Direct Reference

Should we deal with Frege’s Puzzle on semantic grounds? Is the cognitive value of language an aspect of meaning? Frege himself assumed an affirmative answer to those questions, and so did many direct reference theorists, such as David Kaplan and John Perry. Even though they defend a theory that is anti-Fregean by nature, they share the view that it is semantics’ business to account for Frege’s Puzzle and cognitive value. There are two traditional ways to do so in referentialist semantics. One is via character and the other via reflexive content. My aim in this dissertation is to argue that both fail. To do that, I first examine what exactly Frege’s Puzzle is, and if what traditionally goes under the name of “Frege’s Puzzle” really corresponds to the puzzle that Frege himself formulated. I then examine how the solutions to the puzzle in terms of character and reflexive content are supposed to work for indexicals, where they are most appealing, and for proper names. I argue that there is no version of these solutions that is able to account for all the relevant phenomena. I conclude that, if this is the case, then we have serious reasons to suspect that Frege’s Puzzle should not be explained by semantics, and that cognitive value is not an aspect of meaning as it is often supposed.

The canonical arguments against the description theory of names are usually taken to have established that the reference of a name as used on a given occasion is not semantically determined by the qualitative descriptions that the speaker may have in mind. The deepest moral of these arguments, on the received view, would be that the speaker's narrow mental states play no semantic role in fixing reference. My central aim in this paper is to challenge this common understanding by highlighting that the same argumentative schemas can be adapted to undermine a related non-description theory, according to which the reference of a name as used on a given occasion would semantically depend on broad mental states of the speaker. Once this is realised, it becomes evident that the falsity of the description theory is not the deepest lesson of the canonical arguments, but only a consequence of the deepest lesson. The most fundamental moral is that the speaker's mental states, whether narrow or broad, do not always determine linguistic reference.

The Twin Earth scenario assumes reference to natural kinds is unique and never changes (rigid designation), and that we can give justice to the intuition of reference-permanence and things having a deep structure only by pushing meaning outside the brain or mind (semantic externalism). This, I'll show, doesn't follow. Besides, the intuition itself is misconstrued here. To say the term “water” expressed a thought or concept or belief denoting H2O before its actual discovery around 1750, is to make a claim without real content and be guilty of after-the-fact rationalizing. If anything, Twin Earth undercuts the theory of semantic externalism and its core-notion of rigid designation. A pluralized, descriptivist model of reference, I claim, is a better fit for our scientific data and ordinary intuitions either way.

Keywords: communication, semantics/pragmatics, direct reference theory, singular thoughts, Russell's Principle, Generality Constraint, Husserl, Evans, Perry, twin examples, demonstratives, demonstrative identification, perception, perceptual content

Kaplan’s influential (1989) makes a connection between the mode of reference of indexical expressions and the impossibility of a certain sentential operators, which he calls monsters. The impossibility of monsters has recently come under attack from several quarters, both theoretical and empirical. In this paper I consider monsters from a different perspective. I motivate the prohibition on monsters independently of intensional notions altogether, and understand it not as an empirical hypothesis, but as an adequacy criterion on formal systems intended to capture the philosophical notion of direct reference. I show that Kaplan's formalism doesn't live up to this criterion, and sketch in preliminary fashion a formalism that does.

The aim of this paper is to address the semantic issue of the nature of the representation I and of the transcendental designation, i.e., the self-referential apparatus involved in transcendental apperception. The I think, the bare or empty representation I, is the representational vehicle of the concept of transcendental subject; as such, it is a simple representation. The awareness of oneself as thinking is only expressed by the I: the intellectual representation which performs a referential function of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. To begin with, what exactly does Kant mean when he states that I is a simple and empty representation? Secondly, can the features of the representation I and the correlative transcendental designation explain the indexical nature of the I? Thirdly, do the Kantian considerations on indexicality anticipate any of the semantic elements or, if nothing else, the spirit of the direct reference theory?

