Security Watch Articles

In this article Nayef Al-Rodhan explores the relationship between neuroscience, philosophy, and society. More specifically, from the perspective of this relationship, Al-Rodhan critiques the origins and legacy of the Enlightenment, including how there is a common misreading of the place of reason in this movement. He also looks at how neurophilosophy, which bridges the distance between the philosophy of human nature and neuroscience, could open the way for new paradigms of governance and even for a ‘new Enlightenment’.chevron_right

In this article Nayef Al-Rodhan explores the relationship between neuroscience, philosophy, and society.chevron_right

Federica Mogherini contends that Europe is finally taking greater responsibility for European and global security. For instance, the EU has recently developed three key tools to reduce the long-standing fragmentation of Europe’s defense sector: the European Defense Fund (EDA), the coordinated annual review of national defense budgets and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). However, Mogherini stresses that the EU wants to take such efforts and assume its responsibilities in the spirit of cooperation with its partners, starting with NATO and the US. That is, the EU wishes to pursue ‘cooperative autonomy’.chevron_right

Antonio Missiroli writes that the speed and intensity at which the strategic landscape evolves now requires actors including the EU and NATO to constantly update their analytical and operational tools. This is to ensure they can capture change as it occurs, anticipate it whenever possible, and frame it in terms that facilitate adaptation, resilience and cooperation. In this article, Missiroli explores how debates over “hybrid’ —including its associations with “warfare” and cyber-enabled technology working a possible game-changer— provide an excellent case in point.chevron_right

Dara Massicot writes that given Russia’s intervention in Syria, deteriorating ties with the US, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty’s collapse and more, it seems the time is approaching for Moscow to update its military doctrine. While the language and structure of these documents tend to be stable from one version to the next, small changes often prove significant. As a result, Massicot here outlines nine things to look out for in a new doctrine, which he suggests could arrive as early as 2020.chevron_right

In this article, Mario Esteban and Ugo Armanini explain why they think the Cold War experience is a useful lens through which the EU can assess emerging US-China competition and the strategic implications of Beijing’s engagement in Europe’s 5G networks. Esteban and Armanini also contend that such an analysis suggests that when faced with the prospect of a difficult positioning between China and the US, the EU would be well advised to remember its privileged ties with Washington.chevron_right

Allard Duursma contends that mediated peace agreements in civil wars often fail to bring about lasting peace, largely as a result of the use of pressure. To help address the problem, Duursma recasts how we think about such pressure by introducing the notion of smart pressure, which recommends that 1) mediators should ensure that conflict parties largely own peace processes; 2) mediators should only apply pressure when the conflict parties can live with the endpoint of its use; and 3) chief mediators should coordinate and manage pressure from external third parties.chevron_right

Carl Bildt and Mark Leonard contend that amid increasing geopolitical competition, Europeans are in danger of becoming the hapless playthings in a tussle for preeminence between China, Russia and the US. The authors suggest that there’s nothing inevitable about this scenario, but will Ursula von der Leyen and the EU’s other new leaders be able to turn things around? To provide answers, Bildt and Leonard assess the last five years of EU foreign policymaking and outline ways for Europe to fulfil its potential on the world stage over the next five years.chevron_right

Michael Rühle writes that following Russia’s use of hybrid warfare in Ukraine, it wouldn’t take long before the Western strategic community would examine how to best deter hybrid threats. After all, deterrence was the central paradigm of Western security throughout the Cold War. However, Rühle contends that this examination is being held back by the West’s own debate on hybrid warfare, which is characterized by alarmism, fuzzy terminology and sweeping generalizations. In response, he here outlines five key factors hindering this debate and their implications for hybrid threats deterrence policy.chevron_right

Rebecca Hersman and Bernadette Stadler contend that for most of the nuclear age, enhanced strategic situational awareness — the ability to characterize the operating environment, detect nuclear and conventional strategic attacks, and discern real attacks from false alarms — has been perceived as beneficial to crisis stability. However, Hersman and Stadler here explain why existing and emerging technology that could enhance strategic situational awareness may increase the risk of escalation, particularly among nuclear-armed states.chevron_right

Sophie-Charlotte Fischer and Andreas Wenger warn that policymakers and experts increasingly view artificial intelligence (AI) within the narrow context of great power competition. In response, our authors argue that international science diplomacy could help change this situation. Further, politically neutral Switzerland, with its dynamic AI ecosystem, is well-positioned to take a leading role. By providing a hub committed to the responsible, inclusive, and peaceful development and use of AI, it could lessen the danger posed by a few powerful actors racing to harness this immature technology.chevron_right

Tim Prior and Florian Roth note that disaster risk reduction policies can mitigate the most harmful impacts of natural hazards. However, a lack of political support has often hamstrung effective prevention and preparedness, even though early action yields multiple benefits – to more than just the economy. Our authors thus address how to reap the ‘resilience dividend’ through political, financial and societal investments as well as activities such as the May 2019 Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in Geneva, co-hosted by the UN and Switzerland.chevron_right

In this article, Niklas Masuhr writes that NATO is prioritizing conventional military capabilities to deter Russian encroachment on the Alliance. Further, Western planners and strategists view the war in Ukraine as a key benchmark that defines future capability requirements. As a result, various adaptive processes are underway within national armed forces.chevron_right

In May 2019, a letter sent by two US undersecretaries to Brussels accused the EU of damaging transatlantic cooperation and hindering US access to Europe’s defense market through the Union’s European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). For Daniel Fiott, this claim is overblown. Even with the introduction of the two initiatives, the European defense market will remain more open than that of the US. So why has Washington raised tensions with the Union? And why is the US so concerned about the initiatives? Here’s what Fiott thinks.chevron_right

The US and Russia have formally announced their intention to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. In this article, Tapio Juntunen looks at what this development and other negative trends in nuclear weapons politics and arms control may mean for the Nordic countries. Juntunen concludes that the Nordic nations should respond to the present crisis by encouraging discussion to resolve the deadlock over arms control, even if this approach has its shortcomings. This would also enable them to highlight their concerns about Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons in their immediate vicinity.chevron_right