Author
Listed:
- Hillas, John
- Kohlberg, Elon
AbstractThis chapter examines the conceptual foundations of the concept of strategic equilibrium and its various variants and refinements. The emphasis is very much on the underlying ideas rather than on any technical details.After an examination of some pre-equilibrium ideas, in particular the concept of rationalizability, the concept of strategic (or Nash) equilibrium is introduced. Various interpretations of this concept are discussed and a proof of the existence of such equilibria is sketched.Next, the concept of correlated equilibrium is introduced. This concept can be thought of as retaining the self-enforcing aspect of the idea of equilibrium while relaxing the independence assumption.Most of the remainder of the chapter is concerned with the ideas underlying the refinement of equilibrium: admissibility and iterated dominance; backward induction; forward induction; and ordinality and various invariances to changes in the player set. This leads to a consideration of the concept of strategic stability, a strong refinement satisfying these various ideas.Finally there is a brief examination of the epistemic approach to equilibrium and the relation between strategic equilibrium and correlated equilibrium.
Suggested Citation
Hillas, John & Kohlberg, Elon, 2002.
"Foundations of strategic equilibrium,"
Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 42, pages 1597-1663,
Elsevier.
Handle:
RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-42
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the
CitEc Project, subscribe to its
RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2012.
"Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two‐Player Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1639-1699, July.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2009.
"Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic Two-Player Games,"
Research Papers
2021, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2010.
"Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection For Generic Two-Player Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000203, David K. Levine.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009.
"Axiomatic Equilibrium Selection for Generic two-player games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
814577000000000231, David K. Levine.
- De Sinopoli, Francesco & Meroni, Claudia & Pimienta, Carlos, 2014.
"Strategic stability in Poisson games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 46-63.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005.
"Justification of Stable Equilibria,"
Research Papers
1896, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Gatti, Nicola & Gilli, Mario & Marchesi, Alberto, 2020.
"A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 240-255.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2009.
"On Forward Induction,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 77(1), pages 1-28, January.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2006.
"On Forward Induction,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
321307000000000618, David K. Levine.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008.
"On Forward Induction,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
122247000000001859, David K. Levine.
- Wilson, Robert B. & Govindan, Srihari, 2007.
"On Forward Induction,"
Research Papers
1955, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2007.
"On Forward Induction,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000788, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2007.
"'On Forward Induction,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
321307000000000825, David K. Levine.
- , & , B., 2006.
"Sufficient conditions for stable equilibria,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(2), pages 167-206, June.
- R. J. Aumann & J. H. Dreze, 2005.
"When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect?,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp387, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- R.J., AUMANN & Jacques-Henri, DREZE, 2005.
"When All is Said and Done, How Should You Play and What Should You Expect ?,"
Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques)
2005021, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- AUMANN, Robert J. & DREZE, Jacques H., 2005.
"When all is said and done, how should you play and what should you expect ?,"
LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE
2005021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Françoise Forges & József Sákovics, 2022.
"Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(3), pages 589-605, November.
- Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017.
"Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games,"
Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(3), pages 318-343, July.
- Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017.
"Mindreading and endogenous beliefs in games,"
Post-Print
halshs-01589566, HAL.
- Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017.
"Mindreading and Endogenous Beliefs in Games,"
Working Papers
halshs-01469136, HAL.
- Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017.
"Mindreading and Endogenous Beliefs in Games,"
GREDEG Working Papers
2017-01, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Jun 2017.
- Nicola, Gatti & Mario, Gilli & Fabio, Panozzo, 2016.
"Further results on verification problems in extensive-form games,"
Working Papers
347, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised 15 Jul 2016.
- Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018.
"Bayesian game theorists and non-Bayesian players,"
The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(6), pages 1420-1454, November.
- Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017.
"Bayesian Game Theorists and Non-Bayesian Players,"
GREDEG Working Papers
2017-30, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France, revised Jul 2018.
- Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018.
"Bayesian Game Theorists and Non-Bayesian Players,"
Post-Print
halshs-01941773, HAL.
- Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018.
"Bayesian Game Theorists and non-Bayesian Players,"
Working Papers
halshs-01633126, HAL.
- Ozan Candogan & Ishai Menache & Asuman Ozdaglar & Pablo A. Parrilo, 2011.
"Flows and Decompositions of Games: Harmonic and Potential Games,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 36(3), pages 474-503, August.
- Xiao Luo & Xuewen Qian & Yang Sun, 2021.
"The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(2), pages 579-601, March.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008.
"Metastable Equilibria,"
Mathematics of Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 33(4), pages 787-820, November.
- Srihari Govindan & Robert Wilson, 2008.
"Axiomatic Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Signalling Games with Generic Payoffs,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
122247000000002381, David K. Levine.
- Man, Priscilla T.Y., 2012.
"Forward induction equilibrium,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 265-276.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005.
"Refinements of Nash Equilibrium,"
Research Papers
1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2007.
"Stable Outcomes of Generic Games in Extensive Form,"
Research Papers
1933r, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- Sun, Lan, 2016.
"Hypothesis testing equilibrium in signaling games,"
Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers
557, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamchp:3-42. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bookseriesdescription.cws_home/BS_HE/description .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through
the various RePEc services.