Comparative Cognition

What is it like to be an octopus, one of those eight-armed, infinitely flexible sea creatures with a nervous system distributed over head, eyes and arms? One interesting approach is to argue that octopuses, because of their distributed nervous systems, are likely to possess disunified consciousness (Carls-Diamante 2017). However, this supposed isomorphism between a "unified" nervous system and "unified" consciousness is problematic, since the term "unity" is taken as a "given" even though it is far from clear what it means. I will argue that explaining the structure of consciousness requires a prior explanation in terms of how it is achieved by the organism through sensorimotor integration. On this account, the structure of an organism's consciousness is explained partly by what the external world is like, and partly by how the organism's body, senses and nervous system enable the organism to interact with the external world.

Music is commonly employed as auditory enrichment in NHP facilities under the assumption that music is as enriching for NHPs as it is for humans (Hinds et al., 2007; Lutz & Novak, 2005). The purpose of this study was to assess the utility of music as NHP enrichment by exploring musical preference and discriminative ability in three Sumatran orangutans. In Experiment 1, orangutan preference for music vs. silence was tested. Following exposure to a sample of music belonging to one of seven musical genres, orangutans were given the choice via touchscreen to continue to listen to the music sample previously played or to listen to silence instead.  Results indicated that all three orangutans either preferred silence to music or were indifferent.  No preference for any one of the musical genres tested over others was found.  In Experiment 2, orangutans’ ability to discriminate music from scrambled music was assessed using a touchscreen-delivered standard delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) ...

Music is commonly employed as auditory enrichment in non-human primate (NHP) facilities under the assumption that music is as enriching for NHPs as it is for humans (Hinds et al. 2007; Lutz and Novak 2005). The purpose of this study was to assess the utility of music as NHP enrichment by exploring musical preference and discriminative ability in three Sumatran orangutans. In Experiment 1, orangutan preference for music vs silence was tested. Following exposure to a sample of music belonging to one of seven musical genres, orangutans were given the choice via touchscreen to continue to listen to the music sample previously played or to listen to silence instead. Results indicated that all three orangutans either preferred silence to music or were indifferent. No preference for any one of the musical genres tested over others was found. In Experiment 2, orangutans' ability to discriminate music from scrambled music was assessed using a touchscreen delivered standard delayed matchi...

Les forêts du Moyen Atlas sont d’un intérêt mondial, toutefois leur intégrité écologique et leur survie sont menacées.Le Singe magot est un indicateur fiable de l’état de la forêt et la mortalité des Cèdres du Moyen Atlas ne peut lui être attribuée.Ces deux espèces font partie d’un même écosystème et subissent, en conséquence les mêmes menaces.Les cédraies  dépérissent  et sont sujettes nombreuses attaques dont  les causes changements climatiques,  diversité spécifique, densité, épidémie, magot...De  nombreuses  menaces  pèsent  sur  cet  écosystème.  Le  surpâturage  et  l'exploitation  forestière réduisent chaque année la surface des grandes cédraies, réduisant de plus en plus l'habitat  du  singe  et  la  diversité  de  son  régime  alimentaire,  Sans  oublier    la  sécheresse.  En  effet,  selon  le  Fonds mondial  pour  la  Nature  (WWF), la  densité  végétale  des  forêts  du  Moyen  Atlas  aurait  diminué  de  40%  depuis  les  15  dernières  années.Ce  qui  fait  que  le singe  magot  sort  souvent    de    la    forêt    pour    aller    se  nourrir  près  des  villages.  Les disfonctionnements observés n’ont pas une explication claire, et nécessitent de nombreuses  mesures  d’interventions. Aussi, il est temps d’adopter une stratégie plus préventive pour protéger  les  cédraies  marocaines,  en  misant  sur  la  gestion  à  long  terme  des  perturbations dans le cadre de l’écosystème.

