Excerpt from "The Disintegrating Conscience and the Decline of Modernity"

THE DISINTEGRATING CONSCIENCE AND THE DECLINE OF MODERNITY

University of Notre Dame Press

Notre Dame, Indiana

PROLOGUE

How Did We Get Here?

Mire’ los muros de la patria mia, si un tiempo fuertes, ya desmoronados de la carrera de la edad cansados por quien caduca ya su valentia.

I gazed upon my country’s walls, So powerful once, now a withered ruin, Weary with the passage of the years, Their valor now by age outworn.

—Francisco de Quevedo, “Miré’ los muros de la patria mía”

Modern Western civilization is finished. Done. Or at least so declared the eminent historian Jacques Barzun, possibly the most learned human being then residing on the planet, in a hefty book timed to align with the start of the new millennium (or, more apropos, with the close of the old millennium). The twentieth century is ending, Barzun said, and “in the West the culture of the last 500 years is ending at the same time.”1

The previous glorious and exciting half-millennium—the “modern era”—had blessed humankind with a rich endowment of unprecedented achievement and progress, scientifically and politically and economically. “[T]he peoples of the West offered the world a set of ideas and institutions not found earlier or elsewhere,” Barzun observed.2 But the project had run its course. “[T]he culture is old and unraveling,”3 he intoned mournfully.

Barzun elaborated on this doleful assessment for eight-hundredplus pages in a lively history covering a vast and sometimes bewildering panorama of people, ideas, and movements. These people, ideas, and movements had advanced a number of exhilarating principles and causes, including—Barzun put the major themes in capital letters— EMANCIPATION, INDIVIDUALISM, and SECULARISM. Lofty causes, these. We may think so, anyway. And yet

now these purposes, carried out to their utmost possibilities, are bringing about [the civilization’s] demise. This ending is shown by the deadlocks of our time: for and against nationalism, for and against individualism, for and against the high arts, for and against strict morals and religious belief.4

Whether or not Barzun was right about the demise of Western culture, it seemed that he himself, at the age of 93, must surely be nearing his own demise. And yet, perhaps like the civilization he admired, and lamented, the venerable historian lingered on—not departing until 2012, after a respectable tenure in this mortal realm of 104 years. As of this writing, Western culture with its commitments to emancipation and individualism and secularism—and to rule of law and democratic governance and human rights—likewise lingers on. Or at least staggers on. And yet it would be premature to declare with any confidence that Barzun was mistaken. Against the backdrop of centuries that the historian was working from, after all, what is a decade or two? A few grains of sand in the hourglass. And surely the “deadlocks” that Barzun noted would seem to be if anything more intractable now than they were when he wrote.

So the institutions of contemporary Western democracies— electoral politics, capitalism, the rule of law—lurch along clumsily at best. Polarization has intensified; it increasingly seems to be both toxic and irremediable. In America, the major political parties seem categorically incapable of perceiving their opponents as anything other than vile and mendacious. Unable to work together constructively, they instead offer rationalizations for adopting Shermanesque “scorched earth” policies on one or another issue—a tax bill, a judicial nomination, an impeachment. In surveys, startlingly high percentages of citizens anticipate an imminent civil war. 5 As of the time I write this sentence, the nation along with much of the world is in “lockdown,” and large-scale protests sometimes accompanied by rioting, looting, and shooting have been regularly breaking out around the country— in Minneapolis, Seattle, Portland, New York, and elsewhere.

And with a fraught election upcoming, things look to get worse. Who knows what the situation will be by the time the book is finished and you read these words, if indeed that ever happens?

Still, who can say? If anything can be learned from history, it is that history is unruly, hard to reduce to secure generalizations and predictions. Even for the most learned historians (like Barzun)—that is why they are historians, not prophets. History’s contours are discernible, if at all, mostly in hindsight. Things will seem to be following a definite trajectory, which a decade or so later will have been forgotten, replaced by a different trajectory, which will in its turn be replaced by still another one. The population is growing at an unsustainably rapid pace. Population growth is too low for sustainability. Religion is destined for imminent extinction. Religion is taking over the world. Liberalism is dead (after the 2004 American election). Conservativism is dead (after the 2012 election). And so on.