Wie denken und sprechen wir eigentlich über einzelne Objekte in Raum und Zeit? Diese Frage rührt gleichermaßen an Grundprobleme der neueren sprachanalytischen Philosophie und der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Husserls. Unter dem Titel 'Konstitutionsproblem' begegnet sie uns dort in folgendem Gewand: Wie bringen wir es zuwege, ein raumzeitliches Objekt über eine Zeitspanne und über eine Reihe von kognitiven Perspektivenwechseln hinweg 'im Sinn' zu behalten? Der Autor unternimmt den Versuch, das Konstitutionsproblem in einer Art und Weise zu verfolgen, die methodisch sowohl für Sprachanalytiker als auch für Phänomenologen akzeptabel ist.

Peirce’s theory of proper names has traditionally been thought to anticipate the new (or causal-historical) theory of names. Recent
scholarship has argued that affinities between the new theory and Peirce’s theory are overstated because integral to Peirce’s
theory are contextual (social, epistemic, and pragmatic) factors that are absent in the former. After a clarification of the central
aspects of Peirce’s theory and an account of his rejection of descriptivism, I argue that while Peirce went beyond the reductive
causal-historical approach to names, recent scholarship overlooks the fact that many so-called new theorists adopt a similar noncausal approach to names.

In​ ​ this​ ​ paper​ ​ we​ ​ will​ ​ discuss​ ​ how​ ​ both​ ​ proper​ ​ names​ ​ for​ ​ existing​ ​ individuals​ ​ and​ ​ proper​ ​ names​ ​ for​ ​ fictional​ ​ entities can​ ​ be​ ​ used​ ​ metaphorically,​ ​ even​ ​ when​ ​ they​ ​ appear​ ​ in​ ​ argument​ ​ position.​ ​ Thus,​ ​ whether​ ​ a​ ​ name​ ​ used​ ​ metaphorically is​ ​ a​ ​ referential​ ​ or​ ​ a​ ​ non​ ​ referential​ ​ term​ ​ does​ ​ not​ ​ affect​ ​ the​ ​ interpretation​ ​ we​ ​ propose.​ ​ For,​ ​ when​ ​ used​ ​ metaphorically, proper​ ​ names​ ​ cease​ ​ to​ ​ be,​ ​ properly​ ​ speaking,​ ​ proper​ ​ names.​ ​ That​ ​ is​ ​ to​ ​ say,​ ​ they​ ​ cease​ ​ to​ ​ be​ ​ Millian​ ​ tools​ ​ of​ ​ direct reference.​ ​ When​ ​ used​ ​ in​ ​ argument​ ​ position​ ​ in​ ​ a​ ​ simple​ ​ sentence​ ​ of​ ​ the​ ​ subject/predicate​ ​ form,​ ​ we​ ​ claim​ ​ that​ ​ the tokened​ ​ name​ ​ used​ ​ metaphorically​ ​ picks​ ​ up​ ​ an​ ​ individual​ ​ analogous​ ​ to​ ​ the​ ​ way​ ​ Donnellan​ ​ treats​ ​ the​ ​ referential​ ​ uses of​ ​ descriptions.​ ​ That​ ​ is,​ ​ just​ ​ as​ ​ a​ ​ description​ ​ used​ ​ referentially​ ​ can​ ​ pick​ ​ up​ ​ an​ ​ individual​ ​ independently​ ​ of​ ​ the property​ ​ used​ ​ to​ ​ identify​ ​ it,​ ​ a​ ​ proper​ ​ name​ ​ used​ ​ metaphorically​ ​ in​ ​ argument​ ​ position​ ​ can​ ​ pick​ ​ up​ ​ an​ ​ individual independently​ ​ of​ ​ the​ ​ latter​ ​ carrying​ ​ the​ ​ name​ ​ uttered.​ ​ In​ ​ such​ ​ metaphorical​ ​ uses​ ​ the​ ​ name​ ​ serves​ ​ the​ ​ function​ ​ of attributing​ ​ to​ ​ the​ ​ individual​ ​ the​ ​ speaker​ ​ has​ ​ in​ ​ mind​ ​ those​ ​ properties​ ​ that​ ​ are​ ​ relevant​ ​ in​ ​ the​ ​ grasping​ ​ of​ ​ the​ ​ speaker's metaphorical​ ​ meaning.​ ​ Thus,​ ​ a​ ​ name​ ​ so​ ​ used​ ​ loses​ ​ its​ ​ individuative​ ​ (referential)​ ​ power.​ ​ We​ ​ will​ ​ claim​ ​ that​ ​ in​ ​ such uses,​ ​ reference​ ​ is​ ​ guided​ ​ and​ ​ fixed,​ ​ like​ ​ in​ ​ Donnellan's​ ​ referential​ ​ use​ ​ of​ ​ descriptions,​ ​ by​ ​ the​ ​ individual​ ​ the​ ​ speaker has​ ​ in​ ​ mind​ ​ and​ ​ raises​ ​ to​ ​ salience​ ​ in​ ​ a​ ​ communicative​ ​ interaction.​ ​ Yet,​ ​ the​ ​ account​ ​ we​ ​ propose​ ​ does​ ​ not​ ​ undermine the​ ​ Millian​ ​ view​ ​ that​ ​ proper​ ​ names​ ​ are​ ​ tools​ ​ of​ ​ direct​ ​ reference​ ​ nor​ ​ the​ ​ Fregean​ ​ view​ ​ that​ ​ when​ ​ a​ ​ proper​ ​ name appears in a predicative position it ceases to be a proper name. Our final aim is to accommodate both views and address the question as to why the speaker would want to utter a metaphor in this way.

