Excerpt from The Rights of Women by Notre Dame Press

THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN •

•

Reclaiming a Lost Vision

ERIKA BACHIOCHI

University of Notre Dame Press Notre Dame, Indiana

CONTENTS

List of Illustrations Acknowledgments Introduction

xi xiii 1

Mary Wollstonecraft’s Moral Vision

000

Men, Marriage, Law, and Government

000

The Young Republic and the Unequal Virtues of the Agrarian Home

000

Women’s Suffrage, Rational Souls, Sexed Bodies, and the Ties That Bind

000

The Industrial Revolution and the Debate between Abstract Rights and Concrete Duties

000

The “Feminine Mystique” and Human Work

000

Sex Role Stereotypes and the Successful Quest for Equal Citizenship Status

000

Caring for Dependency in the Logic of the Market

000

Sexual Asymmetry, American Law, and the Call for a Renewed Family Ecology

000

Reimagining Feminism Today in Search of Human Excellence

000

Notes Bibliography Index

000 000 000

Introduction On the day before the inauguration of Woodrow Wilson in March 1913, a grand parade marched on Washington, DC, featuring mounted brigades, ornate floats, musical bands, and thousands of predominantly women marchers in distinctive occupational garb. As the procession reached the U.S. Treasury building, the parade turned allegorical pageant, with costumed actors representing in turn Charity, Liberty, Justice, Peace, and Hope, “those ideals toward which both men and women have been struggling through the ages and toward which, in co-operation and equality, they will continue to strive,” according to the official program.1 The New York Times chronicled the pageant as “one of the most impressively beautiful spectacles ever staged in this country.”2 Seven years later, after nearly sixty years of advocacy, the Nineteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution was ratified, granting women in every state the right to vote. Nearly one hundred years after the Woman Suffrage Procession—just three years shy of the centennial celebration of the Nineteenth Amendment—another massive gathering in support of women’s rights was organized in Washington, DC, this time the day after the inauguration of Donald Trump as president. If high ideals were present that day (represented, perhaps, by the slogan “Love Not Hate Makes America Great”), these were overwhelmed by the march’s official panel of speakers, who extolled “nasty” women, made generous use of expletives, and engaged in insult, threat, and ad 1

Th e R i g ht s o f Wom en

figure i.1. Scene from a tableau held on the U.S. Treasury steps in Washington, DC, in conjunction with the Woman’s Suffrage Procession on March 3, 1913. Credit: Library of Congress (public domain).

hominem attack on the new president. The symbol of the march—the female genitalia—was depicted throughout the day in various manifestations on poster board and costume, but most memorably atop participants’ heads in the form of a pink “pussy hat.” Enduring moral principles, which women’s rights advocates in earlier days would have employed to make a reasoned critique of the controversial new president, had given way to vulgar irony: “This pussy grabs back.” Something significant had changed over the intervening century in the cause of women’s rights. And it wasn’t only that participants to the more recent Women’s March arrived by bus rather than on horseback, or that the women marching were as educated and professionally competent as the men, impressive though these changes are. Rather, the underlying rationale for women’s rights—for civil and political freedom and equality as such—has shifted profoundly. But this shift has occurred subtly and over time, such that many now falsely assume that an unbroken line can be traced from those who today agitate for women’s rights to those who argued that women had the right to do so in the first place. This shift can be detected in the changed meanings of words used in the mission statement of the Women’s March; words that have long represented American ideals, such as “self-determination,” “liberty,”

Introduction 3

figure i.2. Women’s March on Washington, January 21, 2017. Credit: (public domain).

and “dignity,” even “love” (rendered “charity” in 1913), do not mean today what they signified in earlier days. Today, these words connote an indeterminacy that would strike previous generations of women’s rights advocates as bereft of noble purpose, and ultimately dangerous. Self-determination and liberty—for what end? Dignity—according to what measure? Love—as evident in what kinds of acts? The moral vacuity implicit in the present meanings of these age-old terms is something altogether new. To be sure, the Woman Suffrage Procession in 1913 was itself not morally impeccable, and the women’s suffragist movement as a whole did not perfectly embody the noble ideals depicted imaginatively that day. Although key leadership had drawn inspiration for their cause from participation in the abolitionist movement, some leaders wished the parade, and the movement too, to be racially segregated. The nation’s original sin had infected its people deeply, and the cause of women’s

