(PDF) An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1

The Epicureans advocate a moderately ascetic lifestyle on instrumental grounds, as the most effective means to securing tranquility. The virtuous person will reduce his desires to what is natural and necessary in order to avoid the trouble and anxiety caused by excessive desire. So much is clear from Epicurus' general ethics. But the later Epicurean Philodemus fills in far more detail about the attitude a wise Epicurean will take toward wealth in his treatise On Property Management (peri oikonomias). This paper explores some of Philodemus' distinctive doctrines and argues that Philodemus' position on crafts is an improvement on the Socratic and Aristotelian positions that he is reacting against. Philodemus rejects both constraints on what counts as a genuine craft proposed by Socrates in the Gorgias: that a craft aims at a genuine good, and that it is based on a grasp of the nature of its subject. Philodemus also rejects the attempts of Xenophon and Theophrastus to preserve an important place for the craft of property management, conceived of as aiming at maximizing your wealth, within the Socratic and Aristotelian ethical tradition that puts virtue and virtuous activity at the center of the happy life. According to Philodemus, cultivating and exercising the traditional technê (craft) of property management is actually incompatible with being a virtuous person and obtaining happiness.

For Aristotle, a just political community has to find similarity in difference and foster habits of reciprocity. Conventionally, speech and law have been seen to fulfill this role. This article reconstructs Aristotle’s conception of currency ( nomisma) as a political institution of reciprocal justice. By placing Aristotle’s treatment of reciprocity in the context of the ancient politics of money, currency emerges not merely as a medium of economic exchange but also potentially as a bond of civic reciprocity, a measure of justice, and an institution of ethical deliberation. Reconstructing this account of currency ( nomisma) in analogy to law ( nomos) recovers the hopes Aristotle placed in currency as a necessary institution particular to the polis as a self-governing political community striving for justice. If currency was a foundational institution, it was also always insufficient, likely imperfect, and possibly tragic. Turned into a tool for the accumulation of wealth for its own ...

This paper examines Horace's portrayal in Sermones 2.2 of Ofellus, the poet's rustic spokesman whose recent loss of property provides the opportunity for an ethical discourse on wealth administration. More specifically, it considers his advice on how to manage wealth within the context of Epicurean ethical doctrines, particularly those of Philodemus of Gadara, who was Horace's contemporary in Italy and who authored relevant treatises with the concerns of Roman landowners in mind. These concerns involve not only the proper acquisition and use of revenue, which is based on the Epicurean doctrine of observing a " measure of wealth " in connection with the pleasure calculus, but also advice on how to endure financial crises by drawing on the support of a network of close friends, all of which contributes to Ofellus' own equanimity in the face of misfortune. Keywords Epicurean ethics – economic theory – Roman satire – Horace A number of studies have elucidated the Epicurean undertones of Horace's portrayal of Ofellus in Sermones 2.2, although many of these connections tend to be limited to food. Various scholars, for instance, have noted the prominence in this satire of meagre fare and country living,1 both of which are staples of

SERGIO YONA An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 The following study draws evidence from the fragmentary treatises of Philodemus of Gadara in order to explore the moral content of Satires 1.1 with respect to wealth administration. I provide a reading of this poem that underscores Horace’s effective synthesis of Greek thought and Roman culture, which is made possible by the influence of contemporary philosophical treatments that were tailored to fit the concerns of wealthy Romans. Furthermore, I offer an alternative to the many references previous scholars have made to Aristotle and the Cynics by elucidating Horace’s economic message, which, being totally consistent with the details of Philodemus’ economic concerns, is in many ways more Epicurean than anything else. The very first poem of Horace’s collection of Satires has been the subject of much study and controversy in past scholarship, especially with regard to its structural unity and connection to the diatribe tradition. While a significant amount of energy has been spent on examining the various loose ends of this allegedly disjointed and informal sermon on popular philosophy, there is much to say concerning its unity in terms of the moral content of its economic message. This message, which is ultimately one of judicious wealth acquisition and enjoyment, involves more than a superficial application of Aristotle’s mean or a quick nod to the Cynics. On the contrary, Horace’s financial convictions regarding the proper “measure of wealth” (est modus in rebus, S. 1.1.106),1 which is directly at odds with the Cynic tradition of mendicancy, may be heavily shaped by the economic advice of his contemporary Philodemus of Gadara. As an Epicurean philosopher, Philodemus emphasizes the importance of observing this “measure of wealth,” which, although undoubtedly influenced by Aristotelian ethics, is expressed within the framework of the calculus I wish to thank the readers of Classical Antiquity for their insights and suggestions, which were extremely helpful, as well as the editor for his patience and efficiency. 1. All passages from the Satires and Epistles are from Friedrich Klingner’s 1970 Teubner edition and translations are taken from H. R. Fairclough’s Loeb text with minor alterations. Classical Antiquity, Vol. 37, Issue 2, pp. 351–378. ISSN: 0278-6656(p); 1067-8344(e) Copyright © 2018 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintinfo.asp. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/ca.2018.37.2.351 352 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 of pleasure and pain. This study will endeavor to trace the presence of this doctrine in Satires 1.1 and demonstrate Horace’s reception and application of Philodemus’ views as expressed in his treatises On Property Management and On Wealth. Aristotle had first explored in detail the doctrine of a proper “measure of wealth” in his Politics (1257b30-1258a14) as well as in his ethical masterpiece the Nicomachean Ethics (1107b5-10), both of which had an impact on the Epicurean development of a similar doctrine. Furthermore, both Aristotle and Epicurus are at odds with the teachings of the Cynics, who embrace nature and reject wealth unequivocally, and whose influence in Satires 1.1 is therefore more a question of style (i.e., the diatribe as a vehicle for ethical advice) than of content. With regard to the Epicureans, their quasi-Aristotelian doctrine of a “measure of wealth” is explained in detail in Philodemus’ treatises On Property Management and On Wealth, which were written in Horace’s day and with the sensitivities of the philosopher’s Roman audience in mind. In order to understand how Philodemus contributes to the Epicurean tradition of wealth management and how this relates to Horace’s observations in Satires 1.1, one must first briefly reflect on a few essential doctrines of Epicurus. For the Master, wealth acquisition for the sage must occur as a result of the exchange of benefits for philosophical instruction (χρηματίσεσθαί τε, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ μόνης σοφίας, ἀπορήσαντα, “[He said that the sage] will be ready to make money, but only when he is in straits and by means of his philosophy,” DL 10.121),2 and the limits of such acquisition are determined by a consideration of various desires. According to the description in his Letter to Menoeceus, these desires fall into three categories (DL 10.127-28 = KD 29 = SV 20): natural and necessary (i.e., food), natural but unnecessary (i.e., sex) and unnatural and unnecessary (i.e., fame). A violation or rather a misunderstanding of this categorization of desires results in more pain than pleasure, which is why Epicurus regards pleasure as the “measuring stick” (ὡς κανόνι, DL 10.129) of all moral decisions. That is to say, since pleasure is what mankind naturally seeks (ταύτην [i.e., ἡδονὴν] γὰρ ἀγαθὸν πρῶτον καὶ συγγενικὸν ἔγνωμεν, “For we recognize this [i.e., pleasure] as our first and inborn good,” DL 10.129), one’s decisions inevitably aim toward it. Pleasure, moreover, is easily found (DL 10.130), since all nature requires for happiness is that natural and necessary desires be fulfilled. In terms of the acquisition of wealth, Epicurus rejects the Cynic practice of begging daily because this is a wretched way of life and involves much toil and suffering (DL 10.119). But, as mentioned above, he condones patronage or the acceptance of financial assistance in exchange for wisdom, since it is good to make certain 2. In fact, according to Diogenes Laertius Epicurus appears to have relied on the generosity of a wealthy landowner and officer of Lysimachus named Mithres (cf. DL 10.10–12). According to a treatise entitled On Epicurus and Others, which is attributed to Philodemus, the Master received substantial support from this individual, as the record of their correspondence reveals. Diogenes also notes that Epicurus dedicated at least one philosophical treatise to his benefactor (10.28). For more on this relationship, see Beloch 1926: 331–35 and, more recently, Erbì 2015: 85–90. YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 353 provisions regarding one’s livelihood (καὶ κτήσεως προνοήσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος, “[the sage] will provide goods for himself and be mindful of the future,” DL 10.120).3 To regard fame or vast riches as necessary for happiness, however, likewise leads to excess physical toil, mental anguish and overall wretchedness, which ultimately outweighs any pleasure such things can possibly offer. This kind of calculation appears frequently as an essential component of Horace’s moral observations in the introductory poems, especially in Satires 1.2 (cf. 78–79: desine matronas sectarier, unde laboris | plus haurire mali est quam ex re decerpere fructus, “cease to court matrons, for from thence one may derive pain and misery rather than reap enjoyment in the reality”).4 It is also worth noting that, unlike the Cynics, Epicurus does not reject conventions like money as evils in themselves, but he staunchly maintains that one should grow accustomed to being content with the little that nature requires.5 Horace incorporates this teaching into key passages, such as those dealing with his rather positive descriptions of himself in Satires 1.4.108 and 1.6.96 as contentus with his modest economic and social status, both of which serve to justify his moral credentials as poet and ethical advisor.6 In accordance with Epicurus’ reasoning, if one is satisfied with this kind of “natural wealth,” then one will be less likely to succumb to false opinions regarding happiness when surrounded by luxury (cf. Men. 131). Overall, Epicurus strongly recommends that one seek only the bare necessities of life in stating that “poverty limited by nature is great wealth, but limitless wealth is great poverty” (SV 25: Ἡ πενία μετρουμένη τῷ τῆς φύσεως τέλει μέγας ἐστὶ πλοῦτος∙ πλοῦτος δὲ μὴ ὁριζόμενος μεγάλη ἐστὶ πενία). As a defender of poverty rather than penury, Epicurus’ approach to wealth lies in between that of the Cynics, who reject it outright, and the Stoics, who view its acquisition as morally obligatory since it is a “preferred indifferent” (cf. SVF 1.190–96), as Cicero explains in On Duties 2.87: res autem familiaris quaeri debet iis rebus a quibus abest turpitudo, conservari autem diligentia et parsimonia, isdem etiam rebus augeri (“It is a duty to acquire personal wealth by means that are not morally base, and it ought to be preserved by diligence and thrift as well as increased in the same way”).7 Cicero goes on to connect this 3. Cf. Hes. WD 293–94 for similar advice. 