exhaustively.
B«
rather
JftQQmprefrensjbili.ty an£ History. We note only some of the doctrine: 1.
stages in the development
The early Fathers. The early
Fathers stressed the incomprehensibility and unknowability of God1s belng.
No
name
reveals Him.
No concept
fully embraces Him. ILL.:
(l) Athanasius. "He
is exalted above
being and above human thought." (2) Augustine. "Our thought tties to reach a nature than which nothing better or more sublime exists" (De. Poet. Chy. fI. 7). "For if you comprehend Him, he is not God11 (Serm. 117. n. 5). In other words, it is easier to say what he is. not thah what He i£. Cf. Bavinck, TDOG. 21-22. all
They distinguished between the quid and aualis of God. We do not know Him in His essential being, but we do know Him as He is to us in His attributes, revealed in nature and Scripture.
3.
The Reformers. Luther spoke repeatedly of God as the Deus Abscondltus (hidden God) in distinction from Him as the Deus Revelatus (revealed God). And Calvin wrotej 'His essence is
incomprehensible;
so
that His divinity
Chemnitz
wisely chooses not to speak about -Droving C-od, but refers rather to the natural and revealed knowledge of God. To him it is only because of the great corruption of human nature that man asks such questions as WHETHER THERE IS A GOD or
WHETHER THERE
IS DIVINE
PROVIDENCE.
These
are
illegitimate questions which only indicate the darkness into which the human mind has fallen, a darkness which only God can penetrate with a special divine revelation (1 Cor. Is21), with a wisdom which the world ridicules as fables, with a wisdom of the Gospel, made known in the Old Testament
(Psi 110) and revealed finally in His Son. Only who has seen the Son sees the Father (John 14:9) And no Tur^k^or Jew, but only one who honors the Son honors the Father. (John 5*23). Preus, II, 20. one
â&#x20AC;˘* NOT
Š*=
"rufiK^y */
one who speaks of Q-od as though he were a about whom, naturally, one knows everything, really knows nothing at all of G-od. Emil Brunner, Our Faith., trans, by John W. Rilling (New York, 1936), p7 11. x
Any
cousin,"
Mitchell Dahood renders but his
comments
ing is the
common
are
tebunah by skill,
unconvincing, since understand Dahood, III, 3^5.
sense.
5
wholly
escapes
In other words,
all human senses" (LB, they stressed that He
29).
gra^gjiied in His essential being.
cannot "be
c*
Incomprehensibility and the Noetic Affects of Sin. It is, of course, obvious that man, due to the noetic effects of sin, cannot comprehend God (cf. Eph. 4;18). The illuminating ministry of the Spirit is necessary (cf. 1 Cor. 2:14).
D.
Incomprehensibility and Infinity. We may look at this in two ways: 1.
Logically.
Incomprehensibility is not an attribute (He is not incomprehensible to
of God
Himself).
It is
a
relational word,
re-
ferring to us. In this respect His incomprehensibility is absolute. He is eternally incomprehensible to the created mind. The Creator-creature distinction is always there. It Is a correlate of His Godhood. He, "the only Potentate, the King of kin^s, and lord of lords; Who only hath immortality," dwells "in light unapproachable; whom no man hath seen, NOR CM SEE; to whom be honor and1 power eternal" (cf. 1 Tim. 6:15-16). In other words, flnltum non-posslt capere infinitum. We know Him only to the
extent of His
revelation of Himself.
Knowledge is real, but relative. than that is beyond us. ILL.: Tersteegen. "A God no
2.
(xod.
More
comprehended
is
bAmmmzaJs axm*ajt-
Sg.EiptVirall.y.
(a) "Such knowledge (His omniscience) is too wonderful for me; It is high, I cannot attain unto it" (Psa. 13$:6); (b) "Great is Jehovah, and greatly to be praised; And his greatness is unsearchable" (l45:3); (c) "Great Is our Lord, and mighty in power; His understanding Is infinite" (147:5; lit., np. number /ct. Dahood/); (d) "0 the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unThe Scriptures affirm these things:
searchable ways past
are
his
finding
judgments, and his
out" (Rom. 11:33).
The
f We know that
we
perceive,
think, and act;
know how. it is perfectly inscrutable to us how the mind takes cognizance of matter; how the soul acts on the "body, or the body on the mind. But because our knowledge of ourselves is thus partial and imperfect, no sane man would assert that we have no self-knowledge. Hodge, I, 337-38.
we
dD not
Two negro
soldiers were on a transport going on the deck they gazed out the vast expanse of water.
overseas. across
Standing
"That's my
the
life," said
water?"
mos1
one.
water
I've
"Did yo'
eber seen in all
eber see so much
Said his companion: Xo ain t see nothin yet. That's jus' the top ob it." The Anthology oÂŁ Anecdotes, p. 134.
4
^
recognition of these things leads to the reverence which is the soul of godline ss.
11
THE knqwability of god.
N.B.: Our
Job, then, is,
for
answer
"No."
We
cannot find out the Almighty unto perfection. We would have to know His essence, all His attributes, the relations of them within Him and with other I, 377). °ur knowl-
objects!Hodge,
edge of God, then,
But, is it
is partial.
real?
(l) TJis. argument from ÂŁhe mind thinking ^Hodge, I, 337-38). (2) Two country bovs and the ocean. ILL.
A.
:
The Meaning of the Term. It is not meant that one
can
know God unto
perfection, but simply that one may obtain the knowledge that "is perfectly adequate for the realization of the life of man" (LB, 30).
the
knowledge.
Cf.
1 Tim.
divine purpose in And it is a true
2:&.
The Grounds of the Knowabllitv. We will consider this in three ways: 1.
LogicallxThe idea of revelation necessarily involves the divine self-revelation and human kiwj^ledge of Gq4.
2.
Theologically. The
creation of
man
in the
image of
God" (cf. Gen. 1:26) involves human knowledge of God. He is a God of knowledge and has Impressed Himself upon us (cf. 1 Cor. 11:2). It is the work of sanctification to restore this (cf. Col. 3:10 3.
/read/).
ScrlPturallv. What may be argued
logically and theologically is stated in the Word: a. Romans 1:19-21 (cf. 1 Cor. 15:34; 2 Thess. 1:8: saving knowledge is in view in these texts). * The distinction between Innate knowledge (notitia insita) and acquired knowledge Cnotltla acqulslta) belongs hers, the former being obtained spont&ne-
ously and involving principles,
such
t
Psalm 76:l;
Jeremiah 9:25-24
In Judah is God known: Israel. Thus
saith
His
name
is
great in
Jehovah, Let not the wise
man
glory
in his wisdom, neither let the mighty man glory in his might, let not the rich man glory in his riches; 24 but let him that glorieth glory In this, that he hath understanding, and knoweth me, that I am Jehovah who exerciseth
lovingkindness,
tice,
and righteousness,
these
things I delight,
in the earth: saith Jehovah.
jus-
for in
5
^
the existence o3TGo<f, and the latter being the result of reasoning and reflection and involving concrete
as
propositions,
such as those involving understanding of God's creation (cf.
2:14-15; Acts 14:17: 17:17-23 /Chemnitz saw v. 27 as a reference to innate knowledge/). This Romans passage may refer to both innate and
acquired knowledge
22-23).
(cf. Preus, IJ,
L.
fsalm 76:1 (the past in
c.
Jeremiah 9:25-24.
d.
Matthew 11:25-27. The Son, the sole possessor of the
view).
knowledge of God, reveals it to some. (1) Karl von Hase. Professor of Church History at <1 ena and Bonhoeffer s great-grandfather, "a thunderbolt fallen from the Johannine sky""
ILL.:
(Jeremias, TCMOTNT. 24). (2) Others, ""a bolt
from the Jo-
hannine blue. ©•
J oHn 1:18. The sedes doctrlnae
(lit.,
seat.
foundation, ground of teaching) revelation in the Son.The
of ex-
"is—ever and ever is""(Lenski, TIOSJG. 98); it is His
presses
the idea,
qualification for revealing. He is the divine Mystagpgue (cf. mystery
f.
cults)
who reveals the divine
to
initiates).
the
secrets
Jeihn 17:5 (present time). The knowledge of God cannot be severed from thekknowledge of the Son. The eternal life is qualitative and experiential.
S'
(present time). Cf. Isa. (future). We are taught here
i. JoHn 5:20 11:9
the necessity of the mediation of the Lord Jesus for both the knowledge of God and communion with God. The£ ^ prepositional phrase, eV no ^
(*otoo
Jr^<rou
come
to
be
because
we
are
we
X/a/0-7*0 in the in the
ut<p
explains how Father; i!fc is .
Son.
'
â&#x20AC;˘
°
Department of
Philosophy and Christian Ethics
THE BIBLE AS TRUTH
Afrit, (<?j"7 By Gordon H. Clark, Ph.D. In
of chess a player can become so engrossed in complicated situation that, after examining several possibilities and projecting each one as far ahead as he is able, he finally sees a brilliant combination by which he may possibly win a pawn in five moves, only to discover that it would lose his queen. So, too, when theological investigations have been pursued through considerable time and in great detail, it is possible to overlook the obvious. In the present state of the discussions on revelation, it is my opinion that what needs most to be said is something obvious and elementary. This paper, therefore, is a defense of the simple thesis that the a
game
a
Bible is true.
This
thesis, however, does not derive its main motivaattack on the historicity of the Biblical narraThe destructive criticism of the nineteenth century
tion from any
tives.
still has wide influence, but it has at the hand of
received
a
mortal wound
twentieth-century archeology. A new form of unbelief, though it may be forced to accept the Bible as an exceptionally accurate account of ancient events, now denies on philosophical grounds that it is or could be a verbal revelation from God. So persuasive are the new arguments, not only supported by impressive reasoning but even making appeals to Scriptural principles which every orthodox believer would admit, that professedly conservative theologians have accepted more or less and have thus betrayed or vitiated the thesis that the Bible is true.
(157)
THE THESIS OF BIBLICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Because the discussion is philosophical rather than archeological, and hence could be pursued to interminable lengths, some limits and some omissions must be accepted. Theories of truth are notoriously intricate, and yet to avoid considering the nature of truth altogether is impossible if we wish to know our meaning when we say that the Bible is true. For a start, let it be said that the truth of statements in the Bible is the same type of truth as is claimed for ordinary statements, such as: Columbus discovered America, twoplus two are four, and a falling body accelerates at thirty two feet per second. So far as the meaning of truth is concerned, the statement "Christ died for
our
sins" is
on
the
same
level
as
any ordinary, everyday assertion that happens to be true. These are examples, of course, and do not constitute a definitionof truth. But embedded in the examples is the assumption that truth is
characteristic of
propositions only. Nothing can be called true in the literal sense of the term except the attribution of a predicate to a subject. There are undoubtedly figurative uses, and one may legitimately speak of a man as a true gentleman or a true scholar. There has a
also been discussion these uses,
as
to which is
though legitimate,
are
the true church.
But
derivative and figurative.
Now, the simple thesis of this paper is that the Bible is true in the literal
of
the
sense
of true.
After
a
thorough understanding
meaning is acquired, the various figurative be investigated; but it would be foolish to begin
literal
meanings may figures of speech before the literal meaning is known. This thesis that the Bible is literally true does not imply that the Bible is true literally. Figures of speech occur in with
they are not true literally. They are true figuratively. But they are literally true. The statements may be in figurative language, but when they are called true the term true is to be understood literally. This simple elementary thesis, however, would be practically meaningless without a companion thesis. If the true statements of the Bible could not be known by human minds, the idea of a verbal revelation the Bible and
would be worthless.
If God should
speak a truth, but speak possibly hear, that truth would not be a revelation. Hence the double thesis of this paper, double but still elementary, is that the Bible, aside from questions and
so
that
no one
could
commands, consists of true statements that men can know. fact, this is so elementary that it might appear incredible that any conservative theologian would deny it. Yet there are some professed conservatives who deny it explicitly and others who, without denying it explicitly, undermine and vitiate In
it
by other assertions. The first thing to be considered, then, will be the reasons, supposedly derived from the Bible, for denying or vitiating human knowledge of its truths. THE EFFECT OF SIN ON MAN'S KNOWLEDGE
The doctrine of total
depravity teaches that no part of the devastation of sin, and among the passages on which this doctrine is based are some which describe the effects of sin on human knowledge. For example, when Paul in 1 Timothy 4:2 says that certain apostates have their consciences seared with a hot iron, he must mean not only that they commit wicked acts but also that they think wicked thoughts. Their ability to distinguish right from wrong is impaired, and thus they give heed to seducing spirits and doctrines of devils. Therefore, without in the least denying that sin has affected their volition, it must be asserted that sin has also affected their intellect. And though Paul has in mind a particular class of people, no doubt more wicked than others, yet the similarity of human nature and the human nature escapes
nature of sin force the conclusion that the minds of all
men,
though perhaps not to the same degree, are impaired. Again, Romans 1:21, 28 speaks of Gentiles who became vain in their imaginations and whose foolish heart was darkened; when they no longer wanted to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind. In Ephesians 4:17 Paul again refers to the vanity of mind and the darkened understanding of the Gentiles, who are alienated from the life of God through ignorance and blindness. That ignorance and
Dlindness are not Gentile traits
Jews
only but characterize the also, and therefore the human race as a whole, can be
in the summary
condemnation of all men in Romans 3: .10-18, where Paul says that there is none that understands. And, of course, there are general statements in the Old Tesseen
tament: the heart is deceitful above all
wicked
things and desperately
(Jer. 17:9).
These noetic effects of sin have been used to support conclusion that
the
unregenerate man cannot understand the meaning of any sentence in the Bible. From the assertion
"there is
none
an
that
understandeth," it might
seem
to follow
that when the Bible says "David took a stone and smote the Philistine in his forehead," an unbeliever could not know what the words mean. The first representatives of this type .
of
.
.
view, to be discussed here,
are centered in the faculty of Theological Seminary in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Cornelius Van Til and some of his colleagues prepared and signed a document in which they repudiate a particular statement of the unregenerate man's epistemological ability. A certain professor, they complain, "makes no absolute qualitative distinction between the knowledge of the unregenerate man and the knowledge of the regenerate man" (The Text of a Complaint, p. 10, col. 2). This statement not only implies that an unbeliever finds it less easy to understand that David smote the Philistine, but in asserting an absolute qualitative distinction between whatever knowledge he derives from that statement and the knowledge a regenerate man derives, the quotation also suggests that the unregenerate man simply cannot understand propositions revealed
Westminster
to
man.
In another paper it is "erroneous"
to
two of Van Til's associates declare that hold that
"regeneration
...
is not
a
change in the understanding of these words" (A. R. Kuschke, Jr., and Bradford, A Reply to Mr. Hamilton, p. 4). According to them, it is also erroneous to say "when he is regenerated, his understanding of the proposition may undergo no change at all (but) that an unregenerate man may put exactly the same meaning on the words as the regener...
man" (ibid., p. 6). Since these are the positions they repudiate, their view must be precisely the contradictory, namely, an unregenerate man can never put exactly the same meaning on the words as a regenerate man; that regeneration necessarily and always changes the meaning of the words a man knows, and that the unregenerate and regenerate cannot possibly understand a sentence in the same sense. These gentlemen appeal to 2 Corinthians 4:3-6, where it is said that the gospel is hidden to them that are lost, and to Matthew 13:3-23, where the multitudes hear the parable but do not understand it. These two passages from Scripture are supposed to prove that a Christians "understanding is never the same as that of the unregenerate man. " As a brief reply, it may be noted that though the gospel be hidden from the lost, the passage does not state that the lost are completely ignorant and know nothing at all. Similarly, the multitudes understood the literal meaning of the parable, though neither they nor the disciples understood what Christ was illustrating. Let us grant that the Holy Spirit by regeneration enlightens the mind and leads us gradually into more truth; but the Scripture surely does not teach that are
the Philistines could not understand that
Goliath.
Such
a
view has not been
common
David had killed among
Reformed
however, will be cited as an example. Abraham Kuyper, in his Encyclopedia of Sacred Theology (pp. 110-11), after specifying eight points at which we are subjected to error because of sin, adds that "the darkening of the understanding does not mean that we have lost the capacity of thinking logically, for so far as the impulse of its law of life is concerned, the logica.has [sic] not [italics his] been impaired by sin. When this takes place, a condition of insanity ensues . . sin has weakened the energy of thought [but] the universal human consciousness is always able to overcome this sluggishness and to correct these mistakes in reasoning." In thus defending the epistemological ability of sinful man, Kuyper may have even underestimated the noetic effects of sin. Perhaps the human consciousness is not always able to overcome sluggishness and correct mistakes in writers; just
one,
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
The point I wish to insist on is that this is somepossible. An unregenerate man can know some true propositions and can sometimes reason correctly. To avoid doing an injustice to Van Til and his associates, it must be stated that sometimes they seem to make contradictory assertions. In the course of their papers, one can find a paragraph in which they seem to accept the position they are attacking, and then they proceed with the attack. What can the explanation be except that they are confused and are attempting to combine two incompatible positions ? The objectionable one is in substantial harmony with existentialism or neo-orthodoxy. But the discussion of the noetic effects of sin in the unregenerate mind need not further be continued because a more serious matter usurps attention. The neo-orthodox influence seems to produce the result that even the regenerate man cannot know the truth. reasoning.
times
MAN'S EPISTEMOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS
That the regenerate man as well as the unregenerate is subject to certain epistemological limitations, that these limitations are not altogether the result of sin but are inherent in the fact that man is a creature, and that even in glory these limitations will not be removed, is either stated or implied in a number of Scriptural passages. What these limitations are bears directly on any theory of revelation, for they may be so insignificant that man is almost divine, or they may be so extensive that man can understand nothing about God. First, a few but not all of the Scriptural passages used in this debate will be listed: "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty to perfection?" (Job 11:7); "Behold God is great and we know him not, neither can the number of his years be searched out" (Job 36:26); "Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it" (Ps, 139:6); "For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways my ways" (Isa. 55:8-9); "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past
miLLLiig
uuu
rur
who hath been his
the
nam Known tne mina 01 tne nora, or counsellor?" (Rom. 11:33-34); "Even so
wnu
things of God knoweth
Cor.
no man,
but the Spirit of God" (1
2:11).
are simply samples and many similar easily remembered. Several of them seem to say that it is impossible for man to know God. We cannot search Him out; we know Him not; I cannot attain this knowledge; GodTs thoughts are not ours; no one knows the mind of the Lord, and no one knows the things of God. It could easily be concluded that man is totally ignorant and that no matter how diligently he searches the Scripture, he will never get the least glimmering of GodTs thought. Of course, in the very passage which says that no man knoweth the things of God, there is the strongest assertion that what the eye of man has not seen and what the heart of man has never grasped has been revealed to us by GodTs Spirit "that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God." It will not be surprising therefore if some attempts to expound the Biblical position are as confused actually as the Biblical material seems to be. With many statements of such theologians we all ought to agree; but other statements, misinterpreting the Scripture in the interest of some esoteric view of truth, ought to be rejected.
These
verses
verses are
MAN'S KNOWLEDGE IN RELATION TO GOD'S
professors above referred to assert that "there is a qualitative difference between the contents of the knowledge of God and the contents of the knowledge possible to man" (The Text, p. 5, col. 1). That there is a most important qualitative difference between the knowledge situation in the case of God and the knowledge situation for man cannot possibly be denied without repudiating all Christian theism. God is omniscient, His knowledge is not acquired, and His knowledge according to common terminology is intuitive while man's is discursive. These are some of the differences and doubtless the list could be extended. But if both God and man The
ainerences oe at least one point ot
wiuw, mere must witn tne
similarity; for if there were no point of similarity, it would be inappropriate to use the one term knowledge in both cases. Whether this point of similarity is to be found in the contents
knowledge or whether the contents differ, depends on what by the term contents. Therefore, more specifically worded statements are needed. The theory under discussion goes on to say: "We dare not maintain that his knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single pointft (ibid. , p. 5, col. 3); and the authors repudiate another viewon the grounds that Ma proposition would have to have the same meaning for God as for man" (ibid. p. 7, col. 3). These statements are by no means vague. The last one identifies content and meaning so that the content of GodTs knowledge is not its intuitive character, for example, but the meaning of the propositions, of
is meant
,
such
as
Twice it is denied that a prop-
David killed Goliath.
thing for God and man; and to make they say that God's knowledge and man's knowledge do not coincide at any single point. Here it will stand repetition to say that if there is not a single point of coincidence, it is meaningless to use the single term knowledge for both God and man. Spinoza in attacking Christianity argued that the term intellect as applied to God and as applied to man was completely equivocal, just as the term dog is applied to a four-legged animal that barks and to the star in the sky. In such a case, therefore, if knowledge be defined, ositioncan
mean
the
same
it unmistakable
either God knows and
cannot
man
or man
knows and God
can-
single point of coincidence, God and man thing, viz. , knowledge. After these five professors had signed this co-operative pronouncement, some of them published an explanation of it in which they said: "Man may and does know the same truth not.
If there is not
cannot have the
a
same
[yet] when man says that God possibly have in mind a conception of eternity that is identical or that coincides with God's own thought of eternity" (A Committee for the Complainants, The Incomprehensibility of God, p. 3). In this explanatory statethat is in the divine mind is
.
.
.
eternal he cannot
ment it is asserted that the
same
truth may
and does
occur
in
is
mail's
iilliiu.
at least
aiiu
111
uuu's.
1 ins
ui
uuurse iiiecuis
max
mere
point of coincidence between God's knowledge they seem to retract their former position in one line, they reassert it in what follows. It seems that when man says God is eternal he cannot possibly have in mind what God means when God asserts His own eternity. Presumably the concept eternity is an example standing for all concepts, so that the general position would be that no concept can be predicated of a subject by man in the same sense in which it is predicated by God. But if a predicate does not mean the same thing to man as it does to God, then, if God's meaning is the correct one, it follows that man's meaning is incorrect and he is therefore ignorant of the truth and
ours.
one
But while
that is in God's mind. This denial of univocal
predication is not peculiar to the professors quoted, nor need it be considered particularly neo-orthodox. Although the approach is different, the same result is found in Thomas Aquinas. This medieval scholar, whose philosophy has received the papal sanction, taught that no predicate can univocally be applied to God and created beings. Even the copula is cannot be used univocally in these references.
two
When therefore
a
man
thinks that God is
or eternal or almighty, he different from what God means by
not only means something good, eternal, or almighty, but, worse, if anything can be worse, he means something different by saying that God is. Since as temporal creatures good
we
cannot know the eternal
what God
means
God's meaning
essence
when He affirms His
of God, we cannot know own
existence.
Between
of existence and man's meaning there is not a single point of coincidence. The Scholastics and Neoscholastics try to disguise the skepticism of this position by arguing that although the predicates are not univocal, neither are they equivocal, but they are analogical. The five professors also assert that man's "knowledge must be analogical to the knowledge God possesses" (The Text, p. 5, col. 3). However, an appeal to analogy, though it may disguise, does not remove the skepticism. Ordinary analogies are legitimate and useful, but they are so only because there is a univocal point
ot coincident
meaning in the two parts.
A paddle for a canoe
be said to be analogical to the paddles of a paddle-wheel steamer; the canoe paddle may be said to be analogous even to the sci;ew propeller of an ocean liner; but it is so because may
of
univocal element.
These three things, the canoe paddle, paddle wheel, and the screw propeller, are univocally devices for applying force to move boats through the water. Without a univocal element an alleged analogy is pure equivocation, and analogical knowledge is complete ignorance. But if there is a univocal element, even a primitive savage, when told that a screw propeller is analogous to his canoe paddle, will have learned something. He may not have learned much about screw propellers and, compared with an engineer, he is almost completely ignorant--almost but not quite. He has some idea about propellers, and his idea may be. literally true. The engineer and the savage have one small item of knowledge in common. But without even one item in common, they could not both be said to know. For both persons to know, the proposition must have the same meaning for both. And this holds equally between God and man. If God has the truth and if man has only an analogy, it follows that he does not have the truth. An analogy of the truth is not the truth; and even if man's knowledge is not called an analogy of the a
the
truth but
an
analogical truth, the situation is
analogical truth, except it contain
a
no
better.
An
univocal point of coinci-
dent meaning, simply is not the truth at allÂŤ In particular, and the most crushing reply of all, if the human mind were
IimitedTo analogical truths, it could never know the univocal truth that it was limited to analogies. Even if it were true that the contents of human knowledge are analogies, a man could never know that such was the case: he could only have the analogy that his knowledge was analogical. This theory, therefore, whether found in Thomas Aquinas, Emil Brunner, or professed conservatives, is unrelieved skepticism and is incompatible with the acceptance of a divine revelation of truth. This unrelieved skepticism is clearly indicated in a statement made in a public gathering and reported in a letter dated March 1, 1948, to the Directors of Covenant House.
rne statement was
maae,
questionea,
ana reainrmeu uy one
of the writers mentioned above that the human mind is
able of
truth at all. if
we
wish to
incap-
truth, the mind of man never gets any Such skepticism must be completely repudiated safeguard a doctrine of verbal revelation.
receiving
any
TRUTH IS PROPOSITIONAL Verbal revelation with the idea that revelation means the communication of truths,
information, propositions, brings
light another factor in the discussion. The Bible is composed of words and sentences. Its declarative statements are propositions in the logical sense of the term. Furthermore, the knowledge that the Gentiles possess of an original revelation can be stated in words: "They that practice these things are worthy of death." The work of the law written on the hearts of the Gentiles results in thoughts, accusations, and excuses which can be and are expressed in words. The Bible nowhere suggests that there are any inexpressible truths. To be sure, there are truths which God has not expressed to man, for "the secret things belong unto God"; but this is not to say that God is ignorant of the subjects, predicates, copulas, and logical concatenations of these secret things. Once again we face the problem of equivocation. If there could be a truth inexpressible in logical, grammatical form, the word truth as applied to it would have no more in common with the usual meaning of truth than the Dog Star has to
in
common
ings. may
with Fido.
It would be another case of
one
word
single point of coincidence between its two meanThe five professors, on the contrary, assert that "we not safely conclude thatGodTs knowledge is propositional
without
a
in character. "
And
a
doctoral dissertation of
one
of their
"It appears a tremendous assumption without warrant from Scripture and therefore fraught with dangerous speculation impinging upon the doctrine of God to aver that all truth in the mind of God is capable of being expressed in students
says:
propositions." To me the tremendous assumption without warrant from Scripture is that God is incapable of expressing
.loo
monorneca sacra
h
<j. rue aiVeArv^ lbchu.^, "TPCSHC .^
April, Âąyt>7
yc -7/
/p/[
(
knowledge is a logical sys'-'^ tern seems required by three indisputable evidences: first,(7) the information He has revealed is grammatical, proposithe truth He knows.
tional,
And that His
and logical; second,
the Old Testament talks about
the wisdom of God and in the New Testament Christ
nated
as
the
wisdom and
Logos in whom
are
isdesig-
hidden all the treasures of
knowledge; and, third, we are made in the being the light that lighteth every man.
of God, Christ
image,^
Certainly, the burden of proof lies on those who deny propositional construction of truth. Their burden is twofold. Not only must they give evidence for the existence of such truth, but first of all they must make clear what they mean by their words. It may be that the phrase nonpropositional truth is a phrase without meaning. What I apprehend to be this confusion as to the nature of truth has spread beyond the group criticized above. The thought of Edward J. Carnell would presumably not find favor with them, and yet on this point he seems to have adopted much the same position. Consider his argument in A Philosophy of the Christian Religion (pp. 450-53). He begins by distinguishing two species of truth: first, "the sum total of reality itself," and second, "the systematic consistency or propositional correspondence to reality." It is not irrelevant to the argument to consider the correspondence theory of truth; but it might lead to a discussion too extended for the immediate purpose. Suffice it to say that if the mind has something which only corresponds to reality, it does not have reality; and if^itjmows reality there is no need for an extra the
something which corresponds to it. The^ correspondence theory, in brief, has all the disadvantages of analogy. Carnell illustrates the first species of "truth by saying, "The trees in the yard are truly trees." No doubt they are, but this does not convince one that a tree is a truth. To say that the trees are truly trees is merely to put literary emphasis on the proposition, the trees are trees. If one said the trees are not truly trees, or, the trees are falsely trees, the meaning would simply be, the trees are not trees. In such illustrations no truth is found that is not propositional and no
describes
a student taking an examination in ethics. The student may know the answers, even though he himself is not moral. But the students mother wants him not so much to
know the truth
student
as
to be the
truth.
Carnell insists that the
be the truth.
Now, obviously the mother wants her son to be moral, but what meaning can be attached to the phrase that the mother wants the son to be the truth? Let it be that thinking is only preparatory to being moral, as Carnell says, but what can be meant by beingthe truth, i.e., what can
be meant than
being moral? The student could not figurative language rather than speaking literally. He then refers to more
be
a
can
tree.
It
seems
therefore that Carnell is using
ChristTs words, "I am the truth." erous
Now, it would be ungen-
to conclude that when Christ says
"I
am
the truth," and
then the student may be said to be the truth, that Christ and the student are identified. But to avoid this identification it is necessary to see what Christ means by His statement,
fist
said
before, the Bible is literally true, but not every sentence in it is true literally. Christ said, "I am the door";'
was
but He did not
mean
that He
was
made of wood.
Christ also
said, "This is my body." Romanists think He spoke literally; Presbyterians take the sentence figuratively. Similarly the statement, "I am the truth," must be taken to mean, I am the source of truth; I am the wisdom and Logos of God; truths are established by my authority. But this could not be said of the student, so that to call a student the truth is either ex-
tremely figurative or altogether devoid of meaning. Carnell also says: "Since their systems [the systems of thought of finite minds] are never complete, however, propositional truth can never pass beyond probability." But if this is true, it itself is not true but only probable. And if this is true, the propositions in the Bible, such as David killed Goliath and Christ died for
our sins, are only probable--they may be And to hold that the Bible may be false is obviously inconsistent with verbal revelation. Conversely, therefore,
false.
it
must
be
maintained that whatever great ignorance may
characterize the systems of human thought, such ignorance
ui
many iruins aoes
There
nor
alter tne
lew
truths
the
mind
pos-
truths of mathematics, astronomy, Greek grammar, and Biblical theology that I do not know; but if I know anything at all, and especially if God has given me just one item of information, my extensive ignorance will sesses.
have
no
effect
gulfed in
a
are
on
many
that
one
truth.
Otherwise,
we are
skepticism that makes argumentation
a
all
en-
waste of
time. In the twentieth century it is not Thomas Aquinas but Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, the neo-orthodox, and existentialists who are the source of this skepticism to the detriment of revelation. Brunner writes: "Here it becomes unmistak-
ably clear that what God wills to give us cannot be truly (eigentlich) given in words, but only by_w_ay of a hint (hinweisend). Therefore because he (Jesus) is the Word .
.
.
of God,
all words have a merely instrumental significance. Not only the linguistic vessel of words, but also the conceptual content is not the thing itself, but only its form, vessel, and means. " The utter_skepticism of this position, in which not only verbal symbols but the conceptual content itself is not what God really wills to give us, is disguised in pious phrases about a personal truth, or Du-Wahrheit, distinct from the subject-predicate relation called Es-Wahrheit. God cannot be an object of thought, He cannot be a Gegenstand for the human mind. Truth, instead of being a matter of propositions, is a personal encounter. Whatever words God might speak, Brunner not only reduces to hints or pointers, but he also holds that Godfs words may be false. "God can, if he wisJhes, speak his Wordto man even through false "doctrine. " Xhiis_the_cjliImlna.tl°n, and comment should be superfluous. In conclusion, I wish to affirm that a satisfactory theory of revelation musti n vol v e a realistic epistemology. By realism in this connection I mean a theory that the human mind possesses some- truth--not an analogy of the truth, not a representation of or correspondence to the truth, not a mere hint of the truth, not a meaningless verbalism about a new species of truth, but the truth itself. God has spoken His Word in words, and these words are adequate symbols of the conceptual content. The conceptual content is literally true, and it is theunivocal, identical point of coincidence in the knowledge of God and
man.
Indianapolis, Indiana
c. AftftlOgy iM iM Knowabllltv q£ Q&cL. The knowledge we have of God is analoglcal. It is not exhaustive knowledge, but it
is
8—20 ) III
true,knowledge (cf. Van Til, AITST, UVlVOCfKL.
•
EcpiAi'vocAL,
6HC( l&o /
KNOWABILITY AND THE WAYS OF NEGATION.
EMINENCE.
AND CAUSALITY.
N.B.J See Hodge, I, 339-45. historical eTut?y-> A. The Ways Defined. The question of how we know God produced interesting answers by older theologians. They suggested three ways.: 1. She wax of negation. We deny Him any limitation. 2. The way of eminence. We ascribe to Him every excellence in the highest degree, c/.Artse/j^"V.crmbLoeiau9 use3. The way of causality We refer to Him every attribute manifested in His works? since He is the First Cause. Thus, we refer to Him all the attributes of our own nature as rational creatures, without limitation, and to an infinite degree. If we are like God, God is like us (cf. Acts 17:_
__
2£). B-
Cf. Pga. U^:8.
~
Th£ W^ys Defended. The method is trustworthy for: 1. I& Is a law of nature. 2.
Our moral nature demands such
3.
Our religious nature mand
TLL.
:
iX» 4.
makes
the
God.
a
same
de-
personal go id
.
Wg. c anno twpr ship, the law of grayj. Tjlllch s Ground Being.
2£
Th£ only: alternative is atheism. An unknown God
is
5.
nothing. The argument from nature agrees^ iwrA The Scriptures present such a God?1^"**°**s
7.
God's 2
revelation in Christ
Cor.
agrees.
Cf.
4:6.
Conclusion: We, then, answer Job s questions by a reference to God manifest in the flesh. Through Him we "find out God,andthe result is that we affirm with the psalmist, "And they that know Thy name will put theij trust
in
thee" (Psa. 9:10).
II. The A.
Knowability. of God
God Incomprehensible but yet Knowable. The Christian Church confesses on the
one
hand that God is the Incom-
prehensible One, but also on the other hand, that He can be known and that knowledge of Him is an absolute requisite unto salvation. It recognizes the force of Zophar's question, "Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find
the Almighty unto perfection?" Job 11:7. And it feels that it has no the question of Isaiah, "To whom then will ye liken God? or what likeness will ye compare unto Him?" Isa. 40:18. But at the same time it is also mindful of Jesus' statement, "And this is life eternal, that they should know Thee, the only true God, and Him whom thou didst send, even Jesus Christ," John 17:3. It rejoices in the fact that "the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we know Him that is true, and we are in Him that is' true, even in His Son Jesus Christ." I John 5:20. The two ideas reflected in these passages were always held side by side in the Christian Church. The early Church Fathers out
answer
to
spoke of the invisible God as an unbegotten, nameless, eternal, incomprehensible, unchangeable Being. They had advanced very little beyond the old Greek idea that the Divine Being is absolute attributeless existence. At the same time they also confessed that God revealed Himself in the Logos, and can therefore be known unto
salvation. In the fourth century Eunomius,
an
Arian, argued from the sim-
plicity of God, that there is nothing in God that is not perfectly known and comprchended by the human intellect, but his' view was rejected by all the recognized ; leaders of the Church. The Scholastics distinguished between the quid and the qualis of God, and maintained that we do not know what God is in His' essential Being, but can know something of His nature, of what He is to us, as He reveals Himself in His divine attributes. The same general ideas were expressed by the Reformers, though they did not agree with the Scholastics' as to the possibility of acquiring real knowledge of God, by unaided human reason, from general reve- ' lation. Luther speaks repeatedly of God as the Deus Absconditus (hidden God), j in distinction from Him
the Deus Revelatus (revealed God). In some passages speaks of the revealed God as still a hidden God in view of the fact that we cannot fully know Him even through His special revelation. To Calvin, God in the depths of His being is past finding out. "His: essence," he says, "is incom-
he
as
t
even
, >
that His divinity wholly escapes all human senses." The;, Reformers do not deny that man can learn something. of-the nature of-^Socy fronTHis creation, but maintain that he can acquire true, knowledge of Hint only from special revelation^Tmfler tlie iHumjnatingJSpirit, Under the influence of the pantheizing theology of immanence, inspired by Hegel
prehensible;
so
>
29
a change came about. The transcendence of God is softexplicitly denied. God is brought down to the level of the world, is made continuous with it, and is therefore regarded as less incomprehensible, though still shrouded in mystery. Special revelation in the sense of
and
Schleiermacher,
pedaled, ignored,
a
or
direct communication of God to
man
is denied. Sufficient knowledge of
God
be obtained without it, since man can discover God for himself in the depths of his own being, in the material universe, and above all in Jesus Christ, since these are all but outward manifestations of the immanent God. It is over against this trend in theology that Barth now raises his voice and points out that God is not to be found in nature, in history, or in human experience of any kind, but only in the special revelation that has reached us in the Bible. In his strong statecan
ments
respecting the hidden God he uses the language of Luther rather than
of Calvin.
for
Reformed theology holds that God can be known, but that it to have a knowledge of Him that is exhaustive and perfect
man
is impossible in every way.
a knowledge of God would be equivalent to comprehending Him, entirely out of the question: "Fjnitum non possit capere infinitum " Furthermore, man cannot give a definition of God in the proper sense of the word, but only a partiaLdescriptjon. A logical definition is impossible, because God cannotl)e subsumed under some higher genus. At the same time it is maintained that man can obtain a knowledge of God that is perfectly adequate for the realization of the divine purpose in the life of man. However, true knowledge of God can be acquired only from the divine self-revelation, and only by the man who accepts this with childlike faith. Religion necessarily presupposes such a knowledge. It is the most sacred relation between man and his God, a relation in which man is conscious of the absolute greatness and majesty of God as the supreme Being, and of his own utter insignificance and subjection to the High and Holy One. And if this is true, it follows that religion presupposes the knowledge of God in man. If man were left absolutely in the dark respecting the being of God, it would be impossible for him to assume a religious attitude. There could be no reverence, no piety, no fear of God, no worshipful
To have such
and this is
service. B. Denial of
the Knowability of God.
possibility of knowing God "has been denied on various grounds. This generally based on th6 supposed limits of the human faculty of cognition, though it has been presented in several different forms. The fundamental position is that the human mind is incapable of knowing anything of that which lies beyond and behind natural phenomena, and is therefore necessarily ignorant of supersensible and divine things. Huxley was the first to apply to those who assume this position, himself included, the name "agnostics." They are entirely in line with the sceptics of former centuries and of Greek philosophy. As a rule agnostics do not like to be branded as atheists, since they do not deny absolutely that there is a God, but declare that they do not know whether He The denial is
or not, and even if He exists, are not certain that they have any true knowledge of Him, and in many cases even deny that they can have any real knowledge of Him.
exists
He did not deny God, but asserted that we have no true knowledge of His attributes. All our ideas of Him are, and can only be, anthropomorphic. We cannot be sure that there is any reality corresponding to the attributes we ascribe to Him. His agnosticism resulted from the general principle that all knowledge is based on experience. It was especially Kant, however, who stimulated agnostic Hume has been called the father of modern agnosticism.
the existence of
thought by his searching inquiry into the limits of the human understanding and reason. He affirmed that the theoretical reason knows only phenomena and is necessarily ignorant of that which underlies these phenomena, â&#x20AC;&#x201D; the thing in itself. From this it followed, of course, that it is impossible for us to have any theoretical knowledge of God. But Lotze already pointed out that phenomena. whether physical or mental, are always connected with some substance lying back of them, and that in knowing the phenomena we also know the underlying substance, of which they are manifestations. The Scotch philosopher, Sir William Hamilton, while not in entire agreement with Kant, yet shared the intellectual agnosticism of the latter. He asserts that the human mind knows only that which is conditioned and exists in various relations, and that, since the Absolute and Infinite is entirely unrelated, that is exists in no relations, we can obtain no knowledge of it. But while he denies that the Infinite can be known by us*, he does not deny its existence. Says he, "Through faith we apprehend what is beyond our knowledge." His views were shared in substance by Mansel, and were popularized by him. To him also it seemed utterly impossible to conceive of an infinite Being, though he also professed faith in its existence. The reasoning of these two men did not carry conviction, since it was felt that the Absolute or Infinite does not necessarily exist outside of all relations, but can enter into various relations; and that the fact that we know things only in their relations does not mean that the knowledge so acquired is merely a relative or unreal knowledge. ,
to
Comte, the father of Positivism, was also agnostic in religion. According man can know nothing but physical phenomena and their laws. His
him
the sources of all true thinking, and he can know nothing except the phenomena which they apprehend and the relations in which these stand to each other. Mental phenomena can be reduced to material phenomena, and in science man cannot get beyond these. Even the phenomena of immediate consciousness are excluded, and further, everything that lies behind the phenomena. Theological speculation represents thought in its infancy. No positive affirmation can be made respecting the existence of God, and therefore both theism and atheism stand condemned. In later life Comte felt the need of some religion and introduced the so-called "religion of Humanity." Even more than Comte, Herbert Spencer is recognized as the great exponent of modern scientific agnosticism. He was influenced very much by Hamilton's doctrine of the relativity of knowl-
senses are
Mansel's conception of the Absolute, and in the light of these of the Unknowable, which was his designation of whatever may be absolute, first or ultimate in the order of the universe, including God. He proceeds on the assumption that there is some reality lying back of phenomena, but maintains that all reflection on it lands us in contradictions. This? ultimate reality is utterly inscrutable. While we must accept the existence of some ultimate Power, either personal or impersonal, we can form no conception of it. Inconsistently he_de.votes a great part of his First Principles to the development oUflie positive content of the Unknowable, as if it were well known ihdeed.Other agnostics, who were influenced by him, are such men as Huxley, Fiske, and Clifford. We meet with agnosticism also repeatedly in modern Humanism. Harry Elmer Barnes says: "To the writer it seems quite obvious that the agnostic position is the only one which can be supported by any scien-
edge and by
worked out his doctrine
in the present state of knowledge."1 Besides the forms indicated in the preceding the agnostic argument has assumed several others, of which the following are some of the most important. (J) Man knows only by analogy. We know only that which bears some analogy to our own nature or experience: "Similia similibus percipiuntur" But while it is true that we learn a great deal by analogy, we also learn by contrast. In many cases the differences are the very things that arrest our attention. The Scholastics spoke of the via negationis by which they in thought eliminated from God the imperfections of the creature. Moreover, we should not forget that man is made in the image of God, and that there are important analogies between the divine nature and the nature of man. Man really knows only what he grasp in its entirety. Briefly stated the position is that man cannot compretiend God, who is infinite, cannot have an exhaustive knowledge of Him, and therefore cannot know Him. But this position proceeds on the unwarranted assumption that partial knowledge cannot be real knowledge, an assumption which would really invalidate all our knowledge, since it always falls far short of completeness. Our knowledge of God, though not exhaustive, may yet be very real and perfectly adequate for our present needs. CD All predicates of God negative and__theLefazeâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;furnish no real knowledge. Hamilton says that the Absolute and the Infinite can only be conceived as a negation of the thinkable; which really means that we can have no conception of them at all. But though it is true that much of what we predicate to God is negative in form, this does
tifically-minded and critically-inclined person
can
are
not mean
that it
may
not at
the
same
time convey some positive
idea. The
his self-existence and self-sufficiency. and holiness, are positive. ÂŽ M. subject. It is said that we know the objects of knowledge, not as they are objectively, but only as they are related to our senses and faculties. In the process of knowledge we distort and colour them. In a sense it is perfectly true that all our knowledge is subjectively conditioned,
aseity of God includes the positive idea of Moreover, such ideas as love, spirituality, our knowledge is relative to the knowing
1.
The Twilight of
Christianity, p. 260.
import of the assertion
but the
under consideration seems to be that, because
know things only through the mediation of our senses and faculties, we do not know them as they are. But this is not true; in so far as we have any real
we
knowledge of things, that knowledge corresponds to the objective reality. The laws of perception and thought are not arbitrary, but correspond to the nature of~tKingS. Without such correspondence, not only the knowledge of God, but alTtrue"T:ndwIedge would be utterly impossible. Some are inclined to look upon the position of Barth as a species of agnosZerbe
ticism.
renders him
a
says
that practical agnosticism dominates
victim of the Kantian unknowablenes's
Barth's thinking and
of the Thing-in-Itself, and
follows: "Romans is a revelation of the unknown God; God to God. Even after the revelation man cannot know God, for He is always the unknown God. In manifesting Himself to us He is farther away than ever before. (Rbr. p. 53)".1 At the same time he finds Barth's agnosticism, like that of Herbert Spencer, inconsistent. Says he: "It was said of ^ Herbert Spencer that he knew a great deal about the 'Unknowable'; so of Barth, one wonders how he came to know so much of the 'Unknown GodV^ Dickie / speaks in a similar vein: "In speaking of a transcendent God, Barth seems sometimes to be speaking of a God of Whom we can never know anything."3 He finds, however, that in this respect too there has been a change of emphasis in Barth. While it is perfectly clear that Barth does not mean to be an agnostic, it cannot be denied that some of his statements can readily be interpreted as having an agnostic flavor. He strongly stresses the fact that God is the hidden God, who cannot be known from nature, history, or experience, but only by His self-revelation in Christ, when it meets with the response of faith. But even in this revelation God appears only as the hidden God. God reveals Himself exactly as the hidden God, and through His revelation makes us more conscious of the distance which separates Him from man than we ever were before. This can easily be interpreted to mean that we learn bv revelation merely that God cannot be known, so that after all we are face to face with an unknown God. But
quotes comes
him
as
to man, not man
this is clearly not what he wants to say. His assertion, that in the light of revelation we see God as the hidden God, does not exclude the idea that by revelation we also acquire a great deal of
in view of all that Barth has written
useful
He enters into relations with His people. When He savs that even in His revelation God still remains for us the unknown God, he really means, the incomprehensible God. The revealing God is God in action. By His revelation we learn to know Him in His operations, but acquire no real knowledge of His inner being. The following passage in The Doctrine of the Word of God,4 is rather illuminating: "On this freedom (freedom of God) rests the inconceivability of God, the inadequacy of all knowledge of the revealed God. Even the three-in-oneness of God is revealed to us only in God's opera-
knowledge of God
1. 2. 3. 4.
as
The Karl Barth Theology, p.
Ibid,
p.
Revelation and Response, p. p.
426.
82.
84.
187.
tions. Therefore the three-in-oneness of
God is also inconceivable to us. nence,
knowledge of the three-in-oneness. The conceivability with which it has appeared to us, primarily in Scripture, secondarily in the Church doctrine of the Trinity, is a creaturely conceivability. To the conceivability in which God exists for Himself it is not only relative: it is absolutely separate from it. Only upon the free_ grace of revelation does it depend_that the former conceivability, in its absolute separation from its object^ is yet not without truth. In this sense the three-in-oneness of God, as we_ know jJLftorn the operation of God,"is truths" u — too,
the inadequacy of all our
——
C. Self-revelation the Prerequisite 1.
of all Knowledge of God.
Himself to Man. Kuyper calls the knowledge of God differs in an im-
God communicates Knowledge of
attention to the fact that
theology
as
all other sciences from it
portant point from all other knowledge. In the study of man places himself above the object of his investigation and actively elicits his knowledge T)v"whatever method may seem most appropriate, but in theology. he does not stand above but rather under the object of his knowledge. In words, man can know God" only in so far as the latter actively known. God is first of all the subject communicating knowledge to man, can only become an object of study for man in so far as the latter and reflects on the knowledge conveyed to him by revelation. Without revelation man would never have been able to acquire any knowledge of God. And even after God has revealed Himself objectively, it is not human reason that discovers God, but it is God who discloses Himself to the eye of faith. However,
other makes Himself and appropriates
by the
"application"of sanctified human reason to the study of God's Word man can, under^jhe-gpidance of the Holy Spirit, gain an ever-increasing knowledge of God. \Barth also stresses the fact that man can know God only when God comes to himSH-an-^act of revelation. He asserts that there is no way from man to God, but only from God to man, and says repeatedly that God is always the subject, and never an object. Revelation is always something purely subjective, and can never turn into something objective like the written Word of Scripture, and as such become an object of study. It is given once for all in Jesus Christ, and in Christ comes to men in the existential moment of their lives. While there are elements of truth in what Barth says, his construction of the doctrine of revelation is foreign to Reformed theology. be maintained, however, that theology would be utterly self-revelation of God. And when we speak of revelation, we use the term in the strict sense of the word. It is not something in which God is passive, a mere "becoming manifest," but something in which He is actively making Himself known. It is not, as many moderns would have it, a deepened spiritual insight which leads to an ever-increasing discovery of God the part of man; but a supernatural act of self-communication, a purposeful act on the part of the Living God. There is nothing surprising in the fact that God can be known only if, and in so far as, He reveals Himself. In a measure The position must
impossible without
on
a
also true of man. Even after Psychology has made a rather exhaustive study of man, Alexis Carrell is still able to write a very convincing book on Man the Unknown. "For who among men," says Paul, "knoweth the things of aman, save the spirit of the man, which is in him? even so the things of God none knoweth, save the Spirit of God." I Cor. 2:11. The Holy Spirit searcheth all things, even the deep things of God, and reveals them unto man. God has made Himself known. Alongside of the archetypal knowledge of God, found in God Himself, there is also an ectypal knowledge of Him, given to man by revelation. The latter is related to the tormer as a copy is to the original, and therethis is
fore does not possess
the
of clearness and perfection. All our/ self-revelation in nature and in Scripture.
same measure
knowledge of God is derived from His
Consequently, our Tcnowledge of God is on the one hand ectypal and analogical, but"onl:Fe"otTier~Fan d~ also true and accurate, since it is a copy of the_archetvpat knowledge which God has of Himself.
(2p Innate and Acquired Knowledge of God (cognitio insita and A distinction is usuallv made between innate and acquired knowledge of God. This is not a strictlv logical distinction, because in the last analysis all human knowledge is acquired. The doctrine of innate ideas is philosophical rather than theological. The seeds of it are alreadv found in Plato*s_doctrine of ideas, while it occurs in Cicero's De Natura Deorum in a mo redeveloped form.
ACQUISTa)
.
taught first of all bv Descartes, who regarded the necessary to consider this aS innate in tfop gpnsp that it was consciously present in the human mind from the gtart. hut only in the sense that man has a natural tendency to form the idea when the mind reaches maturity. The doctrine finally assumed the form that there are certain ideas, of which the idea of God is the most prominent, which are inborn and are therefore present in human consciousness from birth. It was in this form that Locke rightlv attaeked the doctrine of innate ideas, though he went to another extreme in his philosophical empiricism. Reformed theologv also reiected the doctrine in that particular form. And while some of its representatives retained the name "innate ideas." but gave it another connotation, others preferred to speak of a coznitio Dei insita (ingrafted or implanted knowledge of God). On the one hand this cognitio Dei insita does not consist in anv ideas or formed notions which are present in man at the time of his birth: but on the other hand it is more than a mere capacity which enables man to know God. Tt denotes a knowledge that necessarily results from the constitution of the human mind, that is inborn only in the sense that it is acquired spontaneously. under the influence of the semen religionis implanted in man bv his creation~in the image of God, and that is not acquired T>v the laborious process of reason" jng and argumentation. It is a knowledge which man. constituted as he is. acquires of necessity. and as such is distinguished from all knowledge that is conditioned bv the will of man. Acquired knowledge, on the other hand, is obtained bv the studv of God's revelation. It does not arise spontaneously in human mind, but results from the conscious and sustained pursuit of In modern
philosophy it
idea of God
as
was
innate. He did not deem it
knowledge. It
can be acquired only by the wearisome process of perception and reflection, reasoning and argumentation. Under the influence of the Hegelian
Idealism and of the modern view of evolution the innate knowledge of God has been over-emphasized; Barth on the other hand denies the existence of any such knowledge.
(3:^) General revelation of Cod: ness,
and Special Revelation. The Bible testifies' to a twofold a revelation in nature round about us, in human conscious-
and in the providential government of the world; and a revelation embodied as the Word of God. It testifies to the former in such passages as
in the Bible
the following: "The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmanent showeth His handiwork. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge,'9 Ps. 19:1,2. "And yet He left not Himself without witness, in that He did good and gave you from heaven rains and fruitful seasons, filling
hearts with food and gladness," Acts 14:17. "Because that which is known invisible things of Him since the creation of the world are clearly seen, being perceived through the things that are made, even His' everlasting power and divinity," Rom. 1:19, 20. Of the latter it gives abundant evidence in both the Old and the New Testament. "Yet Jehovah testified unto Israel, and unto Judah, by every prophet, and every seer, saying, Turn ye from your evil ways, and keep my commandments and my statutes, according to all the law which I commanded vour fathers, and which I sent to you by mv servants the prophets," I Kings 17:13. "He hath made known His ways unto Moses, His doings unto the children of Israel," Ps. 103:7. "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten your
of God is manifest in them; for God manifested it unto them. For the
Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him," John 1:18.
"God, having of old time spoken unto the fathers in the prophets by divers portions and in divers manners, hath at the end of these days spoken to us in His Son," Heb. 1:1,2. On the basis of these scriptural data it became customary to
speak of natural supernatural revelation. The distinction thus applied to the idea of revelation is primarily a distinction based on the manner in which it is communicated to man; but in the course of history it has also been based in part on the nature of its subject-matter. The mode of revelation is natural when it is communicated through nature, that is, through the visible creation with its ordinary laws and powers. It is .supernatural when it is communicated, to man in a higher, supernatural manner, as when God speaks to him, either directly, or through superand
messengers. The substance of revelation was regarded as natural, if it could be acquired by human reason from the study of nature; and was considered to be supernatural when it could not be known from nature, nor by unaided human reason. Hence it became quite common in the Middle Ages
ngturally endowed
reason and revelation. In Protestant theology natural revelation was often called a revelatio realis, and supernatural revelation a revelatio verbalis, because the former is embodied in things, and the latter in words. In course of
to contrast
time, however, the distinction between natural and supernatural revelation
was
found to be rather ambiguous, since all revelation is supernatural 111 origin ana, as a revelation of God, also in content. Ewald in his work on Revelation: its
speaks of the revelation in nature as immediate revewhich he regards as the only one deserving the name "revelation" in the fullest sense, as mediate revelation. A more common distinction, however, which gradually gained currency, is that of general and special revelation. Dr. Warfield distinguishes the two as follows": "The one is addressed generally to ^HnteBigerTt creatures, and is therefore accessible to all men; the other is addressed to a special class of sinners, to whom God would make known His' salvation. The one has in view to meet and supply the natural need of creatures for knowledge of their God; the other to rescue broken and deformed sinners from their sin and its consequences."2 General revelation is rooted in creation, is addressed to man as man, and mpre particularly to human reason, and finds its purpose in the realization of the end of his creation, to know God and thus enjo> communion w>rfi Him. Special revelation is rooted in the redemptive plan of God, is/addressed to man as sinner, can be properly understood and appropriated only by faith, and serves the purpose of securing the end for which man was created in spite of the disturbance wrought by sin. In view of the eternal plan of redemption it should be said that this special revelation did not come in as an after-thought, but was in the mind of God from the very beginning.
Nature and Record1
lation, and of the revelation in Scripture,
There
was
reason.
opinion respecting the relation of Scholasticism natural revelation provided (7
considerable difference of
these two to each other. According to the necessary data for the construction But while it enabled
man
oT~a sci^t^c*natural theology by human
to attain to a
scientific knowledge of God as
things, it did not provide for the knowledge of the mysteries, Such as the Trinity, the incarnation, and redemption. This knowledge is supplied by special revelation. It is a knowledge that is not rationally the ultimate
cause
of all
must be accepted by faith. Some of the earlier Scholastics guided by the slogan "Credo ut intelligam," and, after accepting the truths of special revelation by faith, considered it necessary to raise faith to understanding by a rational demonstration of those truths, or at least to prove their rationality. Thomas Aquinas, however, considered this impossible, except in so far as special revelation contained truths which also formed a part of natural revelation. In his opinion the mysteries, which formed the real contents of supernatural revelation, did not admit of any logical demonstration. He held, however, that there could be no conflict between the truths of natural and those of supernatural revelation. If there appears to be a conflict, there is something wrong with one's philosophy. The fact remains, however, that he recognized, besides the structure reared by faith on the basis of supernatural revelation, a system of scientific theology on the foundation of natural revelation. In the
demonstrable but were
former 1. 2.
p.
one
assents to
something because it is revealed, in the latter because it
5 f.