Th e R i g ht s o f Wom en

civil and political freedom and equality was sadly no exception. Yet, the parade’s ideals, manifest in both word and dress, spoke a paramount truth to the nation and its leaders, the truth that had prevailed, albeit imperfectly, in the nation’s founding era, and then also in the U.S. Congress and in the states ratifying amendments to the Constitution in the decades following the Civil War. The truth was this: the nation was founded upon and is ever measured by the moral proposition that all human beings are of equal dignity and worth. The women suffragists had argued, like the Black suffragists before them, that by excluding women from full participation in civil and political life, the nation was not living up to its own founding principles. More, the suffragists suggested, in the later years of their campaign especially, that by their engagement in the public realm, women could raise the moral tenor of politics and help a still young nation to embrace more faithfully those principles. The rancorous and occasionally violent reaction to the suffragists’ high-minded procession proved the suffragists right that day. By 2017, one could no longer be so sure. Certainly much has been gained for women’s rights in the last century, but something essential has been lost. It’s worth pondering what that something is, and whether it is worth recovering today. Mining the intellectual history of the cause of women’s rights can shed light on how a philosophical and political principle—equal citizenship for women— has morphed into something that nearly contradicts its original moral vision, a vision first fully articulated by English philosopher Mary Wollstonecraft in A Vindication of the Rights of Woman more than two centuries ago. For Wollstonecraft, political freedom and legal equality were not ends in themselves but necessary means to higher human ends: the common human pursuit of intellectual and moral excellence. The political and civil rights Wollstonecraft claimed for women in the late eighteenth century have been over time and with great struggle steadily secured in modern democracies around the world. In the West, however, the ennobling moral vision upon which she built her rights claims has largely been abandoned. With the stark moral failures of so many of our political, economic, and cultural leaders, the sexual exploitation of women and children through pornography and sex trafficking, the relentless violence that increasingly targets the most vulnerable

Introduction 5

human beings, the abject poverty of so many even amid ever-growing wealth, and the materialism and consumerism that works to corrupt the soul of the West, Wollstonecraft’s substantive vision is needed now more than ever. For Wollstonecraft, women’s capacity to reason, and thus to pursue reason to its proper ends, namely, virtue (imitation of divine perfection) and wisdom (imitation of divine reason), was the very foundation for women’s just claims to political freedom and equality. But not just for women: freedom as such was a necessary means to these higher human ends. It was the forgetfulness of these noble ends, on the part of men especially, that facilitated the subjugation and victimization of women, even in their own homes. A freedom bereft of wisdom and virtue reduces men to beasts, Wollstonecraft claimed. And this was especially true in intimate relations between men and women, the wellspring of the domestic affections she recognized as the source of every public virtue. Chastity was not to be abandoned in the pursuit of equality between the sexes, nor was this virtue specially required of women, as was the convention of the day. Rather, it was men, who, in pursuing self-serving indulgence without habitual respect for women or a regard for the noble purposes of sex and the goods of shared domestic life, had too often failed to treat women with the dignity they deserved. Women, for their part, had too often acquiesced, fashioning themselves more pleasing to the eyes than strong in the mind. Indeed, the eighteenth-century philosopher identifies want of chastity in men as the single most consequential offense against women. Wollstonecraft’s radical vision of sexual integrity for both sexes, with a view toward virtuous friendships of mutual trust and collaboration, poses an especially striking challenge to a modernday women’s movement shaped, since the 1970s, by a very different kind of sexual revolution. Wollstonecraft’s best-known work, A Vindication of the Rights of Woman, was published in 1792, just two years after she published A Vindication of the Rights of Men, the first widely read critique of Edmund Burke’s famous 1790 defense of the British monarchy. Wollstonecraft wrote these treatises during a time of marked political and social change, as the American and then French revolutions threw off old

