The European Security and Defence Union Issue 19

ISSN 2192-6921

Independent Review on European Security & Defence − Winner of the European Award 2011 for Citizenship, Security and Defence

Volume No 19

MAIN TOPIC: Energies

To enhance energy security Europe needs better connected infrastructure and to use the new technologies, including in the security and defence area

The future of European Defence

Anna ElĹźbieta Fotyga MEP, Chair SEDE Committee, European Parliament

The next generation of Airborne Surveillance Solutions Philippe Roy, President Aero Surveillance Inc.

www.magazine-the-european.com ProPress Publishing Group

Edition 2/2014

For 1.

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Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan – all of that for what? Diplomacy has forever been the art of achieving political aims corresponding to the national interest while as far as possible remaining viable in the long term. Diplomacy entails thinking ahead in order to be in a position to act fast in full knowledge of the consequences. The developments in the Middle East are the result of a western policy that did nothing to resolve the root causes of the conflicts there. And today these conflicts are being fuelled, above all, by religious rivalries. Hundreds of thousands of people are fleeing terror and genocide. It is only three years since Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron celebrated in Benghazi as brothers in arms to the strains of the Marseillaise and God Save the Queen. Their air strikes speeded up the process of toppling a dictator. Both leaders urged the Libyans to make the most of this newfound freedom. They supplied them with weapons, but for reasons of national policy were not willing to provide troops on the ground to secure the process of democratisation. Three years on, Libya finds itself in a quasi-civil war situation. The West is not about to see its democratic aims fulfilled. Ten years earlier George Bush had announced to the world Iraq’s release from the clutches of evil, promising it a joyful future with American assistance. But the allied forces left Iraq all too soon to its own devices. And now the country is torn between the different religious groups. The “Islamic State”, whose aim is to create a caliphate, is marching towards Baghdad, leaving death and destruction in its wake. In Iraq and Libya the toppling of the dictators also marked the collapse of law and order. There was no formation of political elites and no viable attempt to create a civil society.

Are the many years of nation-building efforts in Afghanistan heading in the same direction because we are leaving Afghanistan on its own too soon, before the state has been consolidated and Hartmut Bühl internal peace established? Political credibility means being able not only to adapt, but also to sustain a policy, if need be in the face of public opinion. How can anyone who says about genocide “Never again!” just stand and watch the murderous events taking place in northern Iraq? And yet policymakers stood by helplessly while a genocide unfolded. Only after targeted US air strikes to bar the way to Baghdad for the murderous jihadist groups did European states decide to deliver weapons to the Kurds on the ground. For they are the only ones willing and able to resist the jihadists and to protect the country’s Christian, Yezidi and other threatened minorities. But what will be the end result of this armed conflict in northern Iraq – a Kurdish state, or the establishment of a system of terror on either side of the Syrian-Iraqi border whose cruelty surpasses that even of al-Qaeda and the Taliban? Europe is closely following the paradigm shift in Germany, which is overcoming its reservations about weapons deliveries to conflict zones and wishes to help the Kurds. But there is no question of sending troops to secure this process. Is such a policy really consistent, or is German Member of Parliament R. Kiesewetter right in resuming the dilemma facing Germany thus: “we cannot send weapons and then just turn away”?

Photo: © Hofmann, Adelsheim

Editorial

Hartmut Bühl, Editor-in-Chief

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin Headquarters Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Phone/Fax: +33/684 806 655 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Bonn Office: Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 57, D-53113 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Advertisement Office Bonn: Karin Dornbusch Phone: +49/228/970 97-40 E-Mail: Karin.dornbusch@euro-defence.eu

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Deputy Editor-in-Chief: Nannette Cazaubon, Paris; E-Mail: nannette.b@gmx.net Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH, Berlin Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berlin Security Conference), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management. For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.magazine-the-european.com Subscription: This magazine is published in Brussels and Berlin. The copy price is 16 Euro: 3 copies for one year: 42 Euro (EU subscription) 3 copies for one year: 66 Euro (International subscription) including postage and dispatch (3 issues) © 2014 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin ProPress Publishing Group is the holding of the trade mark BEHOERDEN SPIEGEL.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

29 3 6

Interview with Mike Lyden, General Manager NATO Support Agency, Capellen, Luxembourg

Editorial Latest News

The European Union 8 9

Nannette Cazaubon, Paris

The Italian EU Presidency Anna Elżbieta Fotyga MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

The future of European defence More solidarity is needed

31 18

Koen Gijsbers, General Manager NATO Communications and Information Agency, Brussels

Christoph Raab, Brussels

The European Parliament in security and defence – how functional will it be? The growing tendency to look eastwards

Industries 20 22 24

26

Prof Holger Mey, Ottobrunn

European defence industries – which future? There is no clear design

Prof Rolf-Jürgen Ahlers, Brussels

The role of SMEs in security and defence SMEs are the backbone

Jacques Favin-Lévêque, Versailles

A Franco-German alliance in the land systems sector?

The differences in industrial philosophy run too deep Philippe Roy, Le Castellet

Next generation of Airborne Surveillance Solutions High impact on miniaturisation

Policies and institutions 12 14 15

Roderich Kiesewetter MdB, Berlin

Challenges for the European security order Review of the European Security Strategy

Prof Ioan Mircea Paşcu MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

Black Sea security – pondering the next steps Russia is coming closer to NATO Jean Paul Perruche, Paris

NATO: The laborious process of putting complementarity into practice

NATO agencies reform

28 NATO reform at a glance 29 31

Interview with Mike Lyden, Capellen

NSPA – An agency tailored to its mission Gaining efficiency

Koen Gijbers, Brussels

Winning the cyber battle through reform Technological renewal within NATO

The time has come for closer EU-NATO cooperation

Photos Cover: © unique3d, fotolia.com; © Grzegorz Laskowski; private Page 4: © European Union 2014; NSPA;NCI Agency Page 5: © European Union 2014; Woodleywonderworks, CC BY 2.0, flick.com

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Cyber Security Solutions 34

36 39

34

Dr Andreas Schwab MEP, Brussels/Strasbourg

The implementation of the EU Cyber Security Strategy Towards a digital Single Market

Peter Rost, Munich

Innovation in encryption technology

Off-the-shelf products are not always the best solution Klaus Veit, Koblenz

From sensor to shooters – new approaches for interoperability in C5ISR A holistic approach to harmonisation

Dr Andreas Schwab MEP, EP Rapporteur for the Directive on the Network and Information Security, Brussels/Strasbourg

Protection 50 53 54

Dr Victor Remez, Tel Aviv

CATO – CBRN crisis management From project to product

Kristian Krieger and Brooke Rogers, London

Improving public resilience to CBRN incidents How to shape the response to the needs

Interview with Volker Welzenbach and Thomas Popp, Schwaikheim

Water-Food-Camps

High-tech for crisis management

Energies MAIN TOPIC

40

42

45 46 48

Andy Francis Stirnal, Berlin

Learning from physics: the principle of energy conservation New impetus

Maritime Security 57

A golden opportunity for renewables

Michael Rühle, Brussels

NATO and the challenge of energy security Enhancing energy security

Maritime Security Policy: Safety in the Arctic Security and safety - two sides of the same coin

History 60

Dr William Gillett, Brussels

Energy security – new opportunities for renewable energies in the EU

Markus Kafurke, Paris

Hartmut Bühl

100th anniversary of the First World War Trying to look ahead

Conference report 62

Nico Segers, Brussels

2014 BS Secure Forum – a conference report

Thomas Bennington, Brussels

Armed forces going green – only a vision? There is some light ahead

“The European − Security and Defence Union” is the winner of the 2011 European Award for Citizenship, Security and Defence

Albrecht Broemme, Berlin

Energy supply in disaster management Electricity – electricity – electricity

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Nine Women for Juncker’s team

The designation on 4 September of Marianne

Thyssen (Belgium) and Corina Creţu (Roma-

From left to right: Donald Tusk, Herman Van Rompuy, Federica Mogherini source: © European Union, 2014

EU INSTITUTIONS

New EU Top Leaders appointed

At its extraordinary meeting on 30 August, the European Council appointed Donald Tusk, the current Prime Minister of Poland, as President of the European Council in succession to Herman Van Rompuy (for the period from 1 December 2014 to 31 May 2017). Donald Tusk has been Prime Minister of Poland since November 2007. Furthermore, the European Council appointed Italy’s Foreign Affairs Minister Federica Mogherini to succeed Catherine Ashton as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (for the period from the end of the current term of office of the Commission until 31 October 2019). Federica Mogherini has been Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation since February 2014 (for her biography, please see page 25). After the meeting, President Herman Van Rompuy stressed that both personalities had the support of “all members” of the European Council. UKRAINE

New Sanctions against Russia

brings the number

of women for JeanClaude Juncker’s future college of

Commissioners to 9 – the minimum required by the

European Parlia-

ment (in particular by the Socialists), which has to

approve Juncker’s

list of Commission-

Alenka Bratus̆ek is one of the women on Juncker’s list of Commissioners photo: © European Commission, 2014

ers. Also part of the

team will be Elżbieta Bieńkowska (Poland), Alenka Bratušek (Slovenia), Kristalina

Georgieva (Bulgaria), Věra Jourová (Czech Republic), Cecilia Malmström (Sweden),

Federica Mogherini (Italy) and Margrethe Vestager (Denmark).

IRAQ/SYRIA

Action against the “Islamic State”

On 3 September, the European Commission adopted for consideration by Member States proposals for the EU to take significant further restrictive measures against Russia. Those measures were requested by the extraordinary European Council of 30 August, during which Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko had informed the EU leaders in detail about the recent dramatic escalasource: © European Union, 2014 tion of the situation due to the presence and actions of Russian armed forces on Ukrainian territory. The Commission proposals for further sanctions complement those adopted on 31 July and concern access to capital markets, defence, dual-use goods and sensitive technologies.

On 22 July, the EU Council established the European Union Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform (EUAM) Ukraine. Kálmán Mizsei (Hungary) has been appointed as Head of this unarmed, non-executive civilian mission under the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy. EU advisers will initially focus on supporting the elaboration of revised security strategies and the rapid implementation of reforms, in coordination and coherence with other EU efforts, as well as with the OSCE and other international partners. A budget of 2.68 million has been approved for the start-up phase of the mission, i.e. until 30 November. The formal launch of the mission's operations will take place once initial operating capability has been reached. The two-year mandate of the mission will start at that point.

At their last meeting on 30 August, EU leaders said that they were particularly concerned about the atrocities committed by the so called “Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)” and about the deterioration of the security and humanitarian situation in Iraq and Syria as a result of the occupation of parts of their territory by ISIL. The EU is committed to providing humanitarian support to the region, and the European Council supports the initiative of certain Member States to provide weapons to Iraq. The European Council proposed that stronger sanctions against ISIl and the ways and means of depriving it of the benefits of illegal oil revenues be looked into. EU leaders agreed to accelerate measures to stop the flow of foreign fighters to the region and called the fight against radicalisation in Member States a top priority.

http://tinyurl.com/nwexsds

available at: http://tinyurl.com/n7lspw2

http://tinyurl.com/nwexsds

web: European Council Conclusions:

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EUAM Ukraine

nia) as candidate members of the next Euro-

pean Commission

web: A factsheet on EU-Ukraine relations is

web: European Council Conclusions:

NEWS MARITIME

NATO

The EU Maritime Security Strategy was endorsed by the Council on 24 June. The new strategy aims to secure the EU’s maritime security interests against risks and threats in the global maritime domain, such as cross-border and organised crime, threats to freedom of navigation, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or environmental risks. The strategy foresees action in the following five areas: external relations; maritime awareness and surveillance; capability development by promoting pooling and sharing initiatives; risk management and protection of critical maritime infrastructure and crisis response; and maritime security research and training.

Fogh Rasmussen as Secretary General of NATO and Chairman of

Maritime Security Strategy

NATO Secretary General designate

As from 1 October 2014, Jens Stoltenberg will succeed Anders

the North Atlantic Council. The former Prime Minister of Norway

has had a number of international assignments. These include

chairing the UN High-level Panel on System-wide Coherence and the High-level Advisory Group on Climate Change Financing. He is

currently UN Special Envoy on Climate Change.

web: Maritime Security Strategy: http://tinyurl.com/q25xtko

NATO Summit in Wales on 4–5 September 2014

ENERGY

mussen: “Our NATO Summit here in Wales will be one of the most

New Commission initiatives

In recent months, the European Commission has presented two new strategies in the field of Energy. The first is the Energy Security Strategy presented on 28 May, in response to the political crisis in Ukraine and the overall importance of a stable and abundant supply of energy for the EU's citizens and economy. The second is the Energy Efficiency Strategy presented on 23 July. Energy supply and energy efficiency have also become crucial issues in the field of defence, since energy supply is a critical source of vulnerability in military operations and its protection can cause increased casualty numbers and compromise operational effectiveness. At the same time, energy, in all its forms, accounts for a significant amount of expenditure and is a major driver in the cost of operations (for more information, please see our special chapter “Energies”, pages 40 – 49) web: Energy Security Strategy: http://tinyurl.com/nern4uh

web: Energy efficiency strategy: http://tinyurl.com/qhwwst6

Doorstep statement by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Ras-

important Summits in the history of our Alliance. A crucial Summit

at a crucial time. We are faced with a dramatically changed security

environment. To the East, Russia is attacking Ukraine. To the Southeast, we see the rise of a ter-

rorist organization, the so-

As from 1 October 2014, Jens Stoltenberg will succeed Anders Fogh Rasmussen. photo: © NATO

called Islamic State that has

committed horrific atrocities.

To the South, we see violence,

insecurity, instability. Here at

the Summit we will take important steps to counter these

threats and to strengthen the

defence of our allies. We will adopt a Readiness Action Plan which

aims at improving our ability to act swiftly to defend our allies if needed. On defence investment, we will turn the corner and reverse

the trend of declining defence budgets. We will discuss what indi-

vidual allies and what NATO can do to counter the threat from the terrorist organization, the so-called Islamic state.

NATO leaders during air power flypast, 5 September 2014, Wales photo: © NATO

A400M refueling F/A-18

source: © AIRBUS, Alexandre Doumenjou

INDUSTRY

Test campaign for Airbus A400M The Airbus A400M new generation airlifter has successfully performed an air-to-air refuelling test campaign with a F/A-18 Hornet fighter. The tests were developed in five flights in which the A400M performed 33 dry contacts and dispensed 18.6 tonnes of fuel to an F/A-18 Hornet in 35 wet contacts. Designed from the outset to be a dual-role transport and tanker aircraft, the A400M has a basic fuel capacity of 50.8 tonnes which can be increased by the use of extra cargo hold tanks.

We will take steps to enhance our cooperation with Ukraine and

other partners and we will open a new chapter in our relationship with Afghanistan after we complete our ISAF mission by the end of this year. This Summit will shape future NATO. It will demonstrate

our resolve, our unity, our solidarity. Surrounded by an arc of crises,

our Alliance, our transatlantic community, represents an island of

security, stability and prosperity. And here at the Summit we will

strengthen our transatlantic bond as the bedrock of security in Eu-

rope and North America.”

web: For the outcome of the Summit, please see: www.nato.int

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Which direction should we take: more Europe or less Europe? Crisis in and around the European Union makes change a necessity. On the one hand there are ideas of some kind of federal structure. On the other hand some countries would prefer to retire from the Union and play the national card.

Priorities of the Italian EU Presidency

Europe needs to get its soul back by Nannette Cazaubon, Journalist, Paris

Addressing the European Parliament on 2 July at the beginning of Italy’s six-month Presidency of the EU, Prime Minister Matteo Renzi outlined his vision for a new Europe in a passionate speech that earned him standing ovations from a majority of MEPs. “If Europe were to take a selfie of itself today, it would show a tired, even resigned face,” said Florence’s left-wing former Mayor. “The real big challenge awaiting our continent is to get back the soul of Europe, to find again the real meaning of living together,” he said. Europe should not be satisfied with being “just a point on Google Maps”, but needed to return to being “a community”. Growth and employment, a space for freedom and security, the full exercise of citizenship rights and a stronger role for Europe in the world: these are the priorities of the Italian Presidency programme entitled “Europe – a fresh start”. As regards the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), the Italian Presidency will support the efforts to intensify the ongoing work to enhance the CSDP’s effectiveness, flexibility and visibility along the lines of action identified by the December 2013 European Council. Regarding capabilities, the Presidency Programme states that the “successful accomplishment of CSDP missions is highly dependent on the acquisition of key military capabilities by Member States; Italy will therefore support the adoption of effective cooperation mechanisms both for the development of new capabilities, including those relating to the future Medium Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Air Systems (MALE RPAS), a new generation of communication satellites and cyber

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Matteo Renzi with EP President Martin Schulz, Strasbourg, 2 July 2014 © European Union 2014 - source:EP http://audiovisual.europarl.europa.eu

defence, and for the pooling and sharing of nationally owned assets with the aim of filling the gaps identified, e.g. the Multinational Modular Medical Units and Air-to-Air Refuelling. In supporting the HR/VP and the EEAS, it will encourage the development of joint research and technology projects in the most promising fields, particularly those with dual (civilian and military) use, taking into account the opportunities offered by Horizon 2020.” web: The Programme is available on the Presidency website: http://italia2014.eu/en/

photo: aldeka_, CC by 2.0, flickr.com

The European Union

The European Union

A common European security area is still an idea rather than a policy

The future of European defence

Interview with Anna Elżbieta Fotyga MEP, Chair EP Subcommittee on Security and Defence, Brussels/Strasbourg

The European: Ms Fotyga, warmest congratulations on your election to the Chair of the European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence! It seems to me that the tasks for the Common Security and Defence Policy are becoming more numerous and that it is going to be more and more difficult to find appropriate solutions. Do you believe that European societies have finally taken the CSDP to their hearts or is NATO still seen as the guarantor of our security? Anna Fotyga: Thank you. The CSDP has a record of considerable achievements - 12 years of functioning and more than 30 missions on three continents. Unfortunately, the majority of CSDP initiatives have been of regional, and in some cases even, of local significance. The recent internal crisis in the euro zone as well as external crises such as the Arab Spring, the situation in the Middle East and, finally, the Russian aggression against Ukraine, pose a challenge and endanger the realisation of strategic visions within a common European security area. The European: What are the consequences? Anna Fotyga: New challenges and violent combat actions on our very doorsteps call for a very firm and realistic assessment of the threats. Ukraine has been punished for choosing, in dramatic circumstances, the European path. The Ukrainian crisis and the downing of the Malaysian Airlines MH17 commercial flight have sparked concern and fear in Central and Eastern Europe. The European: But there has been a reaction on the part of the European Union!