Revelation and
Inspirationt
p.
6.
perceived as true in tne ngnt 01 natural reason, me logical uewuusixauuii, which is out of the question in the one, is the natural method of proof in the other.
is
The Reformers rejected the dualism of the Scholastics and aimed at a synthesis of God's twofold revelation. They did not believe in the ability of human reason to construct a scientific system of theology on the basis of natural revelation pure and^ijmple. Their view of the matter may be represented as follows: As a result of the entrance of sin into the world, the handwriting of God in nature is greatly obscured, and is in some of the most important matters rather dim and illegible. Moreover, man is stricken with spiritual blindness, and is thus deprived of the ability to read aright what God had originally plainly written in the works of creation. In order to remedy the matter and to prevent the frustration of His purpose, God did two things. In His supernatural revelation He republished the truths of natural revelation, cleared them of misconception, interpreted them with a view to the present needs of man, and thus incorporated them in His supernatural revelation of redemption. And in addition to that He provided a cure for the spiritual blindness of man in the work of regeneration and sanctification, including spiritual illumination, and thus enabled man once more to obtain true knowledge of God, the knowledge that carries with it the assurance of eternal life. When the chill winds of Rationalism swept over Europe, natural revelation exalted at the expense of revelation. Man became with a sense of his own ability and goodness, refused to listen and submit to the voice of authority that spoke to him in Scripture, and reposed complete trust the ability of human reason to lead him out of the labyrinth of ignorance error into the clear atmosphere of true knowledge. Some who maintained that natural revelation was quite sufficient to teach men all necessary truths, still admitted that they might learn them sooner with the aid of supernatural revela-
supernatural
was
intoxicated
in and
authority of supernatural revelation was complete, demonstrated by reason. And finally Deism in some forms denied, not only the necessity, but also the possibility and reality
tion. Others denied that the
until its contents had been of its of
supernatural revelation. In Schleiermacher the
emphasis shifts from the
objective to the subjective, from revelation to religion, and that without any distinction between natural and revealed religion. The term "revelation" is still retained, but is reserved as a designation of the deeper spiritual insight of man, an insight which does not come to him, however, without his own diligent search. What is called revelation from one point of view, may be called human discovery from another. This view has become quite characteristic of modern theology. Says Knudson: "But this distinction between natural and revealed theology has now largely fallen into disuse. The present tendency is to draw no sharp line of distinction between revelation and the natural reason, but to look upon the highest insights of reason as themselves divine revelations. In any case there is no fixed body of revealed truth, accepted on authority, that
Stands
opposed 10 me truuis 01 reason,
ah truui iu-uay resus on lis power oi
appeal to the human mind."1 It is this view of revelation that is denounced in
the strongest terms by
jBarth,, He is particularly "interested in the subject of revelation, and wants to(^ lead the Church back from the subjective to the objective, from religion to revelation. In the former he sees primarily man's efforts to find God, and in the latter "God's search for man" in Jesus Christ. Barth does not recognize any revelation in nature. Revelation never exists on any horizontal line, but always^ comes down perpendicularly from above. Revelation is always God in action,
j'
God speaking, bringing something entirely new to man, something of which he could have no previous knowledge, and which becomes' a real revelation only
God-given faith. Jesus Christ Jesus Christ knows anything of grace, by which man becomes
for him who accepts the object of revelation by a is the revelation of God, and only he who knows about revelation at all. Revelation is an act conscious of his sinful condition, but also of God's
condescension in Jesus Christ. Barth
even
free, unmerited, and forgiving
calls it the reconciliation. Since God
always sovereign and free in His revelation, it can never assume a factually form with definite limitations, to which man can turn at any time for instruction. Hence it is a mistake to regard the Bible as God's revelation in any other than a secondary sense. It is a witness to, and a token of, £od'g revelation. The same may be said, though in a subordinate sense, of the is
present, objective
preaching of the gospel. But through whatever mediation the word of God may to man in the existential moment of his life, it is always recognized by man as a word directly spoken to him, and coming perpendicularly from above. This recognition is effected by a special operation of the Holy Spirit, by what may be called an individual testimonium Spiritus Sancti. The revelation of God was given once for all in Jesus Christ: not in His historical appearance, but in the superhistorical in which the powers of the eternal world become evident, such as His incarnation and His death and resurrection. And if His revelation is also continuous as it is —, it is such only in the sense that God continues to speak to individual sinners, in the existential moment of their lives, through the revelation in Christ, mediated by the Bible and by preaching. Thus we are left with mere flashes of revelation coming to individuals, of which only those individuals have absolute assurance; and fallible witnesses to, or tokens of, the revelation in Jesus Christ, — a rather precarious foundation for theology. It is no wonder that Barth is in doubt as to the possibility of constructing a doctrine of God. Mankind is not in possession of any infallible revelation of God, and of His unique revelation in Christ and its extension in the special revelations that come to certain men it has knowledge only through the testimony of fallible witnesses.
come
—
1.
The Doctrine
of Godt
p.
173.
Questions for further study: In what sense can we speak of the hidden or unknown God in spite of the fact that He has revealed Himself? How did the Scholastics and the Reformers differ on this point? What is the position of modern theology? Why is revelation essential to religion? How does agnosticism differ theoretically from atheism? Is the one more favorable to religion than the other? How did Kant promote agnosticism? What was
GA
V (
The
essence of idolatry is the entertainment thoughts about God that are unworthy of Him. ToZer, 11.
of
•
& 0
z
Lecture
#1
"WHAT CAN WE KNOW ABOUT OOP?, OR THE ATTRIBUTES DEFINED AND CLASSIFIED"
Tlsalah ^0:25:
l:l8";
John
1 Peter
2:9)
Introduction: 1. The introduction to a serious study of the attributes of G-od demands .justification in
day, for it suggests a heavy, labored and academic exercise. It is right to ask that God's messenger, as the Quakers used to say, "speak to the condition" of his hearers. That justification is clearly seen if we simply point to "the loss of the concept of majesty from the popular our
CO illu*
o
©
religious mind" (Tozer. 6). ILL.: (IT"Perkins Chapel dancing; Montreat -i? evening service. Happy, but "in Lord"?
(2) Tozer, "The words,
and
know that
I
G-od
'Be still,
next to nothing to the self-confident, bustling worshlper m this middle period of the twen-
century"
tieth 2.
The
am
,
mean
(p. (Tf.
Ajor ■nie
importance of right thoughts about
CANNOT, CANNOT, CANNOT be overestimated. No nation, no individual can ever rise sJpove their idea of G-od. If we knew what political leaders thought about G-od, we
vspuld be able to tne church.
foretell
Further,
any
error
tice
that
in doctrine cannot
unworthy thoughts then
be
the history of
th#re is scarcely
or
failure
traced
to
about G-od.
in prac-^
imperfect Cf. Isa.
ana
5.'
LBJ and "memorial to G-od. ILL. T— No revival under him The
presence
Idolatry. character,
of wrong thoughts is really It is at bottom a libel on His for it assumes He is_ other than
He is. Idolatry, entertainment of are
then, in essence is the thoughts about G-od that unworthy of Him. Unbelief—»wrong
thoughts-->worship of idols—^immorality (cf. Psa. 115:8). How important, then, is the question of philosopher," theologian," man of street, and child, 1TWhat is G-od CO
like? ILL.: Theothanatology,
logy," o
not
surprising.
of
"G-od-is-dead
Theo-
Making
J'
at a
large depatfr
I presented the store's credjt
2
saying, "You have
^A
card
purchase
to the salesgirl. As I was signing the sales slip, she handed me the carcj,
^
I
never signed this." signed the card and handed it to
her, along with the sales slip, where-
she compared the two signatures, found them satisfactorily similar and upon
^ or-
ay
ment store,
*
,
'
a
0t</>
the sale! MA^/a^'YDE Wadlow, Jr. (Jackson Heights, N.Y.)
rang up
vm
wen
rentrap is e ht to
",ecalp
replace
that eh said. sign
evissergga
"Your
first gnuoy duty as .deyoj
management tI lliw " be around denwo good to
have ,ssenisub
Mr. denioj some sih Wilson was rehtaf in nehW a overeoJ small nosliW
familyfinished
college and
I
SOME PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS. N.B.: A few questions concerning methodology and validity are necessary at this point. A.
Methodology in the vine Attributes. 1.
FB
Determination of the Pi-
The wrong way.
The Scholastics spoke of three ways of
'
determining the attributes:
245-46
negation!s (we remove from our idea of God all imperfections seen in His creatures and ascribe to Him the opposit-es; we remove from Him all false images,.thus speaking of Him as independent, infinite, in-
corporeal,
immense,
Comprehensible).
immortal and inchafehmaj j ,
eminentiae (we ascribe to God
(12.)
in the most emineht'~way the relative perfections of man. Brunner, "Man is mighty, the angels are
mightier, God is
Almighty" (I, 245)
(o) Via causalitatis (we rise from effects~~in world to 1st cause, from creation to Almighty Creator, from moral government to Wise Ruler. But the method, beginning in man, makes him the measure of God. It is, as Brunner feels, "possibilities of knowing "God" in a human manner; they are natural, rational theology" (italics mine; I, 24ÂŁ; cf. Barth, I1/1, 390 ff.). 2.
The The
right
way.
right source of the knowledge of
divine self-revelation, the Scrip Self-revelation supplants human
God
is tures.
discovery. Nature may give Christians light on His power and deity, but even then the Bible must be "the spectacles" of
the beholder
(cf. Calvin).
C_f. Rom.
1:18-23 B.
Validity in the Can of
we
God
be
Study of the Attributes.
the conceptions we have objectively true? Two extremes avoided: (l) Our conceptions are sure
that
are
must be
adequate in kind and degree to represent God in His perfections (there is more of Him than
we
shall
ever
know,
and what we do
Anthropomorphism is found throughout the it is by no means a "primitive way God and it easily harmonizes with a highly spiritual theology, as, for example, in Second Isaiah: God speaks (€en, 1.3)» hears (Ex. 16.12), sees (Gen. 6.12), smells (I Sam. 26.19), laughs (Ps. 2.4; 59• 9) whistles (Is. 7.18) 5
Old Testament; OF SPEAKING OF
»
he
makes
use
of
the
organs
suited to these func-
(Amost 9-4), hands (Ps. 139-5)> (Is. 51-9; 52.10; Jer. 27.5)» ears (Is. 22.14), and feet (Nahum 1.3; Is. 63.3) which he places on a footstool (Is. 66.1). His bearing is described with the help of the most realistic anthropomorphisms: he treads the wine-press like a grape gather (Is. 63.1-6), he rides on the clouds (Dt. 33-26; Hab. 3-8) . . Figures of speech borrowed from military language are particularly frequent. Yahwe'h is gibbor and an ' is'h milchamah (Ex. 15-3; Ps. 24.8; Zech. 9-13)» because at the period which may coincide with the first age of settlement in tions:
he
has eyes
arms
.
Canaan war was the normal Yahweh to reveal himself are
all
and
even
the
only way for
Anthropomorphisms accompanied by anthropopathismss God feels the
.
.
.
emotions of human beings--joy
(Zeph.
3.17), disgust (Lev. 20.23), repentance (Gen. 6i6) and above all jealousy (Ex. 20.5; Dt. 5-9)Jacob, 39-40.
of
ftlVlLLG- S SLl
T.^ICKLA^
/
knowAHim we know imperfectly (child and philosopher or statesman living in same city /AAH, 130/; (2) our knowledge is purely illusory (leads to skepticism, if not dogmatic atheism). If our minds, taught by the Spirit and the Word, present us illusory conceptions of what God is, then we have no assurance they give us evidence that He is. Would the Creator will that we think of Him as He is not? We could never, then, trust
thoughts and faculties.
our
C.
Problem of Ant'nropornorphism
The
(
»
uy-n-os
,
M-op , form) . The term refers to speech about God's nature in human terms (God's face, Exod. 33:11, 20; eyes, 2 Chron. 16:9; nostrils, 2 Sam. 22:9, 16; arms and feet, Isa. 52:10; Psa. 18:9, etc.). ILL. : Richard. Gridley and God s nostrils. man;
Such anthropomorphisms are both necessary and valid. 1. If man is created in God's image (cf. Gen.
£?•
JAKOB, TOTOT, 3?-
(a*}
A/^c^b'iiy
<&>&S M£AAJid<s
co%/n&?rt
£S
Wj&T
Kticid IT ro
7Aum
1:26-27), there must be some relationship between the two (personal, rational Spirit). 2^ GHC
P&S-VicA-
vocal. TOW A
Kuaj- •
We have
f
we
3.
other way
no
cannot
of knowing God,
if
speak of Him in our terms.
(John l:l3TT was manifested in just such relationships, possessing just such at-
The
God-man,
tributes
who
that
has revealed God
indicate He
was
God
and
man.
II
THE DEFINITION. OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES. N.B.: The term attribute is not ideal, for it conveys the notion of adding something to the Divine Being. Berkhof likes properties." or the Biblical term, "virtues" (1 Pet. 2:9). Per-
haps A.
we
may point
out their meaning in this way:
What They Are Not. They are not (1) parts
of the divine essence, for the whole essence is in each attribute and the attribute in the essence
(essence did
not exist by itself and prior attributes; God is not essence and attributes, but in attributes'/cf. Turretin, WGTS, 3347)J (2) persons (person a mode of the existence of the essence, attribute a to
Rsse.
Ch&kx pfts&l
the
mode
of the
internal relation
or
external
operation of the essence).
1
r
Berkhof,
"the
perfections which are predicaBeing in Scripture, or are visibly exercised by Him in His works of creation, providence, and redemption" (52). ted
of the
Divine
Pardington, "an essential, permanent, and distinguishing quality or characteristic, which may be affirmed of a subject; as the color and fragrance of a
rose."
In
(77)
thought an attribute is separable from its subject, but not so in experience; thus, we can think of the color or gragrance of a rose as an abstract quality, apart from the substance of the rose, but we could not take the color or fragrance away from the rose without thereby losing the rose
(Pardington, 77).
4
B.
What They Are. As Shedd says, "The modes either of the
Divine Attributes are relation,
or
of the
operation of the Divine essence.
They are, consequently, an analytical and closer description of thb essence" (DT, I, 334). They
are
1.
of two kinds: As passively related to sence is self-existent
Itself, and
the
es-
simple;
as
passively related to duration, it is eternal; to space, it is immense; to number, it is one. All these are inactlve relationships. modes of existing. 2.
As
actively related to action,
or
ener-
it is omnipotent; to cognizing, ends,
gizing,
omniscience; to adapting means to wisdom; to benevolent energizing,
good-
ness.
KBT's "essence box" has two com(box really a false picture, if only part of essence considered in each attribute). Berkhof's definition.
ILL.:
partmentd
Ill
THE-CLASSIFICATION OF THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES N.B. : Ma.ny attempts have been made to classify the attributes, some being: eRicusori A.
Natural and Moral Attributes.
former, such as self-existence, simpli-'' city, infinity, etc., belong to His constitutional nature. The others belong to His will, being such as truth, goodness, mercy, justice, etc. But the moral are just as natural in God as the others. Dabney prefers the terms, "moral" and "non-moral." The
B.
Absolute and Relative. The former belong to in
itself,
lation to
the His
His
essence
latter to His creation.
The
considered
essence ones
are
in
re-
self-
existence,
immensity, eternity; the others omnipresence, omniscience. But really all the perfections of God are relative, indicating what He is in relation to the world. We cannot have knowledge of God as He is in Himself apart from His relations to us. Strong prefers this classification. are
C.
such
Immanent sitive. go
as
or
Intransitive and Smanent or Tranformer are those which do not
The
forth and operate outside of the divine
5 essence,
but remain immaneht,
immensity, others
do
such
1 as
simplicity, eternity, etc. and produce
effects
external
The to
God, such as omnipotence, justice, etc. But, if some of the attributes are purely immanent, all knowledge of them would be excluded, it would seem. D*
Positive and Negative. The positive express some positive perfection of the essence, such as omnipresence,
omnipotence. They belong in a finite degree to the creature (Shedd, I, 337). The negative deny all defect or limitation of any kind to God, such as immutability, infinitude, incomprehensibility, etc. (cf. AAH, 00T, 137). Active and Passive. The active involve action,
such as omnipojustice, benevolence, while the
tence,
F.
passive have the
idea of rest,
self-e^xistence,
immensity, eternity-,
The ommunicable and This is the "most
55).
hof,
The
such
as
etc.
Communicable. common
distinction" (Berk
incommunicable
are those which have no analogy to the creature, such as aseitas (self-origination), immuta-
bility,
infinity, unity, etc. The communicable are those to which the properties of human nature bear some analogy, such as His power, goodness, mercy, etc.
We must qualify this,
righteousness, however. As
"All God's attributes known to conceivable by us, are communicable, inasmuch as they have their analogy in us,
Hodge us,
says,
or
but they are all alike asmuch as they are all
incommunicable, ininfinite" (137).
But all the classifications must not be understood to divide God's Being into two parts, as He is in Himself and as He is to His creatures. If we remember that the attributes be-
longing to the first class quailfy all those belonging to the second class, so that we can say that He is one, absolute, unchangeable, and infinite in His wisdom, goodness and love, grace and mercy, etc., then the division is acceptable.
Conclusions;
(1) First, an attribute, then, is not a -part of G-od; it is how He is. and how He relates Himself to ward
us.
He
does
not
have
love
to-
He is. love. His love does not grow, or diminish, or cease to be. And when He loves, He is simply being Himself.1 us;
(2) Second,
we
began by saying that there is
nothing; more important than our thoughts about G-od. And there is nothing more diffi-
cult, but also nothing more rewarding. should be for us "a sweet and absorbing spiritual exercise" (Tozer, 20). ILL.: Thomas Traherne, "As nothing is more easy than to think, so nothing is more difficult than to think well" (Tozer, 22). It
r
•unmoi S9^nqx«mv (X) <Z)
YINTEDROTABXL-SUAPRUSBLNJAIGEECMNTT,WYWCORHWOIICOE. itintceamsoaopatboknrsy OWN Beeaddg
NATIO L YOUR OINSENRT MAKE
\ ft q#/4K i1 5
5
h
o o> CO hO
to
The
ASU..
in
Made
The
child by
his question, "Where did God
from?" is unwittingly acknowledging his creaturehood. Already the concept of cause and source and origin is firmly fixed in"his mind. He knows that everything around him came from something other than itself, and he simply extends that concent upward to God. The little philosopher come
is
thinking in true creature-idiom and, allowing of basic information, he is reasoning correctly. HE MUST BE TOLD THAT GOD HAS NO ORIGIN, and he will find this hard to grasp since it introduces a category with which he is wholly unfamiliar and contradicts the bent toward origin-seeking so deeply ingrained in all intelligent beings, a bent that impels them to profee ever back and back toward undiscovered beginnings. Tozer, pp. 32-33for his lack
Contemporary
man seems
|^^But that is not all. He is ^^Fname,
to have lost God's address.
unsure
how to pronounce God's
and, at times, unsure even of that name, or whether, in fact, God is nameable. Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation. and Authority, V, 9ÂŤ
You
might think that the most vital issue for any today is church union, or social witness, or dialogue with other Christians and other faiths, or refuting this or that -ism, or developing a Christian philosophy and culture, or what have you. But our line of study makes the present-day concentration on these things look like a gigantic conspiracy of misdirection. Of course, it is not that; the issues themselves are real and must be dealt with in their place. real
But
or
(iji)
would-be Christian in the world
is ^ragic, that, in paying attention to them,
so
in our day seem to have been distracted from what was, is, and always will be the true priority for every human beingâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;that is, learning to know God in Christ. Packer, many
Knowing God, p.
25^.
The Attributes of God (2): 'The Incommunlcable Attributes (l): Self-Existence Introduction. The attributes of God are "the perfections of the divine essence," set forth in the Scriptures or visibly exercised in His works of creation, providence, and redemption.1 We have divided them into two classes!(1) incommunc&ble. or those that bear little analogy to the properties of human nature; (2) communicable, or those that bear considerable analogy to the properties of human na-
ture. The attributes are "the badges of Divinityâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; that glory which He will not and cannot give to another. Without these, He would only be a man or an
angel on a larger
scale."2
With this study we begin a consideration of the incommunicable attributes, and the first, as well as perhaps the most important, is God's selfexistence. To express this Anselm used the idea of aseltv. a being from oneself (esse a sg) not from another (esse ab alio). or self-origination.3 The truth is somewhat related to "the Absolute" of phil-
osophy, providing, of course, that the "the" is not conceived of aj. neuter, for an "it" cannot be absolute according to revelation!4 Reformed theologians have generally used the term independentia. or independence, for self-existence. The idea is found in such passages as Idaiah 44:6. X Timothy 6:16. and John 512.6. ILLUSTRATION: Novatlan and child s cuestlon.5
1
THE PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT FOR SELF-EXISTENCE,
A.
Introductory Considerations.
Several things must be kept in mind. self-existdnce cause of being.
(l) First,
essentially means the negation of a As Thornwell puts it""God has neve]
Cf. Berkhof, p..52. "Thornwell, I, 189-90. 2Monologlon. v-vi. Brunner, I, 144. He also discusses the related concept of actus purus.â&#x20AC;&#x201D;God is pure activity who posits, creates, gives, or simply, the Living God, the source of all life (Psa. 36:10). -
Tozer,
p.
32.
begun to be.
His exisfcejifwg is dependent upon
species"3f~cause,
no
ei4he#~ that of a supe*rloP will, or that resulting from the union and combination of elements, which may again be separated and reduce Him to nothing. He is because He is. "I am that I am." We can go no farther in explaining the grounds of His being. The understanding is paralyzed, but faith is not
staggered."1
(2) Second, two common expressions must be (a) that God is His own proper cause."
avoided:
Self-existence must always be
No being;
sense.
can
taken in a negative
originate
itself.â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the idea
it-
self is contradictory, involving existence and nonexistence at the same time (cf. laws of identity),
(b) That necessity is the ground of the divine exisas if. since" He must be presupposed to" explain what exists, necessity becomes a "caused Necesslty is only invoked to explain the existence of what is caused, however. The necessity of God's tence.
existence,
is simply the explanation of that It is, simplv stated, the necesunorlginated cause.2
to us, caused.
which is
slty of an
(3) Third, it must not be forgotten that this
"pervades
determinate perfection He is independent in knowledge; He derives nothing from without; He has . no teachers; and He has nothing to learn (no DTSl).' If in any respect He were ignorant, in that respect He would be dependent for His knowledge. He has no partners in counsel; His wisdom is as original as His nature; and His power is free from all limitations and conditions. He does what He will among independence
of God
as
the armies
well
as
every
His being.
of heaven and
the
inhabitants of the
earth, and none can stay His hand or say unto Him, What doest Thou? So, also, His righteousness, holiness, goodness and truth are as absolute as His nature. On the same ground that He is at all, He is what He
is."3
1Thornwell, I, 192.
I, 190.
2Ibid.. I,
191.
5lbld.
-te
"Qr
;
I.
THE
Tfi %
'ÂŁ
ARGUMSS1_AJEDSTERI0BI.
*
"""*
95
quit of the idea of any one having existed from eternity, each beings in the succession must have begun in time; but
of the
the succession itself is eternal.
We
have, therefore, the succesbeings infinitely earlier than any being in the succession ; or, in other words, a series of beings running on ad infinitum, before it reached any particular being, which is absurd."1 sion of
Yet this idea of
an
infinite series is the fundamental
principle of atheism; and the possibility or impossibility of it the great point at issue between the atheist and the theist. On this subject, then, we may still further remark:â&#x20AC;&#x201D;There are only three possible suppositions come
to all that exists.
as
into existence out of
It must have
nothing, without
any cause at all, / it must have been produced by^ some extraneous cause, without itself, which we have seen, cannot be true with regard to every thing, an infinite series of
which is
;;
.
Jv
|
a
contradiction;
or
successively dependent beings having, in various ways, though essentially on one principle, been demonstrated to be absurd; or, thirdly, the only remaining supposition, that the Being "which-* has existed from eternity, and independently, must be selfexistent, must exist from the necessity of his own nature. When, however, we speak of the self-existence, or necessary existence of Deity, and attempt to analyse our conceptions in employing the terms, we shall find, that we have hardly any distinct or definite ideas, further than that we feel ourselves
involved in contradiction when
we
non-existence.
long
make the
supposition of his keep within the boundaries of creation and time, we feel ourselves, comparatively, at ease. We are assisted in our conceptions by the divisions of ,.y time, and by attaching to all that we successively survey, a fit notion of commencement. ^ But when we have traced creation > to its origin, when we have got to that " beginning, in which God created the heavens and the earth;" or (since even from revelation itself we know that there were other intelligent creatures in existence previously to that periodâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;those " morning stars" and " sons of God," who " sang together," and " shouted for The truth
is,
so
as we
"
{
1
Works, vol. i.
pp.
18, 19.
t/u
joy," when " the foundations of our earth were laid ;"x and since we are in entire ignorance what other creatures may have existed, and what other worlds may have been brought into being before ours; or, according to the speculations of the geologist, what other orders of beings inhabited our own in an earlier stage of its organization and furniture ; let me rather say), when we have passed the limits of time, which commenced when Deity put forth his first act of creative power, and brought the first creature into existence, we
then feel ourselves
boundless and trackless
deserted
on a
vision in
every
direction, but
can
find
We strain
ocean.
no
as
if
our
rest for the aching
In travelling up through creation, we along a ready answer to the question, Whence came this ? by ascribing all, in succession, to the almighty agency of the great First Cause. But when we pass creation ; when we find this Being existing alone; and when we begin to ask the same question with regard to him, and to attempt to account for his existence, we are at a stand. T)ie mind ex-
and bewildered eye.
found
all
^eriences all that oppression and agony, which arise from the on which to fix. It tries its immensity and the eternity of the great First Cause of all things; but in vain. It feels itself at every point to which it turns, stupified and lost. To the questions,
entire want of
any
utmost efforts on
Whence
came
thing definite
the
God ?â&#x20AC;&#x201D;How does he exist ?
it
can
return no
And, according as pride and self-sufficiency on the
answer.
the other, are its distinguishing characters, it will either be confounded and bewildered into atheism, or, in prostrate adoration, with the lowone
hand,
or
humility and self-diffidence
liest sentiments of self-abasement,
on
and the intensest feelings of
devotion, with all that the Bible means by " reverence and godly fear,"2 will dictate to the lips the exclamation: " Canst thou by We
searching find out God?"3 never
1 8
Job xi. 7.
should allow ourselves to forget, however, that a
Job xxxTiii. 7.
See
a
profound and eloquent
2 Heb. xii. 28. passage on
the Eternity of God, in
thing may be true to demonstrative certainty, and consequently, implying no weakness to believe it, although the manner of it is altogether beyond the grasp of our limited faculties. When :
J*1
existence is demonstrated to be certain, and non-existence to
imply
m
contradiction, shaken, by finding the
-
a
hension.
~
we
should not suffer
manner
our
of existence beyond
minds to be our compre-
We may, nay must,
incomprehensible
;
believe many things that are but aught that is demonstrably contradictory,
it is
impossible for us to believe, even although, on a first and hasty inspection, it might seem to possess greater plausibility than its opposite. Ifgk: m
mP'' lÂŤpÂŤ
A
joy," when " the foundations of our earth were laid ;"x and since we are in entire ignorance what other creatures may have existed, and what other worlds may have been brought into being before ours; or, according to the speculations of the geologist, what other orders of beings inhabited our own in an earlier stage of its organization and furniture ; let me rather say), when we have passed the limits of time, which commenced when Deity put forth his first act of creative power, and brought the first creature into existence, we
then feel ourselves
boundless and trackless
deserted
on a
vision in
every
We strain
ocean.
as
if
our
can find no rest for the aching In travelling up through creation, we
direction, but
and bewildered eye.
along a ready answer to the question, Whence by ascribing all, in succession, to the almighty agency of the great First Cause. But when we pass creation ; when we find this Being existing alone; and when we begin to ask the same question with regard to him, and to attempt to account for his existence, we are at a stand. Tjie mind ex-
found
all
came
this ?
^eriences all that oppression and agony, which arise from the entire want of
any
thing definite
on
which to fix.
It tries its
immensity and the eternity of the great things; but in vain. It feels itself at every which it turns, stupified and lost. To the questions,
utmost efforts on
the
First Cause of all
point to Whence answer.
came
God ?â&#x20AC;&#x201D;How does he exist ?
it
can
return no
And, according as pride and self-sufficiency on the
hand, or humility and self-diffidence on the other, are its distinguishing characters, it will either be confounded and bewildered into atheism, or, in prostrate adoration, with the lowliest sentiments of self-abasement, and the intensest feelings of devotion, with all that the Bible means by " reverence and godly fear,"2 will dictate to the lips the exclamation: " Canst thou by searching find out God?"3 We never should allow ourselves to forget, however, that a one
1
Job xxxTiii. 7.
profound and eloquent Christian Ethics, Lect. vi. pp. 192-94.â&#x20AC;&#x201D;[Ed.J 8
Job xi. 7.
See
a
2 Heb. xii. 28. passage on
the Eternity of God, in
According to the Masora,
J>7?3.j
&'!?
stands
Of? i.e.. correctio scribarum for ^'^>0 &"? thou" wilt not die. These tikkune sophrim, however, of which the Masora reckons eighteen, are not alterations of original readings proposed by the sophrim, but simply traditional as
,
,
definitions of what the sacred writers originally intended to write, though they afterwards avoided it or gave a different turn. Keil, II, 6k note. Jacob accepts this. The
entire Scriptures are
in reality nothelaboration of God's name ("ein ausgebreiteter Name Gottes"). Pieper, I, kyj7~
ing else than
an
T2) Second, Iaalah 40:18-51 ( cf. vv. 21-22, 's 27-31). He is the genuine actus purus. "He never rests, never slumbers, never grows weary, never relaxes His activity. To live is His blessedness as well as His glory. Ceaseless action is the very essence of His nature. It is a badge of imperfection among us that our energies become fatigued by exertion, and that we require intervals of relaxation and repose," Thornwell points out.l
(3) Third, Psalm 115:5.
He is independent in
His power.
(4) Fourth, Daniel 4:55. He is independent in (cf. Rom. 9'19; Eph. 1:5; Rev. 4:ll).
His will
(5) Romans 11:55-54. fifth. in His
He is independent
knowledge and thought.
(6) Sixth, 1 Timothy 6:16.
vcrcof✓.
This
must not be confused with endless existence. It is far more exalted. 2 He is "life's never-failing fountain. what is meant Is aeathlessness, or rulness of life.
(7) Seventh, John 5:26. that
life derives
is His gift fountain of
(cf.
The statement means Father (cf. Gen. 2:7), Job 10:12), for with Him is "the from the
life" (cf. Psa. 36:9).
therefore, renders the key clause, Father is
B.
self-existent."
The Biblical ments.
Goodspeed,
"For
Name? and Descriptive State„
,
ferSP
We have
time
just as the
to mention
A/^e. SO7T£S *J
only two of them,
(l) First, the expression, "the living God" (cf. Jer. 10:9-10; cf. Ezek. 17519; 33s11 /confirmation of an oath/; Hab. IT12 ZJacob. Thou shalt not die' cries the prophet Habakkuk"5/). The source of the anthropomorphisms and anthropopathlsms is the idea
Thornwell, I, 183.
William Hendriksen, New
Testament Commentary: Exposition of the Pastoral Epistles (Grand Rapids," 1957), p. 208. ^Edmond Ja-
cob, Theology o£ the Old Testament, W. Heathcote and Philip J. Ailcock p. 39.
trans,
by Arthur
(London, 1958),
FrfRfiVrt^^R°USflDOONY very early formally institutionali/ed. After tbc Hood, the great institutional cj)\hodlment of the Society of Satan was the
ing God by means of human achievement and thereby asserting man's independence and equality in relationship to God. It was also an architectural depiction of the ureal
f owe-r of Thibet (Genesis""] 1 :1 -1)). I Tie ,significance of that structure is of mestiJnabU. importance to us because its thee-
man
was once a unity of faith^and comhiuuitv in terms of that faith. The idea of
city was
a
religions concept a-nd tlie_citv
man arc
religious entity and conlmututyH Tis t o r P
ans
speak of ancient cities
^od_and..being
i.e., Canaan, the Mesopotamia!! region, ligypt, and the like, would chare a
citizcnsihip apart frent worship, and the
worship
was
particular and^pecific, hence
focalized and institutionalized in the city. The
tbisJaith of the ancient pa ga rrcTrCwa s, Ifo we vcr, it s_ess en t i al paressence
of
ticipation in deity, in whoniaii being parijcinates. It was thus a logical step to try Ip i pice t Ids t otal par tie ipat I on, and cmas Assyria and Babylon, as well Alexander the Great, moved in terms of this concept of oneness. The City of Ciod, however, moves in terms of the faith held
pircs each
as
from the
beginning, the discontinuity be-
tiyc<-lP._Gpd and man~matfs ethical fall,
ail d
IIye c'citnb'nTan for separa t io 11 i 11
pTJalfliTin God's saving ofB'aTieT was7 tatc
thesis
an
of
icrms
The Tower attempt to forccThis apospower.
ultimate
oneness
and
equality onto all mankind. There was to
he no division among men, and no separalion or discrimination, only an absolute
unity. The religion and virtue
or
ethics of
Babel was to be in the fact of humanity, and community was simply in the com-
humanity. In the City of God, through the Redeemer in Ciod; in the City of man, the Society of Satan, the ground of communion is a common humanity irrespective of any religious or moral differences. All differcnces, including those of intellect and status, must he suppressed in favor of the anonymity of union. The good life ami thc_ "'.on tact
of
communion is
J'till life arein and through the State. The theological requirement lortlieimily of the godhead requires in this faith the unity of humanity, its one true god. Hence, "l et us huile 1 us a city," n one-world order, and usher In paradise apart from God.
Second, fliey declared, they must build further "a tower whose top may reach unto heaven." The structure of (he tower
had great
symbolic significance. Its architectum! style has been carried over into many cultures, and, in New York City, crowns the top of many skyscrapers, (he most notable instance being the pyramidal tower
which crowned
the Bankers* Trust
Building. The Tower of Babel
"stepped, pyramid," largest in extent at the base, recsscd with each story, the top floor being bus a single room, which presented, from very \iew, the appearance of a great was
a
is its
ul 0
uj
U ^ ^ °
q
1
? R ^ ^
thus
a
scientific calling to identify and to
aspect of the Society of Satan by God as He confounds it: "Nothing will be restrained from them." The one-world order sought by the Society of Satan means absolute dictatorship and total power. But this God will not permit. At the ostensible moment of triumph, He is
asked for God's name or selfdefinition, God first denied the possibility, "i am that 1 am," I run beyond definition^ and then gave a relational or historical definition of Himself: "The God of Ahra-
ham, the God of Isaac, and the Ciod of Jacob (Exodus 3:15), the Ciod of the covenant and the God of "sanation. 7 his fatter description was made in its fullness with the new covenant in the person and work of Jesus Christ, "Jehovah saves,"
create.
The warfare today is between of God, which is transcendental
Satan. That demonic order seeks to obthe fact of conflict and to wage war behind the deceptive weapon of ostensible
scure
neutrality. We must recognize that this is a holy warfare, be unafraid to wage it. and proclaim that the sentence has already gone forth, "Babylon the great is fallen,
In terms of all this the meaning of the proclamation, "Let us make us a name," becomes clear: let us he our own blessing, our own Messiah, savior and god. Let us
is
own creator, our own ultimate of meaning and definition. Let there be no value above and beyond lis; let man be the source of definition, not the our
State their mediator and redeemer and have in cll'cct renounced Christ, and they shall be partakers of the plagues of
Babylon, of the Society of Satan.
laHor is
stated: "Lest we be scattered." 1 hi> is the evil to man in the Society of S'aTrTTrfln^
/T/T/7T'7"~fu)t apostasy""no FTcTvTlTb n 1galnM Gf)T Again, the iniportTsTtieologieal. it is
jppfttlosophical and theological necessity
that there be
no
disunity in the godhead;
hence, if man he our god, he cannot be divided; he must he one. Much, if not most, modern ecumenicity is premised on this faith; it seeks, not unity in C hi st, but unity in mankind, in the fact of humanity, and disunity rather than heresy is its great i problem. The United Nations also ex- i cmplifies this same faith. As V O'vnl Watts lias noted (Should Be *!<:• / '
people,
he not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues" (Rev. 18:2, 4). Men who look for the good life in and through the Stale have made the
name!"
for their
alerting Christians with the "Come out of her, my
that ye
subject of it. Let man be beyond, good and evil, and beyond meaning, since lie is himself the source of all definition.- "Let reason
fallen,"
summons,
source
Fourth, the
the City in origin
although present in history, and the totally immanent City of Man, the Society of
the Shem or name promised to man from the beginning, and, in terms of whom, and inlhe hope of whoso coming Noah's son Shem had been named.
us a
A fifth noted
visits destruction and confusion upon them. To the men of Babel, their name meant "the Gate of God," i. c., the threshold of their greatness and total power; to lis, because to God, the true meaning remains confusion. Because Babel was a confusion of the divine order, confusion was visited upon it, and that very judgmcnt was an act of mercy, in that it spared man from the total tyranny he sought to
Moses
make
non-discriminatory prin-
ciplc always works in favor of evil in that it forbids truth and justice in favor of unity. Its champions arc in the modernist clergy. They include also John Dewey. Henry Miller, and the "Civil Rights" champions.
iTion""of God' is~Thwr-tmpossible; a rclational one can he~givcn, and thus when
us
ffod, anil nTTfn its god must Hc~by
natory faith. This
name,
classify thenTTWhen God called a man out of Chaldca, lie first named him Abram and then later expanded that name to Abraham in terms of the calling, task and definition His sovereign grace gave; to that man. God's "name" Jehovah, "J am that 1 am," or "He who is," was the rejection of the possibility of a name or definition for God, lie as Creator is that by Whom an_d *n Whom all things arc defined, and, being transcended by nothing, can hcrtc^" fined by nothing: He is. An a'hstr;IcTcIclin-
be
.
definition good. Lvil is that which opposes this total unity and this non-discrimi-
in the Old Testament, meant a definition; it was a summary statemcnt ~oT the nature ol the thing named". Adam's task of naminf> the creatures was "Shem." A
area,
particular faith, but each city would be a particular cull or system of worship of that god, affirming its own particular form of continuity with the deity. There was no
~
characterized this great institutionulizution of the Society of Satan: "Let us make us a name," or literally, a
each of them, a particular the people of that god. This Is both accurate and yet erroneous in the impression it conveys. All the peoples of a particular
.
ccption of peace and order is the unquestioning acceptance of that unity and a total moral, spiritual and military disarmament in favor of it. The United Nations is non-discriminatory with respect to race, color, creed and all else because man
A third step
possessing,
as
f-'t
by its Charter. It was 'planned that way,'
seen
asserted.
t
and there is no prospect that its Members will try to change it." The only virtue to the United Nations is unity, and its con-
or
FT)T<ri)icrcr<>re to think creatively, ontologically. The best possible status tor Ciod in sucn a universe is that of an elder brother. Instead of a Creator-creature distinction, the common being of God and
city
a
were
bond
.
heaven and earth. God and as one being, witTTTnah
conlinuity ot
polit-
We have, first, the declaration, "Go to, let us build us a city." The essence of a
a
oj />W//,c7T7ie idea of the
chain
^
,
the United Nations? p. 22L): "Clearly, one weakness from which the United Nalions sullers is that it is not selective, either in aims or membership. In political terms, it is not limited. This defect is written into the very nature of the United Nations
ladder or giant staircase reaching "unto heaven." It was the ladder of works by which man reached the level of God, rival-
lift FRAMHWORK of thought maniTested in the temptation and the fall
retical structure is basic to modern ical and religious faiths.
VeC.vvi
Palo Alto, California
J
j
xf it "saould bo the personality
asked, how this meaning hue of and work of Moses, it cannot _Âťe denied that it fits remarkably will into the whole situation. There can be no difficulty in understanding it as a deliberate new formation on .a
the basis
the
of
old
form Yatiu,
with the purpose o
expressing the idea of existence in the divine name.. This in certainly not a matter of Being in the metaphysical sense of aseity, absolute exlstence,
pure
self-determination
of the
same
kind.
of
the
divine
he
entrusts
am'â&#x20AC;&#x201D;that
names
the
or
any
concerned
other Ideas
with
a
revelati
which God grants to Hoses' - when good news, 'I am that I say, I am really and truly present
with the
to
act, as 1 have always been. speak of the Being of God In
ways. There are ancient which assert the existence of God
difficult
very
mean
is
will,
him is to
ready to help and It is possible to
eral
It
Babylonian in
a
gen-
such as Basi-ilu and Ibassi-ilu, which 'There exists a God'. "Only the godless and
sense,
fool
can
say
There Is no God'.
Yahweh is distinguished
The Hebrew
from such cases by
fervour
of
feeling and the dynamic of practical proof. Wh: is stressed is not a general existence at ail timet and places, but existence here and now. The emphasis i_s not on passive" but on active existence. V/alther Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament. I, 189-90.
All
this leads us to assert that we do not the Exodus narrative the revelation of a new name but the explanation of a name already known to Hose 3 which in that ""solemn hour is "d iscovered to be charged with a content the richness of which he was far from suspecting. Edmond Jacob, have
In
Theology of the Old
Testament,
pp.
49-50.
Second
Isaiah, who with Ezekiel is the t'aeolegion of the name Yx.lrveh, shows its eschatological bearing by defining Yahweh as the first and the last.* "I, Yahweh, am the first and I will yet be with the last. r (Is. 41.4)., "I am the_ same, I am t the first. I will also be the last"" (is. 48.12). In these passages the expression: 'ani-hu, I am he, is, it would appear, the best commentary on Exodus 3.14 where the revelation of a God is found who in speaking of himself says: I am ('ehyeh) and of whom men affirm: he is (ylhyeh). With Second Isaiah, the most accomplished theologian amongst the writer of the Old Testament, we witness the full flowering of all the potentialities contained in the name of
against
Yahweh: the only genuine existence as over prethat of idols which are nothing, a him. sence since the ends of the earth shall sos 49.6, eternal presence since it knows no 26). Jacob, p. 54.
complete
an
end (Is.
of the young people have on their autornosign that reads, "Jesus Is." It is an affirmation to them of Pi is living character and preSome
biles
sence.
a
12/71.
its to) living God. But, there are mitigations anthropomorphism: (a) He is not subject, as men, changes of humor or feeling (cf. Num. 23:19; Hos.
of
of to
a
•11:9); (b) the Old Testament nothing 'any Jahweh,"! knows although the of heathen
feminine partner to gods had entire court3 of equal or inferior personages, and sometimes a wife, like a family. In fact, Hebrew has no term for goddess, using the ambiguous 'elohlm (cf. 1 Kings 11:5,"357". He is not a part of the community! (c) No visual representation was permitted. The reasons are clear: (l) an image represeiits the living by the dead; (2) an image represents *a free activity by that which is the victim of a stern necessity. G-od, as self-moved, cannot be symbolized bv any object whose law is to move only_ as
it
is moved.
^
~
~
(2) Second, "Yahweh" (cf. Exod. 3:15-13: 6:6). This is the
name of the covenant God who led Israel of the bondage of Egypt. The origin of the Name is related to the verb £& be> '1 r i7 .5 The form is "an archaic Imperfect Qal form." meaning "'He
out
is,' lie exists,1"'He
is present. It is beautifully and clearly expounded in Exodus 5:14:
"And God ^
said
unt6
Moses, I AM THAT I AM (Heb.
,
*7ff "iVQ /f 7 : LXX, °Eyoo etML ° ) • and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the.children of Israel, I AM (Heb. , JIJLZiL; LXX, _o_ ^ ) hath v
sent
me
unto
you
(ASVj/
The idea of the self-existent God
is developed and expanded throughout the Old Testament (cf*. Exod. 33:19; Isa. 41:4; 43:10-13; 44:6; 48:12 /Isaiah is the theologian of the name Xhhweh, using it in the metaphysical sense of self-existence, even according to Eichrodt/7). ILLUSTRATIONS: (l) Elohrodt on Exodus 3:14 ("active existence." not aseltv)": (2T~ Jacob on relation to & ~r" (3) "I am and the Gospel of John (6:35; 8:12; 10:7, 11; 11:25; 15*1; 14:6; 6:20 /cf. Bernard who, contrary to Abbott, be-
p. 41. 2Thorawell, I, 188. ^Walter Eichrodt, Theology of the Old Testament, trans, by J. A. Baker (Philadelphia, 1961),.I, 187-94. The whole section is important. Ibid.. I. 189. ^Ibid.. I, 191692. Ibid.. I, 190. 7Ja6ob, p. 54.
Ibid..
^
•
lieves that the phrase here may mean simply, I /: time, storm, framework argue for I am
18:5-8:
(4)
it is,
He.77 Cf. Ruahdoony1s statement2: (5) Auto "bumper
sticker. "Jesus f cr s words,,
IS"
(confessing aseltv!:
(67 Stauf-
c^.
THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF
III
SELF-EXISTENCE.
P£4Ai</VT£
A.
I& la the Ground of His Immutability.
The Heidelberg Catechism contains a very poinquestion (Question 59), "But what doth it help
ted
that thou believest all this?" It suggests to us the need of asking concerning the application of the truth of aseity. thee now,
Self-existence is the grourid of His immutability, and, therefore, we can always count upon the promises that He makes to us (cf. 1 Thess. 5*24;
4:21).
Rom.
B.
I& Is the Ground of His Self-Sufficiency.
He has no necessary relation to anything outside Himself, otherwise He would be incomplete. As Tozer says, The river grows larger by its tributaries, but where is the tributary that can en-
large the One out of whom came everything and to infinite
whose
fullness
all
creation owes its be-
ing? Unfathomable Sea: all life is out of Thee, And Thy life is Thy blissful Unity. Frederick W# Faber. 4 for us to realize that God does help. This is so often evident in our Christian appeals to service. "Too many missionary appeals," Tozer claims, "are based upon this fancied
It is difficult
not
need
our
^
frustration of
Almighty God.
An effective speaker
easily excite pity in his hearers, not only for the heathen but for the God who has tried so hard can
1
J. H. Bernard, A Critical and
mentarv
A.
on
the Gospel
H. McNeile
Exegetloal Com-
according to St. John, ed. by (Edinburgh^ 1928), I, cxx. J.
7
and so long to save them and has failed for want of support. I fear that thousands of young persons enter Christian service from no higher motive than to help deliver God from the embarrassing situation Hjs love has gotten Him into and His limited abilities seem unable to get Him out of it. G-od does not need defenders. "A God who must "be defended,
Tozer continues, "is one who someone is helping ~Eim!
c-
can help us
only while
il la. the Encouragement for Our Dependence.
Most of traceable
our
life are usually a
failures In doctrine and
to base thoughts
about God,
"begotten in the shadows of a fallen heart. 3 "Thou thoughtest," the Lord said to the wicked, "that I was altogether such a one as thyself (?sa.
God
He is not. He is the Self-Existent One, self-sufficient, independent, free, and sovereign.
50:2l).
Wishing to be the "I am" himself, man resifets dethroning himself. But only in dependence upon the Independent Jahweh rests the possibility of true fruitfulness and holiness. "The NAME OF JAHWEH is a strong tower; the righteous runneth Into-it and is
safe* (Prov. 18:10).
"The Society of Satan,' Christian Econoraies;^l6 (August 4, 1964), p. 4. ^Ethelbert Stauffer, Jesus and His Storv. trans, by Richard and Clara Winston.(Hew York, 1959), PP.0194-95. Tozer, P. 40. xIbid.. p. 41. Ibid. ^ibjd., Rushdoony,
p.
11.
.Lecture
-ÂŁ2
"WHERE
DID GOD COME FROM?, THE SELF-EXISTENCE OF GOD"
(Exodus 3:13-15;
John
6:16-20)
Introduction: 1.
It
^7,7
k.
attributes
is not
"ways" (via
\
V
would be helpful to
review
our
Intro-
ductory lesson at this point. We learned: a. The right way to determine the divine
it*-
[$'
via
by the Scholastic
negationls; via eminentlae; causalitatisT", but by divine self-
revelation
through the Scriptures.
b.
The
c.
not totally adequate, nor simply illusory. Anthro'pornorphisms are both necessary and valid (cf. Gen. 1:26-27; John 1:18) Shedd's definition of the attributes
study of the attributes is valid, providing we remember our conceptions
are
d.
was, "The Divine Attributes are modes either of the relation, or of the operation of the Divine essence. They are, consequently, an analytical and closer description of the essence"" ("italics
DT, I, 33477 they are of two kinds (some pertaining to the divine Being, as passively related to itself, and others to the divine operations, as actively
mine;
e.
Since
related to actions
..
they
are municable
or
energizing),
commonly classified
as
incom-
and
communicable, ones having little analogy to human nature and
others 2.
have
clearer
analogy)
We begin with this study a consideration of the incommunicable attributes, the first being self-existence. To express this
Anselm used the
idea of aseity, a being from oneself (esse a se^ not from another (esse ab alio), or self-origination. Reformed theologians have generally used the term independentla, or
self-existence.
The
independence,
for
idea is found in such Isaiah 44:6, 1 Timothy 6:16
passages as and John 5:267 ILL.: (lT Closely related to "the (cannot be neuter; then not absolute!) Absolute" of
philosophy)(Berkhof. 58; Brunner, I,
1427507
(2) Children's
question and
Novatian.
But when
have
we
origin, when
we
in which God
created
or
(si(c/^e
traced
creation to
have got to that the
its
"beginning,
heavens and the earth
evenufrom revelation itself
we
know in
that there were other intelligent creatures existence previously to that periodâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;those
"morning stars" and "sons of God." who "sang together," and "shouted for joy, when "the foundations of our earth were laid;" ) .
.
.
when we have passed the limits of time, which commenced when Deity put forth his first act of creative power, and brought the first creature into existence, we then feel ourselves as if deserted on a boundless and trackless ocean. We strain our vision in every direct-
ion, but
can
find
rest
no
for the
aching and In travelling up through ereation, we found all along a ready answer to the question, Whence came this? by ascribing all, in succession, to the almighty agency of the great First Cause. But when we pass ereation; when we find this Being existing alone; bewildered eye.
and
when
we
bein
to
ask
the
same
&bgard to him, and to attempt to his
existence,
we
are
at
a
stand.
question with account for The mind
experiences all that oppression and agony,
which arise from the entire want of any thing definite on which to fix. It tries'its-utmost efforts on the immensity and the eternity of the great First Cause of all vain.
It
feels
itself at
things; but in to which
every point
3.
The Incommunic ab 1 e attributes applications of the
are
Idea of the
special Infinite
to
aspects of God. "As Thornwell says, with reference to the grounds of His being, the infinite gives rise to the notion of independence or self-existence; with reference to the duration of His being,
"Contemplated
to eternity; with reference to the extent of His being, to immensity; with reference to
the
contents
of His
being, to all-sufficito the identity of His being, to immutability." These*are the things that utterly separate God from every work of His hands. They are the badges of divinity,â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the glory He will not and. cannot with reference
ency;
bequeath to another.
Without them He would
only be a superman, or a * mightier angel (cf. Thornwell, I," I89-90T. They are the veil hanging over the mystery of His being. We can only stand afar off to peer and squint at the ineffable glory. 1
2M PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENT FOR SELF-EXISTENCE. N.B.;
The
a
posteriori argument,
C')"^ effect to cause, This rational 1^.-
or the cosmological argument
proof, "like all such, not demonstrative argument.
bable, :
corroborative, not convincing.
^
tr
a
pro-
It is
Something Nov; Is; Therefore, Something Must Always Have Been.
Nothing can be the cause existence, for this is to sup^ pose that it. acts before its own existence I Nor, can this something have been produced by nothing, caused without a cause: Thus, as most atheists acknowledge, something has of
its
existed
B.
is
Here are the
steps:
Âť^KfJA.
that from
There
own
from eternity.
Is An Infinite
Two possibilities:
Series
Any Original Cause at All. fest
of Causes But here
Without is
mani-
contradiction:
Every thing is caused by that which preceded it, but the whole series is caused by nothing.' Here is the fundamental principle of atheism! C.
There Must Be a First Cause, an Eternal Being Who Must Exist from the Necessity of His Own Nature. There is a leap of logic here which is partially filled by the teleo logical, moral and ontological arguments for the existence of God. ILL.: Wardlaw on "boundless and trackless
oceanTi, 95-95; cf. Litton,
pp.
45-52).
it
turns, -stupified and lost.
Whence turn
came
G-od?â&#x20AC;&#x201D;How doe.s he
To the questions, exist?
it
can
re-
And, according as pride and selfsufficiency on the one hand, or humility and selfdiffidence on the mother, are its distinguishing characters, it will either be confounded and bewildered into atheism, or, in prostrate adoration, with the lowliest sentiments of self-abasement, and the intensest feelings of devotion, with all that the Bible means by reverence and godly fear/ will dictate to the lips the exclamation: Canst thou by searching find out G-od?" Wardlaw, I, 95no
answer.
When existence is demonstrated to be certain, and non-existence to imply a contradiction, we should not suffer our minds to be shaken, by find-
ing the sion.
manner of existence beyond our
Ibid.,
I,
97-
comprehen-
71 11
THEOLOGICAL STATEMENTS OF SELF-EXISTENCE. \ Here we turn to the divine self-revelation. A. The Biblical Statements. Let us read some of the most important ones
N.B.:
1.
Psalm 94:8-10
2.
Isaiah 40:18-31.
3. 4.
Psalm 115:3
(He is independent of all
things and."they exist only through Him) (independent in His power). cf
5.
Daniel 4:35 (independent in His will; \ Rom. 9:19; Sph. 1:5; Rev. 4:11). it i Romans 11:33-34 (independent in His
6.
1
"T
>
-n
^
/~\
thought). Timothy 6:16, This must
not
k
I.
T-*i
r—
Q* v «
<r
C«.v
.
confused with endless
be
"far more exalted" He is "life's never-failing Fountain." It is deathexistence.
It
is
(Hendriksen, 208).
lessness, 7.
fulness of life.
John 5:26. Life derives
from
the
(cf. Gen.
Father
2:7), is His gift (Job 10:12), for with Him
is
36:9).
"the fountain of life" (Psa. Goodspeed renders, "For just
the Father B.
is
as
self-existent.
The
Biblical Names and Descriptive Statements. Let us just note two of them.
4*
"The living God." Jer. 10:9-10; cf. Ezek. 17:19; 33:11 (confirmation of an oath); Hab. 1:12 (Jakob,"1 Thou sha] not
die'
cries
the
prophet
/Theology
Habakkuk"
of the Old Testament, p. 327 The source of the anthropomorphisms
and
anthropopathisms is the idea of a living God. ' ?.'i. ILL. : \1) Jakob on anthropomorphisms l^uts (/*ip*-r/. and their limits (Num. 23:19; Hos. ''11:9l "unaware of any feminine partX.6CD ^tA^cibnerrr; OT no term for "goddess," etc.;. •
■
pp.
.
39-42). (2) GrCM
on
Motherhood,
*5!^ "Yahweh." !i223. ^"vmifhtw: 2-
This h.Mo
is
Cf. the
Exod.
name
3:13-15:
of the
Father-
6:6.
covenant God
who led Israel out of the bondage of Egypt. The origin of the Name is refirulated to the verb to be, n"l'T (cf. viEUAL
sB^rATto^^-
^Eichrodt, I, 187-94T-
The form is
\ v.unumica ~~7~bi
fz-~~~3fot IE.7"V
O/21
SAT~&M.
