Judith Collins: Increased integration, interoperability, and space innovation
Peeni Henare: Deliver on Defence Estate and remuneration investment
Chris
Political leadership needed on protecting crowded places
New Zealand’s Defence and National Security MagazineKia ora and welcome to the Autumn 2024 edition – and 31st issue – of Line of Defence Magazine!
In this post-ANZMIN 2+2 and pre-Budget issue, we’re privileged to again be joined by Defence Minister Judith Collins and Opposition Spokesperson for Defence Peeni Henare
Minister Collins highlights the importance of our being a credible partner to Australia through integration, interoperability, and our emerging space capabilities. Former minister Henare focuses on the criticality of investment in the Defence Estate and remuneration.
Senior contributor Dr Wayne Mapp explores the investment decisions that will need to be made in Defence during the term of the current parliament, suggesting that while we’re not spending enough the NATO benchmark of 2% of GP may be too much. Meanwhile, with Andrew Bridgman’s time as SECDEF draws to a close, the top civilian job is becoming vacant. Interested? Details inside!
We’re excited to welcome Ben Morgan back for his second Line of Defence piece, this time exploring what the recent emergence of high-tech, low-cost weapons means for a future conflict in the Southwest Pacific. Houthi action in the Red Sea has demonstrated that these weapons make area-denial possible from dispersed land-based positions at long range. What’s the answer?
Also in Defence, insightful perspectives on intelligencebased capability sustainment from Austal’s Rod Bird, and the latest arms import/export data from SIPRI illustrates the impacts that the Ukraine conflict and geopolitical ripples in Asia are having on the movement of defence materiel internationally.
In Homeland Security, Chair of the New Zealand Crowded Places Security Advisory Group Chris Kumeroa calls for more political leadership on raising awareness nationally on how to protect venues from attack and how to stay safe during an attack, and with the recent start of Foodstuffs North Island’s Live Facial Recognition trial, I explore the need for a bigger conversation – and leadership – around the deployment of this controversial tech.
In this issue we’re again fortunate to be joined by Fortinet, this time breaking down the research on how adopting automation and AI can help SecOps teams address the increasing complexity and volume of cyber threats.
All this, and much more in this issue of Line of Defence, including a call for nominations for this year’s Tohu Awards! Hosted by the Minister of Defence and run by the Defence Employer Support Council, this awards recognise organisations who employ Reservists, Cadet Force Officers and graduates of Limited Service Volunteer (LSV) Programmes.
Get in touch if you feel you’ve got something to contribute to the conversation!
Nicholas Dynon, Auckland
Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO
Hon Peeni Henare MP
Chris Kumeroa
Hon Judith Collins KC MP
Ben Morgan
Nicholas Dynon
SIPRI DESC
Rod Bird Fortinet
Babcock
Fortinet
ASIS International
Defence Employer Support Council
Outstanding Security Performance Awards
Cover photo by SGT. Daisy Williams / NZDF.
Winter June 2024
Main themes: Land Domain, Terrorism, Border Security, Women in Security
Copy Deadline: 1st June 2024
Publication: 10th June 2024
Chief Editor:
Nicholas Dynon
M: +64 (0)22 366 3691
E: nick@defsec.net.nz
Postal and delivery address:
Publisher:
Craig Flint
T: +64 (0) 274 597 621
E: craig@defsec.net.nz
27 West Cresent, Te Puru 3575, Thames RD5, New Zealand
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4 Record number of graduates begin their careers at Babcock Australasia
6 European arms imports nearly double, Russian exports fall
9 Record Low: New Zealand slips to 3rd in latest Corruption Perceptions Index
10 Judith Collins: Building on the rock-solid Anzac bond
12 2024 Tohu Awards: Call for Nominations
14 Is AUKUS the end of New Zealand foreign and defence policy bipartisanism, and is that a bad thing?
16 How much is needed to properly maintain our defence force?
19 Peeni Henare: Empowering Defence Force Personnel
20 Intelligence-based capability sustainment: Meeting new expectations
25 Leonardo and NZ industry partners sign Maritime Helicopter Replacement programme MoU
26 Merlin makes multiple appointments to leadership team including New Zealand CEO
27 Royal Navy HMS Tamar prepares with RNZN for South Pacific mission
28 Break out the infantry! Boots on the ground needed in future islands conflict
33 Vacancy: Secretary of Defence and Chief Executive, Ministry of Defence
34 Study reveals the harmful impact of cyberattacks on large Kiwi businesses
36 2024 New Zealand Outstanding Security Performance Awards finalists announced
37 Treatment of hospital assault ‘epidemic’ ends prompting reinfection concerns
38 Five years on from mosque attacks political leadership needed
40 New Zealand retailer’s trial of controversial Live Facial Recognition CCTV poses big questions
44 State of SecOps: New Zealand braces against phishing, ransomware surge and alert fatigue
46 Disinformation tops World Economic Forum’s Global Risks Report
Defsec
Copyright: No article or part thereof may be reproduced without prior consent of the publisher.
Disclaimer: The information contained in this publication is given in good faith and has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate. However, neither the publishers nor any person involved in the preparation of this publication accept any form of liability whatsoever for its contents including advertisements, editorials, opinions, advice or information or for any consequences from its use.
Babcock Australasia has welcomed a record 69 graduates this year as the company continues to expand in the region and support young people into the Defence industry.
Commencing this month, the new cohort will have the opportunity to work on Babcock contracts including supporting Collins Class submarines, High Frequency Communications and sustainment of the Royal Australian Navy’s fleet.
The 69 graduates, based in New Zealand (20), Adelaide (34), Perth (11), Sydney (3), and Melbourne, will gain first-hand experience across several areas including engineering, project management, environment, procurement and supply chain.
“Babcock is proud to support our young people entering the nation’s Defence industry,” said Babcock Australasia Executive Director People & Safety Sue Whitford.
“This year’s record graduate cohort reiterates Babcock is a growing Defence company in the region and we remain committed to supporting the next generation gain opportunities in industry.
“I encourage anyone considering a career in Defence to get in touch – the sky is the limit with fantastic job opportunities at Babcock Australasia. In turn, you’ll be supporting us with our mission of creating a safe and secure world, together.”
“Babcock’s Graduate Program supports our best and brightest young people develop technical and leadership skills while allowing them
to gain fantastic career opportunities through personal development and networking opportunities.
“I encourage anyone considering a career in Defence to get in touch – the sky is the limit with fantastic job opportunities at Babcock Australasia. In turn, you’ll be supporting us with our mission of creating a safe and secure world, together.”
Project Management Graduate Jasmine Parkin-Eadie, 24, started at Babcock in February.
“I was attracted to working at Babcock because the company has multiple departments and projects, so I knew the work would be interesting and ever-changing,” she said.
“Babcock’s great culture, values and flexibility highlighted to me that the company really cares about their employees and gives me confidence
that a job here can be a long-term career.”
Graduate Mechanical Engineer Samuel Rowe, 23, said he was attracted to work at Babcock due to the company’s focus on early careers.
“Babcock showed a genuine interest in my career goals and interests. With a large array of ongoing projects, the door is always open for growth and learning opportunities,” he said.
Babcock’s Graduate Program forms part of the company’s Early Careers offering, which includes annual opportunities for apprentices, trainees and interns.
Babcock’s most recent graduate/ intern intake in Australia opened on March 4.
Babcock plays a crucial role in international defence, ensuring critical services and readily available, affordable and long-lasting. Now more than ever, what we do matters.
Ukraine conflict and perceptions in Asia over China’s ambitions impact on materiel imports internationally with Ukraine the largest European arms importer and Asia having largest share of transfers.
States in Europe almost doubled their imports of major arms (+94 percent) between 2014–18 and 2019–23, according to the data. Around 55 percent of these were supplied by the USA, up from 35 percent in 2014–18.
“More than half of arms imports by European states come from the USA,” noted SIPRI Director Dan Smith, “while at the same time, Europe is responsible for about a third of global arms exports, including large volumes going outside the region, reflecting Europe’s strong military–industrial capacity.
“Many factors shape European NATO states’ decisions to import from the USA, including the goal of maintaining trans-Atlantic relations alongside the more technical, military and cost-related issues. If trans-Atlantic relations change in the coming years, European states’ arms procurement policies may also be modified.”
US and French arms exports climb, while Russian arms exports plummet
The USA’s arms exports grew by 17 percent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, and its share of total global arms
exports rose from 34 percent to 42 percent. The USA delivered major arms to 107 states in 2019–23, more than it has in any previous five-year period and far more than any other arms exporter.
The USA and states in Western Europe together accounted for 72 percent of all arms exports in 2019–23, compared with 62 percent in 2014–18.
“The USA has increased its global role as an arms supplier—an important aspect of its foreign policy—exporting more arms to more countries than it has ever done in the past,” said Mathew George, Director of the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. “This comes at a time when the USA’s economic and geopolitical dominance is being challenged by emerging powers.”
France’s arms exports increased by 47 percent between 2014–18 and 2019–23, and for the first time it was the second biggest arms exporter, just ahead of Russia.
The largest share of France’s arms exports (42 percent) went to states in Asia and Oceania, and another 34 percent went to the Middle East. The largest single recipient of French arms exports was India, which accounted for nearly 30 percent. The increase in French arms exports was largely due to deliveries of combat aircraft to India, Qatar and Egypt.
“France is using the opportunity of strong global demand to boost
its arms industry through exports,” said Katarina Djokic, researcher at SIPRI. “France has been particularly successful in selling its combat aircraft outside Europe.”
Russian arms exports fell by 53 percent between 2014–18 and 2019–23. The decline has been rapid over the course of the past five years, and while Russia exported major arms to 31 states in 2019, it exported to only 12 in 2023.
States in Asia and Oceania received 68 per ent of total Russian arms exports in 2019–23, with India accounting for 34 percent and China for 21 percent.
Looking at the other top 10 arms exporters after the USA, France and Russia, two saw increases in exports: Italy (+86 percent) and South Korea (+12 percent); while five saw decreases: China (–5.3 percent), Germany (–14 percent), the United Kingdom (–14 percent), Spain (–3.3 percent) and Israel (–25 percent).
Arms imports by European states were 94 percent higher in 2019–23 than in 2014–18. Ukraine emerged as the largest European arms importer in 2019–23 and the
fourth largest in the world, after at least 30 states supplied major arms as military aid to Ukraine from February 2022.
The 55 percent of arms imports by European states that were supplied by the USA in 2019–23 was a substantial increase from 35 percent in 2014–18. The next largest suppliers to the region were Germany and France, which accounted for 6.4 percent and 4.6 percent respectively.
“With many high-value arms on order—including nearly 800 combat aircraft and combat helicopters— European arms imports are likely to remain at a high level,” said Pieter Wezeman, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. “In the past two years we have also seen much greater demand for air defence systems in Europe, spurred on by Russia’s missile campaign against Ukraine.”
37 percent of transfers of major arms in 2019–23 went to states in Asia and Oceania, the largest share of any region but a slight decrease from 41 percent in 2014–18. Despite an overall 12 percent decline in arms
imports for the region, imports by several states increased markedly.
For the first time in 25 years, the USA was the largest arms supplier to Asia and Oceania. The USA accounted for 34 percent of arms imports by states in the region, compared with Russia’s 19 percent and China’s 13 percent.
India was the world’s top arms importer. Its arms imports increased by 4.7 percent between 2014–18 and 2019–23. Although Russia remained India’s main arms supplier (accounting for 36 percent of its arms imports), this was the first five-year period since 1960–64 when deliveries from Russia (or the Soviet Union prior to 1991) made up less than half of India’s arms imports.
Pakistan also significantly increased its arms imports (+43 percent). Pakistan was the fifth largest arms importer in 2019–23 and China became even more dominant as its main supplier, providing 82 percent of its arms imports.
Arms imports by two of China’s East Asian neighbours increased, Japan’s by 155 percent and South Korea’s by 6.5 percent. China’s own arms imports shrank by 44 percent, mainly as a result of substituting
imported arms—most of which came from Russia—with locally produced systems.
“There is little doubt that the sustained high levels of arms imports by Japan and other US allies and partners in Asia and Oceania are largely driven by one key factor: concern over China’s ambitions,” said Siemon Wezeman, Senior Researcher with the SIPRI Arms Transfers Programme. “The USA, which shares their perception of a Chinese threat, is a growing supplier to the region.”
Thirty percent of international arms transfers went to the Middle East in 2019–23, and three Middle Eastern states were among the top 10 importers in 2019–23: Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Egypt.
Saudi Arabia was the world’s second largest arms importer in 2019–23, receiving 8.4 percent of global arms imports in the period. Saudi Arabian arms imports fell by 28 percent in 2019–23, but this was from a record level in 2014–18. Qatar increased its arms imports
almost fourfold (+396 percent) between 2014–18 and 2019–23, making it the world’s third biggest arms importer in 2019–23.
Egypt was the world’s seventh largest arms importer in 2019–23 (ahead of Australia in eighth place). Its imports included more than 20 combat aircraft and a total of 10 major warships aimed at increasing its military reach.
The majority of arms imports by Middle Eastern states were supplied by the USA (52 percent), followed by France (12 percent), Italy (10 percent) and Germany (7.1 percent). The USA accounted for 69 percent and Germany for 30 percent of arms imports by Israel.
“Despite an overall drop in arms imports to the Middle East, they remain high in some states, driven largely by regional conflicts and tensions,” said Zain Hussain, researcher at SIPRI.
“Major arms imported in the past 10 years have been used widely in conflicts in the region, including in Gaza, Lebanon and Yemen. Some states in the Gulf region have imported large volumes of arms to
use against the Houthis in Yemen and to counter Iranian influence.”
