Trust And Cooperation In Natural Resource
Management: The Case Of Agistment In Rangelands
R.R.J. McAllister1, I.J.Gordon1 and M.A. Janssen2
1
CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems, 2Arizona State University, E-mail: Iain.Gordon@csiro.au
Keywords: Rangelands; Complex adaptive system; Agistment; Networks; Trust; Cooperation.
institutions may be insufficient and formal polices
which support those of an informal nature may be
effective in improving outcomes from cooperative
actions in rangelands.
EXTENDED ABSTRACT
Reciprocal altruism is paradoxical; theoretically
the more one is trusted, the better the outcomes
from one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas, although for
individuals the best outcomes are when trust is
not reciprocated. Most real life games are not
one-shot, but iterated where trust develops
through past actions (Cárdenas and Ostrom,
2004). Furthermore, in social-ecological systems
outcomes are driven by the biophysical context.
In rangelands, our focus, low levels of
biophysical variation limit the returns from
trusting others and vice versa (McAllister et al., in
press). Regardless of context, individuals who are
too trusting always loose out.
We explore trust and cooperation using agistment
of livestock in Australian rangelands as an
example, which is a human response to variation
in rangeland resources in time and space.
Agistment interactions are essentially iterated
interactions, where livestock is transferred
between pastoral enterprises in a commercial
arrangement. The interaction occurs between a
pastoralist with a shortage of forage (whether
induced by rainfall deficiencies or management
practices) and another who have an excess.
Agistment may facilitate stock movements
between pastoralists when it is not possible to
maintain an economically viable herd in the longterm on a single management unit and where
attempts to do so can lead to the loss of income or
capital (livestock or landscape function)
(Goodhue and McCarthy, 2000).
Figure 1. Relationship between the trust placed in
others and the percentage of the “cost of
variation” recouped by agistment. The vertical
axis shows the percentage of the cost of variation
a pastoralist recovers through agistment. The
horizontal axis shows how much trust, on
average, an individuals trusts others in their
network. Trust is measured as the mean trust
placed in others at the end of the game, weighted
by the total number of times an opponent is
encountered.
We use the model of McAllister et al. (in press),
which combines a landscape, with variable
resourse disbribution in time and space, and
humans, who have the ability to build networks
for facilitating agistment.
Our results show that fostering a climate of trust
is critical in cooperative action. However, from an
individual’s point of view, one can be worse off if
too much trust is placed in others (Figure 1). Even
though if the need arises, trust is generally likely
to develop as part of a informal institution, noncooperative action experienced by otherwise
trusting individuals implies that the informal
2334
1.
occurred in its present form at least since the
1960s when transport technology and road
network development allowed cheaper and more
efficient movement of stock over long distances.
Also at this time land-use intensified, largely due
to technological advances such as additional
water points and cattle breed. Such advances
reduced the systems’ natural drought buffering
capacity (Walker et al., 1987) which increased the
impact of climatic variation.
INTRODUCTION
Reciprocal altruism is common in humans
(Niamir-Fuller, 1998, Gurven, 2004), however, its
evolution is paradoxical; theoretically the more
one is trusted, the better the outcomes from oneshot prisoner’s dilemmas, although for individuals
the best outcomes are when trust is not
reciprocated. Most real life games are not oneshot, but iterated where trust develops through
past actions (Cárdenas and Ostrom, 2004).
Furthermore, in social-ecological systems
outcomes are driven by biophysical context. In
rangelands, our focus, low levels of biophysical
variation limit the returns from trusting others and
vice versa (McAllister et al., in press). Regardless
of context, individuals who are too trusting
always loose out.
To further our understanding of agistment, 14
semi-structured interviews with north Queensland
pastoralists (26-29 July 2004, Dalrymple Shire.)
We found that agistment is driven by multiple
objectives, including buffering of biophysical
variation, strategic behaviour and even social
conscience. Within our sample, drought
mitigation (69%) and strategic stock building to
stock future planned land purchases (31%) were
the two most discussed drivers for agisting cattle
(with 23% discussing both). For accepting agisted
cattle, strategic land acquisition with future cattle
purchases to follow (31%) was the most common
driver. Taking advantage of unexpected or patchy
rainfall (23%) and strategic designation of land to
generate agistment fee cash-flows (15%) were
also drivers for accepting agistment cattle. We
found a paradox in the distance over which cattle
are agisted. While distance represents a major
financial cost of agistment, pastoralists spoke of
the need to travel 200 km in order to take
advantage
of
landscape
and
climatic
heterogeneity. On average agisted stock travelled
along 375km of road or 270km in a straight line.
