Author
Listed:
- Ernst Fehr
(University of Zurich and Collegium Helveticum,)
- John A. List
(University of Maryland and NBER,)
Abstract We examine experimentally how Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) respond to incentives and how they provide incentives in situations requiring trust and trustworthiness. As a control we compare the behavior of CEOs with the behavior of students. We find that CEOs are consider-ably more trusting and exhibit more trustworthiness than students-thus reaching substantially higher efficiency levels than students. Moreover, we find that, for CEOs as well as for students, incentives based on explicit threats to penalize shirking backfire by inducing less trustworthy behavior-giving rise to hidden costs of incentives. However, the availability of penalizing incentives also creates hidden returns: if a principal expresses trust by voluntarily refraining from implementing the punishment threat, the agent exhibits significantly more trustworthiness than if the punishment threat is not available. Thus trust seems to reinforce trustworthy behav-ior. Overall, trustworthiness is highest if the threat to punish is available but not used, while it is lowest if the threat to punish is used. Paradoxically, however, most CEOs and students use the punishment threat, although CEOs use it significantly less. (JEL: C91, C92, J30, J41) Copyright (c) 2004 by the European Economic Association.
Suggested Citation
Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004.
"The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives-Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(5), pages 743-771, September.
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RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:2:y:2004:i:5:p:743-771
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- Ernst Fehr & John A. List, 2004.
"THE HIDDEN COSTS AND RETURNS OF INCENTIVES — TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS AMONG CEOs,"
Labor and Demography
0409012, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- E. Fehr & John A. List, "undated".
"The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives - Trust and Trustworthiness among CEOs,"
IEW - Working Papers
134, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Ernst Fehr & John List, 2004.
"The hidden costs and returns of incentives - trust and trustworthiness among ceos,"
Artefactual Field Experiments
00044, The Field Experiments Website.
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JEL classification:
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
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