Anna Fotyga: In my opinion, the steps taken by the EU to address these challenges have proven inadequate. This signifies that a common EU security area is still an idea rather than a policy. In order to build a viable and effective CSDP we need real solidarity in defining our interests, together with a common perception of the threats. Currently, we are quite far from having achieved that. The European: Are you alluding to the sanctions and to France’s attitude with regard to the Mistral? Anna Fotyga: Indeed I am, since you ask so directly! The sale of Mistral warships to Russia may be a mere business matter for this nation, but for the countries of my region it represents a deadly menace. Several weeks ago the government of Germany withdrew the consent it had given earlier to the defence sector for certain joint projects with Russia, an act that was noted and appreciated. Unfortunately, however, the recent remarks by the Federal Chancellor ruling out the possibility of locating the NATO bases in Poland and certain Baltic States have totally changed that positive impression. The European: Wasn’t it wise to say that in order to allay the current political tensions? Anna Fotyga: We cannot talk about a European security community without speaking of solidarity. Moreover, we must remember that the CSDP is no substitute for NATO. In the event of a global conflict, the Western democracies would not be safe without the support of the United States and NATO. Observing

Anna Elżbieta Fotyga at her office in the European Parliament, 2014. There are high expectations of the Chair of SEDE regarding the future of CSDP in the current crisis photo: Grzegorz Laskowski

9

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Anna Elżbieta Fotyga MEP

is the newly elected Chair of the EP Subcommittee on Security and De-

fence. She graduated from the Foreign Trade Faculty of Gdańsk University and started her professional career in the Foreign Department

of the Solidarity Trade Union in 1981. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Ms Fotyga worked as an expert and head of the Foreign Office of the

Solidarity headquarters in Gdańsk and was Deputy Mayor of Gdańsk

from 2002 to 2004. In 2004 she became a Member of the European

Parliament and was UEN (Union for Europe of the Nations) Coordinator

for the Committee on Foreign Affairs. From 2006 to 2007 Ms Fotyga

was Minister of Foreign Affairs and chaired the European Integration Committee. She was then appointed Chief of the Chancellery of the

President of the Republic of Poland and was the foreign relations adviser to the Chairman of the Law and Justice party.

the lack of deterrence that exists for a no longer assertive but openly aggressive Russia, many countries expect hard security guarantees, which only NATO and the U.S. can provide. The European: Europe’s internal and external security are increasingly interlinked. New challenges continue to emerge. Do we have the political will and financial resources in the EU in order to strengthen the preventive arm of the CSDP while at the same time reinforcing our means for engaging in conflicts? What influence do you intend to bring to bear on this issue as the Chair of SEDE? Anna Fotyga: The European Union has a range of tools for maintaining peace, preventing conflicts and strengthening international security. Unfortunately there are numerous new reasons to use them. The most costly option, however, is abandonment. It is therefore advisable to pre-emptively engage forces and resources in order to solve problems, even if these may seem far removed from European concerns as long as they have not yet become a direct threat to our security. The European: Are you referring to zones outside of Europe? Anna Fotyga: I am thinking of Africa in particular. In my opinion, all the main issues such as epidemics, environmental pollution and extremism are concentrated there, but eventually they reach the Union in the form of waves of refugees, the threat of disease and terrorism. EU missions in Africa make an effective and tangible contribution to the security of this continent, while performing what is often just a preventive role. The EU does not currently have its own purely military instruments for prediction, prevention, deterrence and finally intervention. The European: And which are the lessons learned as far as you are concerned? Anna Fotyga: As Chair of the SEDE I have requested, inter alia, a joint meeting of several EP committees in order to debate the

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situation in Ukraine and the specific role of the Kremlin in perpetrating the crisis. In my opinion it is the most pressing problem nowadays. The European: During the last meeting of the EP you also submitted proposals for concrete action with regard to the tragic situation in Iraq. What is your strategy? Anna Fotyga: In the near future, we plan to convene an Enlarged Bureau of the SEDE devoted solely to the situation in Iraq and the Middle East. Both topics are of crucial importance and should be submitted to a SEDE plenary meeting for deliberation. I am convinced that the comprehensive use of the Union’s full potential and cooperation between the European Commission and the Parliament will enhance our joint ability to address the challenges. The European: But how can the development of capabilities for the EU be promoted when nations’ budgets are continuously shrinking? Are the nations willing to commit to the CSDP or do national or NATO interests prevail? Anna Fotyga: The European Union has certain advantages over other organisations, because its scope covers many areas and it can avail itself of various instruments ranging from culture, trade and diplomacy to providing advice, closing borders and deploying troops. This complexity is what makes the CSDP unique. The European: This, of course, does not change the fact that individual states rationally evaluate the pillars of their security. Anna Fotyga: In the case of my country, as well as of some other members of the EU, the CSDP is one of three pillars of security, after their membership of NATO and their own self-defence potential. It should also be noted that of these three options the CSDP is the youngest and its effectiveness still requires proper testing. There is therefore no indication that, in the near future, member states will place the responsibility for their security with the CSDP alone. The European: So should the nations invest more in security and defence research & development in order to improve their prospects? Anna Fotyga: According to the hard data available to the general public, nations invest huge sums of money in security and defence. Globally, there was a spending increase of more than 2% in 2013, but this did not include the expenditure of the United States and most EU member states, which reduced their defence budgets overall. This is definitely a wrong and shortsighted approach. The European Union’s neighbourhood is neither stable nor secure. Take, for example, North Africa, the

The European Union

European soldiers are trained for multirole interventions - here Irish infantry on a UN mission in Timor photo: Irish Defence Forces, CC BY 2.0, flickr.com

Middle East and Ukraine: several serious conflicts at least and even real warfare are taking place right next to our borders! The European: Contrary to what many people think, investing in defence technologies is beneficial for the economy. Anna Fotyga: Yes, including for the innovation sector. Moreover, as we have seen, exercising control over new technologies is important in international relations. The proper management of this strategic economic sector is essential for creating coalitions and joint defence capabilities. One of the main advantages of CSDP is the synergy in the defence industry. The European: How do you rate the chances of progress towards a well-functioning and transparent defence market? Anna Fotyga: This is a rather sensitive matter, but I will try to answer the question anyway. The defence industry, among other things for reasons already mentioned in this interview, is considered strategic; furthermore, individual companies or consortia are seen to be associated with particular governments. In some countries the defence sector has already undergone a process of consolidation (strongly supported by national budgets), while in other states the process is just beginning. Budget cuts have already contributed significantly to the reduction of orders. I believe that the deregulation of the European defence market will proceed slowly, and the benefits of the deeper integration in this field will have to be spread evenly. I do not imagine that the EU defence market will be dominated by a few large companies from four or five countries. The European: In order for the EU to become politically more

credible and more operational, a great majority of member states are calling for a Brussels-based European headquarters for civil and military missions. Will you support this project, or are you aiming for alternative solutions? Anna Fotyga: I am not convinced that the time has come to build a European headquarters for civil and military missions in Brussels; nor do I think that this is a priority for the vast majority of member states. The financial crisis has forced countries to review their priorities in the field of defence. It seems unlikely that governments obliged to make cuts in their own defence budgets will agree to incurring extra expenditure by investing in transnational military structures. The European: Do you think that the political will to increase the EU’s military clout currently exists? Anna Fotyga: Due to the unstable international situation, national decision-makers are seeking confirmation of existing security guarantees and trying to reinforce Allied solidarity within NATO. The rational management of modest means leads to a strengthening of cooperation between individual countries. This is often done, however, outside of the CSDP framework. The European: So how would you sum up your credo? Anna Fotyga: The Union’s security environment has changed dramatically over the past 10 years. We must make an effort to build genuine solidarity within the EU. The European: Thank you for your frankness Ms Fotyga. I wish you every success!

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The Treaty of Lisbon has given Europe the instruments needed in order to maintain its influence over global foreign, security and defence affairs. But in these fields Member States’ interests are diverging, obliging the EU to always act on the basis of the lowest common denominator. The EU needs to create – under the influence of the European Parliament – a new Security Strategy adapted to the “new world” around Europe.

Ukraine crisis: desperate need for a renewed Common Foreign and Security Policy

Challenge for the European security order by Roderich Kiesewetter MdB, Berlin

The illegal annexation of most of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation and the ongoing battles in eastern Ukraine have shocked western Governments. 25 years after the end of the cold war, aggressive geopolitical strategies had seemed outdated, but now European security is suddenly being challenged by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s intimidation attempts. Although we are finally seeing some progress in this crisis, with the first direct negotiations between the Ukrainian and Russian Presidents and growing acceptance of Petro Poroshenko’s peace plan, Europe, NATO and the US were not prepared for this scenario.

What is the European Security Structure all about?

Moreover, Putin benefited from disagreement among the EU member states and their uncoordinated action. In the run-up to the NATO Summit in Wales it is time to discuss not only shortterm solutions but also long-term structural changes to our European security architecture. The question is whether we can restore the post-cold war balance or whether we need to reform our strategy and cooperation patterns. Three fields of action are crucial: reviewing the European Security Strategy, restructuring CDSP-NATO cooperation and reconsidering EU-Russian relations. Review of the European Security Strategy The first concern of the newly elected EU Commission officials, in particular the High Representative, should be a review of the European Security Strategy. The new High Representative must strive to get member state governments to commit to common interests, objectives and military and civilian instruments, as

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Roderich Kiesewetter MdB

has been a Member of the Bundestag since

2009, where he is a full member of the Committees on Foreign Affairs and EU Affairs and a

member of the German Delegation to the Interparliamentary Conference on the CFSP/CSDP.

Photo: Ingo Sombrutzki, CC-BY-SA 3.0 DE

Born in 1963, he joined the armed forces/ar-

tillery company in 1982 and studied econom-

ics in Munich and Austin/Texas. After several positions within the Ger-

man armed forces, he worked at the Ministry of Defence from 1997 to

1999. He then spent one year in Brussels at the EU Council and NATO

headquarters and took part in a foreign deployment. In 2006 he was promoted to the rank of Colonel. From 2006 to 2009 he was at the

NATO headquarters in Mons.

well as to priority regions. These four strategic pillars together with a joint communication strategy would allow us to react more coherently and rapidly in our European crisis management and to share the burden with our American partners, who are rebalancing towards Asia. Recent European disputes about increasing the number of air patrols, ship manoeuvres and deployments of military trainers in the Baltic States show that we have a long way to go. Structural cooperation in the EU and NATO A second field of action is the structural cooperation between the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy and NATO. The Berlin Plus Agreement is not operational: it merely serves as basis for a

Photo: snamess, CC BY 2.0, flickr.com

Policies and Institutions

Policies and Institutions

The agenda of the forum between the Eurasion Customs Union, the EU and Ukraine in Minsk on 26.8.2014 was dominated by the crisis in eastern Ukraine. The meeting focused on two areas: economic aspects and the role of the EU in peace and security in the region as well as in energy security. (From left to right): Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, Vladimir Putin, President of Russia, Alexander Lukashenko, President of Belarus, Petro Poroshenko, President of Ukraine, HR Catherine Ashton, Commissioners Günther Oettinger and Karel De Gucht photo: © European Commission

single operation (Althea BIH) and is blocked by frozen conflicts between Turkey, Cyprus and Greece. The need to avoid parallel structures and for the 22 states that are members of both organisations to rely on singles sets of forces, as well as the growing number of simultaneous crises in the European neighbourhood call for a profound restructuring of CSDP/NATO interoperability. A pooling and sharing of capabilities and command structures across countries and institutions has become unavoidable; there are already promising concepts such as NATO’s Framework Nation concept and the EU’s Permanent Structured Cooperation, as well as a new German concept called “Anlehnungspartnerschaft” (mutual cooperation among equal partners). US – Russia relations are pivotal The third major challenge is that of the future relations between the EU and Russia. Russia has the power of veto in the UN Security Council. Moreover, it is a negotiating partner in the Iran 5+1 talks and remains an important player for Syria, as well as a crucial one in the increasingly important Arctic region. Energy security for Europe will not be achievable without Russia in the near future. However, a return to a strong strategic partnership with Russia seems impossible at the moment. The option that remains is that of the normal ties that exist between neighbours and trading partners. Germany could function here as a valuable bridge between East and West, helping to identify common ground and security interests. Furthermore, the OSCE could turn into a promising forum for such a partnership once the Ukraine crisis has been overcome.

Common European structures

In Germany we are currently witnessing a broad discussion on foreign and security policy. Germany’s President Joachim Gauck, Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen and Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier have called for a reconsideration of our nation’s responsibility to confront geopolitical challenges. However, we cannot achieve strategic progress in this complicated policy field without common European solutions. We are in desperate need of a renewed European foreign policy and a reinvigorated European security order.

documentation

Call for a strong EU foreign policy

On 28 August, Elmar Brok, Chair of the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) stated: “The current crises in the EU neighbourhood show once again that a strong, proactive and ambitious EU foreign policy is vital for each and every Member State of the EU. Bringing peace, stability and prosperity to the broader EU neighbourhood must be the first and utmost priority of this policy. This also requires a strong personality for the post of the High Representative, able to lead and put all the energies and resources of the EU and of the Member States at the service of the defence of our interests and values. (…) We need to play a key role in ensuring the full and efficient control of Ukraine’s borders, without which the current crisis cannot be settled. We must keep all the options open with Russia, including further strengthening of sanctions while being open to dialogue. (…) We need a new, comprehensive policy towards Russia taking into account its actions over the last months. The EU must also develop and put in practice a proactive and unified strategy towards Iraq, Syria and the whole region to face the ISIS threat. In Iraq, the EU must actively support the creation of an inclusive government adequately representing all ethnic and political components of the society and committed to a common vision of Iraq. The Iraqi State and the Kurdish Regional Government must be supported in all possible ways in their fight against ISIS, including through humanitarian aid and delivery of weapons by EU member countries. In the Middle East, the EU must be at the forefront of new efforts to maintain the permanent ceasefire between the Israelis and the Palestinians and play a central role in the restart of negotiations for a two-State solution. (…) The situation in Libya is also a major source of concern for its population but also for the regional stability and for the EU itself. EU actions are urgently needed to foster political dialogue, state building and reform of the security sector.” Source: AFET Committee, European Parliament

13

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

With its annexation of the Crimea Russia has optimised its maritime strategic position

Black Sea Security – pondering the next steps by Prof Ioan Mircea Paşcu MEP, Vice-Chair Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET), Brussels/Strasbourg Russia’s annexation of Crimea has profoundly altered the strategic and hence also security environment in the area and beyond. Sevastopol’s role as the launch pad for Russian naval power towards the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and the Gulf has thus been strengthened. Moreover, with the entire Crimean Peninsula at its disposal, Russia can now directly threaten adjacent regions, such as Odessa, possibly linking up with Transnistria, or the mouths of the Danube just 200 nautical miles away. Romania, until now separated by Ukraine from Russia, thus now practically shares a maritime border with Russia.

Russia is getting closer to NATO

has been a Member of the European Parliament and Vice-Chair of the Foreign Affairs

Committee since 2007 and was elected S&D

Coordinator for Defence and Security in July

2014. Born in 1949 in Satu Mare, Romania, he Photo: private

obtained a PhD in Political Science from the In-

stitute of Political Science in 1980. From 1989

to 1992, Mr Paşcu was Presidential advisor and became State Secre-

tary in the MOD in Bucharest in 1993. Between 1996 and 2007, Mr Paşcu was a Member of the Romanian Parliament. In 2000, he was

Leaving aside the issues of the Ukrainian oil and gas explorations – now in the hands of Russia – and the shortening of the South Stream pipeline made possible by the annexation of Crimea, the latter can now be seen as an unsinkable aircraft carrier for Russia, with the difference that the range of weapon systems today is considerably longer than it was during the war, when Russian planes stationed in Crimea bombed Romania. In a twist of logic, the Russian President recently declared that with NATO now coming closer, Russia needed to bolster its defences, with particular reference to Crimea, ignoring the fact that the annexation of Crimea has brought Russia closer to NATO, and not the other way round and its Black Sea Fleet will be getting six new subs and a number of new capital ships. The annexation of Crimea has both political and military longterm consequences. Politically, the new members of NATO (Romania included) have realised that simply joining NATO and thus gaining access to the Article V security guarantee – valid for the 1990s – is no longer sufficient to deter Russia’s aggressive plans. Following the 2008 war in Georgia but more particularly

France didn’t succeed in keeping the MISTRAL – the only strategic system to be the object of a contract between an EU Member State and Russia – out of the EU sanctions against Russia. Photo: MOD France, Paris

14

Prof Ioan Mircea Paşcu MEP

appointed Minister of Defence.

the annexation of Crimea and the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine1 by Russia, we have come to the conclusion that we need a strong, tangible “strategic reinsurance” from NATO, capable of defending us against Russia in case deterrence fails. Politically too, we expect a more vocal and consistent attitude on the part of the EU, which must reconsider the conflicting signals it gives Russia, seen almost exclusively as a strategic trading partner. Moreover, the time has come to scrap the Black Sea Synergy and replace it with a true Black Sea Strategy, starting from the premise that, for some time to come, access to commercial gains will in any case depend on the military factor.2

A stronger NATO presence is needed

Consequently, in military terms, we expect to see a stronger NATO presence – on a rotational basis – in the Black Sea, in response not only to the recent developments, but also to the future ones announced by Russia, including an increase in landing capacity expected this October, when the new Mistral ship named “Sevastopol” will enter the theatre. In summary, the short to medium-term future will bring more confrontation than cooperation in the area, due, on the one hand, to the weakness of the existing forms of military cooperation – Blackseafor, Black Sea Harmony – and, on the other hand, to the inevitable military build-up triggered by Russia’s own build-up and its aggressive moves in the Black Sea. 1 Ukraine is subject to a similar scenario to that applied by Russia in Moldova. As soon as it became evident that Moldova wanted to break away from Russia, Transnistria was “activated” in order to both deter and control Moldova’s actions. Today, seeing that the annexation of Crimea was not sufficient to prevent Ukraine from signing an Association Agreement with the EU, Russia has initiated the destabilisation of Eastern Ukraine, transforming it into a larger-scale Transnistria. 2 (Ed.) The article was written before the latest military moves having a direct bearing on the Crimea and Black Sea

Policies and Institutions

The difficulty of making NATO and the EU complementary has both structural and political causes

NATO: The laborious process of putting complementarity into practice by Lieutenant General (ret.) Jean Paul Perruche, President of EuroDéfense-France, Paris The complementarity between NATO and the EU is self-evident. Their member states share the same values; 22 countries belong to both organisations, which have the same objective of guaranteeing Europe’s security and defence. And yet, although the principle of complementarity is unanimously endorsed and regularly reasserted in official declarations, putting it into practice has posed a problem since the birth of the European Security and Defence Policy (2001)1 .

Responsibilities and a culture of dependency

In actual fact, the difficulties with making NATO and the EU complementary are due to structural and political problems that generally go unmentioned so as to avoid having to resolve them. They relate not only to the different character and format of each organisation but also and above all to the fact that the principles underlying the definition of the complementarity between the two organisations are ill-adapted. The differences in the nature and format (member states) of the EU and NATO make cooperation between them difficult. Their character and aims are very different. NATO is a Euro-Atlantic organisation whose scope is limited to the defence, and hence by extension, security, of Europe, while the EU is an evolving and comprehensive political project open to European countries only. The EU’s ultimate objective of political integration still being the subject of debate amongst its members, there is ambiguity as regards its ambitions, which complicates its relations with its external partners. Yet it has no choice but to be involved in the defence of its members’ interests and more broadly in the security issues concerning them. As the result of a choice made by a majority of European countries, the two organisations have partially overlapping areas of responsibility. NATO has exclusive competence for defence, but external crisis management is an area of responsibility common to both organisations, although the way in which the roles are to be shared has not been defined a priori. NATO with the backing of American might is the more natural framework for dangerous military engagements, conducted in accordance with the interests of the United States and of course under its “leadership”. The EU’s strength resides in its wide range of instruments, allowing it to take a comprehensive approach to security, but the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), confined (by the treaties) to the role of an under-equipped accessory to the CFSP 2, is nothing but a simulacrum of a system of defence.

In summary, the current situation is that the European states have decided to remain weak within the EU, in which they have a position of responsibility, in order not to weaken NATO, in which they have delegated their responsibilities to the US. The result is a “culture of dependency” leading in practice to the failure of European countries to take charge of their own defence. Yet the United States’ strategic shift towards the Asia-Pacific region makes this situation paradoxical and dangerous, and for several years now our American ally has been urging European countries to live up to their responsibilities: they must invest more in their own security or run the risk of undermining the transatlantic link. The different formats of the EU and NATO are an additional source of difficulty: when it is necessary to organise cooperation between two organisations with 28 members each, including 22 countries with dual membership and 12 belonging to one organisation only, the difficulties are compounded.

The ongoing dispute between Turkey and Cyprus

Disputes between countries, for example the one between Turkey and Cyprus, are an obstacle to exchanges of operational information between the two organisations, which is making implementation of the so-called Berlin Plus agreements well nigh impossible for the foreseeable future. The agendas of the joint meetings between the two sets of decision-making bodies (Councils, Military Committees) lack any real substance; cooperation in theatres involving both organisations (Kosovo, Afghanistan) poses problems. Effective cooperation in situations requiring a rapid response is, of course, impossible. In 2004, the handover by NATO to the EU in Bosnia – a theatre in

Jean Paul Perruche

Lieutenant-General (ret.) Jean Paul Perruche is

President of EuroDéfense-France. He is a

member of the Strategic Advisory Group of the

Atlantic Council of the United States and a mem-

ber of the Board of the Institute for Higher Na-

Photo: private

tional Defence Studies (IHEDN. He is a graduate

of the War College and of the IHEDN and holds a

master’s degree in defence from Paris 2 University. His military deploy-

ments include Chad in 1978/79, Central Africa in 1991 and Somalia in

1992/93. Chief of the French military mission to SACEUR (1999 to 2001) and Deputy Commander of KFOR in 2003. Finally, he was Director-General of the EU Military Staff in Brussels from 2004 to 2007.

15

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

► NATO NEWS: which peace had been restored and the military risk was low – took eight months of painstaking planning due to the need for the decision-making process to take place in mirror fashion and in parallel within the two decision-making bodies (Councils). On top of all these difficulties, the basis for complementarity between the two organisations has been ill-defined from the outset.

