Joe Majerus

The present article sets out to more thoroughly examine George Marshall’s geo-political reasoning on strategic peace-building and the fundamentals of a more viable and sustainable peace structure. In so doing, it shows that although Marshall had been mainly preoccupied with the military side of the United States’ engagement in world affairs, he all the same developed a keen understanding of the strategic imperatives needed to fashion a more stable international order – particularly as concerned the methodical integration of America’s various foreign policies on a global scale.

For several decades, the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 have been the subject of a fierce debate between orthodox and ‘revisionist’ historians. In so doing, however, historians have for the most part neglected to look more closely into questions of a primarily economic and organisational nature in investigating the contributing factors to the American decision-making process. Accordingly, this analysis explores systematically how in addition to the predominant need of avoiding further combat casualties, a speedy conclusion of the Pacific conflict was also deemed critical to a successful re-transition of United States war-time production to a thriving peace-time economy, as well as to a comprehensive rehabilitation of the war-shattered European continent.

The decision to employ nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 is arguably one of the most thoroughly investigated subjects in American history. Notably revisionist historians have repeatedly faulted the Truman administration for too easily discarding alternative options, arguing that a simple guarantee to retain the Japanese Emperor would have sufficed to make the Japanese government lay down arms almost immediately. In contrast to that position, the present article, however, maintains that American authorities did indeed have legitimate grounds not to expect that such concessions would in any way lead to a swift conclusion of the Pacific War, particularly since regardless of the Emperor issue there still remained the question of the appropriate moment and manner in which to exact a full surrender from the Imperial Army itself by decisively breaking its considerable military and political clout.

Morality and historical experience require nothing less of us than rendering refugees our full and unrelenting assistance. Just as important, however, failure to help them might also entail dire long-term consequences for our own long-term safety and security, notably by presenting Islamic extremists with the very means, mindsets and social environments necessary for waging war against us on a trans-national scale. Accordingly, this is the time to realize that the people now seeking shelter and sanctuary with us from the horrors in their native countries have no intention whatsoever to wrest away our economic privileges, nor to undercut our established values. Finally, this is also the time to link the current refugee crisis more closely to distinct geopolitical issues and concerns, notably by more systematically considering the wider strategic setbacks likely to be incurred if politicians prove unable to devise applicable solutions to the real human suffering endemic to this harrowing tragedy.

The "Responsibility to Protect"-Doctrine (R2P) is not as much an obstacle to ending human suffering in war-torn countries as its detractors maintain. Originally conceived as a UN-sponsored attempt to provide the international community with a more efficient instrument for preventing or halting mass violence and human rights violations, it was hoped that R2P would overcome the controversies frequently associated with humanitarian interventions. Yet ever since its conception, R2P has likewise met with extensive criticism in regard to some of its key tenets. In particular it is argued that a potential military intervention in governments' internal affairs not only constitutes an encroachment upon state sovereignty, but also merely serves as a pretext of stronger states to impose their will upon weaker ones....

The question of whether states pursue absolute or relative gains in international politics has divided neo-realism and neo-liberalism for quite some time now. Thus whereas neo-realists contend that states seek comparative advantages relative to other actors, neo-liberal scholars argue that they are primarily interested in the accomplishment of absolute individual gains. In applying social-constructivist ideas, however, this paper will attempt to demonstrate that such a preference for relative or absolute gains is not naturally predetermined, but inextricably linked to the continual 're-construction' of states' national identities and interests. In other words, it is political actors' own conception and definition of international relations which ultimately determines their concern for absolute or relative gains.

By analyzing the decision-making process of the Truman Administration for using nuclear weapons against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, this case study will show that American leaders were altogether much more preoccupied with achieving absolute rather than relative gains. Such absolute considerations were simultaneously influenced by the pressures of an anarchic self-help system as well as by specific domestic imperatives and the personal views of individual policy-makers on how to best handle international problems and exigencies. More concretely, American decision-makers believed that only the realization of absolute gains such as swift socio-economic recovery and the creation of a more stable and peaceful security environment would ultimately ensure their country's long-term international position in both absolute and relative terms.