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AbstractWe show that the full version of the so-called "rural hospital theorem" generalizes to many-to-many matching problems where agents on both sides of the problem have substitutable and weakly separable preferences. We reinforce our result by showing that when agents' preferences satisfy substitutability, the domain of weakly separable preferences is also maximal for the rural hospital theorem to hold.
Suggested Citation
Flip Klijn & Ay?e Yaz?c?, 2014.
"A Many-to-Many "Rural Hospital Theorem","
Working Papers
567, Barcelona School of Economics.
Handle:
RePEc:bge:wpaper:567
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