Complementarity defined on the wrong basis

The underlying principles for complementarity between NATO and the EU set out in the Nice Treaty (founding treaty for the CFSP/ESDP) and confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty are paradoxical and counter-productive. Paradoxical, because they are based on the notion of non-duplication between the two organisations, which is a specious argument in this case. Indeed, duplication is an expensive business when it involves assets and capabilities: but these are in any case owned and provided by the member states. NATO and the EU are multinational structures using national forces. If these two organisations of a different nature and format are called upon to conduct autonomous operations, it is legitimate for each to have their own system of command. This in no way affects their capacity for cooperation or their complementarity: on the contrary, it is by pooling their forces at the level of the EU that the European states will be best able to exercise their responsibilities for the defence of their neighbourhood and to become the “able partner” that the Americans are calling for. Moreover, it is counter-productive to rule out any defence responsibilities for the EU a priori, given that this organisation creates common European interests that it must be able to defend. Could there be common European security interests that run counter to the interests of the United States? This is hardly likely, but such interests may be based on priorities and values that differ from one side of the Atlantic to the other. Furthermore, the refusal to grant the Commission powers in the field of defence when most of its actions (neighbourhood, enlargement, research, enterprises, external action, development aid, humanitarian assistance etc.) interact directly with it, appears to be a form of political schizophrenia at a time when everyone recognises the need for a comprehensive approach to security issues and for a continuum between security and defence.

No complementarity without an autonomous EU

In fact, the complementarity between the two organisations must allow for political flexibility, depending on the place, the interests at stake and the intervention opportunities, as well as adaptability in terms of capabilities, according to the preferred types of action, the available instruments, areas of excellence, etc. It should be able to lead either to a strengthening of the capacity for action in a given theatre or to a sharing of roles between different theatres. It is on this basis and with these

16

NATO Readiness Action Plan

North Atlantic Council declaration, 5 September 2014,

Wales (excerpt):

“(…) today we have approved the NATO Readiness Action Plan.

It provides a coherent and comprehensive package of necessary measures to respond to the changes in the security envi-

ronment on NATO’s borders and further afield that are of con-

cern to Allies. It responds to the challenges posed by Russia and

their strategic implications. It also responds to the risks and

threats emanating from our southern neighbourhood, the Mid-

dle East and North Africa. The Plan strengthens NATO’s collective defence. It also strengthens our crisis management capa-

bility. The Plan will contribute to ensuring that NATO remains a

strong, ready, robust, and responsive Alliance capable of meet-

ing current and future challenges from wherever they may arise.(…)”

objectives in mind that realistic complementarity between NATO and the EU must be defined. Up until now, the aims and attributions of the ESDP have been perceived in some quarters as being in competition with those of NATO, leading to an atmosphere of rivalry between the two organisations. In fact, NATO serves as a pretext for some European countries worried that giving the EU more autonomy and a greater capacity for action will weaken the security guarantee that is provided so cheaply by the United States (the more vulnerable European countries are, the greater the need to protect them), and that allows them to avoid having to spend for their own defence. In reality, however, restricting the EU’s powers on the grounds of NATO’s existence makes the latter look like an obstacle to the development of European capabilities.

A pooling of capabilities is essential

The very necessary pooling of capabilities among European countries can only be genuinely effective if there is a certain level of integration, which means that it must be part of a coherent political framework. NATO is a valuable institution and the ideal framework for Euro-Atlantic cooperation; however, it makes sense for the EU, as the melting pot of European cooperation, to provide the framework for a pooling of European capabilities. NATO and the EU can only be complementary if the EU is unreservedly recognised as a genuine player in the area of security and defence capable of taking action, depending on the circumstances, either autonomously or in cooperation with the United States. The only meaningful complementarity is Euro-Atlantic complementarity, in other words, that which exists between Europe and the United States. 1 renamed in 2008 Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) 2 Common Foreign and Security Policy

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

documentation

After the election: Chairs and Vice-Chairs of AFET, SEDE, LIBE, DEVE, ITRE and IMCO

(edit/ak) The European Parliament after its constituent Plenary Session of 1–3 July elected the chairpersons for its 20 Committees and 2 Subcommittees. AFET – Foreign Affairs

The European Parliament how functional will it be?

by Christoph Raab, Chairman European Security Round Table (ESRT

Chair:

Elmar Brok– EPP, Germany Vice-Chair: Ryszard Antoni Legutko – ECR, Poland Ioan Mircea Paş cu – S&D, Romania Andreij Plenkovic´ – EPP, Croatia SEDE – Subcommittee on Security and Defence Chair:

Anna Elżbieta Fotyga – ECR, Poland Vice-Chair: Michael Gahler – EPP, Germany Jaromir Stetina – EPP, Czech Republic Afzal Khan – S&D, United Kingdom Sabine Lösing – GUE/NGL, Germany LIBE – Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Chair:

Claude Moraes – S&D, United Kingdom Vice-Chair: Kinga Gal – EPP, Hungary Iliana Iotova– S&D, Bulgaria Jan Philipp Albrecht – Greens/EFA, Germany Barbara Kudrycka – EPP, Poland DEVE – Development Chair:

Linda McAvan – S&D, United Kingdom Vice-Chair: Maurice Ponga – EPP, France Paavo Väyrynen – ALDE, Finland Kostas Chrysogono – GUE/NGL, Greece Nirj Deva – ECR, United Kingdom ITRE – Industry, Research and Energy Chair:

Jerzy Buzek – EPP, Poland Vice-Chair: Patrizia Toia – S&D, Italy Hans-Olaf Henkel – ECR, Germany Miloslav Ransdorf – GUE/NGL, Czech Republic Morten Helveg Petersen – ALDE, Denmark IMCO – Internal Market and Consumer Protection Chair:

Vicky Ford – ECR, United Kingdom Vice-Chair: Sergio Gaetano Cofferati – S&D, Italy Anna Maria Corazza Bildt – EPP, Sweden Robert Rochefort – ALDE, France Catherine Stihler – S&D, United Kingdom > For the chairpersons of the other committees: http://tinyurl.com/nnom5b6 photos: © The European Union, 2014, EP

18

Security and defence stakeholders can expect an EP tha

Looking at the composition of the new European Parliament, things both have and haven’t changed: the presence of more radical Eurosceptic and anti-European parties on both the left and right will change the atmosphere in the new European Parliament, with louder and more radical voices that will attract more attention in the media.

A new distribution of political weight

The European People’s Party (EPP), even though substantially reduced, still represents the biggest group. The European socialists obtained 191 seats, a small increase. The EPP had a 36% share of seats after the 2009 elections that has decreased today to 29.43%, while the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) have gone from from 25% to about 25.4% and the Liberals (ALDE) have sustained substantial losses, going from 11.4% to only 8.9%. The Greens saw no substantial change in their result. The right-wing Eurosceptic and anti-EU parties together stayed below 20% and formed fewer political groups than expected – a fact that greatly reduces their political role. The new distribution of political weight will, however, mean seeing members of Eurosceptic or anti-European parties chairing some committees. These positions will make them more visible and they will be heard more, so there will be more heterogeneous voices coming from the European Parliament. At the same time, these parties have not performed well enough for them to seriously gain influence over European policymaking.

Conservatives and Socialists have the majority

The EPP and the S&D still hold over 50% of the seats, thus effectively remaining the two decisive groups for any essential decision-making. This strategic alliance, with the liberals as flank players, will determine the key political orientations of the European Parliament in the coming five years, including as regards security and defence matters. In the distribution of key positions, the EPP has secured the chairmanship of six committees, the S&D seven and the ALDE only four. More specifically, however, the EPP group has left the chairmanship of the Security and Defence Subcommittee (SEDE) to Anna Fotyga of the ECR group (formed around the British Tories, among others). It is highly likely that Michael Gahler of the EPP will remain the coordinator for his group within the SEDE, as will Ioan Paşcu for the S&D group.

Policies and Institutions

at promotes the EU’s role in security and defence

t in security and defence –

T), Brussels

Finding institutional agreements

Greens/EFA The Greens–European Free Alliance 50

ALDE Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe Group 67

EPP Group of the European People's Party 221

S&D Progressive Alliance

All in all, it is fair to say that the results of these ECR of Socialists and European Conservatives Democrats elections suggest that the EU political system is and Reformists 191 70 undergoing significant changes whose full effects will be felt only some years from now. However, the EFDD euro crisis has had less damaging effects on the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy 48 results than was previously feared. The first test for the newly elected Parliament has been its role in the GUE/NGL selection of the next Commission President. These NI European United Left– Non-Inscrits Nordic Green Left 52 elections marked the first chapter in the new story 52 linking the citizens’ vote – through the choice of a lead candidate by each political family - with the choice of the Allocation of seats in the new Parliament source: CC-BY-SA-3.0, Glentamara, wikimedia next Commission President. The main political groups in the European Parliament decided to promote “lead candidates” (most use the German term, Spitzenkandidat) for the presidenDepending somewhat on which parts of the budget are considcy of the European Commission. The idea is that by voting for a ered “relevant to security and defence” the European Union member party of a particular group, voters can express their arguably spends several billion euros per year directly on support for one of these candidates. security and defence. It is increasingly seen as legitimate for the Newly elected Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker’s European Parliament to have a say in EU security and defence agenda will focus on ten policy areas: Jobs and Growth, Conmatters and the EP has built up substantial expertise with the nected Digital Single Market, Climate Change Policy, Internal recruitment of qualified personnel. Also, the political groups in Market, Economic and Monetary Union, Free Trade Agreement favour of developing European security and defence policies with the US, Justice and Human Rights, New Policy on Migration, (ranging from humanitarian and border management to exterDemocratic Change and Foreign Policy. Other policy areas such nal security and military matters) form a clear majority. While as Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change as well as there is no question of European security and defence policies Security and Defence will be more in the hands of the Member being further developed in this legislative period, serious States; however, in the latter area less and less can be achieved questions are likely to be raised about how European Instituby Member States individually, which has already led to a high tions justify their activities in these areas and how they plan to level of intensive informal cooperation in this area. It does not bring them into line with European citizens’ demands, above take a crystal ball to predict that this cooperation will further and beyond quoting Eurobarometer opinion polls. increase over the coming years.

The EP and the CSDP

Even though, formally speaking, the EU and more specifically the European Parliament has limited competences for security and defence, over the past few years the Parliament has considerably developed its role in this area. Its reports have regularly stirred public debates, thus influencing discussions among Member States at European level or adding legitimacy to their actions. The EP has in any case vocally accompanied the Council’s policymaking in security and defence. More importantly, through its budgetary power, it has successfully directed money into areas that have a positive medium to long-term effect on European security and defence capabilities and policymaking.

Christoph Raab

was born in 1974 in Karlsruhe. He obtained an Economics degree from

the University of Trier and holds a Master’s degree from the College of

Europe (Natolin). From 2002 to 2005 he was Personal Assistant to Karl

von Wogau MEP. In November 2005, he founded COPURA, an event

management, consulting and communications company specialised in European affairs. In 2009, he founded the European Security Round

Table (ESRT), a neutral event platform on EU security and defence is-

sues and a key Brussels discussion forum for current and future topics

in the field of the CSDP.

19

Over the next 15 to 20 years the key question is what role Europe will play in an evolving and increasingly competitive global environment. Internal financial, economic and social prospects for Europe dominate the political discourse on Europe’s future welfare. In the longer-run perspective, global strategic interactions will be a key factor in shaping Europe’s future.

Europe’s Defence Industries: time to make a choice

European defence industries – which future? by Prof Holger H. Mey, Vice-President Advanced Concepts, Airbus Defence & Space, Ottobrunn European governments have long opted in favour of maintaining modern military forces. In order to defend national borders and national interests, but also to best protect the lives of soldiers, these forces require modern weaponry and technology. Whether rifles or fighter aircraft, someone, somewhere has to produce them: but who? Europe’s nations must continually choose how and where they want to acquire the military equipment needed to sustain their forces. They can produce their equipment nationally, or with partners in a framework, as is the case for the Eurofighter or MEADS, or they can simply purchase the equipment on the global market, from the United States in particular. What is clear is that each route has consequences that go far beyond the quality and suitability of the purchased systems.

Prof Holger H. Mey

is Vice-President “Advanced Concepts” at Airbus Defence and Space in Germany. Before

joining industry in 2004, he spent 12 years as an independent security policy analyst and con-

sultant in Bonn, Prof Mey served as President

Photo: private

and CEO of the Institute for Strategic Analyses

(ISA) in Bonn and as a regular TV and radio com-

mentator, publisher, and lecturer. Mr Mey is Honorary Professor for For-

eign Policy at Cologne University. From 1990 to 1992, he served as a

Security Policy Analyst on the Policy Planning Staff of the German Min-

ister of Defence. From 1992 to 1994, Mr Mey was Security Policy Advi-

sor to the Chairman of the German Parliament’s Defence Committee.

20

Military budgets are shaping the future

Maintaining a national defence technological and industrial base is a political decision with both foreign and domestic policy implications. While Europe’s defence industries are largely in private hands (with governments sometimes owning shares), they are dependent on governments – European and others – for their revenues. That being the case, military budgets and the political decisions underlying them will continue to shape the future of Europe’s defence industries. Government choices on export policy and international cooperation are also crucial. While the diplomatic implications of exports are important, so is their strategic role in maintaining a defence industrial base, including production lines, engineering teams and management staff.

How to deal with the United States

Purchasing large amounts of equipment from abroad may appear to be less expensive – but only at first glance. American military equipment seems particularly attractive, benefiting as it does from high levels of US research and development spending and, theoretically, low unit costs due to the United States’ huge equipment orders for its own use. While US equipment appears inexpensive, the essential services and upgrades – the consumer parallels would be coffee pods and printer cartridges – generate long-term revenue streams for US companies, sustaining them as competitors for decades to come. Whether Europe wishes to directly compete with US products or whether it wants to be a better partner in co-producing equipment and systems together with the United States, the better funded and

photo: futuresun, CC by SA 2.0, flickr.com

Industries

Industries

the more consolidated Europe’s defence industries are, the more influence they will have.

Consolidation versus profit orientation

Europe’s defence sector has taken great strides toward consolidation, but more needs to be done. Even though consolidation has political and strategic consequences, ultimately, it will be business requirements, market developments, and investor interests that determine the outcome. Companies will stay in the defence business only if it remains a profitable business. And it is governments’ decisions on grand strategy and military spending that will shape how Europe’s defence industrial base compares to the rest of the world, with all the ensuing implications for employment, technological development and sovereignty.

Investing in EU capabilities is the better choice

Maintaining a consolidated, competitive defence industrial base is a choice, not a matter of inevitability. European governments could abandon their defence industrial base, choosing to rely on the United States as the main supplier of military equipment. But this would go against the stated objectives of the European politicians calling for greater European autonomy. A better choice would be for European governments to engage in harmonised investments in (common!) European capabilities,

both in order to sustain their shared strategic independence and to make Europe a more influential partner in a wide range of transatlantic and global defence industrial projects. Hence, the future of European defence industries depends on the role that Europe chooses for itself in the world. Others have opted for a strengthening of their defence technological and industrial base. Now it is up to Europe to make a choice!

► Industry NEWS

Single Defence Market

(edit/nc) On 24 June, the European Commission presented an

Implementation Roadmap for measures to strengthen the single market for defence. The objective of this roadmap, which is

the follow-up to the Commission’s Communication on defence

presented in July 2013, is to promote a more competitive de-

fence industry and to foster synergies between civil and military

research including details and timelines for the actions. Roadmap: http://tinyurl.com/mb4tbqb

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

With the effects of a highly regulated environment, there is almost no space left for real competition

The role of SMEs in security and defence by Prof Rolf-Jürgen Ahlers, Chairman of the SME-Group, ASD, Brussels Very often we talk about the Supply Chain with reference to the involvement of SMEs in the security and defence sector. But this does not reflect the challenges encountered by these companies. More than just about the supply of products and services, it is also about the value chain, with market participants asking themselves: “what benefit can I derive from this project? Does it deliver major added value, or is it purely a supply?” We are facing a paradigm shift that we must deal with.

SMEs and the Value Chain

is the owner and manager of A-Tec, the manag-

er of A-Tec Holding GmbH and of ASG Luftfahrttechnik und Sensorik GmbH, as well as CEO

and shareholder of ProxiVision GmbH. Born in

1953, he graduated with an Electrical Engi-

Photo: private

neering degree from the University of Stuttgart

in 1978. He received his PhD in 1986. He has

been Honorary Professor at PTW, Technical University of Darmstadt

In Europe, we know that about two out of three jobs in the private sector are in SMEs, and that more than half the total value-added is created by these organisations. They represent more than 80% of aerospace suppliers and possess a large part of the know-how needed to develop and manufacture aircraft parts and components. Due to the strict flow-down of contractual agreements under the risk and revenue sharing directive of OEMs and System manufacturers, this means that SMEs have to bear development, technological and manufacturing risks. This means a lot of financial risk. There is, as a consequence, no real risk and revenue sharing, since the two are separated in time, i.e. the risk is what we face today, while the return on investment (ROI) is deferred to the far future. SMEs are an important source of innovation and hence as an enabler for competitiveness. New technologies require significant investment in RT&D, yet again a financial risk for SMEs. On a European level we should come up with new programmes, ones that are based on trust and reliability for the participants. Cooperation programmes can succeed if they are based on joint requirements and standards. In the military sector, fighter aircraft, helicopters, transport aircraft, maritime and terrain systems are examples of areas in which we can optimise our efforts.

A new Neutron Camera for detection and imaging Source: ProxiVision GmbH, Germany

22

Prof Rolf-Jürgen Ahlers

since 2010 and is the Chairman of the SME Group and Vice-Chairman of the Supply Chain Commission at the ASD (Aerospace and Defence

Organisation), Brussels.

Defence and security

In the defence and security market the situation appears slightly different, but still we face the value chain issue for a number of reasons. Declining budgets in the Defence sector together with a market fragmentation that is further amplified by the different European policies and activities are a big threat for the players on the market, be they small, medium or large-sized companies. The uncertainty of what is allowed and what the political will is interferes with the market situation. The effect of this highly regulated environment is that there is almost no space left for real competition. Furthermore, faced with this highly regulated market, we have to decide which capabilities we are prepared to lose. We can expect the impact to be minor if we can regain the capability level after a reasonable time. The impact is high if we reach the critical capability level. Any capabilities below this level will be lost forever. There is no way back since personnel-wise, moneywise and knowhow-wise we cannot recover from this situation. Capabilities that are not maintained will not be restored (Risk of Capability Loss). Therefore we must concentrate on those that serve the accomplishment of the respective core tasks; this is the way to optimised efficiency. With our CDSP we have to act in a very conscious manner. We have the responsibility to engage as Europeans since the world will not wait for the implementation of initiatives and actions. Decisions are needed now. Internally pacified Europe is forced to engage in ways that respond to the future dimensions of globalised security and defence requirements. In regard to the innovation aspect, we must realise that no new national programmes, due to the high investment needed and the low market, are showing up on the horizon. How can SMEs

Industries

cope with this situation on a national and/or European level? Yet customers – in general the governments – are asking for security of supply and the control and ownership of critical technologies. This requirement is a valid one, but it immediately collides with the lack of common regulations and the differences in standards and certifications encountered by the various customers.

The needs ahead

To overcome some of the value chain issues stated above, we should think about new programmes to strengthen our technology and industrial base in Europe. This calls first and foremost for a consolidation of demand with some pooling and sharing activities that can be linked with some kind of joint procurement beyond borders. We have to streamline demand as far as the value chain is concerned, i.e. we have to avoid too many different specifications for almost identical systems. Last but not least, if we want to unearth the buried treasure of the skills of SMEs, we have to think about providing financial support for innovative projects. RT&D requirements need to be directed towards those cutting-edge technologies that ensure their successful and efficient transposition into innovation. This is an area in which SMEs can demonstrate their strength, e.g. when it comes to new sensor technologies, including the as yet little known technologies for special applications such as

neutron (Figure page 22) or Terahertz sensors, unmanned systems or new products in the security sector. We must always consider the dual use aspect of new developments. Key technologies such as the new sensors, e.g. deliver new insight into other applications in the areas of border surveillance and the prevention of trafficking, smuggling and organised crime. The new technologies are needed everywhere a.o.: Air-to-Air Refuelling; Strategic Transport Capabilities; Satellite Communications; Maritime Security; and Cyber Defence. All activities also influence humanitarian actions, coastguard issues, the prevention of trafficking and conflict avoidance on a larger scale not worth the effort? SMEs are no longer an endangered species. They survive in a competitive environment by responding in a flexible manner to change in a very clever and intelligent way. One is even tempted to translate the three letters of their acronym into “Smart and Motivated Entities”. The only conditions that need to be met are a level playing field and a strong political will in order to achieve tangible results. SME’s future lies in finding an effective and efficient way to transpose their strategies into new actions with the quality of their decisions, the quality of spending and the resulting quality of innovation. SMEs are ready to move ahead. Their survival is important for the durability of our European Technology and Industrial Base.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Following various unsuccessful attempts since 1960 – a breakthrough now seems possible

A Franco-German alliance in the land systems sector?

by Brigadier General (ret.) Jacques Favin-Lévêque, EuroDéfense-France, Versailles

Could the old dream of an alliance between the French and German land systems industries be on the verge of becoming a reality thanks to Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) and Nexter? Could there at last be hope of better days to come for this fragmented and heterogeneous European industrial sector that has been trying to reach a critical size for decades now, while every buying opportunity around it is snatched by the American industry? Or is this yet another episode like the many we have seen in the past?