Th e R i g ht s o f Wom en

forms of hereditary rule in their respective attempts (with greater and lesser success) to enact altogether new forms of republican government based on God-given rights, derived from the moral status of human beings as rational creatures. In both the Rights of Men and the Rights of Woman, Wollstonecraft articulated this now familiar rationale for civil and political rights in the modern era, artfully extending its reach to women. But unlike most of her contemporaries, Wollstonecraft’s defense of rights was inspired by an ancient view of the human person, one that exalted the common human pursuit of wisdom and virtue above all else. She thus offered a unique synthesis of ancient wisdom and modern political insight, correcting errors she saw among philosophers of her day, and proposing a program that in its fullness remains still yet untried today. Like her fellow travelers in the Enlightenment period, Wollstonecraft extolled freedom from illegitimate and arbitrary power, but not a freedom left to its own devices. Civil and political rights for both men and women (men without property at the time fared little better than women, and slaves often fared far worse) were essential to human dignity and political progress. But such rights were themselves born of moral duties to self, family, fellow citizens, and God. That is, political freedom was at the service of the moral development of each person, which consisted, in large measure, of virtuously fulfilling the ordinary duties of life. By assigning women to a dependent state, ill-formed both intellectually and morally, social convention had rendered them incapable of fulfilling their familial and social duties as well as they might. Wollstonecraft argued that women ought to be freed from those social conventions that judged them less capable than men (and created only to please them). Such freedom ought to be extended not so that women might pursue a life of moral mediocrity, or worse, vulgarity, which would be no freedom at all. Wollstonecraft’s was a freedom for excellence. Wollstonecraft was strongly influenced by the classical republican tradition that was experiencing a renaissance in her time, and so she was persuaded that new forms of republican government would require civic virtue. But she did not recommend virtue for its social utility. Indeed, she railed against utilitarian views of virtue, especially as conceived in aristocratic society as mere decorum or manners; such displays too often lacked an interior disposition of authentic benevolence

Introduction 7

toward fellow creatures. Nor did she hesitate to repudiate the view, then current in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and others, that virtue was bifurcated by sex, with women devoted to developing only those “feeling” virtues most pleasing to “rational” men. Rather, for Wollstonecraft, personal virtue, most highly manifest in benevolence, represented the highest attainment of human life, for men and women in equal measure. All institutions in society ought to be designed according to, and measured against, this highest human ideal. Wollstonecraft did not preach sanctity in a religious sense, but a religious perspective did inform her thinking. She sought instead to enunciate the moral duties that characterized rational creatures, duties to self (to develop one’s rational faculties and master one’s appetites), to family (to care for one’s dependent children, spouse, and elderly parents), to fellow creatures (to be useful in one’s work and respect the human dignity of all others, regardless of social status), and to God (to pursue truth and goodness and to trust in his providential designs). As the content of her children’s stories attest, Wollstonecraft viewed the affectionate inculcation of virtue in children to be among the most essential of all social duties, and so motherhood and fatherhood the very highest of callings. Wollstonecraft’s appeal for women’s education is her most remembered contribution today; her rationale perhaps less so. The self-taught philosopher believed that if women, like men, were afforded both intellectual and moral formation and the opportunities to engage in more serious-minded occupations, they would enjoy greater independence of mind and in turn better appreciate their distinctive duties to their families and beyond. Wollstonecraft’s view of marriage in her Rights of Woman—a relationship of reciprocity and friendship between equals, a shared project for the upbringing of children, and the best means to restore harmony between the sexes—remains the treatise’s most farsighted vision. Given the dangerous political upheaval that served as the context of her first romance, the unjust marital laws that existed in her time, the cruel abandonment she experienced at the hands of her first child’s father, and her untimely death just after the birth of her second child. But her vision still has much to teach us today. Wollstonecraft became a scandal in her day, less for her revolutionary ideas than for the incomplete picture of her tragic personal life

Th e R i g ht s o f Wom en

imprudently published by her bereaved husband, William Godwin, in the months following her death. But although many of the themes Wollstonecraft first articulated in Rights of Woman emerged energetically in the political and legal writings of generations of women’s rights advocates, in her own country, and particularly in the young United States, she proposed a far more substantive moral vision than what is often represented today as a treatise in favor of women’s rights in marriage, education, employment, and political participation. Now, more than two hundred years later, we may yet be ready to hear all she had to say. Emboldened by her insights on work, marriage, children, virtue, and rights, a renewed women’s movement might make itself a catalyst for the regeneration of marriages and families, the revaluing of caregiving and the reshaping of work, and the reconstituting of a morally embattled nation. Sometime in the last half century, the women’s movement lost its way. This book represents one woman’s attempt to reclaim Wollstonecraft’s lost vision for our day.

