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{{Short description|Facet of American elections}}
{{Use mdy dates|date=August 2022|cs1-dates=ll}}
[[File:2018 Ballots being counted in Santa Clara County.webm|thumb|Counting ballots by an optical scanner, San Jose, California, 2018]]
{{Politics of the United States}}
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==Voluntary guidelines==
{{main|Election Assistance Commission}}
The '''Election Assistance Commission''' ('''EAC''') is an [[Independent agencies of the United States government|independent agency of the United States government]] which developed the 2005 [[Voluntary Voting System Guidelines]] (VVSG).<ref name="eac-guide"/> These guidelines address some of the security and accessibility needs of elections. The EAC also accredits three test laboratories which manufacturers hire to review their equipment. Based on reports from these laboratories the EAC certifies when voting equipment complies with the voluntary guidelines.<ref
Twelve states require EAC certification for machines used in their states. Seventeen states require testing by an EAC-accredited lab, but not certification. Nine states and DC require testing to federal standards, by any lab. Four other states refer to federal standards but make their own decisions. The remaining eight states do not refer to federal standards.<ref name="ncsl-eac">{{Cite web |title=Voting System Standards, Testing and Certification |url=https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/voting-system-standards-testing-and-certification.aspx |access-date=July 8, 2020 |website=www.ncsl.org}}</ref>
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The voter may mark the paper directly, usually in a specific location for each candidate, then mail it or put it in a ballot box.
Or the voter may select choices on an electronic screen, which then prints the chosen names, usually with a bar code or QR code summarizing all choices, on a sheet of paper to put in the scanner.<ref name="vv-bmd">{{Cite web |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/ballot-marking-devices/ |title=Ballot Marking Devices |website=Verified Voting |language=en-US |access-date=February 28, 2020 |archive-date=August 5, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200805185249/https://www.verifiedvoting.org/ballot-marking-devices/ }}</ref> This screen and printer is called an electronic ballot marker (EBM) or [[ballot marking device]] (BMD), and voters with disabilities can communicate with it by headphones, large buttons, sip and puff, or paddles, if they cannot interact with the screen or paper directly. Typically the ballot marking device does not store or tally votes. The paper it prints is the official ballot, put into a scanning system which counts the barcodes, or the printed names can be hand-counted, as a check on the machines.<ref name="bmd-cohn">{{Cite news |last=Cohn |first=Jennifer |url=https://medium.com/@jennycohn1/what-is-the-latest-threat-to-democracy-ballot-marking-devices-a-k-a-electronic-pencils-16bb44917edd |title=What is the latest threat to democracy? |date=May 5, 2018|work=Medium |access-date=February 28, 2020 |language=en}}</ref>
Most voters do not look at the machine-printed paper to ensure it reflects their choices. When there is a mistake, an experiment found that 81% of registered voters do not report errors to poll workers.<ref name="bmd">{{Cite web |url=https://jhalderm.com/pub/papers/bmd-verifiability-sp20.pdf |title=Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot Marking Devices? |last1=Bernhard |first1=Matthew |last2=McDonald |first2=Allison |last3=Meng |first3=Henry |last4=Hwa |first4=Jensen |last5=Bajaj |first5=Nakul |last6=Chang |first6=Kevin |last7=Halderman |first7=J. Alex |date=December 28, 2019 |website=Halderman |access-date=February 28, 2020}}</ref> No state requires central reporting of errors reported by voters, so the occasional report cannot lead to software correction. Hand-marked paper ballots more clearly have been reviewed by voters, but some places allow correction fluid and tape so ballots can be changed later.<ref name="fluid">{{Cite web |date=October 1, 2020 |title=2 CCR 20983(c)(6) |url=https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ccrov/pdf/2020/september/20226rb.pdf |access-date=October 5, 2020 |website=California Sec. of State}}</ref>
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===Errors in ballot marking devices===
Ballot marking devices display contests and candidates on a screen where voters can make, change and check selections before printing the choices on paper to put in a ballot box. The election worker provides a code for each voter, to tell the machine what contests that voter may vote on. Contests presented to voters depend on the
*
*In a 2022 election in Marietta, GA, up to 157 voters were presented lists of contests which were partly in error, due to recent changes in district boundaries.<ref name="riggall">{{Cite news |last=Riggall |first=Hunter |date=May 10, 2022 |title=Up to 157 incorrect ballots cast on first day of early voting, Cobb elections director says |language=en-US |work=Marrietta Daily Journal |url=https://news.yahoo.com/157-incorrect-ballots-cast-first-092000088.html |access-date=May 11, 2022}}</ref>
*In a 2019 election in Philadelphia, PA, 40% of polling locations had problems with BMDs, including "touchscreens that were hypersensitive or that froze; paper voting receipts getting jammed in the machines; and panels opening on some machines to expose the equipment's electronic controls."<ref name="harte">{{Cite news |last=Harte |first=Julia |date=2020-06-01 |title=Exclusive: Philadelphia's new voting machines under scrutiny in Tuesday's elections |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-pennsylvania-machines-ex-idUSKBN23828J |access-date=2023-07-27}}</ref><ref name="pov19">{{Cite web |date=2020-06-01 |title=PHILADELPHIA COMMISSIONERS HID VOTING MACHINE FAILURES |url=https://docs.google.com/document/d/14uVFGlT7t4bE6dbuwka3KxgIf4UQI6SLHQw1q1bDv4w/edit?usp=embed_facebook |access-date=2023-07-27 |website=Protect Our Vote Philly |language=en}}</ref>
*In a 2019 election in Northampton County, PA, BMD screens were hypersensitive or insensitive, from being "configured improperly in the factory" so voters had to keep trying to select their candidates. An instructional message was treated as a Republican candidate, so straight party votes omitted the real candidate.<ref name="albiges">{{Cite news |last=Albiges |first=Marie |date=2020-10-21 |title=A year ago, voting machines malfunctioned in a pivotal Pa. county. Have the problems been fixed? |url=https://www.spotlightpa.org/news/2020/10/pa-northampton-county-voting-machines-glitches-presidential-election/ |access-date=2024-03-02 |work=Spotlight PA |language=en-us}}</ref>
===Errors in optical scans===
Software can miscount or fail to count. If it fails or miscounts drastically enough, people notice and check. Errors can happen in the scanner or at the ballot printer. Staff rarely identify the person who caused an error, and assume it was accidental, not a hack.