Africa imports less
Imports of major arms by states in Africa fell by 52 percent between 2014–18 and 2019–23. This was mainly due to large decreases for two North African importers: Algeria (–77 percent) and Morocco (–46 percent).
Arms imports by states in subSaharan Africa decreased by 9.0 percent. China, which accounted for 19 percent of deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa, overtook Russia as the region’s main supplier of major arms.
The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database has provided consistent information on all international transfers of major arms (including sales, gifts and production under licence) between states, international organisations and non-state groups since 1950. Its reflects the volume of deliveries of arms, not their financial value. As the volume of deliveries can fluctuate signi fi cantly year-onyear, SIPRI presents data for fiveyear periods, giving a more stable measure of trends.
Aotearoa New Zealand is now ranked third in the international corruption perceptions ranking – its lowest ranking on record, and government procurement is to blame.
Since the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) was revised in 2012, New Zealand has been ranked first or first equal eight times. This 2023 index, is the first time we have not been in the top two.
In the CPI, which is prepared annually by Transparency International, the higher the score the lower the perceived corruption. New Zealand’s score of 85/100 in 2023 means we now sit five points below Denmark on 90 (which has been ranked first for six years) and three below Finland on 88, which is in second place.
Aotearoa’s drop in score was primarily due to responses to the Executive Opinion Survey (EOS) undertaken by the World Economic Forum in 2023. This is one of the eight contributing surveys/assessments to the CPI.
The EOS asked respondents how common it was for businesses to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with trade, public utilities, tax payments or awarding of public contracts. It also asked how common it was for public funds to be diverted to companies, individuals or groups due to corruption.
“… despite improvement in transparency of public tendering platforms, much more effort is needed in improving the transparency of government spending and the governance of public infrastructure projects if community trust is to be sustained.”
While New Zealand is still given a positive tick by most executives, the survey responses in 2023 indicate reduced business leader confidence in government integrity systems.
“While New Zealand remains among the least corrupt countries in the world, the reduction in our points and drop in ranking is a reminder that complacency is not an option in our battle against corruption,” said Anne Tolley, Chair of Transparency International New Zealand.
“The decline in the confidence of the business community is particularly troublesome. Maintaining low levels of corruption is essential for our economy and for our values of fairness and accountability.”
“There were a number of high-profile prosecutions during the last year in areas such as fraud, tax evasion and COVID subsidy related fraud prosecutions,” said Julie Haggie, CEO of Transparency International New Zealand. This could point both to systems that are working as well as poor integrity systems that are enabling it to occur.
“New Zealanders have also seen a huge rise in scamming without sufficient response. People want to know that integrity systems are holding up against corrupt practices. And, despite improvement in transparency of public tendering platforms, much more effort is needed in improving the transparency of government spending and the governance of public infrastructure projects if community trust is to be sustained.
“Our economy is under stress due to many factors. When times are tough people are keener to know where revenue is spent, and whether everyone is paying their fair share and having the same opportunities,” Ms Haggie said.
It is important that New Zealand remain a credible partner and ally to Australia through increased integration and interoperability and in the space sector, writes Defence Minister Hon Judith Collins KC.
Judith
General, Minister of Defence, Minister for Digitising Government, Minister responsible for the GCSB, Minister responsible for the NZSIS, Minister for Science, Innovation & Technology, Minister for Space, Lead Coordination Minister for the Governments Response to the Royal Commission’s Report into the Terrorist Attack on the Christchurch Mosques.
New Zealand and Australia are great friends, the closest partners, and allies.
Forged on the battlefields of two world wars, the Anzac spirit is as strong as ever 110 years on. Just like their forebears, Kiwi soldiers today still stand side by side with their Australian counterparts on a wide range of operations overseas - from the recent coalition deployment to the Middle East to uphold maritime security in the Red Sea, to the Australian-led International Assistance Force mission in the Solomon Islands, and long-standing peace support operations in the Republic of Korea, Middle East and South Sudan.
Now more than ever, our bilateral relationship with our mates across the Tasman is of the utmost importance. The strong people to people connections the New Zealand Defence Force and Ministry of Defence have with their Australian counterparts are, I believe, critical to our country’s future.
Our Pacific neighbourhood is facing a more challenging strategic environment than for decades due to the impacts of geostrategic competition and climate change. As a consequence there are increasing threats to New Zealand’s security. The underlying liberal democratic principles that have brought relative peace since World War Two, are being tested by increased and
increasing challenges to the rulesbased system.
As a country that relies primarily on trade and travel in order to prosper, it is critical we do our bit to protect the global systems and principles that underpin the rules based system and that we benefit so greatly from.
We must make credible contributions to the stability and prosperity of our region, and to wider collective peace and security missions alongside our partners.
That is why I have made it my priority to ensure the enduring bond with Australia goes from strength to strength.
At the inaugural AustraliaNew Zealand combined Foreign and Defence Ministers meeting in Melbourne in February, Minister Peters and I agreed with our Australian counterparts that we are stronger when we work together. We believe it is critical that we build on our already rock-solid Anzac bond.
With that in mind, Ministers committed our militaries to increased integration and interoperability, including through common capability, the exchange of military personnel, and increased participation in joint warfighting exercises.
The Australia-New Zealand Ministers meeting also discussed the possibility of New Zealand’s participation in Pillar Two of
AUKUS, a trilateral partnership between Australia, the United States and United Kingdom. New Zealand has welcomed Pillar Two and, like Australia, we believe it will make a significant contribution towards security and stability in the IndoPacific region.
In my conversations with Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles and Foreign Minister Penny Wong, we discussed what Pillar Two of the agreement could look like. It is early days for the Pillar but we know it will be focused on the development and sharing of advanced defence technologies.
I believe it is possible the hardworking and innovative Kiwis who work in the New Zealand Defence Force, and in the space, technology and academic sectors, could potentially contribute to the development of Pillar Two technologies with their scientific and technical knowledge.
Following the Australia-New Zealand Ministers meeting, Australian Defence officials have already flown to Wellington to brief officials on Pillar Two. I have also had discussions with the United States Secretary for State of Arms Control and International
Security, Bonnie Jenkins, when she visited New Zealand. AUKUS partners are yet to put timeframes on when it will be opened up to new participants, but our understanding of the arrangement is growing with ongoing and regular discussions.
Another area where I believe it is very important that New Zealand remain a credible partner and ally to Australia is in the space sector.
New Zealand is one of only eleven countries worldwide with space launch facilities, and already it generates more than $1.7 billion a year in revenue, employs 5,000 people, and supports another 7,000 jobs.
Space related industries have the potential to grow the economy, support national security, and improve the lives of New Zealanders. They already enable innovation in fields as diverse as precision agriculture, financial transactions, and supply chain management.
As New Zealand’s first Minister for Space I am focused on ensuring New Zealand realises its potential as a space launch nation, including the benefits this offers to Australia. I am keenly aware that space technology developments have the potential to unleash innovation in the New Zealand Defence Force.
The Defence Force already conducts research into space operations, space surveillance and the use of space-based sensing. They are partnering with the University of Auckland to expand spacerelated research, including the use of artificial intelligence tools to improve search and rescue operations in the Pacific. It is likely that space-based technologies could significantly improve not only our maritime domain awareness, but the awareness for our Pacific partners too.
The Defence Force has several space initiatives currently underway with key international partners. Just last year, it joined the Joint Commercial Operations programme, which keeps track of objects in space in order to avoid collisions and build space domain awareness. Our small team leads the Pacific regional cell, which includes partners such as Australia.
Whether in our region or further abroad, we are stronger when we stand shoulder to shoulder with our only formal ally Australia and other partners. With many workstreams underway, watch this space for more initiatives that bolster the security of New Zealand, and that see our Defence Force work closely with partners in a meaningful way.
Nominations are now open for the 2024 Tohu Awards, recognising employers and organisations around New Zealand who help support the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF).
The annual Tohu Awards, hosted by the Minister of Defence and run by the Defence Employer Support Council (DESC), recognise those who employ Reservists, Cadet Force Officers and graduates of Limited Service Volunteer (LSV) Programmes.
This event, and the awards made, are an official acknowledgement of the service and ongoing commitment provided by organisations in communities around the country to support the NZDF.
With the support of independent organisations and employers, part-time service personnel can attend training exercises and serve on deployments, providing a boost in numbers alongside NZDF Regular Force personnel.
To that end, employers of Reservists and Cadet Force Officers are vital to supporting the NZDF’s readiness and effectiveness.
In return, employers often benefit from the additional training provided by the NZDF to their employees, including skills across leadership, teamwork, communication, discipline, planning, management and more.
Positive relationships between employers and part-time personnel in their civilian workplace often benefit both parties, with personnel being both engaged in their military roles and more likely to be motivated and committed to their employer.
This year, organisations can nominate themselves for an award category.
Nominations for all Employer Awards Categories close on 17 May 2024. A nomination form can be requested by emailing secretariat@ desc.govt.nz.
The 2023 Employer Award Category winners were:
The Reserve Employer of the Year (Large Employer Category) was KPMG, which supports Reservists’ duties alongside their civilian career in KPMG NZ. The company enables cover of civilian engagements and considers emergency response leave for Reservists when they are required to respond to domestic emergency events at short - or even no - notice. Their HR policy includes 10 days of Reservist leave.
The Reserve Employer of the Year (Small Employer Category) was
Reswax (Resin and Wax Holdings Ltd). The company’s employment contracts allow for flexible working arrangements enabling time to be spent on both Reserve and civilian tasks.
Contribution to the Limited Service Volunteer Programme award recipient was Taylor Preston. The company is an enduring supporter of the LSV programme, and its recruitment manager Barry Walsh is a long-time active benefactor. Taylor Preston has employed more than 30 graduates, and these graduates are given time off to talk to current trainees about their LSV experience and work journey.
The New Zealand Cadet Force Officer Employer of the Year was awarded to Toi Ohomai Te Pūkenga, Tauranga, and was nominated by Cadet Force Major Elisha Crawshaw. Toi Ohomai is a strong supporter of the New Zealand Cadet Forces (NZCF), notably to the Cadet Units in the Western Bay of Plenty. The organisation has HR policies in place that recognise the value of skills obtained through the NZCF training programme.
CATEGORIES
Reservist of the Year
Reserve Employer of the Year (Small and Large Employer Categories)
New Zealand Cadet Force Officer Employer of the Year
Limited Service Volunteers (LSV) Employer Recognition Award
Outstanding Contribution to the the Limited Service Volunteers (LSV) Programme
An event in support of part-time New Zealand Defence Force personnel and the organisations who support them.
EMPLOYERS OF NZDF PERSONNEL ARE INVITED TO SELF-NOMINATE
REQUEST NOMINATION FORMS:
From secretariat@desc.govt.nz
SUBMIT NOMINATIONS:
To secretariat@desc.govt.nz
Reservist of the Year: 19 August 2024
All other Categories: 17 May 2024
CLOSING DATES: QUERIES?
Email secretariat@desc.govt.nz
With the Luxon Government signalling potential membership of AUKUS Pillar Two and the Labour Party branding the partnership an anti-China “offensive warfighting alliance”, our turbulent waters are about to get muddy, writes Chief Editor Nicholas Dynon.
New Zealand’s Labour Party opposition is “walking back” its openness to joining Pillar Two of the AUKUS military pact, according to a 12 February Radio New Zealand report
RNZ reported that although the Labour Party is yet to finalise its position on AUKUS, its associate foreign affairs spokesperson Phil Twyford called it an “offensive warfighting alliance against China”.
“We’re not convinced we should be positioning China as a foe” and should not fall into a “trap taking a binary position that it’s either the US or China,” Labour Party Foreign Affairs Spokesperson David Parker told RNZ.
The news came just days after 01 February’s inaugural ANZMIN 2+2 meeting of Australia and New Zealand’s foreign and defence ministers that produced a joint statement highlighting that “AUKUS made a positive contribution toward maintaining peace, security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific”.
Placing Beijing squarely in its sights, the joint statement expressed
serious concerns in relation to “destabilising activities” in the South China Sea and East China Sea, and grave and deep concerns in relation to human rights violations in Xinjiang and Hong Kong respectively.
With the ink still drying on the statement, China’s embassy in Wellington fired off a scathing rebuke that lambasted AUKUS as a “stark manifestation of Cold War mentality” that “will undermine peace and stability, sow division and confrontation in the region”.
Reading the pre-election signs
Prior to its defeat at last year’s national election, the Labour Party had stated it was “willing to explore” participating in pillar two, but there are divergent views on just how prepared the Hipkins Labour government was to consider membership.
According to defence analyst Tim Fish, successive Labour prime ministers Jacinda Ardern and Chris Hipkins “were tentative at best about AUKUS Pillar 2 membership.”
“There had been mixed messaging from senior cabinet ministers about its value for New Zealand as a Pacific regional player, and during the televised leadership debates in the lead-up to the election Hipkins had stated he “preferred other arrangements” to AUKUS,” wrote Fish in an article in Breaking Defence
At that time, the National Party and the two parties that would join it in coalition government after the election – the ACT Party and New Zealand First – all indicated relatively supportive positions on the question of potential Pillar Two membership.
National Party leader – and now prime minister – Chris Luxon, had stated in pre-election debates that he would “explore” joining Pillar 2, and ACT Party Leader David Seymour stated that he would pursue it.
In a pre-election opinion piece in Line of Defence Magazine, the then Act Party Defence Spokesperson James McDowall saw the side-lining of New Zealand in the original formation of AUKUS as a symbol of the country’s strategic irrelevance.
“New Zealand’s irrelevance was most graphically seen when Australia announced the formation of the AUKUS alliance and the purchase of nuclear submarines without bothering to inform New Zealand,” he wrote. “Under Labour, New Zealand has gone from being
an ANZAC partner to being an afterthought.”