In 1966, Betty Friedan founded the National Organization for Women (NOW). Her blockbuster book, The Feminine Mystique, had three years earlier ushered in the modern-day women’s movement, challenging the women of her station to broaden their focus beyond exclusive identification with their homes, husbands, and children. Friedan reminded her readers that American women from earlier generations had helped to build townships, run family farms and shops, staff and reform factories, win suffrage and other rights for women and children, all while tending to their families and homes. Friedan extolled the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth-century advocates of the “first wave” of the women’s movement and noted the revolutionary writings of late eighteenth century proto-feminist Mary Wollstonecraft. Friedan maintained that suburban housewives in the postindustrial, postwar era were feeling incomplete, unfulfilled, and left out of the rest of life, especially as their young children left home during the day to attend school. Not all women were experiencing this feminine malaise, of course, but enough to make Friedan’s book an immediate best seller. When, a few years later, Friedan penned NOW’s original

Introduction 9

Statement of Purpose with civil rights attorney Pauli Murray, the two declared that “women . . . are human beings, who, like all other people in our society, must have the chance to develop their fullest human potential.”3 Sagely, they sought to connect the development of human potential with the acceptance of “the challenges and responsibilities [women] share with all other people in our society,” and included several mentions of their “responsibilities as mothers and homemakers.” Though the pursuit of wisdom and virtue were not foremost on their pens, the proposal represented a thin but decent reprisal of Wollstonecraft’s more thoroughgoing vision: NOW pushed for an end to educational and workplace discrimination, a cultural recognition of the “economic and social value” of caregiving in (and of) the home, and creative solutions to promote the partnership of men and women in the family and in society. It was a modern vision that women (and men) of nearly all backgrounds could support. But as NOW’s priorities shifted sharply in the years and decades that followed, some observers, initially sympathetic to the “second wave” feminist cause, began to express their skepticism. By 1996, for instance, Elizabeth Fox-Genovese, the founder of the Women’s Studies Department at Emory University, who was also an eminent historian of the American South, published Feminism Is Not the Story of My Life, in which she recounts the personal stories of scores of ordinary women—as Friedan herself had done in 1963—but this time to showcase a critique of what had since become of modern feminism. In FoxGenovese’s view, Friedan’s “second wave” movement, three decades in, had given way to an all-encompassing, individualistic dedication to pursuit of success in the workplace, too often at the expense of familial relationships, and of particular harm, in Fox-Genovese’s assessment, to underprivileged women and their children. To be sure, Fox-Genovese, who had five years earlier published the learned feminist treatise Feminism without Illusions, celebrated how the modern-day women’s movement had successfully torn down artificial barriers to allow women all the opportunities once available only to men. But now she and other social thinkers were lamenting that the movement had also seemed to cast away cultural norms that once taught young people how to forge and sustain enduring relationships with one another, and with those who depended upon them. Young

The R i g h t s of Wom en

women were becoming just as adept as their male counterparts at negotiating the educational and professional landscape. But both sexes had lost an important cultural inheritance that, from time immemorial, had given priority to the longings for deep companionship and the duties of care within the family. These were the longings and duties that Wollstonecraft herself had made so central to her program, for both women and men. By 1981, Friedan herself had even begun to wonder if her original vision had gone astray.4 Fox-Genovese’s book sold a fraction of the books Freidan’s had sold, but the historian’s critique was poignant and rang true for many in the 1990s. It certainly rang true for me. As a middle-class white woman born in the mid-1970s, I profited where the modern-day women’s movement had made its most obvious gains: by my late twenties, I had competed athletically at the collegiate level and had earned two graduate degrees. A one-time women’s studies student, I had read Wollstonecraft and Friedan among the other feminist greats and counted myself lucky to be born in the late twentieth century. Indeed, elite women overall are doing better educationally and professionally than ever before, and in many fields increasingly outperform their male counterparts. Wollstonecraft had claimed, like advocates of women’s equality in the Middle Ages and Renaissance before her, and John Stuart Mill after, that women’s true intellectual capacity would remain unknown until women had equal access to education and more serious-minded occupations.5 Thanks to decades of educational and workplace reforms in the mid- to late twentieth century, false assumptions of woman’s inferior nature finally have been put to rest. But my generation was also the first to experience the divorce revolution of my parents’ generation—propelled by 1970s feminist activists of their day—and it took a toll on me personally just as it had taken its toll on many others my age. As a teen and young adult, I lacked the confident sense of selfworth and self-possession that I witness in my own children, instilled imperceptibly by familial stability in their formative years. The divorce rate has plateaued in recent years, but increasing rates of cohabitation have consolidated a decades-long flight from marriage, most notably among the poor and working classes. Children who grow up in single-parent families can show impressive resilience, and many flourish throughout their lives, but researchers from across the political