* in a 2024 primary throughout Puerto Rico, parties found over 1,000 errors. The elections commission said the voting machines "incorrectly calculate vote totals", and Dominion said errors came from "digital files used to export results from the machines." The election commission then "conducted a full vote tally and audited paper receipts from hundreds of ballot-counting machines."<ref name="pr-marcos">{{Cite news |last=Marcos |first=Coral Murphy |date=2024-06-11 |title=Voting machine contract under scrutiny following discrepancies in Puerto Rico's primaries |url=https://apnews.com/article/puerto-rico-primaries-discrepancies-voting-problems-machines-8019db17829c7b1fbae5fb3fde623a4b |access-date=2024-06-12 |work=Associated Press |language=en}}</ref>
*In a 2022 election in Monmouth County, NJ, software did not notice when staff uploaded six flashdrives of ballot images twice, which added more votes to candidates and switched a school board winner. It was caught by a council member who thought the numbers were too high, and made a public records request for detailed numbers, which showed more ballots than voters checked in. The part of the software designed to notice duplicates had not been installed, and there was no automated checking that the installation was right.<ref>http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases23/2023-0906-Monmouth-County-Investigation-Investigative-Facts-Report-(8-31-2023)-(With%20Exhibits).pdf</ref>
*In a 2022 election in DeKalb County, GA, a candidate who actually won appeared to lose, after votes were not counted for her in some precincts, because another candidate withdrew, and programming did not categorize votes correctly.<ref name="vigdor">{{Cite news |last=Vigdor |first=Neil |date=2022-06-06 |title=A candidate in Georgia who appeared to get few Election Day votes was actually in first place. |language=en-US |work=The New York Times |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/06/us/politics/michelle-long-spears-georgia.html |access-date=2022-09-06 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref><ref name="sos6">{{Cite web |date=2022-06-03 |title=Georgia Election System Ensures Accuracy of DeKalb Results |url=https://sos.ga.gov/news/georgia-election-system-ensures-accuracy-dekalb-results |access-date=2022-09-08 |website= Georgia Secretary of State}}</ref>
*in a 2022 election in Clackamas County,
*in a 2022 election in Lancaster County, PA, scanners could not read 22,000 ballots on which the ballot printing company had put the wrong identification code. The ballots were hand-copied by teams of three onto correctly printed ballots. The state does not let mailed ballots be scanned before election day, so the problem was only discovered on election day.<ref name="mcgold">{{Cite news |last=McGoldrick |first=Gillian |date=May 18, 2022 |title=Inside the Lancaster County operation where staff are remarking 16,000 mail ballots that could decide the GOP U.S. Senate primary |language=en |work=Pittsburgh Post-Gazette |url=https://www.post-gazette.com/news/politics-state/2022/05/18/dispatch-from-lancaster-county-elections-staff-work-to-remark-16-000-ballots/stories/202205180147 |access-date=May 21, 2022}}</ref><ref name="stockb">{{Cite news |last=Stockburger |first=George |date=May 18, 2022 |title=Lancaster County Board of Elections reports issue scanning mail ballots |language=en-US |work=ABC channel 27 WHTM |url=https://www.abc27.com/election/lancaster-county-board-of-elections-reports-issue-scanning-mail-ballots/ |access-date=May 21, 2022}}</ref>
*in a 2021 election in Williamson, TN, precinct scanners had two errors: They misread QR codes, mistakenly classifying some ballots as provisional and not to be tallied, then kept that not-to-be tallied classification for later ballots, so large numbers of ballots were not included in precinct reports at some precincts. They were re-scanned correctly on a central scanner and checked by a hand-tally.<ref name="panek">{{Cite web |last=Panek |first=Jonathon |date=March 31, 2022 |title=Report of Investigation Dominion Voting Systems D-Suite 5.5-B Williamson County, Tennessee |url=https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/TestingCertification/EAC_Report_of_Investigation_Dominion_DSuite_5.5_B.pdf
*In a 2021 primary in New York City, 135,000 test ballots were not removed from the database and were included in preliminary counts for the mayoral primary. They were discovered because totals were higher than the number of voters, and corrected by removing them from the count.<ref name="nypo">{{Cite news |last=Anuta |first=Joe
*in a 2021 election in Lancaster County, PA, scanners could not read 12,300 ballots on which the ballot printing company had put the wrong identification code.<ref name="mcgold"/><ref name="stockb"/>
*in 2020 elections in Collier and Volusia Counties, FL, the election's optical scanners mis-interpreted voters' marks on 0.1% and 0.2% of ballot sheets respectively. These were not enough to change any outcomes, and involved voters' marks which barely touched the ovals intended to record votes. They were discovered by independent software re-examining all the ballot images.<ref name="col-vol">{{Cite web |last=Lutz |first=Ray |date=May 30, 2021 |title=AuditEngine Case Study Report, Appendix 1 |url=https://copswiki.org/Common/M1970 |access-date=October 3, 2021 |website=Citizens' Oversight Projects |language=en}}</ref>
*in a 2020 election in Antrim County, MI, last minute updates to some ballots were not applied to all scanners, so the scanners had inconsistent numeric codes for different candidates and styles of ballots, causing errors of thousands of votes. Corrections happened in stages, leading to less and less confidence in the results.<ref name="antrim">{{Cite web |last=Halderman |first=J. Alex |date=March 26, 2021 |title=Analysis of the Antrim County, Michigan November 2020 Election Incident |url=https://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/Antrim_720623_7.pdf |access-date=June 10, 2021 |website=State of Michigan}}</ref> Results were eventually confirmed by a hand count.<ref name="antrim-dos">{{Cite web |date=2020-12-18 |title=Final numbers from Antrim County audit continue to affirm accuracy of election results |url=https:
*In a 2020 election in Windham, New Hampshire, fold lines in the wrong places and dust on scanner sensors caused many fold lines to count as votes.<ref name="appel-nh">{{Cite web |last=Appel |first=Andrew |date=June 7, 2021 |title=New Hampshire Election Audit, part 2 |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2021/06/07/new-hampshire-election-audit-part-2/ |access-date=June 7, 2021 |website=Princeton University}}</ref>
*In a 2020 election in Baltimore, Maryland, the private company which printed ballots shifted the location of some candidates on some ballots up one line, so the scanner looked in the wrong places on the paper and reported the wrong numbers. It was caught because a popular incumbent got implausibly few votes, and corrected by hand-copying mailed ballots onto well-formatted ballots.<ref name="sun20">{{Cite news |last1=Opilo |first1=Emily |last2=Richman |first2=Talia |last3=Davis |first3=Phil |date=June 3, 2020 |title=Concern from candidates, officials as error creates delay in release of returns; Dixon leads in Baltimore mayoral count |work=Baltimore Sun |url=https://www.baltimoresun.com/politics/elections/bs-md-pol-ballot-error-baltimore-district-1-20200603-n26t43fkmjadplqeqybloj4dki-story.html |access-date=July 30, 2020}}</ref>
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* In a 2012 Palm Beach County, Florida, election, votes in four Wellington City contests were reported for a different contest, causing the wrong winners to be certified in two of the contests. The problem did not occur in the county's other 15 municipalities.<ref name="well-3-19">{{Cite news |last=Bennett |first=George |date=2012-03-19 |title=Recount shows wrong winners declared in two Wellington election races |work=Palm Beach Post |url=https://www.palmbeachpost.com/article/20120319/NEWS/812037658 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210418033950/https://www.palmbeachpost.com/article/20120319/NEWS/812037658 |access-date=2022-09-20|archive-date=April 18, 2021 }}</ref><ref name="well-3-31">{{Cite news |last=Bennett |first=George |date=2012-03-31 |title=Wellington election results tossed out, but legal ground uncertain |language=en-US |work=Palm Beach Post |url=https://www.palmbeachpost.com/story/news/2012/03/20/wellington-election-results-tossed-out/7250418007/ |access-date=2022-09-20}}</ref>
*In a 2010 New York election, 20,000 votes for governor and 30,000-40,000 votes for other offices were ignored, because the scanners overheated and disqualified the ballots by reading multiple votes in races where voters had properly only voted once.<ref name="wnyc-12">{{Cite news |last=Hamilton |first=Colby |date=May 9, 2012 |title=Machine Casts Phantom Votes in the Bronx, Invalidating Real Ones: Report |language=en |work=WNYC New York Public Radio |url=https://www.wnyc.org/story/207950-reports-find-machine-errors-led-uncounted-votes-2010/ |access-date=June 26, 2020}}</ref><ref name="wnyc-11">{{Cite news |last=Keefe |first=Hohn |date=December 6, 2011 |title=Thousands of NY Votes Tossed Over Ballot Confusion |work=WNYC New York Public Radio |url=http://www.wnyc.org/story/174110-thousands-ny-votes-tossed-2010-overvoting/ |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150331025717/http://www.wnyc.org/story/174110-thousands-ny-votes-tossed-2010-overvoting/ |access-date=June 26, 2020|archive-date=March 31, 2015 }}</ref><ref name="bjs-11">{{Cite web |last1=Norden |first1=Larry |last2=Iyer |first2=Sundeep |date=December 5, 2011 |title=Design Deficiencies and Lost Votes |url=https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/design-deficiencies-and-lost-votes |access-date=June 26, 2020 |website=Brennan Center for Justice |language=en}}</ref>
*Errors from 2002 to 2008 were listed and analyzed by the [[Brennan Center for Justice]] in 2010.<ref name="bren10"/>
*Errors before 2006 were listed by the [[Electronic Frontier Foundation]] in 2006.<ref name="eff2006">{{Cite web |date=2006 |title=Electronic Voting Machine Quick Reference Guides - 2006 |url=http://w2.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/infosheets2006/AccuVoteOS.pdf |access-date=2023-01-05 |website=EFF|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150923024115/http://w2.eff.org/Activism/E-voting/infosheets2006/AccuVoteOS.pdf |archive-date=September 23, 2015 }}</ref>
*In a 2004 Yakima, Washington, election 24 voters' choices on 4 races were ignored by a faulty scanner which created a white streak down the ballot.<ref name="yakima-weak">{{Cite web |url=http://www.votersunite.org/info/yakimaproblemreport.asp |title=Hart InterCivic Optical-Scan Has A Weak Spot |last=Gideon |first=John |date=July 5, 2005 |website=www.votersunite.org |access-date=February 15, 2020}}</ref>
*In a 2004 Medford, Wisconsin, election, all 600 voters who voted a straight party ticket had all their votes ignored, because the manufacturer forgot to program the machines for a partisan election.<ref name="medford">{{Cite web |last1=McKim |first1=Karen |date=May 15, 2014 |title=It happens all the time: Interview with the consultant who discovered the Medford miscount |url=https://www.wisconsingrassroots.net/_it_happens_all_the_time |access-date=June 26, 2020 |website=Wisconsin Grassroots Network |archive-date=June 28, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200628102806/https://www.wisconsingrassroots.net/_it_happens_all_the_time }}</ref> Election officials did not notice any problem. The consultant who found the lost 600 voters also reported a Michigan precinct with zero votes, since staff put ballots in the scanner upside down.