In this review, I try to present and discuss the main elements of each chapter of the book as briefly and instructively as possible. The first group of chapters deals with various issues about language, and the second group focuses on thought.

Este artigo introduz, de forma detalhada, os problemas do conteúdo proposicional, linguístico e mental, com um destaque especial para a variedade do conteúdo singular, conteúdo irredutivelmente acerca de um objecto específico. São igualmente introduzidas três teorias, ou famílias de teorias, salientes do conteúdo proposicional: intensionalismo modal, referencialismo e cognitivismo. São criticamente examinados os respectivos prós e contras e opta-se por uma versão de cognitivismo no qual os modos de apresentação postulados são exteriores ao conteúdo proposicional, podendo assim depender de características do mundo, mas são ao mesmo tempo semanticamente (em contraste com apenas pragmaticamente) operativos.

As is well known, the linguistic/philosophical reflection on natural kind terms has undergone a remarkable development in the early seventies with Putnam and Kripke's essentialist approaches, touching upon different aspects (metaphysical and epistemological in particular) of Kant's slant. Preliminarily, however, it might be useful to review some of the theoretical stages in Locke and Leibniz's approaches on natural kind terms in the light of contemporary reflections, to eventually pinpoint Kant's contribution and see how some commentators have placed it within the theory of direct reference. Starting with textual evidence even from the logical corpus, in the present essay I will attempt to discuss some of the arguments dismissing Kant's adherence to this view. These assume that in his approach to the semantics of natural kind terms, Kant appears to be still holding on to a nominalist/conceptualist position, though he seems to be well aware of a few key issues for the theorists of direct reference.

Attempting to compare scientific theories requires a philosophical model of meaning. Yet different scientific theories have at times—particularly in early chemistry—pre-supposed disparate theories of meaning. When two theories of meaning are incommensurable, we must say that the scientific theories that rely upon them are meta-incommensurable. Meta-incommensurability is a more profound sceptical threat to science since, unlike first-order incommensurability, it implies complete incomparability.