Introduction 11

spectrum confirm what Wollstonecraft had intuited: children develop best when they have secured loving relationships with both of their parents, and in particular when their parents are committed to (and deeply respect) one another in marriage. The trouble with the women’s movement today, therefore, lies not with its most basic critique, as embodied in the myriad antidiscrimination measures brought about in the 1960s and 1970s. Few today would dispute the view that rigid social norms had confined women unfairly to domestic roles that limited their opportunity to use their talents to contribute to both their families’ well-being and the broader community at large. Two hundred years after Wollstonecraft’s Rights of Woman, women are enjoying civil and political liberties, at least in the most advanced democracies in the world. The trouble with the women’s movement today lies, rather, in its near abandonment of Wollstonecraft’s original moral vision, one that championed women’s rights so that women, with men, could virtuously fulfill their familial and social duties. Nowhere is such an abandonment clearer than in the revolutionary assault on the mutual responsibilities that inhere in sex, childbearing, and marriage that began in the 1960s and 70s. The modern-day fusion of the women’s movement with the sexual revolution is one that most regard, for good or ill, as intrinsic to the cause of women’s rights. But it is not. Rather, it is a great departure from Wollstonecraft’s original moral vision and that of the early women’s rights advocates in the United States too: it has cheapened sex and objectified women, belittled the essential contributions of both mothers and fathers, and has contributed to upending the American promise of equal opportunity for the most disadvantaged men, women, and children today. Disentangling the original vision of the rights of women from the excesses of the sexual revolution may sound unlikely, but if rehabilitated, it’s a vision both women and men could embrace today. Indeed, it’s one that is already taking shape among some of the most well-off and educated in our society, as they increasingly embrace a vision of marriage as a friendship of equals, and shape their progressively flexible work lives around the caregiving needs of their families. And, in the most rudimentary of ways, it is a vision that is being articulated by some powerful women, even if they would themselves spurn what I regard to be some of its most necessary elements.

12 The R i g h t s of Wom en

It now has become common practice for some very influential women in the professional world to acknowledge and even extol the caregiving in the home and the important familial relationships that such caregiving presupposes. Consider, for instance, the rebranding of Hillary Clinton during the 2016 presidential campaign. This most prominent figure of a feminist movement once insistent on the need to refer to married women primarily as independent individuals—coining the term Ms. to replace Mrs. in the early 1970s—cast herself, on social media, first as “wife, mom, and grandma” and only then in terms of her professional achievements and aspirations, “lawyer . . . SecState . . . 2016 presidential candidate.” Princeton professor Anne-Marie Slaughter, one of Secretary Clinton’s top aides at the State Department, became, with her widely read Atlantic article, “Why Women Still Can’t Have It All,” an outspoken proponent of a revaluation of caregiving and a prioritizing of the family within the women’s movement. In her popular book Unfinished Business, Slaughter argues that the women’s movement has mistakenly “left caregiving behind, valuing it less and less as a meaningful and important endeavor.”6 Now, Slaughter is not calling for a return to the 1950s. Few of us are. But Slaughter writes glowingly of her own happy marriage, and forthrightly acknowledges that women today still tend to place the care of their families ahead of their own professional advancement. She seeks instead to invite men into the caregiving enterprise, suggesting that if our society better valued caregiving, then perhaps men would do more of it, and we’d see greater equity in both the home and the workplace. Slaughter follows a long line of scholars and advocates who have been working toward just this substantive goal, with the celebrated women’s rights advocate and late Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at the very forefront. Justice Ginsburg, who died in September 2020, just as this book was going to press, undoubtedly wished for more couples to enjoy the happy situation that she and her beloved husband of fifty-six years enjoyed: a marriage of equals in which each spouse dedicates oneself to work and family with deep respect for the joys and duties of both avenues of fulfillment. Indeed, Ginsburg herself would seem to be the leading icon of Wollstonecraft’s vision for women.