IE REV. R. L RUSHDOONY
After the flood, the great institutional cmhodimcnt of the Society of Satan was the
ing God by means of human achievement and thereby asserting man's independence and equality in relationship to God. It was also an architectural depiction of the xreat
"^ower of Babel (Genesis 11:1-9)7~TT\e
ignificance of that structure is of incstinablo. importance to us because its theorctical structure is basic to modern polit-
ical and
let
chain
able therefore to think creatively, ontologically. The best possible status for God
We have, first, the declaration, "Go to, us build us a city.7' The essence of a
such a universe is that of an elder brother. Instead of a Creator-creature disin
city
was once a unity of faith^and community in terms of that faith. The idea of a city was a religious concept £nfl~the city a religious entity ffj<I cojymunity. Histori-
tinction, the man are *
ans
citizenship apart from worship, and~~tHe worship was particular and specificThence focalized and institutionalized in the city. The essence of~thi3 faith of the ancient pagan city was", however, its essential participation in deity, in whom aU_being_|>articipates. It was tnus a logical "step to try to force this total participation, and em-
pires such
as
Assyria and BabjTon,
as
well
Alexander the Great, moved in terms of this concept of oneness. The City of God, however, moves in terms of the faith held
of being. the idea of the" bond or
continuity of heaven and earth. God and nian were seen as one being, with man
religious faiths.
speak oT ancient cities as possessing, each of them, a particular god and being the people of-tTiat"go3. This is both accurate and yet erroneous in the impression it conveys. All the peoples of a particular area, i.e.. Canaan, the Mesopotamian region, Egypt, and the like, would share a particular faith, but each city would be a particular cult or system of worship of that god, affirming its own particular form of continuity with the deity. There was no
A
common
cFBbbcl
was an attempt to force"this aposthesis of ultimate oneness and equality onto all mankind. There was to be no division among men, and no separation or discrimination, only an absolute
tate
unity. The religion and virtue
or
ethics of
Babel was to be in the fact of humanity, and community was simply in the common fact of humanity. In the City of God, communion is through the Redeemer in
God; in the City of man, the Society of Satan, the ground of communion is a common humanity irrespective of any religious or moral differences. All differences, including those of intellect and status, must be suppressed in favor of the anonymity of union. The good life and the full life are in and through the State. The Theological requfrement for the unity of the godhead requires in this faith the unity of humanity, its one true god. Hence, "Let lis build us a city," a one-world order, and usher in paradise apart from God.
Second, tlicy declared, they must build further "a tower whose top may reach
heaven." The structure of the tower had great symbolic significance. Its architectural style has been carried over into unto
cultures, and, in New York City, the top of many skyscrapers, the most notable instance being the pyramidal tower which crowned The Bankers7 Trust many
crowns
Building. The Tower of Babel was a "stepped, pyramid," largest in extent at the base, remessed with each story, the top floor being bus a single room, which presented, from ?very view, the appearance of a great
being of God and
asserted.
~
^
tfuril step characterized this great in-
stitutionalization of the Society of Satan: "Let us make us a name/' or literally, a "Shem" A name, in the Old Testament, meant a definition; it was a summary statement of the nature of the thing named. Adam's task of naming the creatures was ^ thus a scientific calling to identify and to
^ classify them. When God called &man out u) of Chaldea, he first named bint Abram ul and then later expanded that name to [J Abraham in terms of the calling, task and ^ definition His sovereign grace gave; to that God's "name" Jehovah, "1 am that or "He who is," was the rejection the possibility of a name or definition
vl
man.
70
I am,"
g of *
for God. He
as
Creator is that by Whom
§ and in Whom all things
are
defined, and,
^ beingJranscendedHeby is.nothing, can InrrfiF An abstract defin-
as
from the beginning, the discontinviitv betwecn God and man", mans ethlcal fall, atid lhe"caTf to" m anTof se pa rat ion in "terms oTTaTtTT in God's saving power. The Tower
Scc'voWa
ladder or giant staircase reaching "unto heaven." It was the ladder of works by which man reached the level of God, rival-
early formally institutionalized.
very
CXtcaLu.
Palo Alio, California
'HE FRAMEWORK of thought manifested in the temptation and the fall as
from tile July /Hi issue)
tional Moses
one can
asked
ipossible; a re I abe given, and thus when for God's name or self-
definition, God first denied the possibility. "I am that I am," I am beyond definition, and then gave a relational or historical definition of Himself: "The God of Abra-
ham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob7* (Exodus 3:15), the God of the covenant and the God of salvation. This
fatter description was made in its fullness with the new covenant in the person and work of Jesus Christ, "Jehovah saves,77 the Shem'or name promised lo man rrom the beginning, and, in terms of whom, and in the hope of whose coming Shem had been named.
.Noah's
son
In terms of all this the
proclamation, "Let our own
be
meaning of the
make us
itame," blessing, Messiah, savior and god. Let us
becomes clear: let
us
us
be
a
our own
own creator, our own ultimate of meaning and definition. Let there be no value above and beyond us; let man be the source of definition, not the subject of it. Let man be beyond good and evil, and beyond meaning, since) he is himself the source of all definition. "Let us make us a name!" our
source
Fourth, the
reason
for their labor is
stated: "Lest we be scattered." Tim is the evil to man in the Society of Satan1, (lisillhlV. tw iirttVilnsV hof rdvlllon °iuTTtnsr
God. Again, the import is theological'. It is &■ pi I'll osoph ical and theological necessity that there be no disunity in the godhead; hence, if man be our god, he cannot be divided; he must be one. Much, if not most, modern ecumenicity is premised on this faith; it seeks, not unity in Chi'si, but
unity in mankind, in the fact of humanity, disunity rather than heresy is its great problem. The United Nations also examplifies this same faith. As V, Qrval Watts has noted (Should \Vc Sire aft hen and
Yet .vTi
^ HO/f j»- if
?
the United Nations? p. 22f.): "Clearly, one weakness from which the United Nations suffers is that it is not selective, either in aims or membership. In political terms, it is not limited. This defect is written into the very nature of the United Nations .
.
.
by its Charter. It
was 'planned that way,7 and there is no prospect that its Members will try to change it." The only virtue to the United Nations is unity, and its con-
caption of peace and order is the unquestioning acceptance of that unity and a total moral, spiritual and military disarmament in
tions is race,
favor of it. The United Na-
non-discriminatory""with
respect to
color, creed and all else because
man
is its ffod, and all in its god must be by definition good. Evil is that which opposes this total unity and this non-discrimi-
natory faith. This non-discriminatory principle always works in favor of evil in that it forbids truth and justice in favor of unity. Its champions are in the modernist
clergy. They include also John Dewey, Henry Miller, and the "Civil Rights" champions. A fifth aspect of the Society of Satan is noted by God as He confounds it:
"Nothing will be restrained from them.77 The one-world order sought by the Society of Satan means absolute dictatorship and total power. But this God will not permit. At the ostensible moment of triumph, He visits destruction and confusion upon them. To the men of Babel, their name meant "the Gate of God," i. e., the threshold of their greatness and total power; to us, because to God, the true meaning remains confusion. Because Babel was a confusion of the divine order, confusion was visited upon it, and that very judgment was an act of mercy, in that it spared man from the total tyranny he sought to create.
The warfare today is between the City of God, which is transcendental in origin
although present in history, and the totally immanent City of Man, the Society of
Satan. That demonic order seeks to obthe fact of conflict and to wage war behind the deceptive weapon of ostensible scurc
neutrality. We must recognize that this is a holy warfare, be unafraid to wage it. and proclaim that the sentence has already gone forth, "Babylon the great is fallen, is fallen," alerting Christians with the summons, "Come out of her, my people, that ye be not partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues" (Rev. 18:2, 4). Men who look for the good life in and through the State have made the State their mediator and redeemer and have in effect renounced Christ, and they shall be partakers of the plagues of
Babylon, of the Society of Satan.
If it should be _th the personality
asked, how this meaning accords and work of Moses, it cannot *oe denied that it fits remarkably i/bll into the whole situation. There can be no difficulty in understanding it as a deliberate new formation on the basi.s of the old form Yahu, with the purpose of expressing the idea of existence in the divine name. This is certainly not a matter of Being in the metaphysical sense of aseity, absolute existence, pure self-determination or any other ideas of the
same kind. It is concerned with a revelation divine will, which G-od grants to Moses when he entrusts him with the good news, 'I am that I am'â&#x20AC;&#x201D;that is to say, I am-really and truly present,
of the
ready to help and to act, as I have always been. It is possible to speak of the Being of G-od in very difficult ways. There are ancient Babylonian names
eral
which assert
the
existence
of G-od
in
a
gen-
such as Basi-ilu and Ibassi-ilu, which mean 'There exists a G-od'. Only the godless and the fool can say 'There is no G-od'. The Hebrew Yahweh is distinguished from such cases by fervour of feeling and the dynamic of practical proof. What is stressed is not a general existence at all times and places, but existence here and now. The emphasense,
sis is not on passive, but Walther Eichrodt, Theology
I,
on
active existence.
of the Old Testament,
189-90.
All this leads us to assert that we do not in the Exodus narrative the revelation of a new name but the explanation of a name already known to Moses which in that solemn hour is discovered to be charged with a content the richness of which he was far from suspecting. Edmond Jacob, have
Theology of the Old Testament, Second
pp.
49-50.
Isaiah, who with Ezekiel is the theologian of the name Yahweh, shows its eschatological bearing by defining Yahweh as the first and the last: "I, Yahweh, am the first and I will yet be with the last!" (Is. 41.4). "I am the same, I am the first, I will also be the last" (Is. 48.12). In these passages the expression: 'ani-hu, I am he, is, it would appear, the best commentary on Exodus 3.14 where the revelation of a G-od is found who in speaking of himself says: I am ('ehyeh) and of whom men affirm: he is (yihyeh). With Second Isaiah, the most accomplished theologian amongst the writer^ of the Old Testament, we witness the full flowering of all the potentialities contained in the name of -
"an archaic Imperfect Qal form" (Ibid., I, 189), meaning; "He, is," "He exists," "He is present. It is beautifully and clearly expounded in Exodus 3:14 in the
"And God
text:
said
unto
Moses,
I AM THAT I AM (Heb. , o uiy ) : and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I AM (Heb., 71 rV v ; LXX, co_ hath sent me unto you."
7Qrr'?^
LXX,
:
JEyi&
idHa p?
This
g-tVc
the
self-e^f^fent
G-od is
developed and expanded throughout the Old Testament
41:4;
(cf. Exod. 33:12.5 Isa*
43:10-13: 44:6; 48:12 /Isaiah, is the theologian of the name Yahweh, using it in the metaphysical sense of self-existence a/c Eichrodt, I, 191/). ILL.: (l) Eichrodt on "active existence"
IT, 189-90)1
(2) Jakob on relation to (p. 54). (3) "I Am" and Gospel of John (6:35; 8:12: 10:?, 11; 11:25; 15:1; 14:6; 6:20 /cf. Bernard, I, cxx/). Time,
storm,
framework.
Cf.
18:5-8.
(4) Rushdoonv's statement. (5) Auto ÂŁign, "Jesus IS." ( 6) Stauffer's words (Jesus Story, pp. 194-95).' Ill
THE PRACTICAL
SIGNIFICANCE OF GOB'S SELF-EXIST-
~~
ENCE. N.B.:
and His
(l) Difficulty and idea of origin (cf.
tiny point
of light and idea of Uncreated). Philosophers and scientists and things they "can never know." We save face by bringing
God
down to
Pur
(2) Child
level so we can manage Himf with question) "Where did God
from" is unwittingly acknowledging his ^creaturehood (cause,, source already in mind). ILL.: Heidelberg Catechism. "But what doth it help thee now, that thou believest all this?" come
A.
Self-Existence, or Independence, the Ground of His Immutability. His promises always hold ("of. 1 Thess. 5:24; Rom. 4:21).
B.
Self-Existence the Ground of Self-Sufficiency. He has no necessary relation to anything outside Himself, otherwise incomplete. As
Yahvreh.: the only genuine existence as over against that of ido'ls which are nothing, a complete presence since the ends of the earth shall see him, an eternal presence since it knows no end (Is. 49.6,
26).
Jacob,
p.
54.
Some of the young people have on their automobiles a sign that reads, "Jesus Is." It is an affirmation to them of His living character and, pre-
12/71.
sence.
132
Christ* o*f
the work of God's true church to flourish until the last now,
day. Swear
O Christ, for the iniquity of the Amorites is not yet full
(Genesis 15 :16). And, is it not true that a great birth, the birth a church, is due according to the programme of the great Creator of all things? Swear â&#x20AC;&#x201D; time hurries on, say the Jews; Thy oath is due, saith Thy God. Thereupon Jesus opened His mouth and said just two words: Thou sayest, or, Thou hast said. Two short words, as simple as yes and no. But those two words had the force of an oath even for the Jews at this time. By pronouncing them in reply to a demand for an oath, Christ assumed the burden of the demand, and swore that He was the Son of God. of
This
was
the last and the perfect fulfillment of Christ's
pro-
phetic office in the state of humiliation which He performed over against His people. In the final hour He reaches into the highest council and confesses Himself. Now He has sworn this good confession in the presence of the Sanhedrin and of Caiaphas. Now His official obedience has attained perfect faithfulness to itself. And this was done in the very hour in which the demand of Caiaphas was, as we saw, a denial of Christ, just as Peter's extravagant oaths, as we shall see later, also denied Him. Over against this denial of His work and of the essence of His being, then, Christ places the good confession. For Israel this trial has now reached its deepest depth. Israel began by asking about His disciples and His doctrine, about His temporal, His external, His mundane manifestations. Now it is asking about the essence of His being. This question brings about the decision, for the essence explains the work; the peripheral manifestation does not explain the central significance. Then Jesus swore by God; He swore by Himself. He is God and man in one person. That also proved to be the great concealment. That which the incarnation began and death consummated became one reality when the Son of God swore by Himself. Hence the oath can benefit only Him who takes the oath, and God, and Christ at His word. The God who swears by God is merely saying yes. He cannot transcend His own word. His yea is yea. His nay, nay. Whatever man would have which is more than this is of the evil one. God, swearing by Himself, is simply God, saving yes and no. But this is of as tremendous import as is
Yahw< that senc-
eter
26).
bile fira senc
everything which God does. Hear, Israel, God is swearing by God. The futile attempt of worldly wisdom to appraise Jesus in terms of His own disciples and doctrine has been frustrated. This vicious circle has been supplanted by a luminous arc, a circle again, it is true, but now it is a wonderful one: God appealing to God. What else could He possibly do ? The simplest thing is the mightiest, and all of His mighty deeds are as simple as is the morning light. But what else could Jesus do except to have God swear by God ? As far as heaven is exalted higher than the earth, so much higher is the circle of God exalted higher than the circle of men. God swears by God; why any further argument about this on our part? What is more reasonable than authority? The ground under the feet of Jesus
burning bush in the vicinity
was
not on
fire; there
was
only the chair of the priest. Someone sat in it, a man preening himself; and all of his adorqment was but a maligning of the stars and of God. Irrespective, no
â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
however, of the fact that the Sanhedrin remained essentially un-
perturbed and that
no burning bushes were seen, this hour is of greater importance than the other one in which Moses met Taweh.
Then also God
pronounced His name. The mightiest name has simplest shape. I am that I am, He said. Could any name be simpler? Any more humiliating? What in the world could God possibly say besides this ? He is who He is â&#x20AC;&#x201D; and that ends it. the
Now
just
as
Moses learned to know God
Himself Himself and
as
One who
who called from all inreference to Himself, as one
turns man away
quiries about Him with a holy smile and so God now swears by God.
a
That ends the matter. God dismisses the session. has gone already. No more may be said. other word to be spoken in all eternity. Take the shoes from your
O
God, He
He will not allow
feet, for the ground
on
which
an-
you
standing is holy ground. God swore by God. In all questions put by professional theologians God refers us to Himself. He is are
what He is.
That is His terrible
name.
Now that it has been
uttered, the plagues begin to take effect in Egypt, the exodus of Israel
begins, and
To the made
a
we
it will be
all take
our
position in front of a Red Sea. other a way across. No, I
grave, to the mistake. I mean the Red Sea, one
a
Yatrw that
St
senc
an
eter
26). .10-
"bile firn
✓
send
Thou hast said. Thereupon the earth
quaked, the heavens shook.
The angels fell back, and the blessed took respite from sighing. For He said it. An oath binds Him to me. The crisis has come. And all of the thermometers are bursting because of the heat of the atmosphere here. He is the Lord. Did He not come to bring fire upon the earth?
Religion is terribly simple. That is why no man can appropriate own strength. And the cause of this is an oath-swearing Jesus, K., Sc.icjlchs.^^ ok, 7>w-/ ■ -jfrf*'' ^ '3i£it in his
5
Tozer says,
"The
v.
river
grows/by4its
tribu-
taries, but where is the tributary that can enlarge the One out of whom came everything
and
to
owes
whose infinite its being?
fullness all
creation
Unfathomable Sea: all life is out of Thee, Thy life is Thy blissful Unity.
And
Frederick W. ILL.
Faber"
(p. 40)
Cl) Tozer v "G-od does nqi^ j^aed our help" missionary appeals. Peters message in DTS Chapel. Tozer, pp. 40-41. ~T2) Tozer, "The Christ of popular Christianity has a weak smile and a halo. :
and
He has become
Someone-up-There who likes people, at least some people, and these are grateful but not too impressed. If they need Him, He also needs them" (p. 43). C.
Self-Existence, or Independence, Suggests Oujr DEPENDENCE! Wishing to be the "I Am," man resists dethroning himself. But in our utter dependence rests the possibility of both holiness and sin (cf. Rom. 7:14-25)â&#x2013; O
A
â&#x20AC;˘
U3
,
tb^~l The
Lord of all yet
CHAFER
5
TfcL,
ÂŁf~ *hr Self-existence of God
being! Thou
alone
canst
affirm I AM image may each one THAT I AM; that we derive from Thee and that repeat "I am/' echo of Thine our words own. We are Original of which we acknowledge Thee to be the through Thy goodness are great perfect copies. We grateful if imworship Thee, O Father Everlasting. Amen. "God has no origin/' we
who
so
are
confessing but an
made in Thine
said
Novatian,13
and
it is no-origin which precisely this from whatever is distinguishes not God. That-which-is-God Origin is a word that can we think of apply only to things created. When God. God is anything that has origin we are not thinking of self-existent, while all created originated somewhere at things necessarily some time. Aside from is self-caused.
concept of
By
discover the origin of things we confess our was made By familiar experience weby Someone who was made of
belief that none.
everything
"came from" a
God, nothing
our effort to
cause
are
something else. Whatevertaught exists
that antedates it and
that
everything
have had least equal to it, since the produce the at once both caused and greater. Any person or thing the cause of may be else; and so, back to the someone or One something who is the cause Himself caused of all but is by none. The child by his question, unwittingly acknowledging his"Where did God come from?" is creaturehood. cept of cause and Already the consource and origin is firmly fixed He knows in that everything around him came from his mind. other than itself, and he simply extends something God. The little that concept upward to philosopher is thinking in true and, allowing for his lack of creature-idiom basic correctly. He must be told information, he is reasoning that God has no find this hard to origin, and he will grasp since it introduces which he is wholly unfamiliar and contradicts a category with the bent origin-seeking so
lesser
cannot
must
was at
.
deeply ingrained 12
in all
toward
intelligent beings,
a
bent that
discovered
impels them
To think
beginnings.
to
probe
steadily of that
ever
back and back toward
un-
to which the
idea of if indeed it is possible at all. origin cannot certain conditions a Just as under tiny point of light can be seen, not looking directly at it but by focusing the by eyes slightly to one side, so it is with the idea of the Uncreated. When we try to focus our thought upon One who is pure uncreated may see nothing at all, for He we dwelleth in light thatbeing can no man approach unto. Only by faith and love are we able to glimpse Him as He passes
apply is
not easy,
by our shelter in the cleft of the rock. "And although this knowledge is very cloudy, eral," says Michael de vague and genMolinos, "yet, being produces a far more clear and supernatural, it perfect cognition of God than any sensible or particular apprehension that can be formed this life; since all in corporeal and sensible images are immeasurably remote from God."14 The human mind, being created, has an easiness about the understandable unUncreated. We do not find it to allow for the comfortable presence of One who is wholly outside circle of our familiar of the knowledge. We tend to be the disquieted by thought of One who does not account to us for His who is responsible to no one, who is being,
and
self-sufficient.
self-existent, self-dependent
Philosophy and science have not always been friendly toward the idea of God, the reason being that they are dedicated the task of to accounting for thing that refuses to give anthings and are impatient with anyaccount of itself. The and the scientist philosopher will admit that there is much that not know; but that is quite another they do thing from admitting that there is something yhich they can never know, which indeed they have no technique for discovering. To admit that there is One who lies beyond us, who exists outside of all our who will not be categories, dismissed with a name, who will not fore the bar of our appear bereason, nor submit to our this requires a curious inquiries: great deal of humility, more than most of us possess, so we save face by thinking God down or at least to our down to where we can level, manage Him. Yet how He eludes us! For He is everywhere while He is nowhere, for
"where" has
to do with matter and
space, and God is independent of both. He is unaffected by time or motion, is self-dependent and owes nothing to the wholly worlds His hands have made.
Timeless, spaceless, single, lonely, Yet sublimely Three, Thou art grandly, always, only God in Unity! Lone
in grandeur, lone in glory, Who shall tell Thy wondrous story? Awful Trinity!
Frederick W. Faber It is not a
cheerful
a
the
without the
once
having thought
being of God.
can
Few of
thoughts
think where it will do mousetrap, for grow
too
where
juncture I
us
on
or tried to think
this earth
seriously about
are too
more
instance,
or
painful for
goodâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;about how
us.
to
We prefer to build a better
how to make two blades
ot
grass before. And for this we heavy price in the secularization of our are now paying religion and the of our inner lives.
decay Perhaps
as
millions of
us have let our hearts gaze in wonder AM, the self-existent Self back of which no think. Such creature
at the I
a
thought that
who live in Bibles, who belong to churches and labor to promote Christian religion, may yet pass our whole life
land of
am
one grew
sincere but puzzled Christian may at this inquire about the practicality of such concepts to set forth here. "What
some
wish to
trying
bearing does tins nave my life?" he may ask. "What possible meaning can the selfexistence of God have for me and others like me in a world such as this and in times such as these?" To this I reply that, because we are the it follows that all handiwork of God, our problems and their solutions are logical. Some knowledge of what kind of God it is that theothe universe is operates indispensable to a sound sane outlook philosophy of life and a on the world scene. The much-quoted advice of Alexander Pope, on
Know then thyself, presume
The
proper
not
study of mankind is
God to man,
scan:
if
followed literally would any possibility of man's knowing himself in any butdestroy the most never know who superficial way. We or what we are
of what God is. For this
we
know
at
least
can
something
reason the â&#x20AC;˘wisp of dry doctrine, academic self-existence of God and remote; it is in near as
not as
till
ever
a
our
technique.
breath and
as
practical
as
is
fact thelatest surgical
For reasons known only to Himself, God all other beings by creating him in His ownhonored man above be understood image. And let it that the divine image in man is not a fancy, not an idea bom of religious longing. It is a solid poetic logical fact, taught theoplainly throughout the Sacred and recognized Scriptures by the Church as a truth
derstanding
necessary to a right unof the Christian faith. created being, a derived and of himself contingent self, who possesses nothing but is dependent each moment for his existence Man is
ness.
a
upon the One who created himafter His The fact of God is
God away and That God is
man
has
necessary to the fact
no
ground of existence.
own
of man.
like-
Think
everything and man nothing is a basic Christian faith and tenet of devotion; and tianity coincide with those of the here the teachings of Chrismore advanced and philosophical religions of the East. ,Man for all
his genius is but an echo of the original Voice, a reflection of j the a uncreated Light, i sunbeam perishes when cut oit from the from God would sun, so man apart ! pass back into the void of nothingness which he first from leaped at the creative call. As
Not
man only, but dependent upon theeverything that exists came out of and continuing creative impulse. "In the beginning was the the Word was God Word, and the Word was with God, and All things were made by him and without him was not any thing made that was made." That is how John explains it, and with him agrees the apostle Paul: him were all 'Tor by things created, that are in heaven and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be minions, or principalities, or thrones, or dohim, and for him; and he is powers: all things were created by before things consist." To this witness the all things, and by him all writer to the his voice, Hebrews adds testifying of Christ that He is the brightness of God's
is
glory and the express image of His Person, and that He holds all things by the word of His power.
up-
In this utter dependence of all things upon the creative will of God lies the possibility for both holiness and sin. Une of the marks of God's image in man is his ability to exercise moral
choice. The
teaching of Christianity is that man chose to be independent of God and confirmed his choice by deliberately disobeying a divine command. This act violated the relationship that normally existed between God and His creature; it
rejected God as the ground of existence and threw man back himself. Thereafter he became not a planet revolving around the central Sun, but a sun in his own right, around
upon
which everything else must revolve. A more positive assertion of selfhood could not be imagined than those words of God to Moses: I AM THAT I AM. Every-
thing God is, everything that is God, is set forth in that unqualifled declaration of independent being. Yet in God, self is not sin but the quintessence of all possible goodness, holiness and truth. The natural man is a sinner because and only because he challenges God's selfhood in relation to his own. In all else he may willingly accept the sovereignty of God; in his own life he rejects it. For him, God's dominion ends where his begins. For him, self becomes Self, and in this he unconsciously imi-
Lucifer, that fallen son of the morning who said in his heart, "I will ascend into heaven, I will exalt my throne above tates
the stars of God. I will be like the Most High." Yet so subtle is self that scarcely anyone is conscious of its presence. Because man is born a rebel, he is unaware that he is one. His constant assertion ot sell, as tar aTTfeTthinks oFTFaF ...
all, appears to him a perfectly normal thing. He is willing to share himself, sometimes even to sacrifice himself for a desired end, but never to dethrone himself. No matter how far down the scale ot social acceptance he may slide, he is still in his own eyes a king on a throne, and no one, not even God, can take that throne from him. Sin has many manifestations but its essence is one. A moral
being, created throne of his
to
worship before the throne of God, sits
own
on
the
selfhood and from that elevated position dcr-
clares, **1 AM." That is sin in its concentrated essence; yet because it is natural it appears to be good. It is only when in the
gospel the soul is brought before the face of the Most Holy One without the protective shield of ignorance that the frightful moral incongruity is brought home to the conscience. In the language of evangelism the man who is thus confronted by the fiery presence of Almighty God is said to be under conviction. Christ referred to this when He said of the Spirit whom He would send to the
world, "And when he is come, he will reprove the world of sin, and of righteousness, and of judgment." The earliest fulfillment of these words of Christ was at Pentecost after Peter had preached the first great Christian sermon. "Now when they heard this, they were pricked in their heart, and said unto Peter and to the rest of the apostles, Men and
brethren, what shall
we
do?" This "What shall
we
do?" is the
deep heart cry of every man who suddenly realizes that he is a usurper and sits on a stolen throne. However painful, it is pre-
cisely this acute moral consternation that produces true repentance and makes a robust Christian after the penitent has been dethroned and has found the gospel.
forgiveness and
peace
through
"Purity of heart is to will one thing," said Kierkegaard, and may with equal truth turn this about and declare, "The essence of sin is to will one thing," for to set our will against
we
the will of God is to dethrone God and make ourselves supreme in the little kingdom of Mansoul. This is sin at its evil root. Sins may multiply like the sands by the seashore, but they are vet one. Sins are because sin is. This is the rationale behind the much maligned doctrine of natural depravity which holds that the impenitent man can do nothing but sin and that his good deeds are really not good at all. His best religious works God
rejects
as
He rejected the offering of Cain. Only when he has
restored his stolen throne to God are his works acceptable. The struggle of the Christian man to be good while the bent toward self-assertion still lives within him as a kind of unconscious moral reflex is vividly described by the apostle Paul in the seventh chapter of his Roman Epistle; and his testimony is in full accord with the teaching of the prophets. Eight hundred years before the advent of Christ the prophet Isaiah identi-
fied sin as rebellion against the will of God and the assertion of the right of each man to choose for himself the way he shall go. "All we like sheep have gone astray/' he said, "we have turned every one to his own way/' and I believe that no more accurate" description of sin has ever been given. The witness of the saints has been in full
harmony with prophet and apostle, that an inward principle of self lies at the of human conduct, turning everything men do into evil. To save us completely Christ must reverse the bent of our source
nature; He must plant
subsequent conduct
a new
principle within
us so
will
honor of God and the sins must die, and the slain is the cross. "If
that
our
spring out of a desire to promote the good of our fellow men. The old selfonly instrument by which they can be
any man will come after me, let him deny take up his cross, and follow me/' said our Lord, and years later the victorious Paul could say, "I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in
himself, and me."
My God, shall sin its power maintain And in my soul defiant live! Tis not enough that Thou forgive,
The
cross must
rise and self be slain.
O God of love, Thy power disclose: Tis not enough that Christ should rise, I, too, must seek the brightening skies, And rise from death, as Christ arose. Greek
Hymn
The
Self-sufficiency of God
Teach us, O God, that nothing is necessary to Thee. Were thing necessary to Thee that thing would be the measure
any-
of Thine imperfection: and how could we worship one who is imperfect? If nothing is necessary to Thee, then no one is necessary, and if no then not we. Thou dost seek us though Thou dost not need one, us.
We seek Thee
move
because we need being. Amen.
Thee, for in Thee we live
and
and have our
Lord, and it is brief sentence highest reaches of human thought. God, He said, is self-sufficient; He is what He is in Himself, in the final meaning of those words.
'â&#x20AC;˘The Father hath life in himself," said our characteristic of His teaching that He thus in a sets forth truth so lofty as to transcend the
Himself. All form of unconscious life or the highly self-conscious, intelligent life of a seraph. No creature has life in itself; all life is a gift from God. The life of God, conversely, is not a gift from another. Were there another from whom God could receive the gift of life, or indeed any gift whatever, that other would be God in fact. An elementary but correct way to think of God is as the One who contains all, who gives all that is given, but who Himself can reWhatever God is,
life is in and
ceive
and all that God
from God,
is, He is in
whether it be the lowest
nothing that He has not first given. the existence of a need in God
To admit
is to admit incom-
and
pleteness in the divine Being. Need is a creature-word cannot be spoken of the Creator. God has a voluntary relation to everything He has made, but He has no necessary relation to anything outside of Himself. His interest in His creatures arises from His sovereign good pleasure, not from any need those creatures can supply nor from any completeness they can bring to Him who is complete in Himself. Again we must reverse the familiar flow of our
thoughts
understand that which is unique, that which stands alone as being true in this situation and nowhere else. Our common habits of thought allow for the existence of need among created things. Nothing is complete in itself but requires some-
and try to
39
111JJ
XVI t V/
T F ÂŤ II
II ^ V/X-i
Vi
XXX 4â&#x20AC;&#x201D;J
XXV/XXX
need
order to exist. All breathing things needs food and water. Take air and water
outside itself in
thing
air; every organism from the earth and all life stated as an axiom that to stay
would perish instantly. It may be alive every created thing needs other created thing and all things need God. To God
some
nothing is necessary. The^nver grows larger by its tributary that can enlarge the One thing and to whose infinite fullness Unfathomable Sea: all life is out of And Thy life is Thy blissful Unity.
alone
tributaries, but where is the out of whom came everyall creation owes its being? Thee,
Frederick W.
Faber
God created the universe still troubles cannot know why, we can at least know that He did not bring His worlds into being to meet some unfulfilled need in Himself, as a man might build a house to shelter him against the winter cold or plant a field of corn to provide him with necessary food. The word necessary is wholly The
problem of why
thinking men; but if we
foreign to
God.
that God nothing beyond for the creature; from Him, descent. He holds His position out of Himself and by leave of none. As no one can promote Him, so no one degrade Him. It is written that He upholds all things by is the Being supreme over all, it follows elevated. Nothing is above Him, motion in His direction is elevation
Since He
be Him. Any
cannot away can
supported by all human beings suddenly to become blind, still the would shine by day and the stars by night, for these owe nothing to the millions who benefit from their light. So, were on earth to become atheist, it could not affect God He is what He is in Himself without regard to any believe in Him adds nothing to His perfections; to
the word of His the things He
power.
upholds?
How can He be raised or
Were
sun
every man in any way.
other. To
doubt Him
takes nothing away. just because He
needs no support. The picture of a nervous, ingratiating God fawning over win their favor is not a pleasant one; yet if we look at the popular conception of God that is precisely what we see. Twentieth-century Christianity has put God on charity. So lofty Almighty God,
men
to
is almighty,
quite easy, not to to God. wouldButHethebe altogether of God's divine necessity. natural egotism entertain is that God does not need our help. We commonly represent Him as a busy, eager, somewhat frustrated Father hurrying about seeking help to carry out His benevolent plan bring peace and salvation to the world; but, as said the Lady Tulian, "I saw truly that God doeth all-thing, be it never so little."15 The God who worketh all things surely needs no help helpers. missionary appeals are based upon this fancied frustration of Almighty God. An effective speaker can easily pity in his hearers, not only for the heathen but for the who has tried so hard and so long to save them and has failed for want of support. I fear that thousands of young perenter Christian sen/ice from no higher motive than to deliver God from the embarrassing situation His love has
opinion of ourselves that we find it enjoyable, to believe that we are necessary truth is that God is not greater for our being, nor less if we did not exist. That we do exist is free determination, not by our desert nor by Probably the hardest thought of all for our
is our say
to
to
and no
Too many
excite God sons
help
abilities seem unable to get of commendable idealand fair amount of compassion for the underprivileged and you have the true drive behind much Christian activity today. Again, God needs no defenders. He is the eternal Undefended. To communicate with us in an idiom we can understand, God in the Scriptures makes full use of military terms; surely it was never intended that we should think of the throne of the Majesty on high as being under siege, with Michael and his hosts or some other heavenly beings defending it stormy overthrow. So to think is to misunderstand everything the Bible would tell us about God. Neither Judaism nor Christianity could approve such puerile notions. A God who be defended is one who can help us only while someone helping Him. We may count upon Him only if He wins in cosmic seesaw battle between right and wrong. Such a God could not command the respect of intelligent men; He could
gotten Him Him out of. ism
into and
His limited
Add to this a certain degree
a
but
from
must
is
the
only excite
their pity.
T^NOWL&UGE OF THIS HDLr right we must think worthily of God. It is morally iml iTE
42 To be
perative that we purge from our minds all ignoble concepts of the Deity and let Him be the God in our minds that He is in His universe. The Christian religion has to do with God and man, but its focal point is God, not man. Man's only claim to importance is that he was created in the divine image; in himself he is nothing. The psalmists and prophets of the Scriptures refer in sad scorn to weak man whose breath is in his nostrils, who grows up like the grass in the morning only to be cut down and wither before the setting of the sun. That God exists for Himself and man for the glory of God is the emphatic teaching of the Bible. The high honor of God is first in heaven as it must yet be in earth. From all this we may begin to understand why the Holy Scriptures have so much to say about the vital place of faith and whv thev brand unbelief as a deadly sin. Among all created beings, not one dare trust in itself. God^alone trusts in Himself; all other beings must trust in Him. Unbelief is actually perverted faith, for it puts its trust not in the living God but in dying men. The unbeliever denies the self-sufficiency of God and usurps attributes that are not his. This dual sin dishonors God and ultimately destroys the soul of the man. In His love and pity God came to us as Christ. This has been the consistent position of the Church from the days of the apostles. It is fixed for Christian belief in the doctrine of the incarnation of the Eternal Son. In recent times, however, this has come to mean something different from, and less than, what it meant to the early church. The Man Jesus as He appeared in the flesh has been equated with the Godhead and all His human weaknesses and limitations attributed to the Deity. The truth is that the Man who walked among us was a demonstration, not of unveiled deity but of perfect humanity. The awful majesty of the Godhead was mercifully sheathed in the soft envelope of human nature to protect mankind. "Go down," God told Moses on the mountain, "charge the people, lest they break through unto the Lord to gaze, and many of them perish"; and later, "Thou canst not see my face: for there shall no man see me, and live." Christians today appear to know Christ only after the flesh.
with Him by divesting Him of majesty, the very atassumed in fullness of Father right hand. The Christ of popular Christianity has a weak smile and a halo. He has become Someone-up-There who likes people, at least some people, and these are grateful but not too impressed, jf they
They try to achieve communion His burning holiness and unapproachable tributes He veiled while on earth but glory upon His ascension to the s
need Him, He also needs Let us not imagine that
them. the truth of the divine self-sufficiency
will stimulate all holy self-confidence, will when viewed in its Biblical perspective lift from , minds the exhausting load of mortality and encourage us take the easy yoke of Christ and spend ourselves in Spiritinspired toil for the honor of God and the good of mankind. the blessed news is that the God who needs no one has in sovereign condescension stooped to work by and in and through His obedient children. all this appears self-contradictoryâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Amen, be it so. The various elements of truth stand in perpetual antithesis, sometimes requiring us to believe apparent opposites while we wait for the moment when we shall know as we are known. Then truth which now appears to be in conflict with itself will arise in shining unity and it will be seen that the conflict has not
will
paralyze Christian activity. Rather it This truth, while a needed rebuke to human
endeavor. our
to
For
If
sin-damaged minds. lies in loving obediand the inspired admoniwhich worketh in you/' He needs no oney but when faith is present He works through any-
the truth but in our meanwhile our inner fulfillment ence to the commandments of Christ tions of His apostles. "It is God
been in
In the
healthy spiritual
Two statements are in this sentence and a requires that we accept both. For a has been in almost total eclipse, and that to our injury. Fountain of good, all blessing flows From Thee; no want Thy fulness knows; What but Thyself canst Thou desire? Yet self-sufficient as Thou art,
one.
full generation the first deep spiritual
life
worthless heart;
Thou dost desire my This, only this, dost
Thou require. Johann
Scheffler
.sneutmunbriorcttnAI
) 2 ( :) 3 (
-In
Attributes
(3):
The Attributes of God (3): cable Attributes (2):
We
Introduction.
The IncommunlVarious
studying the attributes have defined as "the perfections the divine essence." set forth in the Scriptures visibly exercised in His works of creation, pro-
God, which
of
of or
are
we
redemption.
We have divided them into
(1) Incommunlcable.
These bear little analogy
vldence. and two classes:
the properties of human nature.
to
(2) Communicable.
These bear considerable analogy to the properties of human nature. In our last study we concentrated on God's self-existence and the normative passage of Exodus
3:13-15. We have defined it as God' s independence. complete self-sufficiency. His existence is from Himself. He is the First Cause of all, yet uncaused Himself. Upon this truth rests the divine immutability and ultimately all our encouragement to dependence upon Him. All the promises and all our consolation are bound up in the G-reat * I Am,"
His
We
others of the
turn to
now
incommunicable
attributes, beginning with His simplicity. 1
THE SIMPLICITY OF GOD.
A.
ses:
The Sense of the Term.
The
term
(l)
the
simplicity has been used in two senstate of freedom from composlteness.
That is, God cannot be divided!into parts. The three Persons are not parts of the divine essence.
Angels and
men are
complex,
composed of soul and
body, two substances and not one. The angels have a spiritual body, one adapted to the spiritual world.1
(2) The state That sence
is, and
of freedom from distinction. there is no distinction between God"1"s es-
His attributes.
1Shedd,
I, 338.
The latter
are
not added
to His essence. The whole son and in each attribute,
B.
essence baymjck's
is in each per-
yjcuJ
The. Scriptural Evidence.
"Put
somewhat
differently," Preus
says,
"simpli-
city means that there is nothing in God except being, and God is His own being. One might almost say that to call G-od Spirit or to call Him simple or to call Him one is to say the same thing in different ways, and is merely an attempt to summarize what long before had been expressed by the prophet Isaiah in his inimitable 40th chapter" (that is, He is above all idols and fetishes).! Thus, the texts that teach unit! also teach simplicity (see below).
Everything in G-od, whether thought, emotion, Thus, such texts as 1 John 4:8, "G-od is. love," affirm
volition, or act, is G-od. 1:5, "G-od la light," and His simplicity.
SUJ-
The Significance of the Attribute. The somewhat philosophical nature of this attribute emerges when one seek to set forth its practical force. Brunner denies that it has any.2 If it does, the idea of faithfulness may be it; He is not double-minded (cf. Jas. 1:5-3), but 2&e.
II
THE UNITY OF GOD.
A.
The Sense of the Term.
The attribute of unity is also used of God in two senses: (l) Oneness.â&#x20AC;&#x201D;numerical oneness. The three Persons form one essence; they constitute one indivisible God. One who is and infinite must be one (cf. John 10:30, ev ).
absolute
(2) Unlcitv. God
to
the
or
uniqueness.
There is only one
exclusion of others.
1Preus,
I, 71-72.
2Brunner,
I, 294
I
B«
The Scriptural Evidence
While there age many text a. that teach unity
(cf. Exod. 15:11 /ct.
EichrodJ/1; 1 14:9 /one day the gods of Buddhism, danism, Unitarianism gone!/; 1 Cor. 1 Tim. 2:5 /cf. Rom. 3:29-307), the ia
normative text
Deuteronomy 6:4:
ttt£
tt J— irr?
——««y»» II »< ■■1
VA
KCiif
e<TTIv
It be
Kings 8:60; Zech. Taoism, Mohamme8:6; Eph. 4:6;
— <»■■
.
I
XqyyX^A
'l
HI
•
■iVjl'IH
Kiyator
-
I
ttitt? X—I—
IH
'
.. — I I
1 I III
I-MI
I
■■■f'ltlMI iAmi —
Kc/^ocCf £'? J
O
.
is"generally acknowledged that"the text
rendered
in
two
ways:B
may
(1) Jateweh our God Is one single Jahweh. That is, He cannot be split up into various divinities or powers, like the Baals of _Tvre, of Hazor and of Shechem, etc. The Hebrew "fV*; refers to a compound unity (cf. Gen. 1:5; 2:24); T 'XT ?r refers to an absolute unity (22:2, 12, 16; this word is never used to
express
the unity of God in the Old
Testamen^.
(2) Jahweh is our God. Yahweh alone. He has exclusive position vis-a-vis all other deities, a
an
meaning that Eichrodt prefers.
What does the use of the text in Mark 12:29. 32 indicate? This text became the basic formula of absolute monotheism. God could not be associated with other e15hTm. The New Testament passages confirm the
adding other details fer
ta7). C.
(cf. Eph. 4:6:
1 Tim.
forc§., 2:5 /re-
The Significance of the Attribute.
In the Old Testament the practical significance
unity of God is related the prohibition of (cf. Exod. 20:2-4). From idolatry there springs a mechanical religion. God th§"IrmSeAsurable
of the images
reduced
to
a
five-foot
Eichrodt,
I, 221.
measure!
The
2Ibld.
.
self-moved God
I, 226.
Isaiah 46:1-4
Bel boweth down, Nebo stoopeth; their idols upon the beasts, and upon the cattle: the things that ye carried about are made a load, a burden to the weary beast. 2. They stoop, they bow down together; they could not deliber the bur-^F den, but themselves are gone into captivity. 3 Hearken unto me, 0 house of Jacob, and all the remnant of the house of Israel, that have been borne fey mg. from their birth, that have been carried from the womb; 4 and even to old age I am he, are
and
even
hoar hairs will I
to
made, and I will bear; deliver
yea,
carry vou. I have I will carry, and will
phil. i: zf
*•
eeM.s
with/as /
CHAPTER XI,
Th
BEARING
to Adam into co ses, as persona
name." graciou Like
as
pi^leth of the
heathen' Ac cord i: tates o conscie: of nece Miom we
OR BORNE.
poke
Isaiah xlvi.
CHAPTER XLVI.repeats is a definite ofprophecy, compl ete the truths which in itself.
It
many
previous chapters, and we have already seen what it says about Cyrus. But it also strikes out a new truth, very relevant then, when men made idols and worshipped the works of their hands, and relevant still, when so many, with equal stupidity, are more concerned about keeping up the forms of their religion than allowing God to sustain themhave
we
found in
selves.
ntered th Mo— uses the s
my
ul
and
ou.
Lord
e
the G-od the •
•
•
dies
of
which previous chapters have been rit is elaborating, is the contrast between the idols and the , and to living God. On the one side we have had pictures of the busy idol-factories, cast into agitation by the advent of Cyrus, turning out with much toil and noise their tawdry, unstable images. Foolish men, instead of letting God undertake for them, go to and try what their own hands and hammers can effect. Over against them, and their cunning and toil, the prophet sees the God of Israel rise alone, taking all responsibility of salvation to Himself—/, I am He : look unto Me, all the ends of the earth, and be ye saved\ This contrast comes The great contrast,
to
a
head in ch. xlvi.
VOL. II.
12
Be are
dols ■he
upo
things
;,
burd en bow dow
they
a
Le
bur-
id
all been
den, bu 3 the rem borne £ ried fr and eve
made,
re
am
a
K* / o
i
It is still the
of the capture of Babylon; but the himself what will happen on the of the capture. He sees the conqueror followeve
prophet pictures morrow
to
Th Adam
into
co
36sj
as
persona
name." graciou Like
as
pi^rieth of the
heathen Ac cord i tates o conscie of nece ttiom we
he,
have id will
deliver
I
car-
i
to
ing the old fashion of triumph—rifling the temples of his enemies and carrying away the defeated and discredited gods as trophies to his own. The haughty idols are torn from their pedestals and brought head foremost through the temple doors. Bel crouches—as men have crouched to Bel; Nebo cowers—a stronger verb than crouches, but assonant to it, like cower to crouch.* Their idols have fallen to the beast and to the cattle. Beast, " that is, tamed beast, perhaps elephants in contrast to cattle, or domestic animals."f The things with which ye burdened yourselves, carrying them shoulder high in religious processions, are things laden, mere baggage-bales, a burden for a hack, or jade. The nouns are mostly feminine—the Hebrew neuter—in order to heighten the dead-weight impression of the idols. So many baggage-bales for beasts' backs—such are your gods, O Babylonians ! They cower, they crouch together (fall limp is the idea, like corpses)/ neither are they able to recover the burden, and themselves !—literally their soul, any real soul of deity that ever was in them— into captivity are they gone. This never happened. Cyrus entered Babylon not in spite of the native gods, but under their patronage, and was careful to do homage to them. Nabunahid, the king of Babylon, whom he supplanted, had vexed the priests of Bel or Merodach; and these priests had been among the many conspirators in favour of the Persian. So far, then, from banishing the idols, upon his entry into the city, Cyrus had himself proclaimed as (t the f Bredenkamp.
ipoke mtered
.th Mothe
.uses ■
a
"ul
my and
ou.
Lord
,e
the G-od the •
•
•
dies of rit is and to .
Be! are
dols he
upo:
things
they
bow dow
bur-
ie
den, bu 3 the renl borne ried fr and eve
made,
a
,
burden
Ld
all
re
been
i
car-
am
he,
have id will
a
delive:
'-•J
servant of
Merodach,"
restored to their own cities the Nabunahid had brought to Babylon, and prayed, " In the goodness of their hearts may all the idols
Tb to Adaa into co ses, as persona
name." graciou Like
as
pi^letta of the
heather Ac cord i tates o conscis of
nece
Miom
we
that
gods whom I have brought into their strong places daily intercede before Bel and Nebo, that they should grant me length of days. May they bless my projects with prosperity, and may they say to Merodach, my lord, that Cyrus the king, thy worshipper, and Kambyses, his son (deserve thy favour)." * Are we, then, because the idols were not taken into captivity, as our prophet pictures, to begin to believe in him less ? We shall be guilty of that error, only when we cease to disallow to a prophet of God what we do allow to any other writer, and praise him when he. employs it to bring home a moral truth—the use of his
imagination. What if these idols never were packed off by Cyrus, as our prophet here paints for us ? It still remains true that, standing where they did, or carried away, as they may have been later on, by conquerors, who were monotheists indeed, they were still mere ballast, so much dead-weight for weary beasts. Now, over against this kind of religion, which may be reduced to so many pounds avoirdupois, the prophet
spes
in
contrast' the
God of Israel.
And it is
but
natural, when contrasted with the dead-weight of the idols, that God should reveal Himself as a living and a lifting God : a strong, unfailing God, who carries and who saves. Hearken unto Me, O House of Jacob, and all the remnant of the House of Israel; burdens from the wombj things carried from the belly. Burdens, things carried, are the exact words used of the idols in ver. I. Even unto old age I am He, and unto grey hairs I will *
Sayce, Fresh Light, ete.,
p. 140.
ipoke intered .th Mouses the s my "ul and ■
rou.
Lord
ie
the God the I )
,s
•
•
•
dieof
,rit is i, and to
r •De are
dols ,he
upo!
things
a
,
burden
they
bow dow
ie
bur-
id
all been
den, bu 3 the rem borne Jj rie<3 fr and eve
made,
re x
caram
he,
have
|a will
a
deliver
x.-/
bear—a have
grievous word, used only of great burdens. I carry; yea, I will bear, and will
made, and I will
recover.
Then follow
some verses
in the familiar style.
To whom will ye
Th to Adaji into co nes, aa persona
name." gracioa Like
as
pi^rleth of the
heather Ac cord i tates o console of neca Miom we
liken Me, and match Ale, and compare Me, that we may be like ? They who poar gold from a bag, and silver they measure off with an ellwand— gorgeous, vulgar Babylonians !—they hire a smelter, and he maketh it a god—out of so many ells of silver!— they bow down to it, yea, they worship it! They carry him upon the shoulder, they bear him,—again the grievous word,—to bring him to his station ; and he stands ; from his place he never moves. Yea, one cries unto him, and he answers not; from his trouble he doth not save him. Remember this, and show yourselves men—the playing with these gilded toys is so unmanly to the monothoist (it will be remembered what we said in ch. iii. about the exiles feeling that to worship idols was to be less than a man *)—lay it again to heart, ye transgressors. Remember the former things of old: for 1 am God, El, and there is none else ; God, Elohim, and there is none like Me. Publishing from the origin the issue, and from ancient times things not yet done; saying, My counsel shall stand, and all My pleasure shall I perform; calling out of the sunrise a Bird-of-prey, from the land *that is far off the Man of My counsel. Yea, I have spoken; yea, I will bring it in. I have purposed; yea, I will do it. Hearken unto Me, ye obdurate of heart—that is, brave, strong, sound, but too sound to adapt their preconceived notions to God's new revelation ;—ye that are far from righteousness, in spite of your sound opinions as to how it ought to come. I have brought near My righteousness, in distinction to yours. It shall not be far off, like your *
See p. 39
f.
ipoke mtered
,th Mothe
,uses ,s
my "ul and 'OU.
Lord
.e
the G-od the •
•
•
dies
of
jrit is ,
and
to
Be are
dols .he
upo:
things
;,
burden bow dow
a
they bur-
te
den, bu 3 the rem borne b ried fr and
id
all
re
been
i
caram
eve
he,
made, a
have id will
deliver
A.'/
impossible ideas, and My salvation shall not tarty, and salvation, for Israel My glory. It is evident that from the idolaters Jehovah has turned again, in these last verses, to the pedants in Israel, who were opposed to Cyrus because he was a Gentile, and who cherished their own obdurate notions I will set in Zion
Th to Adam into cd Bes, as persona
name." graciou Like
as
pi^leth of the
heathen
Accord! tates o console of nece
thorn
we
of how salvation and righteousness should come. Ah, their kind of righteousness would never come, they would always be far from it! Let them rather trust to Jehovah's, which He was rapidly bringing near
in His
own
way.
Such is the
prophecy. It starts a truth, which bursts free from local and temporal associations, and rushes in strength upon our own day and our own customs. The truth is this
: it makes all the difference to a man how he conceives his religion—whether as something that he has to carry, or as something that will carry him. We have too many idolatries and idol manufactories among us to linger longer on those ancient ones. This cleavage is permanent in humanity—between the men that are trying to carry their religion, and the men that
are
allowing God
Now let
us see
to carry
them.
how God does carry.
God's carriage of man is no mystery. It may be explained without using one theological term ; the Bible gives us the best expression of it. But it may be explained without a word from the Bible.
It is broad and varied
as
man's
moral
experience. it The first requisite for stable and buoyant life is
ground, and the faithfulness of law. What sends us about with erect bodies and quick, firm step is the sense that the surface of the earth is sure, that gravitation will not fail, that our eyes and the touch of our feet and bur judgement of distance do not deceive us.
ipoke mtered .th Mo-
the
,uses ,s
my "ul and
'OU.
Lord
,e
the God the •
•
•
dies
of
rit ,
is
and
to
Be are
dols
upo'
he
things
they bur-
le
den, bu 3 the rem borne £ ried fr and
a
,
burd en bow dow
id
all
re
been car-
i
am
eve
he,
made, a
have id will
deliver
A. '
/
o
Now, what the body needs for its world, the soul needs For her carriage and bearing in life the soul requires the assurance, that the moral laws of theuniverse are as conscience has interpreted'them to her, for hers.
and will continue to be
them.
th to Adats into co ses, as persona
name.1 graeiou Like
as
pi^rleth of the
as
in
experience she has found
To this
requisite of the soul—this indispensable condition of moral behaviour—God gives His assurance. I have made, He says, and I will bear* These words
were
in
have often sprung up
answer
in
our
to
an
instinct, that
hearts when
we
must
have been
struggling for at least moral hope—the instinct
which will be all that is sometimes left to a man's soul when unbelief lowers, and under its blackness a flood of temptations rushes in, and character and conduct feel impossible to his strength—the instinct that springs from the thought, " Well, here I am, not responsible
fpr being here, but
tpoke mtered .th Mouses the ,s
my "ul and "OU.
heathen
His."
Accordi
separate from his
tates o console of nece trhom we
and turning-point in many a life. and sweep he finds bottom there, and gets his face round, and
Some such
God's Word sure.
simple faith, which a man existence, has been the
can
hardly rally
first
In the moral drift and steadies on it, gathers strength. And
comes to
him to tell him that his instinct is
Yea, I have made, and I will bear.
The most terrible anguish of the heart, however, is that it carries something, which can shake a man off even that ground. The firmest rock is of no use to the 2.
paralytic, governor,
is
no
with
broken leg. And the most universe, and most righteous moral comfort—but rather the reverse—to the
or to a man
steadfast moral
*
There is a play made, and I ivill aid.
on
a
the words 'anl
'aslthl, wa'ani, 'essa'—I have
Lord G-od
.e
by some One else, and the responsibility of the life, which is too great for me, is so set
the the • ■
•
•
dies of rit is and to .
Be are
dols he
upo
things
a
,
burden bow dow
they bur-
te
den, bu 3 the rem borne Jj ried fr and eve
Ld
all
•e
been car-
l
he,
am
made, a
have id will
deliver
v7
with
bad
conscience, whether that conscience be guilt, or to the habit, of sin. Conscience whispers, " God indeed made thee, but what if thou hast unmade thyself ? God reigns ; the laws of life are righteousness; creation is guided to peace. But man
a
due to the
thou art outlaw of this
thine
will.
Thou
universe, fallen from God of must
bear thine
guilt, thy voluntarily contracted habits. How canst thou believe that God, in this fair world, would bear thee up, so useless, soiled, and infected a thing ? " Yet here, according to His blessed Word, God does come own
own
endure
Th to Adam! into co ses, as persona
name." graciou Like
as
pi^leth of the
heatheiij Accord! tates o console of nece Miom we
down to bear up men.
Because man's sunkenness
and
helplessness are so apparent beneath no other burden or billows, God insists that just here He is most anxious, and just here it is His glory, to lift men and bear them upward. Some may wonder what guilt is or the conviction of sin, because they are selfishly or dishonestly tracing the bitterness and unrest of their lives to some other source than their own wicked wills; but the thing is man's realest burden, and man's realest burden is what God stoops lowest to bear. The grievous word for bear, " sabal," which we emphasized in the above passage, is elsewhere in the writings of the Exile used of the bearing of sins, or of the result of sins. Our fathers have sinned, and are not1 and we bear their
iniquities,* says one of the Lamentations. And in the fifty-third of Isaiah it is used twice of the Servant, that He bore our sorrows, and that He bare their iniquities.\ Here its application to God—to such a God as we have seen bearing the passion of His people's woes—cannot fail to carry When it is *
Lam.
v.
with it the associations of these passages. said, God bears, and this grievous verb is 7.
t Ver.
4,
second clause, and vii.
ipoke altered .th Mouses the ,s
•ul
my and
'ou.