He further wrote that since a tour of its foreign minister to the South Pacific in May 2022, China had “continued to pressure New Zealand to maintain an ‘independent foreign policy’; translation: one that is more dependent on them and not on our traditional allies.”
A challenge to bipartisansim
Various commentators have noted a tradition of bipartisanship in New Zealand defence and foreign policy, but the recent ANZMIN 2+2 joint statement and the Labour Party’s apparent “walking back” from its previous openness to membership of AUKUS Pillar Two suggests an imminent departure from that tradition.
In the post-election issue of Line of Defence Magazine, editor-at-large Peter Greener wrote that throughout the election campaign Christopher Luxon had “made a virtue of New Zealand having a bipartisan defence and foreign policy.”
“These statements were largely made in respect of the fundamentals,” wrote Greener, “being a commitment to New Zealand’s Five Eyes partners, especially Australia, to the nuclear free status of New Zealand and to the independent foreign policy.”
“The latter point was made with specific reference to having a
balanced relationship with China, something that is strongly held by both National and Labour.”
In a 2022 Lowy Institute article titled “Is bipartisanship on national security a good thing?”, Richard Maude commented – in reference to Australian politics – that bipartisanship can reassure allies and friends who want to know they can invest in mechanisms like AUKUS “without fear of being left like a shag on a rock by sudden policy shifts in Canberra.”
It also provides certainty for defence planners, policy agencies, companies and public institutions such as universities that make significant decisions and implement major programmes of work off policies that they hope will endure beyond a single election cycle.
Bipartisanism, he suggests, is also a “helpful signal of national resolve to China” and that it can act as a disincentive for China to exploit perceived policy splits.
Whether foreign and defence policy bipartisanism is ultimately a good thing is a question that ultimately lends itself to debate, as is the question of just how much of a feature such bipartisanism has actually been in the history of New Zealand politics.
Nevertheless, if recent ministerial statements and parliamentary rhetoric are anything to go by, it appears that the days of bipartisanism in Wellington on China may well be coming to an end. If that’s the case, there are deep ramifications. For a start, our domestic politics will become quickly polarised on our view of the world and our place in it.
While an assertive coalition government may well sign us up to AUKUS Pillar Two, our Australia and our partners – and indeed China – may well be left wondering how serious we really are, whether we’re ‘all in’, and will it survive the next election?
NATO members are expected to spend 2% of GDP on Defence. New Zealand isn’t spending enough, but how much is enough, and is 2% too much, writes
Wayne Mapp.Hon Dr Wayne Mapp QSO was New Zealand’s Minister of Defence and Minister of Science and Innovation from 2008 to 2011.
The ongoing unavailability of the Boeing 757s can be seen as testament to way successive governments have failed to have effective and timely replacement programs.
Critical equipment is expected to remain in service well beyond the time it might be expected to be replaced. This is not a new phenomenon. For many decades New Zealand governments have failed to make timely decisions to replace worn out defence equipment, taking the option to run them well past the expected out of service date.
The defence force knows when it’s key capabilities will reach the end of their effective life. This has always been advised in the preparation of the various Defence Reviews of the last three decades. When it comes to the key assets of importance to our partners, particularly Australia, this is also known to them as well.
New Zealand has always spent less on defence than most of our defence partners. To some extent
this is understandable, we are the most remote nation on earth, and that remoteness brings it own security. As a consequence, New Zealand has a smaller defence force than many nations of comparable size. This is most notably reflected in the numbers of people in uniform. It is also reflected in the amount of equipment they operate, be that personal equipment or large scale assets such as ships and aircraft.
What is less understandable is that the way that successive New Zealand governments have failed to ensure the key equipment of the relatively small defence force is replaced when it should be, rather than being kept in service beyond its useful life. This might be a failure to fully understand the proper level of funding that is required for the defence force that New Zealand actually has, or it could be that the government of the day simply has more pressing priorities.
NH90 Helicopter. Image courtesy of NZDF
This failure could result in three different outcomes. First, New Zealand could downsize the size of the defence force so that the available funding ensures that all parts of the defence force have the modern equipment that is expected of them. Second, the level of funding, both capital and operational, is increased to properly maintain the defence force we have. Third, we could continue to muddle on with the current level of funding, knowing full well there will be embarrassing failures of core capabilities, especially towards the end of the life of the major assets.
The issue of how much New Zealand was really prepared to pay for its defence force last came to the fore in the early days of the Clark administration, when the future of the air combat force was in play.
The ultimate resolution of this issue was to disband the air combat force, on the basis of both cost and utility. This decision was to ensure that the balance of the defence force would be able to be relatively well equipped. To a substantial extent this objective has been reasonably well achieved, though there are caveats around the timing of decisions. The defence force has been able achieve simultaneous significant contributions to Timor Leste,
Afghanistan and The Solomons.
Since the air combat force was disbanded in 2000, the overall shape of the defence force has been relatively stable. No-one now is seriously questioning whether the defence force should be further reduced in size. The current size and shape of the defence force is seen as a minimum credible force, whether in terms of combat or civil capabilities. There are no capabilities that are obviously of low utility, as was the case with the air combat force.
There have been significant re-equipment programs during the last two decades, including the NH 90 helicopters, the Project Protector fleet, the P8 Poseidons, the C130J Hercules and the large new tanker and logistics ship, HMNZS Aotearoa. The most recent acquisitions of HMNZS Aotearoa, the P8 Poseidon’s and the C130J Hercules have been relatively more expensive than the acquisitions of the decade of 2005 to 2015.
As a consequence, the expenditure on defence as a percentage of GDP, using the NATO measure, has increased slightly to 1.3% of GDP, with a peak in 2020 of 1.5% of GDP when the P8 Poseidons and C130J Hercules were purchased within a 12-month period.
Notwithstanding these various re-equipment programs, there has been an overall lag in the timing of the replacement of core capabilities. Typically, most of the key assets have had to remain in service up to a decade longer than the optimal time for their replacement, with the consequence that serviceability is significantly impaired.
In short, New Zealand is not devoting enough money as percentage of GDP to replace the core capabilities of the defence force at the appropriate time.
The next decade could well be more challenging than the last. There are two reasons. The first reason is that the single most expensive capability of the defence force, the naval combat force, will need to be replaced with the replacement ships needing to come into service by 2035. By then the existing ANZAC frigates will be nearly 40 years old.
The second reason is the expectations of our defence partners. All the NATO nations are expected to reach 2% of GDP as a minimum level of defence expenditure. Most of them are making good progress in this direction. New Zealand’s one ally, Australia, has significantly increased defence expenditure as a percentage of GDP, rising in the
course of five years from 1.9% to 2.3% of GDP. The NATO nations and Australia have made these decisions, notwithstanding the economic difficulties faced by all OECD nations over the last few years.
New Zealand cannot reasonably expect to be completely immune from this trend. The Prime Minister will have been made aware of partner expectations in this regard. More than any other area of government expenditure, the views of security partners can be expected to lay some part in New Zealand’s decision on what to spend on defence.
New Zealand will not, and should not, aim to spend 2% of GDP on defence, as has become the norm for our defence partners. Both our geography and history militate against that. However, we should at least aim to replace our major defence capabilities in a timely fashion, rather than extending them beyond their reasonable life span, as we have done in the past.
What would be required to replace the core capabilities of the defence force in a timely manner?
In essence, it will mean more money allocated to defence, even if
this won’t occur in the 2024 Budget, which will have been locked in by now. New Zealand’s current GDP is $400 billion. In 2023 defence expenditure was $5.3 billion or 1.3% of GDP. An increase of $400 million in the annual defence budget would lift defence spending to 1.4% of GDP.
This level of increase would almost certainly require more than one budget round to achieve. However, an increase of this size would ensure that all the current capabilities of the defence force could be replaced as and when required.
If New Zealand was prepared to make this commitment, there would be no need to continue the fly the 35 years old Boeing 757s for several more years. They could be replaced by much more modern aircraft.
There would be a guarantee that the ANZAC frigates would be replaced by appropriate ships, likely to be of the same type that Australia will select as their Tier 2 combat vessels. It is noteworthy that the four chosen options for the Australian Tier 2 ships do not include the United Kingdom designed Type 31 frigate.
A decision to go with the Australian choice for their Tier 2 combat vessels would enable a joint Australia New Zealand build program, as happened with the ANZAC frigates.
An intriguing alternative to an ANZAC approach would be the United Kingdom basing two type 31 frigates in New Zealand as opposed to the current plan of basing them in Australia as part of AUKUS, on the basis of New Zealand purchasing Type 31 frigates to replace the ANZAC frigates.
The Minister of Defence is expected to receive the Defence Review around the middle of this year. This will be the opportunity to reset national and international expectations of what is expected from New Zealand in terms of defence.
While the Review is unlikely to have any impact on the 2024 Budget, it would be reasonable for the Review to make its influence felt in the Budgets of 2025 and beyond. If New Zealand is to have any chance in participating in the decisions on the Australian Tier 2 combat ship, the New Zealand government will need to act during this term of government.
With the Budget coming up, writes Hon Peeni Henare, delivery on commitments to increased funding of the Defence Force will be critical in ensuring the safety and prosperity of New Zealanders. sacrifice but also bolstered morale and retention rates.
As a Minister of Defence under the previous Labour Government, I am proud of the strides made during our tenure in fortifying New Zealand’s security and empowering our Defence Force personnel. We prioritised infrastructure development, personnel support, and strengthening relationships with our Pacific neighbours, leaving an indelible mark on the nation’s security landscape.
Central to our vision was the acquisition of four P-8A Poseidon and five C-130J-30 Hercules aircraft, ushering in a new era of capability and readiness. The introduction of the P-8s, replacing the aging P-3K2 Orion aircraft, signifies a significant leap in our maritime patrol and surveillance capabilities.
The procurement of the C-130J-30 fleet further reinforces our airlift capabilities, enhancing our ability to respond to domestic and international emergencies. This is particularly important in an age where climate change is seeing more extreme weather events happening not only in our own backyard, but to our more vulnerable neighbours in the Pacific.
We introduced remuneration for our Defence Force personnel, recognising their invaluable contributions to New Zealand’s Defence. The allocation of over $419 million over 4 years for military and civilian remuneration highlights our commitment. This investment not only honoured their dedication and
Moreover, Labour spearheaded unprecedented investments in Defence infrastructure. Major upgrades at Ohakea Air Force Base, including a $206 million investment in 2020, emphasised our commitment to modernising Defence facilities. Budget 2023 further allocated $328 million for infrastructure upgrades, signalling our dedication to providing our Defence Force with the resources and infrastructure necessary to excel.
Despite the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic, Labour remained supportive of the Defence portfolio. I am particularly proud of our service members, who played a pivotal role in the Government’s pandemic response, reflecting their adaptability, professionalism, and unwavering commitment to duty. Labour ensured that our Defence Force had the resources, support, and recognition necessary to navigate these unprecedented times.
However, as highlighted by the Office of the Auditor General, sustaining meaningful positive change in national performance and effective estate regeneration requires substantial capital investment. While our achievements laid a strong foundation, ongoing commitment to investment in Defence infrastructure is crucial to meet evolving security challenges and maintain operational excellence.
It is imperative to acknowledge the potential challenges facing the Defence portfolio under the current Coalition Government, especially with the looming budget expected in May. The Chief of Defence Force made the challenges clear in his final appearance before the Foreign Affairs, Trade and Defence Select Committee for the Annual Review.
The Prime Minister and his Minister of Defence have both committed to increased funding of the Defence force, and come budget day, we will be holding them to account on this commitment. Labour’s legacy stands as a stark reminder of the critical importance of prioritising equitable remuneration, strategic investments, and infrastructure development in ensuring the safety and prosperity of all New Zealanders.
In conclusion, Labour’s progressive Defence legacy exemplifies our unwavering commitment to advancing security and empowerment. By prioritising fair remuneration, strategic investments, and infrastructure development, we have strengthened New Zealand’s Defence Force and fortified the nation’s resilience in the face of emerging threats. As we reflect on our achievements, let us redouble our efforts to build upon this legacy and chart a course towards a safer, more prosperous future for all.
Equipping naval personnel with the state-of-the-art tools and opportunities necessary to perform their duties effectively also allows them to realise their full professional potential, writes Rod Bird, Head Austal Technology.
In an era where technological advancements and strategic imperatives are reshaping naval operations globally, navies around the world face a critical challenge that strikes at the very core of their operational readiness: workforce retention.
The Royal New Zealand Navy’s recent decision to withdraw its Offshore Patrol Vessels, Otago and Wellington , along with the Inshore Patrol Vessel Hawea , underscores a troubling trend that has not spared even the most venerable maritime forces. Similar to New Zealand’s predicament, the Royal Navy
and the Royal Australian Navy have been compelled to sideline major fleet units, all due to acute shortages in critical workforce competencies.
Echoing this sentiment, the Chief of Maritime Staff of the Royal Canadian Navy has sounded the alarm in a new video, describing the service as being in a “critical state.” With ships that have surpassed their intended life cycles and a glaring deficit of crew to operate them, the message is clear: the issue of personnel retention is not just a national concern but a global crisis that demands immediate attention.
The retention challenge encompasses a myriad of factors, each contributing to the complexity of maintaining a robust and capable naval workforce. Among these, a critical yet often overlooked aspect is the alignment of the workforce’s expectations with the resources and tools provided to them. This article delves into the imperative of equipping naval personnel with the state-of-theart tools and opportunities necessary not only to perform their duties effectively but also to realise their full professional potential.
In an age where technological superiority is synonymous with
tactical advantage, the ability of navies to retain their best and brightest hinges significantly on their commitment to innovation, professional development, and the empowerment of their people.