4. As this passage reveals, Epicureans made ethical decisions not on the basis of abstract morality or external obligations, but for reasons relating to personal pleasure and security. 5. Cf. Principal Doctrines 8 (= SV 50): Οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν κακόν· ἀλλὰ τὰ τινῶν ἡδονῶν ποιητικὰ πολλαπλασίους ἐπιφέρει τὰς ὀχλήσεις τῶν ἡδονῶν (“No pleasure at all is evil in itself, but the effects of certain pleasures bring much more trouble than pleasure”). Cicero ridicules the calculus often in his works, especially in Laws 1.39: sibi autem indulgentes et corpori deservientes atque omnia quae sequantur in vita quaeque fugiant voluptatibus et doloribus ponderantes (“The Epicureans, moreover, indulge themselves and are subservient to their bodies, since all of their choices and avoidances are based on a measurement of pain and pleasure”). See Hanchey 2013 for other examples. 6. Cf. Odes 1.1.18 for Horace’s description of the opposite disposition: indocilis pauperiem pati (“not knowing how to endure poverty”). 7. See On Duties 1.25 and SVF 3.138 for Chrysippus’ statement that those who think nothing of wealth “are crazy” (μαίνεσθαι). Also Asmis 2004: 153. 354 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 understanding of wealth to Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, which, as will be shown below, Philodemus condemns in his economic treatises. In both On Property Management and On Wealth Philodemus draws from Epicurean scholarchs of previous generations in order to describe the disposition and methods of the sage economist, much of which harmonizes quite well with Horace’s persona’s convictions in the Satires and Epistles. Like Epicurus, Philodemus states that the sage property manager will certainly not beg daily like a Cynic (On Property Management col. 12.40–41); this view draws from the disputes between Metrodorus of Lampsacus and his adversaries but, more importantly, also reflects the social expectations of traditional Romans.8 Cicero, for example, warns against listening to Cynics because their shameless way of life violates the Roman understanding of social decorum (On Duties 1.128),9 and Horace likewise voices his disapproval of this “tradition” by means of an anecdote dealing with Aristippus and a Cynic strawman in the Epistles (1.17.17–24): namque mordacem Cynicum sic eludebat, ut aiunt: “scurror ego ipse mihi, populo tu: rectius hoc et splendidius multo est. equos ut me portet, alat rex, officium facio: tu poscis vilia—verum dante minor, quamvis fers te nullius egentem.” omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res, temptantem maiora, fere praesentibus aequum. For this is the way, as the story goes, that [Aristippus] dodged the snapping Cynic: “I play the buffoon for my own profit, you for the people’s. My conduct is better and nobler by far. I do service that I may have a horse to ride and be fed by a prince: you sue for paltry doles; but you become inferior to the giver, though you pose as needing no man.” To Aristippus every form of life was fitting, every condition and circumstance; he aimed at higher things, but as a rule was content with what he had.10 There are striking similarities between this passage and Epicurean teachings concerning wealth, such as the importance of receiving gifts from a powerful patron through wisdom (Aristippus, of course, was a Cyrenaic philosopher), but also of being content with what suffices without rejecting more on principle. In addition to condemning penury, Philodemus also notes that, contrary to the advice of Xenophon and the Stoics (cf. On Property Management col. 1.1–17), the Epicurean economist will neither labor over the preservation of wealth nor desire to accumulate limitless amounts 8. For this treatise I use both the still authoritative edition of Jensen 1907 along with the much newer translation and commentary of Tsouna 2012. The fragments of On Wealth are in Tepedino Guerra 1978: 52–75 and Armstrong and Ponczoch: 2011. For the role of Metrodorus in this treatise, see the differing views of Sudhaus 1906: 45, Laurenti 1973: 106–49, and Tsouna 1993. 9. See Desmond 2008: 45. 10. For the context of the anecdote, see DL 2.8.68 and Mayer 1994: 233. YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 355 of it, regardless of whether this is done legally or not (col. 17.2–14).11 Horace expresses a similar conviction in Epistles 1.1 by stating that the crazed desire for riches is reprehensible no matter what (65–66): isne tibi melius suadet, qui, rem facias, rem, | si possis, recte, si non, quocumque modo, rem . . .? (“Does that man better convince you who says ‘make money honestly, if you can, otherwise make it any way you can—but make money’?”). The fundamental reason for rejecting both of these extremes, according to Philodemus, is that they violate the pleasure calculus: the Cynic life of squalor brings more physical and mental distress than tranquility (On Property Management col.13.3–15), while the overzealous acquisition, management, and protection of wealth are also unhealthy and result in more toil and anxiety than anything else (coll. 11.30–38 and 14.30–37).12 For the sage manager, Philodemus recommends a “measure of wealth” (On Property Management col. 12.17–19), which, when obtained easily from a grateful patron, frees one from troubles and, through the recipient’s generosity, strengthens the bonds of friendship. Perhaps with the concerns of his Roman audience in mind, in On Property Management Philodemus carefully expands Epicurus’ defense of poverty by arguing that “natural wealth” (col. 14.19: ὁ φυσικὸς πλοῦτος), which affords more benefits than the trouble involved in having it (col. 14.9–23), is preferable to a “life of little means” (col. 14.21–22: τῆς ἀπ’ [ὀ]λίγων ζωῆς).13 He later qualifies this striking assertion by placing emphasis on the sage manager’s disposition toward poverty: although he is by no means afraid of or distressed by the thought of poverty (coll. 15.45–16.3) because he understands that nature is easily satisfied (col. 16.3–4), he nevertheless “inclines in his wishes toward a more affluent way of life” (ῥέπει δὲ τῆι βουλήσει μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τὴν ἀϕθονωτέραν, col. 16.4–6). Above all, he reaffirms that “one [i.e., the sage] should accept more, whenever it comes easily and without harm” (τὸ [δὲ π]λεῖον, ἂ[ν ἀ]βλ[α]βῶς καὶ [εὐ]πόρως γίνηται, δεκτέ[ον], 44–46). Philodemus’ observation, although strictly intended for the sage, may also have allowed wealthy Romans in his day to justify the enjoyment of such luxuries as the Villa of the Papyri in Herculaneum, which is where his peaceful and friendly conversations with Lucius Calpurnius Piso Caesoninus (cos. 58 BC) and others took place.14 11. Cf. On Choices and Avoidances col. 21.2–4: [οὐ] δὲ [χρ]ῄζει τοῦ [πολλ]ὰ χ[ρή]ματ’ ἐπ[ισωρ]εύειν (“nor will the sage feel the need for heaping up great wealth”). 12. Cf. Satires 1.2.78–79, quoted above, as well as Horace’s mention in Satires 1.3.77–79 of the importance of calculating punishment so that it is proportionate to the offence: cur non | ponderibus modulisque suis ratio utitur, ac res | ut quaeque est, ita suppliciis delicta coercet? (“why does not Reason use her own weights and measure, and visit offences with punishment suited to each?”). Similar advice occurs in Philodemus’ treatise On Anger (col. 37.29–39). 13. Asmis 2004: 156–57: “The point is that wealth, so long as it is naturally limited, may be much preferable to the condition of having just a little. Thus the opposition is, strictly, between wealth and poverty, not between natural wealth as such and poverty. Nonetheless, wealth is picked out from the range of natural wealth as possibly much preferable to poverty, and this opposition is not found in the fragments of Epicurus.” 14. The connection between this Villa and the Pisones is not absolutely certain, for which see Mommsen 1880: 32–36. D’Arms 1981: 72–78 discusses the challenges of identifying the owners of 356 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 Horace, too, can fancy in Satires 2.6 that the good size of his Sabine estate, toward which he was rather “inclined in his wishes” (cf. 1: hoc erat in votis), corresponds to Philodemus’ “measure” (cf. 1: modus agri non ita magnus),15 and that his ability to afford nine workers and a bailiff (see Satires 2.7.118 and Epistles 1.14 respectively) likewise contributes to his “freedom from trouble” as the poet himself describes it (cf. 59–76).16 Despite such luxury, however, the sage manager does not hoard wealth but rather knows how to make expenditures responsibly (On Property Management col. 25.23–24), understanding that a reduction or even complete loss of wealth is nothing to fear (On Wealth col. 36.11–12: οὐ [γὰ]ρ ἄξιον ϕόβου). This may indicate that Philodemus is in touch with the possibility of loss and reacquisition of property, which was always a Roman reality. It is also topic that Horace discusses in connection with property confiscations that impacted him (cf. Ep. 2.2.49–52) as well as the rustic sage Ofellus in Satires 2.2, who, although a victim of property loss, “used his full means on no larger scale than he does now, when they are cut down” (Ofellum | integris opibus novi non latius usum | quam nunc accisis, 112–14). Philodemus is aware of the possibility of property restoration through land grants from powerful friends, as happened in later years through Octavian and Maecenas,17 especially since he indicates that, for the villas in the Bay of Naples, although he notes that with Piso and Philodemus this connection is easier to make. Allen and De Lacy 1939: 63 argue that Piso was not Philodemus’ patron despite much evidence to the contrary. 