Introduction 13

But as inspiring as women like Ginsburg and Slaughter are to many up-and-coming young professionals, theirs are stories of great privilege, and not just in terms of the resources and flexibility that come with high-status work. Their stories share a profound appreciation for and dedication to marriage at their very core. Indeed, it is hard to read the stories of these successful women, both mothers, without underscoring the relentless support and fidelity of their husbands. And not just women at the pinnacle of their professions. Marriage and childrearing go hand in hand among the wealthier across the board, and women of all professions, including “at-home mothers,” are the better for it. These women’s success stories, then, are not first about sexual freedom and equality as individual autonomy, whatever their personal philosophies may tell us otherwise. They are the stories of the excesses of the sexual revolution spurned. Ordinary women have not been so lucky. Solid marital ties that, for most of our country’s history, bound men and women together with their dependent children—collaborative, loyal bonds of kinship and care that enabled working-class and immigrant families to rise into the middle class and enjoy the “American dream”—are no longer holding sway. Growing income inequality, economic insecurity, and threats to social cohesion have many causes, but the diametric trajectories of the marrying rich and unmarrying poor bear a good share of the blame. Economists and other social scientists have offered various explanations over the last several decades for the sharp decline in marriage, the rise in nonmarital childbearing among disadvantaged women, and the feminization of poverty that has accompanied both. But what has become increasingly difficult to ignore is the way in which the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 70s dramatically altered the circumstances in which poor women bear and raise their children. The decoupling of sex from marriage and marriage from childbearing, ushered in by the sexual revolution, unraveled a working-class culture of once stable marital bonds that children need and both mothers and fathers once relied upon for their success at home and at work, and in all of life. Women in the United States and other Western nations now enjoy untold educational and employment opportunities, won through landmark advances in antidiscrimination law and other state protections

Th e R i g ht s o f Wom en

and cultural gains. But unmarried women who raise children without the emotional and financial supports of their children’s fathers are at a stark disadvantage on any number of measures when compared to those women who raise their children within the marital bond. Again, the most well-educated women in the United States have not abandoned marriage in favor of total independence from men, as more radical feminists, insistent on the inherent patriarchal nature of marriage, suggested in the 1970s that they do. No, college-educated American women (“the most economically independent women in the history of the nation,” according to a noted scholar at the Brookings Institution) are getting and staying married at the highest rates of all demographic groups today.7 Whether working outside of the home or exclusively within it, these elite women well understand the unique contributions their husbands make to their children’s well-being and to their own happiness. They also understand the central Wollstonecraftian principle that collaboration and reciprocity in their marriages is the surest ticket to their children’s well-being—and to their own. Slaughter’s efforts to elevate the culturally essential work of caregiving, built upon the scholarship and advocacy of decades of “relational feminists” before her, are an advance for modern feminism, and so too an advance for women and for families. But a deep contradiction still riddles the modern-day women’s movement from within, and without an understanding of the nature of the contradiction, even this newfound appreciation for duties of care—including Slaughter’s own invitation to men to take part in more caregiving—modern feminism will not be set aright. The cause of women’s rights will only become what Wollstonecraft envisioned, a cause that honors both caregiving within the home and professional work without, when it disentangles itself from the excesses of the sexual revolution, and so firmly reestablishes the responsibilities that accompany sex. Well before Slaughter called for a new men’s movement to better value the work of caregiving, generations of men were already doing so, albeit in more traditional settings than many are today. Devoted husbands and fathers both traditionally and often today sacrifice time with their families to earn a living for their families, so that the essential duties of nurture and caregiving, so often managed primarily (and often quite happily) by women, would be protected and preserved. These