Naval leaders, through direct engagement with the current and next generation of recruits, have come to recognise the intrinsic qualities of these young men and women are every bit as suited to the demands of naval life as those of previous generations. In fact, in several key areas—particularly in their readiness to engage in open communication and collaborative problem-solving— this cohort may well represent the greatest potential of any group of recruits navies have ever seen.
This generation brings a distinctive perspective to their service; they are not content to simply accept existing procedures and practices as the best or only way to accomplish their missions. Armed with a keen sense of innovation and efficiency, they are quick to question and challenge the status quo, especially when they identify more effective ways of doing business.
This characteristic, presents an unprecedented opportunity for
transformation within the naval forces, urging a re-evaluation of traditional processes to embrace more dynamic, effective approaches.
This generation of naval recruits comes with an inherent understanding and appreciation for the potential of information technology to amplify their capabilities and achievements. Growing up in a digital era, they are acutely aware of how technological advancements can streamline processes, enhance operational efficiency, and ultimately lead to more significant outcomes. Consequently, these recruits expect the naval enterprise to supply them with tools specifically tailored to their operational needs and tasks.
This expectation marks a shift from the traditional paradigm where personnel had to manage the constraints and functionalities of the tools at their disposal. Instead, they anticipate a more intuitive integration of technology in their daily operations, where the tools are designed and implemented to complement and elevate their work, not dictate or limit it.
This mindset underscores a broader challenge for naval leadership: to bridge the gap between technological potential and current operational practices, ensuring that
the arsenal of tools available to sailors is as advanced and adaptable as the individuals who wield them.
Austal has taken a significant step forward in addressing the evolving needs and expectations of naval personnel, particularly those tasked with ensuring the material availability of ships and their technical systems, with the development of the Lifecycle Upkeep Sustainment Intelligence (LUSI™) Solution.
This solution set combines a variety of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) applications with bespoke applications curated to offer a holistic capability that aligns with the functional requirements of naval capability sustainment. By integrating these digital tools, the LUSI Solution aims to streamline processes, enhance operational efficiency, and significantly improve the sustainment and upkeep of naval assets.
LUSI represents a new approach to asset management over the entire life cycle from initial acquisition out to Planned Withdrawal Date (PWD), offering a major improvement in data acquisition, management, and transposition of that data into real-time intelligent information to effectively manage entire fleets, not just individual
assets. The solution changes the asset management paradigm for customers from asset failure reporting to a data driven predictive analytics model.
The LUSI Solution is a multifaceted tool designed to significantly bolster the capabilities of various stakeholders within naval operations. Through its suite of digital solutions, it provides targeted support to the engineering team at sea, asset managers responsible for Maintenance Repair and Overhaul (MRO) budgets, and the Maritime Component Commander and their staff. Specifically, it can enhance the functionality and decision-making processes for these key roles by:
Support for the engineering team at sea:
LUSI equips the engineering team with real-time data analytics and diagnostic tools, enabling them to monitor the health and performance of ship systems continuously. This immediate access to information allows for prompt identification of
issues, predictive maintenance, and reduced downtime, ensuring that ships remain operational and mission capable.
Empowering asset managers with MRO budgeting:
For asset managers, LUSI provides a comprehensive overview of the fleet’s maintenance needs, integrating historical data and predictive analytics to forecast upcoming repair and overhaul requirements. This capability allows for more accurate and effective budgeting, ensuring that resources are allocated efficiently, and maintenance schedules are optimized to meet operational demands without overspending.
Enhancing the Maritime Component Commander’s understanding of operational readiness:
At the operational command and control level, LUSI offers the Maritime Component Commander
and staff a dynamic assessment tool for evaluating the fleet’s readiness in response to operational contingencies. By aggregating data across various platforms and systems, the solution provides a real-time operational picture, highlighting the availability of assets, their current status, and potential limitations. This enables more informed decision-making, allowing for rapid adjustments to fleet deployment and tasking to meet emerging threats or missions.
The following scenarios build out these features:
A day in the life of a ship’s engineering team using the LUSI EAM module
In a LUSI managed fleet, the Engineering Officer (EO) and the engineering leadership team will each day access the EO lobby in the LUSI EAM (Enterprise Asset Management) module. The lobby provides them an overview
of daily preventive maintenance tasks, corrective maintenance (that for which both ship’s staff and the engineering support base are responsible), Operational Defects (OPDEFs), maintenance period planning, and overdue work on board the vessel. The EO is also able to view the Inventory / Ship Stores lobby to identify the status of stores demands.
The Ship Planned Maintenance tile provides the EO with a sevenday look ahead of maintenance tasks that the engineering team need to complete. The EO can assign the work to a specific technician in the LUSI EAM module and monitor the progress of the Technician completing the work. Once the Task is completed, the EO will review the notes input on the mobile tablet and capture of Objective Quality Evidence (OQE) provided by the Technician and close out the work order in the EAM.
Technicians are each provided with a mobile tablet that advises which jobs they have been assigned and this enables entering of OQE on the move as well as accessing the documentation including drawings and specifications that they need to complete the work. The centralised repository for the documentation is configuration managed to ensure that all documentation is kept up to date across all vessels whether in operation or alongside through replication ship to shore.
MRO Budgets are being compiled for the next operating budget cycle. The Asset Manager needs to make intelligence-based budgeting decisions.
As LUSI includes a full Enterprise Asset Management (EAM) System, Work Orders (WOs) can be loaded with the cost of completing the work detailed. Regional pricing can be applied to the WOs where maintenance is being carried out at various locations.
The LUSI EAM also provides the ability to use the Technical Maintenance Plan (TMP) to forecast preventive maintenance in short/medium and long term horizons. The EAM can forecast out scheduled maintenance activities to Planned Withdrawal Date (PWD) as WOs can be generated out to any date required by the maintenance organisation based on the technical maintenance plan. It can also forecast contingencies for corrective maintenance based on historical information and trends that is intuitively contextualised to the stage in the life cycle of the vessel.
The solution also includes historical Failure Reporting, Analysis and Corrective Action System (FRACAS) information. This allows the asset manager to average costs for unscheduled Late Activity Requests (LAR’s) assigned last minute to Maintenance Activities, Corrective Maintenance (CM) Debt and CM events. In addition, it captures emergent work while undertaking Maintenance Activities. This can be annualised across the Fleet, Group or Class and forecast into the future with provisioning for growth factors or stage of the life cycle of the asset.
Unlike legacy systems, LUSI collects data directly from Integrated Platform Management Systems (IPMS) on board the vessel. Fault Reports are raised directly in LUSI EAM on board the vessel through an event management system if systems are being operated outside safe parameters or predetermined operating profiles. Data concerning Mean Time To Failure (MTTF – failures that require system replacement), Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF – failures that can be repaired without system replacement), and Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) is compiled by LUSI, allowing MRO planning, supportability analysis and ultimately into advanced asset management schemas.
The LUSI EAM enables the asset manager to accurately forecast spares’ consumptions, consumables as well as planned maintenance. Using the regional price book feature, a user can view the planned cost of the Usage Upkeep Cycle of a vessel –allowing the user to get an accurate profile of the maintenance cost for a vessel’s operating plan.
When faced with the challenge of developing long-term Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) budgets under financial constraints, asset managers often have to make difficult trade-offs that could affect the availability and readiness of naval assets. These decisions frequently involve accepting a degree of availability risk to align with forecasted funding availability.
In such scenarios, the decision to truncate or omit certain maintenance activities, as outlined in the Technical Maintenance Plan (TMP), must be approached with a comprehensive understanding of the potential implications on operational capability and long-term asset integrity. LUSI provides support for an objective and quantified risk based engineering judgement, supported by structured data in LUSI.
LUSI significantly enhances the asset manager’s ability to make these critical decisions in a more informed manner. With LUSI’s integration of FRACAS data, asset managers are equipped with a robust analytical tool that provides a detailed history of asset failures, maintenance outcomes, and the effectiveness of previous corrective actions.
A short notice contingency arises, the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) needs to understand ASAP the readiness of ships to deploy to a certain location for a period of time. Using the Fleet Summary dashboard in the LUSI Sustainment Operational Intelligence (SOI), the MCC is able
to see the status of different vessels in different classes across the Fleet. The MCC is able to identify readiness based on the vessel’s operational status as well as number of OPDEFS that are open per vessel. Using this information, the MCC is able to drill down on a particular vessel to view more information on the Vessel Status dashboard.
For each vessel shown as part of the Vessel Status dashboard, the MCC can view:
• Engineering Changes in progress / approved / embodied
• Current Usage and Upkeep Cycle (UUC)
• Maintenance Plan for Vessel
• Maintenance Debt of Corrective Maintenance (CMs) and Preventive Maintenance (PMs)
• Event Management and Asset Performance Information System (APIS) Alerts
• OPDEFS
• Conditions of Class
The integration of the LUSI Solution into the Maritime Component Commander (MCC) team’s operational toolkit represents a significant enhancement in their ability to monitor and assess the fleet’s condition and readiness.
It does not replace the need for professional advice regarding the condition of specific ships, however, it greatly augments the decisionmaking process by providing a datadriven foundation for identifying and prioritizing issues of concern.
The value of LUSI to the MCC and their team lies in its ability to aggregate, analyse, and present relevant data in a manner that is both accessible and actionable. This capability allows the MCC team to quickly identify potential problem areas or assets that may require closer inspection, thereby streamlining the process of engaging with the engineering support base. Instead of broad inquiries or assessments, the MCC team can initiate discussions that are highly focused on specific concerns, informed by the detailed insights offered by LUSI.
While the functions of consolidating and analysing critical operational and maintenance data have long been the purview of highly skilled engineering, logistics, and operations personnel, LUSI introduces a transformative approach by centralising this vast array of information into a single platform. This integration not only streamlines
access to vital data but also establishes a unified source of truth that is both modern and attuned to the dynamic needs of contemporary naval operations and crew.
The Royal Australian Navy’s (RAN) adoption of LUSI for the Cape Class and Evolved Cape Class Patrol Boats serves as a testament to the system’s utility and impact. Feedback from users, particularly from crew and technicians engaged with LUSI on a daily basis, revealed that LUSI meets the aspirations and expectations of the modern sailor by marrying state-of-the-art IT solutions with the operational needs of a 21st Century Navy. It has significantly bolstered the capabilities of those responsible for maintaining and managing naval assets and enabled performance of their duties with unprecedented precision and insight.
LUSI’s significance extends beyond the expectation of the new generation of crew operating advanced vessels that use information technology in all aspects of their life, it provides the potential to serve as a cornerstone for naval operations worldwide, promising a future where technological innovation and operational excellence go hand in hand.
Leonardo pitches the AW159 Wildcat helicopter as a solution for New Zealand’s maritime helicopter replacement (MHR) programme; will work with partners to establish a Wildcat Support Centre in Auckland.
Leonardo is collaborating with New Zealand industry partners, including SMEs, via a series of comprehensive Memoranda of Understanding (MoU). According to the announcement, the collaborative approach represents a cross-section of the best in Aotearoa’s engineering, manufacturing and technology sectors.
Signed on 20 March, the MoU outlines technical and programme support, operations, maintenance, and job creation, which will foster a symbiotic relationship as part of Leonardo’s MHR programme offering which centres on the latest-generation AW159 multi-role helicopter.
Including Beca Applied Technologies, Core Aviation, Marops, Redfort Logistics Group, and United Machinists, the MoUs recognise the need to build resilience into the NZDF’s operations for the future through the country’s growing industrial capability.
As part of its solution, Leonardo is offering the establishment of a Wildcat Support Centre (NZ) for the AW159 helicopters to be located within the operating base in Auckland and delivered through in collaboration with its domestic partners.
According to the announcement, the MoU “represents an investment in skills, design and manufacturing, sustainment of jobs for local businesses and potential opportunities
for veterans, if Leonardo is successful with the MHR programme.”
Further, Leonardo states that the collaboration will enhance science and technology through maintenance support, simulation and training, across the country, bolstering New Zealand’s aerospace industry capabilities to support the Defence Force.
“The MoUs with local industry in New Zealand highlights Leonardo’s commitment to supporting the country’s aviation industry,” said Adam Clarke, Managing Director of Leonardo Helicopters UK.
“This collaboration will help foster the long-term growth and sustainability of jobs through domestic companies that provide services, maintenance, and technology capabilities for the New Zealand Defence Force with our AW159 Wildcat helicopter.”
The twin-engine multi-role AW159 is capable of conducting missions ranging from constabulary to high-end warfighting in which it can autonomously detect, identify and attack targets on land and at sea, including submarine threats. The platform’s systems include a Leonardo Seaspray multi-mode electronicallyscanning (E-scan) radar and integrated electronic warfare Defensive Aids Suite, and it is fully Network-enabled.
With over 4,000 employees in 25 offices around the world, Beca
supports a wide range of clients, including the provision of aviation consulting, simulator, and engineering services to the NZDF.
Core Aviation is an Auckland based aviation company with engineering, avionics and operational capability across fixed wing and helicopters from small to medium planes and helicopters to larger turboprop and jet aircraft.
Marops is a trusted Defence Partner specialising in developing innovative solutions and training resources for aeronautical, marine, utilities, infrastructure, & e-learning applications.
Redfort Logistics Group moves assets over long distances with specialised skills in helicopter, aviation, and freight logistics. United Machinists provides precision machined components for aerospace, electronics, automotive, medical and marine applications.
The C-level moves include the appointment of former Director of Operational Compliance and Safety Grant Crenfeldt to Chief Executive Officer of Merlin New Zealand.
Autonomous flight technology developer Merlin has announced the appointment of three C-level executives to its leadership team.
According to the 18 March announcement, Soo Cho, a former Palantir executive with over a decade of people management and employment counsel experience, will serve as Merlin’s Chief Operating Officer. She will lead the company’s people and internal business operations, including ongoing flight test campaigns.