The greatest distance travelled was recalled to be
1,200 km by road. We also found that most
agistment agreements were rather informal, and
that trust and reputation are central. Despite this
reliance on trust, and despite pastoralist being
reluctance to give details on dishonoured trust, we
found ample evidence that dishonoured trust was
not uncommon. Pastoralists used a range of
indicators in selecting agistment counterparts; two
common themes were reputation and indicators
such as the condition of land and livestock on the
landowner properties. Even though climatic
variation and its interaction with pastoral land and
stock underpin agistment activity, pastoralists will
point out that agistment is about people. Most
pastoralists relied predominantly on hand-shake
or verbal agreements (46%). Many also relied
predominantly on a written but not legally
binding agreement (31%) but few relied
predominately on a legally binding agreement
(8%).
We explore trust and cooperation using agistment
of livestock in Australian rangelands as an
example, which is a human response to variation
in rangeland resources in time and space.
Agistment interactions are essentially iterated
interactions, where livestock is transferred
between pastoral enterprises in a commercial
arrangement. The interaction occurs between a
pastoralist with a shortage of forage (whether
induced by rainfall deficiencies or management
practices) and another who have an excess.
Agistment may facilitate stock movements
between pastoralists when it is not possible to
maintain an economically viable herd in the longterm on a single management unit and where
attempts to do so can lead to the loss of income or
capital (livestock or landscape function)
(Goodhue and McCarthy, 2000). Pastoralists will
note that agistment is about people because it is
the human relationships which facilitate agistment
which either make it fails or succeed.
Human responses to spatio-temporal rangeland
variation are well documented in the African
context (Perevolotsky, 1987, Scoones, 1992,
Thébaud, 2001), but much less is known about
such institutions in more formally governed
societies like Australia (McAllister et al., in press;
Janssen et al., in press). To gain further
understanding of agistment we conducted semistructured interviews with 14 pastoralists in the
cattle-grazing dominated rangelands of northeastern Australia (Dalrymple Shire, see Stokes et
al., in press, for descriptive account). Interviews
took place during 26-29 July 2004 and typically
lasted between 1 and 2 hours, and we used the
information collected through these surveys to
guide our hypothesis development.
We hypothesise that in natural resource
management, where mutual cooperation is
required to help buffer the variation in rangeland
Anecdotally, it now appears that agistment is
common practice in Australian rangelands.
However the development of agistment has only
2335
resources, that even though increasing the level of
cooperative behaviour improves outcomes,
individuals in the system can lose out if they trust
too much. To study this we employ game theory,
where pastoral agents play games in a landscape
that shows characteristics of resource variation in
rangelands.
2.
a payoff of P (punishment for defecting). If player
A defects and B cooperates, A gets a payoff of T
(temptation to defect), and B gets S (sucker’s
payoff). If at least one of the players withdraws
from the game, both players get a payoff of E
(exit payoff). An attractive feature about our
application is that the actions have direct
interpretation in terms of agistment. When a
player supplying land defects, stock may go
missing through theft or as a result of poorly
maintained fences. Stock may also lose condition
because supplementary feed is not managed as
agreed. When the owner of the stock defects, they
may agist stock poorly bred for temperament,
damaging infrastructure on the land owners
property. It is also possible that, with few legally
binding contracts (pers. observation, see above),
payment expectations (timing or amount) may not
be met. The most important cost of agistment,
however, is the opportunity cost of not agisting. If
you are in a position to supply land, then the
opportunity cost is that of lost revenue from not
agisting. If pastoralists seeking agistment land fail
to agist stock, then the opportunity cost is that of
overstocking; leading to mortality, loss of stock
condition and increases in supplementary feeding
costs. Our interpretation of how the payoff matrix
relates to agistment is that biophysical variation
incurs a cost to pastoralists of R, and that
agistment activity allows pastoralists to (to
varying degrees) recoup those losses, but in some
cases agistment may incur costs in addition to the
cost incurred with biophysical variation. The payoff matrix for the game in this article is defined
using T = 2, R = 1, E = 0, P = -1, and S = -2 (see
Janssen, 2006.
METHODS
This paper uses a model published by McAllister
et al. (in press) to explore and develop theory. We
summarise the model here, but refer to McAllister
et al. (in press) for detail.
The core aspect of the model of agistment activity
is the strategic behaviour of pastoralists, where
the opportunity for pastoralists to interact is
determined by a highly variable biophysical
landscape. Game theory models are used to
explore strategic behaviour, particularly where
social facets are important (for a review see Gotts
et al., 2003). In our problem, agistment involves
the interaction between two pastoralists; when
pastoralists interact they “play” a prisoner’s
dilemma game. We know that cooperation
between selfish individuals can evolve when
players repeat a game (Axelrod, 1984). When
interactions are only one shot, there is no strategic
reason for an egoist to cooperate. However,
experiments show that people do cooperate to a
certain degree in one-shot social dilemmas (Frank
et al., 1993). This may happen when a reliable
reputation score of an opponent (Wedekind and
Milinski, 2000), or other pieces of information are
available, perhaps based on prior face-to-face
communication. Our model explains cooperation
between strangers based on the ability of players
to learn who to trust (based on Janssen, in press).