15. Cf. Bowditch 2001: 144–45. 16. For Horace’s inclination towards wealth (despite his appreciation of poverty), see Odes 3.16.37: inportuna tamen pauperies abest (“nevertheless troublesome poverty is far from me”) and cf. Ep. 2.2.199: pauperies inmunda domus procul absit: ego utrum | nave ferar magna an parva, ferar unus et idem (“Far from me be squalid want at home: yet, be my vessel large or small, I, the passenger aboard, shall remain one and the same”). Horace does not appear to do the work on the Sabine estate himself, perhaps reflecting Philodemus’ view in On Property Management that agricultural toil is wretched for the wise manager (col. 23.7–11; cf. Cicero’s different point of view in On Duties 1.151). On the impressive size and possible productivity of the remains of what may be the Sabine estate, see Price 1932: 141 and Schmidt 1997: 16–55. More recent, however, is Frischer et al 2006, which contains detailed analysis of the site and materials (121–306), along with a collection of textual sources both ancient and modern (389–592). Horace describes his estate to Quinctius in Epistles 1.16, for which see Leach 1993: 281. McCarter 2015: 157 considers the Sabine property in this poem “an internal rather than an external possession and an expression of ideal inner libertas.” Cf. Oliensis 1998: 49. Bowditch 2001: 241–42 views the property as described in Epistles 1.16 as a “written image” and a locus amoenus, with strong philosophical undertones that reflect the poet’s psychological well-being and connect it to “an Epicurean state of health and wholeness.” 17. Cf. Ver. E. 1, in which the shepherd Tityrus extols the source of his rural property in the following manner (6–7): O Meliboee, deus nobis haec otia fecit. | namque erit ille mihi semper deus, “O Meliboeus, it is a god who wrought for us this peace—for a god he shall ever be to me.” See also Horace’s declaration to Maecenas in Epistles 1.7.15: tu me fecisti locupletem (“You have made me rich”) and Epodes 1.31–32: satis superque me benignitas tua | ditavit (“enough has your generosity enriched me and more than enough”). Oliensis 1998: 48 argues convincingly that the reference in Satires 2.6.5 to Maia nate conceals a clever reference to Maecenas himself, for which see also Bowditch 2001: 154 and Armstrong 2016: 205. Seneca states that “he who gives benefits resembles the gods” (On Benefits 3.15.4: qui dat beneficia deos imitatur), which harmonizes with the references to divine benefactors in the passages quoted immediately above. For the difference between ownership (cf. S. 2.6.5: propria . . . munera) and mere enjoyment (cf. S. 2.2.134: cedet in usum) in this context, see Bowditch 2001: 145–54. YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 357 sage at least, the best way to acquire wealth easily is to receive it from a grateful patron in exchange for wise discussions (On Property Management col. 23.23–36). Finally, he observes that the sage is not obsessively concerned, as many Roman are (coll. 25.37–26.1), with saving up wealth. Instead, he will gladly share it with others and consequently strengthen the bonds of friendships through his philanthropy (col. 24.46–25.23), to which one may compare Horace’s role as generous host in Satires 2.6.65–70. As will soon become clear, the preceding description of sensible economics as practiced by the sage manager, which in many ways is applicable to Horace’s persona, is entirely at odds with the portrayal of the wretched characters in Satires 1.1, especially when it comes to the poet’s humorous yet instructive portrait of the miser. The setting for Satires 1.1 and its overall structure is consistent with Horace’s approach in the other introductory poems, which similarly involve the private observations of a moralizing satirist in a withdrawn or detached context. All three sermons on vice begin with entertaining prologues that link the topics to one another, then proceed to tackle vice through a consideration of how irrational behavior (i.e., the pursuit of risky love affairs or a lack of mutual forbearance) violate the pleasure calculus and, finally, end with an appeal to Epicurean moderation and contentment.18 Even within Satires 1.1 there is a distinctive, Epicurean tripartite structure made up of Philodemean content that is bookended by strategically placed Lucretian passages (as will be discussed in more detail below). Horace’s introductory address to Maecenas establishes the literary setting for this poem as an informal conversation between friends,19 who have withdrawn from society in order to examine the philosophical cause of the general population’s discontentment (S. 1.1.1–3): Qui fit, Maecenas, ut nemo, quam sibi sortem seu ratio dederit seu fors obiecerit, illa contentus vivat, laudet diversa sequentis? How comes it, Maecenas, that no man living is content with the lot which either his choice has given him, or chance has thrown in his way, but each has praise for those who follow other paths? The intentional directness and low register of Horace’s language reflects the informal style of discourse traditionally associated with the Cynic diatribe.20 Contrary to the 18. See Armstrong 1964: “The first three satires, then, of the first book, form a triad of parallel structures. Each has a prologue (1, 1–22; 2, 1–22; 3, 1–19); a main body apparently digressing from it (1, 23–107; 2, 23–110; 3, 19–119); and an invocation of nature and moderation and contentment at the end.” (92). 19. Gold 1992: 162–75 discusses the question of audience in this poem and observes the following: “Maecenas is presented here not as a patron, but as a friend who is interested in philosophical disquisitions on contentment and greed and is the suitable recipient of a diatribe on these subjects” (164). See also McNeill 2001: 36–38, who identifies five “rings” of possible audiences, with Maecenas in the middle (first ring) followed by Horace’s close friends and fellow poets (second ring). 20. For Horace’s prosaic opening, see Lejay 1911: 280 and Gowers 2012: 62. Axelson 1945: 76 includes nemo in his register of typically “unpoetische Wörter.” See also Freudenburg 1993: 11, who considers this language consistent with “the popular moralist of Greek diatribe.” For studies on 358 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 Cynics’ reputation for public invective and street preaching, however, the poet frames this discussion within the context of a peaceful but private withdrawal among friends, which recalls Philodemus’ descriptions of the ideal Epicurean community and setting for philosophical conversation in On Property Management as a “leisurely withdrawal with friends” (col. 23.11–18: μετὰ φίλων ἀναχώρησιν εὔσχολον; cf. also col. 23.22–36).21 From the point of view of two detached observers, therefore, Horace leads Maecenas through a philosophical investigation of the causes motivating the masses’ choices and avoidances, which is a skill his father had associated with the instruction of an unnamed “sage” in Satires 1.4 (115: sapiens). The poet’s scientific method, however, is a reflection of his virtuous upbringing as programmatically described in the same poem,22 and which involves close observation of the manifest behavior of generic examples of moral deficiency (S. 1.4.106: exemplis vitiorum; cf. S. 1.1.13: cetera de genere hoc).23 In the case of Satires 1.1, Horace’s preliminary observation of the perceptible behavior and consequences of vice resembles the methodological approach of Philodemus, particularly in his treatise On Anger.24 Both authors also consciously imitate the Cynics’ flamboyant technique for the sake of its shocking effectiveness, an approach later Epicureans generally considered useful for communicating ethical truths.25 In the case of Horace, this borrowing becomes apparent immediately following the introductory address, as he launches into a popular theme of moral philosophy identified as μεμψιμοιρία or “the blaming of one’s fortune.” According to the Horace’s so-called “diatribe satires,” see Herter 1970, Wimmel 1962, and Freudenburg 1993: 8–27. Moles indicates in his OCD article (s.v. “diatribe”), and other scholars have argued (see Sharland 2009 in general for the debate), that the notion of diatribe was described as a genre by Usener but does not appear to have been employed in antiquity to refer to a specific kind of literature. See also Oltramare 1926: 9–66, Kindstrand 1976: 97–99, and Indelli and Tsouna-McKirahan 1995: 53–61. No matter what one chooses to call it, protreptic philosophy has a rich tradition and plays an important role in the treatises of many authors, including Philodemus. 21. Cf. Gold 1992: 168, who states that the inclusion of nemo forms “a privileged group of two, who are not quite included with the rest of mankind.” Gowers 2012: 59 describes Horace’s opening as a “splendid isolation from the rest of humanity.” Cf. a similar opening in Lucretius (2.7–13). 22. Schrijvers 1993: 59; Oliensis 1998: 25; Gowers 2003: 70–71. 23. Gowers 2012: 66, commenting on the significance of genere hoc: “draws attention not just to the type of examples used and rejected here but also to the unnamed genre that contains them.” Cf. also Rudd 1966: 15: “[T]his poetry . . . is concerned entirely with the behavior of the individual in society.” 24. For an edition of this treatise, see Indelli 1988. The importance of empirical observation in connection with the behavioral manifestations of irascible people occurs throughout the work (but especially at col. 8.21–38). 25. See, e.g., Gigante and Indelli 1978: 124–31, Indelli 1988: 25, Schmid 1978: 135, and Gigante 1992: 107–108. In On Property Management Philodemus mentions the Epicurean practice of borrowing material from other traditions in order to bolster their own views (col 27.12–20). See Erler 2011. Armstrong 2014: 103–111 has a recent and excellent discussion of the “Epicurean diatribe” and its presence in Horatian satire. YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 359 evidence,26 it was extremely popular among Cynics like Bion of Borysthenes, but certain terms and important contrasts within the passage make it possible to form further, perhaps more intriguing, and ultimately more relevant connections (S. 1.1.4–12): “o fortunati mercatores” gravis annis miles ait, multo iam fractus membra labore; contra mercator navim iactantibus Austris: “militia est potior. quid enim? concurritur: horae momento cita mors venit aut victoria laeta.” agricolam laudat iuris legumque peritus, sub galli cantum consultor ubi ostia pulsat; ille, datis vadibus qui rure extractus in urbem est, solos felicis viventis clamat in urbe. “O happy traders!” cries the soldier, as he feels the weight of the years, his frame now shattered with hard service. On the other hand, when southern gales toss the ship, the trader cries: “A soldier’s life is better. Do you ask why? There is the battle clash, and in a moment of time comes speedy death or joyous victory.” One learned in law and statutes has praise for the farmer, when towards cockcrow a client comes knocking at his door. The man yonder, who has given surety and is dragged into town from the country cries that they only are happy who live in town. The erratic behavior of these individuals, whose dissatisfaction breeds envy and results in the constant transgression of both natural and social boundaries,27 provides a stark contrast with the contentment and otium of the poet’s “Epicurean day” as described in Satires 1.6.111–31. Furthermore, while the comparison of antithetical professions is probably Cynic,28 Horace’s clear emphasis on the mental 26. No particularly outstanding specimen of μεμψιμοιρία has survived from the Cynics, aside from the fragmentary evidence from Teles, for which see Kindstrand 1976: F16A and Hense 1969: 9–10. More significant examples are given by later sources such as Cic. On Duties 120, the seventeenth pseudo-Hippocratic letter (which Fraenkel 1957: 93 says is “certainly later than Horace”), and a passage from the third century AD sophist Maximus of Tyre, for which see Kiessling and Heinze 1910: 5. Scholarship concerning the role of μεμψιμοιρία in Satires 1.1 is extensive: see, e. g., Heinze 1889: 15–17, Fraenkel 1957: 90–97, Rudd 1966: 13–21, Herter 1970: 330–33, Fiske 1971: 219–28, Freudenburg 1993: 11–16, and Beck 2003 in general. 