*In a 2000 Bernalillo County (Albuquerque area), New Mexico, election, a programming error meant that straight-party votes on paper ballots were not counted for the individual candidates. The number of ballots was thus much larger than the number of votes in each contest. The software was fixed, and the ballots were re-scanned to get correct counts.<ref name="wsj0">{{Cite news |last1=Gruley |first1=Bryan |last2=Cummins |first2=Chip |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB976838091124686673 |title=Election Day Became a Nightmare, As Usual, for Bernalillo County |date=December 16, 2000 |work=Wall Street Journal |access-date=March 11, 2020 |language=en-US |issn=0099-9660}}</ref><ref name="abq4">{{Cite news |last=Baker |first=Deborah |url=https://www.abqjournal.com/elex/apvotes10-31-04.htm |title=ABQjournal: Contentious 2000 Election Closest in N.M. History |date=October 31, 2004 |work=Albuquerque Journal |access-date=March 11, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210416083151/https://www.abqjournal.com/elex/apvotes10-31-04.htm |archive-date=April 16, 2021
*In the 2000 Florida presidential race the most common optical scanning error was to treat as an overvote a ballot where the voter marked a candidate and wrote in the same candidate.<ref name="nh">{{Cite web |url=https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/96548/vtp_wp11.pdf |title=Using Recounts to Measure the Accuracy of Vote Tabulations: Evidence from New Hampshire Elections 1946-2002. |last1=Ansolabehere |first1=Stephen |last2=Reeves |first2=Andrew Reeves |date=January 2004 |website=CALTECH/MIT Voting Technology Project |access-date=February 14, 2020}}</ref>
*Researchers find security flaws in all election computers, which let voters, staff members or outsiders disrupt or change results, often without detection.<ref name="defcon">{{Cite web |url=https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2027/voting-village-report-defcon27.pdf |title=Def Con 27 Voting Machine Hacking Village |last1=Blaze |first1=Matt |last2=Hursti |first2=Harri |last3=Macalpine |first3=Margaret |last4=Hanley |first4=Mary |last5=Moss |first5=Jeff |last6=Wehr |first6=Rachel |last7=Spencer |first7=Kendal L. |last8=Ferris |first8=Christopher |date=September 26, 2019 |website=Defcon |access-date=March 11, 2020}}</ref>
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===Cost of scanning systems===
If most voters mark their own paper ballots and one marking device is available at each polling place for voters with disabilities, Georgia's total cost of machines and maintenance for 10 years, starting 2020, has been estimated at $12 per voter ($84 million total). Pre-printed ballots for voters to mark would cost $4 to $20 per voter ($113 million to $224 million total machines, maintenance and printing). The low estimate includes $0.40 to print each ballot, and more than enough ballots for historic turnout levels. The high estimate includes $0.55 to print each ballot, and enough ballots for every registered voter, including three ballots (of different parties) for each registered voter in primary elections with historically low turnout.<ref name="oset-reality">{{Cite web |url=https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5766827-OSET.html |title=Georgia State Election Technology Acquisition, A Reality Check |last=Perez |first=Edward
The capital cost of machines in 2019 in Pennsylvania is $11 per voter if most voters mark their own paper ballots and a marking device is available at each polling place for voters with disabilities, compared to $23 per voter if all voters use ballot marking devices.<ref name="pitt cost">{{Cite web |url=https://www.cyber.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/PDFs/voting-system-selection-one-pager
New York has an undated comparison of capital costs and a system where all voters use ballot marking devices costing over twice as much as a system where most do not. The authors say extra machine maintenance would exacerbate that difference, and printing cost would be comparable in both approaches.<ref name="bmdny">{{Cite web |url=https://www.nyvv.org/paperballotCostsMain.shtml |title=Paper Ballots Costs |website=www.nyvv.org |access-date=February 28, 2020 |archive-date=February 28, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200228224035/https://www.nyvv.org/paperballotCostsMain.shtml
==Direct-recording electronic counting==
{{see|DRE voting machine|Vote counting#Direct-recording electronic counting}}
[[File:Paper roll with votes from numerous voters, on iVotronic election computer.png|thumb|Roll of paper from direct-recording machine, with votes from numerous voters, Martinsburg, West Virginia, 2018]]
A touch screen displays choices to the voter, who selects choices, and can change
The system may also provide a means for communicating with a central location for reporting results and receiving updates,<ref>[http://www.eac.gov/VVSG Volume_I.pdf 2005 Voluntary Voting System Guidelines] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060208184233/http://www.eac.gov/VVSG |date=February 8, 2006 }} from the
Some of these machines also print names of chosen candidates on paper for the voter to verify. These names on paper can be used for [[election audit]]s and [[recount]]s if needed. The tally of the voting data is stored in a removable memory component and in bar codes on the paper tape. The paper tape is called a [[Voter-verified paper audit trail]] (VVPAT). The VVPATs can be counted at 20–43 seconds of staff time per vote (not per ballot).<ref name="votersunite">{{Cite web |url=http://www.votersunite.org/info/CostEstimateforHandCounting.pdf |title=Cost Estimate for Hand Counting 2% of the Precincts in the U.S. |last=Theisen |first=Ellen |date=June 14, 2005 |website=VotersUnite.org |access-date=February 14, 2020}}</ref><ref name="ga">{{Cite web |url=http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/VVPATreport.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081126235810/http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/VVPATreport.pdf
For machines without VVPAT, there is no record of individual votes to check.
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This approach can have software errors. It does not include scanners, so there are no scanner errors. When there is no paper record, it is hard to notice or research most errors.
