The concept of intelligence and security adopted in post-1989 Poland has been characterized by redundant content, wide scope and a catch-all approach to state security. Similarly, Poland’s intelligence community has been dispersed,...
moreThe concept of intelligence and security adopted in post-1989 Poland has been characterized by redundant content, wide scope and a catch-all approach to state security. Similarly, Poland’s intelligence community has been dispersed, loosely coordinated, heavily burdened with political tasks and hardly efficient. At the outset, it was made up of four specialized services: The Internal Security Agency (ABW), the Foreign Intelligence Agency (AW), the Military Intelligence Service (SWW) and the Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW). However, as time went by, intelligence functions were granted to other institutions and
bodies in charge of internal and territorial security - like the police, border guards, financial intelligence units and anti-corruption offices. Furthermore, the absence of a clearinghouse meant that lots of information acquired from different sources was locked in separate institutions and left practically useless.
Explaining this state of affairs is not simple. In general, its causes and conditions can be found in two different bundles of variables, dealing with geostrategic determinants (cooperation with the US, membership in the NATO and the UE, Russian penetration) on the one hand, and several significant weaknesses
of the political system on the other, the latter manifesting themselves in politicisation, “party politics” and interpersonal animosities. While the burden of the Communist past was hard to throw off immediately and plans for building up a completely new intelligence community gave way to a cautious restructuring of
the security sector, the verification of secret services was selective and generally friendly for the “old guard”. These processes have resulted in overlapping competences,
institutional frictions and legislative incoherence.
In consideration of this overall context, the purpose of this study is threefold: First, to describe the evolution of the Polish intelligence community, starting from the assumption that since the fall of the Communist regime the secret services in Poland have suffered the chronic ailment of politicisation and instrumental treatment by subsequent governing coalitions. Second, to give a picture of the relevant organisations and structures which form the Polish intelligence community. Finally, to point out the relations to, and the activities of, the two most influential external powers on Polish security, Russia and the
United States.