Claire Harkins

This book examines the ‘web of influence’ formed by industries which manufacture and sell ‘addictive’ products in the EU. The differences between alcohol, food, gambling, and tobacco as consumer products are obvious. However, we explore whether food, alcohol, and gambling industries are merely replicating tobacco tactics or innovating in corporate strategy. Using a new data set on corporate networks formed by the tobacco, alcohol, food, and gambling industries at the EU level, the book shows the interlocking connections between corporations, trade associations, and policy intermediaries, including lobbyists and think tanks. Quantitative data guide qualitative studies on the content of corporate strategy and the attempts of corporations to ‘capture’ policy and three crucial ancillary domains—science, civil society, and the news and promotional media. The effects of these three arenas on policy networks and outcomes are examined with a focus on new forms of policy partnership such as ...

<p>Science can provide a rationale and a basis for policy decisions; therefore, corporate planners see it as a crucial resource. This chapter draws on our structural data to show how science policy organizations play a role in pursuing corporate strategy. Corporations create 'sound science' lobby and front groups, and they fund libertarian and neoliberal think tanks and groupings to attack and undermine scientists. They try to influence and capture public and policy debates on issues related to the regulation of addictive substances or services. Specifically, they help to provide a range of experts and advisors that can be tapped by the policy and decision-making apparatus at the national and EU levels. Regulatory systems at national and EU levels are mostly insufficient to monitor or manage the conflicts of interest that arise as a result.</p>

<p>This chapter examines how policy is captured and aims to show how the capture of the other domains examined in this book relate to the ultimate prize of policy capture. Notable, however, policy can be captured variety of ways. The chapter considers two dimensions of policy capture—upstream and downstream. 'Downstream' refers to attempts to influence particular policy measures that might directly affect the industry concerned. 'Upstream' refers to influencing the agreed procedures by which decisions on particular matters will be taken in years to come. After that we turn to a relatively recent innovation in policy making that challenges the very categories adopted in policy studies. Partnership governance breaches the seemingly clear conceptual split between interest groups and government. We examine some key UK and EU examples in the addictions field, asking about the implications for public health and corporate power.</p>

<p>The chapter examines the varying ways 'addiction' has been conceived and the impact of this on both corporate strategy and government policy. It examines the profit-oriented strategies of addiction related industries, the networks they construct to manage policy questions and the varying levels of governance at which corporations operate in the contemporary world. It is argued that the legal status of a particular addictive substance or behaviour has crucial though sometimes unrecognized effects on the ways in which it is traded and consumed. The chapter then includes case studies of the status of alcohol under prohibition and the Opium Wars before going on to examine the role of the US and UK governments in relation to the opium trade in contemporary Afghanistan. The chapter concludes by pointing to similar issues that are faced in policy terms in relation to both legal and illegal addictive substances and behaviours.</p>

<p>This chapter examines the policy role of advertising, marketing, and the media in corporate strategy. This area was shown by our network analysis to be central to corporate networks at the EU level. We examine the extent to which the advertising, marketing, and media industries co-operate with addiction-related industries in their lobbying and related political strategies; how addiction-related industries engage in debate and strategic action in relation to questions of advertising, marketing, and media; and how corporations engage with the news media to protect their interests. In the course of this, we examine case studies of the World Federation of Advertisers, MediaSmart, and the Advertising Education Forum amongst other lobby groups.</p>

<p>This chapter explores contributions from three organizations that occupy the terrain somewhere between corporations and civil society; the Institute of Ideas/Spiked, the Democracy Institute, and the Institute of Economic Affairs. These groups engage in science-related debates on addiction. They play an active role in creating doubt about the public health consequences or public health solutions to the problems associated with alcohol, food, and gambling. Such organization can be seen to take an increasingly proactive role within policy debates around public health regulation. Whether or not these activities are part of a deliberate corporate strategy or a consequence of third-party lobbying activity is unclear. This chapter argues that to understand the exercise of corporate power, researchers must go beyond traditional units of analysis and consider the contributions and motivations of opaque organizations.</p>

<p>This chapter uses social network analysis to explore the web of influence of the four 'addictive' industries examined in the book: alcohol, tobacco, food, and gambling. The data are used to paint an overall picture before taking a closer look in subsequent chapters. The four industries form more or less separated clusters, and whereas the alcohol and food industries are very well interconnected, the gambling and tobacco industries are only loosely tied to the others. The network also shows that advertising and marketing sectors and think tanks often act as connecting hubs between the industries. The closer look at the clusters of the four industries shows some important differences. The food cluster is more heterogeneous than the others are; the alcohol cluster contains product-related subclusters; and gambling, as well as tobacco, is smaller and less dense compared with the other two.</p>

<p>This chapter develops the central research questions of the book and lays down some of the basic assumptions we took. It is argued that corporate actors form a network of influence that reaches into every area of public life. Therefore, researching the influence of business on public policy making cannot concentrate on single actors but must emphasize the network. The chapter does so by applying classical power structure research to the digital age. The research approach is designed to allow the combination of various, very heterogeneous data sources—such as scanned material, data available online, and handcrafted structured data—into one database that can be used for network research. We conclude the chapter by taking a closer look at the sources we used to investigate the important actors within the network.</p>

Civil society is widely thought of as an obstacle to corporate political strategy. This chapter suggests that civil society can be an ally in corporate attempts to undermine public health. It reviews the use of astroturf (i.e. fake grassroots groups) and ‘sock puppets’ (i.e. fake online identities) and discusses these in relation to the corporate-backed ‘sound science’ lobby. The chapter reviews the role of the tobacco and other addictive industries in creating front groups to pursue sectional corporate interests. It looks in turn at interlocking efforts such as the European Science and Environment Forum, the Risk of Freedom briefing, and more recent ventures such as the Institute of Ideas and Spiked the Democracy Institute. These groups are mostly not transparent about their relations with the corporations, and may exhibit some measure of independence from their corporate funders; however, any independence—real or manufactured—is not necessarily a disadvantage.

The appointment of senior civil servant David Frost as Chief Executive of the Scotch Whisky Association, one of the alcohol industry’s most aggressive lobby groups, is just the latest high profile case of the revolving door between government advisers and large corporations.

The rise of think tanks is a key development in the evolution of policy networks. The sheer scale and reach of think tanks is underappreciated: for example, the European Policy Institutes Network has a membership of at least 500 think tanks. In Europe, the conversation about the relationship between think tanks, new policy elites, and the politics of expertise is still at an early stage. Think tanks, however, are widely held to play a fundamental role in the politics of expertise in Brussels. In this chapter we first examine how think tanks appear in our network data and then review the activities and role of five central think tanks in the Brussels arena. Our data show that, empirically speaking, think tanks are an important and underappreciated element of the architecture of corporate policy action in relation to tobacco, alcohol, food, and gambling products.