* The only forensic examination which has been done of direct-recording software files was in Georgia in 2020, and found that one or more unauthorized intruders had entered the files and erased records of what it did to them. In 2014–2017 an intruder had control of the state computer in Georgia which programmed vote-counting machines for all counties. The same computer also held voter registration records. The intrusion exposed all election files in Georgia since then to compromise and malware. Public disclosure came in 2020 from a court case.<ref name="lamb">{{Cite web |url=https://www.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.gand.240678/gov.uscourts.gand.240678.699.10.pdf |title=Supplemental Declaration of Logan Lamb |last=Lamb |first=Logan |date=January 14, 2020 |website=CourtListener |access-date=February 3, 2020}}</ref><ref name="cgg">{{Cite web |url=https://coaltionforgoodgovernance.sharefile.com/d-s0dce50c25084f0da |title=Coalition Plaintiffs' Status Report|pages=237–244 |date=January 16, 2020 |website=Coalition for Good Governance |access-date=February 3, 2020}}</ref><ref name="bajak">{{Cite news |url=https://apnews.com/39dad9d39a7533efe06e0774615a6d05 |title=Expert: Georgia election server showed signs of tampering |last=Bajak |first=Frank |date=January 16, 2020 |work=Associated Press |access-date=February 3, 2020}}</ref> Georgia did not have paper ballots to measure the amount of error in electronic tallies. The [[FBI]] studied that computer in 2017, and did not report the intrusion.<ref name="zetter-ga">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |url=http://politi.co/2heBRW2 |title=Will the Georgia Special Election Get Hacked?|work=Politico |access-date=February 16, 2020 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="lamb"/>
* A 2018 study of direct-recording voting machines (iVotronic) without VVPAT in South Carolina found that every election from 2010 to 2018 had some memory cards fail. The investigator also found that lists of candidates were different in the central and precinct machines, so 420 votes which were properly cast in the precinct were erroneously added to a different contest in the central official tally, and unknown numbers were added to other contests in the central official tallies. The investigator found the same had happened in 2010. There were also votes lost by garbled transmissions, which the state election commission saw but did not report as an issue. 49 machines reported that their three internal memory counts disagreed, an average of 240 errors per machine, but the machines stayed in use, and the state evaluation did not report the issue, and there were other error codes and time stamp errors.<ref name="buell">{{Cite report |url=http://www.lwvsc.org/files/buell-lwvscreport2018scelection.pdf |title=Analysis of the Election Data from the 6 November 2018 General Election in South Carolina |last=Buell |first=Duncan |date=December 23, 2018 |work=League of Women Voters of South Carolina |access-date=February 5, 2020 |archive-date=February 24, 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190224163525/http://lwvsc.org/files/buell-lwvscreport2018scelection.pdf
* In a 2017 York County, Pennsylvania, election, a programming error in a county's machines without VVPAT let voters vote more than once for the same candidate. Some candidates had filed as both Democrat and Republican, so they were listed twice in races where voters could select up to three candidates, so voters could select both instances of the same name.<ref name="ydr7">{{Cite news |last1=Kessler |first1=Brandie |last2=Boeckel |first2=Teresa |last3=Segelbaum |first3=Dylan |url=https://www.ydr.com/story/news/2017/11/07/problem-york-county-voting-machines-could-allow-extra-votes-some-candidates/841010001/ |title='Redo' of some York County races – including judge – possible after voting problems |date=November 7, 2017 |work=York Daily Record |access-date=March 11, 2020}}</ref> They recounted the DRE machines' electronic records of votes and found 2,904 pairs of double votes.<ref name="ydr20">{{Cite news |last=Lee |first=Rick |url=https://www.ydr.com/story/news/2017/11/20/no-change-after-election-recount/869905001/ |title=York Co. election judicial winners: Kathleen Prendergast, Clyde Vedder, Amber Anstine Kraft |date=November 20, 2017 |work=York Daily Record |access-date=March 11, 2020 |language=en}}</ref>
* In a 2015 Memphis, Tennessee, city election, the central processing system lost 1,001 votes which showed on poll tapes posted at precincts: "at Unity Christian ... precinct's poll tape ... 546 people had cast ballots ... Shelby County's first breakdown of each precinct's voting ... for Unity Christian showed only 330 votes. Forty percent of the votes had disappeared ... At first it looked like votes were missing from not just one precinct but 20. After more investigation, he appeared to narrow that number to four ... In all, 1,001 votes had been dropped from the election night count."<ref name="shelby">{{Cite news |last1=Riley |first1=Michael |last2=Robertson |first2=Jordan |last3=Kocieniewski |first3=David |date=September 29, 2016 |title=The Computer Voting Revolution Is Already Crappy, Buggy, and Obsolete |language=en |work=Bloomberg.com |url=https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-voting-technology/ |access-date=October 30, 2020}}</ref><ref name="save"/>
* In a 2012 Shelby County, Tennessee, (Memphis area) election 801 voters signed into a polling place, and only 293 votes were recorded. In another precinct 20 extra memory cards were uploaded before polls closed. The central election management system let the number of memory cards be changed by hand, and reducing it could erase memory cards which had been loaded.<ref name="save">{{Cite web |last1=Chumney |first1=Carol |last2=Weinberg |first2=Joseph |last3=Kernell |first3=Mike |date=September 1, 2017 |title=Voting on Thin Ice |url=https://www.votingonthinice.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Voting-on-Thin-Ice-121917.pdf |access-date=March 16, 2022 |website=Shelby Advocates for Valid elections}}</ref>
* In a 2011 Fairfield Township, New Jersey, election a programming error in a machine without a VVPAT gave two candidates low counts. They collected more affidavits by voters who voted for them than the computer tally gave them, so a judge ordered a new election which they won.<ref name="nj-cw">{{Cite news |last=Thibodeau |first=Patrick |url=https://www.computerworld.com/article/3126820/if-the-election-is-hacked-we-may-never-know.html |title=If the election is hacked, we may never know |date=October 5, 2016|work=ComputerWorld |access-date=February 18, 2020 |language=en}}</ref>
* Errors from 2002 to 2008 were listed and analyzed by the [[Brennan Center for Justice]] in 2010.<ref name="bren10"/>
* Errors before 2006 were listed by the [[Electronic Frontier Foundation]] in 2006.<ref name="eff2006"/>
* In 2004, 4,812 voting machine problems were reported to a system managed by [[Verified Voting]] and [[Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility]].<ref name="eirsmap">{{Cite web |date=February 8, 2012 |title=Election 2004 Machine Problems |url=http://voteprotect.org/index.php?display=EIRMapNation&tab=ED04&cat=02&start_date=&start_time=00%253A00&end_date=&end_time=00%253A00&search= |access-date=February 6, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120208182137/http://voteprotect.org/index.php?display=EIRMapNation&tab=ED04&cat=02&start_date=&start_time=00%253A00&end_date=&end_time=00%253A00&search= |archive-date=February 8, 2012 }}</ref><ref name="eirs">{{Cite web |date=February 4, 2005 |title=Election Incident Reporting System |url=http://www.verifiedvoting.org/eirs/ |access-date=February 6, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050204231058/http://www.verifiedvoting.org/eirs/ |archive-date=February 4, 2005 }}</ref> Most of these problems were in states which were primarily using direct-recording electronic voting equipment as of 2006.<ref name="vver">The following site defaults to the most recent year, and can be adjusted as early as 2006:{{Cite web |title=The Verifier — Polling Place Equipment — November 2006 |url=https://verifiedvoting.org/verifier/ |access-date=February 6, 2021 |website=Verified Voting |language=en-US}}</ref>
* Security reviews and audits are discussed [[Electronic voting in the United States#Security reviews|below]].
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* Other states have tried or considered software, with problems discussed below.
