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SECRET
AO-C003627
SECUftlTX RE»*ARKXN6 REQUIREMENTS
DOD 5200. DEC 78
REVIEW ON 28 OCT 87
RHPORT R.125
AIRTO-AIR ENCOUNTERS
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA (U)
Volume 1 ACCOUNT OF F-4 AND F-8 EVENTS
PRIOR TO 1 MARCH 1967 (U)
John S. Attinclio. Projccc Leader
CctoUcc 1967
\ 'XV.tii.'.Sori^c*! Dir.::-.;. ja Svi-itd
D D C
n)f?f7Qf?{Tn nf7|
INSTITUTE FOR DEFEASE ANALYSES
SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION
4. ,
Prcparri under contrr.ct with the -
WEAPONS SYSTEMS EVALUATION GROUP
as V/SEG Report ll6
I ^ 1
WSEG Log Nc. 126571
Log No, JD VhQ 67-6d30
Copy 'fStt'' of copies
7in
"EXCLUDED FROM GENEflAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE."-.. PRESCRIBED BY E. 0. 11652./^
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Ntleno! djfcme of iM^niMd^tatei within
Hie meening e# the Erpicitege Uwi^Title^lB,
U.S.C. , Seoieiii 793 oml m. The tiwur ilnim"
er^he.f«vefotwn ef itt conttntt in on^ r-ionner
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"EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE.". PRESCfiiBEO BY £. 0. 11652
D D C
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20 October 1967
MEMOy^JUM FOR HOU)ERS OF VOLUME I. WSEG REPORT 1 16
/
SmiJCT; RED BARON Report
of a scries of four volumes on *A.r-to-A.r ^''^^nt^imot the data to aoaly-
cause of the voluminous dam =°''="=''/,'^';J,"^trftecMZm be published,
sis from a variety of vievvpoints, all of the ^^^"^"its IVr-^-air encounters
Volume 1 is a compilation of available data on F-4 and F-8 air to air e
between January 1965 an d 1 March 1967. -
]^ Publication date is expected to be Maith . ^
li'cation in March 1968, . ^
A Volume IV will bo the report of analyses, recommendations, and conclu^fiPS
l;riXd frm *: Wtot^ut«re research and d^^^^^
This volume will be published in December 1957.
5. The user organisations are encoutascd u, utilize ^^'^^Jj^^^^;^^"'
::-^Z^:^^^^ - — these docun^Jt.
would be appreciated. ;
FOR THE DIRECTOR;
-mo
1^
Jack e. mcMahan
'colonel, USA
Executive Secretary
i
! 3^
R-123-/- l-lj'
AIR-TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA;
'i
13
"I
.J
Volume T# ^
ACCOUNT OF F-4 ANDJF-S EVENTS PRIOR TO l^MARCH 1967(U)--[:
October 1967
This report hos been prepared by the Systemi Evaluafion Dlviiion of
the institute for Deferue Anolysei in response to the Weopons Systems
Evaluation Group Task Order SDHDAHCI.5.67 C,QQ12-T.=104A rioted
6 December 1966. -^r-.'^I^^A . . /•> if'-^i #^ / ^ . '\ \ * ^
In the work under this To^ Order, the Institute hos been ouistedl^
mttltofy personnel assigned by WSEG.
•SAIIOIUL S£CURIIY lAFORIUIIOH* .
"Unauthorised Disclosure Subject to Crimlnnl
Sanctioaa*
ID/I
D D C
OCT 24 BT5
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION
400 Army-Navy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202
i.i
/
"EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECUSSIFICATION
KJHEDULE.".. PRESCRIBED BY L 0. 11652 v
^ v4iNCUSSiFIED
FOREWORD
This report Is a product of the Weapons System Evaluation
Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses In conjunction
with the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group In response to WSEG
Task Order SD-35-T>10i* , as modified In a memorandum for Director,
WSED, from Director. WSEG, dated H August 1966, The memorandum
resulted from a request by the Deputy Director, Tactical War-
fare Programs, ODDR&E. The Task was coordinated with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, (J-3 and J-5),
At its inception (October 1966) the RED BARON Project team
consisted of:
John S. Attlnello, Project Leader
Douglas N. Beatty, Ass't Project Leader '
John W. Walden, Cdr. , USN, Senior Navy
Malcom J. Agnew, LCol., USAF, Senior Air Force
Phillip J. Conley, Jr., LCol., USAP, and Thomas J. Hughes, Capt.,
USN, also worked part time on the project from its inception,
primarily acting as an Interview-debrlef team. LCol. Agnew and
Cdr. Walden were the other team.
In November John Rublno, Charles Tiffin, William Eason,
Capt.. USN, and Charles R. Shaw, Col., USA, Joined the project.
In December Robert J. Lynch, Jr., Col., USMC, Joined, and
Philip Brooks, Col., USAP, became Senior Air Force representative.
Richard Stewart, Capt., USN, was assigned In February 1967.
These later military arrivals shared their time with other
WSEG projects.
While developing Interview methods and techniques, the
project was valuably assisted by two psychologists from. IDA/RESD,
W. Sinaiko and W. Richard Kite.
UNCUSSIFIED
111
UNCLASSIFIED
For interviews in the U.S., teams consisting of military
and civilian project members supplemented the two teams designated
initially to "'^llect data in the combat theater. In the SEA
theater, two Navy-Air Force teams (Conley-Hughes and Agnew-
Walden) conducted the interviews. LCol. Agnew and Cdr. Walden
also interviewed SEA returnees at European bases.
As interviews were conducted. It became apparent that much
more data were teing collected than had been initially estimated
from official reports. Therefore, a rapid Increase in qualified
personnel was needed to collate the data for publication.
Roy G. Anderson, Rear Admiral, USN, Senior Navy Member of
WSEG, through appropriate channels, obtained the services of
four Navy fighter pilots for a period of two weeks. The assist-
ance to the RED BARON Project of the following Navy pilots Is
acknowledged:
Dennis E. Becker, Lt., USN
denjamin Cloud, LCdr. , USN
-Samuel C. Plynn, LCdr., USN
William D, Kiper, LCdr., USN
A. J. Beck, Major General, USAF, Senior Air Force Member of
WSEG, with the cooperation of Headquarters, USAF, obtained the
services nine tactical fighter pilots for a thirty-day period.
The assistance to the RED BARON Project of the following Air
Force pilots is acknowledged:
Thomas H. Curtis, MaJ . , USAF
Leslie C. Long, Capt., USAF
Robert S. Maxwell, Capt., USAF
R. P. Moore, MaJ., USAF
Sam P. Morgan, Jr., Capt., USAF
Michael G. Pennacchio, Capt., USAF
William P. Robinson, MaJ., USAF
Ronald W. Scott, Capt., USAF
Ronald J. Ward, Maj., USAF
The project also acknowledges the assistance of the following
individuals who assisted the interv'.ew teams in the data collec-
tion phase:
iv
UNCUSSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
J. J. Berkow, Col., USAF, ARPA R&D Field Unit,
BanKkok, Thailand
R. Hlller, Assistant for Operations Analysis,
'CINCPACAF Staff PTMrPArviT staff
E Kapos, OEG Representative, CINCPACPLT Starr
G Koviades. COMNAVOCEANO ^ 4 ^„
S: L^nsenmeyer, Chief, Scientific Research Advisory
J.°v!"'p4t?erson' Co?!' USAF, ARPA R&D Field Unit,
B.'liSers/olG^Hepresentatlve. CINCPACPLT Staff
H L. Wood, Col., USAF, Headquarters, 7th AF
D. G. Lynch, LCol, USMC, OPNAV
The project acknowledges the assistance of Dennis 0.
Medlock and his assistant Marie Zoellner and the many mem-
bers of the IDA support staff who transcribed the interview
tapes. The assistance of the SED Publications Department is
also acknowledged, particularly that of Walter J. Hamilton
and his graphics artists, who were responsible for the special
illustrations and who coordinated work with Computer Graphics,
The Boeing Company, Seattle.
The commands, whose cooperation made it possible to reach
the participants of air-to-air engagements are also acknowledged.
COMMANDS
Commander-in-Chief, Pa'ciflc
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces
Commander, Seventh Air Force, Tan Son Nhut AS, Vietnam
Commander, Task Force Seventy-Seven
Deputy Commander, 7/13th Air Forces, Udorn Airfield,
Thailand
Commander, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TPW), Ubon Airfield,
Thailand
Commander, 366th TPW, Danang AB, Vietnam
Commander, 355th TFW, Takhli AB, Thailand
Commander. 388th TFW, Korat AB, Thailand
UNCLASSIFIED
V
UNCLASSIFIED
Commander, ^32nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udorn
Airfield, Thailand
Commanding Officer, USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63)
Commanding Officer, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-41)
Commanding Officer, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
Commanding Officer, USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65)
Commanding Officer, USS HANCOCK (CVA-19)
Director, ARPA RiD Field Unit, Saigon, Vietnam
Director, ARPA R4D Field Unit, Bangkok, Thailand
Commander, Hat Air Division, Yakota AB, Japan
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe
Commander, Seventeenth Air Force, Ramsteln AB, Germany
Commander, 9lst TPW RAF, Bentwaters, England
Commander, 36th TFW, Bitburg AB, Germany
Commander, 50th TFW, Hahn AB, Germany
Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Commander, Fleet Air, Miramar, California
Commander, Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellls AFB,
Nevada
Commander, 15th TFW, McDlll AFB, Florida
Commander, 831st Air Division (TAC), George AFB,
California
Commander, 835th Air Division, McConnell AFB, Kansas
Commander, 3525th PTW, Williams AFB, Arizona
Commander, i4531st TFW, Homestead AFB, Florida
Commander, ^^53rd Combat Crew Training Wing, Davis-Monthan
AFB, Arizona.
iiuriAQCinrn
UNCLASSIFIED
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1
Data Sources • ^
Data Presentation • • . 3
DATA DEFINITION AND COLLECTION 7
Background - Goals and Limitations 7
Approach ^
Description of Interview Procedure 11
General Conunents on Data 13
EVENT RECONSTRUCTIONS ' 15
UNCLASSIFIED vii
1
I
I. INTRODUCTION
At the request of the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group has undertaken
a study of air-to-air encounters in Southeast Asia. The project
code name is RED BARON. Data that have been collected on
approximately 320 such encounters through 1 June 1967 will
be analyzed primarily to assist in the selection of suitable
research and development programs for future high-performance
fighter aircraft. A secondary purpose of the study is to pro-
vide data for use by the military services and of the scientific
community. This volume is a. partial documentation for the
secondary purpose.
A. DATA SOURCES
Data contained in this report were taken from two sources:
the official reporting media and personal interviews with par-
ticipants. Past WSEO experience in collecting combat data^^
has shown that the official reporting media, which are designed
primarily for military operational and statistical needs, are
Inadequate for many analytic purposes. The project groups con-
ducting these earlier studies found that personal interviews
with participants were necessary for RiD analyses. In Project
RED BARON, interviews were considered the primary data
source, supplemented, where available, by official reports.
ri iWSEO Staff Study 134, Adequacy of Data from Sou theast Asia
Vj Combat A ir Operations for Research and Development Analyses
^ of Aircraft Losses and Damages (U) . SECRET, February i967>
t>. 2WSEG Report 101, Requirements of Defense R&D A gencies for
I J Data from Combat Air Operations in S outheast Asia, SECRET,
August 1966.
'.J
For purpoces of this study, encounters that were Investi-
gated were defined to Include the following types;
• Sighting of enemy aircraft (either visually or by
radar; ,
• Either U.S. or enemy aircraft initiating hostile or
evasive maneuvers,
• Either U.S. or enemy aircraft expending ordnance, and
• Loss or damage in combat of either U.S. or enemy air-
craft.
During -he data collection phase, an effort was made to
assure the /.haustlveness of the information contained in this
report. Hc.ever, It was establls/isd that certain aspects of
air-to-air combat could not be included; For example, during
the conduct of CAP and escort missions, frequently it was neces-
sary for the fighter force to intercept radar contacts which
proved to be friendly aircraft. Also, during the course of
missions, aircraft sighted were Initially identified and called
as enemy, only to be recognized later as friendly. These occur-
rances v/ere not reported and therefore are not documented in
this vclumo.
While numerous sightings of enemy aircraft are contained
In this volume, it is believed that there are many other sight-
ings v.hlch were not documented (and therefore not Included).
This is partially substantiated by the numerous Instances which
were mentioned during interviews for which no date or location
was recalled and which were not correlated with reported sight-
ings .
The first type was considered in decall only if the sight-
ing was of R&D interest, e.g., if a U.S. aircraft made no
attempt to engage enemy aircraft because of Inferior or malfunc-
tioning U.S. equipment. Where no R&D implications were indi-
cated, siglitings were noted to record the information collected
for potential use for other analyses.
2
Since "test type" Instrumentation does not exist on most
combat aircraft, the validity and quality of data are limited
to the tolerances of human senses and recollections (aided
where possible by official and personal records, notes, tapes,
etc.). A detailed account of the precautions taken to Insure
the validity and quality of data gathered in such interviews
is presented in Section II.
Originally the data sample consisted of 248 encounters
through 1 March 1967 • However, from this date through 22 Nay,
65 more encounters were identified (not including "sightings").
In the 23-raonth period from first encounter to 1 March, 47
"confirmed plus probable" MIG kills were reported. In the six-
week period in April-May 1967, the 65 engagements resulted in
37 "confirmed plus probable" MIG kills. ^
B. DATA PRESENTATION
Though the analyses to be conducted in the RED BARON study
werti to be limited to exposing problems for R&D considerations.
Interest in the basic data was expressed in many areas of the
military and scientific communities. To satisfy these needs
the data have been formalized and will be published in several
volumes as follows:
No. of Encounters
U.S. Aircraft Involved to 1 March 1967
P-UB 13
P-4C 55
F-8 8
P-10i| 1
U-2 1
Volume I
Total Events Reported Volume I - - - - - 78
1 Concurrently, there was a shift in targeting policy (NVN
airfields were bombed by U.S. aircraft from 23 April) and the
Introduction of new equipment (e.g., SUU-I6/A guns installed in
some F-4C aircraft). Because of these factors the additional
engagements were Included In the RED :3AR0N data base.
4»
4>
No. of Encounters
U.S. Aircraft Involved to 1 Marc h 1967
P-105 151
RP-4C I
Volume II V RF-?,,
RP-101 '
■ ^' Misc. (Incl. A-1, A-1) 6
Total Events Reported Volume II 170
Total Events Volumes I and II 2^18
Volume III - Encounters from 1 Mar 1967 through 1 Jun 1967.
For ease of study and analysis, the available information
nas been summarized under the following headings:
•Primary Mission and Tactical Situation
•Mission Route
•Aircraft Configurations
•Flight Conditions Prior to Encounter
•Initial Detection
• Acticm Initiated
•Situation Development
• Ordnance
• Equipment Problems
• Aircrew Coinments
• Data Sources
Following the aboye, an edited narrative is presented which
integrates all the information sources pertaining to the desig-
nated air-to-air engagement. Wherever an air-to-air engagement
proved to be of sufficient complexity that a perspective drawing
aided in its understanding, such a representation was developed.
Although every precaution has been taken to depict the
engagements accurately, the artists' representations serve only
as guides to the reader in following through the complex series
of situations and should not be Interpreted as the precise
flight paths of the aircraft involved.
Terrain features have been added to the drawings princi-
pally to give perspective and to present an appreciation of
ground features that existed in the general locale. Tracks
relative to ground features should not be taken literally ex-
cept where the narrative makes specific reference thereto.-
The perspective representations of the alr-to-alr engage-
ments were the result of cooperative efforts of the SED Graphics
Department and the Boeing Company, Computer Graphics Division.
These drawings were developed with the aid of a specialized
analog computer (Illustromat 1100), by employing maps and over-
lays developed during interviews. Artists then added perspec-
tive views of aircraft in approximate attitudes and positions
Indicated in the Event Summary charts. Although the flight
paths are to the same scale as the terrain, the aircraft shown
are greatly enlarged for Illustrative purposes.
The names and official call signs of the participants have
been replaced by standardized nomenclature to give anonymity to
the interviewees. This precaution was followed throughout to
encouraee frank and honest answers to all questions posed by the
interview teams.
UNCLASSIFIED
II. DATA DEFINITION AND COLLECTION
A. BACKGROUND - GOALS AND LIMITATIONS
The broad goal formulated for the data definition/collec-
tion effort was to obtain sufficient data to enable reconstruc-
tion of the various alr-to-alr encounters In appropriate detail
with maximum accuracy and completeness ("reconstruction" being
the key word) .
The scope and degree of detail was not simply defined.
It revolved around the needs of the R&D community and the
limitations of the available data. The primary limitation was
human ability to sense and recall. There were no recording
devices in U.S. aircraft, and, therefore, with few exceptions
(such as taped communications and photographs), all data had
to be extracted from the minds of participants and observers.
There was also the question of the adequacy, for event re-
construction, of data reported from Southeast Asia through the
standard reporting systems. WSEG experience^ showed that
while these systems offered certain worthwhile information for
R&D purposes, they were far from adequate for the purposes of
this specific study.
It was decided that WSEQ would Interview participants In
air-to-air encounters as the principal source of data.
WSEG Report 101, Requirements of Defense R&D Agencies for
Data from Combat Air Operations in Sou:;hea5t Asia CU), July
1966, (SECRET). W3EG Staff Study 13^, Adequacy of Data from
Southeast Asia Combat Air Operations for Research and Develop
ment Analyses of Aircraft Loss and Damage (U), February 1967 j
(SECRET).
UNCLASSIFIED
7
UNCLASSIFIED
B. APPROACH
The data collection program Involved several Interrelated
areas of operations. They were:
1. Identification of alr-to-alr encounters and the
participants.
2. Development of more specific data needs and resolution
of needs with limitations.
3. Collection of appropriate documentary Information on
Southeast Asia alr-to-alr encounters.
k» Development of optimum interview techniques.
3. Location of and arrangements for interviewing
participants .
These operations were not necessarily sequential and were
continued throughout the data collection phase.
Items 1 and 3 initially were interrelated, i.e., the means
of identifying encounters was through search of existing docu-
mentation — various formally and informally maintained "box
scores" and other files.
Early information was gained from the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations and the USAF air staff. Additional basic
documentation came from the USAF' Tactical Fighter Weapons Cen-
ter, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COHNAVAIRPAC , and the Commander,
7th Air Force. It was quickly determined that the various
"box scores" did not agree. This was attributed to a variance
in definition of what constituted an air-to-air encounter/
engagement and possibly administrative or communications
failures within the commands.
Additionally, early in the study, the CNO and the Chief of
Staff, USAF, were advised of WSEG Project RED BARON and re-
quested to provide reference to appropriate documentation.
Numerous replies were received from various offices within the
Services.
8
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Gradually, sources of documented information were In-
creased until they included: standard reporting system (OPREPs,
COACT, Navy 3^80 Reports, Guided Missile Performance Reports);
various reports of associated studies made by OEG representa-
tives and other analytical groups; letters from pilots who
could not be interviewed; various records kept at all levels
of command; gun-camera films; tapes of communications made by
pilots; and miscellaneous message traffic among military
commands .
Identification of participants was a particular problem
since there is no existing mechanism for providing this infor-
mation. With a relatively few exceptions, names of partici-
pants were not included in reports. However, names were
gradually acquired through informal communications with USN
and USAP pilots and, as the Interview program proceeded, other
persons were Identified by the interviewees.
Some specific items of data desired were defined by visits
to various Service R&D and training organizations and through
meetings with representatives of various industrial organiza-
tions concerned with components of U.S. fighter weapons systems.
(These visits and conferences also provided information on the
technical and operational aspects of the weapons systems con-
cerned.) Eventually, a categorized list of data specifically
desired from each encounter was formulated.
Having, established the data requirements, an Interview
program was desired which would:
• Allow the greatest number of interviews, while
• Maximizing the quality, depth, and scope of informa-
tion obtained from each interview.
There were uncertainties about the interview program,
however. They involved such considerations as the human
ability to recall stressful incidents and the effect of elapsed
time between the event and attempt to recount it. Large numbers
UNCLASSIFIED
9
■ ' 1
gacussuiai
of people throughout the world had to be Interviewed great ,
quantities of Interview data had to be reduced, and time and I
manpower had to be ecnsldered. |
With the assistance of IDA psychologists, H, W. Slnaiko I
and W. R. Kite, basic Interview concepts were, delineated.
These concepts stressed unhurried Informality, anonymity of |
the interviewee, a chronological approach to the entire flight
in question (not Just the alr-to-alr encounter period of It). |
and much use of visual aids - maps, sketches, airplane
models — to reconstruct events. |
A systematic program was developed to Interview a maximum
number of participants in the combat theater and throughout |
CONUS and Europe. There was little chance to control tne
elapsed time between events and Interview. As a result, the .
elapsed time varied from days to more than one year. ■
Efficiency of operation was approached In various ways. -;.
several levels of encounter were defined according to their
complexity- and Intensity,* and the basic Interview procedure
was somewhat expanded or abbreviated according to the level of
encounter and the knowledge of the interviewee. Data formats
were devised which attempted to facilitate the recording (and g
subsequent reduction) of Information while stimulating the
memory of the Interviewee. Q
A total of ten persons were trained as interviewers.
Where it was possible to communicate with a participant but Q
not practical or possible to interview him, he was contacted
by mall. |
While there was the desire to interview a maximum number
of pilots, it was superseded by a desire to maximize coverage |
over the largest number of encounters. Consequently, where a
'siehtlng only (visual or radar); either side taking hostile g
or evasive action; expenditure of ordnance by either side,
loss or damage by either side. g
10 UNCLASSIFIED ||
UNCLASSIFIED
choice had to be made as to whom to Interview, tieadth of
coverage was the first consideration.
At the start, various test Interviews were conducted,
their results evaluated, and Improvements made before a llrge
scale program was undertaken. Minor changes In procedure were
made throughout the program.
C. DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW PROCEDURE
In spite of the small changes that evolved and flexibility
Included to accommodate each situation, the basic Interview
procedure remained largely constant after the early test cases.
Ideally, the Interviewee was given advance notice and a
general idea of what would be discussed. The Interview team
consisted of two persons, one a military pilot with a signifi-
cant amount of flying experience and the second person a mill- '
tary officer or civilian. The team would meet with one crew-
man at a time in a closed room, with minimum distraction, and
with what was intended to be more than ample time allotted for
the meeting. The team attempted to create an air of relaxed
Informality.
The interviewee was given an explanation of the study,
how It came about, what it hoped to accomplish, and what his
role was. It was emphasized that his name would not appear
in print and that, in general, attempts would be made to pre-
serve the anonymity of the persons interviewed. This was done
to encourage frank and honest answers. The complete interview
procedure was explained in detail.
Next, the pilot was asked to give an uninterrupted narra-
tive of the encounter in question. He was asked to start from
planning for the mission and discuss all aspects through the
fllght»s return to base. He was first given examples of the
kind of detail desired. Early In the project it became stan-
dard for the interviewers to use a tape recorder for the
UNCUSSIFIED
11
UNCUSSIFIED
narrative phase. This, of course, depended upon the inter-
viewee's consent and he was always free to ro back and erase
anything he wished from the tape. He was assured that the
tape was only for the use of the interviewers in gaining com-
plete, accurate information from the meeting and its use was
limited to the project.
Next, depending on the intensity and complexity of the
encounter, a sketch of the action was made. Again, the sketch
covered a greater part of the mission than Just the air-to-air
encounter, dealing with ingress and egress as well. The
technique was to put a transparent paper overlay on a large
scale map and trace the paths, in plan view, of the various
aircraft known to have been present (as they were believed to
be) relative to known geographical points. The third dimension
to the picture was introduced by means of a keyed time-sequence
vs. altitude plot at the top of the overlay.
With regard to time, early In the study it became clear
that the -air-to-air combatant rarely had any reasonable concept
of the time duration of events or phases of the combat. He
could, however, recall well the sequence of events. This
caused the Injecting of time-sequences into the Interview
process. The procedure was for the interviewer to "stop the
action" at a point where something significant was occurring
and try to elicit a detailed account of the scene at that
instant — the location and altitude of each participant;
status of the interviewee's aircraft in the way of speed, g»s,
fuel state, avionics modes, etc.; action by the individual and
his reasons therefor; communications which took place; enemy
actions; etc.
After such a stop the description would continue until the
next significant event occurred at which point the action would
be stopped again. These stops correspond with the "T" (or
"Time") marks in events and pictures. While one team member
12
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
worked with the pilot In making the sketch, the other kept
notes on a specially designed note pad.
Upon completion of this step-by-step microscopic phase,
the interviewers consulted their checklist on data items and
asked specific questions about points which had not come out.
Finally, the interviewee was encouraged to coirunent on the
whole range of considerations which might be of Interest to
the study — comments derived from his experience in this
specific encounter as well as from his overall experience.
The duration of an interview was from minutes to several
hours, depending on the significance and complexity of the
encounter and the knowledge of the interviewee.
D. GENERAL COMMENTS ON DATA
WSEQ identified 2*t8 air-to-air encounters that occurred
prior to 1 March 1967. Participants in ISH of these encounters
were interviewed, with a total of 331 interviews conducted. ^
In addition, 37 written accounts of engagements were received.
In general, priority was given to the more complex encounters;
events for which no interviews were conducted were usually a
sighting only, with no R&D significance.
The study group found that human ability to recall the
details of Incidents stressful to them is sometimes quite
remarkable. With regard to the validity of recall, various
comparisons were made between OPREP reports of the encounter
and interviews and between interviews of various participants
in the same encounter. There was generally good agreement.
Where significant discrepancies appeared, they could usually
be traced to the confusion of a fast moving, complex situation
If an Individual was interviewed in connection with two or
more different encounters, this would he considered as two
or more interviews.
UNCLASSIFIED
13
UNCLASSIFIED
rather than memory failure or some psychological phenomena.
(Discrepancies between various accounts of the same event did
cause some difficulty In the final reconstruction process. In
almost all cases, discrepancies were resolved through repeated
study of the data, use of logical deductions, and/or
relntervlew. )
intuitively, it might appear that the best Information
would be Obtained by minimizing the time lapse between encoun-
ter and interview. However, there are opinions and Illustra-
tions which counter this. The thought cannot be proved or
disproved at this time. As noted earlier, elapsed time between
encounter and Interview ran from a period of days to more than
a year. Dates of events and Interviews have been included In
the published data.
The interview techniques. In general, were highly regarded
by interviewees for effectiveness In stimulating accurate,
detailed recall. In some oases, through the procedures used,
interviewees were able to correct and clarify their concep-
tions of events.
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
HI. EVElsfT RECONSTRUaiONS
The account of each event Is presented in at least two
basic parts: (1) An outline which gives an abbreviated pres-
entation of the highlights of the event, and (2) A narrative
of the encounter.
All of the events contained In this Volume are summarized
in Table 1. A Glossary of Terms was developed to aid in the
Interpretation of events and is included at the end of this
report. The glossary also contains descriptions and lllustra->
tions of the more common aircraft maneuvers.
In addition, whenever an alr-to-alr engagement proved to
be of sufficient complexity that a perspective drawing aided
In Its understanding, such a representation was developed.
The perspective drawings were keyed by an Event Summary Chart
which describes the actions of friendly aircraft (BLUE 1,2,
etc.), and enemy aircraft, as well as known communication in-
formation, at significant points in the event. As explained
in Section II, these are identified by "time marks" (Tq, T-j^,
T2, etc.), and are Instants In time when significant points
arose and are not Intervals of seconds or minutes of clock
time. In the perspective sketch, a vertical line representing
altitude appears on the flight path at each of these "time
marks" with the time mark sequence number printed at the top
and the participant to which it referred printed at the bottom
(e.g., B2, M3, etc.). The keyed flight paths presented in the
sketches were color coded such that the paths of all friendly
aircraft were shown in blue and those of enemy aircraft, in red.
CONFIDENTIAL
15
CONFIDENTIAL
^ ■ *
It Is recognized that precise flight paths could not be re-
constructed since the participating airplanes did not carry
Instrumentation for recording of position. Thus, while every
effort was made to depict the engagements as accurately as
possible. It must be remembered that artists* representations
serve only as guides to the reader In following the complex
series of situations and should not be interpreted as the
precise flight paths of the aircraft Involved.
Terrain features have been added to the drawings prlncl->
pally to give perspective and to present an appreciation of
the ground features that existed in the general locale. Some-
times these features were referenced during intsrviews to
assist the pilot to recall details of the event, but it was
rare that exact features played a significant part in the en-
counter even though most encounters took place at low altitude.
Tracks relative to ground features should not be taken literally
except where the narrative makes specific reference thereto.
16
CONFIDENTIAL
Table 1. LIST OF EVENTS
Date/Time
Aircraft Involved
No . /Type
U.S.
Enemy
Resu 1 ts
Los t/Oaniaged
U.S.
Enemy
3 Apr
9 Apr
31 May
4 Jun
17 Jun
10 Jul
1 1
5
6
Jul
Oct
Oct
8 Oct
1 Nov
23 Dec
9 Jan
22 Jan
3 Feb
3 Feb
6 Feb
'65/1110H
•65/0840H
'65/1505H
'65/0712H
■65/1030H
'65/170GH
'6S/1520H
*65/1040H
'65/1040H
'65/1530H
'65/1030H
•65/0730H
•66/0926H
•66/1925H
•66/2100H
•66/2100H
•66/
4 Mar'66/1703H
10 Mar'66/1025H
5 Apr'66/0915H
21 Apr'66/1232H
23 Apr'56/1616H
23 Apr'66/1421H
25 Apr'66/n37H
25 Apr'66/mid-
afternoon
26 Apr'66/1520H
26 .Apr'66/1425H
29 Apr'66/fflid-
af ternoon
30 Apr'66/0900H
8 May'66/1515H
10 May'66/1810H
12 May'66/1622H
30 May'66/1750H
12 Jun'66/1446H
14 Jun'66/0040H
F-8E
F-4B
F-4C
F-4B
F-4B
F.4C
F-4C
F.4C
F-4B
F-4C
F-4C
F-4C
F-8E
F-4C
F-4B
1 F-4B
1 U-2
F-4C
F.4C
F-4C
F-8E
F-4C
F-4C
F-4C
F-4C
F-4C
2 F-4C
4 F-4C
4 F-4C
F-4C
F.4C
F-4C
F-4C
F-4C
F-8E
F-8C
F-4B
3 MIG-17
4 MIG-17
8 Pcss MIG
4 MIG-l?
MI6'17
MIG-17
Unid.
MIG-17
MIG-17
Unid.
Unid.
MIG?
Unkn.
1 Unid.
Unknowns
1 MIG-17
1 MIG-21
(3 MIG-17
\3 MIG-17
1 YAK-25
1 Unid.
Unknown
1 MIG-21
4 MIG-17
2 MIG-21
2 MIG-21
3 MIG-21
1 MlG-2n
4 MIG-17f
4 MI6-17
4 MI6-17
3 Unid.
3 MIG-17
4 MIG-17D
4 MIG-17
4 MIG-n
2 Colt
0/1
1/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Si ght ing
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Si ghting
Radar
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Si ghting
iO/0
\S i ght i ng
Sighting
Sighting
Radar
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/1*
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Si ghting
0/0
0/0
0/0
1 Prob/0
0/0
0/0
2/0
2/0
0/0
1 Prob/0
0/0
0/0(deleted)
0/0
1 Prob/a
2/0
0/0
0/0
1/0
0/0
2/0
1/0
0/0
0/0
1+1 Prob/0
1 Prob/0
^Damaged by AAA.
Event
Date/Time
Aircraft Involved
No. /Type
Results
Lost/Oanaged
U.S.
Enemy
U.S.
Enemy
1-36
1-37
1-38
1-39
1-40
1-41
1-42
1-43
1-44
1-45
1-46
1-47
1-48
1-49
1-50
1-51
1-52
1-53
1-54
1-55
1-56
1-57
1-58
1-59
1-60
1-61
1-62
1-63
1-64
1-65
1-66
1-67
1-68
1-69
1-70
1-71
1-72
1-73
1-74
1-75
1-76
1-77
I-7B
21 Jun'66/1535H
13 JuT66/1102H
14 Jul' 66/1251H
14 Jur66/1200H
20 Jur66/1550H
7 Aug'66/0910H
Aug-S3p'66/1430H
5 Sep'66/1645H
14 Sep'66/1655H
16 Sep'66/1020H
20 Sep'66/0920H
21 Sep'66/1121H
23 Sep'66/0800H
27 Sep'66/1600H
---Sep'66/
1 0ct'66/0814H
5 0ct'66/0748H
9 Ocf66/0830H
9 0ct'66/0845H
--.Oct'66/
2 Nov*66/1700H
3 Nov'66/1541H
4 Mov'66/1548H
4 Nov'66/1556H
5 Nov'G6/1630H
5 Nov'66/
21 Nov'66/Late
morn
4 Dec'66/1665H
5 Dec*66/1105H
30 Dec'66/1620H
20 Oec'66/0207H
30 Dec*66/1610H
( 2 Jan'67/1500H
iz Jan'67/1510H
(2 Jan'67/1515H
3 Jan'67/1550H
5 Jan'67/1201H
6 Jan'67/1030H
6 Jan'67/0920H
16 Jan'67/1545H
17 Jan'67/0807H
21 Jan*67/0855H
22 Jan'67/1140H
23 Jan'67/
5 Feb'67/1530H
4 F-8E
4 F-4B
3 F-8E
4 F-4C
3 F-4C
1 F-104C
3 F-4C
2 F-8E
4 F-4C
3 F-4C
3 F-4C
2 F-4C
2 F-4C
4 F-4C
2 F-4C
1 F-4B
2 F-4C
2 F-4B
4 F-8E
3 F-4C
3 F-4C
3 F-4C
4 F-4C
3 F-4C
4 F-4C
1 F-4B
F-4B
4 F-4C
4 F-4C.
2 F-4C
2 F-4B
4 F-4C
(4 F-4C
h F-4C
U F-4C
4 F-4C
4 F-4C
2 F-4C
3 F-4C
4 F-4C
4 F-4C
3 F-4C
4 F-4C
12 F-4C
4 F-4C
4 MIG-17
6 MIG-17
3 MIG-17
2-3 MIG-21
1 MI6-?
1 MIG-21
1 MIG-?
2 MIG-17
1 MI6-21
4 MIG-17
2 MI6-17
2 MIG-21C
4 MI6-17
2 MIG-17
3 MI6-?
1 MIG-?
Poss MIG
2 MIG-?
2 MIG-21
Unknown
1 rtI6-21
2 MI6-21D
1 MIG-17
1 MI6-?
2 MIG-21D
Unknown
MIG
2 Unid.
1 MIG-?
3 MIG-17
2 Colt ?
1 MIG-21?
(5-7 MIG-21
{5 MIG-21
1? MIG-Zl
MIGs
2 MIG-21
4 MI6-21C
2 MIG-?
3 MIG-21
2 MIG-".7
1 MI6-17D
2 M1G-?
None-SAMs
8 MIG-17
1/0
0/0
1/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
1/1
0/0
lProb*/0
1/0
0/0
Si ghting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
1 Prob/0
1/0**
0/0
Sighting
Si ghti ng
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Two rada
Radar
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
(0/0
{o/o
In / 0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sightinc
0/0
0/0
0/0
1/1
0/0
2/0
1/0
0/1
2/0
0/0
0/0 •
1/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
1/0
0/0
2/0
r contacts
0/0
1/0
0/0
(3/0
{l/O
13/0
0/0
2/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
* Loss probably due to MIG.
**Not Included in official box score.
UNCLASSIFIED
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
(All Terras Unclassified Unless Otherwise Stated)
AA - alr-to-alr weapon
AAA - antiaircraft artillery
AAM - air-to-air missile
AAWC - Ant 1- Air-Warfare Commander
AB - afterburner
ACM - air combat maneuvering
ACT - air combat tactics
ADF - automatic direction finder
AEW - airborne early warning
AGL - above ground level
AIM-7 (D&E models) (SPARROW) - semi active radar type, air-to-
air missile
AIM-9 (B&D models) (SIDEWINDER) - passive IR type, air-to-air
missile
AIM-9C (SIDEWINDER) - Radar guided alr-to-alr missile
AI radar - airborne intercept radar
Aircraft commander - a pilot * designated pilot-ln-command of a
given aircraft (Air Force name for front
seater in F-4)
ALKALI - Soviet air-to-air missile - radar beam rider type
ALQ-51 - Broadband deception ECM system
AUl-71 - Noise jamming ECM pod (production model of QRC-I60-I)
ANCHOR (Various colors) - See Figure 9 on page 31 - code names
for specific refueling tracks
AN/APA-157 - CW radar illuminator and fire control computer
for SPARROW missile system.
Angle-off - angular position off the tail of the reference
aircraft
APQ-72 - airborne intercept radar in P-^IB aircraft
.UNCLASSIFIED
19
UNCLASSIFIED
- airborne Intercept radar In P-8E aircraft
APQ-lOO/109 - airborne Intercept radar In P-^C/D aircraft
APR-25 - vector homing and warning system - providing 360"
directional warning of threat signals in certain bands
with Instantaneous bearing to radiating source.
APR-26 - crystal video airborne warning receiver to detect SA-2
guidance signals
APR-27 - airborne radar warning receiver
armed reconnaissance - an air mission flown with the primary
purpose of locating and attacking targets
of opportunity, i.e., enemy materiel,
personnel, and facilities in. assigned
general areas or along assigned ground
communications routes, and not for the
purpose of attacking specific briefed
targets.
ASE circle - allowable steering error - circle on radar display
provided by fire control computer.
ATOLL - Soviet air-to-air missile, infrared seeker type
autotrack - automatic tracking in which a servo mechanism keeps
the radar bean trained on the target.
Back - the individual occupying the back seat of the P-i|; in
Navy called RIO, in Air Force called pilot or GIB.
BARCAP - Barrier combat air patrol - a MIGSCREEN for one or
more missions
barrel roll - See Figure 2 (page 27) - a 360*» rolling maneuver
in which the flight path of the aircraft describes
a helix about the- Intended direction of the flight.
BDA - boirtb damage assessment
BINGO (fuel) - minimum fuel quantity reserve established for a
given geographical point to permit aircraft to
return safely to home base or aerial refueling
point.
bogey - unidentified aircraft
boreslght mode - in the boreslght mode the radar antenna is
aligned and locked to the roll axis of the
aircraft.
break - an emergency turn in which maximum performance is desired
Instantly to destroy an attackers tracking solution,
break X - minimum range Indication for missile launch, X ap-
pears in the radar scope at minimum range.
20
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
CAP - combat air patrol - an aircraft patrol provided over an
objective area, ovc the force protected, over the
critical area of a combat zone, or over an air defense
area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying
hostile aircraft before they reach their target,
(NAVY) Condition I CAP (Standby): aircraft ready for immediate
(maximum delay of two (2) minutes) takeoff. Aircraft
with engine not running (starter batteries plugged in)
will be positioned for take-off. Pilots In cockpit and
deck drew on alert.
CAS - calibrated air speed (knots)
CBU«2'l - canister dispensed air-to-ground bomb let type munition;
the canister is carried externally on the aircraft and
opens after release at a preset altitude.
centerllne tank - a fuel tank carried externally on centerllne
of aircraft.
chaff - a type of confusion reflector, which consist of thin,
narrow metallic strips of various lengths to provide
different responses « used to create false signals on
radarscope.
chandelle - a maximum performance climbing turn in which speed
is converted to altitude while reversing direction.
CMR-312 (Little Ears) - aural radar warning receiver
CROWN - call -sign for rescue force commander
CRT - Combat Rated Thrust - maximum augmented thrust condition
of engine
DF - direction finder
DME - distance measuring equipment
dot - (aim dot, steering dot) - electronic dot appearing in
radar scope when radar is
locked on providing computed
steering vector Information
element - Air Force term for the basic fighting unit (two air-
craft)
EWO - electronic warfare officer
PANSONG - tracking radar for Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile
system (CONFIDENTIAL)
fighting ( wing) position - an area for the wingman in which optl--
mum coverage and maneuverability is achieved in
maximum performance maneuvers .
finger-four formation - see Figure 6 (page 29) - also fingertip
formation - a four-plane formation in
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
which the aircraft occupy positions
suggested by the four finger tips of
either hand, the fingers being held
together In a horizontal plane.
flak - antiaircraft fire
fluid element - the second or supporting element In fluid four
formation, flying In a high or low element
position.
fluid-four - see Figure 5 (page 29) - a tactical formation having
the second element spread in both the vertical and
horizontal planes to enhance maneuverability,
mutual support and look-out ability,
fragged - mission directed by fragmentary operational order
from higher headquarters.
Front - the Individual in the front seat In the F-^i aircraft;
in the Navy called the pilot, in the Air Force called
the aircraft commander,
g - unit of acceleration (32.2 ft/sec^)
gaggle - slang for a number of aircraft operating in close
proximity, not necessarily in any semblance of
formation.
GAM-83 - BULLPUP; air-to-ground guided missile
GCI - ground control Intercept
GUARD - emergency UHF radio channel usually monitored by all
aircraft and ground stations as a secondary frequency.
Hard turn - a planned turn in which the intensity of the turn
Is governed by the angle-off and range of the
attacking aircraft.
HEAT - armament switch setting for using infrared missiles
hot mike intercom - intercommunication system continuously
active (hot)
IAS - indicated air speed
ICS - intercommunication system
ID - identification; to make Identification
IFF - identification, friend or foe; aircraft transponding
beacon received by radar distinguishing friend from foe.
Immelmann - see Figure 8 (page 30) - maneuver in which the air-
craft completes the first half of a loop and then
rolls over to an upright position thus changing di-
rection 180° with a simultaneous gain in altitude.
IMN - indicated Mach number
22
GONFiDEilTlAL
CONFIDENTIAL
^ IP - Initial point i a well-defined point, easily distinguish-
able visually and/or by radar, used as a starting point
for a bomb run to the target.
IR missile - an infrared or heat-seeking missile
IRON HAND - a code name for a flight with special ordnance and
avionics equipment whose mission Is to seek and
destroy enemy surface-to-air missile sites,
JCS target - a target appearing on the JCS target list
Jinking - constant maneuvering in both the horizontal and
vertical planes to present difficult target to enemy •
*• defenses by spoiling the tracking solution. Bank,
pitch and velocity are all simultaneously changed in
this maneuver.
karst - a limestone outcropping or ridge
r kt - abbreviation for knot (nautical miles/hour)
L. >LAU-3 - a rocket launcher adaptable to external bomb racks
holding 19 2.75 inch air-to-ground folding fin rockets
LAU-17 adapters - stub pylon on F-A
loose deuce - a term to describe fighter tactics in which two to
four airplanes maneuver to provide mutual support
and Increased fire power.
Luf berry circle - a circular tall chase, ascending or descending
^ i M - abbreviation for Mach number
••• MER - multiple ejection rack
ml - nautical mile, as used in this report
tj> HI6CAP - combat air patrol mission whose actions are directed
against MIG aircraft
r^j MIG SCREEN - mission wherein protecting fighters are placed
ilii between the threat and the protected force in a
specific area
% military power - maximxmi unaugmented thrust condition of engine
missile free - authority Is granted to fire unless target is
identified as friendly
i
missile tone - audio signal indicating AIM-9 is locked on to
an IR source
fj^i MRT - military rated thrust - see military power
^ MSL - altitude referenced to mean sea level
/j» OPREP - message report in Joint operational reporting system
A PANAMA - call sign for GCI site located near Danang
1 CONFIDENTIAL 23
CONFIDENTIAL
. II
plpper - aircraft weapon sight Indicator (a dot of light within
a llKhted ring) m
3
a lighted ring)
PIRA2 - positive Identification radar zone
PRP - pulse recurrence frequency
QRC-160 - noise Jamming ECM pod
RAG - replacement air group Q
ready light - light which Indicates a particular avionics/
munitions system is operating and available for
use
RED CROWM - voice call for USS LONG BEACH (CLN-9)
RESCAP rescue combat air patrol
RHAW * radar homing and warning
RIO - radar Intercept officer
RO - abbreviated form of RIO
road interdiction - to prevent or hinder, by aerial means, ^
enemy use of a road or route »
ROLLING THUNDER - code name for air strikes against North
Vietnam
Route Package - see Figure 9 - geographical division of North
Vietnam for purposes of air strike targeting
rudder reversal - a climbing aircraft maneuver In which direc-
tion is changed by rotation around the air- Q
craft's vertical axis
SA-2 ' Soviet surface-to-air missile system
SAM - surface-to-air missile
SAR - search and rescue
scissors - See Figure 1 (page 27) - a defensive maneuver In which
a series of turn reversals are executed In an attempt
to achieve offensive after an overshoot by the attacker.
3
3
3
3
3
3
SCAN-ODD - MIG airborne intercept radar
(CONFIDENTIAL)
section - a Navy term for a tactical element of two or more B
aircraft (usually two) /an Air Force term for two ■
flights of four
SHRIKE (AGM-^»5) - air-to-aurface radar seeking missile Q
SIDEWINDER - see AIM-9
SIDEWINDER tone - see missile tone
SIP - selective Identification feature - electronic device with
variable codes for identification
24
CONFIDENTIAL
3
0
3
SILVER DAWN - a code name for an Intelligence collecting air-
craft (SECRET)
"S" maneuver - a weave in a horizontal plane
Snap-up - a rapid pullup to establish a climb in order to launch
a weapon
SPARROW - see AIM-7
"Split-S" maneuver - see Figure 7 (page 30) - l80° rotation about
the aircraft longitudinal axis followed by a
180° change of heading in a vertical plane
(half loop starting from top)
STBY - standby
steering dot - see dot
Switchology - a coined word addressing the human engineering
considerations of switch arrangements
TACAN - tactical air navigation - an active electronic naviga-
tional system which locates the aircraft with respect
to another Installation
TARCAP - target combat air patrol - aircraft assigned the air-
to-air defense role in the target area
TAS - true air speed in knots
TCA - track crossing angle - the angle between flight paths
. measured from the tall of the reference aircraft
TOT - time over target
TRACK (various colors) - see Figure 9 code names for specific
refueling tracks
TROJAN HORSE - a code name of a U-2 air reconnaissance program
(SECRET)
unit (of turn) ~ divisions on 'an angle-of -attack indicator on P-U
aircraft
UHT - unit horizontal tall (applied to F-8 aircraft) - a tail
design whereby the whole surface rotates about a pivot
point
unloading - decreasing g*s
V - closing velocity (relative)
vector box - see APR-25
WILD WEASEL - P-105F specially equipped for locating and attack-
ing SA-2 sites (employed on IRON HAND missions)
yo-yo - see Figures 3f ^ (Page 28)
High Speed - an offensive tactic to In which the attache
maneuvers through both vertical and hori-
zontal planes to prevent an overshoot In
the plane of the defender's turn.
Low Speed - a dive for airspeed and a pull up for position
closure •
a
3
3
3
ZUNI - five Inch air-to-ground ungulded rocket ^
3
3
3
3
26
3
3
a
3
a
a
0
a
28
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
FIGURE 6. Fingertip or Finger Four (AH at Same Elevation
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED* ^
evCNT 1.1
Aircraft Xnvplved: Pour P-8E« vs three HIG-lTsi
Result: One P-SE damaged
Vicinity Pf Encounter: 19*58'N/i05»5i«E
K PRIMARY NtSSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Package IV
Date/Time: 3 Apr 1965/IIIOS
»
—.1''°"'' ^'^^ aircraft (BLUE flight) were providing flak suppression and TARCAP for a
M «ch^;^SS^? thi^;'^ *^''^K^^^'■*'^ fUeJ^t). BLUE niEht had conpleted a ZWH attack
Md# o? -1 f^S^T' "li^S* ^'^'^^^ ^it" suapected. The attack waa the last
made of a larger (3'i aircraft) flight group on the target.
?. MISSION ROUTE
Gulf iP'-nnv^l^" f^^''^' "'^^ night, was launched from the aircraft carriers in the
VilLti A Prcceeded on a not tnwesterly heading to the coast. The coast line was
So« tJ« ^°L°^'*'K ^^^^^^ approached the target on a westerly heading . Egresa
from the area was by reverse route except for the airplanes that dlvertrd to Oananl:
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-8E BLUE 1. 2. -j. U
2 - SIDEWINDER <AIM-9D)
U - ZUNl (expended on flak suppression)
500 rds - 20min
IFF. TACAV, APq-91, UHF operating, gray and white paint
MIC-17 MIS 1. 2. ?
Estimate 23Trira and 37(nia guns
Believed to be silver colored.
«. F'.IGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUKTER
^^^^^ear\S"S n?25o^f?.'"*^""'* Visibility in the target area to 1-2 ml. Veather was
BLUE
I 3 5 !r
Altitude : —8000-11,000 ft
heading: Circling target, left turn (30-«lO° bank)
5£eed: ......350 fct— — —
Fuel State ; ......hqoo jb— — —
flight Forniatlon i
T« .-!5:1!! P**^^ had completed a zUNI attack with each aircraft making individual runs.
bCue 2 ^eni^Siir™ 5rf;/"^^^'«??;yS^P«^^*<» 'he target and established a tj^ht orbit.
^^^u^ ^i:^- ^ o**"" followed. BLu-E U Joined the orbit
on opposite side of the circle froo BLUf 1. Low visibility in the area was a factor!
5. INITIAL OETtCTlON
A A, Tl!*^IIi°L!!'*!--^'"f\w^^"*'^ ^^.^ member of the strike group, but were mistaken for
Srup ; -iS ? r^**** sighted. Three HiGs were sighted in a dive toward
BLUE 1 and were evaluated as hostile as one MIO opened fire on BLUE 1.
«. ACTION INITIATED
'"""^^ passing his left wing and felt hits. The tracers were thought
fw*'^®""'* '^^rf; report of MIOs had been received. BLUE I turned hard right and
exited the area, while climbing to about 18,000 ft. «»»
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
At the coast BLUE 1 turned SE and again saw tracers pass the left side. A reverse
turn to the left revealed a MIG at 7 o'clock, 2000 ft behind. BLUE 1 engaged afterburner,
accelerated to 1.0 Mach, turned hard left, and was unable to locate the HIG. BLUE 1
diverted to Danang because of damage and loss of utility, and PC-2 hydraulic systems.
8. ORDNANCE
No ordnance expended by BLUE 1, except four ZUlSIs in air-to-ground. MIOs fired an
unknown number ef 23mia/37nna rounds.
9. EQUIt>HENT PROBLEMS
Utility and PC-2 hyiraulic systems rendered Inoperative by enemy gunfire. Emergency
utility system operated satisfactorily. ^ j
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
EVENT 1.1
Experience
BLUE 1
BLUE 2. 3, «<
Total
Hours
2500
P-8
Hours
6C9
Combat
Mlsslona
Remarka
Pilot had flown TP-9 and A*«.
Not interviewed-'
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE I « Radio was clear of chatter. Pelt he had received insufficient tralnlnt; In
air combat tactics. Did not realise there were KIGs in the area until second sighting of
tracers. The pilot was directing nXs attention to look for flak and was not looking for
air targets. Low visibility due to haze contributed to the loss of flight integrity.
Conunents froa Overall Experience
BLUE 1 - Good, .reliable guns are required with the restraint of a positive ID. A
lead computing gunsight with minlaun tracking requirement needed. Tall warning highly
desirable. Por Interceptor role or for use of AI radar a second crewman very desirable.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 1, 3 March 1967
Hes sages . Reports :
CTO 77.7 >5sg O30417Z Apr 1965
CTG 77.7 Mag C3011UIZ Apr 1965
CTG 77.7 Ksg 031i'51Z Apr 1965
CTG 77.7 Msg 0«0117Z Apr 1965
CTO 77.7 Msg O'»O202Z Apr 1965
CTO 77.7 Hag 0402212 Apr 1965
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Pollowing a flak suppression run, the four meabers of BLUE flight became separated in
the hase. which reduced visibility in the target area to 1-2 ml. BLUE 1 was orbiting over
the target at about 6030 ft when tracers and hits were observed by the pilot. B-1 was in
a 30-'tO° bank speed 350 knots. ELLTS 1 inir.edlately broadcast that he was hit, and turned
right to exit the area heading 100*. BLUE 1 thought the tracers were from ground fire.
BLUE 1 was concentrating on looking for flak in the target area, and was not maintaining
a lookout for enemy fighters.
On the way to the coast, BLUE 1 climbed to about 18,000 ft. After crossing the coast
BLUE 1 turned to a southerly heading and upon rolling out on co'irse the pilot saw more
tracers, again on the left cHde. BLUE 1 turned hard right, saw nothing, reversed the turn
to the left and saw a MIG at 7 o* clock at a range of 2000 ft and 200 ft up not firing.
BLUE 1 engaged afterburner, 'noqed over, and accelerated to 1.0 nach and came out of AB.
While in a shallow dive, to maintain 1,0 Maeh In military power, BLUE 1 turned hard left
* to reacquire the NIC, but It was not In sight.
BLUE I broadcast the presence of the MIG and established a course for Danang. The
gunfire damaged the utility and PC-2 hydraulic systems in BLUE 1. En route, BLUE Joined
BLUE 1, confirmed the damage, and escorted BLUE 1 to Danang. The emergency utility system
functioned satisfactorily and allowed the pilot to land safely. Most hits were by the
37mm cannon.
BLUE 4 was in a left turn at 11,000 ft about 220" and three miles from the target
when on rolling his wings level he saw two airplanes at his 3 o'clock position level at a
range of about two miles and identified them as friendly aircraft. As BLUE k banked
left and continued to observe the target, he saw three airplanes assumed to be k-Us diving
towards the target area and one opened fire with guns. This airplane was then observed
to flatten out in a pursuit curve, while the other two continued to dive on the target
area. At this time BLUE ^ positively identified all three attacking airplanes by their
silver color and silhouette as MIGs. He went to 100 percent power and attempted to close
on the firing MIG. BLUE 4 selected an AIN-90 and had a good tone but withheld launch of
the missile because of the many friendlles in the area. At this time BLUE 4 heard BLUE 1
report that BLUE 1 was hit and was exiting. BLUE 4 then broke off the ehaae to locate
and Join BLUE 1.
BLUE 2 and 3 did not see the MIGs in the haze .
The P-4 flight assigned as TARCAP at 25,000 ft never made contact with the MIGs.
The P-Ss in the strike group had used radar to spot the attack aircraft but at the
time of the encounter were watching the target for flak.
^MSQ OaOimiZ Apr 65 and CINCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67 quote MIGs as MIO-15.
tUHl 1-2
Aircraft Involved: Four P-UBs and four M1G-17»
Result: One nlssl'ns
One NIC>17 probably destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: Gulf of Tonkin, 25 nl SM
of Hainan Island
K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Time: 9 Apr I965/08^aH
MIC barrier In nortnern Tonkin Gulf about halfway between Haiphong and Hainan (approx
20"00*;i/103'00'£) to divert ar.y XIGs away from a strike in the Hanol/Halphong area. The
first element (LiL'JE 1 (LeaJ) and 2) launched aoout ?0 ir.in ahead of the second elerrent
(BLUE j and *) tjecause one aircraft a&orted launch and had to be replaced. Each element
engaged MICs independently.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Element 1 (BLUE 1 and 3), launched in vicinity of Point Yankee, proceeded to the HW
(heading: 315*) clearing Hainan Island by about 30 mi, proceeding to the CAP station
(approx 20O00'N/103«00*E). Element 2 (BLUE 3 and U) launched approximately 20 nln later
and proceeded on sane general heading.
3. AIRCRAFT CONF IGURATIOKS
F.OB BLUE 1. 2. 3 BLUE 1
2 - SPARROV; (AIH-7D) * - SPARROW (AIH-7D)
2 - SIDEWINDER {AI>l-95>
1 - centerllne tank
No camouflage palnt«
MIC»17 MIC 1. 2. 3. ft
No missiles
Cannon
Not all-weather version; no radone in duet
Highly polished silver finish.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Solid undereast Mith few breaks, tops at 23.000 ft. Visibility at altitude,
unlimited.
BLUE BLUE
3 6
Data not available
Altitude : 35.000 ft
Heading : — 135'
Speed : ... Hach 1.2 — — —
Fuel State : Unknown (probably full Internal)
Plight Format ion ; First and second elements were about 50 ml apart at initial MIO
. detection.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
(First element data only)
First element heard that second element had MIGs on radar. Plrst element turned
south, went to AB, to attempt to Join engagement. First element sighted four MIGs at great
di&tance (30-50 ni) pulling contrails. As they approached, they could also distinguish
F-4Bs pulling contrails.
«. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 requested clearance to fire, and used radar acquisition to begin SPARROW
attack.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT
BLUE I(L) fired SPARROVs at NIC and followed jp with SIOEUINDERs, breaking off engage*
ment when other MIG section started to pull behind him. He departed area to the south,
checked fuel, and requested permission from ship to reattack and pursue over land (Hainan)
If necessary. He reentered area and resunied engagenjent using boreslght acquisition (opti.
cal sight plus radar). Proceeded with another SPARROW attack and then departed area
because of low fuel.
Engagement took place at supersonic speeds at about 40,000 ft. Total time of engage-
ment was approximately 20 mln.
BLUE 3, 4 (second element) were seen to fire missiles at MICs. BLUE 4 did not return
from mission; cause of loss is unknown. BLUE <t credited with shooting down one HIS.
\
f
4»
B. ORDttANCe
First Element :
DLUC I
BLUE 2
Second Element i
BLUE 3
BLUE ft
(No. rired/Ho. hits)
SPARROW
2/0
2/0
SIDEWINDER
AIM-9B
1/0
1/0
0/0
*/l
0/0
EVENT 1-2
Remarks
1 did not guide, 1 motor did not
flpe
Target evaded missile suceessfully
2 motors did not fire
1 did not guide; the other
would not rire— Mas returned to
ship
BLUE 3 reported seeing MIO on fire
in level fight at contrail level.
BLUE 4 did not return from mission.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 had great difficulty with the SPARROW missile systems. In that missiles wou"
eject but motor would not fire. Subsequent Investigation at the Naval Missile Je"^"^ m J25
Mugu. revealed a malfunction in the launching mechanism switches, which caused the umbilical
to separate prior to motor Ignition thus accounting for the motor no-flres. Shipboard test
equipment available at the time did not have the capability .to detect this problem.
BLUE 2 had one SIDEWINDER that would not fire.
10. AIRCREW CONHENTS
BLUE 1(L> (Front)
Squadron Commanding Officer, had about 1000 hr In the P-IB, and had many missile
firings — a well-experienced pilot. This was first MIO engagement. Data on other crew
■embers not available.
Comments from Overall Experience
Air-to-air IFF would help by clearly Identifying friendly targets In a poor visibility
condition. (Not a factor In this engagement.)
There Is a need for a close-in weapon as a backup on any missile system. If an ID
pass has to be made, aircraft should have a weapon to give him w Immediate attack capabil-
ity If the target proved hostile. Guns would also be useful as an air-ground weapon
(stopping a truck convoy, for example).
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ! BLUE 1 (Lead) - Front, 17 January 1967
Messages . Reports :" • „ .
— ^ CTP77 110322Z (MIC Encounter Recap)
CTCST-'l 1007152
Amplifying Reports on Missile Firings by BLUE 1 and 2.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE 1 and 2 were launched from carrier at about O8OOH and proceeded to the NW on a
heading of 315", clearing Hainan Island by about 30 ml -and then proceeding to the CAP sta-
tion in the Gulf of Tonkin. They then proceeded to orbit at their assigned stations. The
second element (BLUE 3 and i») was not able to launch from the ship until about 0820H. BLUE
3 and 1 rendezvoused and proceeded in a northwesterly direction to Join the first element.
At about 08<I0H. BLUE 3 and It radioed that they had obtained a radar contact and were "going
to investigate. * Their altitude at the time was "at or about the contrail level" (approx
HO 000 ft). Shipboard radar observed BLUE 3 and U t:rnlne right and advised them that they
were to the right of track. By about OSIZH, BLUE 3 . were advised that they were over-
land; however, radar position was Indefinite due to close proximity to Hainan and NVN
which was causing sldeloblng and ringing on the scop^ from land returns.
Tn BLUE 3 and * sighted the MIGs visually at this time and engagement, which lasted until
about 0905H, started In the vicinity of le'SO 'rJ/loS" -0 ' E. Targets were Identified as MIG-lTs.
MIC H dropped his tanks and attacked BLUE 3 and the action ensued.
In the meantime, BLUE 1 and 2 were on. their patrol mission approximately 50 to 60 ml
north of this area. When they heard radio transmissions, they turned and headed south to
assist BLUE 3 and 1. BLUE 1 directed the other members of the flight (BLUE 2, 3, and *l) to
so to afterburner and obtain separation from the MIGs. BLUE 1 then requested and was
granted clearance by the carrier to fire. At a distance of about 30 to 50 al. BLUE 1
sighted the MICs.
36 "'^ * - ■"
1
EVENT 1-2
T, He could dlstlneulah centralis of both MICs and the F-««B5 , as the "J®' "f?^"*""*"
ttL.ly different. The P-UB ccatrall *ra» considerably darker and heavier ^^an that of the
MIC 17. 1 and ? continued to head to-arda the MICa , and « they fPf^^f • ""^ '
acquired. targets on radar and Mde a left turn to fly on a collision course with KICs .
T3 BLUE 2 started to cUmb up to MIG altitude, "hlch at that tin» was about ft.
The MICs were in a westerly heading In a wide flnger-t formation — one of the KICs was
well below the contrail level.
T3 BLUE a then fired a SPARROW missile at a range of 5 ml. The "iMlJe "J* J*
oSserved even after sharply banklne the aircraft. Apparently the missile motor Md not
fire.
Tft At this point BLUE 1 was passing under the HICs , turning right to obtain "Pa^-a^^^"-
The KICs turned to left, were still In a widely spread formation. Individual airplanes
were clearly discernible.
Te BLUE 1 flying at ftO.OOO ft with BLUE 2 in a wlde-wlng position acquired a WO on
boresight at 6 al to right and obtained a radar lock-on.
Tfi BLUE 1 fired a SPARROW at a range of 3 mi. His steering dot •■iifj*;*-,
beyond optimum but still well within range. ITje missile fired, trajectory appeared normal,
but did not appear to guide.
T7 BLUE I then switched to HEAT and continued, Just turning In behind the MIGs. He
pulled up on the left rear HIO, heard a SIDEWINDER tone, closed in behind him with a
straight tall shot and fired a SIDEWINDER at 1.5 mi.
Te At this point the MIO broke hard left and the nisslle tried ^ojollow but slid Just
behind him. BLUE I pilot was surprised that at this altitude the MIO could turn as fast
as he did. The other MIG section started to drop behind BLUE 1.
To BLUE 1 and 2 dropped their noses down as they broke off and accelerated, departing
the area to the south, while they came out of burner and orbited. When in orbit tney
dropped their centerllne tanJcs, called the ship and requested permission to maxe another
attack and pursue the MIGs over land if necessary. Comiaunicatlon was relatively poor but
they received what they thougnt was an affirmative answer. BLUE 1 and
north to resume the attack. During this time they cculd see the other element (BLUE 3
and H) firing missiles at MICa In the distance.
BLUE 3 heard BLUE «» reporting that he had one more missile and was making his last
• run. In;r.ediately thereafter both pilot and RIO of BLUE 3 saw an p.ttB making a »nap-up
towards the HIGs which were at the contrail level. They lost sight of fhe F-ft as he
zoomed and then heard the transnisslon "Op away." Within 30 sec to 1 min after they saw
the P-H in the zoom climb, both crew members of BLUE 3 saw a MIO on fire flying straight
' ■ and level at the contrail level. The HIG fell slowly off Into a dive. The rear ^seater
of BLUE 3 heard BLUE U report "Good shooting; all missiles gone; I'm going "f"** .f
then questioned who got the MIG. Transmission was mede — no jnswer to
was received. Both crew members of BLUE 3 were positive that the burning aircraft was a
t: MIG-17.
; Tin BLUE 1 and 2 then reentered the area, made a boresight acquisition on MIOs, heading
* east at an altitude of it 7, 000 ft; The ♦initial lock-on was made at 12 mi, BLUE 1 and 2
were In afterburner.
•«<: They broke lock and reacquired at a range of 7 ml. The 3 HIOs were still heading
.', east, not maneuvering.
BLUE 1 fired a SPARROW at a range of 3-1/2 mi. T^ie missile ejected, but the aotor
did not fire.
jllj T,, BLUE 1 noted that his fuel was approaching BINQO and he did not have enougi for
)\l another SIDEWINDER attack. BLUE 1 then broke left and headed south to depart the area.
BLUE 2 remained In the area and continued the attack. He acquired a KIO in a right
turn at 10" left. 6 mi. He then turned hard right to pull the dot Into the ASE circle
and fired a SPARROW at a range of 3-1/2 mi in a right turn. The missile motor apparently
did not fire. He then fired a SIDEWIHDER nisslle acquiring the target at lO' right. 3 nl .
and launched the missile at about 1-1/2 mi. BLUE 2 attempted to fire the missile on
station 8D but this one did not fire. He then rejected the right missile and selected
the left SIDEWINDER which did fire but apparently die not guide, although the target was
>.', j„ afterburner. BLUE 2 then maneuvered into a stem position on the HlG-17 and again
•Ji attempted to fire the SIDEWINDER missile on station tD at a range of 1-2^djI. *galn the
SsBUe would not fire. BLUE 2 then returned to the ship. This SIDEWINDER was examined
^ back aboard the ship and the EPU was found to have fired, but not the motor.
BLUE * did not r-'um from this mission. The ctuae of loss was rot known. Extensive
investigation of the snt was made and no definite conclusions were reached. The Chinese
c aimed that on that aay an F-H was shot down by friendly forces, but careful Investlga-
4»> tlon of that possibility has been made and this has teen ruled out. It is presumed that
' BLUE * was lost either due to fuel exhaustion or hit by a MIQ.
37
■ f
Note:
EVENT l-> SUHHAW r
Thi* reconstruction covers the first element only.
Tine
Hark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2)
Status
Action
Other Friendly
CoM«un1cat1ons
Enemy Actions
(MI6 1 .2,3.4)
Remark s
AU: 35.000 ft
Approx Hach 0.9
Lit AB and headed south
B*(L) Instructs second
clenent. (See Coaaunl-
catlons)
B3. 4 reported tar>
gets on redar, Iden-
tiffed visually as
ni6s
B1 directed other
elenent tJ go to AB
and obtain sepa-
ration from HIGs
MI6 4 dropped
tanks. All rolled
in to ettacii 83. 4
First elenent was
50-60 mi N of
second elenent,
heard activity on
radio and headed S
to ioin engagement
AU: 38.000 ft (B1)
Mach 1.2
AU: 35.000 ft (82)
Hach 1.2 in AB
MiGs sighted by
B1 end 2
B4 requested
clearance to ftre
on NlGs
S1(L) requested
clearance to fire
from ship
KICs appro* 30-50
mi away. Coy Id
see contrails of
both MICs and F-40S
F4B contrail was
considerably darner
and heavier than-
niGs.
Alt: 38.000 ft (B1)
Alt: 35,000 ft (62)
Nach 1.3 in AB
SI gave clearance to
fire
B2 acquired target on
radar, made left turn
to obtain collision
course w1 th HIGs .
started cilab
Ship gave clearance
to fire
AU: 41.000 ft (BZ)
Kach K3 In AB
B2 fired SPARROU
■Isslle
NIGt epptered to
turn Into first
element (B1, 2)
KIGs were in
westerly heading,
wide finger-four
formation. One NIG
was well below
contrail level
Ranqe - S mi . MAP
mode, wide display.
1 inear pol arl i. ,
narrow speed gate.
10 mi range.
Interlocks IN
Missile motor did
not fire
c;.:^ tc^5 ^ ^ ^ ^3 ^rr] L.- ^ ^
' EVENT I'i yuMitA«Y fContlwued)
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2)
Other Friendly
Comunicatlon!
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1 .2.3.4)
Reaarfcs
Tine -
Mark
Status
Action
u
Alt: 40,000 ft (SI)
Hach 1.6 in A6
Passed under H16s
Position of B2
not known
Turned right to get
separation
KIGs turned left.
Here in widely
spread formation
Individual air-
planes clearly
discernible
Alt: 40.000 ft (Bl)
Hach 1 .1
82 flying wide wing
position
Acquired HIG on bore*
sight at 6 mi off to
right. At 5 ni ob-
tained radar lock-on
(81)
HIfi-17 at 44,000 ft
Mach 0.9. not
maneuver inq.
Heading E. 1
Range - 5 ml
radar lock on,
switched to HAP
mode to obtain
autotrack
u
Alt: 40.000 ft (bl)
Hach 1.1
30* right bank
Fired SPARROW at rang*
of 3 ni to target
(Nose was pulltd to
right to center tlie
steering dot)
HIG at 44,000 ft
Had steady steering
dot. slightly
below optimum, but
well within range.
Hissi le fired, tra-
jectory good but
did not guide.
Alt: 44.000 ft (Bl)
Mact) 1.2
to* left bank
Switched to HEAT, ob-
tained good tone, fired
SIDEUINOER at 1.5-«1
range.
Target heading ENE
NI6 at 44,000 ft
SIDEUINOER picked
up guidance
Alt: 44.000 ft (Bl)
Hach 1.2
Tried to follow H16 but
could not turn with bin
NIG broke hard left
and down
SIDEUINOER could
not follow hard
left turn and went
behind HI6-I7
In turn trying to
foDoM HIG (Bl)
Bl dropped nose down and
broke off, eased off g,
accelerated, and departe*
area 5. Caw out of
AS. orbfted. B2 followe
.B\(L>.
Called others to
check fuel state
Other element of
<lGs dropping
behind Bl
a
a
While in orbit,
ttack and to pursue
ttack. During this
Bl and 82 dropped center
over land if necestary.
tine saw other elenent f1
line tanks. Called ship, requesting pemisslon to "J*
Sot appartntly afflr«at1v« answer. Elcaent returned H to rcsuae
ring ■1»«i1es at MI6s In the distance.
^VEWT 1-2 SUMMAtlT (Continued)
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2)
Other Friendly
CoBHiunlcatlofls
Enetny Actions
(HIG 1.2.3.4)
Rcffarks
Tine
Kark
Status
Action
10
Alt: 40.000 ft (81)
Kach 1.3
Heading 030*. In AB
Bortslght acqui»iiion,
initial lock-on at 12
ml . Lock-on was
broken. Did not see
<^rond element (B3.4i
Three MIGs headed E
at altitude of
47.000 ft
Alt: 43.000 ft
Mach 1.3 (B1)
Lock on again at range
of 7 Ml
MlCs headed t.
not saneuverlng
^12
Alt: 43.000 ft
nach 1.3
20* right bank
(1.2 9) (B1)
SPARROW fired at range
of 3.5 ail
MAP mode, wide dis-
play, normal clutter
linear polar, |
narrow speed-gate.
Interlocks IN
Mtssilc ejected,
but notor did not
fire
Fuel was getting
low not enough
for another
SIDEUINDCR attack
(Bl)
Broke left and headed
south to depart *
B2 reaalned In area and
continued attack
B2 firtd 3
to rtconstruct t
additional ailasnes (see
hat part of the engageaien
narrative for dotal
t.
Is). There was Insu
fflclent tnfonnatlor
1 available
csi kSi 6&» 9a mUM miM i
KB £9 fltt wm vim mm ^
EVENT 1-3
Aircraft Involved: Two P-itCs vs eight
possible NIGd
Result; No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20'26'N/105*33'E
Route Package ZV
1. PRIMARY H15SI0N AND TACTICAL SITUATION
D.t./Ti.,: n Hay 1,65/I505H wa, TOT; .i«ht.„g too* pl,c. .n.r ,trU. .lr=r.f.
had completed attack.
20«»25'57"N/iO5»32«j,5»E. airxKing jcs larget tt7.1l, Hoal An Ammo Depot at
n. DATA SOURCES
Messages and Reports ;
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight was from Ubon.
16 QoTrl^ 5"^°Kr^'T'" aif-to-K'-o'^d delivery after HIOCAP heading leo" at
ci no ?h L°;ii^s!;.?ri^ie°s
Vlsibmtrw«%^S? ei^hJ^Ues!'""' " " « "-O^^
03
^' ' EVENT 1-4
Aircraft Involved: Two P-«fBa V8 four HIG-lTs
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20*20 'M/IOS^SO'E
Route Package V
1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: « Jun 1965/0712H
aircraft (BLUE flight) were on BARCAP for ROLLiriG THUNDER armed recce mission
(17CI?. CAP was positioned west of normal station to provide measure of protection for
rescue operation of downed pilot 11 nl east of Sam Neua.
2. HISSION ROUTE
BLUE flight cane from Yankee Station. Route unknown.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P.HB BLUE 1. 2
SPARROWS and SIDEWINDERS
mC-17 HIG 1. 2. 3. ^
Ungulded rockets
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: 15,000 ft overcast
" BLUE
Altitude : 13.000 ft
Heading : — 120"
Speed ; „— — Unknown
. Fuel State : — — — Unknown
Flight Formation ; Abeam
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE flight initially sighted MIGs (MIG 1, 2) ft ml on the left, heading 250", In left
turn,- followed by second section In long trail.
, 6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE I continued straight ahead and BLUE 2 turned left for the Identification run.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
\ MIGs 3 and H attacked BLUE 2 and fired air-to-air rockets. BLUE 1 then attacked
MIGs 3 and oOtalned radar lock-on aX mi, closed to 2-1/2 ml, however the SPARROW
missile would not fire. BLUE 1 continued from 60" angle off toward the trail position
and attempted a SIDEWINDER attack. MIGs 1 and 2 attacked BLUE I and fired two salvos
of 6-10 ungulded rockets. BLUE 1 broke off the attack and took evasive action. BLUE 2
• was never in position to fire.
B. 0R0NAr<CE
BLUE 1, 2 - None expended CB-l attempted to fire AlM-7 but no missile select light)
i NIC 1, 2. 3, t - Three salvos of ungulded rockets (no hits)
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
I BLUE 1 could not fire missiles due to missile malfunction. The missiles had cheeked
\ out properly on deck and system was in standby, but the light did not come on when switched
i to ready. After recovery, the right missile would not check out, and the left missile was
slow to tune. Aircraft system checks were good. If the AN/APA 157 had been "ON" instead
of In "Standby," the pilot would have known he had a bad missile and the loft missile
i should have tuned and been ready for firing.
' 10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Not interviewed
y U. DATA SOURCES
4»
Mes sages. Reports: CTC77.6 OftOiJttSZ June 65
CT077.6 04 1255 Z June 65
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
EVENT 1-4
4>
BLUE I and 2 were in abeam fornatlon at 13.000 ft, headlnr. 120", airspeed unknown,
and sighted four HIG-lTs (two leading, two trailing farther back (distance unknown)) In
5ri^ ^""^ heading 250«», altitude unknown. The KIGs appeared to be under CCI control.
BLUE 1 continued ctraUht ahead, and BLUE 2 turned left to make an Identification run on
the HIGs (1 and 2). MIGs 3 and H fired ungulded rockets at BLUE 2 and nissed. BLUB 1
^oi^on-j^t'"'^ behind MICs 3 and U, obtained radar lock at ^4 ml , and attempted to fire a
SPAKRO/T from 2-1/2 ni. There was no missile select light and the pilot could not fire.
The Rlsslle system had been in standby, and when switched to ready, the light would not
come on thus Indicating a nalfunctlon. BLUE 1 continued through 60' angle off
toward trailing position to make a SIDEWINDER attack on MICa 3 and 4. He was then
attacked by MIGs 1 and 2 firing two salvos of 6-10 ungulded rockets at SLUE 1 which missed.
MIGS 1 and i had pulled up into a 15,000 ft overcast and commenced their attack from above,
SfPi**t"^^i directed. BLUE 1 broke off attack on MIGs 3 and H and took evasive action.
BLUR 2 made an Identification pass but was never In position to flr«. The engagensnt
lasted 3-* minutes.
1
I
I
I
a
9
J
16
a*
3
9^
3
a
9
a'
a
EVENT 1-5
Aircraft Involved: Two P-^Bs vs four Hia-17s
Result : Two MIC-17a destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«08'M/105''l5' E
Route Paekase V
1. PRIKARV NlSSIOrt ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 17 Jun 1965/1030H
Six F-UB aircraft (BLUE nip;ht) In tfiree elerr.ents were on BARCAP for two strike groups
attac;<lni5 the Thanii Hoa aricJrie and the Ninh Binh barracks. The F-^s were In the last
orbit after 30 mln on station as the last strike group was Just completing Its attack.
The ttiree eleirer.cs were separated.
Z. RISSION ROUTE
Departed YANKEE Station and after refuel from A-3B tankers .proceeded to CAP station
located about 30 ml !IV to Thanh Hoa. The sections were to patrol on a line running fron
20''08*N/105'''»5'E to 20''55'N/105*'25'E.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-ftB BLUE 1. 3
3 - SPARROW (AIM-7D)
2 - SIDE* INTER (AIM-9B)
600-sal centerline tank
IFF not on
Grey and white paint
HIG-17 MIC 1.2.3.''
2 wing tanks
No missiles
Wing raarklngs
Silver
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Celling (0.8 to 0.9 cover) at X7.000 ft with tops balow 30*000 ft. VlalbtUty
ununited i
BLUE
T J—
Altitude ; 10,000-11,000 ft
Heading; : 310*. Just tumin? NW
Speed; 375 to 400-kt CAS
i 'uel State : 7000 lb
Flight rormation : Other two sections of 2 aircraft each were stationed to east of
position of BLUE 1 and 2.
S. INITIAL DETECTION
Contacts detected at 30 to 35 ml on radar, closed at high speed to visually acquire
four bogeys on heading of ZQO'* , 5 isi at lS,000-ft altitude. BLUE night heading 280°
at visual contact.
6. ACTION INITIATED
At radar sighting, an intercept course was established and speed increased. At visual
sighting, course held to Intercept range.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
On visually acquiring MIGs, BLUE fll?;ht continued Intercept course, and each aircraft
fired a SPARROW when the MIGs turned Into the flight. BLUE 1 fired at MIO 2 and BLUE 2
fired at MIG 3, botn 5LUC aircraft scored hits.
BLUE flight then climbed to 30fOOO ft at^ove overcast to' gain separation. BLUE flight
then turned left and descended to scene of engagement but could not reacquire other NIQa.
8. ORDIIANCC
BLUE 1
bLUE 2
KICs
(No. flr«fd/No, hits)
SPARROW
AIM«7D
1/1
l/l
EVENT I-S
Remarks
Plred at 2 to 3-<ni range, almost
head on.
Plred at max range.
None observed.
Combat
Hours Missions Remarks
000 30 Sixty eoRbat missions in A-1 In Korea
and tMO SPARROW firings.
Not available for other crew meKbers
Cctunents on this Eneouiiter
BLUE 1
Swltcholoey' is a concern in getting SPARROW ready. Nermal procedure is to tune
SPARROW and put It in "standby." When ready to fire, two switches have to be throvn
(CW and ARM) with a short Interval between each operations. More automatic switching
is desirable in tines of high stress.
The F-iis had a centerllne tank. When they made radar contact, they boosted up to
about 55C let to Investigate and this Is above the speed at which one can safely Jettison
the centerllne tanlc. One cannot affprd to Jettison tanks every tine there Is a radar
contact, because such contacts are r^-equent and have to te Invf^stlgated . Thla event took
place with the centerllne tanks atlll\ln place. This should be considered in designing
systens to strip cleaner foi an encounXer.
Frequent nonenemy contacts were nad^ on such missions, and aircraft lacked a good
identification capability. They eantat identify at lon^ enough range. A positive means
of identification is required; the Intercept, with the EF-IO BRAVOS In the last stages of
this event points this out very clearly.
n. DATA SOURCES \
Project Inte.'vltws: BLUE 1 (Front), 7 Dec 66; BLUE 1 (Back), 2 Nov 66; Letter from
BLUE 2 (Front), 20 Mar 67.
HessaRes, Reports :
Alr-to-Alr Missile System Plight Report for BLUE I and BLL*E 2.
CTF 77, Msg 181S19Z June 196?
CTO 77.6, OPREP-5 1T03592 June 1965
CTQ 77.6, Hag 172026Z June 1965
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
BLUE 1
Front 4000
Replacement Air Group (RAO) trained the squadron principally for night Intercepts.
Because of visual identification requirements, they developed "Ident-SPARROW" tactics
after deploying whereby the head aircraft made Identification (and fired, if not outside
parameters) while the lecond aircraft was the primary firing aircraft. After a head-on
pass, the element was to continue, clir.blng for about 5-ml leparatlon and turn'nB^ back
into NIGs. This tactic was developed because of the concern for the MIOs better turning
capability. ^
This mission was prebrlefed to protect two strike groups that were to hit the Thanh
Hoa bridge and the Mlnh Blnh barracks. They departed the carrier, refueled at 20 000 ft
and proceeded to station at 3t5,OCO ft. There were six F-U aircraft Involved. They broke
up Into three sections of two each. Two aircraft orbited north of Thanh Hoa two east of
Mlnh Binh, and two NW of Thanh Hoa. The two NW of Thanh Hoa are the subject of this
event *
EVENT I'i
At about 10?'jH after belr.c on station at 10,000 to U ,000 ft In a counter-clockwise.
KW-5E oripntatlon, race-track pattern In line abreast, 1-1/"* to 1-1/2 «P*^'
appro* isiat el y 30 nln, blUE 1 switched to strike frequency to check when the strike would
be cor.rleted. One strike croup reported that they had flnUhed and another stride group
said that they would te finished In 5 mln. Lead then went back to the BARCAP frequency,
told the flight that t.ley would make one more turn and depart the area at 10 3^>M.
At approximately IO3OH with both aircraft flying at approximately 10.000 to 1^.°;?
ft In a race-track pattern with radar on scale, Just as they turned to the fJ// E-UE
1 DlcVed up a radar contact about 30-35 ni , which was Interpreted to be comlnj froa the
vicinity of Hanoi or Just to ifie west of It. They went Into an "Idcnt-attack formation.
The wlncHMin went in a 3 -ml trail and the clement headed directly for the contact, wuring
the run-m toward the contact, they noted drift on the radar scope and established ^rc»
that that the unknowns were on cor.ewhat of a southerly to southwesterly heading, ihey
turned from a heading 3f abcuv 330° to a heading of about 280o to effect an intercept.