Players learn to recognise trustworthiness using
symbols which we represent as a sequence of
zeros and ones. (see McAllister et al., in press,
Ahn et al., 2004) Our field interviews indicated
that in agistment interactions, pastoralists look for
symbols such land and livestock condition,
infrastructure development, and management
approaches as indicators how trustworthy an
opponent may be in terms of adhering to
agistment obligations.
The probability of a player not withdrawing from
the game and thereafter co-operating with an
opponent is based on the likelihood of trusting the
opponent (see McAllister et al., in press). If both
parties agree not to withdraw from the interaction,
each player chooses either to cooperate or defect
in order to maximise their expected returns from
the game, but their objective functions are biased
by an individual’s aversion to exploiting others
and an individual’s degree of altruism (i.e.
behavioural preferences.)
We assume, in line with experimental evidence
(Ahn et al., 2003), that there is a difference
between material payoffs and the experienced
utility of the monetary payoffs. The rational
choice made by the players in maximizing the
expected utility is based on the expected utility
for cooperating and defecting.
The model consists of a population of 400
players. Players wishing to supply land for
agistment interact with players who demand land.
When players interact, individuals have three
possible actions to choose from: cooperate (C),
defect (D), or withdraw (W). The payoffs from
agistment depend not only on what action a
pastoralists takes, but also what action the
pastoralist’s “opponent” takes. If both players
cooperate, they each get a payoff of R (reward for
cooperation). If both players defect, they each get
Given the two estimates of expected utility, the
player is confronted with a discrete choice
problem which is addressed as a stochastic
decision process. Players learn who to trust by
2336
learning to recognize symbols. Weights applied to
the symbols estimate trustworthiness. If an
agistment game is played, each player receives
feedback on the experience. The weights of
symbols associated with positive experiences
increase, while the weights of those associated
with negative experiences decrease, reducing
discrepancies between the amount of trust placed
in an opponent and that opponent’s
trustworthiness.
individuals with increasing amounts of trust in
others tend to achieve better outcomes from
agistment. Past some point, individuals with
increasing amounts of trust in others tend to
achieve worse outcomes from agistment. Further,
this “threshold” point appears to be different for
different degrees of spatial variation.
80
Cost of variation recouped, %
The key to representing our agistment problem is
splitting the population of players into groups
representing pastoralists who, in a given time
period, either demand agistment land, are in a
position to supply land for agistment, or neither
supply or demand land for agistment. Splitting
players into those not active in the agistment
market, and those supplying and demanding land
respectively is achieved using a simple model of a
rangeland with patchy distribution of rainfall
(hence it is assumed patchy forge distribution).
The basic design of the rangeland model is that in
each period, the systems dries uniformly across
the landscape but hydrates non-uniformly through
patchy rainfall. It is this patchiness which creates
demand for agistment (dry properties seek to agist
their stock on wetter proprieties. Unlike the
McAllister et al. (in press) here we use analyse
only one case of variation.
20
0
20
40
60
Trust in others, %
80
100
Figure 1. Relationship between the trust placed in
others and the percentage of the “cost of
variation” recouped by agistment. The vertical
axis shows the percentage of the cost of variation
a pastoralist recovers through agistment. The
horizontal axis shows how much trust, on
average, an individual trusts others in their
network. Trust is measured as the mean trust
placed in others at the end of the game, weighted
by the total number of times an opponent is
encountered.
Value
400
100
20,000
10
[0, 3]
[0,αi]
3.0
0.5
1.0
160
3
Two issues underlying this result. One, how much
an individual’s degree of cooperative behaviour
impacts on how much cooperation that individual
experiences. Two, an individual’s degree of
cooperative behaviour impacts on how frequently
they are able to enter into an agistment
arrangement when required.
An individual’s degree of cooperative behaviour
experienced is positively related to an individuals
own degree of cooperation action taken (Figure
2.) An individual’s degree of cooperative
behaviour and how frequently they are not able to
enter into an agistment arrangement when
required is negative related (Figure 3).
Specific assumptions used in this paper are
presented in Table 1. The demonstrative lines
shown in figures are statistically derived using a
2nd degree polynomial in Figure 1, and a
cumulative gamma distribution in Figure 2.
3.
40
0
TABLE 1. List of parameters and their default
values.