Lord
.e
the G-od the •
•
•
die-
i
s
of
rit ,
is
and
to
Be are
dols he
upo
things
a
,
burd en bow dow
they ■e
bur-
id
all
den, bu 3 the rem borne Jj ried fr and eve
been
■e
car-
l
he,
am
made, a
have id will
deliver
Hi
used,
wfi remember at once that He is a God, who does only set His people's sins in the awful light of His countenance, but takes them upon His heart. Let us learn, then, that God has made this sin and guilt of ours His special care and anguish. We cannot feel it more than He does. It is enough: we may not be not
able to understand what the sacrifice of Christ meant the Divine justice, but who can help
to
Th to Adars into co ses, as persona
name." graciou Like
as
pi^leth of the
heather
Accord! tates o console of nece frhom we
comprehending
from it that in
Divine way the Divine love has made our sin its own business and burden, so that that might be done which we could not do, and that 1 ifted which we could not bear ? 3.
But this gospel of God's love bearing our sins is of
no use
to
a man
bears him up ment
some
unless it goes with another—that God
for victory
holiness.
in
It
over
is
temptation and for attain-
said
to
be
Mohammedan
a
thoroughly
fashion, that when a believer is tempted past the common he gives way, and slides into sin with the cry, " God is merciful;" meaning that the Almighty will not be too hard on this poor creature, who has held out so long. If this be Mohammedanism., there is a great deal of Mohammedanism in modern Christianity. 11 is a most perfidious distortion of God's will.
For this is the will of Godt
even our sanctificcition ; gives a man pardon but to set him free for effort, and to constrain him for duty. And here we
and God
come
of
to
never
what is the most essential part
Gyd,
man.
as we
have
seen,
bears
of God's bearing us by giving us by lifting those
ground to walk on. He bears us burdens from our hearts that make the firmest ground slippery and impossible to our feet. But He bears us best and
longest by being the spirit and the soul and
the life of
the
reality.
life.
Every metaphor here falls short of By inspired men the bearing of God has
our
v
tpoke altered .th Mouses the .s
"ul
my and
rou.
Lord God
ie
the the I
•
•
•
die,s of ,rit is i
!, and to
Be! are
dols he
upoj:
tilings bow
a
,
burden
j dow
they bur-
,e
den, bu 3 the rem borne £ ried fr and eve
.d
all
•e
been car-
l
am
he,
made, a
have id will
deliver
V
been likened to
father carrying his child, to an eagle her wings, to the shepherd with the lamb in his bosom. But no shepherd, nor motherbird, nor human father ever bore as the Lord bears. For He bears from within, as the soul lifts and bears the body. The "Lord and His own are one. To me, says he who knew it best, To me to live is Christ. It is, indeed, difficult to describe to others what this inward sustainment really is, seating itself at the centre of a man's life, and thence affecting vitally every organ of his nature. The strongest human illustration is not sufficient for it. If in the thick of the battle a leader is able to infuse himself into his followers, so is Christ. If one man's word has lifted thousands of defeated soldiers to an assault and to a
taking her young
Tti Adan:
to
into
co
36 S
9 9'fi persona
name." graciou Like
as
piiiietfc of the
heather,
Accord! tates
c
consols
of
necs
frhom ws
/
6
■
upon
a victory, even so have Christ's lifted millions: lifted them above the habit and depression of sin, above the weakness of the flesh, above the fear of man, above danger and death and temptation more dangerous and fatal
it
is
not
the
still.
sight of
a
visible
But God does
not carry
dead
the God the :
men.
not from
Lord
Le
5
His carrying below, but from within. You dare not.^be passive in God's carriage; for as in the natural, so in the moral world, whatever dies is thrown aside by the upward pressure of life, to
mechanical, but natural;
rou.
And yet
conquering forces, He gives both, for He is the fountain of life. 4-
s my *ul and •
leader, though the
Gospels have made that sight imperishable; it is not the sound of Another's Voice, though that Voice shall peal to the end of time, that Christians only feel. It is something within themselves; another self—purer, happier, victorious. Not as a voice or example, futile enough to the dying, but as a new soul, is Christ in men; and whether their exhaustion needs creative lorces, or their vices require is not
ipoke mtered .th Mouses the
iS
•
•
•
dieof
.rit is !. and to
Be are
dols he
upo:
things
a
,
Burden "bow dow
.e
bur-
den, bu 3
Ld
all been
they
the rem borne ried f and
'e
have id will
made, a deliver
Tb
ses, as persona
name." graciou Like
as
pi^rletb of the heather
Accord! tates o console of nece trhom we
he,
am
eve
to Adaa into ca
car-
l
K
rot and
perish.
in His
ministry.
Christ showed this over and over again Those who make no effort—or, if effort be past, feel no pain—God will not stoop to bear. But all in whom there is still a lift and a spring after life: the quick conscience, the pain, of their poverty, the hunger and thirst after righteousness, the sacredness of those in their charge, the obligation and honour of their daily duty, some desire for eternal life—these, however weak, He carries forward to perfection. Again, in His bearing God bears, and does not overbear, using a man, not as a man uses a stick, but as a soul uses a body,—informing, inspiring, recreating his natural faculties. So many distrust religion, as if it were to be an overbearing of their originality, as if it bound' to destroy the individual's peculiar freshness and joy. But God is not by grace going to undo His work by nature^ I have made, and I will bear—
were
will bear what I have made. natural
man.
anxious about how He and His
religion are by their consistency or efforts ! To young men, who have not got a religion, and are brought face to face with the conventional religion of the day, the question often presents itself in this way: Is this a thing I can carry ? " or " How much of it can I afford to carry ? How much of the tradition of the elders can I take upon myself, and feel that it is not mere dead weight ? " That is an entirely false attitude. Here you are, weak, by no means master of yourself; with a heart wonderfully full of suggestions to evil; a to
"
be sustained
mtered .th Mouses the •
s
•ul
my and
'ou.
Lord
ie
the G-od the
Religion intensifies the
if that be God's bearing—the gift of the ground, and the lifting of the fallen, and the being a soul and an inspiration of every organ—how wrong those are who, instead of asking God to carry them, are more
ipoke
tWPcQj'AMT.
And now,
J
i
.
.
.
die-
!
.s
of
,rit ,
is
and to
Be are
3ols
[!
upo
jie
things
a
!,
"burden
\
1bhey
"bow dow
e
bur-
3
3
rem
e
all been
den, bu the
borne
ried
£
I car-
I
fr
he,
i am
and eve mad© j a
! lave
will
(3
deliver
y world before you,
hardest where it is clearest, seeming impossible where duty most loudly calls ; yet mainly dark and silent, needing from us patience oftener than effort, and trust as much as the exercise of our own cleverness ; with death at last ahead. Look at life whole, and the question you will ask will not be. Can I,carry this faith ? but, Can this faith carry me? Not, Can I afford to take up such and such and such opinions ? but, Can I afford to travel at all without s^ch a God ? It is not a creed, but a living and a lifting God, who awaits your decision. At the opposite end of life, there is another class of men, who are really doing what young men too often suppose that they must do if they take up a religion, —carrying it, instead of allowing it to carry them ; men who are in danger of losing their faith in God, through over-anxiety about traditional doctrines concerning Him. A great deal is being said just now in our country of upholding the great articles of the faith. Certainly let us uphold them. But do not let us have in our churches most
_
Th< to Adam, into
coi
ses,
as
persona!
name." gracioui Like
as
pi^ieth of the
]
heathen* Accord ii tates o: consciei of necei Miom we
that saddest of ail sights,
ecclesiastical procesbut themselves with their manhood remaining unseen. We know the pity of a show, sometimes seen in countries on the a mere
$ion,—men flourishing doctrines,
Continent, where they have images about.
not given over
Idols and banners and
street with their
carrying
texts will fill
a
tawdry, tottering progress, and you will see nothing human below, but now and then jostling shoulders and a sweaty face. Even so are many of the loud parades of doctrines in our day by men, who, in the words of this chapter, show themselves stout of heart by holding up their religion, but give us no signs in their character or conduct that their religion is holding up them. Let us prize our faith,
spoke entered ith Mouses the is my ful and
you.
Lord
ae
the G-od the 5 g
IS
•
•
•
dieof
Lrit is I, and to
Be are
dols tie
upo:
things
a
,
they
burd en bow dow
bur-
e
den, bu 3 the rem borne ÂŁ ried fr and eve
d
all
e
been car-
am
he,
made, a
have d will
deliver
V
The G-od of the Bible is a person. He spoke to Adam. He revealed himself to Noah. He entered into covenant with Abraham. He conversed with Mo-
M
â&#x201E;˘
ses, as a friend with friend. He everywhere uses the personal pronouns. He says, "I am," that "is my name." I am the Lord your G-od. I am merciful and gracious. Call upon me, and I will answer you. Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pi^leth them that fear Him Everywhere the G-od of the Bible is contrasted with the gods of the heathen, as a G-od who sees, hears, and loves . . . According to the Bible, and according to the dietates of our own nature, of reason as well as of conscience, G-od is a spirit, and being a spirit is of necessity a person; a Being who can say I, and to
L
.
Miom
we
can
say
Thou.
.
.
Hodge, I, 380.
*
1
ILLUSTRATIONS; (l) Isalcarried, or is He One who carries?* Psa. 55;22); (2) Sad to have a religion that exhausts (cf. woman, Baptist, healthTj(3) 1
moves
ah
only as He
(Is God
46:1-2
John
to be
kltole children, keen your^ely^g, fro,a
5^21,
* L/.. ->
Ill
moved.
one
n
'3X1 "J1W »1JS —? •
—
*
"
«-
T
THE SPIRITUALITY OF GOD.
A.
The Sense of the Term.
There is much to Shedd's must
contention that
one
distinguish predicates from attributes, as the
base from the superstructure. "It i§ub^jsause God is a sulrst-ecnce and a per spa, that he can possess and exert attributes."! If~~this is so, then God's spiri-
tuality is a predicate, not an attribute. It is common, however, to regard spirituality as an attribute
and
we
shallffollow that
custom.
—
By spirituality God is regarded as an individual (that which has no substance of any kind is a nonentity2). a Person, a self-conscious, .Intel,. . ligentvand voluntary moral agent, simple in Hif/el- " sence.'^ ILLUSTRATION: Scripture' s confirmation.^ subsistence
)
The 'Scriptural lyiGgace. While there
are
other texts
a£firmlng this doc-
(cf. Num. 16:22; Isa. 31:3 /reac|7; Heb. 12:9) /implies they spring from Him and are like Him/), the tuine
normative
text
is John 4:24
(Gr.).
"Spirit,"
We must render not "a Spirit, for He is not one spirit among many. Ag Morris says, "The indefinite article is no more required than it is in the similar statements, 'God is Tight' (I John 1J5)» and 'God is love' (I John 4:8).M5 The emphatic position of rr ve suggests that He is spirit in the
highest sense.
Shedd, I, 158. Ibid. ^Hodge, I, 376-79. ^Ibid.♦ I, 380. 5Leon Morris, The Gospel according to John (Grand Rapids, 1971), p. 271.
Walt Whitman
was listening one night to an lecturing on the stars, and'the hall was stuffy, and the lecture dull, and the bharts and diagrams unilluminating, until, says Whitman, I could bear it no longer, and I rose and wandered out into the night and looked up at the stars themselves! But there are souls to-dayâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;thousands of themâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;who have never thought of doing that, but stay inside poring over the 'charts and diagrams of religion, the mere mechanism of the faith, taking the whole thing second-hand and quite content with that. "Men," cries the New Testament, "come forth, in the name of God, out of those stuffy places, and look up with your own eyes, and see the bright and morning star!" JSS, TGONL. 55-56.
astronomer
Forezuord
"Thj
As clowns yearn to play Hamlet, so I have wanted to write a treatise on God. This book, however, is not it. Its length might suggest that it is trying to be, but anyone who takes it that way will be disappointed. It is at best a string of beads: a series of small studies of great subjects, most of which first appeared in the
rop]
but into
ab ox
duc< chu3
ure!
wore c
YJ
Chri anis
5|
Evangelical Magazine. They are
were
conceived
as
separate messages,
presented together because they seem to coalesce a single message about God and our living. It is their practical purpose that explains both the selection and omission of now
and the manner of treatment. In A Preface to Christian Theology, two kinds of interest in Christian
ver
r
rt-
topics
John Mackay illustrated things by picturing persons sitting on the high front balcony of a Spanish house watching travellers go by on the road below. The 'balconeers' can overhear, the travellers' talk and chat with them; they may comment criti-. cally on the way that the travellers walk; or they may discuss
questions about the road, how it can exist at all or lead anywhere, what might be seen from different points along it, and so forth; but they are onlookers, and their problems are theoretical only. The travellers, by contrast, face problems which, though they have their theoretical angle, are essentially practical â&#x20AC;&#x201D;problems of the 'which-way-to-go' and 'how-to-make-it' type, problems which call not merely for comprehension but for decision and action too. Balconeers and travellers may think over the same
u
H
f 1 h G
their problems differ. Thus (for instance) in relation to evil, the balconeer's problem is to find a theoretical explanation area, yet
IT: \\
of how evil can consist with God's sovereignty and goodness, but the traveller's problem is how to master evil and bring good out of it. Or again, in relation to siny the balconeer asks whether racial
sinfulnSSS-HTtti personal perversity are really credible, whi]p tW traveller, 'dt knowing sin from within, asks what hope there is of txink deliverance. Or take the problem of the of does Godhead; while the balconeer is asking how one God can conceivably be no1 of .at three, what sort unity three could have, and how three who
no 3
infi
make one can be persons, the traveller wants to know how to show proper and trust towards the honour, love three persons who are now together at work to bring him out of sin to glory. And so we might go on. Now this is a book for travellers, and it is with travellers' questions that it deals.
>eam-
in
as
LI
st' di,
was
md I
co'
*ed
OU'
thi of
,and
St 2 re! th<ths in
but S Of
s
ing
>
with
orth,
loc
,
and and
mo i
"■
A
certain bishop,
when speaking to a believer innovations which had been infim®-" duced ritual of his denomination said: "This is all part of the development of the church since New Tdstament times. ' The believer replied: "We call it by a different name: depart-ure!" Alfred P. G-ibbs, .Worship, p. 102. about
the
many into the
G-ibbs
writes, "Much of so-called 'public worship' in Christendom is merely a form of Christianized Judaism, and, in some cases, Pag-
anism." 1. 2.
3-
He
draws
a
parallel between Judaism:
Separate priestly caste man-made clergy, essential to worship (l Peter 2). Jewish priestly dress collars today.
Earthly sanctuary G-od."
IJ±L.
Note
4-fold
"church," "house
use
of
of' church.
DGB at opening of sermon in Park Boston, surveying wealthy congregation in expensive clothing, "'Well, you've got quite a building here, but let me tell you something. At two :
Street Church,
o'clock
in the morning God will no present here than in that night down the street!" H.
be
Canada,
more
club
Oursler, Keswick,
1971.
'dung',
he means not merely that he does not think them as having any value, but also that he does not live with them constantly in his mind: what normal person spends his of
ing of manure?
time nostalgically dream21.
Packer, KG,
Unfortunately the word Infinite has not "always to Its precise meaning, "but has been u-sed Carelessly to mean simply much or a great deal, as when we say that an artist takes infinite pains with his picture or a teacher shows infinite patience with her class. Properly, the word can be used of no created thing, and of no one but God. Hence, to argue about whether or not space is infinite is to play with words. Infinitude can belong to but One. There can be no second. When we say that God is infinite we mean that "been held
he
knows
God
is,
no
bounds.
Whatever God
is
and
all
that
He
is without limit. And' here again we must break away from the popular meaning of words.
"Unlimited wealth"
ther
txse.
f
and
"boundless
energy"
examples of the misuse of words. 7>fÂŁ.se
dung
When Paul he
^
yo k
kre, ÂŁ t4-r
i
are
Tozer,
fur-
51.
/
says he counts the things he lost
means not merely that he does not think of them as having any value, but also that he does not live with them constantly in his mind: what normal person spends his time ,
ing of manure?
nostalgically dreamPacker, KG, 21.
5
c-
£k© Significance Q_f ihe Attribute.
There
are
two
lines
of
thought here:
(l) by
a Person all the possibilities of a personal relation with God are indicated. ILLUSTRATIONS: (l) Walt Whitman and the stars1: (2) JohnHaclsav and twokklnds p£ Interest in Christian things2:
being
of
manure?^
1
XL
(2) The nature of true worship is related to His nature. The locale for worship has been changed, the where. and also the how (not physical,
but_ spiritual: not outward. but inward: not trl-
IV THE INFINITY OF
GOD.
A.
The Sense of the Term.
"Of
can be thought or said about God,1 "His infinitude is the most diffigrasp.1 It is f,the divine essence viewed
all
that
Tozer claims, cult as
to
having
no involves His
and
limits,"5
bounds
or perfection.
which necessarily
He is illimitable, with all defects missing boundless potentiality present. ILLUSTRATION:
Jihaa
"much"
pr
Ha
great
deal.
"6 '
The Scriptural Evidence.
such
There are several texts that teach infinity, Job 11:7-10, Psalm 145:3, and Revelation l:£
as
James S.
Stewart, The Gates of--New Life (New York, 1940), pp. 55-56." 2J7 I. Packer, Knowing G-od. (Downers Prove. 1973), PP. 5-6. ^Ibld. P. 21. Alfred P.-Glbbs, Worship, p. 102. rShedd, I, 339. Tozer, p. 51.
.
Nothing in God is less or more, or large or small."â&#x20AC;&#x201D;TTS^is what He is in Himself, without qualifying thought or word. He is simply God. Tozer, P. 51.
In
the
awful
abyss of the divine Being may lie and which can
attributes of which we know nothing have no meaning for us, just as the
attributes of
and grace can have no personal meaning for seraphim or cherubim. These holy beings may know of these qualities in God but be unable to feel them sympathetically for the reason that they have not sinned and so do not call forth God's mercy and grace. So there may be, and I believe there surely are, other aspects of God's essentlal being which he has not revealed even to His ransomed and Spiritilluminated children. These hidden facets of God's nature concern His relation to none but Himself. They are like the far side of the moon, which we know is there but which has never been explored and has no immediate meaning for men on earth. There is no reason for us to try to discover what has not been revealed. It is enough to know that God is God. Ibid., pp. 51-52. mercy
"This, this is the God Our
we adore, unchangeable Friend, is as great as His power,
faithful,
Whose love And neither
knows
measure
nor
end.
"'Tis Jesus, the first and the last, Whose Spirit shall guide us dafe home; We'll praise Him for all that is past, And trust Him for all that's to come." Joseph Hart
C.
The Significance of the Attribute.
The attribute of infinity might be misused to suggest that allnÂŁHg$n&jh no"t infinite is, therefore, imperfecta SHeaa s comments are useful in providing a corrective. "If knowledge in any being has bounds,11 he points out, "it is imperfect knowledge; if holiness has degrees or limits in any rational spirit, it is imperfect holiness. Yet finite holiness is real excellence, and limited knowl edge is real knowledge. The finlteness of holiness does not convert it into sin; neither does the limitedness of knowledge convert it into error, or untruth. The imperfection or limitation of the finite
relates not
to
quality,
but
quantity."I
to
Finally, it should be remembered that infinity Is
a
general term and
it
denotes
a
characteristic
belonging to all the communicable attributes of G-od It is a beautiful thought to recollect that it refers
to His
mercy
and
His love.
And
it
is
a
sober-
ing thought to realize that it also refers to His terror! If God is INFINITE, is it possible that Tozer is right in saying, In the awful abyss of the divine Being may lie attributes of which we know noth
ing and which can have no meaning for us, Just as the attributes of mercy and grace can have no personal meaning for seraphim and cherubim"?2 is q.0^ like "the far side of the moon" in this respect1^
â&#x2013; ^Shedd,
I, 339.
2Tozer,
pp.
51-52.
^Ibld.
The Attributes of God cable Attributes
(4): (3)
The Incommunl'â&#x20AC;˘
Various---
The attributes of God are "the
Introduction.
^
perfections
They are seen in the Scriptures and in His works of creation, providence, and redemption.
of
the
essence."
divine
Some
of the attributes are
incommunicable, that is,
they bear little analogy to human nature. Others are communicable; they bear considerable analogy to human nature. In
this
lecture
incommunicable
we
that
ones
will consider several of the Remaining we have not considered to this point,
as the immensity, omnipresence, eternity, and immutability of God. These attributes raise some very interesting questions. For example, what is time? Is it ,fa slice of eterâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; nity?" What is eternity? Is it timelessness? Has time been created? Some interesting answers have been given to some of these questions. For example, Hodge,citing Jamieson, says of time, "Or, in other words, time is ' tlpte interval which a body in motion marks in its transit from one point of space to another." Augustine and others have come to the conclusion that God created time, since it had a beginning, but that it is practically impossible to define time acceptably. Augustine's famous statement about time is, ,fIf no one asks me, I know; but if I wish to explain it to someone who asks, I DO NOT KNOW." !!The image that represents eternity is the
such
ocean,'^Shedd says, "that which represents time is the
river."
And what
shall
we
say
gests
about immutability? It, too, sugof a different two passages by
some interesting questions, although nature. Let me illustrate this by putting the
side
of each other:
"For
of
I, the Lord, do not change; therefore you, 0 Jacob, are not consumed" (Mai. 3:6). "When God
saw
their
sons
deeds, that they turned from their
wicked way, then god relented (AV, "repented") concerning the calamity which He had declared He would bring upon them. And He did not do it" (Jon. 3:10, NASB). Cf. 2
Kings 20:1,
Is,
then, God
1Hodge,
5 an
I,
(cf. Isa. 38:1, 5). unchangeable God?
337-
2Shedd,
I,
343
Canon "W". G. H. Holmes of India toH of" seeing Hindu worshipers tapping on trees and stones and
whispering "Are you there? Are you there?" to god they hoped might reside within. In complete humility the instructed Christian brings the
the
He
answer
is fined
there
to
as
that question. He is here and
God
is
indeed
there.
everywhere, not conto tree or stone, but free in the universe, near to everything, next to everyone, and through Jesus Christ immediately accessible to every loving heart. The doctrine of the divine omnipresence decides this forever. Tozer, pp. 81-82. God is said to be "in heaven," "in believers," "in hell," etc., because of a special manifestation of his glory, or his grace, or his tetribution. In this reference, sinners are said to be "Away" from God, and God from them. Shedd, I, 341.
5 I
1
THE IMMENSITY AND OMNIPRESENCE OF GOD.
A.
The Nature of the. Immensity and Omnipresence of God. ~
First, I want to offer a definition of immensity and, then, call attention to some important distlnotlons concerning the two doctrines.
(l) First, Berkhof's definition is, "that perHe transcends
fection of the Divine Being by which all spatial limitations, and yet is
point of space with His whole
present in every being.'1 It has a
namely, the Divine Being is not limiAnd it has a positive side; He fills every part with His whole Being. Immensity (from in mensum /in (Lat., not) plus mensum (past part, of metior, -frit mensum. to. mea^sjaj^T is an aspect of Godrs infinity. His infinity in relation to
negative side, ted to space.
time is His eternity: His immensity.
in relation to
space,
it
is
(2) Second, A few distinctions should be noFirst, Immensity stresses His transcendence. omnipresence His immanence. One relates Him to ted.
abstractly.' the other to His
space
creatures perso-
nailv.2 ILLUSTRATIONS: (l) The error of TaTdenial of transcendence of GodHT^God
pantheism: is all and
all is God" /of. Brahmanism; Stoics; Spinoza (one of most perfect expressions of it in his system); Hegel
Wordsworth, of all
things;
dus^: (3)
power,
(b) assumption He is substance (2) Canon W. G. H. Holmes and Hjn-
the error of deism: God is present with but not with His Being and nature.
Second, He is not equally present and present
in the same sense with all His creatures. He does not dwell on earth as in heaven, in animals as in men, in the wicked" as in the righteouss nor in, the church as in Christ. As Charnock says, "God is in
heaven, in regard of the manifestation of his glory; in hell, by the expression of His justice; in the earth, by the discoveries of his wisdom, power, patience, and compassion; in his people, by the monu-
Berkhof,
p.
60.
Theology (Grand Rapids, p.
141.
A. A^_ Hodge, Outlines of /ed. of 1879 reprint/), ^Tozer, pp. 81-82. 1972
ments of his grace;
substance.111
in regard of his
and in all,
The Theological Evidence for the Teaching.
The omnipresence of
His
God
simultaneous action and
may
be deduced from
knowledge,
everywgfqre
and perpetually, throughout His universe. of the cause must be where the effect is.2
One might also argue from immutability, and His senee and immensity.
The
power
God's infinity. His
omnipotencv to His omnipre-
If He has
an
infinite es-
He has
an infinite presence, for an infinite essence cannot be contained in a finite place. _Infiniteness speaks of unboundedness.3 ILLUSTRATION: Compare. then, human expressions such as, The Man Upstairs""Ton ground floor, too.). sence,
cA needs
The Biblical- Evidence for the Teaching.
truth so widely taught in Scripture hardly documentation, but here are a few passages:
(1) 1. Kings 8:27.
Solomon, wondering that God
would appoint a temple to be erected to Himself since the "heaven of heavens" could not contain Him, affirms His immensity. Notice it is "cannot," not does not contain.
(2) Psalm
139:7-12. If there were a region, large, to which God were restricted ih the presence of His Being, He would be a finite God. Thus, the Psalmist speaks not only of His pervading power, but His Immanent presence. The gods of the
no
matter how
heathen were local for a rude people,
deities,
but
nIt
was
reserved
just escaping from bondage and degradation, to reveal a sublimer theology than the Porch, Academy or Lyceum ever dreamed of. A spiritual, eternal, omnipresent, infinite God is the pervading doctrine of a race, unskilled in letters and
Charnock, tures
in
p.
/reprint of 1927 edJYy 159,
162.
^Robert L. Dabney, Lee-
164.
(Grand,Rapids, 1972 44. Charnock, pp.
Systematic Theology p.
How foolish, was Jonah
to
suppose
that Go.d was
not ' in the '//S"St of this little world.' An infidel father wrote and put upon a wall in his house, wish-
ing to instil his infidelity into his little "boy, words: God is nowhere. The child looked at the words for a moment, and then said: "That is via at my teacher tells us, that God is now here.1 W. Graham Scroggie, The Psalms (4 vols. ; London: Pickering & Inglis Ltd. , 1951), IV, 49. the
pantheist. So far from sayhe sharply distinguishes between the Creator and created things: Thy spifit, Thy presence, Thou are there, Thy hand, darkPsalmist
The
is
no
ing that nature is God,
ness
hideth not
And
verse
from Thee.
17.
"The
eye
Ibid.,
IV,
50.
that mocketh at his
and despiseth to obey his mother, tne ravens of the valley shall pick it out, and the young eagles father, shall
eat It is
It."71-
Clarke, whose pious mother, in his earliest days, had nurtured his soul with the sincere milk of the Word of God, that he, when a little boy, having one day been disobedlent to his mother, on entering the garden, saw a raven over his head flying through the air. At this sight, the last of the above quoted passages of Scripture flashed across his young mind, and. fell with such power upon his conscience that he, crying and trembling, covered his eyes with his hands, to protect them against the raven, and hurried back into said
of
the
well known Adam
the
house. Let not my younger Christian readers make light of the childish fear of young Adam Clarke, for it was the fear of the Lord, which is the beginnning of " wisdom. He looketh to him that is poor and of a contrite spirit, and trembleth at His Word (Isa. lxvi. 2.) Would there was more of this trembling I at His word in the "children of this generation, who,' in this respect, certainly are not so wise as the little boy Adam Clarke. J. A. von Poseck, Light in Our Dwellings, pp. 260-61. .
yesterday, presume to measure the motions of eternity by our scanty Intellects? . . The counsels of a boundless being are not to be scanned "ov THE BRAIil OF A oTLUi WORM, THAT HATH BREATHED BUT A FEW i.ttrntifpr tfj miir1 Tin rt.fi Charnock, p. 86. as
.
No 'bis
account
breath
is
is
to
better account lime condition? that were not a1way3 a
be
mauls'
of man,
because
his nostrils,' Isa. ii. 22. be made of God, if he were of He could not properly be
in
mighty
.
.
.
The
Gould the
almighty,|
almi^htlness |
and eternity ofGGod are linked together: I am 1 Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, saith the Lord, which was, and which is, and which is to come, the Almighty, Rev. i. 8. Almighty because eternal, and eternal because almighty. Charnock, pp.
81-82.
How bold and foolish is it for a mortal creature to censure the counsels and actions of an eternal God, or be too curious in his inquisitions? It is by the consideration'of the unsearchable number of the years of God that Elihu checks too bold inquiries: 'Who hath enjoined him his way, or who say thou hast wrought iniquity? Behold, God is rereat, and we know him not.neither can the number of 1 his years be searched out, Job xxxvi. 26 compared ^ can
with ver. and
23.
understand
we, as
Eternity sets God above
censures.
the
that are of
yesterday,
Infants
of
acts
wise
of
a
day old and
grey
short a being and presume to measure"the so
our inquirieJl not able heads. Shall
tof
are
f
understanding
motions of scanty intellects?". The counsels 0f 9- boundless being are not to be scanned by THE BRAIN OF A SILLY WORM, THAT HATH BREATHED "BUT A FEW
eternity by
our
IllHUTES IN THE WORLD.
â&#x20AC;˘
.
Charnock,
p.
86.
.
constantly prone to relapse Into superstition. How clear the proof that the Bible is no contrivance of man!"1 The text, then, speaks of Bfr»"trtail-presence. ILLUSTrtATiOH; Sproggle. "How foolish of Jonah to suppose that God not in the West of this little
world!"2
(3| Isaiah 66:1 (cf. Acts 7:48-49^. Jehovah condemn^ those who, at enmity with Him^ expect to do
H|m a service by building Him a temple when they return from Babylon! He is the "Being who filleth all."3 He sits in and over the grandest temple of all (not St. Peter's, either!). If heaven is His throne, HE is above it.4 He desires "him that
TRATION:
|
trembleth at my
Word" (cf.
v.
2).
ILLUS-
Adam Clarke and Proverbs "50:11-17. see Jeremiah 23:23-24 (omniActs 17:28; Hebrews 1:3 (Omnipresence ac-
For other passages
.
I presence);
cording to II
Dabney-?).
THE ETERNITY OF GOD.
4.
The Nature of the Eternity of God.
The term eternity has a secondary meaning,—the future world in distinction from this one. Of a dead man we say, has passed into It is also used relatively, that is, of long duratlon yet not endless (cf. Gen. 17:4; Deut. 15:3.7
"He
Zreally
eternity.""
till jubilee/; Exod. things:
12:24).'
We
may also
say these
ted
(1) Firpt, His eternity is His infinity relato/space). By omnipresence He is is everywhere:
by eternity He is always.
Thomwell, I, 196.
^W.
Graham Scroggie, The
Psalms (London, 1951), IV, 49. ^Franz Delitzsclr: Biblical Commentary on the Prophecies of Isaiah, trans, by of 1877
157.
James Martin (Grand
e<3ju7)»j-II, 495.
"Dabney, 'Charnock, pp. 72-73.
fi.
p>
1*52.
Rapids,,1950~Zreprint c ^Charnock, Shedd, I, 349.
The
instantaneous vision,
and succft-seionless
unchanging consciousness of the Divine omniscience, in comparison with the gradual view and successive increasing knov/ledge of the creature, have been thus illustrated. A porson stands at a street corner, and sous a procession passing, whose component parts hi^does not know beforehand. He first sees white men, then black men, and lastly red men. â&#x2013; >hen the last man has passed, he knows that the procession was composed of Europeans, Africans, and Indians. Now suppose that from a church tower he should see at one glance of the eye, the whole procession. Suppose that he saw no one part of it before the other, but that the total view was instantaneous. His knowledge of the procession would; be all-comprchendlng, and without succession. He^ would not come into the knowledge of the components of the procession, as he did in the former case, gradually and part by part. And yet the procession would have its own movement still, and would be made up of parts that follow each other. Though ÂŤ the vision and knowledge of the procession, in this instance, is instantaneous, the procession itself is gradual. In like manner, the vast sequences of human history, and the still vaster sequences of physical history, appear all at once, and without any consciousness of succession, to the Divine observer. This is implied irythe assertion that God "declareth the end from the beginning, " Is. 46:10; T bhedd, pp. 344-45. .
.
.
existing in
a
certain region of the earth. But it would be
contrary to the concept of God as an unlimited being to suppose that anything other than God Himself could prevent Him from
existing, and it would be self-contradictory to supHimself could do it. be inclined to object that although nothing could prevent God's existence, still it might just happen that He did not exist. And if He did exist that too would be by chance. I think, however, that from the supposition that it could happen that God did not exist it would follow that, if He existed, He would have mere duration and not eternity. pose that He Some may
54
THE EXISTENCE OF GOD
j|
If
#
a
housewife has
di!|pes they
a
set of
as
are inferior to those of another set like them in
alii! respects except that they first set
fj
extremely fragile dishes, the 1 are not
connection in
ofllthe
fragile. Those
dependent for their continued existence handling; those of the second set are not. There is are
on
a
gentle
definite
common language between the notions of dependency and inferiority, and independence and superiority. a God. God To say that something which was dependent on nothing lived He has a! whatever was superior to ("greater than") anything that by C. was dependent in any way upon anything is quite in keeping all our S. Lev/is with the everyday use of the terms "superior" and "greater." we Thai think of Correlative with the notions of dependence and independence L short' would be are the notions of limited and unlimited. An engine requires fuel and this is a limitation. It is the same thing to say that ad ends line to an engine's operation is dependent on as that it is limited by 3 and on that its fuel supply. An engine that could accomplish the same will end work in the same time and was in other respects satisfactory, but did not require fuel, would be a superior engine. God is usually conceived of as an unlimited being. He is conceived of as a being who could not be limited, that is, as an absolutely unlimited being. This is no less than to conceive of Him as something a greater than which cannot be conceived. If God is conceived to be an absolutely unlimited being He must be conceived to be unlimited in regard to His existence as well as His operation. In this conception it will not make sense to say that He depends on anything for coming into or continuing in existence. Nor, as Spinoza observed, will it make sense to say that something could prevent Him from existing.12 Lack of moisture can prevent trees from existing in a certain region of the earth. But it would be contrary to the concept of God as an unlimited being to suppose that anything other than God Himself could prevent Him from existing, and it would be self-contradictory to suppose that He Himself could do it. Some may be inclined to object that although nothing could prevent God's existence, still it might just happen that He did not exist. And if He did exist that too would be by chance. I think, however, that from the supposition that it could happen that God did not exist it would follow that, if He existed, He would have mere duration and not eternity.
out
now
anout
today .','
ana so on. it seems aosurc to
make God the
subject of such questions. According to our ordinary conception of Him, He is an eternal being. And eternity does not mean endless duration, as Spinoza noted. To ascribe eternity to something is to exclude as senseless a God God all sentences that imply that it has duration. If a thing has lived He has a] duration then it would be merely a contingent fact, if it was all our ; a fact, that its duration was endless. The moon could have by C. we S. Lev/is endless duration but not eternity. If something has endless Th; think of duration it will make sense (although it will be false) to say short would he that it will cease to exist, and it will make sense (although it will be false) to say that something will cause it to cease to ad ends line to exist. A being with endless duration is not, therefore, an 3 and on that absolutely unlimited being. That God is conceived to be will end eternal follows from the fact that He is conceived to be an absolutely unlimited being. I have been trying to expand the argument of Proslogion 3. In Responsio 1 Anselm adds the following acute point: if you can conceive of a certain thing and this thing does not exist then if it
were
to exist its nonexistence would be pos~
sible. It follows, I believe, that if the would depend on other things both for
were to exist it coming into and continuing in existence, and also that it would have duration and not eternity. Therefore it would not be, either in reality or in conception, an unlimited being, aliquid quo nihil maius
cogitari possit. ^
thing
jÂŁ.&/, U/faA
Anselm states his argument as follows: If it Tthe thing a greater than which cannot be conceived] can be conceived at all it must exist. For no one who denies or doubts the existence of a being a greater than which is
inconceivable, denies or doubts that if it did exist its nonexistence, either in reality or in the understanding, would be impossible. For otherwise it would not be a being a greater than which cannot be conceived. But as to whatever be conceived but does not exist: if it were to exist its non-existence either in reality or in the understanding would be possible. Therefore, if a being a greater than can
-ii
dwells in eternity but time dwells in God. already lived our tomorrows as He has lived
God He all
has our
yesterdays.
An illustration
offered by C. that
Lewis may help us here. He suggests we think of a sheet of paper infinitely extended. Tha would be eternity. Then on that paper draw a short line to represent time. As the line begins on that infinite expanse, so time began in God and will end in Him. Tozer, p. 45. S.
and ends
Second, His eternity is more than e^SAsSS.It is duration without beginning, without
ness.
end,
and without
succession.!
(3) Third, external events are always present God's mind.2 Thus, succession in this sense is denied God, but, of course, He does have knowledge in
of is
in His
The idea
duration in human events.
successive
thinking.
cession in His
own
Me
may have a sense of suesubsistence. Does He not say,
!,As I live**? But, perhaps Babney is right, 1 The thing is too high for us. "3 We can at least say He has
a
tion.
We come to know ILLUSTRATIOHSi
total duragradually and piecemeal.4 (l) Person on corner and parade. then on tower. Of. Isa. 55s8; 46:10.5 (2) To zer, "He has already lived all â&#x20AC;&#x17E;our tomorrows?as He has
simultaneous possession of his
lived
all
our
ours
yesterdays.""
(4) Fourth, in relationship to memory His eternity means that He neither remembers or forgets Memory belongs to the finite mind. All knowledge i present to Him. How, then, shall we understand Heb rews 10:18? B.
The Theological Evidence for the Teaching.
God follows from His self(cf. Exod. 3:13-15, "I am": He could not
The eternity of existence be "*1 am,"
if there were beginning or
en<J).
Cf. Mai. 3*6 (immutability related to self-etistence in this text; note, "Jehovah"). If anything bteginsj: it changes. If it changes not, it must be eternal (cf. Heb. 1:10-12: two attributes connected). It also
It not
does
follows
from His
immutability.
follows from His omnipotence. harmonize with a nature that
"Almighty" had
a
begin-
If He had a beginning. He was once nothing then could "act nothing1. 7
ning. and
Shedd, I, 342. Charles Hodge, I, 388. "Dabney, p. 40. ^ ^Shedd, I, 343. 7 5lbld.. ip 344-45. Tozer, p. 45. 'Charnock, p. 81. .
dwePltrhg-place; thou hast for us, sheltered us against storms, and preserved us from-mischief, as a house doth an inhabitant from wind and weather, and that not in one or two, but in all generations. Charnock, 69. Thou
hast
been our
kept open house
Many truths lie couched in the verse. T. Tho~~world' had a beginning, of being.
'
not
from
It
was
it was once nothing. Had it been of a veryfLong duration, some records would have remained of some memorable actions done of a longer date than any extant. eternity;
The
2.
world
its
owes
being to the
creating
of'bod. 'Thou hadst formed It' out of nothIng Into being. Thau, that is, God. It could not spring into being of itself: it was nothing; it
power
have
must
former.
a
God
3.
in being before
the world. The effect; that Word which gives being must be before that which receives bemust
cause
was
be
before
the
ing. 4.
This Being
'from
from eternity:
wa3
lasting. "
Tni's Being shall endure to eternity:
5.
ever-
'to
everlasting/"^ 6.
God, one Eternal: 'From everlasting to everlasting thou art God.' None else but
There
is
but
one
.
hath the property of bternity; the gods of heathen cannot lay claim to it. Eharnock, 71. one
the
As
one
thousand
day
years
is to
to the
the life of man, so are life of God, Ps. 3cc~. "41
Holy Ghost expressed Tilmself
to
the
a
"The
capacity of
man, to give us some notion of an infinite duration,by a_resemblance suited to the capacity' of man. If a thousand years be but as a day to the life of God,
then
as
a
is
year
to
the
life
hundred
of man,
so
are
three H
sixty-five thousand years to the life of God; and as seventy years are to the life of man, so are twenty-five millions four hundred and fifty^ thousand
years there is
to the life of God.
since
no
nity,
we
•
•
•
must
our
pp.
thoughts beyond all those
73-79.
.The Son stands apart from the world and above Pefore it, Tor He laid its foundations; after it, for He shall fold it up as a garment;
,,
1 and and ,
while
it
changing. PQWS 15b U
dart
Ibid.J
•
Yet still. proportion between time and eter-
,
.L
p# y f
waxes
A. 50*
tl LX U il
B.
old He
stands
over
against it
un-
Davidson, The Epistle to the Heb-
■
f^jB-LLE J
WW
»-*.
W •
*—» w mtm X. X.
* W
1 i W liU W X X U.1
is" the fact that uneducated persons, hearing passages read in an unknown language (Greek^or Hebrew, for example), have, years after, when in an abnormal
is nothing analogous in successionless consciousness perhaps needs some qualification. Those who have been brought to the brini of the grave, and then brought back, speak of a seemingly instantaneous survey of their whole past life. The following from Trances hemblTTbutler's" Records of Later Life is striking. She is doscribIng tier experience during a fearful storra at sea. "As the vessel reeled under a tremendous shock, the conviction of our impendins destruction became so intense in my mind, that my imagination suddenly presented to me the death-vision, so to speak, of my whole existence. ' I should find it impossible adequately to describe the vividness with which my whole oast life presented itself to my perception; not as a procession of events, filling up a succession of years, but as s, whole--a total—suddenly remark that there consciousness to the of the Supreme being, The
human
to me as In a~mirror,~IndescrIbably awful, with the simultaneous, acute, and almost desparing 3ense of loss_,« of waste, so to speak, by which it was accompanied. This instantaneous involuntary retrospect was followed by a keen and rapid survey of the religious belief in which I had been trained, and- which then seemed, to me my only important conuern." In all this, however, there" is really a succession and a series; only it is so exceedingly rapid as to seem simultaneous. Shedd, I, 350-51. held up combined
There
succession, We know that
moments, our
mysteries connected with chronological in our nature, which we cannot explain.
are
in dreams
and moments extended
consciousness
often
is
compressed into to months, so far as
months may be
concerned.
We know that it
happens to those near death,
that, ail the past
becomes Instantly present. Had God so us that memory was as vivid as present there would to us be no past, so far as
constituted consciousness, our personal existence Is concerned. It is not impossible that, hereafter, memory may become a consciousness of the past; that all we ever thought, felt, _o rg_dId, may be_ ever present to the mind; that everything "written on that donee-
tablet J.s Indelible. in foreign countries,
Persons . who, by ~long resi-
have entirely lost all knowledge of their native language, have been £ known to speak It fluently, and understand It per- ™ fectly, when they came to die. Still more wonderful Is the fact that Uneducated persons, hearing passages read in an unknown language (Greek or Hebrew, for example), have, years after, when in an abnormal
state, repeated those pannages correctly, without understanding their meaning. If unable tocomprehend ourselves, we should not pretend to be able to comprehend God. Hodge, I, 388-89.
Thoughts
Some
Nineveh's
For
Jonah's
ment;
"In
wickedness
f
3
turn
rom
a
Jan. Over.dux n
Nahum
to
was "a text without child could understand
message
simple,
so
Jonah
on
a
3:1-5. sermon,
it"
(p.
without
com-
99).
sermons the most beautiful promises are held out to approval, without obligation.' No one has the he is pressed into a corner or confronted with a choice. The Gospel is offered cheaply, accepted cheaply. turned down cheaply (101-2). many
but 'on feeling that
us,
"The
thing happens, however, that the Ninevites single sermon of a single sentence, by that bare, dry crisp, hard sermon. How this puts Jerusalem, the church to shame! Among God's people hundreds of sermons like that have been and will be preached, in all sorts of ways. And the result? '0 Jerusalem, Jerusalem, that killeth the prophets, miraculous
are
converted
and
stoneth
by
them
thy
chickens
under
In I
are,
the
he
her
church
realize
and.
in
that
what
with
Knows?
"Jonah
We
Know!"
they
thev
sins
(speaking on that fact that judgment; 112). "Who
her!
unto
how
often
would
I
have
(108).
tarnished
are
sent
are
together, even as a hen gathereth her wings, and ye would not!'" (107). Cf. those
Ninevites
think,
ao,
Šions
that
children
gathered born
a
of
greed, the
even
are
possess.
sinners in what thev Also their posses-
fraud
animals
are
and
materialism"
included
in
the
(122).
again defaults. He does not answer the heartknows?' He should have called out: We know! We know for a fact that at your prayers God is merciful enough to avert the impending judgment. We people of Israel have experienced that so often" (123).
rending
once
cry:
'Who
"The
one question still remaining is whether it still makes speak of the unchangeable God. It makes all the sense in the world, provided we do not slander God by imputing to Him an unchangeableness a la Darius. For the Bible never presents the unchangeableness of God in that manner" (127).
sense
to
"In sistent
is He changeable? In this, that God remains conHimself as the holy and merciful, the just and gracious One. He cannot repudiate Himself. He can never cease to be God and to act as God. He is unchangeable with respect to His
what
with
faithfulness
with sinful man. He mainblessing. He pours out His wrath but always in the present time, in the day of grace, in the forty days, never completely deaf, never completely turned away. In His wrath He remembers mercy" (127). Jan Overduin, Adventures of a. Deserter, trans, by Harry Van Dyke (Eerdmans, 1965 [orig. ed., 1965]). 153 pp. holy
tains
His
Covenant
in
in
His
dealing
chastisement
1
and
c«
The Biblical Evidence for the Teaching;.
We cite only a few texts.
(1) Genesis
21:35
(cf.
1 Tim.
1:17).
(2) Psalm
90:2. 4. Moses, an old man, celeGod s eternity,—a comforting and alarming fact. ILLUSTRATIONS: (1) Charnock. "Thou hast kept open house for us"1; (2) Charnock. "many truths"^;
brates
(3) Psalm 90:4
(3) Psalm
and
duration.5
102:25-27
(cf. Heb. 1:10-12).
in a constant flux of movement; He ILLUSTRATION: Davidson on picture and
are
is the
Men same.
creation.4
(4) Revelation 1:8 (cf. v. 4; 2 Pet. 3:8). Cf. 57:15; 4l:4; 1 Tim. 6:16. Hodge says two thing are taught by the verse: (a) God is without beginning of years or end of days; (b) to Him there is neither past nor future; all is present.5 ILLUSTRATIONS: (l) Analogy and Frances Kemble Butler's experience of stormQ; (2) Persons dving. and native Isa.
language.7" Time-word3 in the Bible, then, refer to pur
time, not to His.
111
THE IMMUTABILITY OF OOP.
A«
The Nature of the Immutability of God.
Webster writes, "the quality immutable"! Not so clear! On says, "never changing or varying;
On immutability or
state of
being
"immutable" he unchangeable" (italics mine).9 ILLUSTRATION:
The
Charlie Brown's failures.
Unver&nderlich.
The law of gravity.
seasons.
A
wifeTs"nagging!
As omnipresence reeults
from God's immensity, immutability follows from His eternity. As Shedd says, "That which has no evolution and no succession; so
A.
B.
Charnock, p. 69. Ibid.., p. 71. 3lbld.. p. 78 Davidson, The Epistle to the Hebrews (Edin-
burgh, 1959 Zn.d. for orig. ed77)7~P. 50. ^Charles Hodge, I, 386. °Shedd, I, 350-51. 'Charles Hodge, I, 389. °Tozer, p. 45. "New World o
Dictionary,
p.
727.
Thp_ yfip.snn why gifts from above are peagacJl:they descend from the Father of lights. G-od is the Creator of those heavenly bodies which give light to the universe and are vital to the that
is
maintenance of. physical light. But unlike them there is with"no variableness or shadov.- of turning. The Greek word eni translated is_ implies that there is no possibility of any such change. The sun its light to the earth in varying measure full light of noon, now the dimness of and night nb light at but there is
give
'now the
all1 (Ropes);
twilight,
variation with God (see Mai. iii. 6). The light truth and the light of His holiness remain
no
of His
5); He always wills what is such they need for His purpose to be fulfilled
constant (see I Jn. i. best for His children,
gifts as .
.
.
The
R.
V.
and
R.
and He always bestows S.
renderings suggest
V.
with more probability that it is the shadow on the earth caused by the apparent revolution of the sun that the writer has in mind . . . Such variation consists in, or may be observed in the shadow which is cast on the earth and is short or long as the sun appears high or low in heaven. Tasker on
James,
48-49.
Illustrate and
by the
sun
in Scotland in winter
summer.
In
Canada,
at Keswick,
a
brother in the testi-
to He said, in order to have a sense of intimacy with God that w4 might get up in the.morning, saying to God, "Good morning,, God, how are you?" I asked Mary, when preparing a message on the attributes a few years ago, what she thought of this. She replied, 1 That's nutty. God's always all right.' " Corre ct.' mony meeting in The Delectable Mansion, sought share with us something a friend had told him.
7
is*TThlPksame yesterday, to-day, and THATION:
no
for^e^ni
Figure of cube the ancient
ILLUS-
illustration.
He is immutable in His essence, for He can have attributes.2 He is exalted above all becom-
new
ing."5 ' He
is immutable 3ji His will.
Being infinite
in wisdom, there can be no error in the conception of His plans. Being infinite in power, there can be as. failure in their To sum up, G-od cannot change (1) His being is from Him-
accomplishment.^ since!
(2) changes would be: (a) (b) worse to better; (c) grant-
self, not from another; from better to worse; ing moral stability,
(3)
from immaturity to maturity;
all reasons for change are lacking,â&#x20AC;&#x201D;dependence,
error
of
mind,
inconstancy of purpose,
etc.
The Theological Evidence for the Teaching.
We have covered this to a large extent in our previous remarks. If He is changeable, then He is not the most perfect Being, nor the most simple Be-
ing, nor eternal, nor infinite and almighty. The Jehovah also argues immutability. ILLUSTRATION;
name
Marv
on
testifier at
Keswick.
The Biblical Evidence The evidence is clear and
(1) Psalm
102:23-27.
for the Teaching.
convincing.
The aim of the writer is
to confirm Israel in the truth of the divine promises regarding the future. Though the whole fabric of the universe should come unpinned, Israel should be stable. Her promises rest on the rock of divine truth. It comes from Him who ij3 HE (Heb.).
(2) Malachi 3:6 (note order).
(3) James
1:17.
lifts from above are perfect lights, the is unchangeable. full moon,
because they come from the Father of eternal Creator. But unlike them He There is no quarter moon, half moon,
ft
1Shedd,
I,> 351. J J*2Ibid. Hodge, I, 390.
wucuu>
Charles
â&#x20AC;˘
5Berkhof,
p.
58.
Luther,
"I stick to this rule, to
avoid
â&#x20AC;&#x17E;
of
questions as entangle us with the throne the Divine Majesty, as much as I can. It is much better and safer for one to sit down by the cradle of our Lord Jesus Christ, V/ho has become man, than to puzzle one's soul with, the G-aebeleln, The Servant and the Dove, p. 124. such
Deity.11
Helpful is the analogy of.the thermometer. changeable or unchangeable* xne observer says it is changeable^ for the mercury moves in the tube according to heat and cold. But just as certainly it is unchangeable, for it according to fixed law and invariably""^s^onds bo the temperature. Finally, we note that the Bible contains certain deflnlte principles of God ' s dealings with nations. A classic passage on this subject is Jeremiah 18. After watching the potter take clay and fashion it on the wheel, as it seemed good to the potter, Jeremiah received this Word from God: "At what instant I shall speak concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to pluck up, and to pull down, and to destroy it; Is
superficial
it
acts
direct
against whom I have pronounced, I will repent of the unto them. And at what~Ihstant I shall speak "conceding'a nation, and concerning a kingdom, to build and plant it; if it do evil in my sight, that it obey not my voice, theh I" will repent of the good, wherewith I said that nation,
if
turn from their evil, that I thought to do
them" (Ter. T8:7-10). These principles assuredly apply to Nineveh. Although the conditional element is not directly stated in Jo-
I
would
benefit
nevertheless it is unquestionably implied. to overthrow the wicked city. But the city repented and turned back to Him. Therefore, acting in conformity with His declared orinciples of dealing with nations, God did not"carry out the sentence of doom. Ibid., 125-26.
nah, God
threatened
"Repentance in God is not a change of vail, will to change." if God had treatedâ&#x2013; theKinevites after their repentance, as he had threatened to treat them before their repentance, this would | have proved him to be mutable. If would have
but
a
showed
itence,
him to
be
at
one
and another with AS
time displeased with impen-
penitence." ge. go
(y, Jo#aj
Shedd, I, 352 5;7 j^â&#x20AC;˘'A) /
^
•
twilight in His wisdom and love to
dawn,
THATION:
Scottish
There
and
us.1
ILLUS-
moon.
fbur?problems~in
are
teaching:
sun
connection with the
,l>vtH££_
(1) The problem of creation. The creation ex God. There was change, but
nihilo made no change in it was in His creation.
bukkuof, cf, iho-hi.
.
(2) The problem of incarnation. The incarnation change in the Son s essence, no change from deity into humanity. The divine essence was not
made
no
transmuted into ture (cf. Phil.
human nature;
it assumed human na2:7; but did not cease to be God.1).
(3) The problem of God's repentance (cf. Gen. 6:6; Jer. 18:10; Exod. 32:147. The term refers to no change in His being or attributes, but to "his manner of treating men."l It is accommodation to And often it is
expression of His general laws if there is no change in man. Further, His words often have the nature of contingency about them (cf. Gen. 6:6). ILLUSTRATIONS: (l) Jonah, 3;110. Anthropopathic, or phenomenal. Conditional element implied in 'yet forty days" (cf. Jer. 18:710). Could have just blown the whistle on them with weakness.
our
no
warning!
noclc
word
s
s
(g) Thermometer.
an
(3) Shedd and Char-
xwi}
»
(4) The problem of immobility. We must not immutability with immobility. In denying , a change to God we must not deny to Him action. He is actus purus (lit., pure doing'). There is change about Him, but no change in Him. ILLUSTRATION: Immuconfound
Tchange in knowledge), becoming).^ Ptocass rmouxy
tabilitv and Arminianism
theismTeternailv
pan-
xm THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE TEACHING. mmm n—
1 ■
A.
w—iimiwui
ip
■
ji
^1 mm
*<—iirwimp m
11
The Application of
1
tmu mm
Immensity and Omnipresence
The doctrine is immensely consolatory. omnipresence is a terror to an evil man, it
"'"Shedd, P.
59.
I, 352.
-Ibid., I, 352-53-
If His is a
com-
^B©rkhof,
9
fort
to
9),
12:7, and
in
1
righteoua one,—in his temptations (2 Cor. sharp afflictions (Psa. 27:10; 1 Sam. 30:6)
a
our
special tasks
(Sxod. 4:12).
The Application of St emit v. This doctrine, too, has its terror and its con30lation. How dreadful it is to lie under the Judjg-
ment of an eternal Pod (cf. Jer. 10:10). derful to receive covenant promises from
Pod
How an
won-
eternal
(cf. Heh. 6:13; 13:20; Tit. 1:2).
The enjoyglorious after many ages as at the first,—strong comfort against our enemies (cf. Isa. 26:4, Heh.J. ILLUSTRATION: Tor£§£, ".£]£§. Pod OX thsTDUTUM is. greater tMll tM PpJ, of the PAST (resources greater than expenditures; potential larger than payments.'). ment
of Pod
G-
will "be
as
fresh and
The Application of Immutability.
respond to this doctrine with, "Of Pod's immutability to me? It's all metaphysical speculation.No. There is great comfort and encouragement in this teaching^ How foolish to continue in sin against an immutable Pod (cf. Job 9:4)! And how encouraging to pray to a Pod who does not have the inconstancy of a chameleon. He does not change His thoughts toward us. He does not keep office hours. He is not moody.2 His covenants and promises are unfailing, for He is faithShould
what
use
we
is
ful.
"*"Tozer,
p.
59
2Ibld.
Com tun
( (
•.
mM^mM
130 from to
-.
y
Bj&Ahui^j,,,
gj
.