{RIO thought intercept course 31O0, turnlnii: to 290o prior to firing.) The eler^nt accel-
erdted to about 550 kt. Th*?y jllnfced slightly to lU.ooo ft and spotted the contacts
visually at about 5 nl (four airplanes) 15« to the right. Both RIOs had deternlred that
there were four contacts, and they had determined that they were not locking up on -he
saRW airplane. BLUE 1 was locked on the MIO 2 contact and BLUE 2 was locked up on cltner
RIG 3 or MIO 1. The boeeys were cutting across the F-tJB's nose at almost a 90" an?le,
5ust slightly above at 15,000 ft, Just under the overcast; HIG 2 was flying In tralx of
KIC 1 at about 1500 to 2000 ft, NIC 3 ar.d KIO U were In a good section forr.atlon In the
nelKhborhood of another 2000 to 3000 ft behind XIG 2, At almost the sane tine that BLtB
1 spotted then, they either spotted the F-J»s or got a vector In their direction. i^iG 1
turned, cane directly towards BLUE 1. BLUE 1 could tell that they were "snail sliver air-
planes > but no positive Identification was nade at this tlrie MIC 2. l^'^'^ad ^f cutting
Sj^H'the corner to Join his leader to clo.e the gap. flew the sane "^^^ ^^'J^^'^J S^^jf
that his leader did. 3y the tlr.e he turned the corner, tanked up in a steep ban* l^urning
toward his leader, the lead F-H was close enough to r.ake a positive ID on hla. he shouted
-KIc;.- BLUE 1 RIO reported "...we are In range. Fire. Fire. Fire." The steering dot
was 'ust slightly out of the circle. Lead made a slight turn and fired station 8, rlght-
wWsPARROW at about 2-n:l ran^re (RIO reported flrlni at 3-5 ml). It appeared that the
SPARROW went nff about 10 ft behind the MIC 2 tall, i About this same tlr.e, MIC 2 roiled
uD on his wing and was a mass of flames. Smoke started" pouring from the center of ^^e
aircraft on aft. and "t.-.e whole thing was a sheet of flar.e." The wlngaan saw this
also. In the .iieantlce. the second section of HIGs had tended to cut across the corner
of this turn and close on MIO 1. The P-i» wlngman fir-d at MIG 3 and his =;lssile hit when
iiTG 1 was directly above BLUE I and MIC 1 (which passed about 500 ft to the left, canopy-
to-canopy. of BLUE 1). Melther BLUE 1 nor the pilot of SLUE 2 saw MIG 3 get hit; both
were engrossed in the maneuvers of MIC 1. BLUE 2 RIO observed his olsalle hit a AIG and
explode. The MIGs did not appear to fire at any time.
The P-*s commenced a separation maneuver In AB, flew into the clouds, lost sight of
the MIGs. completed the separation maneuver, turned to the left at 30,000 ft and came
r-, back out of AB; no radar contacts and no visual sightings were made. They could see the
1 vapor trails from a SPARROW mlssUe. It was obvious that they returned to the same area,
v| but made no sightings or radar contact»5. While attempting to reacquire the MiCs. ra^ar
JSntacts were detected to the SE. The ?-H thought It logical for the "I-'/^^'j'^f /f^^^
wav toward the strike force. BLUE flight headed toward the contacts and Identified them
as friendly EF-102s. BLUE then returned to the firl.ig area. They searched the area and
sighted one parachute about 2000 ft off the ground. They were extremely low on fuel and
m{ departed the area. BIMGO fuel was 5800 lb and the initial contact had been made at
7000 lb.
I
1
9
U
1,9
» -4
Tine
Mark
Action Aircraft (
Status
BLUE 1)
Action
Other Friendlles
BLUE 2
Comnunlcati OAS
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1 .2.3.4}
Remarks
To
91 coning left
counterclockwise
to NW orbit, 375
to 4vU**Kk ina,
10,000-11.000 ft,
Conf 1 guratl on :
centerllne tank
3 SPARROW
2 SIDCUINOeR
B2 slipping back
to line abreast
at 1-1/4 nf as
section ap-
proached NU leg.
Checked with
progress of
strike and
shifted back
to CAP fre-
quency
BARCAP to NU Of target.
Radar on 50-nl scale,
ttlssllcs turned and CM
on.
^1
(about
1032)
Bl made rh^tr
contact about
340» True at
30-35 ml as
he cane out
of turn.
Bl accelerated
to S50-kt IAS
and proceeded
on heading of
about 330*
climbing to
14.000 ft to
investi gate
B2 si Ipped Into
3-ai trail.
B2*obtained
radar contact
at about 25 nl.
Lead directed:
"ARM; fuel
transfer
switches
on."
Heading S Co SU
at 400 to 4S0-kt
IAS.
Attempting to establish
drift.
(about
1034}
Contacts
drifted left.
Intercept
course of
280». sec-
tion at 550-
kt IAS and
M.OOO ft.
Changed
course to
280* True.
Backs of BU2'
agreed that
contacts were
multiple bo-
geys, agreed
to different
"lock-ons."
Bl took Ml ;
B2 took M3.
Continued Straight
and level at about
15.000 ft.
^3
(about
1035)
Sighted
contacts
visually
about IS'
to star-
board .
5 mi.
Both aircraft
were locked
on.
Four sliver air-
craft In two
sections turned
left into F-4s.
M2 followed path
of Ml . H3S4 cut
inside of turn
to close on
leader.
I
£3 69 Ci»^pB^ OSai I
0^ i« m M 1^
r— ^ r-
EVENT I»5 SUMMARY (Continued)
Time
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1)
Status
Action
Other Friendllei
BLUE 2
Conmunfcatlonf
Enemy Actions
(HI6 1,?.3,4)
Rcnarkt
(about
(about
1536)
(about
1037)
B1 1<}ent1f1ed
second aircraft
as It presented
plan view In
turn as MI0-17
about 3*«1
range.
Jockey 1 ng
slightly to
get dot In
center
BUZ In AS
climbing to
30»000 ft on
a heading of
about 280*
B1 called
"MIGs." B1 may
have changed
course si Ightly
(up to 10<=>} but
basically was
flying straight
and level; dot
was In circle
but out of
center.
Lead RIO re-
ported "...
we're in
range .
Fire "
61 fired one
SPARROW at M2
at 2-3 ml;
went to AG
after firing
and CDtnmenced
climb to
30.000 ft
B2 fired at H3;
firing at naxl-
mun range with
interlocks com-
pleting 'the
firing ci rcul t.
After firing
and seeing his
SPARROW leave
rail, B2 saw
M2 burst into
flames from B1
missile.
\
On reaching
about 5-m1
separation ,
8I&2 turned
to port and
descended
back through
clouds, drop-
ping out of
AS - looking
for remaining
two MIGs.
B1 RIO had
called for
turn to right
because MIGs
last seen cn
stbd quarter.
Lead MIG approached
head on.
Kl passed SOO ft
on left on opposite
heading to Bl.
HI passed 100 yd
abeam 82.
SPARROW appeared to ex-
plode 10 ft aft of M2.
82 saw M2 brought down,
but didn't see his own
hit because of concern
for Ml . RIO of B2 saw
their missile Impact
and M2 explode.
M2 rolled In a
sheet of flame
from center
fuselage «ft
and went out of
control
M3 exploded.
F-4s returned to scent
of engagement (could
still see smoke trail
of SPARROW) but couU
not detect MlGs.
A. A
EVEHT 1-5 5UHHART (Contlnugdl
Mark
Time
Action Aircraft (SLUE 1).
Other Friendlles
BLUE 2
Communications
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1 ,2 »3|4]
Re Dia r k s
Status
Action
(about
1038}
81 heading to
S£ searching
for MlCs, got
radar contact
toward strike
group and in-
vestigated
81 prepared to
engage radar
contacts
B2 returned to
Ident-trall
forMatlon.
r
(about
1340)
B1 maneuvering
to visually
Identify radar
contacts and
be ready to
fire
BUZ sighted
EF-lOBs which .
were pro-
viding active
ECW support
for strike
group
B2 In trail
Turned back to NU to
search area of engage-
sent for remaining NIGs.
h
t Jl^OUt
1043)
Bl searching
for remaining
HiGs, sighted
parachute
about 2000 ft
from ground
and watched
It descend to
ground
Bl departed
area, low on
fuel after
parachute
landed and
NIGS not
located
durl ng
search.
82 continued
In trail.
3.
tfn cr3 a
t23 ca u c;;^ Im9 ^
EVENT I.f
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-*Cs vs two MIQ-lTs
Result: Two MIG>17s destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'lT'N/lOSnS'E
Route Packaee VI
1. PRIMARY NISStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time; 10 Jul 1965/I659H
A flight of P-ftC (BLUE flight) aircraft was to follow a force of P-105s striking the
Ten Bal ordnance and ammunition depot and provide NISCAP.
2. HISSION ROUTE
Take-off from Ubon, refueled at approximately 18'00'M/lOl^OO'E and proceeded to Just,
south of the target 21*'iiO'N/10ii 50*E, turned east and established an orbit 25 ml
east of the target.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLOZ 1. 2. 3. ^
* - SPARROW (AIM-7)
* - SIDEHINUER (AIH-9B) cn Inboard pylons
2 - 370-?al tanks on outboard pylons
Radar on; TACAN and IFF off
Painted light gray on upper surfaces » white underneath
KIO-17 Wltj 1. g
Sl?.ver with North Vietnamese markings
Red stripes on the wings
Two external fuel tanks per aircraft
Fo missiles observed
)'.o afterburner operation observed
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Scattered cumulus with bottoms at 8000-10,000 rt« tops about 14,000 ft. To the
northwest of the target there were thunderstorms, buildups with tops at 28,000-30*000
ft. The action of the engagement took place mostly in ciear areas.
BLUE
T 2 1 >r
Altitude ; 22,000 ft
Heading " —Turning through E
Speed : Mach 0.92
Puel"3tate : About 8000-6500 lb, near BIMQO
Flight Formation: (Fluid-four)
44
REAR
ELEMENT
S. INITIAL DETECTION ^ ^ LOV/IR
The MIOs w<»re initially detected on radar at about range, dead ahead. Visual
contact was made head-on at 10 ml by BLUE 1 (Back). The MIGs' track was displaced about
1/2 ml to the left and at the same altitude as BLUE flight. Due to the element separation,
BLUE 1 and 2 saw the MIGs before the following element (SLUE 3 and U). In the lead ele-
■ent BLUE 2 identified the MIGa first. In the second element BLUE 3 sighted the MIOs first.
C. ACTION INITIATED
At radar contact It was decided to go to an Identification formation cal"' d the loose-
deuce, with the lead element (conposed of BLUE 1 and 2) making the Identification pass.
Due to fuel considerations, the lead element did not accelerate in afterburner, and inauf-
ricient separation was achieved at identification.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
As enemy and friendly flights passed, each turned Into the other, tut due to separa-
tion of the elements of the BLUE flight, the MIOs end-d up attacking BLUE 3 and U, firing
cannon at a high angle off. During the turn into the MIGs the two elements of the flight
became separated, and after the MIGs attacked, BLUE 3 and 4 split.
55
SimTIOK DCVCLOPHENT (Conttnued) ^^^^"^ ^'^
BLUE * unloaded g'a and after accelerating to »«P*"°"i^ 'P"*** """Jjj ^1^0?
wnnm oiiMh k Mlne.over and a 180* turn at the top enabled him to get on tne laii 01
Sr«i cJuli ?olS2 the »an;S«r! BLUE Tthen fired four SIDEWIMDEBS. reaultlng
In a kill.
BLUE 3 attempted to gain separation throuRh a scissors "maneuver but was unable to
■min An «dvant«M However, throurh acceleration separation was achieved and on reattach
BLUE Ws Sbl! U fo?ce the MlHrover shoot . BLUE 3 fired four SIDEWINDERS resulting In
S kill. ?lle lapse f^om fJrst radar slghtlns to the time BLUE flight -as headed home ««
'ess than 4 «lnu?e». The engaeer.ent of BLUE 3 from the initial turn J° [J^i^f
last missile was about 1-1/2 minutes. The engagement of BLUE H fron the split until the
last Blssile was fired was judged to be •1-1/2 minutes at the most.
B. ORORANCE
BLUE 1, 2
BLUE 3
BLUE H
NIO 1
MIO 2
(No. fired/No. hits)
SIDEWINDER
AIM-9B
CANNON
No firing.
4/2
4/2
1/0
X/0
Remarks
Fired Ho. 1 — no tone; No. 2
and 3 exploded to the right
of the MIC; No. 4— unknown.
No. 1 and 3 detonated near
SIO; No. 2 and 4 fired in
haste.
Pired on BLUE 3 and 4 on
initial break and on BLUE 3
in scissors maneuver.
Pired at BLUE 3 and 4 on
initial break.
9. EQUIPHCNT PROBLEMS
BLDE 2 - Radar was not operating at peak performance.
BLUE 3 - Radar became Inoperative during the hlgh-g scissors maneuver.
BLUE 4 - Intercom between cockpits went out during the engagement . Could only
operate radar on emergency and, therefore, was not searching.
be established.' The radar later failed.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Exoerienee
4 »
•»
No automatic lock-on could
Total
Hours
P-4
Hours
Combat
Missions
Remarks
2500
250
Unknown
Had not completed checkout until Ubon.
1000
700
250
400
75
60
TAG background.
Had only observed one SIDEWINDER firing.
£600
250
60
Little ACM. Pired only one SIDEWINDER.
2700
2000
200
350
50
50
Never fired a SPARROW or SIDEWINDER; alr-
to-alr experience.
Had never fired a SPARROW. ADC experience
with GENIE firing.
BLUE 1
Pront
BLUE 2
Pront
Back
BLUE 3
Pront
BLUE 4
Pront
Back
Comments on this Encounte r
BLUE 1 (Front) - Expressed desire for a fighter with maneuverability
thatcan be exploited. Some optical aid should be available for visual ID,
!*h !raf wo5l5 SedeslraEle in P-4. Seat restraint harness is too restrictive for Rood
J^iiJjfJtr canopy distorts view in some areas. Heads-up display to give range to
JiJiSl ioJid SrSSlpfil. Had trouble with SIDEWINDER due to h.ad pitting. Believed
caused on takeoff when AB kicked up debris.
BLUE 2 (Pront) - Expressed desire for a tail warning radar. Needs missile with less
minimum range. Backseat la helpful for radar observation.
BLUE 2 (Back) - Peels that KIGa were OCI'd since they mad^ lfiO» turns away from them
and into them.
56
Corotn'nts on this Encounter (Continued) EVENT i.g
BLUE 3 (Front) - Gun not necessary; It will Ret oeople Into trouble. Woul'l UHe
c.p.bnUy\o nre all mlsclles on P-i. with "nterllne tank on Less minimum jan^.e for
missiles Instead of guns. Front cockpit means of going to boreslght on F-««. t.or.„ana
Sistri" is MS^yfJoiR m case it locks on friendly. ^^^^
ttnPB that he did not know were In the area. Because of lack of ACT at tine of event,
5S SoJ SoS hSi tS maSSSJcr the F-U as well as he could later after sone experience.
BLUE H (Front) - Felt that all the requirements demanded of pilots Tlylng nultl-
■ission aircraft meant that some aspects (e.g.. ACM) would not receive sufficient
I training*
BLUE 1 (Back) - Expressed desl.'-e for better visibility at 6 o'clock. Could not see
niG when they pushed the nose over. Would llXe Internal gun. Ran a lot of Intercepts on
Savy aircraft anJ ri.-st thour.ht the bogey picked up was Ilavy. Likes two-man crew but
wants an RIO for the second crew. Second crew needed as specialist to operate the equip-
Bcnt, particularly in degraded environment.
\l. DATA SOURCES
P«>ieet Interviews ; BLUE 1 (Front). 13 Jan 1967; BLUE 2 (Front), 9 JaS-^^JJ^ ^J:"LLif *
7 Mar l$b7; B LUE 3 (Front), 9 Jan 1967; BLUE H (Front), l6 Mar 1967; BLUE 1 (Back),
9 Mar 1967.
Wessacies. Reports ;
J ' 2AD, 101509Z JuLy 65, 2D0T0 03538
?AD, 1011592 July 65, 2D070 03532
CINCPACAF IIOIOIZ July 65, DO 31155
PACAP Tactics 1 Techniques Bulletin Mo. 25, 27 Sep 65
'"; USAP Fighter Weapons School CAD Bulletin No. 10, 7 Feb 67
CIMCPACFLT Staff Study 11-66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
As bombing action was Initiated in the northernmost part of Vietnam In the summer of
1965. particularly north of Hanoi, a certain pattern of enemy air activity was noted. As the
bombing flights continued to follow a pattern, the enemy actions also assumed a pattern.
The pattern was evident In the MIC warnings which were broadcast by the BIG EYE sup-
port aircraft. The MIG warnings at this time were of two types: Yellow warning signified
f the MIOs were airborne, and red earning slg;nlfled the r-TICs were about 10 mln away fron a
i possible engagement. The following events developed the pattern of Interest. As the
first strike entered the area, the first warning -*a3 "yellow," followed by "red"; however,
shortly afterward the red warning was changed to yellow. As the last flight departed the
t area after the strike, the red -earning would be called, and the MIGs would follow the
■ flight out of the area. Unaccountably, the MIGs did not attack.
^■1 The tlaing of the second red warning was such that the escort had only minimum fuel
remaJnins. Information would be received that MIOs were coming up from Phuc Yen, and it
ms suspected that the MIGs could determine from their GCI, when the escorts would return
• ' to base. Consequently, the only possible action on the part of the escorts, which were low
oa fuel was at most one fast intercept or attempted intercept.
The pattern was noted by the strike force pilots. A recommendation was made to
Seventh Air Force to take advantage of the fact that the MIGs always retreated when the
attack force came Into tht area and then attempted attacks on the last flights. On
10 July, the morning strike flights again observed this pattern of MIG activity. As a
result, the afternoon flight was briefed that a plan to engage the harassing MIGs would
be put Into effect. BLUE flight was instructed to change the takeoff tine for this
particular flight, 20 min later than the normal strike flights. The escort would then
fbllow the last P-105 flight and arrive approximately 15 min after the normal flight.
A tactic was designed to give the P-l flight the appearance of the last P-105 flight
on target. They would actually meet the last strike flights and press on to the north,
on a search-type mission. Radio silence was to be -nalntalned, and the speeds and
altitude flown on the way Into the orbit area would also give the appearance of an F-105
flight. From the planned holding orbit the F-^is would be in a position to attack any MIOs
attempting to attack the withdrawing strike flights.
V •'
I. ."
I i
1 I
f. Action Prior to Enaaeement
V ''f\ BLUE flight consisted of four P-'^C aircraft. Each aircraft was armed with four
f'. J/i SPARROW (probably AIM-7D) missiles and four SIDEWIMDEFt missiles — two each on each of
I trw inboard wing pylons. The outboard wlnp; pylons carried the 370-gal fuel tank. No
'/ eenterllne tank was carried since there were only a few in the theater at that time.
^* .J., The aircraft were not camouflaged, but painted light grey on the upper surfaces and
^ White on the lower surfaces.
t Kore than the normal ground checks were performed for this mission. During cllmb-
; oyt SPASROW miaslle tuning --as accomplished. The SIDEWINDER was checked on th- ground
to see if its head would track a flashlight, and In the air by sighting another aircraft
S; '■ lO assure that a tone developed. The SPAHROV/ mlssl'.e tuning was accomplished every 15
!■ !„ ^n. If one would not tune iTxiedlately , the pilot vas instructed to leave It on. This
procedure insured that the SPARROWS were inrr.odutel / available despite wear on the radar.
57
NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (Continued) EVENT 1-6
As planned, BLUE flight nalntalned radio silence from Ifbon to the refueling point.
The rendezvous, refueling, and subsequent departure fron the tankers with full tanks was
accomplished In complete radio silence. The tankers had been briefed cn this special
mission, and no radio contact was attempted. The refuellntr point as noted on the map
(PlRure 1) was not the one that was later chosen for eonununlcatlon. BLUE flight was
assigned a radio frequency different fron that of the strike fllshts, although the strike
frequency was nonitored.
Fornatlon and RaJar Search
The flight refueled at 28,000 ft (H3L) and 310>kt CAS and proceeded north at Mach 0.65
and about 20,000-rt altitude which approximated that of the F-lb5 strike aircraft. The
track was toward the target, and the flight was spread in a flu.ld-four fornation --
BLUE 1 and 2 on the left, BLUE 3 and U on the right roughly 2000 ft apart and the elements
spread approximately 5000 ft. This formation was selected to obtain more coverage to the
rear of the F-'4 . The second element (BLUS 3 and ) provided cover by weaving behind the
Lead. The radar coverage was assigned to BLUE 1 and 3 (the element leaders); one searched
high and the other searched low. BLUE 2 and ^ were assigned the responsibility for visual
search. If a target appeared it wculd be called out until Lead (&LUE 1} locked on. After
lock-on the flight would resume its assigned sweep modes.
En route to the orbit area the radar was set on a range scale of 100 sil. Zr. the area*
each aircraft was assigned quadrants for search with the Front scanning the sky visually,
and the Back responsible for the radar contacts. The track to the orbit area was in the
direction of tho target. As a result, the aircraft searched ahead and to the side as they
orbited, expecting the MIG threat In the area Indicated In Figure 1.
During the orbit, BLUE U ' s radar was not operating properly. Although the radar
checked at take-off, after reaching altitude, loss of pressurlzatlon In the wave guide
caused the radar malfunction. The radar could be operated in emergency mode but due to
other failures the automatic lock-on feature did not function. Consequently, all operation
of BLUE 4*9 radar was manual and waa not operated unless other flight members reported a
contact.
BLUE flight was far enough behind the preceding flight of F-105a to be out of radar
range. The IF? was switched off during this mission, and the flight employed the inertlal
system for navigation.
Just south of the target, the flight turned east. To minimise detection the
turn was executed by a single radio command.
In addition to the F-105 strike aircraft, two other CAP flights of P-tts and a few
B-66 aircraft were in the area. An EC-121 BIG EYE aircraft was stationed over the Gulf
of Tonkin. The flight did not recall receiving any warning or other Information from the
BIG EYE aircraft. (Hote: This disagrees with CINCPACFLT UOIOIZ July 65 which states
that "...MICCAP which subsequently destroyed two MIG-175 reports receipt of BIG EYE
warning.") The BIG EYE aircraft later reported that it had Identified six or eight MICs
airborne during the engagement.
During the flight to the orbit area and during the time spent in clockwise NE/SW
orbit, BLUE flight Investigated several radar contacts. The contacts proved to be either
friendly aircraft or radar lock-on to ground clutter. The orbit altitude was 22,000 ft
since SAMs were not considered a threat at that time. The orbit altitude was slightly
lower than normal (30,000-38,000 ft) to simulate an P-105 flight.
When almost to BIKOO fuel' levels for normal return (which was about 8000 lb in this
area), it was decided to make one more pass to the N, from which the threat was expected.
Action at WIG Detection
After Just completing the turn at the southern end of the orbit, BLUE 1 picked up a
radar contact at 33 mi (one other flight member quoted ml). Shortly afterward, BLUE 3
also locked on. BLUE 1 instructed the flight to assume the loose-deuce formation. The
element composed of BLUE 1 and 2 was to make the identification by accelerating ahead of
BLUE 3 and 4. The Ideal separation vas from 7-10 ml to permit the lead element to break
away after Identification and permit the second element to fire SPARROW missiles.
Due to the fuel state, which was about 7000-8000 lb at this time the lead element
chose not to use afterburner and accelerated In military power. The absolute BIMGO fuel
levels for the area of operation were 6500 lb to engage in ccmliat and 3500 lb to reach
home. In order to enter the engagement at a reasonably high airspeed and prevent losing
radar contact, the second element (BLUE 3 and 4} flew an S-pattern to gain separation for
the identification. The result of these conflletlng requirements was that when the MIOs
were visually contacted, the elements were separated by only 2-3 mi instead of 7-10 ml
desired. As a result a SPARROW chot could not be safely attempted by the second element.
Vhen BLUE flight prepared for the ID, BLUE 1 had no confirmation that the other
flight members had acquired the target. Actually, they had. Vhe lack of communication •
resulted from a contlnulni? attempt to minimize radio transmissions to conceal the presence
of the aircraft. At initial contact by BLUE 1, one bocey waa noted. It tracked down tne
scope and then turned 130* and went away from BLUE flight. Af :er following the radar con-
tact for awhile, It was realised that there was an overtake vei,ocity of about 200 kt.
NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOH (Continued) ■
The flight continued to follow the target, until It was clear the target would reach
t China before an Intercept could be accomplished. A right turn toward home was initiated
when the overtake velocity changed to 900 kt . The flight Immediately returned to
an Intercept course. Due to the high overtake velocity, the MIGs were visually sighted a
short time thereafter.
Tq - Only two KIOs were seen slightly high and to the left.
Ti - BLUE 2 (Front) identified the HIGs first; they were difficult to identify and were not
smoking. Positive Identification was not made until the MIGs were at 90«.< beam (9 o clockj.
The MIGs started to turn after the lead element but rolled out and continued to
turn after the second element. The two HIGs were In close formation, not In fighting
position. ^
T, - BLUE 1 and 2 turned left-Tnco the MIGs, During ID BLUE 1 led the first element only
wfijle BLUE 3 was In control of the second element. BLUE l and 2 Jettisoned tanks, lit AB,
and In the turn observed the MIGs turnini? behind BLUE 3 and k and Jettisoning their tanks.
(BLlfE 1 mistakenly assumed the tanks were missiles.)
T3 - BLUE 1 and 2 initially started to turn left, but BLUE l unloaded and accelerated while
BLUE 2 Started a climbing turn which spilt the element.
Tj, - After accelerating, BLUE l climbed to 2U,000 ft and orbited the area. During this
orbit the other members of the flight were contacted and their actions were monitored.
T5 6 - BLUE 1 called for a "Join up" south of the river at the termination of the engage-
ment.
Til - BLUE 2 started a climbing left-hand turn and Jettisoned tanks when the Back reported
that the HIOs had done likewise. BLOT 2 continued looking for two other MIGs since they
had been briefed to look for HIGs In groups of four, but none were ever seen. During the
I . turn the MIGs were lost from view.
T5 - At the top of the climb to 35.000 ft BLUE 2 observed BLUE U's attack and subsequent
hit on a MIO.
Tfi - BLUE 2 flew toward BLUE U, but the action was completed before BLUE 2 had Joined.
•■■ To - BLUE 3 and H heard BLUE 2 call Identifying the bogeys as MIGs and lit afterburners
at ID As the MIGs passed BLUE 3 and , the MIGs dropped their tanks, and (T3) BLUE 3 and
- . it did' likewise. (Tj,) breaking into the MIOs. The MIGs then turned very tightly behind
BLUE 3 and firing. Both BLUE 3 and U saw the firing, but BLUE 3 did not notice any
( tracers. Just "the nose of the r-:iG lighted up" by -luzzle flashes. The HIGs were not
^ tracking, and although the HIGs initially out-turned BLUE 3 and U, the F-Hs accelerated
during the turn which permitted BLUE 3 and !i to gain separation.
BLUE U was initially flying a flghtlna; wing position with BLUE 3. at 200 ft out and
200-300 ft behind. Because he felt that BLUE 3 had sufficient lookout protection (i.e.,
u. 0LUE 3, Back). BLUE U broke right during the turn in an attempt to either sandwich
Or split" the MIGs.
J The MIO» spilt, one following BLUE 3 and the other following BLUE 1.
Tc - After the MIGs split, BLUE 3 executed several reverses, the MIG slid by behind In an
overshoot and BLUE 3 again reversed, During these maneuvers BLUE 3 felt that the MIG had
an airspeed advantage, hence BLUE 3 did not unload the aircraft and attempt to disengage.
'Tt During the scissors maneuvers BLUE 3's radar went out. When the MIO overshot. ?
.^' BLUE 3 decided to gain separation. '
-BLUE 3 executed a roll right and went Into a 30° dive. The MIG tried to follow '
ending up at 7 o'clock, three-fourths of a mile away. This was followed by a slight f
left turn resulting In a 5-ml separation. During this period, Back proved extremely ^
helpful to Front by keeping him Informed of the enemy positions. 1
T7 - After gaining the separation BLUE 3 started a hard left turn into the MIO, attacking
lii almost a head-on position. The Back, aware that the radar was out .told the Front to
"Go HEAT." The Front interpreted this as a problem In acquiring the HIQ, and replied,
•Oo boreslght." During the subsequent communications resulting from the misunderstanding
(Tq) the MlG passed head-on, very close and firing but scored no hits.
After the aircraft had passed, SLUE 3 made a slight left turn to keep the MIG in sight
and then made a very steep (about 60«») dive to 10,000 ft. The afterburner had been turned
f^! on in the Initial break and was still operating so that the speed increased to Hach 1.3-
'j7 To - BLUE 3 then Initiated a high-g barrel roll with the MIG behind at approximately 1 ml.
A?ter reaching the 270» position, tTjoJ the MIG opened fire from \° " ^Jf,^'* ^^^i^^-'^i J^"8*»i
however the firing range was excessive and no hits were scored. As BLUE 3 dished back
(eraerKed from the maneuver), the MIG overshot. The MIG changed his attitude to pull up
but could not change the direction in which the aircraft was moving due to a stall.
After the MIO overshot, he started to turn, then leveled and descended toward a cloud.
1
■J
•71
59
NARRATIVE OeSCRIPTION (Continued) EVENT 1-6
Til - BLUE 3 was now at about 13,000-15,000 ft, Mach 0.9-0.95, with the MIC ahead. BLUE 3
'rired a SIDEWINDER at range, without tone. This first; missile went unobserved.
^ Shortly thereartffr, BLUE 3 fired a second SIDEWINDER which produced a lurF.t fireball at,
or Just to the rlijht of, the tall cone. A third mlssHe was fired and de:onated slightly
to the rl^ht of the MIG . A fourth nlsslle was fired but was unobserved. Followlni; the
first nlsslle, the next three were fired within a period of 10 sec, all with a gQOd tone.
BLUE 3 did not see the MIG blow up, Just the fireball entering the cloud.
Ti2 - After the fourth nlsslle was fired, BLLT. 3 broke left »flth the intent of heading to
Udorn as fuel level had reached jOGQ lb.
- BLUE t, after breaking rlRht, started a dive from 20,000 ft In afterburner and unloaded
the alrcrar-, . BLUE U accelerated to about Mach l.H at 12,000 ft (Tg) and started a l-flj
pull-up. The MIG had lost ground, but continued to follow BLUE "J . During the pull-up,
BLUE H lost sight of the MIG. He cllT.bcd to 33,000 ft (Ty) and came back over the top,
Inverted In a "sort of launelmann" to rejoin the engagement. At this time the radar was
completely Inoperative.
On rolling out at the top of the climb, BLUE U observed the MIG at about 28,000 or
29,000 ft falling off on the left wing in a 090* bank, doing a vertical recovery. The
HIC smoothly pulled out In a 020" bank, de!":endlng slightly, to the left. The MIO at this
time was looo-^OOO ft in front of BLUE 4, ha BLUE 4 came out of afterburner.
BLUE « felt that the MIC must have started to climb at the same time as BLUE ti's
climb was initiated, and lost sight of BLUE U during the ensuing climb,
Tft - The fall-off to the left and the turn gave BLUE * an excellent firing position.
BLUE t cane out of afterburner, cc.-apleted the Immelaann, nade a sll;?ht turn to the left,
fired the first SIEEWINDSR. At the tine BLUE tt was straight and level with a slight
descent (15° nose down) closing on the MIG. The first missile, fired with tone, did not
contact the MIC. It went by the tall pipe and then detonated off to the left about <t-6 ft
from the left wing tip. On detonation, the KIO rocked the wings six to seven times rapidly
and at low amplitude. A second SIDEWINDER was fired rapidly without tone.
The MIC was still flying and continued to roll slowly to the left In a left bank.
BLUE >i then established a tone with the third SIDEHIHDER and fired. The missile tracked
well and exploded short of the tall pipe but In line with it. The fireball expanded until
only the wing tips were seen. Ho debris was seen leaving t.*-.e aircraft at any time durlnn
the encounter, but when the fireball subsided, the NIC started to emit dense white smoke
from the tailpipe. Before the explosion of the third missile, SLL'E k saw fire in the MIG
tailpipe but could not ascertain if it was afterburner operation or not.
During the firing BLUE 1 continued to descend with the MIG, continuously closing. At
the time the MIC reached about 6000 ft, the MIG was 60° nose djwn and inverted.
T9 - BLUE ft was about to overshoot so he rolled Inveited, pulled the nose through the MIG
and fired a fourth SIDEWINDER but did not observe the missile.
At thls-tlme BLUE t (flack) broadcast flak warning. The flak was In the area of both
BLUE 4 and the HIO. BLUE 4 lit the afterburner and began maneuvers to evade the flak while
exiting the area.
BLUE 4 never considered firing the srARROW.* He had set up for HEAT at the initial
encounter and planned to use the SIDEWINDER.
The Intercom was not functioning properly, and BLUE 4 had difficulty communicating
with the Back whose duty was to "clear the 6 o'clock position."
After the encounter, all aircraft exited the area low on fuel and Joined about 30 ml
from Udorn. The flight landed at Udorn with about 1800 lb of fuel.
Later information . .^>m the BIG EYE aircraft revealed that a large flight of MlOa was
10-1^ ffll behind the flight as they exited the area.
A . 4
EVENT 1.6 sUMHARy
Keyed to Figure 1
TUe
Action Aircraft (SLUE I, 2, 3, 4}
Status
Action
Other Friendly
COBRiuntcAtlons
Eneny Actions
(NIG 1.2)
Reaarks
r
'OA
'08
B) .2.3.4 altitude
22.000 ft. nach
0.9, ainost at
BINGO fuel
8t fuel state
6000 lb
B2 fuel Stat*
8000 lb
B3U
84 fuel ebout
8S00 lb
Coning out of turn at
southern'end of orbit.
In fluid-'four for«a-
tion
81 (8Ack) picks up one
bogey at 33 ml goes to
Military power
Goes to ■Hilary pOHer
Throttle back and
start weave to gain *
separation. Acquires
targets on radar
81 Nach 0.92
altitude 22.000 ft
82 Nach 0.92
altitude 22.000 ft
83S4 Nach O.BS
fuel 8000 lb
Range of bogey 20
breaks lock and un
reacqutsltlon Identi'
fles two targets
6ets radar lock-on at
range 1 7-20 nl .
Both have radar lock
at this tine
8t calls contact
ahead at 30 nl and
ID posture. No
confirmation that
others have
acquired bogey.
None
None
Bogey at 11:30
o'clock at same
altitude
Nllitary power
used since fuel
is low
84 Is not
searching due to
radar problems.
He operated it on
emergency only
after others had
called bogeys.
Bogey turns 180*
closing velocity
200 kt
81 (Front) asks 81
(Back) to check
lock-on.
Lead almost calls
off the chase nt
this point since
Lead felt bogeys
would fly Into
Red China.
* r
EVENT 1-6 SUHMARt (Continued)
Keyed to Figure i
Tine
r.irk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. «)
Status
Status for all
aVcraft sane
I
BU2 Mach 0.92
altitude 22.000 ft
83l>4 Nach 0.85
altitude 22.000 ft
2.1/2 Hi In trail
of lead tleaent
Action
V:sua11y acquire NIGs
Other Friendly
Comnunicatlons
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1 .2)
Remarks
ClotInQ velocity
9oes from 200 to
900 kt. Heading
jtdys same, indi-
cating 180* turn
by HIGs. range
about 18 n1 .
Tifw
Mark
EVENT 1.6 SUMMARY (C ontinued)
keyed to Perspective Sketcn
Action Aircr«tt (BlUt I. 2. 3. O
Status
81 Hach 0.92
aUltude 22,000 ft
in full mnftary
power* tanks on
B2 Hach 0.92
attitude 22,000 ft
on left In close
wing fomatton on
B3&4 Hactt 0.8S
altitude 22.000 ft
about 2-t/2 mi in
trait
Acti on
Other Friendly
i\ saac status
82 saeie status
B3&4 sane status
NIGs visually acquired
by B1
HIGs sighted at about
11 o'clock up, hard
to identify at first,
no snoke fron MIGs.
B2 sees the M!Gs first.
Back sees HIGs at about
045* off, range less
than 1 mit seen noM
due to canopy restric-
tions
Comunlcetlons
Lights afterburner
accelerates
B2 gets definite ID
when HIGs pass 9
o'clock, lights after-
burner
B2 (Back) starts
to call out over
air but advises
Front who calls
Encny Actions
(ttlG 1.2)
HIGs about 2000 ft
higher, range
approximately 1 ml
HIGs In close for-
oatlon, level
At this point ihe action of the flight las luffieitntly sep rated to treat each
61 calls ID and
break to left for
Bl and B2 only
HIGs pass to left
of BU2, 1/2 ml
away in a close
formation. Pass
about 1500 ft up
Remarks
Sun behind them
helped to Identify
as HIGs pass
abeasi, since sil-
houette "stood
out."
aircraft individually
IP
JUJIiAJl'.PJjtUii
f
EVENT 1-6 SUM HARY (Continued)
Keyed to Ptrspectivt Sketch
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1)
Other Friendly
Communl cat 1 ons
Enemy Actions
(HIG T 21
Remarks
Time
Hark
Status
Action
^2
Bl in afterburner
Hach •^.0.9S
altitude 22,000 ft
Starts • 4 to 5-9 level
turn. Jettisons tanks
•
None
NtGs Start to turn
after B1&2, see
second element
{B344) roll out
and continue
In afterburner,
has completed 180*
of turn, attitude
22,000 ft, tanks
gone
Goes to 0 9 end
accelerates for sepa-
ration
None
During turn loses
track of all
other aircraft,
except MIGs.
Sees HICs jetti-
son tankt and
thinks HIGs are
f 1 r i ng ml ss i les
«t hioi
In afterburner,
nach t.3. ettltude
15,000 ft
Has accelerated suf-
ficiently, starts
climb. Sees enerny
aircraft during climb.
None
Du<-1ng the climb
81 sees an enemy
aircraft 5000-
7000 ft below and
back at 7 o'clock
Loses contact with
HIGs
In afterburner,
Hach 1.2, altitude
25.000 ft
Ends climb, shuts off
afterburner and sets
up orbit
B1 calls rest of
flight. Contacts
B2,3,4, .and moni-
tors their actions.
Hears B3 call that
he Is In a
scissors. Also
hears 83 call . "I
got one." Hears
B2 say that 82 has
B4 In sight
^6
Hach %0.9, altitude
24.000 ft
Has B2li4 on radar.
Join up Mith others
south of Red River
Bl calls for Join-
up and egress, be-
cause fuel Is loM.
Join-up south of
River.
I
EVEWT 1-6 SUHHARY (Continued)
Keyed to Perspecttve Sketch
Time
Mark
Action Aircraft (SLUE 2)
Other Friendly
Communications
Enemy Actions
(NIC 1.2)
Remarks
Status
Action
In afterburner
Starts wide turn and
climb to the left
HIGs Start to turn
Into 81A2. see
second element
(S3K4}. roll out
and continue.
Then turn after
B3A4. NIGS at
7:30 o'clock
Climbing In after-
burner
After receiving word
that HIGs Jettisoned
tanks, B2 punches off
tanks
B2 (Back) sees
tanks Jettison and
advises Front to
do sane, front
advises flight to
drop tanks
MViS start very
tight turn and
drop their tanks.
Turn Is 'aMaalng.*
During the
cllicblng turn,
wings are rolled
level periodically
to check airspace
for other possible
MIG. as they were
advised to expect
them In f1 Ights
of four. Also
plenty of
J 1 nK 1 ffig
u
Climbing In after-
burner
82 loses sight of HIGs.
Altitude 35,000 ft
Sees 64 at 2 o'clock
down naybe 5000-10.000
ft and a "couple of
Miles out." Sees B4
fire at least two mis-
siles. At 25.000-
30,000 ft sees one
Missile detonate
behind MI6. Following
this NIG noses over
trailing smoke. Into an
Increasingly steep
dive.
f f
EVENT 1-6 SUHMAWY( Continue d)
keytd to Perspective Sketch
Time
Action Aircraft (BLUE 2)
Status
Action
Other Friendly
Coninunlcetlons
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1.2)
(teaiarks
(Continued)
Back sees MIG trailing
light oreylsh-whlte
smoke In • 050*-05S*
dive. Also sees a
cnlsslle fired, and the
aircraft nose over
trailing more smoke.
Altitude 35.000 ft
Descends to al titude
of 64 to Join up.
Joined at 2S,000 ft
and then c1 Imbed
together to optlnun
cruise altitude
I RS9
.4 ^-
f
fesS ^
EVENT 1.6 SUMMARy (Continued)
Keyed to Perspective Sketch
Time
Hark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 3)
Other Friendly
Communications
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1,2)
Remarks
Status
Action
^2
Altitude 22.000 ft
Hach %0.8S
Hi afterburner
Hears &2 cal 1 ,
-They're MIGs,
they' re MIGs,
break left."
NiGs Start to turn
after 8142 see
second element
(B3»4) roll out
and continue
NIGs at 11 o'clock
1-2 ail fron B3
fi 3 1 9 1 A f flAM A Ait
of his element
(6314).
Altitude 22,000 ft
Hach 'vO.SS,
Jettliont tanks
MIGs jettison tankt
and start a hard
tjrn
B3 calls the NIGs
turn "unbeliev-
able."
^
Breaking to left,
afterburner on
FroM T5 on the ac
Continues turn to left
accelerating, loses
track of 84
tlons of B3 and B4 are se
are not synchronized.
parated and the
NIGs shooting one
at 83 and one at
84. Range 2000'
3000 ft and
coming up
83 sees no
tracers Just
nose of NIG
Hght up. 63
now follows only
the NIG which
stayed behind him.
'5
Afterburner en
Reversed and started
several "scissors' or
reverses with the MIG.
Dfd not 90 to 0 9
because B3 felt NIG
had airspeed
advantage.
Calls 64 for help,
but B4 says he can-
not help, has a
MIG on hin.
NIGs split. NIG
slid by behind In
overshoot and r»-
versed.
63 feels MIG made
a mistake in re<
versing after the
overshoot. The
NIG should make
a single pass only.
Radar goes out
during the sds-
SOrs maneuvers.
NIG Shoots at
each crossover.
A. 4
99
EVENT 1-6 s»MM*BY ^Continued)
Keyed to Perspective Sketch
f—
TiBte
Mark
Action Alrereft (BLUE 3}
Status
I
10
Afterburner on
Action
Altitude 20,000 ft
Afterburner on
Altitude 10.000 ft
Hach 1.3
270* through barrel
rol 1 (I.e., In a
090"* bank to left)
Rolled right and down
In 030' dive, then
■ade • »1l8ht left
turn, gaining separa-
tion
Start hard (6.5 to 7 g)
left turn Into.HIG
Other Friendly
HI6 passes head on,
starts slight left
turn to keep HIG In
sight and then dives
at 060* to 10,000 ft
Starts high-g barrel
ro1 1 . Comes out of
af terOurner .
01 shed back fron the
barrel roll In a left
turn
Coflimunl cations
Back calls. "60
HEAT." Front re-
plies, "60 bore-
sight."
Conversation be-
tween Front and
Back
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1,2)
H16 seen at 7
o'clock, range
3/4 ml . continues
to follow B3
MIG shoots, nose
lights up
Renarks
Has gained speed
advantage so B3
decides to gain
separation
Front thought
could not get lock
on and did not
realise that the
radar was out
MI6 astern at 1 mi
HIG at 7 o'clock
range 1/2 flii and
firing
During left turn
KIG overshoots due
to higher speed of
MIG. HIG changes
attitude to pull
up but cannot
change direction.
MIG starts to turn
then leveled and
headed toward a
cloud, descending
range 1-1/4 cai
B3 felt niG was
out of range
MIG Is now stalled
as Indicated by
condensed vapor
over the wings.
f 1!
^ es^ ^5 t L ; J L.
EVEHT t>gSUHHA«T( Continued)
Keyed to Perspective Sketch
Time
Hark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 3)
Stetus
Action
Other Friendly
Communications
Enemy Actions
<HI6 1.2)
Renarki
11
Altitude 13.000-
15.000 ft.
Mach •vO.9-0.95
Fired first SIDEUINOER,
no tone
Fired three more
SIDEWINDERS within
10 sec. good tone on
all missiles
12
Fuel State 3000 lb
After firing last
till s sil e broke hard
left with intent to
go home.
En route to Udorn.
Joins up with B1 >2,4.
63 does not know
what happened to
missile
Ml. site fZ deto-
nates wHh large
fireball at the
tail cone or just
to the right of it
Missile #3 deto-
nates slightly
to right of MIG
Fuel was main
concern through-
out encounter.
f
«V4
EVENT l-C SUMMARY (Continued)
Tlae
Merk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 4)
Other Friendly
Conntinlcatlons
Cnetny Actions
(MI6 1.2)
Remarks
Status ■
Action
Altitude 22,000 ft
Hach icO.85
Lights afterburner,
sees NI6s
MI6 starts to turn
after BItZ see
second element
(83t4) roll out
continue, HIGs
about 2000 ft up
and to the left
Altitude 22,000 ft
Mach «0.85, after*
burner on
Jettfsoni tanks
HIGs Jettison
tanks and start a
hard turn.
HIGs pass about
2000 ft to left
side
u
Aftcrburntr on
From on the acti
Accelerating and
descending In a left
turn. In fighting
Ming 200 ft out and *
300 ft back of 83.
During turn B4 si Ips
to outside of B3
ms of B3 and B4 are sepa
ated and the time m
irks are not sj^nchro
MIGs turn to In-
side, start firing
nlzed.
HIGs were not
tracking
Afterburner on,
altitude 20,000 ft,
Nach 0.9
Hard right break and
descent away froa 83
MIGs split, one
follows B3, other
following B4 back
about SOOO ft
Haneover planned
to split HIGs or
of MIGs.
u
Nach 1.4,
Altitude 12.000 ft
Starts a smooth 4-g
pull-up. Pulls
straight up, relaxed
g's momentarily, and
then comes back over
the top.
KI6 pulls up at
same time as B4
e=3 c:3 C3
CmSI tsia Ka ks;3
ftja u CU3 UJ
/A
Tine
Hark
EVENT 1-6 SUHHARY fContlnutdt
Keyed to Perspective Sketch
Action Aircraft (BLUE 4)
Status
Action
Other Friendly
Conmunlcetloni
Encay Actions
(HIS 1.2)
Rcnirki
Altitude 32.000 ft
350<kt CAS. cane
out of* afterburner
Topped out of vertical
climb Inverted, 1/4
roll to 135*. slight
turn to left, range
to target 4000-5000
ft
Altitude 28,000 ft
01 S* nose down
level
Fired first SIDEWINDER
■Isslle. Good tone
closing on target,
range 3S00 ft
Fired second Hlsslli in
haste. No tone, range
2500 ft
Fired third missile.
Sood tone* range
000 ft
Inverted In steep
dive after NI6.
Altitude 6000 ft
Fired fourth ntsslle
ranee 1000 ft. closing
rapidly, about to
overshoot. Nosed over,
lit afterburner, went
supersonic, climbed to
altitude and cruised
hoae.
Meets B2 first, then
8311 . Sees B2 conning
at 5-7 ml behind.
B4 is at 45.000 ft.
NIG at 26.000 or
29,000 ft In a
vertical recovery
to the left In
090* bank, nose
to the west
Radar completely
out In B4 at this
tlife
020* bank In left
turn, descending
to pick up air-
speed
StIU In left
turn, OSO* bank,
020*-030* nose
down. Emits white
snoke from tall
after explosion.
Ho debris
Missile detonates
4-6 ft from
left wing tip.
MIG rocks wings,
In shallow rapid
fashion S or 6 •
times
Unknown results
for second missile
Missile detonates
In line with tall-
pipe, but short
Back starts
yelling flak
06O* nose down
In left turn,
almost Inverted
B4 did not ob-
serve the missile
I
EVENT 1-7
Aircraft Involved: One P-4C vs t«o unidentified
aircraft
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l»55'N/105»30'E
Route Package VI
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 11 Jul 1965/1520H
BLUE flight of P-*C.
11. DATA SOURCES
Messapies. Reports :
2A0 1121U2Z July 1965 DOCO 03558
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
At 1520 local time BLUE flight located approximately 21*»55'N/105'30*E noticed two
contrails heading SE at approximately Jzoit^' N/IOU'UO'E. Pllsht headed toward tracks,
Jettisoned tanks and applied r.axlr:um power. The two aircraft tn question made 180 turn
and took an apparent !M heading to Mene-Tzu. When BLUE flight determined that the two
aircraft had crossed the Chinese border, 3LUE flight returned to Phuc Yen area until
BINCO fuel and returned to home station.
EVeilT 1-8
Aircraft Involved: One RD-66 and four P-*tC» vs
five MIG-I7s>
Result : No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'lO'.N/loe'tO'E
Route Package VX
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATICN
Date/Tlrae: 5 Oct 1965/12* IH
One RB-66 (CREEM flight) on an ECM alsslon with four P-ICs (BLUE flight) In the
general area to provide MIGCAP for both GREEN flight and the Btrlke force. BLUE flight
was not In orfolt with ORzcV* flight.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE flight took off fron Korat and flew due east to rendezvous with the tanker over
the Gulf of Tonkin. BLUE flight flew north to Just above Haiphong and flew west to the
orbit area.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-ftC 3LUE 1. 2. 3. "
k - SPARROW (A 1.1-7)
ft - SIDEWINDER (Ai:'.-3D)
2 - 370-gal tanks
1 - 600-gal eenterllne tank
RB-66 GREE?< 1
Unknown
HIG.17 MIC 1. ?. t. S
Unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Reported as good, with no thunderstorms.
BLUE GREEN
I 5 5 ? ~r-
Altitude : -25, 000-2$, 000 ft— 33.000 ft
He ading ; Unknown
Speed ; Unknown
PueT'Statet Pull internal and
Flight, Formation :
Unknown
partial in external
tanks
5. INITIAL DETECTION
OREEN gave MIO alert for the area. About a minute later OREEN was alerted to MIO
presence at sound of firing. GKZZtt then called for BLUE flight MICCAP. BLUE flight
obtained a radar contact In the general location of the bbgey.
6. ACTION INITIATED
GREEN turned to follow MISa. BLUE pursued the radar contact.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The MICs made one .T.ore pass at OREEN fliftht after the initial run, and then broke away.
BLUE flight followed the contact until they entered a high threat SAM area, then disengaged.
The coRiaand post gav*} Instructions to terminate the strike and OREEH and BLUE flights
exited north of Haiphong.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1, ?, 3, * - More
NIOs 1* 2, 3. 0, 5 • Guns
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Hone reported
XINCPACPLT Staff study 3-67 gives aircraft as MIO-l*.
si
Hours
Combat
EVENT 1-8
1.1
h 1
150
30 No alr-to«alr gun experience; no nlsslle
flrlnB.
. i - r-t radar. Wants more ACT training for this envlronaient.
', • (ri:«) - Weather not a factor.
.»:* iCi.»CtS
. : .>rv. '•»':' : E^^E 3 CEack), 10 March 1967
-'i CIJ:CPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
%i;(«UlI DtSCRIPTION
,-1 fll.'lts proceeded tc the planned orbit area, with OBEEN Preceding
- ' - VfV'r. arrival in the area. SLUE flight was In radio contact with the airborne
. 2'.rt*;f rcrce and CRr.EN filght
'/I..*.-. — I'led GR-EV thit they were about 20 ml from GBEEJI and GREEN gave a
rt [:ruV tS.y «re in! Aoout U5 to 60 sec later, GREEN called MIC attack.
.1. «t coo ft ar.d Jaru-alng when the crew ncted sound of firing plus "slight
. - r"Jv^tc be a niar nl.s. The pilot saw three MIGs foUo^ved by two others.
:./j".'o '^.icw the HIGs and transsiitted for DP steer to BLUE flight. The MIOs
:'r '»rtcr ai.atr.er pass on CREEH, two went north and three went south.
.-e call. 2LUE flight Jettisoned all external tanks and lit ajltej''^"^""-
••.1' ■"■1' "js for 3LUE: to CAP about 1000-2000 ft belo- the altitude of the B-66s
;'* ■ ''l.T.t of ?-i*s at lower altitude to "sandwich" anyone attacking the S-bbs.
. tfr.e of the call, the flight was at 25,000-26,030 ft. BLUE flight waa
j'V.r.i;- radar search. Part of flight was searching on the 25-ml scale and tne
.-r, scale,
-•/ a.'"T r.eirlng the call, BLUE 3 (Back) got a single radar contact at 18-20 ml.
»'- -• %-:ear contact and BLUt flight swung in behind the contact. The contact was
-i:>i :ijr5e heading south. They locked on at V' ml with 200-kt overtake.
* I *
fil-xed the contact but broke off aue to the prOKlnlty to Hanoi mlsslle-
e fact that the B-66 needed protection. BLUE filght never closed to
to the bogey.
•.f* Vre SLUE flight dlseneaged, the command post called off the strike. BLUE
■. rr.J^rvcysed with GREEN and stayed with the B-66 until the GREEN left the
ilrlice force.
tr-»t an!
mum
mum
mm
evCNT I. 9
Aircraft Involved: Two P-4Ba vs three NIC>i7s
Result: One HIG probable kill
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^SO'N'/loe^lS'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Package VI
Date/TlRe; 6 Oct 1965/lOUOH
u '^Z I'^tV^ ^' '"•^•^^ E''«"P attacking JCS target 18. T"! Vu Chua
Railroad Bridge north of Keo airfield. In iiliW racetrack pattern north of Kep airfield.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed carrier on yA;:KEc: Station at about l8»30'N/between 107* and 108» B
rendezvoused overhead with A-3 tanker, taking on about HOOO lb fuel. Then proceeded on
intoic^r^^ ^5 westward to TARCAP in vicinity of 21«30'N/
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-ftB BLUE 1. 2
3 - SPARROW (AIM -7D)
2 - SIDEWINDER {a:m-92)
1 - 600-gal centerline tank
Radir and TACAM operating
Navy color (not camouf.agcd}
>»IC-17 MIC 1> 2. 3
Sliver color
«. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Broken to scattered clouds 3OOO ft with tops about 4000 ft
BLUE
i ?
Altitude ; 2500 ft —
Hcaoingr 190" .....
Speed: 'lOO-kt TAS
Fuel State ; Unknown
(Centerline tank was er.pty}
Flight Formatlc n: BLUE 2 in l500-ft trail behind BLUE 1
5. INITIAL DETECTION
. BLUE 1 had radar contact at I8 ml and lock-on at I3 mi. BLUE 2 also achieved radar
contact Immediately after BLUa 1 reported the pick up.
6. ACTION INITIATED
oritir flight accelerated to about 500-kt TAS with BLUE 2 increasing his spacing behind
BLUE 1 to be in firing posltlcn If 3LU£ 1 identified the bogeys as MIOs. BLUE flight In
shallow left interception turn. » "snv »n
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
V:^^ ^ visual 10 at about one ajlle, he made right turn, passed over top of
the MIO-17 flight, climbed, otserved MIG at his 7:30 position, and then executed descendlns
separation maneuver followed by a hard right turn tc reengage.
/^"t^ I ""'^ SPARROW at KIG 2, which detonated in close proximity to and probably
downed nIG 2.
b...., ^ started to posltlcn for attack nn MIG 3 when he observed MIG 1 closing on
BLUb 1 who was In hard right turn. BLUE £ advised ELUE 1 to unload and BLUE 2 shifted
his attack to MIO 1, who disengaged by going to the deck and proceeding to the south Into
the heavily defended area around Hanoi. MIQ 3 had already disengaged to the south.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. fired/Ho. hits)
SPARROW SIDEWINDER
A1M-7D AIM-9B Soviet AAM Reaarka
BLUF. 1 0/0 0/0
BLUE 2 1/0 0/0 -.BOOO-rt range. 2 g.
detonated within 10 ft
behind NIQ 2. Probable
kill.
MIQ I, 2, 3 — . — — — _Ho firing observed
83
4r «k
9. CQUIPKCNT PftOBLEHS
None
10. AlftCRCU COHNENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
BLUE I
Front — --.
Back
BLUE ?
eVENT 1-9
Hours
Combat
Missions
Somarks
Front
Back
3500
-Not interviewed — — -
-Not Interviewed-——
(Letter only)
600 105
-Not interviewed——
All fighter background.
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE ? (Front) - Turning and acceleration rate of the MlG-17 very impressive. The
HIG leader was aggressive and a good Tighter pilot.
Commenta Vrorx Overall Experience
BLUE 1 (Back) - Satisfied with the AP3-72 AI radar. Would like a novin? target
indicator for low altitude work. A nore precise gain control for the radar is desirable.
Would also like ground :nappln5 radar capability. Need capablll'.y to Icck-on one target
and search for other targets without losing original lock." Heed IFF interrcsatlon capa-
bility computer. Requirement exists fcr short range nlssile for close in work.
BLUE 2 (Front) - Would like to see fighter with about the gross weight of an F-8.
Maximum speed of I A with rapid acceleration capability from ?20 knots to Mach 1.1 and
better turning capability than the MIGs. Fighter needs guns or .-.hort-rance nlssile.
Sold on energy naneuverJng diagrams. Need a clean airplane with nothing hanging. Does
not favor multlnlsslon aircraft whlcn degrades pilot capabilitlvs as well as weapon
system performance for any given mission.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 2 (Front). 19 January 1967
Mesaatses. Reports ;
CTO 77.5 OPREP-3 0707052 Oct 1966
Letter ; BLUE 1 (Back), 15 March 1967
12. NAPRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE (1, 2) were northwest; of Kep airfield-ln 3ARCAP orbit aUltuf.*? of about 2500 ft
underneath a scattered to broken 3CCQ-ft cloud deck with tops to about "000 It. BLUE 2
was In about 1500-ft trail tehind SLUE 1. There were also F-85 In the area acting as
TARCAP for the A-^s hitting the Vu Chua Railroad Bridge north of Kep airfield.
To - On a southbound leg, BLUE 1 (Back) detected a suspicious grouping of targets at I8 ml
in the karst ground return.
Ti - Subsequent lock-on at 13 mi showed the targets to be airtorne with a closlnz velocity
of 600 knots. BLUE l(back)had <t radar with exceptional lock-cn S'?nsltivlty ard iralntained
lock-on throughout the intercept.
BLUE 2 achieved radar lock-on at about 8 ml. BLUE 2 Rained separation of about one
mile behind BLUE 1 as BLUE 1 accelerated from 100- to 500-knot TAS. This was the planned
maneuver to place BLUE 2 In firing position if the bogeys were Identified as itIOi.
T2 - At 10 ml the bogeys were observed to nove tj the left and closing velocity went to
zero as they made a 270° turn rolling out on a heading of about 090".
- BLUE 1 made visual ID at about one mile and called, "They're MIGs" three tlneS. The
MiGs were at 1 o'clock about 500 ft low in a climbing left turn.
Tc - BLUE 2 achieved lock-cn and fired a SPARROW which detonated about 10 ft behind MIO 2,
probably resulting In a kill.
About this time MIG 1 discovered the attack and made a hard left turn. t41G 3 followed
in this turn.
Ta - After having fired the SPARROW at HIG 2, BLUE 2 easily slid into g-un range behind
HIG 3 (no guns though) and passed close enouch to MIG 3 to see the M-O pilot's ^ and on
ttie stick. BLUE 2 started a high side yo-yo to cet to nissi:*; firing range on i-!IO 3.
Tu - After ID and passing over the MIG flight In a right turn, BLUE 1 reversed and climbed
In an effort to gain an advantageous position on the MIGs.
84
I
I
I
I
»
ft
S
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
ft
i
I
3
I
EVENT 1-9
9
T, - BLUE lft.cO Observe- HI= I at 7: 30 ^".I'iijjat"? 'Jt^TrlH ''U, t^'^ll
effort to reengage the KIG . orrrr n- t..».n
^ - BLOE » „.rc.cr.i„6 Booo ft In hi. ,o-,, rro';!or"rtS"'.i/
a^d closlns to "• '••C, ';„!rS to «U" HIO 3 and rolled on arounO In a
Sirri'/UIl tl''S^.lui"«""o'Jl"il •on"Srri'?H;rr«''i«] tl». «»n«.8ed .o tn. .outh)
n^^^^^: M rra»Jr.s^o:°.nS.r^.! ssrruM 55irrrBi»i%
and feinted Into BL-U£ 2 but continued to chase HUUc. i,
Tu> - A» BLUE 2 passed belo- 500 ft. HIG 1 broke right to the deck (pos.lbly as lo- as
25 ft) end dlsenjaged to the south.
,.i Lr.\txx ruM r.is-^.;rru"o"iof is,':„s'!JnSA'r'
aboard the carrier.
Ritw 1 2 retained 600-sallon =enterllne tanks throushout the engagement. By tne
HsijSVi'-t :i^^rri>;To.tJ^i: irrc?frJ'5^Js:-rs "uj*
speed Jettison. w ^ i«
A low altitude engageaent facilitated by effective employment of radar resalted In
probable kill of one Hia-17. No damage to 3LUE flight.
9
I
9
9
S
I
I
4
es
EVENT 1.9 SUHHARy
Tine
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLU£ 1. 2)
Other Friendly
Communications
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1.2,3)
Renarks
Status
Action
^0
2S00 ft
«400-kt TAS
BZ In 1S00-ft trail
behind 81
Bl reported radar
contact
82 also had con-
tact
B2 indicated target
probably F-8 TARCAP
B2 backseater
thought he had
targets In the
ground return
h
2500 ft. 50O.kt TAS
B1 has lock-on at 13 n1 .
B1 accelerating to 500-
kt TAS
B2 falling back for
spac ing
Bogey closure rate
s600 kt
Bogeys start left
360' turn
2S00 ft. 500«kt TAS
B1 observes zero
closure rate Indicating
bogeys making turn
Bogeys continue
rapid left turn
h
2000 ft. 500-kt TAS
B) sees HIGs at about
one o'clock. 1 n1
500 ft low
Bl calls "They're
MIGs" three times
Three MIG-)7s In
500-ft trail
cliabing left turn
U
1500*ft, 500*kt TAS
Bl in right turn passed
over top NIG flight.
31 made climbing left
turn
12 had lock-on
T
'5
1500 ft. 500>kt TAS
a fired SPARROH 2 g's
^000-ft range Just
before break X
HI in hard left
turn
N3 slow to tighten
his turn
SPARROW detonated
-10 ft behind M2.
Probable kill, not
verified at time.
A-4 flights later
reported what they
thought to be
burning wreckage
In the area.
CIS O (Cd O ^ ^ ^ ^
c^ai €^ «a EiLa o ^ ^ ^
V r
r:::;^ ^ ^ 4:,-^
EVENT !•» SUHHARY (Continued)
Tine
Nark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2)
Othtr Fritndly
ConnuRleatlons
Cncny Actions
(NI6 1.2.3)
Rcnarks
Status
Action
h
T500 ft. 500* -kt
TAS
A6
B2 tailed in beiilnd M3
(within gun range If he
had had a gun) passed
close enough to HS to
see pilot's hand on the
stick.
B2 pulled up in high
side yo-yo to reposition
for attack on H3
-
HI pul ling around
rapidly in his left
turn
Bl 6000 ft
AB
Bl 500 ft
1.2 Mach
Bl observed Ml closing
toward his 6 o'clock
with about 90° angle
off l/Z-ml range
Bl nosed over ztro g ,
and headed for the deck
to accelerate away from
HI
After what 61 considered
adequate separation he
started 6-7-9 right
turn to reengage HI.
HI closing on 61
Ml cut across Bl 's
turn
B2 8000 ft out of
AB
32 in his high side yo-yo
observed Ml cutting
across Bl's turn and
closing to Bl's 6 o'clocl*
11 discontinued attack
on M3 and completed a
left barrel roll de-
(cending rapidly to
attack HI. 82 slow In
leveling his wings al-
lowing HI Bore closure
advantage
62 advised Bl to
level his Mings and
run
Ml continued to
close on Bl ap-
proaching firing
range SOO-ft
altitude
}2 S50-600 kt
10 AB
1000 ft
n 500 ft
tach 1.0+
iZ attempting to get
)elow Hi to use his
ilssltes
H1 observed B2
feinted Into him
but continued to
chase 61 .
HI closed to
»3000 ft on Bl.
Did not fire.
EVENT 1-9 SUMMARY (Continued)
Time
Mark
10
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2)
Other Friendly
Status
82 SOO ft
B2 sttn trying to gtt
into nissllt firing
position
Action
CofliMunlcatlons
BZ advised B1 Ml
has broken off and
told B1 to cone
out of AB.
r.re«y Actions
(HIG 1.2.3)
HI broke right and
down to about 2S-ft
aUltude jJnkIng
around karsts and
disengaged to the
south.
Remarks
Bl had been In AB
since 10 «t Tj.
I
IK
[1 c:>ic::»c2ac»ii>cia<^M^
bJ»
EVENT 1-10
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-ftCs and two RB-66s
V8 two unidentified aircraft
Result : Slghtlni; only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l<»3*' N/10««IB' E
Route Package V
1. PftlNARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 8 Oct I965/1^30H
Escorts on IPON HAND mission.
11. DATA SOURCES
Messages . Reports
CIMCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67
12. NARRATIVE OESCfllPTION
Escorts on IRON HAND mission visually sighted two unidentified aircraft, escorts turned
toward unidentified aircraft, when ttiey entered Hanoi area.
EVENT I-n
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-4Cs and two EB-66s v«
four bogeys
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 22«2«i 'N/IOS'SZ'E
Route Package VI
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlme: 1 Nov 65/1030H
BLUE 1 and 2 (p.iic) were escorting GREEN 1 (EB-66} and BLUE 3 and 4 (P-IC) were
escorting GREEN 2 (EB-66).
GREEN 1 and 2 were separated by about 20 ml at time of encounter.
11. DATA SOUftCES
Messages; 2d Air Dlv nessage C20537Z Nov 65, DIO 00C03
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE 1 sighted four aircraft, possibly MICs, at about 25,000-ft altitude, climbing,
at 6 o'clock and about 5 al distance from GREEN 1. BLUE 1 and 2 were weaving at 30,000
ft, GREEN 1 Circling at 30,000 ft, at 0.8 Mach. BLUE 3 and 4 and GREEN 1 condition
unknown. BLUB 1 turned into the bogeys' path on a heading perpendicular to theirs. As
BLUE 1 headed into the bogeys' path, they broke off to the east and disappeared Into the
clouds. BLUE 3 was able to pick up the bogeys on radar at 18 mi, lock on and hold for
about 30 see but lost contact as the bogeys maneuvered away. BLUE did not pursue the
bogeys .
EVENT I'M
Aircraft Involved: Two F-UCs va two MIGs
Result: Two MIGs sighted. Intercepted and
visually Identified an A-3B.
Vicinity of Encounter: 19^0 'N/108»20'E
Route PacVage I
1. PRIMARY HISSIOM AND TACTICAL SIVUATION
Date/TUe: 23 Dec 1965/0730H
Pour F.«iCs were cn arn,ed reconnaissance In Route Package I. ' "J;"^ L
and BLLE 2 were to alternate with BLUE 3 and BLUE U to maintain an on-station escort in
tSe Gulf of Tonkin. Du.- to some unstated difficulties. BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 returned
to Danang. and BLUE 3 and BLUE * arrived on station first.
2. HISSION ROUTE
BLUE 3 and «» departed Danang and, after completing the armed reconnaissance "iMlon
m Route Packa« I. refueled froa airborne tankers. The fUeht Proceeded to Point
Bravo (iS^OO'IJ/IOT'aO'E) where BLUE 3 and U caise under the control of BIG eye. After tne
second Intercept the flight returned to Danang.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGUBATIONS
p-ac SLUE 3. "
4 . SPARROW (AIM-7D)
4 - SIDEWIftDFR (AI>;-9B)
2 - 370-gal external wing tanks
H - 750- lb bomb
TACAN and IFF
HlC HIO 1. 2
Ordnance loid was not observed. Mot positively identified, either MIG-15 or 17,
high tall, gray color.
4. FLIGHT CONOITjONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Ueather: Weather
over land, clouds
Altitude !
Headln^ T
Speed:
Fuel State :
Plight Formation
was clear over the gulf, visibility unrestricted. There was an overcast
1500 to 2000 ft.
BLUE
— 3
31,000 ft 31,000 ft
OUO" 04C»
0.92 Mach 0.92 Naeh
1ft, 000 lb 14,000 lb
SLUE 3 and were directly abeam with about 3000-ft separation,
level In altitude. When BLUE flight was vectored in for the visual
ir, BLUE 3 went into a 3-b1 trail,
i
5. INITIAL OETEfTION
BIO EYE detected a bogey In the vicinity of 2O«»iio'N/106«5O'E, between Hainan Island
and North Vletnan heaalng toward Haiphong. BLUE 3 and >* obtained radar contact at
approximately 70 ml. Uter, BLUE 3 and « were vectored to intercept a second bogey and
acquired a radar contact at approximately 40 mi.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 3 and 4 were vectored CttO" for an ident I'lcatlon pass when the first bogeys were
at a range of W ml. Both engaged afterburner and accelerated to 1,2 Mach. The bogeys
vera lost in clouds near Haiphong, and BLUE flight turned to resume station.
When vectored to intercept the second bogey, considered a hostile ay BIS EYE, BLUE 4
Jettisoned thej external tanks, engaged afterburner, and accelerated to 1.? lih.
All swlt'ches were positioned for a SPARROW launch on each ID pass w.'. .-'.ven the
Initial vectoR,
7. SITUATION i DEVELOPMENT
On the first visual Identification pass BLUE 3 lost rad?.r concacn moneritarJ.ly ,
BLUE «> assumed the lead. BLUE 3 took a trail position with a separation of approximately
3 ml At 20 ml the target Initiated a steep dive. BLUE 1 followed by flying the steering
dot and deseliectad afterburner. BLUE U attained an In-range position at an altitude of
12 000 ft whllr deacendlng In a 10« dive but could not see the target. SI.UE 4 covered the
entire range spectrum of the SPARROW missile but cculd not see the target. At a range of
1-1/4 mi and yooo-ft altitude the target appeared tc execute a spllt-S naneuver.
9S
EV£NT 1-12
BLUE 3 Mas in trail as BLUE U pulled up ncse high anticipating an overshoot. BLUE it
(Front and Back) visually sighted the MIGs at H o'clock low. The bogeys were gray colored,
high-tall r410-15 or 17. The MIGs dove Into the clouds. BLUE 3 did not see the MIGs.
BLUE 1* climbed for altitude and headed to seaward, southeasterly. BLUE it was then
vectored 2'»7'* to IntercepL a bogey that was reported :o be attacking BIG EYE. At an
altitude of approximately 20,000 ft, external wing tanlo were Jettisoned and afteruurners
were engaged, as BLUE * accelerated to 1.2 Mach. BLUE 3 was still in trail attempting to
overtake BLUE U.
BLUE U was cleared to fire without visual Identification. BLUE U realized the
target was still 7 nl froni BIG EYE and elected to visually Identify the target Before
firing. At acproxlRsately 3 ml BLUE 4 Identified the bogey as a Navy A-3B. BLUE <t
returned to base because of BINGO fuel.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 3
BLUE U
SPARROW
AIH-7E
0/0
0/0
SIDEWTNCER
Ai;:-98
0/0
0/0
750-16
Bomb
Remarks
All bombs were dropped on a
road in Package I.
9. CquiPKENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 3
Lost radar contact at approximately <tO ml on Initial ID pass. Operation of the
radar was intermittent.
BLUE t
None
10. AIRCRCU CONHENTS
Experienc e
BLUE 3 - Front
Back
BLUE 4 - Front
Back
Total I
Hours He
Mot interviewed
1700
500
200
150
Combat
Missions
10-15
10-12
Remarks
Tac background
Coccnents on this Encounte r
BLUE 4 - Front
A gun would have been uneful on the first ID pass because the Intercept ended
in good position for a gun attack, but Insuf fiCLient time remained to maneuver for a
missile launch before the .MIGs disappeared into the clouds.
The front attacks are of little use when a visual identiricatlon is required. A
gun and closer range nlsslle are needed. SPARROW missile is jf limited use in SEA be-
cause of limitations in the beam area. For alr-to-alr, a SO-ni radar range satisfies
the needs.
BLUE ft - Back
If the bogey on the first Intercept had been claaaified as hoatlU, as all warnings
Indicated, a kill could have resulted.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
BLUE H - Front, 9 Jan 1967
BLUE ft - Back, 16 March 1967
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Pour F-ftCs were scheduled to fly an armed reconnaissance in Route Package I, refuel
from airborne tankers, and then BLUE I and 2 were to alternate with BLUE 3 and ft to
maintain an on-statlon escort in the Gulf of Tonkin. BLUE 1 and 2 returned to Oanang for
an unstated reason.
B
8
B
t
I
t
t
I
S
B
i
I
i
eVENT 1-12
tSSnil'^caU. =can. -!tn antennas ^ ,„ ,c ,„ after tr..
alert. BLUE 3 and « aMleved radar "i'^^"" "J^f'-^'Jive , negative." The
?i°nti«.':.«"at";no5S ?;ro!ST'K'--UnTorrJo2rsr?.,at a^peaJed to tat. the.
froia iSalnan to Halpnone- .
EVE lnforr.atlon wouKl have resulted In a long tall chase.
BLUE fU.ht achieved a radar lock-on at JO ml in Jj« "J'^^^J u, JJI^g
wUh an overtake spce:> of 250 kt. At 2° the target J^;;,^^^ through
t... steering d^t, f<'li'--«<*,?2^?"*^!?^risc k[ cVe^take sp'^-ed^ U -as locked on
12. -10 rt at aOO kt. In. a 1C° ^Ive with l^C-kt overtake sp ed ^^^^^ ^^^^^
as the ln-ran(;e lU-V. car:e on at 5 ml. ^^Lallv acquire the bogey. At at. «hlle
of the 2?ARRCW r^isslle BLL. u J^J 'I'J^JJj^^^ii^l^ecute f split-S as evidenced by
trail Quring the fie^ Lhrto«ys' L In color with a high tall.
the rlRnt turn to a southeasterly heaaln« with SLJl^ 3 still in trail.
BLUE H was vectored 2«7« to Intercept a hostile declared to be "tacking BIO EYE,
attempting to close on BLUE «.
intercept.
BLUE tt was at BIKGO --.i and returned to Danang. BLUE 3 remained on station for
approximately another 5 hr by in-flight fueling.
EVENT 1-12 SUNKARV
1
Time
N«rk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 3. 4)
1
Comuntcatlons
Enemy Actions
(MIG)
Remarks
Status
Action
BLUE flight 31 ,000
ft 0.92 Mdch under
8IG EVE control .
heading approil-
mately 060*
BIG EYE
Head) ng approx
285" en route from
Hai nan to Ha j phong
31.000 ft. 0.62
Hach
BLUE flight asked
BIG EYE if 10 pass
was desired. BIG
EYE replied
"Negative"
BLUE flight turns right
to 040V B16 EYE re-
quests ID pass
816 EVE. -Vectcr
040* for ID pass."
63 Inses radar
contact.
Target 40 ml
B4 takes lead, B3 In
tral 1 approx 3 ml
84 begins correcting to
••Intiln closure
83 In trell
u
84 rolls out astern
target ?50-kt elostire.
Approx 20 ni behind
target, begins dive to
keep a centered steering
dot.
B3 in trail
Eneny s tarts d1 ve
B4 passing through
12.000 ft. 10* dive. 400
kt, about 8~rai range of
target, l50-kt
B3 In trail
Diving
\
B4 7000 ft 300 kt,
des cendl ng .
Target 1 1/4 mi ahead
B3 In trail
Does a splft-S
B4 realizes target
had spllt-S. pulls
nose up high In
a climbing right
turn
84 sees MIG 4 o'clock
Ion. just prior to MIS
going In cloud
B3 follows 84
but did not see
NIG
Just before dis-
appearing into
clouds.
'6
-
84 cItMbs to 20.000 ft
on an easterly heading
83 still In trail
Bie EYE. Gives
vector ?47"
Then makes an ID 1
;>ass on a Navy
K-2i
EVENT I-n
Aircraft Involved: One EC-121 and P-flEs (unknown
number) vs unknown aircraft
Result: Radar contact only
Vicinity of Encounter: 19*40 'H/IOT^IS »E
1. PRIHAItY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOH Package IV
Date/Tlice: 9 Jan 1966/0926H
»oee,J po'r^-f IJ^'JiiJI^-J^f <«° "><»=) OuK Of T0„K1„ «h.n
11. DATA SOURCES
Crq 77.5 OPREP-3 090752Z Jan 66
te. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Tonkin*? ?«?Mon"??S;;.S,^;-ff«.«re eacortlng^a^ CBJO LOOK) over the Culf of
a3 approaching from the north bearing SJoVdrstaSce CJS^o^n destroyer
at O.rSa^h'o'neirS "?alJe%';a'rr%'on?S:t''"^jrbo«: r^^vf ^^^''^ P""^-
-ere recalled by the controller to retuJS to IJL^nf reversed course ana the P-83
The number of aircraft approaching SSt SeJeraiwi. ° ''^"'^ -letting waa made.
e«eRt t-13A
Aircraft Involved: Two P-4Bs, and one EF-lOB vs
(a) two possible MIQ-21a and
(b) two possible HIG-178
Result: No Damage
Vicinity of Encounters: (a) 21''00'N/108''00'E
(b) 1 9" 10 • N/106* 00 'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAl SITUATION
Date/Time: 11 Jan 1966/C120H
A flight of two USMC P-«lB« (BLUE flight) were escorting an EP-lOB (GREEN flight) on a
nighttime FIRECRACKER mission over the Gulf of Tonkin.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE flight originated from Danang, rendezvoused for alr-to-alr refueling over Tiger
Island, £nd rendezvoused with GREEK flight at spproxinately 19«»/106» . The flights then
proceeded to Hon Hal, where one orbit was made to 21'>/lo8"'. After the single orbit, a
return was made to Danang without refueling (See Fig. 3).
3. AIRCftAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-OB BLUE 1. 2
^ - SPARRC: (AIM-7D)
2 or «« - SIDEWINDER (AIM 9B)
Centerllne tank
Grey and whlce paint
MIOs
Unobserved except for GREEN and RED lights.
«. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Clear night but no noon. Cloud deck over land In north at about 9000 feet be-
coming scattered and broken to the south of Thanh Hoa.
BLUE 1. 2 QREEM 1. 2
Altitude ; 20-25,000' 20-25.000'
Headln ,;; B-1 223''/B-2 MO* 223»
Speed ; Hach .9 KACH .7
Fuel State : Unknown .Unknown
Plight Fornatlon : P-4s orbiting the EP-lOB on opposite sides (See Pig. 1)
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 2 called two contacts on radar, three miles from B-1 and closing. BLUE 2 was
about 15 miles from B-1 at this time.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 turned hard to the left and B-2 turned 16 0 degrees to follow GREEN 1.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 made radar and visual contact with two different bogeys and followed the radar
contact as It descended to the north at supersonic speed. After breaking off thli con-
tact due to proximity of land, B-1 rejoined B-2 and G-1 as they neared the end of the
mission. BLUE 2 again got a radar contact and B-2 ar.d G-1 departed to the south. B-1
again got a radar and visual contact and pursued the radar contact to the land mass before
breaking off.
8. ORDNANCE
None expended.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
I03a
4I»
Event I-13A
10. AIRCREW CORHENTS
Eiperlence
Total
HOURS
Hours
Combat i
Missions
Remarks
BLUE 1
Front
500
200
20
Had flown P-8
BLUE 1
Back
775
715
30
Had EP-lOB experience
BLUE 2
Front
375
150
3
BLUE 2
Back
200
120
3
4lnce USMC was not flying missions over '■he north which counted for rotation purposes,
this is an estimate of the number of suci. rnlsslons flown by each crew. Because of this
situation a crew could leave the theatre with r.uch less than 100 missions over HVN at
that tine.
Corjnents on this Encounter
BLUE 1 (Back)
It was very difficult for the P-ts to communicate with the EF-lOB so that their
position and actions could be known.
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
BLUE 1 - Back, 2 Feb 1968
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
The mission was a nlghttlrae PIRECRACKER nlsalcn conducted over the Gulf of Tonkin.
A sinale EF-lOB (GREEM fliaht) was to r.ake one orbl: to the north over the Gulf and return.
The other scheduled EF-lOB aborted. Two F-^Os (ELJE flight) escorting GREEN were trying
a new tactic at this time in order to provide rad^:- .;overage for the F,P-10Bs. as the
EF-lOB moved along Us track, the two F-Hs flew • -lllptlcal orbit around the EF-lOB
such that, as the P-Ub overtaking the EP-IO fro. fi rear lost radar contact, due to the
fact that the EF-10 was too far off to the beam, -.hf lead F-^i would then reverse its
course approximately 15 miles In front of the EF-10 in order to pick It up on Its ^adar
(See Pig 1)» Navigation Itself was difficult since the onboard navigation equipment did
not function accurately and locations were determined by use of radar contact with the
coast line.
A destroyer radar picket was on station near the orbit area. "P^" '^t*.
destroyer informed OREEfl and BLUE Plights that they were the only frlendlies airborne at
that tine.
In addition to navigation difficulties there were significant corxiunlcatlon diffi-
culties between the EF-lOB and BLUE flight due to the fact that the EF-IO constantly
llstenlntt on Its ELI«T mission and was not nonltorlng the F-48. Also the EP-10 had no
radar coverage of Its own and, therefore, could not perform station keeping assists to
locate the P-iis .
One other situation had a significant Impact on this particular mission.
of this mission, that is. 11 January 1966. a truce was 1" eff*" ^^tw^!' ll?^llne
explicit instructions :hat, under no circumstances, were they to cross the enemy coast line
and overfly North Vietnam.
The EF-lOB with Its P-H escort proceeded up the orbit track, the EP-lOB was cruising
at .7 Haoh number, approximately 20 to 25.000 ft. As the EF-10 reached the northern
?ernlnua of the orbit, at about 21"»N/108'»E, the EF-lOB nade a turn to reverse course.
Sue S ?he coS^uSlcation difficulties, mentioned previously, the "^fJ^SJ
position. In particular, BLUE 1 was caught approxlr.ately 15 ^S. 5p lOB
QREEN flight so that after reversal. BLUE 1 found hlr.self too far In trail of the EF-lOB.
BLUE 2, hlwever. was In approximately a reversed course to the BP-lOB and was palntlne
B-1 on t.'-e radar (See Fig. 2).
Tn - At this time BLUE 2 picked up two radar contacts approximately 3
Sd closing. B-2 immediately notified B-l of this situation, and broke right l^-^ng 1"
the direction of the contacts. B-l at this time was about 21,000 feet. BLUE 2 immedi-
ately turned l80* to continue on with OREHH 1.