27. Cf. Odes 1.1.7–18. Radermacher 1921 who noted the similarities between these two passages early on, conjectured that the Odes passage had actually been composed first, and that Horace modified and appended it to Satires 1.1 later in life. This thesis, however, is rejected by Wimmel 1962: 11–17. 28. Heinze 1889: 17 considers Bion as the most likely candidate. Fiske 1971: 220–21 agrees with a Cynic source, and adds to the list the fragmentary evidence from Phoinix of Colophon, for which see Gerhard 1909: 4–7. Wimmel 1962: 12 is more cautious, agreeing that Horace’s pairing of lives draws from an older source but that “es für dies Motiv keine Quellenvermutungen gäbe.” Of course, there appear to be connections between Horace’s description and Cicero’s well-known consideration of acceptable professions as sources of income in On Duties 1.151, in which he states that mercatura is “filthy” (sordida) at worst and “not entirely blameworthy” (non est admodum vituperanda) at best, whereas he praises agriculture as “most excellent, most profitable, sweetest and most worthy of a 360 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 and physical disturbances that result from their restlessness, which bears noteworthy resemblance to a similar passage in Lucretius (3.1053–67), is suggestively Epicurean. For instance, the immense toil that the soldier and farmer undergo precludes the enjoyment of bodily repose or ἀπονία, while the constant anxiety that plagues the merchant and politician render impossible the attainment of tranquility of mind or ἀταραξία. As it turns out, then, the entertaining barrage of complaints from Horace’s malcontents serves to communicate a more serious point hidden beneath an attractive or entertaining surface. Aside from being Cynic, this approach is also a robust nod to Lucretius, who, similar to doctors, in his didactic epic gives pupils a dose of difficult medicine (pueris absinthia taetra . . . dare conantur, 1.936– 37) that is coated with a generous layer of honey (oras pocula circum | contingunt mellis dulci flavoque liquore, 937–38), which tricks the subject while simultaneously benefiting him (939–41).29 As Horace clearly indicates in the lines following the μεμψιμοιρία passage, he too intends to sweeten his truthful observations concerning wealth in order to make them more palatable to his audience (S. 1.1.23–27): praeterea, ne sic ut qui iocularia ridens percurram—quamquam ridentem dicere verum quid vetat? ut pueris olim dant crustula blandi doctores, elementa velint ut discere prima— sed tamen amoto quaeramus seria ludo Furthermore, not to skim over the subject with a laugh like a writer of witticisms—and yet what is to prevent one from telling the truth as he laughs, even as teachers sometimes give cookies to children to coax them into learning their ABCs?—still, putting jesting aside, let us turn to serious thoughts . . . Unlike the Cynics, moreover, Horace employs sweeteners for a specific purpose and in a manner consistent with the diatribe as often used by Epicureans like Philodemus and especially Lucretius, namely, to condemn irrational behavior or false opinions in an entertaining way while communicating the bitter truth about life. As Horace indicates, the irrational willingness of the individuals in the passage quoted above to undergo such excessive labor is ultimately motivated by their underlying desire to accumulate great wealth. In closely uniting discontentment and avarice as joint causes of the toil associated with certain sources of income, Horace is following a philosophical tradition of which Philodemus is an free man” (nihil est . . . melius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine libero dignius). See especially D’Arms 1981: 2–6. 29. The Cynics were widely recognized in antiquity for promoting their extreme asceticism by means of “sweeteners.” Diogenes, for example, compared his comic style to medicinal honey (for which, see Oltramare 1926: 15), while Bion reputedly stated that the only way to please the masses is to “transform oneself into a honeyed cake” (Kindstrand 1976: F18: πλακοῦντα γενόμενον). YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 361 important part.30 This tradition includes Theophrastus’ sketch of the typical μεμψίμοιρος in his collection of moral essays, which implicitly identifies greed as the underlying cause of grumbling: the discovery of a coin, for instance, does not satisfy the desire for treasure (Char. 17: θησαυρόν). The role of greed in discontentment is also suggested by Bion, who warns against “desiring” the lot of others: μὴ οὖν βούλου δευτερολόγος ὢν τὸ πρωτολόγου πρόσωπον (“Do not, therefore, desire to be the star when you are but a supporting actor”).31 In a fragment attributed to Philodemus’ lost treatise On Envy, in which envy is described as the cause of intense suffering (fr. 12.1: μάλιστα [πα]θεῖν) and self-inflicted pain (4: λυπού[μενο]ι),32 avarice is explicitly connected to irrational vice (fr. 16.1–2: φιλαργυρίας δό[ξα] . . . ἄλογον τ[ίθησι] κακόν).33 One may compare this to Horace’s description of certain individuals’ willingness to undergo extreme labor, even to the point of risking their lives, for the sake of acquiring wealth (S. 1.1.28–32): ille gravem duro terram qui vertit aratro, perfidus hic caupo, miles nautaeque, per omne audaces mare qui currunt, hac mente laborem sese ferre, senes ut in otia tuta recedant, aiunt, cum sibi sint congesta cibaria That farmer, who with tough plough turns up the heavy soil, our deceitful host here, the soldier, the sailors who boldly scour every sea, all say that they bear toil with this in view, that when old they may retire into secure ease, once they have piled up their provisions . . . The busyness conveyed by this action-packed description and summed up by the phrase laborem ferre may reflect the restless toil and pursuit of riches often designated 30. Beginning with Heinze 1889, scholars have thought that the rough transition from discontentment to avarice was evidence that Horace had spliced these themes from two separate sources (diversa componi, 15). Cf. Rudd 1966: 13, who refers to the “informal aspect” of Satires 1.1 and Fiske 1971: 219, who mentions Horace’s “partially successful attempt” to fuse the two themes. The debate continues to the present day, with a number of scholars recognizing that Horace was most likely drawing from a single philosophical tradition according to which these themes were closely related. See Fraenkel 1957: 92–95, Wimmel 1962: 11–16, Armstrong 1964: 88, Herter 1970: 340–42, Brown 1993: 89, Dufallo 2000: 579–90, and especially Beck 2003, whose extended introduction provides a detailed and useful summary of the debate (with bibliography). Hubbard 1981 argues for unity based on the poem’s “rhetorical mode.” 31. Kindstrand 1976: F16A. 32. See the edition, translation, and commentary by Tepedino Guerra 1985. Tsouna 2007: 124–25 gives a brief analysis of the fragments, in which the causes of envy are linked to the obsession with external goods such as wealth. For the connection between envy and self-inflicted pain, cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. 1108b5 (λυπεῖται) and Eud. Eth. 1233b20 (τὸ λυπεῖσθαι). For Bion’s treatment of envy, Kindstrand 1976: F47A-48. 33. Cf. Hippoc. [Ep.] 17.8: καὶ τούτων πάντων αἰτίη φιλαργυρίη (“Of all this [suffering], greed is the cause”). 362 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 by the Greeks as πολυπραγμοσύνη,34 but it may also engage with the economic advice of Philodemus. He sanctions, for example, the accumulation of wealth provided that it is not accompanied by excessive toil and anxiety (On Property Management col. 14.23–30): [Τ]ῶι γὰρ μὴ λυ[πε]ῖσθαι τ[ῶι] παραπολλυμέν[ωι] μηδὲ διὰ τὴν ἄκρατον σ[που]δὴν περὶ τὸ πλέον καὶ το[ὔλαττ]ον ὑφ’ αὑ[τ]οῦ ζητρί[οις τισὶ]ν ἐ[γκ]εῖσθαι, τούτω[ι γ’] ὀ[ρ]θῶς οἰκο[νο]μεῖσθαι νομίζω τὸν πλοῦ[τ]ον· ὁ [γ]ὰρ κατὰ τὴ[ν κτῆ]σ[ι]ν π[όν]ος [κἀν] τῶι προ[σφορ]ὰν ἕλκειν ἑαυ[τῷ]35 γίνετ[αι] κἀν τῶι περὶ τῶν ἐλαττ[ωμάτ]ων ἀγωνιᾶν ὡς εὐθέ[ως εἰ]ς ἀλγηδόν[α κ]α[τ]αστησόντων ἢ παροῦσαν ἢ προσδοκωμένην. For this is what I consider the proper administration of wealth to be: not to be grieved at the loss of revenue nor trapping oneself on treadmills because of the unconquerable zeal regarding profit and loss. For the toil involved in acquiring wealth involves dragging oneself by force and agonizing over losses that will quickly result in pains, either present or expected.36 Philodemus’ observation is simple: the potential “toil” (πόνος) involved in wealth acquisition must not be more than the ultimate pleasure derived from it. In other words, it is not wealth itself that is to be avoided as an evil (cf. On Property Management col. 14.5–9) but only the obsession with it that inevitably violates the pleasure calculus. At the heart of the frenzied race for wealth is, according to Philodemus in On Choices and Avoidances, a fundamental misunderstanding of desires, which happens when people regard unnecessary and unnatural desires as the most necessary (col. 5.4–14). Among these empty desires are those for “illustrious reputations, overabundant wealth, and such luxuries” (καὶ λαμπρᾶς δόξης καὶ π[ε]ριουσίας ὑπεραγούσης καὶ τ[ρυ]ϕῶν τοιούτων, 5.15–17), and the effort to acquire such things generally results in more pain than pleasure. First and foremost, then, Philodemus recommends that the pleasure calculus be applied to every economic decision (On Property Management. col. 15.37–45): τοῦτο γὰρ δε[ῖ] καὶ ποεῖν τὴν χρείαν ἄλυπον καὶ τὸ διὰ ταύτης τέρπον ἀκέραιον τὸ μὴ προσεῖναι τῆι πλούτου κτήσει τοῖς σοφοῖς φροντίδα 34. Cf. Teles’ report of Bion as quoted by Fiske 1971: 221–22: ἢ πάλιν οὐχ ὁρᾷς διότι οἱ μὲν πλούσιοι πλείω πράττοντες κωλύονται τοῦ σχολάζειν; (“Or don’t you see that the rich, on account of being overactive, are prevented from enjoying leisure?”). It should be noted, however, that Bion’s praise of adaptable merchants who boldly undergo storms at sea is certainly not echoed by Horace in the above passage (pace Fiske 1971: 222), in which audaces refers more closely to their rashness in foolishly risking their lives as confirmed at lines 6–8. Cf. also Arist. Pol. 1258a1–15 for a description of the continuous toil (διατριβή) associated with accumulating limitless wealth. Of course, the term πολυπραγμοσύνη chiefly means “officiousness” or “meddlesomeness.” 