According to the New Theory of Reference, proper names (and indexicals) and natural kind terms are semantically similar to each other but crucially different from definite descriptions and “ordinary” predicates, respectively. New Theorists say that a name, unlike a definite description, is a directly referential nondescriptional rigid designator, which refers “without a mediation of the content” and is not functional (i.e. lacks a Carnapian intension). Natural kind terms, such as ‘horse’ and ‘water’, are held to have similar distinctions, in contrast to other predicates. However, the New Theory contains some problems related to reference, descriptionality, content and meaning. In view of these problems, it will be argued that the distinctive shared feature of proper names and natural kind terms, while technically corresponding to nonfunctionality, is to be explicated in terms of independence of possible worlds, rather than in terms of reference and content: natural kind terms are world-independent predicates, making “worldless” predications. Just as, say, ‘Elvis’ names Elvis even with respect to “Elvisless” worlds, or, rather, names Elvis independently of worlds, natural kind terms are in an important sense “worldless” as well: to talk about Elvis is to talk about him irrespective of moments of time and possible worlds, and is to talk about a human, also irrespective of moments and worlds, while it is not to talk about, say, a drug-addict irrespective of moments, nor about a singer irrespective of worlds. There is no genuinely timeless and worldless predication of the sort “Elvis is (was) bald”, but there is, it seems, such a predication “Elvis is (was) human”. This notion of independence of times and worlds is detached from those of descriptionality and content mediation.

Robert Stalnaker contrasts two interpretations, semantic and metase-mantic, of the two-dimensionalist framework. On the semantic interpretation, the primary intension or diagonal proposition associated with an utterance is a semantic value that the utterance has in virtue of the actual linguistic meaning of the corresponding sentence, and that primary intension is both what a competent speaker grasps and what determines different secondary intensions or horizontal propositions relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. The metasemantic interpretation reverses the order of explanation: an utterance has the primary intension it has because it yields the secondary intensions it yields relative to different possible worlds considered as actual. In these possible worlds, the semantic facts can be different: the metasemantic interpretation is metasemantic in the sense that the secondary intensions are determined relative to possible worlds considered as actual given the meanings the expressions have there. Stalnaker holds a causal picture of the reference of names, according to which names have no meaning over and above their unique referent, and therefore maintains that the semantic interpretation is not an option. He thus endorses the metasemantic interpretation , while insisting that this interpretation does not, contrary to what he originally thought, yield any account of a priori truth and knowledge. My double aim in this paper is to show (i) that the metasemantic interpretation, as sketched by Stalnaker, is not compatible with one natural understanding of the causal picture of reference, on which names are rigid because they have their original bearers essentially, and (ii) that a third kind of interpretation of the framework is available,

Are there ontological consequences or ontological requirements of the theory of direct reference for general terms? It has normally been said that general terms should be conceived as rigid designators of ‘natural classes’, but this is a very vague expression. What is a ‘natural class’ here? Is it a universal? Is it a  class of resembling objects, or tropes? It is argued that the theory of direct reference functions better in connection with an ontology of universals. The semantic model, in effect, requires certain type of successful cognitive relation with the referent and it is difficult to explain how such a successful connection would obtain if there are no universal properties, but only perfect resemblance classes or objects or tropes.

In the paper I discuss a possibility of defending the Direct Reference theory from its most dangerous threaten which is the notorious Frege's puzzle. I discuss two possible ways of doing that. First is based on King's theory of propositions as facts. I show that tools provided by King's theory are not enough to solve the puzzle. More promising is a method supported by new Soames's theory of propositions as cognitive event-types. I try to show that this framework allows us to develop a satisfying solution of the puzzle, which focus on the notion of cognitive value of sentence.

Many recent semantic theories have involved explicit acceptance of the following two theses:

1. DIRECT REFERENCE (DR): The utterance of a simple sentence containing names or demonstratives normally expresses a "singular proposition" -- a proposition that contains as constituents the individuals referred to, and not any descriptions or conditions on them.

2. SEMANTIC INNOCENCE (SI): The utterances of the embedded sentences in belief reports express just the propositions they would if not embedded, and these propositions are the contents of the ascribed beliefs.

Such theories face a well-known difficulty: they seem to conflict with a third, and apparently obviously true, thesis:

3. OPACITY (O): Substitution of coreferring names and demonstratives in belief reports does not always preserve the truth of those reports.

In order to meet this difficulty, two different strategies have been proposed.

A. Conventional Implicature: The first suggestion, adopted by Salmon and Soames, is to claim that O is false: despite appearances, the substitution of coreferring names and demonstratives in belief reports does preserve the truth of those reports.