The [[Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act]] (UOCAVA) lets overseas citizens and all military and merchant marine voters get ballots electronically (email, fax, or web site). They then submit ballots by mail to
===Problems in online voting===
Security experts have found security problems in every attempt at online voting,<ref name="appel-dem">{{Cite web |last=Appel |first=Andrew |date=June 8, 2020 |title=Democracy Live internet voting: unsurprisingly insecure, and surprisingly insecure |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2020/06/08/democracy-live-internet-voting-unsurprisingly-insecure-and-surprisingly-insecure/ |access-date=June 23, 2020 |website=Princeton University}}</ref>
<ref name="vv-int">{{Cite web |title=Internet Voting |url=https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/internet-voting/ |access-date=June 20, 2020 |website=Verified Voting |language=en-US}}</ref>
<ref name="nas-sec">"Secure Internet voting will likely not be feasible in the near future ... At the present time, the Internet (or any network connected to the Internet) should not be used for the return of marked ballots" {{Cite book |date=September 6, 2018 |title=Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy |publisher=National Academies Press |doi=10.17226/25120 |isbn=978-0-309-47647-8 |s2cid=158434942 |url=https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protecting-american-democracy |access-date=June 23, 2020 |language=en}}</ref>
<ref name="eac-nist">"Electronic ballot return faces significant security risks to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of voted ballots. These risks can ultimately affect the tabulation and results and, can occur at scale ... Even with ... technical security considerations, electronic ballot return remains a high-risk activity." {{Cite web |publisher=Election Assistance Commission, National Institute of Standards and Technology, FBI, Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency |date=May 11, 2020 |title=Risk Management for Electronic Ballot Delivery, Marking, and Return |url=http://s3.amazonaws.com/ftt-uploads/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/07210015/Final_-Risk_Management_for_Electronic-Ballot_05082020-1.pdf |access-date=June 23, 2020}}</ref>
including systems in Australia,<ref name="aust">{{Cite conference |last=Halderman |first=J. Alex
Estonia,<ref name="estan">{{citation|last1=Springall|first1=Drew|last2=Finkenauer|first2=Travis|last3=Durumeric|first3=Zakir|last4=Kitcat|first4=Jason|last5=Hursti|first5=Harri|last6=MacAlpine|first6=Margaret|last7=Halderman|first7=Alex|title=Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security |chapter=Security Analysis of the Estonian Internet Voting System|year=2014 |pages=703–715 |doi=10.1145/2660267.2660315 |isbn=
Switzerland,<ref name="swiss-sctyl">{{Cite web |last=Zetter |first=Kim |date=March 12, 2019 |title=Researchers Find Critical Backdoor in Swiss Online Voting System |url=https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/zmakk3/researchers-find-critical-backdoor-in-swiss-online-voting-system |access-date=June 20, 2020 |website=Vice |language=en}}</ref>
Russia,<ref>{{Cite news|last=Gupta|first=Manhar|title=Russia's Blockchain Voting Turned Into A Fiasco|work=Cryptotrends|url=https://cryptotrends.in/russias-blockchain-voting-turned-into-a-fiasco/}}</ref><ref name="moscow">{{Cite conference |last=Gaudry |first=Pierrick
and the United States.<ref name="vice-mit"/><ref name="appel-dem"/>
<ref name="fl-scytl">{{Cite
in 2019-2020 researchers found insecurities in online voting systems from Voatz,<ref name="vice-mit">{{Cite news |last=Zetter |first=Kim |date=February 13, 2020 |title='Sloppy' Mobile Voting App Used in Four States Has 'Elementary' Security Flaws |language=en |work=VICE |url=https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/akw7mp/sloppy-mobile-voting-app-used-in-four-states-has-elementary-security-flaws |access-date=June 23, 2020}}</ref>
<ref name="mit-vo">{{Cite web |last=Specter |first=Michael A.
<ref name="sdut">{{Cite news |last1=Halper |first1=Evan |date=May 16, 2019 |title=The vote-by-phone tech trend is scaring the life out of security experts |language=en-US |work=San Diego Union Tribune |url=https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/us-politics/la-na-pol-voting-by-phone-20190516-story.html |access-date=June 23, 2020}}</ref>
and Democracy Live.<ref name="appel-dem"/><ref name="npr-demlive">{{Cite news |last=Parks |first=Miles |date=February 28, 2020 |title=States Expand Internet Voting Experiments Amid Pandemic, Raising Security Fears |language=en |work=National Public Radio |url=https://www.npr.org/2020/04/28/844581667/states-expand-internet-voting-experiments-amid-pandemic-raising-security-fears |access-date=June 23, 2020}}</ref>
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Handwriting experts agree "it is extremely difficult for anyone to be able to figure out if a signature or other very limited writing sample has been forged".<ref name="prop">{{Cite web |title=Handwriting Disputes Cause Headaches for Some Absentee Voters |url=https://www.propublica.org/article/handwriting-disputes-cause-headaches-for-some-absentee-voters |last=Armitage |first=Susie |date=November 5, 2018 |website=ProPublica |language=en |access-date=June 1, 2020}}</ref>
The National Vote at Home Institute reports that 17 states do not mandate a signature verification process.<ref name="nvahi-50">{{Cite web |date=May 2020 |title=Vote at Home Policy Actions: 1 and 2 Stars |url=https://www.voteathome.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/NVAHI-50-State-Policy-Analysis.pdf |access-date=June 18, 2020 |website=National Vote at Home Institute |archive-date=June 6, 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200606200617/https://www.voteathome.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/NVAHI-50-State-Policy-Analysis.pdf }}</ref>
The Election Assistance Commission says that machines should be set only to accept nearly perfect signature matches, and humans should doublecheck a sample, but EAC does not discuss acceptable error rates or sample sizes.<ref name="eac-ver">{{Cite web |date=May 20, 2020 |title=Signature Verification and Cure Process |url=https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/electionofficials/vbm/Signature_Verification_Cure_Process.pdf |access-date=June 17, 2020 |website=
In the November 2016 general election, rejections ranged from none in Alabama and Puerto Rico, to 6% of ballots returned in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky and New York.<ref name="eac16">{{Cite web |date=June 28, 2017 |title=The Election Administratin and Voting Survey (EAVS) 2016 Comprehensive Report |url=https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/2016_EAVS_Comprehensive_Report.pdf |access-date=June 12, 2020 |website=Election Assistance Commission}}</ref>
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Where reasons for rejection were known, in 2018, 114,000 ballots arrived late, 67,000 failed signature verification, 55,000 lacked voter signatures, and 11,000 lacked witness signatures in states which require them.<ref name="eac18">{{Cite web |title=Election Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) 2018 Comprehensive report |url=https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/2018_EAVS_Report.pdf |access-date=June 12, 2020 |website=Election Assistance Commission}}</ref> The intent of the signature verification step was to catch and reject forged signatures on ballot envelopes.<ref name="semin">{{Cite news |last=Cervantes |first=Lauren |date=October 8, 2020 |title=How Seminole County election officials detect voter fraud |language=en |work=ClickOrlando |url=https://www.clickorlando.com/news/local/2020/10/08/how-seminole-county-election-officials-detect-voter-fraud/ |access-date=December 2, 2020}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Jennings |first=Nicole |date=October 29, 2020 |title=A ballot's journey at King County Elections headquarters |work=MyNorthwest |url=https://mynorthwest.com/2266769/a-ballots-journey-at-king-county-elections-headquarters/? |access-date=December 2, 2020}}</ref>
The highest error rates in signature verification are found among lay people, higher than for computers, which in turn make more errors than experts.<ref name="comp-methods">{{Cite
Researchers have published error rates for computerized signature verification. They compare different systems on a common database of true and false signatures. The best system falsely rejects 10% of true signatures, while it accepts 10% of forgeries. Another system has error rates on both of 14%, and the third-best has error rates of 17%.<ref name="hafe-lr">These systems handle scanned ("offline") signatures from multiple people ("WI, writer-independent"). {{Cite book |last=Hafemann |first=Luiz G.