35. This is the text as Tsouna prints it, whereas Jensen has πρò[ς βί]αν ἕλκειν ἑαυ[τόν]. The restoration and English translation are doubtful. 36. Note that both Philodemus and Horace make references to mental anguish as well as physical pain and toils in connection with slavery to money-making. YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 363 βαρεῖαν, πῶς δυνήσεται σῴζεσθαι, μη[δ’] ὅταν οἱ σφαλερώ[τ]ατοι κ[αιρ]οὶ καθεστήκωσι[ν]· This is also necessary: to enjoy revenue without pain and make sure that the pleasure derived from this revenue is pure and that its acquisition does not render to the sage profound anxiety regarding how he will preserve it or when difficult times will arrive. The ideal economist accepts wealth that comes easily and is not obsessed with increasing profits at the expense of physical and mental health (cf. ἄλυπον and φροντίδα βαρεῖαν), unlike the individuals in Horace’s descriptions.37 Indeed, their broken limbs, calloused hands, and constant fear of death are the direct result of an active pursuit of wealth (cf. S. 1.1.38: quaesitis; 92: quaerendi).38 In light of Philodemus’ constant insistence on observing the pleasure calculus when making economic decisions, Horace’s characters’ frenzied pursuit of “leisure” (S. 1.1.31: otia) by means of intense pain and prolonged suffering seems all the more bizarre.39 It is possible that the poet, in a spirit of irony, has deliberately constructed these introductory scenes as a comic inversion of the Epicurean calculus with regard to wealth administration. This may be further confirmed by Horace’s surprisingly negative description of agricultural work, which, judging by Cicero’s evaluation (On Duties 1.151, quoted above) and Livy’s famous portrait of Cincinnatus (3.26.8–11), was traditionally accepted by Romans as perhaps the noblest source of income. For the poet, however, it is inherently toilsome: the farmer’s turning the weighty earth (S. 1.1.28: gravem terram) with a hard mattock (28: duro aratro) is overwhelming labor, as the carefully chosen vocabulary and ponderous succession of three spondees communicates. Horace’s criticism may have been influenced by a similar evaluation of Philodemus in On Property Management, who, aside from emphatically condemning the active pursuit of wealth through military service (col. 22.17–28: πορισμὸν . . . δορίκτητον; cf. 29: miles) and political office (coll. 22.28–23.1: τοὺς πο[λ]ιτικούς; cf. 9: legum peritus),40 likewise rejects agricultural 37. As mentioned already, the sage passively “accepts” more (δεκτέ[ον]) whenever it comes easily and without harm (see On Property Management coll. 16.44–17.2). Also Asmis 2004: 159: “Philodemus emphasizes that the rich person must not grab; he accepts.” Cf. especially Horace’s advice in Epistles 1.17.44–45: distat, sumasne pudenter | an rapias (“it makes a difference whether you accept rewards prudently or snatch them away”). 38. For Lucretius’ identification (3.63–69) of the pursuit of wealth and power as “security against . . . the fear of death,” see Konstan 2008: 44–45. For Lucretius and the diatribe against the fear of death in general, Wallach (1976) as well as Segal (1990): 80, 144 and 179. 39. Gowers 2012: 64: “This looks more like a satire on human irrationality and the ironies of plus ça change than deliberately incompetent logic on Horace’s part.” Cf. also Hippoc. [Ep.] 17.5: τίς ἡ κενὴ σπουδὴ καὶ ἀλόγιστος μηδὲν μανίης διαφέρουσα; (“What is this empty and irrational passion, no different from madness?”) and Plut. On the Desire for Wealth 524 for a description of the obsession with riches as “madness” (μανικόν). 40. For Horace and Philodemus, these sources are not wretched in themselves but rather merit censure because of the tremendous effort and anxiety they involve. Indeed, the Epicureans could consider even life as a politician as acceptable under very specific circumstances, for which see Fish 2011: 72–104. 364 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 labor on the part of the sage (col. 23.8: γεωργο[ῦν]τ’ αὐτόν; cf. 9: agricolam) as wretched on account of the many pains it involves (col. 23.7) that preclude the attainment of leisurely retirement (col. 23.15–16: ἀναχώρησιν εὔσχολον; cf. 31: otia recedant).41 Horace next compares the masses’ obsession with accumulating wealth to the industrious ant; this addresses issues related to Epicurean economic theory but also serves as an entertaining transition to the important topic of wealth limitation. One may recall that for Epicurus the proper administration of wealth is characterized by forethought, which implies that the sage will not beg daily like a Cynic (DL 10.119: οὐδὲ κυνιεῖν . . . οὐδὲ πτωχεύσειν) but rather plan ahead (DL 10.120: προνοήσεσθαι καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος).42 Philodemus deals with the same issue in both of his economic treatises, in which he reflects the Epicurean position as well as the Roman concern for decorum by strongly condemning the Cynics’ rejection of all possessions and their practice of begging daily as involving much anxiety and torment (On Property Management col. 13.32–33: καὶ φροντίδ[α]ς καὶ [ἀγ]ωνίας).43 Rather than rely on what is immediately at hand, the sage economist recognizes the importance of planning ahead, as Philodemus explains (On Property Management col. 25.4–12): δεῖ δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα καὶ συνάξειν τι καὶ τὸ συναχθὲν φυλάξειν μὴ ‘τὸ παρὸν εὖ ποιεῖν,’ κατ’ Ἐπίχαρμον, οὐ μόνον δαπάνης ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ προφανέντος κέρδους ἁρπαστικὸν γινόμενον, προνοεῖν δὲ καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος· And it is necessary to gather something as provision and to preserve what has been gathered (lest “one should live well for the moment,” as Epicharmus says), and, making acquisitions not only with a mind towards actual expenses but also foreseeable profits, to be mindful of the future. 41. See Laurenti 1973: 154–64, Tsouna 2007: 188–91, and Asmis 2004: 168–70 for these passages. According to Teles (Hense 1969: 42), Diogenes described how people wish to grow up, but, as soon as they are grown, complain about having to engage in military service and politics (but no mention of agriculture), which prevent them from enjoying the leisure (σχολάσαι) they had taken for granted as youths. It is possible that, like Philodemus, Zeno of Citium rejected agriculture as an acceptable source of income, although positive evidence for this is restricted to an ambiguous line from Stobaeus (= SVF 1.312). Chrysippus omits agriculture from his list of ways of acquiring money in On Vices, for which see Natali 1995: 122–23. Cf. also Hippoc. [Ep.] 17.5, which includes a short description of farming as inherently toilsome: ἄλλοι δὲ τῶν περὶ γεωργίην ἀσχοληθέντων (“some [laugh] at those who practice [lit. have been deprived of leisure with regard to] farming”). This last source betrays the influence of Epicureanism in various passages (e.g., the mention of ἀταραξία at 12 and 17.7, the atomic swerve at 17.7, and the implication that perception alone is sufficient for knowledge at 17.7). Like Philodemus, moreover, the author of this letter rejects mining from slave labor and horse breeding as acceptable sources of income (17.5; cf. On Property Management col. 23.1–7). 42. See Asmis 2004: 148, Gigante 1992: 29–36, and Castaldi 1928: 291. 43. Discussed at length in coll. 12.5–17.2, for which see Tsouna 2007: 177–80, Balch 2004: 184–86, Asmis 2004: 149–61, and Laurenti 1973: 97–149. For Cynic beggary (πτωχεία) as the rejection of all possessions and thus distinct from Epicurean poverty (πενία), which is the possession of few things, see On Wealth coll. 42.31–5 and 45.15–18 as well as Balch 2004: 195–89, Gigante 1992: 39–42, and Castaldi 1928: 305. YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 365 Horace communicates the importance of forethought and the recognition that wealth acquisition is preferable to mendicancy, even if accompanied by some toil, through his exemplum from fable,44 which emphasizes the ant’s industry and prudence (S. 1.1.32–35): sicut parvola—nam exemplo est—magni formica laboris ore trahit quodcumque potest atque addit acervo quem struit, haud ignara ac non incauta futuri. Even as the tiny, hard-working ant (for she is their model) drags all she can with her mouth, and adds it to the heap she is building, because she is not unaware and not heedless of the morrow. Translating the Greek epithet πολύμοχθος (cf. ps.-Phocyl. 170), Horace connects the ant to his previous characters by means of her “great labor,” which she undergoes for the sake of financial stability.45 In contrast to their restlessness and obsession with gain, however, the ant’s toil is favorably described in terms of reserved caution (non incauta, 35) and passive awareness (haud ignara, 35), which motivate her to plan for the future (cf. Ep. 2.2.190–91: utar et ex modico, quantum res poscet, acervo | tollam, “I shall use and from my modest heap take what need requires”).46 Indeed, Epicureans were in no way barred from working hard—as long as they observed the pleasure calculus and ensured that they became not a burden but a resource to their friends.47 Unlike the shameless dog, therefore, whom the Cynics considered a pristine example of how to live according to nature,48 the ant, like an Epicurean, lives by calculated forethought and enjoys the benefits of her toil, just as the sage economist is “not unaware of the toil involved in such possessions, nor of the enjoyment that comes from it” (On Property Management 44. Cf. the Aesopic version (Perry 373). Marchesi 2005: 310 n.11 notes, however, that the ant’s laboriousness was so common in antiquity that it is difficult to connect Horace’s passage specifically to Aesop. For fables as rhetorical and moral exempla, see Holzberg 2002: 1–38, who does not include the above passage in his list of Horace’s references to fables (32). For their role in Roman education, see Bonner 1977: 254–56, who mentions their popularity among children. This may be suggested by Horace’s earlier simile involving cookies as a sweetener (S. 1.1.25–26). His delightful story of the laborious ant, therefore, is another metaphorical “cookie” (crustulum) intended to sweeten an “elementary lesson” (elementa prima). 45. For the ant as negatively characterized for its love of gain, see Gerhard 1909: 27 and Laurenti 1973: 103. 