Unlike Barzun’s tome, therefore, this book will be both much shorter and more tentative: it will offer no confident pronouncements on the death of Western civilization. Still, his title—From Dawn to Decadence —seems apt, whatever the future may hold. Ideas and movements that were fresh in the sixteenth century, and that have had in some cases a glorious run, do seem to be floundering or decrepit

today. Maybe they will recover—who knows?—but they seem in deep trouble at the moment.6

So, how did we get from there to here?

That is what this book aims to consider, in a limited way. It is what Barzun considered as well, of course, but there will be no attempt here to duplicate his scholarly achievement. For one thing, his book has already been written, so there is no need to write it again. And even if Barzun had, let’s say, decided in a fit of frustration to chuck his manuscript into the fire without publishing it, an author with scarcely a smidgeon of Barzun’s erudition could hardly undertake a similar project. Rather than attempt to canvas the field, therefore, the much more modest effort here will be to discern and ponder the transformative changes in several smaller, discrete episodes.

In three episodes, to be precise, or three chapters. These three episodes, I will suggest, reflected in microcosm decisive turning points at which Western civilization changed from what it had been in premodern times to what it is today. Just in themselves these episodes may not seem to have carried any epic significance. And yet by focusing in on them (and, yes, by projecting onto them), we can discern what have turned out to be major transformations.

Instead of offering the panoramic cast of characters that Barzun discussed—a cast that makes the list of figures in a Tolstoy novel seem paltry by comparison—we will focus instead on three main characters, one for each chapter or episode. To anticipate: our principal protagonists will be Thomas More, James Madison, and William Brennan. Other supporting actors will appear as well, of course: none of our protagonists performed on an empty stage. But we will center our inquiry on one character per episode. The hope is that through this “up close and personal” perspective we may discern and appreciate possibilities and tendencies and contradictions—and slowly developing dangers—that would be left in fuzzier focus if we tried to survey the entire historical landscape.

The treatment here will be more modest than Barzun’s in two other ways as well. First, Barzun tried to trace and develop about a dozen themes. Here we will focus on only one—conscience—and not even one that showed up explicitly on his list, although it has been

very closely associated several of his themes, including the ones noted already: emancipation, individualism, and secularism. A commitment to something called “conscience,” I will suggest, has been a central and in some ways defining feature of modern Western civilization. Reflecting on the changing meanings and importance attributed to conscience can thus provide a revealing perspective on fundamental developments that gave rise to the “modern era” Barzun presented, and that may now be bringing that era to some sort of close.

There are of course other themes that might have been chosen— changing ideas about God, for example, or the nature of the human person—that may seem more fundamental and potentially more revealing. Conscience has the advantage, however, of being concrete and profoundly practical: it has often been at the core of live political or legal controversies with existential consequences that have forced participants to articulate their assumptions and commitments not just in abstract or academic ways but in situations where a good deal—life or death, freedom or imprisonment—has been on the line. Nor is conscience a matter independent of arguably more fundamental issues like God and human personhood; on the contrary, it is in a sense a practical or as-applied implementation of those fundamentals.

But, second, although our first chapter will be international in the scope of its reflections, our second and third chapters will be more particularly focused on the political experiment that nearly everyone will agree has played a leading role, for better or worse, in the unfolding of modernity. Namely, America. In the 1830s, Alexis de Tocqueville contended that the emergence of democracy and egalitarianism in America was leading and presaging a transformation that would spread through the civilized world. In that he was surely correct. So examining the development of conscience in America is no parochial undertaking. Still, there is no reason to suppose that events have followed exactly the same course—or that they must necessarily follow exactly the same course in the future—in other regions and countries as they have done and will do in America. (This is an observation, I trust, that carries with it a measure of hopefulness.)

So much for the preliminaries. And now . . . let us raise the curtain on chapter one, in which a paragon loses his head.