It is possible to be less stringent and reject fewer true signatures, at the cost of also rejecting fewer forgeries, which means erroneously accepting more forgeries.<ref name="igarza">{{Cite conference |last1=Igarza |first1=Juan |last2=Goirizelaia |first2=Iñaki |last3=Espinosa |first3=Koldo |last4=Hernáez |first4=Inmaculada |last5=Méndez |first5=Raúl |last6=Sanchez |first6=Jon |date=November 26, 2003 |title=Online Handwritten Signature Verification Using Hidden Markov Models |url=https://www.researchgate.net/publication/220842960 |conference=CIARP 2003 |volume=2905 |pages=391–399 |doi=10.1007/978-3-540-24586-5_48|doi-access=free }}</ref>
Vendors of automated signature verification claim accuracy, and do not publish their error rates.<ref name="parascript">{{Cite web |date=May 5, 2020 |title=SignatureXpert for Vote by Mail |url=https://www.parascript.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/SignatureXpert-for-VBM-brochure.pdf |access-date=July 21, 2020 |website=Parascript}}</ref><ref name="agilis">{{Cite web |date=November 7, 2019 |title=Agilis Ballot Packet Sorting System |url=https://runbeck.net/wp-content/uploads/Agilis_Product_Sheet.pdf |website=Runbeck}}</ref><ref name="fluence">{{Cite web |title=Criterion Elevate |url=https://www.fluenceautomation.com/products/criterion-elevate |access-date=July 21, 2020 |website=www.fluenceautomation.com}}</ref><ref name="bluecrest">{{Cite web |title=Vote-By-Mail Best Practices Webinar Series |url=https://www2.bluecrestinc.com/vote-by-mail-webinars |access-date=July 21, 2020 |website=www2.bluecrestinc.com}}</ref>
Voters with short names are at a disadvantage, since even experts make more mistakes on signatures with fewer "turning points and intersections".<ref name="sita">{{Cite journal |last1=Sita |first1=Jodi |last2=Found |first2=Bryan |last3=Rogers |first3=Douglas K. |date=September 2002 |title=Forensic Handwriting Examiners' Expertise for Signature Comparison |url=https://www.academia.edu/1361670 |journal=Journal of Forensic Sciences |language=en |volume=47 |issue=5 |pages=1117–24 |doi=10.1520/JFS15521J |pmid=12353558 |issn=0022-1198}}</ref>
==E-pollbooks==
{{main|Electronic pollbook}}
An electronic pollbook, also known as an e-pollbook, is a combination of hardware and software which maintains voter register information at a polling place to check if each voter is registered and has not already voted in the election. When voters have a choice of multiple [[vote center]]s where they may vote, e-pollbooks communicating over the internet can prevent a voter from voting more than once.<ref name="oc">{{Cite web |last=Orange County Registrar of Voters |date=2017-04-02 |title=Voter's Choice Act Versus Traditional Election Models |url=https://www.caceo58.org/assets/documents/votecenterbriefingdocumentfinal.pdf |website= California Association of Clerks and Elections Officials}}</ref>
In 2022 Williamson County TX found two problems: that its use of e-poll books sometimes assigned the wrong ballot style to voters, so they voted on contests outside their area, and did not vote on contests in their own area; and that some ballots did not display the voters' precincts.<ref name="appel23">{{Cite web |last=Appel |first=Andrew |date=2023-02-17 |title=Unrecoverable Election Screwup in Williamson County TX |url=https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2023/02/16/unrecoverable-election-screwup-in-williamson-county-tx/ |access-date=2023-02-17 |website=Princeton University |language=en-US}}</ref>
==State and local websites for election results==
Election offices display election results on the web by transferring USB drives between offline election computers, and online computers which display results to the public.
Election-reporting websites run software to aggregate and display results. These have had programming errors which showed erroneous partial results during the evening,<ref name="kvue">{{Cite news |last=Reding |first=Shawna |date=July 14, 2020 |title=Texas Secretary of State website fixes technical glitch in runoff election results |language=en-US |work=KVUE - ABC |url=https://www.kvue.com/article/news/politics/vote-texas/texas-primary-runoff-election-results-2020-secretary-of-state-website-glitch/269-91570c9b-8e86-423c-b128-0845991e5747 |access-date=July 30, 2020}}</ref> and the wrong winner.<ref name="journal">{{Cite news |last=Cottrill |first=Clarissa |date=May 18, 2018 |title=Official results in: Hammer, Redding win judge seats |language=en |work=Journal-News.net |url=https://www.journal-news.net/news/local-news/official-results-in-hammer-redding-win-judge-seats/article_8cd8c910-2f00-5404-827d-cc954cd226e9.html |access-date=July 30, 2020}}</ref> Local officials can change results. A Virginia official was charged with changing results by herself in the state's VERIS system. All charges were dropped when witnesses changed their stories, since computer logs did not prove whether changes were or were not made.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Muzyk |first=Cher |date=2024-01-03 |title=Former Prince William elections chief cleared of all criminal charges |url=https://www.princewilliamtimes.com/news/former-prince-william-elections-chief-cleared-of-all-criminal-charges/article_5868b370-aa85-11ee-ad5e-f7527afca6b8.html |access-date=2024-02-01 |work=Prince William Times |language=en}}</ref>
Before the 2016 general election, Russians gained access to at least one employee's account<ref name="intercept">{{Cite news |last1=Cole |first1=Matthew |last2=Esposito |first2=Richard |last3=Biddle |first3=Sam |last4=Grim |first4=Ryan |date=June 5, 2017 |title=Top-Secret NSA Report Details Russian Hacking Effort Days Before 2016 Election |language=en-US |url=https://theintercept.com/2017/06/05/top-secret-nsa-report-details-russian-hacking-effort-days-before-2016-election/ |access-date=July 30, 2020}}</ref> at a vendor which manages election-reporting websites.<ref name="sherman">{{Cite news |last=Sherman |first=Amy |date=October 19, 2016 |title=Premature posting of election results was mistake, not a crime |work=Miami Herald |url=https://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/broward/article109203007.html |access-date=July 30, 2020}}</ref> During the 2018 general election, a hacker in India gained administrative access to the Alaska election-reporting website.<ref name="anchor">{{Cite news |last=Herz |first=Nathaniel |date=May 8, 2018 |title=Hackers broke partway into Alaska's election system in 2016. Officials say no damage was done. |language=en-US |work=Anchorage Daily News |url=https://www.adn.com/politics/2018/05/07/hackers-broke-partway-into-alaskas-election-system-in-2016-officials-say-no-damage-was-done/ |access-date=July 30, 2020}}</ref><ref name="newman">{{Cite magazine |last=Newman |first=Lily Hay |date=March 16, 2020 |title='Kill Chain': HBO's Election Security Doc Stresses Urgency |language=en-us |magazine=[[Wired (magazine)|Wired]] |url=https://www.wired.com/story/hbo-kill-chain-election-security/ |access-date=July 30, 2020 |issn=1059-1028}}</ref>
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|California||2007||"top-to-bottom review" of security of all electronic voting systems in the state, including
The California security experts found significant security flaws in all of the manufacturers' voting systems, flaws that could allow a single non-expert to compromise an entire election.<ref>[http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/top-to-bottom-review.htm CA SoS Top to Bottom Review] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141203021026/http://www.sos.ca.gov/voting-systems/oversight/top-to-bottom-review.htm |date=December 3, 2014 }} Retrieved March 2, 2012</ref>
The July and August reports found that three of the tested systems fell far short of the minimum requirements specified in the EAC 2005 [[Voluntary Voting System Guidelines]] (VVSG).
On August 3, 2007, Bowen decertified machines that were tested, and also the ES&S [[InkaVote]] machine, which was not included in the review because the company submitted it past the deadline for testing.
|-
|California||2007||Hart eSlate voting system||Researchers at UC Davis, and Yolo County reported on security flaws.<ref name="davis">{{Cite web |last1=Proebstel |first1=Elliot |last2=Riddle |first2=Sean |last3=Hsu |first3=Francis |last4=Cummins |first4=Justin |last5=Oakley |first5=Freddie |last6= Stanionis |first6=Tom |last7=Bishop |first7=Matt |date=June 26, 2007 |title=An Analysis of the Hart Intercivic DAU eSlate |url=http://www.usenix.org/events/evt07/tech/full_papers/proebstel/proebstel.pdf |access-date=May 22, 2021 |website=Usenix}}</ref>
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|California||2004||Diebold||Researchers evaluated software because of Harri Hursti's discovery of their hackability in Leon County FL.<ref name="basic">{{Cite web |last1=Wagner |first1=David |last2=Jefferson |first2=David |last3=Bishop |first3=Matt |date=February 14, 2006 |title=Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuBasic Interpreter |url=http://www.solarbus.org/election/docs/security_analysis_of_diebold.pdf |access-date=May 22, 2021 |website=SolarBus}}</ref>
|-
|Michigan||2017||ES&S<ref name="mi-rfp">{{Cite web |date=January 25, 2017 |title=RFP No. 007116B0007029 Election Systems & Software, Exhibit A, Attachment 1.1 Voting System HARDWARE Technical Requirements, DS200, pages 83, 114 |url=https://www.michigan.gov/documents/sos/ESSBid_549580_7.pdf |website=Michigan Secretary of State}}</ref> and Dominion Voting Systems<ref name="rtr">{{Cite web |date=May 28, 2019 |title=Democracy Suite
|-
|Florida||2008||online voting from Scytl,<ref name="fl-scytl"/>||
Line 253 ⟶ 267:
|Ohio||2003||AccuVote-TS (Diebold), iVotronic (ES&S), eSlate 3000 (Hart), AVC Edge (Sequoia), and their tabulation systems.<ref>{{Cite web |publisher=Compuware Corporation |date=November 23, 2003 |title=Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Technical Security Assessment Report |url=http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/everest/01-compuware112103.pdf |access-date=May 22, 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101227142213/http://www.sos.state.oh.us/sos/upload/everest/01-compuware112103.pdf |archive-date=December 27, 2010 }}</ref>||
|-
|Connecticut||2007||Diebold voting machine and
|-Kentucky||2007||ES&S, Hart, Diebold systems||Includes expert report by Jeremy Epstein and report by KY Attorney General<ref name="kyag">Epstein's report begins on p. 85. {{Cite web |last=Stumbo |first=Gregory D. |date=November 15, 2007 |title=Submission of Reports on Kentucky's Electronic Voting Systems |url=https://www.eac.gov/
|-
|New Jersey||2006||[[Premier Election Solutions]] (formerly [[Diebold Election Systems]]) AccuVote-TSx||[[Princeton University]] computer scientists studied security of the voting system for a group of New Jersey counties. Their results showed that the AccuVote-TSx was insecure and could be "installed with vote-stealing software in under a minute". The scientists also said that machines can transmit computer viruses from one to another "during normal pre- and post-election activity".<ref>Riordan, Theresa. September 13, 2006. {{cite web |url=http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S15/81/66A80/index.xml |title=Researchers reveal 'extremely serious' vulnerabilities in e-voting machines |access-date=February 8, 2016 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304114355/http://www.princeton.edu/main/news/archive/S15/81/66A80/index.xml |archive-date=March 4, 2016 }} Princeton University. Retrieved March 6, 2008.</ref>
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Four states reuse the same machines or ballot images as the election, so errors can persist, CT, IL, MD, NV.
