Author
Listed:
- Charness, Gary B
- Cabrales, Antonio
- VILLEVAL, MARIE-CLAIRE
AbstractWe devise an experiment to explore the effect of different degrees of competition on optimal contracts in a hidden-information context. In our benchmark case, each principal is matched with one agent of unknown type. In our second treatment, a principal can select one of three agents, while in a third treatment an agent may choose between the contract menus offered by two principals. We first show theoretically how these different degrees of competition affect outcomes and efficiency. Informational asymmetries generate inefficiency. In an environment where principals compete against each other to hire agents, these inefficiencies remain. In contrast, when agents compete to be hired, efficiency improves dramatically, and it increases in the relative number of agents because competition reduces the agents’ informational monopoly power. However, this environment also generates a high inequality level and is characterized by multiple equilibria. In general, there is a fairly high degree of correspondence between the theoretical predictions and the contract menus actually chosen in each treatment. There is, however, a tendency to choose more ‘generous’ (and more efficient) contract menus over time. We find that competition leads to a substantially higher probability of trade, and that, overall, competition between agents generates the most efficient outcomes.
Suggested Citation
Charness, Gary B & Cabrales, Antonio & VILLEVAL, MARIE-CLAIRE, 2007.
"Competition, Hidden Information, And Efficiency: An Experiment,"
University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series
qt3kp5v19m, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
Handle:
RePEc:cdl:ucsbec:qt3kp5v19m
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Other versions of this item:
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2006.
"Competition, Hidden Information, and Efficiency: an Experiment,"
Working Papers
0605, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2006.
"Competition, Hidden information, and Efficiency: an Experiment,"
Post-Print
halshs-00142849, HAL.
- Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2006.
"Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2296, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Cabrales, Antonio & Charness, Gary & Villeval, Marie Claire, 2006.
"Competition, hidden information, and efficiency : an experiment,"
UC3M Working papers. Economics
we071909, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa.
- Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness & Marie Claire Villeval, 2006.
"Competition, Hidden Information and Efficiency: An Experiment,"
Post-Print
halshs-00175051, HAL.
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Cited by:
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More about this item
Keywords
Experiment;
Hidden Information;
Competition;
Efficiency;
All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- A13 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Social Values
- B49 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Other
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
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