CHAPTER ONE

Lost World, New World

Thomas More and His Troublesome Conscience

I“Sir Thomas More,” the presiding judge pronounced,

you are to be drawn on a hurdle through the City of London to Tyburn, there to be hanged till you be half dead, after that cut down yet alive, your bowels to be taken out of your body and burned before you, your privy parts cut off, your head cut off, your body to be divided in four parts, and your head and body to be set at such places as the King shall assign.1

Thus was sentence rendered on the internationally renowned lawyer and Renaissance man; “the most avant-garde humanist north of the Alps”;2 “undoubtedly the cleverest and most learned Englishman of his generation”;3 lately lord chancellor of England; longtime friend,

confidant, and adviser to King Henry VIII; future saint but scourge of the emerging Protestants; and by one later distinguished observer’s assessment “the person of greatest virtue that these [British] islands ever produced.”4 A man extravagantly revered—and also reviled—in his own century, and in ours.5

Though ungentle, the sentence was standard in cases of treason, which was what Thomas More had been convicted of. And how had he been a traitor to the realm? By being relentlessly, resolutely silent. In the three years since More had resigned as chancellor, the king had broken with the Roman Catholic Church, had ended his marriage to Catherine, his Spanish wife of twenty-four years, and had married Anne Boleyn. Henry had sought to manufacture support for these controversial actions by requiring all subjects to swear an oath affirming their legitimacy. For his part, More had refused to swear, and had remained firm in his refusal during fourteen months of close confinement in the Tower of London. At the same time, he had adamantly declined either to criticize the king or to explain why he would not take the oath—except to say that he was acting from “conscience.”

On that point, he had been adamant. “How be it (as help me God) as touching the whole oath,” More had insisted, “I never withdrew any man from it nor never advised any to refuse it nor never put, nor will, any scruple in any man’s head, but leave every man to his own conscience. And me thinks in good faith that so were it good reason that every man should leave me to mine.”6

At his trial before the King’s Bench, More had contended that mere silence could not constitute treason. It was a solid enough legal argument, and his case had been presented by the foremost lawyer in England—namely, himself. Even so, the verdict had been foreordained. That was because, on the queen’s insistence, an impetuous and increasingly imperious king had demanded that his friend must choose: swear, or die. The jurors at More’s trial knew what they must do; had they voted to acquit, they might themselves have been imprisoned.7 Only an extraordinarily courageous jury could have stood up to the king’s demand, and More’s jury did not distinguish itself for courage.8

Indeed, through the whole royal and ecclesiastical crisis, few in England exhibited anything that looked conspicuously like courage.

The most prominent exceptions were More himself and his friend John Fisher, bishop of Rochester, who had likewise refused to take the oath, and who had already been executed for treason. (Though partners in treason and martyrdom, More and Fisher had conducted themselves differently: whereas More had steadfastly guarded his silence with respect to the king’s divorce and Anne’s succession, Fisher had been outspoken, writing no fewer than seven books defending Queen Catherine’s position.)9 Less prominent examples included a handful of obscure but determined Protestant dissenters whom Lord Chancellor Thomas More had caused to be executed—a troubling complication that we will need to consider more closely. Following the pronouncement of the sentence, More was taken back to the Tower to await his execution. During his final five days on earth, he collected himself and, as was his habit, composed prayers. His last prayer pleaded with God to strengthen him (“Good Lord, give me the grace in all my fear and agony to have recourse to that great fear and wonderful agony that You, my sweet Savior, had at the Mount of Olivet before your most bitter passion”), to unite him and his fellow Christians (“Make . . . us all living members, sweet Savior Christ, of Your holy mystical body Your Catholic Church”), and to forgive him together with those who had opposed and condemned him:

Almighty God, have mercy . . . on all that bear me evil will and would harm me. And by such easy, tender, and merciful means as Your infinite wisdom can best devise, grant that their faults and mine may both be amended and redressed; and make us saved souls in heaven together, where we may ever live and love together with You and Your blessed saints.10

Perhaps this last plea for reconciliation was at least partially answered, after a fashion anyway, because in a last gesture of clemency, the king relented by softening the sentence for his friend. And so as it turned out, Thomas More was not carted through London on a hurdle, or disemboweled and deprived of his genitals while still alive, or drawn and quartered. Instead, he was led out to nearby Tower Hill and directed to ascend the axeman’s scaffold. Feeble from months of confinement in

a dank cell and suffering from kidney stones, but always ready with a joke, the condemned man asked the attendant guard to help him up the steps, “and for my coming down, let me shift for myself.”11