Sixteen states do not require audits, or only in special circumstances.
In seven states many voters still lack paper ballots, so audits are not possible. IN, KY, LA, MS, NJ, TN, TX.<ref name="vv-states">{{Cite news |title=State Audit Laws
Even where audits are done, no state has adequate security on the paper ballots, so they can be damaged to impede audits, or altered to match erroneous machine tallies.<ref name="evote">{{Cite
===Public attitudes===
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For any of the foreign actions (hacks, contributions or lies), 72% of voters support economic sanctions, 59% support cutting diplomatic relations, 25% support a military threat, and 15% support a military strike. There was less support for action, by 4-20 percentage points, if the foreign country helped one's own party win, so the researchers point out that retaliation is unlikely, since there is little support for it in a winning party. Deep investigation creates more certainty about who is to blame, which they find raises support for retaliation very little. They randomly listed China, Pakistan or Turkey as the interfering country, and do not report any different reactions to them.<ref name="tomz"/>
A Monmouth University poll in May 2019 found that 73% thought [[Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections|Russia interfered in the 2016 election]] (not necessarily by hacking), 49% thought it damaged American democracy a lot, 57% thought Russia interfered in the 2018 election, and 60% thought the
==Election companies==
Many election companies are members of the
Three vendors sell most of the machines used for voting and for counting votes. As of September 2016, the American [[Election Systems & Software]] (ES&S) served 80 million registered voters, Canadian [[Dominion Voting Systems]] 70 million, American [[Hart InterCivic]] 20 million, and smaller companies less than 4 million each.<ref name="wharton">{{Cite web |last1=Hitt |first1=Lorin |last2=Ahluwalia |first2=Simran |last3=Caulfield |first3=Matthew |last4=Davidson |first4=Leah |last5=Diehl |first5=Mary Margaret |last6=Ispas |first6=Alina |last7=Windle |first7=Michael |title=The Business of Voting Market Structure and Innovation in the Election Technology Industry |url=https://publicpolicy.wharton.upenn.edu/live/files/270-the-business-of-votin |access-date=July 7, 2020 |website=Penn Wharton Public Policy Initiative}}</ref>
Three companies sell mail sorting and signature verification machines: ES&S, Runbeck and a merged company, Olympus/Vantage/Pitney Bowes/Bell & Howell
and in 2021 BlueCrest acquired Fluence,<ref name="blu">{{Cite web |date=2021-11-04 |title=Fluence Automation acquired by BlueCrest |url=https://www.parcelandpostaltechnologyinternational.com/news/automation/fluence-automation-acquired-by-bluecrest.html |access-date=2022-11-11 |website=Parcel and Postal Technology International |language=en-GB}}</ref>
which had obtained the Bell & Howell election business in 2017.<ref name="flu">{{Cite web |date=2017-08-01 |title=Bell and Howell Sells Sorting Business to Fluence Automation |url=https://bellhowell.net/about-us/news/bell-and-howell-sells-sorting-business-to-fluence-automation/ |access-date=2022-11-11 |website=Bell and Howell |language=en-US}}</ref>
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and Vantage<ref name="van-bc">{{Cite web |last=Bluecrest |title=Vantage sorting solution |url=http://www.bluecrestinc.com/products/sorters/vantage-sorting-solution/ |access-date=2022-11-23 |website=www.bluecrestinc.com |language=en}}</ref>
machines are sold by BlueCrest. Runbeck uses Vantage sorters from BlueCrest.<ref name="run-bc">{{Cite web |date=2020-09-25 |title=BlueCrest and Runbeck Election Services Team up to Tackle Vote-by-Mail Surge |url=http://www.bluecrestinc.com/company/newsroom/bluecrest-and-runbeck-election-services-team-up-to-tackle-vote-by-mail-surge/ |access-date=2022-11-23 |website=www.bluecrestinc.com |language=en}}</ref>
Runbeck also processes envelopes under contract.<ref name="runb-mar">{{Cite news |last=Fifield |first=Jen |date=2024-04-22 |title=Why this private company handles a pivotal batch of Arizona ballots |url=https://www.votebeat.org/arizona/2024/04/22/runbeck-election-services-scans-maricopa-county-arizona-ballots/ |access-date=2024-04-27 |work=Votebeat |language=en}}</ref>
The signature-matching software most used is from Parascript,<ref name="wiggers">{{Cite web |last=Wiggers |first=Kyle |date=2020-10-25 |title=Automatic signature verification software threatens to disenfranchise U.S. voters |url=https://venturebeat.com/ai/automatic-signature-verification-software-threatens-to-disenfranchise-u-s-voters/ |access-date=2023-02-14 |website=VentureBeat |language=en-US}}</ref> spun off from Paragraph, a Soviet-American joint venture
though there are other companies.<ref name="layani">{{Cite web |author=Robert Hummel |author2=Timothy W. Bumpus |author3=Alyssa Adcock |author4=Sharon Layani |title=Authentication Using Biometrics: How to Prove Who You Are |url=https://www.potomacinstitute.org/steps/featured-articles/september-2021/authentication-using-biometrics-how-to-prove-who-you-are |access-date=2023-02-14 |website=www.potomacinstitute.org |language=en}}</ref>
Parascript had fewer errors than other software in 2010: Parascript rejected 14% of genuine signatures and accepted 8% of forgeries if they were modeled on a genuine signature.<ref name="ferrer">{{Cite web |last=Ferrer |first=Miguel and J. Francisco Vargas-Bonilla |date=December 2010 |title=The 4NSigComp2010 Off-line Signature Verification Competition: Scenario 2 |url=https://accedacris.ulpgc.es/bitstream/10553/46159/1/68969_1.pdf |website=Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria}}</ref>
Amazon provides election websites in 40 states, including election-reporting sites in some of them.<ref name="bose">{{Cite news |last=Bose |first=Nandita |date=October 15, 2019 |title=How Amazon.com moved into the business of U.S. elections |language=en |work=Reuters |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-elections-amazon-com-insight-idUSKBN1WU173 |access-date=July 31, 2020}}</ref> A Spanish company, [[Scytl]], manages election-reporting websites statewide in 12 U.S. states, and in another 980 local jurisdictions in 28 states.<ref name="Forbes 2 December 2017">{{cite news |last1=Heilweil |first1=Rebecca |title=Nine Companies That Want To Revolutionize Voting Technology |url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/rebeccaheilweil1/2017/12/02/eight-companies-that-want-to-revolutionize-voting-technology |access-date=December 4, 2018 |work=Forbes |date=December 2, 2017 |language=en}}</ref>
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*'''1964''': The Norden-Coleman [[optical scan voting system]], the first such system to see actual use, was adopted for use in [[Orange County, California]].<ref>E. G. Arnold, [https://josephhall.org/arnold_ca_vs_hist.pdf History of Voting Systems in California] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160306210826/https://josephhall.org/arnold_ca_vs_hist.pdf |date=March 6, 2016 }}, California Secretary of State Bill Jones, June 1999.</ref>
*'''1974''': The Video Voter, the first [[DRE voting machine]] used in a government election, developed by the Frank Thornber Company in [[Chicago, Illinois]], saw its first trial use in 1974 near Chicago.<ref>Douglas W. Jones and Barbara Simons, Broken Ballots, CSLI Publications, 2012; see Section 5.2, page 96.</ref>
*''' Mar. 1975''':The U.S. Government is given a report by [[Roy G. Saltman]], a consultant in developing election technology and policies,<ref>{{Cite news |title=Roy Saltman, election expert who warned of hanging chads, dies at 90 |language=en-US |newspaper=Washington Post |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/obituaries/2023/04/26/roy-saltman-hanging-chads-dead/ |access-date=2023-04-30 |issn=0190-8286}}</ref> in which the [[certification of voting machines]] is analyzed for the first time.