THE EXPOSITORY TIMES a
saga
impress
of the Sojourn 1 which curiously failed but very late writers.2
The tentative conclusion to which we are thertfore led is that the writer responsible for
any
1
For the tradition of the reflection of the experience the present writer's article The Expository Times,
Sojourn in Egypt and its of the Exilic period, see ' Sojourners in Egypt,' in lviii. (December 1946),
especially p. 82 with notes 3 and 6. 2 The only references to the story of Joseph as an individual occur in Ps i0517f- (late), Wis iol3r-, 1 Macc 2"' and Sir 49W The context of this last reference is no less curious than the omission of Joseph in the his-
torical
retrospect of Sir 44 f. ; cf. W. O. E. Oesterley, Ecclesiasticus (Camb. Bible), ad loc.
thai
f i
I
portion of the Joseph saga customarily attribute f in! to the Elohist (in which most of the significant 1 Ch evidence occurs) embodied in the Jahvist's story do elements drawn from a cycle of romances which gathered round Jewish heroes of the Diaspora thi during the sixth century and after.3 an: 3 For the popularity of cf. Erbt, Die Purimsage, col. 5112.
mi
such stories at this period, p. 45 f. and Ency. Bib.
ils ih i im
Ch
f«t hu:
ET, jy
QltT'tt-D
bee
■
Confrt (Suftona
€$e Jbed of 3«tpa00t6tftfg in f(Je Qtero Ceofamenf. Is it possible to find in the New Testament that conception of the impassibility of God which was so characteristic of Greek philosophy and figured so largely in Christian theology down to recent times ?
The thesis of this article is that it is
possible, and that Christian theology is intelligible only on the basis of such a conception. The evidence will be collected under four heads : ' blessed ' (vaKapios) as
(a) the use of the term applied to God ; (b) the
which insist upon the painlessness of heaven ; (c) the conception of God's immutability ; (d) the conception of God's perfection. (a) There are two Greek words which are translated by ' blessed ' in the New Testament : (vXoyyTo?, ' well spoken of,' and paKitpios ' happy.' Only the latter is strictly relevant to our subject, and this is used in reference to God twice, in 1 Ti i11 : 'the gospel of the blessed
God,' and in
1
Ti
615:
passages
' the blessed
and onhr
Potentate, the King of kings, and Lord of lords, who only hath immortality, dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto ; whom no man hath seen, nor can see.' The two uses of this word in the same Epistle may not, especially in view of the disputed Pauline authorship, appear to constitute very weighty evidence for Christian doctrine as a whole. Nevertheless they seem to indicate a view of God in the Church which was in line with the Greek conception of God's impassibility. The second passage, linking '
blessedness ' with '
immortality ' (dfiavaaia) and
the transcendence of God, is of affinity with Greek
especially suggestive thought.
paKapios is, of course, the word used in the Beatitudes, and, at lirst sight, it may seem there to be not incompatible with the experience of suffering. But the term ' blessed ' in ' blessed are they that mourn ' is proleptic, referring not to the state of mourning, but to the promised comfort. Similarly the term ' blessed ' in ' blessed are thev
anb
Commenfe.
to
Th
ae£
which are persecuted ' looks forward to ' Rejoief and be exceeding glad, for great is your reward ir. heaven.' It is not unreasonable, therefore, to
interpret pa<dptos when applied to God, as imply ing the non-suffering nature of God. (6) Stronger evidence is afforded by the passage which emphasize the ' painlessness ' of heaven In the description of the blessed ones in heaven it Kev 7i7, the words ' God shall wipe away all tear* from their eyes ' undoubtedly suggest the truli that in heaven there is no suffering. In Rev 214 it is explicitly stated that in the heavenly City God shall wipe away all tears from their eye* '
and there shall be
no more
death, neither sorro*
crying, neither shall there be
any more pain If there is no suffering in heaven, then there cat be no suffering in the heart of the God of heaver. nor
(c) The ' immutability of God ' is forcibly pre-
claimed in
Ja i17
:
' Every good gift and even
is from above, and cometh down from the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness neither shadow of turning.' Plato himself not have stated God's changelessness more clearly and the fact that God cannot change implies th*'< He cannot sulfer, since suffering involves chanc* in the sufferer. Ignatius drew the inference th*: God is impassible, and that the Son of God becami
perfect gift
coul'
passible for the first time in the Incarnation. this doctrine he was followed by the vast majonh of the great theologians down to recent times. (rf) That God is perfect is an axiom of the V* Testament ; but suffering, whatever it may be its accompaniments, uses, and results, is in sf evil, and
evil of any kind can be inherent perfect in every respect. Jesus clear'' regarded suffering as an evil, since He sought 110
One who is
abolish it wherever He found it. Sympathy be regarded as good ; but that which is good
n
sympathy is not the element of sorrow in it. 'v the love and benevolence. In seeking to rem01 suffering, Jesus was indirectly seeking to rcino"' occasions for sympathy in the sense of suffers with or for sufferers. That the New Testam<* clearly recognizes that pain is an evil is shown y the
insistence
that
the
souls
made
perfect ■'
*it 1
THE EXPOSITORY TIMES
\
S '
; •
.
| | i
I | -
?
| | i
I
I
^
|
<
have no sorrow or pain. Since God is -(fleet and suffering in se is evil, God in His -finite nature does not suffer. fo all this it is often objected that the Cross of (hrist proves that God suffers, it is asked, What ."joes the Cross reveal if it does not reveal suffering V the heart of God ? Has not Jesus said, ' He hat hath seen me hath seen the Father ' ? The jnswer to this argument is that it proves too -,uch. If the Cross proves that God suffers, it jlso proves that God died. Now it is quite certain -hat the New Testament teaches that God is ^mortal, i.e., that God cannot die. God was in hrist reconciling the world to Himself, but God at God cannot die. In His voluntary selfiumiliation in the Incarnation the Son of God -tame subject to death, although qua God He is T.niortal. In the same way He became subject ■.) suffering, although qua God He is impassible. The Cross reveals the perfect saving Love in the wart of the Father, but that Love is consistent
Five Hebrew words for ' cup ' occur in the O.T. Of these five three
-ra^en
nth God's
187
5T3J, and
nb'p) are only
used
literally, while another (^0) oidy occurs once, and that in a metaphorical sense. The main word (Din) is used some eleven times literally and some twenty times metaphorically. It is interesting to look at the passages, where sp and cin are used
metaphorically. The
of qp
one occurrence
1 will make
Jerusalem
is Zee 122—' Behold, of reeling unto all
a cup
the peoples round about. ..." The word Din occurs three times as a metaphor for what is desirable—Ps 165, ' The Lord is the
portion ... of my cup ' ; Ps 23s, ' My cup runneth over ' ; Ps 11613, * the cup of salvation.' 111 the other seventeen occurrences it has a similar sense to that of in Zee 122, and in every case is a metaphor for Divine punishment and is frequently associated with Divine wrath. Ps 11', Upon the wicked he shall rain snares ; fire and brimstone, and burning wind shall be the portion of their cup.' Ps 75s, ' in the hand of the Lord there is a cup, and the wine foameth ; It
impassibility.
'
-jtrifice for us unless we understand that He *ho had never experienced suffering voluntarily imbled Himself and in His Incarnation became
I We fail to realize the ful extent ofChrist's selff
| f I
I
II f
f
■Tject to suffering and to death for us and our alvation. Even then the Divine impassibility dines through. In the darkest, bitterest hour, «us could say, ' My peace 1 give unto you ' ; 1 lay down my life for the sheep no man aeth it from me, but I lay it down of myself ' ; deep not for me, weep for yourselves.' Even s the Cross, Jesus is Master of the situation : xl must be worshipped, not pitied, It the suffering which saves us were suffering
is full of
.
.
.
saved by a sacrifice continually being the heart of Eternal God, but that hrist hath suffered once (ana$) for sins . . that
This surely
I* ^plies that Christ did not suffer before His '"'irnation, nor after His Exaltation. His orifice was effected and completed ' once for all His life and death in the historical scene. ' It
j1 wished.'
| Sard's
A. W. Argyle.
Cross, Bucks.
.
T
.
tin. 36 anb
(paraffefe.
'Mk I4w Mt 263»<42>, Lk 2242 (cf. Jn 18") and v lo8'' 39> 2o82- 23 Jesus uses the word _k>wi' metaphorically of His approaching sufferN Hacj He in mind the metaphorical use of '*P in the O.T. ?
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
| F.22] He will visit thine iniquity, O daughter of Edom. .' Ezk 23s1- 32-33 (twice), Thou hast walked in the way of thy sister ; therefore will I give her cup into thine hand. Thou shalt drink of thy sister's cup, which is deep and large : thou shalt be laughed to scorn and had in ...
.
Cuj> QJtetap^or in (Jttarfi
.
.
drink .' Here it is worthwhile reading the whole passage. Jer 4912, ' For thus saith the Lord : Behold, they to whom it pertained not to drink of the cup shall assuredly drink ; and art thou he that shall altogether go unpunished ? .' Jer 517, ' Babylon hath been a golden cup in the Lord's hand, that made all the earth drunken .' La 4al, ' The cup shall pass through unto thee
also.
—■
.
.
be, if they refuse to take the cup at thine hand to
.
to God ' (i P 318).
.
.
are
riected in
us
.
thine hand the cup of staggering, even the bowl of the cup of my fury ; thou shalt no more drink it again : [y.23J and I will put it into the hand of them that afflict thee .' Jer 251S- 17- 28, ' For thus saith the Lord unto me : Take the cup of the wine of this fury at my hand, and cause all the nations, to whom I send thee, to drink it. Then took I the cup at the Lord's hand, and made all the nations to drink And it shall
I
might bring
.
drunken, but not with wine : [e.22] thus saith thy Lord the Lord, and thy God that plcadetlx the cause of his people, Behold, I have taken out of
'inch had existed for ages in the heart of the ' ither and His Eternal Son, then wherein would * the special sacrifice in the Incarnation and the I .'ocifixion ? The Cross itself would be a mere utance of ' exhibitionism ' : it would be revelaa of what saves us, but not the saving act 'tlf which the New Testament declares it to be. teaching of the New Testament is not that " ■
same :
wicked of the earth shall wring them out, and drink them.' Is 51'7 (twice), 22 (twice),' Awake, awake, stand up, O Jerusalem, which hast drunk at the hand of the Lord the cup of his fury ; thou hast drunken the bowl of the cup of staggering, and drained it [f.21] Therefore hear now this, thou afflicted, and
...
'
mixture, and he poureth out of the
Surely the dregs thereof, all the
.
'
.
.
derision
.
; it containeth much. Thou shalt be filled with drunkenness and sorrow, with the cup of astonishment and desolation, with the cup of thy sister Samaria. [F.84] Thou shalt even drink it and drain it out. .' Ilab 2", '. the cup .
.
.
.
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This unchangeableness of G-od was anciently repre sented by the figure of a cube, a piece of metal or wood framed four square; when every side is exactly of the same equality, cast it which way you will, it will always be in the same posture, because it is j
equal to itself in all its dimensions. 104.
Charnock,
<r"N*
She Attributes of God (5)s cable Attributes (1):
*
.
She CommunlVarious
Introduction. Has G-od ever learned anything? ever surprized? Does He ever wonder? If He
*s
knows all—past, present, future—is ble with human free agency?
this compati-
If God is all-powerful, can He make a square triangle? Can He make the past present? Can He make
the
sun
Can G-od lie,
shine or
and
not
shine a£ the
same
time?
die?
If all men are created equal, why are states (wise, dolts /dummkopfp; conditions (rich, poor) and circumstances
th&ir
"dumb-dumb"/, morons!
(free countries, enslaved, etc.) different? Since they are not equal, why not? If G-od wills all things, does He
will
sin?
ti
These questions provoke the study of the communi cable attributes of G-od. The incommunicable attributes stress the absolute Being of G-od. The communicable stress His personal nature. by which He enters into relation with others. We may classi-
fy the communicable attributes in this three-fold (l) mental, or intellectual (knowledge, wisdom) (2.) volitional (power, will)"; V5) moral (goodness, holiness, righteousness).
way:
I
THE KNOWLEDGE'OF GOD.
A.
The Nature of the Knowledge of God.
Berkhof's
definition is,
"that
perfection of
God whereby He, in an entirely unique manner, knows Himself and all things possible and actual in one most simple act."l is called knowledge;
When speaking of the of the past, rememl/brance; of the future. foreknowledge or prescience; |of the universality of. objects, omniscience.2 Cf. Sam» 2}Jl* The Lord is a God of knowledge" (Heb., knowledges); Psa. 147? 5 /ready7 eternal and .present, it
"'"Berkhof,
p.
66.
2Charnock,
p.
185-
r
lings th.it are
hlngs that may never
not, he knows
be, as he knows things that so he knows things
shall be because he wills them, that might be, because he is Ho knew that the inhabitants of
able .to effect them. Keilah would betr \y David to haul if he remained in that place, 1 Sam. xxiii. 11; he knew what they would do upon that occasion, though it was never done. Charnock, 191.
There
are
expressions signifying
two elegant
God's knowledge of 'Hv transgression is
the certainty and perpetuity of sins past: JobJxiv. 17, sealed u~o in a bam, and thou sewest A metaphor taken from men, that put the money they would charily keep,
"up .my iniquity.' up in a bag
'
tie the bag,
the holes, and bind it hard that nothing may fall out; or a vessel wherein they reserve liquors, and daub it with pitch and glutinous stuff, that nothing may leak out, but be safely kept till the time of use. Or else, as some think from the bags attorneys carry with them full of writings, when they are to manage a cause against a person. Thus we find God often in Scripture calling to men's minds their past actions, upbraiding them with their sew
up
ingratitude; wherein he of his
own
testifies his remembrance and their crimes. Char-
past benefits,
193-
nock,
God's ability to foreknow free of these he hath build up Jerusalem was predicted by him, but the name of that person, Cyrys. Isa. xliv. 28. What is more conbingenty or is more the effect of the liberty of manT will, than the names of their children" (212)? Speaking of
Charnock writes, "Several foretold; not only a person to'
acts
Future
things in their causes may be known
angels and men, as I said before;
by
whosoever knows
necessary causes, and'the efficacy of them, foretell the effects; and when he sees the and concurrence of several causes together,
may meeting
he may what the consequent effect will be of such a concurrence. Go physicians foretell the progress of a disease, -the increase or diminution of it by natural signs; and astronomers foretell eclipses by their observation of the motion of heavenly bodies many years before they happen. Ibid., 204. presage
[ III) 111 V CO
then
it \vqu.lu
-
_
u^ ^^
WT MTCTii J-" â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
Judas
trcacher y,
knew that
for he had
our
Saviour did foreknow
told hI'm of it in the
his
hearirfc [|
disciples, John xiil. 21, 26, yet he never charged the necessity or his~crime upon the foreknowledge of his Master. If Judas had not done it freely, ho had had no reason to repent of it; of his
|
repentance justifiesChrist from imposing any necessity upon him by that foreknowledge. No man acts anything but he can give an account of the his
motives
of
his__action; he cannot
blind necessity; the will t hen it vfoulo cease to oe
father it upon a
cannot be compelled, for will. C liar nock, 21Y.
We have time only to say three things about it: (l) it is intuitive, not discursive (not obtained by reflection or deduction ^reasoning from
premises to not
conclusion/).
successive
mind).
(not
is simultaneous, gradually into the Reading at once a whole 11-
ILLUSTRATION: sun).1
brarv (cf. globe; is independent. not
tutor;
(2) It
received
Cf. Heb. 4:15.
dependent
(He has
no
(3) It
books
or
Isa. 40-? 13). Ihe Extent of the Knowledge of God.
(l), God's knowledge is knowledge of all things possible and actual. (2) Second, it is of Himself (of. 1 Cor. 2:11). In this He excels all His creatures. If He did not have this. He would be "under the greatest ignorance, because He would be ignorant of the most excellent object."2 He could not then create, or govern. Thus, to sum up, it is of all things, past and future, possible and actual. First
ILLU3fRATION5;,(llolkSamma2-231II and"Kellah3; (2) Cyrus name (cf. Isa. 44:28)1 (*3) Judas and necessitation of the human will (cf. John 13:21, 26775"" r/A TT, z-j',3
C.
Some Problems in the Knowledge of God.
Even this
depths!
Let
me
seemingly simple teaching has its ask two questions:
(1) First,
can God foreknow free action? Some for freedom's sake, denied foreknowledge; others, for foreknowledge's sake, denied freedom. But does not Scripture teach the divine foreknowledge oÂŁ contingent events (cf. 1 Sam. 23!10-13; 2 Kings 13: 19; ?sa. 81:14-15; Isa. 42:9; 48:18; Jer. 38:17-20; Ezek. 3:6; Matt. XU2l). At bottom is His decree.
have,
(2) Second, is predetermination consistent with free
will?
If by free will one means indeterminacy (the capacity to be swung either way), then the answer is, "no." If one thinks a free agent's act
must
be
uncertain by definition,
1Ibid.. 191.
224. Ibid..
p.
p.
the
answer
is,
2Ibld..p. I89. 3Ibld.. 212. ^Ibld., p. 217.
"no.1
p
1
2_ If free acts
are uncertain, they cannot be foreseen certain under any conditions.! Boettner claims, 1 Common sense tells us that no event can be foreknown unless by some means, either physical or menas
tal,
it has been
predetermined."2
Further, complete freedom, arbitrariness, or indeterminism in the philosopher s language, is ihconsi stent with continuity of character. Trueblood puts it this way, A wholly unpredictable man would by no means be a good man. He would, indeed, be no
than is a tossed coin. 3 Man's the air, swinging either way by the whim of the moment. It is a secondary thing, anchored in our deepest being, our very character, and responds to our inmost thinking. Our Lord reethical being does not hang in
more
an
will
ferred 1
good These grace
to
some
individuals to whom the Word
came
as
ground" (Luke 8:8, 15);
this is given by &od. are influenced by the Holy Spirit in infallible and respond to the truth (cf. Psa. 27:8, cal-
ling17"; Hos. 2:14, "alluring"; John 6:4^, "teaching"). But, this is not
coercion:
carries
along with it spontaneously.
the
will
it
is
an
influence
that
Finally, from the human
side the individual who freely responds as a "free agent.1 While this explanation may not convince all, or explain everything, I am convinced that the solureceives
such grace
tlon we shall all come to in heaven will be found to lie in this direction. ILLUSTRATION: My courtship with Marv may illustrate it 7 she chose me, influenced me, and I Joyously came!).
The Relation of the Knowledge of G-pd to the Wisdom of G-od. Wisdom is
particular aspect of knowledge. It intuitive, not theoretical and acquired"! They do not always accompany one another. The uneducated may be superior to the scholar in wisdom. ILLUSTRATION: Saving. "He is educated beyond is practical
his
a
and
Intelligence.
Cf.
Rom.
11:33; Psa.
104:24.
Hodge, I, 399-400. 2Loraine Boettner, The Reftbrmed Doctrine of Predestination (Philadelphia, 1958) pS 42. ^David Elton Trueblood, Philosophy Religion (New York, 1957), p. 283.
as
to
The'Scripture is written in such a aa.rino.r obviate errors foreseen by Sod to enter in':c
the church. It may "be wondered why the universal particle should "be inserted by Christ, in the giv^ ing the cup in the supper, which was not in the distributing the bread: Mat. xxvi. 27? 'Drink ye all of it;' not at the distributing the bread,
tells
eat You a11 of And Mark in his relation They all drank of it,' Mark xi. 23. The Church of Rome hath been the occasion of discov-
us.
ering to usjthe wisdom of our Saviour in inserting particle all, since they were so bold to exelude the communicants from the cup by a trick of concomitancy. Christ foresaw the error, and fherefore~p"ut in a little wo.rd to obviate a great invasion. 'And the Spirit of^God hath particularly left upon record that partidle, as we may reason..ably suppose, to such a purpose. And so in the description of the blessed virgin, Luke i. 27There is nothing of her holiness mentioned, which is with much diligence recorded of Elizabeth: ver. 6, 'Righteous, walking in all the commandments of Sod blameless;' probably to prevent the superthat
stition
world.
which Sod
And
we
foresaw would
find
do not
more
arise
in the
undervalulng
ispeeches uttered by Christ to any of his disI ciples In the exercise of his office than Tib" her, except to Peter. As when she acquainted him with 'the
want of Wine at the marriarce in Cana, she receives a blighting answer: r.voman, what have to do with thes7 John ii. 4. And when one was
I
admiring the blessedness of her that bare him, he turns the discourse another way, to pronounce a blessedness rather belonging to them that hea r the word of God and keep it, Luke xi. 2?, 28, in a mighty wisdom to antidote his people against any conceit of the prevalency of the virgin over him In heaven, in the exercise of his mediatory' office. Ibid., 289-90. CONCOMITANCE. This is a technical term used in the eucharlstic theology of Roman Catholicism to describe the presence of both the body and blood of Christ m each of the species of bread and wine, and thus to afford a theological Justin fication for the denial of the cup to the laity.
Geoffrey W. Bromiley, logy, p. 133bCUei'Zierx-jâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;u j
u u u
Baker's Dictionary of Theo-
aT.rT1""
to sin, He would not be God. If the creature had infinite perfection, it would not be a creature. If yesterday had not_passed^awa^^ -would not be yesterday; if tomorrow existed ooaayfc lie,
there
to die,
would be
no
today.
Pieper, I, 4o0.
f
"if God were to lie, to die, to sin, He would not be God. If the creature had infinite perfection, it would not be8 creature. If yesterday had not passed away, it would not be yesterday; if tomorrow, existed today would be no today." Pieper, I, 460. Scherzer,
a
t! there
Systema, p.
55'
'
The wisdom of God
is particularly seen in the (Psa. 104:24; its variety, beauty, order,
creation
etc.),
fitness,
redemption
providence
Rom. 11:33:
3:10;
(33:10-11; Rom". 8:28),
(l Gor. 2:7; 1:18-24; Rom. 16:27; Eph.
solving the problemoof the justice
God), and the plan of the ages (Dan. 2:20; Rom. 11:33-36). ILLUSTRATION: Scriptures
and
mercy of
even counteract vldence
Mark
showing His
foreseen heresies,
(conoomitanoy: Matt. 26:26-27, ""all";" 11:23, "They all drank of it" )A
11
pro-
cf.
POWER OF GOD.
A.
The Mature of the Power of God.
Berkhof defines it as, "that perfection of His Being by which He is the absolute and highest causalitv. To Shedd it is "the Divine essence ener-
Sizing, and producing outward omnipotence,
(cf. Matt.
limited
effects."3
It is
only by His own perfections
3:97 ~o:Âą8).
Ttb^§annst;=^b7==itff^":
(1) Things self-contradictory. A logical impossibility is that in which the predicate is contradlctbry ;tQ. the subject, such as' "a material spirit, a corporeal deity, "a sensitive stone," 'an irrational man.1 1 a square triangle,11 Man honest politician" (I), or "a modest Texan." ILLUSTRATION: Scherzer's statement.4
(2) Things being of God. pr
inconsistent
with
He cannot walk
sleep (immaterial
(3) Things
spirit),
inconsistent
the nature and not omnipresent)
(then or
die
with the
(l Tim. 6:16). perfections
of
God.
He cannot do things unbecoming His holiness, Justice, or goodness, such as be tempted (Jas. 1:13:
would
imply He might desire something better than He lie (Heb. 6:18), or deny Himself.
possesses), sin, He
can
do
all He
wills,
by"lils""hB7eiire;trf.
Charnock, very worthwhile.
4Pieper, I, 460.
pp.
but His will is determined
Eph. 1:11.
289-90.
^Berkhof,
The whole section is p. 79. -^Shedd, I, 358 ^Hodge, I, 409.
[4.J Divine
apparent in bis resurrection. The unlocking the for the deliverance of Jonas, the rescue of Daniel from the den of lions-, and the restraining the fire from burnthree chifJren, weresignal^ileclUigfrions of his power, and types of the resurrection of our ^II rrvtli Saviour. But what are those to that which was represented by them? I That was.a power over natural causes, a I of/elements; but in the resurrection of curbing of beasts and restraining Christ, fiod exercised a pow ;r over bfyosej.f,_and_guenched the flames of his own wratn, notter than~mTll| ons of NhbuchadnczzaFs turnacesT I ' " of the law had lodged onr Saviour stropger than the belly and ribs of a * Amyrald, Irenic., p. 282. leviathan. In the rescue of Daniel and Jonas, God overpowered beasts, and in this tore up the strength of the old serpent, and plucked the sceptre from the hand of the enemy of mankind. The work of resurrection, indeed, considered in itself, requires the power was
\belly of the whale
.
*
*
*
w
efficacy of an almighty power. Neither man dispositions in a dead body, to render it capable of lodging a spiritual soul, nor can they restore a dislodged soul by their own power to such a body. The-restoring a dead body to life requires an infinite nor
angel
can create new
power, as well as the creation of the world. But there was in the resurrection of Christ something more difficult than this. While he lav in the grave he was under the curse of the law, under the execution of that_dreadful sentence, ' Thou shalt die the death.' His resurrection was not only the
re-tying the marriage knot between his soul stone from the grave, but
a
taking off
an
and body, or the rolling the infinite weight, the sin of mankind,
which lay upon him. ~5o vast a weight could noFoe removed without the strength ofan almighty arm. It is therefore ascribed not to an ordinary
operation, but an operation with power, Rom, i. 4, and such a power wherein the glory of the Father did appear: Rom, vi. 4, ' Raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father;' that is, the glorious power of God. As the eternal generation is stupendous, so is his resurrection, which is called a new begetting of him, Acts xiii. 33. It is a wonder of power that the divine and human nature should be joined, and no less wonder that his person should surmount and rise up from the curse of God under which he Jay. The apostle therefore adds one expression to another, ancl heaps up a variety, signifying thereby that one was not enough to_j*epresent it: Eph. i. 19, 'Exceeding greatness of power,' and * working of mightv power, which_ he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead.' It was an hyperbole of tif the
power^the excellency of the mightiness of his strength. â&#x20AC;˘ the loftiness seems to come short of the apprehension he had of it in
expressions
his soul.
5
(4) Things could
not
Inconsistent
destroy the
Eph. 1:4-5). B.
world
with His decrees.
after
H|
Adams's "fall (cfÂť
'*
The Proof of the Power of God.
What the stands still; fire curbed,
suggest (cf. Jo'sh. 10:13: sun 6:22: lions' mouths stopped; 3:15: the Scriptures state concerning
miracles
Dan.
etc.),
'God Almighty" (Gen. 1751, "rp ). Of. Gen. 18: 14; Hum. 11:22-23; Bsal 115=3 (cf. 135:6): Jer. 32: 17; Matt. 19:26 (see context); Luke 1:37 (the virgin conception and birth mind, too); Rom. 1:20. C.
are
in" tne angel
Gabriel's
The Manifestation of the Power of God.
The power of God is demonstrated in the spheres of creation (Psa. 8:3, work of His government, or providence (cf. Col. 1:17; Luke 22:31:
"the
fingers"),
restraining Satan), and redemption (cf. 1 Cor. 1224, 1 the Dower of Sod11; Isa. 43-11, the arm of the
Lord").
(Jonah;
ILLUSTRATION: Power over natural Daniel) and over GOD HIMjSLFT^" fi:*f
III
â&#x2013;
causes
Sf fi
THE WILL OF GOD.
A.
The Meaning of the Win of God.
Profound and mysterious questions, some of which I have mentioned in the introduction, come before us now. Are things right or wrong because God commands or forbids them, or does God command or forbid them because thev are right or wrong for some other reason than His will
The will of God is the second of His volitional attributes. Together with His power the two attributes express the sovereignty of God (Psa. 135:5-6).
"^Ibid.,
I, 408-9.
^Ibld..
I, 405
The
king's heart is like
He turns it wherever
I He in the hand of the Lord; wishes. For He
says
to Moses,
whom I have mercy, on whom I have So then it does 'wills or the man who
on
channels of water
MI will have mercy
and I will have
compassion."
not depend on
compassion
the man who
but""on God who has mercy. For the Scripture says to Pharaoh, "For this very purpose I raised you up,'to demonstrata My power in you, and that My name might be
runs,
proclaimed throughout
and
He
hardens
On answers
for
-U J-
li'<-/
!-■ vy
0 man, who molded will not "Why did you make me like The thing
right over lump one vessel
--»• ■*. — —• — — — - -
condition is purpose of the
fulfil the
common
use?
undetermined, and there-
undecided. It is, however, manifestly inconsistent with the perfection of God, that He should first will one thing and then another; nor can his purposes be dependent on the uncertainty of human conduct or events. These are questions, however, which belong to the consideration of the doctrine of deHodge, I, 405fore
the
<
who are you,
the contrary, back to God?
Or does not the potter have a clay, to make from the same honorable use, and another for
k) vl 11 5
earth." '
whom He desires, whom He desires.
say to the molder, this," will it? the
the whole
then He has mercy on
So
!
father is
5
<
cress.
employed by Augustinlins, much to the purposes of God,
terms, when reference not so as to the events which but not the purpose of These
have
reaps,
if he sows.
He
sowing
His reaping and But the purpose of that a man shall reap, if He purposes that he shall other hand, regard
God
are
decreed. The
evelit,
God, is conditional. A man is saved, if he believes. are conditional events. is absolute. Ifh<He purpose He purposes thatAshall sow; shall be saved, He purposes
that he believe. Anti-Augustinians, the purposes of God
on the as^conditional. He purposes the salvation of a man"; IT he believes. But whether he believes or not, is left undetermined; SO THAT Till PUHPO&fi OF G-OD 13 SUSBEND BP OH A CONDITION lUT UN'J BR HIS CONTROL, OR, AT
LEABT,
UNDECIDED.
Hodge, I,
404-5-
"Prelude"
Wo r<ig Worth at the beginning of his jK5>!CQd -th^t HP Had 0scape4 the elty Xd long i>«en pent up and was "now free, free as to- fettle where I will." But to be free as bird Is not to be free at all. The -naturalist
where he
supposedly free
knows that hie its entire life In a ind Instincts; it is •
a
a
bird" actually "lives
made of "fears, hungers, ^ limited by weather conditions cage
supply, pred irre~plot comltwy. created net of necessiTozer, 115-16. yt,wpot/s t
pressures, the local food and strangest of all bonds, the slstlbie compulsion to stay within the small of land ''nd air assigned it by birdl.and The freest bird is, along with every other thing, held in constant check by a yaryin ; air tory
beasts,
ty.
Only Sod is free.
Isaiah 46:10
Declaring the end from from ancient times
And
been
the beginning
things which have
done,
Saying, 'My purpose will be I 'will accomplish all I-ly
established,
And
A
father may purpose
good
to give an
pleasure' ;
estate to his
Whether the son will undetermined, and there- t
obedient; but
if he be
son,
not
fulfil the condition is fore the purpose of the
undecided. It is, however, manifestly inconsistent with the perfection of Sod, that He should first will one thing and then another; nor can his purposes be dependent on the uncertainty of human conduct or events.. These are questions, however, which belong to the consideration of the doctrine of decross.
Hodge,
father is
I, 405-
terms, when employed reference not so much to as to the events which are but not the purpose of G-od, is These
by
Augustinians,
the purposes of G-od, decreed. The event,
have
conditional. A man reaps, if he sows. He is saved, if he believes. His reaping and sowing are conditional events. But the purpose of God is absolute. PurP°se that man shs.ll reap, He purposes thatAshall sow; if He purposes that he shall be saved, He purposes a
that he shall Dollr/e. other hand, regard the
Anti-Augustinians, on the
purposes of God as condltlonal. He purposes the salvation of a man, 1f he believes. But whether he believes or not, is left undetermined; SO THAT Till PURPOSE OF GOD IS SUSPSNDED OH A AT
LIAS I,
OO.-iDITION l\'JT UH'JER
UilDGCIDiD.
Hodge, I,
HIS CONTROL, OR, 404-5.
s
^
The term,
the will of G-pd. has different meanings: (l) the whole moral nature of God (inclusive of love, holiness, justice, etc.); (2) the faculty of gtetermination; (3) the products of selfldetermination, or purposes; (4) the power to realize His purposes (the will in action; Heb. 2:4); (5) the rule
of life
for
man
(cf. Heb. 13:2l).
We are concerned with the faculty of selfdetermination. God's will is His delight in Himself (He is the supreme good for Himself and His
creatures; it is self-love. absolute, right and divine) and Hj3 delight in His creatures for His sake (He does not need them; they need Him /cf. Psa. 16:4/; Rom. 11:36, "TO Him"). His willing toward His creatures is not a striving to obtain something, or a sign of Infelicity. It is for His glory through them,â&#x20AC;&#x201D;soli Deo gloria! Is God, then, 'consumed with self-love, or 1 egotistical"? The connotations are blasphemous in His case. B.
The Freedom of the Win of God.
Does God act necessarily and He do what He does? We should be
freely?
Why does
clear
two
on
dis-
tinctions:
(1) His
necessary
will.
His necessary will;
He is the object of
He wills Himself, His nature, the Godhead distinctions, etc. He' necessarily (and yet freely) delights in Himself.
(2) His
free
will.
We
are
the
He creates determines
objects here.
according to His plans. He uses us and oiir destiny .--voluntarily (Prov. 21:1; Rom. 9:15-18, 20-21; Rev. 4:11). ILLUSTRATION: Wordsworth and "free as a bird" (Isa. 46:10. "ALL ray pleasure ). One can seldom kncnr^rh^T^arson for the
divine determination.
ing"
deliberation, to
Even the idea of "chooshesitation, and
is suggestive of uncertainty,
God.
and
these attitudes
are
really
foreign
the
will of the decree of sin for greater good than
the
prohibition of sin).
ILLUSTRATION: Beza moral. Cf. Joseph,
wills
on
Cf. Acts 14:16,
Justicd,
Gen.
mercy;
g'c
ot cr g
.
natural vs.
50:20.
(2) Second, the decretive and the preceptive are often contradictory. How can we justify
that? The decretive will den by the preceptive and
includes things forbid-
excides things commanded by the preceptive (cf. Gen. 22:2, 12: Exod. 4:2123; I sac. 38:1, 5 /cf. 2 Kings 20:1-3/) ; Acts 2:23) The things may be an inscrutable mystery, but we must remember that by the decretive will God has
determined what He will do
or what shall come to
conflict
in the former He does
.
By His preceptive will He reveals what we The latter is not a law for His conduct; it is a rule for our conduct. Berkhof commehits, VThe decretive and preceptive will of God do not
pass. must do.
in the
sense
that
(italics mine), and according to the latter He does not, take pleasure in sin; nor in the sense that according to the former He does not, and according to the latter He does, will the salvation of every individual with a positive volition. Even according to the decretive will God takes no pleasure in sin; and even according to the preceptive will He does not will the salvationâ&#x20AC;&#x17E;of
individual with a positive volition.ILL(1) Dabney on righteous man and perverse subject ; (2) Bavinck on father, son, and knife P~~ every
USTRATIONS:
(3) Third, what is the relation of the will of moral obligation? As-Hodge says, "The question on this subject is, Whether things are right or wrong, simply because God commands or forbids
God
to
them?
Or,
does He command
or
forbid them,
because
are fight or wrong FOR SOME OTHER REASON THAN HIS WILL?" To some a thing is right (l) because it tends to promote the greatest good, to others
they
(2) because it promotes our own happiness (vice might be nice, might it not?!), to others (3) because
^
it
1Gill,
Dabney,
of
is in harmony with
God,
p.
p. 74. 162.
"trans,
Rapids, 1955).
eternal
^Berkhof, p. 79. -'Herman Bavinck,
and ed. p.
an
240.
and
neces-
3Ibid.
The Doctrine by William Hendnksen (Grand
'
1
difference between right and wrong, to which God is subject. To Christians the norm is the will of God.â&#x20AC;&#x201D;that God commands it. This is not arbitrary (He cannot will wrong to be right), for His will is the expression of His nature. Some things are right because He commanded them (circumcision), or because of the present constitution of things (property rights; capitalism), or because of His immutable excellence (moral obligation). Cf Rom. 12:1-2. sary
even
EDITORIAL COMMENTARY
Not Worth
Dime
a
An Unsentimental View of Roosevelt's Jefferson's on the nickel; Washington's on the quarter; And they sure both ought to be
time of the 1940 Presidential campaign, flaunted a button that said "Win With Willkie" right in the teeth of that famous grin. As for ourselves, word reached us on Okinawa of the President's death; we heard it with the same incredulous sadness as most of his fellow countrymen. When it came to the end, I knew I'd lost a friend. Thru the earth us plain guys brushed a once
there. Lincoln is on the penny
because he thought of the many. You've got to admit that's fair.
I don't know who's on a hundred or a thousand dollar bill, And I don't suppose I ever will. But I've got my picture gallery
Of great men right here with Most of the time, On
a
cent, a
now
Just
a
a
me
tear
For
dime,
on a
on a
shiny
new dime. How can I even start To tell what's in my heart At the sight of a dime, of a shiny new dime. He's not long in the past, but his name
sure
®
we
...
versa;
haunting lyrics by Harold Rome from the smash hit "Call Me Mis-
ter," which ran for years on Broadway. FDR himself, of course, was no mean performer. "He communicated master-
fully," said
a
mentally and for
no quid pro quo, lowed the whole of Eastern Europe,
spokesman for the Smith-
of the Russian bear.
propriation, is planning to celebrate the 100th anniversary of his birth on Jan. 30. "He was the first President to use the radio as a tool for mass communication. He was the first to fly in an airplane to a national convention. He was the first to
tion, which calls for
an
official
com-
memoration of the great day at a joint session of Congress, highlights of which will include a glittering roster of speakers and performers. Even the Reagan Administration somehow has gotten into the act. After all (as a leading business daily not long
observed): in July of 1980, the forHollywood star did "turn to FDR inspiration" in his acceptance speech the Republican convention. Since
at
then, his advisers have let it be known that they are more interested in dismantling the Great Society than the New Deal. (One ardent Reaganite last week went so
far
as
to comment: "In
1981,
Reagan began doing for the welfare state what FDR did for capitalism—saving it by tempering it.") On a personal note, and in the interests of full disclolet it be said for the record that our good wife, a reactionary pre-teen at the sure,
January.4, 1982
a tycoon as
named Cy-
follows to Frank
Kent,
have
tight
nearly done it in.
For some, in short, the and music have long since
stirring words turned to dis-
cord, but others can still be moved. As noted, the next 30 days will see an out-
pouring of fond remembrance, disinterested and otherwise, and let's not forget that this is an election year. The kind of thing we may as well brace for emerged last week in The New York Times, under the headline "A Senator Remembers
Heady New Deal Days." Last survivor Days, the lawmaker, Sen. Jennings Randolph (D., W.Va.), waxed eloquent. "'I still consider myself a New Dealer,' he says. 'I'm proud to be introduced that way. of the famous Hundred
.
.
Franklin Roosevelt was determined that there be a new deal in America, and I wanted to be part of that and work with him. It was a crusade. It was exciting. I look back on it after 45 years and the
legislation for which
we fought is still on the books. It didn't go away. The National Labor Relations Act. The Securities and Exchange Commission. The Tennessee Valley Authority. The Fair Labor Standards Act. It's all there.'" So it is—and the landscape is littered with legislative and bureaucratic debris.
tern, which has seen two out of five nuclear projects—Whoops!—run out of money and shut down long before com-
Washington Public Power Supply Sys-
pletion. As to the SEC, its self-aggrandizing, anti-capitalist tendencies were plain from the word go. Back in the late 'Thirties, when Stanley Sporkin was still
money. The two Securities Acts are millstones around the neck of the invest-
banking industry, an industry which has played so important a part in the building up of our nation." Nor should we overlook federal dement
posit insurance, that other great New Deal "reform," which, by creating false confidence among the thrifty, who failed to realize that through inflation one can lose one's life savings bit by bit as well as overnight, encouraged the vast over-expansion of housing and home finance. Today's crumbling savings banks and savings and loan associations—not to mention the beleaguered federal agencies that seek to keep them from collapse (See our colleague Shirley Hobbs Scheibla's story on page 16.) — are a fitting sign of the times. All of which brings us to Social Security, the biggest New Deal scam of all. In decrying its glaring inequities, Barron's used to be
a
voice in the wilder-
longer. Scarcely a month goes by without some fresh revelation of scandal or impending disaster, while even such dedicated champions as Sylvia Porter at long last are waking up to the ugly realities. In a recent column, ness,
but
no
Porter recounted the tale of the first Social Security recipient, who, after con-
tributing exactly $22 in taxes (which have just gone up to 6.7% on $32,400 of earnings per year, or a maximum levy of $2,170.80 on employer and employe alike), wound up collecting over $20,000 in retirement benefits. (You should live so long.) Small wonder that
even after the lawmakers finished juggling the accounts and ducking the issues, the Old craven
Age Fund With -
OTC Quotes To the Editor: I commend you for adding the "Additional OTC Quotes" to Barron's. It was quite a shock and Joss to this small investor when the NAS-
DAQ/OTC list was revised. Thank you for adding these additional stock quotations to your financial weekly as it permits many small investors to keep track of our stocks. I encourage you to expand the list in the future; as it is, acts like this
emphasize the quality and service of publication.
your
D. Motycha
Lincoln, Neb.
mer
for
Eaton wrote
itself, the New Deal and what followed
potential standard-bearers to
their stuff), it will also feature a performance of Depression-era songs by Arlo Guthrie, whose father, Woody, was one^of FDR's favorite minstrels. Just before adjourning last month, the House and Senate passed a concurrent resolu-
throwing spitballs, rus
a syndicated columnist on the Baltimore Sun: "Never in all my long business career have I seen money so abundant and cheap, nor have I seen the flow of capital so completely dammed, not even in times of wars, panics and
recognize the New Deal for what it really was: a cynical statist thrust "We shall tax and tax, spend and spend, elect and elect"—that was foredoomed to failure. Wherever one looks to
today—whether at the regulatory bodies that have gone to fruitless and alarming
strut
ago
dragging and sagging safety nets; or the Social Security system, most colossal pyramid club on earth—the political fraud perpetrated so mrny years ago increasingly stands exposed. Far from saving capitalism from
Thus, the glittering promise of TV A has led directly to the dismal showing of the
—
television."
federal agencies like the FDIC
and FSLIC with their
Above all, from suffering at the hands of Roosevelt's political and spiritual heirs, some of us at any rate have come
Other events in honor of the upcoming centennial are in the works. A party fund-raiser, aimed at evoking a "revival of the Democratic spirit," will be held Feb. 1 at the Waldorf-Astoria in New York City. While designed to serve as a showcase of political talent (and to encourage
alin-
eluding Poland, to fall into the clutches
sonian Institution, which, with the help of a special $200,000 congressional ap-
appear on
Times change. Some 35 years later, unhappily have seen the other side of
debased. Despite the best (or worst) efforts of the Washington press corps to cover up, we now know that the nation's first family had irregular and curious sexual liaisons during three terms and more in the White House. We now know of the ghastly diplomatic mistakes committed at Yalta, when FDR, senti-
SHOW BIZRoosevelt, always adored Franklin Delano and vice come
we
ken, once-great reputations have been
Copyright 1946 (renewed) Warner Bros. Inc. All rights reserved. Used by permission.
those
our eyes.
the coin. After $5.1 billion worth had been minted, the Roosevelt dime was transmuted from nearly pure silver to a composition of 25% nickel and 75% copper; over $20 billion of "clad dimes" are currently in circulation. By the same to-
will last
Down thru time. Down thru time.
from
knew the world was a poorer and colder place, Without that face on the dime, the face on the shiny new dime.
quarter and
dime.
a
face
nickel,
...
excess;
New Deal
EDITOR'S NOTE: An even broader OTC listing begins in this issue, on page 79. Barron's also has added a more com-
prehensive money market listing, Donoghue's Money Fund Report, on page 99. *
*
*
Boston's Plight To the Editor: As president of the firm that serves as financial adviser on debt matters to the City of Boston, I read with some discomfort an article in Barron's by Mi-
chael Brody,
"Back From the Brink"
(Nov. 30), devoted to recent trends in Boston's financial condition. The article states that "creative
ac-
partially responsible for Boston's ending its most recent fiscal year with a $72-million balance. This statement is completely inappropriate, for the $72 million represents the actual amount of cash the city had on hand at the end of the fiscal year and had nothing whatsoever to do with the city's accounting system, or the results of the city's financial operations in compliance with that system. Indeed, the audit of the city's 1981 financial performance, being conducted by Boston's independent auditors, Coopers & Lybrand, in accordance with generally accepted auditing and accounting principles, has not yet been completed. In any case, the actual cash on hand for any governmental entity does not involve directly or indirectly the applicability of the accounting system (or for that matter, any "creative accounting" system) followed by that counting"
was
and Survivors Insurance Trust again is threatening to go broke. an
accumulated actuarial deficit
running into the trillions of dollars, the system has long been philosophically bankrupt. If that Democratic fund-raiser's interested, we'd be glad to help celebrate the great occasion next month by belting out our own favorite golden oldie, "Brother, Can You Spare a Dime." *
*
*
The 100th birthday, finally, has revived debate about a suitable memorial to the 32nd President, an issue which has simmered ever since 1955, when a one-man
commission
was
created
to
tackle the job. Over the years, various ideas have surfaced, involving such sites as Roosevelt Island in the East River or West Potomac Park. We have a modest
proposal to make. Somewhere in the capital environs, put up the greatest circus tent on earth, complete with replicas of tightrope-walkers, magicians, aerobats and clowns. will be free, but it
Admission, of course, will cost an arm and a
leg to get out. Blazon it with P. T. Barnurn's famous slogan: "There's a sucker born every minute." FDR would have loved it.
government. Continued
on
Page 33
—Robert M.
Bleiberg Page 7
BARRON'S
Page 8
people think, and that this would be good for the country, not bad for the country. We want to discourage people from borrowing, and encourage them to save, which is just the reverse of what we've been doing for the last 20 years. Barron's: Anyone want a final word on the economy before we move on to of
Our Panel Divides Continued from Page
corporate borrowers and creating a virtual escalation of interest rates. Well, Mr. Kaufman was correct on the fact that the budget deficit, instead of being the $43 billion advertised by the Adminout
5
enormously higher rate of consumer savings than we have. Undoubtedly, they also have higher corporate savings, but certainly consumer savings are also high. I think there's widespread agreement that, ultimately, one way or another, we have to encourage the American people to save more, otherwise the money for investment isn't going to be there unless the government takes over.
istration, will come in probably even higher than Mr. Kaufman said. I think he was talking about $80 billion. And yet, here we are today
with
a
prime of
we
have to
15%%. Wilson: One
thing that
KOMANOFF: "I'm committed 100% to the premise that the
Sept. 25 closing low of approximately 824 and the Sept. 28 inter-day low of 807 were the ultimate lows."
the market? NefT: I'd like to take
exception to Jay's economic outlook. I kind of buy his inflation rate, but I think what's happened is that an awful lot of economists were too ebullient on '81, and they all marked down their '81 accordingly. But they also marked down the percentage increase for '82. And to my mind, that's double counting, because it seems to me that what happened in '81 is we purged inventories quick and dirty in the fourth quarter and set a stage for a quick turnaround in the economy, because that's about the only thing that's really gotten maybe a little bit overwrought, particularly in that we corrected the consumer quite a ways back. Barron's: Okay, we'll let that be the final word. Let's go on to the market. Irv, what are your thoughts? KomanofT: I'm committed 100% to the premise that the Sept. 25 closing low of approximately 824 and the Sept. 28
inter-day low of 807 were the ultimate lows. I'm allowing for the possibility— and I won't even be enthusiastic about it that the Dow will come down to ap—
kind
keep in mind, in terms of interest rates,
very sluggish one. Barron's: You think corporate profits will be down 15% the first half. How about the second half?
is that anybody who saved any money for the last 20 years has suffered. There has been a negative real interest rate, and Americans have gotten out of the habit of saving. About a year ago there
of
Barron's: At any rate, Jay, what recovery do you envision?
a
Levy: A
Levy: If we're very lucky, we will have a rise in the second half. Barron's: What about the rate of in-
fiction next year?
Levy: It will be down. Whatever price index you want to look at for 1981 will rise IVi percentage points less in 1982. Barron's: And that's the best you see? Anybody disagree with that? KomanofT: I sharply disagree with that. Fraenkel: Yeah, I do, too. Barron's: What do you think, Irv? KomanofT: I think the rate of inflation for 1982 will be substantially below the 8% level. I wouldn't be at all sur-
was an
interesting article in
your
sister
publication, The Wall Street Journal, about how the younger generation—the people who are just getting out of college and what not—just weren't saving at all. Saving wasn't in their lexicon, not part of their culture. And one could argue that maybe they're dissolute, imprudent young people, but I think one could also argue that they were very intelligent, because the return on savings was negative. So that I think in order to
proximately the 855 area, at which point I think that it will probably hit a trendline which has been established, assum-
ing the September low as a low point. I'm committed to the point that we will have a strong stock market in 1982, based on a I never set
variety of reasons. However,
myself
up as a
business
ex-
pert, or as a monetary expert. I have my own gut feelings. But I watch the market, and my gut feeling is unquestion-
ably that the September lows
were the lows and that we are going into a phase of the stock market which will show 1982 to be a sharply upward year. Barron's: Joe Granville, we have a
feeling you're not going to agree with that.
between
5% and
If we get a
buy signal in the low 700s, or
750—you name it—that is the authority follow. Not the prediction that we're going down to 550-to-650. We can only follow one authority: the market itself. It's telling us that the laws of probability state that we will get down between 550 and 650 in the Dow in 1982—probably
we
between the middle of 1982 and the fall of 1982. But I will state unequivocally that we will break 824.01.
Barron's: What about between now and then? Granville: You've just witnessed what we call a classical bull trap. Now, a bull trap is one designed and structured
the bulls. In other words, you previous rally high on volume, which we did, and that is the same trap that entrapped most people last spring, when we went from a February low in the low 930s, up to 1024 in the Dow. And as you know, I stated, "sell everything" on Jan. 6, 1981, at 1004.69 in the Dow, which turned out to be 1.89% under the exact-top. And that date, strangely enough, was the day the Donald T. Regan was confirmed by
to
entrap
have to break out above a
the Senate of the United States as our
Treasury Secretary. And, as we stated at the time, that was the first manew
jor blunder in Ronald Reagan's Administration—appointing a Wall Streeter as Treasury Secretary. You got a typical Wall Street opinion. He loves to make speeches like Joe Granville does, and he made his first speech that afternoon, after his confirmation, and he made 76 documented speeches thereafter. And I'll tell you what he said. In short, he said, Ladies and Gentlemen, inflation is going to cool, interest rates are going to come down. We're going to balance the budget in 1984, we're going to put jobs back in the hands of the working population, and we are going to prosper, and the bond market is going to soar, and stocks will go into a new bull market, and the firm—which I still say he fronts
GRANVILLE: "I want to put
myself on the record, I want to
be documented. I will bet
life on the fact that the market will go under 824 in the very near future." (Walter my
prised if the rate of inflation ranged somewhere 1982.
Granville: The laws of probability that in 1982, we will see somewhere between 550 and 650 on the Dow. My record is not based on what Joe Granville says; it's what Joe Granville does.
are
6% for
Mintz, the professional
Barron's: Where do you see interest headed? KomanofT: They will probably move
cynic,
listens.)
rates
small notch from here—very ternporarily—and then ease off, possibly by 150-to-200 basis points. But I never set myself up to be a prognosticator of interest rates. I simply want to point out the fact that the so-called most highly regarded interest rate prognosticator in up a
the business was... Barron's: Is that your friend Henry Kaufman? KomanofT: I don't want to mention names.
Barron's: What are his initials? KomanofT: H.K. He was dead wrong, because on Jan. 6, 1981, on "Meet the
JogGfumtiiM
Press," he predicted a sharply higher
prime than the then-existing 21 V^%, and after predicting doom and doom and doom, he modified his stance. And the funny thing about it is that the basis of his prediction of higher interest rates lay in the fact that he predicted a sharply higher governmental deficit, which, from his point of view, meant crowding
get the savings rate up to
be, of
we must see
where'it has to
positive rates of return
than the classic 3%. Barron's: Are you making a case
more
for high interest rates? Wilson: The point I'm making is that interest rates could stay higher than a lot
Granville: Irv KomanofT, I want to
put myself on the record.
My
name is not Richard Nixon. I want to be documented. I will bet my life on the fact that the market will go under 824 in the very near future. Barron's: How do
collect, Joe?
we
for—mounted
a
multimillion-dollar ad
campaign in June to tell
you to snap up bonds—much to their later regret—and he told you in January that the prime would be down to 12% by the summer
Continued
on
Page 28
7
Some Distinctions Applied God.
to
l
the Will of
some good and some bad, have speaking of the will of God. First, the secret and the revealed will ectof God. This distinction is based upon^Deuteronomy 29* 29. The secret will of God is the will of the decree (Dan. 4:35? Rom. 9*18-19)• The revealed will is the rule of life for men, or is expressive of man's duties (cf. Rom. 12:2; John 7*17)•
'Distinctions,
been used when
(2) Second, a very similar, and perhaps more popular, distinction is that between the decretive and preceptive will. The decfdtive will is His of all that is to come to pass, either causatively or permissively (cf. Eph. 1:11). k The preceptive will is His rule of life for men (cf. Matt. 7*21; Col. 1:10—4:21).. decree
There are other distinctions that are sometimes used in connection with the will of God, but since they belong more properly to a consideration of the divine decree, they will be considered at
point in these studies.
that
D-
The Will
of
God,
Sin.^fe, arid Moral Obli-
gation. The doctrine of the will of God gives rise to serious and probably unsolvable problems, consid-
ering the present state of (l) First,
it would
our
knowledge.
that God, by His if not the auescape the difficulty, make His will to permit sin dependent on His foreknowledge. The Reformed, however, point appear
decretive will, becomes the cause, thor, of sin. Thus, Arminians, to
4.27-2W
to Acts 2:23, and 3*18, in which it seems obvious that His will
may include sin. They carefully dis tinguish, however, between the will of delight in sin and the will of permission of sin (or perhaps
Gill, A Body of Divinity (Grand , pp. 72-73. good illustration of the matter.
Cf.
John
R&glds, 1971 /orig. ed., 1769-7;©/) gives
a
He
•--i.' :
.:.r
•-
f
CA
( (
:;KV; ■
\
yj
•.
•
»»*
*•*
v .-
v.
.
■
*♦,.
■'
•
•'
I I
CO
U O
The
Attributes of God (6): cable Attributes (2):
The Communi-
Various
Introduction. To be wrong about the attributes is to be wrong about God, for they have to do with
perfections of the divine being and nature. And an impossible thing. ILLUSTRATION: Woudstra and immutability, "We're not dealing with a
the
it is not
static God." We
are
turn here to three of them we
(2) holiness; I
THE
attributes.
shall mention:
There
(1) goodness;
(3) righteousness.
GOODNESS
A.
the moral
OF
The Nature
GOD. of
the Divine
Goodness.
Among the ethical attributes first place is assigned goodness. The Greeks identified it with usefulness,
but m the Bible it is the sum-total of
the divine perfections. Berkhof "That -perfection that prompts Him
defines it as, to dgal bountiful-
ly and kindly with all His creatures."^ In two senses God is good: (1) He is absolute good (perfection and bliss are in Himself). Cf. Mark 10:18. (2) He is active good, being the fountain and cause of all good. Cf. Psa. 145:9, "ebon to 7irn> One
of
the
interesting things about the divine goodness is the fact that He makes distin&ions in the gift of goodness. It is seen in His gifts to animals (Job 35:11), men (Matt. 5^5? Acts 14:17), elect men (Rom. 11:5)Âť non-elect angels (2 Pet. 2:4; Psa. luj):zO), and elect^iingels (1 Tim. 5:21). B.
The Varieties
of the Divine Goodness.
is the general term, and from it there proceed other attributes (cf. Psa. 145:8-9: those of v. 8 become "good" in v. 9; Exod. 33:12â&#x20AC;&#x201D;34:9). We have time only to mention the varieties: Goodness
"Hi. Same pp.
C.
Hoeksema, editorial, "Confronted by the Issues," The^Standard Bearer, 47 (March, ,,1972),
244-45.
hof, p.