46. See Wimmel 1962: 15–16 and Rudd 1966: 29. Cf. Verg. G. 1.185–86, according to which the pesky ant is motivated by fear, while in the Aeneid this is described in terms of forethought (4.402– 403): ac velut ingentem formicae farris acervum | cum populant, hiemis memores, tectoque reponunt (“As when ants plunder a giant heap of grain and store it in their home, mindful of the winter”). Horace describes the wise man’s economic prudence by using the expression metuens futuri in Satires 2.2.110, although this does not seem to be the same kind of destructive fear the miser experiences, as will be shown below. 47. Nor were they unqualifiedly forbidden from entering politics or engaging in other activities that benefited their friends or even the state. See especially Roskam 2007: 50–56 and 120–25. 48. See Gerhard 1909: 23–24, Oltramare 1926: 49 and 145, and Fiske 1971: 223. 366 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 coll. 18.45–19.1: οὔτε γὰρ ὁ πόνος ὁ καθ’ ὁποιανοῦν κτῆσιν [ἄ]δηλος αὐτῶ[ι] δῆλον ὡς οὔθ’ ἡ τέρψις ἡ διὰ τ[ὴν κτῆσι]ν). Beyond rejecting Cynic mendicancy, in their economic treatises Philodemus and Metrodorus attribute to the sage a measure of wealth (On Property Management col. 12.18–19), which places a certain limit to wealth acquisition within the context of household economics.49 Philodemus follows Epicurus in valuing wealth as a useful means of satisfying necessary desires, but he places additional value on its ability to increase the general quality of life by removing difficulties–provided, of course, that this is not accompanied by more pain than pleasure. Under no circumstances, however, will the sage become a professional moneymaker or view wealth acquisition as an end in itself (On Property Management col. 17.2–9): τεχνίτης μὲν οὖν ἅμα καὶ ἐργάτης [κ]τήσεως πολλῆς καὶ ταχέως συναγομένης οὐκ ἴσως ῥητέος ὁ σοφός. ἔστι γὰρ δή τις ἐμπειρία καὶ δύναμις καὶ περὶ χρηματισμόν, ἧς οὐ κοινωνήσει σπουδαῖος ἀ[ν]ήρ Let not the sage be called an expert or a practitioner at generating much wealth and collecting it efficiently, for there is indeed a certain expertise and ability concerning moneymaking in which the prudent man will not take part . . .50 Philodemus indicates that, although the sage may freely acquire even great wealth, this must not be motivated by fear of poverty or a perverted understanding of the practical value of money, which prevents one from setting limits to its acquisition. This doctrine appears to be instantiated by Horace’s ant, whose wisdom allows her to gather substantial stores with the ultimate goal of actually enjoying their benefits and providing for her needs when necessary (S. 1.1.36–38): quae, simul inversum contristat Aquarius annum, non usquam prorepit et illis utitur ante quaesitis sapiens 49. See Tsouna 2007: 177–80, Asmis 2004: 165, Natali 1995: 111–12, and Laurenti 1973: 99 for the πλούτου μέτρον doctrine in Philodemus. As Rudd 1996: 23 notes, the notion of equating virtue with the avoidance of extremes (especially ὕβρις), which was crystallized in doctrinal form by Aristotle, is certainly much older and even part of the fabric of ancient Greek culture. 50. For Philodemus’ identification of the sage as a good χρηματιστής but not a φιλοχρηματιστής, see Tsouna 2007: 192-94 and Natali 1995: 112-14. This should be contrasted with the definition of economic prudence (σωφροσύνη) given by Xenophon’s spokesman Ischomachus at Oec. 7.15: ἀλλὰ σωφρόνων τοί ἐστι . . . οὕτως ποιεῖν, ὅπως τά τε ὄντα ὡς βέλτιστα ἕξει καὶ ἄλλα ὅτι πλεῖστα ἐκ τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ δικαίου προσγενήσεται (“But being prudent. . . means acting in such a way that what they possess shall be in the best condition possible, and that as many other possessions as possible shall be added to them by fair and just means”). Cic. On Duties 1.25 gives a similar description: nec vero rei familiaris amplificatio nemini nocens vituperanda est, sed fugienda semper iniuria est (“Still, one should not find fault with the accumulation of property, provided it hurts nobody, but unjust acquisition of it is always to be avoided”). See D’Arms 1981: 20-22 for further observations. YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 367 Yet she, soon as Aquarius saddens the upturned year, stirs out no more but uses the store she gathered beforehand, wise creature that she is . . .51 By means of the transitional quae,52 Horace effectively shifts the argument’s focus from the toil involved in acquisition to the topic of wealth limitation, of which the ant suddenly becomes a primary exemplar.53 The tiny creature’s “wisdom” is conveyed by the prudence and logic of her economic practices,54 which are clearly limited (non usquam prorepit) and adhere to the requirements of the pleasure calculus: the previous toil involved in gathering stores (illis ante quaesitis) is outweighed by her present enjoyment (utitur).55 As will soon become clear, Horace’s entertaining description of the ant is carefully opposed to his portrayal of the miser, and as such provides the key to understanding his economic message. Horace’s extended descriptions of irrational behavior and the bizarre administration of wealth depend heavily on the Cynic and comic traditions but may also be interpreted within an Epicurean context as projections of the miser’s underlying false assumptions and fears. This echoes Philodemus’ identification of the safeguards necessary for financial security and prosperity, which includes above all the responsible management of one’s desires and fears (On Property Management col. 23.36–43): ὧν δ’ ἐπιτηδευτέον εἰς π[ρ]όσοδον καὶ τήρησιν ταύτης τε καὶ τῶν προϋπαρχόν[τ]ων τὸ μὲν συνέ[χ]ον ἡγητέον ἐν τῆι τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν εὐσταλείαι καὶ τῶν [φ]όβων· Of the things that one must pursue for the sake of revenue and the protection of both this and the possessions one had before, one must keep in mind that the principle one consists in managing one’s desires and fears. In the lines following this passage, he mentions the desire for “admiration” (coll. 23.46–24.1: π[ε]ριβλέψε[ις]), which also suggests the competition inspired by envy (or, as commonly designated in Greek, πλεονεξία) as one of the primary 51. The reading sapiens, which is given by Ψ and Blandinianus, seems more appropriate than patiens, which appears in Ξ. As Wimmel 1962: 16n.16 observes, however, the latter reading would still be consistent with Horace’s portrayal of the ant’s ability to “endure” a measure of wealth (cf. S. 1.1.106: modus). 52. Rudd 1966: 29: “So the innocent quae in v. 36 has actually the force of at ea. It represents the very thin end of the wedge which Horace is about to drive between the ant and the greedy man.” 53. See Mader 2014: 425. 54. Schlegel 2005: 23 calls the ant “the only sapiens in the poem.” Cf. Hes. WD 778, where she is referred to as “the knowing one” (ἴδρις). 55. Fiske 1971: 232 compares this portion of the ant simile to the following fragment from Lucilius (561 M), which may have expressed the same view through a similar example: sic tu illos fructus quaeras, adversa hieme olim | quis uti possis ac delectare domi te (“Thus should you also acquire such fruits as you may enjoy and delight in at home when adverse weather arrives”). Cf. On Property Management col. 18.40–44: μετρήσει μὲν οὖν ἴσω[ς τὸ] συμφέρον καὶ κτήσει καὶ φυλακῆι πολὺ βέλτισθ’ οὗτος, ὥστε μὴ πλείω [π]ονεῖν διὰ τὰ χρήματ’ ἤπερ εὐπαθεῖν (“[The sage] will better calculate what is beneficial for both the acquisition and preservation of things, so as not to engage in more labor for the sake of money than pleasure”). 368 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 causes of the mismanagement of wealth (cf. Lucr. 2.12–13, in which the masses are described as contending “night and day with ever-present toil in order to achieve the greatest wealth and possess property,” noctes atque dies niti praestante labore | ad summas emergere opes rerumque potiri). One may compare this to the Horatian miser’s year-round pursuit of wealth and insatiable desire to become the wealthiest man in all of Rome (S. 1.1.38–40): cum te neque fervidus aestus demoveat lucro neque hiems, ignis mare ferrum, nil obstet tibi, dum ne sit te ditior alter. While as for you, neither burning heat, nor winter, fire, sea, sword, can turn you aside from gain—nothing stops you, until no other man be richer than yourself. Horace’s sudden change of tone reflects an important shift in attention, now apparently focused on the nameless miser identified only as “you.”56 This is consistent with the diatribe tradition, and one should not expect to learn anything terribly specific about the nameless interlocutor. Perhaps the source of his wealth is trade and commerce, as mare suggests, or perhaps he has benefited from a land grant on account of being a veteran soldier, as ferrum seems to indicate. Agricultural work may also have something to do with his prosperity, which would fit nicely with Horace’s later mention of a “threshing floor” (tua triverit area, 45) and “grain” (frumenti, 45). It is a moot point, however, for the poet does not intend to criticize so much the acceptability of his interlocutor’s source of wealth as his twisted convictions regarding wealth itself, along with the troublesome consequences of such beliefs. Our first impression of the miser occurs within the context of his need to outstrip all others in financial prosperity and win universal admiration, although this is not explicitly revealed as a false desire until later. At the very heart of the poem, Horace introduces the partial answer to his introductory question qui fit by the following verses (61–62): at bona pars hominum decepta cupidine falso | ‘nil satis est,’ inquit, ‘quia tanti quantum habeas sis’ (“But a good many people, misled by false desire, say ‘You can never have enough: for you are worth as much as you have’”). The expression “worth as much as you have” appears to have been a commonplace in ancient literature that influenced the Cynics as well as Lucilius and Plutarch.57 As Pseudo-Acro noted long ago, Horace specifically roots this 56. Gold 1992: 168–69 interprets this personal pronoun, which occurs frequently in lines 38–91, as addressed to the “internal audience” as represented by the vicious miser. Lyne 1995: 139–43, on the other hand, notes the referential ambiguity of tu throughout the poem and considers the possibility that it occasionally refers to Maecenas (especially at lines 38, 40, and 41). 57. It is expressed already by Alcaeus (fr. 360) and Pindar (Isthm. 