T5 - After turning through approximately 60*. BLUE I saw twe lights coming at them. De-
spite lack of accuracy In observing lights at night, they wtre estimated to be about
103b
i
i
I
B
S
B
I
S
Q
e
B
B
fl
i
B
9
B
§
3
a
g
a
Q
f
II
i
i
a
a
a
Evtnt 1-UA
\2. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (Continued)
2 miles away. Red and 7.reen ll.'hts were seen, then they banked up and went out. Two
more Itsrhts were seen about 12 -Ilea iiway. BLUE 1 continued through a hard turn with
speed about Kach 5-1 was Ir. full afterburner and it took approxlnately 30 seconds to
coripU-te 60 degrees of the slightly descendlr.ij turn. After 60 degrees of turn BLUE 1-back t
went to the scope and BLUE 1 rolled out heading approximately north northeast (010 naenetlc) |
at about r-iacn I and 15,000 feet.
T-i - BLUB l-backseat get a radar contact at 9 to 10 miles In sround clutter and locked on
to the contact. At this tlr.e the speed of the P-'i was about Hach l.Z but the target was
openln.- at 50 knots. BL'JE 1 then saw land coming up, but It was not ascertained whether
the laiidfall was P.ed China or Ncr-.h Vietnam; however, due to the ground rules, mentioned
earllef, chey could not crosa land so SLUE 1 broke off. At this point BLUE 1 asked the
PICKET Destrcyer !f Uiay nad any radar contacts behind them. The destroyer said, no, he
had no IFF squawks. (Ccr.T.ent: this Is what he should have had since the enemy would not
have been squawking on ^he IFF.)
Til - BLUE 1 after making an Inplace turn at the coast, picked up OREE.** 1 and BLUE 2
about 50 miles down the track cn radar. The radar was on 1.00 mile range sole at the time.
BLUE 1 then accelerated to about J';ach ,95 in order to close on 3REEN 1 and BLUE 2, who
were proceeding back down the orbit at approxlnately Mach .7 at this ♦"ime.
Tq - BLUE 1 causht up with cREE:; 1 and SLUE 2 somewhere off the coast near Thanh Koa. The
approxlsiate coordinates were 19'«5'N, lOJ^E. As 3-1 caught up with the of the flight,
SLUE 2 was abreast of CREE:i 1 so SLUE 1 started to make a 360" turn behind OREEN 1 in order
to reestablish the orbit pattern around GREEN 1.
T* - After BLUE 1 had gone through about 180" of his 360* (BLUE 1 was now heading back
approximately north northeast) BLUE 2 called two radar contacts from 270« (about 10 mile
range) BL-JE 1 therefore continued to turn. BLUE 1 expected to pick up the EF-10 on the
radar, expecting the contact to appear somewhere In the left lower center portion of the ;
scope.
T7 - Upon rolling out of the 360" turn BLUE l-baekseat picked up a contact heading S'JO*;
however, the contact appeared at longer range and more toward the center of the scope
(I.e., higher up the scope and more to the center) than expected. To find the EP-lOB B-1
backseat then locked up on the contact, ^
The contact was suspicious however, since the closing velocity at 175 knots was con- •
slderably lower than it had been previously despite the track being In the general direc-
tion of the orbit. However, It was thought that the EP-10 had accelerated at the call of
contacts. In order to establish the position of GREEJ 1, BLUE 1-back called for a 10
count ADF check. While attempting to make the check, due to communication problems
enumerated earlier, BLUE 1 saw a sec of aircraft lights at 20 to 30° off to the right of ;
the nose at what aotseared to be 10 to 12 miles. The radar c mtact at this time was :
apparently over land at about a range of 6 miles. Since B-1 was close to the land it was
anticipated that the E?-10 would then turn south to break off from the land contact and
since ..he contact had not it was suspected by BLUE 1 that this was not the EF-10. After
establlihlng the EF-10 location by an ADF direction finding check B-l-back found that the
ADF needle was Indicating a location at B-l's 8 o'clock position, so that GREEN 1 was
deflnlteiy off the scope. The concluslxin at that time was that the contact on the scope *
was hostile. The other light was still seen.
At tils point BLUE 1 went to afterburner; however, a posltlpn^check Indicate*., that
they were crossing over the coast. At this time B-1 was aoout 2C',000 feet. Kach .9, I
and flak was coning up. Due to the overland restrictions BLUE 1 oroke off. »
The crews on this mission concluded that, due to the speed of the targets acquired '
at the northern end of the orbit, the contacts were probably MIO-Zl aircraft. Of Interest
was the sighting of lights on enemy aircraft. It was unknown by the crew whether this was
an apparent decoy; leaving the lights on to distract the pilots to other targets while a
closer one made an attack, or the fact that the aircraft were out on training mission
during the truce period and had not turned off their navigation lights after takeoff.
At the point at which BLUE 1 had completed hla 360" turn. (T7) a.id picked up the *
radar contact. BLUE 2 and GREEtl 1 had broken off to the south-southeast heading back
toward Danang. After leaving the coast. BLUE 1 then also followed the EF-10 and BLUE 2 4
back to Danang without further incident. *
Due to the slir.pliclty of this event the only drawings are a large scale picture ^
showing the track and the location of the two MIG encounters, and a smaller sketch Illus-
trating the F-4 positions of orbit around the EF-10 during the mission. j
103c
EVENT 1. 14
Aircraft Involved: Two F-ftCs V8 one unidentified
aire raft
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 19''33'N/103'22'E
Laos
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 2? Jan 1966/1925H
Two P-Ucs (BLUE I and 2) on strike.
n. DATA SOURCES
Messages y Reporta :
2AD 2330*22 Jan 66 CCCO-0 12m»1
CIHCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
12. NARRATIVE OESCRtPTlON
BLUE flight reported sUhtlnj an ""Identified jet aircraft at 19«33'M/103«>22^^ at
1925H local tLe. It was grey color, swept or delta wing. ^Sighting was brief, no
distinctive markings noted, and the type of aircraft was not identified.
The sighting wa. made while In a turn following a strike. BLUE P^f;j^);"„;«?Jf"K
turning to i. and the unidentified aircraft was In the same turn, at 9 ?/ I^^^J P°^"^°"
airiJlghJly'hclow SL'JS fUgi't. BLUE flight wa, at 5000 ft. «° "'S- »J«r«[J/«**
operating In the vicinity at the time. No hostile action on part of the unidentified
aircraft was taken and It disappeared from view almost liaaedlateiy .
105
Event 1-1$
Aircraft Involved: Four P-iiBc va unknown number
and type of enemy aircraft'
Result: No danage
Vicinity of encounter: 20*20'H/105'00»B
Route Package V
\. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOfI
Date/Time: 3 Feb 1966/2100H
Pour F-*Bs (BLUE flight) escorting two EF-lOBs (CREEtl flight) on nlghttlne ECM/ELINT
alas Ion (Code Kara* FIRECRACKER) In HW/SE racetrack pattern.
2. MISSION ROUTE
From Danang to initial orbit point about 20«n/l05«E without refueling, then to orbit,
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
Unknown
4. fLIGMT COKOITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUHTER
Weather; Clear » bright moonlleht.
BLUE OREEW
3 I
UninSwn- Unknown-
Islf-State : Unknown — Unknown-
Fllght Kormation ;
BLUB I and 2 on left and BLUE 3 and U on right, trailing GREEM flight 5-10 ml.
OREEX 1 and 2 In close formation to maintain visual contact.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 2 backseat Observed MIG identified with red star °"tall pass abeam and close
aboard He could aJso see the pilot. Approximately 2 mln before this there had b«n «
S?S ai;rt from an unknovm source with no coordinates flven. Subsequent detections were
made as a result of cannon fire observed. (See para 7 and 12 below). After being
alerted by BLUE 2 back, BLUE 2 front called for BLUE I to break.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 turned and gained radar contact, then lost It as the hostile aircraft descended
thi Pada? horlsSn line and ground return. Other action later initiated in response
S*otSSJ SSjSStJonS: (S« pa?! fand 12 below). BLUE 3 and BLUE 4. and GREEN 1 and
GREEN 2 brok^ away from BLUE 1 and BLUE 2.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
PollowlnK initial visual detection and maneuvering. BLUE 1 and 2 regrouped and con-
tinued escor? of CReIn flight, subsequently, SLUE 1 observed aerial cannon fire nearby
iiS Sul s gave brief chisi to the source, abandoning chase due to '"'^ 'J??* "^^^
of SAM sites. BLUE 2 observed out-of-range cannon fire fron his 7:30 position. BLUE 3
«nd 5 in "iponse to the Initial cannon fire, made a 360« turn and gained radar contact
irth^ee bogeys also observing some distant cannon fire. BLUE 3 and '♦P"""^ their
SSgeJs"o ?hr5l. giving up thi cha^e. aa did BLUE 1 and 2, due to low fuel atate and
proximity of S.\;l sites.
8. ORDNANCE
Enemy : cannon
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEM!
None reported
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
None interviewed
^Single AB operation; cannon armament and visual contact Indicate aircraft could be HI0-17D.
4^
Event LIS
DATA SOURCES
Reports :
B
8
e
Ca IMAW OPREP-3 O'iOY'i^Z Feb 66
USAF Tactical Fl^htep Weapons School Combat Analysis Division Bulletin #3, 1966
CIHCPACFL7 Analysis Stuff Study 3-67 > |
12. WAIIVt DESCRIPTION B
A fo-JP-plane F-'*B fllfiht was eccortlp.15 two EF-lOBs on a nlp:ht ECM/ELI»T nlsslon over * V*
North Vlctnan» They were flying In a KV/SZ racetrack pattern In the vicinity of 20^20'N/ >i
i05*CO'K. BLUE 1 and 2 were on the left and BLUE 3 and k were on the rl(?ht, tralllni? the ||| |
r;!--lC9s at 5-10 ml. At approximately 20^5H a MICJ alert was received on ^uard channel from B ; 1
an unknown source with no coordinates sclven. About 2 nln later BLUF. 2 observed a MIG, |§
IJentiried by a red star visible on the tall, pass abeam and close aboard and called,
'yia In formation." Visual contact was then lost, BLUE 1 turned and gained radar contact,
Icslng It as his contact descended rapidly Into the radar horizon line and ground return.
sLUE 1 and 2 regrouped, continuing the escort.
«t some later time the EF-lOBs cor-TiCnced a final left turn to depart the area with the
JiL'JE ;ilcht In radar trail. After 90* of the turn BLUE 1 observed cannon fire from hl3
C-:30 position at an estimated 1500-ft distance. BLUE 1 broke shirply Into the attack and
called, ""IG attack." P.LUS 2 subsequently detected a tarset at '-i-mi dlstanc takln?
evasive action, heading 06C** and intermittently us^n^ single burner. BLUE 2 followed but
after 1 mln abandoned the chase due to proximity of SA.'I sites and to low fuel state.
Approxinately 1 mln later when on retlreisent course, SLUE 2 received cannon fire from
his 7 o'clock position. Firing appeared to be out of range and BLUE 2 accelerated and
eonneneed evasive action.
When BLUE 1 observed cannon fire, BLUE 3 and li were positioned approximately 1/2 mi
behind and 3 ml abeam of BLUE 1. When BLUE 1 broke sharply away, BLUE 3 and U made a
right 3£'0'* turn and upon co.Tipletlon of turn made radar contact with th~ee unidentified
targets at approximately 6-8 ml. Upon completion of the turn, BLUE 3 observed cannon fire
from his 3 o'clock position, out of ranfi;e with rounds falling well short of the F-^Bs.
BLUE 3 and <> then made radar lock-on on one of the three targets and pursued the boiey aa
It turned to about 060", descending. BLUE 3 and U closed to within ^ ml and descended to
about 8000 ft. BLUE t obtained a radar lock on the target and achieved an in»ran^e light,
ncwever BLUE h did not get a clearance to fire. At this point they were approaching a
confirmed SAM Installation. Because of this and low fuel state, they broke off the tail
chase and retired from the area without further incident. The low fuel state was a
problem since psst-strike refuel was not planned and therefore no tanker was available.
lOS
B
8
6
Bii
B
B
B
B
6
B
B
B
B
B
Event 1-16
I
Delete Event I-I6
i
n
109
EVENT i-17
Aircraft Involved: One
Ri;^uLt: No danagc
Vicinity of Encounter:
U-2 V3 one MIG-21
20 ml NE of Diet. Elen Phu»
Approx coordlna*;es :
21<»35*N/103'-0'E
Rout . Packv.^ V
PRIMARr MISSION A'JO TACTICAL SITUATION
D3te/T1,T»;: (i rcu llto/
O-ie U-2 aircraft (BLUE 1) on phf^tor-conna I seance mission.
DATA SC'jaCES
U3AF Tactical Tighter W#2oons Cenfr - Coiabat Analysis Division Bulletin No.
CI.'.'CPACFLT rtaff Study j-67
\2. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
TJjrer r.lnut-.'3 after BLUE 1 at 68,000 ft sighted bo^ey at 60, GOO ft, BLUE 1 photo-
Brai»h»-'J an aircraft passing dlrecvly '/-.-Is** on an af.femated Intercepw. Aircraft proved to
be a y.lG-3l wi'.fj a protatie r;l3slle urrier each wing. Two other visual sightings of very
^:i£^. alt!* -lie and fiign Wach tojlea were made In thlu area on the same date.
111
EVENT t-18
Aircraft Involved;
Two F-UCs vs three MI0-l7s
Pour P-JJCs va three HIG-lTs
Four P-53 V9 MIOs
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Sl'SO'N/lO^'lS'E
Route Package V
1. PRIHARV MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 1 Mar 1966/1703H
Three flights of aircraft were on a HICSCREEN In the area between 21«5* 'N/10U<=lU 'E
and 21*'2C'fi/105°C6 'E. The JMc-its flew i,he same track stacked In three layers. Four F-UCs
(CREEI." flleht) were In tha tcp orbit at about 15,000-rt MSL flyln? a fluid-four. Another
niGJit of four F-i;Cs (BLUE rilght) was at an intermediate level of 13,000-ft MSL flying
two eler-.ents In trail. On the bottom orbit was 8 flight of four F-5a (YELLCW flight)^ at
10,000 ft on thp same track.
The MIGSCREEM was set up to cover the retirement of a 2'J-planv* F-105 strike force
(one of which Is 3?{0'f,ll flight) which was operating In the area against the Lao Kat rail
line. In addition, there were two EB-66s in the area with their own CAP.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE flight left Udorn, refueled at either BED or WHITE ANCHOR and proceeded north
to enter orbit approximately 21*10'N/10<i*S0'E. GREEM flight refueled In the same area
and proceeded to the same orbit.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-ttC BLUE 1. ?. -j. H and SREEM 1. 2. 1.
U • SPAP.HOW (AIM>7) (Soth D&E were being used at this time.
14 - si:;ew:nder (aim-9B)
1 - fOO-gal centerline tank
2 - 370-s;al wing tanks
Camouflage paint
IFF and TACAN off
P>S YELLOW 1. 2. 3. »
2 - SIDEWINDER (AXM<9>
P>105 BROWN 1
Unknown
MIC-17 MIG
Silver color
No external stores reported
Chinese markings
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTTR
Weather : Clear with dense haze and smoke to about 13,000-ft MSL.
was 3-4 ml or less, depending on altitude and direction.
Exact load unknown.)
Air-to-air visibility
BLUE
Altitude ;
Headin g;
Speed :
Fuel State :
FllF.ht Formation;
13,000-ft MSL^
North2
480- to S20-kt TAS
8500 lb
GREEN
YELLOW
1 2 I >i
15,000-ft^MSL^
480- to 500-kt TAS
_ Unknown — -
10, 000- ft MSL
— — Unknown
.... Unknown — —
— - Unknown — — .
BROWN
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
SECOND
ELEMENT
LOWER
There was some discrepancy concerning the '-S orbit Altitude,
leader and OPREPs have been followed.
The flights were continually jinking, cha.';£lne altltuie and direction.
In this ease the flight
EVENT 1-18
\. IMTUL DETECTION
l-V.'t. 2 (Back) heard a MIC red warnlni? but no other fllg^t member heard it. Shortly
..,5^,r.^r J-LUE t (Front) saw a MIG-l? at BLUE j*5 6 o'clock, low In firing position, at
• »r./:i.'-orf , distance less than 1000 ft.
Atrj'. 2-3 fflln later CBEEW 2 (Front) folloiied by GREEK 3 (Front) saw three NIG-17s
:«iilr.^ ur.icr the flight-
i. ACTION INITIATED
^:.\JE 3 and BLUE U broke right and Jettisoned tanks to evade the HIG Inunedlately
'*::;-lr..: hlUZ H'i sighting of MIG on BLUE ii.
3r.-K:; 2 and 3 called GREEN 1 but Lead never saw the NIGs.
?. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT
iTr.L-d lately after initiation of their break, a MIG was seen at BLUE U's 6 o'clock
3 and 1 split. Due to the action taken, foraatlon spacing, and visibility, BLUE
: Ar.i r <;uickly lost contact with BLUE 3 and 4. Both BLUE 3 and 4 successfully disengaged
; / -.nlcadinR and accelerating. On the way out, BLUE 4 was attacked a second time by a
>':;-17 an.1 again disengaged by accelerating.
ZhZ'ill lead did not acknowledge the corjnunications of the other members of GREEN
r::.T.t; consequently, the lead was never transferred to a flight neraber who could direct
:.::.>; ;.ien^ action. As a result, the XIGs were lost in the haze befo^-e GREEK flight could
GREEK flight then continued in their orbit.
e. ORO>iANC£
slUE and GBEEH flights - none
MIGs - cannon (Incl 37niin} firing on BLUE 3 and k
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
SLL'£ t - Periodically fading radio which hampered communications, unreliable inertial
r.»Tl£atIon, which prevented rendezvousing with BLUE 1 and 2.
13. AIRCREW COKNENTS
':-i- _e r _ ler.ce
Total F-**
Hours Hours Missions Remarks
MVS 1
3300 500 Unknown Background in tactical fighters, consider-
able ACT experience. Had fired the SIDE-
WINDER but no SPARROW.
!•:■•:£ 2
500 200 5 • No mlaslle-firlne experience.
p.-cnt 1600 250 Unknown Never fired nlsslle from P-H.
z?z,tn 1
500 Combat experience in Korea. Never had
fired ffllsslle.
^^'^ 500 250 50 Never had fired missile.
rront 3500 300 Tactical fighter experience. Completed
fighter weapons school. Never fired
SPARROW.
frzm 2600 400 6o 8-66 and ADC experience.
tl^VN Unknown — — —
^'.-^tnt s on this Encounter
^ (PPont) - Roll rate of f-H is satisfactory. Would like an external gun. Pelt
r.,:r; "^^^r misaHe was better than "guided" for SEA situation partly because of Its slra-
""^^ longer range, hlgher-g llmltj and more look angle than present nls-
^* '*'Jml . second crew member in aircraft which has complex radar to operate. Also, he
^> -•mI second set of eyes. Likes two engines, and want? higher nhrust-to-weight
---lo. ratigue due to second mission contributed to poor shoiing.
EVENT 1-18
BLUE 2 (Back) - Too many frlendlles in the area. They would be chasing then all the
tini«i If they followed every contact. Back provides another look out. Ground cluttvr is
bad.
BLUE 3 (Front) - Saw y.TSs only because they had Just eonpleted the turn. Gun ifould
pemlt Improved tactics since r.lnlr.um ranf^e la net a problem. Two reliable guns were
wonted. Kli5*:-c capability In short-range missile needed. Second crew member In F-^ needed
to help look outside ar.d Is valuable for SAM protection. Better aircraft would be possible
If not n.ultlpurpose. Better raneuverablllty needed.
GREEN 1 (Front) - Conr;unlcat Ions channels very garbled.
GhEEN 1 (tacit) - Weapons system all right. The stereotyped missions that they had
btien flying let tne e.-.eray know what to expect and so SAKs and then MIGs were sent against
them.
Due to the KIG<"AP, F-4 and P-5 aircraft did not feel It was necessary to drop ordnance
at sight of MIGs.
Feels that CAP aircraft at the strike force function more efficiently since the strike
force need not primarily consider eneny aircraft.
Never had to Jettison ordnance because of MIGs.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interview.- : BLUE 1 (Front), 25 January 1967; BLUE 2 (Back), 17 March 1967i BLUE 3
(Kror.t) , 23 January 1967; GRESN' 1 (Front), 13 March 1967i GREEN 1 (Back), 10 January 1967;
GREEM 3 (Front), 2ti January 1967; GRLEH <( (Back). 25 January 1967; one member of BROWN
flight, February 1967-
Messages. Reports :
6252 TFW Danans DOI TELECOM ll8 ^ Mar 66
2AD 0^*17392 Mar 66 DOCO-0 H5?0
6252TPW Dar.ani^ DOI TELECOM 2 38 8 Mar 66
2AD Message 091107Z Mar 66
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
L etter : GRE£N 2 (Sack)
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
, BLUE, GREEN and YELLOW flights were fracged for a MIOSCREEN orbit Just south of the
Red River and ncrthxesc of Yen 3al. The flights from Danang had performed CAP missions
in the sane area for several previous days, with the same TOT.
On the morning of 1 March, BLUE and GREEN flights had been In the same area on a
mixed screen mission similar In type to the one for the afternoon. During the morning
mission they had experienced flak, and on the preceding day's mission had had SAMs fired
at them. Due to the flight time of the morning mission, at the time of the encounter they
had been flying 5-6 hr.
BLUE flight had not been able tb poststrlk? refuel after the morning mission and had
no recover at Udorn. Consequently, in the afternoon they launched out of Udom for the
mission.
The flights were new to the theater and were experimenting with tactics. BLUE flight
had decided to split the flight into two separate elements to provide radar coverage of
each other's 6 o'clock. This radar coverage was lost In the turns wnlch were made toward
the target at each end of the orbit. Due to the visibility limitations In the haze, the
cluttered communications channel (large number of aircraft In the area using the same
frequency) and the dograded radar coverage because of the terrain, was unable to ascer-
tain position of flight elements of DLUE I'llght. QP.EEN flight was in a modified fluld-
four with the second element displaced aft.
While In the orbit, the flights were continuously Jinking, making up to Oi)5* Incre-
Dients of turn, every 30-30 sec, in an effort to clear their 6 o'clock and confuse the flak.
On the afternoon orbit, unlike the morning mission, no flak was seen, Hany brush fires
burning on the hills contributed to the poor visibility at the lower level in the haze.
Visibility was as low as 1 mi at 8000-9000 ft when looking away from the sun.
YELLOW flight was seen only momentarily. Ac the time of the MIQ encounter BLUE
and CREEM flights did not know YELLOW flight's position.
Because of the very limited visibility and cluttered radar return, BLUE flight was
not monitoring the radar very closely.
A. BLUE Flight
TQf^ - BLUE 1 and 2 were making a turn at the NW end of the oribt and BLUE 3 and ^ had
Just completed a Jinking turn and headed north when BLUE U saw one Kia>17 coming up behind
BLUE 3 from 5 to 6 o'clock low. The silver color o: the MIG>17 blended well with haze and
when first noticed was less than a mile away. BLUE 4 called for BLUE 3 to break right.
The MIC closed rapidly and BLUE 3 observed the 37nn sannon firing.
115
EVENT 1-18
When BLUE 3 end U were attacked, BLUE call alerted BlUE 1 and 2. BLUE 1 was cn
the outside of a turn and did not aee the HIGs attacking BLUE : .and «».
Tj^ - On observing the MIG, BLUE 3 broke hard rlshi, selected afterburner, and
Jettisoned tanks.
BLUE 2 Clack) did see the second element at 9 o'clock. He saw an F-t turning right
with a HIS on his tall, followed by another F-1 behind the MIO. and another silver aircraft
fol lowing the socond F-t. The latter aircraft overshot lh« second F-t. BLUE 2 took the
lead and headed toward the engacement but lost slsnt of BLUE 3 and U as they dove Into the
haze.
T,. - BLUE 1 and 2 could not obtain a good fix on BLUE 3 and ^, and therefore con-
tinued their orbit. BLUK 1 and 2 heard SLUE 4's call when he was under MIO attack for the
second tlM. nLUE 1 and 2 made radio contact with BLUE 3 but did not rejoin either BLUE 3
or 1 until all returned to Danang,
In the break, the HIG-17 on 9LUE 3 overshot underneath and started a high S-roll over
the top, but then dropped low and to the inside of BL'JE: 3- Then the MIG was forced out-
side and foi>ward of BLUE 3 by about 100 ft. As the MIG was forced outside, BLUE 3 pulled
the nose up and executed a rudder reversal back to the left. The result of these maneuvers
put BLUE 3 and tne MIG into a scissors, each approaching head on.
T** - BLUE 3 then broke hard right and down to avoid a mld-alr collision. The MIG
pulled Inside of the turn but did not stay in that position. As the MIG fell away, BLUE 3
unloaded and descended to the mountain tops.
Tua - BLUE 6 followed the Initial rl?ht break during this naneuver; however, BLUE 3
saw a Ml8 cn the tall of BLUE U and called it. Almost itnnediately tiLUE h (back) also saw
the KIG. Tne MIG appeared to overshoot from 5 to 7 o'clock to DLUE 14 broke left, unloading
in afterburner.
T- - - On loslnp; the MIG, BLUE 3 pulled up to 15,000 ft In an Inmelinann to search
for the^AlS* The MIG slid to the outside at 5 o'clock low. BLUE ^ then headed for the
deck coming out over a T.ountaln to obtain separation and the MIG fell well behind.
BLUE 3 then stayed on station for a short tine until BIIICO was reached and then he
recovered at Udorn.
To, - When BLUE »» lost the MIG, he was heading E-N'E toward the Hed River; he then
turned ?8 the south to avoid the heavy flak and SAX areas which were located to the lirjnedl-
ate east of his position. 3LUE 1 then exited to the south and started a climb to cruise
out. At about 15,000 ft another MIG-17 attacked BLUE H.
Tq - BLUE 14 broke hard left and the HIO dove downward. BLUE U accelerated to 1.3
Mach ana*lnitlated a straJght-up climb breaking contact with the MIG.
TlOA UA - At this time BLUE 1 was south of the position of BLUE 3. and due to fuel
state, headed south to home.
According to the persons involved, the HIGs seemed to be under CCI. The MIGs
approached on the deck and were on top of BLUE flight with almost no warning. However, the
MIGs overshot the flight possibly due to lack of visual acquisition.
B. QPEEN Flight
T„„ - GREEN flight heard BLUE flight's Initial MIG call but due to excessive radio
communlSlt'ona by other aircraft In the area, it was not ascertained if MIGs had attacked
or where the encounter occurred. OREESI Lead Indicated that there had been other MIG
calls earlier which had proven to be F-Us.
Tia - Shortly after hearing the call, GREEN 2 (Back) got a radar contact which appeared
on the bottom sweep among the ground clutter at very snort ranr>e (5 nl>. Immediately,
GREEN I (Front) called out. "MIGs at 11 o'clock low." GREEN 2 (pack) looked up and saw three
HI0-17» popping up out of the haze layer, at about 9 o'clock.
The MIGs were on a reciprocal heading crossing from left to rl?ht and were below
the flight about level with the mountain tops in the area (2000-3000 ft above the
ground).
T^R - GREEN 3 and ft were starting to cross to the aouthslde of the orbit track
when the MIGs were called. When GRIEN 3 relied up to the rl^ht to check underneath, he
saw one MIO at 5 o'clock and on rolling up further saw another .410.
The MIGs rapidly disappeared Into the haze before GREEN flight could alert Lead to
the presence of the MIGs. The orbit was then continued without further contact, either
radar or visual.
As BROWN flight was heading NW, wln^man sighted enemy aircraft at 1 o'clock l» mi out
and level, on the way In toward target. The wlngraan called ou!. the MIGs on the way into
the target; and the fllp;ht continued on without Jettisoning or.mance. Im.Tiedlately after
this, one of the MIGCAP was heard to call out "bogeys" on his radar. Due to the direction
of the bogeys, they were identified as the strike flight. Shortly thereafter, the F-U was
heard to call "bogeys" ani engage enemy aircraft. BROW.M fll;-iv continued on to expend
ordnance on the target and return. On return from the target, the enemy aircrart were
spotted again.
116
EVENT 1-16 SUKHARV
OB
IB
*ct*on Aircraft {GREEN 1,2.3,4)
6^2.3.4 480-520.kt
TAS
Altitude ibout
IS.OOO-ft HSL
Heading NU
'28
Continue orbit for
2-3 min
SLUE flight In same
9ener«t orbit.
63A4 start crossing
from right to left.
C2 Back obtains radar
contact In grou.id
clutter at S>n1 range
slight look-down..
Front cal ts out 3 HIGS
at 1 1 o'clock loM and
•Lead Me' ve got NIGs
going under us,"
Back looks up and sees
3 NIGs popping up at
9 o'clock.
Front never sees NIGs
although he hears the
call. Back sees 2
HI6s.
63 rolls up to rlg»t to
check underneath, ^ees
one NIG at 5 o'clcck.
Mear B3&4 Jumped
by HIG
Commun 1 ca tlon
Channels becone
very cluttered.
6314 acknowledge,
but 61 never does,
G3 calls NIG
pass 1 ng underneath
5 to 6 o'clock
Enemy Actions
(«IG 1, 2. 3)
Reaarks
dRllH flight In
nodi fled fluid-
four finger-tip
fornat^on. Echelon
right, echelon
level
Three HIG-17s
passing In rec1p>
rocal heading
from left to right
about 2000-3000 ft
below the flight
NIGs proceeding
SE. Disappear
into haze
NOTE:
8lft2 altitude
13,000-ft NSL at NW
turn point in left
turn speed 480-500
kt TAS
Tq for GREEK flight Is the only corresponding T-mark with other flights.
0? bdck on 2S-ni
scope, 3-bar scan,
slight down look
BREEN flight In
sane general orbit
■bove BLUE
Blt2 hear the call
that B3&4 have been
Junped by NIGs.
BU2 did not hdve
radar coverage of
8344 during the
turns.
t»EWT l.ie SUMMARY (COWTINUEOl
TiM
Action Atrcrift (HUE 1, 2. 3. 4)
Eneny Actions
Status
Action
Other Friendly
Coaaiunlcatlons
Renarks
B2 looks out and sets
at 9 o'clock 6314 with
MIGs.
B1 Ml th S2 in lead
heads toward 63i4.
B2 takes the lead
since he has seen
n 1 US •
The scene observed
by 82 Mas: One F-4
(B3) turning down to
the right toward the
haie w1 th a much
snaller aircraft on
Its tall. Another
F-4 (64) was follow-
ing behind the MIG
and thpn another
sma II silver a1 r-
craft which had
overshot the second
F.4 (84).
B2 loses B3t4 as they
descend Into the haze.
NOTE: Since BUZ arc separated fron B3k4, only T„ and T-.
synchronlted Kith T,^ and Ig^.
are comnon to both.
T, and Tj for BLUE
flight Is not >
Action aircraft B3 and B4 only.
^OA
B3«4 altitude
H3,000-ft MSL.
Heading about
north. Speed 460-
kt TAS.
B4 sees a MIG-17 coning
In on B3 at 5 to 6
o'clock low. range
Inside 1 mi
GREEN flight In
same general orbit
above
84 calls 83 to
break right
MIG-W with 75-
lOO-kt overtake
BLUE flight In
general heading of
330* . 83&4 had Just
completed a 30" , 4-g
Jink to the right tn
clear their 6
o'clock.
^A
63 starting 4-S-g
right break, speed
500-kt TAS. alti-
tude -10.000-ft RSI
B3 sees MIG, breaks
hard right. Into AB.
Jettisons tanks. $-6 9.
B4 breaks to right with
B3. Jettisons tanks,
goes to AB.
MIG cl OS 1 ng and
firing on B3 20*"
angle off. range
Inside SOO ft
Observed 37inm
cannon firing
EVENT I-IB SUMMARY (COWTINUEO)
Titnc
Mtrk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 3. 4)
Other Friendly
Entny Actions
Ststus
Action
ComKunlcatlons
Renarks
t
B3 In hard right
break, altitude
9000 ft
83 sees HIG overshoot
and one second later 83
reversed up and over to
the left, by pulling
nw9C up snu
doing rudder reversal.
MIG passed
'jnderneath ,
t
t
In AB 7000-8000 ft
6-6,5 g's. 500 kt
O70°-080^ bank
S3 pulled into MIG
canopy t.o canopy, then
broke hard right to
avoid mid-air collision
Mith MIG. Descended
•nd armed SIOEyKtOERS
B4 calls out warn-
Ing B3 of possible
n1d-a1r between 83
and NIG
HIG passes out in
front of B3 and
turns back Into B3
200-300 ft In
front
%A
Altitude 6000 ft,
500-kt IAS, 090**-
T10° bank
84 In AB In right
turn
83 still sees MIG on .
his tail so continued
to turn Into HIG.
B4 breaks left and down
B3 sees a HIG on
the tai 1 of B4 and
tells 84 to break
hard right. Called
reverse
B4 Back calls MIG
at 6 o'clock
MIG pulls to
inside then slips
to outside
H2 firing on 84.
MIG overshoots
from S to 7
o'clock
MOTE: Since B3 and B4 split froa this point on, the tine narks for B3 end B4 are not synchronlicd.
Action Aire
raft BLUE 3 only
^A
B3 one g
B3 unloads, continues
dive and passes a noun-
tain. Also loses sight
of HIG
^A
1.2 Hach. 4000 ft
fn AB
Pulls straight up and
over to the right to
heading of MW in a mod-
ified lauatliaan. Tops
out at U.000-1S.000 ft
^A
14.000-15.000 ft
Cones out of AB.
r
j
gVENT 1-18 SUMMARY (rOWTIHUED)
Time
Mark
7A
10A
IIA
Action Aircraft {BLUE 4)
Status
Action
Action Aircraft BLUE 4 only
B4 in loft break
In AB
Heading E-NE
Heading south
1S.0OO ft, 5000 lb
of fuel
Unloads
Heads for deck
Reverses to right turn,
comes out on top of
inountal n
Turns south
Sees H16 at 6 o'clock
low. breaks hard left,
unloads and accelerates
to Hach 1.3
Reverses over the top*
In a cllnb
Turns south and goes
home
Other Fi lendly
Comni«n1 cat Ions
MHiM'taiaaMMi
Enemy Actions
MIG slides outside
to 5 o'clock low
HIG falls behind
Remarks
HIG goes down and
away
'-" 'T^'iTlll
EVENT 1-19
Aircraft Involved: Fo-i . --Ca va one YAK-25
(posnlDle)
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity ef Encounter: lft<»33'M/l07*10'E
Laos
I. PRIMARY KtSSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
■ Oate/Tltne: 10 Mar 1966/1025H
A fllp.ht or four P-iiCa (BLUE flight) on a TIGER HOUND mission against a target at
15*19*20"N/107-06' 19"E.
11. DATA SOURCES
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
2A0 1014052 Kar 66 DOCO-0 14990
2A0 11*11252 Mar 66 DIO 288U8
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE night came off the target and turned to a heading for Plelku. The TACAN was
determined Inaccurate and the flight obtained a radar vector. Immediately after turning
to the vector, heading SSa' (approximately 200°) near the tip of Cam&odla, BLUE 2 3potted
a bogey at approxlnately 10 mi off to the right. The bogey was closing from the west
at 28,000 ft, heading 90°, abean of the flight.
The bogey closed to 1 or 2 ml of the flight before It turned to a heading behind
the flight. The speed of the bogey approximated that of the F-UCa, 510-kt TAS. The
duration of visual observation was approximately 1 to 1-1/2 mln«
BLUE 3 had radar lock-on to the bogey at the Sdme time and location but could not
spot the bogey when BLUE 2 called It out. The bogey broke lock at approximately 2 ml
from the flight and disappeared from the scope on a reciprocal heading from BLUE flight.
The bogey was described as white or bright aluminum in color, no markings were
observed, the wings were swept back very long and thin at 60^, "not a deltn wing."
One pod was located on outer third of each wing. Pods were blunt, resembling engine
naceilei> rather than fuel tanks. The fuselage nose was blunt and rounded and there
was a high tall. 3ogey was closer in appearance to a yAK-25 than HIC15/17/19t
866 or A- 3D, "except nose was less rounded.
127
EVENT I -10
Aircraft Involved: Two P-fiEs vs one
unidentified aircraft
Reault: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: ?0«10'N/1C8<»10'E
Tonkin Gulf
1. PRIHARY MISSION A»D TACTICAL SITUATION
Pate/Tlne: 5 Afp 1966/0915H
Two F-8E5 (BLUE flight) were on a strike against a target located 17'10'N/107*20*E.
11. DATA SOURCES
HessajTo: CTO 77-3 0S0627Z Apr 66
}2. riAPRATlVE DESCRIPTION
At about OllOZ fron 20*»10'ri/l08''ia'E BLUE fll.^^t s'-shted an unldentiried sliver colored
aircraft. BLUE rii,-nt was at 32,CC0 ft, when the bogey passed directly overhead at an
estimated altitude of ^0,000 to CC.OOC ft on ' a headlne of 120'. BLUE flight turned to
follow but lost visual and radar contact. Identification not possible due to distance and
altitude. BLUE flight continued and delivered their ordnance on the target.
ml
EVENT 1-21
K Aircraft Involved: Two ?-^Cs and one U-2
iJV Result: Radar contact only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20°i45'N/10t''05'E
Route Package V
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tiw: 21 Apr 1966/1232 to 12^5H
Two ?-tiC aircraft were cn an escort cover mission for TROJAN HORSE (U-2).
n. DATA SOURCES
Mess are ; 7AP OPREP-H 0-210935Z; DOCO-0 17970 April 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
A fll'ht of two F-'JCs (BLU!-: flight) was on an escort cover mission for TROJAN HORSE
(GREEN 1) iz position 20 = U5'tJ/l0tioO5'E. CREEH 1 aborted the mission <» In after MIG
alert for unknown reasons. BLUE flight was heading 021o at 32,000 ft, airspeed 500 kt
when It ml: alerted to the situation of bogeys 60 mi east. They turned right to 060*
heading, er.saolished a radar contact at 65 ml (direction unknown), started a rapid
descent »ni at SO ml lost target.
1*^
131
8
4em
EVENT 1-22
a*
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
0
a
a
a
a
a
Aircraft Involved: Two P-lCs vs one MIO-21
ResuU: 1 MIG kill, probable
Vicinity of Encounter: 22*00 'N/IOS^SO'E
Route Package VI
K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TlBie: 23 Apr 1966/l6l5H
Two F-lJC airplanes (BLUE flight) eacortln;^ one ED-66 (CREEK flight). The EB-66, with
escort, was orbltlnc In the vicinity of 22°00'NV106«00'E In support of strikes being con-
ducted In the general area. The mission of the P-UCs was to protect the EB-66.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Pour P-liCs departed Danang and proceeded into Thailand for aerial refueling. The
flight then proceeded northerly and Joined two EB-66s. At the Red River, while heading
northeasterly, the two EB-66s split and proceeded to assigned orbit areas with escorts.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-»C BLUE 1. 2
4 - SPARROW (AIH-7E)
4 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B)
1 - 600-gal centerllne tank
2 - 370-gal wing tanks
Ho discrepancies with avionics at beginning of flight.
Airplanes camouflaged with white underside and green/brown top surface.
E3-66 OREEN I
Unknown
HIO-21 MIQ 1
Not determined.
Silver color.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Haze layer began at about 10,000 ft and reduced visibility to 1-1/2 to 2 ml below
that altitude. Sky clear with unrestricted visibility above the haze.
BLUE CREEK
— T 5
Altitude ; On direction of tlPEEH 1 all airplanes were Jinking in altitude while evading
possible SAM launches. Altitude varied between 20,000 and 30,000 ft.
Heading: Completed a 180' left turn, rolled out on a northwesterly heading.
Speed : 0.82-0.88 Mach
^uei State ; Pull internal • Unknown,
plus unknown
in external.
Plight Formation ! F-UCs were on each wing of the EB-66 about 1/2 mi wide and 30*
aft of thj beam.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 1 sighted four MIG-17S in formation, very low, headed north. Almost imnediately
BLUE 1 sighted a single airplane at his 6 o'clock, U-6 ml and closing. This airplane was
later Identified as a MIG-21. Silver color made it stand out as enemy.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight Jettisoned external tanks. BLUE 1 lit afterburners and broke right into
the HIO. BLUE 2 remained with GREEN 1. When the MIG followed BLUE 1, GREEN 1 turned left
and departed the area. BLUE 1 turned hbrd right in pursuit of the HIO.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
After about l80* of turn BLUE 2 sighted two targets at about 6 ml. Back-seat pilot
obtained radar lock. Uncertain whether BLUE 1 or MIO. Closed range in afterburner
accelerating to about 1.7 Mach. Identified target as MIG-21. BLUE 2 maneuvered to gain
separation. Attemoted to fire two SPARROW r.lsslles, no launch. Switched to HEA? and
fired two SIDEWIUDER missiles. No hit. Overran MIG again, so maneuvered for separation.
Fired two SIDEWINDER missiles. .No hit. Disengaged in a right diving turn and departed
the area.
EVENT 1-22
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE ?
MIC 1
(No. rired/Mo. hits)
SPARRCW
AIM- YE
2/0
SIDEWINDER
AIM-9B
<l/0
Remarks
Did not shoot.
SPARROWS did not leave
the alrolane.
SIDEWINDERS were not ob<
served by BLUE 2.
Did not shoot.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2 had radio (UHF) and Intercom difficulties after encounter started. Was unable
to communicate with BLUE 1 and back-c>eat pilot.
BLUE 2 had attempted to launch two SPARROW missiles. Missiles failed to eject due to
a malnLenance error.
)0. AIRCREW CONMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
BLUE 1
Front 3500
Back
BLUE 2
Front
Hours
300
Combat
Missions
Not Interviewed
500
Back ' 500 250 50
Not Interviewed
Remarks
T-33, P-S'J experience. Had
completed fighter weapon
school. Had never fired SPARROW.
Had fired one SIDEWI.*jDER.
Very experienced In fighters.
Combat experience in Korea
and Vietnam.
Had never fired a missile,
was never in an F-4 when a
missile was fired.
4*
GREEN 1
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE I (Front)
P-i| Is a good airplane. Believed MIO-21 pilot was surprised by performance of F-k,
Knowledge of the SPARROW weapon system weak, therefore limited confidence in weapon.
BLUE 2 (Front)
Evaluated f^H as superior to the Mia-21. Pilot visibility from the cockpit of the
MI0~21 very limited, structural restrictions to rearward visibility and to the down-
looking field of view. Thought KIO pilot was also inferior.
BLUE 2 (Back)
Shortly after breakaway from OREEH 1 communication betv<een cockpits in BLUE 2 was
lost. Back-seat pilot was not contributing anything to the engagement and did not know
next action planned by front -seat pilot.
Commcuts from Overall Experience
BLUE 1 (Front)
A gun would be useful for close-in situation. Pilots may midjudge the range to
target and launch missile when not within missile envelope.
BLUE 2 (Front)
Did not like "hot mike" Intercom In P-'J. Used camouflige color pattern to assist
In Judging distance from other P-^. Did not li;<e location of missile/ordnance control
panel in F-ft. Impt-ove the performance of the AAM, and gun will not be needed. Two-place
airplanes and two pilots a good configuration. Training safety restrictions severely
limited alr-eorabat-tactics training prior to deployment to the combat area. Recommended
an optical aid for the back-seat for road recon or air to gr)und. Optical sight In F-H
was poorly located.
IS**
EVENT 1-22
II. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
BLUE UUad) - Front, 23 Jan 67
BLUE 2 - Front, 13 «ar 67
- Back, 10 Jan 67
Messaires . Report s ;
OPREP-3 7AF, 230851Z Apr 66,
DOCO-0 18133
7AF, 2322232 Apr 66
DODO-0 18186
DIA Msg, DIAAP-2 92o8 Apr 66 See 3
25OI42OZ Apr 66
USAF Fighter Weapons School Bulletln-4
U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Four F-'JCs (BLUE fll?fit) departed Danang to escort an £8-66 (CREF.H flight) In support
of strike operations in chc arei north of Hanoi. After flight refueling, the fighters
rendezvoused wUh the £5-66 In the vicinity of 20°OO'N/103°30'E. The flight proceeded
northeasterly to the Red Slver where the E3-66s spilt Into two flights and oroceeded
Independently, each with two F-UC escorts. CREEH 1, with BLUE 1 and 2, established an
E-W race-traclc orUlt near 22<'0C*K/106o0O'E. While orlbtlng, several SAM evasive maneuvers
were executed In response to warnings froin OREEM 1.
Ta As the flight was turnlne through a northerly heading at the eastern end of the
orbit at an altitude of about 23,000 ft, BL'JH 1 sig^'ted four MIG-17s In format icn, very
low, heading north. Alr.cst ir.r.edlately BLUE 1 saw a single airplane at 6 o'clock,
cllnblng, at a range of S-" ai. The bogey was Identified as a MIG and BLUE 1 called the
TALLY HO*
Ti BLUE 1 Jettisoned his external tanks, er.zaged afterburner and broke right Into the
MIG when the >*IG was about 1-1/2 ir.l astern. BLUE 2 stayed with GREEN 1 to be sure there
were no other KIGs In the area. The HIG turned to chase BLUE 1.
T5 BLUE 2 then told GriEM 1 to depart the area. hLUE 2 engaged afterburner, turned
hard- right and Jettisoned his external fuel tanks. The KIO was pursuing BLUE 1 but was
unable to stay Inside the turn and was slipping to the outside.
T^ BLUE 1 saw this and reversed to the left. BLUE 2 saw two targets ahead at about 6 ml
as he was rolling out on a southeasterly heading. Because cf the distance he did net know
which was the MIG and which was BLUE 1. BLUE 2 chose to chase the airplane that had not
turned. This turned out to be the MIG.
T|, BLUE 2 was unable to contact BLUE 1. BLUE 2 accelerated to Kach 1.5-1.7 as he closed
on his target.
Tc His back-seat pilot had a radar lock-on but because of uncertainty of Identification,
BLUE 2 continued to close the target.
Tc BLUE 2 Joined with the target at close range. The target was Identified as a MI 0-21.
Blue 2 executed a hl^h-g barrel roll to gain separation.
T7 From a position between 1/2 mi and 1 (A BLUE 2 tried to launch two SPARROWS. The
missiles did not leave t.le airplane due to a maintenance error. The missile ejector
mechanism was not properly connected. Communication between cockpits was lost.
To BLUE 2 switched to HEAT and launched two SIDEWINDERS. Neither pilot saw the missiles
in the air but the back-seat pilot felt them leave the airplane. BLUE 2 executed another
barrel roll to keep from overrunning the MIG. Again in a position astern of the MIG two
more SIDEWIMDERs were launched. Again neither pilot saw the missiles in the air but the
back-seat pilot felt them launch.
To BLUE 2 was below BIMGO fuel so he disengaged ar.d departed the area. In exiting the
area he accelerated to supersonic speed for about 1',. mi and landed at Udon Instead of
Danang due to low fuel, 600 lb. BLUE 1 landed at Udon about 15 mln later.
135
EVEWT 1-22 SUMMARY
Time
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1,2)
•
CoMiRunlcatlons
Eneiay Actions
(KIG 1)
Remarks
Status
Ac t1 on
Othtr Friendlics
(GREEN 1)
0
SI and B2
4$I0EUIN0E(
4 SPARROW
28,000 ft
Hach 0.82-
0. 88
Full In-
ternal
fuel
Bl Sighted four
MIG- 17s low on
the deck headed
N.
Bl sighted NIG-
2).
Bl Jettisoned
externa) fuel
tanks.
UI neaoing nm.
Bl alerted flight
of presence of HIGs.
Ml connencing
attack on G).
6U2.
BU2 escorting Gt.
Bl Into hard
right turn and
t^nttMttAM Aft
engagsg no.
B2 continued with
Gl.
Bl called "Break."
82 stated he was
staying wi th Gl .
Ml chasing Bl.
2
B2 accel-
erating.
B2 engaged AB .
turned hard
right, jetti-
fuel tanks.
G1 into diving
left turn to
clear the area
oi aiisinpcing to
disengage from HI.
Ml Chasing Bl .
unable to stay
Inside the
turn.
B2 adviscJ Gl to dear
the area.
T
•3
C2 sighted two
airplanes out
in front. Bl
broke left as
Ml slipped to
6 o'clock.
Ml did not
attempt to
follow Bl In
left break.
.
u
B2 accel-
erated to
Mach 1.5-
1.7
B2 chasing HI.
82 unable to
contact Bl
HI heading SE
at high speed
B2 accelerated to V
out of turn.
h
B2 gaining
rapidly on
MI. Obtained
radar lock-on*
No contact with Bl.
Ml departing
area at high
speed.
flK} BSI ^9 99^ aBK
cSt''
0 0^ «0»
Mark
Time
Action Alrcntt {BLUE 1,2)
Status
Acti on
Other Friendlles
(GREEN 1)
B2 joined Ml at
close range. B2
executed high-9
barrel roll for
sepa rat 1 on .
82 In posttlon
to launch nfs<
slles.
Attempted to
Uunch tMO SPARROW
missiles. No
1 aunch
82 launched two
SIDEWINDER nis-
Slles. Old not
see missiles in
flight.
Executed
another , hi gh-g
barrel roll to
keep from ower-
runni ng Ml .
Launched two
more SIDEWINDER
ni ssl les .
Did not see
mUsl les.
B2 disengaged
in diving right
turn fn AS.
Comnuntcations
Lost communi cation
wi th pi lot in rear
cockpi t.
Regained comtnunl-
cation with beck'
seat pilot.
Cneny Actions
(MIG 1)
No evasive
action
Engaged AB
and attempted
to get away.
Remif k J
B2 Identified target as
HIG-21.
Back-seat pilot had
radar iock>on and
called "Shoot" before
ICS failed.
Departed «rea.
B2 landed at emergency
divert field very
low fuel state 600 lb.
& €^ C9
ft
C3
a IS
Q. a
n
r*
n
o
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G
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o
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• (9
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a" a -»
or
• rt
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c
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3
i50 M
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H C
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3 *1
3
O »— "O
(.^ 3
1 3
o
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O.
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<» >-*
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A 3
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a a
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1 V
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3- P
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♦
303-
»» ( n
P
• 3 1
—4
— «
0
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P C — 3
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0 A 0
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3- A
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(p
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"3
p ►»! rr
m
P f
— »
p 1 3"
— •
m
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rr 1 ^A
m
■<
0 0
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3 3
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— «
1—
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0
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EVEMT i.2< SUHMARY
Tine
Mark
Action Aircr
Status
*ft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. <)
Action
Other Friendlles
Comffluni ca 1 1 ons
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1 ,2,3.4}
Remarks
480 to SOO-kt
TAS descending
14.000-18.000
ft
Commenced left turn for
ID pass, accelerated
slightly. S3t4 jetti-
soned wing tanks and
widened turn for
spaci ng
Radar contact called
out. Bl stated his
element would make
ID pass. Bl directed
B3S4 to get spacing
to be in firing
posi tion.
On course about
245". Continued
this heading.
One of the F-4s re-
ported radar contact
45" left about IS ml .
Other aircraft had
almost simultaneous
reading of radar con-
tact rapid overtake.
\
500-kt TAS
IS. 000 ft
All F-4«^working for
radar lock-on; SPARROW
missi les retuned;
83ft4 behind 3000-
4000 ft above lead
element.
Bl(L) called "visual
12 o'clock" then
"Shiny wings 11
o'clock."
Bogeys remain on
steady course.
15.000 ft
B142 jettisoned ex-
ternal tanks, armed
■Issi tes
Bl called positive
10. Bl rear seater
ha.i radar lock^on.
advised front seater
to fire.
MIGs apparently
did not see BLUE
flight until after
tanks were Jetti-
soned. Still
Straight and level
to that time.
Positive 10 as HIG-
1 7s by shape of
vertical stabilizer
3
500* -kt TAS
15.000 ft
Bt fired SPARROW,
locked on from 45"
stern In full system,
overtake 150 kt. As
missile left, break
X appeared on scope.
Bl reported he was
1 1 r 1 ng «
MIGs jettisoned
tanks and broke
left Into BLUE
f 1 tght.
SPARROW fired about
4-ini range. Had
Just passed mln range
and aiming dot was
not In the ASE circle.
Knew he MOuld miss.
Missile went 2000-
3000 ft behind HtGs.
Gave no indication
of guiding.
T4
J
1 5004^ -kt TAS
15.000 ft
BZ fired SPARROW 3-af
range in boreslght node.
BU2 went AB. descended
slightly to accelerate
and then made a hard
climbing left turn.
B3&4 about 2 mi behind
[ B1.
MIGs in hard
left turn,
making gun
attack.
SPARROW motor did not
ignite although ais-
si le left the, air-
tcraft. Estimated four
MIG-17$ in flight. No
lock on was achieved.
A A
EVENT l'2i SUMMARY (ContlnMed)
Time
Hirk
Action Aircraft {BIVL 1. 2, 3, <)
Other KrIendHcs
Conmunlcatfoni
Eneny Actions
MIG 1,2.3.4)
Remarks
bCttUt
Action
500* -kt TAS
15.000 ft In
slight dive
S3 fired SIDEWINDER
• 1 mos t head-on, then
made hard left turn in
attempt to get Into
firing position on the
MIGs. B4 In fighting
Ming position.
HIGs aggressively
maneuvering to get
in firing position
on BLUE flight.
B3 could not get
radar lock-on.
Switched to HEAT,
Knew he had 1 < tt 1 e
chance of getting
a hit. SIOEUINOCR
did not hit.
The engagement developed Into a left Lufb^ry dogfight,
number of turns made. Between Tg 4nd T^.
It HAS not possible to reconstruct the octual
SoflietliRe during this
period B3t4 ev«ded a
HIG approaching
firing positicn by
going AB and making
c 1 1tnbi ng left turn .
B4 reported
four additional
MIGs approached
and departed the
area.
MIG at 6 o'clock
on B3ft4 could net
follow separation
maneuver and broke
off to the left
Hach 0.92
17.000 ft
5 9'«
B1 6 o'clock on a HIG
attempted to fire a
SIDEWINDER. Range
1-1/? mi . Could not
fire due to high g's.
Had to unload to 2 g's
and reduce angle of
attack to avoid losing
Hach and altitude. Bl
slides to the outside.
62 had his head in
the cockpit attemot-
ing to locate rea-
son for no aotor
fire on his missile
(Tj). In process
fell behind SI but
still has Bl in sight.
Bl observed B2 some
distance behind coming
to the side.
B3t4 ?000-3000 ft above
both B2 and the HIGs.
S3&4 accelerated and
maneuvered to engage
the HIGs on 82's tall.
B3 transmits
that 3 MIGs
are approaching
firing position
on 82.
Three HIGs in
trail on B2's
tall.
B2 later reported
closest MIG 1500-
2000 ft back . 200
ft low at 6 o'clock,
B2 could see tops
of wings and knew
the HIGs were not
pulling lead.
-^'•■Tfifiif--'-^-^-----riiBii
EVtKT 1-23 SUHHARY (Continued )
Time
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4)
Other Friendlies
CoiMiunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
(NIG 1.2,3.4)
Results
Hark
Status
Action
83&4 closing gap to
get In firing posi-
tion on the MlGs.
B2 went to AS. felt
jolt, thought he
was hit. B2 con-
tlnue<i turn to west.
B3 reported lead MIG
was f i ring on B2.
B1 directed B2 to
unload and depart to
the west.
B2 reported he was
hit.
62 could still see
tops of wings and,
although KlG was
firing, felt he
could not be hit.
82 accelerated and
started to pull away
from MIGs,
B1 to the outside of
the other F-4s was
concentrating on
getting together with
B2 si nee his "1 * w«
been hit" report.
B3i4 approaching
firing position on
the MIGs.
*
M3 behind M2 saw
B3&4 closing and
broke left, passing
1500 ft in front
Of 83. H3 then
maneuvered to get
6 o'clock on 83M.
NU2 continued to
ually losing groun<
ho'
14,000 ft
2 9'$
83 fired SIDEWINDER
at M2. B3 observed
K3 novlng Into
firing position on
his element.
B3&4 went AS, made
steep cl Inbl ng left
separation maneuver.
63 reported M3
positioned «t
6 o'clock.
HI broke left and
down to disengage.
Not seen again.
H2 smoked, pieces
fell off and
rolled down out
of control (kill).
H3 noved Into
firing position
on 83&4
SIDEWINDER fired «t
about 40O0'ft range
450.kt TAS. 30*
left bank, 2 g's
(hit).
Tt,
11
18.000-20,000
ft
B4 rolled to the
right In a downward
maneuver to follow
H3. Got pipper on
NIG and had radar
tock-on .
81 Joined up with
92 at 12,000 ft.
Could not find any
damage. Directed
82 to clieib and
head for home.
B3 reported M3
rolling off and
that he could
make attack on
H3.
K3 attempted to
follow 8314 In
the separation
maneuver. Could
not follow and
rolled off to the
right and down.
Hade lock on after
acquisition In
boresi ght.
EVENT 1-23 SUMHARY {ContlnmO)
« Time
" H«rk
Actfon A1r<
Status
raft (BLUE 1, ?, 3. 4)
AcH on
Other Frlendlles
ConnunlCAtlont
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1.2.3,4)
Renarki
500-Kt TAS
16.000-
17,000 ft
AB
40* dfve
B3 fired SPARROU
at H3.
B4 front seater
attempted to qo
HEAT (SIDEWINDER)
but could not
reach switch due to
Inability to unlock
shoulder restraint.
Elected to fire
another SPARROW.
M3 went A8 and
started evasive
maneuver 1 ng .
H3 In near
vertical dive.
SPARROW fired while
84 was In sidesi Ip,
passed by left side
of M3. Appeared to
be guiding.
•
r
Hach !♦
13.000 ft
S.OOO ft
B4 reposi tioned and
fired two more
SPARROWS at H3.
One SPARROW hit N3.
B4 pul led out of
dive by 8000 ft and
rejoined B3.
•
After being hit
by SPARROW M3
started to snoke
and continued to
dive.
One SPARROW hit M3.
Other SPARROW not
seen. Apparently no
motor ignition. Ap-
parent long prepara-
tion tine on second
SPARROW fired.
BL
UE flight four F-4s Joined
up shortly ifter Red River. All •ircrift had BIHGO fuel or better.
mam
mm
i,
t
f ;.i
w
I''
t
J;
,1
I
EVENT 1-24
Aircraft Involved: Two P-llCs vs two MIC-21a
Result : No dacaec
Vicinity of Encounter: 22<'26'N/10't«»50'E
Route Package V
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITaATION
Oate/Tlne: 25 Apr 1966/1137H
Two P-*JCs (BLUE ril»;ht) were escorting a U-2 (GREEN flight) on a TROJAN HORSE alsslon:
Attacks were authorized on any boeeys above 35»000 ft, without positive Identification.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE flight departed Udorn to fly a triangular pattern, arriving at the vertices at -
a prescribeJ time. The track was tc be at approximately 20°00'N/103''»»0'E at T- + 30 minutes;
22<»20*N/I05°00'E at Tq+50 minutes; and 22''20*N/103°10'E at Tq+60 minutes. Thefe was no :
air refueling.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P«4C BLUE I. 2
4 - SPARROW (AIM-7D)
4 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B)
2 > 370-gal wing tanks
1 - 600-gal centerllne tank
Camouflage paint
MIG-21 MIG 1
Silver color
Presumably missile arr.ed, no positive Identification of ordnance
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Clear; contrail level started approximately 32,000 ft.
BLUE
GREEN
70.000 ft
V
30,000 ft
In turn. Hdg SW
Mach 0.62
Pull Internal, and some in external tanks
BLUE 1 and 2 In loose formation with BLUE 2 separated about 1/2 ml,
Altitude ;
Heading
Speed :
Fuel State :
Flight Forr;atlon :
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Visual detection of a contrail by BLUE 1 (Back) at 7 o'clock and about 20-Dl range.
The contrail was heading 270". While a silver speck vfas seen ahead of the contrail,
po;,ltive identlficatlcn was not made un.tll B-2 first attacked the MIGs.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE night dropped tanks, accelerated and turned to Intercept the bogey.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
After Instructing the U-2 to withdraw, BLUE 1 made a beam SPARROW attack, then pulled^;
in trail for a SIDEWINDER attack, neither of which was successful. BLUE 2 made three
attacks, the first was head on as the MIG attempted a snapup attack on the U-2. After the
MIC made a I80» turn back towards Hanoi, BLUE 2 made a SPARROW attack and a SIDEWINDER
attack on the' MIG. None of BLUE 2's attacks were successful and BLUE flight retired at
the detection of a second .MIC, becat:se of fuel limitations.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
No. Plred/No. Hits
BLUE 2
MIC 1
SPARROW
AIH-7D
0/0
I/O
3/0
SIDEWINDER
AIM>9B
2/0
2/0
No ordnance expended
Remarks
A SPARROW firing was attempted but
. no missiles left the aircraft; one
gas generator Ignited and burned
Plrcd cut of range
Plpper off tarpet during boreoleht firing.
Two went ballistic, one appeared to guide
through a portion of the flight
Both fired out of range
4W
151
]
1^
a
EVENT 1-24
EQUIPMENT PROSLEMS
Exact source of Bl's misfire unHnown,
AIRCREW COMMENTS
10
Experience
BLUF. 1 (rront)
BLUE ? (Pack)
BLUE 2 (rront)
Total
Hours
7000
700
Hours
60 0
500
Conbat
Missions
e 70
« 70
Renarlcs
Some ADC time, fired only 1 SPARROW
and no SIDEWIHDER, Little ACT.
Extensive ADC experience In P-101.
Corjents on this £nc;ountor
BLUE I (Front)
tactic would be to fly opposite the U-2 track so the threat Is faced.
• Since BL'JE flight was operating in a location where the MIOs were under OCI, two
more escort ali-craft would Increase effectiveness.
• Did not realize how fast things can nove when both tarpjet and attacker are flying at
supersonic speeds.
• Felt that the :!IG aircraft knew t^.at there were F-^^ escorts and were foolish to
attenpt an attack.
BLUE 2 (Sack )
•Irpressed with the heat seeker nlsslle due to Its slnpllclty.
.Dlsapoolnted In the pcrfor:.ance of the SPARROW since Its lack of perforniance under
ideal Intercept was not explained. ^„
• AH crew mernbers felt initial expenditure of ordnance was an acceptable tactic to
protect the U-2 even though missile paranetera were not met.
Comnents fren Over all Exrorlence
PLO' E 2 (Back ) . . . .
battle If a gun was available.
.Would like a fighter that could turn better. However, other performance features
should not be overly compromised to achieve this., such as acceleration.
•Would like the acceleration of the F-105 at sea level.
11. DATA SOURCES
Pr-M^^t Interviews : BLUE 1 (Front) 13 Dec 1966; BLUE 2 (Back) 1« Mar 1967.
Messages. Reports ;
Letter from BLUE l (Back)
BLUE 2 (Front)
USAF Flgiiter Weapons School CAD Bulletin I**, 18 May 1966.
USAF Flchter Weapons School CAD Bulletin 110, 7 Peb 1967.
7AP mse 2506132 Apr 66 DOCO-0 18303^
7AP OPREP-3 250933Z Apr 66 DCCO-0 18322
7AP OPREP-1 251112Z Apr 66 DOCO-0 18327
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
The .isslon was Pl--^ a U-2 esco« with the requlre^^^ at J^f ven^loca-^
"r'^troJbtruii'evii^rnTnd^i ? r roSher'r^corSedlvonU). The'docu.entatlon'
«tiibU;E?ie iSe fr^Sf^ncy of^attacks (5 times) mentioned b, BLUE 1 (front) was not found.
Because of the limits Imposed by the time-distance points, nonavaJlabUlty of refuel-
above 32,000 rt wnicn wou.u uioi^xw J" Pftr^tnnt w-'avo and orbltlnis was necessary
p!4 at a decided disadvantage at the start of any hostilities.
152
EVENT 1-24
BLUE 1
To During a turn to the south, as part of the orbit pattern, BLUE 1 (Bf«il> 'P^"*^ *
JSntrall a? 7 o'clock coning fron Hanoi area. Since f Jf?" ^^^^^
35,000 ft, attacks were authorized on any target above this altitude without the necessity
of positive identification.
The BLUE crews had studied the flight profiles of MIO-21 aircraft niaklng CCI attacks
on a hlr.h-altitudc tarr^t and had a knowledge of the expected SP^^^^^"? "JJ""*' °fj,*^r!_
bogey. After advising the 0-2 to withdraw, BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 dropped tanks and ""h the
bogej now to the rear, BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 entered a diving turn to position and gained air-
speed for an attack. In diving to gain airspeed. BLUE 1 bottomed out at 13,000 ft,
necessitating a lone cUnb back to attack altitude. A beam attack '^^i^'l
SPARROW firing was atten.pted in boreslght mode, plpper on the target and the aircraft in
a 100° bank. It had proved Impossible to maintain radar lock-on during the turning ma-
neuver. None of the SPAKHOW missiles left the aircraft although all were triggered. Tne
gas generator on one missile did Ignite.
T, Due to the altitude and low speed BLUE 1 fell off with the afterburner out. At thla
time he saw the first irlssile fired by BLUE 2 pass the KIO.
T BLUE 1 lit his afterburner »nd rolled out In trail of the MIO and, in desperation,
fired two SIDEWINDERS out of range, BLUE 1 had a good tone and low-g load on the airplane.
The missiles were observed to track; however, the range was too great and the missiles
self dcstructed bahind the MIO.
T Shortlv thereafter BLUE 1 came out of afterburner as fuel approached minimum fof re-
turn- hoiever. h^tt ay Jd In trail of the MIO and Instructed BLUE 2 to make another attack
on the MlCy BLUE 1 finished the engagement with 3200 lb of fuel, and with home base 315
ml awav he started a climb to best cruise conditions. While going out BLUE 1 saw BLUE 2
SoSrsO ml tS tSe «3t making his attack and also saw a contrail making J^i^^nS ^i'ted
on BLUE 2. BLUE I informed BLUE 2 of the attack and BLUE 2 broke off the attack and exited.
^ At the initiation of the action, BLUE 2 accelerated out and turned to position hlm-
iill2f„J^^'SJ^i2in ?D attack In the dive anJ turn BLUE 2 «nt to 25.000 ij^i^^-
"int airspeed was achieved and since he could not get a radar lock-on he Initiated a
snap-up attack from 29,000 ft. In boreslght.
T^iTu At thla time the MIG began a rotation and climb to start a snaP;"P f"\^J^°".
the U-2. The combination of this and insufficient airspeed precluded keeping the plpper
on the target and a SPARROW was launched with the plpper slightly to the rear of
?irget. iSe missile, which was observed by BLUE 1 at this time since BLUE 1 was slightly
behind BLUE 2, missed the MIG, passing about 100 ft behind.
T*: The HIC pilot probably observed the missile since he broke off his attack, leveled out
and continued on a westerly heading. BLUE 2 rolled out In trail of the MIO and got a
rSdar lock-on. However, the overtake was negative and BLUE 2 decided to descend below
contrail level and stay In trail.
Tt The MIC finally turned l80» through south to east and BLUE 2 turned to "P^a f^ont
Quarter Intercept. A descent was made to pick up speed and the afterburner isnlted. After
!ccel«ating BLUE 2 remained below the contrail level until 11 ""^S'^^^f J^;,^*
Nhieh time a snap-up attack was made. The radar was locked on to the MIG and the three
remaining SPARROWS were set to be fired automatically, interlocks in.
T,« All switch positions were rechecked. Including polarization. The first missile was
f ?ed lime3la?ely as the In-range light came on at 5 ml «lt\an overtake of 1000 kn^^
After this missile fired, BLUE 2 resqueezed the trigger fnj the "^^^" '^e missiles
SPARROWS. On each of the firings the steering dot was within the ASE circle. The "issii"
aooeared to go ballistic, and did not track the target. The last missile appeared to make
!SS eorreStlons but it ilso missed. All switch settings In BLUE 2 aircraft were in the
proper positions.
T,, BLUE 2 then rolled out at 3-* «1 In trail with the MIQ and fired two SIDEWINDERS.
TR«se both appeared to track but the firing was made out of range.
Ti7 During this attack the MIQ proceeded at the same speed and altitude. At this time
BLUE 1 called mininum fuel and the attack was terminated. BLUE 2 had about JOQO lb
of fuel at this time. After minimum fuel was called a contrail »»/",^"^«^"P^ """J^q
ras sighted. BLUE 2 decided to remain In the contrail layer "o-^fntarlly to draw the MIO,
?SJn dive?; 10,000 ft in afterburner to obtain separation. At the end 2 had 3200
lb of fuel. BLUE 2 climbed to best cruise altitude for the return. On landlna BLUE 2 had
1200 lb of fuel.
153
• • • •»
EVENT 1-24 SUNNARY
Time
Hark
Action A1rcr«ft (BLUE 1. 2)
Other Friendlles
(GREEN 1)
Communi cati ons
Enemy Actions
{HIG 1 .2)
Remarks
Status
Action
B1 AU - 30.000
ft. Hach 0.82
B2 same status
Radar on 50-n1
scale
In left turn to south
as part of an orbit In
support of 61 . . 81
sights high-speed con-
trail coming from Hanoi
area at 7 o ' c lock ,
range about 20 ml.
In left turn to south
as part of orbit
G1 has Just turned
to the west, alti-
tude about 70,000
ft
Bl calls (il warning
of approaching
bogey . Recei ved no
reply. Bl calls B2
and advised him to
accelerate out and
atttmpt a head-on
attack.
B2 calls that he
Is going In for the
ID
Alt 46.000 ft,
speed Hach 1 .fi,
Heading 270'
making a con-
trail which
continued through
encounter
Clear air ipaca abovt
35,000 ft. Bl and B2
at 30.000 ft to stay
below con layer
h
Bl same status
as at Tg
82 sane status
Lights AB, jettisons
tanks and dives to
accelerate. In bottom
of dive goes to 13.000
ft and starts pull-up.
Lights AB, accelerates
straight out, jetti-
sons 3 tanks and
descends slightly to
25.000 ft In right
turn .
•
Sane
•
2
til Hach 0.9-1.0
Alt - 38,000 ft
50-60* nose-up
100' bank,
range to target
6 ml , target
10 o'clock high
B2 Hach super-
sonfc, Alt -
29.000 ft level
Radar on 2S-r1
scale
Back cannot get lock-
on so goes boreslght,
trying to follow tar-
get wtth pipper.
Attempts to fire 4
SPARROUS. SPARROUS do
not fire. Hex of 2 g
B2 b««.l> t annot get
1o<.k-i>ii.' Mdrts snap-
up naneuver in
boreslght.
B 1 called to Back
to look at 10 o'clock
then go boreslght
Sane
Bl sees silver HIG.
The parameters were
not met for Bl's
Missile firing, how-
ever. It was thought
necessary to scare
off the HIG. The
gas generator Ignites
on one missile of
Bl's aircraft but It
does not eject. Trig-
ger held down 5-7 sec.
^3
B1 AB off, 10*
nose dOMA
B1 falling off
HIG Starts snap-
up attack on G1
Has good view out
the side
I
EVENT 1-24 SUMMARY (Continued)
I
Tine
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1.2)
Other Friendly
(GREEH 1)
CoflHnunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
(MI6 1,2)
Remarks
Status
Acti on
u
82 Alt 39.000 ft
Speed ISO-kt CAS
Range - ? mi
30' nos* up. no
bank
61 10* nose-down
AB Off
Fires a SPARROH In bore-
sight. Due to Insuffi-
cient speed, pfpper Is
slightly to rear of
target
Falling off. lights AB.
continues down to
25,000 ft and starts to
Cl inb
B1 sees Missile
pass 100 ft behind
NIG
B2 Front calls bogej
as M16-21
Upon seeing nf ssl 1e
MIG breaks attack
and returns to Mach
1.6 and 46,000 ft.
heading 270*
No lock-on
Speed Judged from
reactive velocity
and knowledge of
HIG's best speed
for attack
81 Alt 35.000 ft
Mach 1.25, Nose up,
cHnblng 10* locked
on in fuU system
10* angle off from
MIG
Fires 2 SIDEWINDERS out
of ranQe. Good tone,
SIDEWINDERS do track.
Continues to follow HlG
i n AB , headirg 270°
Little talk between
B1 and 82
Alt: 46.000 ft
Hach: 1.6
Heading: 270**
SIDEWINOERS self-
destruct 3 ni be-
hind MIG fired at
S-7 mi range
82 AU 30,000 ft
Hach 0.88
Radar cn 25-n1
scale
B] fuel 3200 lb
Rolls out 15 Ml behind
NIG. Negativt overtake
Comes out of AB and
starts home
Decision to follow
MIG below con layer
to see which way he
will go.
h
82 same
Radar on S0«n1
scale
Turn after KIG to set up
intercept, and dive to
accelerate. Goes to
20,000 ft and heading
220*. Lights A8.
NIG Start* turn to
south.
Judgment Is that
NIG will turn 180*
vi'V iiipviv ■> www •
h
82 Hach 1.4 Ind.
Alt 30.000 ft In AB
Heading 220*
Radar on 25''ia1
scale
MIG at 2S* to left on
intercept course. Range
30 ail. Dot coaing down
the scope.
Coming out of turn
heading 090*
AU: 46.000
Hach: 1.6
B2 Mach 1.4 ind.
Alt 30.000 ft
in AS
Range to MIG 12 n ai.
Starts snap-up SPARROW
attack. Interlocks In.
Alt: 46.000 ft
Mach: 1.6
heading: 90"
EVENT 1-24 SUMMARV (Continued)
Tlini
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2)
M«rk
Status
Action
Other Friendly
(GREEN 1)
Comnun Icatlons
Enemy Actions
(NIG 1.2)
Remarks
^10
B2 Mach 1.3
J^tUOU ft
Bl out of AS at
30,000 ft
Computer fires first
missi le at S ml
• 1000. Remaining
mi ss 1 les f i red at 4.5
and 4 mi . Steering
dot in ASE circle.
Sees SPARROy missiles
miss
Fl rs t missile fal 1 j
to guide. Second
missile falls to
guide. Third mis-
si le tries to guide
but cannot make
the Intercept.
^1
B? Alt 46.000 ft
Mach 1.2 Indicated
In AB
RoT Is out in trai 1 " "
MIG at 3-4 ml and fi res
2 SIDEWINDERS out of
range. 10-15* stern
aspect.
SIOEUINOEflS explode
1 ml behind NIG
^12
Bl best cruise
conditions
B2 Mach 1.2
Alt 45.000 ft
Fuel 4000 lb
Bl exiting
Descends to pick up
speed and separation,
then cIlHbs to best
cruise attitude and
exits
Bl calls B2 that
there is a central 1
on an Intercept
course on 62
MIG continues.
Second MIG contrail
seen on Intercept
to 62.
EVENT 1-25
Aircraft Involved: Four P-ftCs vs two MIG-2ls
Result: Mo damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«50'N/10U«»ttO'E
Route Package V
1. PRIMARy HISSI0.1 AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 25 Apr 1956/rald-afternoon
Four F-UC (BLUE flight) escort for EB-66 (GREEN rilght) ECM mission northwest of Hanoi
In the vlcinlt'/ of Yen Bal. Mission was to protect EB-65 and to attack MIGs only If the
EB-66 was threatened. E3-66 was providing ECM support for P-105 strikes In vicinity of Yen Bal.
2. HISSION ROUTE
Udorn to RED ANCHOR for refueling to 21*45 •N/10*''30'E to enter NE-SW orbit north
of Yen Bal .
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F«1C Bt'JE 1. 2> 3. "
ft - SPARROW (Ai:!-7C)
4 . SlDEUZt.XER (Ai;{-dB)
1 - 600-B:al external tan^. (centerllne)
2 - 370-cal external tanks
Radar on, TACA.'l off
Camouflage paint
EB-66 CP.ESM 1
Not given
MIG-21 MIG 1. 2
Not Itnown
Sliver color
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Thunderstorm bullduoa to about 40,000 ft over mountains to the west. Some
— lower clouds with tops about 15,000 ft. Visibility 10-15 ml. no clouds In the
area and altitudes of the engagement.
B LUE
2 r
T
Altitude :
Headlng T
Speed !
Fuel State:
32,000 ft
30,000 ft 30,000 ft 32,000 ft
045»
Mach 0.82 (S-tumlng to stay with GREEN 1)
16,000-18.000 lb
(full Internal olus some external fuel)
GP.EEN
1
30,000 ft
045«
Nach 0.76
Unknown
Plight Forniatlon ;
V4MI
1
B4
\n ml/
2-3 Ml-
5. * INITIAL DETECTION
No MIO warnings had been received. BLUE 3 (BacO spotted two silver glints
3 o'clock hl2;h, 6-7 ml on reciprocal course. Advlae-l Front and obaerved one of bogeys
enter contrail level at accut 5 o'clock position and start right turn toward
6 o'clock on BLUE flight.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 3 called boc;eys. Jettisoned external fuel ^anks and made hard right descending
135'* bank turn to Identify the bogeys. BLUE 4 Jettisoned tanks and followed to be In
firing position after ID. BLUE 1 and 2 remainea with QREBN I who broke left and down.
159
4»
EVENT I-2S
7. SITUATIUN OEVELOPHENT
CREEIl 1 er.ccrtc<i by BLUE I and 2 descended to about 7109 ft heading 2?0°. 3op;cys
were not seen by any of these aircraft after the left trcak.
BLUE 3 nade nead^on pass wttn first bocoy, passed at/Out ft below and identified
as a HIG-21. MIC3 1 was In 70* banked left turn. BLUE 3 attenp-.ed to reen^ace but
could not relocate MIG 1.
HIG 2 made rlrht turn.
BLUE K fired four SPARRO'* slssUes at !-!IG 2 from aspccrs vary-
InR from head-on to If** tall-on.
l^-20*> cllRO.
!:o hits. KIC 2 in about 20° descent and 5LUE <> In
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1, ?, 3
BLUE U
(No. fired/No. hits)
SPARKOW SIDEWINDER
AIM-7D AIM-9S
0/0 0/0
4/0
Remarks
(1) No motor Ignition. (2) Fired boreslght
6 to 8 ml, >»5« h.jad-on asnect . Did not
appear to r^ulde, oassei J.pi.ind MIC 2.
(3) No motor Unltion; {^) "ired with lock
on ainlna; dot In circle. Had ln-ra.i^e
light H-nl range 45' tall-on aspect. Did
not appear to sulde, passed behind 2.
(Hay not have hai sufficient overtake and
may have broken lock during the run.}
MIG 1, 2
No firing observed
9. eqUIPNENT PR03LEHS
BLUE 1,2,3 - "one reported
BLUE ^ BacX
Report-d that, while trying to find the tanker in the scope the radar went out. It
did not go out completely but "there was something wrong with tne tracking. The dot was
not fur.ctlonlng properly. There was no problem with the scope aS such, but there was a
malfunction of sor.e of Its properties." After completion of refuelinr the radar set was
turned to "standby" for a few .-nlnuces. V/hen turned back, on the Back was able co loci: cn to
some r-1053 ccnlng back from a strike and the radar worked perfectly, getting Icck-ons
with the lock-otis cordng down Che scope properly and with the dot in Its proper position.
It seemed to have corrected Jtself after the short period In "standby". Radar worited
satisfactorily when checked during the return flight to the base.
See BLUE 4 Front and Beck eoirjnents on the SPAHRO'rf missiles in Paragraph 10 (below).
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
F-l| Combat
Hours Missions
Remarks
BLUE 1 - Front
190Q
450
All TAC flsht^.* t8ck;;round and two S
month TDY tc.rs in air defense aa3ii::n
mcnts.
Back
Hot
obtained
BLUE 2 - Front
Hot
obtained
Back
300
BLUE 3 - Front
2200
600-650
40-50
Flp;ht»?r bacl rro'jnd, no for^ial ACT
tralnln*".. Fired one SPARRCW and one
SIDEWItlDEK In tralnlntt.
Back
350
175-200
-50
BLUE « - Front
BOO
650
~30
Fired one SPARROW in tralnlni;
Back
:t50
300
40-50
1
Corrincnts on this Encc -. -tar
BLUE ^ - Front
Had studied Rti3Sl?.n training r:anuals published by POD concernlns; '-IIO tactics.
Rec07.nl zed MIG taotlc:i of tnls cncojnter as those i'.c had rt-ad isout.
Was certain the bor.eys wtre MI'J-21s but hesitated to fire t«ause .^e had previously
been Jumped by f'-105J.
IbO
EVENT
XIOs «pc>.are<l to .e ander .CI control. (^^11 the contacts he had heard of, except one.
had appcare'l 5o be undvr OCI control.)
Pc^tt' ey^ had Indicated .urn.lo.t ^^^i^-.^-^^'^""'^' " '
and therefore should hav- ;;een fired upon during the .D pass.
bL UE U - Frcnt -,aifunet'ons U was found that the squadron
Relative to possllM? causes of 7i"iJ%^*J^"2r;^"5:d to check out the rails on the
did not have ihe particular ^est equlpr.cnt that wa- Tnl\r.en other cons Idera-
airplane. At first. U --^^^^^^^f o? im>aW to the missiles. [Tnet-e was
tions It was thous^nt U.ax It ^l^^^^^^'^J^J^lj!" /^.ji"^"^ four missiles (SPARP.Qv:). The
another one that ^^^'^^^^^^^^.j'^t- f^l o.l o? t air before It Ir.pacted.
first one rirod bores Irnt lowed J^^J-Id ev°rvthlng was Just beautiful, school
He fired throe more on a heart-on 35^ snap-up and ^^-^-l^^^^j^ed. They looked at this
solution, in^^erloclcs 1. Ju3t beautiful and none cf J-J/^J^^Ji,,,^,;; ,«uch. but the
one also and ceesied to -.^^^^^-e?!.^^,.;;- PJ^he test equipment there to check this air-
5?i^e^'1er^ve:;'?^i^,r ^ve^'dld^Jj? S 'results on\il fissile.
- ' I: SpIpRO. (AI:.:-7.) nlssiles used In this .Ission ■-%^^P^°^^^,;^S\iS: l^Ttlll
from CicLnav.a and wer. see of t.e -^^-^ ^^^^J" ^J^r/'tJaes by^etn? f!own to altitude
S^l irrou^^nin ale^r^o^lie^a ^^^^.^^^^ relJ^bllity oJ these missiles was
considered very low.
nnrrr.er.ts ri"2n Overall Exr erleoee
Bl.iJg. 1 - rrcnt
jjeed short-rance missile with hl^n-? capability.