Contemporary plant biologists take seriously the notion of plant cognition or intelligence (Gross 2016; Trewavas 2016), yet there is still no consensus on how these abilities are to be described (e.g., Calvo 2016). Most contentious has been the formulation of the intelligent behaviour of plants as ‘neurological’ (ibid; Alpi et al. 2007). I argue that there is no consensus because there is yet to be a principled way to distinguish between the adaptive behaviours plants display (Cvrčková et al. 2009, 395). What are needed to settle this matter are principled distinctions for the kinds of behaviour attributed to plants. This can be achieved by the application of criteria that generally delineate the cognitive, and that discriminate between kinds of cognitive abilities. To this end, I use an evolutionary taxonomy of cognitive control developed by Kim Sterelny (2003) to establish principled grounds upon which the plant cognition debate can be resolved.

In this essay I explore the resources Thomas Aquinas provides for enquiries concerning the psychological abilities of non-human animals. I first look to Aquinas’s account of divine, angelic, human, and non-human animal naming, to help us articulate the contours of a ‘critical anthropocentrism’ that aims to steer clear of the mistakes of a naïve anthropocentrism and misconceived avowals to entirely eschew anthropocentrism. I then address the need for our critical anthropocentrism both to reject the mental-physical dichotomy endorsed by ‘folk psychology’ and to articulate a more adequate ‘commonsense psychology’ that acknowledges most embodied animal behavior is observable psychological behavior.

Next, I argue that we can develop Aquinas’s doctrine of estimation and conation to formulate an account of nonhuman animal action that more adequately characterizes the purposeful behaviors of non-human animals. To do so, we first need to recognize a wider range of non-human animal behaviors that are captured by Aquinas’s ‘estimative sense’ and that all of these behaviors are specified by a finite variety of particular goods confined to the animals’ environmental niches. But we also need to supplement Aquinas’s account of human and non-human animal agency by exploring the ontogeny and ecology of how humans and other animals become attuned to affordances within these different environmental niches. I argue that we should look to Aquinas’s account of non-human animal capacities in ST I-II 6-17 for subtle insights that can expand our understanding of how non-human animals engage in purposeful behavior by exercising analogous non-rational and imperfectly voluntary forms of intention, deliberation, choice, execution, and enjoyment. I conclude with an outline for how future enquiry can seek to explain the nonrational purposeful problem-solving competencies of chimps, canines, corvids, cetaceans, cephalopods, and other nonhuman animal species.

Michael Tomasello (2016) prominently defends the view that there are uniquely human capacities required for shared intentions, therefore great apes do not share intentions. I show that these uniquely human capacities for abstraction are not necessary for shared intentionality. Excluding great apes from shared intentions because they lack certain capacities for abstraction assumes a specific interpretation of shared intentionality, (which I call the Roleplaying Model). I undermine the necessity of abstraction for shared intentionality by presenting an alternative model of shared intentionality, which I call the Normative Model. I build on Margaret Gilbert's idea that normativity is always a part of shared intentionality. In my model, I substitute Gilbert's account of obligation for Kristin Andrews' (2020) more inclusive account of animal social norms. If the Normative Model is plausible that suggests that uniquely human capacities for abstraction are not required for shared intentionality. By undermining the necessity of uniquely human abstraction, I make cases of prima-facie cooperation in chimpanzees plausible instances of shared intentionality. The denial of nonhuman shared intentionality creates a problem insofar as apparent shared intentional activity cannot be fully analyzed. The Normative Model resolves this problem.

Human children 18 – 24 months of age and 3 young chimpanzees interacted in 4 cooperative activities with a human adult partner. The human children successfully participated in cooperative problem-solving activities and social games, whereas the chimpanzees were uninterested in the social games. As an experimental manipulation, in each task the adult partner stopped participating at a specific point during the activity. All children produced at least one communicative attempt to reengage him, perhaps suggesting that they were trying to reinstate a shared goal. No chimpanzee ever made any communicative attempt to reengage the partner. These results are interpreted as evidence for a uniquely human form of cooperative activity involving shared intentionality that emerges in the second year of life.