Additionally, Merlin has appointed Patrick DePriest, its former Vice President of Finance, to Chief Financial Officer, as well as Grant Crenfeldt, its former Director of Operational Compliance and Safety, to Chief Executive Officer of Merlin New Zealand.
“Merlin is rapidly innovating to create a safer and more resilient air network, and we need great leaders to accomplish that mission,” said Matt George, CEO and founder, Merlin. “Our people are what make our mission, and we couldn’t be more excited about the leaders we are adding to our team.”
“Since the opening of our New Zealand-based test center, we’ve made significant technological and certification progress to accelerate advanced automation systems,” said new NZ CEO Crenfeldt.
“As the new Chief Executive Officer in New Zealand, I’m excited to lead the ongoing and future test efforts that will ensure our systems can safely and effectively shape the future of aviation.”
Upleveling Merlin’s leadership team comes on the heels of recent commercialisation and certification achievements. These include entering an agreement with the United States Air Force (USAF) to design, integrate, test, and demonstrate aspects of the Merlin Pilot on the KC-135 Stratotanker for the first time, as well as receiving a Part 135 Air Operators Certificate to support future operational freight routes in New Zealand.
“Merlin is a progressive company that is rapidly, but pragmatically, innovating to transform the future
of air transport,” said new COO Soo Cho. “I know the value that cutting-edge technology and automated approaches can bring to both the private and public sectors, particularly for government applications, therefore I’m honoured to join the Merlin team alongside such passionate aviation professionals.”
“Merlin’s team consists of unparalleled talent that is building the next evolution of technology adoption in aviation,” said new CFO DePriest. “I’m excited to head the financial operations for the company, and look forward to continuing our momentum as a technology innovator.”
Merlin was founded in 2018 and is headquartered in Boston, with additional offices in Denver, Kerikeri, and Mojave.
Hauraki Gulf.
The crew of the Portsmouth-based patrol ship trained in March with the Royal New Zealand Navy’s deployable boarding team in the waters of the Hauraki Gulf, with New Zealand Customs launch Swan V and HMNZS Canterbury playing ‘vessels of interest’.
Having operated away from the UK for more than two years, and with her crew rotating regularly to sustain her Asia-Pacific mission, the Tamar also got visit from an assurance team from the UK to assess its sailors with Fleet Operational Standards and Training (FOST).
Tamar is about to work with authorities in Fiji, conducting joint patrols around the island chain, and helping the Commonwealth nation build up their capacity for and knowledge of board and search operations to help curb illegal fishing.
HMS Tamar’s crew praised the facilities at Devonport naval base and the training establishment HMNZS Philomel.
“The training in the Hauraki Gulf with the Royal New Zealand Navy’s Deployable Boarding Team and Maritime Training Group has been outstanding,” said Commander Tom Gell, Tamar’s Commanding Officer.
“It has also been fantastic to see the Royal Navy’s FOST organisation and the Royal New Zealand Navy’s Maritime Training Group come together to deliver world class training.”
“North Island and the Gulf of Hauraki are stunning,” said Lieutenant Justine Lambert, Tamar’s correspondence officer. “The welcome and assistance we have had from the Royal New Zealand Navy has been amazing. The traditional Pōwhiri welcome is an experience that will stay with me for a lifetime.”
While in Auckland Commander Gell also joined veterans of Operation Grapple and other British nuclear tests in the Pacific as they received medals issued by the UK Government in recognition of their test service.
A formal presentation of the decorations took place in the Naval Museum in Devonport in the presence of British High Commissioner Iona Thomas, Minister for Veterans Chris Penk, and Deputy Chief of the RNZN CDRE Andrew Brown.
HMS Tamar is a Batch 2 River-class offshore patrol vessel, and is distinguished by her dazzle camouflage. Tamar is capable of performing a variety of roles, from intercepting drug-traffickers and smugglers to protecting territorial waters and providing humanitarian assistance in the wake of a disaster.
Earlier in the year, Tamar was deployed to the Pitcairn Islands for sovereignty protection and other duties. She departed the UK in September 2021 to be forward deployed to the Indo-Pacific region for a minimum of five years.
Counterintuitively, the proliferation of high-tech weapons in current conflicts demonstrates that effective force projection in the South-West Pacific requires ‘boots on the ground’, writes
Ben Morgan.Ukraine, Gaza, the Red Sea and Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts provide a picture of the future. A feature of these conflicts is increased use of cheap but effective drones and missiles – long-range precision-strike weapons that allow small forces to attack targets with precision at great distances, or to conduct areadenial operations. These weapons are easy to disperse and rapidly proliferating meaning that they are both becoming more available and are hard to neutralise.
Australia and New Zealand are allies and the most likely militaries to lead multi-national operations in the South West Pacific (SWP), so it makes sense for the NZDF and ADF to start planning to address this threat.
Asymmetry: A key feature of possible SWP conflict
Cheap, effective long-range drones and missiles change the face of all conflicts, but specifically ‘asymmetric’ conflict. Asymmetry
is a term used to describe conflict between forces of completely different structure and capability. Most often it is used to describe conflict between insurgencies and conventional forces.
But unbalanced, or asymmetric, conflict can involve any significant difference in force structure or capability. For instance, it could describe the Nagorno-Karabakh War in which the conventionally superior Armenian army was defeated by an Azerbaijan force making extensive use of drones to offset its opposition’s superiority in armour.
Asymmetric conflict is what the SWP’s large militaries expect and plan to face because:
• The potential of near-peer conflict is low. The region’s key rivalry is between the US and China. The US and its allies hold such a level of naval supremacy that China is deterred from a direct engagement. This imbalance is likely to continue, as the US builds an increasingly powerful network of allies in the region whose combined strength mitigates China’s ship building programme.
• The differences in size between SWP nations. The difference between the wealth and resources
of larger SWP nations such as Indonesia, France (via its departments/colonies), Australia, and New Zealand compared to smaller nations, like Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Guinea, Fiji, Tonga, Samoa or East Timor, is significant.
Further, the SWP provides plenty of opportunities for small nations, indigenous groups or non-state actors to create military forces, while opportunities exist for home grown insurgencies to develop. Currently, for example, Papua New Guinea’s government is fighting to regain control of its highland provinces. Meanwhile, across the border, Indonesia continues its long war against West Papuan insurgents. Elsewhere, in 2023 both Solomon Islands and Vanuatu discussed forming defence forces . Each of these are examples of instability with the potential to develop into more significant security threats.
Essentially, the SWP’s future conflicts are likely to be asymmetric, but now instead of facing IEDs and terror attacks the region could see a new form of asymmetry, one closer to the kind of conflict we’re seeing in the Red Sea or Gaza. One that pits small relatively low-tech groups using dispersed, long-range drones or missiles to attack targets at considerable distances.
The SWP’s size and complex terrain provides excellent dispersion for firing points that when combined with the long-range and precision of these weapons will produce a powerful threat. Australia and New Zealand’s militaries are not structured to counter this threat.
The proliferation of long-range precision weapons
Cheap, available and easy to move drones and missiles are readily dispersed and hidden. Unlike aircraft they do not need large bases for fuelling or re-arming. Further, their
long-range enables their fire effects to be concentrated at considerable distances from their firing points.
Mick Ryan, a retired Australian general, has observed that the Ukraine War demonstrates the difficulty of fighting a war under constant real-time surveillance. The ubiquity of surveillance by ‘sensors’ that range from drones that can provide accurate geolocated live footage, to smartphones that can film and stream information in realtime, all providing information that can be linked instantly to faraway ‘shooters.’
Before the Second NagornoKarabakh War in 2020, these technologies had only been used by large and well-established militaries. When Azerbaijan’s small army invaded Armenia’s territory its force included large numbers of surveillance and attack drones that wrought havoc on Armenian armour. This war was the first indication that precision-strike is now a
‘democratised’ capability available to small nations’ militaries and insurgents.
The possible applications of this technology for a threat group operating in the SWP are significant – a trend that must now become a consideration for Australian and New Zealand planners.
Currently, the US and its allies are facing a difficult asymmetric threat in the Red Sea. A local insurgency, the Houthi, are using a variety of air, sea and underwater drones combined with missiles to attack passing ships. The Houthi are a large and well-organised force that has demonstrated a high-level of capability and resilience. On 8 and 20 November the Houthi even managed to shoot down US Reaper drones worth US $50 million each.
The Red Sea conflict provides an interesting case study that is applicable to the Pacific because it has demonstrated the effectiveness of an insurgency controlling large remote areas that can be used as firing points for weapon systems that are directed using digital communication from local observers.
The Houthi are highly effective because access to cheap but effective drones and missiles allows them project power vast distances. Essentially, they are conducting an area-denial operation across the southern end of the Red Sea.
This is an interesting situation. 10-15 years ago, insurgent groups were relatively limited in their ability to project power. For instance, Al Qaeda needed to send
suicide bombers to New York to project power against American citizens. Now, an insurgency can use a remote base area to launch attacks against its enemy many kilometres away. The Houthi have even launched missiles targeting Israel , more than a thousand kilometres away.
In the SWP, a force equipped with similar weapons firing from Papua New Guinea’s Enga Province, could engage targets in Port Moresby, Cape York, the Gulf of Carpentaria, the western Coral Sea and the Torress Strait. A force firing from Solomon Islands could engage targets in Vanuatu, the north-eastern Coral Sea and the Solomon Sea. And, a force firing from the highlands of Timor Leste could hit Darwin! Although, these are hypothetical examples, they demonstrate the potential range of these weapons.
The long-term cost and sustainability of countering Houthi area-denial
Maintaining freedom of navigation in the Red Sea requires huge resourcing. Task Force 153, a US-led fleet protecting shipping in the Red Sea includes US, UK and French warships, a large force of modern surface combatants that is costly to maintain on station.
The main role of these ships is to provide air defence, a task that uses very expensive air defence missiles to engage cheap, easily produced drones or missiles. Using a milliondollar missile to shoot down a drone worth thousands of dollars is neither economic nor sustainable.
Sustainability of naval forces is a point noted by Royal United Services Institute research fellow, Sidharth Kaushal who, when speaking to Time Magazine in December last year commented that maintaining the task force in location is difficult. Specifically, he notes that “there is a question about the ability to replenish stocks, in particular air defence interceptors since vertical launch systems can’t be replenished at sea.”
It’s an important consideration for any nation planning to fight in the SWP because in the Red Sea, Task Force 153 has access to port facilities. An ANZAC force deploying in the SWP is likely to be further from such facilities, requiring long journeys by escort ships needing to reload their magazines. Or, otherwise, the force will need to be able to secure bases close to the operational area.
The current response to the Houthi’s area-denial operation has been a combination of using escorts to provide air defence and the deployment of US and allied air power to directly attack Houthi assets. Escorting merchant ships is
effective but expensive to sustain. Unsurprisingly, air attacks have done little to resolve the problem.
History is full of examples demonstrating the ineffectiveness of bombing campaigns against insurgent forces. The current campaign reinforces these lessons. Even with Reaper drones, satellites, and air supremacy, it has been impossible to supress a well-hidden enemy dispersed over a wide area with airpower alone.
While the Houthi control ground they have fire positions and areas to disperse within, a situation that is not challenged by air attacks. Airpower can defeat a conventional force because it relies on a vulnerable logistics chain, but it is relatively ineffective against a dispersed and lightweight enemy.
The Houthi simply disperse, taking advantage of the range of their drones and missiles to minimise their own loses while retaining the ability to conduct area-denial in the Red Sea. Today, any threat group can disperse over a huge area and still effectively apply long-range fire onto specific targets. An important lesson for forces planning to fight in the SWP.
An area denial operation, like the Houthi’s operation in the Red Sea, is a potential threat in the SWP. Especially so if Sino-American competition increases and China looks for opportunities to destabilise the region.
China and other large, potentially hostile powers can now deliver large quantities of modern precisionguided weapons. It is not beyond the realms of possibility that China, or another power, could develop a useful proxy by arming a SWP nation or an insurgency with these weapons. An effect of this action could be the establishment of a large area-denial zone probably impacting
maritime trade that would be risky to deploy military force to defeat.
Therefore, in the SWP we need to start planning to counter this form of war. Maintaining escort fleets can protect shipping but requires expensive long-term commitments. Air strikes are a blunt weapon that has proven ineffective. The key issue appears to be that ground dominance is required to counter modern areadenial threats.
We need to be looking at the requirement to secure ground, preventing its use by a threat group to launch precision-weapons.
Ground operations are required, and ground operations require infantry
Securing ground is likely to be the key operational requirement to defeat long-range precision guided weapons. Ground must be dominated, or controlled, so that insurgents cannot use it. This is because on the modern battlefield, possession of even a small area of ground allows a force to strike targets hundreds or even thousands of kilometres away.
Dominating ground requires infantry. Lots of it. Ukraine continues to prove that even on the modern, high-tech battlefield there remains an insatiable demand for infantry soldiers – ultimately they are the ones that hold ground, dominate it and prevent its use by enemy assets.
In recent years, the ‘average infantryman’ has been relegated somewhat by technology and special operations forces. Highly trained special forces (SF) units achieved a new prominence, during the US-led Global War on Terror (GWOT) their historic counter revolutionary war doctrines and training morphed seamlessly into the 21st century’s counter terror operations.
In response to the GWOT, armies evolved, becoming smaller and as their war-fighting focus changed, conventional forces learned
new skills from SF. SF commanders leapt ahead of leaders from other arms taking senior positions, and setting policy. Budgets focussed on the skills of small wars rather than on deployment and sustainment of large conventional forces, Australia and New Zealand included.
Armies preparing for the next conflict in the SWP need to start building mass, creating the ability to quickly expand the number infantry available for securing ground to defeat the proliferation of cheap long-range drones and missiles.