2.11), and more explicitly by Bion (Fiske 1971: 237), to which cf. Plut. On the Desire for Wealth 526c: κέρδαινε καὶ φείδου, καὶ τοσούτου νόμιζε σεαυτὸν ἄξιον εἶναι ὅσον ἂν ἔχῃς (“Make acquisitions and take care of them, and consider your worth as determined by your possessions”). This appears to be a prose paraphrase of a lost work of tragedy (cf. TrGF Adespota 461), which Seneca translates in his correspondence with Lucilius (Ep. 115.4). Cf. also Juvenal’s observation that “each person’s credit corresponds to the YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 369 desire in a false or empty opinion (ad 61: falsa opinione, aut inepta et inani cupiditate), which scholars have rightly connected to Epicurus’ description of the exaggerated desire to fulfill a natural need as originating in idle imaginings (Arr. 1.5.149.9–12: κενοδοξίαν).58 As a result of this thought process, the miser of Satires 1.l incorrectly imagines that more wealth will result in more happiness (gaudere, 72) and tranquility (otia, 31), which consequently urges him to amass limitless heaps of unused cash (70– 73) in a search for money and self-worth that is boundless (sit finis quaerendi, 92; est modus, 106; cf. Cic. On Ends 1.45: inanium autem cupiditatum nec modus ullus nec finis inveniri potest, “No measure or limit, moreover, can be found for empty desires”).59 Unlike the ant, therefore, who observes the proper modus by making calculated “expenditures” in accordance with her means (cf. On Property Management col. 25.23–24: κατὰ τὰς ὑπάρξεις ἀναλίσκε[ι]ν) and rations wealth in order to satisfy both natural and necessary desires, the miser views wealth acquisition as an end in itself and refuses to enjoy its benefits: nescis, quo valeat nummus, quem praebeat usum? (“Don’t you know what money is for, what end it serves?” S. 1.1.73).60 As Epicurus states, however, the objects of limitless desire, such as wealth and admiration, cannot of themselves procure freedom from disturbances or result in true happiness and joy (SV 81): Οὐ λύει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ταραχὴν οὐδὲ τὴν ἀξιόλογον ἀπογεννᾷ χαρὰν οὔτε πλοῦτος ὑπάρχων ὁ μέγιστος οὔθ’ ἡ παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμὴ καὶ περίβλεψις οὔτ’ ἄλλο τι τῶν παρὰ τὰς ἀδιορίστους αἰτίας The disturbance of the soul cannot be ended nor true joy created either by the possession of the greatest wealth or by honor and respect in the eyes of the mob or by anything else that is associated with unlimited causes. The notion that substantial wealth cannot eliminate disturbances or contribute to happiness is associated with Epicurus’ teaching that pleasure cannot be increased amount of cash in his money chest” (quantum quisque sua nummorum servat in arca, | tantum habet et fidei, 3.143–44) and Trimalchio’s statement that “if you have a penny you’re worth a penny” (assem habeas, assem valeas, Sat. 77). A similar passage occurs in Lucilius 1119–20 M: aurum atque ambitio specimen virtutis utrique est: | tantum habeas, tantum ipse sies tantique habearis (“Gold and public approval are virtue’s ideal: you will be regarded and valued in accordance with how much you possess”). 58. Fiske 1971: 236, Rudd 1966: 24, and Schlegel 2005: 22. Horace perhaps underscores the irrationality of the miser’s false opinion concerning hoarded wealth by placing into his mouth the Lucretian phrase suave est (51), which originally refers to the tranquility of those who have withdrawn from the race for wealth (cf. Lucr. 2.1–2). 59. According to Teles (Hense 1969: 43), Bion similarly taught that limitless desires for wealth push one into service like a slave. 60. Gowers 2012: 76 on usum: “‘enjoyment,’ in the Epicurean or financial sense.” 370 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 beyond the satisfaction of basic and necessary desires (KD 18). This is echoed by Philodemus, who, borrowing language from the Stoics, states that since the requirements of nature are easily satisfied, the loss of wealth is “indifferent” (On Wealth col. 53.3–5: [ἀδιά]φορο[ν]), and that one may derive “equal pleasures” from wealth and poverty (col. 56.4–8: ἴσ[ας] ἡδονάς).61 For this reason the sage economist is not disturbed or frightened by financial loss, which is certainly more than can be said of the miser. Horace completes his identification of the underlying reasons for economic vice by incorporating the negative consequences of fear into his description of false desire. According to the poet, it is the “fear of poverty” (pauperiem metuas minus, S. 1.1.93; cf. 76: metu), the “terror of evil theft” (formidare malos fures, 77), and the “dread of being oppressed by scarcity of food” (ne se penuria victus | opprimeret, metuebat, 98–99) that drive the miser to take drastic measures in order to guard his ever-growing wealth.62 This exaggerated concern for his livelihood, for instance, scares him into thinking that any expenditure will result in the complete liquidation of his resources (41–43): quid iuvat inmensum te argenti pondus et auri furtim defossa timidum deponere terra? “quod, si conminuas, vilem redigatur ad assem.” What good to you is a vast weight of silver and gold, if in terror you stealthily bury it in a hole in the ground? “But if one splits it up, it would dwindle to a paltry penny.”63 Horace’s description of the miser secretly burying his gold, which echoes a similar passage in Plautus (Pot of Gold 6–8),64 also serves to distinguish him from the wise ant’s careful use of her store.65 The inclusion of timidum, moreover, reveals his economic habits as influenced by the fearful equation of expenditures with poverty, which Philodemus associates with the wretched toil and anxiety avoided by the sage economist (On Property Management col. 19.4–16): 61. See Asmis 2004: 152. Cicero also borrows teachings from the Stoics whenever they suit his purpose, as he states in On Duties 1.6. 62. Cf. Lucr. 3.1076–94, where the empty fear of death is the underlying cause of the masses’ “great desire for life” (vitai tanta cupido, 1077), projected by their discontentment and constant labor. 63. Klingner and Gowers omit quotation marks and print a question-mark here, indicating that this is the narrator speaking and anticipating the miser’s response. I follow the interpretation of others such as Wickham and Fairclough, who view verse 43 as being spoken by the miser. 64. Cf. also Theoph. Ch. 10.14: καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ τῶν μικρολόγων καὶ τὰς ἀργυροθήκας ἔστιν ἰδεῖν εὐρωτιώσας καὶ τὰς κλεῖς ἰωμένας (“In fine you may see the money-chests of the penurious covered in mold and their keys in rust”). 65. Heinze 1889: 18 and Fraenkel 1957: 93–94 note that the portrayal of animals as free from such practices was a standard Cynic theme. Cf. Hippoc. [Ep.] 17.8: τίς γὰρ λέων ἐς γῆν κατέκρυψε χρυσόν; (“What lion ever hid gold in the ground?”). YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 371 κτᾶσθαι μέντοι γ’οὐ δυνήσεται πλεῖστα καὶ τάχιστα καὶ διαθεωρεῖν, ὅθεν ἂν μάλιστα τὸ πλεῖον αὔξοι[το], μηδὲν ἀπομετ[ρῶ]ν πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ πλέον καὶ τοὔλαττον, καὶ τὰ προϋπάρχοντ’ ἀεὶ φυλάττειν ἐντόνως. πολὺς γὰρ ὁ πόνος ἤδη περὶ τοῦτο καὶ μετὰ φροντίδος σκληρᾶς γιγνόμενος καὶ πᾶν τιθε[ίση]ς ἐν πενίαι τὸ δυσχερές. [The sage] will not acquire as much as possible very quickly or examine closely whence his surplus may be increased most of all, measuring off nothing with regard to the ultimate purpose but with regard to the more and the less, and always striving to safeguard his possessions. For the toil associated with this is great and brings bitter anxiety, which equates every difficulty with poverty. As Philodemus explains, the fear of poverty is completely unfounded, primarily because the requirements of nature are easily satisfied (col. 19.16–19): ἐναργῶς τῆς φύσεω[ς δει]κνυούσης, ἄν τις αὐτῆ[ι] προ[σ]έχ[ηι], διότι καὶ τοῖς ὀλίοις εὐκόλ[ω]ς χρήσεθ’ (“although nature makes it clear, if anyone pays attention to her, that she is easily satisfied and requires few things”). For this reason, worry about an economic fall is not worthy of fear (On Wealth col. 36.11–12). One may, for example, quite easily fulfill necessary desires for food by purchasing basic foodstuffs, as Horace reminds the miser: panis ematur, holus, vini sextarius, adde | quis humana sibi doleat natura negatis (“You may buy bread, greens, a measure of wine, and such other things as would mean pain to our human nature, if withheld,” S. 1.1.74–75).66 Although Horace’s advice concerning such meager fare as quoted above may appear to have an ascetically Cynic flavor, a few distinctions should be made. First, the Cynics were famous in antiquity for their rejection of all social conventions, which especially included money, as Diogenes’ divinely-inspired injunction to “deface the coin” suggests (DL 6.20–21).67 Furthermore, even relatively less austere Cynics like Bion equated “independence” (αὐτάρκεια) with extreme “poverty” (πενία), which for them entailed the complete rejection of such basic conventions as beds, eating utensils, and wine.68 The evidence from Teles involves a speech given by Poverty personified and is worth quoting here: καὶ ἡ Πενία ἂν εἴποι . . . “ἀλλὰ μὴ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεὴς εἶ; ἢ οὐ μεσταὶ μὲν αἱ ὁδοὶ λαχάνων, πλήρεις δὲ αἱ κρῆναι ὕδατος; οὐκ εὐνάς σοι 66. Porphyrio likewise links this passage to “necessary desires” (ad 75: quae sunt necessariae). Cf. S. 1.2.111–12 for similar advice: natura . . . quid latura sibi, quid sit dolitura, negatum (“Nature . . . what satisfaction she will give herself, what privation will cause her pain”). Cf. also S. 1.6.115: porri et ciceris (“leeks and chickpeas”). For Epicurus’ teaching on necessary desires, see KD 29 (= SV 20). 67. See Desmond 2008: 98–103 for more on the Cynics’ renunciation of money. 68. Oltramare 1926: 51–52 and Kindstrand 1976: 217–18. 372 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 τοσαύτας παρέχω ὁπόση γῆ; καὶ στρωμνὰς φύλλα; . . . ἢ πεινᾷ τις πλακοῦντα ἢ διψᾷ Χῖον;” “And Poverty would say: “indeed, do you lack any of the necessities of life? Do not roads pass through the midst of wild greens, and are not the natural springs full of water? Do I not supply you with the earth as your bed and the leaves as your blanket? . . . Does one’s hunger demand honeyed cakes or one’s thirst Chian wine?”69 Epicureans like Philodemus, however, utterly condemn the Cynics’ view of poverty in On Wealth as entailing mendicancy (col. 45.15–17: πτωχεία[ν] . . . στέρ[ησιν οὐ] πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ πάν[των]), which is an evil (col. 43.4–5: κα[κόν δὲ π]τωχεία), and instead emphatically define πενία as “the possession of few things” (col. 45.5 ὕπαρ[ξιν] τῶν ὀλίγων), which is a good (col. 49.11–12: ὅ ἐστιν ἀγαθ[όν]). This is the context in which Philodemus asserts that the sage, though unwilling to engage in toilsome beggary (cf. DL 10.119), will be content with few possessions and not fear poverty (On Property Management coll. 15.45–16.4): [οὔ]τε [γ]ὰρ ἀσχαλᾶι σώφρων ἀνὴρ καὶ πρὸς τὸ μέλλ[ον εὐ]θ[α]ρρὴς τῆι ταπεινῆι καὶ πενιχρᾶι διαίτηι, τὸ φυσικὸν εἰδὼς καὶ ὑπὸ ταύτης διοικούμενον (“[The sage] is confident with regard to the future and the possibility of a poor and meager life, for he knows that the requirements of nature are satisfied even by this”). Being poor, therefore, means possessing “what suffices” (cf. col. 16.7–8: τὰ . . . ἱκανά) without being distressed by the unquenchable desire for more (On Wealth col. 58.8–9: τῆς [ἐ]πιθυμίας τῆς π[ρ]ὸς πλοῦτον). The same advice is offered by Horace when he states the importance of “requiring only what one needs” (at qui tantuli eget quanto est opus, S. 1.1.59),70 and it also explains his careful distinction between being “poor” (pauperrimus, 79; cf. Odes 3.29.55–56: probamque | pauperiem sine dote quaero, “I seek to court modest poverty, whose virtue is its own reward”) and living without any means whatsoever: non ego avarum | cum veto te, fieri vappam iubeo ac nebulonem (“When I call on you not to be a miser, I am not bidding you become a worthless prodigal,” 103–104). Above all, he reminds the miser that there is “moderation in property management” (est modus in rebus, 106),71 and that, rather than living 69. Preserved in Hense 1969: 7–8. See also Kindstrand 1976: F17. 