Now, of course, this suggestion leaves us with a puzzle, namely: why do we ordinarily suppose, and speak as if it were the case, that O is true? Here, Salmon and Soames suggest that belief reports carry conventional (or generalised) implicatures which can change under substitution of coreferring embedded names and demonstratives.
Neither Soames nor Salmon has given any details about the nature of these implicatures. However, they do say that what gets implicated is information about the mode of presentation under which a singular proposition is grasped by a subject. Consequently, it seems hard to resist the suggestion that what they require is a compositional theory according to which implicated modes of presentation associated with sentences are composed of implicated modes of presentation associated with the words which make up those sentences.

But then the question naturally arises why it should not be supposed that these allegedly implicated modes of presentation are actually part of the semantic content of belief reports. Given that we need a theory which associates modes of presentation with words, won’t all of this talk about implicated modes of presentation be just a pointless and unmotivated complication in the theory?

B. Unarticulated constituents: The second suggestion, adopted by Crimmins and Perry, is to deny that the theses DR, SI, and O are inconsistent. This response seems most unpromising. Consider the following quasi-logical principle which connects the notions of truth and semantic value:

4. FUNDAMENTAL SEMANTIC PRINCIPLE (FSP): If the substitution of expression E1 for expression E2 in sentence S (in context C) leads to a change in (literal) truth-value, then this change is due to the semantic values of E1 and E2 (in context C)

I take it that this is more or less a definition of what it is to be a semantic value: semantic values are whatever it is that words contribute to the determination of the literal truth-values of sentences in which they occur (upon particular occasions of utterance, or more generally, of tokening of those sentences). Moreover, I take it that it is obvious that FSP entails that if the substitution of a name or demonstrative E1 for a coreferring name or demonstrative E2 in a sentence S (in a context C) leads to a change in the literal truth-value of S, then it follows -- contrary to DR, or SI, or both -- that E1 and E2 do not have the same semantic content.

Not surprisingly, Crimmins and Perry are at least tacitly committed to the rejection of FSP. In their words, their view is as follows:

"It is very common in natural languages for a statement to exploit unarticulated constituents. When we consider the conditions under which such a statement is true, we find it expresses a proposition which has more constituents in it than can be traced to expressions in the sentence that was spoken. Each constituent of the content that is not itself the content of some expression in the sentence, is an unarticulated constituent of the content of the statement. ... The important principle to be learned is that a change in the wording can precipitate a change in propositional constituents, even when the words do not stand for constituents."

In other words, the "important principle" to which Crimmins and Perry wish to draw attention is that the substitution of an expression E1 for an expression E2 in a sentence S (in a context C) can lead to a change in the semantic content of the sentence S (in the context C) even though E1 and E2 have exactly the same semantic content -- and this is the denial of FSP.

In order to illustrate the notion of "unarticulated constituency", Crimmins and Perry consider the example of utterances of:

(1) It's raining.

As they note, if one utters (1), one will be understood to be claiming that it is raining at the time of one's utterance at some place which is indicated by features of the context of utterance. (Often this place will be the place of one's utterance, but it needn't be.) Moreover, there is no (surface) expression in (1) which has the place in question as its content.

However, there are two points to note about this example. Firstly, this example does nothing to support the principle that a change in wording can precipitate a change in propositional content even when the words do not stand for the constituents. Rather, this example supports the principle that there can be a change in propositional constituents when there is no change in wording even in the case of sentences which contain no indexical expressions. (In other words: sentences can exhibit an indexicality which is not derived from the indexicality of their component expressions.)

Secondly, and more importantly, the genuine principle which can be derived from cases like (1) does nothing to support the account of belief reports which Crimmins and Perry wish to defend. In their view, the semantic contents of

(2a) Scott believes that Hesperus rises in the morning.

and

(2b) Scott believes that Phosphorus rises in the morning.

in a given context C, may differ because the context contributes different unarticulated constituents to (2a) and (2b). But it is incredible to suppose that cases like (1) lend any credence to such a view. In the case of (1), there is no word which can plausibly be connected to the place which (allegedly) forms part of the semantic content of (1). However, in the case of (2a) and (2b) there are obvious candidate words -- namely, "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" -- which could be semantically associated with the (allegedly) unarticulated constituents of the semantic contents of (2a) and (2b). So why suppose that these constituents of the semantic contents of (2a) and (2b) are not (parts of) the semantic contents of the words "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus"?