70.
Bavinck,
pp.
203-4.
JBerk-
1
*
Air Blast. The. following letter, was airline sales department: "Sir, may I
seitt to suggest that your pilots not turn on that little light that says FASTEN SEAT BELT, because every time they do, the ride gets bumpy." Reader* s Digest, 5/71, p. 70. an
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2
1
(1) The love of God. Love stands here in the first place, being so much a part of God that it is said, "God is love" (1 John 4:8). The prophets
particularly show forth God*s love under two fig-
(1) con.jugal love (Hos. 11:1-9'• mysterious irrational character ); (2) -paternal love (Hos. 11:1-4} Isa. 49:15)7 The Greek words say the same
ures:
and
things (cf.
££i/uo
"take"
:
;
'i "give and take'*;
"give" ). Berkhof*s definition is, "that perfection of God by which He is eternally movdd a, varnx:
to
self-communication," The
love of God for the elect is not tracetheir works (Rom. 9:11-12} Tit. 3:3-4) or their faith (cf. Acts 13:48). "God loves men,g Gill says, "not because they have~fa3,th; bht they have faith, because God loves_them."^ His 1ove is eternal, as eternal as HiiT love for the Son (cf. John 17:23=24} 2 Tim. 1:9} Tit. 1:2} Rom. 8:351 able
to
39).
(2) The grace of God. If ScriptuE had revealed all of the attributes except this one, then it would have been of no value to us. Grace is God1s unmerited goodness to those who are by nature under condemnation. These things may be affirmed of it: (A) It is sovereign (Exod. 33:19) and inde-
pendent of merit (Rom. mon or general (being,
11:6). (b) It is both comlife, food, etc.) and speclal or particular (Rom. 8:29-30). (c) It is electing grace (Rom. 11:5-6). (d) It is redeeming" grace (Acts 15:11} Tit. 3:7} Rom. 3:2TfT. ILLUSTRATION: Luke 7:41-42. Cf. : "The sun is risen, for it is light.? Letter to airline sales depart-
men"t.
"
(3) The
G<£AT
<S-£>T)
of
ulotiVE-RS
i''
of God. Mercy is God*s goodness (Psa«lD3:13-l^). It, too, appears saving work of God, from election (Rom. 9:18, 23» ^vessels of mercy") to salvation (Tit. 3:5). mercy
"to the miserable in almost all the
ness
(4) The longsuffering of God. It is His goodby which He bears with the disobedient, wheth-
"4?.
van Imschoot, Theology of the Old Testatrans, by Kathryn Sullivan and Fidelis Buck (New York, 1965), I, 77. ^Berkhof, p. 71.
ment,
Gill,
p.
80.
^pieper,
I, 463.
If a child cannot rationally sit in judgment the condupt of his parents, nor a peasant comprehend the affairs of an empire, we certainly are on
notJ^
competent to call Gpd to account, or to ask of-Him the reason of his ways. Vie might rest satisfied with the assurance that the Judge of all the earth must do right. These considerations, however, have not availed to prevent speculation on the subject. Hodge, I, 430.
i
#
7
er toward theiungodly Tim. 1 sl6; Luke 23:42
C.
(Rom. 9s22) or the elect (1 Llth hour! Cf. Gill, 9§/) •
The Problem of the
Divine Goodness.
The perennial problem may be If God is good, why is there sin,
slowsprogress in on
child
standing
redemption.
put in^this way:
suffering, and
ILLUSTRATION:
Hodge
judging^parents' conduct; peasant under-Bur also, cony (m. u&ht of pao.).
empire.
answers have been given to the probsuch as: (1) the denial of evil, k la Christian Science (only a subjective reality, etc.); (2) the denial of God's ability to prevent it. In the
Rational
lem,
case, it is usually claimed that God must of necessity limit Himself, if we are to retain human responsibility. Free agency, it is claimed, is inconsistent with certainty. God may argue, per-
latter
suade, but He cannot sovereignly govern. But, as Hodge says, "If this be so, then God cannot govern free agents. He cannot secure the accomplishment o,f- his purposes, or the fulfilment of His promises."
that ends
The the are
Scriptural answer, based upon the fact glory of God is the end to which all other subordinated, is that God's self-manifest-
possible good. This is the in creation, providence, and redemption. Sentient creatures are necessary for this manifestation, and there can be no manifestation of mercy without misery (Rom. 9:22-23) nor grace' and .justice without sin (Eph. 3:10) • The knowledge of god is for us the highest good, for ation is the highest end of all His works
it
is
eternal life
"hlodge,
(cf. John 17:3).
I, 430.
^Ibid.,
I,
434-35.
1 II
THE HOLINESS
The
A.
Some
GOD
OF
Nature
of
the Divine Holiness.
attributes of God we prefer because of we derive from them. We prefer His
benefits
the
goodness before His
power.
We prefer His mercy
before His justice. But God delights in His attributes because of their excellencies. If this is so, then due to the stress upon holiness, a case might be made #or it being the transcendental" attribute. It
through the rest and casts its lustre
runs
them.
He
is
set
forth
in His,holiness
more
upon than by
any other of His perfections. Among kable things said of holiness are theses the term used by God to describe Himself
the remar(a) It is (cf. Isa. 40:25; Hps. 11;9); (b) It is the term used by the Lord Jesus of Himself (Rev. 3*7)i (c) It is the term used of the third person of the Trinity (cf. Matt. 28:19); (d) It is ascribed by the Persons of the Trinity to One Another (cf. John 14:16*17, 26; 17:11)• In fact, ©His Name," which signifies all His attributes in conjunction, is "holy and reverend" (Psa. 111:9). ILLUSTRATION: CHS and "robbing God." Holiness has
twofold
character: (1) and His supreme
It is majesty. In this sense it is hardly a moral attribute, but something co-ext&nsive with and applicable to everything that can be said of God. Cf. Exod. 15:11; Isa. 6:3; John 12:41, "glory.'' fhe Hebrew and Greek words (wTft or ; oryiaC^ ) contain the idea of separation or withdrawal. <4 X£ (masc.) and ITjJ 7P (fern.) refer to sacred persons (temple
His
absolute
prostitutes
4:14 John ern
Lev.
a
transcendence
of
each
sex;
cf. Deut.
"sodomite"; "whore" ; 17:19; 10:32; 1 Cor. 7:14. term
for God,
23:18=19; Hos. • Cf.
"harlotry7)
ILLUSTRATION: ©the Wholly Other."
(2) It is His absolute ethical purity. 11:44-4-5; 19:2; Heb. 7:2^
Charnock,
p.
448.
2Berkhof,
p.
Mod-
Cf.
73.
THE EMPTY THRONE FILLED 'In the year that King
high and lifted
up,
Uzziah died I saw also the Lord sitting upon a throne,
and His train filled the
temple.'â&#x20AC;&#x201D;Isaiah vi. 1.
reigned for fifty-two years, during the greater part of which he and his people had been Uzziah had
brilliantly
prosperous.
"Victorious in
war,
successful in the arts of
also The later
he
was
peaceful industry. of his life were clouded, but on the whole the reign had been a time of great well-being. His son and successor was a young man of five-and-twenty; years
and when he
came
to the throne ominous
war-clouds
gathering in the North, and threatening to drift No wonder that the prophet, like other thoughtful patriots, was asking himself what was to come in these anxious days, when the helm was in new hands, which, perhaps, were not strong enough to hold it. Like a wise man, he took his thoughts in_to the sanctuary; and there he understood. As he brooded, this great vision was disclosed to his inward eye. 4In the year that King Uzziah died' is a great deal more than a date for chronological purposes. It tells us not only the when, but the why, of the vision. The earthly king was laid in the grave ; but the prophet saw that the true King of Israel was neither the dead Uzziah nor the young Jotham, but the Lord of hosts. And, seeing that, fears and forebodings and anxieties and the Sense of loss, all vanished; and new strength came to Isaiah. He went into the temple laden with anxious thoughts; he came out of it with a springy step and a lightened heart, and the resolve Here am I; send me.' There are some lessons that seem to me of great importance for the conduct of our were
to Judah.
'
daily life which
may be gathered from this remarkvision, with the remarkable note of time that is appended to it. Now, before I pass on, let me remind you, in a word,
able
of that
apparently audacious commentary upon this great vision, which the Evangelist John gives us: ' These things said Esaias, when he had beheld His glory and spake of Him.' Then the Christ is the manifest Jehovah; is the King of Glory. Then the vision which
but
was
transitory revelation is the reality, and 4 the vision splendid' does not 'fade but brightens, into the light of common day'; when instead of being flashed only on the inward eye of a prophet, it is made flesh and walks amongst us, and lives our life, and dies our death. Our eyes have seen the King in as true a reality, and in better fashion, than ever Isaiah did amid the sanctities of the Temple. And the eyes that have seen only the near foreground, the cultivated valleys, and the homes of men, are raised, and lo ! the long line of glittering peaks, calm, silent, pure. Who will look at the valleys when the Himalayas revelation
stand out,
L. Let
'
was
saw
the
an
of Israel
a
eternal
and the veil is drawn aside ?
me say a
of loss and It
of
word
or
two about the ministration
in
preparing for the vision. 'King Uzziah died' that the prophet Lord sitting upon the throne.' If the Throne had not been empty, he would not have seen sorrow
when
the throned God in the heavens. our
losses, with all
ments, with all reveal to
us
things that our
sorrows
our
our
And
sorrows, with all
so
our
pains; they have
the throned God.
it is with all
a
disappointmission to
The possession of the taken away from us, the joys which smite into dust, have the same mission,
are
highest purpose of every good, of every blesspossession, of every gladness, of all love â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the highest mission is to lead us to Him. But, just as men will frost a window, so that the light may come in but the sight cannot go out, so by our own fault and misuse of the good things which are meant to lead us up to, and to show us, God, we frost and darken the window so that we cannot see what it is meant to show us. And then a mighty and merciful hand shivers
and the
ing, of
the
every
painted glass into fragments, because
it has been
of Eternity.' And though the casement may look gaunt, and the edges of the broken glass may cut and wound, yet the view is unimpeded. When the gifts that we have misused are withdrawn, we can see the heaven that they too often hide from us. When the leaves drop there is a wider prospect. When the great tree is fallen there is opened a view of the blue above. When the night falls the stars sparkle. When other props are struck away we can lean our whole weight upon God. When dimming4 the white radiance
Uzziah dies the
King becomes visible. pains, losses, dis-
Is that what our sorrows, our
appointments do for us ? Well for those to whom loss gain, because it puts them in possession of the enduring riches ! Well for those to whom the passing of all that can pass is a means of revealing Him who 4 is the same yesterday, and to-day, and for ever'! The message to us of all these our pains and griefs is ÂŁ Come up hither.1 In them all our Father is saying to us, 4 Seek ye My face.' Well for those who answer, 4 Thy face, Lord, will I seek. Hide not Thy face far from me.' Let us take care that we do not waste our griefs and sorrows. They absorb us sometimes with vain regrets. They jaundice and embitter us sometimes with re-
is
bellious
thoughts. They often break the springs of activity and of interest in others, and of sympathy with others.
But their true intention is to draw back
the thin curtain, and to show
us
ÂŁ the
things that are,'
the realities of the throned God, the skirts that fill the
Temple, the hovering seraphim, and the coal from the altar that purges. II. Let me suggest how our text shows
us
the
com-
pensation that is given for all losses. As I have
pointed out already, the thought conveyed prophet by this vision was not only the general one, of God's sovereign rule, but the special one of His rule over and for, and His protection of, the orphan kingdom which had lost its king. The vision took the special shape that the moment required. It was because the earthly king was dead that the living, heavenly King was revealed. So there is just suggested by it this general thought, that the consciousness of God's presence and work for us takes in each heart the precise shape that its momentary necessities and circumstances require. to the
That infinite fulness is of such
a
nature
as
that it will
form for which the weakness and the need dependent creature call. Like the one force which scientists now are beginning to think underlies all the various manifestations of energy in nature, whether they be named light, heat, motion, electricity, chemical action, or gravitation, the one same vision of the throned God, manifest in Jesus Christ, is protean. Here it flames as light, there burns as heat, there flashes as electricity; here as gravitation holds the atoms together, there as chemical energy separates and decomposes them; here results in motion, there assume
any
of the
in rest; but is the one force.
And
so
the
one
God will
become
everything and anything that every man, and requires. He shapes himself according to
each man, need.
The water of life does not disdain to take
the form
imposed upon it by the vessel into which it The Jews used to say that the manna in
our
is
poured.
the wilderness tasted to each
man as
each
man
desired.
in the manifestation
all, comes to us each need; just as He came to Isaiah of His kingly power, because the
throne of Judah
vacated.
And the God, who comes to us in the
shape that
So when
our
we
was
hearts
are sore
ment Manifestation of the comes
to
us
and says, ÂŁ
The
with loss, the New Testa-
King,
even
same
is
Jesus Christ,
my
mother and
love compensates for the love that can die, and that has died. When losses come to us He draws near, as durable riches and sister and brother,' and His sweet
In all our pains He is our anodyne, griefs He brings the comfort; He is all in all, and each withdrawn gift is compensated, or will be compensated, to each in Him. So, deafr friends, let us learn God's purpose in emptying hearts and chairs and homes. He empties them that He may fill them with Himself. He takes us, if I might so say, into the darkness, as travellers to the south are to-day passing through Alpine tunnels, in order that He may bring us out into the land where God Himself is sun and moon,' and where there are righteousness. and in all
our
'
ampler ether and brighter constellations than in these lands where we dwell. He means that, when Uzziah dies,
our
mourners,
hearts shall see the King. And for all for all tortured hearts, for all from whom
stays have been stricken and resources the old word is true: 4Lord shew it sufficeth us.'
us
withdrawn,
the Father, and
Let more
recall to you
me
what I have already insisted
than once, that the
perfecting of this vision is in
the historical fact of the Incarnate Son. shows
God.
on
Jesus Christ
Jesus Christ is the
King of Glory. If we will go to Him, and fix our eyes and hearts on Him, then losses may come, and we shall be none the poorer; death may unclasp our hands from dear hands, us
but He will close
a
dearer
one
round the hand that is
betaken away but it leaves by His own sweet presence. If our eyes behold the King, if we are like John the Seer in his rocky Patmos, and see the Christ in His glory and royalty, then He will lay His hands on us and say, 4Fear not! Weep not; I am the First and the Last/ and forebodings, and fears, and sense of loss will all be changed into trustfulness and patient submission. ÂŁ Seeing Him, who is invisible,' we
gropingfor He will
a
stay; and nothing
more
can
than fill the gap
shall be able to endure and to toil, until the time when the vision of earth is
perfected by the beholding of they who with purged eyes see, and with yielding hearts obey, the heavenly vision, and turn to the King and offer themselves for any service He may require, saying, 4 Here am I; send me.' heaven.
Blessed
are
3
^
Holy, then, is not the standard of God; He is holy, and He _is the standard. That is why He swears by His holiness. It is the only attribute that is trebled,--in both testaments (cf. Isa. 6:3? Rev.-5:8' The natural man is blind to holiness, and the spiritual man is half^blind, or myopic, to it. efe&jS6- IgXUT
B.
The Expression of
the Divine Holiness.
expressions of the divine holi(1) The divine law. The divine law may be divided into: (a) general revelation, that is, the laws of conscience C~cf. Rom. 2:15-15), physical^ laws (securing happiness to virtue, misery to vice, or natural laws), and mental laws (securing peace of There
are
two
ness.
mind upon
ot£dience,
remorse upon
disobedience).
(b)
special revelation, that is, the Mosaic Law, with its symbols (Sabbath) and cultus designed to teach the nation holiness, and the revelation by Christ (cf. Matt. 5-7; Heb. 1:1-3; ACts 3*15), the supreme expression in Word.
(2) The divine emotions, or will (Turretin). delights in purity (Psa. 11:7) a.nd abhors evil (Jer. 55:5; Hab. 1:13).
He
C.
The
Illustration of the Divine Holiness.
The sixth chapter of a Prophet," affords the divine holiness.
called f»The Making telling proclamation of
of Isaiah, a
It recounts Isaiah*s clean-
sing, call, and commission.
It is in three parts:
(1) The vision (Isa. 6:1-5).
The occasion
is expressed in the words, ®Uzziah died." The date tells us not only when, but why he had the vision! A
great rule (Azariah
2?ahweh-his-Helpe^7; Uzziah
/Yahweh-his-Strength/^ had ended in a leper's house (2 Kings 15:5)» Hero-worship is (Is] led on to faith. The sceptre may fall on earth, but When earthly props are swept away,
not from above! HE appears. ILL-
1
Alexander Maclaren,
iure, Isaiah, I, 36-55.
Expositions of Holy Scrip-
aju
o
■
y'' £>
^
-
Frosted
USTRATION:
glass;
6ur
trees.
1
The
seraphim suggest that no ice can exist (seraphim, lit., burners). Attitudes of reverence and activity prevail. They sing the utter otherness of God (see above),â&#x20AC;&#x201D;no failure, as in the case of Uzziah, in Him. Him
near
(2) The confession and.cleansing (6:5^7).
He but He is also the "Holy One' of Israel,.'" He meets with us (cf. 4-1:20). His grace, shown here, is as remarkable as HiS glory. is holy,
it
confession
The The
is true,
comes
sight of Him leads to
going evangelicalism has it has
cause
no
first a
(5; Exod. 33:20).
sense
of sin.
Easy-
sense of sin beclear vision of God (cf. Johathan no
deep
ILLUSTRATIONS: (T) Three besetting sins religious (callousness in worship; contentment with mere form; carelessness in life)One cure: vision of Lord and voice of Trisagion ; (2) Job (4-2:5-677 Peter (Luke 5:1-11); John (Rev. 1:17-20);
Edwards). of
(3) Camnus Crusade
error
(doctrine).
pjeansing follows (6-7). Restoration through that which suggests judgment by sac-
The comes
rifice.
The
Hebrews
9:22.
"altar"
reminds
one
of
the
truth
of
(3) The commission (6:8-13). Some homileticiwith, "Woe, Lo, and. Go
has outlined the chapter but the NASB has ruined it! an
for
tive
The^prophdt*s cleansing leads to readiness
service. for
116:165 pressed
And this motive is a far service than the seranhs have
higher mo(cf. Psa.
thou hast loosed my bonds"). in His forces. "Take the
There
are
no
motive-power of redemption from sin out of Ohristianity," Mactruly said, "and you break its mainspring, sq that
the
men
clock will only tick when
life that
sees,
submits
d
1
â&#x20AC;˘
2
it
is shaken.The
(only in word!).
Ibid., I, 26. Gearge Adam Smith, The Book of Isaiah, rev, ed. (New York, 1927), I, 66-67. ^Maclaren, I, 22.
7
III
THE
JUSTICE OF GOD.
S.'The
Justice
justice
T
a
Character of God's
Justice.
is related to holiness.
Shedd calls In His moral na-
"mode of holiness." in His dealings with His rational just. w â&#x20AC;&#x201D;*
is noly; crea"Etfr^S, He is
ture He
Both
the Hebrew
(pjy , Trpu?'
;
Cf.
us
<J /to
is to defend the right/ and the Greek words have the idea of conformity to a rule, or standard. Cf. Lev. 19*36 (of objects"!"; Gen. 18:25? Deut. 32:4; Psa. 119*37 (of prsons); John 17*25; 2 Tim. 4:8; 1 John 2:29; 3:7. There are three aspects of His justice: judge
(1) His rectoral justice. tude
This is the recti-
with which He rules both the good and
evil. In a word, made necessary by
the it is His moral government,
creation, with its rewards and punishments (cf. Deut. 4:8; Psa. 99*4; Isa. 33*22; Rom. 1:32; Jas. 4:12). (2) His distributive rectitude with which He
justice.
executes
This is the distri-
the law,
buting rewards and penalties justly (cf. Isa. 3*10 11; Rom. 2:6; 1 Pet. 1:17 ). It, too, is of two kinds: (a) remunerative justice, the distribution of rewards To Doth men and angels (2 Chron. 6:15; Rom. 2:7? Jude 6), necessary because of sin and salvation. It is the expression of the divine love and proceeds on the ground of relative merit only. We have no absolute merit (1 Chron. 29:14). The rewards are peace and life (1 Tim. 4:8; Rom. 2:10). (b) retributive justice, the infliction of penalties, necessary because of sin and perdition. It is the expression of the divine wrath (cf. Rom. 1:32; 2:8; 12:19; 2 Thess. 1:8). While remunerative justice is relative, this is absolute. Man does not merit his reward; he does merit his pfnalty.o Unlike holiness, sin is not divinely initi-
ated.^
1Shedd, I,
371.
I,
364.
2Hodge,
I, 4l6.
3Shedd
Tills
agrees with ths Intuitive convictions "The profound and awful idea of substitution moots us in tho religion of the early Romans. â&#x20AC;˘ When tho gods of the community were angry, and nobody could bo laid hold of as definitely guilty, thsy might be appeased by one who voluntarily gave himself up (dovovere se). Noxious chasms, in the ground were closed, and battles half-lost were converted into victories, when a brave cltisen threw himself as an exoiatory offering into the abyss, or upon the foe." Mommsen: Rome, I. xii. Shedd, I, 374.
of
man.
of
Mommsen adds that the compulsory substitution innocent for the guilty, human sacrifice by
the
force, wealth.
was
not allowed in the early Roman common-
Ibid.
It
with
follows, respect to
his power are! than one w y.
then,
that the sovereignty of God
rotrlbu^ye justice, consists in
right to satisfy its claims in more Ho has a choice of methods. lie
inflict the full amount of suffering due to either upon the sinner, or upon a proper substitute. He may require the complete satisfaction of justice from the transgressor, or he may provide for it for him vicariously. Divine justice may 3mi the guilty man, or it may smite the man who is God' "fellow," Zcch. 13t7- It is free to do either; but one or the other it must do. God is not obliged either to accept or provide a substituted penalty, and in case he does either', it is grace and mercy, towards the actual transgressor. These two particulars, of permitting substitution, and Provldlng the substitute, furnish-the .answer tp the question, "^Nhere is the mercy of God, in casejustice_is_31rlctly satisfied by a vicarious person?" There is mercy in permitting another person to do for the sinner what the sinner is sound to. do for himself; end. still greater mercy In orovidin-; ill t norson; AITD GREATER STILL, IX" B&COAIRG THAT PMR30N. Shedd, I, 377~7'3.
may
sin,
8
(3) His redemptive .justice (iustitia evangelica). He provides and recognizes the faithrighteousness of the righteous and brings it to light and triumph. Being synonymous with His lovingkindness, it flashes forth His grace (Psa. 97:11-12), even forgiveness of sins (51:15; 103:17; 1 John 1:9)• The truth is most fully developed by Paul in Romans 3:21-26. ®•
The
Special Character of Retributive Jus-
tice. Three things may be noted briefly. (1) The logical evidence for it. Conscience (Rom. 2:1^15), sacrifices, even among pagans, teach it. The propitiatory work, teaching that sin can only be pardoned by satisfaction (Gal. 2:21; 3:21), evinces the reality of the.attribute. It is unjust to pardon without it.
(2) The vicarious tMbution is necessary
satisfaction of it.
Re-
with respect to sin, but free and sovereign with respect to the sinner. Sin must be punished, but not necessarily in the person of the sinner. It is true that justice i_s not obliged to accept a substitute, but
neither
is it obliged to refuse
a
substitute.
The substituted penalty must be a full equivalent, and the person substituted must be able to render full satisfaction. and freedom of God relates, not/,the abolition of relaxa-
So.^the sovereignty
tion, but to the substitution of the penalty. ILLUSTRATIONS: (l) Intuitive "conyictions (Romans); (2) choice of" methods and mercy.
(3) The
purpose
said
was
of it. While the Greek sophreformation, and in English society punishment was related to the good of the public, which produced great evils (forgers were hanged), the true purpose of retribution surbjy is exact punishment. This is kind, and it prevents extremes of indulgence or cruelty. ists
it
^odge, 377-78.
for
I, lJ-23
2Shedd,
I,
37^,
(I
or olio put-Lie in the chief end
If
punishment, the criminal might be made to suffor more7 than his c.ra>me deserves. If he can "be used like a thing, fo,.r the benefit of others, there is no limit to the degree in which lie may be used. Hi.s personal desert and responsibility being left out of view, he may be made to suffer as much, or as little as the public welfare prescribe. It was this theory of penalty that led to the multiolicatlon of capital crimes. The 'prevention of forgery, l.t was claimed in England, required that the forger should be executed; and upon the principl tthat punishment is for the public protection and not for t'xact justice -and strict retrication, the forger was hanged. But a merely civil crime against property, and not against human life, does not merit the death penalty. Shedd, I, 383of
.
"Wherein did His action consist?," Godet And the answer follows, "he positively wl th'j.ia3\v Hit '-land; He oodsecl to hold t lie bo at an l It was drained by the current of the river. This j is the meaning of the term used by the apostle, Act i xiv. 16: 'He suffered*the' Gentiles to walk in their •own ways,1 by not doing for them what He never ceased to do for His own people. It is not a case J of simple abstention, it is the positive withdrawal of a force" (F. G-odet, Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, trans, by A. Cusin [2 vol 'asks.
<
'
o
•
burgh," 1881/, I, 177-78). 3
1
i The question is this: o' What Is the real 1 ficance of the spread of immorality, crime and vio> lence in Western civilization? To compound the
i
C 3 t
€
problem, the newspapers are filled with stories of eleruymen encouraging sexual license. Many Christian ministers, contrary to the Apostle Eaul s ..nJ.
J
.
V
.
other
no longer regard homosexuality, and sexual aberrations as a. sin. It is rather a
teaching,
sick-
3 n:-:s" , or a weakness. In an article in one of the tnational news magazines a few years ago homosexuali ity was referred to by the author as undeslrUp/blo handleap." To many today it is nothing more I than a deviation from the customary sexual patterns Ga third sex. Occasionally, in what must seem to t the Christian the ultimate evil, homosexuality is i traced to God Himself, for, It Is said, H7Tmade men and women what they are! S. Lewis Johnson, Jr., I "God Gave Them Up,'"--A Study in Divine Retribution, " Bibliothecra Sacra, (April-June, 1972), p.
'an
I
«*
</
G.
_
T.
. -
w _w T
'Xj
44U11X J
J.
WUSUUUi
u
I 1< .(
• • O. _L. J.
Shed", both eminent leaders of their day.
c*.
Tho
thirty
Some/years
ago the
famous Harvard sociologist, in his book The Crisis of Our Are, increases in crime, suicides, mental revolutions and war have been symptoms
Pltirim Uorpkin, warned
that
breakdowns, of
civilizations in the midst of death pangs. another article on homosexuals in Tims magazine author wrote, "At their fullest
'
In the
I
flowering, the Per-
(
si an, Greek, Roman and Moslem civilizations permitted a measure of homosexuality; as they decayed, it became more prevalent." Later Sorokin in his The
American Sex Revolution pointed out that sex anarchy leads to mental breakdowns, rather than the other
way
around, as the Freudian psychologists have taught. Further, he pointed out that increasing sexual 11cense leadss to decreasing creativity and productivity in the intellectual, artistic and economic spheres life.
of
'Ghat, then,
the sources of the problems of As Howard indicates, "Spengler had a biological answer: civilizations grow old and die like any other living thing. Toynbee has a religious answer: civilizations fail to respond to the higher challenges of the Spirit and therefore fossilize. In his Civilization and Ethics, Albert Schweitzer the
are
present age?
tried a
to find an ethical answer. different answer." Johnson,
It
should
St.
Paul had
still
<
be
carefully noted that the apostle Is not speaking of eternal punishment in these three verses. Ghat he has specifically in mind is a judgment that pertains to this life, not the life to come But on the other hand, it is also plain that Paul's â&#x20AC;˘words lead on to the doctrine of everlasting tormc-nt (of. v. 32). The vindicatory judgment inflicted by ,
God
is continued in rible and permanent
the
life
to
come
in'a
more
ter-
form if the escape through the gospel of the cross Is neglected. The doctrine of eternal punishment has never been popular, and it is less
so now. Even evangelical seminaries s .em embarrassed by it. There is an old story about Boswell and Dr. Gamucl Johnson that contains solemn truth. When'the latter once appeared overfearful as to his
'Think of the mercy of your replied Johnson, "my Savior has said that he will oluce some on his right hand, and some" 011 his left." ~~~ It is doubtful that there Is a doctrine in the a Bible easier to prove than that of eternal punishf| future,
Savior,."
G.
"Gin. "
(cf. Matt. 25:46)', a fact that reminds one of incident involving henry lord Boechor and Gillian T. Shed 1, both eminent leaders of their day. Tho
ment an
Boswell said,
North American Rev lev: on
the" subject of
engaged the two. men for articles
"eternal punishment, knowing the
commented, both here and hereafter; but it will not continue after it ceases to do good. with a God. who could give pain for pain's sake, this world would go out like a candle." Shedd was asked to write an article supporting the doctrine, and Beecher was asked to answer it. When the proof sheets of Shedd's article were sent to Beecher he telegraphed from Denver to the magazine's editors, "Cancel engagement. Shedd is -too much fof mo,. I half believe in eternal punishment now myself, Get so lebody else.~" The reply was never written,by anyone. Shedd remained unanswered. There is no answer, biblically, logically or philosophically to the doctrine of eternal punishment. Johnson, views of the two men. Beecher had "I believe that punishment exists,
once
9
C.
Pauline Vindication of Retributive Justice.
A
Isaiah has
spoken of judgment as God's "strange work" and His "strange act" (28:21). Yet, this justice forms an important part of the theology of Paul. There is one passage that fully expresses it, and that passage is Romans
1:24-32â&#x2013;
The terrible refrain, the Leit Motif, over which there has been considerable debate, is found in the threefold
26, 28.
Three
senses
of vv. 24,
mxpelTcokey
have been given the words:
(1) The permissive otherwise.
The active voice
sense.
argues
(2) The privative sense. He is said to have restraining hand (an aspect of His common grace). Cf. Acts 14:16 (Gr.). ILLUS-
withdrawn His TRATION:
Boat
raging river.
and
(3) The penal, positively gave men the
lusts
of
k
judicial, sense. He over to the cultivation of their hearts (cf. if-:25; 6:17; 8:32: or
positive). Cf. Acts 7:4-2 (Gr.)j Eph. 4:19 (human agency). Moral depravity is the result of the judgment of God!
questions
Two
paragraph:
are suggested by this potent (1) What is the significance of immo-
rality, crime, and violence in Western life? It is divine judgment. ILLUSTRATIONS: (1) Weakness of Christian ministers; (2) $ime", Tundesirable handicap," "third sex," traceable to God Himself!; (3) eternal punishment implied (cf. Boswell
and
Johnson;
Shedd and Beecher
(2) When did the retribution nite?
Babylon?
1:26, 20-257).
The
cross
1
F.
Romans,
177-78.
Godet,
occur?
Indefi-
Eden (cf. 5:12; 1:22-23 /cf. Gen. Can God do this? Does He care?
answers
trans,
f.
both
queries.
Commentary
by A. Cusin
on
the Epistle
to
"(Edinburgh, 188IJ,
the
I,
INTYEDROTABXL- SUAPRUSBLNJAIGEECMNTT, WWCYHORWOIICOE. ititncaemasopatbokrsy OWN Beoeaddng
NATIO L YOUR OINSENRT MAKE
The
ASU..
iMande
in
Trinity Historv (l):
I: THE
TRINITARIAN CONTROVERSY K
* _
7^_ '
1
^
^Y_ A,
rj
CJU^-dZo^ T7crcX^i4 (\-cn* JLen*^-1 1^6? 2-''
^
(f$7.f* J)' ^rjf
I.THE BACKGROUND
The trinitarian controversy, which came to a between Arius and
head in the struggle Rife°f.
Athanasius, had its roots in the past. The
early Church Fathers, as we have seen, had no clear conception of the Trinity. Some of them conceived of the Logos as imper- / sonal reason, become personal at the time of creation, while others
regarded Him as personal and co-eternal with the Father,
sharing the divine essence, and yet ascribed to Him a certain subordination to the Father. The Holy Spirit occupied no
important place in their discussions at all. They spoke of Him primarily in connection with the work of redemption as applied to the hearts and lives of believers. Some considered Him to be subordinate, not only to the Father, but also to the Son. Tertullian was the first to assert clearly the tri-personality of God, and to maintain the substantial unity of the three Persons. But even he did not reach a clear statement of the doctrine of the Trinity. Meanwhile Monarchianism came along with its emphasis on the unity of God and on the true deity of Christ, involving a denial of the Trinity in the proper sense of the word. Tertullian and Hippolytus combated their views in the West, while Origen struck them a decisive blow in the East. They defended the trinitarian position as it is expressed in the Apostles' Creed. But even Origen's construction of the doctrine of the Trinity was not altogether satisfactory. He firmly held the view that both the Father and the Son are divine hypostases or personal subsistences, but did not entirely succeed in giving a scriptural representation of the relation of the three Persons to the one essencejn the Godhead. While he was the first to explain the relation of the Father to the Son by employing the idea of [83]
^
f
y
THE DOCTRINE OF THE
TRINITY
eternal generation, he defined this so as to involve the subordination of the Second Person to the First in respect to essence. The
secondary species of divinity, which may be called Theos, but not Ho Theos. He sometimes even speaks of the Son as Theos Deuteros. This was the most radical defect in Origen's doctrine of the Trinity and afforded a stepping-stone for Arms. Another, less fatal, defect is found in his contention that the generation of the Son is not a necessary act of the Father, but proceeds from His sovereign will. He was careful, however, not to bring in the idea of temporal succession. In his doctrine of the Holy Spirit he departed still further from the representation of Scripture. He not only made the Holy Spirit subordinate even to the Son, but also numbered Him among the things created by the Son. One ofhis statements even seems to imply that He was a mere creature. Father communicated to the
2. THE
Views
of
nus
Son only
a
NATURE OF THE CONTROVERSY
[a] Arius and Arianism. The great
trinitarian strife is usually
called the Arian controversy, because it was occasioned by the anti-trinitarian views of Arius, a presbyter of Alexandria, a
disputant, though not a profound spirit. His domithe monotheistic principle of the Monarchians, that there is only one unbegotten God, one unonginated Being,
rather skilful nant
idea
was
distinguished between is simply a divine energy, and the Son or Logos that finally became incarnate. The latter had a beginning: He was generated by the Father, which in the parlance of Arius was simply equivalent to saying that He
without any beginning of existence. He the Logos that is immanent in God, which
before the world was called into being, and for that very reason was not eternal nor of the divine essence. The greatest and first of all created beings. He was brought into being that through Him the world might be created. He is therefore also mutable, but is chosen of God on account of his foreseen merits, and is called the Son of God in view of His future glory. And in virtues of His adoption as Son He is entitled to the veneration of men. Arius sought Scripture was
[84]
created. He was created out of nothing
THE TRINITARIAN CONTROVERSY
support for his view in those passages which seem to represent the Son
as
Matt 28:18;
inferior
the
Father, such as, Prov 8:22 (Sept); Mark 13:32; Luke 18:19; John 5:19; 14:28; I Cor to
15:28.
[6] The opposition to Arianism. Arius was opposed first of all Strength of by his own bishop Alexander who contended for the true and Athanasius proper deity of the Son and at the same time maintained the doctrine of an eternal sonship by generation. In course of time, however, his real opponent proved to be the archdeacon of Alexandria, the great Athanasius, who stands out on the pages of ArHAh/A^(Ul<\ i history as a~strong, infiexible, and unwavering champion of the truth. Seeberg ascribes his great strength to three things, namely, _(i) the great stability and genuineness of his character; (2) the sure foundation on which he stood in his firm grasp on the conception of the unity of God, which preserved him from the subordinationism that was so common in his day; and (3) the unerring tact with which he taught men to recognize the nature and significance of the Person of Christ. He felt that to regard Christ as a creature was to deny that faith in Him brings man into saving union with God. He strongly emphasized the unity of God, and insisted on a Athanasius construction of the doctrine of the Trinity that would not endanger this unity. While the Father and the Son are of the the Son and j same divine essence, there is no division or separation in the the Father essential Being of God, and it is wrong to speak of a Theos Deuteros. But while stressing the unity of God, he also recognized three distinct hypostases in God. He refused to believe in the pre-temporally created Son of the Arians, and maintained the independent and eternally personal existence of the Son. At the same time he bore in mind that the three hypostases in God were not to be regarded as separated in any way, since this would lead to polytheism. According to him the unity of God as well as the distinctions in His Being are best expressed in the term 'oneness of essence'. This clearly and unequivocally expresses the idea that the Son is of the same substance as the Father, but also implies that the two may differ in other respects, as, for instance, in personal subsistence. Like Origen he taught that the _
.
°^tionof
[85]
the doctrine of
the trinity
begotten by generation, but in distinction from the former generation as an internal and therefore necessary and eternal act of God, and "not as an act that was simply dependent on His sovereign will. It was not merely the demand of logical consistency that inspired Athanasius and determined his theological views. The controlling factor in his construction of the truth was of a religious nature. His soteriological convictions naturally gave birth to his theological tenets. His fundamental position was that union with God is necessary unto salvation, and that no creature, but only one who is Himself God can unite us with God. Hence, as Seeberg says, 'Only if Christ is God, in the full sense of the Son is
he described this
qualification, has God entered humanity, and only then have fellowship with God, the forgiveness of sins, the truth of God, and immortality been certainly brought to man/ Hist, of Doct. I, p 211. word and without
3. the
council of nicaea
convened in ad 325 to settle the disThe issue was clear-cut, as a brief statement will show. The f Arians rejected the idea of a timeless or eternal generation, while Athanasius reasserted this. The Arians said that the Son was 2. created from the non-existent, while Athanasius maintained that He was generated from the essence of the Father. The Arians 3 held that the Son was not of the same substance as the Father, whileAthanasius affirmed that he was homoousios with the Father. Besides the contending parties there was a great middle party, which really constituted the majority, under the leadership of the Church historian, Eusebius of Caesarea, and which is also known as the Origenistic party, since it found itsimpetus in the principles of Origen. This party had Arian leanings and was opposed to the doctrine that the Son is of the same substance the Father (homoousios). It proposed a statement, previously drawn up by Eusebius, which conceded everything to the party of Alexander and Athanasius, with the single exception of the above-named doctrine; and suggested that the word homoiousios
The Council of Nicaea was
pute.
Council of itsdecision
[86]
THE TRINITARIAN CONTROVERSY
be substituted for homoonsios, so as to teach that the Son is of similar substance with the Father. After considerable debate the
finally threw the weight of his authority into the balance and thus secured the victory for the party of Athanasius. The Council adopted the following statement on the point in question: 'We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of things visible and invisible. And in one Lord Jesus Christ, begotten not made, being of one substance {homoousios) with the Father', et cetera. This was an unequivocal statement. The
frr^pB^emperor }
term
homoousios could
that the It
essence
not
be twisted to
mean
anything else than
of the Son is identical with that of the Father.
placed Him on a level with the Father as recognized Him as autotheos.
an
uncreated Being
and
4. THE AFTERMATH
[a] Unsatisfactory
of the decision. The decision of the but was rather only the beginning of it. A settlement forced upon the Church by the strong hand of the emperor could not satisfy and was also of Council did
not
nature
terminate the controversy,
uncertain duration. It made the determination of the Christian faith dependent on imperial caprice and even on court intrigues.
Athanasius
himself, though victorious, was dissatisfied with such ecclesiastical disputes. He would rather have convinced the opposing party by the strength of his arguments. The sequel clearly proved that, as it was, a change in emperor, an altered mood, or even a bribe, might alter the whole aspect of the controversy. The party in the ascendancy might all at once suffer eclipse. This is exactly what happened repeatedly in subsequent history. [b] Temporary ascendancy of Semi-Arianism in the Eastern Church. The great central figure in the Post-Nicene trinitarian controversy was Athanasius. He was by far the greatest man of the age, an acute scholar, a strong character, and a man who had the courage of his convictions and was ready to suffer for the truth. The Church gradually became partly Arian, but predominantly semi-Arian, and the emperors usually sided with a
method of settling
[87]
THE DOCTRINE OF
so that it was said: 'Unus Athanasius contra Athanasius against the world). Five times this worthy servant of God was driven into exile and succeeded in office by unworthy sycophants, who were a disgrace to the
the ^
^
v
THE TRINITY
majority,
orbem* (one
Church.
opposition to the Nicene Creed was divided into different parties. Says Cunningham: 'The more bold and honest Arians/ The
Opposition
l°of Nicaea s^d that the Son was heteroousios, of a different substance from
others said that He was anomoios> unlike the Father; z and some, who were usually reckoned semi-Arians, admittedg that He was homoiousios, of a like substance with the Father; but
the Father;
phraseology, and proper divinity ofthe Son and saw and felt that that phraseology accurately and unequivocally expressed it, though they sometimes professed to adduce other objections against the use of it/ Historical Theology I, p 290. Semi-Arianism prevailed in the eastern section of the Church. The West, however, took a differ-
they all
unanimously refused to admit the Nicene
because they were opposed to the Nicene doctrine of the true
and was loyal to the Council of Nicaea. explanation primarily in the fact that, while the East was dominated by the subordinationism of Origen, the West was largely influenced by Tertullian and developed a type of theology that was more in harmony with the views of Athanasius. In addition to that, however, the rivalry between Rome and Constantinople must also be taken into account. When Athanasius was banished from the East, he was received with open arms in the West; and the Councils of Rome (341) and Sardica (343) unconditionally endorsed his doctrine. His cause in the West was weakened, however, by the accession Marcellus of 0f Marcellus of Ancvra to the ranks of the champions of the Ancyra jj-cene theology. He feii back on the old distinction between the eternal and impersonal Logos immanent in God, which revealed itself as divine energy in the work of creation, and the Logos become personal at the incarnation; denied that the term 'generation' could be applied to the pre-existent Logos, and therefore restricted the name 'Son of God' to the incarnate Logos; and held that, at the end of his incarnate life, the Logos ent
view of the matter,
This finds its
[88]
THE TRINITARIAN
returned
to
his
UUNlKUVtuai
premundane relation to the Father.
His theory
apparently justified the Origenists or Eusebians in bringing the charge of Sabellianism against their opponents, and was thus instrumental in widening the breach between the East and the West.
heal the breach. Councils were convened at Antioch which accepted the Nicene definitions, though with two important exceptions. They asserted the homoiousios, and the generation of the Son by an act of the Father's will. This, of course, could not satisfy the West. Other Synods and Councils followed, in which the Eusebians vainly Various efforts were made to
sought
a western
Reconciling
e^orts
recognition of the deposition of Athanasius,
But it was all in by cunning and force succeeded in bringing the western fine with the Eusebians at the Synods of Aries
and drew up other Creeds of a mediating type. vain until Constantius became sole emperor, and
management bishops into
(355). Disruption [c] The turning of the tide. Victory again proved a dangerous thing for a bad cause. It was, in fact, the signal for the disruption of the anti-Nicene party. The heterogeneous elements of which it was composed were united in their opposition to the Nicene party. But as soon as it was relieved of external pressure, its lack of internal unity became ever increasingly evident. The Arians and the semi-Arians did not agree, and the latter themselves did not form a unity. At the Council of Sirmium (357) an attempt was made to unite all parties by setting aside the use of such terms as ousia> homoousios, and homoiousios, as pertaining to matters far beyond human knowledge. But things had gone too far for any such settlement. The real Arians now showed their true colours, and thus drove the most conservative semi-Arians
and Milan
0Jp:^0esition
into the Nicene camp.
Nicene party arose, composed of men disciples of the Origenist School, but were indebted to Athanasius and the Nicene Creed for a more perfect interpretation of the truth. Chief among them were the three Cappadocians, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus. They saw a source of misunderstanding in the use of the term Meanwhile
who
a
younger
were
[89]
" a ~ ""
the doctrine of the trinity
hypostasis as synonymous with both ousia (essence) and prosopon (person), and therefore restricted its use to the designation of the personal subsistence of the Father and the Son. Instead of taking their starting-point in the one divine ousia of God, as Athanasius had done, they took their point of departure in the three hypostases (persons) in the divine Being, and attempted to bring these under the conception of the divine ousia. The Gregories compared the relation of the Persons in the Godhead to the divine Being with the relation of three men to their common humanity. And it was exactly by their emphasis on the three hypostases in the divine Being that they freed the Nicene doctrine from the taints of Sabellianism in the eyes of the Eusebians, and that the personality~of the Logos appeared to be sufficiently safeguarded. At the same time they strenuously maintained the unity of the three Persons in the Godhead and illustrated this in various ways. Early koutihe
Spirit
[d\ The dispute about the Holy Spirit. Up to this time the
Holy Spirit had not come in for a great deal of consideration, though discordant opinions had been expressed on the subject. Arius held that the Holy Spirit was the first created being/ produced by the Son, an opinion very much in harmony with that of Origen. Athanasius asserted that the Holy Spirit was of 2 the
same essence
with the Father, but the Nicene Creed con-
indefinite statement, 'And (I believe) in the Holy Spirit'. The Cappadocians followed in the footsteps of Athanasius and vigorously maintained the homoousis of the Holy Spirit. 3 Hilary of Poitiers in the West held that the Holy Spirit, as searching the deep things of God, could not be foreign to the divine essence. An entirely different opinion was voiced by Macedonius, bishop of Constantinople, who declared that the
tains only the
Holy- Spirit was a creature subordinate to the Son; but his opinion was generally considered as heretical, and his followers were nicknamed Pneumatomachians (from pneuma, spirit, and machomai, to speak evil against). When in ad 381 the general Council of Constantinople met, it declared its approval of the Nicene Creed and under the guidance of Gregory of Nazianzus accepted the following formula respecting the Holy Spirit: 'And [90]
the trinitarian
controversy
Holy Spirit, the Lord, the Life-giving, who proceeds from the Father, who is to be glorified with the Father and the Son, and who speaks through the prophets.' Procession [e] Completion of the doctrine of the Trinity. The statement of the Council of Constantinople proved unsatisfactory in two the Son points: (i) the word homoousios was not used, so that the consubstantiality of the Spirit with the Father was not directly asserted; and (2) the relation of the Holy Spirit to the other two Persons was not defined. The statement is made that the Holy
we
believe in the
%^iHt}rom
Spirit proceeds from the Father, while it is neither denied nor proceeds from the Son. There was no entire unanimity on this point. To say that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father only, looked like a denial of the essential oneness of the Son with the Father; and to say that He also proceeds from the Son, seemed to place the Holy Spirit in a more dependent position than the Son and to be an infringement on His deity. Athanasius, Basil, and Gregory of Nyssa, asserted the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father, without opposing in any way the doctrine that He also proceeds from the Son. But Epiphanius and Marcellus of Ancyra positively
affirmed that He also
asserted this doctrine.
theologians generally held to the procession of the Holy Spirit from both the Father and the Son; and at the Synod of Toledo in ad 589 the famous 'filioque' was added to the Constantinopolitan Symbol. In the East the final formulation of the doctrine was given by John of Damascus. According to him there is but one divine essence, but three persons or hypostases. These are to be regarded as realities in the divine Being, but not related to one another as three men are. They are one in Western
in their mode of existence. The Father is ^ 'non-generation', the Son by 'generation', and Holy Spirit by 'procession'. The relation of the Persons to
every respect,
except
characterized by the one
another is described
as one
of 'mutual interpenetration'
(circumincession), without commingling. Notwithstanding his rejection of subordinationism, John of Damascus still spoke of the Father as the source of the Godhead, and represents the Spirit as proceeding from the Father through the Logos.
absolute
[91]
inn
uUUTKINE OF THE TRINITY
This is still
a
relic of Greek subordinationism. The East
adopted the 'filioque' of the Synod of Toledo. It on
AU^Trinit
was
never
the rock
which the East and the West split.
The western conception of the Trinity reached its final state-
the the
in the great work of Augustine, De Trinitate.
He too stresses and the Trinity of Persons. Each one of three Persons possesses the entire essence, and is in so far
ment
unity of
essence
identical with the
They
are not
essence
and with each one of the other Persons.
like three human persons, each one of which
of generic human nature. Moreover, the be without the other; the relation of dependence between them is a mutual one. The divine essence belongs to each of them under a different point of view, as generating, generated, or existing through inspiration. Between the three hypostases there is a relation of mutual interpenetration and interdwelling. The word 'person' does not satisfy Augustine as a designation of the relationship in which the three stand to one another; still he continues to use it, as he says, 'not in order to express it (the relationship), but in order not to be silent'. In this conception of the Trinity the Holy Spirit is naturally regarded as proceeding, not only from the Father, but also from
possesses one
is
only
never
a part
and
can never
the Son.
QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY What different views of the Logos and of His relation to the Father were
prevalent before the Council of Nicaea? How did Origen's doctrine of the Trinity compare with that of Tertullian? In what points was his doctrine defective? What conception did Arius have of God? How did his view of Christ follow from this? To what passages of Scripture did he appeal? What was the real point at issue at the Council of Nicaea? What was Athanasius' real interest in the matter? How did he conceive of man's redemption? Why was it essential that the term homoousios rather than homoionsios should be used? Why were the semi-Arians so opposed to its use? How could they detect Sabellianism in it? What valuable contribution did the Cappadocians make to the discussion? How must we judge of the anathema at the end of the Nicene Creed? How was the question of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the other Persons settled in the West and how in the East? Why was the East unalterably opposed to the famous 'filioque'? Does the final statement of the doctrine of the Trinity by John of Damascus differ much from that by Augustine?
[92]
THE TRINITARIAN
CONTROVERSY
LITERATURE
Bull, Defense of the Nicene Faith; Scott, The Nicene Theology, pp 213-384; Faulkner, Crises in the Early Churchy pp 113-144; Cunningham, Historical Theology, I, pp 267-306; McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought, I, pp
III, pp 132-162; Seeberg, History of Dogmengeschiedenis, pp. 140-157; Shedd, 306-375; Thomasius, Dogmengeschichte, I, pp 198-262; Neander, History of Christian Dogmas, I, pp 285-316; Sheldon, History of Christian Doctrine, I, pp 194-215; Orr, Progress of Dogma, pp 105246-275; Harnack, History of Dogma, Doctrines, I, pp 201-241; Loofs, History of Christian Doctrine, I, pp
131.
«
[93]
"
God
that
man
gives man nothing in a finished state. All shall have abundant work to do with them.
His gifts are so bestowed This is specially true,
Bible."—Rothe.
only of man himself, but also of the
not
speaks of two Hellenises, therefore he who speaks of one But this is not so ! God forbid. For as he who says Father and Son are two' confesses one God ; so let him who says ' One God,' think of .two, Father and Son, as being one in the Godhead." — "
For if he who
Sabellianises. '
Athanastus.
trinitarian to see that if Arianism had had the theology of Christianity would have become of a kind in which philosopher, who had outgrown the demonism of ancient systems, could One need not be an orthodox
"
its way, nn
for
moment
a
acquiesce."—T. H. Green.
i
OR.^ 1
ii. p. 242.
Sec, as respects Kngland, the valuable appendix bairn, in Dorncr's Person of Christ, v. pp. 337-466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Theodorct, etc. 4 Philostorgius the Arian reckons 22. 2
6
by Dr. P. Fair-
Thcod. i. 8. DILL1CU
5. And the third
day
from the dead
rose
6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth on the
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometli to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus prebaptismal creed see Badcockj The History of the Creeds.] served the Old Roman
34
LECTURE
IV
Subject continuedâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;Arian and Macedonian (Fourth Century).
Same
Monarchian controversies
TlIE
Controversies
of the third century
Trinity and the supreme divinity of Christ were but preludes to the great pitched battle of the Arian controversy in the fourth. The fundamental question at on
the
issue
was
faith
were
how these peculiar assertions of the Christian to be reconciled with the unity of God ; above
j>
all, how the relation of Christ to the Father was to be conceived of, so as, on the one hand, not to compromise His
divine
true
dignity, and, on the other, not to
endanger the divine
This question could
Monorchia.
only be answered, as it was answered, through the stating of all possible alternatives, the testing of each, and the rejection of such as were found inadequate. We
are
to
to
see
exemplified with regard to Spirit in the controversy now
this process
deity of the Son and
the
be reviewed.
the
Ere
Arian
had
controversy
broken out, a
the external fortunes of the Church. The struggle, prolonged through three centuries with the forces of a persecuting paganism, had decisive
change had taken place in
defeat of the latter. In 313 A.D., the last terrible persecution by Diocletian, edict of Milan, giving universal toleration,
issued in the decisive
following runr
1
the
on
ii. p. 242.
.See, as respects England, the valuable appendix bairn, in Dorncr's Person of Christy v. pp. 337-466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socmtcs, Theodorct, etc. 2
4 4
by Dr. P. Fair-
Philostorgius the Arian reckons 22. Thcod. i. 8. DU11CU
day rose from the dead ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth on the right hand of the Father 8. Whence he cometh to judge the living and the 9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The holy church 5. And the third 6. Who
dead.
11. The remission of sins
the flesh everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
12. The resurrection of 13. The life
[For criticism of the theory that
Marceilus and Rufinus pre-
served the Old Roman baptismal creed see
of the Creeds.] 34
Badcock, The History
ÂŤ
arid
in j-3 a.i>. Constantino, having overthrown ins rival Licinius, became sole ruler in the empire.
last
The
next year,
of the
324 a.I).,
Christian
the so-called establishment
saw
religion,
event which, outwardly favourable, introduced a new factor into the history of the development of dogma—one nearly always hurtful an
and
disturbing—I mean the exercise of imperial authority. Ere, however, this fateful step was taken,
the Church
was
involved in the controversy we are to
study. It
not, however, in external respects only that a change had taken place in the condition of the Church. The Church triumphed because it was already internally the strongest force in the empire. Even in the third century it was formidable—compactly organised, ably directed, influential not only in numbers, but in the rank of many of its members.1 Its recognition by Constantine in the fourth was but the acknowledgment of a preponderance of influence already won. In an intellectual respect the advance was equally great. Theological tendencies were assuming distinct shape, and marked contrasts had begun to develop themselves was
J *
in the schools. One such contrast must be referred to here for the sake of the profound influence it exercised on
after
theology, that, viz., between the schools
Alexandria and Antioch. Alexandrian school has
of The commencement of the
already been described. Its representatives during the fourth century were, first, the renowned Athanasius, and after him the three great Cappadocian Fathers, Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, and Basil's brother, Gregory of Nyssa. Throughout it retained the liberal, speculative, idealising character imparted to it by its master, Origen ; but in its newer chief
1
„
See ihc evidence in my
extent to
which
Neglected Factors, etc. (Lcct. II.), on the Christianity had permeated the higher ranks of society.
2 Sec, as respects England, the valuable appendix bairn, in Dorncr's Person of Christ, v. pp. 337*466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Theodorct, etc. 1 Philostorgius the Arian reckons 22. *
by I)r. P. Fair-
Thcod. i. S. DUi leva
5. And the third
day
from the dead
rose
6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth on the
right hand of the Father
8. Whence he cometh to
judge the living and the dead.
9. And in the Holv Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the
13. The life
flesh
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus prebaptismal creed see Badcock, The History of the Creeds.] served the Old Roman
34
form it kept clear of, and overcame Onsen's subordiua* tionisrn.1 The Antiochian school had opposite characteristics. It was sober, literal, grammatical, rational ;
Coleridge's phrase, rather than of the
exercised in
was a
school of the We have
reason.
in
understanding
seen
the influence
Antioch
by Paul of Samosata, and the teachings, no doubt, continued to operate
leaven of his
after his removal.