Non-compatibility of industrial “ideologies”

Let us look back, for instance, to the first unsuccessful attempt to build a Franco-German tank in the 1960s, which ended with each side acquiring its own tank: the AMX 30 and the Leopard 1 respectively. Or to the 1980s, when the hopes of building a joint tank were dashed once again. Is this due to a difference of approach in terms of operational requirements or even of timeframes? Or to disagreement about the technical definition of joint equipment? No, nothing of the sort … the explanation, rather, is that the German vision of a free and competitive private industrial sector is totally incompatible with the status of a French industry bound to the public sector and benefiting from state aid to offset its shortcomings: a Giat Industries, in other words, that from a German industry perspective was hardly an attractive candidate for a strategic partner-

Jacques Favin-Lévêque

was born in 1938. Brigadier General (ret.)

Favin-Lévêque graduated from the École Poly-

technique and the National College of Civil Engineering. He opted for a military career in

1961 and served for the most part with the

Photo: private

French Forces in Germany where he rose to

command the 13th Engineer Regiment. In

1985 he was assigned to France’s Defence Procurement Agency

(DGA), where he held the posts of Director of Communications and

then Deputy Director for International Relations.

On leaving the Army in 1993, he was appointed Chief Executive Officer

of the French Land Defence Manufacturers Association (GICAT) where

he stayed until 2003. Jacques Favin Lévêque is Vice-President of PanEurope-France and a member of EuroDéfense-France.

ship. So what has happened since then to turn something that used to be impossible into a feasible prospect today?

Exploring the possibilities for cooperation

A lot has happened, to tell the truth. Firstly and probably above all, the economic crisis, leading to dramatic reductions in the defence budgets of all European countries, obliging each EU member state to explore all options for remaining in the technological race. In this respect Europe acts as a catalyst; in spite of all the doubts and hesitation of the member states when it comes to asserting their resolve to awaken the CSDP (Common Security and Defence Policy) from the state of torpor it has lain in since 2005, the EU encourages industrial mergers likely to strengthen its Defence Technological and Industrial Base. And finally, there is the fact that Giat Industries no longer exists. Nexter, from now on encouraged to open up its capital and about to be released from the stifling burden of public ownership, has advanced know-how in areas The Leclerc MBT, one of the best tanks in the world, came into service very late, to ranging from artillery and armoured vehicles the detriment of its export chances photo: Creative Commons CC 0 1.0 Universal Public Domain Dedication, wikimedia. to smart munitions and the use of ICT for the

24

Industries

integration of land combat systems. Thus it is a partner offering a more diversified spectrum that is complementary to KMW’s sound technological and industrial expertise.

Hurdles to be overcome

So can we look forward to a happy marriage following this engagement announcement? While there is every reason to hope so, we must not underestimate the hurdles that need to be overcome in order to create a joint company that can be held up as an example at the level of the EU. Germany’s defence budget still falls short of what might be expected from an economic power of its stature. France’s budget, laid down in a five-year programming law that recently came under threat, is stretched to the limit, but still appears to have the wherewithal to contribute at least significantly to the R&D funding of the Scorpion programme, a major land equipment programme that constitutes the backbone of a land force equipped with state-of-the-art technology. There is nothing of the sort in Germany where the army, in the full swing of the professionalisation process, still has a sufficiently effective stock of equipment and has no plans for any major R&D effort. The French partner may find that it is contributing a lot to the bride’s trousseau. Conversely KMW, whose continuity is guaranteed by a huge fleet of battle tanks all over Europe and the world that must be maintained in operating condition, might content itself with medium-term prospects and not deem it necessary to invest in future programmes that have not yet been defined at government level.

A solution is not impossible

The negotiations under way will certainly encounter difficulties and it will not be easy to agree on the solutions. While is true that the principle of juste retour that prevailed for decades in the field of armaments cooperation is no longer a key condition for the partner states, the fact remains that each must stand to benefit from this joint undertaking that is so decisive for its future. In the area of government-funded R&D there needs to be a Franco-German development programme, which is not the case at present. By the same token, when it comes to self-financing the two partners need to agree on a common objective, in the area of exports for example, and to pool their marketing efforts.

Conclusion

The consolidation of this sector all too long penalised by its inability to restructure itself is essential if it is to be able to compete in satisfactory conditions on the European and international markets. The announced merger between Nexter and KMW is therefore good news for the Defence Technological and Industrial Base, although it remains to be seen whether this marriage will achieved the desired results. There is every reason to think so, but only time will tell.

documentation

The future EU High Representative

(edit/nc) Federica Mogherini has been appointed as the next EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. She succeeds Catherine Ashton for a period of five years and will also be VicePresident of the European Commission.

Federica Mogherini at a press conference after her appointment, European Council of 30 August, Brussels photo: © The Council of the European Union

Federica Mogherini has been Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation since February 2014. Born in Rome in 1973, she has a degree in Political Science. She is a Member of the Italian Parliament (Chamber of Deputies) where she was elected for the first time in 2008. In her parliamentary capacity, she has been the Head of the Italian Delegation to the Nato Parliamentary Assembly and Vice-president of its Political Committee (2013-2014); member of the Italian Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (20082013); Secretary of the Defence Committee (2008-2013) and member of the Foreign Affairs Committee. She also coordinated the Inter-Parliamentary Group for Development Cooperation. Ms Mogherini has been in the leadership of the Democratic Party since it was founded, in 2007: first as Secretary for Institutional Reforms, then as a member of the National Council, and in 2013-2014 as Secretary for European and International Affairs. She was previously a member of the Bureau of PES (Party of European Socialists), Vice-president of the European Community Organisation of Socialist Youth (ECOSY), member of the Bureau of the European Youth Forum, and a member of the Secretariat of the Youth Forum of the United Nations Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO). She is member of IAI – Istituto Affari Internazionali, of the Council for the United States and Italy and a fellow of the German Marshall Fund for the United States. She is also member of the European Leadership Network for Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (ELN) and of the Group of Eminent Persons (GEM) of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Source: European Council

25

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Miniaturisation has a very high impact on solution costs, including in the area of defence

Next generation of Airborne Surveillance Systems by Philippe Roy, President Aero Surveillance Inc., Le Castellet

Governments and Industries are faced with an increasing number of threats and situations that are changing in scope and nature. We are all collectively faced with increased terrorism and regional conflicts but also with security challenges such as illegal immigration, piracy, human trafficking, drug smuggling and illegal fishing, as well as an increasing need to protect our environment.

New requirements for defence and security

Maritime challenges, for instance, and the need to protect Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) mean that very large areas are in need of persistent aerial surveillance solutions. All or most of these challenges require airborne surveillance assets that can be characterised with three key attributes. First of all, the assets need to provide a high level of persistence combined with good detection, identification and reconnaissance capabilities. Second, the required solutions need to be cost-effective both from an acquisition and an operation standpoint. Third, the selected systems need to be adaptable to new threats and must offer true multi-mission capabilities in order to be mutualised. Governments are faced with increased budget pressure and have invested in sophisticated and costly airborne surveillance systems that, in many cases, are no longer adapted to the new challenges. The acquisition and operating costs of legacy systems limit the use of such systems precisely at a time when increased operating time is required. The defence sector, in most cases, can no longer afford to use specially designed equipment and has to rely increasingly on commercially developed products often referred to as Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) and Dual Use technologies (e.g. products that can be used for either defence or civilian applications). Finally, with information flowing at the speed of light, governments, the military and intelligence bodies need more than just information. They need intelligence that is readily available, easy to use and secured to make the best-informed decision. In most cases, they also need information to be translated into “intelligence� that can be correlated with other data in order to understand the context.

RPAS can be compared to a network of dedicated and specialised computers that interact with each other in order to achieve a particular mission. Each dedicated computer has software that controls sensors, communication and man-machine interfaces in order to acquire, store, disseminate and exploit data. A variety of sensors are available in increasingly smaller formats that generate larger and larger amounts of data. These systems include imaging sensors widely used because they provide information that is very easy to understand and use. Additional technologies such as radio frequency and magnetic sensors can play very important roles in detecting, identifying and recognising objects of interest.

The miniaturisation of technology

The miniaturisation of technology stemming from the commercial world is very useful but requires additional work in order to be used in defence environments. In particular, most of these technologies (except on the ground) need to be ruggedised in order to operate in harsh environments, and a critical element remains the software. Miniaturisation also has a very high impact on solution costs as illustrated in Figure 1, especially when lower cost aircraft can carry similar surveillance capabilities and offer equal endurance. The operation of an automatic system depends on the software, which needs to be reliable and easy to adapt to changing hardware and the demand for additional functionalities. In addition, sensors are substantially improving, providing ever

ISR capabilities are critical assets

We mentioned UAS or RPAS as aircraft that can be remotely controlled to operate Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance missions. But UAS and RPAS are far from being just remotely controlled aircraft: Unmanned Aircraft Systems or

26

Price capabilities positioning

graphik: Aero Surveillance

Industries

Philippe Roy

is the President of Aero Surveillance Inc. He holds an Electrical Engi-

neering Degree from University of Poitiers in France, an MBA from Babson College and graduated from the Executive Management Program

at Ivey School of Business in Canada. Prior to ASI, between 1998 and

2011 Mr. Roy has held several senior management positions at Mer-

cury Systems and in the Aerospace-Defence business unit of Digital

Equipment. He has over 25 years of worldwide experience in the Aerospace and Defence electronics industry including 20 in the US working

Data generation vs transmission and analysis capabilities graphik: Aero Surveillance

on the most advanced programs. Mr Roy is the recipient of multiple

awards and co-author of a US patent on UAV advanced technology as

well as an Introduction book on Unmanned Systems. He holds an FAA

commercial pilot license for multi-engine aircraft with instrument

better resolution of images and signals, which translates into larger amounts of data. Aerial surveillance is and will increasingly be a large contributor to big data. Meanwhile, transmission technology bandwidth capabilities are not increasing at the same pace and limit the amount and quality of data available on the ground. Finally, commercial technologies, because of their fast life cycles, are faced with faster obsolescence, which in turn does not fit with the typically long cycles of large defence systems. As we can see, there are many factors at play and it is very important that the right trade-offs be made when designing new systems and defining new operating concepts and key operational objectives.

Open Architecture for the next generation

NG means that the system must be designed in compliance with Open Architecture concepts. This means that all sub-systems are designed using open standard interfaces. Such interfaces apply to all technology layers and all sub-systems that constitute an RPAS. For instance, each sub-system used in an RPAS features hardware interfaces and software components, and generates several types of data.

Dissemination and exploitation of multi-source data

privileges and is an active pilot approaching 2000 hours.

All hardware interfaces and major software components should be compliant with major international open standards such as IEEE, NATO STANAG and many others. Data formats applicable to imagery, video or other sensor data should also be compliant with major international open standards. The standard data formats are extremely important in order to facilitate Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination of relevant information to RPAS users. Open Architecture-based RPAS must also enable processing to take place on board inside the aircraft and pre-process information in real time. The potential benefits are enormous and with processing capabilities per unit of power constantly improving, major progress lies ahead of us.

Summary

With the world facing increasing challenges in the Defence and Security domain, governments must look at aerial surveillance and the associated new technologies as a tool capable of substantially improving the way they can handle such challenges. New technologies and, more importantly, new ways of using them will provide better results at lower unit costs. The community is used to long cycles and it is difficult for innovations to penetrate at the same rate as on commercial markets; however at a time of budget restrictions, governments have the opportunity to enhance their capabilities whilst reducing their procurement and photo: Aero Surveillance operating budgets.

27

Meeting at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, the NATO Heads of State and Government endorsed a new Strategic Concept, which states that the Alliance will “engage in a process of continual reform, to streamline structures, improve working methods and maximise efficiency.”

NATO Reform – at a glance (edit/nc) “NATO Reform” refers to a package of ambitious reforms, underscoring the importance of pursuing the reform of NATO structures and procedures. It is all the more necessary for NATO to function in an effective and efficient way in a worldwide political context that has changed. Shrinking defence budgets in most Member States have also had a part to play. The reform process started back in June 2010 with the internal organisation of NATO Headquarters. NATO also engaged in the reform of its Command Structure (NATO Command Structure Review) and that of its Agencies (NATO Agencies Review).

Main Areas of NATO Reform

Three areas seems to me essential inside NATO Reform. NATO Command Structure Review: The goal of the new NATO Command Structure (NCS) is to put in place a leaner, more effective and affordable NATO Command Structure. NATO Headquarters Reform: The goal of the HQ Reform is to build an organisation that continues to be capable of furthering the needs of the Alliance, by redeploying human resources from lower to higher priorities, striking the right balance between improved efficiency and enhanced effectiveness.

28

NATO Agencies Reform: The goal of this reform is the consolidation and rationalisation of the existing NATO Agencies’ functions and services. In July 2012 the first milestone in the NATO Agencies reform process was reached, when four new organisations – the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), NATO Support Agency (NSPA), NATO Procurement Organisation (NPO) and NATO Science and Technology Organisation (STO) were established. By decision of the Council, these agencies took over the functions and responsibilities of 14 preexisting NATO bodies. NATO COMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION AGENCY (NCIA), with its headquarters in Brussels, providing NATOwide IT services, procurement and support in areas such as Command and Control Systems, Tactical and Strategic Communications and Cyber Defence Systems (see page 31) . NATO SUPPORT AGENCY (NSPA), with headquarters in Capellen, Luxembourg, delivering in-service support, maintenance and logistics support for weapons systems, as well as operational logistics and other services for nations and the Alliance as a whole (see page 29).

NATO PROCUREMENT ORGANISATION (NPO) – The North Atlantic Council decided to merge the Procurement and Support Agencies in early 2014, reducing the number of new Organisations initially envisaged from four to three. It has postponed the activation of the procurement entity within the NSPA to the time when programmes are actually assigned by the participating countries. THE NATO SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ORGANISATION (STO), based in Brussels, is to include a Programme Office for Collaborative Science and Technology and a Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation. The STO is headed by a Chief Scientist, who serves as a NATOwide senior scientific advisor. THE NATO STANDARDISATION AGENCY (NSA) has been transferred into the NATO Standardisation Office (NSO). The North Atlantic Council has appointed Koen Gijsbers, Major General (ret), a Dutch citizen, as the General Manager of the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA) and Mike Lyden, a US citizen and retired Rear Admiral in the US Navy Supply Corps, has been named General Manager of the NATO Support Agency (NSPA).

photo: Utenriksdept, flickr.com

NATO agencies reform

NATO agencies reform

The Agency will expand its role as NATO’s premier logistics and services provider

NSPA – an agency tailored to its mission Interview with Mike Lyden, General Manager NATO Support Agency, Capellen, Luxembourg The European: At the Lisbon Summit in 2010, Nations agreed upon NATO Agency reform. Mr Lyden, can you tell us how NSPA has evolved since it's setting up in 2012? Mike Lyden: Part of the NATO reform was indeed the Agency Review with the goal of streamlining the 14 former NATO agencies into three programmatic themes – procurement, support, and communications & information. Under Support, NSPA brought together NATO’s Central Europe Pipeline System, Airlift Management Program, and Maintenance and Supply Activity, as Business Units within new integrated Agency framework. The new NSPA is more than just a sum of its parts – it blends a broad range of support capabilities which can provide NATO nations and partners with an expanding portfolio of logistics products, services and integrated solutions. The European: I understand that NSPA now incorporates NATO’s procurement function. Can you elaborate upon this? Mike Lyden: NSPA currently delivers state-of-the-art e-Procurement services for nations to include e-contracts for recurring requirements, Random Brokerage services for one-time buys and, in the future, an e-Shopping Mall to support NATO general procurement as a shared service. Furthermore, we offer turnkey full Project Management services to meet diverse requirements such as airfields, infrastructure, facilities, and ammunition disposal and de-mining. More recently, the North Atlantic Council has approved the merger of NATO’s existing Procurement and Support Organisations, although the activation of the procurement entity within the NATO Support Agency (NSPA) has been postponed until new acquisition programmes are actually assigned. The European: I can imagine that bringing together three different agencies, as it was the case with NSPA, was quite challenging. How did you create a single streamlined and harmonious organisation? Mike Lyden: Well, the blending of the three former agencies into NSPA has taken some time. We had to ensure we could continue to deliver our current capabilities uninterrupted, particularly for our customers in Afghanistan. Their support remained our no.1 priority. Initially the Agency implementation work concentrated on bringing together the core functions and capabilities of each Agency in a new, integrated structure. Next we focused on rationalizing the processes and policies of the Agency’s enablers – its key support functions of Procurement, Human Resources, Finance and Information Technology. This year we are exploring opportunities to optimize our organisational structure further which we think will deliver tremendous

Mike Lyden

was nominated General Manager of the NATO

Support Agency on July 1st 2012.

He received a bachelor’s degree in Management Engineering from Rensselaer Polytech-

nic Institute and a Master’s in Business Admin-

Photo: NSPA

istration from Harvard University Graduate

School of Business Administration. Prior to NA-

TO he served as a Navy Supply Corps Officer for 33 years. His joint and multinational experience includes a.o. Director, Logistics and Security

Assistance (J-4), USEUCOM, Stuttgart; and Commander, Defense Sup-

ply Center Richmond, and Executive Officer to the Director, both in the

Defense Logistics Agency. Mr Lyden’s afloat tours include a.o. supply

officer, USS Valdez (FF 1096) and USS Carl Vinson (CVN 70). He served

as Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command, and 45th Chief of

the Navy Supply Corps from 2008 to July 2011, from where he retired

as a Rear Admiral.

synergies as well as position the Agency well to expand its role as NATO’s premier logistics and services provider team into the future. The European: What were the key challenges you faced in this process of harmonisation? Mike Lyden: First, we had to talk to our team members to ensure that they understood the purpose and objectives of the new Agency, and gain their trust through open communications. Building on this base, we needed to work on obtaining the efficiencies and savings desired by our stakeholders. To do this, we restructured the organisation to bring all the support elements under single leads with integrated alignment, processes and policies. This initiative, which continues today, required a constant focus on change management coupled with innovative thinking. Within Information Technology (IT), for example, when we had a first look at the IT systems in the previous agencies, they all used the same system, but different versions which had to be reconciled. Throughout this review process we continuously focused on understanding the costs associated with each of our business units and support functions. We are adjusting the current IT systems and processes to support this effort. Additionally, we had to build in new capabilities to support multiple currencies in our business unit operations. The work continues but I look forward to completing most of this by 2015.

29

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

“NSPA requires a broad vendor base to be successful in its mission.”

