Ancient Greek Weaponry and Warfare

The Ancient Greek Warfare - as been presented to the public by the modern scholars -is a multi-dimentional kind of war with various kind of troops , tactics and applications.
Recent researches have emerged the importance of archery to the Ancient Greeks as a platform of "flexible - war" absolutely necessary to most of the famous Battles of the era.
Greek Archery from the end of the Middle Greek Bronze Age (1400 BC) to the end of the Classical Period (400 BC) presented a wealth of important elements. The various shooting methods of the archers - as been depicted in archaeological findings (pottery ,statues, fragments, depictions) - present us a culture that has been very familiar to this weapon and has developed several ways of using it, depended on the needs of war.
In this study we will not focus only on ethnically Greek archers but generally the archers of the Greek world, comprising all of them who fought along with the Greeks in their armies. Taking into account that the surviving literal sources of the drawing techniques areextremely limited, we will try to emerge our conclusions through artistic representations of the era under research. Shooting techniques, as the "Greek Draw" the "Mediterranean Draw", the "Reverse Draw", the "Thumb technique" and all the variations of those, we
will be presented in a detailed way, based on various depictions.

The issue of ancient Greek archery looms in mist, as it passed to history as a distrusted weapon, alien to the codes of honorable battle. Though, it had been kept in high respect. There was a full tactical and technical doctrine, as both literary and representational sources testify. Starting from Hercules, son of Zeus proper and demi-god and hero par excellence in the Greek lore, he is mentioned to shoot at point targets with great accuracy and at extended range with venomous arrows.

Other known archers of the era are Odysseus and the non-Greek Paris, who is the most prominent; whole contingents though are mentioned as archer bodies and shoot over the first lines of the friendly formations. After this period of lords and soldiers trained to the bow, the classical Greeks use solid bodies of archers. They are few and mostly conscripted or imported by tyrants and other despised rulers. But although despised, whole areas are proficient with the bow and engulf its culture and the weapon is used with surgical accuracy against the prominent archer invader, Persia, with calamitous effect in both land and sea.

The shooting technique and tactics of the era imply direct shots, but indirect, high-arc aiming is also mentioned some decades later as a known skill. By the time of Alexander, a standard doctrine which includes small but picked archer forces (losing their commanders thrice in 3 years) indicates their effectiveness in maneuver
warfare over difficult terrain and in special operations.

The tactics of Epaminondas in surprise, timing, and combined arms are still a subject of study. The direction of the Battle of Mantinea is considered his crowning achievement. Though, it is not universally accepted which exact formation he used, and few reside on how the whole maneuver was carried out
from the point of drill and issuing battle orders. In this paper, a detailed account is proposed as to the
exact drill applied by Epaminondas’ Theban hoplites in the second battle of Mantinea, 362 BC. Taking account of the available drill level of the time, the detailed description of Xenophon and of similar allied and enemy tactics and intentions, we suggest that the Theban infantry line reformed from phalanx
battle order almost to marching order under cover of dust and successful friendly screening action by light troops and cavalry. In this way, both directional fl exibility and speed of movement was achieved so as to crash onto the enemy right, were the troops of value (by virtue or nativity) were always stationed
by decree of tradition. After succeeding in their charge, Thebans lost cohesion and in the confusion, their general as well. Being irreplaceable, the victors stayed aghast allowing the enemy a counterattack which snatched a draw from the jaws of defeat. This string of events is indicative of an elaborate
and extra privy plan, demanding the presence of the mastermind proper to fulfi ll it. The only possible
intent, which was risky, sensitive and decisive, is for Epaminondas to intend to reform his phalanx line
perpendicularly to the enemy’s already smashed one. This plan imitates standard Spartan fl anking intentions without the need of the extreme Spartan maneuvering ability and indicates that the most suitable attack formation had been at this case to revert to marching order. Thus redeployment was
easy, contrary to the generally assumed addition of fully deployed units in successive lines to achieve
the desired depth with less eff ort. Such theories and conclusions may be bolstered only by experimental
archeology and living history approaches, as dynamic concepts may be proved or disproved only by experiment, this study does not constitute proof. But entails a defi nitive positive value; if a concept is workable today, it has always been so, although the actuality is far from defi nitive.

The purpose of this paper is to review the archaeological evidence about warfare in the period during which the late Bronze Age society of the Greek world collapsed and was then transformed into the emerging societies of the Archaic Period. The Bronze Age Catastrophe or Collapse refers to the social, financial and cultural transformation of the eastern Mediterranean Basin which was destroyed by disasters whose nature is difficult to determine even today. These catastrophes have been described by Richard Hope Simpson and Oliver Dickinson “by the end of LH IIIB almost all the great mainland centres (sic) had been destroyed by fire, several been deserted thereafter. The destructions seem to concentrate at sites where there were palaces or comparable large buildings, or fortifications.” The factors which led to the end of Mycenaean civilisation were undoubtedly complex but are strongly connected to the overly centralised, highly specialised economy which never developed a broad-based flexible infantry response, thus leaving the bureaucratic Palatial States armies vulnerable to a variety of enemy military units, that were able to fight in shock formation, were more mobile and flexible, and were not reliant on horsemen or chariot-borne missile troops.

We study the scarce Greek armament found in the southern Iberian Peninsula dated along the first half of the 1st millennium BC, more specifically between the seventh and sixth centuries BC during the so-called Orientalising period. This armament consists of four Corinthian helmets which were made in the Peloponnese and the Hellenic colonies located in Magna Graecia. They were found both in indigenous aquatic contexts as ritual religious offerings-such as those coming from Ria de Huelva and Guadalete and Guadalquivir rivers-or Phoenician contexts as it happens with a tomb excavated in the colony of Malaca. To them we can add an armour breastplate which can be included in the "muscled" type, which comes from a wreck, sunk in the waters of Almuñécar, perhaps also Phoenician. Although the debate continues among researchers currently, its parallelism with what has been proposed for other areas of the Mediterranean where these Corinthian helmets have also been found means that, rather than with the direct presence of Greek warriors, as has sometimes been suggested, relate them to the indigenous and Phoenician populations that lived in these places, in particular with the ruling elites of both communities. The same happens when it comes to determining the way in which they arrived to these western territories, considering that it was mostly in the hands of Phoenician merchants but without absolutely discarding the leading role that Greeks themselves could have had in distributing such valuable products.

The modern needs on observing and examine the past and the history, demand new and not conventional presentational methods. This article presents with the use of several examples, the ways that Association Koryvantes uses experiential learning for the promotion and the popularization of Archaeology. Innovative ways of communication, which enable archaeology outcomes to be acceptedby the general public with a maximum effectiveness.