The true founder of the Antiochian
school, however, was Lucian, martyred in 3 11 A.D., who stamped on it its predominant exegetical, and in part rationalising, character.2 From this school came Arius and most of the leaders of the party who supported him.5 Professor Harnack goes further, and gives a very definite and detailed account of the opinions of Lucian, of which I will only say that it seems to me largely hypothetical, and not borne out by the authorities.4 To Harnack Lucian is simply the Arius before Arius. He adopted the Christology of Paul of Samosata, and combined with it the Logos doctrine. His doctrine is Paul's, with the difference that, instead of a man, it is a created heavenly being who becomes God. The stress is
laid
on
creation out of
nothing, and on deificaby progressive development. There is, however, no evidence that I know of that Lucian was a disciple of Paul of Samosata,5 or that he held that the Logos tion
1
It kept free also from most of Origen's heretical peculiarities (eternal creation, prc-existence of souls, etc.), though Gregory of Nyssa, nearest to Origen in spirit, follows him in his restitutionism. 2 A good characterisation of the school is by Neander, iii. p. 497 ff. (Bohn's ed.). Distinguished later representatives were Diodorus of Tarsus, Theodore of Mopsuestia, Chrysostom, and Theodoret (see Lecture
VI.).
3 Arius calls Eusebius of Nicomedia his 44 fellow-Lucianist" Ere. Hist. i. 5). Philostorgius, the Arian
historian, gives
a
(Theod. list of Lucian's
pupils in this party (ii. 14). 4 iv. pp. 3-7 (E.T.). A It goes against this connection that Eusebius, the historian, who acted with Eusebius of Nicomedia and other friends of Arius, speaks in 1
ii. p. 242.
.
2
See, as respects England, the valuable appendix bairn, in Dorncr's Person of Christ% v. pp. 337*4^6. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Theodoret, etc. 4 *
by Dr. P. Fair
l'hilostorgius the Arian reckons 22. Theod. i. S.
"
â&#x20AC;˘ _
uuncu
5. And the third
day
from the dead
rose
6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth
on
hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
the right
8. Whence he cometh to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus prebaptismal creed see Badcock3 The History of the Creeds.] served the Old Roman
34
was
created
of
out
nothing,
or
that Christ became God
by progressive development.1 That his views tended in some way to A nanism we may indeed fairiy conciudc ; it is certain, further, that he stood with his school during three episcopates outside the communion of the Church, and was only reconciled to it slibftly before his death.2 This, however, hardly warrants us in attributing to him so fixed a type of doctrine as that just indicated. I. The Arian
dispute took its origin about 318 A.D. a leading presbyter, had come into conflict with his bishop 011 the subject of the Trinity.3 Arius is described to us as a tall, spare man, ascetic in habits and dress, with _lonJangled hair, and a curious practice of twisting about, but withal of fascinating manners,, and address, and not without a considerable mixture of craft aneKvanity* Of this last in
Alexandria, where Arius,
the introduction to his book/dalled the Thalia—" I that celebrated man whp^nas suffered /many things
am
for
God's glory, and bej-rf^ taught of G6d, has obtained wisdom and knoyt£dge "5—is sufficient witness. Not-
withstanding/his apparent smootlmess, he of
stron^/fCnd vehement passions/ He
roundldm
.
..
was a man
soon
gathered
multitude of supporters, and was unwearied in >Ke dissemination of his views. The condemnation a
^fs^ry^m^e^ngSe/t ^Mrms 'ofXuc^an
the
(viii. 13
;
ix. 6), but gives the
condemnatory accounts of Paul and his doctrines (vii. 27, 29, 30). Against this the vague expression of Alexander, Bishop of Alexandria, in an epistle against Arius—"Whom Lucian, having succeeded" (5iaetc. (Theod. i. 4)—is hardly decisive. 1 Nothing of this kind is suggested, but the opposite is shown by the
most
the creed ascribed 2
Thcodoret, i.
Lucian
to
at
the Council of
Antioch,
241 a.d.
4.
3
The accounts in the histories vary as to the precise circumstances of origin of the quarrel, but admit of being readily harmonised. 4 Cf. Stanley, Pastern Church, iii. 5. s )n Alhan. Oration*, i. 5. 1
ii. p. 242.
2
Sec, as respects Kngland, the valuable appendix bairn, in Dorncr's Person of Christ, v. pp. 337-466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Theodorct, etc. 1 h
Philostorgius the Arian reckons
by Dr. P. Fair-
22.
Theod. i. 8. UU11CU
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth
on
the
the dead
right hand of the Father
8. Whence he cometh to
judge the living and the dead.
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh
13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marceilus and Rufinus preserved die Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcock3 The History of the Creeds.] 34
^
of his
opinion* by
a
local council (3
A.D.) only fanned l>olh sides became intensely keen. Each party sought to strengthen itself by inviting the support of influential bishops ; the whole Church was soon in turmoil ; the very theatres resounded with ridicule of the disputes of the Christians.1 Constantine, whose chief anxiety was for the peace of his empire, was deeply chagrined at this unexpected outbreak about matters, as he regarded them, of trifling importance, and wrote urgently to both Alexander and Arius, beseeching them to exercise mutual forbearance. When this failed, and his eyes, perhaps, had become more open to the gravity of the issues, he conceived the idea—by an inspiration of Heaven, as he thought—of summoning a council of the whole Christian world to the flame of controversy.
Feeling
? 1
on
decide the matter.
13,
j.
The
controversy thus opened affords a favourite text for those who are disposed to make light of theological controversy generally. The whole contention, this class would have
us
believe,
was a
machy—a dispute about trifles, in Christianity
was
in
no
hopeless logo-
which the essence of way involved. Gibbon has made >
the whole world convulsed about a diph-1 thong.2 So, for that matter, it is only a single letter* which makes the difference between " theist" and 11 atheist! " Profounder minds judge the merry over
"
controversy
differently. Harnack, despite his theory of the Greek origin of dogma, makes it very clear that it was Christianity itself that was at stake. " Only," he says, as cosmologists arc the Arians monothcists, as theologians and in religion they arc polytheists. Deep very
"
contradictions lie in the
Son;
a 1
*
Logos who is (*'
i
background : a Son who is no Logos; a monotheism which
no
6
*
/V./zw rf«7 /'a//, \*i.
ii. p. 242.
.
2
See, as respects Kngland, the valuable appendix bairn, in Dorncr's Person of Christ, v. pp. 337*466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Theodorct, etc. 1 >
-*1
rhiloscorgius the Arian reckons
by Or. P. Pair-
22.
Thcn<l. i. S. UUilCU
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth
on
the dead
the right hand of the Father
8. Whence he cometh to
judge the living and the dead.
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus preBadcockj The History of the Creeds.] served the Old Roman baptismal creed see 34
docs not exclude
polytheism ; two or three ousias, who worshipped, while still only one is really distinguished from the creation ; an indefinable nature to
arc
be
which first becomes God when it becomes man, and which still is neither God nor man. The opponents,-' .
.
.
right; this doctrine leads back to heathenism.) The orthodox doctrine has, on the contrary, its abiding' worth in the upholding of the faith that in Christ God. were
Himself has
redeemed
man,
and led them into His
fellowship.
This conviction of faith was saved by Athanasius against a doctrine which did not understand the inner nature of religion generally, which sought in religion only teaching, and ultimately found its satisfaction in an empty dialectic."1 The
historical
significance of Arianism lay, as already hinted, in the fact that it brought to expression certain tendencies already working in theology, and compelled the Church to face them and give judgment upon them. We saw how, in the preceding period, there were influences tending to exalt I
have
the divine " Monarchia " at the expense
of the distinct hypostasis of the Son ; how, on the other hand, as the result of Origen's influence, there was a strong current of subordinationism on the part of those who held that hypostasis. This tendency, I remarked, was strengthened by—if it had not its main cause in—the Platonising way of regarding God as the self-caused, unspeakably 1
Grundriss, i. p. 141 ; cf. Hist. of Dogma, iv. p. 41 (E.T.). Mr. ^■ Eroudc tells us that in earlier years Mr. Carlyle had spoken contemptu-. ' oiislv of the Athanasian controversy, of the Christian world torn to
aver a
diphthong, but later told him that
pieces
he perceived Christianity itself to have been at stake. If the Arians had won it would have dwindled awav to a legend (Life in London. ii. p. 462), I may add the judgment of Professor Schultz in his GoUhf.it Christi. M The Arian Christology," he says, "is inwardly the most untenable and dogmatically worthless of ail the Christologics that meet us in the
history of dogma" (cf. ii.
1
p.
6$),
ii. p. 242.
2
Sec, as respects England, the valuable appendix by Dr. P. Fairbairn, in Dorncr's Person of Christy v. pp. 337-466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Theodorct, etc. 4 Philnstorgius the Arian reckons 22. *
Thcod. i. S. ouricu
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven
7. And sitteth
on
the
the dead
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometh to
9. And in the Holv Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh
13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus preserved the Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcock, The History of the Creeds.] 34
being, who alone was God This led, first, to God being put
exalted, incomprehensible in the at an
highest
sense.
infinite distance from
necessity of interposing the transition
His creation
the latter;
to
;
next, to
the
middle being to effect
some
third, to the Son who
begotten for this purpose being put in the second rank, as not having those attributes which were supposed
was
to constitute
absolute Godhead. Subordinationist tenwere active in the Church before
dencies of this kind
in Lactantius, in Eusebius of Csesarca,
Arius, e.g.,
probably in Lucian ; but it was only when definfte expression was given to them, and their logical conse-
fairly drawn out by Arius, that their fully seen. In brief, Origen had spoken as occupying a secondary relation to the Father, while at the same time upholding His eternal generation and identity of essence with God. These two ' tendencies could not but come ultimately into collision. If the identity of nature with the Father was maintained, full and true Godhead must be granted to the Son, and the subordinationist elements, so far as in conflict with this conception, must be eliminated. If, on the other hand, the subordinationist standpoint was adhered to, in combination with the abstract, Platonising view of God, the Arian doctrine was the logical outcome. It is not so much my object to enter into the details of the history of this controversyâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;which my limits do not permitâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;as rather to bring out the great issues involved, the principles at work, the logic, as I venture to call it, of the movement. It will help to this end if, before looking at the proceedings of the Nicene Council, we glance at the parties involved, and at the positions they severally occupy. This will show with quences
were
import
was of the Son
tolerable
clearness
development 1
was
the
course
which
the
historical
bound to follow.
ii. p. 242.
2
See, as respects Kngland, the valuable appendix by I)r. P. bairn, in Dorncr's Person of Christ, v. pp. 337-466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Thcodorct, etc. 4 *
Philostorgius the Arian reckons
Fair-
22.
Thcod. i. S. duticu
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven
7. And sitteth
on
the
the dead
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometli to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus preBadcock, The History of the Creeds.] served the Old Roman baptismal creed see 34
had
By the time of the opening of the council three parties shaped themselves with some dcfinitcncss.
Eirst, the At/tanasian party—to
name
Athanasius
its
outstanding representative — was the only one of the three that had a perfectly unambiguous ground. The Son, in its view, was of the same essence (o/rooverlos) with the Father—very God of very God. In this view the genuine Christian interest was conserved which Athanasius constantly came back on, viz., that no creature, but only God, can unite us with God.1 He was not less clear on the other point that a true incarnation is needed in order to redemption. Only the divine Son as
could atone for the sins of the world.2 In thus bringing the deity of the Son into direct connection with man's
salvation, he takes
a step beyond the Fathers who primarily with the creation, and in some of his positions well-nigh anticipates Anselm.3 Yet he invariably contended that he introduced nothing new, but was defending what had always been the faith of
connected
it
the Church.4
At the the pure
opposite pole to the Athanasian was, second, Arian party, led at first by Anus, and at a
1
Cf. Orations, ii. 69, and passim. Harnack says, "Is the divine Being, who has appeared on earth, and has united man with God, identical with the highest divine Being who rules heaven and earth, or is lie a half divine Being? That was the decisive question in the Arian 2
controversy" (Grundriss, i.
136).
p.
Cf. specially his Incarnation
of the iVord, written before the Arian controversy. Harnack says, "The theology and Christology of Athanasius are rooted in the thought of redemption " (Hist, of Dogma, iv. p. 26). 3 Cf. Harnack, iv. 29 ; Dorner, Person of Christy ii. pp. 248-60. 4 Cf. Harnack, p. 45. "Athanasius always appealed to the collective testimony of the Church in support of the doctrine which he defended," etc. So, on p. 22, of the Bishop Alexander : " Conscious that he is contending for nothing less than the divinity of Christ, the universal faith of the Church."
The doctrine of Arius,
1
ii. p. 242.
2
Sec,
h
Theod, i. 8.
on
the other hand, is
new
(p. 41).
as respects Kngland, the valuable appendix by Dr. P. Fairbairn, in Dorner\s Person of Christy v. pp. 337-466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Theodorct, etc. 1 Philostorgius the Arian icckons 22. Durieu
5. And the third
day
from the dead
rose
6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth
on
the
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometh to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh
13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus preserved die Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcockj The History of the Creeds.] 34
subsequent stap.c in the
cunttovcrsy by Actius and Kunomius (whence in the later Fathers the name Hit novtiiins\ The general procedure of Arius is thus
characterised
by Dorner
"In the sphere of the relative, and skilful ; in the handling of the lower categories of logic he evinces dialectic address, but he applies them as a standard to everything, and is unable to rise to anything higher. He is entirely destitute of the strictly speculative faculty." 1
his
movements
are
:
easy
In his treatment the distinction of the Son
Father
from the
pushed to its extreme logical limit. His starting-point was from the term Son, which he held necessarily implied the priority of the Father. The Son, he taught, was 3. created beingâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;created " out of nothing." He was the first and greatest of the creatures, and was brought into existence that through Him the world might be created. He was not eternal; was not of divine substance ; was mutable, i.e., could fall into sin : was not able to comprehend the Father. It was on the ground of His foreseen merits as man that He received the names of Logos, Son, etc.2 The Son, the Arians granted, is pre-temporal. before all agesj but this was because they held that time began with the creation of the world. This idea they expressed by the was
formula, " There
was
when He
was
not" (yv
ore ovtc
rjv).*
Intermediate between the two parties now described a third, the Senii-Avian or subordination^ party, distinguished from the Athanasian by their rejection of
stood
1
ii. p. 239. On the opinions
2
of Arius, see Athanasius, Orations, i. 5, etc. ; Socrates, i. 6. Arius embodied his views in his Thalia, and in sengs, set to popular airs, which were diffused among the people (.Philostorgius,
ii. 2). 1
Harnack says, 41 With Arius the Son belongs to the world side, while, with Athanasim, He, as Itclonging to God, stands over against the world " (Âťv. p.
1
ii. p. 242.
2
Sec, as respects Kngland, the valuable appendix by Dr. P. Fairbairn, in Dorncr's Person of Christ, v. pp. 337-466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Theodorct, etc. 4 Philostorgius the Arian reckons 22. * Thcnd. i. S.
Durieu
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven
7. And sitteth
on
the dead
the right hand of the Father
8. Whence he cometh to
judge the living and the dead.
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh
13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus served the Old Roman
baptismal creed
of the Creeds.] 34
see
pre-
Badcock, The History
the term the or
was
They would
oiioovcrios.
go no
farther than
that the Son resembled the Father. " of like substance " ('o^lolover1 with the Father.
vague
statement
But here two classes
are
specially to be distinguished.
disingenuous, time-serving section— the Euscbians, as they are commonly called, from their leader Eusebius of Nicomedia, one of the most active There
was%
first,
a
t
Arius—whose real views were strongly Arian, but who scrupled at no evasion which might disguise their opinions, ana employed the basest methods of intrigue and violence against their opponents. They supporters of
have been called the Herodians of the Arian contro-
versy.
Later
on
they fell back from the bfioiovo-ioif
formula, and took refuge in the bare declaration that Christ was " like " (o/«ho?) to the Father (whence their
1
name " Homoeans") ; or urged that Scriptural terms only should be employed. They are at this stage known as Acacians, from their new leader Acacius. But, second} there was another and larger section—the sincere Semi-Arians, as we may call them—subordinationist in tendency, whose chief objection was to the word o/Aocvaios, which to their mind had evil associations,2 rather than to the doctrine represented by it. In the later stages of the controversy, this party, 1 repelled by the unabashed Arianism of some of their., i allies, drew nearer to the orthodox, and ultimately ) accepted their formula, though still without complete unity of view.
'•
Such, then,
were
the parties whose opinions came
1 "'0uoiounot is in fact nothing, and when used of the real Son is consequently either nonsense or false" {ibid. p. 33). 2 It was, they held, novel, unauthorised, had Valentinian and Sabellian associations, had been condemned by the Council at Anlioch in the case
of Paul of Samosala, etc. —
————
1
*
w
1
ii. p. 242. Sec, as respects England, the valuable appendix by Dr. P. Fairbairn, in Dorncr's Person of Christy v. pp. 337-466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Theodorct, etc. 2
4 *
Philnstorgius the Arian reckons
22.
Tbeod. i. 8. DUTICU
5. And the third
day
rose
from the dead
ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth on the right hand of the Father 8. Whence he cometh to judge the living and the 9. And in the Holy Ghost 6. Who
10. The
dead.
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the 13. The life
flesh
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus precreed see Badcock, The History of the Creeds.]
served the Old Roman baptismal
34
^
into collision in the famous Council of
follow
out
little further the
a
Arian view
Nic.ua.
discussed then and after.
as
evasions of the
us
Some of the
time—it was not difficult for Athanasius to strip off. The phrase, 44 There was when He was not," meant nothing unless a time relation was imported into it. It was only fitted to throw dust. in the eyes of the simple, who felt ai if Arius was asserting some quasieternity of the Son when he admitted that He was born before all ages. Again, it was easy to show that on the Arian theory " begetting" meant nothing else than " creating." The Son was a creature, neither more
Son
nor
system—that,
I.et
logical bearings of the
less: the
e.g., about and others
relation
of the
Father and the
purely causal one. And this, when brought to the point, Arius freely admitted. The Son, he said, was created "out of nothing." Further, the reason why the Son was created is, that God is so exalted that He cannot immediately create a world. An intermediate being is needed to fill up the gulf between God and His creation. But, since the Son is Himself a creature, it is plain that the same difficulty occurs in regard to Him. The difference between God and the creature must always be infinite. If, then, God is too exalted to create a world, was
a
He is likewise too exalted to create the Son ; a new
being
is needed
to
fill
up
the gulf between the
Son ; another to fill up the gulf between God and this new being, and so ad infinitum. Father
and
the
These
objections lay on the surface. But, in truth creatureship of the Son being admitted, Arian ism could run only one logical course ; and the logical stages arc, as usual, virtually also the historical ones. Arius naturally began by trying to exalt the Son as high as he could—by bringing his view as near the the
"X
—
1
*
?
ii. p. 242.
2
See, as respects England, the valuable appendix by Dr. P. Fairdin, in Dorncr's Prrso/t of Christ, v. pp. 337-466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Theodoret, etc. 4
h
Philostorgius the Arian reckons
22.
Tbeod. i. S. Durieu
5. And the third
day
from the dead
rose
6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth
on
hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
the right
8. Whence he cometli to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [/?«/. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marceilus and Rufinus prebaptismal creed see Badcock, The History of the Creeds.] served die Old Roman
34
dtxlnnc as jx>vub!e. He was led to thv* a!*<> by his view that the Son was the intermediary of creation. For if God is too high to create the world, church
represented
the Son must be
as a very
exalted being if
The Son in this way is brought so near to God that the incomparablcncss between Him and God is oil the point of disappearing, and there seems no need for violent opposition to the Church doctrine.1 Arius, in one letter, even speaks of Christ God is to create Ilim.
*
as " perfect God " (7rXrfpr]? #€09) and " unchangeable —expressions quite contrary to the tenor of his ordinary doctrine. But, next, these high predicates bestowed on Christ could not conceal the fact that, in the view of Arius, the Son was only a creature—not truly of the essence of God ; that the Father's relation to Him was, as said, only a causal one.3 From this he quite logically developed his other propositions, that the Son was temporal, mutable, incapable of comprehending God, etc. It is now the dista7ice between God and the Son which is the ruling thought, and in this lies the real nerve of the Arian doctrine. But now, if the Son is only a creature, foreign in essence to God, on what ground is He to be called either Logos or Son ? He lis no longer Son by nature ; why give Him this name?_ •Arius answers that He receives the title on the ground )of God's foreknowledge of His merits as man. Son^ship is taken from the divine side, and based on human merit. The transition is made to a view not unlike that of Paul of Samosata.4 The pre-existent hypostasis becomes what Dorner calls a " cumbersome, confusing, cosmological appendage, which ought to Thus Dorner, ii. p. 237. 2 Theodoret, i. 5. Ibid. "This is really the cause of our persecution (that the Son had beginning), and likewise because we say that He is from nothing 1
3
a
ovk
4
6vtuu)." Athanasius, Oral. i. 5, and
Cf.
v
1
II.
inv
vi
throughout.
jlwj11^'wiui,
vv cio
1
\jii
p. 242.
2
Sec, as respects Kngland, the valuable appendix by Dr. P. Fairbairn, in Dorncr's Person of Christy v. pp. 337-466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Theodoret, etc. 1 *
Philostorgius the Arian reckons
22.
Thct'wi. i. S, ULUicei
5. And the third
day
from the dead
rose
6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth
on
Father judge the living and the dead.
the right hand of the
8. Whence he cometli to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins
12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and RuAnus preserved die Old Roman
baptismal creed
of the Creeds.] 34
see
Badcock, The History
jft
^
< ,*//
}>, ar Ivrn
<w\
:
v;;\)i
in'ir
*1.**
j*
?
.'■.
«•» < vj
■
<
j a! t»m
■■
—.
t >1
i)
\i
ncvv
There wa\ Ix-sidm, on thin view, no work for Christ to accomplish which required thin higher nature. Historically, therefore, the person of Christ became increasingly lowered in the hands of the Arians ; as, generally, it is the case that, wherever Arianism has appeared, it has tended to work round point of view." '
into Unitarian ism.2 II. was
The first of the
so-styled ecumenical Councils Nicaea, in Bithynia, in May
summoned to meet at
June 325 _A.D._ There, after some preliminary proceedings, it was formally opened with much splendour by the Emperor in person. A brief narrative of its doings will suffice. It consisted of about 300 (traditionally 318) bishops,3 but a throng of presbyters, deacons, acolytes, etc., swelled the attendance to one or two thousand. The moving spirit in the debates on the orthodox side was the youthful or
Athanasius, deacon of Alexandria, who assist
his
was
present to
bishop.
The avowed Arians were few in number. Even with the Eusebians they numbered barely a score.4 A creed proposed by the partisans of Arius was rejected with horror: the creed itself was torn ignominiously in pieces.5 The leadership of the middle party was assumed by Eusebius of Ccesarea, who
now
and
the
submitted
creed, which he said he had been taught as a catechumen at Caesarea; but this also, notwithstanding the great influence of its proposer, 1
a
support of the
Emperor,
was
rejected
on
ii. p. 242.
2
See, as respects England, the valuable appendix by I)r. P. Fairbairn, in Horner's Person of Christy v. pp. 337-466. 3 Cf. Athanasius, Socrates, Thcodorct, etc. 1
h
Philnstorgius the Arian reckons
22.
Tbend. i. 8. DULicvu
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth
on
the
the dead
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometh to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus prebaptismal creed see Badcock, The History of the Creeds.] served the Old Roman
34
account
thing
of the
ambiguity
01
us
u.\pn.-.Triuii.v
needed which would mark accurately the distinction between the two parties, and this, it is said, was unintentionally supplied by Eusebius of Nicomedia himself in the term ofioovaLo?.2 The majority of the was
Council
saw that the formula that the Son was " of the substance " with the Father expressed exactly
same
what
they were contending for, and precluded the ambiguities by which the Eusebian party sought to evade the force of other terms. It met, accordingly,' with their acceptance. The Emperor also now saw that if unanimity was to be secured, it was only on the ground of this formula it was to be had. He therefore threw his influence into this scale, and the triumph of the Jiomoousion was secured. A new creed was drawn up on the basis of that of Eusebius, and its acceptance was enforced by imperial decree.3 This seems to me a,?more probable representation of the course of events than that frequently given, which makes the majority of the Council belong to the SemiAriaji party, and supposes that it was the Emperor's will that forced on them the acceptance of the homooust on formula. It seems clear that the Emperor's 1
The creed is
given, Socrates i. 8, Theod. i. 12. Alhanasius tells epistle {Ad Afros, 5, 6) that when the creed was .read the Eusebians. I were seen exchanging nods and signs Jo intimate ..that they could ac.co.pt itsjahguage in their own sense. 2 Ambrose, De Fide, iii. 15. Eusebius had written that " If we say the
j in
an
*
Son is be of
true
one
God and uncreate, then we are in the way to substance {dfioovaios) with the Father."
confess Him to lt When," says
Ambrose, "this letter bad"Teen read before the Council assembled at Nica-a, the Fathers put this word in their exposition of the faith, because they saw that it damped their adversaries ; in order that they might take the sword which their enemies had drawn, to smite off the head of those opponents' own blasphemous heresy." This is probably the ypdfifxa of )
Eusebius referred 3 Two Arian
I banished. 'f
to
in Theod. i. 8.
But the
accounts arc
bishops who declined
Eusebius
confuseT
to sign were, along with Arius, of Nicomedia and another signed the Creed, but
refused to sign the anathemas attached, and
were
banished later.
buried
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth
on
the
the dead
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometh to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh
13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus preserved the Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcockj The History of the Creeds.] 34
Kuscbius of C.esarca was 'his advi -cr, and given his approval to the Kusebian ('reed. It was evidently only when he saw that the Athanasian formula alone had any chance of acceptance by the Council as a whole, that he gave it the weight of his
other way. lie had
support.
This is not inconsistent with
the view that
majority of the Council were originally more or less undecided ; and only as the discussion went on came clearly to perceive that it was the essence of the faith, as they had always held it, that Athanasius was doing battle for. the
This famous
Symbol, oldest of the ecclesiastical
creeds
so-called Apostles' Creed, of which it is really an expansion—does not quite correspond in its original form with the shape in which we now have it. It runs thus—" We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, Maker of all things visible and invisible ; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, the only-begotten, that is, of the substance of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance (o/xoouo^o?) with the Father ; by whom all things were made both in heaven and on earth ; who for us men and for our salvation, came down, and was incarnate, and was made man ; He suffered, and the third day He rose again ; ascended into heaven, and will come to judge the quick and the dead. And in the Holy Ghost. But those who say, * There was when He was not,' and ' Before He was begotten He was not,' and that ' He was made of nothing,' or who say that the Son of God is of another ' substance' or ' essence/ or that the Son of God is 4 created/ or 'changeable/ or 'alterable/ arc anathematised by the Catholic and —if
we
except the
DIUlcu
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven
7. And sittcth
on
the dead
the right hand of the Father
8. Whence he cometh to
judge the living and the dead.
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus prebaptismal creed see Badcock, The History of the Creeds.] served the Old Roman
34
Apostolic Church." It will be seen that tile L-reca partsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;the Creed proper, or doctrinal part, declaring the Catholic faith, and the anathematising part, condemning the errors of Arius. Of the changes subsequently made may be noticed, first, the omission of two clauses, viz., " only-begotten, that is, of the substance of the Father, God of God," and " both in heaven and on earth," and later, of the whole anathematising part; on the other hand, besides the insertion of various clauses, as " only-begotten " before the words " Son of God," the phrase " before all worlds " after "begotten of the Father," especially a considerable addition after the words " the Holy Ghost." 1 The changes will be readily seen if the shorter original form is compared with the Creed as given in the consists of two
prayer-books. The Council held spoken, but its decision, far from terminating the controversy, was in a sense only the beginning of it. The battle was transferred to the Church at large, and went on with varying fortunes for the next half-centuryâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;till the time of the Council of Constantinople in 381 A.D. The Church was now to reap the fruit of its ill-advised concession to the emperors of the power of interference in ecclesiastical affairsâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;a power which made the settlement of doctrine, the determination of the Christian faith, too often an affair of imperial caprice and court intrigue, and introduced the principle of persecution formerly employed against the Church into the Church, in the relation of parties with each other. In this long conflict of the Nicene faith with its out
above all
adversaries, the is the
others
man
who stands
noble Athanasius.
The
history of the Arian controversy after Nicsea is little 1
See below, on Council of Durieu
Constantinople,
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sittcth
on
the
p. 123,
the dead
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometh to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marceilus and Rufinus prebaptismal creed see Badcockj The History of the Creeds.] served die Old Roman
34
more
than
a
history «>f the persecutions
Hooker docs
< 1 Athana ius.
exaggerate when he sums up situation in Ins famous sentence—44 So that this not
the was
the
plain condition of these times : the whole world against Athanasius, and Athanasius against it."1 In the midst of these trials the character of Athanasius shines out in
splendid greatness.
He is,
as
Stanley
says, of all the saints of the early Church, the only one who has actually kindled the cold and critical pages of Gibbon into a fire of enthusiasm.2 To say that
Athanasius
was
the greatest man
acts
were
of his age is to say little. In comparison with the shifty, intriguing, unscrupulous men opposed to him—in comparison with the emperors who drove him into banishment— he towers as a giant in moral stature and strength of purpose. In good report and evil report he held to his faith without wavering. The means by which he fought his battles were conspicuously in contrast with those of his opponents. He sought to conquer by argument, by persuasion, not by violence. In the hour of victory he was generous and forbearing. The men against whom he was pitted, on the other hand, relied on nothing so little as on the justice of their cause. Their sole design, as the history of the period shows, was to ensnare, circumvent, and destroy him, and to very
this end
be
to
and
no
employed. the
base, no measures too mean, Five times he was driven into exile, too
put in his place were a disgrace to humanity and religion.3 On this moral ground alone, apart from all question of truth and error, the Arian party of the fourth century stands condemned. 1
2
late 5
men
Ecc. Polity, v. 42. Eastern Chutwh% I.cct. vii.
"Athanasius
2.
masters
Gibbon," the
Principal Cairns once remarked to the h titer. C(. on (irorpe of Cappadocia and other*. Duriea
15. And the third day rose from the dead 6. Who ascended into heaven
7. And sitteth
on
the
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometh to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus
pre-
served die Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcock3 The History
of the Creeds.] 34
KJ1
111C
pnaov/j
wi
tnv<
,
^
speak in the most summary manner. It was not long till the policy of Constantino changed, and he brought back Arius and sought to force him on the Church—a step only frustrated by the sudden death of the heresiarch in the hour of his triumph (336 A.D.). But it was under Constantine's successor, Constantius—a man of and despotic spirit, feeble and irresolute, the
narrow
tool of
wily plotters, without his father's genius, but intermeddling in ecclesi-
with all his father's love of astical
The
affairs—that
the
chief landmarks
in
crisis
the
became
history
are
really acute. the (Semi-
Arian) Council of Antioch in
341 A.D., remarkable for the (orthodox) Council of which the Eusebian party withdrew, and set up a rival council at Philippopolis ; the multiplied councils and creeds of Sirmium, 351, 357 A.D. (Arian), 358 (Semi-Arian), 359; finally the twin Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia, 359 A.D., in connection with which, after prolonged resistance, force the number of its creeds ; Sardica in 343 A.D., from
prevailed to
secure
subscription to
a
court-formula,
and, in Jerome's memorable phrase, "the whole world groaned, and was astonished to find itself Arian." Space fails to tell how after this the parties among the Semi-Arians gradually diverged ; how the persecution of the sincere section under Valens drove them into the arms of the orthodox ; how the vicissitudes of fortune
brought Theodosius to the throne of the East, and gave a new turn to affairs in the capital, where the preaching of Gregory of Nazianzus had already wrought a change in the temper of the people ; how at length, in 38 1 A.D., Council
the
This one
;
summoned
at
Constantinople with history of the Arian controversy closes. Council, when it did come, was purely an Eastern and it is only the subsequent adoption of its
which
was
the
buried
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven
7. And sitteth
on
the
the dead
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometh to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh
13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus preserved the Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcock, The History of the Creeds.] 34
title
to
the
name
"ecumenical."
To it
are
tradition-
ally ascribed those enlargements of the Niccnc Creed formerly referred to. This is now known to be a mistake. received
The were
additions
not
which
the
the work of this
Niccnc
Creed
Council, but had
their
origin earlier. Most of the clauses, e.g., arc found in the Creed of Cyril of Jerusalem about 350 A.D., and in a Creed of Epiphanius of Salamis, about 374 A.D. The Creed thus enlarged was at most adopted and endorsed by the Council of Constantinople—the "Council of the 150"—and even of this there is not contemporary evidence. It is first attributed to this Council by the Council of Chalcedon in 451 A.D. Such, then, was the doctrinal outcome of this long and weary controversy, and it can be judged hbw far it was a triumph of Greek philosophy, or how far a victory of Christian faith. The truth is, the whole strength of Athanasius was put forth to rescue the Christian idea of God from influences derived from Greek philosophy which threatened to subvert it. Sohm, in his spirited sketch of Church history, justly says that the struggle of the Nicene Council " was not a barren dispute about words, not a struggle to jntroduce one more speculative idea into theology. It was a struggle for the final expulsion of pagan philosophy from Christian territory, that the essence of Christianity might not be sought in a logical explanation of the universe, nor its result in the establishment of a philosophical theory. The Hellcnisation of Christianity was successfully combated by Athanasius and the Niccnc Council." 1 1
P* 56 (K.T.). Tin's support from many of
verdict, so opposite from Ilnrnnck's, yet receives Ilnrnnck's own admissions. 14 There was no philosophy in existence." we arc told, 44 jx>>sessed of foimul.c which could p!<* cnt in intellijphle form the prnjsoMti<>ns of Athanasius '* (jv. p. •O) With Athanasius "the religious and UiMical argument i* the chief buried
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth
on
the dead
the right hand of the Father
8. Whence he cometh to
judge the living and the dead.
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus
pre-
served the Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcock, The History
of the Creeds.] 34
The
the
Nicene
aHirmations
that all
sense
arc " metaphysical affirmations that relate to
only in
being or essence—affirmations, e.g., of the existence, personality, absoluteness, eternity of God, or, for that matter, of our own personal identity and freedom—are metaphysical. But
such
affirmations
are
none
the
less
necessary.
Ordinary speech is saturated with them, and could not get on without them. What can be truthfully affirmed is that, just because the Nicene definitions relate to the sphere of being and essence—are " metaphysical " in that sense—they require to be supplemented by others drawn from the moral and spiritual sphere. The highest manifestation of the Godhead of Christ is to be sought, all will agree, in the sphere of character and will—in that which makes the human in Christ the
image and exponent of the divine. " We beheld His glory, the glory of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and trut-h."1 Here, unquestionably, modern theology comes in to supplement defects in the Nicene theology. But modern theology can never dispense with the foundation laid in the witness of the Nicene
theology to Christ's essential divinity. III. The siipreme
divinity of the Son had been established, but the circle of Trinitarian doctrine was not yet complete. It could not be till similar expression had been given to the Supreme Deity and Personality of the Holy Spirit. This was a phase of controversy which could not but arise as a sequel to thing" (p. 33).
lie attaches little importance to the term ojioofoios where thing itself is retained (p. 36). Ilarnack complains that the Nicene Creed separated dogmatics "from clear thinking and defensible conceptions " (p. 49). It is something to have it recognised that after all reason has some right to be heard in theology. But this is not easy to reconcile with the assertion that Nicene dogma is the product of Greek metaphysics. 1 John i. 14. the
buried
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven
7. And sitteth
on
the
the dead
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometli to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh
13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus
pre-
served the Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcock, The History
of the Creeds.] 34
\r,r
.N icr:;c
bound
to
C'/ Cir.'
Ix:
helped
aiu;
at
ill"
to a decision
controversy, therefore,
belongs
Him;
through them.
V* .1
The
to the fourth century,
but earlier stages invite a moment's notice. The earliest age of the Church shows little reflection on the doctrine of the
trace
of
Holy Spirit. From acknowledged the threefold name Spirit, and so, implicitly, may be said to have confessed the deity and personality of the Spirit. But there was no dogmatic treatment of the subject. The Church possessed the Spirit, and did not feel the need of discussing it. For long the wealth of material in the Apostolic Epistles lay unexplored. The Apostolic Fathers are for the most part content to use the Scriptural phrases. Hermas seems to confuse the Spirit and the Son.1 The apologists are too exclusively occupied with the Logos to have much to say of the Spirit. They do not deny either His personality or His deity, but, just as in the case of the Son, do not regard His procession as eternal, and, the first the Church of Father, Son, and
in accordance
Him in of the The
a
with their subordinationist
third rank in the Godhead.2
apologists, is the first
Montanistic
movement
to
in
use
bent, place Theophilus, one
the word Trias?
the
second century_ be regarded as a reaction in favour of the recognition of the Holy Spirit ; but it passed into extravagance in its claim to inaugurate a new era of the Paraclete. may
The
early Catholic Fathers carry the doctrine further. deity and personality of the Spirit are fully recognised by Irenams, Tertullian, Clement, and Origen. Tertullian expressly calls Him " God," and lays stress The
1
Cf. Sim.
2
Justin, iit Afol.
3
ii.
<iÂť. 10).
1$.
v.
13 :
Athenagoras,
Khcwhcrc Theophilus tends
jo. to confuse the Son and
Spirit
buried
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth
on
the dead
hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
the right
8. Whence he cometh to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus preserved the Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcock, The History of the Creeds.] 34
i
J
•
I ''
\ J
•
? I i \»
t ' I
I
^
'
! I !
I,'
\ t
I I I i
i
i; ^ t
i
v
i
ii
i
■
t
«
«•
iiti
I he Alexandrian leathers
(not Tertullian) acknowledge JI is eternal oiigin ; but Origen, in line with his general tendency, emphasises the subordination of* the Spirit." As he calls the Son a Sct-rc/my Tocos', so in one place he speaks of the Spirit as yeinjTov (originate), though exalted in honours and dignity, as also in eternity, above all 7€V))tu.3 His language thus gave a point of connection to the loose views of the fourth century ; but in reality Origen held strongly to the consubstantiality of the Holy Spirit with God.4 The Monarchian heresies, in both their Unitarian and Modal forms, necessarily drew after them the denial of the Spirit as a
distinct Person. It was,
however, in the fourth century, as I have a consequence of the Arian controversy, doctrine of the Spirit came formally to be
said, and
as
that the
discussed.
respects the
It had been decided in this controversy as Son that He was not a creature, but had His
personality in the sphere of the divine. On this higher and eternal side of His being He was o/jlooiktios with the Father.
what of the
circle ?
But if Father and Son
were
divine Persons, sacred
Spirit—the third member of the
The Nicenc formula did
not
pronounce on
this
question, but only said briefly, as a kind of appendage to the rest of the Creed, " And in the Holy Ghost." It was
apparently taken for granted that, the personality and deity of the Son being confessed, that of the Spirit would 1
Against Praxcas (2, 25, 26), "The Spirit, although lie is called
God " (26). 2
First Com.
Principles, Preface, and ii. 2, etc. on John i. 2. The word is used in the sense of " derived." "Father, Son, and Holy Spirit," says Harnack, " form a triad to which nothing may be compared ; they arc equal in dignity and honour, and the substance they possess is one" (ii. p. 358). 3 4
buried
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven
7. And sitteth
on
the dead
the right hand of the Father
8. Whence he cometli to
judge the living and the dead.
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus preserved the Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcock, The History of the Creeds.] 34
b*cn
h.ulenjp- 1 by .my section <*1 t:.<• t .111 \«>!ic ^ hurch. the middle ot the century d<»es there seem to have been much discussion on the subject. The Arians, denying the real divinity of the Son, naturally could not acknowledge that of the Holy Spirit, and <
N<>r till
appear
Son,
to
even
have as
regarded iiim as a creature of the the Son was of the Father.2 After
350 A.D., however, the real controversy on the Spirit broke out.3 The gradual approximation of the SemiArians to the acceptance of the homoousioji formula did not
imply that they
were equally willing to extend Spirit. Opinions, on the contrary, began to be freely broached unfavourable to the acknowledgment of the deity of the Spirit. Fie was
this formula to the
declared
by many to be a creature, and even to be ministering spirit, similar to the angels, and differing from them only in degree.4 Athanasius found this a
form
of
belief
refutation of it
prevailing
in
Egypt, and
wrote
in
scries of letters to
Serapion, a bishop in the Delta/' The subject came up in a council held by Athanasius in Alexandria in 362 A.D., and the denial of the deity of the Spirit was there formally branded as heresy. From 360 A.D. the party found a
1
The language of Methodius, in the end of the third century, is specially strong and unequivocal, and evidently expresses general belief. To him the Spirit is o/Loouaiov with the Father. Cf. Migne, xviii. 351 ;
and E.T. in Anle-Nicene 2
Library,
pp. 209,
216,
230, etc.
Epiphanius (69) says—" They say the Holy Spirit is the creature of a creature, for the sake of the making of all things by the Son." Cf. Athanasius, Orat. i. 6. 3 Harnack states that "in the first thirty years after the commencemcnt of the Arian controversy, the Holy Spirit is hardly ever mentioned," i.£., in debate (iv. p. 111). 4 Cf. Sozomen, iv. 27. r> He cites Scripture and appeals to catholic tradition (i. 2S), but argues also that the principle of sanctification cannot be of the same nature a*
that which it sanctifies.
lb jiu inc natyr c. H c
mu s 1
As by Him wc 1 >c div; nc (i. li. 2. <.
arc
made
partakers of
buried
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth
on
the
the dead
right hand of the Father
8. Whence he cometh to
judge the living and the dead.
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh 13. The life
everlasting. [Rz//. omits.] .
[For criticism of the theory that Marceilus and Rufinus preserved die Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcock3 The History of the Creeds.] 34
_
11cciq
iv
rn
uttc
Maccdonius,
uep/oscci
oumyy
violent and
a
through his exertions the the
among n
i
Semi
-r-
man
r
*1 and
views spread rapidly
new
Arians.
-
w.
unscrupulous The
Church
was
anew
plunged into indescribable confusion. " What storm at sea," says Basil, " was ever so wild and fierce as this tempest of the Churches. In it every landmark of the Fathers has been removed ; every bulwark of opinion has been shaken ; everything buoyed up on the unsound is dashed about and shaken down.
another,
one
we
overthrow
We attack
another; if our enemy we are wounded by the
one
is not the first to strike us, comrade at our side."2
It would be tedious to enumerate the
synods and check this Macedonian (",Pneumatomachjarn^) heresy gave rise. Treatises on the Holy Spirit, or against the Macedonians, now take their place in the writings of the Fathers with those against the Eunomians and other heretics. Amidst the distractions which they depict so graphically, the creeds to which the attempt to
,
minds of the leaders truth
lay,
never
wavered
as
to where the
did the Church under their guidance waver in the public testimony it gave forth. Apart from other reasons, the defenders of the deity of the Spirit had always this great argument on their side, nor
that if the homoousion of the
Son with the Father is
admitted, it is difficult to deny the applicability of the idea to the
Spirit, who, whatever else may be said of Him, is always in the Scriptures recognised as in the_
fullest
â&#x20AC;˘
sense
divine.
Few
seem
to
have denied the
1 "The exploits of Maccdonius," says Socrates, "on behalf of Christianity consisted of murders, battles, incarcerations, and civil wars " (ii. 38). 2 On the Spirit, 30. Gregory of Nazianzus says some regarded the
Son
as
an
others did
influence, others not
know what
to
as a creature, others as God Himself, and decide (31st Oral ).
buried
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven
7. And sitteth
on
the
the dead
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometh to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh
13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus served die Old Roman
baptismal creed
of the Creeds.] 34
see
pre-
Badcock, The History
Gregory, hand,
did. usually
In uvulrru times, on the other the personality, not the deity,
some
it
is
of
the Spirit men deny. If, however, the first two members of the Trinitarian circle arc admitted to be
personal, the third, for that
very reason, may
sumed to be
this
the
one
so
also.
It is
doctrine with
be prelogical implication of
the other which
makes it
rare
for those
admitting the personality and deity of the deny a like personality and deity of the Spirit. The same logical implication accounts for the fact that the controversy on the supreme deity of the Spirit, if sharp, was also short. The Macedonian heresy was definitely condemned along with the Arian at the Son to
Council of Constantinople in 381 A.D. After this it to have died downâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;at least is little heard of. It has left its memorial in the enlarged clause in the
seems
Nicene Creed to which reference
formerly made. portion, which makes explicit the divinity of the Spirit, and reaffirms certain articles already embraced in the Apostles' Creed. " And [we believe] in the Holy Ghost, the Lord and Giver of life ; who proceedeth from the Father ; who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified ; who spake by the prophets. In one holy, catholic, and apostolic Church. We acknowledge one baptism for the remission of sins; we look for the I
quote the whole of this
was
new
resurrection of the dead, and the life of the world to come."1 It
will
be
observed
that
the
controverted
word
6fjboov(jio<; does not occur in this addition to the Creed. It possibly was designedly omitted to avoid giving offence ; but the assertion of the supreme divinity of the Spirit is sufficiently plain, and the clauses may be 1
The
Prayer-Book (Western) version lias the singular, " I believe." buried
5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven
7. And sittcth
on
the
the dead
right hand of the Father to judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometh
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh
13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus preserved the Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcock, The History of the Creeds.] 34
hesitated in the interpretation to be It will be hard also to point to anything in these clauses that can justly be described as metaphysical/' or as having any analogy to Greek philosophy. Even the term " proccedeth " has not the fixed theological sense it acquired later. Its use is based on the etymological idea of spirit as something breathed forth, and it is employed to distinguish the mode of origin of the Spirit from that of the Son, who, in harmony with the filial relationship, is spoken of as begotten." There is doubtless a distinction covered by the difference of terms, but it should freely be acknowledged that we pass here into the region of the The Church
never
put upon it.
"
"
ineffable.
Supplementary The
only important addition to the Nicene-Con-
stantinople Creed since 381 a.d. has been the insertion by-the Synod of Toledo in 589 a.d. of the " filioque " clause, which marks the difference between East and West on the subject of the " Procession " of the Holy Spirit. The Eastern Church reads the Creedâ&#x20AC;&#x201D;" proceedeth from the Father," while the Western Church has it, " proceedeth from the Father and the Son" The dispute indicates a difference which has existed in these Churches from the first, and is easily explicable out of their respective conditions. The Eastern Church had to do with Arians and Macedonians, who made the Spirit a creature of the Son, or viewed Him at least as inferior in dignity, because brought into being through the mediation of the Son. It sought, therefore, to safeguard His full divinity by representing Him as proceeding solely and immediately from the Fatherâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; buried 5. And the third
day
from the dead
rose
6. Who ascended into heaven 7. And sittcth
on
the right hand of the Father
8. Whence he cometh to
judge the living and the dead.
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh
13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus preserved the Old Roman baptismal creed see Badcock, The History of the Creeds.] 34
i'»<»
I he
Westerns
on
the other hind, st.it led
identity of the substance of Son and bather, and, wishful of conserving the truth that the Spirit is as truly the Spirit of the Son as of the Father—else the two were held not to be equal — expressed this by
with the
saying that the Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son. The Easterns rejected this formula absolutely, and the division thence originating has never been healed. Augustine may be named as a chief upholder of the " filioque" view. The Synod of Toledo, at which ecclesiastical sanction was given to it, was
held
to the
on
occasion of the conversion of the Goths
Catholic faith.
buried
5. And the third
day
rose
from the dead
ascended into heaven 7. And sitteth on the right hand of the Father 8. Whence he cometli to judge the living and the 9. And in the Holy Ghost
6. Who
10. The
dead.
holy church
11. The remission of sins
the flesh everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
12. The resurrection of 13. The life
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus prebaptismal creed see Badcock3 The History of the Creeds.]
served the Old Roman
34
(((II))) CREEDS I. The Apostles' Creed a.
'The Old Roman Creed'
[From Epiphanius, lxxii. 3 (P.G. xlii. 385 D). The creed of Marcellus, Bishop of Ancyra, delivered to J alius. Bishop of Rome, c.340. Marcellus had been exiled from his diocese
influence and spent nearly two years at Rome. left this statement of his belief.
through Arian On departing he
Rufinus, priest of Aquileia, Expositio in Symbolum, c.400 (P.L. xxi. 335 B), compares the creed of Aquileia with the Roman creed which he believed to be the rule of faith composed by the
Apostles
at Jerusalem, which had been retained as the baptismal creed in the Roman Church. This creed differs from that of
Marcellus only in small
details.]
1. I believe in God
almighty [Rnf. the Father almighty] son, our Lord was ÂŁorn of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary
2. And in Christ 3. Who 4. Who
was
Jesus, his only
crucified under Pontius Pilate and
was
buried 5. And the third
day rose from 6. Who ascended into heaven
7. And sitteth
on
the
the dead
right hand of the Father judge the living and the dead.
8. Whence he cometh to
9. And in the Holy Ghost 10. The
holy church
11. The remission of sins 12. The resurrection of the flesh
13. The life
everlasting. [Ruf. omits.]
[For criticism of the theory that Marcellus and Rufinus served die Old Roman
baptismal creed
of the Creeds.] 34
see
pre-
Badcock, The History
[Extracted from
a sermon (pscuuu -AUguauuuoj
|
...
ius, Bishop of Aries, 503-43.]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
I believe in God the Father almighty I also believe in Jesus Christ his only son, our Lord, conceived of the Holy Spirit, born of the Virgin Mary, suffered under Pontius Pilate, crucified, dead and buried; he descended into hell, rose again the third day, ascended into heaven sat down at the right hand of the Father, thence he is to come to judge the living and the dead. I believe in the Holy Ghost, the Holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints, the remission of sins, the resurrection of the flesh and life eternal.
[The complete 'Apostles' Creed,'
as we
know it, is found first (i.q.
in Dicta Abbatis Pirminii de singulis libris canonicis scarapsus excarpsus, excerpt), c.750.]
II. The Nicene Creed a.
The Creed of Caesarea
[At the council of Nicaea (325) Eusebius of Caesarea, the historian, suggested the adoption of the creed of his ran
own
church. It
thus:]
We believe in
one God, the Father All-sovereign, the things visible and invisible; And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Word of God, God of God, Light of Light, Life of Life, Son only-begotten, Firstborn of all creation, begotten of the Father before all the ages, through whom also all things were made; who was made flesh for our salvation and lived among men, and suffered, and rose again on the third day, and ascended to the Father, and shall come again in glory to judge the living and dead; We believe also in one Holy Spirit. Epist. Euseb. apud Socrates, H.E. i. 8
maker of all
For this reason the church is called upon to re-think its confession (in the lifht of doubt over the person of Christ). face of falsehood and
If the church wishes, in the denial, to testify to the truth, it will have to be more than ever convinced of the reliability of its messap-e. The church must not stutter when it answers, as it should answer the question of the Hindu professors, the question "why we Christians assert that Jesus Christ alone is the Redeemer." And in answering it the church will always have to fall back on the witness concerning the disclosure in Caesarea Philippi. The church must know vfchat it is about when it defends the ancient creeds. And in this defense it will not be enough merely to extend a protective hand over the common property of tradition, but if it is to speak with the rinp- of
sincerity, it will have to show something of the necessity which is laid upon it. Berkouwer, TPOC, 17. Cf. 1 Cor. 9*16.
Lectrafre—#4
*—
v>
«—
perversions of the doctrine of christ's ^
personv^antslent and modern
(Mark 6:1-3: 1 Peter 2?gg7
IX&Tt
Introduction: 1. When Jesus entered Jerusalem Scripture says, "All the city was moved, saying, Who is
this?" $Matt. 21:10). All the city said it then; and all the world has been saying it since then. For 1900 years one lone Figure has puzzled and tormented the mind and conscience of mankind (cf. JSS, TSN, 69).
2.
We have is
sought to answer the question,
this?," in the terms of
"Who
the formula of Chalcedon (451 A. D.). In one divine person are united a complete human and a com-
plete divine nature (the hypostatic union). We stopped here, not investigating such other significant doctrines as His sinlessness,
5.
impeccability,
etc.
This agreement of the church concerning Christ was not easily reached and, further, it
has been challenged through the centurIt is being challenged today. And the church must be prepared to defend its views
ies.
concerning Christ, for they are at the heart of the missionary program of the body of Christ♦ It must not stutter in preaching
him!
i
~~
~
"
ILL. (i)Berkouwer and Hindu professors' query. (Z) £ (Ugcgss^/Qy TO COfAPLETT (TrOCgfTfOAJ cf=: THE DOCTRINE OlTcHRIST UP TO CHALCEDON. We may divide this time into two parts. A.
Errors
1.
of the
First
Ebionism. The Ebionites
poor), little
Three
Centuries.
(from Hebrew word meaning more
than Judaism within
the Christian fold, denied the reality of the divine nature. They were stro:
influenced by Deut. 6:3. He was quali fied to be the Messiah by the descent the Spirit upon Him at His baptism. Bit He 2.
was
only
a man.
Cerlnthlanlsm (Cerinthus the heretic). He held there was no real and essential, union of the two natures in Christ before the baptism. His deity was founded the enduement of the Spirit.
on)
<r
I
recall
story which appeared in a popumagazine ; few years ago. it explained why telegraph and cable companies spell out nunctnation marks instssd of having just one signal for each of them. At one time, according to the story, there was a code signal for each punctuation mark. A woman, touring in hurope, a
lar
cabled her husband wonderful bracelet. sand dollars. May
as
follows:
"nave found
Price
seventy-five thouI buy it?" The husband â&#x2013; , promptly caoled back, "Mo, price too high." The cable operator, in transmitting the me^ osage, missed the signal for the comma. Âąhe woman received a message which which read, "Mo price too high." She bought the bracelet; the husband sued the company and won. isver since, the users of Morse code have spelled out punctuation. This
anecdote
;iViTDor,tÂŤnp.A
serves vnh o o
o
to
remind
rrcs
K\ n v\ Y"N
us
that
^
the
ighed by th< of letdivided olved rer
a
In the
gospels there is not the
slightest attempt to transvalue the nterpretaself-witness of Christ or to rob it of am iiordern, its content, as happened many a time OPT. pr>. 21 in later ages.
GCB, TPOC, 171*
statement GCB has, "The Jews understand what the Arians cannot grasp," as Augustine has it. See Kittel, Ibid., under isos, In
page
a
footnote
to the
of Oklaho-
most
ame dozen
d
rose on
judge
I to
Nixheld
an,
an,
erences.
forces
353. ras
Iking to eeting.
not,
:-is-not/
that armade to
mce
between at would
iservative ntion
fuzes. '
inseparably
ierefore dis-
joc-
tion.
agreed
as
main ef1
primar-
efore expanding expanding as xoXtreui,
the
;reed that have
to rces ar
to
will re-
fortunes. l
the at
Father)
the third
ilready been le
West and
I recall a story which appeared in a popumagazine a few years ago. xt explained why telegraph and cable companies spell out punctuation marks instead of having just one signal for each of them. At one time, according to the story, there was a code signal for each punctuation mark. A woman, touring in hurope, lar
cabled her husband
as
wonderful bracelet.
follows: "nave found Price seventy-five thou-
sand dollars. May I buy it?" The husband > promptly caoled back, "Mo, price too high." The cable operator, in transmitting the message, missed the signal for the comma. The woman received a message which read, "Mo price too high." She bought the bracelet; the husband sued the company and won. x/ver since, the users of Morse code This anecdote
have
spelled out punctuation. to
serves
remind
us
that
the
importance of a message cannot be weighed by th< size of the punctuation t the number of letters involved. Although only an iota divided ÂŁhe parties at "icea, the issues involved represented two completely different interpretations of the Christian faith. William nordern, A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theoloav, on. 21* 22. s
"braiil
most ot
me earLri> wno lur us men ana Ior our saivauon came dozen
and
And in the
Holy Spirit. 'There
And those that say
was
when he
was
not,*
and, 'Before he was begotten he was not,9 and that, 'He came into being from what-is-not,'4 or
those that allege, that the Son of God is 'Of another substance
or
'created/ 'changeable* 5
or
'alterable,' 5
or
these the Catholic and 1
one. 1
or
essence3
Apostolic Church anathematizes.
hi tt]s overias rov Tcarpos, 'from the inmost being of the Father,' inseparably (See note on p.45.)
opooi'aiov rw TzctTp'i, sharing one being with the tinct in existence though essentially one.
