Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n: Difference between revisions

|Litigants=Gade v. Nat'l Solid Waste Management Assoc.▼

In '''''Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Association''''', [[Case citation|505 U.S. 88]] (1992),{{ref|citation}} the [[United States Supreme Court]] determined that federal [[Occupational Safety and Health Administration]] regulations preempted various [[Illinois]] provisions for licensing workers who handled hazardous waste materials. ▼

Pre-emption may be either expressed or implied, and "is compelled whether Congress' command is explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose." [[Jones v. Rath Packing Co.]], 430 U.S. 519, 525, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1309, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977); [[Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.]], 463 U.S. 85, 95, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2899, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983); [[Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. De la Cuesta]], 458 U.S. 141, 152-153, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3022, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982). Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the scheme of federal regulation is " 'so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,' " id., at 153, 102 S.Ct., at 3022 (quoting [[Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.]], 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947)), and conflict pre-emption, where "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," [[Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul]], 373 U.S. 132, 142-143, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1217-1218, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." [[Hines v. Davidowitz]], 312 U.S. 52, 67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 404, 85 L.Ed. 581 (1941); [[Felder v. Casey]], 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2306, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988); [[Perez v. Campbell]], 402 U.S. 637, 649, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1711, 29 L.Ed.2d 233 (1971).▼

Our ultimate task in any pre-emption case is to determine whether state regulation is consistent with the structure and purpose of the statute as a whole. Looking to "the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy," [[Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux]], 481 U.S. 41, 51, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 1555, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), we hold that nonapproved state regulation of occupational safety and health issues for which a federal standard is in effect is impliedly pre-empted as in conflict with the full purposes and objectives of the OSH Act. [[Hines v. Davidowitz]], supra. The design of the statute persuades us that Congress intended to subject employers and employees to only one set of regulations, be it federal or state, and that the only way a State may regulate an OSHA-regulated occupational safety and health issue is pursuant to an approved state plan that displaces the federal standards.▼

:1. This state law is an occupational safety and health standard within the meaning of the OSH Act, regardless of whether it has another, nonoccupational purpose, based on the criterion that it directly, substantially, and specifically regulates occupational safety and health. In assessing a state law's impact on the federal scheme, this Court has refused to rely solely on the legislature's professed purpose and has looked as well to the law's effects. See, e.g., [[Perez v. Campbell]], 402 U.S. 637, 651-652, 91 S.Ct. 1704, 1712-1713, 29 L.Ed.2d 233. State laws of general applicability, such as traffic and fire safety laws, would generally not be pre-empted, because they regulate workers simply as members of the general public. Pp. 104-108.▼

:2. The state licensing acts are pre-empted by the OSH Act to the extent that they establish occupational safety and health standards for training those who work with hazardous wastes. The Act's saving provisions are not implicated and Illinois does not have an approved plan. Illinois' interest in establishing standards for licensing various occupations, cf., e.g., [[Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar]], 421 U.S. 773, 792, 95 S.Ct. 2004, 2015, 44 L.Ed.2d 572, cannot save from OSH Act pre-emption those provisions that directly and substantially affect workplace safety, since any state law, however clearly within a State's acknowledged power, must yield if it interferes with or is contrary to federal law, [[Felder v. Casey]], 487 U.S. 131, 138, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2306, 101 L.Ed.2d 123. Nor can the acts be saved from pre-emption by Gade's argument that they regulate a "pre-condition" to employment rather than occupational safety and health, since SARA makes clear that the training of employees engaged in hazardous waste operations is an occupational safety and health issue and that certification requirements before an employee may engage in such work are occupational safety and health standards. This Court does not specifically consider which of the licensing acts' provisions will be pre-empted under the foregoing analysis. Pp. 108-109.▼

Justice O'CONNOR, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Justice WHITE, and Justice SCALIA, concluded in Part II that the OSH Act '''impliedly''' pre-empts any state regulation of an occupational safety or health issue with respect to which a federal standard has been established, unless a state plan has been submitted and approved pursuant to § 18(b) of the Act. The Act as a whole demonstrates that Congress intended to promote occupational safety and health while avoiding subjecting workers and employers to duplicative regulation. Thus, it established a system of uniform federal standards, but gave States the option of pre-empting the federal regulations entirely pursuant to an approved state plan that displaces the federal standards. This intent is indicated principally in § 18(b)'s statement that a State "shall" submit a plan if it wishes to "assume responsibility" for developing and enforcing health and safety standards. Gade's interpretation of § 18(b)—that the Secretary's approval is required only if a State wishes to replace, not merely supplement, the federal regulations would be inconsistent with the federal scheme and is untenable in light of the surrounding provisions. The language and purposes of §§ 18(a), (c), (f), and (h) all confirm the view that the States cannot assume an enforcement role without the Secretary's approval, unless no federal standard is in effect. Also unacceptable is Gade's argument that the OSH Act does not pre-empt nonconflicting state laws because those laws, like the Act, are designed to promote worker safety. Even where such laws share a common goal, a state law will be pre-empted if it interferes with the methods by which a federal statute was intended to reach that goal. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494, 107 S.Ct. 805, 812, 93 L.Ed.2d 883. Here, the Act does not foreclose a State from enacting its own laws, but it does restrict the ways in which it can do so. Pp. 96-104.▼