Mike Lyden and Hartmut Bühl at the NSPA in Luxembourg Source: NSPA

The European: You have mentioned IT and that brings me to IT security and cyber defence and your relations with the NATO Communication and Information Agency (NCIA). Mike Lyden: We cooperate well with NCIA and in two areas in particular. You mentioned cyber defence: currently we have one cyber defence lead and complementary internal cyber defence protective mechanisms. We have just received full re-accreditation by the NATO office of security for our established common IT networks across the agency in unclassified, restricted and secret systems. In addition, we are also working with the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) as they put in place some warning centers here as part of the global NATO approach to cyber defence. The European: But how do you communicate with industry, one of your backbones? Mike Lyden: You are correct – industry is our lifeblood. To effectively engage industry we rely upon open source internet connectivity. This includes a very robust e-procurement portal and platform which provides a powerful, automated linkage with our industry partners. We are very aware, however, of cyber security threats and the paramount requirement to defend our NATO secret systems as well as our own data. As you might imagine, the commercial, in-confidence aspects of the business with industry is a particular concern. Accordingly we are working diligently with NCIA to constantly enhance our cyber defence system. The European: I understand that engagement with industry is a key activity of NSPA, could you describe in a few words how the cooperation works? Mike Lyden: NSPA requires a broad vendor base to be successful in its mission. We work with each of the NATO Allies to ensure that their industrial base understands the opportunities that we offer for business, as well as how their companies can effectively engage in our procurements. Led by our Procurement Director and his team, we regularly host Industry Forums for nations in Capellen or support similar efforts back in the countries

30

themselves. A central focus area is on the Source File that we maintain with over 10,000 currently registered companies. Our e-Procurement processes automatically leverage this data to forward Request For Proposals (RFPs) to qualified firms. NSPA also maintans a Future Business Opporunities page on its website for larger or more complex solicitations. Of note also, NSPA is a great opportunity for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). In 2013, we awarded over 24.000 contractual instruments with a vast majority of them for less than 25 KEUR. The European: NAGSMA is also one of your agency partners. How are the exchanges with it? Mike Lyden: We enjoy strong cooperation with NAGSMA leadership and staff. Our mutual objective is to work together to develop planning for life-cycle management of the AGS system. We are actively engaged in the complete acquisition phase, as we define the eventual role for NSPA once the systems are delivered and reach Initial Operating Capability and then Full Operating Capability. The expectation is that the responsibility for follow-on, in-service support will reside with us here at NSPA including potential integration of specific elements of NAGSMA to ensure seamless transition to our support. The European: I see that you have achieved quite a lot under NATO Agency Reform, but the process is not yet complete… what remains to be done during the coming year? Mike Lyden: We have been talking about the implementation aspects of the NSPA and gaining efficiencies, but one of our other core objectives is to maximize our effectiveness. This means we must constantly engage with our customers and stakeholders to ensure we identify and develop the required capabilities – products and services – as their requirements evolve in the future. This becomes increasingly important with today’s world situation and in particular with the end of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. The European: I wish you all the best for your upcoming projects. Thank you, Mr Lyden.

NATO agencies reform

The strategic imperative for the Alliance is to be agile in innovation

Winning the cyber battle through reform by Koen Gijsbers, General Manager NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCI Agency), Brussels It may seem odd to talk about institutional reform in the context of cyber defence. Yet, in the case of NATO, the establishment of the NATO Communications and Information (NCI) Agency in 2012 was an important step forward. Prior to 2012, the teams that did research and development, including on cyber and missile defence, were in different organisations from those that actually operated NATO’s cyber defences, communications, computer, intelligence and surveillance capabilities. Despite good inter-Agency collaboration this was not optimal; projects were handed over from one organisation to another, sometimes causing delays and friction.

The reform aims at efficiency

As part of NATO’s 2011 reform package, five separate technology organisations were merged into one Agency, under one General Manager, to reduce overhead costs and generate significant savings for the taxpayers (for example, the top level management structure was reduced by 50%) and to deliver better capabilities, more rapidly.

Today, one Agency – the NCI Agency – is responsible for developing, operating and defending NATO’s communication and information systems 24/7, from cradle to grave.

One-stop shop

We completed the move to the new structure in early 2014. The transition was done in a series of measured steps, to ensure critical services were continued: from Afghanistan to the Secretary General’s desktop and mobile devices. The reform brings benefits not just to the Alliance and its nations but also to our relationship with industry. For industry, all of NATO’s major communication technology acquisitions are now managed by one versus three acquisition departments, reducing the costs to industry of interfacing with NATO. At our industry conference, in Bucharest in March this year, we announced upcoming business opportunities of some 2 billion, ranging from new networks, to new cyber, intelli>>> page 33

NATO agencies reform

Major General (ret.) Koen Gijsbers

is the first General Manager of the NATO Com-

<<< page 31

munications and Information Agency, which

gence and surveillance capabilities. I encourage readers to visit our website (www.ncia.nato.int) to find out more about upcoming contracts. Our next industry conference will be held in Madrid, in 2015. For Nations, we are now engaged in a programme – piloted by The Netherlands and Germany – to re-use capabilities tried and tested in Afghanistan for national use, to speed up the preparation of national units for duty in NATO’s Response Force. Not only do Nations benefit from the investments they made for Afghanistan; we win a second time by preserving hard-fought interoperability improvements between NATO and national systems. Under the new Agency this support can now be offered as one comprehensive package – from networks to software.

Speeding the development of defences

Institutional reform has helped, but we still face a formidable challenge: to increase the pace of technological refresh within the Alliance. We are in an age of rapid technological innovation, most of which is no longer driven by the military but by the private sector. This innovation cuts both ways; it helps us but it is also exploited by cyber criminals and adversaries. And our adversaries frequently can be more agile than our complex procedures. Together with Nations, we are currently exploring three options that I believe can tilt the playing field: First, encourage greater participation of small and medium enterprises and have a more diverse supply chain. This reflects the fact that small and medium enterprises are frequently forces of disruption and innovation (take for example Skype from Estonia); Second, innovation in NATO acquisition – e.g. by giving more freedom to industry to shape solutions. I believe that if we specify requirements in too great a detail we will not fully

was established in July 2012. He holds a Master’s degree in Military Art and Science from

the US Army Command and General Staff Col-

Photo: NCI Agency

lege. During his career, he has commanded

troops up to brigade level as well as supported

troops at home and abroad, including in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Congo

and Kosovo. From 2006 to 2009, he was Assistant Chief of Staff for

Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence at

NATO’s Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, USA. Prior to his

current position, he was CIO at the Ministry of Defence of The Nether-

lands and member of the Dutch national CIO and Cyber Boards.

leverage the creativity of Industry. So when we launched a major modernisation of NATO’s IT infrastructure we first turned to Industry to see what solutions they would recommend; Finally, I see a change in climate among Nations in terms of tolerance to Industry performance, using both incentives and being more diligent in executing penalties. This is a direction that I very much promote, keeping in mind that we spend taxpayers’ money. The champion of these changes in NCI Agency will be Peter Scaruppe, formerly of the European Defence Agency, and now the Agency’s Director of Acquisition. I encourage interested parties to establish a dialogue with him, as he is now discussing options with both Nations and Industry. This edition of “The European” will appear shortly after NATO’s Wales Summit, which will launch a number of initiatives, including the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership. What is certain is that in today’s geo-political climate, the need for the Alliance to be agile in innovation will remain a strategic imperative. The reform of 2012 means we have a good institutional framework in place. Now it’s time to be equally bold in our procedures and processes.

► Further information:

NATO’s cyber defence policy (edit/nc) Following the cyber attacks

tation. The second NATO cyber defence pol- cyber defence policy was endorsed in June

tions in spring 2007, NATO approved its first

ters in June 2011. In February 2014, De- Cyber defence was also high on the agenda

against Estonia’s public and private institu- icy was approved by NATO Defence Minis- 2014. policy on cyber defence in January 2008. At

fence Ministers tasked NATO to develop a

of the September 2014 NATO Summit in

the Lisbon Summit in 2010, the North At- new, enhanced cyber defence policy regard- Wales. lantic Council (NAC) was tasked to develop

an in-depth NATO cyber defence policy and

ing collective defence, assistance to Allies,

streamlined governance, legal considera- web: More information on the Summit

to prepare an action plan for its implemen- tions and relations with industry. The new decisions are available at: www.nato.int

33

Only half of the Member States have national cyber security strategies, which remain fundamentally different in terms of their maturity and capabilities. An EU Cyber Security Strategy as proposed by the Commission in 2013 is a positive step towards harmonising the existing approaches in order to ensure a high level of cyber security throughout the European Union.

The creation of a “Single market for Cyber Security” is of crucial importance

The implementation of the EU Cyber Security Strategy

by Dr Andreas Schwab MEP, Rapporteur for the Directive on the Network and Information Security (NIS) , Brussels At the beginning of 2013, the European Commission adopted the proposal for a Directive on Network and Information Security together with a Joint Communication on a Cybersecurity Strategy, in the framework of an overarching approach. Since then, the European Parliament has agreed on a first reading position that enjoys broad political support, and is now awaiting the Council’s position with a view to reaching agreement on the final text of the Directive by the end of 2014.

Digital Single Market

E-commerce and online services are a vital force for achieving the completion of the Digital Single Market and the aims of the EU 2020 strategy, for the benefit of all actors on the Internal Market. However, the number of cyber challenges has risen constantly in recent years, undermining not only the proper functioning of the Single Market but also consumers’ confidence in the Digital Single Market. At the same time the maintenance of the services provided by critical infrastructures such as transport systems, energy plants, hospitals and public administrations is at risk, as long as they are not adequately equipped against cyber threats. To give just a few examples: in 2007, public and private institutions in Estonia were attacked in such a way that the whole country was “paralysed”. In 2011, the SonyPlayStation network was attacked and the sensitive data of millions of users stolen. But the EU institutions have also been targeted by serious network attacks over the last months and

34

Dr Andreas Schwab MEP

has been a Member of the European Parliament since 2004. Born in

1973, he studied law at the University of Freiburg and the Institut d’E-

tudes Politiques in Paris and obtained an L.L.M. from the University of

Wales in 2000 and Doctorate in law in 2002. He served as a lawyer at

the Ministry for Culture, Youth and Sport in Stuttgart and Private Sec-

retary to the Minister. He is the EPP Group Coordinator in the Commit-

tee on the Internal Market and Consumer Protection, a Substitute

Member of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and a

member of the Bureau of the EPP Group.

years, leading to crashed websites and system breakdowns. Yet not even half of the Member States have a national cyber security strategy and there remain fundamental differences between the national strategies in terms of their maturity and capacity. Furthermore, network and information systems in the Union are highly interconnected and many network attacks transcend national borders due to the global nature of the internet. In view of the constantly evolving nature of cyber challenges, the uneven levels of resilience and a Digital Single Market that remains fragmented, an EU-wide approach and closer cooperation between the Member States have become more necessary than ever.

photo: © Bastian Weltjen, Fotolia.com

Security Solutions

Security Solutions

“Single Market for cyber security”

A high level of network and information security and the longterm creation of a “Single Market for cyber security” are of crucial importance for the competitiveness of both suppliers and users of security solutions in the Union. For businesses, in particular small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), there remains much untapped potential, as even business users often remain vulnerable to cyber threats as a consequence of being uninformed and unaware about the costs and benefits of investing in cyber security. This being the case, the EU needs to step up its efforts in order to invest more in the area of research and development. The EU Horizon 2020 Framework Programme could serve as a solid basis for developing innovative and scientifically sound solutions, targeting in particular the funding of security solutions for SMEs. Against the background of these challenges, especially in light of the current economic situation, it is important to find a balanced solution that guarantees high-level security and fosters risk management without creating burdensome and costly rules. At the same time it is necessary to seize the opportunity to launch resilience-oriented cooperation amongst the 28 Member States with their widely differing levels of cyber security. Above and beyond actions to secure the resilience of public administrations and market operators, the efforts to fight cyber crime and cyber threats to national security also need the benefit of synergies, additional expertise and capabilities at Union level in order to create a more secure environment for each citizen and for our societies as a whole. At the same time, awareness raising among our citizens, so that they themselves can contribute to the protection of their personal data, will also be indispensable in an environment marked by increasingly elaborate cyber threats and attacks.

Andreas Schwab MEP congratulates the new President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker on his election. photo: EP, Brussels

In the long run, the implementation of such an EU-wide and comprehensive and holistic approach aimed at more cyber security and a high level of network and information resilience will benefit the smooth functioning of critical and everyday services in the Single Market while creating a climate of trust, economic prosperity and security for citizens, businesses and Member States.

NEWS

Launch of a Joint Cybercrime Action Taskforce

and EC3; its members thus far are Austria,

(edit/nc) With the launch of a Joint Cyber-

partners working side-by-side to take ac-

tember 2014, for the first time a perma-

targets. It will cover all relevant areas like

Netherlands, Spain, the UK and the US. Aus-

nets, Crime-as-a-Service, online fraud, in-

to this initiative. The J-CAT will gather data

crime Action Taskforce (J-CAT) on 1 Sepnent multilateral cybercrime taskforce has

been established in Europe to coordinate

investigations against top cybercriminal

networks. The task force, which will be led by Andy Archibald, Deputy Director of the

National Cyber Crime Unit from the UK’s

National Crime Agency (NCA), is hosted at

the European Cybercrime Centre (EC3) at

Europol. Piloted for six months it will coordinate international investigations with

tion against key cybercrime threats and top

malware coding, testing, distribution, Bottrusion and similar top-end crimes, such as

underground forums and malware, including banking Trojans. Initiated by the EC3,

the EU Cybercrime Taskforce, the FBI and

the NCA, the J-CAT comprises a team com-

posed of Cyber Liaison Officers from committed and closely involved Member States, non-EU law enforcement partners

Canada, Germany, France, Italy, the

tralia and Colombia have also committed on specific criminal themes from national repositories and from relevant government

and private partners, as well as transform-

ing this raw data into actionable intelligence, and proposing targets and networks

for investigations.

Source: Europol

35

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Greater flexibility through modularity and software-defined cryptography

Innovation in encryption technology by Peter Rost, Head of Product Management at Rohde & Schwarz SIT GmbH, Munich News coverage in recent months has clearly reinforced the need for government agencies, military organisations and critical infrastructure operators to protect their communication networks effectively against eavesdropping. A new approach combines the benefits of commercial network security products with those of dedicated, government-approved security solutions. Up until now, governmental and military institutions have had to choose between two alternatives for protecting their data on the move. Either they could select today’s standard network communications products, which often include security and encryption features and are available at off-the-shelf conditions, but which in many cases are not sufficient to protect against serious cyber attacks against countries or alliances. Or customers could turn to specialised government-approved security solutions. These solutions provide excellent levels of security, but they typically involve long development cycles and roll-out processes. Combining the benefits of both options is the key to enhancing the breadth and depth of cyber defence. It is therefore useful to examine their respective market mechanics.

Off-the-shelf products only focus on performance

For network encryption, many organisations use the security functions provided by off-the-shelf network components. However, for the manufacturers of these products it does not pay to invest in government-approvable security measures. They are under intense pressure to create innovative products with increasingly short product life cycles. Security features tie up additional resources in product development, which drives up development costs, slowing down functional innovation. Their main target market, corporate IT, does not place any particular emphasis on a holistic design for security, reducing the incentive for them to invest in security features.

Peter Rost

is Head of Product Management at Rohde &

Schwarz SIT GmbH. He represents the com-

pany in various associations such as the

TeleTrusT competence network and several

BITKOM working groups. Mr Rost owns a MasPhoto: private

ter of Industrial Engineering from Technical

University Darmstadt. Previously, he held prod-

uct management positions at global technology companies such as Siemens, Infineon and Micronas.

Custom development is time-consuming

Due to their sovereign responsibilities, government and military organisations rightfully impose demanding security requirements for encryption solutions. They must use government-approved high-security products to protect classified information in accordance with the classification level. The suppliers of these solutions custom-develop the equipment to the required security level, and to the mostly nationally driven functional specifications. Since many countries have national cyber defence suppliers, few crypto products will find a market of any reasonable size beyond their own borders. Most others will not be able to recover their high initial investment from the market, requiring upfront or permanent governmental support. But they have numerous advantages: Their security functions are derived on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the relevant threats and weaknesses. Implementation is not limited to a correct algorithm, but takes a holistic approach to the whole solution, combining software, hardware, key generation and management systems.

R&S®SITLine ETH40G: Highspeed network encryptor for secure site and data center interconnection

36

photo: Rohde & Schwarz SIT

Security Solutions

Flexibility and security: The new platform architecture from Rohde & Schwarz SIT GmbH is used to derive dedicated, application-specific encryption solutions with suitable housing for radios, telecommunications systems and network encryptors. photo: Rohde & Schwarz SIT

For example, red/black separation, additional physical security mechanisms and product development and production in secure facilities are essential characteristics of high-security products. Such devices perfectly fulfil functional and security targets for the years and decades to come. However, communication technology is advancing increasingly rapidly. And capabilities are evolving with the paradigm shift from “need-to-know” towards “duty-to-share”. In a high-security environment, it can be very time-consuming and expensive to migrate to updated crypto solutions that meet the new challenges.

Greater flexibility through modularity and softwaredefined cryptography

The key challenge for future encryption products therefore involves staying ahead of the rapid pace of technological development. A modular approach for crypto product design is advantageous in this context. By using software-defined encryption, the products can be updated faster and more cost-effectively. The software application determines encryption strengths and network protocols. The modular hardware platform defines the performance and environmental fit of the actual product. In this manner, the manufacturer is able to derive products for specific applications more quickly by drawing upon combinations of suitable hard- and software components. Users benefit sooner from advances in communication technology without having to compromise on security.

Towards a new platform architecture

Rohde & Schwarz SIT has realised such an approach with its new encryption platform. Based on a modular security architecture, products are derived by combining standard core modules

with interface boards tailored to the different environments (commercial, governmental and military applications) and customer-specific cryptography. The use of standard core modules shortens time-to-market for high-security products, while flexible interface boards enable a fast response to advances in communications needs and network technology. This approach also ensures long-term product availability. The first product based on this platform, a network encryptor featuring a stunning 40 Gbit/s AES-256 throughput for geo-redundant data centre interconnection, was introduced in spring 2014.

► Industry NEWS

Brussels industry representations On 15 October 2014 Safran’s

representative in Brussels, Sen-

ior Vice-President Jacques Cipri-

ano, is to retire at the age of 64

years. Since 2003, he has been in

charge of the Safran group’s poli-

cies with regard to the EU Institutions and NATO. He is highly appreciated in EU circles for his in-

depth knowledge of EU and NATO

industrial affairs.

photo:private

37

Security Solutions

German armed forces focus on capabilities for worldwide multinational operations

From sensor to shooter – new approaches for interoperability in C5ISR 1

by Major General Klaus Veit, Deputy Director-General BAAINBw2, Koblenz

Placing an even greater focus on operations – that is the key concept of the current reorientation of the Bundeswehr. This focus helps to increase Bundeswehr capabilities in multinational operations worldwide and during disaster relief operations at home. Apart from the human resources, our soldiers, it is the defence materiel that plays a crucial role in the success of current operations. Maximum benefit for operations must be achieved through an effective combination of the numerous sensor and weapon systems employed on a wide variety of platforms – from ships through vehicles to aircraft. The BAIINBw monitors the entire life cycle of this defence materiel on the different platforms as well as the information processing and information transfer systems linking them all.

Information technology as service provider

Information and communications technology as an integrating factor enables interoperable, comprehensive and continuous networking of all elements involved. This approach results in effective and integrated thinking and acting – also in multinational coordinated efforts. The integrated system of command and control, engagement and support provides the required capabilities for this concept. This interoperable networking is facilitated by a service-oriented approach. The required capabilities are supplied as a service wherever and whenever they are needed. In the multinational

Major General Klaus F. Veit

has been Deputy Director-General of the BAINNBw since 2012. Born in Grünstadt, he

joined the Bundeswehr in 1974. Mr Veit studied

electrical engineering at the BW-University in

Munich. 1986: German General Staff Course

Photo: BAAINBw

and 1990: Italian General Staff Course in Civi-

tavecchia. From 1993 to 1995, Mr Veit was bat-

talion cdr of the 1st Signal Battalion in Hannover and from 1997–1999,

he was assistant branch chief C2 Support for the German Army. Mr Veit

served as Executive Officer to the General Manager of NATO’s C3

Agency in Brussels, as assistant G6 at the 7th Armored Division in Düs-

seldorf and branch chief MOD, Bonn from 1999 to 2004. Prior to his cur-

rent position, Mr Veit served from 2005 on as Deputy Director-General

of the Federal Office of Information Management and Information Technology.

By means of a holistic service-oriented approach, availability of IT functions is already considered at the concept stage and developed further in cooperation with the future operators and users. environment, this approach is already being applied in the Federated Mission Networking (FMN), for example. On a national level, Germany is pursuing a service-oriented approach during the harmonisation and further development of command and control information systems.

Support framework for a successful service approach

The IT supporting the entire task spectrum of the Bundeswehr consists of elements used for information processing, for weapon system control and for evaluation of radar or UAV RPAS. Through command, control, information (and weapons control) systems the information processing and information transfer systems reach the individual vehicle, ship and aircraft and finally the soldier deployed abroad or at home. This capability is ensured through the HERKULES project. For operations abroad, it will be established in the next few years. In the service-oriented approach to IT, the connecting element is the NATO C3 classification taxonomy which categorises, describes and correlates all IT services in a structured framework. The C5ISR systems supporting the command and control, reconnaissance and engagement sequence can thus be fully supported with the required IT services.