Father, and therefore dis-
*
kvavOfKcirrjaovTCL, taking on himself all that makes man man, expanding aapKicd'evra, 'was made flesh'; or perhaps, 'lived as man among men,' expanding and safeguarding the Caesarean 'lived among men,' kv avOpiazoLs xoXtrevaapevov. But this seems less likely. 4 ovk ovticv, 'from nothingness.' *
i.e. morally changeable. * The additions, 'God of God' (from the creed of Xicaea) and '(from the Father) and the Son,' occur first in the 'Creed of Constantinople' as recited at the third Council of Toledo, 589. The latter phrase, the 'filioque clause,' had already been at an earlier council of Toledo, 447: it gained popularity in the West and
used
Oklaho-
made
flesh, and became man? suffered, and rose on the third day, ascended into the heavens, is coming to judge living and dead. was
an,
Nix-
an,
held
ferences. 1 forces
liking to teeting. that armade to between lat would iservative aition joction.
agreed
as
main efI
primar-
efore
the
$reed that to irces or
have will
to
re-
fortunes.
II. The a.
The Creed of Caesarea
[At the council of Nicaea (325) Eusebius of Caesarea, the historian, suggested the adoption of the creed of his ran
own
church. It
thus:]
We believe in
one God, the Father All-sovereign, the things visible and invisible; And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Word of God, God of God, Light of Light, Life of Life, Son only-begotten, Firstborn of all creation, begotten of the Father before all the ages, through whom also all things were made; who was made flesh for our salvation and lived among men, and suffered, and rose again on the third day, and ascended to the Father, and shall come again in glory to judge the living and dead; We believe also in one Holy Spirit.
maker of all
I prepar
nday
pu
im to 968
c
Rep
initiation tossed
£ arrival at it
wai
lid not
pme tin atigue, he and
;
for
ghout tl d the er
a
gooi
that he i
d has
ui
impaign George s
"brain
us.
> of
joy
of the
ss
he Romonserva-
1964 dis-
b. The Creed of Nicaea
their
ng
[Eusebius' creed
orthodox, but it did not deal explicitly with the Arian position. It was taken as a base, and put forward by the council in this revised form (additions and alterations in italic
was
end >st
type):]
We believe in
a
!
creeds
s
of his
y
36
and
ove,
ig politi-
one
God the Father
of
pros-
tion are Richard lia Gov.
All-sovereign, maker
of all
things visible and invisible; one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, begotten of the Father, only-begotten, that is, of the substance 1 of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, true God of true God, begotten not made> of one substance 2 zeith the Father, through whom all things were made, things in heaven and things on the earth; who for us men and for our salvation came dozen and was made flesh, and became man,3 suffered, and rose on the third day, ascended into the heavens, is coming to judge living and dead. And in the Holy Spirit. And those that say 'There was when he was not/ And in
and, 'Before he and that, 'He or
or
_or
one.
begotten he
was
tt)s
(See
Apostolic Church anathematizes.
ovaias rovTrarpos, 'from the inmost being of the Father,' inseparably note on
a hosmost of
Oklaho-
Father, and therefore dis-
*
kvavdpi£Tcr}rrc.VTa.3 taking on himself all that makes man man, expanding aapKccdeuTa, 'was made flesh'; or perhaps, 'lived as man among men,' expanding and safeguarding the Caesarean 'lived among men,' kv avOporzois ttoXltcuBut this
ovk ovticv,
seems
less likely.
'from nothingness.'
an,
Nix-
an,
held
ferences. 1
forces
dking to eeting. \
that armade to between
at would iservative •ntion joction, as
agreed
main ef-
p.45.)
1
1
d,
not,'
'alterable,' 5
opooi'cnov rcf TzctrpLy sharing one being with the tinct in existence though essentially one.
aapevov.
^re were
into being from what-is-not,' 4
'created,' 'changeable' 5
these the Catholic and €K
was
ob-
national
those that allege, that the Son of God is 'Of another substance or essence9 or
1
came
was
1
primar-
*fore
the reed that to have rces will
br to
re-
*
i.e. morally changeable. The additions, 'God of God' (from the creed of Nicaea) and '(from the Father) and the Son,' occur first in the 'Creed of Constantinople' as recited at the third *
Council of Toledo, 589. The latter phrase, the 'filioque clause,' had already been used at an earlier council of Toledo, 447: it gained popularity in the West and
fortunes.
the creed of
nicaea c.
51
The 'Nicene' Creed
[Found in Epiphanius, Ancoratus, 118, c.a.d. 374, and extracted by scholars, almost word for word, from the Catechetical Lectures of S. Cyril of Jerusalem; read and approved at Chalcedon, 451, as the creed of '(the 318 fathers who met at Nicaea and that of)
Sh
time' (i.e. at Constantinople, 381). Hence Nicaeno-ConstantinopolI prepare itan creed, and thought by many to be a revision of the creed of Jerusalem held by Cyril. See, for discussions, Hort, Tzco Disnday pub sertations (1876), Burn, Introduction to the Creeds (1899), Bindley, im to ca Oecumenical Documents (1906), Badcock, History of the Creeds 968 Repu (1938). Badcock puts forward a new theory.] mination, We believe in one God the Father All-sovereign, maker tossed ok of heaven and earth, and of all things visible and invisible; 5 arrival, And in one Lord Jesus Christ, the only-begotten Son of at it was lid not seei God, Begotten of the Father before all the ages,6 Light of y of his pol Light, true God of true God, begotten not made, of one substance 7 with the Father, through whom all things were made; the 150 who met at a later
often called the Constantinopolitan or
time
atigue, hi he and
s
1
r^ ghout thf for
a
d the affi er
good
that he is| d has unc
impaign George s
"braim
who for
us men
and for
our
salvation
came
us.
of
joy
:s
of the
le
Rom-
onserva-
1964 dis-
their
ig
end
down from the
of
>st pros-
heavens, and was made flesh of the Holy Spirit and the Virgin Mary, and becafne man, and was crucified for us under Pontius Pilate, and suffered and was buried, and rose again
ion
are
Richard lia Gov.
the third
day according to the Scriptures, and ascended and sitteth on the right hand of the Father, and cometh again with glory to judge living and dead, of whose kingdom there shall be no end: And in the Holy Spirit, the Lord and the Life-giver, that proceedeth from the Father,8 who with Father and Son is worshiped together and glorified together, who spake through the prophets: In one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church: We acknowledge one baptism unto remission of sins. We look
on
into the heavens,
for â&#x20AC;˘
politi-
g
a
same
and
we,
a
resurrection of the
(cont.)
was
inserted in
most
dead, and the life of the
was
re were
3,
a hosmost of
Oklaho-
7
See
note
(2)
on
Michigan er
governor are no
realistic.
This
long-
means
a
shake-up in the struggle for power that is going on quietly within the Republican party. It is really no secret that the supporters of New York Gov. Nelson Rockefeller regarded Romney as a stalking horse, or a cover, for their own plans to obtain the nomination for Rockefeller.
on
previous
held
Iking to feeting. that armade to
Bishop of Constantinople, for having corrupted the s See note (3)
Nix-
an,
forces
age to come.
versions of the creed, except that of the Reman to insert it. But in 867 Nicholas I was
the Creed of Nicaea, p.36.
an,
â&#x20AC;˘erences.
Church, where Leo III in 809 refused excommunicated by Photius, creed by this addition.
ob-
national
page.
petween
Nixon and
Reagan that would endanger the conservative thrust in the pre-convention jockeying for the nomination. Reagan reportedly has agreed to let Nixon make the main ef-
fort, in the presidential primaries and elsewhere, before the convention. But it if Nixon
bid
is
agreed that
seems
to
have
failed, the Reagan forces will move in and endeavor to recoup
the conservative fortunes.
0 A
****
Sunday, September 10, 1967
<Ilj£ Balks lUorntttg Stoma
6Brainwashing5
One Word Shatters By ROBERT E. BASKIN Washington Bureau of The News WASHINGTON
ly
-
more like a wake itical reception with
It
was
than
real-
polthe corpse — standing a
News, had prepared an editorial for
Sunday publication calling on him to cancel his bid for the 1968 Republican presi-
political corpse in the receiving line. The occasion was the receptidn given Friday night by Mich-
dential nomination.
igan Republicans on behalf of Gov. George Romney for mem-
ing." He did not the
bers of the GOP National Com-
tion.
—
a
mittee
in the
swank halls of
the
Washington Hilton Hotel. Only a short time before Romney arrived, the word had spread throughout the gathering i
1
A Inter.
pretive ■
that the newspaPer which had
Romney tossed off the editoron his arrival, with a terse
ial,
remark that it
was
"very
amus-
realize gravity of his political situa-
At the
same
His statement that he was brainwashed in 1965 when he and a group of other governors visited Vietnam has had astonishing repercussions. At this weekend's meeting of the Re? publican National Committee it
the principal topic of conversation.
was
seem to
time, he showed
Roniney's Bid
WHILE ROMENY MAY have
been
simply careless in his
choice of words in
a
television
signs of fatigue, his eyes deep-
interview, the harm has been
circled, as he and his wife took up posts for a receiving line.
done.
throughout the evening he maintained the affable pose of the rather good automobile But
And, instead of trying to
clarify the matter, he has stuck with his use of the word and extended its application to
even
Americans at
hira
salesman that he is. One word has undone the bur-
theater and sup-
geoning campaign for the presidency of George Romney, and
large. Few people like to admit that they have been brainwashed. It is very well to say that some-
the word is "brainwashing."
One
Pr°Pelled into the
political
ported him through the years, the Detroit
that
tried to brainwash them
or
they
were presented with distorted facts or even fed lies.
But "brainwashing" indicates
a
susceptibility to being led down the path of colossal error. And Romney indicated it took two years for him to discover he had been brainwashed. It
is
now
evident that
the
will have to make
that is
a
move,
and
the next
big political development before us. now
'
THERE IS NO END of
joy
in the conservative ranks of the
Republican party over the Romdebacle. But the conserve-
ney
tives, mindful of their 1964 disaster,
are
not smacking their
lips publicly
over
it.
On the conservative
end
of
the
picture, the foremost prospects for the nomination are former Vice-President
Richard
M. Nixon and California Gov.
Ronald
Reagan. candidacy
The Nixon
was
ob-
vious at this week's national
committee
meeting. There were quite a few signs around, a hospitality suite was open most of the ma
time and former OklahoGov. Henry Bellman, Nix-
on's
campaign chairman, held press conferences.
several
Meantime,
the
Nixon
forces
hard at work
talking to people attending the meeting.
were
IT IS UNDERSTOOD that
ar
rangements have been made to
shake-up in the struggle for power that is going on quietly within the Republican party.
conflict between Reagan that would endanger the conservative thrust in the pre-convention jockeying for the nomination. Reagan reportedly has agreed
It is really no secret that the supporters of New York Gov.
fort, in the presidential primar-
presidential aspirations of the Michigan governor are no longrealistic.
er
This
means
a
prevent any Nixon and
to let Nixon make the main ef-
plans to
ies and elsewhere, before the convention. But it is agreed that if Nixon bid seems to have
obtain the nomination for Rockefeller.
failed, the Reagan forces will move in and endeavor to re-
Nelson
Rockefeller
Romney
as a
a
for their
cover,
regarded stalking horse, or own
THEY HAD
FIGURED, however, that the Romney push might fall flat early next year, after which it would be to move in and make
possible a lightning bid for the nomination. In the wake of this week's
events, the Rockefeller timing has been thrown badly out of gear. A void has been created, and the Rockefeller forces are not
immediately prepared to
into it. There is an obvious agony in the ranks of the Eastern liberal Republicans, who regard contenders from the prairie move
states, the West and the South as inelegant rubes. Essentially, they would like to have a Republican version of Adlai Stev-
ensori.
Just
what
the
Rockefeller
forces will now do is not clear. The Detroit News proposed that efforts on behalf of Romney be transferred to Rockefeller, who up
until
now
has plumped for
the Michigan governor. Obvious-
ly, the Rockefeller adherents
coup
the conservative fortunes.
VHERE FASHION-MINDED AND
UDGET-MINDED PEOPLE SHOP
FASHION, SELECTION IN
AND VALUE
10,000 YARDS OF NEW FABRIC
r*
PURCHASED FOR THIS SALE
•
IN EACH
•
STORE
•
•/»,
•
MISTAKES &
RE-RUNS
ASST. COLORS ASST. WIDTHS ASST. LENGTHS LARGE
2
^
Docetism ( <eu?, to seem or appear). This error flourished in the 1st and 2nd centuries. They denied the humanity of Christ (cf. 1 John 4:1-3). B.
Errors of the Fourth and Fifth Centuries. The Christologieal conflict began to rage in the 4th century on a large scale. It came to a head in the 3th.
1.
Athanasius here
Arianism. The year
325 A. D. will always remain a mile-post in the development of the doctrine of Christ by the church. At Nicea Arius, a presbyter of the church at Alexandria, was condemned. He had denied the deity of Christ, as well as His eternal gener&tlon from the Father. His views were epitomized in two claims: a.
There
(-yjv
ning
28). b.
was
a
time when He
was
not
jV). The Son had a begin (iDeut. 574; Prov. 8:22; John 14:
oTfc
ouk
The Son possessed a nature like the Father's. but not the same nature ( OACOI oJcl O-X not 0~m- oo&t los ) ILL.: (1) Diphthong and telegram. ,
mo
2. wGTs/iL,
3<^(hcd) an^Aecr
t*i-
Kiry( MWfOG onchkizt /
ioc/Cmarwack), (2) CFAoaoa) (3)
*
Romney shattered by"wdrd. Read the Creed of Hicea.
Apolllnarl&nlsm/ t^z)
W*"
(jto-fol)
Apollinarius,"bishop of church of Laodicea, denied the completeness of our Lord's human nature, an/ incipient
i
mono-
physitism.
He reasoned that, since Jesus Christ is immutable, He could not have united Himself with a variable human spirit. So, the Logos assumed body and soul, taking the place of the human spirit. Thus, He was only two parts human;
His human nature was not like that of other men. Apollinarianism was condemned at the Council of Constantinope, 381 A. D As Berkouwer says, "The contours of the
'vere deus,
vere
sent
minds"
to
our
homo' are now fully pre-1 (TPOC, 66).
J
//-
3}
,
Ausz*^
/
SfrfoiVAfW- P^OP^TT^S
/yl££$L / **<£-
y^uCtuA^_. p4*s-o*&Z-yuJL f T^cHrPl f <0 Jy-rX*£LfiHjzll- yj^o^Xr&£■ a, /4^e<!x^<J. ^a^X*€L 'e+~ AisfiaA-edtidb -^i-*n><_ cjerr><s*«jr*- -mwm
f^R&otJ
-
<A-
/
V.
.CHAPTER
L Ahfe f
-DtSTt/Vcr
<U
the
person
,
I^^OU^L. Ar%~
of
christ.
§ 1. Principal Heresies in Christology. Four factors
are necessary
in order to the
com-
plete conception of Cblist's Person :(lL) True
deity; (21) True and proper union of deity and humanity in
proper
The
and humanity; Ub one
Person;
(C) The distinotion of deity from humanity, in the mixture of natures. If either of these is wanting, the dogmatic statement is an erroneous one. The heresies which originated in the Ancient Church took their rise, in the failure one
to
Person,
so
that there he
no
combine all these elements in the doctrinal stateSome
of these
integral parts of the subject were adopted, while the others were rejected. The classification ol the ancient errors in Christology will, therefore, very naturally follow ment.
one or more
the above enumeration.1 Compare Gitericke: Church History, §87-90; Hooker: EccloBook V. Ch. 15—lv.
gi&stical Polity.
(L) The Arians
would not concede the existence truly and properly divine nature in the Person of Jesus Christ. Even the Semi-Arians, who allowed that the Son of of
a
God, or the Logos, was of a God, yet not identical attribute absolute divinity to the
nature similar to that of
with
it, could
not
Redeemer of the world. That exalted and preexistent being who became incarnate in Christ, even upon
the Semi-Arian theory could not be called
6W-man with technical accuracy. Christ was
confessedly lacking in
But the Arian a
divine nature,
in every sense of the term. Though the Son of God was united with human nature, in the birth of Jesus, yet that Son of God was ajeriofxa. He indeed existed long before that birth, but not from
eternity.
The only element, consequently, in the
Arian construction of Christ's Person that served intact and pure was the
this
point the Arians Into the
same
earlier Nominal
humanity.
were
from
pre-
Upon
orthodox.
class with the
Trinitarians.
Arians, fall the Inasmuch
in trinity, the (vtiootccok;) in the Essence,
their construction of the doctrine of the Son is not a subsistence but
was
as,
only an effluence (bvva/xig) or energy issuing it, they could not logically assert the union of
the divine nature, or the very
substance of the Godhead, with the humanity of Jesus. A merely effluent energy proceeding from the deity, and entering the humanity of Christ, would be nothing more than an indwelling inspiration kindred to that of
the
prophets. The element of true essential deity, essential humanity, in the Per-
in union with true
consequently, wanting in the Christology of the Nominal Trinitarians. (n,; The Monarcldan.s, or Patripa-ssians, went to the opposite extreme of error. They asserted the true and proper deity in Christ's Person, but denied his humanity. According to them, the one single Person of the Godhead,7 the true and absolute deity, united itself with a human body, but not with human rational soul. The humanity in Christ's Person was thus incomplete. It lacked the rational part,—the spirit as distinguished from the flesh. This Patripassian Christology received a slight modification from Apollinaris bishop of Laodicea (f 382), who has given the name of Apollinarism to the scheme. The threefold division of human nature, into body (<?«//«), soul (xpuxu), and spirit (nvtvfxa), had become current, and Apollinaris supposed that it would be easier to conceive of, and explain Christ's Person, if the Logos were regarded as taking the place of the higher rational principle in the ordinary threefold nature of man, and therebx becoming an integral portion of the humanity.1 But upon this scheme, the Divine did not take to itself a complete and entire human nature, any more of
son
Christ,
was,
O
a
'According to Suidas (sub voce
'ATroXAivapiof^Apollinaristhought the human reason
would be a su-
perfluity in union with
Reason: M rjtie yap forjSrjvai rrjv adpKa €K('ivrju dv^ponlvov voos1 fjy(fU)V€vofi€vrju inro top airrrjv
the Divine Svkot'os seov.
ivoe
original Patripassian theory. The material body, with the animal soul, or the vital principle, is by no means the whole of man. The Logos, upon this theory, was united with a fundamentally defective and mutilated humanity. For if the rational part be subtracted from man, he becomes either an idiot or a brute. It is true that Apollinarism supplies the deficiency with the Divine Reason; but it is no less true, that at the instant of the union of the two natures, the human part is merely the body (uw/(ÂŤ), with its vital principle (ipvyji). It is irrational, and God assumes into personal union with himself a merely brutal nature. The human factor, consequently, was defective in
than in the
the
Apollinarian Christology.
(' Illy The third general error in Christology, that arose in the Ancient Church, is the Nestorian.1
By this we mean the theory that was finally eliminated by the controversies between Nestorius and his opponents. Whether it was a theory which Nestorius himself would have accepted in the opening of the controversy, or one that he intended to construct, is certainly open to debate. But Nestorian Am was a definite scheme, when ultimately formed, and is wanting in some essential elements and features.
Nestorian Christology relates the distinction of the two natures, but to the
The defect in the not to 1
Compare Walch:
tory, II. 150, 152 su.
Ketzerhistorie; and Dollinger:
Church His-
union of the two in
one
Person.
A true and proper
deity and a true and proper humanity are conceded. they are not united in a single self-conscious personality. The Nestorian Christ is two persons, â&#x20AC;&#x201D;one divine, and one human. The important distinction between a " nature " and a " person " is not observed, and the consequence is that there are two But
separate and diverse selves in Jesus Christ.1 Instead of a blending of the two natures into onlv one self, o
i
%/
the Nestorian scheme and allows tween
only
them.
nature derive
other.
places two selves side by side, moral and sympathetic union be-
a The result is that the acts of each
no
There is
character from the no
qualities of the
divine humiliation, because the
humanity is_confessedly the seat of the humiliation, and the humanity is by itself, unblended in the unity of no
a common
self-consciousness.
exaltation of the
And there is
humanity, because the divinity
is
confessedly the source of the exaltation, and this lso is insulated and isolated for the same reason. 1
"Between Nestorius and the
church of
God, there was no difference, saving only that Nestorius imagined in Christ as well a. personal human subsistence, as a divine ; the church acknowledging a substance both divine and human, but no other personal subsistence [i. e. personal ego] than divine, because the Son of God took not to himself son,
a
man's per-
but the nature, only, of
a
man."
Hooker:
Book V. Ch. emas
Eccles. Polity, The anath-
liii.
Nestorius
which
uttered
against the doctrine of Cyril separate the two natures very plainly. lie appears to regard the union, or rather, the association of deity with humanity as occurring at birth, and represents the humanity as laid aside again after Christ's death and tion. Milman
:
resurrec-
Book II. Ch. iii.
There is God, and there is man ; but God-Man. ,-»*
there is
no
—
(IV-) The fourth of the ancient heresies in Christology is the JEutychian or Monophysite. This is the opposite error to Nestorianism. It asserts the unity of self-consciousness in the Person of Christ, but loses the duality of the natures. Eutyches taught that in the incarnation the human nature was
transmuted into the
divine;
so
that the result-
and one nature. For this reason, Eutychians held that it was accurate and proper say that " God suffered,"—meaning thereby that
ant
was one
person
the to
He suffered in God's nature.
When the Catholics
employed this phrase, as they sometimes did, it was with the meaning that God suffered in man's nature. "When the apostle," remarks Hooker, "saith of the Jews that they crucified the Lord of Glofy (1 Cor. ii. 8), we must needs understand the whole person of Christ, who, being Lord, of Glory, was indeed crucified, but not in that nature for which he is termed the Lord of the Son of
Glory.
Man, being
Son of Man
In like manner, when
on earth, in heaven at the
affinneth, that the instant
(John 13), by the Son of Man must necessarily be meant, the whole person of Christ, who being man upon earth, filled heaven with his glorious presence, was
same
iii.
but not
according to that nature for which the title
of Man is
given him."1 1
Hookei;
:
Eccl. Pol. Book V. Oh. liv.
tJ tJ KJ
Jtiu.1 V/11 A.
vx-
vmviw x
w
x<v vj<
x
â&#x20AC;˘
The counciIs of Nice and
Constantinople, in determining the true statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, assisted to_ settle the doctrine of Chrisfs Person, indirectly.
So far
his
deity was concerned, the Nicaeno-Constantinopolitan creed furnished material that must necessarily go into a scriptural Christology. But it did not come within thepurpose of these councils to make statements respecting Chrisfs humanity, or to determine the as
relations of the two natures to each other.
It
was
for this reason, among
others, that the subject of Christology was less developed than that of the Trinity; and that men like Apollinaris, who were correct in their Trinitarian views, should embody an error in their Christological theory. These various errors
and deficiencies in the statement of the doc-
trine of Christ's Person filled out,
finally corrected and in the creed drawn up by the Council of were
Chalcedon, in 451. The Council of Ephesus, in 431, had made some beginning towards the settlement of the questions involved; but this, though summoned as such, was not strictly an oecumenical council, and was too much under the influence of the then Monophysitizing Cyril1 to yield a comprehensive and 1
impartial result.
Cyril's anathematizing positions, which he succeeded in forcing upon the Council of Epliesua, in 431, asserted that after the
incarnation, the distinction bethe two natures no longer existed. This lie afterwards tacitly retracted, though not formally. tween
L
I
The Chalcedon
2.
Christology.
The Chalcedon Symbol1 defines the Person of Christ as follows. "We teach that Jesus Christ is
perfect
as
respects godhood, and perfect
respects
as
manhood; that he is truly God, and truly a man consisting of a rational soul and a body; that he is consubstantial (6/noovawv) with the Father as to his divinity, and consubstantial (duoovoiov) with us as to his humanity, and like us in all respects sin excepted. He was begotten of the Father, before creation (tvqo aicovcov), as to his deity ; but in these last days he was born of Mary the mother of God (Otoroxog),2 as to his humanity. He is one Christ, 'See Mansi, YII. 108;
Gue-
rickb's Church
History, § 89 ; Gieselrb's Church History, I. §89. 3
The Catholics
of this word 44
person
as
were
tenacious
applied to the
" in distinction from the
44
natures." The mother, they maintained, is the mother of the toJiole person, although the soul, as the immaterial nature, is not conceived,—the theory of Creatipnism being adopted. As the human mother gives birth, not merely to the body, but to the whole person, which consists of a
real
and
essential
union of
body and soul, so the Virgin Mary, although she did not give birth to the divine nature, as such, is nevertheless the mother of the
God-Man, who is
a
Person
com¬
posed of deity And
as
and
humanity. may be
the God-Man
properly denominated God, Mary was, in this sense, Scotokos. That she was not the "Mother of God," in the ture
sense
was
that the divine
na-
conceived and born of
her, is proved by the guarding clause in the creed statement,— 44 he was born of Mary the mother of
God, as to his humanityThe object of the Chalcedon divines, in the was
to
use
of the term SeoroKor,
teach, that Mary
the mother of
a mere
was
not
and ordi-
the Nestorian docimply. For, according to Nestorianism, Christ was the second Person in the Trinity associated, by a merely moral union, with a distinct human person,—of which distinct and sepai nary man, as
trine would
existing iu
two natures without mixture
(u6vy%v-
rcog), without change (drQkTiTcog), without division (^cidiuigtvcog), without separation (d^cogiorcog\â&#x20AC;&#x201D; the diversity of the two natures not being at all destroyed by their union in the person, but the peculiar properties (i'diorr/g) of each nature being preserved, and concurring to one person QigoticdJiov), and one subsistence (ynooxaoiir)^--.
This statement not only asserts that there are two natures in Christ's Person, but also adjusts their :e, according to the Chalcedon symbol, the uniting of the two natures in one personality does not confuse or mix them, in such a manner as to destroy their distinctive properties. The deity of Christ is j ust as pure and simple deity, after
the
incarnation,
as
before it.
And the
of Christ is
humanity
just as pure and simple human nature as that of Mary his mother, or any other human individual, sin being excluded. The unifying act, by which the nature of God, and the nature of man, are blended into one personal subsistence, does not
in the least alter their constituent rate human was
person alone, Mary the mother. The Chalcedon
position two
and
was
natures
that the union of the was
embryonic, in
by the miraculous conception in the womb of the Virgin, so that " that holy thing born " of her (Luke i. 35) was theanthropio, It was not a mere man, but a
God-Man and not
Man that
properties. that
was
conceived,
a mere
was
man, but a Godborn. And in de-
nominating Mary 3*oro*of, Catholic Church did, they
that she entire
she
was
as
the
meant the mother of the
Divine-human Person,â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
was
Christ.
The
the
mother of Jesus
human nature is not transmuted into the the divine nature is not transmuted into the neither is there a tertium quid formed
by mixing
the
two,â&#x20AC;&#x201D;8 third Divine-human neither human nor divine.
/ 2^
divine; human;
nature
In the second place, the Chalcedon
prohibits the division
that is
statement
of Christ into two selves
or
The incarnating act, while it makes no changes in the properties of the two united natures, gives as a resultant a Person that is a tertium quid, persons.
resultant that is neither divine person, but a a
we
have reference
a
human person, nor
a
theanthropic person. For, if merely to his self-consciousness,
personality, Jesus Christ is neither human, nor divine, but is Divine-human. Contemplating him or
the resultant of the union of God and man, he is not to be denominated God, and he is not to be denominated man; but he is to be denominated GodMan. The u person " of Jesus Christ, as distinguished from the "natures" that compose it, is a as
iheanthropic
Says Leo the Great: "Two together in our Redeemer, and while the properties of each remained, so great a unity was made of either substance, that from the time that the Word was made flesh in the virgin's womb, person.
natures met
may neither think of Him as God without this which is man, nor as man without this which is God. Each nature certifies its own reality under distinct we
actions, but neither disjoins itself from connexion with the other. Nothing is wanting from either 26
P D
â&#x20AC;˘
towards the
other; there is entire littleness in majesty, entire majesty in littleness; unity does not introduce confusion, nor does propriety divide unity. There is
thing passible, another impassible, yet contumely whose is the glory. He is in
one
his is the
infirmity who is in
the self-same Person is capable, and conqueror, of death. God did then take on Him whole man, and so knit Himself into him, and him into Himself, in pity and in power, that either nature was in the other, and neither in the other lost its own property."1 power;
both
This union of two natures in
Ego l
may
"
"T"
rS ,
1 I o N
self-conscious
be illustrated by reference to man's
sonal constitution. But this
An individual
man
is
per-
one per-
consists of two natures^ a material nature, and a mental nature. The^per—— sonality, the self-consciousness, is the resultant of son.
u
one
one
person
•
the union of the two.
the person.
Neither
•
one
Both body and soul
of itself makes
are
requisite in
order to a complete individuality. The two natures do not make two individuals. The material nature, taken
by itself, is not the man ; and the mental part, taken by itself, is not the man. But only the union of the two is. Yet, in this intimate union of two such diverse substances as matter and mind, body and soul, there is not the slightest alteration of the properties of each substance or nature. The 1
Leo Magnus: Sermo LII. ii.
Compare Dorner: Person Christi,
II. 706 sq.;
Hooker: Eccl. Pol. Book V. Ch. li. sq.
body of a man is as truly and purely material, as a piece of granite ; and the immortal mind of a man is as truly and purely spiritual and immaterial, as
the Godhead itself. the mental
Neither the material part, nor
part, taken by itself, and in separation,
constitutes the
personality ; otherwise, every human individual would be two persons in juxtaposition. There is, therefore, a material " nature," but no material " person;" and there is a mental "
nature," person.'" The person is the union of these two natures, and is not to be denominated either material or mental, but human. In like manbut
ner
no
mental "
the Person of Christ takes its denomination of
theanthropic,
Divine-human, neither
or
Divine nature
alone,
nor
the human
from the
nature
but from the union of both natures.
alone, â&#x20AC;&#x201D;
One very important consequence of this slate^-â&#x20AC;&#x201D; ment of the Council of Chalcedon is, that the preperties of both natures may he attributed to the one Person. If the Person be called Jesus Christ, then it is proper to say, that Jesus Christ Christ is the
wept, and Jesus
same
yesterday to-day and forever.
The first statement denotes
a
inanity, which is attributable last statement
attributable
to
characteristic of son.
then
a
characteristic of huto
characteristic of
the one
the
Person; the deity which is
Person; and both alike and the
are
theanthropic PerIf, again, the Person be called the God-Man, it is accurate to say that the God-Man existed same
before Abraham and the God-Man
was
born in the
:
reign of Augustus Caesar and David's Lord.
son,
;
that He
The
was
David's
characteristics
of
the finite nature, and of the infinite nature, belong equally to that Ego, that conscious self, which is constituted of them both.1
Another equally important Chalcedon adjustment of the consequence of this relations of the two natures was, that the suffering of the God-Man was truly and really infinite, while yet the Divine nature is impassible.2 The God-Man suffered in his human nature, and not in his divine. For, although the properties of each nature may be attributed to the one Person, the properties of the one nature cannot be attributed to the other nature.
of the
suffering, therefore,
as
seat
must be the
humanity, divinity, in the Person. But the Persuffering is the God-Man; and his personality is
and not the son
The
truly infinite as it is truly finite. really suffered; not in his Divine
Jesus Christ
nature, for that
iaBy
reason not of two per-
linked in amity, but of two natures, human and divine, conjoined in one and the same person, the God of glory may be said sons
as
to
well to have suffered death, as have raised the dead from their
graves; _th<^_Son 0f Man as well have made as redeemed the world." Hooker: Eccl. Pol. Book V. Ch. liii. " A man is called tall, to
fair, and healthy, from the state body; and learned, wise, and good, from the qualities of of his
his mind.
So Christ is called
holy, harmless, and undefiled; is said to have died, risen, and as-
cended up to heaven, with relation to his human nature. He is also said to be in the form of God, to have created all things, to be the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his person, with
relation to his Divine nature." Burnet: On the Thirty-Nine Articles (Article II). 3
Compare Pearson
Creed (Article IV).
:
On
the
cannot be
the seat of
suffering, but in
nature, which he had assumed suffer.
so
liis human
that he
might,
The
passion, therefore, is infinite because the Person is infinite ; although the nature which is the medium through which the Person suffers is
,
finite.
Here,
again, the analogies of finite existence furnish illustrations. A man suffers the sensation of heat from a coal of fire; and a brute suffers the same sensation from the same coal. The seat of the
sensation, the sensorium, in each instance
is a physical nature. For the mental and immaterial nature of the man is not burned by the fire. The
point of
contact, and the medium of
suffering, in each instance, is a material and fleshly substance. But the character and value of the suffering, in one instance, is vastly higher than in the other, by reason of the difference in the subject, the Ego. The painful sensation, in the case of the man, is the suffering of a rational and it is the
immortal person; in that of the brute,
suffering of
creature.
an
unreasoning and perishing
The former is human agony ; the latter is brutish agony. One is high up the scale, and the other low down, not because of the
sensorium, or "nature," in which it is seated (for this is the same thing in both), but because of the person or subject
to
which it
and refers back. Now the entire
body and
runs
humanity of Christ,â&#x20AC;&#x201D;the
reasonable soul,"â&#x20AC;&#x201D;sustained the lation to his Divinity, that the
"true
same
fleshly part of a
re-
man
does to "his rational part.
It was the sensorium, passible medium or " nature," by and through which it was possible for the self-conscious ego, the theauthropic Person, to suffer.1 And as, in the instance of an ordinary man, the mere fleshly agony is converted into a truly human and rational suffering, by reason of the humanity that is united with the animal soul and body, so, in the instance of Jesus Christ, the mere human agony is converted: into a truly divine suffering, by reason of the divinity that is united with the human soul and body, in the unity of one self-consciousness. Another important implication in the Chalcedon Christology is, that it is the Divinity, and not the humanity, which constitutes the root and basis of Christ's personality. The incarnation is the humanizing of deity, and not the deification of humanity. the
The second subsistence in the Divine Essence assumes human nature to itself; so that it is the God-
hood, and not the manhood, which is prior and determining in the new complex-person that results. The redemption of mankind is accomplished, not 1
Or
more
strictly, perhaps, to
be comciovs of suffering. In the instance of an ordinary human
suffering that arises from
a
physi-
rjil source, the immaterial part of man does not, properly speak-
ing, itself suffer
sensation, but painful sensaoccurring in the material
is conscious of tion
a
a
part.
In like manner, the deity
in Christ's Person does not itself
suffer, but is conscious of a suffering that occurs in the humanity. The consciousness itself is in the divinity, which is the root of the personality of the God-Mail; but the material of the consciousness is in the humanity.
by the elevation of the finite to the infinite, but the humiliation of the infinite to the finite.1 It is further to be the Chalcedon
noticed, that, according to doctrine, the Logos did not unite distinct individual, but with a hu-
Himself with
a
man
An individual
nature.
by
man was not first conceived and born, with whom the second Person in the Godhead then associated himself, but the union was effected with the substance of humanity in the
womb of
%/
a
Virgin: Says Hooker
:
" ' He took not If the Son of
angels, but the seed of Abraham.' God had taken to himself a man now made and al~ ready perfected, it would of necessity follow, that there are in Christ two persons, the one assuming, and the other assumed; whereas the Son of God did not assume a man's person into his own [person], but a man's nature to his own person; and therefore took semen, the seed of Abraham, the very first original element of our nature, before it was come to have any personal human subsistence. The flesh and the conjunction of the flesh with God, began both at one instant; his
himself there is
our
flesh
was
but
making and taking to
one
act, so that in Christ personal subsistence but one, and that from everlasting."2 The distinction between a " nature" and a " person " is of as great consequence 1"
no
What strikes
us
first of all, in of Jesus
comparing the greatness
with that of the heroes of anthe source of His greatness is not His ascending,
tiquity, is, that
but His condescending; not rising above men, but letting Himself down to them." Ullmann : Sinlessness of Jesus, p. 60. 8 Hookei:: Eccl. Pol. B. V. Ch.
in
Christology, as in Trinitarianism ; and the Chalcedon divines were enabled, by carefully observing it, to combine all the Scripture data relating
Incarnation,
to the
into a form of statement that has been accepted by the church universal ever since, and beyond which it is probable the human mind is unable to go, in the endeavor to unfold the of Christ's mystery aspects is the
complex Person, which in
even
more
baffling than
Trinity.
some
the
of its
mystery of
liii.
An American writer seems have had this statement of Hooker in his eye. " The personality of Jesus Christ," to
Hopkins in
in
(Works I. his divine nature, the human.
existed from
:
says
283), "is
apd not Jesus Christ
a
distinct, divine
eternity, the
person second person
in the adorable Trinity. The human nature which this divine person, the Word, assumed into a personal union with
not, and son
not
never
himself,
is
was, a distinct per-
by itself, and personality be
can-
ascribed to it, and does not belong to it, any otherwise than as united to the Logos, the Word of God. The Word assumed the human nature, not a human person, into a personal union with himself, by which the complex person
END
OF
exists, God-man. person in the man
Had the second taken a hu-
Trinity
person, into union with him-
self, and
were
this
Christ, God
possible, Jesus
and man, would be persons, not one.
two
Hence, when Jesus Christ is spoken of as being a man, 4 the Son of Man, the man Christ Jesus,' etc., these
terms do not express the
personality of the manhood, or of the human nature of Jesus Christ; but these
personal terms
are
used with
re-
spect to the human nature, as united to a divine person, and not as a mere man. For the personal
terms, He, I, and Thou, cannot, propriety or truth, be used by, or of, the human with
nature, condistinct from the divine nature of Jesus Christ." sidered
VOL
I.
as
(d-MfTl)
3* Nestorianism. /
kJ€ts, &ct>r x,
Nestoriua, bishop of the church aft Constantinople in the 4th century,
i
'
denied the
Th& problem of the unio personalis led him to oppose soD-A^the designation of Mary as "mother of God, n unique personality of Christ.
wjam/
/Mr
no
'
"
since
she
is
the mother of His human na-
He was thought to that the two natures imply two perHe may have been falsely condemned,
ture, not His divine. believe sons. or
"framed,"
enemy, was
a
as we would say, by his great Cyril of Alexandria. But the error real possibility anyway, and the
church condemned Nestorius at
Ephesus in D., as well as at Chalbedon. ILLUSTRATION:(0 R. L. Stevenson's "The' Strange Case of Dr. ffekyll and Mr. Hyde" has dramatlzed the Nestorian heresy of dual personallty. eg) costs (i+cx>,T, 1^2.-3); /W's peasmal coverrruT<OHj ( MATEJt iAV7 W &JTAL K)ATUA£S ^ IjuX D/JEEutychianlsm. 'pwa&ov Eutyches, an abbot of Constantinople in the 5th century, denied the Integrity of
431 A.
4.
hivvyv^ /vatvub the two natures by confusing them. He came' to a third nature, a te'rtlum quid. From two natures Nestorius had
ivpo rua
/;£o2) SUFFGAEV
„
K
Eutyches from the one person had
persons.
inferred one theanthropic nature, the op-
lwe'wA. posite
U£t Div/ 7W\(Z f/Kfwa. ("[
inferred twe
His heresy, also known as
error.
Monophysitism, was condemned at Chalcedon (\jjsrz/(<KD,rl vo4) in 451 A. D. One can now see why Chalcedor was largely a negative formulation. Aa Berkouwer says, Thus the ancient church weeded its garden and produced much fruit" ibi£.
(ibid., II
p.
70).
PASS JO/0 /AJRAJVT£
Aijc FF&J&J
THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST FROM CHALCEDON TO THE REFORMATION, chaucfdo/U ( tics, n < We will pass over this time with the mention of
Morpthelltlsm, which alleged that, while Christ had/ two natures, He had but one will. rThe teachina
was
condemned
at
the
sixth Ecumenical
Council
•Constantinope in 681 A. D. Otherwise, the middle ages added little.to the doctrine of the person of Christ (cf. Berkhof, p. 308). of
Prominent Lutherans A
prominent Lutheran theologian writes in a volume pubPress of the Lutheran Church
lished in 1963 by Fortress in America:
First, God pronounces Jesus his son. He adopts him. installs Jesus as His adoptive son fell
view that God
The into
disrepute through certain teachers in the early Church. Even today it is objected to by many Christians because it seems to exclude the eternal sonship and divinity of Jesus Christ. Is not Jesus God's son 'by nature'? In fact, it was thought in the old Canaanite Baal-religion that the King was 'God's son'. The Old Testament rejected this pagan view. It transformed the idea of the physical divine sonship of the Anointed into a solemn declaration by which God installs him with the rights of a son.«
~=
Every word of Jesus and every account of his activity in the Gospels show him as a man who is so possessed by God that he forgets himself because of God. . . . Because be
I
Jesus Christ—True God and True Man
451
God alone, he rejects! 10: 17-18).7 This Lutheran, who delivered one of the chief essays at the IV Assembly of the Lutheran World Federation when it met in Helsinki, Finland, in 1963, does not hesitate to say ^ that Jesus made a mistake concerning the Day of Jwjjge* that only God is 'good,' and description 'Good Master' (Mark
knows the
ment: "==== Tor it should be openly acknowledged that in this respect Jesus 'made a mistake'. There is more cause for surprise that this mistake did not damage the faith of the early Church in Him and that the non-appearance of the day of
glory, or more precisely jts delay, in according to all the statements of the
no way
shook belief,
New Testament.8 If Jesus made a mistake, obviously He is not God. Nathan Soederblom, a Swedish Lutheran who has frequently been referred to as the "Father of the Ecumenical
Movement" wrote: We know that Jesus Christ Himself—who in His perL sonality is recognized by faith as God's speaking work to A
j: g P
-
C
*
•
men—He, too, was a child of His time, although He rises heaven-high above the ages. He thought like His contemporaries concerning the form of the earth and the course of the sun. Like them, He related certain forms of insanity to evil spirits, that made men demonical.® Joseph Sittler, a theologian of the Lutheran Church in America, writes that he cannot accept the "Greek" idea of the pre-existence of Christ, and that he prefers the "oriental" concept of "foreknowing."10 But if Christ did not exist with the Father from the very beginning and if he was only foreknown by the Father, Christ is really not God equal with the Father in every sense of the term. ^
'•
In him ilwullnth all tho Itilni ita of tJio Owllmiul
fP JljyUVwas
a
bcxJily."—Col. ii. 9.
day when death had darkened the homo of
that rugged but sensitive
soul, Thomas Carlyle. Some
taking a New Testament, opened it at the Gospel of St. John, and read the familiar words : " Let not your heart I be troubled. In My Father's house are many mansions " I 'LAye," muttered the bereaved man. " if you were God. I you had a right to say that; but if you were only a man, one,
what do
you
know
any more
than the rest of
us
? "
Dr. Harry
a prominent spokesman for few decades ago, rejected the deity!
Emerson Fosdick,
liberal Protestantism
a
<;>f Christ in his frequently quoted sermon, "The Peril •
of!
^Worshipping Jesus." He said: "I think God was in my| Mother, the source of all loveliness that blessed us there. And I rise from that with a profound sense of the what I am doing when I profess my faith that
reality of
God was of
in Christ." He also stated: "Of course, the divinity Jesus differs from ours in degree, but not in kind."1
Such attacks upon the essential deity of Christ are still permitted within most major denominations of our day. Georgia Harkness, a prominent Methodist theologian, writes: •
It is the Christian faith that in Jesus this Saviour came, and that in him we see God manifesting himself in a human
Jesus' name for God was Father, and uniquely beyond he lived as a son .of God ought to live. ln% Jesus we have the world's supreme revelation of God. lived like God; prayed to God; triumphed over life.
all other men
Jesusl temptation!
lovej
pain in Godlike mastery; gave himself like God in suffering for men. The cross is the eternal symbol or the union of love with suffering—of love and suffering at the heart of the universe. It is not by accident that people find the way to God most readily, not through speculation, but through devotion to the Christ in whom God haa re* vealed himself that men may know what God is like.2
and and
Later this
same
author writes:
believes what has been Said about Jesus Christ as the supreme the Saviour of men, he will affirm
If
one
earlier in this chapter
revelation of God and belief in Christ as the Son of God. This does not mean that Jesus was God. It means that his life was so filled with the character and power of God that when men have seen him, they have seen
the Father.*
Ecumenical Leaders a Presbyterian and one of America's m6^t lnflueritial ecumenical leaders, writes in his Liberal Theology, An Appraisal: "In Jesus of Nazareth God Himself was present, as fully present as it is possible for
Professor Henry P. Van Dusen,
present in a truly human life. / "The identity of Jesus with God was of
Him to be
pose, of will, of compassion." A^fA^J f Elsewhere Van Dusen writes: "Unless measure
come
outlook, of pur* God is in some he cannot be~
incarnate in the life of every man,
fully incarnate in Jesus of
TSAif%b
Nazareth."4
WHO 18 THIS JESUS ?
(2) HKHOLD
YOUK
GOD
"In him dwnlhth till tJm fulnwH of t ho Godhnari
bodily."—Col. ii. 9,
rpiIEKE was a day when death had darkened the home of that
rugged but sensitive soul, Thomas Carlyle. Some taking a New Testament, opened it at the Gospel of St. John, and read the familiar words : " Let not your heart be troubled. In My Father's house are many mansions" Aye," muttered the bereaved man. " if you were God, you had a right to say that; but if you were only a man, what do you know any more than the rest of us ? " one,
"
/
1
VIII
WHO IS THIS JESUS? TSA
(2) Bkjiold
youk
(ion
"lit him flwtilfoth itl I Uw Uiiw.tM of Urn Oodhmul
bodily."â&#x20AC;&#x201D;Col, ii. 9.
wag a day when death had darkened the home of rugged but sensitive soul, Thomas Carlyle. Some one, taking a New Testament, opened it at the Gospel of St. John, and read the familiar words : " Let not your heart
ri111 EKE
JL
that
be troubled.
In My Father's house
many mansions." \ " Aye," muttered the bereaved man, " if you were God, j you had a right to say that; but if you were only a man, ;
what do you
know
any more
n.â&#x201E;˘
than the rest of
us
? "
1 III
SINCE.;1HE. REFORMATION. divide the time into two periods. From the Reformation to the Twentieth Century In the 16th through the .'lBth centuries littie change came in the teaching concerning Christ. But with the 19th century a great change came. We shall mention some names.
THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST We may
A.
Schlelermacher. He stands at the head of a movement that
1.
anthropocentric, and in which the supernatural Christ became a human Jes_.â&#x20AC;&#x17E;,,us and the two natures doctrine became became
,
(Berkhofpar309).
'"that of a divine man In his view Jesus similar/to
h
all other distinguished from them by the vigor of his God-consciousness
men, but constant
(Berkouwer,
p.
24).
Ritschl. The doctrine of the two natures impossible. A true man. cannot be truly God. He is not God-man, but a sublime revela-
2.
tion of the unity of the divine andtthe
,
human.
He
is fiah motivated
M'.
3.
by God.
The kenotic Christology. The
Logos parted voluntarily, either wholly or in part, with his divinity when he became
It
man.
founders on the
immutability of God, as we have seen, for it sees the Godhead charffeed into humanity, not "veiled in flesh. ' Twentieth doctrine of
The
Century. Christ
in the
twentieth
cen-
tury is a thoroughly human one. Essentially, men are divine, differing from Christ
all
ILLUSTRATIONS: (1)Fosdlck, "Of course, the divinity of Jesus differs from ours in degeee, but not in kind" (Otten, Baal or God, p. 4277 (2) only in degree of sonshlp.
ft;)
Jesus and mistakes
gia Hafrkness,
H.
P.
(ibid.,
p.
Van Pus en
45):Âť (3) Geor(lb-id., 42-43)
Conclusion: We must, then, keep three points in all heresies about His person touch them:
view, for (1) the reality of the two natures; (2) the integrity of the two natures; (3) the union of the two natures in one person. Is it important? ILLUSTRATION: Carlyle, bereaved, on John 14:1-3, "Aye, if you were God, you had a rlglat to say~that; but if you were only a man, what do you Tpidw any more than the rest ofv us?" no f
C. Samuel Lesson #5
Storms
HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY (3)
NT
Ebionism affirmed humanity denied deityx
Orthodoxy Docetism affirmed deity lenied humanity I
early church
sboth
rejected 1 deity & humanity affirmedÂŤ no
are
explanation/as to how
or what
(?) i
A-pollinarig^ (2)N
(11); Arius VL^denied
reduced
deity-
umanity
(Condemned at Nicea
325) Constantinonle
381
Trinity affirmed & explained Deity & Humanity of Christi affirmed but not explained
Set
stage for
ChristoL6gIt>al Debates
Alexandria
Antioch
tendency to 2 natures
merge
Cyril
Conflict <
Nestorius
(Ephesus 431)
Eutyches (condemned at Const.
tendency to separate 2 natures
448)
Resolved at Chalcedon 451
(?)
challenged but defeated by
not l #
Monophysites
Monothelites
(1 nature)
(1 will)
""WB* .rII
I.
Introduction A.
Overview:
Chart of Christological Development
B.
The Three
Stages of Christological Development and 3 on the chart)
numbers
II.
1.
Stage
One
-
2.
Stage Two
-
3*
Stage Three
Apollinaris: A.
(note the
1,2,
-
The Man and
His Theology
The Man - Born @310, died 390. Bishop of Laodicea, of Athanasius, and highly educated, skilled orator, sense
B.
of humor,
stalwart defender of Nicea.
friend good
His Theology How
in
can one
perfect humanity and perfect deity be maintained
person?
Apollinaris* answer: it is impossible to make the divinity and the humanity combine in their entirety in one person. Two persons would necessarily result. The only alternative is to reduce Christ's humanity. Therefore:
based
trichotomy of I Thess. 5*23 (body, and spirit), Apollinaris built his Christology. According to A, the soul was merely the impersonal and unconscious vital principle that gives life to the body. The spirit, however, is the seat of personality, conscience, and rational thought. Apollinaris suggested, therefore, that Christ or the Word simply took the place on
soul,
of the
M
--—
human
spirit.
Consequently, Christ's true
and full
the
slighted.
doctrine of two natures
———-
Objections to Apollinaris'
Christology
humanity denied and
"Hp r ~~
■
'' *r""
1. 2.
3. 4. 5.
Apollinaris' teaching was condemned at Rome in 377, at Antioch in 378, at Constantinople in 381, and again by Rome in 382. Chalcedon in ^51 also condemned his view.
III.
The Christological Confrontation
-
Part It Antioch versus
Alexandria A.
The School of Antioch General
Characteristics
Diodorus of Tarsus (d. 378), Theodore Mopsuestia (d. ^28), and Nestorius (d. @^51).
Leading figures of
-
-
Christological emphases: 1.
Christ assumed
a
complete human nature
consisting of body, soul and spirit. entities exist in the 2.
The
deity
was
(contra Apollinaris) Thus two complete
Christ.
one
said to 'reside*
'dwell' in the humanity
or
much like God dwells in a temple or like the HS dwells in the believer. I.e., the Son of God dwelled in the son
3.
of David.
The relationship, or union, between these 2 natures was therefore, not personal or natural. Rather it was described
simply
as
a
connection
or
conjunction.
This gave the impression to many that they were that Christ was two persons. . . .
Objections
t
teaching
1) 2)
B.
The
School of Alexandria
General
Characteristics
Leading figures and
-
Athanasius
(early), the 3 Cappadocians,
Cyril of Alexandria.
Christological emphases 1.
-
t
Although Christ had more
or
less
a absorbed
in fact say that to begin with).
it was (some did less than complete
complete human nature, into the
divine nature
Christ's humanity
was
2.
They stressed the unity of the person in order to retain their strong soteriological emphasis. Hence a greater stress on deity than on humanity.
3.
Failure to adequately consider and stress the reality of 2 natures in Christ some (cf, Gregory of Nazianzus) said the humanity disappeared into the divine. .
Stress
on
the
.
.
communication of attributes from the
humanity to deity (or,
'communicatio idiomatum').
"
Objections:
Vlas
a1
Aui'it +T
UoTsnTouoo
Uj
1) 2)
IV.
The
Christological Confrontation Cyril (Alexandria)
Part IIÂť
-
Nestorius
versus
A.
Nestorius:
1.
The
of
Man
He
-
His Theology
of the
was
school
of
Antioch, was patriarch Extremely crude, dogmatic, his cause by antagonizing others.
Constantinople in ^28.
and 2.
The Man and
(Antioch)
did much to harm
His Theology
bearing'
He
-
rejected the title for Mary of 'GodReflecting the emphasis of Antioch
(theotokos).
as to the distinction between the 2 natures, N contended that such was an improper title. Mary is but the mother of the man who serves as an instrument or temple for the divinity, not the divinity itself. She
called,
N
however,
insisted
Christ
on
was
'Christ-bearing'
may be
(christotokos).
keeping the 2 natures separate and distinct.
one
combined in himself 2 distinct
person who
elements, the Godhood and the complete manhood. Thus the divinity and humanity existed side by side in the Son, each nature retaining all of its proper characteristics. How
then,
do the
2 natures
relate?
-
The problem arose from those (esp. Cyril) who approached Christ with a stress on the unity of the Person. According to them N had to be teaching that Christ was 2 persons because he refused to adequately explain the union of the 2 natures.
Did Nestorius really teach
a
'schizophrenic' Redeemer?
-
Cyril: The Man and His Theology fbe Man to defeat
d. N
4^. were
Was more
victory of school
patriarch of Alexandria. Motives theological . . desired the
than
.
of Alexandria over Antioch and used political and material means to achieve his ends. 2.
His Theology
As
-
the person.
an
Alexandrian he stressed the unity of
Christ
before Incarnation Christ after Incarnation
-
two natures nature
one
There
.
.
.
.
.
.
is no division in the natures once Christ became incarnate and yet they are not confused or mixed. It is, however, far more of a real and personal union than the 'conjunction' theory of Nestorius. Cyril called .
it
'natural'
.
.
and
'hypostatic.'
5 be said that although Nestorius never adequately explained the unity of the persons of Christ so as to dispel notions of the '2 persons', Cyril never adequately explained the distinction of natures in Christ so as to dispel notions that he reduced the humanity of the Son. Are we justified in calling either of these In conclusion it may
men
V.
'heretics'?
The Christological Settlement
Council of Ephesus ^-31 - Through political manipulation Cyril was able to obtain the condemnation of Nestorius at Ephesus in ^31â&#x20AC;˘ The latter retired into obscurity but his followers remained and carried his teaching as far as China in the 7th century.
A.
The
B.
The
of Constantinople Under the leadership of the patriarch of Constantinople, a certain Eutyches was condemned for teaching an extreme form of Cyril's doctrine of the one nature in Christ. Synod
Flavian,
Both Flavian and Eutyches in Rome. In response Leo the 2 natures in 1 person. C.
appealed for support from Pope Leo I wrote his famous Tome and affirmed
The RobberS' Synod of 449 - The emperor called a council to meet in Ephesus in 549 to settle the question. Leo's Tome was to have been read and approved but a certain Dioscorus, successor to Cyril, took control of the Council, rejected the Tome, approved Eutyches, condemned the doctrine of 2
natures,
and apparently was successful in 'stealing'
the
victory for the school of Alexandria. D.
The
Council and Creed
of Chalcedon 451
(near Nicea) in Asia Minor. It
Some
-
Met in Chalcedon
550-600 bishops attended.
accomplished 3 thingsÂť
First,
it reaffirmed the Nicene Creed
as
standard
of
orthodoxy. Second.it canonized 2 letters of Cyril Leo's
Third,
Tome
the
(against Nestorius) and
(against Eutyches). creed
itself
.
.
.
"We, then, following the holy Fathers, all with one consent, teach men to confess one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, the same perfect in Godhead, and also perfect in manhood; truly God and truly man, of
reasonable
soul
and
body; consubstantial with us according to the manhood; in all things like unto us, without sin; begotten before all ages of the Father according to the Godhead, and in these latter days, for us and for our salvation, born of the Virgin Mary, the Mother of God, according to the manhood; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, in two a
inconfusedly (or, unmixed), unchangeably (or, unchanged), indivisibly (or, undivided), inseparably (or, inseparable), the distinction of the natures being
natures,
by no means taken away by the union, but rather the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one person and one subsistence, not parted or divided into two persons but one and the same Son and Only-begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ ..."
VI.
Epilogue;
Chalcedon Challenged
A.
The
Monophysites
B.
The
Monothelites
but not Defeated
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