Around the world reserve forces are used to provide soldiers that can either integrate into an existing regular force unit or form their own units. Reserve forces are recognised as a relatively inexpensive way to develop a large pool of trained soldiers.
Australia has worked hard to build its reserve force in recent years, but New Zealand’s is rapidly disappearing. Building an effective reserve force is a challenging issue because armies are run by regular force professionals meaning that reserve budgets are not always prioritised.
Across the SWP are several smaller militaries that could be supported and integrated into joint operations. Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga have all deployed forces alongside Australia and New Zealand. However, the transition to actively supporting and assisting these partners to increase their capabilities is slow.
The UK’s Ranger Regiment provides an interesting model that could be applied in the SWP. Such a model might involve Australian and New Zealand training teams working
directly with partner forces, assisting them in training and by providing a mechanism for interoperability during operations. Support could include Australian and New Zealand soldiers serving alongside local forces and providing the conduit for logistics and fire support.
ANZAC integration of capabilities
Australia and New Zealand are allies and likely to deploy together. Acknowledging the disparity in size and difference in capabilities, the two nations could work together as an integrated infantry capability that maximises numbers ‘on the ground.’ New Zealand’s regular infantry specialising in a range of specific skills might contribute more usefully to an Australian led joint force than providing ‘line’ infantry units.
For instance, New Zealand service people are very well trained and have demonstrated an exceptional ability to work with local communities and smaller armies, so specialisation in a ‘partnering role’ like the UK Ranger Regiment could be an option to add value to the ANZAC alliance.
Another could be Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR), a role that in complex asymmetric conflicts requires a strong ability to work with local communities. An ISTAR specialisation would play to the demonstrated strengths of New Zealand’s soldiers but requires greater investment in inter-
operability, i.e. New Zealand would need to spend more time and money building trust and integrating secure communication networks with the Australian military.
Wider joint force considerations
This article has focussed on an ‘elephant in the room’: that a future conflict will require larger numbers of infantry. However, this is only part of the answer given that infantry need to get to the conflict and be supported. The developing threat constituted by the proliferation of long-range precisionstrike weapons requires a radical rethink of ANZAC air and maritime force structure too, and future articles may propose ideas about these aspects of military power.
Summary
The importance of the ‘average infantryman’ has long been overlooked. Changes in the capabilities of insurgent forces brought about by proliferating drones and missiles radically change the planning assumptions of an asymmetric conflict in the SWP. Control of ground to counter dispersal by hunting out and neutralising threats is now becoming essential for preventing area-denial operations.
This means that large numbers of ‘average infantrymen’ and the allarms combat teams supporting them will be required, and after decades of focussing on special forces and tech it will take time to rebuild this resource.
Secretary of Defence Andrew Bridgman’s five year term as the country’s top Defence civilian is due to end on 30 June 2024, and the Public Service Commission is now seeking a suitably qualified replacement.
Applications are now being accepted for the role of Secretary of Defence (SECDEF), with completed applications to be submitted by Thursday 04 April at 11:59pm.
“As the principal civilian advisor to the Government on defence matters, the Secretary of Defence will have experience developing and leading high-quality policy and strategic advice while leading and managing the delivery of multiple functions through a public service organisation as part of a broader system,” states the Public Service Commission’s announcement.
According to the Position Description, the Secretary of Defence:
• Leads the provision of policy advice on defence matters, including advice on deployments and prepares defence assessments both in consultation the Chief of Defence Force.
• Is responsible for advice in respect of military capability options.
• Is responsible for arranging the assessment and audit of any of the NZDF’s functions, duties and projects and of the Ministry’s own capability function.
“The appointee will have a record of delivering system-wide
Incumbent Secretary, Andrew Bridgman, assumed the role on 1 July 2019. He was previously the Chief Executive and Secretary for Justice, commencing that role in August
According to his profile on the Ministry of Defence website, he was also previously the Deputy Chief Executive, Ministry of Health from 2007, and from August 2010 to January 2011 was the Acting Chief Executive and Director-General of
results throughout their career, enabled by their collaboration and relationship-management skills,” states the announcement. “They will have a strong understanding of the levers that will increase the strategic impact of the Ministry’s work and will be experienced in working with Ministers.”
“The Secretary of Defence will be expected to build the capability of the Ministry to ensure that Defence sector investments are fiscally responsible and sustainable.”
Prior to joining the Ministry of Health, Andrew was Deputy Secretary, Policy and Legal Group, Ministry of Justice, having begun his public service career in 1991 as a Senior Solicitor in the Ministry of Māori Development.
He holds a Bachelor of Laws Degree from Victoria University of Wellington and worked as a Solicitor in Rudd Watt and Stone (now Minter Ellison).
The appointee to the role must be a New Zealand citizen, and the appointment will be subject to a New Zealand Government Top Secret Special security clearance.
Information about the vacancy can be viewed at and downloaded from the Public Service Commission’s website
According to research commissioned by Kordia, operations were disrupted for a third of large businesses in New Zealand impacted by cyber-attacks.
Independent research released by Kordia in early March shows just how detrimental cyber-attacks are on some of New Zealand’s largest businesses.
Of the surveyed businesses that were hit by a cyber-attack in 2023, more than one in three (36%) said their business operations were disrupted, and 29% said personal data was stolen or accessed.
Key research findings:
• One in three (36%) businesses impacted by cyber-attacks or incidents say their business operations were disrupted
• 28% of businesses impacted by a cyber-attack or incident point to third-party suppliers as the cause
• 70% of business leaders say they would consider paying a ransom to a cybercriminal
• Cloud misconfigurations or software vulnerabilities were responsible for causing cyber incidents for almost two out of five (39%) businesses
• Around 46% of cyber incidents and attacks took longer than one month to resolve
• 29% of businesses suffering a cyber incident say personal data was stolen or accessed.
More than two-thirds (69%) of businesses claim they experienced an impact from a cyber incident, with nearly half (46%) finding it took
more than a month to resolve the incident, including 9% saying it took five months or more.
“Cybercriminals are financially motivated. What’s interesting in this survey is it highlights the beginning of a trend where hackers are targeting operational downtime over stealing or encrypting data as a means of extorting their victims,” said Alastair Miller, Principal Consultant at Aura Information Security, Kordia’s cyber security advisory and testing consultancy. “This is in line with what we’re seeing overseas, such as the recent DP World cyber-attack in Australia.
“It’s much harder for organisations to ignore an attack when they can’t function for a period of time. The motivation to pay a ransom is greatly increased when you can’t generate an operational income.
Any cyber-attack disruptive enough to cause a business to completely go offline can cripple a business in days, but the reality is that a major incident can take months to resolve – with costs running into the hundreds of thousands. For large businesses and critical infrastructure providers, like the ones we surveyed, operational downtime impacts can have knock-on effects for whole supply chains and our economy.
Despite this, New Zealand businesses still lag far behind when it comes to elevating cyber security to the highest levels of governance.
Only two thirds of businesses said that cyber security was a very important issue for their board, and this must change to see real progress in the overall resilience of our national industrial and business landscape,” continues Miller.
According to the Kordia report, in 2023 global cyber threats impacted New Zealand citizens on a new, escalated scale. The hack on Australian financial services company Latitude saw personal data belonging to one million Kiwis (20% of the population) compromised in the largest privacy breach New Zealand has ever seen.
Miller says harm to privacy is one factor, but increasingly cyber incidents are causing immense harm to the employees of victim organisations as well.
“Around a quarter of respondents said recruiting skilled people to manage cyber security is a top challenge within their business,” said Miller. “The cyber security labour market is incredibly tight, both globally and here in New Zealand, so being able to hire and retain skilled people is crucial.
Many businesses are asking themselves how they will keep up
with the moving threat landscape with so few resources working on mitigating it.”
Miller points to a recent academic study, which found that cyber-attacks can cause high levels of psychological harm — equal to conventional political violence and terrorism.
“With four in five NZ large businesses in our survey saying they faced a cyber incident in the past twelve months, these incidents will likely be taking a significant toll on the wellbeing of many of our cyber security leaders and their teams,” he said.
As cyber security evolves, so do the threats facing New Zealand businesses. Of the businesses surveyed that were subject to a cyber incident, 39% said the incident was due to cloud misconfiguration or software vulnerabilities. Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks were the second most common at 35%.
“In 2023, cloud played the most significant role in cyber-attacks across the board, climbing 11 percentage points year-on-year in our survey,” said Miller
“In saying this, DDoS attacks
continue to feature prominently globally, there has been an increase in activity stemming from geo-political events, including cyber warfare in Ukraine and Israel/Palestine. With a very low barrier to use, DDoS has also been observed as a tactic used in conjunction with other methods, leveraged by threat actors to mask other attacks occurring concurrently.
“Phishing continues to remain in focus, whilst supply chain attacks came to the fore for New Zealanders, with third-party attacks featuring in more than a quarter (28%) of all incidents,” he added.
New year, new government, new cyber security legislation? With the new National Party-led government in place, questions are being asked by New Zealand businesses on how they will tackle the evolving cybersecurity threats.
Kordia’s survey results show that a third (33%) of Kiwi business leaders want the government to increase spending on national cyber security.
“Business leaders are eager to see more action to penalise organisations that fail to adequately protect data. New Zealand’s current privacy laws only punish failure to report a breach and that caps penalties at NZD$10,000, significantly more restricted and lower than legislation in other five eyes nations,” said Miller.
“Australia has made notable changes to cyber security governance, through a slew of legislative changes including harsher privacy law penalties of up to $50 million and mandatory reporting requirements for ransomware attacks. A notable number of respondents have indicated they would be supportive of similar initiatives in New Zealand.
New Zealand often looks across the Tasman when it comes to policy, so it will be interesting to see whether similar legislation will eventuate here,” he added.
A panel of independent experts from across Aotearoa New Zealand’s security industry has concluded its judging and the finalists of the 3rd New Zealand OSPAs have been revealed.
According to the UK-based OSPAs founder Professor Martin Gill, the 2024 New Zealand OSPAs has attracted a large number of quality submissions, with an expert judging panel having faced a challenging task to narrow down the entries.
The presentation of the 2024 OSPAs will take place at the Pakuranga Hunt, Ellerslie Event Centre, Ellerslie Racecourse in Auckland on Friday 5th April 2024 and will form part of the ASIS International New Zealand Chapter certification celebration.
The 2024 finalists are:
Outstanding Contract Security Manager/Director
Anna Barragan – Global Security Solutions
Dion Neill – The Neill Group & Prosec Solutions Ltd
Beyers Rautenbach – FIRST Security
Isaac Taingahue – Optic Security Group
Outstanding Security Team
Facility Security Officer Team – Beca
PECCS Team – FIRST Security
Team Leaders and Supervisors – Monitor NZ
Outstanding Contract Security Company (Guarding)
FIRST Security
Global Security Solutions Limited
Red Badge Group
Outstanding Security Consultant
Lee Ashton – Optic Security Group
Beca Applied Technologies Security and Risk Team
Glenn Chapman – Global Security Solutions
Jazz Kaur – Global Security Solutions
Dion Neill – The Neill Group and Prosec Solutions Ltd
Outstanding Security Installer/Integrator
Daniel Malan – Global Security Solutions
Retail Crime Prevention Programme Team –
Optic Security Group
Rishu Sharma – Evotek Technologies
Outstanding New Security Product
Ajax MotionCam Outdoor (Photo on Demand) –
Ajax Systems and Net Alarms Limited
Controller 7000 (C7000) – Gallagher Security
BarWatch and StoreWatch – Dion Neill & Prosec Solutions Limited
Outstanding Security Officer
Shaun Laifone – Global Security Solutions
Lositoa Moala – FIRST Security
Jaron Samson – Red Badge Group
Manjinder Singh – Global Security Solutions
Outstanding Female Security Professional
Marie Ahokava – Global Security Solutions
Alexis Bannister – Maritime NZ
Racheal Bergersen – Red Badge Group
Jemima Briggs – FIRST Security
Darcel Rhind – Global Security Solutions
Vianna Sue – Optic Security Group
Marolyn Walker – Precision Live Security
Outstanding Young Security Professional
Pascale Howell – Gallagher
Siva Kalolo – FIRST Security
Pushpinder Singh – Global Security Solutions
Jack Stewart – Red Badge Group
Lifetime Achievement
To be announced on the day
Government’s $5.7 million summer boost to emergency department security comes to an end, prompting concerns from doctors and hospital workers that violence will return.
Announcing the ED security boost, Health Minister Shane Reti cited alarming increases in violent incidents in hospitals “In 2021, HNZ reported 1,179 assaults, rising to 3,459 in 2022,” he said. “In the first three months of 2023, 1,267 assaults were reported.”
“That’s why we’ve committed to these additional workers to help keep patients – and our hard-working doctors, nurses and other ED staff – safe during a particularly busy time,” he said on 22 December.
As part of the government’s 100-day plan initiative, eight higher risk emergency departments in Auckland, Waikato, Wellington, Christchurch, and Dunedin each received an additional five security staff until the end of February.
A further 24 emergency departments near summer hotspots each received between two and five additional security staff to help manage pressures over the summer holiday peak.
According to a February 2023 report by APEX, the union for allied, scientific and technical employees in New Zealand, overseas data suggests health care workers make up 50% of the victims of workplace assault. It’s a problem, states APEX, “driven in part by societal changes, and in part by increasing pressure and short staffing, [which] is increasingly being labelled an “epidemic” in its own right.”
But it’s by no means a recent epidemic. According to the report, a 2011 study on workplace violence by Massey University of over 96 organisations representing over 76,000 employees found that “health was the industry with the highest rate of violence – reporting 55.3 cases of assault per 1000 employees, twice as bad as construction and nearly nine times worse than manufacturing.”