Holistic perspective and harmonisation

A service-oriented approach enables us to take a consistent and comprehensive view of existing but previously separate IT worlds and to bring them together. By means of a holistic service-oriented approach, availability of IT functions is already considered at the concept stage and developed further in cooperation with the future operators and users. This will allow us to provide the users with an effective and modern IT system. 1 Command, Control, Consultation, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance 2 The Federal Office of Bundeswehr Equipment, Information Technology and InService Support

39

To implement a strategy, all aspects – both internal and external – must be taken on board. The European Energy Security Strategy aims to combine climate protection and the efficient use of resources with a realignment of infrastructure and the promotion of investments. It opts for a market approach that is typical of EU policymaking. Security of supply cannot, however, be obtained by market regulation but calls for the establishment of a broad and reliable policy framework. Commission Communication regarding a European Energy Security Strategy

Learning from physics: the principle of energy conservation by Andy Francis Stirnal, Political Scientist, Berlin

Severe unrest in Eastern Europe already brought home the alarming level of vulnerability of Europe’s energy supplies back in the winter of 2006. The continued need for urgent action has again been demonstrated by the events of the past few months.

A framework for climate and energy

In January 2014, the Commission presented its policy framework for climate and energy for the period 2020-2030, a measure that at the time was associated with climate change objectives and

Andy Francis Stirnal

studied political science and communication in Strasbourg and Paris, and at the Freie Univer-

sität in Berlin. After having worked in Berlin for several communication agencies, he became

a political consultant at Berlin’s Business Rep-

Photo: private

resentation in Brussels. He subsequently wor-

ked for a Brussels-based political consultancy,

initiating debates in the field of European foreign and security policy.

He is currently working as an independent journalist, conference conceptioner and EU project manager. Recently he became an approved grant consultant for European funding.

40

the conservation of resources. However, reducing our dependency on energy imports and resources efficiency are but two sides of the same coin. If we add security of supply and the need to rethink Europe’s energy mix to that equation, it becomes evident that the problem of reorganising Europe’s energy policy is something of a Rubik’s Cube. In spring 2014, in response to the crisis-laden environment in Europe’s eastern neighbourhood, a more targeted effort to reduce dependency on energy imports seemed to be the appropriate political answer. But the need to act has also revealed that not enough has been done since 2006 in terms of reorganising and strengthening the resilience of Europe’s energy infrastructure and of diversifying energy suppliers. Moreover, the strategic challenges confronting our future energy supply were not sufficiently anticipated, insofar as a system of crisisresistant treaties bringing together supplier countries, transit countries and consumer countries has still not come about to this day, any more than crisis-solving mechanisms have been developed to any satisfactory extent.

A European Energy Security Strategy

Pressure causes counter-pressure: in view of these circumstances, in May 2014 the Commission presented nothing less than a European Energy Security Strategy (EESS) based on an

photo: Gabi Schoenemann, pixelio.de

Energies

MAIN TOPIC: Energies

in-depth study1 of the state of energy security in terms of supply, consumption, capacities and transport, variables that are all needed for a balanced appraisal in order to reduce our vulnerability to external energy shocks. To prevent a disruption during the winter of 2014-15, member states must be able to meet peak demands, even in the event of a disruption of the single largest infrastructure asset, by December 2014. Moreover, reverse flow systems must be installed and functional for all cross-border interconnections within the EU. This is the technical condition for an emergency/solidarity mechanism, together with the completion of missing transport links. These infrastructure measures will be supplemented by enhanced coordination of risk assessments and contingency plans, in order to pave the way for a well-functioning and fully integrated internal energy market. In parallel to moderating energy demand, the EU will increase indigenous energy production, including the increased deployment of renewables as well as a balanced deployment of traditional energy sources. Furthermore, it is crucial to develop energy technologies that make it possible to maximise efficiency or even to benefit from new resources. In this regard, full use of EU structural funds and the mobilisation of private and public funding are seen as promising instruments.

Political impact and restrictions

Disruptions of energy supply might be caused among other things by natural or technical incidents. The Commission, however, seems to place the emphasis on political incidents, in that it outlines the importance of diversifying supplier countries, routes and sources of energy. New partner countries (Caspian Sea Region, the Mediterranean) and increasing LNG supplies are just some of the keywords that signal its response to a challenging political environment. According to the paper, improved coordination of national energy policies and an effort to speak with one voice are of the utmost importance. The idea of a common external energy policy is not only insinuated, but clearly expressed in the document; it is also echoed in the “Strategic Agenda for the Union in Times of Change” and in the Council conclusions, both dated June 2014.

► Further information:

Energy Security Strategy

Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament and the Council – European Energy Security

Strategy – Brussels, 28.5.2014, COM(2014) 330 final

> http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528_energy_security_ communication.pdf Commission Staff working document, In-depth study of

European Energy Security, Brussels, 2.7.2014, SWD (2014)

330 final/3

> http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/20140528_energy_securi ty_study.pdf Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament, the Council, the European Econimic and social Committee and the Committee of the regions

A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from

2020 to 2030, COM(2014) 15 final, Brussels, 22.1.2014

> http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/2030/com_2014_15_en.pdf Commission staff working document impact assessment Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions

A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 up to 2030, Brussels, 22.1.2014 SWD(2014) 15 final

> http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/impact/ia_carried_ out/docs/ia_2014/swd_2014_0015_en.pdf European Council, 26/27 June 2014, Conclusions, SEUCO

79/14, CO EUR 4, COCL 2

> http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pr essdata/en/ec/143478.pdf European Council, 26/27 June 2014, Strategic agenda for the Union in times of change

> http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pr

However, it is not yet clear whether this Energy Security Strategy is anything more than a rejection of the current dependencies and whether the alternatives that are presented are indeed viable. Likewise the document delivers no clear answers as regards the principle of future sustained relations with supplier countries with questionable policies.

essdata/en/ec/143477.pdf Günther H. Oettinger, European Commissioner for Energy

European Energy Security Strategy: key priorities and actions:

College of Europe and European Commission: First joint high-

level Roundtable on EU Energy Policy, Brussels, 25 June 2014 > http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-505_en.htm

1 [SWD(2014) 330 final/3]

41

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

EU energy security policies offer a golden opportunity for renewables

Energy security – new opportunities for renewable energies in the EU by Dr William Gillett, Coordinator Energy and Climate, EASME, European Commission, Brussels

Since the early 1970’s, warning signals have repeatedly drawn the attention of those responsible for energy supplies in the EU. In 2014, all eyes are once again on the EU and its Heads of State to come up with a strategy for improving the EU’s energy security. Recent concerns about the EU’s energy security have triggered many lobby groups to reframe well-rehearsed demands for greater consideration for their particular sectors. Meanwhile individual citizens and their elected representatives in cities and communities across the EU, as well as in the European Parliament, are calling for risky imports of fossil fuels to be replaced by greater use of renewable energies.

Ambitious EU renewable energy target

In response, European governments are discussing an increase in the overall EU renewable energy target from 20% by 2020 to 27% by 2030. At the same time, renewables are becoming more competitive and governments are reacting to the rapidly falling costs of their deployment by cutting back their subsidies. Unfortunately, not all countries are reducing their subsidies in a well-planned way, and some have even done it retrospectively, which has forced several leading EU businesses into bankruptcy and damaged investor confidence. Like many decisions related to energy security, the decision to increase the use of renewable energy lies with policy makers. However, in this case, they must at the same time ensure that

Dr William Gillett

is an engineer, who is currently Coordinator En-

ergy and Climate in the European Commission’s Executive Agency for Small and Medium

Enterprises (EASME). From 2005 to 2013, he

was Head of Unit for Renewable Energy in the

Photo: private

Executive Agency for Competitiveness and In-

novation (EACI), where he led a team of 12 re-

newable energy specialists, who managed projects that tackled non-

technological and market barriers to the deployment of renewable en-

ergy. From 2000 to 2005, Mr Gillett was based in the Directorate Gen-

eral for Energy and Transport, where he helped to manage the European Commission’s research programme on sustainable energies.

Before that, he worked in the UK national energy agency, private sector, and University mainly on sustainable energy.

42

the investments required will bring sufficient returns to attract private investors, as most of the up-front capital must come from the private sector. In practice, this means that the future deployment of renewable energy in the EU is highly dependent on establishing long-term, stable and transparent energy policies which will build and maintain private sector investor confidence.

The three pillars of EU energy policy

The EU’s current sustainable energy policy has been built on three main pillars, namely mitigation of climate change, industrial competitiveness, and security of energy supplies. Over the past decade, the third pillar “energy security” has received comparatively little attention. But in Spring 2014 it was quickly brought up to the top of the EU agenda, with increased uncertainty over reliable and affordable fossil fuel imports for the EU. The result, which is summarised in the European Commission’s new European Energy Security Strategy [Communication COM(2014)330 dated 28 May 2014], is a fresh look at how to ensure reliable and affordable supplies of electricity and heat to keep EU industries working, to keep the lights on, and to keep EU citizens warm, both at work and at home. Part of the new energy security strategy is, of course, to use energy more efficiently, and there is no shortage of good technologies for doing that. Similarly, affordable indigenous energy sources ought to partially replace imported energy supplies , for example by using hydro, wind, solar, and bio energies to generate electricity and by using bio, heat pumps, geothermal and solar energy to supply heat (for which there are plenty of proven and commercially available technologies). However, the challenge for both EU and national policy makers is to create an energy market framework which will encourage the replacement of fossil fuels as cost effectively as possible.

Single energy market framework

A single energy market framework for the EU makes sense because fuel prices are set in global markets, and increased trading between Member States will help to reduce the overall costs of supplying energy to the EU, even though it will require major investments in infrastructure such as transmission lines, pipelines, ports, roads and rail terminals, which are inter-connected across national borders. However, the establishment of a single energy market is proving to be far more difficult than expected. Despite the good work of ACER and ENTSO-E, each

MAIN TOPIC: Energies

Member State has its own energy regulator and the choice of power generators, which remains a closely guarded Member State competence, is also influenced by the local availability of fossil and renewable energy resources, by the potential for local job creation, and by the business interests of the energy companies concerned. Nevertheless, the European Commission’s recent roadmaps and policy communications, which propose improved energy efficiency, greater use of renewables, enhanced interconnections between national energy grids, and smarter management of networks have been well received because together they will reduce EU dependency on imported energy sources and greatly improve overall energy security. In other words, energy security policies offer a golden opportunity for renewable energy.

Günther Oettinger, Commissioner for Energy in the Barroso II Commission (2010-2014), during his Press Conference, 23 July 2014, in Brussels

Hesitation in the electricity sector

However, this opportunity is not immediately welcomed by all stakeholders, especially those in the electricity sector, who have invested in conventional generating technologies, such as gas turbines, and want to operate them as much as possible in order to make a return on their investments. Similarly, those who own older conventional power plants, which have already recovered their capital investments, want to continue to use them as long as possible in order to generate good profits, and those who are responsible for managing the existing transmission and distribution grids are not ready to invest in new infrastructure unless it will bring them additional returns. Lastly, and this is a big challenge, some individual citizens and local community groups find it difficult to accept that new energy supply infrastructure must be built in their own back yards. For the electricity sector, there is the added complication that the two biggest contributors to renewable electricity (wind and PV solar) offer variable supplies, which must be balanced with the demand. Technically, this can be done reliably by using smarter or better interconnected networks, backup generators, storage and demand response schemes, but all of these require additional effort and costs, which eventually have to be paid for by consumers.

Big potential in the heating sector

In the heating sector, there is an enormous potential for substituting fossil fuels by renewables (solar, heat pumps, geothermal and bio energies), notably in buildings - where more than 40% of EU’s final energy consumption occurs. In new buildings, energy demands can be limited by building regulations, which require high levels of insulation together with well designed glazing and air handling. However, much bigger opportunities lie in the refurbishment of existing buildings where, after draught proofing and insulation, the most cost effective way to cut the consumption of fossil fuels in the long term is to substitute with renewable energies. Here, the main

photo: © European Union

challenge is to mobilise the capital needed for the up-front investments, for example by creating win-win opportunities for building owners, tenants, and heating energy service providers.

EU-wide energy policy and market framework,

In summary, the main opportunities for renewable energies in the EU do not lie primarily in finding better or cheaper technologies, because these are already emerging as a result of economies of scale in rapidly growing global markets. What needs to be done urgently in order to improve European energy security is to stabilise and promote an EU-wide energy policy and market framework, which will boost investor confidence and thereby lead to improved energy efficiency and a steady growth in the market up-take of ever more cost-effective renewable energies. At the same time, despite its extensive experience in the deployment of sustainable energy technologies – the EU hosts some of the biggest markets in the world for renewable technologies – the EU needs to invest in its people and in the further development of their skills to deploy, operate and maintain the next generation of sustainable energy technologies. Over the past ten years, sustainable energy has been promoted in the EU using a powerful combination of legislation and the financing of collaborative actions and initiatives through programmes such as Intelligent Energy Europe. Together, these tools have delivered remarkable progress, and more funding for sustainable energies is now planned in the current financial period 2014–2020, notably through EU cohesion policy funds and the H2020 programme, as well as by further mobilising the resources of the EIB. Renewable energy offers many new opportunities for improving the EU’s energy security but, like many other security related markets, stable policies are essential to securing the investor confidence which is needed to mobilise private funding for the required infrastructure and technology deployment.

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MAIN TOPIC: Energies

Nations must systematically examine energy and security

NATO and the challenge of energy security by Michael Rühle, Head of Energy Division, NATO Headquarters, Brussels

quent political discussions – among Allies but also with partner The Ukraine crisis has highlighted an inconvenient truth: when countries, many of which are energy producers or transit counit comes to energy, geography is still destiny. Pipelines mean tries. In short, NATO must be ahead of the analytical curve. both economic and political power. The struggle between Second, NATO needs to deepen Moscow and Kiev over the price of its ties with other energy players. gas is more instructive in this There is a need for more strategic analysis, Energy touches on cyber, terrorregard than a thousand economy ism, maritime security, and nontextbooks. It revealed that energy more intelligence-sharing, and more proliferation. But it also touches security is also an issue of nationfrequent political discussions on climate change, environmental al security; that dependence on protection, and military energy Russia can be a strategic liability; efficiency. NATO has many and that the much-hyped interdecontributions to make, but defining them requires reaching out pendence between the producer and the consumer will not to the EU, to the International Energy Agency, and to the private encourage stability when the producer can go longer without sector. NATO must become a trusting revenue than the consumer can go without gas. and trusted partner within this group of stakeholders.

The global energy landscape is changing

So far, so bad. But the global energy landscape is changing. New energy suppliers are entering the international stage; new pipelines are connecting producers and consumers; renewable energy is becoming economically viable. Deep offshore drilling, the “fracking” of shale gas, and the liquefaction of natural gas are transforming the global market. And tankers carrying Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) are making gas independent from pipelines. All this should be good news. A flexible energy market means lower prices and greater security of supply. However, even such an optimistic scenario will not come about without a major effort. Many energy producing countries suffer from domestic instability. About half of the world’s oil production is transported by ships that pass on fixed routes through critical straits. Piracy is a constant threat. Ports are more complex and more congested than ever before. And as critical energy infrastructure becomes computerised, it becomes increasingly exposed to cyber attacks.

Enhancing energy security

Finally, there is a need to educate future military leaders and diplomats in energy security. This means putting energy security into NATO’s exercise scenarios. It means using NATO’s educational establishments to teach courses that examine energy security in all its dimensions: from geopolitics all the way to enhancing energy efficiency in the military. NATO’s role in energy security will remain modest, yet energy issues have become too intertwined with other security developments to allow NATO to ignore them. In the globalized world of the 21st century, the Alliance cannot afford a blind spot.

Michael Rühle

is currently Head of the Energy Security Section

of the Emerging Security Challenges Division in NATO’s International Staff. Born in 1959 in

Challenges for NATO

The upheavals in the global energy landscape are also a challenge for NATO. NATO is not an energy organisation, but an Alliance that seeks to safeguard the security of 900 million citizens cannot turn a blind eye to energy developments and their security implications. What does this mean in concrete terms? First, it means that Allies must examine the relationship between energy and security far more systematically. There is a need for more strategic analysis, more intelligence-sharing, and more fre-

Stuttgart, he studied Political Science at the

University of Bonn. Before joining NATO’s Inter-

Photo: NATO

national Staff in 1991, Mr Rühle was a Volks-

wagen Fellow at the Konrad Adenauer Founda-

tion and a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington D.C. Prior to his current position he was

Head of Speechwriting and Senior Political Advisor in the NATO Secre-

tary General’s Policy Planning Unit. Mr Rühle has published widely on

international security issues.

45

Energy production is to be twinned with high technology energy management and storage systems

Armed forces going green – only a vision?

by Thomas Bennington, Programme Manager Energy and Environment, European Defence Agency (EDA), Brussels

Energy, in all its forms, is a ubiquitous commodity that underpins almost all aspects of human activity and its generation, distribution and consumption are essential to social development and economic growth. However, the universal dependence on fossil fuels has produced areas of strategic tension not just in terms of energy security, but also in the more profound challenge of dealing with global warming and its aftermath. Almost all commentators agree that the most likely future will be one characterised by increased competition for scarce energy resources and adaption to the effects of climate change both factors are likely drivers for future instability and conflict.

How to slake the military’s thirst for fuel energy

So it would seem that the military forces of Europe may have an additional role to play in delivering energy security and in dealing with instability brought on through climate change. But, does it end there for military planners? As all sectors within Europe gear up for a low-carbon economy by 2050, what changes should the military take to reduce its own thirst for fuel energy and deliver its own contribution to a low-carbon future? To put it simply: Should our Armed Forces ‘Go Green’ and, if they do, to what extent? Reducing the carbon footprint of the Armed Forces has been a matter of seasonable debate in logistic circles since oil prices soared in the 1970 and 80s; however, the tragic loss of life

Thomas Bennington, Group Captain RAF (ret.)

has been Programme Manager Energy and Environment since 2013. He holds a MA in De-

fence Studies from Kings College London and

Photo: © EDA 2014

a BSc in Mathematics and Physics. Mr Ben-

nington has been a military pilot since 1985

and has served with the US Navy as a Test and Evaluation Department

Head, on the NATO staff as a Counter Piracy Specialist and most re-

cently as the Assistant Head of Nuclear Capability and Programme Di-

rector of the Underwater Capability Programme in the UK MOD. He was

the Chief of Staff to the UK’s Expeditionary Air Wing in Iraq in 2007.

protecting fuel convoys in Afghanistan has brought the topic into sharp focus. Improved operational energy efficiency and reducing the logistic burden of fuel is a stated aim of both NATO and the European Union, but its practical implementation has been elusive outside of the USA - replacing the certainty of diesel with stochastic solar or wind power sources is sometimes a difficult transition for soldiers in the combat zone and sanctioning increased investment in this niche field is a difficult call when placed against other pressing military requirements – doubly so in an age of austerity. In addition, the lack of objective data in terms of possible financial benefits is a blocker to ‘green’ business cases especially when break even points may be measured in years rather than months.

There is some light ahead

Thousands of jerry cans will become useless photo: © POWERFOB, Click Industrial Design Ltd 2011

46

However, there is some light ahead. Field experiments such as the UK’s POWERFOB demonstrator in Cyprus (et al), has shown that significant benefits can accrue when sustainable energy production is twinned with high technology energy management and storage systems. Accurately measuring energy usage and critically matching energy generation with demand, coupled with improved energy efficient infrastructures and low-power appliances (LED lighting etc.), can deliver

Energies

significant savings to the fuel bill, improve operational independence and, ultimately, save lives by reducing the force protection burden. Shifting the culture to move towards such solutions is, however, more challenging, but appropriate education and training and hands on experience in exercises can help to bridge the gap and make routine operational deployment of sustainable energy a more likely outcome. Back at home, the benefits can be even more significant. Improving the energy efficiency of military buildings, increasing the use of renewable power at dispersed military sites and shifting towards bio-fuel in all its forms, can offer long-term savings to operational budgets. Similarly, bringing the energy agenda together with an increased awareness of environmental impact can deliver truly integrated solutions for sustainable defence, building operational resilience into the force structure to ensure capability is maintained and even improved within a reduced carbon footprint.

On the way to a transformed energy future

The EDA has been an advocate of Defence sustainability since 2006, and has actively supported collaboration of MOD energy and environment experts through its Military Green workshops and its GO GREEN pilot project on solar energy generation at military sites. More latterly, its nascent Energy Working Group, will act as an interface with the European Commission to exploit, where possible, Dual-use R&T synergies and gauge the impact of energy legislation on the Armed Forces, as well as assess improved energy solutions for military operations. There is, as yet, no collective vision of Europe’s armed forces final destination when it comes to alternate energy supplies or overall sustainability, but, without doubt, the journey has begun. For Europe’s MODs, a long-term, strategy-based approach will offer the best protection to capability in a transformed energy future.