From the platform, More briefly addressed the onlookers, declaring himself to be the king’s loyal servant but God’s first. Then, “with a cheerful countenance,” as his son-in-law reported,12 and after a moment of banter with the executioner about the shortness of his neck, he placed that diminutive neck on the block. A moment later, picking up the now autonomous head from the straw where it had fallen, the executioner waved it before the crowd, shouting “Behold the head of a traitor!”13

The spectacle completed, More’s head was posted on a spike on London Bridge for passers-by to ponder. On the same spike, it seems, that had lately supported his friend and fellow traitor-martyr Bishop Fisher; to make room for More’s head, Fisher’s was taken down and tossed into the Thames.14 More’s final disposition was more dignified: when the time came to retire him from the bridge, his head was retrieved by his devoted daughter Margaret, or Meg, a formidable scholar in her own right,15 who packed the head in spices to preserve it for the duration of her days.16

And thus ended an extraordinary life—and also, we can say in retrospect and with only a little historical license, an extraordinary age. Even a world. Or, in a less morose tone, and looking forward rather than backward, we might say that thus began a new era, or a new world. Thomas More was living in what historian Derek Wilson calls a “fulcrum moment in human destiny.”17 The title of a history of the period by Susan Brigden expresses the idea: New Worlds, Lost Worlds. 18 Thomas More was exiting along with the world—the lost world—that he had valiantly but futilely struggled to preserve. His removal was part of the clearing away needed for the emergence of a new world ruled by “new men,”19 as More described them.

And yet in fact (a word invented by More) there was a paradox (another word invented by More):20 both Thomas More and the “new men” who brought about his demise wrapped themselves in the mantle of something called “conscience.” Thus, More was hardly alone in professing a profound commitment to fidelity of conscience. His

nemesis—the rebel former monk Martin Luther, who bore the blame in More’s view for the events that had led up to his own condemnation and demise—did the same.21 Indeed, Luther’s celebrated declaration rejecting the Church’s authority to dictate his theological views—“Here I stand! I can do no other!”—had been if anything even more clarion in its affirmation of conscience than More’s more sedate “it were good reason that every man should leave me to [my conscience].” Biographer Heiko Oberman thus reports that “Luther’s appeal to conscience as the highest authority made an extraordinary impression on later generations.”22

More’s good friend and deadly foe—Henry, the king—likewise insisted on the sanctity of his conscience. Henry had justified his divorce of Catherine and his marriage to Anne Boleyn as a course commanded by conscience. In this vein, Henry’s counselor and chancellor Cardinal Thomas Wolsey reported that the king “considers it would be offensive to God and man if he were to persist in [his marriage], and with great remorse of conscience has now for a long time felt that he is living under the offense of the Almighty.”23 Historian Richard Marius describes how “Henry, sitting under a canopy of cloth of gold, spoke at length about the matter he said was dearest to his soul—the state of his own conscience. Catherine protested that his conscience had taken a very long time to awaken.”24

Conscience, it seems, had a ubiquitous, versatile, chameleon-like character. It had the conserving power to confirm and unite—but also the radical power to divide and disrupt. Its versatility equipped it for various forums and various functions, and endowed it with a perduring quality. Although all of those who invoked it in connection with the events in which Thomas More was fatally implicated would inevitably pass from this world within a few years’ time, conscience itself—as an authoritative ideal, and as a potent rhetorical trope—would survive them, and would flourish. Inherited from the old world that was in process of being lost, conscience—or at least something or some (perhaps disparate) things often described as “conscience”—would provide a segue into the emerging new world, where that thing or those things would play an even more prominent and at times defining role. Indeed, the new era that was beginning

with the passing of Thomas More might aptly be christened as “the Age of Conscience.”