70. Cf. Ep. 1.2.46: quod satis est cui contingit, nihil amplius optet (“Whoever lives according to what is sufficient does not long for anything more”). I disagree with Fiske 1971: 224–25, who equates Horace’s understanding of satis with the Cynic teaching that the sage will live ἀρκούμενος τοῖς παροῦσι (see Hense 1969: 38). The expression τοῖς παροῦσι seems to me to entail “that which is at one’s immediate disposal” (i.e., the earth, natural springs, wild barley etc.); Horace’s point, however, is not that the miser should get rid of his money and live like a beggar, but that he should learn to administer it properly and enjoy its benefits responsibly. Cf. Horace’s explicit rejection of Cynic beggary in Epistles 1.17, quoted at the outset of this study. 71. This meaning of res, which is often equated with land (cf. S. 1.1.50: iugera centum, and Ep. 1.14.5, where res refers to Horace’s own property), is confirmed by the obvious parallel in S. 1.4.31–32: nequid | summa deperdat metuens aut ampliet ut rem (“[the miser] fearful lest he lose aught of his total, or fail to add to his wealth”), to which cf. also 1.4.110: patriam rem. Gowers 2012: 81 notes the following: “Technically modus is a measured amount, sometimes of land . . . YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 373 like a Cynic beggar or fearfully hoarding treasure, he should imitate the wise ant by acquiring and enjoying wealth responsibly. Towards the end of his ethical investigation Horace considers the detrimental consequences of overvaluing wealth, which, aside from the immense toil and anxiety already mentioned, includes universal abandonment. In his description of the many benefits associated with cultivating friendships, Philodemus mentions that, far from being a financial burden, close friends are “a more profitable acquisition . . . than tilled land and a most secure treasure against the turns of fortune” (On Property Management col. 24.47–25.4: κτήσει[ς λ]υσιτελέστεραι . . . ἤπερ ἀγρῶν καὶ πρὸς τὴν τύχην ἀσφαλέστατοι θησαυροί).72 The cultivation of friendship is described as sowing seeds in the earth, from which it becomes possible to “reap the fruit many times over” (col. 25.18–21: πολλαπ[λάσι]α καρπίζεσθαι γίνεται). This process involves philanthropy (col. 18.34: τὸ φιλάνθρωπ[ον]),73 and, according to Philodemus, the sage is always concerned with sharing surplus wealth with his friends, whose companionship ultimately contributes to the preservation of suitably acquired wealth (cf. col. 24.19–35). The greedy and acquisitive economist, on the other hand, hoards wealth, isolates himself from society, incurs the hatred of others, and consequently jeopardizes his revenue (On Property Management col. 24.19–33): καὶ μὴν ἀφιλία δοκεῖ μὲν ἀναλωμάτων κουφίζε[ιν], ἀσυνεργήτους δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ ὑπὸ πάντος καταφρονουμένους καὶ [ὑ]π’ εὐνοίας ἀπολυωρήτους, ἐξ ὧν οὔτε πρόσοδος ἀξιόλογος οὔτε τήρ[η]σις ἀσφαλής, ὥστε ἂν φιλίαν περιποι[ῆ]ται, καθ’ ἑκάτε[ρον] εὐτυχή[σ]ει. καὶ ἀφιλανθ[ρω]πία δὲ [κ]αὶ ἀνημερότης ζημιοῖ πολ[λ]ὰ καὶ ἀβοη[θ]ήτου[ς] ποιεῖ, πολ[λ]άκις δ’ ἄρδ[η]ν ἀν[αρ]πάζεσθαι [τ]ὴν οὐσίαν. Indeed, traditional managers think that friendlessness procures relief from costs, but it isolates them and makes them despised by everyone and not highly esteemed with regard to people’s favor, which does not lead to suitable revenue or secure preservation; consequently, if he should cultivate friendships then he would be fortunate in each of these areas. But misanthropy and rudeness cause much suffering, make one helpless, and often cause one’s property to be plundered entirely. Perhaps a perfect example of this is afforded by our miser, whose overwhelming preference for money (cum tu argento post omnia ponas, S. 1.1.86) is analyzed here, connected with fixed boundaries (certi fines), it recalls physical images of plots of land.” Cf. also Lucilius 1331 M: virtus quaerendae finem re scire modumque (“Virtue is knowing when to limit and control the search for wealth”). 72. For the importance of φιλία in this treatise, see Laurenti 1973: 168–72, Asmis 2004: 173–76, and Tsouna 2007: 182–83. 73. Cf. Arist. Nic. Eth. 8.1155a115–20 for the identification of philanthropy as an expression of the natural bond that exists between members of the same species. 374 CLASSICAL ANTIQUITY Volume 37/No. 2/October 2018 within the context of a hypothetical situation: in the case of a medical emergency, he would be completely abandoned and left alone helplessly to face the “turns of fortune,” as Horace explains (80–85): at si condoluit temptatum frigore corpus aut alius casus lecto te affixit, habes qui adsideat, fomenta paret, medicum roget, ut te suscitet ac reddat gnatis carisque propinquis? non uxor salvum te volt, non filius; omnes vicini oderunt, noti, pueri atque puellae. But if your body is seized with a chill and racked with pain, or some other mishap has pinned you to your bed,74 have you someone to sit by you, to get lotions ready, to call in the doctor so as to raise you up and restore you to your children and dear kinsmen? No, your wife does not want you well, nor does your son: everyone hates you, neighbors and acquaintances, boys and girls. Contrary to the sage economist, therefore, the miser continues to lose friends and suffer more intensely on account of his perverted administration and understanding of wealth. In addition to this, Philodemus notes that such reckless mismanagement and misanthropy run the risk of incurring the ill will of others, whose desire to plunder wealth (On Property Management col. 24.32: ἀν[αρ]πάζεσθαι [τ]ὴν οὐσίαν) often results in unspeakable deeds of violence (cf. On Envy fr. 6: μοχθηρὰ πράττειν).75 The relationship between wealth and envy, which was somewhat of a commonplace of moral philosophy,76 affects even close friends and family members, as Horace’s serio-comic story about the fate of Ummidius at the murderous hands of his liberta clearly shows: at hunc liberta securi | divisit medium, fortissima Tyndaridarum (“Yet a freedwoman cleft him in twain with the axe, bravest of the Tyndarid breed,” S. 1.1.99–100).77 With this warning, Horace proceeds to conclude his analysis of the empty desires and fears underlying the masses’ discontentment (cf. 108–109: nemo . . . | se probet), which, as has been shown, is closely related to avarice and manifests itself in the endless contest 74. I prefer the reading of Fairclough (affixit) to that of most MSS and Klingner (adflixit), even if the former only appears in K as well as other codices that are less reliable (σ and ϛ). See Gowers 2012: 78, who also prefers affixit and quotes Sen. Ep. 67.2: senectus me lectulo affixit (“old age has confined me to bed”). 75. Cf. also Arist. Eud. Eth. 1234a30: ὁ μὲν οὖν φθόνος εἰς ἀδικίαν συμβάλλεται, πρὸς γὰρ ἄλλον αἱ πράξεις αἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ (“Therefore envy contributes to injustice, for the actions that spring from it affect another person”). 76. See Gerhard 1909: 92–94 for the evidence. In his treatise On Frank Criticism, for which see Konstan et al: 1998, Philodemus notes that the sage is “free of all envy” (col. 1b.6–7: φθόνου καθαρός). 77. Gowers 2012: 80: “[T]he miser who occupies two poles of existence is split down the middle in a parody of the golden mean by an axe-wielding freedwoman.” YONA : An Epicurean “Measure of Wealth” in Horace, Satires 1.1 375 over wealth (cf. 113: locupletior) and the consequent willingness to undergo perpetual toil (cf. 112: hunc atque hunc superare laboret). It is significant that Horace’s final word regarding the importance of departing from life contentedly as a guest leaving a banquet (117–20) is a reworking of a similar observation of Lucretius, and one that transforms an apparent cliché into a beautiful resolution: do not fear death, do not think that wealth will allow you to “loiter before the portals of death” (quasi iam portas leti cunctarier ante, Lucr. 3.67), for it comes to all but—like poverty—it is nothing to fear.78 In this sense, Horace’s allusion at this point to On the Nature of Things ends a conversation that had begun with another reference to the same work, so that the Lucretian passages serve as the framework for his engagement with Philodemus and reinforces the consistently Epicurean thrust of this satire on wealth. One may certainly be tempted to read Satires 1.1 within the context of Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean or the roughshod tradition of Cynic philosophy. An interpretation that incorporates the tenets of Epicurean economics as communicated by Philodemus, however, helps to reveal the consistency of Horace’s approach to the problems of false desires and their effect on wealth administration in a poem hitherto regarded as inept and inconsistent. Despite the lack of detail regarding economics in Epicurus’ extant remains, his followers—especially Philodemus—provide a rich and uniquely Epicurean account of virtuous wealth administration, and one that deserves much more than a simple acknowledgement of the hedonic calculus or a citation made in passing. It has been the purpose of the preceding study to provide a more nuanced examination of the Epicurean underpinnings of Horace’s financial advice. In addition to revealing the poet’s consistent application of such doctrine throughout, these underpinnings may also help to articulate further something that scholars in previous generations have noted, namely, the unity of one of Horace’s more vigorous satiric portraits. University of Missouri yonas@missouri.edu BIBLIOGRAPHY Allen, W., and P. H. De Lacy. 1939. “The Patrons of Philodemus.” CP 34: 59–65. Armstrong, D. 1964. “Horace, Satires 1.1–3: A Structural Study.” Arion 3: 86–96. 78. See Lucr. 3.938: cur non ut plenus vitae convivia recedis? (“why do you not withdraw from the feast, having had your fill of life?”) and 959–60: ante | quam satur ac plenus possis discedere rerum? (“before you can walk away, stuffed full of the feast?”). Gowers 2012: 84 makes this connection as well and mentions the popularity of this particular image among philosophers, including Bion (see Kindstrand 1976: 281–82). 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