A widespread assumption in experimental comparative (animal) cognition is that, barring compelling evidence to the contrary, the default hypothesis should postulate the simplest cognitive ontology (mechanism, process, or structure) consistent with the animal’s behavior. I call this assumption the principle of cognitive simplicity (PoCS). In this essay, I show that PoCS is pervasive but unjustified: a blanket preference for the simplest cognitive ontology is not justified by any of the available arguments. Moreover, without a clear sense of how cognitive ontologies are to be carved up at the joints—and which tools are appropriate for the job—PoCS rests on shaky conceptual ground.

Many organisms coordinate their group behavior in time. On a short timescale, group vocalizations, movements or visual displays can exhibit temporal interdependence. Synchronous behavior has received significantly more attention than all other forms of animal coordination. Antisynchrony (i.e., perfect alternation) is produced in nature, but only recently perceptual biases toward antisynchrony were independently found in human infants and fiddler crabs. Here, these unrelated experiments are linked and inserted into a broader quantitative framework. Future comparative research should encompass perception of other forms of coordination across species and explanatory levels, toward an integrative neuro-evolutionary framework of temporal coordination.

Empirical investigations of humans, pigeons, rats, and monkeys have indicated that these species will select free over forced choice, even when faced with identical outcomes. However, the same has yet to be quantitatively confirmed in nonhuman great apes. This experiment is the first systematic investigation of preference for free or forced choice in great apes using a paradigm in which extraneous variables are highly controlled. Three orangutans were given a choice of one of two virtual routes, one that provided a choice and one that did not via a touchscreen computer program. Choice of either route was rewarded with the same type and quantity of food. Initial results indicated a preference for free choice across all three participants. However, in two control conditions, orangutans' preferences varied, suggesting a weaker tendency to exercise choice than species previously tested. We suggest further investigation of preference for free and forced choice in orangutans and other great apes through alternative experimental paradigms that focus on increasing the fidelity of free and forced choice options. Cross-cultural preference for free choice has been extensively demonstrated in humans. Results suggests that choice, or even the illusion of choice, has affective, cognitive, motiva-tional, behavioral, and physiological benefits

With its roots firmly planted in behaviorist and animal learning traditions, lab-based research is an enduring and pervasive characteristic of comparative cognition. In this review, we discuss progress in comparative cognition research in other experimental settings such as zoos, captive animal parks, and wild settings. Zoos provide access to a large array of species housed in seminatural environments that allow a reasonable degree of experimental control. Thanks to the advent of computer technology, a wide range of complex cognitive processes is increasingly being successfully studied in zoo environments. Further, cognitive research provides enrichment for captive animal participants, reducing anxiety and promoting psychological well-being. The results of cognitive research also benefit the welfare of captive animals through preference assessment, species-specific exhibit design, and behavioral management. Field settings also offer unique advantages and have allowed researchers to systematically study such diverse topics as spatial cognition, cultural transmission, problem solving, and preference. Not only does field research expand our understanding of the evolutionary and ecological drivers of animal cognition, but it also can directly inform conservation efforts. Although venturing out of the lab presents tangible challenges, including the restriction of testable hypotheses and conclusions that can be inferred from results, the benefits to be gained outweigh the costs.

There is a diffuse sentiment that to anthropomorphize is a mild vice that people tend to do easily and pleasingly, but that an adult well educated person should avoid. In this paper it will be provided an elucidation of " anthropomorphism " in the field of common sense knowledge, the issue of animal rights, and about the use of humans as a model in the scientific explanation. It will be argued for a " constructive anthropomorphism, " i.e., the idea that anthropomorphism is a natural attitude to attribute human psychological features to other individuals, no matter they are actually rational agents, or not. If we know the " grammar " of this attitude, we can avoid the risks in overestimating the environmental inputs toward anthropomor-phism and, at the same time, take the heuristic advantages of anthropomor-phism in the use of human mind as a model for both everyday circumstances and scientific enterprise.