“This initiative addresses an immediate need,” Dr Reti said. “I’m also committed to working urgently on a longer-term plan to improve security across our hospitals.
According to One News, Australasian College for Emergency Medicine Aotearoa New Zealand chair Dr Kate Allan said she had heard “a range of feedback” on the initiative from emergency departments. Some reported that some security staff did not seem to be appropriately trained, integrated, or supported.
“Other doctors reported that their emergency departments did not receive any security, leaving staff feeling ‘unsafe and unsupported’,” she said. “Other colleagues reported that the presence of extra security reduced instances of verbal abuse, and ‘kept a lid’ on things after violent incidents.”
With reductions in incidents reported over the Summer, Allan said the feedback indicated the programme worked. She wants every emergency department in New Zealand to have carefully selected security staff who are culturally aware and skilled in deescalation techniques 24/7.
But the government’s $5.7 million in funding ended on 29 February, worrying doctors and hospital workers.
Te Whatu Ora says that between now and 01 July is reallocating money from other projects to fund security guards for hospitals while it reviews the programme, but it will mean fewer guards.
Government has remained reluctant to promote a public facing strategy that informs the public on how to protect venues from attack and stay safe during an attack, writes
Chris Kumeroa,Chair of the Crowded Places Security Advisory Group.
The unthinkable happened on 15 March 2019. The survivors and their families, and the families of the 51 souls whose lives were tragically cut short that day, shoulder an unimaginable grief. The nation has grieved with them, and our memory of those who were lost serves to remind us of our responsibility to embrace our collective diversity and to reject ideologies of hate.
Terrorism and violent extremism remain persistent threats throughout the world, and places where people congregate, whether a place of worship, a shopping mall, a street parade, concert, or a train station at peak hour, are particularly vulnerable. These ‘crowded places’ are attractive venues for attackers whether they’re fuelled by extremist ideology or by something else, such as a grievance fixation, or drug or health issues.
Five years on from the Christchurch attacks, however, New Zealanders who frequent crowded places remain just as vulnerable, and our government remains reluctant to promote a public facing strategy that engages with and informs the public on how to identify a potential attack, protect venues from attack, and stay safe during an attack.
That’s not to say that the information isn’t there. As a result of the recommendations of the Royal Commission of Inquiry into the
terrorist attack on Christchurch masjidain, some excellent documents, such as Protecting our Crowded Places from Attack: New Zealand’s Strategy and Kia mataara ki ngā tohu - Know the signs: a guide for identifying signs of violent extremism have been produced. Unfortunately, they’re largely gathering dust on agency websites.
One might have assumed that five years since March 2019, the “escape, hide, tell” drill for attacks would have become as widely rehearsed across Aotearoa – or at least as widely known – as “drop, cover, hold” is for earthquakes. But it’s nowhere near it.
There’s been no high-profile launch, no Cabinet Minister front person, no media campaign, no noticeable public service advertising, no public discussion beyond invited expert and stakeholder groups. In short, no apparent political will to get New Zealanders talking about how to protect themselves against an attack.
The situation is at odds with the findings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCOI).
The RCOI Report found that had “there been a threat agnostic publicfacing counter-terrorism strategy that incorporated a “see something, say something” policy, there would have
been an increased chance” of the Christchurch attacker’s preparations being noticed and reported.
It also found that if a public facing counter-terrorism strategy relating to risk mitigation measures and managing crowded places had been implemented before 15 March 2019, it “may well have reduced the loss of life resulting from the terrorist attack”.
Yet, it goes on to note that the extent of promotion of the government’s February 2020 Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy Overview was its publication on the website of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. Unsurprisingly, and as the report noted, it attracted little public attention.
The aforementioned crowded places strategy, noted the Report, was whispered into the public domain via a New Zealand Police media release and publication on government agency websites. By contrast, Australia’s crowded places strategy, released in 2017, hit the national media across the ditch after it received a Prime Ministerial launch.
The crowded places strategy, which forms part of the Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism Strategy, provides guidelines and tools to help owners and operators
of crowded places reduce the chance of an attack occurring, and lessen its consequences, using methods that are proportionate to the potential threats they face.
To be fair, government ministers would have understandably been loath to promote the strategy when it was published in September 2020. COVID lockdowns meant that previously crowded places were empty – and financially hurting, and there was a national election around the corner.
But it’s now 2024. Lockdowns are behind us, crowded places are crowded again, and we have a new government. Yet despite some good yet thinly resourced outreach work by the New Zealand Police, the crowded places strategy remains largely unknown to the broader public.
The threat of armed terrorist, criminal, or fixated person attack hasn’t disappeared. Our society is increasingly challenged by tensions exacerbated by international conflicts, political polarisation, socioeconomic divides, mis/ disinformation, and distrust in traditional political institutions. We’re no less likely to experience an attack now than we were in 2019.
To put it into numerical perspective, according to the 2023 National Security Public Survey, 68% of New Zealanders perceived that there is a real threat of “terrorist
attack / violent extremism in NZ” in the next 12 months. Our national terrorism threat level is currently at ‘Low’, but that still means a “terrorist attack, or violent criminal behaviour, or violent protest activity is assessed as a realistic possibility.”
Time for political leadership
As Chair of the Crowded Places Security Advisory Group (CPSAG), a voluntary security industry body established on the suggestion of the Police to identify how industry might contribute its expertise to support the crowded places strategy, I call on our national government to give the strategy the hard launch that New Zealanders need it to have.
Five years on from the Christchurch attack, two and a half years after the LynnMall attack, 16 months since it came to light that a radicalised teen had planned to carry out an attack on locations in Auckland, less than a year since a mass shooting at an Auckland CBD construction site resulted in three deaths and several wounded, and six years since police thwarted a heavily armed teen’s plan to shoot teachers and classmates at a South Island school, political leadership in socialising attack preparedness and response guidance is long overdue.
Let’s get a national conversation started on protecting our places of worship, our office buildings, our tourist attractions, our construction sites, our Sunday markets, our schools and universities, our bars and restaurants, and our shopping malls. Let’s start talking about “escape, hide, tell”.
The threat of armed attack is an uncomfortable topic on many levels, but that’s no reason to shy away from it. If 15 March 2019 has taught us anything it’s that the unthinkable can – and will – happen where and when we least expect it.
The greatest threat to our security, our safety, is thinking there is no threat at all.
The Privacy Commissioner will be keeping a close eye on Foodstuffs North Island’s facial recognition camera trial, and with good reason, writes Chief Editor Nicholas Dynon. But is that anywhere near enough?
Nicholas Dynon is chief editor of Line of Defence, and a widely published commentator on New Zealand’s defence, national security and private security sectors.
The trial, which commenced on 08 February, was initiated after Privacy Commissioner Michael Webster asked Foodstuffs North Island to provide evidence that facial recognition technology (FRT) is a justified measure for reducing retail crime given its privacy impacts. Foodstuffs North Island will use the data from the 25-store trial to assess whether to roll-out the technology further.
According to a February media release by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (OPC), “the use of biometric technologies (which FRT is) is something [the Privacy Commissioner] thinks all New Zealanders should care about because it’s a significant step in this technology becoming more commonplace and it has privacy implications.”
What the Office of the Privacy Commissioner is referring to as Facial Recognition Technology (FRT) and Foodstuffs North Island is referring to as Facial Recognition (FR) is, in fact, Live Facial Recognition (LFR). LRF is a technology that uses analytics to
compare a live camera video feed of faces against a predetermined watchlist of people to find a possible match.
In the case of the six-month trial, LFR is being assessed to ascertain its effectiveness in comparing the faces of people entering Foodstuffs North Island stores with a watchlist containing the facial images of Persons of Interest (individuals who have previously engaged in or assisted “harmful behaviour” at a store).
“New Zealanders deserve to shop for their milk and bread without having their faces scanned unless it’s really justified,” said Webster. “We wouldn’t accept being fingerprinted and checked at the door before shopping for groceries – that sounds ludicrous – but FRT is a similar biometric process that is faster, machine-run, happens in a nanosecond, and creates a template to compare your face to, now and in the future.”
“We want people to be safe as they shop and work. But I have real questions about whether the technology will be effective in stopping violent behaviour or preventing harm. It’s also not an FRT-or-nothing situation”, he stated.
“There are other options in place to deal with retail crime and therefore Foodstuffs North Island needs to find hard data that it works and is necessary.”
The Commissioner has raised the concern that “FRT isn’t a proven tool in efforts to reduce harmful behaviour in supermarkets, especially violent harmful behaviour.”
According to the OPC, global evaluations of even the most accurate FRT software show that false matches are more likely to happen for people of colour, particularly women of colour.
“I am particularly worried about what this means for Māori, Pasifika, Indian, and Asian shoppers especially as the software is not trained on New Zealand’s population,” said the Commissioner. “I don’t want to see people incorrectly banned from their local supermarket and falsely accused.”
“Protecting privacy is key to ensuring human dignity, safety, and self-determination. It is a key part of what makes us a free and democratic society,” he said. “New technologies have the promise of huge benefits. My job is to ensure that we don’t accidentally give up our privacy rights along the way.”
Our Privacy Commissioner has good reason to be concerned. A recent United Kingdom Parliament Justice and Home Affairs Committee investigation into the deployment by police forces of Live Facial Recognition (LFR) Technology has identified several issues .
In a 27 January letter to UK Home Secretary James Cleverly, the Committee’s Chair Baroness Hamwee Committee wrote that the deployment of the technology lacks neither legal foundation, nor rigorous standards or systems of regulation, nor consistency in approaches to training in its use by police forces.
The Committee accepted that LFR may be a useful tool for police forces in apprehending criminals, but stated it is deeply concerned that its use is being expanded without proper scrutiny and accountability.
“To us it seems the fact that the technology is regarded as controversial means that continued public support cannot be taken for granted.”
In order to ensure public trust in the police’s operation of LFR and its
support of the use of the technology, the Committee called for:
• A clear foundation in law for the use of LFR technology
• A legislative framework for the regulation of the deployment of LFR technology
• Clear structures and regulation in relation to the use of LFR as well as independent scrutiny
• Future-proofing of regulations to meet for rapid advancement in technology
• Consistency in training and in the use of LFR across England and Wales.
According to the Committee, the police should make it very apparent to the public when and where LFR technology is being deployed, and pre-deployment communication must be standardised through an enforceable national procedure.
“It is essential that the public trusts LFR and how it is used,” said Baroness Hamwee. “It is fundamental that the legal basis is clear. Current regulation is not sufficient. Oversight is inadequate.”
“Technology is developing so fast that regulation must be futureproofed,” she continued, noting that
police may soon be able to link LFR cameras to trawl large populations, such as Greater London, and not just specific localities.
Notably, the Baroness also stressed that it was the position of the Committee that the Government must lead a wider public debate about the use of LFR technology, both as it is currently being used and as it develops. “To us it seems the fact that the technology is regarded as controversial means that continued public support cannot be taken for granted.”
“We are an outlier as a democratic state in the speed at which we are applying this technology,” she continued. “We question why there is such disparity between the approach in England and Wales and other democratic states in the regulation of LFR.”
In a report published in March 2022 titled Technology rules? The advent of new technologies in the justice system , the Committee characterised the UK as “a new Wild West, in which new technologies are developing at a pace that public awareness, government and legislation have not kept up with.”
In Aotearoa, the New Zealand Police possesses several facial recognition capabilities, which are listed on its Technology capabilities list , but has stated that it does not use LFR technology. The decision not to use LFR came in response to the recommendations of a November 2021 independent report into considerations for use of facial recognition.
“Police will not deploy any Live FRT and will engage in wider public consultation before any possible change to this position is made,” stated the Response Plan stemming from the report’s recommendations. “Police will continue to monitor technology developments in this space, to help inform any decisions on future use.”
That the UK Parliament’s Justice and Home Affairs Committee is raising fundamental concerns over the deployment of LFR by police should be a red flag that New Zealand’s legislators should be taking notice of.
International research into the public acceptability of facial recognition technologies, including a 2019 Ada Lovelace Institute study and a 2021 study published in the journal Public Understanding of Science, among others, find a clear distinction between the acceptability of police use of FRT and private company use of FRT.
In short, despite all the concerns raised about police operation of FRT, the public are significantly more trusting of police than it is of private companies (including retailers) operating FRT. The 2021 study, for example, found that 42% of UK respondents were accepting of government use of FRT, yet only 20% were accepting of its use by private companies.
Importantly, police use comes with a perceived public benefit, such
as the disrupting or terrorists or the tracking down of a murderer. “In cases without a clear public benefit,” states the Ada Lovelace Institute study, “people are less likely to feel comfortable with the use of facial recognition technology.”
The research also tells us that acceptability of FRT depends significantly on the type of deployment. The use of live facial recognition, for example, is significantly less acceptable than the use of non-live facial recognition (such as when it is used in postincident investigation).
A 2023 study published in The Columbia Science & Technology Law Review found that people are most comfortable with the use of FRT by police for the investigation of serious crimes yet are resistant to it being used as a tool for minor offences.
New Zealand’s retailers also watching
Foodstuffs North Island’s LFR trial will be closely watched by retailers across Aotearoa New Zealand, according to retailers’ association Retail NZ.
“Retail NZ members are facing increasing rates of crime, putting both their employees and the public at risk, as well as threatening the financial sustainability of retail businesses,” Retail NZ Chief Executive Carolyn Young said. “The outcomes of this innovative trial will be of enormous interest to retailers across the motu.”
According to a Retail NZ Position Statement , retail crime is a significant issue in New Zealand, impacting more than 92% of retailers. In October 2023, Retail NZ released a Retail Crime Report that found the cost of retail crime to its members was well over $2.6 billion.
More and more, retailers are dealing with threatening, violent or simply unpleasant customers, who are trying to steal or damage their property, said Ms Young. Organised crime groups stealing to order, drug addicts and youths looking for notoriety on social media are driving the spike in retail crime, she continued.