Thus, conscience would become a central and cherished theme for the Protestants who (despite More’s efforts) would take control of England, and then would colonize America, and would go on to establish a republic on American soil.25 And conscience would remain a respected theme in twentieth-century America and into the new millennium. Commenting on the concept’s “astonishing persistence,” Paul Strohn observes that

[t]oday, [conscience] is embraced with equal conviction by nonreligious and religious alike. It enjoys a privileged place in theology and devotion, but no less in art and philosophy. Politicians claim to act on its behalf, and occasionally do. Equally striking is the breadth of its appeal among all kinds and classes of persons: a subject of rarified academic inquiry that works at street level too, and is confidently cited by people in all walks of life as a basis for their actions.26

And yet if conscience was there with Thomas More and his world, and was helping to bring the man and his world to an end, half a millennium later conscience may be playing a role in bringing our own age to an end as well (if, as the eminent historian Jacques Barzun thought, our age is in fact coming to an end).27

Or maybe not. We will consider the possibility in a later chapter. So we need to examine and reflect on that utterly familiar, eerily elusive, humbly majestic, potently protean thing. Conscience. And there is perhaps no better way to do this than to remember Thomas More, and try to figure what conscience meant to him, and what part conscience played in his own and his world’s demise.

More’s Enigmatic Conscience

Not that this will be any straightforward task. Historians—and others, including playwrights from William Shakespeare to Robert Bolt of A Man for All Seasons and novelists like Hilary Mantel of the Wolf Hall series—have pondered More’s actions and fate and have

tried to fathom why he did what he did. They have produced as many questions as answers. More’s own contemporaries likewise found his stance baffling. No one—not his enemies, not his friends, not his daughter Meg who knew his mind best and whom he loved more than anyone else in the world,28 certainly not his wife Alice—seemed able to understand what he was doing, or what he was saying (or refusing to say). A sympathetic twentieth-century Catholic historian, Hilaire Belloc, observed that “[t]o his own family as a whole probably, to his wife certainly, to nearly all his friends and to the mass of Englishmen of his time, his position was not heroic but absurd.” 29

Consider the basic pertinent facts.

As noted, More was arrested because he refused to take an oath affirming that Anne Boleyn was the rightful queen and, by implication, that Henry was the head of the church. Over the next fourteen months, from the time of his arrest up to and even on the very day of his trial, More was assured, over and over again, that he could regain his freedom and eminent position simply by affirming the words of the prescribed oath. He didn’t have to believe the words; he only needed to affirm them. The king’s men urged him to do that. So did his friends, and his family, in a “vehement piteous manner,” as he put it.30

Some of the arguments that were pressed upon him addressed his position, insofar as it could be discerned, on the merits. Others emphasized the catastrophic consequences of his intransigence. Taken together, they added up to a weighty case for taking the oath.

Start with the consequence-oriented arguments. The most immediate adverse consequence of More’s stance was obvious enough: by refusing to take the oath, he faced the present certainty of indefinite imprisonment, to be terminated (as seemed likely, and as in fact occurred) by a public trial and painful execution. The history of Christianity has, to be sure, featured heroic or perhaps perverse souls who have eagerly sought martyrdom,31 but Thomas More does not belong in that select company. On the contrary, he dreaded “the terrible prospect of death,” as he put it in one of his last meditations.32

Actually, it was not exactly dying itself that principally concerned him but rather the intense pain that would accompany that transition. Or so he said. “[A] man may lose his head and have no harm,”33 he

quipped, and he professed himself “well content to go, if God call me hence tomorrow.”34 He looked forward to “the bliss of heaven.”35 “[I]f anything should hap to me that you would be loath,” he counseled Meg, “pray to God for me, but trouble not yourself: as I shall full heartily pray for us all, that we may meet together once in heaven, where we shall make merry for ever, and never have trouble after.”36