The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the cognitive mind of the great ape.  This assessment will examine the multiple facets of ape cognition, what it consists of, and its many dimensions.  The current investigation seeks to demonstrate evidence of cognition and mind.  Recent primate literature will be reviewed with an interdisciplinary approach, taking into account research in anthropology, biology, ethology, primatology, and psychology.  The science of studying the faculty of apes will be highlighted, and examples that suggest cognitive processes will be provided.  Focusing on empirical evidence, the following cognitive abilities of great apes will be explored:  complex and meaningful use of language, deception, manipulation, imagination, and understanding.  Cognition and language are highly intertwined.  The inferior capacity of animals to use language may in fact be a consequence of cognitive and learning limitations.  After all, without the ability to think, there would be little need for language, because there would not be any ideas to communicate.  Therefore, the progression of ape research and ape language research must consider the evolution of the animal mind.  Examples will be used to illustrate evidence of thinking, problem solving, social interaction, and the use of social information.

There is a diffuse sentiment that to anthropomorphize is a mild vice that people tend to do easily and pleasingly, but that an adult well educated person should avoid. In this paper it will be provided an elucidation of " anthropomorphism " in the field of common sense knowledge, the issue of animal rights, and about the use of humans as a model in the scientific explanation. It will be argued for a " constructive anthropomorphism, " i.e., the idea that anthropomorphism is a natural attitude to attribute human psychological features to other individuals, no matter they are actually rational agents, or not. If we know the " grammar " of this attitude, we can avoid the risks in overestimating the environmental inputs toward anthropomor-phism and, at the same time, take the heuristic advantages of anthropomor-phism in the use of human mind as a model for both everyday circumstances and scientific enterprise.

Sea otters are well known tool users, yet the cognitive capacities of other otter species have been sparsely studied. Precedent exists for non-tool using species closely related to native tool users to display comparable abilities under experimental conditions. The social intelligence hypothesis predicts complex cognitive capacities in socially complex species. Using the Aesop’s Fable paradigm – wherein subjects drop stones into a cylinder half-filled with water to acquire floating out-of-reach food items – I assessed North American river otters’, Asian small-clawed otters, and giant river otters abilities to solve a novel tool-mediated problem. Sticks and water were presented with the stones, providing opportunities for tool use. No otters successfully completed the task. Interaction with the apparatus decreased significantly across sessions, possibly contributing to the otters not solving the task. A better understanding of the similarities and differences in the cognitive abilities of these species can inform future conservation efforts.

Dominance hierarchies are ubiquitous in the societies of human and non-human animals. Evidence from comparative, developmental, and cognitive psychological investigations is presented that show how social dominance hierarchies shaped the evolution of the human mind, and hence, human social institutions. It is argued that the pressures that arise from living in hierarchical social groups laid a foundation of fundamental concepts and cognitive strategies that are crucial to surviving in social dominance hierarchies. These include recognizing and reasoning transitively about dominance relations, fast-track learning of social norms (permissions, prohibitions, and obligations), detecting violations of social norms (cheating), monitoring reciprocal obligations, and reading the intentions of others.

Deeper understanding of the neuronal basis of behavior and its evolution requires investigation of model organisms taken from different taxonomic groups. The merits of this comparative approach are highlighted by research on birds: while their cognitive capacities have long been underestimated, research on avian model systems more recently has begun to provide central insights into the functional organization of the brain. In particular, domesticated homing pigeons (Columba livia) have been used as a model for the study of the psychological processes underlying learning, memory, and choice behavior, and much of current animal learning theory is based on findings with pigeons. Moreover, the vast amount of available behavioral and anatomical data has rendered the pigeon one of the key model species of behavioral and comparative neuroscience. This article illustrates some insights gained from research with pigeons with applicability beyond the class of aves.