â–ş Further information:

Smart Energy Camp Project

The European Defence Agency (EDA) has launched a live

demonstration project to address the problem of energy supply in military operations and its protection. On 18 August, the

Agency published a call for tenders for the purchase of a Smart

Energy Supply and Management Network Energy Efficient

Camp (Demonstrator), which will be deployed in a low-intensity operational theatre under the lead of one or more Member

States and/or the EDA. The Demonstrator is to be used to meas-

ure and subsequently highlight the benefits (operational/func-

tional/technical/other) of using energy-efficient solutions, in-

cluding renewable energy, in combination with novel generation, control and energy storage solutions. web: http://tinyurl.com/n8799vj

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Modern society is becoming increasingly dependent on electricity as a critical resource

Energy supply in disaster management by Albrecht Broemme, President Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW), Bonn

The critical infrastructure with the greatest influence on almost all areas of “civilised” life is the power supply system. Electricity must be produced, transported and managed in such a way as to ensure that the power supply functions at all times with the utmost reliability. Disruptions must be prevented or resolved as quickly as possible. Germany’s Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) has a number of expert teams that can step in in the event of power outages, but they cannot replace a power plant. THW’s trustful and well-established cooperation with network operators, electricity suppliers and other partners is the prerequisite for effective action during emergencies. The characteristic of critical infrastructure is that you do not notice it as long as it is working properly … Every modern society depends on water, electricity, energy, food and other vital resources. But we cannot take uninterrupted supplies for granted. The most vulnerable components are the networks: water supply lines, electricity grids and transport routes can be damaged or destroyed by bad weather, earthquakes, technical failures, accidents or targeted attacks.

The last words you hear before the world

THW is in close contact at all levels with network operators and electricity suppliers. The principle that applies here is “do not wait until you’re standing on a pile of rubble before exchanging business cards!” In August, THW concluded a cooperation agreement with Germany’s four transmission system operators, whereby THW will support repair and maintenance work in the event of exceptional disruptions of the power supply, following a natural disaster or an accident, for example. Such support can take numerous forms; here are a few examples: • THW vehicles can transport staff and equipment, where necessary with flashing lights. Its larger vehicles are in principle all-terrain vehicles; • Recovery and clearance teams can clear the access routes to power lines; • The “lighting” team can ensure that even large-surface operations areas and work sites are well illuminated with glare-free lighting; • Explosives teams can demolish damaged power pylons (that are under mechanical stress); • The “infrastructure” team has the job of repairing cables; • THW has emergency generators and power systems capable of synchronisation and with a power ranging from 5 to 750 kVA.

explodes around you are those of an expert saying, “but this is totally impossible!”

Albrecht Broemme

has been President of THW since 2006. He was

born in 1953 in Darmstadt and graduated in 1977 with an MSc in electrical engineering

from Darmstadt Technical University. From 1992 to 2006 he was Head of the Berlin Fire

Photo: THW

Department (Chief / CFO). Since 2003 he has,

among other things, been President of the Eu-

ropean Fire Academy (EFA), Brussels. He chaired the INSARAG (Regional Group Africa-Europe-Middle East/ UN -International Search and

Rescue Advisory Board) and from 2006 to 2008 he was a Board Mem-

ber of the Association for the Administration of German Cities, Committee for Disaster Prevention, Fire Service and Ambulance Service. From 2011 to 2012 he was Vice Chair of INSARAG.

48

THW has had a cooperation agreement with electricity supplier E.ON since 2012; the company has agreed to make its experts available for THW operations and to support the recruitment of young talent for THW. In addition the power supplier is conducting research on the production of environmentally friendly energy for the benefit of disaster management operations in crisis or disaster regions. The cooperation between electricity suppliers and disaster relief agencies is mutually beneficial: industrial companies and intervention forces both upgrade their know-how and are more easily able to cooperate in crisis zones. The participants get to know each other, making for an optimised deployment of staff and resources. The ones to benefit most are the members of the population, whose electricity supply can be restored more quickly following a disaster.

Cooperation partnerships

The cooperation between E.ON and THW proved its worth at the beginning of 2014 in Slovenia. The power lines in some areas had collapsed after days of heavy snow and sleet, leaving more

MAIN TOPIC: Energies

Power lines were down in vast areas of Slovenia in February due to the weight of the snow

THW teams check their emergency generators in Slovenia. The generators supplied the town of Postojna with electricity following the heavy snowfall in February photos: THW

than 200 000 people without electricity. For some four weeks THW units worked in the west of the country to provide emergency power for the population. They used eight generators to supply the town of Postojna and the surrounding area with electricity. An expert adviser from E.ON Energie AG was present on the spot to support the efforts of THW and the local power companies. For the first time ever the state of Hessen sent a fire brigade unit with mobile emergency generators that had only recently been delivered. In view of the scale of the crisis, Slovenia not only called on THW for bilateral assistance but also launched an appeal for help at EU level. As a result teams were despatched to Slovenia, many of whose members knew each other well as a result of the EU-funded IPA exercises.

Critical infrastructure, a focal concern

► Further information:

THW – an authentic organisation

The Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW) is Germany’s disaster relief organisation. It has more than 80 000 members, of

whom 99% are volunteers and only 1% full-time staff. As a civil

protection organisation THW is also prepared to contribute to

the reconstruction of damaged infrastructure. For energy supply purposes it has emergency power transmission systems for

the supply of electricity to hospitals, schools or municipal net-

works. However, THW is only a secondary back-up: large hospi-

tals, for instance, have their own emergency generators which

can, however, also break down.

Modern society with its growing dependence on the critical resource electricity is becoming increasingly vulnerable to power cuts. THW is focusing more and more on helping to rebuild critical infrastructure in the wake of a disaster. From its experience of previous operations it knows how important it is to cooperate with international partners and representatives of industry and the world of research.

49

Protection

photo: kentuckyguard, CC by 2.0, flickr.com

The Lisbon Treaty has given a new mandate to the European Union in order to encourage cooperation between Member States so as to improve the effectiveness of the mostly fragmented civil protection systems for the prevention of and protection against disasters or terrorist attacks. There are good reasons for modern crisis-management and civil protection systems to take cyber attacks into account.

With CATO, overcoming the current approaches and fragmented systems becomes a reality

CATO – CBRN crisis management

*

by Dr Victor Remez, Project Coordinator, EU CATO Project, Tel Aviv

Every day news organisations around the world cover every possible angle of the terrorist threats faced by the West. One area that perhaps does not receive their full attention, however, is the threat posed by CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) attacks. But be under no illusion – there are groups planning just such attacks right now.

How to prepare for and respond to CBRN attacks

It is widely accepted by many in the security community that the likelihood of a terrorist attack using CBRN material is on the increase and it is therefore no surprise that the European Union has invested heavily in a particular research and development programme designed to address some of the key difficulties that emergency response agencies and government have to address. One of the most important factors affecting how we prepare for, and respond to, a CBRN attack is of course the fragmentation across national and organisational boundaries. And any disconnects in the CBRN Life Cycle (prevention; preparedness; response; recovery), as well as the need to share information and knowledge between multi-purpose legacy command and control systems, creates further difficulties for those managing such an incident.

Project CATO is an innovative answer

Project CATO is designed to do just that – starting life originally in January 2012, CATO is a European Union FP7 integration project, which is developing and bringing together a coherent toolbox of systems to allow better life cycle management of

50

incidents. 25 multi-disciplinary organisations from across Europe are involved in this 14M research and development project, which is entering its final stages and will conclude in December 2014. CATO is developing a comprehensive Toolbox for dealing with CBRN crises, which may be caused by terrorist attacks using non-conventional weapons. CATO is addressing the key CBRN incident management challenge: fragmentation – of doctrines, of knowledge, of processes, of systems – as many different

Dr Victor Remez

is Technical Director at Ness Technologies. He

holds a Ph.D. in Applied Mathematics and possesses many years of experience in application

of computers in various fields of human activi-

ty starting from very simple applications and

Photo: private

ending with distributed highly reliable systems

intended for serving of hundreds of users si-

multaneously. Mr Remez led development of complicated multidisci-

plinary products for civilian and military markets. He has deep under-

standing and hands on experience in modern design and development

technologies and sophisticated data processing techniques. During

last years, he specialised in management and technical leadership of

design and development of the Command and Control and Crisis Man-

agement systems.

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organisations need to be involved and coordinated to deal with crises. The current approaches and systems are indeed fragmented due to the multiplicity of players and organisational setups (often varying from one CBRN set-up to another one) as well as the lack of effective shared operational pictures and commonly shared information. CATO brings an innovative answer to the diversity of organisational set-ups and of legacy systems for emergency preparedness & management. The purpose of the CATO Toolbox will not be the development of a single Decision Support System (DSS) but the provision of the means to build a dedicated customised DSS adapted to local and national organisational, political, ethical and financial constraints as well as different levels of exposure to CBRN threats.

Easy access to the toolbox

The CATO Toolbox contains a Knowledge Base of scientific and technological information that both Policy & Decision Makers and First Responders alike can access, as well as a comprehensive set of Operational Guidelines and a Decision Support Model. The project has also focussed on building a comprehensive Community of over 330 CBRN experts, willing to share their knowledge and expertise to help their colleagues and peers in other organisations or countries. The vast majority of the CATO Community has attended at least one of the previous workshops, user advisory group meetings or the first conference in Bonn, and have all contributed to the wider knowledge of the project partners and assisting in the ongoing development of the solutions.

The CATO Laboratory

As the work in CATO draws all the different strands together into a coherent Toolbox of systems, a place is required to load, test, trial and exercise the Toolbox - this is provided by the CATO Laboratory, the second development of which has just been released. The lab exists in two states, a virtual and a physical facility. Online and available to try out to CATO Community members (www.cato-project.eu) is the facility to run the CATO toolbox in your web browser, with no other requirements other than internet access. The physical lab exists to service those organisations for whom even basic internet access is denied, perhaps those more heavily involved in CBRN research, and to support live exercising where real world physical devices are vital to immerse participants in the exercise and identify real world issues. In fact, the CATO Lab has been set up on a trial basis in the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) in Brussels and is currently being evaluated operationally by the experts there.

The CATO project was designated as an integration project.

When the project concludes in just a few months’ time, it will provide an off-the-shelf and ready to procure, coherent state of the art Toolbox of systems, designed and proven to provide an

► Further information:

The CATO Final Conference 26th – 27th November 2014

The final dissemination conference for Project CATO will be

held on 26th and 27th November in Brussels. The two day con-

ference and interactive seminar programme will include inter-

nationally acclaimed keynote speakers sharing their CBRN

knowledge and experiences, as well as senior CATO partners

delivering the key results of the project and demonstrating the

impact and the benefits of what has actually been achieved during the three year project. A series of seminars will focus on the

outcomes of Project CATO, applicable not only to the Preparedness stage of the CBRN Lifecycle, but also to the Response

stage - during both the crucial Golden Hour as well as the initial hours following an incident.

● International keynote speakers

● Informative seminars and workshops

● Panel discussions

● Demonstration of CATO capabilities ● Networking opportunities

The CATO Final Conference will certainly appeal to all European

stakeholders concerned by CBRN crises, including Policy Mak-

ers, Incident Commanders, Health Responders and CBRN Ex-

perts, who wish to discuss the emerging doctrines and proce-

dures for CBRN preparedness, detection, response and recov-

ery and will engage with the latest research development in CBRN decision support.

A limited number of ‘fully funded’ places for the conference are

still available, so if you would like to participate in this impor-

tant event, please visit http://www.eurtd.com/cato/2014/final-conference for further details or contact the CATO Project

office at cato-conference@eurtd.com.

enhanced managed response to a wide range and scale of incidents. Included in this will be a pan-European wide cadre of CBRN experts, available to guide and advise organisations across Europe on how technologies, such as those found in the Toolbox, can be applied to real world emergency response agencies allowing them to deal more efficiently and knowledgeably with the complexity of multi-risk, multi-agency and even multi-national CBRN events.

*The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 26169

51

Protection

How risk communication can improve public responses to CBRN incidents

Improving public resilience to CBRN incidents by Dr Kristian Krieger and Dr Brooke Rogers, Kings College, London

In the aftermath of the Sarin attacks in Tokyo in 1995, the anthrax attacks in the USA in 2001, and the Litvinenko incident in London in 2006, incidents involving CBRN substances have become a growing concern for policy-makers and professionals in the area of civil protection in Europe. Resources were poured into preventing and responding to such incidents, often focussing on improving technical and organisational capabilities. In spite of the significant progress made in the technical and procedural responses to CBRN events, “for many high-impact risks we do not understand what the public actually expects in a situation or how tolerant they may be of ‘abnormal’ risks during a crisis”1. This is changing partly as a result of EU-funded research that has delved into understanding the role of the public in preparing for and responding to CBRN incidents. The PRACTICE project is unique within the world of CBRN research. Specifically, PRACTICE took us a step closer to improving the effectiveness of communicating with the public during a CBRN event by enabling researchers to test the risk communication and behaviourbased findings of past EU-funded studies during a live emergency planning field exercise involving members of the public.

What shapes the public response to CBRN incidents?

Members of the public can become casualties or the first responders to CBRN events. CBRN impacts on the public can vary from physical trauma and fatalities, to psychological and

Dr Kristian Krieger

is a Research Associate at King’s College London. He is currently joint lead of the social science work package of the EU-FP7 funded project “Preparedness and Resilience against CBRN attacks” (PRACTICE). Photos: private

Dr. Brooke Rogers is a Reader in Risk and Terror in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. She is a social psychologist interested in risk and crisis communication, perceptions of risk, and health outcomes in response to extreme events.

behavioural impacts. The public response can make a positive difference to the impact of CBRN events. For example, members of the public can prevent widespread contamination by following health advice during an incident. But public behaviour also has the potential to overwhelm the capacity of our health systems if worried but unexposed individuals seek medical attention during a CBRN incident. A combination of factors shapes public responses to CBRN:

Emergency responders engaging with members of the public during CBRN live exercise ARDEN photo: foi.se

53

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Public threat perceptions; trust in responders; perceptions of response measures; and communication with the public. Key among these factors is communicating with the public before, during and after an incident. Effective risk communication can reduce uncertainty, and improve confidence and trust in responders and their actions. Risk communication can only be effective if communicators understand the public information needs and communication preferences in relation to CBRN events.

To what extent are the public needs met?

If directly involved in an incident, the public wants information about the measures that emergency responders are taking, how this helps, and how effective the measures are. Preferences for risk communicators can vary. However, it is clear that directly affected members of the public want to receive information from individuals with formal authority capable of demonstrating leadership skills balanced by compassion and respect for the concerns of the public. While there is increasing recognition among emergency responders that they need to communicate with the public, there is a limited understanding of how, what and even what role this communication can fulfil. This leads to a Catch-22 in which longstanding practitioner assumptions about public behaviour (such as irrational panic and sheepish compliance) have hindered the development of risk communications that can facilitate an effective response. Instead, information about CBRN incidents is often delayed if provided, leading to an information vacuum resulting in public anxiety, confusion, information seeking and potentially non-compliant behaviours. PRACTICE and other studies show that risk communication about CBRN events must reach beyond basic instructions on what to do in order to include justifications of ‘why’ advised activities are effective, need to be continuous, and that the worries and input of the public have to be taken seriously.

How can these shortcomings be addressed?

The potential for the public response to influence the effectiveness and outcomes of CBRN events has attracted increasing attention among decision-makers. In order to effectively improve the role of the public in CBRN incident, it is important to increase the knowledge of emergency responders about how the public responds to CBRN incidents and how to engage with the public. There is little CBRN-specific guidance across Europe that can help responders learn about engaging with the public. One attempt to address this gap is the production of communication manuals for responders in the context of the PRACTICE project. In order to ensure that emergency response plans include public communication aspects, the EU needs to develop a legislative framework that encourages member states to address this gap. 1 GOS (2011): Blackett Review of High Impact Low Probability Risks. London: UK Government Office for Science, page 24.

54

High-tech protection for crisis management

Water-Food-Camps

Interview with Thomas Popp and Volker Welzenbach, Managing Dir The European: Mr Welzenbach and Mr Popp, you have both been Managing Directors with equal rights of Futuretech, a member of the Kärcher group, for about three years. I see that since then your company has undergone a profound reorganisation, giving a new “comprehensive orientation” to its product range. V. Welzenbach: Within the past decade there have been major changes within our target group; these are due to the continuously changing reality of operations and theatres. The European: Am I right in saying that the most significant and obvious changes are a modernised and updated product range, as well as modularisation? Th. Popp: Indeed, cost cutting, cost efficiency and energy saving requirements as well as reduced manpower following reorganisations are key developments affecting our customer base, as are pooling and sharing initiatives and the growing cooperation between civil and military forces. Last but not least, there is an increased demand on export markets. The European: Why is it that your products have become the preferred choice of users worldwide? V. Welzenbach: In line with our strategy and the objective of being “the leading customer-centric partner for mobile and modular solutions for military and civil defence missions” we have implemented the move from single sourced stand-alone products towards solution-oriented systems. The European: If I may delve a little deeper: what does “solutionoriented” mean? Th. Popp: This means the complete picture: integration, modularity, increased training and service concepts for the forces on the ground, not to forget life cycle management. We take a very

Thomas Popp

has been Managing Director of Kärcher Futuretech GmbH since 2012.

Born in 1963, he studied Mechanical Engineering at the University of

Stuttgart from 1984 to 1991. Mr Popp started his professional career

at Kärcher in production planning. From 1994 to 1996 he worked at

the Kärcher plant in Los Angeles and as Head of Sourcing until 1999. Thomas Popp was Head of Sourcing, Central Technical Departments

and Logistics until 2007. Prior to his current position, he was Managing Director at the Kärcher Group in charge of Sourcing, IT, Logistics,

Central Technical Departments, Research & Predevelopment and

Facilities.

Protection

rectors, Kärcher Futuretech, Schwaikheim structured and systematic approach: most of Futuretech’s mobile solutions are modular and can be combined to form complete systems. These mobile systems are fully autonomous and set new standards in terms of efficiency, service and cost-effectiveness. The European: You mentioned the reality of operations on the ground. Does this mean taking a flexible approach to the challenges facing deployed forces, and the fact that forces and their requirements are never exactly the same? Th. Popp: This question is by far too complex to be answered with a simple yes or no. The European: Can you give us an example, then? Th. Popp:Yes – take water purification. The basic requirements of providing drinking water whether during combat missions or in a refugee camp are pretty much the same. Drinking water has to comply with the relevant national regulations (“TrinkWv 2001”) and international standards (e.g. NATO STANAG 2136). Hygiene and process control along both the production and distribution chains are therefore crucial. The European: Which water purification standard do you apply in Afghanistan? V. Welzenbach: In Afghanistan we apply our national standards to guarantee that the water in the field is of the same quality as that coming out of the tap in any German village. The European: Which systems are being used there? V. Welzenbach: Reverse osmosis systems such as the WTC 1600 and WTC 6000 are used to purify water with an output of up to 6 000 litres per hour. Another very efficient system being used is the WBP 700, which produces 700 bottles of safe drinking water per hour in the field. Customers no longer need to transport water to their base but rather produce it on site, saving fuel and time, not to mention reducing the exposure of personnel to transport risks. So far these systems have produced more than 120 million bottles in Afghanistan. Its fully automated successor, the WBP 1300, with an increased performance of up to 1 300 bottles per hour has just been launched.

Volker Welzenbach

Managing Director of Kärcher Futuretech GmbH, was born in 1961. He

began training as an industrial clerk at Boehring Mannheim Gmbh in

1979 and afterwards became the manager for biochemical issues of

the Asia area. Between 1991 and 2011 he held various positions within the Bosch Group in Germany, Switzerland and Russia. Before joining

Kärcher in 2011, Mr Welzenbach was Vice-President Marketing

Robert Bosch Power Tools, Country Management for Europe, Africa and South-Western Asia.

The European: Which technology do you use? Th. Popp: Depending on the mission scenario, the most effective and efficient elements are Ultrafiltration or Reverse Osmosis membranes, which do not require any chemicals for the purification process itself. The European: For forces on the ground, hygiene is, as you said, essential. People need clean water to drink, but they also need to eat. What does Futuretech have to offer in food preparation? Th. Popp: All of our products must adhere to certain standards, and this is also true for our kitchen products. The HACCP (Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points) principle is designed to prevent hazards and to keep food particularly safe.