Was he as calmly confident as he sounds in these pronouncements? Maybe, maybe not: Who can say? Either way, he trembled before the agonizing prospect of pain associated with his execution. After all, torture—an art that had been refined by the Tudor period—was a real possibility. “[H]e envisaged torture upon the rack and terrible pain inflicted by more ingenious instruments,” biographer Peter Ackroyd explains; “he envisaged death by disembowelling, his heart torn out of his body and shown to him while he was still alive.”37 And even if he could have counted on the king’s clemency commuting his sentence to mere beheading, there was no assurance that the job would be completed with one swing of the axe: when the Duke of Buckingham had suffered a like fate a few years earlier, three strokes had been needed to finish the job.38 More’s writings from the Tower were thus filled with meditations and prayers pleading with God to strengthen him so that he could endure the ordeal (or, should he flinch, to forgive him).39 His commentary-reflection on The Sadness of Christ, written while he was imprisoned in the Tower, is essentially an extended meditation and prayer on this theme. More confessed at one point that he found “my fleshe much more shrinkinge from payne and death, than me thought it the part of a faithful Christen man.”40

There was also the matter of his good name, or his reputation. Meg reported to him that even his friends looked upon him (as his wife Alice openly did) not as some paragon of courage and integrity but rather as a pig-headed fool.41 In fact, More was already well aware that people regarded his stance as reflecting, as he put it, mere “stubbornness and obstinacy.”42

Nor was it only More himself who would suffer for his silence: his refusal and likely conviction for treason placed his family in grave danger of losing their property, or worse. It was one thing to accept the personal consequences of his silence, but was it right of him,

standing stubbornly on his supposed integrity, to bring possible punishment and likely disinheritance on his family?43 Alice, More’s wife, certainly didn’t think so, and she told him as much—emphatically, accusing him of being a “fool.”44 And indeed, More confessed to Meg that it was “a deadly grief unto me, and much more deadly than to hear of mine own death . . . [to] perceive my good son your husband, and you my good daughter, and my good wife, and mine other good children and innocent friends, in great displeasure and danger of great harm” because of his stance.45

Other arguments appealed to More’s character, and to his judgment. He was repeatedly reminded that all of the learned men and clerics in the realm (except Fisher) had deemed it proper to take the oath. This number included prelates whom More respected, including Cuthbert Tunstall, bishop of London and a longtime friend and ally in the fight against heresy.46 His own family had also taken the oath.

“Why should you refuse to swear, Father?” Meg pleaded, “For I have sworn myself?”47 More regarded pride as the basest and most dangerous of sins. But wasn’t it prideful of him—arrogant and presumptuous—to set up his own opinion against that of so many learned and pious men and women?

And not only prideful but also ungrateful, because he was spurning his friend, Henry the king, who had done him so much kindness, taking a lowly London undersheriff and raising him up to the highest legal office in the land. Meg reminded him of his debt to Henry, and cautiously suggested that in remaining obdurate he might actually be incurring “peril unto your own soul also.”48

She also tried to use his own teachings to soften him. He had believed and taught that what matters to God is what a person believes in his heart, not what he says with his lips. The playwright Robert Bolt reconstructed the exchange when he had Meg say to More: “‘God more regards the thoughts of the heart than the words of the mouth.’ Or so you’ve always told me.” Based on this principle, Meg urges her father to “say the words of the oath and in your heart think otherwise.”49

Perhaps, we might suppose, Thomas More was one of those rare individuals who believe that truth-telling is an absolute or categorical obligation, without possibility of exception. If your innocent Jewish

friend is hiding in your attic and the Nazi gestapo show up at your door and ask if you are concealing any Jews, you have to say yes.50 Kant would later take this categorical view.51 So had Saint Augustine52—the Church father whom More most admired.53 And yet it seems that More was not in fact so rigorous, or so rigid, in his commitment to truthtelling. He was after all a lawyer. He had long been a government minister. And in performing his lawyerly and ministerial duties, he had demonstrated the necessary ability, on appropriate occasions, to . . . let us say, fudge and finesse the truth.54 Peter Ackroyd notes that “as he admitted himself, on occasions [More] did not shrink from ‘mendaciolum’ or a small lie.”55 So then why on this occasion did he find himself utterly unable to recite some slippery words to avoid catastrophic consequences?

Indeed, would it even have been necessary to lie, exactly? Surely, brilliant lawyer that he was, More could have come up with some construction, however strained, or some mental reservation, that would have permitted him to avoid the dire consequences that his refusal entailed? Ackroyd notes that More was adept at “putting a lawyer’s gloss upon ambiguous circumstances.”56 Could there have been a more opportune time to employ this lawyerly skill?