This mystery is deepened when we note that Crimmins and Perry claim that "the whole utterance, the context and the words uttered, are relevant to identifying the unarticulated constituent". The point in the first example seemed to be that, since there is no word in (1) which could have the place in question as its semantic value, it is necessary to suppose that the place in question is an unarticulated semantic constituent; but now we are told that in (2a) and (2b) the words "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus" are "relevant to identifying" certain constituents of the semantic contents of (2a) and (2b), and yet that these words can't have those constituents as (parts of) their semantic values.

This time, I take it that the obvious question to ask is: Why not suppose that the semantic constituents which Crimmins and Perry claim are unarticulated semantic constituents in propositional attitude reports are actually (parts of) the semantic contents of the names and demonstratives which appear in those reports? Isn't all this talk of unarticulated constituents of belief reports a pointless and unmotivated complication in the theory?

In sum, then, the crucial question for the two types of semantic theory which I have discussed centres on the thesis of semantic innocence. Crimmins and Perry claim that it is "well-motivated by many considerations in the philosophy of language". However, I cannot see that this is so; rather, it seems to me that this thesis is completely unmotivated, and that, in virtue of the above considerations, it is obvious that semantic theory would be better off without it. The point of the rest of this note is to explain why this is so.

In Seven Puzzles of Thought and How to Solve Them, Sainsbury and Tye argue for their Originalist theory of concepts on the basis that it solves seven well-known puzzles. These puzzles are traditionally seen as puzzles about language, and in particular puzzles concerning semantic content. Sainsbury and Tye argue that they have analogues as applied to the content of thoughts. In this paper I argue that their solution of Frege’s Identity Puzzle (from “On Sense and Reference”) is implausible, because Originalism fails to explain the difference in cognitive significance which Frege took to be the puzzling explanandum.

In her paper “Can Frege Pose Frege’s Puzzle”, Stavroula Glezakos argues for the claim that, unless one presupposes the theoretical notion of sense, there is no in-principle epistemic divide between sentences of the form “a=a” and “a=b”. It would follow that Frege’s puzzle cannot be used to argue in favour of senses, as Frege has done, on pain of circularity. Here I argue that a criterion of name identity based on the notion of explicit co-reference can be specified that does not presuppose the notion of sense. I show how such criterion is plausibly implicitly at work in setting up the puzzle, and that it can be deployed to rescue Frege from the accusation of circularity.

On appelle « indexical » un terme dont on ne peut déterminer la référence qu’en considérant le contexte d’usage dans lequel il est employé. Ce concept d’ « indexicalité » a gagné un regain d’intérêt à la fin des années 1970, plus exactement après la conférence de David Kaplan de 1977 : « Les démonstratifs. Un essai sur la sémantique, la logique, la métaphysique et l’épistémologie des démonstratifs et autres indexicaux », qui fixe la plupart des distinctions conceptuelles qui sont encore aujourd’hui débattues.
C’est la pertinence de cette stratégie référentielle d’analyse des phénomènes de dépendance contextuelle que nous souhaitons ici interroger, à l’aune des réflexions « contextualistes » menées par Charles Travis depuis la fin des années 1980.

Kripke's discussion in Naming and Necessity strongly suggests that semantic stipulation allows us to have new de re thoughts and make new de re claims. For example, it seems we could name the winning ticket in the next lottery 'Tickie' and thereby come to have singular thoughts about Tickie as opposed to merely general thoughts about the winning ticket (whichever one that is). This, in turn, seems to put us into a position to know that Tickie is the winning ticket. If so, it seems we now know which ticket will win the lottery. So it seems semantic stipulation puts us in a position to have all sorts of knowledge that, intuitively, we don't have. We argue that semantic stipulation does put you in a position to have new singular thoughts, though those thoughts will usually be informationally isolated. We think you also typically know these singular propositions, but it is misleading for you to say that you do since you typically cannot act on your knowledge in the expected way. On the other hand, since you can't act on the information in the right way, perhaps your knowledge is thwarted. If so, you don't know Tickie will win since you can't act on that information in order to (e.g.) buy Tickie and no other ticket. We develop both views and argue that they are preferable to the alternatives.