Parameter
Number of players n
Number of symbols s
Number of generations
Iterations of game
Cooperation parameter αi
Cooperation parameter
Max conditional para. αMAX
Learning rate λ
Steepness γ
Spatial variation para. vS
Spatial co-var. para. vC
60
RESULTS
We found that generally, in agistment
interactions, the relationship between how much
trust an individuals build in others is not linearly
related to how successful agistment is for that
individual (Figure 1). Up to some point,
2337
4.
Cooperative actions experienced, %
100
80
60
40
20
0
0
20
40
60
80
Cooperative actions taken, % of actions taken
100
Figure 2. Relationship between the degree of
cooperative action taken by an individual takes
and the degree of cooperation that individual
experiences. The degree of cooperation taken is
measured as the ratio of the number of
cooperative actions taken by an individual to the
total number of actions taken by that individual.
The degree of cooperation experienced is
measured as the ratio of the total number of
cooperative actions experienced by an individual
to the total number of actions experienced (equal
to the number of actions taken).
Fail to reach agreement, %
100
80
60
40
20
0
0
20
40
60
80
Cooperative action taken, % of actions taken
100
DISCUSSION
In our model if all agistment interactions were
mutually cooperative, then agistment would
alleviate the total costs induced by variation. But
“human” nature generally prohibits this outcome,
even though, from an individual pastoralist
perspective, being trusted has an economic value.
The issue is that one can trust too much, and this
constrains the opportunity to exploit variation.
This result is consistent with expectations based
on previous work on reciprocal altruism. For
example, experimental games have shown that
individuals tended to trust altruistic individuals
more than they did non-altruistic individuals, and
contribute more to others in their group when they
expected to play a two-part trust game afterwards
(Barclay, 2004).
If an individual always cooperates, other
individuals will not necessarily reward this
behaviour with cooperation. Likewise if an
individual always defects, then other individuals
will not necessarily punish unremitting defectors.
When the ties between individuals are weak, there
is little value in being trusted by others.
Individuals build relationships, but the sum of
individual relationships has important systemwide implications because a network can be
formed that either stifles or encourages trust. In a
system with few mutually cooperative agistment
interactions, individuals tend to be less trusting of
others, and this behaviour can be self-reinforcing.
As a final point about spatial variation, because
there are more people in the agistment market
when spatial variation is high, an individual will
have greater chance of finding a counterpart. The
paradox of variation is that while, as a percentage,
the cost of variation recouped increases as spatial
variation increases, it is this variation that is the
source of the cost in the first place. However,
despite improved efficiency in the agistment
network, overall costs always increase with
variation (McAllister et al., in press).
The collection of trust network data collection is
complex and expensive, and consequently we are
faced with data limitations. These limitations
have meant we have not tested our model with
data, but the same limitations underpin its
usefulness. In the face of data limitations our
model uses theory to demonstrate how an
individual’s behaviour in agistment interactions is
driven, in complex ways, by the behaviour in the
system. While there is a tendency towards
altruism in bi-lateral arrangements, the social
institutions distort behaviour.
Figure 3. Relationship between the degree of
cooperative action taken by an individual takes
and the number of times an individual failed to
enter into an agistment arrangement. The degree
of cooperation taken is measured as the ratio of
the number of cooperative actions taken by an
individual to the total number of actions taken by
that individual. An individual is deemed to have
failed to reach an agreement when they were in
the market for agistment (supply or demand) but
did not have a single interaction where either
player did not withdraw. In this figure, this is
expressed as a percentage of the number of times
and individual is in the agistment market.
While our model is simple it allows us to consider
possible implications for cooperative action in
natural resource problems. Fostering a climate of
2338
trust is critical in cooperative action. However,
from an individual’s point of view, one can be
worse off if too much trust is placed in others.
Even though if the need arises, trust is generally
likely to develop as part of a informal institution,
non-cooperative action experienced by otherwise
trusting individuals implies that the informal
institutional
may
be
insufficient
and
complementary formal polices may be effective in
improving outcomes from cooperative actions in
rangelands.
5.
Janssen M.A. (2006), Evolution of Cooperation in
a One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma Based on
Recognition of Trustworthy and
Untrustworthy Agents, Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization
Janssen M.A., Ö. Bodin, J.M. Anderies, T.
Elmqvist, H. Ernstson, R.R.J. McAllister,
P. Olsson, and P. Ryan (2006), A network
perspective on the resilience of socialecological systems, Ecology and Society
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N. Abel (2006), Pastoralists' responses to
variation of rangeland resources in time and
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This work was funded the CSIRO’s Complex
Systems Science and CSE Internal Venture
Capital programs. We thank Scott Heckbert for
comments.
6.
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