Felt that reltaolUty of SPARROW missiles was questionable due to the fact that they
had been flown frequently over the previous year.
Bac. seat pilot is a valuable assist particularly to the rii.nt eader Pilot
IS much r-.ore effective than an RO ^ ^^J^^^jJ^"!!^^'. j ^'^o^SSeJ Sr m«t effective
for In the front seat. Front and back seater need .me co,etu«:«
team work.
^^"^^Hi^iTlf a definite advanta=;e to having crew of two whether back seater la a pilot
or RO, particularly for nlisht Intercepts or ground attacks.
Would like to be able to pull ^^'s at altitude cc.-nparable to F-lOU or better.
SPAVHOW IS an excellent missile for uie in non-visual ID environment, but Is
difficult to eircloy when vl.iual ID is required.
r,I0-21 can whip P-i* at altitude. -Kced to get MIC.21 at lower altitude where F-U
can utilize Its excess thrust to better advantage. , . . .
u , ri.hr with two rl3slle envelopes (SIDEWINDER and SPARROW) complicates the
Havlna; to fUht <*itn two '^•^^^^1'^^;"*'' ,7^.. in terms of available envelooes.
fighter pilot's problems A good f^^^ter pilot J^l^f.^Jj^^^JJJe? ctpablUties could be
-me addition of guns, a t^.lrd ^^y^^off • ^^^^^"^."r^JJa? ridar and missile capability
SriS'SrSS^prSSn^r* Tl^^^^ tissue systems could beat an
F-* with guns. ^ ^ ^„
Need forward hemisphere ID caoabllity. Transponder trlgijered by radar beam or
other system to Identify friendllea.
BLUE "i - Back nov-^i air defense role as an interceptor,
in many alr-to-a r engagements and l"^5%^JIr!-,San a pilot because of his train-
an RO (radar observer) =^^1J.,'*?/J= : ; good RO can practically turn
ing. The little taste of ECl 1" 0^^"^^^,^ ""^J.r. iS the ECM environment is sadly
an inexperienced fuy every way he ^o. Tra.. . in tne^o. ^^^^
lacking, r never pan Into an S.CM environment in '.nam cxcepv toi- ^
were dropping chaff.
rather than master the radar.
161
EVENT 1-25
^-.^ F-** la an outotand 1 np. aircraft even wltn mul tlinl:Jslon requirements. However, would
\^V1Tv^ air r.urerlority and rround attack poles oe accorrpllshfti Uy airplanes ootlnally
deiiiiVK-d for each .-;inr.ion rdtiier t;ian navlng a sln»';lc nultlalsalon airplane wnlch
coinpronlDes cucH capability.
HtHd a simple air ::uperlorlty weapon system utilizing a visually fired all aspect
weapon wiLti no lock-on or tail ciiase requirement.
Need rort* maneuverability and ssialler turn radius than the F«4.
U. DATA SOURCES
Project. Int?r'vl'?wj :
BMJH 1 - Pront , 21 Dec 1966; Bac/. - 13 Mar igC?
3LUF ? - Front, U 'Jfjc 1966; Hack - 13 Mar 1967
8LUF 3 - Front, 71 Jan 1967; sack - 19 Mar 19C7
BLUF t - Front, 27 Jan 1967; oack - 1? liar 196?
?^es ja.:e.' . Po:-Drt5 :
7AK OrfviiP-J 2513322 April 1966 DOCO-0 iBSS"
USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons School Combat Analysis Division Bulletin #U, 1966.
K. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
To On the afternoon Z'i April 1966 four F-^Ca (BLUE 1, 2, 3, U) were escortlnir. an
E3-6C (GrHE;: I) ai an altltud- of 30,000 In a V.F.-ZA orhlt t.-»n»rally north cf Yen 3al.
GREEN' 1 wao providing EvM support for r-105 striken In the vicinity of Yen Bal. Cn a
headlrr- of O^^j', In the third or fourth orbit, BLUE 3 Back observed two bogeys at
3 o'clock h',zv., 6 to- 7 nl. 3LUE 3 Sack advised t.-iat thero mlcnt ce aocethlns; at
3 o'clock on opposite course. As ne continued to observe, 3LU" 3 3aclc detected
silver glints and tr.en as the bogeys approached the 5 o'clock position, still on
opposite course, one of them entered tht* contrail level and started a right turn
toward 6 o'clocii on 3L'J5 fligr.t,
Ti,,,^^^^^\^ advised SLoE UL) of bozeys approaching 6 o'clock and that his element
trfLUE 3,JJ) wo'Jid r.ai^e an ID pass. 3LL,T. 1 stated that he and BLUE 2 would stav with
GREE'I 1 ana re-.uested ::Fir:s:i 1 to break left and down to clear the area.
Just before OP.!::-.:; 1 broke left, 3LUE 3 Jettisoned external tanks and made hard right
descending turn with an Initial Dank of about 135". BLUE 3 stated he w.-juld riake ID
and directed SLUE to take spacln? to fire If bor^eys turned cut to be MOs. BLUE U also
Jettisoned external tanks and niade hard right descending turn Into the bogeys. BLUE 4 lost
BLUE 3 when 3LUE 3 jr.ade hard turn Into hln.
^2. 13, 3LUE 3 In afterburner arr.ed SP,\RP.OW missiles and had four select lights.
As he accelerated through Mach 1 at about 25,000 ft, he snotted bot-.ey approaching- r.ead-on
and descendlnc; fron hl.^her altitude. ?L'JE 3 could not get raciar lock on, switched to
boreslgnt node, pulled up head on to the bosiey, and ^oc lock on at eight miles. BlUE 3
Front lost visual contact upon checking; his scope for lock on and did' not reraln
visual until about two nlle3, but still did not have positive ID. The bogey "was dl'-flcult
to see a«aln3t the thunderstorms In the background. bLUE 3, In 15° len bank. Identified
and rront called MIG as MIO 1 passed about fifty feet above him In a 70° left bank
turn. a^Uc. 3 observed MIO 2 turning cut to the right. BLUE 3 nade a descending tiard
right turn to clear area so that BL'JS could fire, after which ho attempted to
relocate MIG I. A three to four minute visual and radar search was unsuccessful.
BLUE * after Jettisoning external tanks, made hard right US" banked descending
turn to follow 3LUE 3 wtio was naklng the ID pass. SPARFOw" mlcslles were armed and four
select lights obtained. BLUE a <jld not nave BLUE 3 in slgnt. After about UC-ITO*
of turn BLUE U observed bogey at 12 o'clock high descending at about a 20" anfle.
BLUE U, In afterburner since the initial turn, pulled up to a 15-20° cUrnb head-on toward
the bogey, speed slightly less than Mach 1.0. Initial visual contact was between
10-15 ml.
'^5* Tj, Tg, 9LUE « unable to get radar lock on, went bores Irht and fired the
first S^Ar^ROW at a rar.ge of 8-<i si. The missile motor did not irnlte. At this '■'-le
MIG 2 started a right turn which BLUE ft was able to follow wltn an easy left turn. bLUE i|
fired second nPARROW In ooreslght at abcut U50 head-on aspect to ::iG 2 at 6-7 mi-«an«e -'le
missile did not appear to guide and pissed behind MIG 2. BL'Ji: h continued to 'ol^cw 'n *
his easy left turn and fired a third SFAPF.OV.- In borer.l,'ht. Tlse missile motor d'd'not*
Ignite. BLUE ii Back called "locked or." and the front soator fter obse-vlns: al--" do-
In the ASE circle with an "In range" ll.7ht fired his fourth .ifARROy at '•*-><> tall -on
aspect 3-ii-r.l range. The mloslle did not appear tc i>:ulde and passed behind *'H3 ">
BLUE U Front was not c-rtaln that ho nad sufficient overtake for this aspect. 3ack
later reported that he thought the radar had broken lock during the run.
8 I
e
1
8
8
i
i
8
8
8
8
8
Q
8
3
8
a
£VENT
Aftwr firing the fourth SPAHROW, BLUE 1 was In about a three mile trail behind HIG 2,
However, MIG 2 had an estimated 0.5 "ach speed advantage and separated rapidly. BLUE I*
had biji^n cllmbln*; IS-r'C'* ansle and waa still below Macn 1 and 'MG 2 was estimated to be at
aboui Macis 1.5. ai/JK 'i did not attempt to fire a £^DE*I^;DER because of the separation
speed and did not follow ;iIG 2 which was enterlnp, the SAK defended area northwest of
Hanoi .
BLUE 3 and U t-ndert up within one mile of each other and quickly located and
reJoir;(?d CJRirlJJ 1 and ULUE 1 and 2. The fllr.ht departed the area after determining that
the last r-l()5 strive had left the target.
neither "IC-2] was observed to fire cannon or missiles. No hits were scored on
the y.ir,9 oy the four SPARROW missiles fired. No dainar.e to either side; however, the MIGa
had disrupted the ECM coverage by causing CRCE;i 1 to leave his station to evade.
V f
EVENT I-2S SUHMARy
1
T Imo
Action Aircraft (SLUE 1. 2> 3. 4)
Stitui
61. 30,000 ft
Mach 0. 76
B1 and 2. 30,000 ft
H«ch 0.80
83 and 4. 32,000 ft
Hach 0.S2
ActUfl
Individual members of
BLUE flight S-turnlng
to maintain Nach and
stay with GREEM 1
(EB-66)
Othir FrUnitly
(GRUN \)
B3 Cdck advised his
Front he thought
there was something
at 3 o'clock 6-7
miles
Coinmunicitluni
Two bogeys on re-
jctprocal heading
Hl9h.40,000-4$.000
ft
fnimy Acttgni
B3 In AB
B3 hard right descending
turn into B4. Inl t1 al ly
13S* banii, armed
SPARRO'J missl les
84 jettisoned tanks
followed In AB
33 Back advised
Front one of bogeyi
starting right
interception turn
13 Front advised
11 (L) had two bogeys
ligh turning to
i o'clock on BLUE
Flight
)3 called right turn
to ID. directed B4
to take up spacing
to fire if bogeys
IDed as HIGs
)1 indicated he and
12 Mould stay with
«1 break left and
town
I
Sogeys continue
turn to 6 o'clock
an BLUE flight
84 lost Sight 63
when B3 turned
1 n to him
83. 24.000-25.000
ft -1.1 «ach
B3 got lock on at about
6 nh as he pulled up in
head on with oogey.
Had visual but sti 11 no
ID. Lost visual when he
looked down at radar
scope to check for lock
on
bogeys descending
about 20* In head
30 pass.
J
109 Gfi^^ 12a Baa 60 G9 BSD CEBI BSS UEM dB OSS 69 Btl BB BB . BBl SSSI
EVENT 1-2S SUMMARY (Continued )
Hire
Nark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2. 3, 4}
Other Friendly
(GREEN 1)
Comnunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
(HI6 1 .2)
Remarks
Status
Action
S3. 24.000-25.000
ft. Kach 1.2
fi3 regained visual con-
tact at 2 ml In slight
left turn 10-15*. Still
no [ 0
Bogey In left turn
30.000 ft
1.* Ma'-.h
B3 passed beneath Ml
who was in 70* bank left
turn. 83 broke light and
down to clear area so
B4 could fire. Observed
M2 start right turn
B4 descended to about
26,000 ft after hard
right turn. Pulled up
10-15* climb to head on
with M2 In 20* descent.
Could not get radar lock
on, went boresigtit
f
Ml apparently de-
parted the area to
southeast
N2 ro* descent
head-on toward B4.
B3 .searched toward
G1 In attempt to
relocate Ml. 3-4
min visual and
radar search
unsuccessful
B4 30,000 ft
0.92 Mach
10-1 $• Climb
B4 fired first SPARROW
In boresi gt)t 8-9 mi ,
no fflissi le motor
i gni ti on.
M2 started easy
right turn.
Mach 1.0, still
descending
Had partial lock-
on. Missile fell
off aircraft
B3. 31 ,000 ft
0.9S Mach
< 1 9
b4 fired second SPARROW
6-7 mi range, 45* head
on aspect angle while
In easy left turn to
follow K2
H2 still In easy
right turn
SPARROW did not
appear to guide
passed behind HIG 2
84. 32.000
B4 fired third SPARROW
4 mi . no missile motor
Ignl tton.
64 Back reported
he had radar lock
on
Continuing right
turn
Missile fell off
the aircraft
▼ f
,1
IVEWT 1-25 SUMMARY (Contlnutd )
Time
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3. 4)
Status
B4. 32,000 ft
< Mach 1.0
Actf on
B4 fired fourth SPARROW
about 4-ni1 range. Had
interlocks full system.
45*^ tail-on aspect
angle. Hisslle passed
behind H2, did not
appear to guide.
B4 turned left to avoid
getting into the SAM
defended area, rejoined
B3 who ended up Nithin
one mile of B4 at end
of engagement. B3 and 4
rejoined G1 , 8) and 2
and returned to home
base.
Other Friendly
(GREEN 1)
Communications
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1.2)
M2 headed south-
east over Yen Bal .
approx Mach } . 5
rapidly separating
with his 0.5 Kach
advantage
Renarks
64 f ront tidS not
certain he had
enough closure rate.
B4 back reported
redir broke lock
during the run
4Mr
EVEHT 1-26
Aircraft Involved; Two P-itCa and one RB-66 vs
two or three MIC-21s
Result: One MIG destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»55' N/106* 15 'E
Route Package VI
1. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 26 Apr 1966/1520H
Three of four scheduled F-UCs were available for escort of two RB-66s. The RB-66s
separated over North Vietnam. The lead P-Uc accompanied one, the second and third P-HC
(BLUE flight} accompanied the other. The RB-66 escorted by BLUE flight established a
racetrack east>west orbit at approximately 22*N/106"C.
2. NISSION ROUTE
Three P-^lCa launched from Danang, rendezvoused with two RB-66s and proceeded north to
the Red River. BLUE flight of two F-4Cs then depart id with one RB-66 (GREEN flight) to
proceed to Its orolt northeast of Hanoi while one P-4C remained with the other RB-66 In
Its orbit northwest of Hanoi.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P.»>C BLUE 1. 2
H - SPARROW (AIM-7E)
1| - SIDEWIflDER (AIM-9B)
2 - 370-gal wing tanka
1 - 600-gal centerllne tank
ZPP and TACAN operating, camouflage paint.
RB-66 GREEN 1
Unknown
MIQ-21 MIG 1. 2 (3)
2 - AAH
Sliver color, very bright
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Scattered, very low layer; clear, visibility unlimited elsewhex^.
BLUE GREEH
1 2 1
Altitude ; 31,000 ft 31,000 ft 30,000 ft
Heading ; 270" 270«» 270»
Speed ; —---——approximately 0.8 Maeh- — — — -
Fuel State : Pull Internal, empty external tanks Unknown
Flight Foraatlon ;
5. INITIAL DETECTION
MIO warnings were received on Guard Channel , 10-15 ailn prior to BLUE flight reaching
the orbit point. Plight was level, heading 270*, after completing a 180" right turn.
BLUE 1 (Back) sighted two Kia-2l8 at 2 o'clock, high, descending, closing rapidly
(estimated high supersonic).
6. ACTION INITIATEO
BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned external tanks, lit afterburners, and broke Into a hard left
descending turn. 3REEN 1 was told to depart the area.
169
EVENT 1-26
7. SITUATION DEVELOPHEHT
The HlOa reversed their heading In a hard left turn and cllnbea out to ^Je northwest,
BLUE I and a p"led up t^ehlnd them, lost sight of one . and {jf °% J^.^^fjrile
BLUE 1 fired three SIDEV/INDERS at very close ranf^e. Unknown ^^UE }. hi- ""^^JJ""''
passed the MIC without detonation and the pilot ejected The third flriJhrlJ io2n ULU'-"
the tall Dice of the MIG which fell straight down. While following the (debris down, ULU-
2 Sas attacked at hU 6 o'clock by another HIG-21. E3LUE 1 and 2 spUt. the « G c^-^bed
awa" Sd from 500 ft BLUE 1 fired his last SIDEWINDER at him. The ^^"^
and 2 departed the area. No firings of any kind were seen from any of the MIGs.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
(No. Plred/No. Hit)
SIDEWINDER
AIM.9B
U/1
Remarks
MIO pilot ejected after
first missile, second bal-
listic, third a direct hit,
and fourth passed close but
did not explode.
BLUE 2 O'O
MIO 1, 2 (3) N« "fins
9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEHS
BLUE 1 - None ^ . « ^
BLUE 2 - Mike cord disconnected after first missile fired.
GREEN 1 - Unknown
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
Hours
Combat
Missions
Remarks
BLUE 1
Back
Front
•b300
^30 Had never fired a missile,
only minimal ACT.
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE 1 ^
Believes l-'IGs were being vectored into stern attack and did not detect the ISO
turn Just conpleted by GREEll and BLUE flights. Would like to have had Internal
guns .
Would like to have had a gun. Would like better performance at hl^h altitude.
Didn't thlnK he had proper ACT in training. Thought MIO 2 may have flamed out In
his original hard turn.
BLUE 2 - Mot interviewed.
Conments from Overall Experience
None
Back -
11. DATA SOURCES
Pro,1eet Interviews ;
BLUE l-Back 10 Jan 67; back seat of single .^-1 which escorted
other B-66, 16 Mar 67
Messages, Reports ;
Letter from 2LUE 1-Front
Kp MSO 02l'»«3Z May 1966 01029^6
35?rrf MSG 261050Z Apr 1966 F«7EL 572
riMCPACA" M3Q 0522562 *5ay 196b
7AP OPREP-3 2613««82 Apr 1966 DOCO-0 l8a30
170
EVENT 1-26
12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Two RB-663 and thr-'e F-UCs ( Trom Dananf^) pt'ocetded north to the Red River near Yen
Bay. on. ^n 1 ^.e K.«C ren^.alnoci In the area while the f ll^'-^^.'^FiJ^^f ^^^jj^ ^^^^ \
Ini 2 and CHEEM 1) continued on to an orbit point a.out 60 nl ''^ "f.^^^^JpEH^ had Just
25 percent on radar and rS percent on visual outsidt scanning.
BL'?E 1 on thi' rli.*ht side of GREEN 1, sir.hted two Mia-21s descending on them at 2
o'clor^'hlr:* , at hl-h ^up'^rsonic speed. BLUE 1 (Back) called thetn out to the
Front and lo'bLUE 2.' Tt-.e MJGs were In a gentle rli;ht bank as they crossed over the
flight and then they reversed hard to the left, level with BLUE flight. BLUE 1 called
GRIEN 1 to depart and c Imultaneoualy with BLUE 2 ,1et6lB0ned tanks, went into afterburner,
and r.acJc a hard left diving turn into the MIOs. BLUE 1 pulled out of his vertical reversal
at approximately 12.000 ft. ."ach 1.6 and 5<6 g's. with BLUE 2 /lying a ticHt win.. PosUloa.
He pulled up after the Mias wr.o were In afterburner neadlng UA at about 30,000 ft. .llG ^
was tiicn seen to be £!0'nr very slowly, descendlnr;, tralllne white vapor toward the eaat.
BLUE 1 and 2 lost si. -he of ••'IG 2 and continued to close rapidly on WIG 1, who was making
gentle clcarlnc turns as he cllnbed away. BLUE 1 achieved several boreal«ht lock-ons but
closed Inside ranre for a SPARROW sho-.. At approxlnately 3000-ft ra^ge, nose high, BLUE 1
fired one 3IDEWlN5E.«i with a good tone. BLUE 1 then did a hlgh-g roll to the left to gain
more lenaratJon and did not observe the .nisslle track. BLUE 2 still on BLUE I's wing,
obs'^rved th'^ rnlsslie Mt or alT.cst hit (no exoloslor.) the MIC and the pilot eject; however,
BLUE 2 had radio difficulties and could not Inforn BLUE 1 of his kill. BLUE 1 then pulled
up behind 'Alo 1 aeain, at 500 ft, and fired another SIDEWINDER with no discernible tone
that went ballistic. He again rolleii to the left, t-ulled up and fired another SIDEWINDER
at 3000 ft, good tone, which suldod right up the tall pipe of the MIG which was now
descending through 20,300 ft. The HIG exploded ir.tc many pieces and fell straight down.
BLUE 1 and 2 then descended around the debris to watch It Impact In the ground. At
10 000 rt, ac BLUE 1 coaT.enced his pull-up, he looked back at his wingman and saw another
mC-21 tracking hl.-n, (It Is not known If this was the original MIG 1 or another one)
BLUE 1 called for a defensive sollt and broke down to the left, BLUE 2 breaking up and
right. A3 BLUE 1 caT.e Cjt of r.is roll to the left he sighted the .MIG ahead In afterburner
clln:bing away, makln; gentle clearlnp; turns. He rolled in behind hi.-n and climbed in
afterburner. He continued a very steep climb and ended up directly behind the MIC at 500
ft, 200 knots, very nose hlrh at approxlnately 2?,0C0 ft. He then fired his last
SIDEWINDER which oassed directly over the left wlnr, of the MIC who then broke right.
BLUE 1 broke left, dived for the deck and egressed due to low fuel state CiSOO lb).
•BLUE 1 and 2 became separated on the defensive spilt and BLUE 2 did not chase the
last MIG that BLUE 1 fired on. Mo firings of any kind were observed from the MIGa
although all MIGs carried 2 r.lssiles. The downed M13 was believed to be a KIG-21C. All
MICs had distinct Chinese Connunlst markings.
The time from initial MIG sighting to MIG explosion was 1 mln 29 sec (from tape
carried In the flight).
171
EVENT SUKK<tPY
Action Aircraft (fiLUE 1. 2)
Other Friendly
Communications |
Enemy Actions
Remarks
Time -
Mark
Status
Action
GREEN 1
{MIG 1 .2)
To
Heading 270* 31 .000
ft. Mach 0.6 fuel
internal
81 Back sights Z MI6-Z1'3
at 2 o'clock, high
Heading 270*.
30,000 ft, Hach O.i
Bl Sack calls out
HIGs
2 KlG-21 'S (Kl ,2)
clos 1 ng rapi dly at
hi gh s uperson i c
speed, in very
easy right turn
h
81 and 2 jettison tanks .
go afterburner breakdown
hard to the left
Gl departs the
area when told by
Bl
Bl tells 61 to
depart
Ml and fZ reverse
their turn hard
left, make level
turn at 30,000 ft
Steep dfvt 12.000
fct. Hach 1.6 5-6
g's
81 and 2 pulling out of
vertical reversal.
Gl no longer in
the area
SI calls out posi-
tion of NIGs
Ml climbing away NW
in afterburner.
M2 descending
slightly trailing
white vapor, head-
ing east
It is unknown what
happennl to M2 .Uhi te
vapo'' could be fuel
from a flame during
high g turn , or
contrails, although
contrail level not
at HIG's altitude
this day.
32^ kt B2 on BI'S
wing
BT pulling up right
behind tilG. closina. H2
is lost fron visual
sight.
81 obtains bores ight
lock on but too close
for SPARROU shot.
E12 calls out to
Bl that his tail
Is clear.
B2 loses radio
about here.
Ml 1$ climbing away
making gentle clear-
ing turns all the
while, about 20'
of bank
U
32S kt about 30.000
ft
Bl fires 1 SIDF-HINDER
at 3,000 ft aft, good
tone. Bl then does an
Immediate roll to the
left to gain separation
B2 unable to con-
nunlcate to Bl
HI pilot ejects
82 observes mi ssi 1«
hit or almost hit
Ml (no explosion) ,
and pilot eject.
Bl does not observe
missile track.
I,
■33 !^ Bsa ea bs ezs caa gsi isa sas C3 bzs wbb wen 0 wa ksi
8sa C3 a C3
C3 C3 Ca d C3 Ca C3
C3
EVEWT 1-26 SUHHARY
Tine
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2)
Conmunications
Enemy Actions
(lie 1.2)
fiema rk $
Status
Action
Other Friendly
GREEN 1
400 kt 4 g's,
25.000 ft
Bl pulls up from roll ,
closes Ml a<ia1n
•
Ml levels off,
starts gentle
descent
300 kt
Bl fires another SIDE-
UINOER at 800 ft aft.
no discernible tone.
Hisslle goes ballistic.
Bl starts roll to the
left again.
375 kt. 20.000 ft
Bl pul Is up from rol 1 ,
closes HI again
HI still descending
1 !
32S kt. 20.000 ft
Bl fires third SIDE-
UINOER at 3.000 ft aft.
Hisslle flies up tail-
pipe of HI . Good
tone
81 calls out "Ue
got hin."
Ml explodes Into
many pieces, fells
down
Bl has to dive to
escape the debris
r
^9
10.000 ft nose Iom
Bl following HI down
sees HIG-21 behind B2,
rcll
Bl calls out HI6,
calls for defensive
split
MIG-21 tracking 82
It is unknown If
this is H2 or new
NIG
^0
81 pul Is out behind HtG
who is very high , pul Is
up in steep climb. Has
boreslght lock-on
MIG is in after-
burner climbing
away, making gentle
clearing turns
about 20* of bank
MIG does not press
attack, simply flys
away. Sun about
20* of HIG to right
of sun
25,000 ft 200 kt
nose high
Bl fires, last SIDEWINDER
at MIG at less than
1.000 ft aft. Hissile
passes over left wing
of HI6
HIG still naking
gentle clearing
turn
Good tone
CVEHT 1-26 SUMMARY
?5 T ft, foil
B1 breaks left and dives
for the deck heading SW
Departs the area.
HIG breaks right
B1 had trapped
wing f oel . thought
he was about to
flame out since he
had very little
fuel in the fuse-
lage. Tuel gauge
Indicated 4000 lb
less fu2l than
actual
EVEHT 1-27
Aircraft Involved;
Pour P-ftCa vs one MIC-21
and four or more HIG>178
Result: One P-OC damaged, ground fir*
Vicinity of Encoui.ter: Pa'^JS'N/loe^OO 'E
Route Package VZ
1. PRIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlr.e: 26 Apr 106C/1^25H
Four P-tc airplanes (bL'.'E flight) vfcre performing: a KIGCAP for three flights of
strike airplanes. ELl'F- riif;ht had briefed to fly a fluid-four formation and to have one
section nake the ID pass wnlle the other maneuvered Into position to launch missiles.
2. HtSSION ROUTE
Departed Worn on a northerly headlnt^ to the Red River at a point about 30 ml south-
east of Lao Cal, Then headed easterly and southeasterly Into the CAP area. Proceeded in
at an altitude of about 20, COO ft. Descended into the orbit area and maintained an alti-
tude of 10,000 to 15 ,000 ft. Airborne refucUn? was conducted en route prior to reaching
the NVK border- The centerllne tanks were Jettisoned at the Red Rivci'.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-tiC BLUE 1. 2. 3.
U - SPAHHOW (AIM-7D)
l| - SIDEVINDSR CAIM-9E)
2 - 370-gal external wing tanks
1 - 600-cal external centerllne tank
IFF, TACAN and UHF normal and operating. Camouflage paint, green and brown.
HrG>21 MIG 1
Object sighted under the wing. Not identified aa AAM or external tank. Silver.
NIC-17 Min 2. 3. U, 5
2 - 23njn guns
1 - STir-Ti gun
At least one olive drab color, others were silver.
4. PLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Generally good visibility with ha'ze below 3,000 to 10,000 ft which reduced visi-
bility to 5 n»l- Scattered, small cumulus clouds.
BLUE
1 2 3 il
Altitude :
Heading:
Fuel State:
Plight Porwatlon ;
Fluid-four
12,000 ft
lOO"
Approximately 500-kt TAS
Full Internal plus some fuel in
external wing tanks.
Centerllne external tank had
been Jettisoned at Red Klver.
1^1000
1000
l/i • 1 Ml
Section
2000-3000 ft
above Lead
5. INITIAL DETECTION
MIG warning had been received. BLUE 3 first detected HIO 1 as a radar contact at 12
o'clock;, 35 mi, high (estlrated above 30,000 ft), closing rapidly. MIGs 2, 3, k and 5 were
later detected visually while making an attack on BLUE 1 and BLUE 2.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 passed tactical lead to Blue 3. Blue 1 and H Jettisoned wing tanks as the
flight lit afterburners and oonimenced an intercept. BLUE 3 took the lead and started a
climbing right turn. BLUii 1 obtained a radar lock-cn and called he was taking back the
177
1. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 3 and U lost ziz
night. The Intercept of
Hanoi. I:I,UF. flight return
race-trjcic pattern and not
fire. rLl'E 1 and 2 ties-:an
flrlnt:. BL'JE 2 broke h^rd
burner and acccleratiri?;.
and u lEet;r..'i,*,t;d as tUK '-'.iCi
launched two 3ID£V;i:;l;ER -i
HIG h, E'!.yF, 1 saw two Tiore
continued in a split-r;-typ
track orbit until reactilng
EVENT 1-27
ht of ni,fE 1 and ? nr. FiLUK 1 rc::<i::rc thu tactical lead of the
'^IG 1 was discontinued ns ttc fMO cm proached t!te CAM ring around
ed to the orbit area Kith each elersyrit at opposite ends of the
within visual ran^e of each othvr. HL'JE 2 was hit by ground
.linking. Doth sighted tvio T'flG-lTs closing from the rear and
left In a divine turn and dlsenra;:rd from MIC 2 u.'?lnr, after-
BLUE 1 or,;;35ed a fterburrer and toof. MtG 3 Into a high .vo-yo
ran out of ilrspeed. f;LUE 1 observed '1IC U chaslni; FiLUE 2 and
GSlies out of ranr.e. V.iille maneuvfrlns to prevent overrunnlnr.
Mlti-17s maklnG; a run on bin fron> tlto left rear quarter. BLUE 1
e .^nancuver and dlsenif:ir,ed. 3LUE 3 nnd 1 remained In the race-
BINOO fufl and then returned to tase.
6. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2, 3, *
KZGS
(Ho. fl red/do. hits)
^ftRROW SIDEWINDEH
[K-y.L)_ „AIM-93
0/0 2/0
0/0 0/0
Rewarka
Missiles launched out of range.
Plred cuns. No hits.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2 was unable to Jettison external wlnp tanks after being hit by flak. BLUE 3
had two SPARROW missiles detune en route to the orbit area. Remaining two missiles de-
tuned during Intercept of :4IG 1. Was unable to Jettison external wing tanks.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
v-n
Hours
Cor.l,at
Ml::-xlons
BLUE 1
Front
Back
BLUE 2
Front •
Back
BLUE 3
Front
Back
BLUB t»
Front
Not In the data available.
500 23
2700 8C0 6
Not. interviewed.
2000 500 30
500 300 30
Not Interviewed,
Remarks
Participated in one SPARAOW and one
SIDEVINDER launch during training.
Has been Instructor pilot.
Participated in one SPARROW launch
during training. Launched one
SPARROW and one SIDEWINDEK in train-
ing as aircraft eoimander. Very
little ACT in training.
Back Not with data obtained by letter.
Comments on This Encounter
BLUE 1 (Front) As a result of BLUE 1 resuning the lead after BLUE 3 had started the
Intercept, the two elements became separated. Just before breaking off the intercept,
BLUE 1 nay have been within range to launch an AIM-7E, but he had only AIK-7D missiles.
Later, BLUE 1 knowingly launched two SICr.UI.'iDER missilea out of range.
BLUE 1 (Back) The two-man crew in tanden was good. Th»- back seat pilot provided
lookout to the rear. He considered silni!r.uni range of the SPAFROW to be excessive. The P-
had acceleration and thrust advantage over MIQ-i7. He had r.evtr observed aircraft make a
gun type attack against him.
BLUE 2 (Front) Confusion developed on egress from numerous search and rescue facili'
ties transmit ting slnuitancously on guard frequency and rescue frequency while attempting
to expedite rendezvous with a tanker. "
BLUE 3 (Front) Radio voice channels very cluttered. During the first intercept, he
would have been In ranp,.,- In another 30 sec but broke off b'.-C£use they weru approachinr a
SAM defense ring. The requirement to make an ID pass altere<; the Intercept to a rear
quarter attack.
BLUE 3 (Back) The target was sighted visually because of contrails.
178
Comncntr- or. this TncQunter (Continued) EVENT 1-27
BLUE tt (Back) It appeared that MIC 1 was tryinc to lure BLUE flight Into the SAM
area.
C>"ir;n<^nts from Pvcrrtll Exserler.ce
BLUE 1 (F-acX) Stated h-j did not trust, the SPARROW nlsr.lle. Would prefer to be able
to <:isoti.;a^e and rcattack rather than fi.'.ht a close-in turning encounter. Improved visi-
bility to the reap was needed. Ccisclnatlon of no close-in weapon and restraint of a
positive ID Imposed undesirable tactics.
PLUe: 3 (Front) Restraint of the visual ID was the bl(?:gest problem. Feels a good
airplane shoulu have a crew of two In tandos, twin engine, backup fllRht control systen,
enerv.ericy electrical power to touch down, alrtorne interrogation of IFF/SIF and Ir.proved
radio and ICS. A.-.alnst an airplane such as the MIO-17/19 not sure a ?;un would be useful
because of the difficulty of attaining a *:un-flrlr.e position — if the MIC maneuvered to
evade. Would have liked a longer range nlsslle. Very inportant to maintain flisht
Integri ty .
BLUE 3 (Eack) Could not rely entirely on radar to detect targets, visual search was
very inportant. Important for flight crews to fly as a team. Inertlal navigation system
very Inportant.
11. 'data sources
Project Interviews : *
BLUE 1 (Lead) (Front) lU Dec 1966
BLUE I (Back) 15 Mar 1967
BLUE 2 (Front) 9 Mar 1967
BLUE 3 (Front) 25 Jan 1967
BLUE 3 (Back) 6 Mar 1967
BLUE « (Back) Letter of 28 Mar 1967
Message Peports :
TAP OPREP-3 26l32t8Z Apr 66, DOCO-0 l81(29
35 TAC PTF V?0 OPREP-3 2610302 April 66, DOI FASTEL 571,
USAF Fighter Weapons School Bulletin-^
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Tq As BL'JE flight approached the area where they were to establish a MIGCAP, a MIG
alert' was received. The flight was on an easterly heading. 6ntE 3 detected several radar
targets and obtained a lock-cn. The radar indicated a very high Vg (approx 1800 kt ) which
showed the target to be approaching almost head-on. When BLUE 3 reporttJ the contact
BLUE 1(L) passed the tactical lead to BLUE 3. BLUE 3 attenipted to Jettison his wing •
tanks. BLUE 1 and BLUE ii Jettisoned wing tar.lts. SLUE c retained his tanks. BLUE flight
engaged afterburner and commenced an intercept for an ID pass.
Ti BLUE 1 acquired the target and resuced the lead. The two elements of BLUE flight
lost visual contact with each other. .The target was sighted visually and identified as
a MIG-21. BLUE flight saw the smoke puffs as the SIO lit afterburner.
T? BLUE flight commenced a snap-up attack. The SPARROW missiles on BLUE 3 detuned. As
BLUE fllBht decelerated, the Vj. changed to a negative value indicating the range to the
target was increasing.
Ti The intercept was discontinued because the Intercept had developed Into a tall chase
and the MIG was- leading the flight Inuo the ring to the south.
BLUE night returned to the orbit area with BLUE 1 and 2 In the southern portion
while BLUE 3 and * proceeded to the northern end of the area.
Ta As BLUE 1 and 2 rolled out on a ESE heading to recheck their position, BL'JE 2 was hit
by flak which was later evaluated to be 57nn. BLUE 1 and 2 commenced an immediate Jink to
the left.
Tc As they rolled left into a diving turn SLUE 1 observed a burst of tracers pass close
aboard and saw a MIC at 3 o'clock as well as one at 7:30 o'clock. BLUE 2 rolled out on a
heading of 100° and accelerated in afterburner going to the deck. BLUE 1 observed rilO 3
starting to slide to the outside so reversed his tur.-i, engaged afterburner, and pulled up
Into a steep hlph yo-yo.
Tfi MIC 3 follow .id BLUE l and opened fire near the top of the yo-yo as he ran out of
airspeed and fell off Into a dive.
T, BLUE 1 checked the area for more MIGs and saw BLUE ? low at 10 o'clock with a KIG in
t^all. BLUE 1 rolled Into a dive, selected :;EAT and launched two SIDKWINuER missiles out
of range hoping to scare off MIG H. BLUE 1 did not launch SPARROWS at the p° because he
felt BLUE 2 Slight also be In range. He knew the KIO was out of range for the SIDfcWIhDEH.
BLUE 1 accelerated rapidly In afterburner dlvlr.i.; tcwird MIG U.
To BLUE 1 cor„T;cnced a hlch-s; barrel roll to preven: overrunning MIG H. As he started
an inte the maneuver the iack looked out at V o'cloci and saw one or more MIGa in a run
on them. Back told the Front to keep the turn In. They continued around in a rolling
179
4j»
NARRATIVE OCSCRIPTIOH (ConHn«ed) fVENT 1-27
splli-S maneuver. When they came .out of the maneuver, no MIGs were In sleht and BLUE 2
was cone also.
Tq BLUE \ heaJed for the coast and ccirrenced a gentle oUmb to conserve fuel. When he
* contrail hl^h at 6 o'clock, 10 nl. and assumed this west a
, .V;'^'"'-''^ '•'•eve to the deck and continued outbound. The wing pylons and remain-
ing SiDE....;;.)h°r> were Jfuilscned to reduce dra?. BLUE 1 landed at Danang with 250 lb of
luci rc:-.alnlr;.:. An attempt was rr.ade to t-endezvous him with a Navy tanker, but he could
not use the dropue type rei'ueler.
BLUE ? secured the daT.aeed right enrlne when over the water. He was unable to Jetti-
son the Kir.?: tantcs. After rcnde :voj:: In? with an alr'jorae tanker, he refueled with only
50 lb of ruol Indlcateil regaining In his tanks.
All pilots stated th«re was confusion In radio transmissions and In Instructions
given to effect rendezvous with the tankers. ruv^iwis
%
180
§
9
«
0
§
9
9
8
S
9
9
9
9
9
r9
EVENT l'?7 SUMMARY
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3. 4)
Other Friendly
Commun 1 ca t i ons
Enemy Ac t i ons
(MIG 1 ,2,3.4 ,5)
1
Remarks i
i
Time -
Mark
Status
Action
BLUE flight
19 Ann f ^
A50-500-Vt CAS
4 - SPARROMS AIM-70
AiH-9B
2 . Wing tanks
B3 has radar contact on
Ml . Bl (L) gi ves lead to
B3. B3 attempts to
Jettison tanks. Bl and
B4 Jettisons tanks. B3
and B4 into AB and com-
mence Intercept for 10.
B\(L) passes tacti-
cal lead to B3.
Ml high heading
westerly, com-
mencing a turn to
the S.
SLOE f 1 Ight en route
to orbit area NW of
iCep to provide a
rtlGCAP. Fluid-four
f ormati on .
Bl acquires radar con-
tact, Bl and 62 into AB.
Bl calls he Is
taking back the
lead.
HI Into AB.
B3 and B^ do not
have Bl and 82 in
sight. HI sighted
visually and identi-
fied as MIG-21.
18.000 ft
Mach 1.2
Bl and B2 commence snap-
up.
B3 and B4 do not
have Bl and B2 in
sight.
HI continuing S.
^3
•
Bl and B2 decelerated in
climb. Ml starts to
pull away.
BLUE flight discon-
tinued intercept
because Ml was pro-
ceeding into area
heavily defended by
SAKs. MIG heading
S at very high
speed.
BLUE flight returned
portion of the area.
to the orbit area with B
They orbited in the are
1 and BZ In the southern portion while B3 and B4 proceeded
a for one or more counter-clockwise turns.
to the northern
1 8000 ft
Hdg 100*
350 kt CAS
Bl and B2 in southern
end of orbit area. BZ
hit by flak. 81 and BZ
jink left.
B3 and B4 in
northern end of
orbit area. No
longer In the
action.
Unable to contact
B3 and B4. Exces-
sive chatter on
radio.
Bl and B2 in left turn.
Bl saw H2 at 3 o'clock.
B2 into AB exiting. Bl
saw tracer pass dose
aboard. Bl 1U AB and
reversed turn to the
right.
H2 sighted.
H3 fireJ at Bl.
'5
EVENT t'27 SUMMARY (Continued)
t
Tine
M«rk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4)
Stttus
30* Dive
Mach .8
Action
B2 exiting area, Iom,
high speed. K4 chasing
B2. B1 took H3 into
high yo-yo. H3 stalled
out.
Bl fired two SIDEWINDERS
to scare off M4. 81
pursul ng M4 . F1 r1 ng
geometry 10-10 off
the stern. Range
2-3 «i. Fired for
scare only.
Bl into high-g barrel
roll to reduce overtake.
Saw one or two MIGs on
tail. Conti nued
clinbino left turn into
niodifled spllt-S. bis-
engaged at low altitude,
very high speed.
Bl heading out of area.
Other Friendly
BZ accelerated away
from K4 and exi ted
over water.
Communications
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1.2.3.4.5}
H3 shooting at 81
just before he
stalled.
H4 is 1000 ft
in trail of B2.
Breaks off it-
tack on mis-
sile firing.
Remarks
Bl launched SIDE-
WINDER rather than
SPARROW because of
possibility of
SPARROU guiding on
82 instead of M4.
M4 was beyond SIDE-
WINDER range.
5 V '
EVENT I-2B
Aircraft Involved: Four P-liCs vs four HIG.l7s
Result: Two MIGs destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«»«iO'H/106*07*E
Route Package VI
1. PRIHAftY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 29 Apr 1966/mldafternoon
A flight of four F-iiCs (DLUE fleet) encountered a flight of four MIG-lTs while flying
MIGCAF for a I2-plane F-135 strike against the Bac Clang bridge, some 25 nl NE of Hanoi.
Orbit areas for the F-it flight was north of the strike area. It is believed that another
ril|ht of F-^Cs v*as sir.ultaneously orbiting as MICCAP east of the target area, that two
E3-66s were airborne north of the target to give SAM warnings, and that BIG E'?E was over
the Tonkin Gulf. Other P>tCs were some 20 mln behind this mission, also covering P-I05s
on what was believed to have been a different target.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE flight departed from Udorn. They refueled on Red track, leaving the tanker
about latitude ig'SO'K, then proceeding HHE, at about 21,000 ft and 250-kt IAS to a turn-
ing point approximately on the Red River, out of the SAM area. They turned east and com-
menced descent to about 10,000 ft, dropping empty ccnterllne tanks at about the turning
point, later turning SE toward the target area. Enroute, the F-'*3 flew generally above
and behind the P-lOSs, nalntalnlng radar and visual contact with them, breaking off and
going into their orbit area well befcre reaching the target.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
F-iiC BLUE 1, 2f 3. '*
ti - SPARROW (AIM-TD), fuselage
- SlDEWIf.'DER (Ai::-9B), Inboard wing stations
2 - 370-£al wing tanks, outboard stations
1 - 600-sal centerllne tank (Jettisoned enroute to nisalon area)
Avionics - :;ornally TACA:i utilized early in the flight and then turned to standby;
radar always on; IFF was optional at this time and was frequently left off over
NVtl.
Camouflaged
MIG^7 MIC 1.?.3.^
Silver color
Wing tanks
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Scattered cur.ulus, about 2/10 coverage, visibility good except soir.ewhat reduced
in haze below about 10,000 ft.
• BLUE
I 5 3 T-
Altltude : 8000 ft 8000 ft 12,000 ft 12,000 ft
Heading :' generally SE
Speed : t(O0-kt IAS
Flight Fornatlon : Elements operating separately, generally on opposite sides of orbit;
one element high, one low; weaving and varying altitude.
$. INITIAL DETECTION
Various MIG warnings were heard while enroute to orbit area, Including report from
EB-66: "MIGs airborne at Phuc Y«n." Initially BLUE 2 aircraft commander detected and
called a MIC at 9 o'clock low. Imstedlately tHereafler , various memoers of the flicht
observed a total of four aircraft below, quickly identified as MIGa primarily by their
sliver color. Flight r.enbers recalled no warning whic! alerted them to this specific group
of MIGs. Initial detection distance probaoly less than 2 nl.
6. ACTION INITIATED
All Jettisoned tanks; BLUE 1 turned left to engage, observed three other MIGs below
In staggered trail and told flight to go after the ^roup of three; BLUE 3 pulled nose up
then rolle-u to rlirnt, going Into AO to Cialntaln spead; wingnen maintained position on
their element leaders.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 3 made a slncjc quick paaa at the MIGs from above, fired one SIDEWIMrPP, which
downed a MIG, and pulled off. RL'JE 1, durl.i^ his '.ultlal turn, observed rLUE 5 and ^
rolliniT into the J-'IGs and iiad to break off In the o- poslte direction. He observed a MIG
getting into an attack postltlon on BLUE 3 and quick y fired a SIDEWINDER to attract the
EVENT 1-28
MIGa attention This MIG then went Into extreme evasive maneuvers with BLUE 1 Pursuing,
Jiuh'cu;n5S;d In the mC's colliding with the ground. The JT^^ ^^J" J"?
due to low fuel state, DLUE 3 making a quick pass and rapidly firing two SIDEWINDERS (out
of .parameter) at two more MlGs which passed nearby during his egress.
The MIOs initially encountered were flying straight and level, not very fast, at low
altitude when encountered. They apparently were not aware of the F-Us or else had no
!n5enSon of engaging them. Thiy Jettisoned tanks and commenced naneuvers only after the
F-lt8 made hostile maneuvers.
8. ORONAKCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2 and k
BLUE 3
(No. flred/No. hits)
SPARROW SlDEWirroSR
ATH-7D AIM-9B
0/0
0/0
0/0
1/0
0/0
3/1
Remarks
Fired hurriedly without tone to attract
attention of MIO on BLUE 3's tall.
Missile attempted to track but could
not follow.
First missile fired with tone In param-
eters, went up tall of MIG, exploded,
pilot ejected with aircraft on fire and
corkscrewlnf;. Other two missiles fired
hurriedly with tone but high g and long
range — no hit observed.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEHS
None reported.
10. AUCREU COHHENTS
Experience
BLUE 1
Front
Back
BLUE 2
Front
Back
Total
Hours
2600
Hours
Combat
Missions
1)5 total. 10
"counters*
— Not interviewed
1500
500
700* 700
basic all
pilot back
training seat
500+
Unknown
Unknotm
Unknown
Remarks
Had little or no alr-alr maneuvering
training; tnls was only alr-alr en-
counter experienced. Noted that all
members of flight had about sane com-
bat experience level at this time.
Had no ACM training; this was first ACM
practice and first and only alr-alr
combat encounter.
Had gone from pilot training to
CCTS, to a squadron — all time after
pilot training was In P-"*. Had ex-
perienced one SIDEWINDER and one
SPARROW practice firing — both against
nonmaneuverlng target.
Had flown heavy bombers, then Into
P-8it$ and F-Hs. Had fired 2 SIDE-
WINDERS in training.
Was 1st lit at time of this encounter.
Was Captain at time of this encounter.
Has Ist Lt at time of this encounter.
Back
BLUE 1
Front
Back
Comments on this E ncounter
BLUE 1 Front
At one point in the encounter he could have fired a SPARROW and probably gotten a
MIG if his state of training had been higher.
BLUE 2 Front
Had flown with Uad and knew his characteristics so wel' that he could respond
almost automatically.
186
B
I
I
9
a
«
5 :
6 i
f i
8
s
EVENT I. 28
He was completely disoriented during the various maneuvers and concentrated on
stayini^ on Lead's wlnt;';.
BLUE 2 riack
Unsure of what occurred durlni: parts of the engacement — much of the time was
spent lookinr. out for the rest of the flight to maSte sure they didn't get a MIG at
6 o'clock,
Mlfis did not ccem to react in a very capable manner.
While on MICJCAP he spent about 90 p)?rcent of his time looking outside and 10 percent
of time looking; ac radai". Reason for t;hlo was that NIC3 probably were going to come In
low and you wculdn't detect thera on radar. In this situation where they were low, could
never have Ufn:n cau.^hL on radar.
Didn't think SPAfiROW could ever have been used in this encounter because all attacks
were diving; at the ground and were never in the proper range band. SIDEWINDER was quite
a bit more convenient in this encounter.
Experienced llcht buffeting at times during the encounter.
A gun would have been useful — could have gotten into gun range.
BLUE 3 Front
At this period there seeded to be no SAMs fired when the MIGa were airborne.
BLUE 3 ^:ick
After the Initial attack BLUE 3 was never able to achieve the necessary conditions
for an Ideal r.isslle attack. The nearness to the grcund negated much of the missile
effectiveness. '
An Internal gun couid have been used very effectively In thla environment.
The radio calls during the encounter were minlital. The only other call after the
initial sighting was: ">ie got one."
BLUE tt 5aeic *
BLUE 4 did not initiate any attacks during the engagement because of the need for
element integrity. BLUE 4 cculd have successfully engaged a HIG on the first pass.
Comiaenta from Overall Experl ence
BLUE 2 Bae'^c
It was not necessary to have a pilot in the back seat of the P-4 except during night
air-ground nisslons when a pilot may more capably advise the aircraft commander. Ac-
tually, a radar oficer would be mere interested in the back seat operations than a pilot
would be.
BLUE } Fron t
It would be undesirable and possibly fatal for an P-tt to use a gun In fighting with
a MIC because the MIG Is built to fight with guns and the P-it is not.
As a last resort to kill a KIG's tracking solution on you, you can go Into a nose
high rudder roll.
We need a capability to fire missiles at higher g.
It is best to fight the MIG in the vertical.
BLUE U Back
The Back is very limited in helping the aircraft commander during a elose-in en-
gagement. His responsibility in such case should be to look for enemy aircraft In the
6 o'clock area.
11. DATA SOURCES
Pro.tect Tnterylews : BLUE 1 Front (12/1/66), BLUE 2 Front (12/13/66), and Back (1.= '13/66).
bLLS; 3 Front (12/13/66), SLUE b Front (12/13/66). J'
Letter Accounts from : BLUE 3 Back, BLUE i Back.
Messages :
7AF OPREP-3 291110: Apr 66, DOCO-0 I8638
7AF OPREP-3 Apr 66, DOCO-0 I865O
Other ;
'JSAP Tactical Fighter Weapons School Combat Analysis Division (CAD) Bulletin ft, I966.
12. NARRATIVt DESCRIPTION
BLUE fllcJit had been on MIGCAP station for about 15 to 20 mtn when they encountered
four Kia-17s. (BLUE 2 and BLUE U flew a close combat wing on Lead and BLUE 3 througt.out
I67
EVENT 1-28
(3 and U))
T Tnitiallv BLUE 2 «»lrhted and reported. "MIG 9 o'clock low.* All aircraft In 3LUE
f^lcht ieulsi^J their ank=. BLUE Lad turned h.ri left to enr.a?e and saw three other
5rSf in locte t5all with a slnclc MIO at Lead's 11 o'clock headed In a different dlrec-
i' 2n AS R*UE Lead attached th- slnrle r.IG xas observed to Jettison his tanks. BLUt
S nK^UhteS the tSrce Si^s n t^ low and passing left to right. maneuvered nose
iigS. rolUng right, uslnc afterburner, and Initiated a diving attack on the flight of
three
T RriiP t«.Ad slehted his Wing attacking the MIG formation of three and broke off his
Iltack wuh a hard re^er e llAlln-^ barrel roll to the rieht . uslnc ^"«|;J"^"^r 'SlSI "
?a'5 air spe?d. The single MIG was not observed by any member of the flight after BLUE
dll Srokl right. The KIGs Jettisoned tanks and went into an easy right turn. At least
one HIG went Into afterburner.
T, BLUE Wlnc continued his attack and downed one of the lead MICs with a single SIDE-
WINDE? To preSeSt an overshoot due to closure rate BLUE Wing had Performed a h gh-
speed yo-yo In his attack. Following nJsslle release he pulled up hard In Jf, -o a 50
cno^.i>™h PtiiF if'Ad'a ^ arrel roll to the outside permitted him to observe BLUE .Ulng s
kUl Js'bLUE Wlng Julled up bISe Lead observed the HIG 3 trying to position hlr.self for
Hi iitaJk on BLUE WiSg. BLUE Lead continued the roll, going into a descending turn.
T BLUE Lead fired a SIDEWINDER without a tone and out of the missile's envelope. MIG
S^apparently Observed the SIDEWINDER leave BLUE Lead's aircraft and went Into a maximum
performance turn to the left and into Lead, forcing the mlssi-e to miss.
T, BLUE Lead then passed "canopy-to-canopy" with HlC 3 and BLUE I-^aJ PuUed up hard and
started over the top in a barrel-roll-type maneuver while the MIG continued turning in a
shallow descent.
BLUE Lead went Into spllt-S and a steep descent from about 12,000 ft in full AB
toward ?heM?G. The SlS observing BLUE Lead closing at 6 o'clock made several hard nose-
down turns and reversals.
Tfi With Lead at 6000 ft. chasing the KIG and Just beginning to get SIDEWINDER tone the
MIG rolled inverted to the left with an altitude of about 2500 ft and crashed. The MIG
either lost control of the aircraft or attempted a split-S with insufficient ftltude.
One member of BLUE flight declared BINGO fuel and the flight departed the area. .UG 2 m
the group of three had been sighted only intermittently during the encounter and then
doing little or no naneuvrrlng.
r-f The flight rejoined and was egressing when BLUE 3 observed two MICs at low altitude
going away.
TB BLUE 3 oade one high-angle, max-g turning pass, fired 2 SIDEWINDERS, then rejoined.
No hits were observed.
s
B :
0
0
Q
I
1
0
&
9
9
Q
cd^csi ^ ca? C3S S2> ca -sa c;a ^ "^'^^^ *^
EVENT I-'28 SUMMARY
Ttme
Mirk
Action Aircraft (SLUE 1. 2. 3. 4)
Status
About 9000
Fuel
lb
Speed - 400+ knots
Weaving an<J varying
a 1 ti tude
Bl ♦ -8000 ft
B3 - 12.000 ft
Action
Bl up to 450-kt
accelerating to
6.5 8.
B1t3 - «S000 ft
IAS
Bl (m1 th B2 on wing)
turns left to engage MI6
and observes 3 other
MIGs below. 83 (wUh 64
on wing) pulls nose up
and rolls to right to
engage. All Jettison
empty wing tanks. (See
remarks re 82 and 84)
Bl sights B3&4 rolling
in and h^s to break off,
reversing hard to the
risht, going Into AB and
then Into a high.g roll.
83 continues maneuver,
coming alnost canopy to
canopy with M3, levels
wings and goes Into
high-speed yo-yo.
Other Friendly
81 upside down at
instant Tg, in high
g barrel rol ! .
B3 in right turn,
steep bank , nose 15
down, «SO0-kt IAS
81 - -U ,000 ft
B3 ' 7000 ft.
81 continues barrel roll
rol Is out and starts
descending.
83 fires one SIDEWINDER
In this attitude and ther
pulls off and goes Into
steep cllnb. In AB .
81 observes M3 In attack
position on 83 and
Initiates attack on N3.
Conwunlcatlons
82 reports HIG at
9 o'clock 1 ow .
Lead cal Is to en-
gage MIGs.
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1,2.3.4)
Single HIG (H4)
flying straight
and level. Three
other straight
and level in
stagge red trail,
500 to 1000 ft
apart , at Iom
speed.
HI .2.3 at '•5000 ft
M4 -4000 ft.
Renarks
r-4s had been on
CAP station some 15
min when KIGs were
sighted. Va r i ous
flight members saw
MIGs just after
initial cal 1 .
B2 and B4 ma i ntal n
wing position on
their element leads
throughout the
encounter.
Flight of three Movements of single
jettisons tanks andMIG initially de-
commences shallow
right turn still Inafter flight of
trail. Lead MIG
Initially broke
hard right but then
fell off. At least
one HIG observed to
go into AB. No
change In altitude.
Lead MIG 1n right
turn is hit by
missile, goes Into
corkscrew roll to
ground; pilot
ejects with good
chutt . H3 pul Is In
behind 83 and 4.
tected not known
three detected.
B3 had nissi le tone,
fired at about
l-m1 range. Mis-
sile went up tal 1
pipe and exploded.
MIG on fire and
tral ling whi te
smoke . MiG pi lot
chute orange In
color, square. Mith
four risers - one
to each corner.
■ T"" "^ri-*'iV'-^«Viiiiii'iiia'.
Time
Mark
•6
FVgMT 1-28 SUMMARY (Continued)
Action Alreritt (BLUE
Status Action
Bl 750-kt IAS, In
hard, diving turn
to right. 6 9>
AB.
B3 In 50"-60* cUmb
In AB.
Bl — 8000 ft •
B3 —10.000 ft
Bl fires SIOEHINDER at
M3 (no tone) from this
attitude; reveries to
left, still descending,
Bl 700 to 750-kt
IAS
Other Friendly
Bl 'on top" and
unloading at
12.000 ft
Bl SOa-kt IAS.
6000 ft still In
AB. 60» pitch.
After Bl and H3 pass
canopy to canopy. Bl
commences hard (nax
performance) pull up.
Bl follows through to
get on top of MI6.
Split-S down to about
8000 ft.
Following MIG collision
with ground. 81 pulls
up and cones to SU
heading. 83 and 4 fol-
low novenents of 81 and
82.
Communications
Enemy Actions
(MI G 1. 2. 3. 4 )
H3 apparently ob
serves Bl's missile
and breaits hard
left (streamers
from wing root out)
K2 apparently
taking no hostile
or evasive action.
H3 -7000 ft.
Remarks
Bl fired SIDEWINDER
to divert MIG from
attack on 83 and 4
even though there
was no tone and mis-
sile was not wi thi n
parameters . Mis-
sile attempted to
track but got no-
where near MIG.
Track of 83 un-
certain after this
point unti 1 T,
H3 in hard turn,
shallow nose-down,
8000 ft.
K3 about SOOO ft
still descending
and turning toward
Bl . Continues shal-
low descent, comes
gut of turn, weav-
ing left and right.
An aircraft In the
flight calls BINGO
fuel .
Bl calls for
flight to rejoin
and egress.
Location and action
of H2 no longer
known
Bl feels he might
have gotten off a
SPARP.OU about this
time if he had been
in a higher state
of training.
Alternates between
left and right turn
then goes Into
spllt-S from about
2S00 ft. Collides
«1th ground.
Bl almost on top
of MIG and closing
range; has
SIOEUINOER tone.
F-lOSs have com-
pleted attacks and
are egresslng.
C9 ^ O C> ^ *Sa
>. - .-J- t^i^ . ^
B3ft ttft ^^"f
CVEWT 1>28 SUHHflRY fContlnued)
Tine
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3. 4)
Status
Ac 1 1 on
Other Friendly
Comnunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
(MI6 t, 2. 3, 4)
Remarks
B3 • ^12.000 ft
B3 +600-kt IAS.
70* nose down. In
4.S g turn; below
BIK60 fuel.
83 turns and' descends
tOM«rd new HIGs. SI
and B2 continue egress.
B3 sees two HIGs.
B3 fires two SIOEUINOERs
In this attitude; then
pulls off and continues
egress. Hisslles fired
out of range.
Flight continues egress.
Two KIGs flying
straight and level
low altitude,
going away.
B3 has SIDCWtNOER
tone and si Ight
lead on HIGs , but
Is at extreme
ranqe and high g.
Fired knowingly
out of paraneters
but fel t he cou ) d
not afford fuel
required to get
Into better
position. Did not
observe missiles In
flight or explosion.
EVENT 1-29
Aircraft, Involved: Two F-UCs va four MIC-lTs
Result : One KIG destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21''25'N/10'j''20«E
Route Package V
1. PftlNARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Daie/Tlme: 30 Apr 1966/C900H
An cKnent of twc F-bCs (BLUi 3 3nd k) were alternating with P-*Cs BLUE 1 and 2 In
air refuellnr. and providing RESCAP for an attemot to recover two downed pilots. BLUE 3
and » Mere withdrawing; frcm the RESCAP area and rLUE 1 and 2 were returning when BLUE 3
and slr.htcJ four aircraft, subsequently identified as '•^XG-lTs, closing them. It is
believed that the only other U.S. aircraft over HVll at this time were two A-ls searching
for the pilots, possibly a helicopter or two encaged In the search, and possibly a normal
ECH IntelMgencfr aircraft.
2. NISSION ROUTE
BLUE 3 and 4 had been scrambled from Udorn for RESCAP, had refueled after takeoff,
proceeded to their assigned area,' and had been on station for about an hour when the
encounter took place.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-^C SLUE 3. ^
• - SPARROW (AIM-7D) fuselase
4 . SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) Inbcard wing station
2 " 370-gaI wing tanks outboard wing station
1 - 600-gal centerline tank
IFF. TACAN and radar operating
Camouflaged
HIG-I7 WIG 1. 2. 3. '»
Sliver color
VI ng tanks
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: High cirrus clouds; visibility much reduced in thick haze below about 15,000 ft.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Bl^UE 3 (Front) slanted four aircraft at o o'clock, level, about 5 ml. closing, coning
out of the sun. BLUE 3 (Back) nay have seen the.-n at about t^^e same instanc . They were not
imnied lately identified and an ID pass was Initiated. They were identified as HIC-17s at
about 1.^ 911. There had been some NIC warnings earlier. There was no warning of this
specific encounter.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE element broke left into the flight of four aircraft for an ID pass. Jettisoning
fuel tanks.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Following the P-iia' pass through the MIC forr.atlcn, they ccmmenced a cllr.iblnf, turn
to engage. When they had completed about 150* of the turn, .MICs were observed clcslns;
from the rear hemisphere, firing guns, but with apparently insufficient lead and out of
range. The P-bs conncnced cllnblng in afterburner with apparently two MICs followln>;.
Both KIGs full off in the climb. SLUE ^ then went into a dive, leveling out on the tall
of a :!IC, and downing the MIC with one SIOE'a'XN'DER. BLUE element then departed the area
due to low fuel.
FLUE
T
Altitu de:
Head! ng ;
Speed ;
Fuel State ;
Flight Formation :
— 15,000 ft—
SW
300 to 350-kt IAS
Approximately 5000 lb
Co-altltude, BLUE i* behind and
to the right of BLUE 3
195
8. ORDNANCE
EVENT 1-29
BLUE 3
BLUE 4
SIDEWINDER
AIH-9B
0/0
1/1
SPARROW
AIK-7P
0/0
0/0
Remarks
Missile guided up the tall pipe and exploded.
9. EQUIPHENV PROBLEMS
BLUE H
Following engagement, and while trying to rendezvous wIt^l tanker, radar became
Inoperative. Steerin.-; dot was cut of position In back seat, causing Back to give erroneous
steering Inforaatlon wnile tracklnig IMQ.
Guard frequency receiver Inoperative, discovered only after return to base.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
EKperlence
Back
Total
Hours
700
p.<4
Hours
Unknown
500
Combat
Missions
Back
— Not Interviewed —
500 250 ?
Remarks
Considerable ADC experience.
Had commenced his combat tour at Udorn
in Feb 1966. Had observed one SIDEWINDER
firing in training, llo air-air gun
experience .
Had commenced combat tour at Udorn in
Feb 1966. AU F-<i time in back seat.
No air-air guti or missile experience.
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE 3 Pack
The action was carried out as planned, i.e., in an engagement, outclimb the Hia-17>
BLUE Back
If you get into a turning or up and down fljjht, the only ^hing to do Is go "boreslght"
and keep your head out of the cockpit. Tn extreaie maneuvers there Is nothing you can do
in search mode.
Confidence in SPARROW was low at thiJ point; there had been 13 firings with no hits
n the previous week.
While on RESCAP had radar on 25-nil scale, spent 20 to 30 percent of time or less
!boking at radar. Rest of the time looking outs-lde.
MIOs were apparently ground controlled; (1) came out of the aun^ (2) waited until
P-ls low on fuel before closing; (3) were conlnt; right toward the F-4a but apparently
didn't see then until they were very close.
F-'is did not maintain flight Integrity during the hassle. Probably would not have
gotten the kill If Integrity had been maintained.
Training was not really adequate for t.'its engagement, didn't know what the Back should
do in a hassle sucti as this.
Would have liked to have been able to identify the MIOs earlier, In time to make a
head'on SPARRC'ti attack.
Enemy pilots In this encounter did not seen too good: (1) when P-'is f3ew through them
they scattered: (2) they made one pass and started firing out of range and out of angle;
(3) made the mistake of trying to climb with the F-ts.
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 3 Back
Does not have confidence in radar-guided alr-alr missiles.
Tlie two-man crew and extra eyes are an asset in an area where you must look out
for SAKs.
It Is desirable to have SAM warning equipment on a fighter.
LU E 1 Back
The lOQ-nl scale or. the radar scope is of no vf.lue in alr-alr corbat. A KIG-21 may
glvi: you a good painting out to 35 ml. You might want a lonrcr scale to find a tanker.
There is no need for a pilot in the back seat of an F-l.
296
B
B
t
B
3
0
§
I
B
B
B
I
9
B
B
S
EVENT 1-29
r^mmgrits froa Overall Exporlence (Continued)
5^^"— — K.tn., thr. -^-ac home and land It solely from the
It 19 a fallacy to ^^^y that you can bring thr -4C^ antiskid system; there
back seat: You've cot to blow the c.oar <^°'^"^;*";^/-*^",i?tg:es- you r.ay be United to using
Sruo-dra. Chute hamlK-; there are no ^1^* ^ ^jiSl; you'Ln't^o Into or out of AB.
ran^e .
t^ttetiAcccnmt.: BLUE 3. (Front) (3/67)
Messages :
7AF OPREP.3 3006l'.Z Apr 66, DOC-VO 18703
MfplnJeiilJenfe Sua^ary 302:0.2. DIE 20530 Apr CS
Other: USAP Fighter Weapon School Cor,b. . Analysis Division (CAD) Bulletin »K 1965-
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^^^^^^^
To - BLUE flight, consisting S^^^ .J slewed at 9 o'clock almost simultaneously
ShL^?.; Fri.?ran; S^^^ "^T^ Jr.Uevs%;rr;p!^anr approLmately 5 ml. level, ana could
llTnir. tan^s .e.t .to a hard .ft tum. using ane„.
r ".Tlu^! mc'rid^nuned the aircraft as .lO-Hs at abo.t 1.5 ml. as they steadied out
: 'TuE^fUght passed directly -^--^^-ttfr^ra f ro^^irk/^ilS-c^f^MnS "^I'fWlr..
ip%roxlr.ately i5.000-rt aiatuu^ i'^^t^JtI;!?/a JloSe cir.bat\lng .n BLUE 3-
possibly using arte. burner, followed in an attempt to execute a
T«o of the HIG. ther. apparently .X^.T^^s rot otseriiS again.
..un attack. Action of the other .-o .-.I.- °' ; ^j,,. p^psulng then
It "^l J^afSSrBrSrfaS^^^^i^rti^enS th^!? tiSls^nJ^cJ^tlnueo their steep climb.
now in afterburner. aonarentlv out of range and
T. - T.e l.a. MIO o»=.r,.d to i;^^lrlr5 at BL.=^^ .uJ^|PParentl, ,erAurn
angle. There were no hli:s. oLL.. « r!^* * «t. vTO went into a high-g barrel roll. With
!i i-ais rpsrir„r.«/Sor?r.n:;^rtJ«-''.".s «i ot..rve. to ran orr ..oot
T. Z\.. t., .arrol roU ^U^E 3 ir he =o,,Unu.a i^'^-^i/t -JiJ/t ^.^Je?!
0? the lead HIG at deereas.d "W','"? rUnt puUlSg the no.e ».n ;.le>. the
!;rrra:n°ir.n.?i!;"rn:r".i'« ;S:n^"SrM"-.-al! ./r .tr.Uh. th.n roll
. ..T,- w..^ =e RTT^- u deaconded he observed one of the
f.?t.Ton:;S/lf™ «t-P"n^ " ^« --"^ ,0 .-.IOC. ...ut
':in!;t5rsurojrn5srt«".is^ ■ »• -"-^ "™ "
::'! r:;«.Uht ....r .ee...h ac,...ed a;d ..UH ,._^cont..j„^,to^t„c. the MXO .Uh the
p?pper for several seconds closlnr as BacK sa^e hl^ g SIDEWINDER envelope."
T« - BLUE «. fired a single SIDEWTNDEH with a ^'^^.J^^ij^ "as oSJerved to break in two
h^^^ fSra^er.Se^io-^w^fu;i iSatS (about 3.00 lb). The «I0 pilot
«s observed to eject wltr. a good crmte. , .,,,.^„aiiy BLUE ft attempted rendezvous
3LUF 3 and did not rejoin but ^'^''^^sed lnd.\13uaiiy. ^^^^ uJorn. at
ji'SoH "'i5o°s ;'r=rS^trBKrvsLi;.5°:r'4t:'^'2"".i;; ...hout attempt.. re,.euns.
H..hut own at Udorr. with «00 lb of f-ael.
197 J
fVgWT 1-Z9 SUHHARY
Time -
Action Alrcraf
t (BLUE 3, 4)
Action
Other Friendly
CommunicBtions
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1.2.3.4)
ftemarkt
Mark
^0
Status
3Z0-kt IAS
5000 lb fuel
1S,000-ft altUude
Elenent breaks left Into
hogeys, jettisons tanks.
B4 takes position In
fighting wing, increases
speed (possibly into AB)
DJ CflllCU DUyvy'
at 9 o'clock
Level . no prec 1 se
foriration. roughly
line abreast
J3 observed 4 alr-
:r8ft clfiing f ro^n
1 0 ' clock level ,
sbout 5 rti , coming
out of sun
^1
B3 and 84 steadying
up from turn, same
al t1 tude
B3 calls "They're
HIGs"
Straight and level
In extended root
formation
Distance to MIGs
sbout 1.5 mi . HIGs
are silver with red
stars, readily
identified as NIG-
17s
^2
1
1
1
B3 and B4 pass through
HI6 fornation and go
into medium left cl1«b-
Ing turn In AB or at
least full military
power .
. — .
Continue straight
«nd level
1
In AB. at 16.000 ft
83 and 84 steady out of
turn and Increase rate
of climb.
2 MIGs fol low F-4s
at -vUtOOO ft and
climbing
B3 sights 2 HIGs
closing at 7-8
o'clock
I
B3 and B4 In AB.
at £2,000 ft
83 and B4 continue climb
with B4 going into left
turn. Then B3 goes into
barrel roll
Ml firlnq at B4.
M2 falls off.
about 19,000 ft
HIG apparently out
of range and angle
for firing.
[•
1
1
B3 In barrel rol 1 ,
In and out of AB.
B4 In AB at about
25,000 ft
3 3 pa rt way thru , comes
out of barrel roll and
continues clinb.
B4 goes Into hard diving
turn to right.
Ml falls off
straight ahead and
roils right from
about 22.000 ft
B3 did not complete
barrel roll because
he would have rolled
out in front of
«IG
t
^6
B' in AB.
descend! ng ,
probably supersonic
at about 19.000 ft
B4 goes Into hard left
turn (6 or 7 g)
54 sees HIG In
shallow climb,
ahead at 2 mi.
lovements of B3
unclear from this
point on.
V
EVENT' !-29 SUMMARY (Continued )
Action Aircraft (BLUE 3. 4)
Time
Mark
Status
B4 bottoming out,
superson i c , at
about 14,000 ft
B4 in AB
Mach 0.9,
15.000 ft
Hach 0.9, 1 9
84 fuel 3S00 \b
Action
B4 pulls in behind MIG,
Locks on in boreslfht.
Comes out of AB
84 fires one
SIOEUINOER
B3 and B4 depart the
area
Other Friendly
Communi ca t i ons
B4 Front tells Back
to "Go boresight
and lock on"
B4 Back calling
ranges to target
and calling "Steer
left, steer left"
B4 "I got one with
a SIOEUIMOER"
Enemy Actions
{HI6 1.2.3;4}
Remarks
Straight and level
64 sees another MIG
at 10 o'clock, up
2000 ft straight
and level at 3 mi ,
opening. Decided
to go after MIG.
34 front did not
steer left in re-
sponse to Back.
Later discovered
that steering dot
in error
Range to target
dt firing is 1 to
1-1/2 mi . Missi 1e
guides up tai 1 pi pe
and explodes; MIG
breaks In two
behind cockpit;
pilot ejects with
good chute
EVENT 1.30
Aircraft Involved: Four P-ICg vs three
unidentified aircraft,
possible MIGs
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Two sightings:
21»30'H/106''35'E, and
21«'10'K/107''22'E
Route Package VI
). PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 8 May 1966/16L5H
A night of four F-tCa (BLUE flight) on a KIGCAP mission, escorting F-105 flights
which were strlkln.- JCS TarRst 16.23 or .21 (brid(?;es along the Northeast Railroad) vicinity
of 2l°30«t.V106*35*E. SLUE flight was in a NW/SE racetrack orbit over the above coordinates
at. 15,000 ft.
2. MISSION ftOUTE
BLUE flight departed Danang and rendezvoused over the Gulf of Tonkin for refueling
and Join up with the F-105 strike flights. After refueling, the F-ts followed the strike
flights west to the target area north of Haiphong at approximate coordinates 21^ 31* IV
106"35'E. After a r.ldalr collision, the flight proceeded due east to the Ouif then south
over the water to recover at Danang.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-aC {pf.'jt?-»'ov ) BLUE 1. 2. U
k - SPARROW (AIM-7)
1^ - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B)
3 - External fuel tanKS (one 600 -gal centerllne tank and two 370-gal wing tanks)
All aircraft canoaflase paint
Unidentified Aircraft (possible MIGs)
Silver color (no markings observed)
Swept wings
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTEIt
Weather : Low->level scattered to broken clouds, tops 2000-3000 ft with several thin layers
at 10,000 and 20,000 ft, and some high thin cirrus.
(First Sighting) (Second Sighting)
BLUE BLUB
I 3 3 IT I 2 3 IT
Altitude ; ™ — 15,000 ft ——19,000 ft-— —
Headi ng: Approximately 1*5» in a left turn Approximately 090*
Speed: ™«ach 0.8-0.85 Unknown
Fuel State ; -Unknown Unknown
Plight F^ntation ; ----Fluid Four 3j,'i had separated;
(relationship of 3 14,? close to each other,
to 1 not specifically bui not actually In
known) formation as they were
attempting to join
separately— one on 3
and the other on 4
5. INITIAL DETECTION
First sighting: BLUE flight was about to roll out of a left turn on a heading of
145" In their i-llCCAP orbit when BLUE li looked down through the cloud layers and saw two
unidentified swept -wing silver colored aircraft flying very low on an approxisiate reciprocal
heading of 320* . These aircraft were headed In the r.eneral dii-ection of the strike air-
craft, and since all mission aircraft were known to be camouflaged, BLUE 4 called out,
"MlOs below." Both front and back seat BLUE 4 observed the unidentified aircraft.
Second sighting: As SL','?- 1 and 2 were approaching the coast line on an easterly
heading to Join and escort their damaged elenent bac'.: to Danang, BLUE 1 (Back) looked
back and sighted an unidentified sliver aircraft, co-altltude, and 2000-3000 ft In trail
with BLUE 2. BLUE 1 could se- '.o irarklngs as he ob3<;rved the unidentified aircraft
making a turn away toward the - ^rth, apparently withuut firing.
203
EVENT 1-30
7. SITUATION OtVELOPHENT
BU. U (Front a.. ^acK) .a.e tje UitUl =1.^ ^S^.ail.^/
fUcht turned back toward the ^iEhtlng, BLUE 3 aj<i^ BLUE 1 and 2 followed to
nearcd the coast during egression.
8. ORDNANCE
Ho ordnance was fired by any aircraft concerned.
9 EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS ,
• None mentioned except for damages received as a result of the midair collision.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Total
Hours
Hours
BLUE
1
BLUE
2
BLUE
BLUE
4
Front
Back
1950
Combat
Missions
So
Remarks
Ho missile firing experience at time of
encounter.
••75
Not interviewed
Corn-Te nts on this Encounter
BLUE u (3ack) - Ex^sslve chatter on radio circuit saturated the net to the point
that It^E 2 clld not respond to second KIC call until repeated several times.
Comments f rcm Overt til Experience ,
BLUE « (Front) - Aircraft should be designed and outfitted f^;:,^/^"*"^*^,"*^''!^?"'
seat Should be occupied by a P''*' Sessional Radar Int"«P* ^Jf ^^nrJeat. and not enough
Identify and found It to be a friendly A-3.
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
BLUE 1 (Front) './as contacted 9 Jan 67, but no formal Interview; BLUE 2 (Front)
18 Jan 671 3LUE 3 (Back) l6 Mar 67; and BLUE U (Front) 24 Jan 67.
He s sages. Reports ;
35 TFW OPREP-3 PASTEL 196, 9 Kay 66
■ 12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
"missiles away" call «as Stven, Probf ly by "'^'JJ, Jjif ;ii\rthe low 10-11 o'clock
r.^8:i'.Sl"i:t.5 i.«»"'ru,"ut or co«tn.l, „fL.t^, r>co..r.^ »p.r...l, .nd
204
NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (Continued) CVENT 1-30
turned east to set out over the water. BLUE 1 and 2 followed to Join and escort the
crippled alrcrart. Approximately 13 ml west of the coast, BLUE i (Back) noticed another
unidentified aircraft In BLUE 2'z 6 o'clock position, level, at approximately 3000-rt
range. BLUK 1 called, "There's a KIC on your tall," but at this time the unidentified
aircraft was making a turn away to the north without firing. Both BLUE 1 and 2 broke
left, however visual contact was lost during the turn. BLUE 1 and 2 turned back east,
reforming: by DP bearing on BLUE 3 and 1, and continued the escort to Danang. All air-
craft landed safely thouch both BLl'S 3 and were badly damaged.
The backseaters were looking at the radar scope about one-fourth to one-third of
the tine.
205
EVENT 1-30 SUMMAHY fFlrst Slghtlno)
Tint
H«rti
Actton Aircraft (BLUE 1 , 2, 3. 4)
Status
Left 180" t^jrn
15,000 ft
Hcch O.B>0.8S
Left 180* torn
heading 145'
15.000 ft
Hach 0. 8-0. 85
Action
KibCAP orbit
BLUE flight tr»
left descending
turn
Left descending
turn
MIGCAP orbit B4
sights tMO unidentified
silver aircraft low on
sinost reciprocal
heading.
BLUE flight Initiates
a left descending turn
toward unidentified
a ircraf t.
84 rolls aircraft 90'
right to check for SAMs
then rolls back left
and at 45* right bank
saw B3 closing. 84
tried to bank back to
right but collided
belly to belly with ST.
Other Friendly
BLUE flight in
fluldofour forma'
tlon
Fluid-four forM'
tton
Fluid-four forna-
tion
B3&4 midair col-
lision right m1 ng
to right wing,
belly to bellv
B1li2 not Involved
Communi cat i ons
84 calls,
below."
'HlGs
IRON HAND f 1 ight
calls. "Hisslles
away."
B3S4 each call
being hit
Enemy Actions
(Possible
H16 1. 2, 3)
Remarks
Both B3&4 are
damaged and
momentarily lose
control they re-
gain control and
egress separately
to the E.
t
CZ3 GE9 BESi 69
CVENT 1-31
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-llCs vs three KIC-l7s
Result: No dcfflage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«28'N/10'>°38'E
Route Package V
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Tine: 10 Hay 1966/1 810H
BLUE flight (F-ttCs) was on a MIGCAP 75 ml IW of Hanoi. OREEN flight (two
A-ls tii c5'33) we^e a rescue mission and had Just picked « Pil^'^'
A 130 (CROWN) acting as Airborne Air/Sea Rescue Control was in th9 area.
I. MirilOR ROUTE * V n-i
BLUE flight refueled and returned to an orbit point on the Red River north of Yen Bai.
GREEN had made the rescue and was heading 190«, 13,000 ft.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
y-HC BLUE 1. 2. 3. »
k - SPARROW (AIM- 7)
4 - SIDEWIHOER (AIM-9)
2 - 370-gal wing tanks
A-1 and GREEN 1 . 2. 3. t
Unknown
MIG.17 HIO 1. 2. 3
Alr-to-alr rockets or missiles
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weathert Broken to overcast, V8 to 7/8. with 10.000-ft tops.
^UE flight in orbit at 25.000 to 30,000 ft, ?uel state was described as -very good.
GREEN flight had completed a rescue pickup and was heading 190», 13.000 ft about jO-35
mi south of BLUE flight.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
GREEN flight saw three MIG-178 on a parallel course 6000 ft above.
6. ACTIOS INITIATED
OREEN flight called the reecue force comander (CTOWN) which called BLUE flight.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE night, after some communication difficulty ■''•a^ff./^lfJ^^J^JJi^^S^ S?gs from
r aSr- S E^JirgSt'JSJtSieftSrfi^^^^^^
«en Hain by BLUE flight. BLUE and GREEN nights were on different frequencies.
8. ORDNANCE _ ^
One rocket or missile fired from a MIO. It la unknown whether It was guided or not.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total P-'l Coo^at
Hours Hours Missions
BLUE 1 3500 600 50
BLUE 3 400-500 30-»0
Cowmen ts o n this Encounter
BLUE flight expressed concern over 3 to H oln ""ted In getting position o
flight from CROWN. CROWN was Slow answering reQ««t8 f«« ^^^^ tli-Z^^^^ ORSEH flight
spilt into two sections which was not known by BLUE flight.
209
EVENT 1-31
IK DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUE 1(L) - Front, IS Jan 67
BLUE 2 - Back, 10 ;-:r.r 6?
BLUE 3 - Pront, 9 Kar 67
BLUE 4 - Front, 13 Dec 66
Messages. Reports ;
TAP OPREP-3 10202^;:. DOCO-0 192U6 Hay 66
TAP OPREP-'J 10165'^:: DOCO-0 19235 May 66
DIA INTSUM 10 May i6
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTION
BLUE night had been on station, 75 ml NV of Hanoi. They had Just finished air
refueling and were back In their MICC/;' orbit. During this time GBEEU flight had
successfully conpleted the rescue and 'lad started back. After about 20 mln In the orbit
for the second tire, BLUE flight received a call from control advising that GREEN flieht
had been intercepted by MIG aircraft.
GREEN flight was heading 190" at 21*28' N/10U° 38 ' E about 13,000 ft when three MlC-17s
were sighted 6000 ft above on a parallel "ourse. The NIOs then made three descendlnc turns
over GREEN flight coming as close as 2 ml and 1000 ft high. GREEN fll^t did not obs<;rve
a firing pass. During the attack CPf:EN flight descended rapidly exiting towards low
clouds.
BLUE flight was on one cornxunioatlon channel with CROVfW and GRCEN flight was on a
different channel. It took BLUE three to four minutes to get GREEN' 3 position via CKOVII.