Discussions at the production site: Thomas Popp, Hartmut Bühl, Volker Welzenbach (from left to right) photo: Christian Neudel

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

The European: And what are your technical solutions? Th. Popp: Kärcher kitchen products are designed for easy cleaning (e.g. rounded corners), the surface material is stainless steel and the cooking pots are deep-drawn without welding-seams. The European: In which countries are your installations in use? V. Welzenbach: Our kitchens – both the TFK and MFK – are currently in use around the globe. In Afghanistan, several thousand meals are prepared each day in our containerised large-scale kitchen system without any incident. The European: This is a military operation; what about the civilian side? V. Welzenbach: Our solutions are used by international and national NGOs and GOs. For example, MFK modules and our KRR 50 E are frequently used by such organisations as Germany’s THW and the Red Cross. The European: Tell us more about your catering products. V. Welzenbach: We are very successful in this field, especially with our two most modern products, the KCS 15 combi steamer and the new state-of-the-art KCC 500 containerised kitchen able to serve up to 3 000 people. For energy we also use our closed combustion diesel burner technology, which is highly energy-efficient.

Volker Welzenbach explaining the Waterclean WTC 500 RO. photo: Christian Neudel

The European: Let me come to the critical issues of transport and local infrastructure. Th. Popp: Indeed, robustness and reduced weight are important for transport. The educational level of operators and the infrastructure situation in a combat mission will be significantly different from those in a refugee camp. Technically there are many similarities, but our solutions are scaled to serve different needs, from small-scale easy-to-carry systems with a maximum weight of less than 100 kg per unit up to 20 ft containers or even air-transportable platforms. There are differences in terms of quality, security, serviceability and operability. The European: You mentioned energy. An autonomous camp needs numerous power sources and energy savings are essential, a challenge that you tackle by using conventional sources of energy and by providing energy-efficient products; but have you also given thought to using alternative forms of energy? Th. Popp: A good point. Electricity and fuel are resources that are several times more expensive in field missions. Our approach is therefore geared towards energy efficiency. This is true of our kitchens and water purification systems as well as our catering products. The European: Could you sum up what is special about Futuretech? V. Welzenbach: Yes indeed: we can offer you a complete approach from water purification to drinking water distribution (storage, filling and distribution) and waste water disposal (storage and treatment). We can provide the same level of performance for food. We also offer transport solutions and for camps, an approach based on modular systems.

Thomas Popp commenting on module 2 of the TEP 90 CBRN Decontamination system. photo: Christian Neudel

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The European: Gentlemen, it was a pleasure talking to you!

Maritime Safety and Security

photo: Aah-Yeah, CC by 2.0, flickr.com

The very mention of the words “Navy” and “Arctic” in the same sentence creates images of cold war exercises or deployments in the High North. But there is another connection between the two – less in the field of maritime security than that of maritime safety. With their capabilities, European Navies can contribute to maritime safety in the Arctic. Europe’s navies – a valuable tool in support of the EU’s Arctic policy

Maritime Security Policy: safety in the Arctic by Markus Kafurke, Captain (GE), French Naval Staff, MOD, Paris

The effects of climate change are especially pronounced in the Arctic. Decreasing sea ice cover means a longer navigation season and greater marine access – with a profound impact on maritime transport, tourism and the exploitation of resources. This in turn will lead to an increase in human presence, activity and shipping in the Arctic. Depending on the origin and destination, Arctic shipping routes are not automatically the best choice. But they may offer important shortcuts for certain types of point-to-point shipments, of gas and fuel products or bulk cargo, for example. However, navigation in the Arctic waters remains challenging or even dangerous.

Transport

“Free of ice” refers to the absence of a solid sea ice cover; it does not mean that there is no ice at all! As a result, ships navigating through these waters need to be prepared to encounter floating ice of various sizes – requiring not only a strengthened hull but also a crew specially trained in ice navigation.

Tourism

More and more people are opting for a vacation in the Arctic region. Cruise ship tourism in particular seems to be booming. However, the number of tourist voyages is growing faster than the ability to measure and manage their impact. Add to this the lack of sufficiently accurate nautical charts, a challenging maritime environment and sparse search and rescue assets and you have a disaster in waiting. Evacuating 3000 passengers from a cruise ship is already challenging close to shore – in the middle of the Arctic it is even more difficult.

Markus Kafurke

has been the Commander of the Lynx helicopter squadron of the German Navy since July

2014 when returning home from Paris. Born in

1971, he joined the German Navy in 1990 and started his career as a helicopter pilot. He was

Photo: private

posted to a helicopter training squadron in San

Diego and he assumed a staff job at the Ger-

man Naval Office in Rostock. In 2011 Markus Kafurke attended the

French Staff college ("Ecole de Guerre") in Paris, followed by an ex-

change posting to the French Naval Staff in Paris from 2012 to 2014.

Resources

A report by the US Geological Survey estimates that the Arctic contains hydrocarbon resources representing 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil and 30% of the world’s undiscovered gas reserves. In addition to hydrocarbon resources, nickel, iron ore and other rare earth minerals are also present in the Arctic. With the increase in ice-free periods these reserves are becoming more and more accessible for exploration and exploitation. Due to the temperature change in the Arctic Ocean, fish stocks are moving and new areas are becoming available for fishing. However, more research is required to provide a solid basis for the sustainable management of fishing resources. Furthermore, if fishing fleets are moving to new areas and resource extraction moves further offshore, search and rescue coverage needs to be extended to the same areas.

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

In 2009, the “Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA) identified the main challenges: • a general lack of marine infrastructure in large parts; • gaps in hydrographical data for significant portions of primary shipping routes; • a lack of emergency response capacity for saving lives and for pollution mitigation; • serious limits to radio and satellite communication; and a limited number of systems for monitoring and controlling the movement of ships.

Navies’ contributions – Ship monitoring

The issues listed in the AMSA report give cause for serious concern. With infrastructure in such short supply, new construction projects will not be able to keep up with the increasing traffic in the short or even medium term. However, the armed forces could use their know-how to improve sea and air surveillance and connectivity and to increase cooperation in the field of search and rescue (SAR). Given the size of the Arctic and the limited number of assets available, it will be necessary to step up cooperation between the Arctic countries’ armed forces and possibly also to extend it to non-Arctic countries, e.g. during SAR operations. The lack of infrastructure and of dedicated satellite coverage currently limits the use of the two most common tracking systems “Automatic Identification System (AIS)” and “LongRange Identification and Tracking (LRIT)”. While AIS tracking via satellite is improving, communication remains difficult. The only satellite connection available across all of the Arctic is via systems such as Iridium, offering only a very limited data rate. One solution to this dilemma could be to transfer the surface picture to a ship that is in a position where it can connect to a shore station or a communications satellite. On the military side, surface radars reach further than their civilian equivalents and the HF data links currently in use offer message and data transfer beyond line-of-sight; some even provide automatic relay. On the civilian side, researchers are working to extend the coverage of terrestrial communication systems by using fixed and floating offshore installations such as other vessels, lighthouses or even unmanned aerial systems. This raises a critical issue: a single unit will not increase coverage by much – a coordinated network of several units is necessary to get a real improvement. Being part of a larger group and sharing the surface picture amongst units is commonplace for navies.

Emergency response and research

Through initiatives like the “Common Information Sharing Environment (CISE)” this information can be made available to other organisations as well. It is in the interest of all stakeholders in the Arctic to know the whereabouts of the ships coming from, going to or working in the region. The increasing ship traffic in the Arctic makes accidents more

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likely – not so much between ships as between a ship and the ice. Unfortunately, the development of the assets and infrastructure for responding to these emergencies is not keeping pace with the increase in traffic. To improve the coordination of emergency response operations, the members of the Arctic Council signed two agreements on search and rescue (2011) and on oil pollution preparedness and response (2013). These encourage increased cooperation, even with non-member states, in the form of exchanges of experience, visits and joint exercises. While naval units cannot provide the same capabilities as a nuclear icebreaker, they can contribute to improving the current situation through the provision of such resources as medical facilities, personnel trained in search and rescue or a helicopter. Additionally, each naval unit serves as a prepositioned asset, shortening reaction times. Naval units already record certain weather and hydrographical data at regular intervals. This could be taken a step further to include cooperation between military and civilian organisations. Some countries have specialised units for hydrographical surveys in which the use or even ownership of assets is shared between the navy and civilian organisations. Such civil-military cooperation could even be extended to support EU-funded research projects. Certainly, embarking researchers on naval vessels does not offer the same possibilities as the use of a dedicated research vessel. However, not using a ship that is already in an area of interest might mean missing opportunities and synergies. The gaps in meteorological and hydrographical data need to be filled urgently in order to improve the safety of navigation.

Conclusion

Shipping traffic in the Arctic will continue to increase and most likely the capacity to safely manage this traffic and handle possible emergencies will lag behind for a while. Navies can help to improve maritime safety in the Arctic by contributing to ship monitoring, emergency response and research. However, given the sheer size of the Arctic Ocean and the number of assets required to provide decent coverage, no country can handle this task on its own. By supporting polar research the navies can provide real added value for the development and governance of the Arctic. As a possible side effect, the connection with civilian EU research initiatives could mean increased recognition of the navies’ role and capabilities.

A working group of the “Chiefs of European Navies (CHENS)” forum has studied Maritime Safety in the Arctic. This article is a summary of its findings. The full document can be found at http://www.chens.eu/products

Maritime Security

Resources in the Arctic

Source: NORDREGIO

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

100 anniversary of the First World War th

(edit/hb) The heads of state and government of the main protagonists of the First World War commemorated the 100th anniversary of its beginning by looking, each in their own fashion, towards the future. Together the victors and the vanquished humbly honoured the victims’ sacrifices. Against the backdrop of the armed conflict in Eastern Europe they warned against ever placing peace at risk again. Russia’s currently isolated President paid tribute in his own way to his country’s dead. These ceremonies brought home the fact that we do not always learn from past experience, that war and genocide remain a permanent threat and that the international community needs to adopt long-term measures in order to keep the peace. Metaphors about the inevitability of that slide into conflict, or the European countries having marched to war as though in a state of trance were notably absent, fortunately. But not missing from these ceremonies was the reference to the fact that while

Barack Obama, President of the United States of America at Flanders Field Cemetery on 26 March 2014 “We just spent some quiet moments among the final resting places of young men who fell nearly a century ago. And it is impossible not to be awed by the profound sacrifice they made so that we might stand here today (…). I’d also note that the lessons of that war speak to us still. Our nations are part of the international effort to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons -- the same kinds of weapons that were used to such devastating effect on these very fields. We thought we had banished their use to history, and our efforts send a powerful message that these weapons have no place in a civilized world. This is one of the ways that we can honor those who fell here. (…) We must commit perennially to peace, which binds us across oceans.”

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the war was triggered involuntarily, the failure to act at the decisive moment may have made it inevitable. Largely to blame for this were Europe’s elites, from Paris to Berlin and Vienna, so hungry were they for the glory of war as a lifesaving, purifying challenge to their societies, and so in thrall to the idea of a profound renewal of humanity that they were willing to make a celebration of combat and slaughter. In that rapturous climate, pacifism did not stand a chance. The legacy of this conflagration on a massive scale was the latent aggression of the coming generations: the next war was foreordained and, indeed, soon followed. The commemoration ceremonies in the countries of the European Union were an appeal to Europe not to evade its responsibilities, for, as the King of Belgium so poignantly stated, “there can be no lasting peace without a state of mind that transcends the suffering of the past and the question of guilt and looks resolutely towards the future”.

Vladimir Putin, President of Russia at the ceremony unveiling a monument on Poklonnaya Gora on 1 August 2014 “В мировой истории так много примеров, какой страшной ценой оборачивается нежелание слышать друг друга, попрание чужих прав и свобод, законных интересов в угоду своим интересам и амбициям. Неплохо бы научиться смотреть и считать хотя бы на шаг вперёд.” “World history gives us so many examples of what a terrible price we pay for refusing to listen to each other, or for trampling on others’ rights and freedoms and lawful interests in the name of our own interests and ambitions. It would be good if we could learn to open our eyes and to calculate at least a step ahead.”

François Hollande, President of the French Republic, at the French-German commemoration at the Hartmannswillerkopf on 3 August 2014 “En célébrant le courage des soldats, nous insistons sur ce qu’il y a d’universel de l’amour de son pays, c’est-à-dire la capacité pour chacun et chacune d’entre-nous de regarder au-delà de son intérêt particulier. Le patriotisme, c’est-àdire la volonté de vivre ensemble en défendant les mêmes valeurs…Le patriotisme n’éloigne pas de l’Europe, [car] l’Europe s’est construite […] pour fonder une communauté de valeurs autour d’une exigence de paix et de partage de responsabilités.” “In celebrating the courage of the soldiers our focus is on universal values: the love of one’s country, in other words, the capacity that each and everyone of us has to look beyond ourselves and our own interests; patriotism, or the desire to live together and to defend the same values (…) Patriotism does not distance us from Europe, as Europe was built in order to create a community of values founded on the demand for peace and a sharing of responsibilities.

Her Majesty, King Philippe of Belgium on a commemorative event in Liege on 4 August 2014 “Le souvenir de la Première Guerre mondiale nous donne à réfléchir à la responsabilité des dirigeants et aux décisions qu’ils peuvent prendre pour préserver la paix et rapprocher les peuples... L’Europe pacifiée, unifiée et démocratique: nos grands-parents en ont rêvé. Nous l’avons aujourd’hui. Continuons ensemble à porter à travers le monde le message que la paix durable passe par une véritable réconciliation et un projet commun.” “The memory of the First World War gives us pause for thought about leaders’ responsibilities and the decisions that they can take in order to preserve peace and bring peoples closer together… A peaceful, united and democratic Europe: our grandparents could only dream of this. Today it is ours. Let us together continue carrying to the rest of the world the message that a lasting peace must be founded on genuine reconciliation and a common project.”

photos: Archives New Zealand, CC BY-SA 2.0; Amandabhslater, CC BY SA 2.0, flickr.com

History – 100 years first world war

Joachim Gauck, President of Germany at the same ceremony “Dass Frankreich und Deutschland einmal zwei selbstbewusste, zugleich einander freundliche Nachbarn sein würden: Das war lange Zeit nicht vorstellbar.. Und wir alle können nichts als dankbar sein für das große Werk der Versöhnung, das von Vertretern jener Generation ins Werk gesetzt wurde, die sich nur kurz zuvor noch als Erbfeinde zu erkennen glaubten. … Das blutige 20. Jahrhundert soll uns nicht vergeblich mahnen. Lernen wir weiter voneinander und miteinander, kommen wir weiter miteinander ins Gespräch und entwickeln wir gemeinsam eine Kultur des Vertrauens, für eine Gegenwart und eine Zukunft des Friedens und der Freiheit – in ganz Europa.” “That France and Germany would one day be two self-confident nations who enjoyed amicable relations with one another was inconceivable for a long time. And all of us have to be profoundly grateful for the great reconciliation efforts initiated by members of a generation which only shortly before had regarded each other as archenemies. The warning sounded by the bloody 20th century should not be in vain. Let us continue to learn from and with one another, let us intensify our dialogue with one another and let us develop a culture oftrust together for a present and a future in peace and freedom –in Europe.”

The Rt Hon David Cameron MP, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom at a commemorative event in St Symphorien on 4 August 2014 “History is human stories. And so we remember them: The teenagers who fought in the fields around here – terrified and missing home. The men who laid down their lives for their friends. The veterans who were never the same again. The families who bore those silent wounds. The place at the table that was never filled, the marriages that never happened, the babies that were never born. This was a war with an immense human cost – and we must always, always remember that no matter how busy things are. So much of modern life is a race to what comes next, a race to the future. But we are all in a long chain of events; the inheritors of the fights that were won before us; the stewards of the world that the next generation will inherit.”

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THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Defining the contours of the NATO Agenda from Budva to Wales

2014 BS Secure Forum – a conference report by Nico Segers, Vice-President, YATA, Brussels

At the end of May 2014, for the fourth year running, over 400 government representatives, academics, foreign affairs observers, military representatives and diplomats gathered in the Adriatic archipelago of Budva to discuss subjects vital for the improvement of global and regional security via the NATO Alliance, its institutional and non-state partners and stakeholders. Speakers unflinchingly acknowledged the robustness and lasting relevance of the Transatlantic Alliance, while agreeing that further convergence and fullfledged collective preparation against future challenges implied readying all resources and the will to confront them. High-level representatives, including Montenegrin President Filip Vujanović, Defence Minister Milica Pejanović Duris̆ić and US Ambassador Sue K. Brown passed on the message that the country is a reliable and committed NATO advocate and candidate. Montenegro’s top officials are keen to rally the key requirements in order to be one of the next countries to accede to NATO. Spanning a range of six panels, the speakers spoke with great authority and expertise on matters pertaining to: the future of NATO enlargement, Afghanistan after 2014, the war on terror (lessons learned and future prospects), the Ukrainian crisis and international responses, the anniversary of the Partnership for Peace as an instrument for bridge-building, and Cyber Defence as a new global battlefield. Having NATO act with legal empowerment, as a legal entity, with

Nico Segers

has been the Vice-President of YATA since 2013. He holds an MA in History (KU Leuven) and a postgraduate degree in International Relations and Diplomacy (Universities of Antwerp and Bologna).

In addition to supporting Euro-Atlantic values in his capacity as the

Vice-President of YATA Belgium, in late September 2014 he will be ini-

tiating a 10-month specialisation programme in International and European Security at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and the University of Geneva as a prelude to a Ph.D. Nico Segers is to be the “The European – Security and Defence Union” Correspondent on NATO Affairs from 2015 onwards.

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the expected signing of the Balkan Security Agenda by NATO delegates at the upcoming Wales Summit, will be the next step forward towards reinforcing democratic practices and Euro-Atlantic values. Concerning Russia’s actions in the Ukraine and Crimea, it was inferred that the Russian Government had once again caught the West by surprise. The failure to draw the right lessons from Russia’s “retaliatory” armed interventions in Chechnya and Georgia in the past exhibited what one panellist referred to as a “crisis in [EU and NATO’s] crisis management”. There can be no doubt that due to the changed strategic reality, the transatlantic Alliance is confronted with the rekindled question of NATO enlargement. In two panels there was a general consensus that the events in Ukraine and the Crimea should not affect the criteria, process and intent of future accessions to NATO by free and willing nations. On terrorism: the stress was on the prevention, pre-emption and pre-emptive disruption of terrorist groups as priority actions, rather than post-incident responses (tracking, arrest and detaining of terrorists) – which comes down to consequence management. Although the official mandate of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan – the longest, largest and most daunting operation with NATO in a leading Command & Control role – will expire by end of this year, the international community still holds the key to the country’s stabilisation in the coming three to four decades. Its future role and the roadmap for Afghanistan and the country’s security will depend on the lasting commitment of both the ISAF framework nations and the international community, in terms of reconstruction investments, expertise and nourishing the fragile economic basis for diversification, in spite of the persistently profitable business of (opium) poppy production and trade. The upcoming NATO Summit in Wales will provide the right forum for building upon a policy outcomebased consensus to meet the current challenges (budgets, modernising strategic assets, ongoing training and preparedness) to NATO’s continued role as a security guarantor and endorser of peace and democracy. The next 2BS Forum is scheduled in Spring of 2015.

web: For more information please consult http://www.2bs.me

EUROPE’S EVENTS

SECURITY and DEFENCE DEFENCE AND SECURITY BERLIN SECURITY CONFERENCE 2014 – 13th CONGRESS ON EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENCE Berlin, 2/3 Dec 2014 www.euro-defence.eu POLICE 18th EUROPEAN POLICE CONGRESS Berlin, 24/25 Feb 2015 www.european-police.eu

DISASTER MANAGEMENT 11th EUROPEAN CONGRESS ON CIVIL PROTECTION Bonn, 29/30 Sept 2015 www.civil-protection.com

Claude-France Arnould, Chief Executive, European Defence Agency (EDA)

Dr. Géza Andreas von Geyr, Director General for Security and Defence Policy, Federal Ministry of Defence, Germany

General Gratien Maire Vice Chief of Defence Staff, ÉtatMajor des Armées, France

Dr. Thomas de Maizière, Federal Minister of the Interior, Berlin

Brigitte Zypries, Parliamentary State Secretary, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, Berlin

Troels Oerting, Assistant Director, Head of European Cybercrime Centre (EC3), Europol, The Hague

Boris Pistorius, Minister of the Interior and Sport of Lower Saxony

Claus Sørensen, Director General, DG Humanitarian Aid and Civil protection (ECHO), European Commission

Dr. Georg Schütte, State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Education and Research

Information: Helga Woll Behörden Spiegel Office Bonn Friedrich-Ebert-Allee 57, D 53113 Bonn Tel/Fax: +49 228 97 09 70 E-Mail: helga.woll@behoerdenspiegel.de

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