Introduction 15

men understand what Wollstonecraft hoped they would, namely, that marital and paternal responsibilities accompany marriage and childbearing, and the sexual act has an intimate connection to both. Indeed, it is precisely this connection, between sexual activity and potential fatherhood, that Wollstonecraft strongly defended, and that the sexual revolution devastatingly eclipsed. And it has left the most vulnerable of women (and their children too) more vulnerable today than nearly anytime in modern U.S. history. The contradiction deep at the heart of the modern-day women’s movement is a tale plainly told because it is a great departure from Wollstonecraft’s original moral vision and from that of the early women’s rights advocates of the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and it also departs from NOW’s founding statement in 1966. The departure took shape the day the modern women’s movement wholeheartedly embraced abortion as a remedy, not just for life-threatening risks facing pregnant women, but as the sine qua non of women’s freedom and equality. Once understood as the necessary means toward the higher human goods of virtue and wisdom, goods first learned through the interdependent bonds of familial solidarity and affection, we are now told that freedom and equality ought to include that act that tears at the first bond of human affection, between a mother and her unborn child. But easy abortion access has not rendered women freer or more equal, as much as of the U.S. Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey suggested it might have. Instead, it has distorted the shared responsibilities that adhere in male–female sexual relationships, promoted a view of childbearing as one consumer choice among many, and has greatly contributed to the dim view of caregiving ever since. More still, the relentless quest for abortion rights over the last several decades has placed the modern-day women’s movement squarely on the side of the individualistic and consumerist economy, ever hostile to the priorities of the child-rearing family, and so diametrically at odds with the market-resistant logic for which the women’s movement originally stood. Before the late 1960s, those advocating abortion mainly had done so for eugenic and population-control reasons, with women’s rights advocates standing historically opposed to the practice in promoting an ethic of solidarity, care, and the shared duties of both mothers

The R i g h t s of Wom en

and fathers. Nineteenth-century women’s rights advocates, who had won for women the right to vote, regarded abortion as an act of violence against an innocent unborn child, a reality advances in modern science have only made clearer. They, like Wollstonecraft before them, also intuited what social scientists have described in our time: that sex unmoored from its reproductive potential would increase sexual risk-taking, particularly among men, and that the negative effects of what economists now call “low-cost” sex would redound disproportionately to women, especially among the most vulnerable. Like today’s feminists, both Wollstonecraft and early women’s rights advocates were deeply critical of the sexual double standard that shamed women for behaviors that men freely indulged in. But these early generations of women’s advocates worked not for women to imitate dissolute men, as organizers of the 2017 Women’s March seemed keen to do. Instead, Wollstonecraft and the suffragists argued for sexual integrity for both sexes. “Votes for women, chastity for men” was actually a suffragist slogan. Indeed, out of respect for both the reproductive potential of sex and women’s distinctive reproductive capacity, many nineteenth-century women’s rights advocates and their husbands practiced periodic abstinence, what they called “voluntary motherhood,” an early precursor, not to abortion (or even contraception, which most of them opposed for the selfsame reasons), but to natural methods of fertility regulation, which have only grown more scientific and effective in our day. Sexual integrity, on this account, was a necessary precondition to authentic equality, and harmonious companionship, between women and men. It’s worth asking whether this belief could still be true today.

In this book, I trace the intellectual history of that once predominant vision of women’s rights, one that honored the reproductive asymmetries of men and women but that also sought to promote shared concern and mutual collaboration in all spheres of life. Beginning with Mary Wollstonecraft’s moral, familial, and political vision; through the champions of joint property rights, suffrage, “voluntary motherhood,” and worker’s rights in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; then as articulated in NOW’s original 1966 platform; and culminating

Introduction 17

in the landmark sex-discrimination legislation and high court rulings of the 1970s, chapters 1 through 7 detail how efforts for women’s legal and social equality not only acknowledged and celebrated embodied sexual differences and the responsibilities they entailed, but also argued that these ought not disparage women’s distinctive contributions or confine women to maternity alone. Women’s reproductive powers had historically given rise to women’s legal, political, social, and economic subordination. The early women’s right advocates said no more but sought not to reject the consequences of reproduction outright—arguing that such rejection would denigrate women by freeing men from their familial responsibilities. They sought instead to elevate women’s dignity, legal status, and contributions in all realms of life. Justice Ginsburg stands at the very center of the story, as both the rightly celebrated protagonist of the Supreme Court’s sex-discrimination jurisprudence in the 1970s, and then, as a Supreme Court justice, the Court’s fiercest defender of abortion rights. In chapter 8, I suggest that the tension between these two pillars of Ginsburg’s legal thought — antidiscrimination and pro-abortion rights—has contributed to what some have called the “stalled” gender revolution, where women, thanks in large part to Ginsburg’s trailblazing work in the 1970s, have achieved remarkable gains educationally and professionally, but without a concomitant valuing of the essential caregiving work that both mothers and fathers undertake in the home. “Reproductive choice” may have offered women a means to accommodate their bodies to the fit the ideal unencumbered (male) worker with whom they seek to compete in the workplace, but it has delayed dramatically the workplace’s acknowledgment of the essential cultural reality that most working persons are (or ought to be) deeply encumbered by their obligations to their families, and to the dependent and vulnerable at large. Ginsburg’s 1970s advocacy pushed law and culture to rethink the ways in which women traditionally had been pigeonholed as caregivers and men as providers, opening up a new era in which both men and women could respectably and responsibly engage in both avenues of fulfillment, according to their personal talents and family circumstances. But by constitutionalizing the right to abortion in the very same era, the