BLUE flight finally was able to estimate that QRE2N flight was approximately Ii5 ml south
of the pickup point, and BLUE fllgh:: headed south.
The weather under and Immedlarely south of the CAP orbit was about 7/8' s broken
clouds which were close to the top; of 10,000-ft mountains, consequently BLUE flight
terminated the let down above this cloud deck at approximately 12,000 ft. BLUE 2, 3 and
i| at this time got a radar contact at 12 o'clock, at between 15 to 20 mi. BLUE 1 and
BLUE 2 were in the lead with BLUE 2 about 200 ft back and to the right of BLUE 1, BLUE 3
and BLUE U were back In tactical fornuition about 3000 ft behind the lead element left and
slightly Mgher. BLUE 1 was searching low in one-bar scan (MAP-B mode) with a range set-
ting of 25 ml' Since BL.'^- 1 did '.lot have a contact. BLUE 2 was given the lead.
As the flight continued sou'.'h, closing on the radar contact, all missiles were
tuned. At a range of 10 mi fror. the radar targets tha fllgh"; Jettisoned external tanks.
By this time the cloud cover fiad improved to if/S to 5/8 with holes, with BLUE flight above
the cloud deck. Unknown to BLUE flight, the rescue force had split Into two groups, with
the HIGa circling the trailing olecent. The forward element was separated by several
miles. BLUE apparently had radar contact with the forward element and on overflying the
trailing element dropped the tar.ks between the HXGs and the second element by sheer
coincidence.
BLUE flight's descent was continued to about 8OOO ft. At this time BLUE 1 and BLUE 2
(L) saw an A-1 at 12 s^'jlock l:w running underneath the clouds at about 5000 to 60OO ft.
BLUE 1 resumed the lead and BL'JE 1(L} and BLUE' 2 made a hard left-hand turn (5-6g) and
descent in order to reduce speed and reldentlfy the A>1. During the turn radar contact
was lost. At 3000 to 4000 ft all visual contact with the bogeys was lost.
As BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 flev; over the rescue forces and turned, BLUE 3 and 1 arrived
in the area and BLUE 3 saw two A-ls and a helicopter below to the right. As he was looking
down through a break In the clouds, BLUE 3 noticed a smoke trail from what he thought was
a mlasile (described as SIDEVINDER-type trail) or a rocket. As BLUE 3 was ready to roll
down through the clouds, BLUF. U called "SAM break left," thinking the missile trails were
SAMs meant for BLUE flight. After breaking left BLUE 3 and BLUE continued down through
the cloud layer and again pl-:ked up blips at 10 to 15 mi healing away. BLUE 3 accelerated
buth both BLUE 3 and BLUE U were low on fuel, 30 the decision was made to break off and
return. It was reported thtt BLUE (Back) saw one aircraft that "looked ijke a MIG."
BLUE 1 and 2, after Icr.lng contact continued on a basic heading of O6O' In an
attempt to pick up the HIG? if they were heading back to Hanai. They searched until they
reached the proximity of the SAM defenses and low fuel state (7500 to 8500 lb for BLUE 1).
On return to the orlg.'nal area not more than 3 mln later, BLUE 1 also saw the smoke ^
trails but was utiable to lr:entlfy them. BLUE flight observed the two smoke trails at ^
21«15'N/10H»20'E.
31
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
J
CVCHT 1-32
Aircraft Involved: Three P-UCs und one RB-66C vs
four MIO-lYPs
Result: One HIO-17 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 22«01*N/10't'^15'E,
Route Puc^aee V
1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 12 May 1966/1622H
Three F-Uc aircraft (BLUE flight) escorted an EB-66 aircraft (CREL:n flight). The
Eb-66 mission was to orovide active /passive ECM support for armed recmm&iasance and
IRON HAKD aircraft. No blO EYE CEC-I21) was on station.
2. MISSION ROUTE
The EB-66 flew froa Takhll to lfi'»02'M/103'*01 •£ to rendezvous point ( 19''30'N/103***0«E)
then to IP at 21«tO'N/lO'4«25'E for a M-S orbit. The P-tC flight (three P-»»Cs; the fourth
aircraft did not launch due to maintenance nondelivery) flew from Danan^ to the WHITE ANCHOR
alr-refuellns track { 17'J»3'N/104<»«3'E) to drop off at 19'00'ri to the ^end^.•^vous Joining
with the RB-66 and then to the orbit area. Plight altitude in the orbit area was 28,000 ft.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P»ftC BLUE 1.2.?
k - SPARROW (AIM-7E)
H - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B)
2 - 370-gal outtoard wing tanks
1 - 600'gal centerllne tank
All radars operating, TACAN off and IPP off
Camouflage paint
EB«66 GRSEM 1
Believed not camouflaged
Various active and passive ECH gear operating Including chaff
MI0-17D MIO 1. 2. 3. "
Ouns and cannon
.Sliver color
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Very good* visibility was exceptional (75+ ml)
BLUE CREEN
I 2 5 — r~
Altitude ; —28.000 ft— 28,000 ft
He ading ; 230« (In process of conpletlng left turn)
Speed ; 0.82-0.86 Mtch 0.72-C.80 Mach
fruel 'state : 9500-10,000 lb
Plight Pcrmatlon !
5. IHITIAL DETECTION
Visual sighting of three HIGs by BLUE 3 (both crew members) at 9 to 10 o'clock to
BLOE 3 and about 1 te 2 o'clock to QREES I and BLUE I and 2, bLUE 3 called out MQs to his
flight. At approximately this sane tine CREEM 1 called that someone had fired on him.
6. ACTION INITIATED
After passing GREEN 1 and BLUE 1 and 2. the MIOs sharply turned to their right.
cl''mblng and reverslns: tr.«rlr direction to reattaek. BLUE 3 called for ali te
Jettison tanks and for CREEN 1 and BLUE I and ? to fcreak richt. BLUE 3 started
a left turn toward th« "IQs.
4V
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT ^^^^j ^ .^^
the lift inf passed BLUE 1 and 2 and continued after GREEN 1 "-ho had turned back to
a llJeilVDS? BLUrriSd"! T '5.?'^'' ^^"^ 3 pursued HIJ 1 and desfjojed hS wUh
eveifSaliy 5Uensa«ei. ^ ' meanwhile were attacked by MiGa 2 and 3, continued tuiVlJng wd
8. ORDNANCE
(No. flred/No. hits)
SPARROW SIDEWINDER
BLUE 1, 2
BLUE 3
AIM-7
C/0
0/0
AIW-9
0/0
2/1
Pi red/0
MIG 2, 4
KW 1. 3
9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
BLUh 2 - Centerllne tanka did not Jettison from aircraft.
10. AIRCREU COMMENTS
Experience
CANNON Remarks
One fired as MIG did a split-S,
nlssed. Second guided up tall
pipe.
Not observed firing,
Tot&l
P-ll
Combat
Hours
Hours
Missions
BLUE 1
Front
3600
600
60
Back
BLUE 2
Front
1000
325
30
Back
600
400
80
BLUE 3
Front
Back
750
•iOO
95
Remarka
Cocimencs on this Encounter
separation or out-acce'eratir^ th.-i it il.l ? no trouble obtaining vertical
to^ake sone Shots at twi i rferenrMI^S dC^' n^%H!":-«"*5\' P^^lded an opportunity
for missile firing. A shorter Ja^L i^ssf'i^^C^ ^5 encounter when aircraft were too close
the MICs were Jelng vecSo?^ fccI) fnti a 6 «^nVii^^'°,?f^* ^^i^"^- ^■^'P''«»lon -as that
suited in the head?on'p„r;hif{iu;j?e5 th^ in^S^SJ^J!''" "^'^^
Comments from Overall Experience
)K DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews:
BLUE I (Front) - 8 Mar 67
(Back) - Mar 67
BLUE II (Front) - l8 Jan 67
(Back) - 7 Mar 67
BLUE HI (Front) - 2 Nov 66
(Back) - 3 Mar 67
Mesaagea. Reports ;
IITKS OPREP-Ji iJlTRS PASTEL 032 May 66
7AP OPRFP-3 DOCO-0 19369 May 66
7AP OPREP-3 PASTEL DOCO-0 107 May 66
7AP OPfiEP-3 PASTEL DOCO-0 103 May 66
USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, CAD Bulletin #7. 12 May 66
212
0
3
3
3
3
3
3
Q
0
Q
Q
0
3
3
3
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
EVENT 1-32
GREErf 1 had Juat rolled out of a left turn at the north end of his orbit on a heading
of 210". BLUE 1 and 2 were In the process of crossl-iR from the outside to the Inside of
the turn (right to left). BLUE 3 was on the outside of the turn approximately Z r.l and
slightly back. BLUE 3 sighted three aircraft In a loose left-echelon in a slight climb
at his 10 o'clock position. BLUE 3 called out the bogeys, then a few seconds later
Identified then as MIGs. The three MIC-lTs were heading 050", almost on a reciprocal
heading to RLUE flight. GREEN 1 called that he had been fired at. As the MIGs passed the
OHEEH and BLUE flights, they pulled up In a right chandelle, dropping In trail as they
rtade a right diving attack on GREEN 1 and BLUE 1 and 2. BLUE 3 called for a right break
and to Jettison tanks. BLUE 3 started an easy left turn toward the KIGs.
BLUE 1 In his right turn saw two MIGs (HIG 1 and 2) overshoot. The MIGs, after
overshooting, did a defensive split; MIG 1 going high and NIO 2 going low, turning to the
left. BLUE 1 maneuvered behind HIQ 1. BLUB 2 called at this tine that SLUE 1 was being
fired on and to break rlt:ht, which BLUE 1 and 2 did. BLUE 1 saw MIG 1 turn Ittft toward
GREEN 1, who after the Initial right break turned back left and was descending, making
S-tums. CLUE 1 saw BLUE ? pass overhead after MIG 1 as he broke right.
MIG 1 being high and at 6 o'clock to OREEN 1 rolled Inverted, BLUE 3 launched a
SIDEWINDER at the MIG Just as the MIG began descending In what appeared to be a spllt-S.
The MIG pulled dovm close to GREEN I'a altitude and rolled out. BLUE 3 still Lehlnd the
MIG, fired the second SIDEWINDER au about the same time the MIG lit afterburner. The KIG
took a direct hit and disintegrated. BLUE 3 Joined with OREEN 1 and both withdrew from
the area.
BLUE 1 and 2 In the meantime were In a right break, with MIG 3 and <t in pursuit.
MIG 3 overshot and BLUE I reversed Into him, gaining a 6 o'clock position; too close,
however, to fi.-? a olssile. BLUE 2 called BLUE 1 that MIG 4 was at BLUE 2*8 5 o'clock
position and firing. BLUE 2 started a right climbing turn in afterburner, attempting to
out-cllmb and gain separation on the MIG. BLUE 1 broke off his attack on MIG 3 to give
assistance to BLUE 2. MIC 3 dropped down and to the left, out of the flight. MIG l*
continued to Thuae BLUE 2 fcr approximately 180® of turn firing four bursts of cannon
fire. As BLUE 2 gained altitude and separation MIG 4 disengaged down and left. BLUE I
and 2 unloaded and accelerated then turned back, "after picking up a good head cf steam"
(1.2<>1.5 Kach), but were unable to acquire the MIGs again. BLUE 1 and 2 later Joined with
OREEN 1 and BLUE 3 on the return route. BLUE 1 and 2 recovered, without damage, at Udorn
due to BiPlnum fuel. BLUE 3 continued to Danang. GREEN I recovered at Takhll.
213
4 %
I
EVENT 1-32 SUHMHRY
Tine
Hark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3)
Other Friendly
(GREEN 1)
ComunUatlofls
tnemy Actions
(NIG 1.2.3.4)
Remarks
Status
Action
G1 altitude 28.000
ft, 0. 72 Hach,
S1&2 28.000 ft.
0.85 Hach
93 30.000 ft,
C.8S Mach. 210*
Fuel 10.000 lb
B3 lighted three bogeys
at his 10 o'clock
(1 o'clock to 61 and
BUZ)
G1 had Justrolted
out of a left turn
heading 210*
No HIG alert fron
BIG EYE wh*ch
aborted due to
engi ne f a^ lure*
B3 calls out
"bogeys'* to
flight.
Three MIG-17s In
loose echelon to
the left, making a
head-on pass on G 1
B1ft2 crossing be-
bind 61 to the
inside of the turn
83 2 mi out on
the right slightly
back
BINGO fuel 9S00 lb
B3 1.) HEAT mode,
radar on, armed
in 3-bar scan.
Bl S 2 25-n1
scan, radar on.
arned.
B3 Identifies the bogeys
as MIGs. 61. BU2
break right.
61 Is fired tt jy
NJGs In head-on
pass. 61 right
turn
61 calls that he
has been fired at.
83 calls that the
bogeys are MIGs
and for 8112 and
Gl to break right.
4IGs fire at 61 as
they pass. Pull up
in right chandelJe
going to an 1n-
trall formation
82 unable to Jetti-
son centertlne
tank
\
1
1
CI , BU2 In right
turn 28,000 ft
B3 in sl ight left
turn
HUZ overshoot 3U2
MIGs spill, Kl high, H2
lOM. Bt reverses in
behind N1 (Bl Is very
close 1500-2000 ft).
Gi turns ^ack to
the left and starts
a series of
descending S-turns
B2 asked 83 where
the HlGs were. B3
did not reply
HIGs in right
di V i ng turn attack
nA2. MU2 over-
shoot B112 In the
ireak. Ml goes
ligh and In front
}f Bl reversing
turn to the left.
B3 preoccupied In
his attack did not
reply to 62 call on
NIG position
81 Is too close to
fire missiles and
attempts to get
spacing.
Bl switches to HEAT
aode.
t=r:-^ t^'-^
^4
EVENT 1-3? ^llMHARY (Continued
I
Time
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3)
St«tui
Gl $-turn1ng and
des cend i ng
8U2 behind Ml
B3 •ttacklng HI
Action
'4A
B2 advUes. B1 he ts
being fired at and to
break right
B3 attacking HI as it
turns left after Gl ,
BUZ break right.
"1
Other Friendly
(GREEN 1)
S-turn1n9 descend-
ing and heading In
a SU direction out
of the area.
Gt continuing to
S-turn and descend
B3 attacking HI
1-1/2 ml In trail
(BUZ)
bA
HOMi At thU point the
Ml spilths diving afttr
Gl. B3 fires SlDCWlNBER
Just as HIG does sp1U>
SIDEHINOCR Misses
fnght splits 61
S-tiirnlng and
descending htadlnci
SU
(BUZ)
83 fires second
SIDEWINDER. Just as Ml
lights AB. Missile hits
Ml In the tall and the
rilG disintegrates. 83
Joins &1 and escorts
hia out of the arc*.
Connunlcations
B2 calls Bl that
NIG Is shooting
at Bl
I 83 vs Ml. BUZ vs M3&4
Cneny Actions
(HIG 1,2.3.4}
nUZ turn left to
attack Gl. H3
firing at Bl
iplU>$ dive after
B3 calls ha got
the HI6.
Note Gl did not
hear any conversa-
tion until B3 re-
joined after the
N16 kill.
IIG closing on 61 .
Lights his AB
fien«rks
M2 Is quite 1 om
and Is probdbly
not seen by 63. B2
did not see MIGs
until they were at
7 o'clock.
B2 sees HlGs jetti-
son wing tanks.
83 does not believe
that th# MIG knew
he was behind hfm
that the sp1U-S
was not a defensive
maneuver but Just a
dive after Gl
HIG 1 lit AB,
apparently to
close Into a
better gun-
firing range.
EVIWT I>32 SUMMART (CoftKnwed)
I
Time
Hark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2, 3)
Communications
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1,2.3.4)
Remarks
Status
Art 1 nit
Other Friendly
(GREEN 1)
B142 in right
break as M3 over-
shoots. M3 goes
high, M4 low In a
vertical split.
(BUZ)
81 maneuvers behind H3
after overshoot. H4
drops behind 6? and
starts to ffre at BZ.
overshoots Bl .
44 drops behind BZ
•nd ftres.
Bt Is too close to
M3 to fire a ntssi 1e
Bl Is atteeipttng to
drop back Into
firing position.
BU2 in right
cl tmbing turn, AB
on. (BUZ)
BZ has a MIG at 6 o'cloc
firing. BZ starts i
right, clinbing turn,
outcl labing the HIG.
Bl turns right breaking
off his attack on N3,
to assist BZ.
B2 advised Bl that
B2 Is receiving
fire from MIG at
6 o'clock. Bl
tells BZ to take
the lead.
43 fells back and
left. H3 turning
Inside of B2*s turn
!>ut dropping back.
M4 «ade four sepa-
rate bursts at 82.
Otd not hit. After
the right break.
BZ does not think
M4 was able to pull
lead. ^
BUZ right ctiaibing
turn, altitude
35,000 ft; air
speed 220-kt IAS
M4 dmiift down And h*»
hind 82 turning left
disengaging. BZ does
right barrel roi 1' as .
HIG drops back. BUZ
descend end accelerate
to 1.2 Hach.
14 drops back and
ttown to the left,
11 sengag 1 ng
6Z turned back to
the N after egresS"
Ing the Imecdlate
area but did not sec
the HIGs again. 82
in Diking a right,
high-9 barret rol 1
at low speed was
attempting to get
the HIG to spin out.
me nib broke off
however, probsbly
just prior to the
roll .
NOTE: There Is dis<
the first ov<
repancy as to whether thi
rshoot. He nay have nov<
re were three or foi
d back In. When N4
IT NlGs. N2 was los
Is aentloned this m
t sight of as h* wen
ly have been H2.
t down low on
I
"If
IB
i
8
V
r
e
i
B
i
B
: i
\ B
; a
i s
! a
I i
EVUT I -33
Aircraft Involved: Twq P-4Cl v* four HI0-17»
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Er.;ounter: 21»50:n/10*«00'E
Route Package V
1. PRlHAUr Mission AND TACT.CAl SITUATION
Date/riBie: 196<:/i7^2H
F-ftCa (BLUE flliht) esco-t Inj two SAH helicopters.
n. DATA SOURCES
Heasage , Report :
7AF MSG 3023192 ^6
CINCPACFLT Staff Study --67
12. KARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
ELUE flight ,l.;hted fo.r aircraft believed to be niQ-lU. The •^^L;!"
K.«H«n' (Tjt^« --i;'- fiiih' ..j.; » 13.000 ft, hcatimg north. BLUE flight turnea ana
oStJtn'd loc^-.n. ^Tn^re ifs'n;; overtake and since J'.loS «re going a«ay aWE flight
continued with RSSChF es=ort.
221
a
a
a
a
a
a
: a
. s
a
a
a
a
a
i a
EVENT 1-34
Aircraft Invc>lv«d: Two P-SEs plus two P-8Cs vs
" four MIG-17S
Result: 1 MIQ destroyed; 1 MIO destroyed, probable
Vicinity of Encounter: 21<'20*N/106*30'E
1. PR] HART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION Package VI
Date/Time: 12 Jun 1966/14a6H
A « ,J^?J"f^ ^^'^,^2. Pl"'/*'<' <BLUE 3 end aircraft acting as TARCAP for an
BIQ F¥pi5?r ;*oaD ? Military Area northwest of Haiphong. Support aircraft,
oiu EYE/BIG LOOK, were ai3o alroorne. « ft- ■
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed aircraft carrier In Ttonkln Gulf about l^OOH In company with A-H
pI nnl Jf"*!**"*?" aPPfOfl™>t« neadln? of 360" {nagnetlc), climbing lo an altitude of
h.oS? ^ 1 * vicinity of Sac lor.ff Island, the flight turned to a northwesterly
5.oi ?L bI!'' t ''^fr:^" descended to an altitude of 2500 ft.
► • J'*/!^®?^ proceeded to assigned target area at low altitude. TARCAP P-8»
orbited to a point 5 ml northeast of the target while the A-Hs eompletad the attack.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGl-RATiONS
F-8E. C SL'JE 1. ?■ li
2 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9D)
IFF and TACAN (unKncwn)j grey/white paint
SOmrn guns
Mia I. ?. u
No external tanks or ordnance
Color: a - grey; 1 - sllveri 1 - brown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
^^^^^^ituSS^-rifHfJfi?*" f 3500 ft with another cloud layer at a much higher
altitude; visibility was 5 to 7 ml In haze. Sunlight penetrated the cloud layers.
BLUE
1 ^ 3 li
Altitude; 2500 ft 2500 ft 3^00 ft ^000 ft
heading; : North-northeast (In jlow left turn)
, aboutt 400 kt
Fuel State; Eatlnated tSOO lb.
PUffht Formation; BLUE 1 and 2 were on the lefi side and above the
retiring strike force, and BLUE 3 and 4 were on the
"f*'L5^'** °' strike force, slightly behind BLUE 1
and 500 ft higher.
223
EVENT 1-34
5. INITIAL DETECTION
SLUE 3 heard MIC warning fron 310 EYE/BIG LOOK about 15 Jtc before MIGs were sl?;Sited
visually. BLUE 1,2, and 1 received r.o MIG warnlne and BLUE 3 did not have tine to warn
th.— . i)«fore MICs were slnhted. BLUE rilzht was In a slow left turn followlni; the A-4
3t:-lki.« force. The flight had Just passed through a heading of 360 when MICa 1
ani 2 were sighted by BLUE 2 at 10 o'clock, co-altltude.
«. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 3 called out MIGs to flight. BLUE flight broke left and simultaneously lit
af tec burners. BLUK 2 assumed flight lead since BLUE 1 had not sighted HICa. BLUE flight
r.ct y.lG flight he.id-on and began a series of individual attacks on KIGs 1 and 2. MIGs
3 and were sighted ana attacked, after the initial encounter* by individual members
sr rLL'E flight.
7. SITUATION DEVtlOPHENT
During the Initial series of turns after the MIG sighting, the engagement became a
"cne-on-one" situation with no flight Integrity. On the Initial head-on pass, BLUB 2 fired
a ffw ireffectlve ?Orrxi rounas at KIG 1. BLUE 3 also fired with no apparent results. After
the l:i:-lal pass, ELUK 1 resured the lead, with BLUE 2 on his wing, and began a series of
si'.^irp scissor maneuvers with MIG 1 who was ultimately des':roy»d by BLUE 1 using a SIDE-
VINlJSR. BL'JE 3 and 'i countered KIG 2, who had detached fron 'MG 1, in an engagement
daring which three SIOEWir.'CEfIS were fired with no favorable results.
Two additional aircraft, MIGs 3 and *, were seen at irregular Intervals, and
engaged by individual elements of BLUE flight. BLUE 1 damaged HIO 4 with 20miQ cannon
fire.
S. OROKANCE
BLUE 1
(No. fired/No. hits)
SIDEWIHOSn
AIH-9D
2/1
Guns
20min
175 rds
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
BLUE 4
XIO 1, 2. 3, 4
9.
2/0
2/0
2/0
125 rds
100 rds
0
Remarks
First SIDEVIKDER may have guided on
false target; missed actual target.
Second SIDEWINDER guided and detonated;
direct hit. Fired approximately 150
rds of 20™n at fleeting, long-range
targets; 25 rds fired behind MIO 4
damaged wing. Both lower 20ffln
guna Inoperative due to electrical
malfunction .
Neither missile guided. Fired approxl*
nately 25 rds at fleeting, long-range
targets; 100 rds of 20mm fired In two
bursts with unknown results before
guns Jammed.
Neither missile guided. Fired 100 rds
of 20mm at fleeting targets with
unknown results.
First missile guided but fell short
of opening target; second missile did
not guide. Duns would not fire.
No ordnance expenditure observed; no
missiles carried.
EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1, 2, 3. and 4: See Paragraph 8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 2: Gunsight inoperative: No yaw stability:
10. AIRCREW COHNENTS
Experience
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
BLUE 4
224
Total
Hours
4500
2300
Combat
Missions
170
No aileron/rudder interconnect.
Remarks
I
e
I
e
e
B
B
I
B
B
B
B
B
6
B
B
B
B
B
i
a
a
a
Q
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
! 0
a
EVENT 1-34
Ct'ia urita on Ihin Encounter
F-8 wapons 3ysf;ems . alr-to-alr mtsslles and 20r.m cannon, l>est for
air coxbat L.I^uJ^Hng where ;i.ual identification is a preliminary requiren«nt.
siDr.wi::i;.i.H mssiie with short range ClOOO ft), hlgh-g, and low-altitude capability
coald have been used to ROOd effect.
The S!nE'*I!;DER (AlM-9) needs a range indicator.
"I would nave had him If aiy guns had worked."
The MIGs did not appear to fight well. There was never any P-8 In trouble.
IK DATA SOURCES
i TcvU-ct Interviews : KeasaRes, Reports;
'•■I'lw 1 17 T'ini".rv 1967 CTQ 77-3 120822Z June 66
I: i'uoi:^?r 1966 CTG 77.3 120933". June 66
VVK % 16 Karch 1967 CTO 77-3 121513:. June 66
B.At 3, lt> Larcti 190/ ^^^^ 121733Z June 66
USS HANCOCK I6I&OOZ June 66
Other:
USAF Fighter Weapons Center CAD Bulletin :io. 7 cc ^ I'cc uiwrnrif frvA iqi
Alr-to-Mr Klsslle Weapon System FliP;ht Sepcrt 12 fijo" ^^S HAN^^^ (CVA-19)
Air C0T.bat Report {CPJfAV Form SB^^O-^) 12 Jun 66, fron ";-,"^'';:OCK (c;a-19)
DEC Rep. "cno of 16 Jun 66, Analysis of Encounter by USS nA..CCCK Aircraft.
CIKCPACrLT ID:-'. Report, So utheast Asia Air rncldL-nts
CIllCPACFLT Staff Study H-'jo
CIllCPACFLT Staff Study 13-60 .
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ♦
BLUK flight was m a slight left-hand turr. following « "^J^^/?;" ',Jf
was in a right turn. The strike force was at a very low altitude (approximately ;t )
jrthev approached a heading of north. BLUH 1 and 2 were at 2500 ft on the left of the
"r5'ke for?e! and ELUE 3 and ^ were at 3000 ft on the right °'*the strike force ELLE 2
s ?hted a boeey at 3 mi. 10 o'clock, and slightly high (Tq) and "llfj^t?^ ""Ji^;**!;.^ ,
?l5e fllei.t broke left and split into two sections. BLUE 2 assumed the ^"J "i^"^;^"-^, J
°nui;f EtOrfr 2! .inc. Iloe fllsM lo.t J„ of «. ln-..srltjr .ft.r Tj.
BLUE 1
BLUE 1 sighted MIG 1 as the two flights initially net head-on. KIG 1 continued
his left turn and BLUE 1. resuming the lead, broke right to counter (T2). A series of
Siarp sclsso; m^euvers Ensued at%ltltudes up to 4000 ft with BLUE 1 slowly KjlninS
offenalve. During these maneuvers. BLUE 1 fired approxiniatelyiSO rounds °f ^Cmm with no oh-
served results. BLUE 1 finally was in position (3/tt ml) behind MIO who in a right
5^ nosedown 3-g turn at i^OO let. Prom this position, BLUE 1 fired his first ^Pf«^DER
whlJS guided temporarily and then fell off to the ri^ht without detonating. It la believed
^hat this missile guided on a cloud reflection since it was fired against a scattered
c?oud Sackcround (T, Bl. MIC 1 then rolled wings level, and BLUE 1 frer. a position of
1/2 Si behind fired^hls second SIDEWINDER. This missile detonated at the tall of
the MIC and parts of MIC I's win^ and tall were seen to come off before ne p unged out
S con?rSr(Tu)B!. After BLUE 1 had destroyed MIO 1. he noticed MIOs 3 and In an orbit
9 o'clock high at about ^000 ft (T5}B1. BLUE 1 had no difficulty In fuming the 6 o'clock
Dosltlon b'^hlnd :tIG 1. Prom this position BLUE 1 fired 30 rounds of 2Crr.T. and Inflicted
damage (probable kill) to the right wing of KIG 4 before he unexpecteoiy ran out of
SnLLrion (T6)Bl. An electrical malfunction prevented the lower guns fron firing.
BLUE 1 then exited the area and returned to his ship (TyjBl.
225
BLUE 2
EVENT 1-34
BLUE 2 passed the section lead to BLUE 1 after the Initial enc.->unter with MIC 1 and
2 (Tj). As BLUE 1 maneuv*»r«d for poslt.lo(i on MIG 1, BLUE 2 at.ayed as wlnsrman until he
detached when MIC 3 leveled 2ff at 3000 ft. SLUE 2 atte.Tipted to fire a SIDEWIHDER frora
MIG 3*3 7 o'clock poslllcn, about 500 ft high, and at a ran(z;e of l/^ ml. BLUE 2 was In
a slight nose-down attitude, with a good tone, and pulling r.ore than gs when he fired
at KIG 3. The nlsslle huni;. A second missile was iRnedlately selected and fired but
It did not guide and went ballistic (Tj)S2.
BLUE 2 then broke right to exit the area but noticed KI2 d pass hla 12 o'clock
position, low at 1500 ft. .'^LUS 2 easily took position behind HZG t and fired about 60
rounds of 20rj3 without the aid of a gunslght. As he continued to close to a range of
about lOOC ft behind KIG <i. he opened fire again with 20ina, but his guns failed after
15 rounds (T4)B2. BLUE 2 retired at high speed (Tj)B2.
BLUE _ J
BLUE 3 fired a few Ineffective rounds of 20irjn at MIG 2 on the initial head-on paas
(Tj) at an altitude of 3000 ft. After crossing MIG 2, BLUE 3 began a 3g climbing )eft
turn from which he was able to observe ^IG 2 cominence his unorthodox rolling spllt-S
maneuver (Tj). As MIC 2 recovered in a high g, iow-altltude pullout, with BL^'K rollowlng,
BLUE 3 was able tc gain his 5 o'clock position frozi which he attempted tc laur-Jh two SIDE-
WINDER missiles from a distance of about 1500 ft {73)03. The first missile was slrw In
firing, and the second was then flrea in such a way that both missiles left the aircraft
at almost the saT.e tL-ne. AC the i.istant of firing, MIG 2 was in a hard right turn, pulling
about 'tgs, and cllr.bing fast. Though BLUE 3 had a tene, both SIDEWIMCERS missed. As MIG
2 turned past BL'JE 3, BLUE 3 climbed straight ahead, saw MIG 3 (Ttt)B3, and maneuvered his
airplane Into a posltlcn from which he was able to fire a few 20m.'n rounds as MIG 3 ducked
Into a cloud (15)83. BLUE 3 followed MIC 3 into clouds, but was unable to regain a visual
sighting. BLUE 3 then departed the area at high speed (75).
BLUE »
BLUE * gained the 6 o'clock poaltlon on HIG 2 at 3500 ft of altitude, and closed to
within a few hurjdred feet. He was unable to fire his 2Cmi due to a malfunction. MIG 2
commenced a 225* roll to the left and recovered in a spllt-S r.aneuver. MIG 2 almost
collided with the ground. SLUE ii in following MIG 2 recovered fron the dive by pulling
in excess of 7g (T5}B^, On recovering from his oullout, BLUE U regained the 6 o'clock
position on MIG 2 (after BLUE 3 had fired his Kisslles at MIG 2) and launched a SIDEWIIIOER
at an altitude of 30C0 ft although BLUE 1 was decelerating anu range was Increasing (Ti|)B4.
The missile guided well tut fell short of the target as MIG 2 passed through a sttibII cloud.
BLUE 1 lost sight of XIC 2 and while engaged In evasive clearing turns he observed MIG >i
and launched his second SIDEWINDER, without a ir.lsslle tone, at an altitude cf 3000 ft,
450 let, at a ran?e of 1-1/2 t.I. The missile did not guide. DI.UE ^ was In a slight cllnblng
attitude at missile launch (T5)B'). SLUE »» retired frora the area (T6)Bit.
The A-'t strike force exited the area without being engaged by the MIGs.
s
Eza c:3 Ecia cia
n Ea C3 era c:::^> csi
EVENT I-34SUHME1
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2. 3. M
Other Friendly
CoMunicattons |
Cnevy Actions
(HIG 1 .2.3,4)
Reaiarks
T i -
Mark
Status
Action
^0
Bl , 2 at 2000 ft
B3. 4 at 2500 ft
400-450
Fuel 4500 lb
82 sights MlGs at 10
o'clock, night breaks
left. Afterburners en-
Kjaged. 82 assumes lead.
Strike force de-
parting target at
ICOO ft
BZ calls MlGs at V
10 o'clock, !«
slightly high; ji
calls for left
break
IGs approaching in I
asy left turn;
escending slightly
<lCs appeared to
it 6C1 controlled
to a trailing
position on BLUE
f 1 ight
^1
BLUE flight if.
clinbing attitude
to engage HIGs
82, 3 fire 20«« *t
Ml. 2
strike force
continued to exit
area
n and 2 do not
Fire
Dl does not see
Nl and 2. 82 takes
section 1
to engage Ml.
^2
81 and 2 split to engage
HI . 8 3 and 4 counter H2 .
Bl and 2 start series «f
scissor maneuvers with
MI . F i re 20b» inter-
mi ttently
Strike force has
exited area
>41 and 2 passed j
under BLUE flight.
n\ continues in
easy 3g left turn,
WZ starts split-S.
Ml is silver. M2
ts grey. Neither
has external tanks
nor o^d'^^^C^
2000 ft
350-400 kt
Weather: Many
scattered clouds In
area
81 gains position on
Ml and fires SIDCUINDCR
62 had previously
detached to engage
H3
Ml then rol Is ngs
level . Appears to
ie returning to
itome base
Missile guided
improperly. Possibly
on a cloud
^4(81
2000 ft
350-400 kt
Bl fires second
SIOEWINOER *t Ml. Mis-
sile detonated properly
and destroyed Hi
!11 in level
attitude
Ml appears headed
for home base at
2000 ft.
2500 ft
Climbing
Bl breaks right after
destroying Ml and
notices H3 and 4 heading
east
43 and 4 in level
formation
Enemy aircraft
appear to be tn
orbi t
^6(81
4000 ft levtl
3S0 kt
Bl gains 6 o'clock
position behind M4 and
fires 30 rds of 20aB
before exhausting
a««unition. Right Ming
of M4 danAgcd
M4 continues In
straight and level
attitude
I
4
EVEWT 1-34 SUMMARY 1 Continued)
TUc
M«rk
Action A1rcr«rt (BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4)
St»tu»
Act 1 on
Other FrUndly
CoMinuiilCAtlons
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1 .2.3.4)
7(B))
4000 ft
650 ft
ai exits are* at high
speed
3(32]
360O ft
400 kt
I
B2 has detached fron Bl
on seeing M3. Fires
SIOEUINOCR froM range of
3/4 oil . Missile hung.
Second missile immedi-
ately selected and fi red
Did not guide and goes
ballistic
4(82)
1500 ft
400 kt approx
On breaki ng right to e«l \
area 82 notices H4 at
U o'clock, low. Assumes
6 o'clock position and
fires a total of 9S rds
of 20«n before guns fail
5<B2)
B2 exits area at
high speed
3(B3)
2500 ft and cli«b1n
rapi dly
4 g*s on aircraft
_ gained M2*5 5 o'clock
position as he recovered
from his evasive spiit-5
followed by B4. B3
launched two SIOEUINOEk
missiles that missed the
target
M3 and 4 continue
No evasive action
employed by HIGs
H3 is level at
3000 ft. No
evasi ve maneuvers
attempted
M3 is brown in
color
M4 attempted no
evasive maneuvers
M4 was brown or
dark grey in
color
No change noted
MZ Mas rapidly
turning and pulling
about 4 g's and
climbing fast
I
**^^1ciimbing straight
and level
450 kt
B3 climbed straight
ahead and noticed H3
lr,.B,|B3 gained M3's 6
^'^^'o'clock position
anti f i red a few
20n'n rds wi thoot
results before M3
ducked into cloud
K3 was not man-
euvering. 3S00 ft
at 450-500 kt
level flight
ho ciiange
Enemy appeared to
be in a wide
orbit. Gentle
left turn
r
EVtWT I'i* SUHHAffY (Continued)
^31B4)
TIM
H«rtt
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3, 4}
StBtMS
4(B4}
5(84)
6(84)
B3 attenpted to locate
M3 1 n cloud m1 ttiout
results. Departed area
at high speed
3000 ft In «
citabfng pullout
B4 gained M2's 6
o' clock pos i ti on in the
split-S dive. Unable to
fire 20nffl due to
nal function
3800 ft in sHght
Slight cIlBbIng
attitude
Action
S4 regains M2*s 6
o'clock position and
fires SIDEUUOtR that
nisguides as HZ gott
into cloud
14 while doing evasive
turn sees H4 and fires
SIDEWINDER without tone.
Kissi le falls short of
target
Other Fr1entl1>
Communications
Fuel 2»00 lb
}4 eilti area at high
speed Mhile going to
lower altitude
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1,2,3.4)
;('kRMwn
KZ recovers from
dive at high>g and
very low altitude
H2 tiucks Into cloud
at high speed,
cl imbi ng and turn-
ing
M4 appears , does
no maneuver to
eva<te
Remarks
Maneuver by HZ
appeared to
be for purpose
of causing pursuer
(HA) to rjn Into
gro:jnd
82 loses sight
of HZ in cloud
Unknown
I
IT
n
0
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
Q
EVENT 1-35
Aircraft Involved: Two P-tBs va slow-spee^
prop aircraft (possibly
^ COLTS) (nlgfit engagenent)
ri"!^ Result: One enemy aircraft probably
\j destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«00' H/106»00'E
Route Package V
Q\, PRiMARr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tire: lU Jun I966/OOOH
Two F-Ub alrc-aft BLUE I and CPEEN 1 (the aircraft were from different squadrons)
OvPi* en VandlticT decn-alert on the USS RANGER {CVA-6I) to be launched when required
arHnsJ a' - "•'•'ace " a-ge s . Per Condition 1 the aircraft are on the catapults and the
Juot 3r.5*R:o':n i.^e cccKpUs .Un all preflight checks completed and startlnR units
plugc<-*»^ in 'o perxlt launch In mini aura time.
3 2. MISSION ROUTE
Initial oc: vector after launcn was 320«. 165 al from USS RAKCER to targeta In
vlclnl*-y of ao^OO'N/lOb^CO'E.
Q3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-hB SL'JZ 1 a-.j CREKN 1
2 - SPARROV (Ai:-'-7E)
2 - SIDHWlNL'r.R (a:M-93)
Q»l - LAU-3 (2.75" rocket pods)
6 - KK-211 llluiT.inatlng flares
I - 600 -gal external fuel tank.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : About 12,000-ft overcast. Raking It very black.
Aircraft on Condition 1 deck-alert as Indicated In paragraph 1
5. INITIAL DETECTION
At l«i00l5K, USS COCKTZ on station vicinity ig'SCNVlOT^OO'E reported air radar contact
vicinity 20*00' :;/lC6"00'E. At 0027K, contact evaluated as two aircraft below 5000 ft
In left orbit. .Flares reported In area of contact. Apparently enemy aircraft assisting
in attack against friendly surface forces.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Condition 1 deck-alert aboard the USS RANGER (BLX 1 and GREEN I) was launched and
vectored 320o» 165 mi at OOilOH.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 and CREEK 1, after clearance to shoot froa the USS C00NT2 and necessary
coordination to ensure against shooting at each other, made separate low-altltude
full-radar attacks assisted by the COONTZ. BLUE 1 fired two SPARROW nissllea, one of
which hit and downed an enemy aircraft. CRESM I fired one SPARROW which was observed
to explode and probably downed a second eneiny aircraft. Later analysis revealed air-
craft were probably COLTS.
6. ORDNANCE
(No. flredA'o. hits)
SPARROW
AIM-7E Remarks
BLUE 1 2/1 Ho motor l^iition. Short In umbilical cord.
GREEN 1 1/1
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None (See 8).
235
.1
10. AIRCREW COHHEHTS ' t*'**' l'^*
Eiperlence
Total Combiit
Hours Hours Mlsalons Remarks
BLUE 1
Pront Not obtained
Bask ..—.——Not obtained————
CREEW 1
Front 3100 1000 90 Had fired approxtmately 20 AIM
raloslles (SIDEWINDER and SPARROW),
Back Had only been Mith squadron a month.
His first tour as RIO.
Comments on thla Encounter
BLUE 1 Front
A 8lngle>aeat aircraft could not have carried out this operation.
More than one friendly aircraft In the area at night or In bad weather CQmplleates
the »ltuBtlon. Better If there Is only one.
GREEN 1 Front
Control switched from the RANGER to the C00NT2 before the attack was made. This was
a amootfi transition requiring no frequency change; the COOHTZ Just started to control.
The COCNTZ tried to run a elosed>control CGI, but was having problems due to low altitude
of the engagement. Actually ran our own control with the COON'TZ providing supplementary
vectors.
C0ONT2 tried to break off the engagemenr as the target passed over the beach. Since
Z was rapidly approaching firing position, I pressed on.
Never saw the enemy aircraft. Later analysis indicated they were probably COLTS.
One aircraft would have been better for this particular mission. Should have held
one aircraft in reserve to reduce the confusion factor.
Impossible to identify aircraft at night, must have authority to ahoot.
Was "squawking;*' IFF on this mission. Probably of no help to COONTZ because of
ground clutter.
Comments froa Overall Experience
QREEN 1 Front
Firm believer In two-seater aircraft with two engines. Back seater Is a must for
intercept missions such as this one and for night attack missions. Feel that many alr~
craft have been saved by having the extra set of eyes on night missions.
Quns wouia be most valuable for the RESCAP role but not particularly valuable In
the alr-to>alr role. However, do need a close-in weapon capability in the 2000- to
1000-ft range.
Would like tall warning gear in P-^s for SAMs to tell when they are fired. Peel
available SAH radar warning gear of little value because It creates mass confusion and
disrupts the mission. Wants to know when the missile la about to be fired or has been
fired.
11. DATA SOURCES
Projeet Inverviews ; BLUE 1« Front and Back - 3 November 1966
QREEN 1, Front - 13 January 1967
GREEN 1, Back - 18 January 1967
Messages. Reports :
CIO 77.1. OPREP 3. 132309Z June 1966
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
At IftOOlSH, USS COONTZ reported air radar contact vicinity 20*00' N/loe^OO* E. At
0027H» the contact was evaluated as two aircraft, below 5030 ft in a port orbit dropping
flares to support KVil attack on friendly surface forces.
At OQiiOH, two P-JiBs (BLUE 1 and QREEN 1) were launched from the USS RANGER and
vectored to Intercept the enemy aircraft 320^/165 mi. OCI control switched to the
UBS COONTZ lo'-ated approximately 19*30' K/107*00'E at about OO^OH «it which time the vector
was 315*/65 ml.
236
EVENT |.3$
BLUE 1 launcht^ first, followeil by CHEEH I. Both aircraft Jettlaoned LAU-3, ?.*75"
rockvt pods and KK-?!* flares after take-off, leaving two srARFOW and two SIDEWIKDER
in addition to a 6C0-gal external fuel tank per aircraft.
Tq The P-iBs proceeded on course at about 10,000 ft at 600-kt TAS. GREEN 1 was 15-20
ml In trail on BLUE 1.
Both aircraft accocpllshed radar system checks and tuned SPARROW r.lsslles en route.
Clearance to shoot was isiven &y USS COONTZ approximately 40 ml from the target. Klsslles
were armd at that tine. Flares were observed by both P-uds.
Ti BLUE 1 did not have radar contact upon closing with the target and executed a 360*
rieht turn. GREEN 1 had radar contact at approximately 36 n ml. Tarret was low. The
COONTZ Indicated the two eneny aircraft were in a left orbit between ^CO-1300 ft.
GREEN 1 reduced altitude to 500 ft, airspeed to dOO-kt TAS.
Tp As GREEN 1 approached firing range, he was not certain of the whereabouts of BLUE 1.
GREEN 1 requested BLUE 1 to turn out to the east to clear the area.
As CREEN 1 catne Into firing range, the target was turning hard rl£ht. GREEK 1 made
a 360* right turn at 500-ft altitude approximately 1 g's trying to get into flrine
position. Had two chances to fire, but did not because of uncertainty as to the loca^-
tion of BLUE 1.
T4 BLUE 1 and GREEN 1 exchansed position information using the C00:i7Z TACAN. GREE:i 1
requested BLUE 1 come in from the south and he (GP£EN 1) would clear area to the east.
Te BLUE 1 received vector from COCNTZ 290*/l8 ml and had radar lock-on at 8 ml. Did
not fire SPARROW because his estimate of GREEN l*s position, based upon exchange of TACAN
position information, was only 3 nl from the target.
Tg BLUE 1 got break X (minimum missile firing range) at about 2 ml, saw two red lights,
flew toward tnem.
T7 BLUE 1 passed within 20 ft of the two enemy aircraft which were recognized by their
interior (cockpit) red lights. Aircraft were in a hard left turn toward BLUE 1 at 700 ft.
Cockpits were large and rectangular and BLUE 1 j'udged them to be prop aircraft because of
their shape.
Tg BLUE 1 executed a 360** left turn and received an additional vector from the COCNTZ.
T9 BLUE 1 got radar lock-on heading 300*, 700 ft, it50-kt, head-on aspect slightly nose-
up attitude.
TjO 0116K BLUE 1 fired first SPARROW- missile at ^ ml, no motor ignition.
T-i-i BLUE 1 fired second missile at 3-1/2 ml. Explosion was observed approximately 2
sec later. GREE;.' 1 heard BLUE 1 call POX (missile away) and observed the SPARROW
flight and explosion. C00KT2 reported losing radar contact on one target after this
explosion. ApproxlT.ate time and location of this shoot down was OII6H at 20*09* N/106"17*E.
BLUE 1 called he was breaking out to the east.
T19 GREEN 1 made radar contact at 12 ml, had lock-on at 8 ml as target passed over the
beach on a westerly heading and descending.
Tx3 GREEN 1 doing 1*00-500 kt with 300* kt overtake.
Til, GREEN 1 climbed to about 3500 ft as he passed over the coastline 'than fired one
SPARROW slightly .nose-down, attitude, 2-21/2- to 3-ml range. CREEH 1 saw the SPARROW come
off, guide and detonate at the proper time.
T15 The radar broke lock after the explosion. BLUE 1 made a hard left turn after the
radar broke lock and proceeded back over water. Approximate time and location was OliSH
at 20"05'N/106«11'E.
The C00N7Z reported no more contaeta. The two F-4B8 were released and recovered
aboard the RANGER.
A night low-altitude full radar Intercept assisted by the GCI radar aboard the
COONTZ, although complicated by coordination problems between the two F-^iBs, resulted
in one probable kill.
237
1
3
EVENT 1-35 SUMMARY
Pw mil BB^^^^Bl -
1 1 me
Hark
Action Aircraft (GREEN 1. BLUE I)
Other Frlcndlles
Comnuni cations
Enemy Actions
Reaiarlts
Status
Action
To
10,000 ft
600-kt TAS
315'
61 tn 20-in1 trail
"behind Bl got
radar contact at
36 ffll . Bl does
not yet have
radar contact.
Bl and 61 de-
scending to low
altitude for the
Intercept and
slowing down
USS RANGER pro-
vided initial
vectors. Function
later taken over
by USS COONTZ w/o
channel change
Two enemy flare
drop aircraft In
left orbit SOO-
1SQ0 ft
Enemy aircraft held by
USS COONTZ radar.
COONTZ was controlling
F<4Bs and had gl ven
clearance to fire at
40 ml.
h
500-ft alt
•^300-kt TAS
Z 9
B 1 did not have
radar contact.
Hade 360* right
turn .
Bl advised G1
turning to the
r1 ght.
500 ft
400-kt TAS
G1 approached
SPARROW firing
range. Did not
fire because, he
was not certain
of 81'$ posi-
tion.
G1 asked Bl to
break out to
the east. 61
acknowledged
and conplled.
Target a 1 rcraf t
In hard right
turn
son ft
400-ict TAS
< 9
61 attempting
to position to
fire SPARROU.
Had two chances
to fire but
did not due to
uncertainty of
Bl 's position.
Bl and 61 ex-
change position
inforaation
using the
COONTZ TACAN.
In hard right
turn
U
61 turned to
heading 90' to
start time pat-
tern ta provide
separation on Bl .
Gl advised Bl
to come In frofli
the S and that
Gl was clearing
to the E.
ti n C'l-:^ ^rrry rr-y f^.::y -a ir j c.,:? q
u
Ik
r
tVEHT I-3S SUHKARY (Continued)
Time
Action Aircraft (GReEN 1. BLU£ ))
Other Frlendlles
Communications
EncRy Actions
Rema rks
nark
Status
Action
B) turned to
290* to follow
C00NT2 vector
1 n$ true ti on
Gl proceeded
to the i.
COONTZ gave Bl
vector 290*,
la mi .
Bl and Gl stiU
exchanging posi-
HO>l inTv rnio 1 1 un
\
700 ft
Bl got lock-on
but did not fire
because his
estimate of
Gl's position
was 3 mi f roffl
target. Got
break X at T,
approxima tely
2 lal.
•
h
700 ft
340- to 350-kt
TAS
D 1 passed within
20 ft of prop-
type a i rc raf t in
hard left turn.
Bl made left turn.
Enemy aircraft In
hard left turn
\
SI continued left
to follow COOKTZ
vector of 300*
COONTZ gave Bl
addl tlonal
intercept
vector.
700 ft
4$0-kt TAS
300'
Bl radar contact
approKiMately 12
n1
Proceeding overland
in apparent effort
to evade F-4Bs .
ho
750 ft
450-kt TAS
300*
Bl fired one
SPARROW at 4 mi.
No notor Ignition
Bl called FOX
(missi le away)
CVENT N35 SUHHARY (Continu ed)
Time
Mark
Status
Action
Other Friendlles
Connunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
Remarks
hx
750 ft
4S0-kt TAS
3C0"
Time
00] 6H
81 fired second
SPARROW at 3-1/2
mi . Missile ex-
pi oded after
about 2 sec.
Gl observed
SPARROW flight
and explosion,
B1 right turn
to 90* to
clear area
for Gl
COONTZ reported
'loss Of radar
target at explo-
tlon tlire.
Bl stated he was
breaking out to
the E.
400- to 450-kt
TAS
Gl got radar
contact at
}?. in i .
400- to 4S0-kt
TAS
Gl radar 1 ock-on ,
overtake speed
on target
approximately
300-kt (frorii
rsda r )
CPONTZ called 61
•too are Bp-
proaching feet
dry, break it off."
61 continued attack due
to Idea) conditions and •
rapid closure rate.
3000-3S0O ft
450-kt TAS
Tine
OOIBH
G) had climbed
Slightly as ht
approached beach
at 3S00 ft. nosed
ovvr, had good
missile Indica-
tion (2 lights).
Fired one
SPARROW in nose-
down attitude at
2-1/2- to 3-«»
range.
Going for the deck
to evade
SPARROW appeared to guide
and detonate at an appro-
priate tine. The radar
broke lock after the
detonation.
h5
61 broke left
and departed
the area.
81 and 61
returned to
RANGER.
COONTZ advised no
■ore targets
I
«9 ^Sj^ <^ *
Gl SS9 «9
■» ». • » » ,
4 V
UM^t. I&JJ OF i: rO^STirsM
J 9
il s
S* rn
sr £ =
(0
T3
8. *
C
n
£?,
o
o
CO
SITUATION OLVELOPMENT (Continued) * EVENT 1-36
BLUE 3 returned brrnlnd CREEN 1, saw BLUE 1 af.;t transr.li t- i , "F-8 you have a MIC on
your tall." After otiSt-Tvlns; BLUE 1 craoh, BLUti then detc-wV-d MIC on his own tall,
within ranee and rirlng;. He aroke Into the KIG Jitid reallzea h« could nut out-maneuver
RIG due to previous AA Jair.age. He then selectcJ aftert'urner to open on IIICJ and exited
the area. Tlie MIG followe:! BLUE 3 for a tine tnen dls-.-nraf-'. J, and turr.f^d l80'. BLUE 3
detected KIG In turn, i-eversed ana Utstroyed yJG w\ih SIS'Jo IIILjKR. BLUE 3 then exited
with extremely low fuel. The four P-3s had used aftertjurner Intermlttuntly .
8. ORON^NCC
SIDEWINCER
AIH-9D
(No. rired/Ko. hits)
BLUE
BLUE
Unknown
1/0
1/1
20nni
Unknown
75 rds
None
BLUE 3
GREEN 1
MIG 1
MIG 2, 3,
MIG 5
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None
20-25 rds
1/1
None
1/0
Remarks
Suspect. BI.UH 1 did net fire.
Kits vlUi <fOmm. Miitslle
firing rart£;e unknown. Did not
guide -- possibly due to abrupt
plteh-up MIG at firing.
Plred r.t al. Left missile would
not rirc. hlght r.lsslle guided well
and exploded by tall of HIO.
Plred h:i.:;h z» ^i^t.*'' anp.lc off. No
hit observed. Guns Jammed.
Killed SLUE 1.
Plred at BLUE 3, no hits.
BLUE 1 - None known.
BLUE 2 - None.
BLUE 3 - Left missile did not leave launcher when flrcJ.
GREEN 1 - 2O1SID quit after 25 rds fired.
:OKHENTS
10. AiaCREU
Experience
BLUE 3
GREEN 1
Comments on This Encounter and from Overall Experience
BLUE 3 - F-8 tops as fighter ~ needs little Improvenor.t . P-8 does need bop« reli-
able guns. Do not need second man In a fighter. Acceleration end dticeltratlon capability
L. ^t important In a fighter.
BLUE 2, 3t GREEN 1 - MIGa tended to make all turns lo left.
Total
Hours
1000
1700
Combat
Missions
>50
about 100
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
Messages, ReportsT
BLUE 3, 3 Nov 66: GREEN 1, 21 Jan 67
Air Combat Report (OP»AV Porm 3^*50 ) for BLUE and GREEN
P-6E Combat- Performance Report - CVA-I9/O3, 3310, SerU.l: 003^, 25 Jun 66 (OEO Memo
analysis of MIG encouittar by USS HANCOCK aircraft
21 Jun 66)
CTO 77.3 Msg 2122tt6Z Jun 66
COMUSMA'^V Msg 25II56Z Aug 66
CO 1st HAV OPREP-tt 21I202Z Jun 66
CTG 77.3 OPREP-3 2110062 Jun 66 Chg 1
CTO 77,3 OPREP-3 2107ii^Z Jun 6fi
CTG 77.3 OPREP-3 2108122 Jun 66
USS HAtiCOCK Msg Zll'i'in Jun 66
CTO 77.3 OPPEP-3 212?U6Z Jun 66 Ci^^, 3
CTG 77.3 OPHEP-3 2liQUUZ Jun 66 Chg 1
CTO 77.3 OPREP-3 21122SZ Jun 66
CINCPACFLT Mag 30233'*2 Jun 66
USAP Fighter Weapons Center Bulletin *7
Alr-to-Alr Missile Weapon System Flight Report llND-FX.nAEG-6ei1/'i for BLUE 2 and 3
Statementa : BLUE 2, 3 and GREEN 1
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION f^/^f^'^^^^ EVENT 1-36
GHtEM 1 launch«.<<) aa photo escort with an R:'-8 from C\'i.~iO as photo recce for rKllway
northeast of Hanoi. HL'JE flight launched as strlite fllf^Nt escort and TARCAP and proceeded
to target (See para 1 and 2).
Tfie photo and escort connenced their run aa plannffd. Arsproxlmately "3 mi from the
start, the photo pl.in*? took an AA hit and cau::!iL fire. The- pJlot turned l80*» to exit and
had to eject. GREKN 1 otiserved :he crash sc»;r;s find took GAR orblL whlJt; broadcasting
Ion guaid for SAH assistance. b:,LI£ flight, wh'.U* on TAH'^A:', heard the escort broadcast.
BLUE fJlRht procoeae-u to the sce.no (as soon sir. the atrlk.; /roup exited fro::; the target),
with U? rron GREE-'I 1 eriei-gency calls. GREEH 1 Joined wit,;; hi.ijii fllsht as a section leader
" ' with blue: 3 on his wing and both sections took up SAR or-':>it (ltjOO>2000 tl) lookinK for the
downed pilot.
IDuilnE the orbit BLUE 3 took an AA hit In hi:; rlf,hr. elevator from intense AA fire
locateu by the rallroail Just west of the dowru'd pilot, hl.l',-; 3 decided to remain on station.
GREEN 1 and BLUE 3 sighted the downed pilot Ju::t c-tist of thr- ridge line which was acknowl-
edged by an orange flare and BLU-i: 1 and 2 cllrrrir-d to cr.':i.:)ct SAR forces. At 6000-7000 ft»
BLUE 1 heard SAM warning; In his area and doscff.'idod to bf.'ir.v ovorcast and resumed orbit.
BLUE 1 checked flight fuel state and sent CRKrJ:; 1 and Pt. 2 home sln':e they were approach-
ing low fuel state. Prior to leaving all bLUK A'lD CREE'; crews saw an orange flare.
Shortly thereafter, BLUE 1 called "MIGs,'- (T^). ^■i i:.'.'JH 2 crossed from BLUE I's left
,.. to right he looked up e.nd saw a section cf KrG--i7s (MIG 3 and 2) coring out of the clouds
500 ft above, at 1-2 o'clock and l/u to 1/2 ml Jsway. l^L!r: 2 pitched up and fired 75 rds
20Run, close range at MIC 2. As XIO ? passed, f-LUE 2 of.;i'.*rved fuel streaming from t'dG 2's
wing, believed caused by SOrin, and this was credited as b kill. The MIO section split with
HIG 2 diving for the deck. BLUE 2 bro''e left and down, ;:7t a harsh SIDEVItiDER tone on KIQ
r 2 and fired — range unknown. MIG 2 pitched uf ls BLUE ? fired tall^on and the SIDEVrZNOER
did not guide, due either to excess range or target inati«uvi.'r.
The action cf BLUE 1 and MIG 1 was net cbserved rr::.i the tire BLUE 2 pitched up to
fire on .MIG 2 (Ti) until SLUE 1 was observed ty ^LUE 3 o:; .'"ire from a HIO firing in trail
(Ti|). Sudpect .^IC 1 followed BLUE 1 undetected tiy BLUH 1.
I At BLUE I's tally ho, GREEK 1 and BLUE 3 wore 2-3 r.l to the east 3000 ft exiting area.
i.- GREEN 1 and BLUE 3 ir.-r.edlately reversed hard left, to roturn and enrage. BLUE 3 could not
turn with GREEN 1 (?ue to aircraft darr.az'i and followed 1-1/2 ml in trail to GREEN 1.
Shortly after GREEN' 1 rolled out of his turn, h-:- objervod t.wo MICs (MIG 3, '*) (T-,) diving
1 out of the clouds at 2 o'clock, 200 ft. In a rlt^ht turn in Afl. GREEN 1 f^ulled hard
! ■ causing MIG 3 to pass out in front, at high ancl'^ off fanJ ?,tteir.pted a 20rjn firing pass.
' ' The guns Jammed after 25 rds.
BLUE 3 returned 1-1/2 ml behind GREEtl 1 at 500 ft ITj^) and saw a MIG behind an F-8
on the deck. BLUE 3 transnltted , "F-6 you have a KIG on yo'jr tall." Kc then saw the HIG
guns firing, and the F-8 tall burst into flame-.-., after wr.lih he observed the F-8 pilot
eject. BLUE 3 then checked his own tall and savr a MIQ {I'.IQ 5) In range end firing.
BLUE 3 broke Into the MIG but could not counter due to dtimncc austaincd previously by AA.
BLUE 3 then dlsenga>-ed.
As CRF.EH 1 finished his firing pass on MIG 3, he hof.rd BLUE 3's transmission and
disengaged from KIC 3 and 'i, selected AB and dived to chock his tall. During GREEN I's
maneuverlne to clear his tall, he observed a flr-oball later confirmed to be BLUE 1.
GREEN 1 then exited to the east due to low fufl slate.
As BLUE 3 departed to the east with MIC In trail oponJnp, he observod a MIG (KIO 5)
to break off attack (Tg) and corjrcnce an easy left turn. As soon as BLUE 3 ascertained
that MIG 5 had di3en>!;ar,ed , 33 reversed course to ar.sln er;;^;^!:*' the MIG for a SIDEWINDER
shot. As BLUE 3 closed wir»-.in range on MIG ^ (Tjq) in i,M-t:.l trail, 3000-ft altitude,
Slightly high, he atterpced to fire his left mlsr.lle out ft d]d not leave the launcher.
BLUE 3 swltcned to the right missile and rircd» the mlsitilc detonated at the HIG's tail
pipe. BLUE 3 Irjnedlately reversed to exit east due to cr!tlcflily low fuel but did observe
MIG 5 to roll into stoep nose down, right wing down tui'it and smoking badly. NIO 5 eon*-
sldered destroyed.
From all information available, It Is assur.ed that bl/JE 1 fired neither SIDEWINDERS
nor cannon. The leader of t.he first MIC section cane from a favorable position directly
into firing range on BLUE I's tall and after a short ohiiSc c!osLroyt>d BLUE 1 with gunfire.
HICs used afterburner Intermittently. All P-8 aircraft tanked on the way back to
the carrier.
No radar was used prior to ordering the encounter tii?cau::e of poor low-altitude
capability.
0
n
2*7
3
D
r. -. .-: C^: !^ 52^5 cn
EVEhT 1-36 SUMKAWV {ConHoued)
Mark
Action Aircraft (SLUE 1. 2. 3. GREEN 1)
Haneuvers ,
Ordnance ,
etc.
Communications
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1.2.3.4 Remarks
possibly 5) 1
Status
Action
U
B3 In •pproxiaately
1-1/2.n1 tratt to
Gl
B3 sees F>8 with HIG
on its tall and firing
and transmits same.
Determined later to be
D 1 .
83 then checked hts
tail and saw MIC
closing and firing. B3
broke Into him. RIG at
7 o'clock. 500 rt
B3 tranjKl ts , "F-8
you have a MIG on
your tall."
Al 1 F-Bs responded
to this call ex-
cept 81.
1IG bel teved to be
il shot and do-^ncd
Jnknoxn MIG engaged
13 in level flight
ind ef f ec t i vely
:ountered B3's
actions.
S3 was undble to 1
rca t n w i t n Gl j
d u r 1 n the 160* )
turn due to AB
damage inflicted
during downed photo
pilot SAR orbit.
Although four !lIGs
v*ere lis ted as the j
n'jmbcr eicountered .
It is believed tr>e |
MIG that engaged 83 (
most probably was
MS.
h
B2 recovering from
nose down
5I0EWIN0ER firing
on H2
82 hears nS's above
transmission and looks
back to check tail and
sees two KIGs ap-
proaching at 7 o'clock.
62 counters with series
of hard turns .
S2's hard turns
were sufficient to
keep the MIGs at a
*iiqh angle off iind
out of a firing
posi tlon.
IIG section be-
\ ieved to De f13S4.
countered i32
>ut did not reach a
Tiring position.
M3S4's fliqht pat** i
t
unknown. 1
1
I
h
Gt finishing high
deflection gun shot
at M3
Gl hears 63's trans-
mission and disengages
from H3&4, dives for
the deck in AB and
Checks tai 1 for HiGs,
comes out of AB, sees
fireball of Bl 1/2 n1
behind shortly
thereafter .
Gl fires at aVnost
bank.
lelleve 13*5 -e-
jcined an<: con-
tinued their diving
right turn and en-
laged B2 (see T^) .
Gl ditf not obse've
actions of K3&-:
after his one
firing pass.
h
B3 exiting to the
east with MIG In
trail
B3 determined he cannot
counter H5 possibly due
to aircraft damage and
dives for the deck to
open on N5 and to exit
the area. B3 also
reaching low fuel state.
B3 accelerated to
approximately 600
KIAS which was
maximum for main-
talnlna aircraft
control due to
previous damage.
>i5 did fire at B3
during their brief
encounter but no
lilts. NS appeared
not to be able to
iccelerate with B3.
During descent 83
sees crash of F-8
(Si) and pilot's
chute.
9 »
A »
EVENT 1-37 SUMMARY (PART B) (Continued)
■
Tine
Nark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 3)
Other Friendly
Communications
Enemy Actions
( MI 6 I , 2 3
4. 5. 6)
1
Remarks
Status
Action
In A9
Slight cMmb
Headed straight up to
9000 ft
MIG at 9 o'clock
in 90* turn came
across about 2000
ft away
At top of climb
Alt: 9000 ft
Heading: --
Speed: ZOO kt
Came out of AB . full
left stick in corner-
half flaps and rudder
to slip aircraft around
Oove down -- relit
AB
Came out of re-
versal on SSW
headi ng m1 th
a 70' dive angle
'OB
As nose swung
e round . acQu i red
MIG visual ly
Leveled off at
4000-5000 ft In
left turn
Went to rtitr to pick up
target. Finally picked
up noisy signal and held
lock by override
Told Back that
NIG Is 30* left
Off nose and low
MIG was In hard
left turn going
toward the east
^B
Alt: 4000 ft
Heading: 090'
Speed: «S0 kt
Continued left turn
and closed range
HIG In hard left
turn, range about
2 ml
Target was drifting
toward nose, B3
pul 1 ino more g's
than MIG
i
Got SIOEVINOER
tono
Alt: 3000 ft
Sp«fd: 400 kt
Fired SIDEWINDER
MIG was still in
left turn. Started
hard right turn
Alt: less than 1000
ft
r I
HIG wds 10* left
of B3
D3 pilot saw mis-
sile leave and make
hard left turn
(about 20 g's) ar*d
head off MIC
Range approx 1.5
to 2 mi
Fused near tailpipe
Still in left turn;
followed MIG around
to assess damage.
Got down to 1500 ft
alt. Speed: 350 kt
Heading: 000''
HIG rolled into 120'
bank and crashed
Saw explosion.
Orange fireball.
HIG pilot did not
eject
B3 made one nore fast orbft -- observed no other eircreft and proceeded to coast. Speed: 4S0-S00 kt , AU: 2
500 ft.
A. 4
EV£WT !«36 SUHHART (Continued^
Time
Nirk
'10
Action Aircraft (SLUE I, Z, 3. GREEN J)
Stitut
61 determined tad
c1e«r of HIGs.
62 maneuvering
to counter H3ft4.
83 ex 1 1 1 ng at
maxlRium speed
w1 th MS on tal 1 .
Altitude 3500 ft
Kach .60
83 closes to
within SIDEWINDER
range to M5
500 KIAS. Kdch .85
AltUude 3000 ft
Action
G1 observes MIG
heading up through
the clouds. Exits
to the east due to
low fuel state.
BZ breakt off his
engagement and exits
to the east.
83 observes HS to
break off his tall
chase and comntence
a left turn. 83
wal ts to ensure M5
Is reversing and
then also reverses
to reengage MS.
At 3/4 ml behind,
slightly high, B3
fired SIDEWINDER In
tal 1 on aspect.
Missile exploded at
MS's tall pipe. B3
Immediately turned
left to exit area
due to extremely low
fuel state. P3 did
observe K5 trailing
smoke In a right tyrn
and steep dive.
Maneuvers,
Ordnance,
etc.
Commun t ca 1 1 onj
83 attempted to
fire left missile
first with weak
tone but It
would not leave
launcher.
GI calls leaving
the area
82 calls leaving
the area
t'nemy Actions
(MIG 1.2.3.4
posslbW i)
Remarks
Believe NIG was
one of HIG f I Ight
engaged earl ier
Enemy action
unknown a Iter 82
d 1 sengages
M5. upon seeing
that 63 Is opening
breaks off pursuit
and turns easv
left
MS Mas apparently
unaware that 83
had rpversed and
was setting up for
j SIDcWlri'JtR shut,
altitude 2S00 ft
Mach .6
B2 disengaged be^
cause of Superior
airspeed capability
B2 observed F-S
tail on f 1 re and
pilot In chute
during engagement.
F-B determined
later lo be B I .
S3 was able to
disengage because
of superior air*
speed capabi 1 1 ty
Left lower fuselage
missile gave tone
on deck Aid in a i r
b'jt it would not
leave aircraft on
atterrptcd firing
good tone on
second missile,
r<glosio.n at 7
Ir'ciacV. ie't cf
j Hn . '-ic^-y t(lj:i
s.■;lO^«^ cj.TiC frc^'. tf.c
lliG. MIG goes into
30' nose down 45*
ri^ht wing down
spiral. No pieces
observed coming
from MIG.
c«ai Kid
IVCHT 1-37
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-<i6s vs six NIQ-17s
Result: Ore MIC-17 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: ZO^Ul ' N/105'*55'E
Route Package VI
I. PRIKARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 13 Jul 1966/1102H
Four F-'iBs (BLUI; fllt-ht) were assigned TARCAP In support of an Alpha strike on the
Co Trai Brldcc (JCS TaiT.fJt Ho. 18.22). BLUE flight was briefed to overfly the target area
after departure of the strike force to perform preliminary BOA. The strike force con-
sisted of tiix A-6As. four A-4C8, and two A-i(Es (IRON HAND) aircraft.
t. HISSION ROUTE
Departed Yankee Station on a heading of 310*, making landfall due South of Nam Dlnh
(at the "Hour Glass" Klver). The night popped up to 3500 ft when reaching land and
proceeded to the target area (20<»*)1'N/105''55 'E) on a .^eadlne of 3''0«. One element of
BLUE flit;ht was deployed In trail on each side of the strike force corridor. As the
strike (rroup headed back, BLUE rils;ht stayed In the target area to obt;:in preliminary
BDA. The two IRON KA.N'O A-«Es (GREEN 1. 2) were still N of area. BLUE flight started to
depart the target area on a heading of 110**.
S. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-tB BLUE 1. 2. 3. 0
3 - SPARROW (AIM-7E)
1 - sidewi:;der (aik-93) (blue l, 3, *)
1 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9D) (BLUE 1, 3, D
2 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-gO) (BLyE 2)
1 600'Gal centerilne tank
APG-72, APA-157 (Ir.speratlve on BLUE H)
CNR-312 (Little Eersj
TACAN
No camouflage (white and grey)
A«ftE OREEH 1. 2 (on IKON HAND Mission)
Dark camouflage
mG«17C MIG 1. 2. 3. it. 5. 6
AA rockets
ZOnin cannon
Color: a dark purple or grey
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Scattered suall cunulus clouds with tops to 5000 ft. Visibility 5 to 10 mllea.
Haze below 3000 ft.
_ BLUE OREEN
T 3 TT "S y
Altitude : 3500-11500 ft 300O ft —
Heading: no 030 SSE
Sfieed: i(50 kt 400 kt Unknonn
Fuel State: Probably full Internal Unknown
Plight Forr.ation :
Elements (i.e.. BLUE 1, 2 and BLUE 3, 4) were flying as two sections each in a
tactical "loose deuce." Second section perhaps 5 ml off 4 o'clock position of
first section in a "loose deuce" of sections.
S. IMITIAL DETECTION
This event consisted of several Independent encounters and Is described In three
separate parts. There was no MIG warning from support forces until after start of
ongagement •
Part A
BLUE 1(L) made visual contacts with two smoke trills In 8 o'clock position. BLUE 2
turned left for ID pass and identified then as k-Us. BLUE 1 stayed in 2-ml trail. BLUE
2 then reversed to rejoin BLUE 1, both d.-opplng behlntl the A-J*s. The A-Us (GREEN 1. 2)
then reported they had MIG3 at their 6 o'clock pcaltlon. Two MIGs (MIC 1, 2) were then
acquired visually coming in a high gunnery pass from the NW, 1-1/2 mi astern. KIC 1 firlna
cannon at BLUE 1. A total of four MIGs engaged BLUE : and 2. «»«'«rn. f.iu iir.ng
EVENT 1-37
X
'"^'eUlTl L « l.,ard MIC c.U from BLUE KM »<1 "T'^'f """J? f ft'l'iHSiSI
(CR£EH I).
6. ACTION INITIATED
fart A
BLUE I and 2 broke hard left Into MICs 1 and 2.
and did not light afterburners.
Parts B and C
BLUE 3 directed BLUE
They did not drop centerllne tanks
7. SITUATIOC OEVEIOPKEHT
" .,„c 1 2 descended to the deck to pick up airspeed the second element of MIO»
,HIO,*l'^f «»c^ jj^Uh sun..er, p.= s («
r5Si°;oSrd'!!r;d.s;,^hr»*.f«;=""%e'fcuid ° ^ »"r!:,j^:j,ror\sr*""
of a cro.ded radio channel. BLUE 1 sot separation at l^",''" ^ •"".i"" JifLt ID
Si'o:."bLUE 1 then ^'"ed up another t.rpt tu„ed o„ard, lt^ ,
KSS" SSrretu" ° Ui f'SL'^^Mn MM«51; ran^:'.nd only fired the missile to
sittsn^eVrM-BLui^ ^4rB£S.'r^^^kiiT:e»iro
radar broke lock. BLUE 1. 2 could not pursue because of lack of fuel.
Par ts B and C . ^ ^ *-
ift^r^ B^'JE ^ fired the SPARROW Into the cloud, MIO 5 turned back almost head-on to
? rlSe^ wentlo fun AS and executed a rapid vertical reveraal ending up behind
SlS% • BLUEN'frrfd rsiSiilScES at"5S 5 Which Sas still '^"e^f ^i;,^,^r"*SlG 5
wtlrf hnwAVP- the SID^VIKDER KUlded and detonated near the MIG's taixpipe. ni^ ?
5Sne5 SJo f!IS''banS and Impacted^Uh the ground. BLUE « engaged MIG 6 an<l^J«t
S^iJ!on BlSeI could not fl« any SPARROW missiles since the J"°P«S i lioE-
SlSe ^reversed and continued the head-on '^"^"^era hoping to get sep- ■J^JJj/JJ/t^SISE-
uTuncD .t-i-.^k MTG 6 was flrlnK both Buns and cannon. MIGs 3. •» were oenino «nw
llZl Tlrtng-AA^rocL;" "SS^'^ighted a single «IG (MIG tailing BLUE and 2
BLUE U in AB. atteaipted to clcae on »IC 6 engaging BLUE 1. MIGs 3 and u , firing aa
^llmtk Cere a^aln behind BLUE U which he shook off using vertical maneuvering. BLUE ft
KSJe Sff SnalfeSf low fuel state and all aircraft headed back for the coast.
8. OltDNANCE
(No.
fl red/No. hits)
SPARROW
AIK.7E
SIDEWINDER
AIN-9D
Soviet
AA
Rockets
Remarks
BLUE
1
1/0
0/0
Plred within minla.ii« range, missile
did not have time to fuze.
BLUE
BLUE
2
3
0/0
1/0
0/0
1/1
Radar broke lock. Target within
minimum range. MIG destroyed
BLUE
4
0/0
0/0
Radar inoperative after takeoff.
no 3.
Apparently did not have AA missiles.
The other MIGs also fired guns and cannon.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2 - Back
Helmet crept down during high-g maneuvers pulling mask off — had to keep replacing
mask. Opening the visor helped.
BLUE 3 BSi.^.^
One SIDEWINDER was inoperatli^ii- cause not given.
EVENT I -37
^cth radars and APA-IM) went out on tak.-off. Thus. BLUE J had "o SPARROW
cai-abllltv The Ailrl nud been chcciA'd prior to tak.^-off and were oP^'-a-J"^- Later
e«?.?iatUn showeS t?i unit ha-.l a bad power supply with a blown fuse m the radome.
apparently caused ty niolJtare In V,h«.> c/sten.
10. AIRCKIU COKHENTS
K«f crlence
BLUK HI.)
Front
BLUE 1
back
Vi l'SE 2
Front
back
Tfial
Ho^irs
5000
1000
:00
Hour.i
600
130
650
300
Combat
15
22
20
BLUK 3
Front
BLUE A
Front
data not available
850
6!')
550
25
25
Remarks
Fired seven SPARflOWs an-l five SIDE-
WIliDKRs In training. Leader was
squadron CO. First ^10 encounter.
First NIG encounter.
Only had hlg;h-altltude ACM training,
quite different from low-altitude
regime.
.'lown many ACM sorties. Tactics In-
structor. Aeronautical engineer.
On(! MIG encounter.
Flist MIO encounter. Not much air-air
eor.ibat training, one direct and seven
or eight training missions.
data not available
Back
Comwehta on thli Ene;:unter
Cowmunl cat lens :
Saturation of co.-?s"inl cation channel was a problem. The radios were cluttered with
messat^es during the entire flight making flight coordination extreir.ely difficult.
Hormal .*adlo proc^iures were Ignored during the heat of the engagement; callers were
not identifying thcr.selves or spoclfying whoir. they --ere warning. This confusion caused
some aircraft to broa^ uvay to lose a MIG whlcli was not there at all.
Amount of traffic on UKF net also made use of intercom (ICS) very difficult.
BLUE J - Pa ck
A close-in ! cad-on weapon would have been useful In this encounter.
BLUE 2 - Fro nt
Visual Identification of KIGs presented a protiltm In this encounter since boL:i MlCs
and A-Us were dark ar.d dull In color. When the MICs are not shiny (as is usually the
case) It Is easy to r.istake MIG 17 for A-^s , partl .ularly at certain aspect angles when the
tall surfaces fill Ir. the swept-wlnc area, making it appear like a delta wing. SLUE 2
felt he could have gotten one or both of the MIOs near BLUE I, had he known they were
MIGs. Afjaln the corrsunl cation Difficulty deBcribui above prevented him from obtaining
Identification Inforr^tlon from BLUE 1-
Ordnance carried was three 5PARR0V missiles rather than four because of weight
llnltatlons due to carrier operations.
At the time period of this enf.accnent, iJavy ?-kr> generally did not drop their
center! ine tanks because they were difficult to replace and pilots felt that the enpty
w»l(Tht of 250 lb really did not handicap then to:> much.
In the initial acquisition, BLUE 2 felt that thuy should have looked beyond the A-ls
which were Initially Identified with radar, and i^ad they done so they probably would
have seen the four ^'IGs trailing the flight of A-4s.
BLUE 2 - Back
He- felt that he did not have sufficient prdctlcn with "dog fighting" at low altitudes,
which makes operation of the wcdpoiii'. system mu-.-n mcri; difficult, because of the [>roxlmKy
of terrain which greatly increases the amount :f rad.ir clutter.
255
mm 1-37
They had problems with the radar locking on to t;lo«iJ targets, and It waa dirrieult
<l> to dlstlnsulsh these froa aircraft targets Inside cl?u::5.
BLUE 3 - Front
It was very difficult to maintain visual contac:: rfurlns the eng-'.cpnient . It was also
difficult for th- Baclc to acquire radar locle durtnc t'u- brief enca:;erent and the pilot
felt that although he had flown exactly as hu had darlt.j; training (pert.aps, not as well
due to the combat situation) that extensive and reall::' Jc air combat irancuverlnc training
prior to combat, particularly at low altitudes, woul'i t-.-tvu helped their performance.
PLUE 3 - Back
Visual ID rciiulrenents made the engac*"cnt muvh !:;r»re difficult. Would like to be
able to fire at once, without visual ID, ar.t! probably 'rfculd have had better results.
Because of the ID requirements, the SPftRKCV; la not to& useful because generally one must
get too close to the target to riake the II).
Having some additional Indicators In the back re.it *,c>uld eliminate sone of the need
for talk between fronc and back seats. Tnc- Back feV. Urit the following would be useful:
the IFF box control — the pilot la often too I'usy to 5v$. It and at times gets vertigo
when ne must set It; the g-neter guage — tMs is parvl >.i;iariy helpful at night; rate of
ellnb Indicator; eosununl cation channel indicator; r-iMle intiication on the radar scope
(either 25- or 'iO-mi. range}; left and right .1PH gauge;:; fuel gauges.
BLUE 1 - Front
Probably should have aborted flight whon radars wore found to be Inoperative.
The P-tt is at a distinct advantage when fight Irit: vertically to get separation. F-^s
can always separate successfully by climbing in afterburner.
11. DATA SOURCES
Pro.tect Interviews ; BLUE 1 (Lead) Front, 16 Mar 67; r^ack, 18 Jan 67
BLUE 2 Front, l8 Jan 67, Back, Id Jan 6?
BLUE 3 Back, l8 Jan 67, Front, 17 Mar 67 (letter)
BLUB 4 Front, 17 Jan 67; Back, 10 Kar 67 (letter)
Messages. Reports :
CTF 77 130309Z Jul 66
CTG 77.8 13R<(5'tZ Jul 66
CTO 77.8 131002Z Jul 66
7AF DAI •13225'«Z; DIO 29999 Jul 66
USAF Fighter Weapons Center, Bulletin No. 7
Air Combat Report. 13 July 1967, No. 1 USS CONSTIXLATION (CVA-6J|}
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
This event consisted of several Independent encouniors and Is described In three
separate sections (Parts A, B, and C).
BLUE flight, consisting of four P-i>B aircraft wai assigned TARCAP in support of an
Alpha strike on the Co Trai Bridge. The flight was briefed to overfly the target area
after departure of the strike forces to perform preliminary 3DA and to watch for possible
KIGs.
The flight did not receive any MIG warnings prior to the start of the engagement.
After the strike force had departed the target area, RL'JE flight made another orbit.
Two A-4E IRON KAllO aircraft (GREEM I, 2) were still north of the area. BLUE flight had
Just decided to depart and were flying In a loose deuce of sections, with the second
section (BLUE 3t ") about 5 ml behind and to the rici)^- of BIiUE 1(L) and 2.
Part A
T^. The first section (BLUE 1, 2) was proceeding on a heading of about 110° at an
altitude of 3500 ft and speed of approximately U^o kt and Jinking. BLUE I sighted
two contacts at his 8 o'clock position at 9000 ft and started to turn back and
T%. sent BLUE 2 to make a positive ID. By this tin'.- the lontacts were close enough
for BLUE 2 to identiry them as X-UZs. BLUE 1 :\>turnel to his original heading and
almost lmr.ediately saw two aircraft at about the same position. They were MIC-17s
T,. in a curve of pursuit and startlr; to fire at BLUK 1. At this point BLUE 1 called
a hard left break (at full military power). The two MIGs, (MIG 1, 2) were follow-
ing BLUE 1, 2 and firing as the range closed. tM.UE 1, 2 continued their turn,
^ went to AB and MIG 1, 2 overshot BLUE 1 flrltu; ^'^ he passed. At this point, BLUE
T^, 1 was pointed N, still turning, when another DC-tlon of two MIGs (MIQ 3, H) started
a pass on BLUE 1, also from his 7 o'clock poc-lMor. and high. BLUE 1 (and 2) con-
Tc<. tlnued the turn In AB and MIC 3, U overshot. Py this time KIC 1, 2 returned for a
m * second attack. BLUE 1 lowered hla nose and relaxed the g's on the aircraft to pick
'6A
256
3
3
3
3
3
3
9
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
-3
0
u
U
0
0
ft;
J
rj
I.