It is not well known that in his Göttingen period (1901-1916) Edmund Husserl developed a kind of direct reference theory, anticipating, among other things, the distinction between referential and attributive use of a definite description, which was rediscovered by Keith Donnellan in 1966 and further analysed by Saul Kripke in 1977. This paper defends the claim that Husserl's idea of the mental act given voice to in a speech act sheds new light on that distinction and particularly on cases where semantic referent and speaker's referent diverge. It is argued that when embedded in a dynamic theory of intentionality, the idea of giving-voice-to allows for a pragmatic (as opposed to a purely semantic) analysis of such cases. In section 1 an example involving a referentially used description is presented, and the view that descriptions that can be used both attributively and referentially are thus ambiguous is criticized. Section 2 is concerned with Husserl's discussion of a case where someone seems to demonstratively refer to something that he mistakes for something else. On the basis of this discussion, a dynamic conception of the intentional content (and referent) of the mental act given voice to in a speech act is developed. Section 3 applies this neo-Husserlian conception to the example described in section 1. Finally, it is shown how this conception serves to elucidate the referential/attributive distinction.

Joseph Almog says concerning “a certain locus where Quine doesn’t exist…qua evaluation locus, we take to it [singular] propositions involving Quine [as a constituent] which we have generated in our generation locus.” This seems to be either murder, or worse, self-contradiction. It presumes that certain designators designate their designata even at loci where the designata do not exist, i.e., the designators have “Kaplan rigidity.” Against this view, this paper argues that negative existentials such as “Quine does not exist” are true only at ordered couples of loci (times or possible worlds) < l, l’ > such that the constituents of the truthmaker are the designatum itself from l and whatever corresponds to “does not exist” from l’.

At first pass, internalism about justification holds that there is no justificatory difference without an internal difference. Content externalism holds that there are content differences without internal differences. Many find both plausible but they are in tension. What to do?

¿A qué nos referimos cuando sostenemos que Pegaso tiene dos
alas? Parece obvio que el enunciado tiene sentido, pero fallamos al señalar el referente. Una forma de entender este
tipo de enunciados, los cuales poseen personajes ficticios
o nombres vacíos como sujetos, es recurrir a la teoría de Meinong.
En lo presente, presentaré una serie de objeciones a dicha perspectiva inflacionaria,
en pos de una resolución ontológicamente mínima que respete nuestras intuiciones.

ABSTRACT
From human relations to philosophy, many problems arise because of the indefiniteness or indeterminacy of terms. In order to solve such problems, we need to determine the whatness or quiddity of the meaning of any term, sentence or statement. Questioning such quiddity requires the determination of how the terms of the language acquire their meaning in the first place. Most of the terms the meanings of which we need to determine the meanings are used to inform us about the objects in the external world. It is not possible to complete the semantics of natural languages without doing semantics of context sensitive terms like indexicals. In our work we present David Kaplan's theory of context sensitive terms. In cases of such terms any inquiry into the determination of the meanings of terms as well involve an answer to the question how we decide the reference of the terms. For this purpose, many philosophers like Frege and Russell in order to eliminate ambiguity in language and make language into a more objective endeavor to do semantics of names and descriptions. But they did not work on the
semantics of indexical terms which encompass a large portion of language. It is not possible to complete the semantics of
natural languages without doing semantics of context sensitive terms like indexicals. In our article we present and critically
discuss David Kaplan’s theory of indexical terms.

In this paper I challenge the widespread assumption that the conditions for singular reference are more or less the same as the conditions for singular thought. I claim that we refer singularly to things without thinking singularly about them more often than it is usually believed. I first argue that we should take the idea that singular thought is non-descriptive thought very seriously. If we do that, it seems that we cannot be so liberal about what counts as acquaintance; only perception (and memory) will do. I also briefly discuss and reject semantic instrumentalism. Finally, I argue that while singular reference is cheap, singular thought comes only at a price.