La empatía se define coloquialmente como la capacidad de ponerse en los zapatos del otro, lo que implica una capacidad de entender los estados emocionales de los congéneres. Durante mucho tiempo esta característica nos pareció una habilidad exclusiva de los humanos, sin embargo investigaciones recientes nos han demostrado que los roedores podría ser capaces de experimentar estados empáticos y ayudar a sus conspecíficos que se encuentran en situaciones estresantes.
Estos hallazgos tienen un impacto importante a nivel de trato digno a los animales y el potencial
impacto en discusiones bioéticas. Dicha investigación nos devela nuestro lado animal y nos muestra
que estamos más conectados con los animales de lo que imaginamos.

Abstract. This paper examines the significance of imitation in non-human animals with respect to the phylogenetic origins of culture and cognitive complexity. It is argued that both imitation (learning about behaviour through nonspecific observation) and social learning (learning about the environment through conspecific observation) can mediate social transmission of information, and that neither is likely to play an important role in supporting behavioural traditions or culture. Current evidence suggests that imitation is unlikely to do this because it does not insulate information from modification through individual learning in the retention period between acquisition and re-transmission. Although insignificant in relation to culture, imitation apparently involves complex and little-understood cognitive operations. It is unique in requiring animals spontaneously to equate extrinsic visual input with proprioceptive and/or kinaesthetic feedback from their own actions, but not in requiring or implicating self-consciousness, representation, metarepresentation or a capacity for goal-directed action.

Three rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) per-
formed a simultaneous chaining task in which stimuli had
to be sorted according to their visual properties. Each
stimulus could vary independently along two dimensions
(luminosity and radius), and a cue indicating which
dimension to sort by was random trial to trial. These rapid
and unpredictable changes constitute a task-switching
paradigm, in which subjects must encode task demands and
shift to whichever task-set is presently activated. In con-
trast to the widely reported task-switching delay observed
in human studies, our subjects show no appreciable
reduction in reaction times following a switch in the task
requirements. Also, in contrast to the results of studies on
human subjects, monkeys experienced enduring interfer-
ence from trial-irrelevant stimulus features, even after
exhaustive training. These results are consistent with a
small but growing body of evidence that task-switching in
rhesus macaques differs in basic ways from the pattern of
behavior reported in studies of human cognition. Given the
importance of task-switching paradigms in cognitive and
clinical assessment, and the frequency with which corre-
sponding animal models rely on non-human primates,
understanding these differences in behavior is essential to
the comparative study of cognitive impairment.

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) sometimes help both humans and conspecifics in experimental situations in which immediate selfish benefits can be ruled out. However, in several experiments, chimpanzees have not provided food to a conspecific even when it would cost them nothing, leading to the hypothesis that prosociality in the food-provisioning context is a derived trait in humans. Here, we show that chimpanzees help conspecifics obtain both food and non-food items—given that the donor cannot get the food herself. Furthermore, we show that the key factor eliciting chimpanzees’ targeted helping is the recipients’ attempts to either get the food or get the attention of the potential donor. The current findings add to the accumulating body of evidence that humans and chimpanzees share the motivation and skills necessary to help others in situations in which they cannot selfishly benefit. Humans, however, show prosocial motives more readily and in a wider range of contexts.

A pesar de ser una visión dominante, el programa antropocéntrico presenta errores en la manera en la que entiende la evolución de la cognición social, ya que su sistema de comparación tiene como base el ser humano. El programa ecológico, por otra parte, señala este error y propone que la base de la comparación debe ser ecológico-adaptativa, es decir, que la sofisticación de la cognición social, y por consecuencia del grado de complejidad social de las especies, surge de demandas ambientales que promueven la cooperación entre individuos y no de su cercanía filogenética con el humano. En el presente trabajo, realizamos una crítica de la perspectiva antropocéntrica dominante de la investigación en cognición social; asimismo, proponemos que este campo debe ampliarse y partir de la perspectiva ecológica del estudio del comportamiento y la cognición mostrando el vacío teórico y sintético que nos urge a realizar una síntesis de la cognición social comparada.