T
■■^IZA
^13A,'^l*A
^TA
Part B
18' IC
'2B
^3B
f5B
*7B
■^88
^IIB
Part C
5C
'7C *'^QC
'^9C
t
up speed . SLUE 1 descended to near tree
aircraft. As PI,UF. 1 started to pull up,
(probably MIC 3, ^'^ at a ran^t,* of ^ ir.l ri
was unaOle to fire as he could not ^et nl
left level turn (altitude aLicuL 1000 ft)
crossed apprcxlraitf ly ?00 ft Lbovc his a!
clln;bed sUf-htly he received call to r<'v-
level. BLUE 1 was below the cleud decJ: :.
he saw a bo?ey approxlniately «• 1.0 5 rA ?iw
target but did not fire bec:it:u'/ no ID h..j
approximately hpad-on, BLUt: 1 Identlfi-.l
ably r-U" S) ar.d fired a Sl^ASHO'.v r.lssil-- i
to 5000 ft. At the sap.e tl.ny the MIC oy.'i
flashes. The SPARROW passed clor,e to "\C
BLUE 1 head-on. bL'JE 1 stari-.-i a hard c'
and checked his fuel state at ^vCO lb.
Seeing no further contacts Pr.Ut:', 1 and Z i
off the coast another contact xas seen rv
the contact also turned back and was Icis^
BLUE 1 could not pursue the tarir,«t beeuuv.
proceeded back to the ship.
EVENT 1-37
top level and lost sight of all other
r.tin turnln/, , he sighted two MIGs
yi'AZ a hcad.-;n firing run. HLUE 1
3 pipper lln<?d up. BLUE 1 made a hard
i.o-jJlng apprwAir^ately east as the MIGs
rcraft. As HLUE 1 went out of AB and
ri-v for a single contact at 2 o'clock
nd started a rovcrse to the richt as
^y. BLUE 1 put the plpper on the
U-t-n made. An the aircraft closed
thf target a^^ n single MIG-17 (prob-
n brreslfjht rrodc at a ranee of l^OOO
ri»'d flro a« evidenced by the nuzrle
6 but did not detonate. MIC 6 passed
Imblng left turn, climbed to 7000 ft
>L\:e 2 was still flying wing to BLUE 1.
roceeded to the coast, Jinking. Just
cr land. BLUE 1 turned back, however*
In the clouds (range about 7 Jfll).
of low fuel. BLUE 1 and 2 then
Vfnen the second .-.ectlon (BLUK 3, ^) hearti the MIC call of BLUE 1 and ? It headed
W toward the other section locVrlng for \'.\'\z. Throu^'.hout this encounter the
various aircraft of the striv.c were on tl.e air with iUG calls resultln<^ in a
lot of confusion on the conxiun 1 cat Ions cimnel. BLUE 3 sighted two dots
In the sky. Identified ther as XIGs and ^jlrected BLUE '1 to go in trail.
BLUE 3 acquired L;-.e targets on radar at -i range of 5 ml, arT.ed the missiles
and started an eauy right turn. The r:rGs were in a hard left turn about
2500 ft behind the two A-«F. IHCM HAND aircraft (GREEN 1,2). BLUE 3 locked the
radar on the lead iilG and vras In ran^e. GRKEN 1, 2 were in a hard left turn.
Just as BLUE 3 fired a SPAKKOW, the load MIG ducked Into a cloud and the radar
broke lock (ran^e l-i/2 ml). The second '-UG broke off and BLUE ^ followed
him. (This part of enj^agencnt Is covf:^rcn In Part C). The first HIC ("IG 5)
reversed ranldly and cane back from IG o'clock — 1 to 2 ml away. BLUE 3
went to full AB and climbed to 9000 ft. The MIG turned 90° and crossed approx-
imately 2000 ft ahead of BLUE 3- At the top of the clln.b BLUE 3 came out of AB
and slipped the aircraft thi-ouj^h the turrt, then wont back In AB and headed SSW
with a 70° dive angle. MIG 5 was ahead f>f Mm In a hard left turn, gcing
East. BLUE 3 leveled off at about UOOO i-o 5000 ft In a left turn and went into
the HEAT mode. The Back plcred up a noise target on radar and held lock by
override. MIG 5 continued his hard left turn with BLUE 3 ^ ml behind and
starting to close range oulllnc; more r.'s than the MIC. With MIG 5 10* left of
BLUE 3 and a good SIDEWItlDEft tone BLUri 3 fired a STDEWIfrUFB. MIG was below
1000 ft at this time and had .started a hard right turn as the missile Impacted
the tailpipe. MIG 5 then ^-rent into a 120" bank and crashed. BLUE 3 followed
the MIC around to assess daman's and sai; .in orange fireball. After this
BLUE 3 made one more fast orbit, observt;! no other aircraft and proceeded to
the coast at a speed of 450-^00 ict» altl-;ude 3000 ft. .
BLUE 3, had sighted tvo MlCr, chaslnp
sighted the second ;^IC (MIG 6) first and
left. BLUE H saw BLUE 3 char.o '-llfi 5 and
pulled up his nose and climbed, turnlnt:
r.et hln head-on. BLUE ^ could have gott
working. BLUE 4 pulled up to repeat thi
separation for a SIDEWIMDEf^ att.ick. (At
had shot down a KIO.) He ar.ain made a h
sec t.he MIG firing his guns. MIG 6 star
to turn into the MIO. At this point two
fired rockets at BLUE " who rolled to th
MIGs. BLUE U, sighting a KIi! tailing P"
(probably HIC 6), and tried to get Into
KIG3 again attacked BLUE U with rockets
rate fron the attacking MICs. BLUE ft pu
saw the MIGs 25C0 ft below hlr., headln::
nff at 5000 to 6000 ft and headed for i !i
of fuel left. BLUE ft had to use the t^n
hr A-ftEs (GREEJI 1 and 2). BLUE ft had
crossed over MIC 5 as they turned
he went after MIO 6. BLUE ft
.oft. niG 6 reversed course and BLUE 't
on a SPARROW shot had his radars been
.-. maneuver, hoping to get sufficient
this time he heard BLUE 3 call that he
^ad-on paoa with the MIC and could
;pd to turn left and BLUE ft broke right
other MIC3 (probably MIGs 3 and ft)
c left and reversed into the attacking
1 and 2, headed toward the MIG
:>03ition to fire a SIDBWIMDER. Two
and BLUE ft broke left and up to sepa-
lied up to makf a high reversal and
:J, while he vsas heading S. He leveled
•-; coast, having approximately ft600 lb
•:er to t^et back to the ship.
c
257
EVENT 1-37 SUMMARY (PART A)
CB
Time -
Mark
Action Alrcrtf
Status
t (BLUE 1. 2)
Action
Other Friendly
Coauauni cat ions
Enemy Actions
fMie 1. 2. 3>
4. 5. 6)
Remarks
AU: 3500 ft
Heading: 110*
Speed: 4S0 kt
B2 turned left to make
ID pass. 61 stayed In
1 to 2 ml tral 1
•
Bl (Back) spotted
2 smoke trails
bogeys at 8 o'clock
AU: 3500 ft
Heading: 045*
Speed: 450 kt
Returned to original
heading
Two A-4ES (61. 2}
heading In south-
erly direction
Alt: 8000-9000 ft
Called "They're
frlendlies.^
I(<ent1f1*d hoaevs
as A-4ES. Fuel
approx 8000 lb
1
AU: 3500 ft
Heading: 110*
Speed: 450 kt
Full nilitary power
Hard DrcttK to ict^
R7 «tav»(l with Bl
61, 2 out of sight
Bl called "left
break"
2 MIGs at 7000 ft
7:30 position 1 ml
made gunnery run
on Bl
AU: 3500 ft
Heading: 045'
Speed: 400 kt
Continued turn
Called "Hl&s"
Ml, 7. wc re firing
and closing on
BUL)
I..
4A
AU: 3500 ft
Heading: 000*
Speed: 350 kt
Continued turn. Kent
to AB
HI , 2 overshot on
81
Second section (H3,
4) high, came In
from 7 o'clock
AU: 3500 ft '
Heading: 315*
Speed: 350 kt
Continued turn In AB
M3, 4 started to
fire In gunnery
run
Alt: J9UU TV
Heading: 270*
Speed: 300 kt In AB
rAfktlfliijAil turn Put
nose down
H3. 4 continued to
f i re
H3. 4 overshot
Ml, 2 returned for
second attack
81(L) lost sight of
M3. 4
^A
AU: 2000 ft
Heading: 135*
Speed: 300 kt
Kept nose down end
g's on alrcrtf t
Relaxed g's to pick up
■ore speed
Nose down
HIGs not In range
Cf3
EVEWT 1-37 SUMMARY (PART A) fCOfitlnuedl
II
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2)
Other Friendly
CoMunlcations
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1. 2. 3.
4. 5. 6)
Rema rk s
Tine
Mark
Status
Action
^A
Alt: 100 ft
Heading: UO*
Speed: 575 kt
Bl completely lost
sight of every-
body
AU: 1000 ft
Heading: 270*
Speed: 450 kt
Section of HIGs
(probably 3. 4) at
range of 1 cnt . alt
1000 ft, were head-
< ng to-^ards 81 , 2
Made head-on
firing run
Bl could see
muzzle flashes
^lOA
Alt: 1000 ft
Heading: 270*
Speed: 450 kt
Madt hard left turn
(level)
HIGs passed B1
head-on, firing
MIGs turned right
Bl was unable to
fire, could not
get pipper lined
up 1
t
)
AU: 1009 ft
Heading: 090*
Speed: «50 kt In AB
Went out of AB
HIGs headed SW
Crossed over top
of 81 (200 ft)
from 11 o'clock to
5 o'clock
•T
; 1
91 Alt: 15C0 ft
Heading: 09C*
Sseed: 450 kt
Be^O'* cloud deck
Kade hard right turn
Back or Z2 called
to " reverse" ;
visual contact at
Z o'clcck level
3A
Alt: 1500 ft
Heading: 180* .
Speed: 450 kt
Slfght right turn
Kept pipper on bogey
Did not fire because 10
had not been made
Saw a black speck
at 2 o" clock,
range 4-5 mi , alt
approx 2000 ft
Sogey heading: 135*
in left turn
No 10 made yet
EVENT 1-37 SUMMARY (PART A) (Coottnued)
Time
MA
Action Aircraft {SLUE ^. 2)
Status
Alt: 1500 ft
Heading: 160*
Speed: 4S0 kt
Act lor.
Fired SPARROW
Range 4000 to SOOO ft
in boreslght node
Other Friendly
Connunlcatlons
Immy Actions
(HIG 1. 2. 3.
4. 5. 6)
10 showed bogey to
be single KIG
(probably H6)
MIG starts to fire
as missile goes by
Remarks
Missi le passed
close but did not
detonate
ISA
Alt: 1500 ft
Heading: i80*
Speed: 450 kt
Bl started hard cllabing
left turn
H6 passed 81
head-on
I6A
Alt: 7000 ft
Heading: 31S'
Speed 4S0 kt
Checked fuel - had about
4500 lb
Hade gradual right turn
to heading of 110 and
alt of 4000 ft
B2 still flying
wing on B1
Bl . 2 at edge
of cloud cover
No further contacts
17A
Alt: 4000 ft
Heading: 110*
Speed: 450 kt
Proceeded to coast*
Jinking
EVENT 1-37 SUMMARY (PART Bl
Tine
K«rk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 3)
Statas
Action
Other Friendly
Communications
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1. 2. 3.
4. 5. 6)
Remarks
'OB
Alt: 3000 ft
Heading: TOO*
Speed: 400 kt
jinking
Started to look for HIGs
81 , 2 and G1 . 2 re
ported MIGs In area
B3, 4 were flyioj
back to coast
IB
Alt: 3000 ft
Heftdir.g: 090^
Speed: 400 kt
jinking
Started to head N toward
8T. 2
Changed radar tcatt to
itt what could bt picked
up
Bl Identified two
contacts as NIGs
Ai'i sixteen aircraft
Were on air with
numerous MIG calls
resulting in a lot
of communication
confus i on
'2B
Alt: 3000 ft
Heading: 010*
Spesd: 450 kt
Acquired targets on
radar at range of S ml
Locked on lead aircraft
aissllts armed
Started easy right turn
B3 d1 rected B4 to
qo fn trell
Did not see G1 • 2
on radar
Bl , 2 called two
NIGs on tal I
MIGs were heading
in easterly
d1 rectlon
B3 sighted two
dots in sky
Identified as MIGs
3B
Alt: 3000 ft
Heading: 070*
^peeo: 4&0 kt
HIG locked up on radar
and In range
G1 . 2 In hard left
turn
B3 reported two
NIGs at 12 o'clock
MIGs were In hard
left turn, follow*
Ing 61 , 2 at about
2500 ft
HIG rolled into 90*
left bank, range
about 1-1/2 mi
'4B
83 was 1-1/2 ml
behind NI6s
Fired SPARROW
In rang* light was still
on (or ready to go to
break I)
Gl. 2 stilt In hard
left turn
83 announced he's
firing SPARROU
(on ICS)
HIG 1.: hard left
turn, ducked Into
cloud
Radar lost lock
(possibly on clouds)
ust as B3 fired
SPARROU
iissi 1e went Into
cloud and
nissed aircraft
SB
Alt: 3500 ft
Heading: NC
Speed: 400 kt
went to full AB and
started climb
HIG returned (I to
2 mi away) at 10
o'clock position
crossing toward
S o'clock
w
EVENT l-3/SUMH*RY (PART C)
I
Action Aircraft (BLUE 4)
Other Friendly
1
Commun < ca 1 1 on$
fri«my Actions
(MIG I. 2. 2,
4. S. 6}
flenarks
Time
I Mark
Status
Action
Orbited target
area (CCU)
Alt: 3S0O-40OO ft
Speed: 400 kt
J 1 nK 1 ng
Went to AB headed N
B3 went to AB
(Seen by B4)
:;i . 2 called
■HIGs"
34 lost radars on
takeoff -- had no
displays, could J
not use SPARROU M
^1
'ic
Alt: 3SOO-4000 ft
Heading: 010*
Speed: 47S-SOO kt
BI(L) and 2 were
heading N
HICs were chasing
61. 2
li
B4 Sighted two
HiG'l 7s
Alt: 4500-5000 ft
Speed: 47S-500 fct
Passed directly over
first HIG (HS); had
sighted H6 first; made
clear 10
Started to pull up
B3 started pull up*
(see Remarks)
MS, 6 were at
heading of 160<>,
separated t /2 mi ,
chastng Gl and 2.
MS was at 4S00 ft
M6 was at SOOO ft
•Note: This is rot
Substantiated by ■
B3's account
Speed: 475-500 kt
pU 1 ICO Uf# noac Ou*^
and cllnbed turning left
B3 picked up HS
and broke right
chasing HIG
H5 was still Chas-
ing Gl , 2
M6 lurned left
B4 lost sight of
B3 for remainder
of encounter
r
4L
Alt: 10,000 ft
Speed: 375 kt
(On top of pull-up
and descending)
Started down and re-
versed to original HIG
headi ng
Met n6 head-on at
about 3000 ft
M6 reversed course
H5 was Still chas-
tng Gl. 2
Could have fired
SPARROW had radars
been working
Passed H6 head-on
Alt: 3000 ft
Headlog: 135'
Speed: 475 kt
Pulled up to repeat
maneuver to attempt to
get separation for
possible SIOEUIHDER
launch
B3 called that he
got a HIG (HS)
HIG reversed to
left
Out of AB for about
IS sec
Alt: 10.000 ft
At top of pull-up
maneuver
S4 could see
guns firing
he
Masterly htadfng
Hade second head-on pass
at MIG 6
K6 firing guns
at B4
14 again was In
position for
IPARROW shot
EVEHT 1-37 SUMMARY (PART C) (Continued)
OS
Action Aircraft (BLUE 4}
Other Friendly
Conmunications
tneny Actions
(MIG 1, 2. 3,
Remarks
Tine -
Mark
Status
Action
4, 5. 6)
(teading: W
In AB
oroKc riqnt \q turn
Into NIG
MIG started to
turn left
^9C
Alt: 7500-8000 ft
Speed: 360 kt
1 It pull up
Rolled to left and re-
versed Into HIGs
on tall of B4
9ack cal led "two
MIGs on tall
7 o'clock position"
MIGs (probably
3 and 4) fired
air-to-air rockets
Rockets passed be-
hind 64. No evasive
maneuver needed.
^lOC
Alt'. 6500-7000 ft
Heading: 180*
Speed: 425 kt
Came out of AB for
turn
Headed toward MIG 6 and
01. 2
61(L) and B2 In
scissors with HIG C
B1. 2 estimated at
about 2500 ft
MIG 6 3000 ft be-
hind Bl , 2
Alt: 2000 ft
F1 ring at Bl , 2
(probably M6)
Sighted MIG 6
tat I ing Bl , 2
^1 IC
Alt: 1500 ft
Speed: 275 kt and
accelerating In AB
Chasing MIG 6--tr1ed to
get Into position for a
SIDEHINOCR Shot
MIG 6 was tfanging
on to 61. 2
•
^IZC
Closed to Z m\ from
HIG 6 in front
Broke left and up
because of 2 MIGs on
tall
Bl, 2 continued
thel r naneuvers
Back called "2 MIGs
at 7;30 posltlon--
flrlng air-to-air
rockets"
Tmo MIGs had evi-
dently rolled in
again and coflimen-
ced firing rockets
^13C
Alt: 13.000 ft
Pulled up to make high
reversal
MIGs turned left.
MIGs were below at
about 2500 ft
heading N, were In
head-on situation
Down to Alt SOOO-
6000 ft. full AB
Fuel : approx 4600
lb
Heeded for coast
Ended up with low
fuel -- had to use
tanker
I
«ra ofsn lEsa 0SS C3 EEM £a3 63 BO B3 C3 CSS BO C3 «30 W
tVENT 1-38
SITUATION OlVELOPHtNT (Cjntioued)
lanmed PI/;-: 1 resur.^Mi lead and went Into a hlgn yo-yo Be. J"*-^ J*" . . ,„g
ilG vV; cro55*-d -..'-.o circle and fired at BLUE I. scoring hlt-3 1" '^e '•Ich. ning.
niu. ...u - cruj^'.u .... . s.*.^ nrttP 1 i->ti»r t»1ee»^ed over the suli o: .onKin as
success.
e. ORDNANCt'
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
SIDEWlKDr.R
M M-93
0/0
1/0
do.' fired/No. hits)
SIDFVXNDER
0/0
0/0
1/0
0/0
20nuii
Cannon
None
124 rds
None
Remarks
SIDEWINDER (A1M-9B) launched at high
»'s. pitched down and hit ground.
SIDEWINDER {AIH-9D) guided but could not
follow target. Guns Jarr.ed preventing
full firing, (See EQulpment Problems
for details)
Fired tmhnown amount of 23/37naa cannon
BLUE 3
MIC 1, 2, 3
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLl^E 2 - While pulling over four g the P^^f ^J-f^jJ^f ^/.^^ :iS;nr:e!rSeK
and fired the 20min cannon. The tracers i"<ij"^^f „J^^-r°?"nt HZ o"r fL^ g. Three of
loads.
Right - upper cannon fired 3-* rounds, lower cannon none.
Left - upper cnnnor. fired 20 rounds, lower cannon almost fired out.
Each cannon was loaded with 100 rounds.
BL-JE 3 - Lost radio during first maneuvers when earphone cord became disconnected.
10. AIRCREU COHHENTS
Experience
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
NOTE:
Total
Hours
3500
1300
3000
F-8
Combat
Hours
Missions
1000
210
800
8
800
125
Remarks
Much gun and miislle firing experience,
Training Squadron.
"he missile. » K<„h o- of t
was he
and^for' a reliable CJnsystem.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interview:-. ;
Use of tracers
ly
nnen.
BLUE
IS 1. 17 Dec 66; BLUE 2, 20 Jan 67; BLUE 3 19 Jan 6?
DATA SOURCIS (Continwv*)
EVCNT t.3a
CT« 7?.0 ' Juiy SI
CTC 77. f- CrP.Kf-j ' i-Jf'Oi';; July 'iS
CTG 7/.'*i OI'Hiir-^ iJOri^'oT .;L;ly CO
12. NARPATIVf OESCRlMTIOr;
Aftrr ?^:j5Jlrie f ' » cisl-ln (.iant, BLUE flJrht continued Inland In a combat fonutlon
with BLUi: ] and ? In ;."vi.;on an-l •-.LUE 3 S-tun.ln^ above to assist In the look-out In
the rear h<^:nl t'j^hert; .
Tn - ArprcKlr.ntely 11 :.: t-'iforr 'ir:'! '/li..- at the diversionary target, BLUE 2 sighted two
«ICs Ir. t-n'i rasslH' ic l(»rv, low ani to the rear below the clouds. BLUE 2
culled ":-l05 at 9 o'-l- k. tre;-;. ic.-t." BLUE 2 took the tactical lead and broke left
and dcwn, dc^cendln.- j vlc-v: the cicuJc !n pursuit of the MICa. BLUE 3 was crossing over
the aecll'-n In a rl(il.% '-urn and contltiued tumins as he pulled up Into • climbing yo-yo
nareuvcr .
Ti - As P.LVE 3 r«ach«?-l t:'.e top o> };!s rianeuver, he saw a MIC overshoot to the left as the
'AtZ nadf ft ♦'!r':ii5 pt:«r-. ?.Ll'E ^ ftlao r.'sw a HIG ccr.c jp through the clouds on hla right.
BLUE 3 revoi^^d hla *vt;:-.. '.o the Ivfi :o counter tJic first MIG. The ?110 saw BLUE 3 reverse,
turned loft and dDV.- beicw the clo'^rii , -flth tH'E 3 fal lowing.
To - BL'JF. with BLVK 1 In trail, leveled out below the clouds at 500 kt , and saw a MIQ
In an ear,;;, rlrht turr,. zL^SE 2 rov-vac-i hla turn to tfie right (approximately 3 g) , and
pulled inside the KIU \z track for a r'-in attack.
T-^ - Just sr. ?LUE C wu.; n-s-dv to shoo*., he observed SLUE 3 passing right to left In front
of the "IT. at a ranrc of 2rprcxl:ra:ely 1000 ft, liL'JE 2 called BLUE 3 to break left and
advised tr.at he"».us r---sslnc In frcr.t of a "10. BLUE 3 did not hear any radio trans-
missions t-?:a-ise ci-rhone cor.l app^jrent ly had bcsone disconnected during his first
maneuver. Tht "in sj.-; :-.L'.'E 3 &nd rov?rsed his turn to the left and coriTnenced tracking
BLUE 3 as he closed Wyi rince. BLUI-: 2 also rcver5(*d his turn, again pulled to the Inside
of the turii to track thy
Th - BLUE 2 rlased the i-.'ro plpper on the XIC and fired a burst of 20am but the tracers
passed w.ll behind tl.v
T5 - BLUE :* then use.l th- fixed plpter and pulled as n:uch lead as possible with 30° an&ie
Off, 500 kt, and 6 p. .^h^n he flrod a?;aln, only the left guns fired, the right guns had
Ja.'STTied. The ''13 war. hit at least twlcf, but before significant damage resulted, one of
the two ^^\r\s flrln;; stcT.jieJ and the other gun fired erratically at a very reduced rate
before It finally slct: fd. BLUE 2 was unable to expend more than about 25 percent of his
amnunltJon.
T6 - The encounter had developed Into a continuously turning, high-g, high-speed engagement,
as the altltuJe ran*:cd froD the base of the clouds to the ground (estimated within 50-ft
AGL). In trill behind tiL'JE 3 we:^ the M1C>, BLUE 2 and BLUE I. A second MIG descended
through tt.K clouds ar..l was sighted by .BLUE 2 as It Joined the fight on the opposite side
of the circle.
Ty - Although well outside the nlssllo envelope, PLUS 2 fired a SIOEWIHDER-B at the MIG
In an attv.-pt to force the away fro-n BLUE 3. T'.:c missile came off the launcher and
pitched down and behlr.d the MIC Into a rice pad.ly. BLUE 2 then advised BLUE 1 that his
guns had stopped flrlnr;. The tactical lead was resumed by BLUE 1 who started a high yo-yo
to the Inside to move Into a firing position on the >I1C.
T3 - As BLUti 1 reach?;;! the top of his maneuver, the MIG that had Juct entered the encounter
took advanL3,-c of Bl.'jr. I's reduced speed and closed the range by cutting across the circle.
The MIC flr-^'i at SLUs: 1 and scored hits in the tall, wing, and lower fuselage. Because of
control difficulties, SLUE 1 dlsengaRed by entering the clouds. BLUE 3 observed the hits
on BLUE 1 and for the first tine saw the XIO on his tall.
Tq - After slowing to S^JO kt, to maintain control of his damaged airplane, BLUE 1 headed
fi5r the coast, tn an atter.pt to dlst?n?;ape fror. the MIG on his tall, BLUE 3 d0V«» for the
ground in afterburner open the range. The MIG did not follow BLUE 3 down to ground
level, but rfer.alned a little hlg** at 6 o'clock, not in a firing position.
Tio,3i .15 - Uriable to Icse the t'lO by diving, BLUE 3 pulled up hard Into tne clouds and
then exc-cutt.d a 3^0" rlr;;it turn Juj^t above the clo'Jds followed by a 3^0" left turn below
the cloudy nr.d departed the area to the :IE. As the MIG detached from BLUE 3, SLUE 2
launched a Cii^Ev;i;jnr:?i •..iih 60" an-le-off, in a IjS^-SOo climb, at a range of about 1000 ft.
The missile appeared to guide initially but passed well behind as the MIG continued to
maneuver. I'l.Uii: 2 continu-jd to fcllovj both MIG2, which were out In fronc heading toward
?huc Yen. Vlth no rCT-tlnlnir ordnft.'ise , BLUE 2 entered the clouds and turned toward the
coast after giving BL'JP: 1 and 3 t^^.x■ to exit the area.
The fllr.ht rendiVLivcuDed over the w;iter and proc<?eded toward the carrier at a reduced
speed whli': aiisesslnt the damage to BLUE 1. Unable to refuel In flight because of a utility
hydraulic faUui-e, the pilot of BLUE 1 ejected when fuel was exhausted (result of fuel leaks
from battlo damage ). ^^^^^
?73
EVENT 1-38 SUMMARY
A *
Time
M*rk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3)
Status
Action
Othtr Friendly
Conmufilcttfons
Enemy Actions
(NIG 1 . 2, 3)
Rvmarkt
BLUE flight 1 r»
tactical formation
patrol 1 t ng for MI Gs
ir.i dcting as
strike decoy group.
B2 sights two MIGs pass-
ing 3-9 o ' clock behl nd
and cal Is f 1 ight to
break left. 6112 turn
left and down below
undercast and B3 turns
right and up due to
notition on dl&2. 52
takes lead of section.
Altitude 3000 ft
Speed <SO-fct IAS
B2 calls -HIGs 9
o'Clrck--brsak
left.-
Three NIGs (MIG 1 ,
2. 3) pass behind
BLUE fllQht and
turn to Interccct.
B3 at top of yc-yo
and In right turn
63 sees MIG (M2] make
firing pass and over-
shoot to 1eft--1oo1ts
down and sees another
MIG coning up through
clouds. B3 (decides
nust turn left to
counter top MIG. 83
reverses left, down to
below clouds.
M2 fires on B3 and
reverses down to
bclOM clouds.
Pos i tion of M3
unknown after
being seen by 83.
BI&2 under clouds
looking for NIGs
82 spots Ml and turns
to track Mm with guns
B1 in trail to BZ
HI in easy right
turn
B2 getting ready to
fire on Hi at 1000
ft
82 spots 83 coming from
right to left and pass-
ing out in front of
Ml . As Ml reverses on
B3. B1SZ atso reverse
to track Hi.
B2 calls "83 break
left, you are pass<
Ing In front of a
MIG."
As 83 passes In
front of Ml . he
reverses and turns
to the Inside of
83.
83'S radio was
out and he did
not get B?*s tneS'
sage.
82 tracking Ml
at 1000 ft. 83
unaware Ml Is
tracking hln
82 fires on Ml but no
hits .
HI bracking 83 at
SOU ft. but not
firing for unknown
reasons
EVENT 1-38 SUHHARY (Continued)
Tine
Hark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. Z, 3)
Other Friendly
Coainunication:-
r.'.emy Actions
(NIG 1, 2. 3)
Renarki
Status
Action
h
B2 firing on Ml
B3 being tracked
by N1
82 hits HI at least
twice with ZOam. 82
saw holes but it didn't
affect H2 * i performance
Ml still tracking
83
82*$ guns not
work ing wet 1 . and
gradually worsen
to where all guns
stop
B2 t'as firing
approximately 30*
angle off. 500<kt
IAS. 6 g's
h
BI. 2. 3. Ml all
in tight left turn
82 sees H2 entering
circle and directly
on opposite side
M2 rinds flight
below cloudSt
enters engagement
i
Same as above
B2 fires SIDEWINDER
(A!K 93} at Ml hoping
to scare him off of 83
B2 transmits to BI
that his guns had
stopped. 81 states
he "w1 1 1 yo-yo high
to Inside and try
to cut across to
inside on Kl .**
Sare as above
82 was aware
SIDEWINDER (AIH-
98} had no chance
of trackl ng Ml .
missile pitched
down out of siTht
B2 di-" observe
what he thought
was Ml firing
at S3 one time.
^8
B2 in trail on Ml
with M1 tracking 63.
SI at top of yo-yo
getting ready to
start down
81 hit In wing. UHT and
fuselage by 1*2. 81
climbs into clouds to
lose H2.
B3 still with no
radio, saw M2 fire
and hit BI from
across the circle
BI transmits that
he has been hit.
KZ had been
gradually gaining
on BI by cutting
acrprs the circle
and when 81 pitched
up, M2 took advan-
tage of Bl's re-
duced speed and was
able to naneuver
into a firing
position.
BI commenced
losing fuel due
to hit in
fuselage.
» If
IVIHJ 1-38 SUMHARY (Continued)
Time -
Action Alrcraf
Action
Other Friendly
Comunlcatlons
Jnemy Actions
(MI6 1. 2. 3)
Remarks
Mark
Status
)1 In clouds
evading M2. 63
stm trying to
evade Ml
Bl slOMS to maintain
control and turns to
fly to the Gulf.
63. seeing that Hi Is
still tracking, dives
for the deck In AB
to put Hi out of a
firing position and
to open
Still trailing
Ml
M2 disengages 61
and continues turn
toward base.
Ml will not
follow 63 to
qrou nd level,
instead stays
high at 6 o'clock
81 subsequently
ejects due to
fuel exhaust1on>-
cannot refuel
due to hydraulic
f ai lure.
63 pitches up into
clouds to evade HI and
does a series of turns
above and belOM clouds
to ensure HI had not
followed before heading
for the Gulf.
62 tttll trailing
HI
61 transmits that
he doesn't know
whether he will
nake the Gulf or
not.
Ml breaks off from
B3 as he enters
clouds and con-
tinues turn toward
basi.
11
62 trelling MZ
B2 observes Ml detach
from B3. 62 fii .s
SIDEWINDER (A1M-9D) at
Hl--wiss11e Initially
guides then passes
behind without eic
ploding.
62 also sees H2 ahead
and follOMS both M1I2
4 n 1 t f 1 1 ah t
1 n 1 eve i 1 1 i t^it *
■CBentarlly
breaking off t«1th
nothing to shoot ot
them.
B163 heading for
the Gulf
Hi 12 both had
broken off attacks
and were heading
home below clouds.
Al though
SIDEWINDER (AIM-
90) appeared to
guide, 62 now
believes he was
Inside minimum
range due to Nl's
g forces.
82 breaks off attack
Mild hcods for clouds
enroute to the Gulf.
M1&2 In level
flight proceeding
to base.
/
0
r
9
i
i
i
a
I
a
J
B
B
S
e
EVENT N39
Aircraft Involved: One P-105 and four P-4Cs va
two or three MIG-21s
Result; Two MIGs aestroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 2in8'N/105''32'E
Route Package VI
1. PRIHAftV HlbSlOii AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dato/Tlr-^: !■! Jul l^oo/abcut 1200H
V ^vT- fPna) -.•I'o flyltic f'.IC cover for an IRON HAND fllEjht of three
F-ms ?'r^-;; :M";^y !m ; Ll-e in eJiu'.upportlng ROLLIIIG THUNDER strikes In the ar«
L"-* or LV„i -:)C. w.ro t.c trail and maintain vlaual contact ""h IROIl HAND fjlsjj.
AdiuMOT.ar'-'r.'^.-:. -lircrart (hi'i KYE, SILVtiK UAWN. and EB-668) were airborne at the time
of I ho vnct> -ii: ■■
2. HISSION i;l>!jtl 0
BLUE nU-.-. '.imparted D^nang about 1030li and proceeded on aPP^o*^';^^%^°""^of L
to re-Je-v-v- -.Vth =he tanker In the vicinity of Udorn. After re fuel In?; at 26«000 J^'JiH
It ?he fll k': - -CKe of f tne ta.;.cr about l^U, and proceeded to the ^^"'le^^O"* "^J J °f
fll-MC wlti V-. t-llinr aPh-i 1 to 1-1/2 The fUght proceeded !n a J^^terly
d •■cu^r c.:-"-; v:>cut i^coo-i';.ooo ft, aWE about 3000 ft higher at 550-560-kt TAS At
a^L'-jxS^V-'V^w V :/ic:,0 35.i;, i^HEEU began letting down to 3O0O-0O00 ft. coB^tng to a gen-
errM" stSth--".-.-"iy heading tcward the target area. char.iln.T course fron time to time and
»«"Jnln° oJ;- " ■ . (ylri .soffc) contacts. GR-EM picked up a FAIJ SONG signal 0".f P.IKE
!Is ^"i-^i -•: rh'n r-ov-.-rsed course and proceeded northwest picking up another FAN SOI. Q
;?r-i^ A. • " was too closo In for a 5HR1KE launch, GREEN lead advlaed he
JsKc'a 300- -:ur;. eo tne ri£nt. It was during this turn that eneniy aircraft were sighted
and !Ju^i3equ•f^.tli• "nr.aced.
3. AIRCP.Afl COMriGURATIOriS
ii - sp A i. (Air-:- 7)
2 - 3?'-'"t-i -^ir.t tanks \
1 - 60v-r- - cetiterllne tank j
IFF (bl o :.-:,) cn, TAC/.S off» camouflage paint :
F-io';. gree: .' 1
Not glv...n. At least two were P-105P WILD WEASEL aircraft and had SHRIKE; nlsallea.
MIG-21 MI'3 ] . 2
One A A r.lsslle
Silver color •«
4. FLIGHT C0N31TIOI*S PRIOR TO £«COUNTER
■..'oather: Sc:tt:ored to broken cumulus tflouds at about 8000-10.000 ft; visibility 10+ with
sllflht Y.az^.
BLUE QREEW
1 5 3 5 3
Aitlti^d^: 7500 ft 9000 ft 8OOO ft 9000 ft M500 ft
HeaTiTnTT North-northwest (In right turn)
iocThT' About 500 knots ^ , ,
f^r rstate ; 15,000-16,000 lb (full internal plus some external)
FlUht ForrrAtJcn: Kot clearly determined. During the engagement some flight
positions became Interchanged and it is not clear If this
occurr«:d during the maneuver, prior to MIG sighting, or during
the initial scries of turns after the sighting. Probable
relative positions at the tlae of initial MIQ sighting, based
on all interviews, is given oelow.
0
281
IKtTIAL OETECTIOH
EVENT 1-39
No HIC -arnl.,s received fron su,port aircraft BLUB fllGjt was In a right C360«)
turn, following OEEri:^ when 'MQ I was sighted by BLUE 3 at 7 o clock.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 3 caned out MIG to,ril£ht. BLUE Jettisoned tanks. «JQ 3.
linn:edia:ely sl^.ted BLUE 3 at U °'<^i°^^ /"^^I^.f^^^ .U^tJd SiG toward
BLUE 1 arter an Initial J^^^^^^^^j/r^jrUnr^rf^nrof BW^^^ had begun to turn
GREEN 3; he turned to Intercept AIQ 2 ^''iiJ"! ^oti^ 1-1/2 to 2 ml behind becar.e engaged
?;sJ°i^;o.^:f :._.^:5S?;/n;::'??iS!.'r„:o;„t^^^/nSI?h:/iS,ouin. t.. .ir=r.r..
The two encounters will be handled separately.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT cuot«
BLUE 1 and 3 were In a chase-type ensagenent. GREEH 3. ^^^H^^v^^fc'TShS 5af turn
launch nlsslon (ilthcugh knowing he was under attack) -«%PJ^,^^J^JiJj/^%^oE5?NilR which
srnj? ^^^ciiJ^^i fon^n^M^^^^iN f\iuiT.o'..iiii^ a^er «ig a
and downed hla with a SIDEWINDER. ^ „- h
BLUE 2 and u were In an eneaee.ent m which MIG 3 fired a »laaUe at ELUE (.^sacd).
BLUE 2 pursued MIG 3 and downed hln with a SIDEMItlDER.
Neither engagenent required extensive maneuvering.
8. QRDMANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3, "
MIG 1. 2
MIQ 3
(No. flred/No. hits)
SPARROW SIDEWINDER
AIH-7
0/0
0/0
AIM-9
Soviet AAM
3/2
2/1
none
none
I/O
Remarks
No. 1 passed over MIG. No. 2 guided
and detonated behind .MIG. No. 3
guided up tailpipe and detonated.
No. 1 guided and detonated near right
aide of tall. No. 2 not observed.
Missile corkscrewed low and left
rear of BLUE 4.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
10. AIRCREW COKNENTS
Experience
BLUE 1
Front
B LUE 2
Back
BLUE 3
Front
BLUE >i.
Back
Total
Hours
2000
400
2600
Hours
250
100
400
Combat
Missions
-40
-60
•Interviewed but this Information
not re corded-
Remarks
TAG fighter background. Had fired
SIDEWINDER (4) and SPARROW In
training. Only alr-to-alr
engagement .
TAG fighter background. No missile
firings.
Coiignents on this Encoiinter
Ene«y pilot capability not impressive as Indicated by providing good missile target
source (afterburner) and falling to take evaalve action. (BLUE 1)
P-4C aircraft is an excellent performer. In this case a better decleratlon capability
would have helped BLUE 1 to back off. (BLUE l)
282
EVENT 1-39
An Internal gun ml^ht have enaOled BLUE 1 to down HIG on first pass. (BLUE 1, BLUE 3)
Radio frequencies are overcrowded and overworked, creating confusion. (BLUE 1)
Comir.ent from Overall Experience
Need more ACT In training tall Inter /lewees ) .
Need passive SAM detection gear (RlU:, 3 Front).
Value of 2-man crew Is great, two se-s of **yes better than or.s, especially at night
(all l:-itervlewees} .
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUE 1-Frcnt (9 Jan 67), BLUE 2-Back {IH Mar 67), BLUE 3-Pront
(25 Jan 67), DLUti: K-Bac^c (10 Jan 67)
Messages :
TAP OPREP 3, l«l072?Zi DOCO-0 22886 Jul 66
7AP OPHEP 3, lt075lZ; DOCO-0 22888 Jul 66
7AP 1'I0755Z; DOCO-0 22887 Jul 66
7AP l'J0721Z; DOCO-0 22885 Jul 66
7AP OPftEP 3, 1108252; DOCO-0 22892 Jul 66
35 TPW OPREP 3 PASTEL 557 Jul 66
35 TPW OPREP 3 PASTEL 556 Jul 66
Other
Letter, BLUE 1 (Lead) -Back
USAP TFWC CAD Bulletin <7
12. MARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE fllp-.ht was in a right-hand turn following oaEEN flight (P-iOSs) wno was preparing
to launch SHRIKE missiles.
MIG 1 was sighted by BLUE 3 at 7 to 8 o'clock an! almost inunedlately afterwardi MIO 2
at H o'clock was sighted by BLUE 3.
BLUE lead began a hard left turn and qulcltly rev?rsed Into a hard right turn as MIG 1
passed>behlnd him (estimated 2 rai). In this right turn he sighted MIG 2 coming up behind
GREEN 3.
It is not clear how other aircraft in BLUE filgh'- maneuvered relative to BLUE 1,
especially in light of the uncertainty regarding the Initial formation positions noted
previously. It Is known that In the Initial maneiivers BLUE 3 becaiTte wlngman for BLUE L.
BLUE 2 and BLUE u oecame separated fron the other two and perhaps each other In the Initial
maneuvers also. During the initial maneuvers all SLUZ flight Jettisoned their tanKs.
After the Initial MIG sighting and maneuvering HLUE flight in effect became involved
in two separate, nonrelated encounters - neither Involving the sa-Tie aircraft. Accordingly,
this section will deal with the encounters separately.
BLUE 1 (Lead) and 3
Tfl - About the time BLUE 1 reversed his turn to the right, CREEH 2 (Lead) called a MIG at
5 o'clock and GP.EEII 3 confirmed. (Jiote: It Is assumed that GREEN 2 and 3 detected the
NIG airborne Intercept radar on their special equipment.
Ti - BLUE l spotted the MIG coming up behind GREEII 3 md advised GREEN 3 to break right
and that BLUE I ha3 the KIO. GREEN 3 declined to break, saying he was preparing to launch
a SHRIKE, and continued In a alight rl?ht turn - the :'.IG turnlnp; to cut him off about 3 mi
behind. BLUE 1 turned and got behind the MIG, overtaiClng the MIG rapidly.
Ti - About the time the MIC had closed to approximately 1/2 ml behind GREEN 3 (who by this
time has rolled out on an easterly neadlng) BLUE I was 1/2 ml behind the MIG and fired a
SIDEWINDER missile wnlch passed without detonating over the canopy of the MIG. The MIG
then lit his afterburner and initiated a 30° climb - In a slight right turn.
Tj - BLUE Lead i,hen fired a second missile whluh deto:iated behind the MIC.
Tfc - A third ndaslle then launched by BLUE 1 went up the MIO tailpipe aivX exploded - 'the
MIO exploded Into many pieces.
BLUE 1 a.nJ 3 then exited the area, rejoined GREEN flight and all returned to their
respective bases.
EVENT I-3»
BLUE 2 and t ^ . »r ur mf
To . At the tin* of Initial «G MrMln, and call by BLU£ 3. LLUE U «» to th« rear of B.UE
I and 3. BLUE U spotted a «1G at « o'clock and or&Ke rlgfit.
T, - The «IG turned In 0«hlnd -md fired a miasllc ^LUE tr,. nls = lle ml«ed lo« .o the
left and rear. BLUE U continued his ri«nt turn and lost sU/.t of tiie mu.
- BLU. 2 neanxMle .a. -^Ken r^nc and spotting ..e MIG ^J^lif^^^i^^Ji^^^rinl^S SlS'J'e
BLUE 2 and "t. (BLUE had seen ite explosion and flc- over to investigate . ;
Estimated duration of each engaEeaent, 2-1 mln.
r^- — -- ' ■ ■ • . .....
E-a c?. c:::^ CO era era C3^
iTIme
Action Aircraft (BLU£ 1.3)
Status
Action
B1 7000-BOOO-ft
altitude
-500 kt, 1-2 q'$
Right level turn
15.000-16.000 lb
fuel
BLUE fllaht fol-
lowing GREEN
1-3 ni
B3 8000 ft
-500 kt. 1-2 9's
Right level turn
15,000-16,000 lb
fuel
Sees KIG at 7
o* clock
On hearing HIS cal 1
from 83, Bl starts
hard turn to the left,
goes into AC and jet-
tisons centerline
t«nk. As t4IG passes
behind him about 2 mi,
he reverses turn to
right and sights MIG
to riqnt heading
toward G3, turns to
enaage H2, Jetti-
soning v'.ng tanks.
B3 calls cut »IG to
flight. Jettisons •
tanks. Breaks Into
MZ then sees Bl
turning In front of
hitn toward MIG. Did
not 90 into AB.
C3' •a::^' c3
cr3 cr^ o
E V £KT 1.3!? SUy.y.ARY
Other Friendly
Conmunlcations
Enemy Actions
(MIC 1 .2)
Remarks
GREEN flioht is
in a right turn
50U0 ft or lower
turninq toward
an easterly
heading to launch
SHRIKE miss i le{s )
at FAN SONG radar
sionals. C3 Is
behind G1S2 and
-1-2 mi ahead of
CLUE flight.
G1&3 pick up HIG
A] radar on
electronic equip-
ment.
B3--HIG at B
0 • c 1 ock high
G1--HIG at 5
o'clock
G3--Conf irned HIG
at S o'clock
Ml at 9C0O ft
descendifiq
head i ng f rom 7
0 ' clock to 6
o'clock-- —2 ml
behind BLUE 3.
M2 at 6000 ft
heading toward G3
In -45* bank turn
bU3 lose sig^Jt of t
HI in initial turns
as their attention
was focosvd on H2
apparently heading
to attack G3. It
is possible HI was
subseouently
engaged with B2ft4.
Loohs to-^ard lil
{ri<>ht side) sees
ei's tank(s) go and
sees HIG at 4
o' clock passing by
81.
tVEHT 1-39 SUMMARY (COHTIWUEO)
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 3)
Other Friendly
Connunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
(KIG 1,2)
Remarks
Tine -
Hark
Status
Action
81 6000 ft
~S50 kt in AB
1-2 g's
SI ight descent
Bl rolls in behind
MIG about 2 ml
B3 6000 ft
Front tells back to go
to 10-mI scope end
boreslght. Back ac-
knowledged <^d advised
fror.t to advise when
HIG was in reticle,
Bl was accelerating
rapidly, up to 550-600
kt. Front jdvlsed back
HIG In reticle. Back
says he Is locked on
the HIG, in range and
also has G3 on the
scope. Front started
to squeeze the trigger
but back advised they
were too close. Some-
time in here front
reallied he was over-
taking HIG rapidly and
came out of AB and ex.-
tended his speed brakes.
Front then switched to
HEAT. Sack advised
they were In range and
at less than 2 g's.
riVinQ Q» Vfiriyniaii iv>
Bl.
G3 rolled out of
turn on easterly
heading.
B1--''G3 break
right. Bl has the
HIG."
G3 --'Negative-*
have contaet--
getting ready to
launch." (SHRIKE)
H2 ~1 ml behind C3
and closing ~1 ml ■
^2
61 5000 ft
-500 kt
1-2 g's
83-5000 ft
Bl launches SIOEUIKOER
at HIG.
Front saw missi le pass
over HIG's right wing
past canopy. He did
not observe it explode
but did see smoke
trail.
H2 about 1/2 ml
behind 63. Aiier
missile passed
went into AB and
started to climb
to right.
Front did not
recall hearing mis*
slle tone, and did
not see missi le in
night. Did get •
break X as missile
left.
S3 sees 81 launch
missi le.
EVEWT 1-39 SUHHURY (CONTlHUEDl
Time
Mark
Action Aircraft (SLUE 1, 3)
Status
Action
B1 at 9000 ft
-500 kt, \ g.
B3--no data
81 at 10.000-n.OOO
ft. -500 kt, 1 9
a3--no data
B1 back Into AB. B1
pursuing MIG. Fires
another SIDEWINDER with
good tone just as he
return* to minimum
range l3/4 ml). Hissile
explodes ~200 ft short.
B3 flying wing.
Other Friendly
G3 continues on
SHRIKE launch.
81 fires third SIDE-
WINDER with good ton«.
very quickly after
second firing (T3).
Coficnunlcatlons
Enemy Actlor.s
(HIG I. 2)
H2 cHnbing but
not turning.
After SIDEWINDER
detonation H2 cut
of A6 then back In,
ftemarhs
Hissi 1e goes up
tailpipe. M2
exploded into many
p1eces--some on
fire. Pilot
ejects (seen by 83
only) before
explosion.
61 tecs no
ejection.
B3 flying wing
sees KIG pilot
eject, J«»t
before nisslic
hit.
and return to bases.
CO c
£VEUT 1-39 SUHMAKY (COHTIftUE D)
Tine
Hark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 2. 4)
Status
Action
Other Friendly
Cominunl ;ati ons
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1.2)
Renarks
B2&4. 9000 ft
■X.500 kt; in A8
(catching up)
B2: No data
B4: 7000 ft
x500 kt. 5 g'S
82, «>.9000 ft,
S50 kt. SPARROU
mode tO-Oii scope
and boresight
B2&4 hear. B3 HIG call .
82 sees HIG behind B4.
84 breaks right and
down (5 g's). 82 at
first eases left then
also breaks right.
Tanks jettisoned and
into AB.
BU3 ahead--
becoming engaged
separately
B2&4 both called
HIG behind B4.
M3 close behind
64.
84 in break. HIG
fires Milssile. B2
is turning to right
and begins to pursue
HIG.
MIG fires missile
at B4. missile
nlsses-'IOM «nd to
rear; KIG then
slides behind B4
who did not see
tiln again. BZ
sees KIG go Into
AB and climb.
B2 Is beMnd HIG and
closing rapidly. Back
advised too close so
front put down speed
brakes and went out
of AB. Front went to
HEAT and fired blDE-
WIND::R after sliding
back into range (good
tone). Missile ex>
ploded at side of tall
pipe. Pilot ejected,
84 saw explosion off
to left, flew over to
look and saw chute.
HIG hit. pilot
balled out.
H3 may be HI . the
first one sighte**
by 83.
EVENT 1-40
Aircraft Involved: Three F-tCs vs one MIO
Result: Sighting only
»ie.„U, or Encounter.
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 20 Jul 1966/1550H oioi,n'vi/ioco26'E. Flight
aborted.
n. DATA SOURCES
Hessap;ea. Reports ;
-lt,TFW OPREP-3. 20 Jul 66, OOCC -0
7Af! 6pREP-3. ^OH-tilZ Jul 66. OOCO 023227
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION nwht carried
BLUE flight departed fronj a«!^,!\J505H; confUuptlon u„K^^^^
no ECK equlpinent. BLUE * sighted ^ : I- type aircraft at 1 . JH. n 6^^^^ night
m color, 6 to 8 ml In trail with BLUE H. at ^0°- luy^ ii- vlaual contact with
iJd MIC heading 150«. BLUE f \ ^"'^"^^^^.^f ^,^?^|c5^^2l4SWl05'26'E In conjunction
WC. BLUE U observed an SA-2 missile explosion at 1555H. -^u «/x ? «
with HIG sighting.
[
r
f:
u
u
EVENT I-4t
Aircraft Involved: One I--101C vs one HIG-21
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20*'50'N/107''lO'E
Houtc Package VI
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 7 Aug 1966/0910H
One F-IOUC (BLUE flight) was on an IROll HAND escort luisalon.
n. DATA SOURCES
Reports ; 7AP IBM Print Out, DI066>2196
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight observed one HlO-21 at 11,000 ft, heading 360** with a speed of about
550 kt. 6LUE flight was at 1500 ft heading 130» and U25 kt. The weather was scattered
clouds with 5 ml visibility.
i c
EVENT I-4Z
Aircraft Ir.volved: Three P-'IC vs one MIG
Result: SI r.htlng only
Vicinity of Kncounter:
2?"00'H/10t*'58'E
Route Package V
\. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlmo: Late Aug or early Sep l?>C6/li*30H or l^OOH
Three F-tC aircraft (BLUE fUghl) escortlnp. a fllsht of F-105 strike aircraft In
Route Package vi-A.
11. DATA SOURCES
Protect Interview ! BLUE 3 (Back) - l6 Kar 1967
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE 1 at 10 COO ft. 350-^400 kt , on a headlriK of 030° saw a possible MIO (silver
airplane) palsln^scr 6 n, behind the formation. BLUE 3 turned right to Intercept
Jhe MiS and lost sight of hlrs. BLUE 3 searched in the direction the possible MIG was
heading at 5000-ft altitude, but he was unable to find him.
299
[i
EVENT 1-43
Alrciart iiivolved: Two P-8E9 va two «I0-17s
Reault: ».:.e F-8E lost, one P-8E damaged.
Vlcinltv '^V Encounter: 20*15' «/105''59'E
Route Package IV
Kith two other F-8Es. provldlnR TABCAP
Lai heading of 300°, then proceeded north
\. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOU
Date/Time: 5 Sep 1966/16H5H
Two P-8ES (BLUE 1 and 2), operating Jn rotstl.--
covering A-'Js during attack on a train.
2. NISSIOK ROUTE
Penetrated SVW coast at 20»07'N/106«>20'E on U^
to the scene of action.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
p-flE BLUE 1 and g
2 - SIOEVIHDER (AIM-9) load «as eltner 1 AiK-9i> rjnd 1 AIH-9D or 2 AZK-90
UOO rounds - 20niin
Radar off
No external stores
MIG-17 MIG 1 and 2
23nini and 37^i> cannon
4 FLIGHT COHDITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
weather; Broken to overcast, 1500 ft with tops ibout 2000 ft, occasional buildups to
7000 ft.
BLUE
(ill
Altitude- —3000-5000 ft-
South^ln right-har.. turn
gUffht Fomatlon ; Loose-deuce, with BLUE 2 In prcce.s of crossing under BLUE 1.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
.TUMro? r„w^ss^i ?:M-Ei?t rffi!-
6. ACTION INITIATED
When hit. BLUE 2 turned left Into a cloud to evade further hostile firing,
BLUE 2 Observed BLUE 1 turning right ilnto a cloud.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT . v, >, vi.„ai
BLUE 2 transmitted to BLUE 1 that he had ^.en hU and ^aj^^eading for the beach. ^JU
and voice contact «lth BLUE 1 was lost and never r-..^ J^P^ ^
Prior to loss of visual contact, B^;"^ ^ did not ^^^-/^ j,^^^^,^ terrain elevation was
S^p"?oii:S?e5ri3iJ°« iSrsSSE^f l^^:.^^ ti^^:^ the doud. At no ti»e did BLUE 2
see enemy aircraft,
e. ORDNANCE
(No. rired/No. hits)
BLUE 1, 2
MIO
-None expended——
Sov!t>-. »AH
2'{ni:n ,ind 37ii"i>
f i red
Reaarks
BLUE 2 hit by 23aua and
37{Rm fire.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS ^,
The flUht was plagued with -xice c-.unic.Uon. jro^ ^.rtaS^filuJe may
receive response 'ZJ^^^^^V^^^u^'co^^r^^^^ t,ut prior to that
tLrhe^'har o %; :iief r;ipoLerti hU cui ll transmissions.
301
10. AIRCRCU CONNENTS
EVENT 1-43
Experience
Total P-8 Combat
Houra Hours Missions
BLUE 2 1800 1200 55-60
Cocuaent3 on this Encounter
BLUE 2 believed that, due to :xtenslve damage to his aircraft the MIG (or MIGs)
consloered it, unnecessary lo follow l-.lm fjriher. He stated that he did not receive
a MIG warnir.^ from any source. Thci.sht there should b« aircraft particularly designed
for the TARCA? nlsslon, as well as i.trlWe. This was aue In part to the fact that Ir.
raulti-ralsslon aircraft the pilot in',..;t be proficient in too r.any areas and Is not there-
fore good enouj;h In any one. It waj felt that the cinnur.icaticn difficulty was enhanced
by the fact that the controllers cr. the ships did not u..der5tand what was going on.
Ccmaents from Cvsrall Experience
BLUE ? felt that a better gu:i il^ht would be desirable on the F-8 , and would prefer
more amnunltlon per gun. Would li.<e sc.-;ie Indication frcn the radar when within gun-
flrlng r&.tge. In two-place aircraft feels, "RIO as opposed to pilot Is better for
second crew. Also a RIO Is neces-'ary on all-weather aircraft."
11 . OAT.^ SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUE 2, 17 J inuary 1967
Messages, Reports :
CTG 77.6 OPREP-5 051956Z September 66
CTG 77.6 OPREP-3 0511 30Z September 66
CTG 77.6 OPREP-3 O80722Z Septenber 66 CH-3
CTG 77.6 OPREP-3 0^10^462 SepteT.ber 56
era 77.6 OPaEP-3 051703Z September 66 CH-2
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTlOh
bLUE flight was scheduled as an element for a TAHCAP. However, the :nlsslon was changed
at the last ciurient because a tialn had teen sighted betwee.n .^a-^ .Olnh and Phu-Ly , about
20»30'M/160'>00'E. The A-« al: :raft were dispatched to strike the train -Uth four
flying TARCAP. The first eleri^nt (pair) of 7ARCAP was to fly Ir and orbit over the karst
area almost directly south cf ?iiu Ly while the second section was to remain offshore to the south
of the mouth of the rivers, E-'IE of Thanh Hoa. As tr.e first element reared BINGO fuel. It
was to fly outbound and the ?"ccnd ele.-nent, BL'JE 1 and 2, was to relieve the first. The
first element reached BImGO Vael after orbltlns approximately 20 min, at which tL-ae BLUE 1
and 2 flew ir.tound at about .'D'OO 'M/IOS' :0 ' E and proceeded alcr.f the karst, which runs from
SE to !JW until the position i of Mho iuan was reacned. At this pcint, SLUE 1 and 2 turned
north. The ir.bound fllcht w.i3 executea between 3000 ft and ^O-IC ft while Jinking. BLUE I and 2
held south of Phu Ly an-l pen'ormed rl^ht-r.and circles with rar.:!cm turns in a loose-deuce
tactical formation. There /ere low clouds in the area with ceilings close to the ridge
which at one place reacned ^530 ^t. Some of t.he cloud fcr.'naticns had buildups as high as
7000-7500 ft. This cloud c >ver required BLUE 2 frequently to fly to rear cf BLUE 1 to keep
him in sight.
After .leveral minutes or. station, fuel level was observed approaching BI!!00 and
decision made to depart th<; area. 4l.^h-power settings had been maintained to hold about
U50 kt In tight turns. At tines, BL'Ji 2 slowed to as low as 350 kt, which though not
desl-aoie, became necessary because of the clouds and tight turns Involved. BLUE 2 had
called BLUE 1 to report trut fuel was gettlnsc low, tut he dJd not receive an answer
from BLUE 1. BLUE 2 assuned that 3LUZ 1 was monitoring other transmissions; however, later
It was believed that BLUE 2*s transmitter had failed.
As both aircraft rer-;hed a southerly heading at about UOOO-^SOO ft and turning right,
SLUE 2 started to pass bc:-.lnd BLUE 1. At this time, BLUE 2 observed tr>»cers passing to the
left of his cockpit. BL;:^ 2 was tnen a maxlnun of 200 ft behind BLUE I end possibly ttO-50 ft
stepped down and at SLUE I's 5 o'clock position. BLUE 2 called BLUE 1 and said, "We are
taking fire from 6 o'clcfk," at which time a shell struck BLUE 2's canopy. As the shell hit,
BLUE 2 observed that BLIL 1 made what appeared to be a negative "g" right turn Into a
cloud to the right and nead. BLUE 2 did not observe any hits on BLUE 1 nor any debris.
At this tine BLUE 2 did not believe chat BLUE 1 nad been hit.
BLUE 2 observed another clcud buildup to nls left and turned hard into it. As he
entered the cioud, he turned left to see If there were any alrcr3.''t behind but saw nothlnij.
He then turned hard, right. and at tne sane tine notlcea his fuel was down to about 2^00 pounds
and that his hydraulic -.earning lignt was on. SLUE 2 locked to -.he rlgnt again a.nd noticed
that a large section ol the rlgnt wlnjr. was ?one. A shell had |fcne through the ca.*icpy,
and as a result, the nf.lse level v/ss quite 'hlnn. BLUE 2 had dimcuHy henrlns- radio
transmissions. BLUE 2 callod BLUE 1, r»;;!orted the .^.It, wns aim- navln,^ tiydraullc
problems, and now headjn*: "for the teach." At this tlr.;.', BLUE .■ thour.ht that he heard BLUE 1
mnke a call of some icii.d but he could not tell what It was. DL'*F. 2 was positive th^t Is war
EVENT 1-43
c
c
s
P
i^^^T>»rrH-^i^^^^^ ''^^^V ^^"^ ^ considered turning back, but due to the danase to his
r. i decided to continue to«j.rd the beach. BLUE 2 does not believe that BLUE 1 had been
V;!^2 ?K •"J*'^<*. clouds, but felt that BLUE 1 flew Into the karat. BLUE 2 also be-
hi!!?;?. K?! that wers firing on then broke off as soon as he had been hit
! » » * V"'^ **" sevf rvMy daoaBed and fuel was streaming out rapidly. BLUE 2
HlZJtJ: -"^^ '^""^ discovered beyond doubt that his tranamltter was not
Inll^ ^''^^'^".^'•^f " ^««lve a MIG warning. It is unknown whether or not his
lluw\ rZ .1 '^-\irunctlor.in^: or turned off. BLUE 2 thought he heard a beeper from
Ir^l^i riJl .10 enemy all-craft were seen by BLUE 2 . and he did not observe any
SSS BrtiF ? Ji^K,? "° launched. In view of the angle at
Srn- ^ \ " hit. it was cuneluded that U was not ground fire. It is believed that the
MIC8 were under excellent GCI control. BLUE 2 believed that the MIGs must have been under
SiTi^i^H^th^?'*^-^?^' ^^"f ^ '""^ ^ " ^^'■'^ 2 passed under and behind BlSe 1. BLUE 2
ltl lj%i rf ^ ^'^r^^^fu*"^*" occurred 30 sec earlier op later, BLUE 1 and 2 night have seen
the HIOs first. On the way out, BLUE 2 turned on his IPP when he was over the beach/
u
ll^tt^^^ EVENT 1-44
Aircraft Involved: Four F-'tCs vs one MIG-21
Result : No dani.'ir.e
Vicinity of Enco.int^r: 2in0 • N/106»00 ' E
' Route Package VI
1. PRtHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUAIION
Date/Tlr.e: l'' Sep 1966/1655H
Four F-UCs on ROLLING THUNDER nlsslon.
2. HISSIOH ROUTE -,i ei m M/in7"flO'E
. nenu't to 21®;'?"I/107**3'i ' K, Dll'-SCt 21"'l8'N/107 00 «:•»
0.r.cr?!Jrr»5?;P?rrririrJlMO-5/io|So?i.;' k<rJ,^.n4...n, ... rout..
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-itC BLUE 1.2. 3, . A
k - spARRcy (An-;-7)
It - SIDEWINDER (AIM-S)
H - Kk-82 (500-16 fiombs)
WIG-ai MIG I
Not given
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOlir:TER
weather: Cloud cover not given. red.iccd visibility in haze.
I T— '"5 ^ "S"
Altitude : 11.000 ft 6000 ft
Heap ins : 330«>-
Speed : 510 kt-
ftiiipxi- "330* 120"
H eaa>n a: cin Unknown
ISIrstate ; Unknown Unknown
tenant Format 1 an ; —floraal tactical—
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Flight was flying 330«. level. 5LUE I slgfaed a MIC ml away desccndlne through
6000* ft. No HIO warnings given.
(. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 dropped ordnance (four Kk-82s) and started toward MIO.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
HIC was lost m haze.
8. ORDNANCE
None fired.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Not available
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
None interviewed.
n . DATA SOURCES
Prelect Infrvlews : None available
Messages. Heports :
35 TFW DCOI PASTEL 522 lU'^^SZ Sept 66
35 TFW DCOr PASTEL 518 lUHUi^Z Sept 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION » v .
BLUE flight was flying toward tarpt Da ^-.J^'^^'^/^^.^Vj^fy JjitS^NAoSSSo'ETLlSI'!
VI A heading 330°. il.OOO ft ^^J.^i" ' J'^^.^^J^^'iJ^Je^ htadlnc of 1^0".
sighted «IG-21 r.1 lost him In the haze at
BLU- 1 J e'^^ ironed four .-.k-c.s n>i.n U tnl. nor was a hostile
rnfrnf'rnStiJtiS^^ ^h^oug^C? UriJc^eSt ;ie 'hw. encounter«d Intense 57/8^>™ AA.
1
I f
0
■EVEHT 1-45
Aircraft Involved: Thre«.- r-'tCa vs four
Result: 1 F-ftC probably lost;
1 MIG dcsaroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21 "oO'N/lOC'OO'E
Koute Package VI
1. PRlhARr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
I Date/Time: 16 Sept 1966/1030H
Three P-'«C aircraft (BLUE flight I, 3 and were to strike JC:; Turcet l6 IV,
Dap Cau RR and ICr.hway Srldpc ( 21 "1? ' U-H/IOG^C} ' "E) , and convert to i*lp
/ * superloflty mission if MICj were encountered. F-0 and V-lO^y strike:; In vicinity
I with 5 niln Intervals between strikes. BLUK I'llfjtit was thir-d fllelit to tarcct
I . with several fUf.ht3 followlnG- See Volune II for HIO encounters oV strike
ritf.htn. EC-121 DI'J EYE on station 2000/10700 and SILVEK DAWN an station,
IROH HAHD flight In area.
I 2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed from Ubon Air Base, Thailand. Refueled at 18,000 ft off east coast
of South Vietnam - proceeded up coast at 25,000-rt altitude to In-point {Cam Pha
Mines area). Let down to 10,000 ft. In delta area, then along rld^e Hue and back out
Into delta area at 5000 ft.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIOKS
F-tC BLUE 1. 3. ^
H - SIDEWIHDER (Arf1-9B)
4 - SPARROW (AIX-7)
2 - 370-gal wins tanks
Ji . 750-lb bcnbs on centerllne
I . Camouflage
[ No ECM equipment
HIC-17 MIG 1. 2. 3. 1
r Cannon
Sliver color - one with red star, others unmarked.
i 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
: f" Weather : 13iOOO-ft scattered clouds, 3- to $-ml visibility In hase.
1 BLUE
: I ! T
Altitude (ACL) : 5000 ft
f": Heading ; Approximately due W
} Speed : 500 kt
; Fuel State ; —12,000 lb .
external wing tanks empty
Fllt^ht Formation
S. INITIAL DETECTION
M Pour HIGs sighted at 2 o'clock at approximately 2 mi by BLUE 1. location 21*10*30"N/
u! 106^23 'CiQ"£. Received BIG EYE NIG Marnlngs, and KIO calls from retreating P>105 flights.
SAM calls from IRON HAND flight.
'f^ 6. ACTION INITIATED
1^. BLUE flight Itranedlately decided to engage MICs and entered rlcN- hand turn to gain
6 o'clock on HIGs. BLUE flli^ht ordered to drop external tanks, ordru»rice, centerllne
MER at approximately 21''C3'N/106'*33*E. BLUE 4 did not drop ordnance or tanks and could
'\'t not stay with BLUE 1 during turn.
■While at least four MICs vfere initially seen, the numerous attacks by MTCs could have
indicated that there were more in the area. BLUE I estimated up to eli;hi KIGs.
307
7. SITUATION DEVELCPHENT
EVENT |.4S
4*
4 •
After sl»-hilntT .vna, BLUE flight turned rlpjht with BLUE 1 cUablng and BLUE 3 and
BLUE re-.ai:iin>: cr.rcnt. 1 a 1 ly at 5000 ft. After first 360" turn, situation developed Into
thrt'c aypaiaie ciu-.a.jcr.vnts .
BLUK 1 was In clljr.ijlno and dlvln.: rlg^it-hand turns, slowing to 300 kt at 10,000-rt
altitude anJ accel«T3t to 600 kt at 2,000-ft altitude. BLUE 1 observed MlCs firing
on RLl'Si: 3 and EL'JiC and called warnings. BLUE 1 fired three SIDEWINOEKS and two SPARROWS
unsuccessfully.
BLUE *, after wide right turn and MIG warning, spllt-S to ground to escape MIG. BLUE
4 departed and returned to area, passed MIC head on, but without sufficient tine to fire
a SPARROW. Turned, acquired another MIG, fired two SIDEWINDERS. Did not observe flight
of missiles due to attack hy another MIC. BLUE J» then Initiated evasive maneuver of
spUt-s to ground, turned and observed debris and parachute In vicinity of previous
S1UE*7HI:ES firing.
BLUE 3 was last observed with element of two MIGs in 5 to 6 o'clock position. BLUE 3
did not return fron i7ilsslon.
8. ORDNANCE
(No.
BLUE 1
SPARROW
AIM-7E
2/0
flred/No. hits)
SIDEWINDER
AIH-9
3/0
MIC
ZjKn 37iiiin
Cannon
BLUE 3
BLUE 4
MIGs
Unknown
2/1
Remarks
§1 SIDEWINDER fired and was un-
8ucc«»ssful. .
#2 SIDEWINDER fired and was un-
successful .
#3 SIDEWINDER fired In radar mode
and was unsuccessful.
#1 SIDEWIKDEH did not fire.
? SPARROWS fired with full system
lock-on with radar Interlocks In,
dot almost centered. First ralsslle
did not guide. Second missile
guided but MIQ turned hard right
and missile passed without detonat-
ing, 500 to 1000 ft behind KIG.
Loat in engagement.
2 SIDEWINDERS fired within 5 sec of
each other with good tone about 1
ml range. Both Dlssiles appeared
to guide. Did not observe mlbslle
flight since it was necessary to
evade another HIG.
23Bin cannon
9. tqUIPMEfJT PROBLEMS
BLUE I
One SIDEWINDER did not cheek out and did not fire. Centerllne MER did not Jettison,
therefore two SPARROWS cculd not be launched. One SPARROW missile did not appear to guide,
despite apparent lock-on".
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total P-ii
BLUE 1
Front
BLUE 1
Front
Hours
35C0
800
CoiBbat
Missions
Unknown
•Not reported-
Remarks
Background all tactical aviation.
Begen combat tour in September
196f .
In F-Ub since pilot training.
3 yr In back. 150 hr In front.
Had fired three SPARROWS and fou!
SIDEWINDERS before going to
theater.
308
t '
Comwent;' on this Enco'Jt.t.<T , EVEMT 1-45
BLUE 1 (F rotitl
Basic tactic of MIO to operate at altitude mnxlmUe turn advantage over P-t.
MIG pilots noted as ase^sslve.
Visual Identification of HIOs war. slcplirird alnce MICs were silver and U.S.
aircraft canouf laged.
Conmunlcatlon not very active tLt still at ttr.es not IntclllGlble.
Air-to-air weapon with close ranre required, 'iowri to 1500 to 1000 ft. Could
have used a gu" several Instances.
Requirement to launch SIDEWK.Tr.? under g ccr.iitlon of 2 or less Is restrictive In
visual maneuvering coiabat .
AlPcrtyw of two valid In CCl envlrorjr.ent cr.iy. Distract Inr, in visual engagement,
because must think about back seat. Coordination difficult If radio garbled.
Procedures for alr-tc-alr weapor. launch r.v-irrd head J" coc.plt for JJJJJJ ""^"^
and head out for visual scan In order to r;alr.t.ait, contact with alr-tO-alr situation.
Procedure Is Inefficient and "heada-up" display Is -landatory.
Ordnance Jettison procedures or. P-U tlme-co:.sumlng and difficult, due to swltchology,
P-fts and F-105S were not compatible for lntRrr.lxed strikes without exact spacing.
F-Us Should go to area with full nlsslle fend fuel load so they can nix U up with
the MICs and keep them off the strike force.
Missile lock-on should be automated to ena!:le pilot to keep head out Of cockpit and
attention on situation.
There were so many KIQs. acquired MIGs in co^t favorable position .were the only ones
attacked. Many others were seen.
;.[r:".- .>,r..-.lr.r.ft nuht .a. .„-.s...i,I. ..c.u.. It forced =„. ».n .. ri««
""*"c;ul<, h.v. u..d . p.n in ..«r.l specific pl.c.s (..«.. T,,. Hu.t h.v. . c»putl«
gun-sight with It.
Missile-firing envelope should be expanded in g and range.
mure fighter aircraft should be more laancuver^ble.
.Need improved visibility to rear and down.
Had swltchology problen.
Likes pilot in back seat for ACM situations,
n. DATA SOURCES
t»««».^*. Tntervlews: BLUE 1 - Front - 9 January 19v7
Protect Interview s, o^^^ ^ ^ ^^^^^ ^ ^^^^.^ ^^07
Letter from BLUE-l - Back
- ■■ "'^" fApVpprP-r -i62321Z sept 66 DOCO 2559-
TAP MSG 162356Z Sept 66 DIO Z^^^^ _
5pflEP-3 1708352 sept 65 DOW KASTEL
7AP OPf.EP-3 leig'tTZ Sept 66, 2CC0 ->^-603 ^
USAP Plshber Weapons School CAD ^'Jltetln ..o. 7
?AP OPRKP-t 1617242 Sept 66 DOCO 25c.0i.
HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^
r.lsslon) against JCS Target 16
'ike
I vfie mira tsfci irc e,- w-r -
l\"T-Z a;.d"F-rd5rroIiovIns at 5-ciln Interva:
BLUE
Let down
departed
several SAM warninB= — ^ experienced MIG sightings
BLUE flight was alerted to KIC threat In a^-c, and had .xpcrien
on previous two days. westerly headlnc, approxlnately
\2. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION (Continued)'"" ****
target. BLUE 1 detccled a fUpht of t-o elernenta of two VllG'i:s, at ^ ° '^1"; P""l*»"
^ at 5 range of 2 mi. BLUE I called KIG warning to Ml«ht and ordered "Drop ordnance.
BLUE 1 united afterburner, called "afterburner" and entered a ^i^^'^i^S.J^JlJ^j'if
tarn. Kir.s also entered right-hand turn, '-ihlle In turn BLUE 1 observed a MIC firing and
called "Break" to BLUE u, who broke and left area.
After BLUE flight entered hard right turn the event developed Into three sfPfrate
eneaeer.ents. The details of BLUE I's encounter will be dsscrlfced roliowed by BLUE « s
encounter .
BLUE 3 U assumed to have teen lost In the engagement. SLUE 3 was last observed by
BLUE «• wl'.h an element of MIGs approaching 6 o'clock position and firing.
BLUE 1 ccntlnucd to operate In rlRht turna climbing to 10.000-ft altitude and slowlr?
to 300 kt followed by a dive to 2000 ft and accelerating to 6C0 kt . HICs also continued
J?Bh?-haJ.d LurnsrSut level at 5000-ft altitude. While In turn BLUE 1 observed KIC firlnis
Ind callid "BEili- to BLUE 3. -ho did not acknowledge. Radio reception was garbled at
that time.
During Initial three turna BLUE 1 fired three SIDEWINDER '"J^iJ"' "J??
oresented a plan view and mlsalle "tone" was not optimum. The fourth SIDEWit.DEP did
iSunch! BLUE I felt that firing should be attempted even if the situation is non-
optinu.Ti since the engagement time la limited because of fuel.
After completion of another right turn BLUE 1 acquired a MIG a^^/ljl^i, ^l^''- . ,
SPARROW nlaslles without success. In both cases acquisition was complete with full
fmeS loJk^on and interlocks In. At firing BLUE I's altitude was 10.000 and
?he HIG waJ a? 7000 ft . going away and In a slight turn. The first SPARROW that was
Uuncied dL not appear fo gSlde.' The second SPARROW appeared to guide toward the
MIC; however, the KTC broke as the missile was half-way to the target and it passed
the KlO'a 6 o'clock position at 500 to 1000 ft. No detonation was observed,
f BLUE 1 observed another MIO and attempted to fire last two SPARROWS. The
J missiles did not launch since the XER was still oh.
i BLUE 1 gained 6 o'clock position at 600 ft from KIC and again attempted to
I launch remaining SPARROW and SIDEWINDER missiles without success.
|! After the initial MIC warning from BLUE 1. BLUE entered a f^eht-hand turn
i Kenerally level, and attempted to Jettison ordnance and tanl:s^ but missed the switch. Due
'k trheavler load BLUE U could not hold turn with leader. SLUE u received a '-•amln? from
S BLUE 1 that a MIG «as closing at 6 o'clock end firing. BLUE U responded with a hard break
S ?o the left tway fro.' the tuPn and a spUt-S to within 50 feet of the ground. Afterburner
W- was iKnlted ar Ihls time. 3LUE U proceeded In a northeasterly direction toward ridge line
i ^5 addtuoSal hard-breaking Maneuvers. At this tine the ordnance ^"f,""''^^ were
f Jettisoned. BLUE a entered the ridges and maneuvered In the ridge line. After evading
I tSe MW^ iLuE t returned to the engagement (our of afterburner). While at "-OOO to 5000
!? ft! BLUE u acquired a MIG dead ahead and approaching 2-to «?APROW Si!
acquire with radar for a SPARROW launch. Soreslght firing attenpted but SFAMOW not
i^^n^hPd BLUE '-i passed MIG with aporoxlnate ly 5C0-ft separation. At this tine SLUE «
EM 51 ^fterburne?! made a hard tu?n, In attempt to catch MIG. BLUE^ 'Tg
I if? flfc 1? o'clock - soins away, at 2-ml range. In afterburner, BLUE a closed on MIG and
^ SJeplrei to liSnch SiSeSindE?" With strong SIDEWIHDER tone. SLUE u launched two missiles
V and both appeared to guide to MIO.
I At this time a MIG was observed rolling on over the top In BLUE U's 6 o'clock position.
C BLUE "made a hard left and then a hard right turn As BLUE i^^*^:??
stnEWlKDER rirlrss he observed debris and a parachute. The attacking MIG wa^ still foi-
and BLSE f rolled Into a spllt-S to the ground and proceeded to ridge line, making
hard maneuvers. Fuel was low and BLUE 4 exited the area.
On exiting. BLUE U closed to within 2 or 3 mi of a flight of four F-105S, when he
Observed a slnle aircraft on the south side of the ridge line closing ^he F-lOSs.
iSnce tde^tif^cation could not be made. BLUE U turned to engage. BLUE U was SPARROW
posUlon on the r^lsslle panel and the back seater locked on. Cn closing the aircraft
turned out to be BLUE 1.
BIUE U then loined on BLUE 1. with about 5 mln of fuel remaining, so BLUE 1 and BLUE H
exited «u?h2fciSp5a Sines and'started to climb, to cruise altitude receiving pretty
hiivv and accurate 85mm fire. BLUE flight (two aircraft) maneuvered tr^rou^h this and .
5t5S\^ta??er"er«:;cy squawk on IFF and SIF. BLUE flight then renaezvou.sed with the
BROWtJ ANCHOR tanker through ADF and. after refueling, proceeded to Udorn.
RiiiF \i eomnentf'd that the BLUE 3 aircraft seemed to be a little underpowered since
durlnfcUnb aS S' evasion on way to the target BLUE 3 had trouble paying with the
oUhe!J flight members. BLUE 3 also was flying at a single-plane element In this flight.
A
310
EVENT I>4S SUMMARY
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1)
Other Friendly
Communications
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1. 2, 3. 4)
Remarks
Time -
Hark
Status 1
Action
^OA
Fuel 12.000 lb.
500 kt. &O00-ft
altitude.
2 wing tanks
4 750 GP bombs
4 SPARROWS
4 SIDEWINDERS
Bl Initially sights
four NIGs 2 o'clock. 2
ml. Calls HI6 sighting.
V formation In
trail to target, Bl
in lead. 5000-ft
altUude. SOO-kt
speed, heading W to
target. Status
same as B1 . B4
wing for Bl . B3
single aircraft
element.
Bl cal Is MIG warn-
Ing--"M1G-17$ at 2.
o'clock." F-105
(IRON HAND) flight
coning off target
also calls "HIGs."
Flight of two ele-
ment of two MIG-
17s each, heading
St, 4500-ft alti-
tude . E lemen ts are
1500 to 2000 ft In
trail. (Possibly
three elements of
two HIGs each . )
it previously
iborted at refuel-
ing. BLUE flight
part of strike
forces cofT.posed of
F-lOSs and F-4s with
five minutes TOT
separation. BLUE
flight third flight
In strike force with
several flights be-
Ulnd,
h^
Jettisoned ordnance. tapk*
dropped; center MER did
not eject; A8 Ignited.
Began hard right-hand
climbing turn to 10.000
ft and came back down.
81 calls "Ordnance
off— afterburner.
HIGs at approx 5000
ft stayed level In
hard right turns.
Inmediate decision
to engage MlGs,
procedures for Jet-
tisoning complex.
T4A
Altitude 6000 ft.
speed 500 kt.
Sees MlGs* cannon puff,
loses visual contact
with 03 & 4, continues
three hard right 360"
turns In vertical plane,
climbing to 10.000 ft
and 300 kt and diving to
2000 ft and 600 kt.
In and out of after-
burner in turns; used
burner to close on tar-
get. In the turns
attempted to fire SIDE-
yi?JO£RS--three fired, bul
no hits; ene SIDEWI.'^OER
hung. At one time a MIG
approached from 4 o'cloc
and an overshoot was
forced by a high-speed
yo-yo. After this, the
third SIDEUIKDER was
fired.
For B3 & 4 activi-
ties, see B4 event
sumtsiry .
k
Bl called break to
B4.
Firing on BLUE
flight. HIGs mak-
ing level turns .
A lot of HIGs In a
turn, but seen
singly. In plain
view.
Hfter the call of ]
Sreak, the flight I
cecamc cosipletoly
separated, operating!
as three separate
aircraft. 1
Jsed burner to dose
on target. Bl tried
to pick up HIGs
4ith1n missile para-
peters. The tone
ten f 1 r i ng was ma r-
jyinal. During the
.turns , HIGs are |
rcver a threat to Bl
k-never sees deton- 1
'atlon of any missile.
One SIOEUINOER was
fired at a HiG who i
was close behind an {
1
EVEWT 1-45 SUHM<^RT (ConHwued)
Time
Kark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1)
StAtus
Action
Other Fritndly
CoBinunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
(KI6 1,2)
Remarks
4A
After the tine/event narks are no longer synchronized between B1 end B4.
I
5A
Altitude 10000 ft;
speed 600 kt.
6A
10,000 ft lookdown
aspect on MIG--
almost straight and
level.
7A
8000 ft.
Sees NI6 at 5 o'clock.
Sees HIG aheed.
Locks on and ft res, full
system two SPARROWS —
Interlocks in. Does not
see detonation of second
missile.
81 up to 10.000 ft and
left. Lost sight and
concern for HIG.
F-IOSs coning out
from target also
engage NIGs. See
Volune 11.
No contact. See
B4 Time/Event
Chart.
F-105. MIGs ac-
qui red at about
a iT<1 le. and by the
time an attack w^s
established & set
up, the range was
about 2S00 ft. By
time position
reachec where he
was tracking and
had g profile
regulated so g
could be relaxed
and still keep MIG
In reticle A SIOC-
HINDER g envelope,
range was about
2000 to ISOO ft.
Called break for
83, but not sure
MIG firing at B3.
No acknowledgement.