And what would have been the harm anyway? After all, in taking the oath More would not have been misleading anyone: everyone would have known that he was opposed to the divorce and even more opposed to the king’s assumption of authority over the church. Conversely, his dying did no earthly good;57 it amounted to a kind of personal retreat and surrender in what he perceived to be a desperate “battle for the soul of England,” as one historian has described it.58 If the defense of the Church’s position in that battle was so imperative, wouldn’t it have been more prudent—more virtuous, really, even more unselfish—to take the oath (with mental reservations if necessary) and live on to defend that cause, a task for which More was uniquely qualified? He couldn’t have known it, but within less than a year Queen Anne with her seductive wiles and her Protestant impulses would follow him to the Tower and the scaffold. And Henry, though infatuated, was still fundamentally Catholic, attending three masses a day on hunting days, sometimes five on other days.59 If only Thomas

More, whom the king loved and admired, had still been around to guide him.

Or let us stipulate that no meliorating construction was available, so that in taking the oath More would unavoidably have been affirming something he did not actually believe. Even so, wasn’t there something grossly disproportionate about his stance? Was the wrongfulness of uttering a few words at variance with his belief really so weighty as to justify the loss of his life and the serious risks and deprivations he was imposing on his family? Was his stance really one of conscience, we might ask? Or rather, as his family and friends hinted and more than hinted,60 was it more in the nature of a finicky, unmoored, perhaps even self-indulgent scrupulosity (which in Christian tradition has been regarded as a sin)?61

So, which was it? Integrity? Or scrupulosity?

More as Hypocrite?

And perhaps also hypocrisy?

The question arises because in More’s particular case, there is an additional and troubling complication—one that historians and novelists and interested spectators have debated endlessly in the centuries since. We have already seen that in defending his refusal to take the oath, More repeatedly and eloquently invoked the idea of conscience. One of the prison letters describing a conversation with Meg has been compared to a Platonic dialogue on the subject of conscience.62 And More had indicated that conscience creates reciprocal obligations. Once again: “I . . .  leave every man to his own conscience. And me thinks in good faith that so were it good reason that every man should leave me to mine .”63 And yet in his career as a government minister and especially as lord chancellor, More had seemingly shown little enough respect for the consciences of Protestant dissenters. On the contrary, as we will see, he had vigorously pursued them, hounded them, burned their books, and sometimes burned them if they refused to recant what he regarded as their heresies.64

So, wasn’t it hypocritical of More, now that he was the one in the dock, to pronounce piously on the sanctity of conscience when in

more felicitous times he had shown so little respect for the consciences of his opponents?

In asking what conscience meant to More and why it was so imperative as to lead him to his death, we have thus come upon a number of questions. What did More understand conscience to be? Why was it so imperative? And how, if at all, could he square his proclaimed respect for conscience with his persecution of Protestants?

In attempting to answer these and related questions, our hope will be to get a clearer understanding of that portentous idea or faculty that helped to bring More and his world to an end, and that helped to usher in a new world—our world—but that may now in turn be contributing to that new world’s decline and demise. We will be trying to get a clearer understanding of that portentous and paradoxical thing—conscience.

First, though, we need to take a closer look at the man himself. Who was Thomas More? How did he come to embody the world that he was desperately struggling to save?

II

The Man and His Enemies

So we begin by asking: Who was Thomas More? And sometimes one can understand a person by asking what and whom he hated, or who hated him, so we should ask about More’s opponents as well.

Thomas More was born in 1478 to a moderately prosperous family living in London. His father, John More, was a lawyer who would eventually rise to be appointed to the King’s Bench, one of the highest courts in England (and the court which would later convict More of treason). Young Thomas received a varied education. Five years at St. Anthony’s grammar school on Threadneedle Street, just a few minutes’ walk over mud and cobblestones from his family’s house on Milk Street. Then two years’ service at Lambeth Palace as a page in the household of Archbishop and Lord Chancellor John Morton. Then, at age fourteen, More became a scholarship student at Oxford. The year was 1492; while Thomas (Tommy?) pored over his books,