*'''August 28, 1986''': The Uniformed and Overseas Citizen Absentee Voting Act of 1986 (UOCAVA) requires that
*'''1990''': The FEC ([[Federal Election Commission]]) released a universalized standard for computerized voting.
*'''1996''': [[Reform Party of the United States of America|The Reform Party]] uses I-Voting (Internet Voting) to select their presidential candidate. This election is the first governmental election to use this method in the U.S.<ref name="lorrie.cranor">{{cite web |url=http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/evoting-encyclopedia.html |title=Electronic Voting |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150506054541/http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/evoting-encyclopedia.html |archive-date=May 6, 2015 }}</ref>
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*'''September 21, 2006''': The governor of Maryland, [[Bob Ehrlich]] (R), advised against casting electronic votes as an alternative method for casting paper absentee ballots. This was a complete turn around since Maryland became one of the first states to accept electronic voting systems statewide during his term.
*'''September 3, 2009''': [[Diebold]], responsible for much of the technology in the election-systems business, sells their hold to [[Election Systems & Software]], Inc for $5 Million, less than 1/5 of its price seven years earlier.<ref name="votingmachines.procon">{{cite web|url=http://votingmachines.procon.org/view.timeline.php?timelineID=000021|title=Historical Timeline |access-date=February 25, 2015}}</ref>
*'''October 28, 2009''': The federal Military and Overseas Voters Empowerment Act (MOVE) requires
*'''January 3, 2013''': Voter Empowerment Act of 2013 – This act requires each
*'''Spring 2019''': Department of Defense [[DARPA]] announces $10 million contract for secure, open-source election system prototypes based on the agency's SSITH secure hardware platform work: a touch screen ballot-marking device to demo at the annual [[DEF CON]] hacker conference in summer 2019 and an optical scan system to read hand-marked paper ballots targeted for DEF CON 2020.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/yw84q7/darpa-is-building-a-dollar10-million-open-source-secure-voting-system|title=DARPA Is Building a $10 Million, Open Source, Secure Voting System|last1=Zetter|first1=Kim|last2=Maiberg|first2=Emanuel|date=March 14, 2019|website=Vice|language=en-US|access-date=June 1, 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.technologyreview.com/f/613126/darpa-is-trying-to-build-an-unhackable-open-source-voting-system/|title=DARPA is trying to build an unhackable open-source voting system|date=March 15, 2019|website=MIT Technology Review|language=en-US|access-date=June 1, 2019}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web|url=https://futurism.com/darpa-open-source-voting-machine|title=DARPA is building an open source voting machine|last=Robitzski|first=Dan|date=March 14, 2019|website=Futurism|language=en|access-date=June 1, 2019}}</ref>
==Legislation==
In the summer of 2004, the Legislative Affairs Committee of the [[Association of Information Technology Professionals]] issued a nine-point proposal for national standards for electronic voting.<ref>[http://www.aitp.org/newsletter/2004julaug/index.jsp?article=evoteside.htm "Legislative Committee Resolution Awaiting BOD Approval"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110724231220/http://www.aitp.org/newsletter/2004julaug/index.jsp?article=evoteside.htm |date=July 24, 2011 }}. (July 2004). ''[http://www.aitp.org/newsletter Information Executive] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080518061010/http://www.aitp.org/newsletter/ |date=May 18, 2008 }}''</ref> In an accompanying article, the committee's chair, Charles Oriez, described some of the problems that had arisen around the country.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.aitp.org/newsletter/2004julaug/index.jsp?article=evote.htm |title= Information Executive - July / August 2004|website=www.aitp.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20040908180039/http://www.aitp.org/newsletter/2004julaug/index.jsp?article=evote.htm |archive-date=September 8, 2004}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.aitp.org/newsletter |title= AITP Chapter Redirect|website=www.aitp.org |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110724231334/http://www.aitp.org/newsletter |archive-date=July 24, 2011}}</ref>
Legislation has been introduced in the United States Congress regarding electronic voting, including the Nelson-Whitehouse bill. This bill would appropriate as much as 1 billion dollars to fund states' replacement of touch screen systems with optical scan voting system. The legislation also addresses requiring audits of 3% of precincts in all federal elections. It also mandates some form of paper trail audits for all electronic voting machines by the year 2012 on any type of voting technology.<ref>{{cite news |last=Padgett |first=Tim |url=http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1680451,00.html |title=Voting Out E-Voting Machines |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |date=November 3, 2007 |access-date=February 6, 2014
Another bill, HR.811 ([[Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003|The Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2003]]), proposed by Representative [[Rush D. Holt, Jr.]], a Democrat from New Jersey, would act as an amendment to the Help America Vote Act of 2002 and require electronic voting machines to produce a paper audit trail for every vote. The U.S. Senate companion bill version introduced by Senator Bill Nelson from Florida on November 1, 2007, necessitates the Director of the National Institute of Standards and Technology to continue researching and to provide methods of paper ballot voting for those with disabilities, those who do not primarily speak English, and those who do not have a high literacy rating. Also, it requires states to provide the federal office with audit reports from the hand counting of the voter verified paper ballots. Currently, this bill has been turned over to the [[United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration]] and a vote date has not been set.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:SN02295:@@@D&summ2=m& |title=Bill Summary & Status - 110th Congress (2007–2008) - S.2295 - CRS Summary - THOMAS (Library of Congress) |publisher=Thomas.loc.gov |date=November 1, 2007 |access-date=February 6, 2014 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151018162217/http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:SN02295:@@@D&summ2=m& |archive-date=October 18, 2015 }}</ref>
During 2008, Congressman Holt, because of an increasing concern regarding the insecurities surrounding the use of electronic voting technology, submitted additional bills to Congress regarding the future of electronic voting. One, called the "Emergency Assistance for Secure Elections Act of 2008" (HR5036), states that the [[General Services Administration]] will reimburse states for the extra costs of providing paper ballots to citizens, and the costs needed to hire people to count them.<ref name="2008-PDF-election">{{cite web|url=http://electionarchive.org/ucvInfo/US/legislation/SummaryFlyer5036.pdf |title=Archived copy |access-date=March 6, 2008
The [https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/1562 '''Secure America's Future Elections Act''' or the SAFE Act (HR 1562)] was among the relevant legislation introduced in the [[115th Congress]]. The bill's provisions include designation of the infrastructure used to administer elections as [[critical infrastructure]]; funding for states to upgrade the security of the information technology and cybersecurity elements of election-related IT systems; and requirements for durable, readable paper ballots and manual audits of results of elections.
==See also==
* [[Electronic voting in India]]
==References==
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