MIG at S o'clock
firing cannon.
MIG at 7000 ft
altitude going awaj
In « slight right
turn.
KI6 heading NU
7000 ft. HIG brokejparameters
right when ml ss (1 e
halfway there and
second SPARROU
passed 6 o'clock
position SOO to
1000 ft from HIG.
HIG Initially in
First
SPARROM did not
gul de . F 1 rings
with full system
lockon-interlocks
In.
sa c&si
Gsa Kia u u a
J 1
J w
4^
£~j r"" r^i m cr:. rri m r~:
' i
1
EVEHT 1-45 SUHHARY (Continued)
Tine
Mark
HA
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1)
Stilus
10.000 ft.
10,000 ft.
DA
6000 lb fuel,
15,000 ft.
Actfon
Picked another MI6.
Attempts to fire last
two SPARROWS In bore-
sight. No lockons —
no fire.
Gained 6 o'clock «t 600
ft fron NIG eble to
track left turn T/2 to 1
min broke off as
energy dissipated.
Tries SPARROU i SIOE-
UIKDCR. No firing.
Other Friend'y
Picked up B4 end heeded
E. Refueled on way out.
Communi cati ons
gives "BINGO"
11. Cans B4>-
ca
Join up.
Cneny Actions
(HIG 1.2)
NIG 11 o'clock
heading SC.
Initial slight left
turn, then rolled
cut MtG at
12 o'clock.
Renarks
No tone on SIDE<
WINDER firing
atteapt.
: I
r::z ^2 ^^ ^ c
EVENT 1-45 SUMMARY (Continued)
Action Aircraft (BLUE 4)
Other Friendly
Conmunlcatlons
Eneny Actions
(HIG 1. 2. 3. 4)
Renarks
Time
Mark
Status
Action
Fuel 12,000 Ibi
SOO kt; 4500 ft
altitude; HRT.
2 Wing Tanks, 457
lb
4 750 GP bombs
4 SPARROWS
4 SIDEWINDERS
B4 sees three 2-a1rcraft
elements.
See B1.
See Bl.
See Bl.
See 81.
4500 ft altitude;
500 kt TAS.
Turned right to attack
MIGs. Lost sight of
last tMO elenents of
MIGs. Passed attack
against lead elements.
31 message "Jettlsor
ordnance and tanks.'
HIGs approit 5000 ft
Stayed level In
hard right turns.
B4 not able to
Jettison tanks and
ordnance--m1s5ed
the switches.
1
4500 ft MRT.
Turning to attack had
eiemeni, oi niii5 in lo-
unit turn.
See 81 Time/Event
Sheet. B3 one-
half mile out and
one-half nlle back
In trail.
Bl tailed "Break"--
MIG closing In rear.
Lead element of
MIGs outturn 84 and
gained position at
4 to 5 o'clock.
Due to ordnance loa(
could not maintain
turn.
4000 ft HRT.
Turning right 3g.
Bl leading attack.
B3 observed with
element of MIGs
approaching from
rear .
B4 called 63 warn-
ing of MIGs.
Follows B4.
B4 lost sight of
second MIG of lead
element which Is
following him.
2000 to 30Q0 ft
altitude; 500 kt.
rime/Event narks are
B4 broke hard left in
AQ Mith spllt-S to 50
ft off the ground. MIG
observed to begin to
follow. Reversed to
right, disengaged from
HIG with hard maneuver-
ing turns and Jinking,
staying close to ground.
not synchronized between
B3 observed out
wide in right turn
with two HIGs at
4 to S o'clock
firing.
Bl and B4 fron T^ e
61 called "Break
hard."
n.
HIG at 4 o'clock
level firing at 84.
Two MIGs at 6 o'-
clock on B4« firing
S4 realized that he
had not jettisoned
ordnances and tanks.
EVENT I>45 SUHHARY (Continued)
ActlQit Aircraft (BLUE 4)
Other Friendly
Comnunlcetlons
Enemy Actions
Remarks
Time ■
Mark
Stitui 1
Action
(MIG 1 2)
50 ft & 500 ft AGL;
559 to ODO Kt TnS;
in AB.
Jettisoned wing tanks,
bombs and MER. Makes
hard turns to check
6 o'clock. Does not
see MIG. Turns to
return to engagement
area, out of AD and
climbs to 1000 to
_5f)nn ft
Lost contact with
81 and 63.'
Much chatter on
radio. Not Intel*
Hglble.
DHenjageil.
Runs to ridge line
area; makes man-
euvers close to
ridge line displte
speed. AM stores
Jettisoned cleanly.
^6B
l
1
4500 ft: SOO-600
kt TAS; MRT.
Sights HIG at 12 o'clock
head-on. 3 to 4 ml awajf.
Attempts radar lock-on
without success. At-
tempts borcslght firing
Mtthojt success.
HIG 4500 ft level.
Cannot get radar
lock due to clutter
and confusion.
4500 ft; 5S0
kt; HTR.
Passes KIG head-on. 500
ft separation. Coai-
mences left turn and
enaages AB. Turn Is
16-1 / unl ts .
HIG 4500 ft level.
^3B
2500 ft altitude:
550 kt IAS. 16-17
units Of angle of
attack. In AB.
Hard left turn
conpleted. At finish of
tarn, sights MIG ahead
in light maneuvering.
Changed from SPARROW to
SIDEUINOER.
HIG Altitude 4SC0
ft.
T
40uu ft altitude;
550-500 kt In AB
slight left bank.
Closes to Mithin 1 ml
with HIG at 6 o'clock.
Fires two SIDEWINDERS.
HIG sighted rolling in
on B4. Hard left break
down to 2000 ft alti-
tude. Turn is 20 units.
Light maneuvering;
shallow turns; no
evasive maneuver.
MIG In slight left
bank. MIG attacks
B4 rolling in from
barrel-roll. MIG
at about 6500 ft.
Inverted.
Fires two SIDEWIND-
ERS within 5 sec.
Both missiles appear
to guide. Back
sights HIG rolling
as from above to
attack 84. Could
not follow SIDE-
UINOER due to eva-
sive maneuvering.
sua u ikMa
"-to
EVENT 1-45 SUI^MARY (Continued)
ActUn Aircraft (BLUE -* )
Time
Mark
Status
IT
10B
2000 ft altitude;
500-600 kt In AB.
Acti on
Reversed turn to hard
right. Sights debris
and parachute Mhere HI6
had been. Turns are 20
units. Cones back over
the top.
Other Friendly
Connunicatlons
Enemy Actions
(MI6 1.2)
Remarks
11B
7000 ft altitude to
25 ft in AB; SSO-
6S0 kt; fuel State
2000 lb.
Back still sees KIC fol
lowing. Rollb around
into a sort Of spl i t-S
to 25 ft off the deck;
nade some hard Jinks,
heads out. Runs down
B) on radar Intercept,
thinking B1 Is hostile.
Kefueled on Moy out.
NIG above at 7
o'clock.
1
t
r
I.
(i
EVENT 1.46
Aircraft Involvea: Three P-lCs vs two MI0-l7s
Result: Onr> P-i(C lost
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*13*N/106«28'E
Route Packaee VIA
r 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SlfUATIOtJ
I . Date/Tln.c: 21 Sep 1566/0920H
Strike on JCS-16 prl:r.:;ry ntissI<Ti, t<aoK>up [r.lsslon, MIGCAP. Flight of three F-^JCs pro-
ceeding to Route PacKage VI A (foui-Ll^ T'.- turned to tJiat- due to refueling difficulty). Two
I minutes out from target area the F-lOL-3 over tar^^et reported MIG attack. F-iJs Jettisoned
I ordnance and proceeded at hig^h sped lri:c trie delta Ju-.t east of the target.
2. HISSION ROUTE
Proceeded west from Cuif of Tonkl::, north of the ridge line, north of Haiphong; during
engagement turned toward HaU?iong ar.d ocrsssed Generally over inbound route.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
I I P-IC BLUE 1. 2. 3
* - CBU-2J1 (Bl)
* - 750-lb bombs on ccnterllne (b2 & 83)
f ■ 2 - 370-6al tanks
ft - SIDKV/rMCER (AIM-9) on Inboard station
!. 4 - SPARROW CAIM-7)
Radar. TACAN, IFF operating
i MICIT MIC 1. 2
I. '. Ouns
Camouriage
[" 4. FLIGHT CONOniONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
. Weather ; Clear, 5 ml in haze.
BLU E
I T 3
Altitude ; IJ500 ft-
Speed ; ^bO knot.i-
Fuel' State : Pull Internal (sorne still in winy
„ tanks) 11,500-1<'?.000 lb
I j Flight Pormtitlon ;
Relative to BLUE 1: BLUrl 2 - 30° Cone behlitd bLUiS 1 and 1500 ft out to right
BI.U£ 3 - iO^'-lO" back and flying high and 4000 ft to left
5. INITIAL DETECTION
^ Plight was Inbound to target when MIC alert waa called by RD-66 aircraft. At the same
time warning was given wl'^jfi F-io^s wi-rv er.^;:aged by MIG^. MIGa were Initially acquired
visually. They were se»:n cJlnblng uij "cut of the terr.iln" at 6 o'clock position.
([T Plight leader (BLUc: 1} reported seelri£; three MIGs; BLUE 2 noted two MIGa. Range
|j at contact approximately 150O ft.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 2 and 3 Jettisoned the 4 TfO-lb boirbs carried on centerllne station at MIO
alarm. BLUK 3 Jettisoned ftjol tanki^j f»I.UF: 2 did not. MIG 1 fired cannon at BLUE 2
"intermittently." MIGs at 5M'£ 2's 3. 9. and 7 o'clock positions, BLUE 3 maneuvered
Into poaltlon to attack MIO 2.
Bl. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
After MI(i 1 made cannr^n attack on Fil^UM 2, BLUE 2 was Instructed to break hard
left and egress chu area. Although Ih'.re was no Jmcdlate indication that BLUE 2
hart been hit by gunfire, hf- had received four or five probable aircraft cannon hits.
f7 BLUE ?'8 left enj-ine exploJvJ on route to the r.ujf of Tonkin. Later the rlj^ht engine
J , flamed-out. frcm .''uel staviifi'.'jn and y-:.V>i 2 ejected. Hi, UK 3 alchted second MIO at
I.' 9 o'clock and positioned tf* fire iij J.':',.'i;{!Li:Ra at VA?t 2, BLUE 1 maneuvered Into
MIO 2'8 6 o'clock poaltlon and firctl bor.h SIDEWItlDKRS and SPAHHOWS at HIG 2.
4 a
, MIG 2 did not turn bHc'»i to rij-lit. , biu. maneuvcrc;! -'.'olently to avoid the miaalles
J 4> fired at hln while foilcwln.^ ."i t:Anvi';il ttrNidinK Lrc.vaitl i;alphonr.. On anticipated
' low-altltude cnri-'tgcnpnts. BLUl^ 71ight li.id prcpnt-ed to use SIDliWINOEKS.
V^^^^^HV 323
I I I
I I I
8. ORDNANCE
V
SPAFIROW
AIM-7
(No. fl red/No.
SIDEWINDER
BLUE 1
"i7c
hits )
Cannon
0/0
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
NXQ 1
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE
BLUE
BLUE
0/0
3/0
1/0
EVEMT 1-46
i i I
' Remark3
Good 5one before flPine; firing against blue
aky jbackaround. Later opinion range was
below nlnlrnum; nlsslles did not guide.
One 'mlsislle known to be inoperative and was
not Iflred; launch of the second r.lsslle
Judged' to be wltt-.ln ran?e and g-force limits.
Tracked enemy In AB; missile detcnated behind
violently maneuvering aircraft.
Plr^t 2 fired In boreyilght m.^de at 500- to
1000-ft altitude. 5-6000-ft range.
Detonation not observed.
Ill , .
Of second 2, one nlsslle hung up on launcher;
one .tracked and detonattd In vicinity of air-
craft . '
No remarks .
Fired singly. Opinion that alaalle launch
was Inolde nlnlnum range . No tone. Hlssllea
did jnot guide.
Sporadic firing of guns observed.
SIDEWINDER Inoperative before take off, one SPARROW malfun.tlon durl.ig encounter,
k) radio and Intercom out when stores ljettlson*d. Survival raft inflated
liflculty. SLUE 2 pilot's rift did not :tnflate. ^, ^ r
SIDEWINDER Inoperative. Maintenance personnel reported no Pi^fy^o^^^hlstory c
ms with tnlaslles fired, but SLUE i APA-157' launch computer failed pcstflljht
1 - One
2 - (Bac
with difficulty
3-1
problems
check
of
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
tfours
BLUE I (Front) 2«50
BLUE 2 (Pront) 130
BLUE 3 (Back) 3100
200
350
Combat
Missions
75
62
20-30
I i !
I Remarka
5-1/2 yeara P-100, 3-1/2 years F-^iC -
Instructor, te^t work; extensive
gun/..^laslle experience, AF Fighter
Weapons School, Nellls Air Force
Base.
Ho gunnery er missile firing experience.
Hadi fired SIDEWINDEPS and cannon from
P-100. Fired L SPARROW from F-« prior
to event.
Coraaents on this Encounter
BLUE
I I
Would like
1 f Pront 5 - Believed HiGs have developed tactics jtc, defeat T.lsslles,
to haSe gun -! feels would have mere control. N^^d ran^e information device
to JndlctSe "in range.* and in firlr^ envelope. On each Hi n^. observed MIG to
fly a continuing hard "S-lng" maneuver and toward lower a^^l ^jj".
ftiuE 3 (Front) - MIGs broke off because BLUE 2 outran ' theia , reaching '
JhereTs about a tO^ cone In the where you cannot see a thing and the back
iSs^ pull himself around to see'behlr.d. MIG seerjed radar vectored.
BLUE 5 (Back) - Guns would have killed HIG. Struggled to open range for mlaslle
envelope. Aircraft performance adequate for engagement.
Cenanents from Overall Experience
1 Firm believer In two-man crew. Prefers j se eoiid man be a pilot.
2 : IJjantage of.ack seater on night miaslins -i simply keep pilot of
altitude wSen pulling up from run unJer flares helps to k«p from runnlne out of
EHrH^night-bomoti
BLUE
BLUE
BLUE
i
1
I
3
J
f
3
a
0
32'»
0
I
11. DATA SOURCES E»EllT 1-46
Project Intcrvlcwa ;
BLUE J (Front)- 8 Jan 1967
BLUK ?{Kront)- 9 Feb 1967
BLUE 3{bacV)- 8 Mar 19b7
Hessage? . Hoports :
7A'-' XSC/?in2'»Z Sept 1966 DOCO 25829
7AP OrfU:P-3/2^l5'*''2 Sept 1?66 DOCO 25906
35TFW ysc PASTEL 795 Sept 19t>6 21O9«0Z Sept 1966
35TF1*' MSG FASTEL iO'-i Sept 1966 211'»15Z Sept 19b6
35TPW MSG PASTEL 7S0 Sept 196S 2106152 Sept 1966
357r-< r-'-SI PASTEL 773 Sept 1966 210'»^2Z Sept 1966
TAP y.SG ?123522 Sept 1966 DIO 30^92
12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
. ri,^*st th,.p«. F-UCs was flylnz west at U500-rt altitude to provide HICCAP for
P-105J uideTat ack 1^ the't'^Jg.t'ar.a. The P-i., Jettisoned "^dnance and pro-
ceeSed to'^Vn. Lvz^t area at high speed. 3LUh 2 was abcut 1500 ft out and 30 -^«J^"^^?^UE 1.
muE 1 ^as 20«-?0° bade arid high behind BLUE 1. BLU:. ^ was rlgnt wing, SLOE 3 wa3
ShSn 8'5e 2 tuSd leffAia 1 followed a pursuit course flrlns on BLUE 2. Internlttently
ShlSe'aLUE 2 was turning left he was hit by "four or ' l[Vl
-thumps"). BLUE 2 continued a hard diving left turn, cor.pletlng two 360» turns. .
broke away to the rlgn'-. and was not seen a.-aln. BLUE 2 egressed the area at lo«
S Sigh ?tte of speed and subsequently ejected over the Gulf of Tonkin after the left engine
Mpllrted n a reSult of tne hits sustained from KTC I and the right engine flained-out from
fuel starvation.
BLUE 3 observed one KIG (MIG 2) In the 9 o'clock Fosltlon- BLUE 3 maneuvered behlnc
MIG 2 and was followed ty SLUE 1. BLUE 3 could not obtain a "tone" but <»««"«J rtfS „„t
STDEWI.VDERS "visually". The first two ralssiles were fired inside minimum range and did not
guide. The MIG either outr^euvered the third missile or the, missile did not guide.
BLUE 1 then took the lead and released three SIDEWIMDER and three SPARROW missiles.
The first two launches were probably Inside rainlr.un rar.ge. The third SIDEWINDER within
the envelope with good tcne and the HIG was in afterburner, but the HIO if
maneuver the missile. BLUE 1 went bore5lg.nt. put the viC under the P^PP"^*"^ J^^J /"l"
first twb SFARP.0V3 with Inter-lccks-ln. When the SPARROWS were re leased, the MIG aove for
the pround. Two more SPARRWS were fired, one hung u? and the other detonated Close
to the ••■IG The SPARROWS appeared to guide but the MIC was able to see them coming ana
outcaneuvered them. SLUE Flight was near 3ING0 fuel ar.d the sngageiaent was moving close
\o Haiphong so they broke off to the left and the KIG continued on toward Haiphong.
EVEWT 1-46 SUHHAWY
Time
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3)
Other Friendly
Communications
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1.2]
Remarks
Status
Action
T„
0
Bombs J e Ct < soned
\n preparation for
MIG engagement.
B) re t a i ned tanks ,
B2&3 Jettisoned
tanks
Inbound to the target
{JCS-16)
Head 1 n g mc s t
a1 ti tude 4500-
6000 ft. tactical
formation - 62
right wing 1500 ft
out; B3 left wing
4000 ft out and
high
F- 105$ called MIGs
attacking in the
target area. B3
sights and cal Is
"MIGs 3. 9 1 7
o'clock low"
HiGs coming tn and
up from 6 o'clock
to 3 o'clocli
position
i
]
B1 broke down and into
MlGs, reversed to the
left. B2 unable to
. i cay f n turn, breaks
off to left. B3
continues hard right
diving turn 270*- 360*.
Rllir fllnkf i tL
DLuC. ilignt iS
split up. B1&3
400 ft reversing
left In climbing
turn. B2 turning
left. 83 continues
right turn to
about 270*.
62 rear seat sights
MIGs during turn,
calls them out ,
but intercom is not
transmi ttlng.
HI drops In behind
62. M2 probably
followed Ml in the
left turn going
high.
3 MIGs sighted.
2 MIGs engaged.
Same
Bl after completing
reverse sees MIG
shooting at B3 sees
2 MIGs . ) shoottng at
62 and the second at
9 or 10 o'clock. 82
Starts < diving left
turn
Ml at 62's 6
o'clock. Bl ts
1000-2000 ft
behind KI and B3
is 2500 ft behind
Bl .
Dl called 62 to
break left. 83
called "Hie 9
o'clock"
Ml shooting at 62.
N2 Is at 9 o'clock
to 82.
\
SI same
B3 Idle and speed
brakes
B3 turns into H2 and 61
fol lows B3 around the
t urn . 62 is turn f ng
left at high speed and
very low level conpletes
tMO 360* turns and de-
parts the area for the
poststrike tanker
63 in a left turn
very close to H2.
61 behind then
Ml broke off 82
in the turn and
left the area.
M2 is turning
left with 83
very close
behind him
83 too close to
MIG and attempts
to back-off to
shoot SIDEWINDER.
? !
EVENT 1-46 SUMMARY
Time
Mark
Actton Aircraft {BLUE 1.2, 3)
Other Friendly
Communications
Enemy Actions
(h:6 1.2)
Remarks
Status
Action
U
83 behind M2 trying to
back off to get within
the SIDEWINDER firing
envelope. Bl pulled
Into 63 6 o'clock and
thence around to hts
9 o'clock.
BLUE 3 fires three
SIDEWINDERS at H2
82 on his way out
of the area. B3SI
behind H2
Hi has departed
area. HZ Is m a
ser'es of diving,
climbing turns
avoiding
SIOEWINOCRS
33 fired 2
SIDEWINDERS inside
the minimum range.
They did not appear
to guide. The
third SIDEWINDER
seened to guide but
the HIG iiw it and
out-turned the mis-
sile causing it to
miss .
B) took over lead and
fired 4 SPARROWS and
3 SIDEWINDERS. B3 flew
fighting wing on 61.,
BLUE flight now in
normal fighting
foriaation with Bl
In the lead
enploying dives
and ZDO<n and hard
turns in an effort
to evade the mis-
siles. H2 in
afterburner most
of the time.
81 fired 3 SIDE-
WINDERS (1 mis-
sile defect! ve and
not fired.) Also
fired 4 SPARROWS,
but one hung up on
the rai 1 . 81 be-
lieved to be within
the minimum launch
range with 2 SIDE-
UINOlfiS but did not
guide. Other
SIC'^A W;:]Lit seened u
guide well. The HIG
was able to out
maneuver missiles
by taking extreme
evasive action
when missiles were
launched.
h
Bl ordnance ex-
pended. B3 has
4 SPARROWS. BINGO
fuel.
Engagement ended at
this time. BLUE
flight was BINGO
fuel. B3 still had
4 SPARROWS, but had
lost HIG In the haze
and unable to regain
contact.
BU3 broke off to
return to base.
Bl asked B3 to fire
any ordnance but B3
wa^ BINGO fuel and
had lost visual
contact with the
target.
H2 successfully
evaded all the Mis-
siles and was flylni
toward Haiphong at
low level.
Aircraft Involved: Two P-*»C9 va two MIG-21Ca
Result: No damaf9;e
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^ZOMl/loe'^T'E
Route Pacicas« VX
1. PRIKARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tl.~;e : 21 Sept 1966/1121H
Strike asrainst JCS target 16.00 (Dap Cau Hwy/RR Brldffie). After strike to remain
In area as MIGCAP until fuel BiriGO reached. F-1053 striking the sane target. BLUE
rilGht was scheduled to D'j the third or fourth flight on the target that day. «IGs were
er.s2sine F-lOSs.
2. MISSION ROUTE
From Danan? over water to Zl'H* W/10I!3p_*Ej^then Ke5t^to^21«36'N/106"09'E and return
by the sane route.
Hefueled en route on BROWN TRACK, at 22,000 ft.
3. AIRCRAFT CO.NflGURAT ION
F'UC BLUE 1 and 2
k - SPARROW (AIM-7)
ft - SIDEWLSDEH (AIM-9)
6 - Mk 82 (250-lt» bcntis)
2 - 370-sal external fuel tanks
1 . 600-sal external fuel tank
Canouflage colors.
MIG 1. 2
Atoll missiles
Cannon
Silver color
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Lisht haze (not considered a factor by BLUE 1)
17,000-ft MSL
260'
U50-kt TAS
Not Indicated
Loose deuce
Weather :
Altitude :
Hoadlr.g :
Soccd :
Fuel State ;
Fllcr.t Forration
5. INITIAL DETECTION
While recovering from a SAM break at 5000-ft MSL, BLUE 2 observed MIO-21 at 6 o'clock
on BLUE 1(L).
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 2 called HIOs at 6 o'clock several times. Jettisoned ordnance and external fuel
tanks .
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
MIG 1 fired one Atoll missile and apparently fired out his cannon on BLUE 1 as
latter climbed- back to 15,000 ft. BLUE I did not hear BLUE 2*3 MIG calls until he
reached 15,000 ft, at which tine BLUE 1 Jettisoned ordnance and external fuel tanks,
broke right and descended to the deck to evade L. (MIG 1 apparently did not attempt
to follow.) During climb Sack to 15,000 ft, MIG 2 was on BLUE 2's tall. MIG 2 fired
one Atoll missile and cannon, but broke off the attack before reaching 15,000 ft. BLUE 1
and 2 attempted to re-engage MiGs after their separation maneuver, but were unable to
locate the MIQs. No damage to any of aircraft lnvol"ed.
8. 0!>DHANCE
BLUE 1 . No missiles fired
BLUE 2 - No, missiles fired
MIC 1
KIG 3
(No. flred/Ko. hits)
Atoll C annon
1/0
1/0
?/3
•/O
Remarka
Passed high and to right of
BLUE 1 (unknown miss distance)
Passed high and to the right
of BLUE 2 approximai;ely
100 ft
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
EVENT 1-47
None
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS^
Corenents on this Encounter
BLUE KLK Front
"Due to excessive amount cf radio chatter, did not hear SLUE 3's numerous calls
warning that MI3 1 was at ny S o'clock." This allowed MIC 1 to fire out before BLUE 1
knew he was In danger. BLUE 1 (Back) had not seen NIC 1. Conmunlcatlon situation also
hairpered front- to rear-seat connunicatlons .
BLUE 1 (Front) felt that his fllsht has been subjected to a coordinated MTQ/SAW
attack . He felt that the two unidentified aircraft tnat he saw on reciprocal heading
before the SA"s were fired were the MICs that later Junped hin. In essence, the enemy
plan of attack appeared to have been the followin?: The SA"iS were fired knowing that
If the F-lis saw them, they would break down. This would put the F-iis co-altltude with the
MZGs* It would require accurate tliclng. However, the MICs in conjunction with the SAH
firing could have made a l60" turn and arrived In position of the P-ds as they bottomed
out of the SAM break.
BLUE 2. Front
Due to all flights operating on the sanie frequency, radio conimunlcatlon was almost
Impossible. This lack of radio communications made any coordinated defensive or offensive
action Impossible.
The lack of an Internal gun and lead computing sight denied the flight the short-
range, accurate weapon that was needed to turn a near defeat into victory.
ConiT-.ents fron Overall Experience
• BLUE 1. Front
HIOs have a great respect for the
KIG-21 has a real problem In disengaging from the F-ii. The only chance HIG-21 has Is
to get down to the treetopa where It Is difficult to acquire him either in a SIDEWINDER or
SPARROW shot.
The P-lt has no problem turning with the MIO-21 below 15,000 ft at about Nach 0.9*
The P-ii should have a gun but not at the expense of the existing missile capability*
i.e.* a gun Ip addition to the missiles to give it a elose-ln capability.
As to the utilization of the back seater during an engagement, he wants the back seater
to lock his eyes on an Identified MIG. He does not want him to look away until relieved
by the front seater.
The F-4 should get every MIG that gets on his tall.
11. DATA SOURCES
Pro ject Interview : BLUE 1 -(Front) 28 Jan 67 .
M ess age 3 J Reports ; Letter - BLUE 2 (Front), Cundated, approx 15 Feb 67)
35th TFW, OPREP-3, SlQlJUOZ Sept 66 FASTEL 777
35th TFW, 0PP£P-3, SIOT'JSZ Sept 56 PASTEL 787
7th AP, OPREP-3 211U33Z Sept 66 DOC 258»»3
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
On 21 September 1966 BLUE flight of four F-^ICs was scheduled for a strike mission
against JCS Target 16.00 (Dap Cau Hwy/RR Bridge) and to. function as MICCAP after the strike
oiission. Two of the F-tCs aborted and the other two, BLUE 1 and 2, proceeded on the mis-
sion as planned. Each F-4C carried six t{k 32 (250-lb general -purpose bombs), four
SIDEWINDER missiles and four SPARROW missiles in addition to two 370-gal fuel tanks.
Tq At about 1120 (local time) while at 17.000 ft on heading 260**, BLUE 1(L) observed
two unidentified aircraft pass under the flight on a reciprocal heading. He assumed them
to be F-105s departing the area. BLUE flight was scheduled as the third or fourth flight
to hit the target that day.
Ti At 1121 (local) BLUE 2 called SAMs at 12 o'clock. BLUE 1 also observed the SAMs,
waited for the proper time, and called the SAM break. The two SAMS, when picked up, were
at 8000 ft on a heading of 30* with a 20" climb angle heading directly toward BLUE flight.
SAMs vera about 1000 ft apart in trail. BLUE flight was in a loose-deuce formation with
SLUE 2 on the left.
At "SAM break" BLUE 1 and 2 rolled almost Inverted (i.e., about iJ^* from the inverted
position) and headed down, keeping the SAila in sight with the idea of making a pull-
up as the SAMs started to maneuver downward. The 3AX5 coiititiu«j o«i the original path witn
no attempt to track.
^Aircrew experience data not oUkained^,^
332
EVENT 1-47
AS BLUE KL), while on heading about 170* and at 5000 ft, started pull up to the right
lb return to ortclnal altitude and heaalnr;, BLUE 2 or. heading 190° observed a MIG-«:1 at
BLUE I's 6 o'clock and flrlnc; at BLUE 1. MIG was at BLUE 2' s li o'clock position about
800 ft away. BLUE 2 called MIGs at 6 o'clock and Jettisoned bombs and external fuel
tanks. However, due to the saturation of radio comnunl cat Ions on the assisned frequency,
BLUE 1 did not hear this call and continued his cllnb to 15tOOO ft.
MIO 1 fired one Atoll nlsslle from about 500-ft range which ml.i5>.*d BLUE 1(L) high
and to the rlfht. MIG 1 continued to fire cannon, apparently firing out during the
period. BLUE^I did not realize he had a MIG at his 6 o'clocic. Neither Front nor Back
BLUE 1 observed the HIG.
1*^ About the tine he Jettisoned his ordnance, BLUE 2 observed a second NIC (NIG 2) at
his 6 o'clock. MIO 2 fired one Atoll .-nlsslle, which passed lOO ft and to the right of
BLUE 2. MIC 2 then fired cannon, after which he broke off the engagement.
After several attempts to alert BLUE 1 of his situation. BLUE 2 was finally able to
get throuch the communication clutter as BLUE 1 reached 15,000 ft. BLUE 2 advised
hl.UE 1 to Jettison his ordnance, which he did, and then BLUE 1 heard BLUE 2 calling
"You have a t-ilG on your tall, take it down."
Ti| At this time BLUE 1 bro'Ke right and down, unloaded the aircraft, and accelerated
past Kach I. BLUE 2 followed.
T5 After about ^5 sec in afterburner at low altitude BLUE flight reversed course to
reencac;e, but was unable to regain visual or radar contact. KIG 1 apparently disengaged
about the tine BLUE 1 broke.
BLUE flight remained on HIGCAP until BINGO {"uel was reached and then returned to
Danang.
BLUE fllcht had not fired any missiles and received no damage from the HIG-21C
attack.
^ 1^ C-i
EVENT 1-47 SUHMARY (Continued)
Time
Hark
A^ior fltrcMft (BLUE 1 an^ 2)
Status
C'llnblitg to
IS, 000 ft
450-500-kt TAS
IS.OCO.ft
A8
Hach \,*
500 ft
500 ft
AB
M«ch 1.2
Acti on
B1 continues climb
unaware of HIG
firing at him
(right turn).
tiZ observes a
Kir, (K2) at his
6 o'clock firing.
Other Frlendltes
81(L) hears B2 Jet-
tison call and Jet-
tisons bombs and
external fuel tanks.
B1 breaks right and
down to the deck In
AB.
az follows B1.
After about 45 sec
In AB BLUE flight
reverses course to
the right In an
attempt to re>
engage but cannot
sight the HIGs.
81 and B2 take up
MIGCAP station
until reaching
BINGO fuel and
then return to
Oanang w1 thout
further Incident.
Communl ca t1 ons
82 continues to
transalt warnings
to 81.
82 tells 81 to
Jettison ordnance
B2 tells Bl that
he has a HIG on
his tall and to
take It down.
61 hears.
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1 and 2)
Ml still firing
at B).
M2 fires Atoll
at 82 which
passes high and
right aboiil 100
ft. M2 then
fires cannon at
Bi: and disengages.
Aenarks
HI probably dis-
engages as 81
breaks.
Kl and M2 have
apparently
departed the
area.
1
tV£NT 1-47 SUMMAftY
Ttme
Hark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1 and 2)
Status I Act1 on
17,000-ft MSL
450-500-kt TAS
Hd9 260*
SAMS at 12
o'clock
80° HOG 20°
climb angle
SOOU-ft MSL
BHD Hdg t70*
B2 Hdg 180*
B1(L) observes two
unidentified air>
craft pass beneath
hln on opposite
heading.
B2 on left of B1
flying loose>deuce
fornatlon.
81 observes SANs
and Mai ts for
proper tine to _. -
break.
B1&2 roll almost
inverted (tj within
45* of inverted) and
head down watching
the SAMs to see if
they f 0 1 1 ow .
61 bottoms out of
SAH break and starts
right climbing turn
to original altitude
and headi ng.
82 observs MIG-21
(HI } at Bl' s 6
o'clock and firing.
Ml is 4 o'clock.
800 ft from 82.
82 jettisons
ordnance and fuel
tanks and attempts
to Dosi tlon on HI .
Other Friendlles
Communications
82 calls "SAMS at
12 o'clock.*
81 calls SAH break.
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1 and 2)
SAMs do not
follow -
continue on
same flight
pa th .
82 calls several
times telling 81
he his a MIG on
his tall.
At about 500-ft
range Ml fired
Atoll mirsile at
Bl. Missile
passed high and
right, unknown
distance. HI
then fired
cannon at Bl.
Remarks
81 assumes the air-
craft are F.lOSs
depa'-ting the
target area.
Bl does not hear
82's MIC warning
because of ex-
treme saturation
of the communica-
tions. All flights
are cn the sane
UHF channel.
,i cr\ r.-ji c
t *^ c.:> cJ^ f
EVENT 1-48
Aircraft Ir.volved!
Two P-lCs, one EB-66 V3
four M1G-17S
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*12 'N/10«''50'E
Rout * Package V
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SHUMIOK
Date/Tine: 23 Sep 1966/08OOH
TWO F-tC airplanes (BLUE flight) escorting an E3-66 (GREEtl fUSht). J-^^gLUE air-
-wift vior.. rrcund aceic^. a third was an airborne abort. Orbit point for QRttN riigni
Uroxlr.a?el? ?I»3GVi/10U''5O' E. Numerous F-i05 fllshts were conducting atrlkea in
the sarne area.
The route of flight to the orbit point Is unknown.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE fllgnt departed Danang.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
r^HC BLUE 1. 2
4 - spAF.aov; {Ai:".-7E)
11 - SIDEWINDER (Ai::-99)
2 - 370-sal wing tanks
1 - oOC-gal centerllne tank
IFF and TACAH operable but off, camouflage paint
EB~66 GREEM 1
Not given
MIG 17 HIC 1, Z. 3. "
Unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: A very thin, low, scattered layer; clear, visibility unlimited elsewhere.
BLUE
Alt itud e;
He ad i n gT
Speed •■
Fuel State ;
Pllgnt t-'orratlon ;
— 30,000 ft
360"
— 0.8 Kach
— 9000 lb
OREEN
J
31,000 ft
360«
0.8 Maeh
Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 2 Front and Sack slnultaneously sighted a flight of four MIG-17 airplanes at
1 o'clock 5000 ft, heading 25C», In direction of F- 105 flights, about 2 ml E of Yen Bay -
BLUB fllcht was passing over Yen 3ay at this time ar.d was observing P-105 flights making
strikes directly below them.
6. ACTION INITIATED
None. BLUE 2 was unable to cormunicate to BLUi: l due to execsslvtt radio chatter by
the F- 105 flights. BLUE I never sighted MIOs.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPMEWT
BLUE fllcht maintained Its escort position In crblt until scheduled return tlee.
EVENT 1-48
8. OMONA'fCE
Nona expend-.-.i
9. EQUIPKENT PRiiPLFMS
BLUr 1 - :!-^::-.'
hiyiV. 2 - :.'j-.e
10. AIRCRTJ COMMCMS
Total
Hours
I Combat
Missions
BLUE 1 - Frcnt — Unknown — , — 7 — : —
blue: ? - Bac:c 830 500 l 1 IQQ
C onnen ', p cn thlr rn counter i 1 1 i
£LU£ I - Front 1 , 1 1
Kxi^esslve raJio cnattcr ty F-105 fllehts. 1 ' '
BLUE ? - Back ! ' ' '
I'iiot thot;;;-:t it would have been very slmplle to 'dive down on the MIQ fUght and
shoot dswn at Icri/t one ocforc t!ic MIOs knew he Was there. He ssil he would have closed
to 1 to 2-1/2 £skcrn anri then started firing SIDEWIMDERS.
11. DATA SOURCES
Proje c t IntervlQv. .' : bLUE 1 (Front), 29 Jan 67
BLUE ? (5ac>:) , 17 Mar 67
o„„.^.,. .. -jrYF-..; 3253052 Sep b6
12. NARRATIVE PESCP.IPTION
BLU-; rilf;r/L Jaunc!.°d fron Danang as a scheduled four-plane escort of an EB-66;
however, only :-..o F-^C aircraft actually made the fllshtl BLUE 1 and 2 proceeded to the
tankttr, then noz-U: to Yen Bay to the prescribed orbit Ipolnt. VvT.ere GREEM 1 Joined the
flight Is unknc:.-:.. GREEN 1 established a left ortlt oriented N-S, escorted by BLUE
1 and ?. ! '
I I I I
After aprrijxl:;.stely one orbit, heading BoO", BLUE 2 , Front and Back simultaneously
sighted a flight 5f four :'.IC-17 aircraft at j o'clock,' very low (approximately 5OO0 ft)
heading ?50*
of the
maKln
ocuu-se of excessive radio chatter BLUE; 2 Iwas unable to Inform BLUE 1
On or tc! -..'am several flights of .-'-105s directly belcw BLUE flight
ft rlkes .
IGs continued 250° on an Intei^cept course for the F-1053, who very
shortly called our. that they were being attacked by MIGsJ BLUE 2 finally contacted
BLUE 1 uut SLLi; J ioclded to r;aJnt3ln position oni the EB-56. CREEH 1 continued In his
orbit ayproxlr.ritely 20 nln and then egressed with j BLUE | flight .
• I I I I
EVEHT 1-48 SUMHABY
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1 .2)
Friendly Aircraft
(GREEN 1)
Conmun'.catlons
Enemy Actions
Remarks
Tint
MarV.
Status
Action
(MIG 1 . 2, 3, 4)
/o
S and 2 at 30,000
ft. Kach 0.8.
Heading 360*. 9000
lb of f uel . 2 mi
in trail ofCi
82 sights a flight
of 4 MIG-Ws
Gl at 31 .000
ft. Mach 0.8.
Heading 360'
Several flights of
F-105S directly
below BLUE f 1 i ght
making attacks
82 attempts to
can 61 . but
radio Is con-
plstely satueted
by r-'.ObS
Four MIG-17S at
approximately 50C0
ft. Heading 250°
In direction of
m> fl ights
Unchanged
BLUE flight continues
on escort mission
B2 finally infcrns
Bl of KlGs
1
F^IGs seen only by
Z2
EVENT 1-73
Aircraft Involved: Four F-^Cs vs three MlG-21s
Result: Sighting Only
Vlclnl^ty of Encounter:
2l'*30'H/104''55'E
Route PacKaee V
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TlT.e: 16 Jan 1967/15^5H
11. DATA SOURCES
FACA7 Coirisand Vest Ho. 27 Hated on Project MIO Incident Summary
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
None >
{
r
t.;
Aircraft Involved:
EVENT 1-74
Pour F-«Cs and four P-i05s
va two KIC-17S
Route Package V
Result: No damace
Vicinity of Encounter:
1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH ^
Date/Time: 17 Jan 1967/0807H
Four F-liC aircraft (BLUE fU?fa> Inbound to target area to provide escort (MIGCAP)
for four K-105 IROII HAKD (GREEN flight) and twelve P- 105 strike aircraft! ^"^^cafj
2. MISSION ROUTE
Dan«n?*Cfr'u2T??"^?r ■-^/■•'"^P/^'P"*^'' (Uotlan refueiing route) to target area and recovered
Danang via WhiTK Af.'Cr-.vR (poststrlWe refueling).
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-»C BLUc. !. ?. 1. U
t - SPARRCW (AIX-7)
- SIDEWINDER (AlM-9)
2 - 370-gal tanks
1 - 600-c;al tanit
P-IQ^ QRbEH 1. 2. 1. 0
2 - U^O-gal tanks
1 - QP.C-160 ped
Ordnance had been expended at time of encounter.
WIC-:7 MIC 1. 2
Drop t anks
Sliver color
4. FLIGHT CONOITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clear, visibility In haze 2-3 nil Into sun;
AUKude:
Heeding :
Speed ;
Fuel State :
Plight Formation :
BLUE
12,000 ft
130* True
«»50-kt IAS
13*000 lb
3-5 ml away from sun.
GREEN
5000 (estlirated)
310» True
As fast as possible
Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
B-1 (back) called MIOb to BLUE t.ead on interphone and BLUE 3 called "Strangers
f«®n??.?*^5w'K/'^2^?' was «re 3 o'clock low at 1-3 ml heading In opposite direction
to BLUE flight and I ml In trail with a flight of four P-lOSs (OREEN flight). MIGs were
picked up visually. No prior warnlns wae received, » ^r.
6. ACTION INITIATED
the MIoillTs*'** *'*^^*'* '^^•^ right* and BLUE flight initiated a deaeending right break into
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT
The MIGs were not
apparently had BLUE fll
Jettisoned tanks and In
into turn, BLUE flight
disappeared into heavy
with fragged mission.
No Information on
no indication as to who
information on relative
able to maintain relative position or overtake OREEN flight. MIGs
ght m sight because as BLUE flight broke towards them, the KIGs
ItUted a right cllrifclnc turn Into BLUE flight. Approximately PO"
Jettisoned tanks. The MICs then reversed their turn back left and
haze. BLUE flight was unable to reestablish contact so continued
BLUE flight's radar was on 50>mi scan.
the number of g's used or ti.m radius of MlOa or BLUE flight. Also
was In the rest advantarfois position or gaining advantage and no
positions when contact wa^ lost. Interviewed BLUE Lead only.
«69
EVENT 1*74
8. ORDNANCE
No ordnance expended by frlendlies or enemy.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Hone
10. AIRCREU COMMENTS
Eiperienee
Total F-ii Combat
Hours Hlsalon3
Remarks
All tactical fighter background.
Houra Hours
BLUE 1
Front" — — — Unknown
C oinmcnts on this Encounter j
BLUE 1 - Look-down capability of radar la bad. Described NIGs aa light In color
with swept wings and round wing tips. I <
I
11. DATA SOURCES I
Project Interviews ; BLUE 1 (Lead) - Front
jteaaages. ^ Report a :
366 TW OPREP-3 17O500Z Jan 67 No. 003
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight (four F-^a) on escort/MICCAP mission, was Inb
130° at 12,000 ft, iJSO-itt IAS, In spread formation when they
F-105S) beiow then at 3 o'clock, 5000 ft In QRC formation exit
opposite direction with two strangers 1 ml In trail and fallln
right and down towards the now Identified riIG-17s and Jettison
time, the HIGs Jettisoned tanks and started a right climbing t
MIGs then reversed their turn and disappeared Into heavy haze,
raeatabllsh contact so continued with their fragged nlsslon.
Six of the eight personnel Involved observed the enemy al
•11 ordnance systems armed and working. OREEN had QRC-160 In
ound to target area heading
Ighted GREEN flight (four
Ing target area heading in
G behind, BLUE flight broKe
cd fuel tanks. At the same
urn into BLUE flight. The
BLUE flight was unable to
rcraft. BLUE flight had
operation.
'^-"^ f ^ ^ CTJ r:i r-*^ r-:> r~;
EVENT 1-74 SUHMARV
Tine
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1*2.3,4)
Status
Action
Othtr Fritndly
Conmunlcstions
Eneny Actions
(MI6 1.2)
ftcaarks
12.000 ft
450-kt IAS
13.000 lb
4 SPAP.ROUS
4 SIDEWINDERS
1 QRC'UO
SoMe F-T05$ were exiting
Flight of F-4S were
exiting to the SH then
turned NW
F-105$ in QRC formation
All systems arned and
operating
All working
Escorting F-IOSs
Four F-IOSs IRON
HAND
Twelve F-lOSs '
strUe aircraft
B1 Back called
NIGs to lead over
1 nterphone
B3 called
"Strangers 6
o'clock- to F-105S
BLUE flight Jettr
soned tanks
Lead called break
right
BLUE flight lost
Sight of NIGs
NIGs reversed and
headed into haze
KlGs were swept
King, si Iver color
Two MIG-Ws were In
trail about 1 mi
behind F-IOSs at
about SOOO ft
NIGs were not able
to keep up with
F-105s--were losing
out
MIGs started turn
up toward BLUE
flight--got about
20* Into turn--at
this tine F-4s
Jettisoned tanks
Weather clear, but
haty. Visibility
Into sun 2-3 mi ;
away fron sun 3-S
mi
PtcVed up KIGs
visually at about
1 to 1-1/2 mi
No HIG warnings
Radar on 50-m1
scale
Look-down capa-
bility on radar Is
poor
CVrNT 1-75
r
Aircraft Involved: Three P-^Cs vs one WIG-17D
Result: No danage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21''10*N/10J4<'50'E
Route Package V
1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 21 Jan 1967/0355H
Three K-«iC aircraft following an F-105 IRON HAND flight.
?. NiSSlOlt ROUTE
Departed Darsanp; and flew directly to tr»e ORAjnE AHCHOR refueling orbit. After
refuellnc:* tne flight proceeded to the area of the encounter.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
« - SPAKRC'*' (AI,':-7fc:)
« - 5IDt;XINCtR (AIH-9B)
QRC>160 pod
Avionics, tank configuration, camouflage, etc., unknown
KIG-17D
Guns only
Silver in color
Scan-ODD radar
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Scattered clouds at 2000 ft. Visibility Into the sun was 3 mi and In other
quadrants was 10 ni.
T
BLUE
-5 —
T
Altitude :
Head InVT
Fuel State:
Plight Forf»atIon !
16,000
050°
l«80-kt CAS
-—Pull Internal plus some-
fuel in the external tanks
KZO
-r
30,000
l8o"
Unknown
Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Plight was In formation shown above when BLUE 3 sighted a stranger at 10 o'clock high.
Shortly thereafter he called "MIC 12 o'clock high."
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flleht contlnuec? straight ahead until the MIG was In the 6 o'clock posltlon-
eo-altitude and about ^jOOO ft back. BLUE 3 called a MIG break, and the flight executed
a hard right descending turn as BLUE 3 jettisoned his tanks.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
^'"^^ flight broke down and right, the MO disengaged and departed the area. BLUE
night did not slgnt the MIG again.
8. ORDNANCE
No ordnance was expended by any of the airplanes involved.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 - No problems
BLUE 2 - No problems
BLUE 3 - Had Indications (both a red and a green light) that his QRC pod waa only
partially effective.
Si
EVENT I.7S
10. AIRCRCU COHMCNTS
Experlencv
Total
Hours
F-H
Hours
Combat
missions
BLUE 1
■'if
BLUE
Front
Back
2 Front
Back
BLUE 3 Front
Back
CcrjTtents on t^tlc Encnunter
-Not Obtained-
Remark a
I Not Interviewed.
First mission In N.
Not Interviewed.
Vietnam.
-• ,c=u-"^ 'Jj??Lf!l.'v'«Li%:" fr°f"l> t.r.lnea,or mentally prepared for thl.
11. DATA SOURCES
. Project Interviews :
;;*.Megsaire r.er.orts: —
BLUE 3 (Front), 28 Jan 1967
366TFW 210608Z Jan 6?
12. MAftRATIVE DESCRIPTION
I I
I i
and heaSlng'JiS* Ihenl^ jE^HTef'^f I ,ViP/<'"«"«n « If .000 ft indicating iiSO-kt CAS
called a hr^*i. tS. rM:::-K-:L*!".:f:! I'^S *^?l?»"«"Y?f:«^.to ^,Oao ft at 6 o'clock. BLUE •
jijjiin." ro*5i..s:,:i'£5 5s»:.?°i:.„*i^r
At this
I I
! I
I !
I !
I ■ I
r —
» f
EVENT 1-75 SUMHAPY
Tine
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3)
Stilus
Action
Other Friendly
Commun 1 cations
Enemy Actions
(NIG 1)
Renirlis
Loose finger tip
formation at 16,000
ft, 4e0-kt CAS.
heading 050*
B3 sights i bogey «t
10 o'clock high
Sene
Same
Same
Saae
3 F-4CS following
an F.105 IRON HAND
flight
B3 Identifies bogey, now
at 12 o'clock high
rollfnc In, as a HIG
83 obse-ves Nl at
6 o'clock to the flight
83 observes Ni 4000 ft
at 6 o'clock to the
f light
BLUE flight breaks right
and down to 6000 ft.
83 Jettisons tanks. B1
and 82 retained tanks.
B3 calls HIG
rolling In
33 calls NIG break
B3 sights bogey an'*
calls It out.
B1 replied "No Joy.'
33 calls "He's at
6 o'clock. -
Sogey continued
toward BLUE flight
Ml came overhead
and maneuvered
down an<i in tral 1
with BLUE flight
B3 1 denti f ted bogey
a^ probably a
NIG-17D
Ml now closing in
the 6 o'clock
posi tlon
Ml dosed to
4000 ft at
6 o'clock
Nl disengages
BLUE flight after
recovering from the
break, does not
sight the NIC
agaJn.
B3 feels that he
muffed the event
and that given the
sane chance again
he would have been
able to handle the
engagement better.
HdiaiHeiiBii
Mi
Aircraft Inv;
EVENT 1.76
'■a and four F-105s
n03ull: f.'o (t;
Vicinity or
V MISSION Ar;.-}
■■-^Cs (fif.'JK :■;
Mi flight (•:; .
ROUTE
u.r.
130*
500--:';
:2 Pull';/ '
** soifiC
nal ta:-,.
QPC-lC.
•L DETECTION
flight reeclv'.-':
TiVlOieiO'F; ( ; •
approx n nl .
:nt) . BLUK
r-i the KIGs.
INITIATED
« flight bernn. •,
:ig of 2100 a-ij .
ION develcpme:;:
flight pursuer: ■
In in the vlcl- .
•JLUE flight tr.
3, •
J.'i
Ive sur-p'Tt 3!
•■/fating In the
refuellr..;
n of rolsslor,
ji recovery a*
:pe rational
GSSEN
. i, 3, i
reported
reported
- reported
jt reported
..'jut MICs In tr.Q
. Two MIC alr;r:
.-ave and close ■
ill 'external fuei
:k the MIGs heca:v
; lowest poasit;!?
it lost slfht of
;5'''<1'E. SLI'F: f •
rrr.ent and cllrr.t!! :
iltS)
■ t A AM
tf*'
Package VI
:jireet 18.33.
iC time.
^nned route to ort'.
.•tided to WHITE
'.ven
vhlle proceeding
;d at 11 o'clock
flight of F-1058
.'terbumers and
'.<E flight and turned
■fseape*
'.hey ducked around
have an opportunity
'Hslve orbit.
rks
e. No suitable
.A
{
EVEWT- SUMMARY
Tine
H«rk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1.2.3.4)
Other Friendly
(GR£EM 1.2. 3. «)
Communl cati ons
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1 .2)
Remarks
SUtuS
Action
^0
Heading 1 3S"
n.ooo ft
sao-kt CAS
Saw F-IOSs and HIGs at
about 6-tti range.
JettisontMl all cxternil
\ t. »!*.'. .
Flight of F-1055
(IRON ilANO),
ltL'<i<iing I'JU''
B4 cal led MIGs
(claimed he saw
plain view of 21)
1
SAU two MIGs at
dbout 1000 ft.
Aj.;in,: fort t.;t Ijo
:.i',.v, « if*'-.. ••■.!r.'.
<...-■.. r- . '• •
Weather clear w1 th
10-ni visil*ility.
i!' ord f 1 i '!•!*. of
to about 2 Bi
Hent Into SAH
break to left
82 Back called
•BLUE flight, SAM
9 o'clock."
iny right turn
around hill
B2 Back saw SAM
fired from
9 o'clock
lost sight of
MIGs
Lead did not see
SAM.
Total time 3 mln
or less.
V
L
■ [
•o
0
EVEHT 1-77
Aircraft Involved: Twelve P-lJCs
Result: One F-^C lost and one damaged by SAMs
Vicinity of Encounter: Northern end of Thud
Ridge and Yen Bal
1. PRIHARr MISSION AMD TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlir.e: 2 3 Jan 1967/
The mission was a planned fighter sweep consisting of three flights of P-UCs (BLUE,
GREEN, BROU:i). The cilsslor., called 30L0 II, was Initiated because of the success of an ■
earlier flch'.^r sweep ealleJ SOLO I (EVENT 1-69). In addition lo the F-t flights at
least four 7-105 IRC.'I HANC rilii;hts In the area* two of which preceded the F-4s. To
assist In the planned deception, the first two P-U flights were to simulate the F-lOS'a
flight profile.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE flight was the lead flight, and after take-off from Ubon proceeded to RED
ANCHOR for alr-to-alr refueling, ' ;n to 20°33' Ji/lOS^lO' B, then to 2(1050' N/105°20 'E.
GREEN rilPh.t was spaced 3 mln behind BLUE, They were to parallel tha Red River until
the second turning point and ^^Jen make a 090" track to Phuc Yen- After take-off from Ubon,
and refuel at 0RA;JG£ a::cHCR, aPiEEN fll;?ht nroceeded to 20°56 ' H/10i»°07 ^E direct to
21"31'H/10b*00'E direct to 21°12';V105°20'"e direct to 21''10«H/105°37'E at which point
GREEN flight broke off and e^ressed ^he area.
BROWN flight originated at the same base and followed the preceding flights to
the vicinity of Yen 3al.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-ftC BLUE GREEN BROWN
4 - SPARROW (Ai:4-7E} Same as BLUE Probably sane
4 - SIDEWI::d£R {AZM-9B) except that one as BLUE.
l - QPC-160 pod aircraft had an 1 - QRC-I6O pod
1 - 370-sal wing tank AI.O-Tl pod Instead No RHAW gear
1 fOO-gal centerline tank of the QRC-I60 podi
Exact type of P«AW gear APR-25
unknown
Camouflage paint
Radar on
Status of TACAM, IFF
unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Overcast at 18,000 ft, solid layer at about 7000 ft, visibility unlimited.
BLUE ♦ GREEN BROWN
— I 2 3 B — rmTT
Altitude: Unknown 14,000 ft 14,000 ft 16,000 ft 16,000 ft 16,000 ft
Heading : Unknown — — — ogo* . Uhknom
Speed ! Unknown ^...^ 525-kt TAS — Unknown
F uel State ; Unknown — Not Reported — Unknown
Plight Formation ;
qRC-160 pod formation. OREEH 4 had inoperative QRC-I60
pod and was close to GREEN 3.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE riltsht observed one SAM coming up in a 450 to 60* (trajectory elevation) climb
with sustalner burning. Three more SANs followed the first one.
GREEN flight saw a group of four missiles, GREEN 2 called the missiles first, at
9 o'clock, 2-1/2 ni.
BROWN saw four SAMs cone out of the overcast with sustalner burning at 2:30 o'clock
position, range 3 ml.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight watched the Initial 5AK explode and then maneuvered to evade the remaining
three. No warnings were given to BLUE flight. BLUZ 1 and 2 had indications from activity
lights but no PRF warning.
483
EVENT 1-77
CHEEN flicfit watcfied Khe SAXs to determine If they were trackln*;. CRfciF.N flight
heard BLUE fllF-.hfa ^,vi cdII, and ArR-e«, was active. GREEJI 3 had first launch light.
f^^^, ill"'"^ turned Into the 5a::= and watched them. They had heard the SAM call
Afe"-,5 " ^^'^ launch Indications. BROWN flight had no
7. SITUATION OEVeLOPHENT
J^l^^^c^^T nianeuvep to evade the SAMs, the number^ 2 SAM exploded near BLUE 2 damaBlng
fuel cell and the afterburner section. The time «lapae from slehtlng of
BtuF ? JuJ^iI H^^H rr^f ^2" 5,-6 se'c. The flight egressed after
BLUE 2 sustained the battle damage. wo
waa ^fS^fi ^prfi V^^" ^*jrE.*2'*, f**'"" 3 aLd ft broke left and up. GREEN ft
TfL to GREEN 3 since GREEN H's ECM pod was Inoperative. However, GREEN ft
^« ,nno K ^""^ aircraft exploded In a lareel fireball. As the flight rolled
Th.^M^j3rKi2L*i a^o"' 11.000 to Ifc.OOO ft, three core SAMs were seen at 3 o'clock!
S: ilttl iXlililVltrVl^. lUV:'' P«sed abov. .„„ detonated ^ar»li,Jl,/
BROWN night saw the first SAM detonate Immealately after they leveled off Shortly
lirflrtS S4M ^M^^'^ <»e«en<}; at this tine the third SAM detonated.
« 3t HI appeared to be guiding on the flight lab EROWN flight broke right-
as they rolled out of this break, tne final SAM exploded at or?««.^^snc.
The flight then egressed,
B. ORDNANCE
None
9. EQUIPNENT PROBLEMS
BLUE - None reported
GPEEN ft « QRC-160 pod Inoperative
BPOWN ft - QRC-160 pod ceased operating during a break
AIRCREW COMMENTS
about 3000 to 5000-ft range.
10
' Experience
Total
Hours
ftftOO
3ft50
Conbat
Mlaalons
*3
i GREEN I - Front
!'eR0VW 1 . Front
I Cornnents on this Encounter
I GREEN 1 ...
The Q;S!!JS%S.^*:J1!i,i5 '^lltl^ry "^^^ 1» operating,
since Heather «•» not good enough to bonb. the deceptiJn was not authentic.
BROWN 1 j I
n. OATA SOURCES
Project Interview. : QREEN LPront; BROUN l-Pront (exact datej unkno-n. In J«,-Peb of 1967)
Messages ;
^ STFW 230515Z Jan 67 DOI 01536
8TPW 23.-..Z Jan 67 XI 01537 '
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOM
See Item #7.
I
484
Aircraft T;
Result:
Vicinity
1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 5 Feb 1967/1530H
A fllEht of four P-ICs (BLUE flight) while crsl".
encountered a total of eight MIG-17s in a orlef jprir
twt'nty P-1053 were striking a target about 7 nl 1:; ri
period some friendly aircraft were airborne la th«
2. MISSION ROUTE
Danang to refueling on UHITE track to TACA!! c^.::: :
orbit area.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-tC BLUE 1. 2. 3.
U - SPARROW (AIM-7E) (Note: One P-UC, speclf:= ■
« - SIDEWiriDER (AIM-93) AIM-TEs)
1 - QRC-lSO pod on right outboard pylon
1 - 370-g;al tank on left outboard pylon
1 - 600-5al centerllne tank
Radar on, IPP and TACAN not radiating
Canouflas'.ed
MI0»17s MIO 1. S. 3. It. 5. 6. 7. 6
ATOLL missiles
Cannon
Silver color with solid red star on wings and f,.
stabilizer.
External fuel tanks
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Scattered clouds at 1000 to 3000 ft; 3 to
Broken cloud layer at 20,000 ft.
Plight Conditions ; 3000-ft altitude, U50-kt TAo , SE .
Puel: 13,000 lb fuel (Note; B3 A 1 were unable
centerllne tanks-- approximately '4000 lb of fuel.
Plight Pormatlon ; Close-in fluid four-- about one-.nal:
5. INITIAL DETECTION
The flight was heading 148* when BLUE 1 (Prcn:)
fled as a MIC-17) at 10 o'clock, about 1 ml dlstar.:^,
300-350 kt, heading about As BLUE flight r.sie .
Observed in company with the first. While in the tur:
6 o'clock (to the southeast), less than 1 ml dlstir.s-^
the same time a flight of four more MZGs was observ-?^
had been heard en route to the orbit area, but t.'^.ere :
encounter.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Lead called out the Initial MIU and told the fli
about a H-g turn, going to full military power, tc c^.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
As BLUE flight maneuvered to attack position o.". ■
subsequently determined to be a flight of two), t-A2
attack on BLUE lead element from 6 o'clock, app-ire r.t 1 '
Going Into a hard creak, BLUE i then oo served four r.-
aoout the sane position as tne first >SIG observea.
four, becoming separated from BLUE 3 and li at a:>oi.t :
split into two elements and gained pursuit posit
encounter continued as two on two with continuous -n:"
termination with BLUE 3 and tt commencing egresa 'r.,-: •
Into the clouds. BLUE 1, 3 and U fired mlssllt".';,
attempting to get Mills off the other elements* tail, •
BLUE I* also rired a SIDEWir.'DER at a >5IC with n^c.i
entered a cloud. MIOs were observed to fire carir.-'^ „■
SIDEWINDER and two SPARROW eiissiles were fired
EVENT I-7B
• C3 V8 eight F(I0-l7s
7'N/105»22*E
.a Package VI
an F-105 strike
^his period some
During this
/105«22«E, then to
:i\ had only three
r.ige bar on vertical
: moderate haze.
fuel from their
. Ing.
•IG (readily Identl-
Ings level, airspeed
. , a second MIG was
-'.^hted two mos at
losing. At about
. east. NIG warnings
:ng of this apeelfle
Plight made
tlon.
-hted MIG (which was
-:nsueceasful missile
•.er the one pass.
•:;ck, closing from
into the flight of
'.,Tht of four MIGs
-3 of P-iis. The
. apparent mutual
MIGs disappearing
observed. In
r nlaslle parameters.
i.:king as the MIG
•\ total of five
OB?
SITUATION DEVELOPMENT (CONTINUED)
Two unguldc-cj SAMs crossed In front of lead element as they pursued a MIG, detonating
more than a laile away.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
SPARROW
AIM-7E
0/0
0/0
2/0
(No. flred/llo. hits)
sidewi;:de?.
AIM- 9 3 Cannon
2/0
0/0
2/0
BLUE «
1/0
1/0
NIGs
1/0
Soviet AAM Remarks
Fired both missiles In salvo,
knowingly out of parameters,
and with unresolved tone. In
sueeessful attempt to divert
HICs from attack on other ele-
ment. No bursts observed.
Plred two SICEWINDERS, tcnow>
Ingly out of parameters, and
with no aural signal. In attempt
to divert MIGs from attack on
other element. Plred two
SPAFROWS without lock-on (due
to ground clutter). Ho bursts
observed.
Plred SPARROV with no lock-on
In attempt to divert MICs from
attack on other element. Ho
burst. Plred SIDEWIHDER from
good position, ^ood tone.
Missile guided, fol lev/in? NIC
Into clouds. (Jo burst observed.
2/0 Lead observed missile firing
In his direction; flight broke
hard. Missiles passed con-
siderable distance from flight;
unable to determine' whether or
not they guided. Two r^IGs
(other than the ones firing
missiles) both observed to fire
a 3- tc 3-sec burst at BLUE 3
I 4 at about the same time.
9. EQUIPMENT PROSLEHS
BLUE 3 14 were unable to Jettison their centerllne tanks and could not feed fuel
from theo.
Vhlle no abnormal equipment problems were e/perleneed In missile firings. It Is note-
worthy that the tactical situation dictated out -of -parameter launch of seven of the eleht
missiles.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Exoerlenee
Not known. BLUE 1, 2 i 3 aircraft commanders were grade of major; BLUE 4 was a cap-
tain; all back seaters were 1st Lt.
Comnent s on this Encounter
BLUE 1 ?'ront
The orbit area for this mission was between a river and a 3500-ft mountain ridge.
The area was selected because of Its nearness to the. target and because the terrain masking
permitted the flight to keep a loolcout for ".IQz without being concerned about SAMS. Even
though Q.1C-160 pods were carried, flight traled not to rely on -shem.
The MIGs' tactics seemed to consist of a single firing pasj and breakoff.
Never had the opportunity to set up for an attack — there was always another MIG or
two positioning themselves for attack at the same time.
It was about a constant I- to 6-g maneuvering encounter, with the best pass BLUE I
could ever get on a MIO being about 85^ off the tall.
Elenent integrity was maintained throughout the encounter;
It Is not believed that the final KIG was coordinated with the SAMs in an attempt to
draw the P-irr~lnto SAM range.
If the P-is had carried guns, they could have undoubtedly .-;otten off some reasonable
gun attacks.
[
c
i
AIRCRCU CONMINTS (CPNIINUCO)
EVENT 1-78
The KhDlti cn^afement tciok place at such Ion altitudes and close ranges that
lock on Mas nnt possible.
BLUE 1 trii>d to draw the MIGs up to a higher altitude— at one point, with MICs at
6 o'clock pulllnc up to 8000 ft and reversing turn— but they wouldn't follow.
It appeared that the first two MIGs were decoys to attract the F-Us' attention
while others positioned for an attack — If you see two, there's going to be two more
•round, was the normal expectancy.
Radar mqs in a boreslght mode the entire time.
The BaO was so confused by all of the aircraft In the vicinity that he wasn't Inter-
ested in t:ie radar.
The Back and his extra set of eyeballs helped "Immeasurably."
The mCs did not maintain element integrity after an initial pass.
A tighter turn capability and more maneuverability In general would have been very
helpful. ' o f
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
5te3safres. hei-c^rts;
BLUE Lead Front, 12 Mar 67
3667PW. OPREP-3, 0510552, PASTEL 113, Feb 67
366TFW, Cnange 1 to OPREP-3, O51630Z, PASTEL 121, Feb 67
366TPW, Change 2 to OPREP-3, 061110Z, PASTEL 117, Feb 67
12. NARUTIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE ril5ht of four F-«Cs took off from Danang, refueled on WHITE track, proceeded
TACAN channel 97 and tnen to an orbit area where they were to provide HICCAP for an
-'rlke. The orbit was between a river and a mountain ridge In the vicinity of
105"22'E; the F-105 strike, involving about 20 aircraft, took place some 7 m:
to
F-105 Strike.
ai^OS'M/
the E.
ml to
The average elevation of the mountain ridge was approilmately 3500 ft. The orbit
liad been selected in this area because of its nearness to the target and because the ter-
rain masking afforded by the rnountalns allowed the flight to keep a lookout for MICs with-
out being too concerned about SAMs.
^ Each aircraft was carrying a QRC-160 ECM pod and the flight maintained a close-in
(about one-half norr.al spacing) fluid-four formation. Altitude and speed in the orbit
•ere about 3000 ft ACL and iiiiO-kt TAS.
The fuel management switches for these aircraft had been modified In order to
permit a setting which would force the external win<; tanks to feed before the wing
Internal fuel. In this setting, the fuel from the wing external tank would be used first,
thereby reducing the asynsnetrie fuel load as soon as possible. This was a field modifica-
tion for the squadron to permit operation with full missile load and the QRC-160 pod.
To Just after establishing the orbit and while on a southeasterly heading, BLUE 1 Front
observed a single, readily Identified, KIG-17 at 10 o'clock, IQOO ft above heading about
285** <. He called out the NIC and told the flight to break right, going Into a 4.g turn and
full military power.
now
Ti As the flight rolled out on a northerly heading to set up an attack, the MIG was
observed by BLUE 1 to be entering a low cloud formation about 2 to 3 ml ahead and was
also observed to be a flight of two. At about this time, BLUE 1 Back sighted two more
HIGs closing from 6 o'clock, low. BLUE I Front then looked back and saw them at about
3 to ftOOO-ft distance, 5 to 6 o'clock, in a tracking situation. At about the same instant
Front observed two missiles released by the lead KIC, apparently fired at BLUE 1 or 2.
The MIGs then broke down and left. The flight continued i' hard (4 to «-l/2g) right
climbing turn. The two missiles were observed to pass low and behind BLUE flight, 2000-
ft distant, with no determination as to whether or not they had guided. At about the
saae time BLUE 1 had seen the two MIGs closing from behind, BLUE 3 or U observed four mora
MICs closing from the east. * iwur ner«
Tfe It was apparently Just after this break In response to the missile firings that the
elements became separated. In the turn, BLUE 3 observed two MIGs splitting from the
flight or four and BLUE 3 and U broke into them as the MIGs were turning through their
3 o'clock position and descending.
T3 As BLUE 3 and 4 tightened their turn to pursue two MIGs, BLUE 1 (with BLUE 2 on his
«Tng} rolled out on a southerly heading and Jettisoned center line tank when his Back
slehted the same four MIGs to the east. The lead element (BLUE 1,2) irr'.edlately broke right,
Ti, It Is not cle|r what maneuvers the MIG3 executed after Tu, but after BLUE 3 11
turned through 360 and BLUE 14 2 assumed a northerly heading, the two elements net almost
head-cn wl.h the lead element about 2000 ft above. At this time each element wis oursued
by two FIOs. Two MICs were at BLUE 3 1 **a 6 o'clo:k position, about WOO ft distance
0
487
EVENT 1-78
NARRAIIVE OtStRIPTlON (CONTINUED)
(both M1G3 rirint? cannon), and two MIGs were at BLUE . i 2's 'i o'clock position, 3000 to
fcOOO ft dlr,taric«. Kacfi element leader had advlsuO the other of MIGa on his tail prior
to Tt BLUE 3 now flrfrd two SlL'EV.ISDEiHS with no tone In an attempt to "scare off the t*
KIGs behind BLUF. 1 i 2. Al.-^ost Imnedlately , BLUE H fired a single SPABROW, with no lock-
on. in a slnlUr atteT.pt. Almost simultaneously BLUE 1 nade a 5^-10* divl.i^ attack on
the KlGs pursulnr: BLUE 3 1", flrlnq two SIDEVIIJDERS with an unresolved signal due to
ground envlrcnrent. tlo bursts were observed from any of these firings. T.^ere was no
report of the missiles having guided or not.
BLUE 3 I * continued in a cllnbing right turn. BLUE 112 pulled up and continued
turning.
Tc After completing about 270' of turn after flrlne, and still turning, BLUE 3 1
heading east ,
(It Is believed that
>t dove Into the
sighted two «ICs at their 2 o'clock low position, head
these were the twc diverted while attacking BLUE I and 2.) BLUE 3 and
KIGs from benind.
Tfi BLUE 3 fired two SPAKROWS with no lock-on due to ground clutter. The MlC underflre
broke right and then left. One missile passed 500 to 700 ft behind him and the other
200 ft In front. No bursts were observed. BLUE 3 then broke right and called for an
egress due to nls low fuel state. BLUE »• continued following th«; MIQs.
BLUE 1 & 2, rolling out on a southeasterly heading, observed a single MIG-17, very low,
ahead, heading east. They turned left to chase, descending and going Into afterburner.
T7 BLUE IJ , in position behind the !<IGs , and with a good aural tone, fired a single
SiDEWI;:D'='R. He observed that It tracked properly and when the missile was about "tOO to
500 ft from the target the MIG-17, in a diving left turn, went Into the clouds at about
1000- ft altitude. Ho burst was observed. BLUE » then turned right and climbed to Join
BLUE 3.
BLUE I and 2 were pursuing a single MIG-IT when two SAMs came across in front of then
from 10 o'cloc'ic to 2 o'cIock. They appeared to have no guidance and posed no threat.
They rose, arched to a lower altitude and detonated 1-1/2 to 2 ml away.
BLUE 3 * '< called that they were departing. BLUE 1, Icnowing 3 * * were having fuel
troubles (could not feed from or Jettison their centerUne tanks), decided to break off
his chase and Join them.
Plight Joined, proceeded to refuel on VHITE track and return to base.
3
a
1
3
3
3
a
a
4>
488
0
Q
S
a
a
a
3
3
# 4
ttftWT I-7« SUMHARY
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4)
Other Friendly
Communications
Enemy Actions
(8 HIGs)
Remarks
TIM -
Hark
Statu*
Action
1
H,2,3.4 close-tn
riutd-four forma-
tion, 3000-ft alti-
tude. 450-kt TAS,
heading SE. 13,000
lb fuel.
Flight breaks tight. 4-9
turn, full military
power.
Lead calls «N1G—
break right."
Straight and level
B1 Front sees
single, readily
identified. HIG-17
at 10 o'clock, dis-
tance 1 ml , up 1000
ft. heading about
285" -
Rolling out of
turn. 4000-ft alti-
tude. SOO-kt TAS,
northerly heading,
full military pover.
Continues hard right
turn.
Initial MIGs
sighted enter
clouds. Lead MIG
of two at 6 o'clock
fires two missiles,
then both break
down and left.
Single MIG now
observed to be
flight of two. Bl
Back sees two MIGs
dosing from (
o'clock, low. less
than 1 ml. B3 or 4
see four more MIGs
closing from the E.
In hard right turn,
altitude SOOO ft.
full mnitary pOHer
03 1 4 break Into two
MIGs which are split-
ting from the flight
of four.
83 ft 4 observe two
MIGs splitting from
group of four to
the E and descend-
ing.
'3
B1 * ? rolling «wt
on southerly head-
ing. 6000-ft alt.
SOO-kt TAS. full
nllltary power. B3
K4 about same ill^
B1 jettisons centerllne
tank, going Into right
turn after sighting
four HIGs.
Bl Back sees four ^
NIGs to £. close b>"
at higher altl- ;
tude. 1
n t 2 In shallow
dive. SOO-kt TAS.
SOOO-ft altitude.
i\ t 2 make a S'-IO"
diving attack on MIGs
following B3 ft 4; 61
fires two SIOEHINDEftS at
2000 to 3000- ft range,
60* angle from head-en,
unreso't /ed tone, to
divert NIGs. Mo bursts
observed.
Elements advise
each other of NIGs
on the other's tall
Two MIGs pursuing
each element of
r-4St Tiftng connon
at B3 ft 4. A11
break off after
BLUE missile fir-
ings.
Two NIGs at 83 ft i
4's 6 o'clock, *
4000'ft distance.
Two MIGs at Bl ft
2's 4 o'clock. 3000
to 4000>ft distance
BLUE elements meet
almost head-on.
tVEMT 1-78 SUMHAWY (Continued)
Action Alrcreft (BLUE 1. 2, 3. 4}
Other Friendly
Conununl cat Ions
Enemy Actions
Renarks
Merk
Status
Action
(a wigs)
U
Cont.
B3 tt firing 400-kt
TAS, 4000-ft alti-
tude. 4« g
B3 fires two SIDEWINDERS
at HIGs following Bl 1
2, 1S00 to 2Ci00-ft
range, angle-off fron
head-on 90'-100", no
HIGs. No bursts Ob-
served.
B4 et firing 400-kt
TAS. 4000-ft alti-
tude.
64 then fires one
SPARROW at sane two HIGs
1500 to 2000-ft range.
1 1\ f- A r 1 AT Ir < out. rftdAr
iUbCi iw^^s
boreslght. no lock-on.
No bursts observed.
B3 A 4 continue climbing
right turn.
81 A 2 pull up In right
turn after firing.
.[5
B3 K 4 nake diving
attack on newly sighted
HIGs.
83 A 4 sight two
MIGs at 7 o'clock,
low, heading £.
(Believed to be the
MIGs that had been
pursuing 81 A 2. )
B3 at firing. 400-
kt TAS. 2g$.
B3 fires two SPARROWS.
20". Interlocks out.
radar In boreslght. but
no lock-on due to ground
clutter. No bursts. B3
turns right for egress;
B4 follows one of the
NIGs.
After firing, 83
calls for egress
due to low fuel.
MI6 firtd upon
breaks right, then
left.
One missile passed
200 ft in front of
target, other 500 to
700 ft behind.
81 t 2 altitude
about 5000 ft.
Bl A 2 turn to chase MIG
and descend, going Into
afterburner.
Bl A 2. rolling out
on southerly heading
sights a single KtG>
17 ahead, very low.
heading E.
U U fL^ fl
UJ LJ^ LJ3 UJ U^!
EVCWT l'7a SUMMARY (Continued )
Action Aircraft (SLUE 1. 2. 3. 4)
Other Friendly
Comnunicetions
Enemy Actions
(8 MlGs)
Remarks
Tine
Mirk
Stitus
Action
h
D4 at firing 4$0-kt
TAS, 3000-ft eltl-
tude. Z gs.
84 fires one SIDEWINDER.
2000'ft range, behind
target (S'). good aural
tone. SO-kt overtake.
No burst observed. B4
then turns. cIlMbs to
Join B3.
When nisslle Is
400 to 500 ft from
target, HtG, in a
diving left turn,
enters clouds at
about 1000 ft.
Missile observed to
track.
01 1 Z. 2S00-ft
altitude.
After SAM firing, 81 & 2
break off chase, turn
left to Join B3 ft 4.
Single MIG.
going away
froa B1 ft B2
81 ft 2 observe two
SAMs cross in front
of then from 10
o'clock to 2
o'clock, no threa t ,
detonate 1-1/2 to
2 mi away.
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AD-C003628
SECURITY REMARKING REQUIREMENTS
DOO 5200tl*R» CeC 78
REVIE4 ON ?.d SEP 88
00
CO
WSl-G RHPORT 116
Alil-TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA (U)
Volume II: F-103 livcnts Prior to 1 March 1967
September 1968
Comprising
IDA REPORT K-\2\ ^
John S. AcfincIIo, Pr^jtct Ltadtr
i
o
O u-
INSTITUTE rOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION (/ J
WEAPONS SYSTEMS E VALL* ATlOxV GROUP
400 ARMY-NAVY DRIVE. ARLINGTON. VA..
ODC CONTROL
Log No. J 3 520 J
uetam m
•ns
Mr 1
nuiotnoi
□
mmtkim..
IT ^
■ttniHnN/«»««4iafn
IttL
iiitL ai/« mam.
SPECIAL HANOLtNG REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
nformafJon contained in the crfoched dociment wifl not b.
lojed to fore.gn nctionols without the express ocprovol of
he head of the originating office. Appro/ol sholl refer
speciFicol!/ to this document or to specific
informotton contained herein.
ii
i r
SPCdiAL HANOIINC KEOUIRED
NOT MUASASLC TO FORriCN NATIONALS
AIR-TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN S,OUTH EAST ASIA.
Y.oluine Jl»/F-y«5 Events Prior to 1 March 1967 (i^i-^^
'^^
- — — 7 c^^.- — k^. lOiCfl .^^-^ //n > '::> ^ n I '
September 1968
Thb raport hos baen prapared by the Systara Evoluotion Division of
H«lmf!tut«forD«fem« Anolyfdtiniespoiuetothe WeaponiSyiteim
Evaluation Group Toik Order SD-DAH05 &7 C00I2-T-I04A doted ^
In the woAgnder thU To$k Order, the InstiSte hoibeen on btod^
militoty per:onnel ossigned by WSEG.
"Unautborlscd Disolosuni Sbibje«t to Criminal
Saaetlona* ^.^^
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSt ANALYSES
SYSTEMS EVALUATION IMVISION
400 AfBiy-Nav/ Drive. Arlington, Virginia 22202
D D C
OCT 84 Bn
lEiSEinnstyj
D
"EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIHCATION
IDA Log No. HQ A8-9047 ly
DDC COiasoL
UNCLASSIFIED -^-^.r-:^^---^^-^
■\3t
FOREWORD
This report Is a product of the Systems Evaluation Division
of the Institute for Defense Analyses, in. conj.untition. with, the ;
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in response to VSEG Task Order
SD-35-T-104s as modified in a memorandum for Director, WSED,
from Director* VSEG. dated 4 August 1966. The memorandum re-
sulted from a request by the Deputy Director, Tactical Warfare
Programs, ODDR&E. The Task was coordinated with tho Joint
Chiefs of Staff, (J-3 and J-5).
The RED BARON Project produced four volumes. Those mem-^ ;'
bers who made primary contribution to Volume II were as follows:
Velma M. Archer
John S. Attinello
Douglas N. Beatty
Floyd A. Frlesen, Cdr., USN
Charles W. Gardner
Howard K. Hostler, MaJ., USA
Ralph L. Kuster, Jr., MaJ., USAP
John W. Rub in o
Richard C . Stewart , Capt . ; USN"
Earl A. Thomas
John W. Walden, Cdr., USN
David D. Young, LCol., USAF.
At its inception (October 1966) the RED BARON Project 'teaira
consisted of: '
John S. Attinello, Project Leader
Douglas N. Beatty, Ass*t Project Leader
John V. Walden, Cdr., USN, Senior Navy
Malcolm J. Agnew, LCol., USAF, Senior Air Force
Phillip J. Conley, Jr., LCol., USAF, and Thomas J. Hughes, Capt.,
USN, also worked part time on the project from Its inception, V^ r
primarily acting as an interview-debrief team. LCol. Agnew and
Cdr. Walden were the other team. . ' i ''y-^':- - 'i-l
In November John Rubino, Charles Tiffin, William Easun; ": ■ '.
Capt.» USN, and Charles R. Shaw, Col., USA, Joined the project.
■ 1
■ ^
r 5>.
ONGUSSiFIED
ill:
UN£LASS!FIED
In December, Robert J, Lynch, Jr., Col., USMC, Joined* and
Philip Brooks, Col.> USAF, became Senior Air Force representative.
Richard C. Stewart, Capt., USN, was assigned In February 1967-
These later military arrivals shared their time with other WSEG
projects.
While developing Interview methods and techniques, the
project was valuably assisted by two psychologists from IDA/RESD,
W. Slnalko and W. Richard Klt«>.
For Interviews In the U.S., teams consisting of military
and civilian project members supplemented the two teams designat-
ed Initially to collect data in the combat theater. In the SEA
theater, two Navy-Air Force teams (Con ley-Hughes and Agnew-Valden)
conducted the interviews. LCol. Agnew and Cdr. Valden also inter-
viewed SEA returnees at European bases.
As interviews were conducted, it became apparent that much
more data were being collected than had been initially estimated
from official reports, "nierefore, a rapid increase in qualified
personnel was needed to collate the data for publication.
Roy G, Anderson, Rear Admiral, USN, Senior Navy Member of
WSEG, through appropriate channels, obtained the services of
four Navy fighter pilots for a period of two weeks, nie assist-
ance to the RED BARON Project of the following Navy pilots is
acknowledged:
Dennis E. Becker, Lt., USN
Benjamin Cloud, LCdr., USN
Samuel C. Plynn, LCdr., USN
William D. Klper. LCdr., USN
A« J. Beck, Major General* USAF, Senior Air Force Henber of
WSEC>, with the cooperation of Headquarters, USAF, obtained the
services of nine tactical fighter pilots for a thirty-day period.
The assistance to the RED BARON Project of the following Air
Force pilots is acknowledged:
IV UNCUSSiFiED
UNCLASSIFIED
Thomas H. Curtis, MaJ . , USAP
Leslie C. Long, Capt., USAF
Robert' S, Maxwell, Capt., USAF
R. P. Moore, MaJ., USAF
Sam P. Morgan, Jr., Capt., USAF
Michael G. Pennacchio, Capt., USAF :.