Retail NZ confirmed that it supports the introduction of new
technologies to combat retail crime and that it is pleased Foodstuffs North Island is taking a lead.
Retail NZ also called on government to adequately resource police to deal with retail crime, and to unclog the court system so that offenders are dealt with promptly.
“Ultimately, retail crime results in higher costs and more security barriers for all customers and consumers. We look forward to learning from this trial to see if the technology is suitable to be rolled out across other retailers,” Ms Young said.
While the eventual results of the trial may provide Foodstuffs North Island with an internal business case either for or against its wider adoption of the technology, it will not provide a meaningful gauge of public acceptance of the use of LFR… that’s beyond its scope.
That there has been a degree of transparency by Foodstuffs North Island around the trial is a good thing. That the Privacy Commissioner is keeping a close
eye on the trial is a good thing. But even then there is every possibility that this trial leads to an outcome that has not benefitted from wider political and public debate on the question of whether LFR is an acceptable form of surveillance in New Zealand – and, if it is, by whom, in what circumstances, to what extent, and in accordance with which specific safeguards and regulations.
These are bigger questions and, frankly, they are more important questions than those the specific parameters of the Foodstuffs North Island trial seek to cover.
That retailers across the country are also keeping a close eye on the trial is understandable, but it also gives one pause to consider LFR’s potentially dystopian implications.
There are 25 North Island supermarkets involved in the current trial. If you ordinarily shop at one of these but do not wish for your facial image to be captured by the store’s LFR analytics and compared against images in its watchlist, you can opt to shop somewhere else. But ultimately, what if all supermarkets, all shopping malls, were to use LFR? Where would you shop? How would you shop?
It’s a version of the future in which ubiquitous retail LFR surveillance may well have a chilling effect on the contemporary public squares of our cities and suburbs –the retail spaces we shop in, recreate in, meet up for coffee in, wander around in blissful anonymity within.
And for what? Supermarket LFR does not treat the drivers of crime, and it is thus incapable of preventing crime. It can merely displace it. It will take it somewhere else… the supply chain, distribution centres, vans delivering online orders, other retailers, the streets, or the dairies for whom LFR isn’t a viable solution.
There seems little public benefit in that.
A report commissioned by Fortinet urges adoption of automation and AI to address increasing complexity and volume of cyber threats, ensuring organisations’ SecOps stay ahead of cybersecurity challenges.
According to the survey conducted by IDC on the state of Security Operations (SecOps) in the AsiaPacific region, only 50 percent of businesses have dedicated IT resources for security teams, and 96 percent find it challenging to keep their team’s skills updated with the rapidly changing threat landscape.
Current security challenges:
Threats and team readiness
The predominant cyber threat in New Zealand is phishing with 50 percent of organisations ranking it as their top concern. The top five threats include phishing, ransomware, unpatched vulnerabilities, insider threats, and identity theft.
Ransomware incidents have doubled across the country, with 62 percent of organisations reporting at least a two times increase in 2023 compared to 2022. Phishing and malware are the primary attack vectors. Other significant vectors include social engineering attacks, insider threats, and zero-day exploits.
82 percent of the respondents feel that remote work has led to an increase in insider threat incidents. Insufficient training, lack
of employee care, and inadequate communication contribute to this surge, emphasising the need to address human factors in cybersecurity.
Added to this, only 50 percent of businesses have dedicated IT resources for security teams. This augments the challenges faced by organisations in strengthening their security measures.
Emerging technologies associated with hybrid work, AI, and information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) system convergence pose significant challenges. Cloud technology adoption emerges as a primary challenge, impacting organisational vulnerability to cyber threats across Asia-Pacific.
SecOps SOS: Struggles with alert fatigue and threat containment 36 percent of the surveyed organisations express concerns about being underequipped for threat containment, highlighting the critical need for enhancing cybersecurity capabilities. Alarmingly, three out of four organisations do not conduct regular risk assessments,
exacerbating the challenge of timely threat detection.
More than 50 percent of surveyed enterprises experience an average of 221 incidents per day and two out of five enterprises grapple with over 500 incidents daily, leading to alert fatigue.
The top two alerts faced are suspicious emails (phishing) and malware or virus detections, highlighting the imperative for targeted training on phishing awareness. Additionally, suspicious user behaviour, account lockouts, and multiple failed login attempts further contribute to alert fatigue.
On average, there is only one SecOps professional for every 180 employees, each of whom manages about 33 alerts daily. This workload places significant pressure on cybersecurity professionals, allowing them less than 15 minutes to address each alert within an eight hour workday. The time constraint underscores the necessity for efficient processes, automation, and prioritisation to effectively manage the workload.
Additionally, the challenge of false positives persists, with 76 percent of respondents noting that
at least 25 percent of the alerts they receive are false positives with email security alerts/phishing, traffic spike alerts, and cloud security alerts being the top contributors. 76 percent of teams take more than 15 minutes to validate an alert, highlighting the need for automation.
96 percent of respondents find it challenging to keep their team’s skills updated with the rapidly changing threat landscape. Survey respondents prioritise the ability to automate (56 percent) as a key skill for Security Operations Centre (SOC) teams, highlighting the growing importance of automation in cybersecurity. This, along with the ability to multitask and critical thinking, right set of certifications, underscores the evolving skill set needed.
A significant majority (84 percent) of organisations across New Zealand have embraced automation and orchestration tools in their SecOps, underscoring the widespread recognition of their value in fortifying cybersecurity strategies.
Despite the prevalent adoption of automation tools, the survey suggests that organisations have yet to fully harness the complete potential of these technologies. Opportunities for
improvement are identified in areas such as streaming response triage, incident containment, remediation, recovery, and threat containment.
“In the ever-evolving cybersecurity landscape, 70.7 percent of organisations prioritise faster threat detection through automation,” said Glenn Maiden, director of threat intelligence operations, FortiGuard Labs, Australia and New Zealand. “At Fortinet, we recognise the imperative of swift detection and response as the cornerstone of an enhanced cybersecurity posture. Automation plays a crucial role in promptly identifying and responding to cyber threats, minimising the window of vulnerability.”
“Our customers’ experiences underscore this urgency, with a transformative reduction from an average of 21 days to just one hour for detection, driven by AI and advanced analytics.”
Notably, around 85 percent of respondents have experienced significant productivity gains, with at least a 25 percent improvement in incident detection times attributed to automation.
Organisations are actively pursuing the optimisation of automation processes to establish a more streamlined cybersecurity framework. Looking ahead, a significant number of organisations (60 percent) across Asia-Pacific express their intent to implement automation and orchestration tools within the next 12 months.
Organisations recognise the pivotal role of automation in enabling rapid and efficient detection and response to cyber threats, reflecting a proactive approach in bolstering their security resilience. Survey results highlight that 100 percent of respondents want to leverage
automation to maximise visibility, automated responses, and threat intelligence.
Over 50 percent of respondents say that the top areas for automation include extending coverage, minimise false alerts, and optimising the operational efficiency of existing security resources and intelligence. The emphasis on holistic automation signifies a comprehensive approach to SecOps, incorporating intelligence optimisation and automated responses. This approach aims to improve overall efficiency, visibility, and intelligence utilisation amidst dynamic cybersecurity challenges.
Organisations are gearing up to prioritise SecOps investments in the next 12 months. The top five priorities include boosting network and endpoint security, empowering staff cyber awareness, elevating threat hunting and response, updating critical systems, and performing security audits. These priorities align with the evolving threat landscape and underscore the strategic focus on comprehensive cybersecurity measures.
“The integration of AI-assisted tools, reassessment of staffing, potential outsourcing, and increased automation emerge as imperative facets highlighted by the survey, emphasising the urgency for organisations to embrace automation strategically,” said Simon Piff, research vice-president, IDC AsiaPacific.
Conducted between October and November 2023, the AsiaPacific survey polled 550 IT leaders in organisations with a global headcount of 250–5,000+ employees. The study covers 11 markets: Australia, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
The full version of the report is available online
Misinformation and disinformation are the biggest short-term risks, while extreme weather and critical change to Earth systems are the greatest long-term concerns, according to
Global Risks Report 2024.
Drawing on nearly two decades of original risks perception data, the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Risks Report 2024 warns of a global risks landscape in which progress in human development is being chipped away slowly, leaving states and individuals vulnerable to new and resurgent risks.
Against a backdrop of systemic shifts in global power dynamics, climate, technology and demographics, global risks are stretching the world’s adaptative capacity to its limit.
These are the findings of the Global Risks Report 2024, released on 10 January, which argues that cooperation on urgent global issues could be in increasingly short supply, requiring new approaches to addressing risks. Two-thirds of global experts anticipate a multipolar or fragmented order to take shape over the next decade, in which middle and great powers contest and set – but also enforce – new rules and norms.
The report, produced in partnership with Zurich Insurance Group and Marsh McLennan, draws on the views of over 1,400 global risks experts, policy-makers and industry leaders surveyed in September 2023.
Results highlight a predominantly negative outlook for the world in the short term that is expected to worsen over the long
term. While 30% of global experts expect an elevated chance of global catastrophes in the next two years, nearly two thirds expect this in the next 10 years.
“An unstable global order characterised by polarizing narratives and insecurity, the worsening impacts of extreme weather and economic uncertainty are causing accelerating risks – including misinformation and disinformation – to propagate,” said Saadia Zahidi, WEF’s Managing Director.
“World leaders must come together to address short-term crises as well as lay the groundwork for a more resilient, sustainable, inclusive future.”
Rise of disinformation and conflict
Concerns over a persistent cost-ofliving crisis and the intertwined risks of AI-driven misinformation and disinformation, and societal polarisation dominated the risks outlook for 2024.
The nexus between falsified information and societal unrest will take centre stage amid elections in several major economies that are set to take place in the next two years. Interstate armed conflict is a topfive concern over the next two years. With several live conflicts under way, underlying geopolitical tensions and corroding societal resilience risk are creating conflict contagion.
The coming years will be marked by persistent economic uncertainty and growing economic and technological divides. Lack of economic opportunity is ranked sixth in the next two years.
Over the longer term, barriers to economic mobility could build, locking out large segments of the population from economic opportunities. Conflict-prone or climate-vulnerable countries may increasingly be isolated from investment, technologies and related job creation. In the absence of pathways to safe and secure livelihoods, individuals may be more prone to crime, militarisation or radicalisation.
Environmental risks continue to dominate the risks landscape over all timeframes. Two-thirds of global experts are worried about extreme weather events in 2024. Extreme weather, critical change to Earth systems, biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse, natural resource shortages and pollution represent five of the top 10 most severe risks perceived to be faced over the next decade.
However, expert respondents disagreed on the urgency of risks posed – private sector respondents believe that most environmental risks will materialise over a longer timeframe than civil society or government, pointing to the growing risk of getting past a point of no return.
The report calls on leaders to rethink action to address global risks, recommending focusing global cooperation on rapidly building guardrails for the most disruptive emerging risks, such as agreements addressing the integration of AI in conflict decision-making.
The report also explores other types of action that need not be exclusively dependent on crossborder cooperation, such as shoring up individual and state resilience through digital literacy campaigns on misinformation and disinformation, or fostering greater research and development on climate modelling and technologies with the potential to speed up the energy transition, with both public and private sectors playing a role.
“Artificial intelligence breakthroughs will radically disrupt
the risk outlook for organisations with many struggling to react to threats arising from misinformation, disintermediation and strategic miscalculation,” said Carolina Klint, Chief Commercial Officer, Europe, Marsh McLennan.
“At the same time, companies are having to negotiate supply chains made more complex by geopolitics and climate change and cyber threats from a growing number of malicious actors. It will take a relentless focus to build resilience at organisational, country and international levels –and greater cooperation between the public and private sectors – to navigate this rapidly evolving risk landscape.”
“The world is undergoing significant structural transformations with AI, climate change, geopolitical shifts and demographic transitions,” added John Scott, Head of Sustainability Risk, Zurich Insurance Group.
“91% of risk experts surveyed express pessimism over the 10-year horizon,” he said. “Known risks are intensifying and new risks are emerging – but they also provide opportunities. Collective and coordinated cross-border actions play their part, but localized strategies are critical for reducing the impact of global risks. The individual actions of citizens, countries and companies can move the needle on global risk reduction, contributing to a brighter, safer world.”
The Global Risks Report is part of the WEF’s Global Risks Initiative, which works to raise awareness and build consensus on the risks the world faces, to enable learning on risk preparedness and resilience. The Global Risks Consortium, a group of business, government and academic leaders, plays a critical role in translating risk foresight into ideas for proactive action and supporting leaders with the knowledge and tools to navigate emerging crises and shape a more stable, resilient world.
ASIS accredited certifications can help you reach your career goals.
Validates your ability to conduct security investigations through the effective use of surveillance, interviews, and interrogations. Designed for those with 5 years of related experience.
• Provides independent confirmation of your specialized skills in security investigations
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Be one of the many ASIS board certified practitioners who are leaders, mentors, and trusted strategic partners, serving both their organizations and the profession.
Visit www.asis.org.nz
“PCI is an important element in the ASIS C ertification programme, dovetailing into both CPP a nd PSP for a comprehensive understanding of broader security industry objectives. An effective and reliable investigation depends on objectivity, thoroughness, relevance, accuracy and timeliness. PCI helps identify critical investigative outcomes, including evidence collection, case management, and the process of offender detection, iden tification, interview and prosecution. Good physic al security designs, together with robust policies and procedures are key elements in a successful investigation. The PCI certification p rov ides an insight into how these pieces interrelate."
- D avi d H orsburgh, MSc CPP PSP PCI
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Increase the competency level of your staff by supporting your security professionals in their certification journey.