The purpose of this paper is to bring out, by means of a simple thought experiment involving demonstratives, a discrepancy between what is expressed and what is believed (which contradicts the Theory of Direct Reference), and to consider some consequences of this – most notably, whether we might hold, for example, that the ancients never believed that Hesperus is not Phosphorus.

At first pass, internalism about justification is the view that there is no justificatory difference without an internal difference. Externalism about mental content is the view that there are differences in mental content without an internal difference. Assuming (complete) mental contents are the primary bearers of justificatory features, the two views are in obvious tension. The goal of this paper is to determine how the tension is best resolved.

Nathan Salmon (1986a)(1986b)(1989) and Scott Soames (1987)(1988) defend a neo-Russellian account of the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions in which senses and modes of presentation play no part. They also defend an under-developed pragmatic theory in which senses and modes of presentation do play an important role.

Graeme Forbes (1987a)(1987b) defends a neo-Fregean account of the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions in which senses and modes of presentation play a crucial part. He contends that the view which is defended by Salmon and Soames is not really an alternative to the view which he defends. (Hence, I suppose, his view is not an alternative to their view, either.)

There are two issues which I wish to take up. First, in sections I-V, I explore the question whether there are really any important differences between the view defended by Salmon and Soames, and the view defended by Forbes. The conclusion which I defend is that there is very little which distinguishes between them.
Second, in sections VI-X, I take up the somewhat neglected question of how theories of propositional attitude ascriptions in the Frege-Russell tradition ought to construe the notions of sense and mode of presentation.

In this review I discuss Joseph Almog's book "Referential Mechanics". The book discusses direct reference as conceived by three of its founding fathers, Kripke, Kaplan and Donnellan, and introduces Almog's ambitious project of providing a referential semantics to all subject-phrases. I offer a brief overview of its four chapters and point out some of their virtues and shortcomings.

My aim in this paper is to present and discuss Miščević’s position on pejorative terms. Pejorative terms, for Miščević, are negative hybrid social kind terms that refer directly and pick out social kinds as their referents. Despite sharing some of Miščević’s intuitions on pejorative terms, I raise three main objections to his account. First, I argue that introducing pluralistic commitments about propositions is not helpful in any way for his account. On the contrary, I show that it brings about the falsity of meaning and the failure of reference. Furthermore, I point out that Miščević is mistaken in trying to avoid the problem of co-reference between terms such as “Boche” and “German”. I argue that there is no co-reference present because the referents of these two terms belong to two different social kinds. Finally, I raise a more general objection connected to the reference of social kind terms and, consequently, to pejorative terms as well. I bring up a worry that certain referential theories about pejorative terms, Miščević’s account included, might lack an explanation of what ties a social kind token to a particular social kind type.

"This paper reconstructs Moore’s Open Question Argument and discusses its rise and fall. There are three basic objections to the OQA:  Geach’s point, that Moore presupposes that ‘good’ is a predicative adjective (whereas it is in fact attributive); Lewy’s point, that it leads straight to the Paradox of Analysis; and Durrant’s point that even if ‘good ‘ is not synonymous with any naturalistic predicate, goodness might be synthetically identical with a naturalistic property. As against Geach, I argue that ‘good’ has both predicative and attributive uses and that in moral contexts it is difficult to give a naturalistic account of the attributive ‘good’.  To deal with Lewy, I reformulate the OQA.  But the bulk of the paper is devoted to Durrant’s objection.  I argue that the post-Moorean program of looking for synthetic identities between moral and naturalistic properties is either redundant or impossible. For it can only be carried through if ‘good’ expresses an empirical concept, in which case it is redundant since naturalism is true.  But ‘good’ does not express an empirical concept  (a point proved by the reformulated OQA). Hence synthetic naturalism is impossible.  I discuss direct reference as a possible way out for the synthetic naturalist and conclude that it will not work.  The OQA may be a bit battered but it works after a fashion.

Note: the first person to suggest the possibility of a synthetic identity between goodness and some natural property was not Putnam but my late Otago colleague, Bob Durrant