Th e R i g ht s o f Wom en

Supreme Court imposed a new and disputed view of liberty (as coincident with radical autonomy) onto the nation, liberating men, but never women, from the consequences of sex, with ramifications that are especially rife for poor single mothers today. Doubling down on its error, the Court appropriated a recently popularized theory of equality (with a very brief heritage) into the Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. It thereby short-circuited more humane and creative responses to the asymmetries that naturally exist, and socially persist, because of women’s disproportionate role in reproduction. In chapter 9, I begin to put the pieces back together in both law and culture to set up an affirmative vision for women and men today inspired by Wollstonecraft’s original vision. I take as my guide the prolific work of internationally acclaimed legal scholar Mary Ann Glendon. Glendon’s thought, like that of Wollstonecraft, is steeped deeply in the Western tradition, culling from sources both ancient and modern. She and Wollstonecraft share a keen insight into the priority of the moral development of persons and the domestic affections that make the attainment of such virtue possible. Glendon is notably among the world’s leading thinkers on the foundations of law and human rights. She has thought long and hard about the moral preconditions of liberty and equality, preconditions that Wollstonecraft too understood to be necessary to the flourishing of both individuals and republics. But Glendon, an ambassador, Harvard Law professor, and celebrated public intellectual, offers us something Wollstonecraft cannot: insight into how their shared moral vision can help us today. Bringing the themes of the book sharply into our own time, I seek to explore how Glendon’s dignitarian vision, as developed from her writing in a variety of areas of legal and political thought, is a crucial corrective to the irreconcilable tensions that exist in Justice Ginsburg’s more libertarian strain of thought. Not only does Glendon’s vision rehabilitate the neglected insights of Wollstonecraft, early women’s rights advocates, and the drafters of the original NOW platform in their acknowledgment of reproductive asymmetry and our shared responsibilities for human dependency, but it also, in my view, offers a more authentic completion of both Wollstonecraft’s vision and Ginsburg’s 1970s antidiscrimination advocacy than Ginsburg’s own equality arguments for abortion rights do.

Introduction 19

Glendon questions the elevation of individual autonomy, or freedom as its own end, as our preeminent constitutional value. Rather, she suggests that the liberties necessary for the full flourishing and collaboration of women and men, and of a constitutional form of government that encourages such flourishing, rest upon cultural preconditions that freedom itself does not provide. If these preconditions are not furnished by the family and other mediating institutions, the overweening forces of both the market and the state necessarily step in, elevating individualism and materialism, eroding the moral development of, and solidarity with, persons that makes authentic freedom possible. Glendon suggests that law must properly acknowledge and respect human dependency, the maternal and paternal duties that dependency demands, and the mediating structures of civil society that have always taken up the task of forming persons to embrace responsibly their duties of care. In chapter 10, I end with a lengthy treatment of authentic freedom and reproductive justice. Lamenting our culture’s modern tendency to view freedom in a consumerist vein, I return once again to propose Wollstonecraft’s vision anew: freedom for the sake of human excellence. I then sketch out the path to a feminism reimagined upon this philosophical foundation, looking first to the duties of care of mothers and fathers in the family, upon which every other public good rests. I conclude with some general suggestions drawn from the extraordinary women highlighted in this book and others, too, as to how workplaces and the community at large might better value the culturally essential work of the home, and in so doing rewire the world of work so that human persons are served above all else. In 1792, Mary Wollstonecraft called for a revolution of female manners: in reforming themselves, she thought, women would go on to reform the world. One need not go beyond the territorial limits of the Unites States to recognize that the world needs reforming today: though we often hesitate to use such language, those in powerful positions at all levels of society have shown significant moral failure. It is time to reexamine a cause originally inspired by an imperfect woman with a noble vision. What follows is the history of her idea, and the blueprint to take it forward.