William P. Robinson, Maj., USAF
Ronald W. Scott, Capt., USAF
Ronald J. Ward, MaJ., USAF
The project also acknowledges the assistance of the follow«
Ing Individuals who assisted the interview teams In the data
collection phase:
J. J. Berkow, Col., USAF, ARPA R&D Field Unit,
Bangkok, Thailand
R. Hlller, Assistant for Operations Analysis,
CINCPACAF Staff
E. Kapos, OEG Representative, CINCPACPLT Staff
G. Koylades, COMNAVOCEANO "7
R. Llnsenmeyer, Chief, Scientific Research Advisory |
Group, CINCPAC Staff J
J. V. Patterson, Col., USAF, ARPA R&D Field Unit, ]
Saigon, Vietnam
B. Powers, OEG Representative, CINCPACFLT Staff
H. L. Wood, Col., USAF, Headquarters, 7th AF
D. G. Lynch, LCol, USMC, OPNAV
The commands, whose cooperation made It possible to reach
the participants of air-to-air engagements , are also acknowledged.
COMMANDS
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces
Commander, Seventh Air Force, Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam
Commander, Task Force Seventy-Seven
Deputy Commander, 7/13th Air Forces, Udorn Airfield,
Thailand
Commander, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TFW), Ubon Airfield,
Thailand
Commander, 366th TFW, Danang AB, Vietnam
Commander, 355th TFW, Takhli AB, Thailand
Commander, 388th TFW, Korat AB, Thailand
UNCUSSIFIcD V
UNCLASSiHED
Commander, ^32nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udorn *
Airfield, Thailand
Commanding Officer, USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63)
Commanding Officer, USS TICONDEROCA (CVA-^1)
Commanding Officer, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)
Commanding Officer, USS ENTERPRISE (CVACN)-65)
Commanding Officer, USS HANCOCK (CVA-19)
Director, ARPA R&D Field Unit, Saigon, Vietnam
Director, ARPA R&D Field Unit, Bangkok, Thailand
Commander, Ulst Air Division, Yakota AB, Japan
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe
Commander, Seventeenth Air Force, Ramstein AB, Germany
Commander, 8l8t TFW RAF, Bentwaters, England
Commander, . 36th TFW, Bltburg AB, Germany
Commander, 50th TFW, Hahn AB, Germany
Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Commander, Fleet Air, Mlramar, California
Commander, Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellls AFB,
Nevada
Commander, 15th TFW, McDlll AFB, Florida
Commander, 831st Air Division (TAC), George AFB,
California
Commander, 835th Air Division, McConnell AFB, Kansas
Commander, 3525th PTW, Williams AFB, Arizona
Commander, 4531st TFW, Homestead AFB, Florida
Commander, 4453rd Combat Crew Training Wing, Davis-Monthan
AFB, Arizona
vl
UNCLASSIHED
UNCLASSIFIED
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION , ' * * '
Data Sources
Data Presentation * • •
DATA DEFINITION AND COLLECTION . . .
Background - Goals and Limitations
Approach
Deccriptlon of Interview Procedure
General Comments on Data • . . .
EVENT RECONSTRUCTIONS
UNCLASSIFIED
1
1
3
7
7
8
11
13
15
1^
I. INTRODUCTION
At the request of the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group has undertaken
a study of air-to-air encounters in Southeast Asia. The project
code name is RED BARON. Data that have been collected on
approximately ^400 such encounters through 1 August 196? will
be analyzed primarily to assist In the selection of suitable
research and development programs for future high-performance
fighter aircraft. A secondary purpose of the study was to pro-
vide data for use by the military services and of the scientific
community. This volume is a partial documentation for the
secondary purpose.
A. DATA SOURCES
Data contained in this report were taken from two sources:
the official reporting media and personal interviews with par-
ticipants. Past IDA/WSEG experience In collecting ccsnbat data^*^
has shown that the official reporting media, which are designed
primarily for military operational and statistical needs, are
inadequate for many analytic purposes. The project groups con-
ducting these earlier studies found that personal interviews
with participants were necessary for RfcD analyses. In Project
RED BARON, Interviews were considered the primary data
source, supplemented, where available, by official reports.
iWSEG Staff Study 134, Adequacy of Data from Sout heast Asia
Comb at Air Operations for Research and Development Analyses
of Aircraft Losses and Damages (U) . SECRET, February 1957.
2WSEG Report 101, Requirements of Defe nse R&D Agencies for.
Data from Combat Air Operations in Southeast Asia , SECRET,
August 1966.
For purposes of this study, encounters that were investi-
gated were defined to include the following types:
• Sighting of enemy aircraft (either visually or by
radar) ,
• Either U.S. or enemy aircraft" initiating hostile or
evasive maneuvers,
• Either U.S. or enemy aircraft expen(f.lng ordnance, and :
• Loss or damage in combat of either U.S. or enemy air-
craft .
Dui*lng the data collection phase, an effort was made to
assure the exhaustlveness of the information contained in this
report. However, it was established that certain aspects of
air-to-air combat could not be included. For example, during
the conduct of CAP and escort missions, frequently it was neces
aary for the fighter force to Intercept radar contacts which
proved to be friendly aircraft. Also, during the course of
missions, aircraft sighted were Initially Identified and called
as enemy,' only to be recognized later as friendly. These occur-
rances were not reported and therefore are not documented in
this volume.
While numerous sightings of enemy aircraft are contained
in this volume, it la believed that there are many other sight-
ings which were not documented (and therefore not Included)-.
This is partially substantiated by the numerous instances which
were mentioned during interviews for which no;: date or location,
was recalled and which were not correlated with reported sight*
ings. • ■ ■ ■
■ ■** • •
The first type was considered in detail only If the sight-
ing was of R&D interest, e.g., if a U.S. aircraft made no
attempt to engage enemy aircraft because of inferior or malfunc-
tioning U.S. equipment. Where no R&D implications were indi-
cated, sightings were noted to record the information collected
for potential use for other analyses. .
since "test type" Instrumentation does not exist on moat
combat aircraft, the validity and quality of data are limited
to the tolerances of human senses and recollections (aided
where possible by official and personal records, notes, tapes,
etc.). A detailed account of the precautions taken to insure
the validity and quality of data gathered In such Interviews
Is presented In Section II.
Originally the data sample consisted of 2*l8 encounters
through 1 March I967. Hcwever, from this date through 22 May,
65 more encounters were Identified (not Including "sightings**).
In the 23-month period from first encounter to 1 March, ^7
"confirmed plus probablG" MIG kills were reported. In the six-
week period in April-May 1967» the 65 engagements resulted In
37 "confirmed plus* probable" MIG kills . ^
B. DATA PRESENTATION
Though the analyses to be conducted in the RED BAfON study
were to be limited to exposing problems for R&D considerations.
Interest In the basic data was expressed In many areas of the
military and scientific communities. To satisfy these needs
the data have been formalized and are published In three volumes
as follows:
Volume I: Account of P-^ and F-3 Events Prior to 1 March
1967 (U) (WSEG Log No. 126571)
No. of Encounters
U.S. Aircraft Involved to 1 March 196?
F^nfB n
F-4C 55
P.P 8
■ P-104 1
U-2 1
Total Events Reported Volume I "78
^Concurrently, there was a shift in targeting policy (NVN air-
fields were bombed by U.S. aircraft from 23 April) and the in-
troduction of new equipment (e.g., SUU-16A guns installed In
some P-^IC aircraft). Because of these factors the additional
•engagements were Included In the RED BARON data base. '
Volume II: Account of F-105 Events Prior to 1 March 1S67 (U)
No. of Encounters
U.S. Aircraft tnvolved to 1 March 1967
P-105 151
Volume III: Account of ALr-to-Air Events from 1 March 196?
to 1 August 1967^ and All Hlscellaneous Events
(U)
For ease of study and analysis, the available Infoi'mation
has been summarized under the following headings:
•Primary Mission and Tactical Situation
•Mission Route
•Aircraft Configurations
• Pll ^ht Conditions Prior to Encounter
•In tial Detection
• Ac .ion Initiated
•Situation Development
• Ordnance
• Equipment Problems
• Aircrew Comments
• Data Sources
Pollowinc; the above, an edited narrative is presented which
Integrates all the information sources pertaining to the desig-
nated air-to-air engagement. Wherever an air-to-air engagement
proved to be of sufficient complexity that a perspective drawing
aided in its understanding, such a representation was developed.
Although every precaution has been taken to depict the
engager ents accurately, the artists* representations serve only
as guides to the reader in following through the complex series
of situations and should not be Interpreteu as the precise
flight oaths of the aircraft involved.
The perspective representations of the tilr-to-air engage-
ments were developed by the SED Graphics Department employing the
Illustromat 1100 Analog Computer at the Ballistic Research
Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving Ground* Maryland with the aid of
maps and overlays developed during Interviews of the air crews.
Artists then added perspective views of aircraft in approximate
attitudes and positions indicated in the Event Sunmary charts.
The names and official call signs of the participants have
been replaced by standardized nomenclature to, give anonymity to
the Interviewees. This precaution was followed throughout to
encourage frank and honest answers to all questions posed by the
interview teams*
UNCUSSIFIED
II. DATA DEFINITION AND COLLEaiON
A. BACKGROUND • GOALS AND LIHITATIONS
The. broad goal, formulated for the data. deflnitlon/colleA?'
tlon effort was to obtain sufficient data to enable reconstruc-
tion of the various alr-to-alr encounters in appropriate detail
with maximum accuracy and completeness ("reconstruction" being
the key word) .
The scope and degree of detail was not simply defined.
It revolved around the needs of the R&D community and the
limitations of the available data. The primary limitation was
human ability to -sense and recall. There were no recording
devlces*^ In U.S. aircraft*, and", therefore, with few exceptions .
(such as taped communications and photographs), all data had
to be extracted from the minds of participants and observers.
There was also the question of the adequacy, for event re-
construction, of data reported from Southeast Asia through the-
standard reporting systems. IDA/WSEG experience* showed that
while these systems offered certain worthwhile information for
R&D purposes, they were far from adequate for the purposes of
this specific study.
It was decided that IDA/WSEQ would Interview participants
in air-to-air encounters as the principal source of data.
WSEQ Report 101, Requirements of Defense R&D Agencies for
Data from Combat Air Operations In Southeast Asia (U)."?uly
196b, (SECRET). WSEG Staff Study 13^. Adequacy of Data from
Southeast Asia Combat Air Operations for Research and Develop-
ment Analyses of Aircraft Loss and Damage (U). February 1967.
(SECRET). ; ^
UNCLASSiniD
7
UNCUSSIFIED
B. APPROACH
The data collection program Involved several interrelated
areas of operations. Thsy were:
1. Identification of air~to-alr encounters and the
participants.
2. Development of more specific data needs and resolution
of needs with limitations.
3* Collection of appropriate documentary information on
Southeast Asia air-to-air encounters.
4. Development of optimum interview techniques.
5. Location of and arrangements for interviewing
participants.
These operations were not necessarily sequential and were
continued throughout the data collection phase.
Items 1 and 3 initially were interrelated, i.e., the means
of identifying encounters was through search of existing docu-
mentation — various formally and informally maintained "box
scores" and other files.
Early information was gained from the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations and the USAP Air Staff. Additional basic
documentation came from the USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Cen-
ter, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAP, COMNAVAIRFAC , and the Commander,
7th Air Force. It was quickly determined that the various
"box scores'* did* not agree. This was attributed to a variance
in definition of what constituted an air-to-air encounter/
engagement and possibly administrative or communications
failures within the conmands.
Additionally, early in the study, the CNO and the Chief of
Staff, USAF, were advised of Project RED BARON and requested
to provide reference to appropriate documentation. Numerous
replies. were received from various offices within the Services.
8
UNCLASSIFIED
Gradually, sources of documented Information were In- .
creased until they included: standard reporting system (OPREPs,
COACT, Navy 3480 Reports, Guided Nisslle Performance Reports);
various reports of associated studies made by OEG representa-
tives and other analytical groups; letters from pilots who
could not be Interviewed; various records kept at all levels
of command; gun-camera films; tapes of communications made by
pilots; and miscellaneous message traffic among military
commands . ^
Identification of participants was a particular problem
since there is no existing mechanism for providing this infor-
mation. With a relatively few exceptions, names of partici-
pants were not included in reports. However, names were
gradually acquired through informal communications with USN
and USAF pilots and, as the Interview program proceeded, other
persons were identified by the Interviewees.
Some specific items of data desired were defined by visits
to various Service R&D and training organizations and through
meetings with representatives of various industrial organiza-
tions concerned with components of U.S. fighter weapons systems.
(These visits and conferences also provided information on the-
technical and operational aspects of the weapons systems con-
cerned.) Eventually, a categorized list of data specifically
desired from each encounter was formulated.
Having established the data requirements, an interview
jprogram was desired which would:
• Allow the greatest number of interviews, while
• Maximizing the quality, depth, and scope of informa-
tion obtained from each interview.
There were uncertainties about the inter^'iew program,
however. They involved such considerations as the human
ability to recall stressful Incidents and the effect of elapsed
time .between the event And attempt to recount it. Larg«»> numbers
UNCLASSIFIED
9
UNCLASSIFIED
of people throughout the world had to be Interviewed, great
quantities of Interview data had to be reduced, and time and
manpower had to be considered.
With the assistance of IDA psychologists, H. W. Slnalko
and W. R. Kite, basic Interview concepts were delineated.
These concepts stressed unhurried informality, anonymity of
the Interviewee, a chronological approach to the entire flight
in question (not Just the alr-to-alr encounter period of It),
and much use of visual aids — maps, sketches, airplane
models — to reconstruct events.
A systematic program was developed to Interview a maximum
number of participants In the combat theater and throughout
CONUS and Europe. There was little chance to control the
elapsed time between events and Interview. As a result, the
elapsed time varied from days to more than one year.
Efficiency of operation was approached In various ways.
Several levels of encounter were defined accordli.g to their
complexity and intensity.! and the basic interview procedure '
was somewhat expanded or abbreviated according to the level of
encounter and the knowledge of the interviewee. Data formats
were devised which attempted to facilitate the recording (and
subsequent reduction) of information while stimulating the
memory of the Interviewee.
A total of ten persons were trained as Interviewers.
Where it was possible to communicate with a participant but
not practical or possible to interview him. he was contacted
by mall.
While there was the desire to Interview a maximum number
Of pilots. It was superseded by a desire to maximize coverage
over the largest number of encounters. Consequently, where a
1 ■ :
Sighting only (visual or radar): either side tairino. h«.«.4i.'- '
;o%rS^^^Lt^:^- = eIJKJ- orS^Inle"b%'tiJMit^
1° ONCUSSinEO
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
UNCUSSIFIED
choice had to be made as to whom to interview, breadth of -
coverage was the first consideration*
At the .start, various test interviews were conducted,
their results evaluated, and improvements made before a large
scale program was undertaken. Minor changes in procedure were
made throughout the program.
C. DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW PROCEDURE^
In spite of the small changes that evolved and flexibility
included to accommodate each situation, the basic interview
procedure remained largely constant after the early test cases.
Ideally, the interviewee was given advance notice and a
general idea of what would be discussed. The interview team
consisted of two persons, one a military pilot with a signifi-
cant amount of flying experience and the second person a mili-
tary officer or civilian. The team would meet with one crew-
man., at. a. tlme^ in a. closed, room, with, minimum distraction, and
with what was intended to be more than ample time allotted for
the meeting. The team attempted to create an air of relaxed
informality.
The interviewee was given an explanation of the study,
how it came about, what it hoped to accomplish, and what his
role was. It was emphasized that his name would not appear
in print and that, in general, attempts would be made to pre-
serve the anonymity of the persons interviewed. This was done
to encourage frank and honest answers. The complete interview
procedure was explained in detail.
Next, the pilot was asked to give an uninterrupted narra-
tive of the encounter in question. He was asked to start from
planning for the mission and discuss all aspects through the
flight's return to base. He was first given examples of the
kind of detail desired. Early in the project it became stan-
dard for the interviewers to u se a tape recorder for the
more detailed discussion is presented in Volume IV of this
report .
DNCLASSinED "
UNCLASSIFIED
narrative phase. This, of course, depended upon the inter-
viewee's consent and he was always free to go back and erase
anything he wished from the tape. He was assured that the
tape was only for the use of the interviewers in gaining com-
plete, accurate Information from the meeting and its use was
limited to the project.
Next, depending on the intensity and complexity of the
encounter, a sketch of the action was made. Again, the sketch
covered a greater part of the mission than Just the air-to-air
encounter, dealing with ingress and egress as well. The
technique was to put a transparent paper overlay on a large
scale map and trace the paths, in plan view, of the various
aircraft known to have been present (as they were believed to
be) relative to known geographical points. The third dimension
to the picture was introduced by means of a keyed time-sequence
vs. altitude pint at the top of the overlay.
With regard to time, early In the study it became clear
that the -air-to-air combatant rarely had any reasonable concept
of the time duration cf events or phases of the combat. He
could, however, recall well the sequence of events. This
caused the injecting of time-sequences into the interview
process. The procedure was for the interviewer to "stop the
action** at a point where something significant was occurring
and try to elicit a detailed account of the scene at that
Instant — the location and altitude of each participant;
status of the interviewee •s aircraft in the way of speed, g»s,
fuel state, avionics modes, etc.; action by the individual and
his reasons therefor; communications which took place; enemy
actions; etc.
After such a stop the description would continue until the
next significant event occurred at which point the action would
be stopped again. These stops correspond with the "T" (or *.
''Time") marks in events and pictures. While one team member
13 UNCLASSIHEO
UNCUSSIFIED
worked with the pilot in making the sketch, the other kept , **
notes on a specially designed note pad.
Upon completion of this step-by-step microscopic phase,
the interviewers consulted their checklist on data items and
asked specific questions about points which had not come out.
Finally, the interviewee was encouraged to coaunent on the
whole range of considerations which might be of Interest to
the study — comments derived from his experience In this
specific encounter as well as from his overall experience.
The duration of an ^.ntervlew was from minutes to several
hours, depending on the significance and complexity of the
encounter and the knowledge of the Interviewee.
0. GENERAL COMMENTS ON DATA
The Project identified 2kQ air-to-air encounters that
occurred prior to 1 March 196? . Participants in l6n of these
encounters were interviewed, with a total of 361 interviews
conducted. 1 In addition, 37 written accounts of engagements
were received. In general, priority was given to the more com-
plex encounters; events for which no Interviews were conducted
were usually a sighting only, with no R&D significance.
The study group found that human ability to recall the
details of. incidents stressful to them is sometimes quite
remarkable. . With regard to the validity of recall, various
comparisons were made between OPREP reports of the encounter
and interviews and between interviews of various participants
in the same encounter. There was generally good agreement.
Where significant dlscreoancles appeared, they could usually
be traced to the confusion of a fast moving, complex situation
^If an individual was interviewed in connection with two or
more different encounters, this would be considered as two
or more interviews..
UNCUSSIFIED
13
rather than memory failure or some psychological phenomena.
(Discrepancies between various accounts of the same event did
cause some difficulty In the final reconstruction process. In
almost all cases, discrepancies were resolved through repeated
study of the data, use of logical deductions, and/or
relnterview, )
Intuitively, it night appear that the best information
would be obtained by minimizing the time lapse between encoun-
ter and interview. However, there are opinions and illustra-
tions which counter this. The thought cannot be proved or
disproved at this time. As noted e€U*ller» elapsed time between
encounter and interview ran from a period of days to more than
a year. Dates of events and Interviews have been included in
the published data.
The interview techniques, in general, were highly regarded
by Interviewees for effectiveness in stimulating accurate,
detailed recall. In some cases, through the procedures used,
interviewees were able to correct and clarify their concep-
tions of events.
i
5
i
Hi
ID
BNCUSSinED>
Ill, EVENT RECONSTRUCTIONS
The account of each event Is presented In at least two
basic parts: (1) An outline which gives an abbreviated pres-
entation of the highlights of the event, and (2) A narrative
of the encounter.
All of the events contained in this Volume are summarized
in Table 1. A Glossary of Terms was developed to aid in the
interpretation of events and is included at the end of this
report. The glossary also contains descriptions and illustra-
tions of the more common aircraft maneuvers.
In addition, whenever an air-to-air engagement proved to
be of sufficient complexity that a perspective drawing aided
in its understanding, such a representation was developed.
The perspective drawings were keyed by an Event Summary Chart •
which describes the actions of friendly aircraft (BLUE 1, 2,
etc.), and enemy aircraft, as well as known communication in-
formation, at significant points in the event. As explained
in Section II, these are identified by "time marks" (Tq, Tj^,
T2» etc.), and are instants in time when significant points
arose and are not intervals of seconds or minutes of clock
time. In the perspective sketch, a vertical line representing
altitude appears on the flight path at each of these "time
marks" with the time mark sequence number printed at the top
and the participant to which it referi»ed printed at the bottom
(e.g., B2, M3, etc.). The keyed flight paths presented in the
sketches were color coded such that the paths of all friendly
aircraft were shown in blue and those of enemy aircraft, in red.
It Is recognized that precise flight paths could not be re*
constructed since the participating airplanes did not carry
instrumentation for recording of position. Thus, while every
effort was made to depict the engagements as accurately as
possible. It must be remembered that artists ' . ^representations
serve only as guides to the reader In following the complex
series of situations and should not be interpreted as the
precise flight paths of the aircraft involved.
I
1
t r
i
1
r
Table 1. LIST OF FVENTS
Aircraft Involved
Results
No-Type
Lost/Oanaeed
Event
. D«ie/Tinit
u> « •
Enmy
II. 1
4 ADr'65/121SH
24 Jun'6S/1600H
5 0ct*6S/day
16 Nov*65/1540H
28 Nov'6S/1212H
16 0ec'6S/t630H
16 D€C'65/U2SH
20 Dec'65/1600H
16 Kar'66/1433H
4 F-105C
4
HI6-17
2/0
0/0
4 F-105
2
ftt6-15
0/0
0/0
n>3
1 F-105
NIGS
vo
0/0
4 F-105
9
M 1 G - 1 7
tl 4 W — 1 /
0/0
0/0
tI-5
5 F-105
9
C
n 1 u— 1 /
0/0
0/0
II-6
1 F-105
9
n lo- f
sighting
II-7
4 F-105
e
MI/:. 1 7
Sighting
II>8
3 F-105
9
C
n 4 u - 1
Sighting
1 1 -9
4 F-105
9
HI 77
H 4 to— 1 f »
0/0
0/0
IN10
4 F-105
»
t
M t C^l
n 4 a - C 1
Sighting
ii-n
23 Apr'66/1532H
8.Hay*66/1605H
10 Nay*66/1621H
< F-1050
MIC.l 7
n 4 ft- 1 /
0/0
0/0
I
4. F-1050.
2
HIG-17
0/0
0/0
11-13
4 F-105D
4
HIG-17
Sighting
11-14
10 Mav'Cfi/lBOOH
IV wf 1 own
74 Jun' fifi '1 31QH
4 F-105
3
MIG-17
Sighting
11-15
4 F-105
4
MIfi-17
0/2
1/0
I 1 . 1 ft
1 4 * 1 O
---.lun' Alt
4 F-IOS
1
KIG-17
Stglitfng
11-17
2 F-IOS
2
NI6-17
0/0
0/0
4 F-105D
4
HI6-17
0/0
0/0
11-19
7 Ju1'66/161SH
ft F-105D
;i F-105F
2
HIG-21
0/0
T t - 9n
1 1 "tU
12 .Jul'66/
4 F-105
2
NI6-17
0/0
0/0
11-21
11 Ju1'66/070SZ
/I F-105
11 F-10E
{1
KIG-21
NIG-21
0/0
0/0
1 1 ■>?
tl 1 1ll* HA
19 Jur66/1611H
4 F-105
1
HIG-21
Sighting
n-23
8 F-105
4
HI6-17
1/1
0/3
1 1-24
4 F-105
2
HIG-17
0/0
0/0
II. 2S
20 Ju1*66/0842H
.-.Jur66/1300H
20 Jur66/08S0H
4 F-IOS
2
NIG-21 .
0/0
0/0
■ I " Cv
1 F-IOS
5
NIG-17
sighting
11-27
4 F-105
2
Unld.
0/0
0/0
1 T _2ft
1 1 — c o
20 Jur 66/1446H
4 F-105
1
HI6-21
0/0
0/0
11-29
4 r-105
1
HIG-21
Sighting
1 1-30'
22 Jur 66/1630H
4 F-105
3
HIG-17
Sighting
11-11
4 F-IOS
2
NI6-19
0/0
0/0
11.32
4 F-105
2
HI6-17
0/1
0/17
IN33
17 Aug'66/1S16H
2 F-IOSD
1
NIG-17
0/0
0/0
1 1-34
17 Au9 66/15uZn
18 Au9>66/1S28H
18 Au9'66/1603H
18 Au9'66/1603H
2 F-IOSO
2TNIG-17
0/0
0/0
T T _
4 I - J3
2 F-105
2
HIG-17
• 0/1
1/0
r T _ IX
1 1 - so
4 F-1050
2
HI6-17
0/0
0/0
1 T _ 17
2 F-105D
3
NTG-17
0/0
0/0
f f _ lA
22 AU9*66/1626H
4 F-1050
4
HIG-17
0/2
0/0
11-39
9 Stp'66/0900H
i1 F-105F
11 F-1050
3
HI6-21
0/0
A iA
0/0
T 1 -irt
I I - *u
11 Sep'66/
;4 Sep'66/1643H
14 $«p'66/1638H
15 Sep 66/1535K
3 F-105
1
Unld.
sighting
f T A^
4 F-105
2
HI6-17
0/0
0/0
1 I - ^ «
4 F-1050
3
HIG-17
0/0
0/0
11-41
4 F-105
2
NI6-17
sighting
1 1-44
3 F-105
2
HI6-7
Sighting
f t <K
16 Sep'66/16S0H
4 F-IOS
4
HIG-21
Sighting
4 1 —
4 F-105D
2
HIG-17
0/0
0/0
16 Stp>66/1647H
4 F-IOSO
4
HIG-17
0/0
0/0
IN48
17 Stp'68/0927H
3 F-106
{1
Ht6-19
NIQ-r
0/0
0/0
11-49
18 Stp'66/0931H
18 S«p'66/1648H
18 $cp'66/1644H
18 Sep'66/1645H
20 Stp'66/U4SH
21 Sap'66/1027H
21 Stp'66/101$H
21 $tp'66/1000H
21 Stp*66/101SH
3 F-inso
3
M16-17
0/0
0/0
It>90
2 F-IOSO
4
Nt6-17
0/0
0/0
11-51
4 F-105
2
HI6-17
Sighting
0/0
11-52
4 F-IOSO
4
HIG-17
0/0
11-53
11 F-105
4
HI6-17
0/0
0/0
n-54
4 F-105
2
HI&-21
0/0
0/0
II-S5
4 F-IOS
1
HI6-17
0/0
0/1
11-56
4 F-IOS
2
Hlfi-17
0/0
1/0
I1-S7
4 F-IOSO
2
MI6-17
0/0
1/0
11-58
21 Stp'66/1025K
4 F-IOSO
{\
HI6-17
MI6-21
0/0
0/1
tI-59
21 Stp'66/1032K
4 F-105
3
RIG-17
0/0
0/1
11-60
21 Stp'66/1030H
22 S«p'66/084SH
28 Sep'66/
• 2 F-IOS
4
MIG-17
0/0
0/0
11-61
4 F-105
1
MI6-7
Sighting
11-62
4 F-IOS
1
Ni6-2ir
Sighting
tI-63
28 Sep'66/1725H
4 F-IOSO
4
HI6.21
Sighting
8 Oct'66/1545H
4 F-105 •
2
H|G-17
0/S
0/0
17
Daie/TUc
Aircraft Involved
Mo-Type"
Enemy
Results
Lost/Paaaged
U.S. 1 Enemy
11-66
11-67
11-68
n-69
11-70
n-71
11-72
n-73
11-74
11-75
n-76
11-77
n-78
II-79
n-80
11-82
11-83
11-84
11-85
11-86
11-87
11-88
n-89
11-90
11-91
It-92
11-93
11-94
n-95
n-96
n-97
11-98
11-99
tt-100
11-101
n-102
11-103
11-104
U-105
U-106
11-107
11-108
11-109
n-110
11*111
11-112
lt-113
11-114
U-US
11-116
11-117
11-118
11-119
11-120
11-121
11-122
8 0ct'l(6/1545H
a Oct' 66/1543H
S 0ct'66/1S41H
— i)et'66/
3 NOV' 66/1 556H
— Kov'66/ — -
---Nov*66/
---flov'66/
— Noy'66/
— -Nov'66/
2 Oec'66/1425H
2 Or;,'66/1430H
3 Dec'66/1220H
3 Dec*66/1240H
3 Dec'66/1213H
4 Dec'66/1040K
4 Oec'66/
4 Dec' 66/1 040H
4 Dcc'66/1637H
4 Dec' 66/1 642H
4 0ec'66/1645H
4 0ec'66/1706H
4 Dec' 66/1 705H
4 0ec*66/1715H
4 Oec'66/1713H
5 Dec'66/1Q12H
S Oec'66/101SH
S 0ec'66/1530H
S Dec*66/163QH
S Dec'66/1652H
5 Dec'66/1655H
8 Dec'66/1615H
13 D*c'66/1610H
13 Dec'66/1600H
14 Dec'66/1625H
14 Dec'66/1530H
14 Dbc'66/17C7H
14 0ec'66/161SH
14 Cec'66/n04H
14 Dec'66/16S0H
14 0ec'66/1613H
14 9ec*66/- — "
19 Die' 66/1 548H
19 Dec'66/1600H
19 0ec'66/160SH
19 0cC*66/1603K
19 Dec'66/160QN
19 Oec'66/1603H
19 0ec'66/1549H
19 Dec' 66/1 54SH
19 Oec'66/IS47H
19 Dec'66/1S4SH
— Dee '66/
2 Jan'67/1S10H
6 Jan'67/1534H
7 Jan'K7/late
afternoon
1 Jan'67/late
afttrnoon
7 Jan'67/08302
4
F-105
4
F-105
4
F-105
4
r •Ivb
4
F-105
4
F-105
4
F-105
4
F-105D
4
F-105D
4
F-105
4
F-105
4
F-105
4
F-105
4
F-105
4
F.105
4
F-105 .
4
F-105D
4
F-IOS
4
F-IOS
A
r - 1 w*
4
F-105
4
F-105D
4
F-IOS
4
F-IOS
4
F-105
4
F-1050
4
F-105
3
F-1050
ii
F-105F
\\
F-10S0
\\
F-105F
F-105D
4
F-105
8
F-105
4
F-105
16
F-1050
4
F-1050
4
F-IOSO
4
F-IOS
4
F-IOS
2
F-IOS
4
F-105
4
F-IOS
1
F-IOS
4
F-1050
4
F-IOS
4
F-10SD
1050
10S0
4 F-IOS
F-IOSD
F-105
F-105D
F-105D
FO050
F-1050
F-10SF
F-IOS
F-105
4
»
11
2
6
1
3
1
2
4
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
8-10
16
{!
4
4
9
2
2
4
1
MIG-21
MIf.-17
HIG-^1
HlG-n
HIG-19
.n6-157
MIG-21
MlG-17
MIG-21
MIG-21
NIC-21
H16-17
N16-21
HIG-21
m;6-21
MIG-IS/W
HIG-Zl
MIG-17
NIG?
HIG?
MI6-17
HIG-17
MIG-17
MIG-21
HIG-17
HlG-17
HIG-17
MIG-21
MIG-21
MI6-21
MI6-17
4 F.105
:o-F-ios
4 MIG-21
2 MI6-17
8 Unid.
8 N16-21 .
1 N16-21
? NIGS
MIG-21
■416-21
MIG-17
MI6-17
MIG-21
NIG Poss
2 NIG-21
? MIGS
2 MIG-21
12 MIG-17
2 MIG-21
1 MIG-21C
M1G-?
H16-7
NIG-17
MIG-21
MIG-17
N1G-?
NI6-21
14 MIG-17
9 MIG-17
4 NIG-21
2 NI6-21
2 HI6-21
1 NlC-21
4 MIG-21
4 MI6-21
2 NI6-21
0/0
0/0
Signting
Sightlns
Sighting
Sighting
Sightl ng
S>ght1 ng
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
1/0
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
0/0
1/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/C
0/0
0/0
0/17
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
17/0
0/0
1/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Event
-K4
-125
-126
-127
-129
-130
-131
-132
-n3
-134
• US
• U»
.137
>138
-139
-140
-141
-142
-143
-144
-145
-146
-147
-148
-149
-ISO
-151
Oate/TiiBe
8 Jan'
15 Jan '
15 Jan'
16 Jan'
16 Jan'
16 Jan'
16 Jan'
17 Ja«'
16 Jan'
17 Jan'
17 Jan'
17 Jan*
17 J«n*
21 Jan'
21 Jan*
67/0825H
67/1615H
67/ IbASH
67/0B18H
67/0838K
67/082SK
67/0825H
67/0759H
67/1538H
67/0838K
67/0715H
67/1609H
67/0820H
D7/0(i44H
67/084 2H
21 Jan'67/1605H
21 Jan'
21 Jan'
21 Jan'
21 Jan'
21 Jan'
21 Jan'
22 Jan'
27 Jan'
29 Jan'
4 feb'
4 Feb'
4 Feb*
4 Feb*
67/0844H
67/1525H
67/0d40H
67/152?H
67/1621H
67/1620H
67/0936H
67/
67/
67/0848H
67/073OH
67/0859H
67/1600H
Aircraft Involved
So-Tvoe
■uTT
F-1050
F-105
F-1050
F-105
F-105
f-105
F-105
f-105
F-105
F-105
F-105
F-IOS
r-105
F-J050-
F-1050
F-105
F-105
F-105
F-105D
F-1050
F-1050
F-105
F-1Q5
F-105
F-1051)
F-105
F-105
F-105
F-105
Eneoijf
4 HIG-21
4 ni6-21
1 MIG-21
4?MIG-?
2 MIG-21
1 NIG-21
2 MIG-21
4 HIG-21
1 MIG-21
2 niG-?:
7 MIGS
1 HI6-?
2 MIG-17
4 MIG-Zl '
3 MIG-21
j8 MIG<17
12 NI6-21
1 NIG-21
2 MlG-17
107M1G-21
5 MIG-W
2 KlG-19
5*8 NIG-17
4 MI6-n
NIG-17
NIG-21
HIG-21
MIG-21
Unld.
HIG-17
Results
Lost/Oamaped
in
sighting
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
SlQhtlng
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
0/5
0/0
Sighting
$1ght1no
0/0
0/0
0/0
Slghtlr.3
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/1
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Eneny
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
19
UHCLASSIFIED
GLOSSARY OF TERMS
(All TRrms Unclassified Unless Otherwise Stated)
AA - alr-to-alr weapon
AAA - antiaircraft artillery
AAM - air-to-air missile
AAWC - Antl-Alr-Warfare Commander
AB - afterburner
ACM - air combat maneuvering
ACT - air combat tactics
ADP - automatic direction finder
AEW - airborne early warning
AGL - above ground level
AIM-7 (DiE models) (SPARROW) - semiactlve radar type, alr-to-
alr missile
AIM-9 (BiD models) (SIDEWINDER) - passive IR type, air-to-air
missile
AIM-9C (SIDEWINDER) - Radar guided air-to-air missile
AI radar - airborne Intercept radar
Aircraft commander - a pilot designated pilot -in-command of a
given aircraft (Air Force name for front
seater in F-4)
ALKALI - Soviet air-to-air missile - radar beam rider type
ALQ-51 - Broadband deception ECM system
ALQ-71 - Noise Jamming ECM pod (production model of QRC-I60-I)
ANCHOR (Various colors) - see Figure 9 on page 3^ - code names
for specific refueling tracks
AN/APA-157 - CW radar illuminator and fire control computer
for SPARROW missile system
Angle-off - angular position off the tail of the reference
aircraft
APQ-72 - airborne intercept radar in F-'tB aircraft
UNCLASSIFIED
21
UNCLASSIFIED
AFQ-9I1 - airborne intercept radar in P-8E aircraft
APQ-lOO/109 - airborne intercept radar in P-ilC/D aircraft
APR-25 - vector homing and warninc system - providing 360<>
directional warning of threat signals in certain bands
with instantaneous bearing to radiating source.
APR-26 - crystal video airborne warning receiver to detect SA-2
guidance signals
AFR-27 - airborne radar warning receiver
armed reconnaissance - an air mission flown with the primary
purpose of locating and attacking targets
of opportunity, i.e., enemy materiel,
personnel, and facilities In assigned
general areas or along assigned ground
communications routes, and not for the
purpose of attacking specific briefed
targets.
ASE circle - allowable steering error - circle on radar display
provided by fire control computer.
ATOLL - Soviet air-to-air missile, infrared seeker type
autotrack - automatic tracking in which a servo mechanism keeps
the radar beam trained on the target.
Back - the individual occupying the back seat of the P-^; in
Navy called RIO, in Air Force called pilot or GIB.
BARCAP - Barrier combat air patrol - a MIGSCREEN for one or
more missions
barrel roll - see Figure 2 (page 27) - a 360» rolling maneuver
barrel roxx s^ ^^^b^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ aircraft decides
a about the intended direction of the flight.
BDA - bomb damage assessment
BINGO (fuel) - minimum fuel quantity reserve established for a
given geographical point to permit aircraft to
return safely to home base or aerial refueling
point .
bogey - unidentified aircraft
boresight mode - in the boresight mode the radar antenna la
aligned and locked to the roll axis of the
aircraft .
break - an emergency turn in which maximum performance is desired
instantly to destroy an attackers tracking solution.
break X - minimum range Indication for missile launch. X ap-
pears in the radar scope at minimum range.
22
UNCLASSIFIED
-1
I
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I
1
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1
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1
CAP - combat air patrol - an aircraft patrol provided over an.
objective area, over the force protected, over the
critical area of a combat zone, or over an air defense
area, for the purpose of interceptlnc and destroying
hostile aircraft before they reach their target.
(NAVY) Condition I CAP (Standby): aircraft ready for immediate
(maximum delay of two (2) minutes) takeoff. Aircraft
with engine not running (starter batteries plugged in)
will be positioned for take-off. Pilots in cockpit and
deck drew on alert.
CAS - calibrated air speed (knots)
CBU-2'4 - canister dispensed air-to-ground borablet type munition;
the canister is carried externally on the aircraft and
opens after release at a preset altitude.
centerllne tank - a fuel tank carried externally on centerllne
of aircraft.
chaff - a type of confusion reflector, which consist of thin,
narrow metallic strips of various lengths to provide
different responses, used to create false signals on
radars cope.
Channel 97 - A TACAN station located during the period of the
study at 20°27 'N/103°'*3'E used for navigational
aids. (SECRET)
chandelle - a maximum performance climbing turn in which speed
is converted to altitude while reversing direction.
CMR-312 (Little Ears) - aural radar warning receiver
CROWN - call-sign for rescue force commander
CRT - Combat Rated Thrust - maximum augmented thrust condition
of engine
DP - direction finder
DME - distance measuring equipment
dot - (aim dot, steering dot) - electronic dot appearing in
radar scope when radar is
locked on providing computed
steering vector information
element - Air Force term for the basic fighting unit (two air-
craft)
EWO - electronic warfare officer
PANSONG - tracking radar for Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile
system (CONFIDENTIAL)
fighting ( wing) position - an area for the wingraan in which opti-
mum coverage and maneuverability is achieved in
maximum performance maneuvers •
finger-four formation - see Figure 6 (page 29) - also fingertip
formation - a four-plane formation in
which the aircraft occupy positions
suggested by the four finger tips of
either hand, the fingers being held
together ?.n a horizontal plane.
flak - antiaircraft fire
fluid element - the second or supporting element In fluid four
formation, flying in a high or low element
position.
fluid-four - see Figure 5 (page 29) - a ^ap^ical formation having
the second element spread in both the vertical and
horizontal planes to enhance maneuverability,
mutual support and look-out ability,
fragged - mission directed by fragmentary operational order
from higher headquarters.
Front - the Individual in the front seat In the F-^l aircraft;
in the Navy called the pilot, in the Air Force called
the aircraft commander,
g - unit of acceleration (32.2 ft/sec^)
gaggle ^ slang for a number of aircraft operating In close
proximity, not necessarily In any semblance of
formation.
GAM-83 - BULLPUP; air-to-ground guided missile
GCI - ground control intercept
GUARD - emergency UHP radio channel usually monitored by all
aircraft and ground stations as a secondary frequency.
Hard turn - a planned turn in which the intensity of the turn
is governed by the angle-off and range of the
attacking aircraft.
HEAT - armament switch setting for using infrared missiles
hot mike Intercom - intercommunication system continuously
active (hot)
IAS - indicated air speed
ICS - intercioinnunieation system
ID - Identification; to make identification
IPP - identlftCv.clon, friend or foe; aircraft transponding
beacon received by radar distinguishing friend from foe.
Imnelmann - see Figure 8 (page 30) - maneuver in which the air-
craft completes the first half .of a loop and then
rolls over to an upright position thus changing di-
rection 180" with' a simultaneous gain in altitude.
niN indicated Mach number
IP - initial point; a well-defined point, easily distinguish-
able visually and/or by radar, used as a starting point'
for a bomb run to the target.
IR missile - an infrared or heat-seeking missile
IRON HAND - a code name for a flight with special ordnance and
avionics equipment whose mission Is to seek and
destroy enemy surface-to-air missile sites,
JCS target - a target appearing on the JCS target list
jinking - constant maneuvering in both the horizontal and
vertical planes to present difficult target to enemy
defenses by spoiling the tracking solution. Bank,
pitch and velocity are all simultaneously changed in
this maneuver.
karst - a limestone outcropping or ridge
KIAS - knots indicated air speed
kt - abbreviation for knot (nautical miles/hour)
KTAS - knots true air speed
LAO-3 - a rocket launcher adaptable to external bomb racks
holding 19 2.75 inch air-to-ground folding fin rockets
LAU-17 adapters - stub pylon on F-4
loose deuce - a term to describe fighter tactics in which two to
four airplanes- maneuver- to provide mutual support
and increased fire power.
Lufberry circle - a circular tail chase, ascending or descending
M - abbreviation for Mach number
HEK * multiple ejection rack
ml - nautical mile, as used in this report
MIGCAP - combat air patrol mission whose actions are directed
against KIG aircraft
HIO SCREEN - mission wherein protecting fighters are placed
between the threat and the protected force in a
specific area
military power - maximum unaugmented thrust condition of engine
missile free - authority is granted to fire unless target is
identified as friendly
missile tone - audio signal indicating AIM-9 is locked on to
an IR source
MRT -> military rated thrust - see military power
MSL - altitude referenced to mean sea level
OPREP - message report in joint operational reporting system
PANAMA - call sign for OCI site located near Danang
25
pipper - aircraft weapon sight indicator (a dot of light within
a lighted ring)
PIRAZ - positive identification radar zone
Pod formation - A flight formation configured to maximize the
Jamming of Femsong radar. Slight alteration is
made to provide for better defense under MIO
threat. (See Pig. 9)
PRP - pulse recurrence frequency
QRC--I60 - noise Janmlng ECM pod
RAQ - replacement air group
ready light - light which indicates a particular avionics/
munitions system is operating and available for
use
RED CROWN - voice call for USS LONG BEACH (CLN-9)
RESCAP - rescue combat air patrol
RHAW - radar homing and warning
RIO - radar intercept officer
RO - abbreviated form of RIO
road interdiction - to prevent or hinder, by aerial means,
enemy use of a road or route
ROLLING THUNDER - code name for air strikes against North
Vietnam
Route Package - see Figure 9 - geographical division of North
Vietnam for purposes of air strike targeting
rudder reversal • a climbing aircraft maneuver in which direc-
tion is changed by rotation around the air-
craft's vertical axis
SA-2 - Soviet surface-to-air missile system
SAM - surface-to-air missile
SAR - search and rescue
scissors - See Figure 1 (page 27) - a defensive maneuver in which
a series of turn reversals are executed in an attempt
to achieve offensive after an overshoot by the attacker.
SCAN-ODD - MIG airborne Intercept radar
(CONFIDENTIAL)
section - a Navy term for a tactical element of two or more
aircraft (usually two)/an Air Force term for two
flights of four ,
SHRIKE (A0M-il5) - air-to-surface radar seeking missile '
SIDEWINDER - see AIM-9
SIDEWINDER tone - see missile tone
I
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1
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4
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♦
SIP - selective Identification feature - electronic device with j
variable codes for identification
SILVER DAWN - a code name for an intelligence collecting air-
craft (SECRET)
"S" maneuver - a weave in a horizontal plane
Snap-up - a rapid pullup to establish a climb in order to launch
^ a weapon
I SPARROW - see AIM-7
f2 "Split-S" maneuver - see Figure 7 (page 30) - 180** rotation about
the aircraft longitudinal axis followed by a
180° change of heading in a vertical plane
(half loop starting from top)
STBY - standby
steering dot - see dot
1^ Switchology - a coined word addressing the human engineering
^ considerations of switch arrangements
c» TACAN - tactical air navigation - an active electronic navlga-
Itional system which locates the aircraft with respect
to another installation
TARCAP - target combat air patrol - aircraft assigned the air-
I to-air defense role In the target area
TAS - true air speed in knots
TCA - track crossing angle - the angle between flight paths
measured from the tail of the reference aircraft
Thud Ridge - A nickname given to a prominent geographical fea-
ture in North Vietnam. It is a ridge running in a
general NW-SE direction from 21»ilO*N/105*'25E to
21^20 »N/105°'I8*E.
TOT - time over target
TRACK (various colors) - see Figure 9 - code names for specific
refueling tracks
TROJAN HORSE - a code name of a U-2 air reconnaissance program
(SECRET)
unit (of turn) - divisions on an angle-of -attack indicator on F-4
aircraft
UHT - unit horizontal tail (applied to F-8 aircraft) - a tail
design whereby the whole surface rotates about a pivot
point
unloading - decreasing g»s ,
V - closing velocity (relative)
vector box - see APR-25
WILD WEASEL - F-105P specially equipped for locating and attack-
ing SA-2 sites (employed on IRON HAND missions)
27
1
yo-yo - See Figures 3 and 4 (page 29)
High speed - an offensive tactic in which the attacker
maneuvers through both vertical and hori-
zontal planes to prevent an overshoot In
the plane of the defender's turn.
Low speed * a dive for airspeed and a pull up for
position closure.
ZUNI - five inch air-to-ground ungulded rocket.
3
1
1
1
I
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UNCLASSIFIED
FIGURE 1. Seisson
At Ftortrayad in Perspective Sketch
FIGURE 2. Borral Roll
UNCLASSIFIED
29
B».nt
Alrorftft Involvatt: Four P-105Ds vs four MIO-IT*
. Rtsult: Two P-105* lost
Vicinity of Bneounttr: 10 mi sauth of Thanh Hoa
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Datf/Tlnw: « April 1965/1215H
ROLLZNO THUNDER 9 AX inlsalon - Target 14 - Thanh Hoa Brldga; 48 7-105s tttteklng
target In flights of four; it F>lOOs on MICCAP . The flight of 4 P-105S Involvod In thla
encounter was holding At the IP prior to attacking target.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Take-off I13OH (local tine) fron Korat, fle« northeast to tanker* refUelvd about
1200. Proceeded at 400 kt to IP, 10 al south of Thanh Hoa bridge.
3. AINCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105P BLUE 1(L). 2. 3, M
Full lead ZCcn cannon assiO
8 - 790-lb bombs
2 - (150-eal external wing tanks
Gross weight 49,000 lb at beginning of encounter
MIO-17 MIC 1. 2. 3. 4
tight gray, Chinese Cosnunist marking - guns
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Hace layer - heaviest haze, between 12,000-15,000 ft
Altitude ; 15,000 ft _
Headi ng; Bl(L), 2, 3» » all beginning left-hand orbit at IP. B3 on baadlng of 200" at
acquisition
Speed ! 325-kt CAS (approximately Maoh O.63)
Fuel State ; 11,000 ib
Plight Formation
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Uhile in left-hand turn (beginning holding orbit' at- IP) 10^ to' 15° bank, B3 looked
back fcnd sighted two aircraft approaching the flight about 5000 ft away. In 1 to 2 sea
he Identified them as MIO-15 or ITs "coming out of the hase." Distance to NIQs when
identified estimated at 3000 ft. Estimated KIC's speed at Mach 0.85. (F-105*s speed
approximately Mach O.63.} 9hen first element Identified as MIOs, a second element of.
HIOs were sighted following first and aligned for atcack on B3 and B4. B3 called NIOas
84 followed with oaU when B1(L) and B2 did not react or acknowledge 83*8 warning.
6. ACTION INITIATED
B3 called break - B3 and B4 made hard nose^down turn into attackers, Jettismed
stores, began switching to air-to-air mode. Bl and 82 continued in shallow banking la^t
turn not reacting to warnings.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Pour heavily loaded P-105s flying a holding orbit at the IP at 15.000 to 16.000 ft
altitude were attacked by four MIO-iTs. The second element of P-lOSs (83* 84) detected
NIOs and called warnings. The warnings appeared to be unheeded by the lead element.
Both P-105S in the lead element (Bl and B2} were hit by cannon fire from the first two
NIGa attacking from above at the loS's 6 o'clock position. Bl and B2 Jettisoned tanks
after being hit. Enroute to acting RESCAP for Bl, B3 was attacked by two NXOs (unknown
If element of original four NIGs). B3 evaded HIQ attack by executing a rapid slowdown
■anauver while in a diving turn, causing HIQs to overshoot. One NLO in vertloal dive near
ground may not have recovered. Bl and B3 ejected.
8. ORORARCE
Mo. Pired/No. Hits Hemarks
BLUE 1. 2. 3» « 0/0
MIO 1 Guns 23 or 37nin/ye8 on Bl Mo BE flashes observed
NIG 2 Guns 23 or 37na/yes on B2 HB flashes observed
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS , .
81 and 82 did not appear to receive voice transmissions fron B3 and B4 although other
aircraft In area verified warnings transmitted by B3 and B4. Unknown whether equipment
failure or heavy transmission traffic on strike frequency responsible for not raeelvlag
or masking warning.
Svont XX-l
P-105
Houra
500
600
Combftt
WlssJonj
2nd in
SEA
5th In
SEA
Remarks
Tactical fighter experience In P>81t
and P-lOOs since 1957
Limited eun training.
In training.
Plr«d 2 AIH-9»
10. AIRCRCW COHHENTS
Experience .
BLUE 3
BLUE »
Coaments on thla Encounter
Briering to squadron, on rapid deceleration of P-105 vtien nos« Is pulled up sharply,
was the naneuver employed to shake MIOs making second attack on 83 • B3 had never
practised this maneuver previous to this engagement.
Without radar protection (Big Eye, etc, were put into operation at a later date) the
holding orbit near the target at low speed made the loaded P-105a Ideal targets for the
NIOs.
Coamunleatlons "breakdown" between flight elements responsible for sueeessfui MIO
attack on lead element of P-105s.
MIOs appearea to be OCI directed.
Comment a from Overall Experience
Rapid, simple procedures for changing from ground attack to air-to-air node without
requiring pilot to look into cockpit are easential.
Air cover Is inadequate and uncoordinated at this early date In war.
"Sterilising" the target area against enemy air attack requires extraordinary
coordination between OCI facility. Interceptors and strike aircraft.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 3 - * January 1967 i BLUE » - * January 1967
Measagea. Reports ;
PACAF Tactics/Technique Progress Bulletin No. 2 - 5 May 1965
Message from 2AD - Oiilil37Z April 1965
Nesssge from 2AD - 060740Z April I965
PACAP - 052213Z April 1965
DIA Intelligence Bulletin 6 April 1965 » page P-3
<
12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
The following MIO encounter took place 4 April I965 during an P-105D strike on Thanh
Hoa bridge in Route Package III. The strike force^^conslsted of 48 P-105s in flights of
four. Pour p-ioos on HIOCAP for the strike. are 'hot part of this event (see Event III-l).
The flight of four P-105s Involved In this event are designated BLUE 1 (Leader). 2, 3 and
k. This flight was the fourth or fifth element in the strike force.
Because of refueling problems and consequent delays, (BLUE flight was 15 minutes
behind schedule) the attacking elements were not on schedule and were "bunching up" over
the target. The strike Was under control of a mission conaaander orbiting the strike area.
As BLUE flight approached the IP the mission commander instructed them to orbit over the
IP, which was approximately 10 ml south of the target.
Tq blue flight was the third flight in orbit at the IP, flying at about 15,000 ft.
BLUE flight could see the second flight orbiting ^out 2000 ft below In the has* which
hung between 12,000 and 15,000 ft. Because of the bomb and fuel load (eight 750-lb bombs;
11,000 lb fuel) the flight required military power to hold at 325-kt CAS at 15,Q0a-rt
altitude.
T^Tj As the flight completed a 180^ left turn In the orbit, B3 and B4 were positioned
about' 900 ft above B1(L) and outward. Tfie flight bad been briefed that MIOs had been In
the air the previous day, had come south to a point 30 ml off the target, made I60* turn
and headed home. The flight was therefore alerted that MIOs were getting airborne
and hence were hunting them. As B3 began turning Inside Lead to maintain position
In the turn, he looked to north for MIOs and sighted two airplanes approaching rrom benina
In a 20^ dive approximately 5000 ft behind the flight (&3 was passing thru a heading of
200* at the time). They were not Identifiable 'or 1 or 2 sec. When at about 3000 to
4000- ft range, B3 Identified the airplanes as nlGs, aligned on Bl and B2. B3 called "BLUE
Lead breaK - you have MIOs behind you BLUE Lead - Break - BLUE Lead we* re being
attacked." This transmission on strike frequency was followed shortly by a similar warn-
ing from Bli to Bl and B2. neither Bl nor B2 reaeti^.;to the warnings which were heard by
fcWcnt I 1-1
other aircraft in the area. B3 reported that In aUilitlcn to the 48 F-103s, 30 or more' '
F-*lBs, F-lOOa, MIGCAPs, RESCAPs, as well as the mission coramartder, wvre calllnr. on the
strike frequency - "the F-USs were dolnii a bit of talking and in fact the 100c p;ot Into
some sort of engagement and they were doing a bit of talking" - although the channel waa
cluttered, B3 and B'4 felt they were close enough to override the m&re distant trans-
mission and both nade numerous attempts to warn Lead.
The lead element of HiGs coning in on a southerly heading In a alight dive (approx
20*) from above and at 6 o'clofik, set up for an attack on the BLUK Lea.1 clement. Two
more MIGs sighted further behind the first element were setting up to attack B3 arid B*: .
B3 called break, B3 and B'* broke left Into the attack, lowered iio:^c, put In moxtnum bank and
g'3. The attacking HIG element passed over and behind B3 and B'l - ccntlnulnc; In the
original attack direction. Acceleration from 325 -kt CAS (-^ Mach 0.65) "was too slow to put
either B3 or B'l Into an effective fighting position fast enough,"
The lead MIO element passed In front and above B3 and Bi* at hljrh speed (M&ch 0.85 or
hlt;her). They were observed to be light grey In color with Chinese Conr.unlst red-star-
and-bar markings on bottom of the wings and close enough to be Identified as HIG-17s.
7^<c MIS l>^adcr'.: t^uiss be^an f^risliing vhui. about l^OC ft behind ill, and b3 obnervcd several
hits {'pieces of netal coning off) in the aft section of Bl's aircraft, -fhe second MIG,
flying In "almost" a flghtlne wing position fired on B2 "almost simultaneously." fi3
observed fla::ie3 on the aft section of B2s airplane (the hits on Bl did not flash), B2
called 31. .."Lead you have a HIO behind you - (pause) - I've been hit." The two XICs
ceased firing at a range of approximately 700-800 ft, rolled wings level, and continued
straight ahead at high speed.
After a time the NIGs started a slow turn to the right and were lost to sight In the
haze,
B<i, with extensive training in P-I05 systems {as gunnery officer Instructor for 3 yr)
and completely familiar with F-IOS switches, was unable to complete sequence to air-to-air
mode In time to engage the MIGs. He was unable to activate his ^un sight. While atter.pt-
ing to set up switches he lost sight of the MIGs. B'l broke down in a tight spiral, and
left to check his 6 o'clock position (B3 was no longer there ), picked uo speed to 1.1 to
1.2 Mach, then climbed to join Bl and B2. B4 decided to Join B2 and d3 would Join Bl.
Bl enrouta to Intercept 82 was flying at 0.96 Mach and overtook B2 dolnf^ about 200 kt (at
about SOO-ft altitude). Because of the haze, 84 did not see 83 until about 1000 to 1500
ft behind him, hi^nee, overshot and lost him in the weather. As BU turned and tried to
find 82,. 82 announced he was going to eject.
Tj., B3 flew toward Bl to act as RE.SCAP, As B3 turned to look for Bl , E3 saw flii^hes
behind him as two MICa began an attack on B3 (B3 was flyln;; about Macii Q.hU :it
6* 10,000 ft). B3 immediately pulled more g's and lowered the nose slightly, then
rolled under, reversed his turn and began climbing. During the climb he kept turning
_,' to keep the attacking MIGs In sight, B3 observed that the MIGs were closLng, so he
'^8 rolled to the left as if starting a split-S. The MIGs followed. 63 pulled the nose
downwards to left. He pulled power to idle in the turn until nearly 3/1 turn completed
when he pulled the stick back sharply, bringing the nose up {20*'-30'' above the horizon)
and rapidly slowing to aoout 250-kt TAS at about liOQO-ft altitude. The MIGs slid outside
and ahead of the F-105. The lead MIO went by B3 on the right about 800 ft away in "almost
a vertical dive" followed by the second MIG in about a 30-5o" dive. (Whether the lead
illC pulled out of the dive was unk.ncwn.) B3 eased the nose over and went to full power
to recover as the MIGs overshot. B3 was so low that he had to slowly ease the nose up to
avoid "mushing" Into the ground. He pulled out at between 500 and 1000 ft of altitude,
losin:; sight of tne KIGs In the haze.
83 began transmitting to Bl(L) and OP homing until bl was located. 31 indicated that
he could fly safely and was instructed by B3 to climb cut to as high an altitude as
possible. Eventually they reached 20,000-22,000 ft. E3 flew around Bl to observe the
damage. He reported seeing a large hole In the bottom octal of the speed brake, some
damage to the top petal and a large hole ("about a foot or so across") in the left trail-
ing ed(;e flap. The drag chute door was open, but the chute was still Inside. The speed
brake petals were in the ejector position which indicated that 81 probably had a utility
system hydraulic failure. This was confirmed by Lead. B3 also noted fluid cor.lng out
around the tailpipe which appeared to be hydraulic fluid and reported this to Lead.
B4 circled the area but could not observe 82 land because of an intervenlnc low
cloud deck. He did observe what he thought was the B2 aircraft Impact the water. He
thought later It could be fuel tanks from the P-100 RESCAPs In the area. An HO-16 SAR
conducted a search but was unsuccessful in recovering B2.
B* Joined B3, escorting Bl toward Danang. The three airplanes were 10-12 ml (TACAH
radio DKE) from Danang at 15,000 ft when Bl eased back on engine power to begin the
descent. (Tne field nad been alerted to the emergency landing.) Bl's engine lost oil
pressure and "froze".
Lead had been preparing to make a^spli^ling descer.t landing, but as the engine froze
he leveled out and began flying ^f^J^^^m^^ about 300-320 kt. He elected to eject.
Ewnt XI-1
Ejection appeared normal to B3 iRd 5*1 buiTai cane out of th; cockpit without his htlaet.
t * not observed to open. Because of Intervening olodda, 81 could not b«
Observed to the water. 81 stayed high because he Mas at "alnost eocrRency condition* on
ruei. B3 spiraled down looking for Lead end stayed In the area until the reccue hell-
copter arrived, 83 had noticed a large naval vessel (later identified as USS CANBERRA)
about 10 ml to the south and he flew over It "waddling" his wing, T»ic vessel Imaedlately
»!egan moving to the area of the helicopter. B3 reached emerRency fuel, but coordinated
with the helicopter before leaving the scene. Bl»s body was recovered by rescue vessel,
hi a chute had deployed but It was unknown If It had opened In tine to check fall. Low on
fuel, B3 and 84 made routine landings at Oanang. . «ww «»
KEb BAROH EVEHT 1 1-1 SUHMRY
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2. 3. 4)
Other Friendly
CoMBunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
Remarl'S
Tin*
Hark
Statuf
Action
(MIG 1. 2, 3. 4)
B • 750>'ib bombs
UG M 49,000 lb
340-350 kt
Initiating holding
orOiv ai ir ai ni>>ion
Commander's order.
83 and B4 sliding out
and under B1 and 82 as
they approach 180'
position of orbit
Successive strikes
"buRChing-up" over
target required
several flights to
hold at IP 10 ml
south of target
Ti
1
1
Approaching
southerly heading
320-kt CAS 15.000-
16.000 ft
83 called t*IGs and
7 o'clock high -
two niGs
attacking 81 and
B2 at)Out SOOO ft
beh1:id and 1SO0 ft
to 2000 ft above.
Closing speed «
200 kt
1
sec)
*
B3 and 64 see NI6s
81 and B2 unaware
of attack (MIGs at
6 o'clock of B1
mud 82)
83 and 84 Jettison
bombs and begin setting
up switches for air-to-
air. Kott second ele-
ment of HIGs cosing out
of haie.
81 and B2 made no
change In flight
position until
HIGs complete fir-
ing pass.
82 calls warning
to B1 and reports
being hit
HI ar.d H2 initiate
firing about 2000-
f t range. Con-
tinue to about 400
ft.
(>5.
10
sec)
•
81 and 82 Jettison
bombs. 82 losing
power headed for
sea decending
sloMly. B1 headed
out to sea then
south to Danang*
B3 and B4 broke down
and left
82 called going
over to rescue
frequency. Gave
RESCUE information
and tones for Of
steers for B4 and
RESCUE.
All KIGs continued
straight ahead
after passes,
climbed, then
started to right
Into haie.
83 and B4 were at
low speed (320 kt)
and without gun
sights. Conolex
switching not com-
pleted - 83 to
RESCAP 81, 84 to
RESCAP 82
% :
■■■■ ■ ' "-
HIGs turning right
disappear Into naze
82 headed for sea d
ft. 81 headed towar
20.000-22,000 ft, 8
act RESCAP (o.sni.
act RESCAP (0.8N)
ecending to about 5000
d Danang climbing to
3 trying to find Bt to
B4 trying to find 82 to
81 reported on
165* heading. 83
homing In on
transmissions on
UHF/VF, 84 talking
to 82 in attempt
to find 82.
B3 slowed down so
as not to over-
shoot 81
inttrval after list tiM M'rk
RED BAROW EVEWT II-l SUMMARY
riwt
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2, 3, 4)
Encny Actions
(Mta 1. t. 3. 4)
St«tus
Action
Other Pritndljf
Coniunl cations
Reaarks
B3 In left tarn
10.000 ft, 400 kt
A8/for short turns
Sees 2 HIGs firing.
Rolls underv reverses
turn and cllabs
B1. 2 and 4
seperate
'B2 announced he
was ejecting.
Reported control
p rob lens.
HIGs shooting at
B3 from rear (con-
ing froa north)
h
B3 rolls as
though going Into
spllt-S nates
corkscrew turn to
Jeft (3/4 turn)
pulls up- sharply
slowing to 2S0*kt
CAS at 4000 ft
Decelerates In
descending spiral by
bringing nose up fast.
62 eiected
Head HIG In verti-
cal dive about
800 ft ahead and
to side. Second
HIG in 30»-40"
dive (at 4000 ft
altitude).
h
B3 recovers at
500.1000 ft
B3 cllabs to rejoin Bt
cai C3i c^i tr:::? : q;^ Cj^Sa C3a c:3a n3a
tftort ii « « i fl >J r « M3 j W .fc l J r H iUi t i^ T i*.!
1
1
ft
1
1
1
I
Event II.2
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105« « two HI0-X5*'
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l'23*H/105*17'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 2ii June 65/approxlmately l600H.
Four P-105B (BLUE Flight) were fragged for Son U. Target was obscured by weather,
therefore alternate railroad bridge was hit.
2. HISSION ROUTE
Departed Takhll for tanker rendezvous; then proceeded *f^*!l* . u..^.^
target. After hitting the alternate target, BLUE Plight went Into '"Si^J 5
south to a point approxlnately northwest .of Phuc Yen, then turned north to a heading of
360O.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1. ^. I t
1,029 rounds M£I 20mA
2 - k50 gal tanks ^ ^ ^ . - « ,
1 - center line MER with 6-HK-117. f50-lb bombs ♦ 2 Pylons
IPF/SlP-off, Radar on search mode.
MiGa 1 i 2
2 - external tanks
Ouns
4. FLIGHT COttOtTIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; 20,000 ft overcast with S-"* mile visibility In some quadrants with aeatterod
—"•''^ clouds at lower levels. Thunderstorms in vicinity.
Altitude:— BLUE 1*2: 15.000 ft
Heading : 360o
Speed : t60 KCAS
^uel State : Unknown
Pll>»;ht formation ;
V
BLUE 3 14:
17,000 ft
360°
460 KCAS
Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
MICs were observed by BLUE 2 at 6 o'clock position. 1 mile behind BLlffl 3 * «J. MIO
RED warnings bad been received from BIQ EYE during the entire mission prior to initial
contact.
6. ACTION INITIATED
All aircraft Jettisoned tanks, BLUE 112 turned right and climbed into NIOs while
BLUE 3 14 turned right and descended.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPNERT
no 1 stayed with BLUE 4 th; -mghout encounter firing his cannon in*5e"'**"iy . until
BLUB 4 went to Kach 1.1 and dove for the deck to break contact after 270*' o^^*"^"- .
Itm 1 and 2 attacked KIO 2 who was trying to cut off BLUE 3 1" ^ turned
sharply to the left at which time BLUE I attempted to hit hln with cannon firo. MM 2
went into the clouds.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2, 3. * 4
KIO 1
HIO 2
llo. Plred/No. Hits
Fired short burst/0
0/0
Fired eannon/0
0/0
Remarks'
Did not expect any hits, could not get sight
to radar range.
Very poor fire control system apparently.
Pilot interviews give aircraft as Mia~17 but all other sources show MlO-15.
*3
■ Event H-2
9. EQUIPHCNT PROeiENS
BLUE 1 vas unable to get a lock-on vith his eun sight.
10. AIRCREW COMNEmS
EKperience Total Hour s P-105 Hours Hlaslons
BLUE 1, 2 ft 3 Unknown
BLUE « 1800 1000 Unknown
Coaaaents on this Encounter
BLUE i| - KIO 1 fire control system was apparently not too good because the bullets were
Biasing by a gross range. KIO 1 apparently did not want to pull any nore g.
HIOs dlda*t punch their tanks until P-lOSs did.
BLUB 1 - As an effective fight, we didn't do too well as far as being attacked by the
MIOs la eonoemed. This was our first actual engagement. Would have been nice
to have a few missilss on this engagement.
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 1 - For an aircraft we need high energy maneuverability or a high sustained g
capability. Heed good visibility to the rear. Need a good gun sight; we have
a low reliability on our Integrated radar or computer gun sight,
BLUE 2 > 105 should engage MIQ at Mach .96.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviewa i BLUE 1-9 March 1967; BLUE 2 - March 1967;
BLUB 3 > 6 January 1967.
Messages ; 2AD OPREP-4 2i)1721Z June 1965
2 GOTO 03230
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Flight was scheduled for a target in the Son La area. Takeorr was delayed so
as to arrive over target at about the termination time of the other strikes with a raini-
Bum of fuel expended and then proceed on a MIO search. Refueling was normal but the
target was weathered in and an alternate target was hit (a railror^.d) . Then BLUE Flight
proceeded on a southerly heading in a Fluid ^ formation (3 * 2»000 ft high) to a posi-
tion approximately northwest of Phuc Yen, when they made a turn to the north. On rolling
out on a heading of 360**, BLUE 2 called out to the high element (BLUE 3 & 4), "Look out
(BLUE U), you have twc at 6 o'clock." BLUE 'I couldn't see the MIOs. All four aircraft
then jettisoned .their tanks. The MIOs came out of the clouds at a high altitude and on
seeing the lOSs Jettisoning their tanks, did the same. BLUE l then called, "Break, right"
and climbed toward the high element. BLUB 3 and 4 simultaneously turned right and de-
scended 80 as to sandwich the KICs between them and the' low element (BLUE 1 and 2). At
first only one MIQ wss sighted by BLUE 2, but 1000 ft behind MIO 1 came MIG 2 closing on
MIQ 1. BLUE 1 and 2 managed to get behind the MIGs. While In the turn, BLUE 4 still
eouxdn't see the Kias and at this time BLUE 1 called out, "Rog, they're MIOs, they're firing
keep going." Again BLUE 1 called out, "Pour, look out, they're firing." BLUE I then
crossed over to the left aide of BLUE 3 and saw the MIOs at his 5 o'clock position.
BLUE 4 was so engrossed with the KICs and being fired on that he failed to notice
BLUE 3 increasing Ills g'a. MIO 1 waa now about 2,500 ft back at BLUE 4*s 5 o'clock
position. BLUE a became aeparated fum BLUE 3. By this tine BLUE 1 and 2 were approxi-
mately 5000 ft in trail with the two NIGs when MIO 2 tightened Lis turn and appeared to
be cuttl.ig across the circle possibly going after BLUE 3. MIO 1 was still on BLUE 4's
tail and firing. At this point BLUE 4 asked for someone to get the MIO off his tail.
BLUE 1 and 2 were unable to close on MIO 1 uainly because they hadn't selected afterburner «
but when MIO 2 turned they were able to go after him. Just as BLUE 1 fired at MIO 2, the
no broke left hard and inside BLUE 4*8 turn. BLUE 1 continued on around in his turn but
MIO 1 was not pulling lead and waa maintaining 2500 ft separation. After 180" of turn,
BLUE 4 was at 7,000 ft with MIO 1 still on his tail.
Meanwhile BLOB 1 and 2 turned left and up with MIO 2 and went through some turns
which appeared to BLUE 1 as though MIG 2 was looking for MIC 1. Then MIO ? turned right
and appeared to see BLUE 1 and 2 at which time he tu:>ned left sharply and climbed into
the clouds. BLUE 1 attempted to follow and called and said he had lost sight of BLUE 4.
BLUE <> then lit afterburner, dove for ;<he deck to pick up 1.1 Mach and lost MIQ 1. BLUE 4
after a few iclles separation turned left to find thac he had lost MIO 1, at which time
BLUE 1 called and told BLUE 4 to leave the area to the south. - *
BLUE Flight Joined and returned home safely.
RED BAROM EVENT 1 1-2 SUMMARY
T1«tt
Nirk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 3, 4)
Other Friendly
Cnrny Actions
(HIG 1.2)
Status
Action
Coaiaunlcatlons
Remarks
0
AU B1I2 IS.OOO ft
Alt B3 « 4 17.000
ft
Speed - 460 KCAS
Head - 360«
High eleaent broke rt
and down. Lou elcnnt
broke rt and up.
All aircraft jettisoned
external stores.
62 called "Look
out (BLUE 4) you
have two at 6
o'clock." Calls
break right. 84
tells 83 "You've
got It, three."
81 says *Rog,
they're NlG^s,
they're firing,
keep gol ng . *
Cane out of clouds
froiF a high alti-
tude on a 10-1SO
dive at 83 S 4's
6 o'clock. Jet-
tisoned external
stores on seeing
friendlles do so,
H2 about 2,000 ft
behind Ml.
83 at this point
doesn't see
MIGs.
h
B3 A 4 speed .96H
Alt - approx
17,000 ft pulling
3 g's.
B3 t 4 are out In front
with Ml firing en B4,
Bl 1 2 are closing on
Ml t 2. B4 ooes to the
outsldt of 63 (on left
wing) and sees MIGs
about 2.000 ft back.
"Four, look out
they' re firing"
by 81.
HI firing on B4i
Is e!)out 2,000 ft
back.
*-.
h
81 4 2 too far out- on
Ml out of position.
Chose N2 to attack.
B3 pulls hloh g's
and loses B4 who
Is looking at
MIGs. 63 novi out
of action. C3 In
descending skeep
turn. d4 stMi
pulling 3 g's.
83 asks soveone to
get M)G off his
tall, that MIG Is
cutting h1« off.
M2 attempts to
cut stress circle
and intercept 63
In tight turn.
Ml was not pulling
any lead on 64.
All cannon fire
was not close in
range. Believe
M2 was attempting
to pull lead on
B3.
Bl fires at K2 in turn
Bl tries to lock-up to
H2 on radar when N2
rolls out. 81 about
4,000 ft behind N2.
N2 Is followed In
left turn by
Bl k 2.
H2 breaks left
and up. H2 still
on Bl's tall. M2
being fired at
by Bl.
u
Bl follows M2 who then
breaks hard left and
Into overcast. 81
reverses turn to look
for 84.
64 still has Ml
on tall heading
iaO« 7,000 ft.
1
61 has lost sight
of 84.
H2 makes hard
left turn Into
clouds and looses
B1B2.
It was believed
M2 was looking
for Ml when he
saw 61 A 2 end
broke to left.
mm
1
RED BAROM EVENT ll-t SUHHARY
Tin*
Ntrk
Action Alrcrift (BLUE 1, 3, 4)
Stttui
Action
B4 descends to obtain
1.1H. loses Nl.
63 Joins up Mith
Bl B 2.
Other Friendly
ComMnlcitlens
TrsnsBilttln^ of
steers to leed
but Bl unable to
locate B4.
81 told B4 to
1ee¥e area.
Eneaiy Actions
(NIG 1,2)
Renarks
B4. after • few
■lies separation,
turns back to the
left but unable
to find Ml.
Climbs to 15.000
ft and leaves
area. BLUE Flight
later joins and
returns home
iifely.
I
'r::3a t=;2a craa croa
1 w
1
I
I
i
1
I
I
I
f
1
Event 11-3
Aircraft Involved: On« P-105 v» MOb
Result: One P-105 lOBt
■ „.i.t., Of «».«»..r. 5j:«'gii2r"'*
I. MIHAH HISSIOH «"0 TMTICAL SimTIO»
(21*30 •K/106*'21'E).
II. OATA SOURCES
OP-05WJI List of KIC EncounttTS
DIA Intellieence Bulletin 18 July 1966
WSEG compendium of Aircraft Losses
U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION « . h««iiiM of lH* .
After the strl.e. BLUE 2 heard B^"^ i^'Sii^iSS^^SSd "vJouJlS iS^t^^t^ "-105
This was BLUE I's last transmission. China clalaea a ooraer vio*.
was shot dotm by HICs.
Brent H-"
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-I05s ve two MIC-17a
Result: No danasa
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"H/107*50'
I, PRIMARY HISSIOH AHO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: October 1965/Not specified
Exiting from IRON HAND olsalon in conjunction iflth atrlke on mlaalXe aite aoutheaat
of Kep.
II. DATA SOURCES
ppoleit Interviews 1 BLUE 3. 6 Jan 67
12. HARRATIVE DtSCRIPTIOH
...» rrt.,^ V ^ntin were exltlnK to the Oulf of Tonkin after an IRON HAND mia-
ISoo-toToSo S^G^nSpSr^nt'l? J;?i/Jr.it.h »p but n.».r lot «.h .!..» t»« .
mile even though BLUE H had been damaged by ground fire.
BLUB Plight »as Short on fuel but this was not neceeaarlly a factor which kept them
from engaging the MIOs. (See BLUE 3 comments in Event 11-17).
Event ^^"5
Aircraft Involved: Five P-105* two MQ-IT*
Result: No daiuse
Vicinity of Encounter: ai«l8»H/10«*12»E
I. PMHARt .HlSSIOM ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Tin* t 16 November 1965/15tOH
Pive F-105» (BLUE Plight) on a atrlke ttiaaion.
II. DATA SOURCE
CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 3-^7.
«. HARRATIVE DE SCRIPT 1 OH K.Mnd BLUE
to low fuel atate.
♦"f^-iiyM^ Event 11-6
Aircraft Involved: One P-105 vs t«fo HIG-?
Result: Sighting
VJ.cinlty Qf Encounter: ZO^SS 'M/10**«i6»E
I. PRIKARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOK
Date/Time: 28 November 1965/121 2H
An P-105 (BLUE 3) was on RSSCAP for B^UE 2.
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Starr Study 3-61.
12. HARRATIVf DESCRIPTION
BLUE 3 observed two NIGs for approximately 3 seconds while deacending. but no attack
was made by either side.
Event II-7
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-135a and five MIG-17s
Result: Sightings only
Vicinity or Encounter: 21°30*N/104°00'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICA!. SITUATION
Date/Tine: 16 DecenAer 1965/I63OH
A night of four P-lOSa (BLUE Plight) was on a strike mission.
II. DATA SOURCES
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight sighted five HIGs, me In lead and two sections following in trail.
Ho engagement resulted.
Event 11-8
Alrerart Involved: Three P-I05s vs two HIOs
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20*30 'N/IOS^OO •£
t. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TlM: 16 Oeeember 1965/1625H
Three P>1058 (BLUE Plight) on a ■Isaion on RT UKA*!.
11. DATA SOURCES
RED BAROH MZO Incident Susoary.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight sighted the MZQa 1-1/2 miles behind the flight. Ho engagement occurred.
!;<• r.
r
I
I
i
Aircraft Involved
Result: No danago
Vicinity of Encounter
Event 2X*9
Four P-105a vs tvo HIO^lTe
21*15 'H/IOT^IS 'B
1. rniMARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
D»te/Time: 20 December 1965/I6OOH.
Four p-1053 (BLUE Plight) on a SARCAP for another P-105 (QREEM 3).
n. DATA SOURCES
CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67.
12. NARRATtVL OeSCRlPTION
BLUE Plight sighted two NICs coming from the direction of Haiphong. The P«105a
attempted to attack but could not catch the MICs. The MZOa were eoming straight and
level; and GLUE Plight turned Into the HIOs who passed under BLUE Plight with about
700 ft separation. The NlOa did not slow or turn, and no further aetlon rvsulted.
Aircraft Involved:
Event IX- 10
Pour P-105a vs two possible
Mia-21s
1
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*26 •N/103*02'B
PRIMARY HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 16 March 1966/1*MH
BLOE Plight was diverted from primary target for RESCAP niasion. Dropped ordnance
on secondary target prior to RESCAP.
5. INITIAL DCTECTION
It is not known which member of BLUE Plight sighted HIQs. HIOs crossed 2 nlles In
front of BLUE Flight headed for Hanoi.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Distance between aircraft prevented action.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT
HIOs exit to Hanoi; BLUE Plight continued RESCAP.
8. ORDNANCE
None exoended
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None noted.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
No interviews.
n. DATA SOURC
Message : 2AC lt..4.55Z. DOCO 1S376, Mat 66.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was on a strike mission. They were diverted to a RESCAP niasion and
dropped their ordnance on a secondary target. At about 21<*26'N/103*02*E, they aighted
two possible MIG-21S 2 miles ahead, heading to Hanoi. They did not pursue the KlOa.
Markings were unidentifiable due to distance. HIQs were at 2«»000 ft.
53
laWiW* i*»Vr'<rfiWfiiifiii1\
^^^^^
Event IX-II
Aircraft Invplved: Pour P-lO^Ds vs three NIO-lTs
Result: No damage ~
Vicinity of Encounter: 21055'N/105°3<I'E '
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlflje: ?3 April 66/1532K
Pour F-1059 (BLUE Plight) had bombed the Bao Olang Bridge and waa exiting the area.
BLUb 2 was separated from the reat of the flight.
2. MISSION (lOUTe
BLUE flight was from Korat but route to target unknown. Egreaa waa overland through
Laos.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE Flight carried an unknown number of 750 lb bomba.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Cloud cover at unknovn altitude.
BLUE Heading ^290* 1500 ft AOL 550 KTAS
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 2 detected 3 MIGs at his 3 o'clock position, on a reciprocal heading at an
altitude of 2,000 ft.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 2 entered cloud layer to elude NIGa.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Two of the three KlSa chaaed BLUE 2 for 20 n ml (about 3 mlnutea) and fired before
breaking off. BLUE 2 rejoined flight and exited the area.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE flight expended no alr>to-alr ordnance, HICs had eannona and fired unknown
number of times at BLUE 2. No hits.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None noted.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
None.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUE U lU March 1967
Messages » Repor ts: Neaaagea: a. 7AP 2311332, DOCO-I81I3. Apr 66, OPREF-3
b. 250'>20 Apr 66. OIAAP-2 9208
• CINCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight was part of the strike force which was supported by the U.S. aircraft In
Events 1-22 (F-la escorting a B-66} and 1-23 (P-4s on MIO SCREEN). These aircraft were
not involved In this event.
After attacking the target, BLUE Flight, which was the last of 3 or 4 strike flights,
turned north to evade heavy 37min, 57mm and 85mm flak from the Kep area. During this
maneuver BLUE 2 became separated from the flight. BLUE 2 was heading 290 degrees about
55 miles NW of the target when he observed 3 MIC-17s at 3 o'clock on a reciprocal heading.
Two of the HIQs made a 18O degree turn and gave chase firing on BLUE 2. Although the
HIGs chased him for 20 miles, BLUE 2 successfully evaded by using cloud cover and low
altitude. BLUE 2 did not use afterburner. During the ohasc, BLUE 2 infomed the rest of
the flight of the situation, but BLUE 4 did not hear the transmiaalon.
The remaining 3 aircraft of BLUE Plight turned weat for the Red River and the turning
point south. BLUE 2 rendezvoused with the rest of the flight on the Vest bound leg but
by thac time the HIOs had broken off.
I
i
I
I
i
Event 11-12
^-^ *J Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSOs va tvo HIO-lTs
ft Rc3ult: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»22*N/107»05*K
PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 8 Hny 196G/160',;H
Pi' - -
B^UC flle^t had left the target after a strike and was heading toward Tonkin Oulf .
FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
I
k > /*■' Altitude Speed HeadlnK
I-': (■ BLUE 1. 2, 3, 5,000 ft 450 kt , 110°
|.< 'I . KIC 1, 2 7,000 ft Unknown 130*
; BLUE Flight In Plngertip-Four fomatlon
S. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Flight had received a e«ne»*al MIC alert from EC-121,
J.. BLUE 3 detected MIG flight of two aircraft at 8 o'cloclc, about 2,000 ft above.
#< : «i MICs crossed over and continued to 3 o'clock position, apparently not detecting BLUE
Plight.
^' : 6. ACTION INITIATED
The MIGs turned to close on BLUE Plight. BLUE Flight accelerated to 575 knots.
MIC 2 attacked from 6 o'clock.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 did not know of presence of HICs because of bad radio receiver and continued
straight and level. BLUE 2, 3, and H started Jinking maneuver. BLUE h reported that
KIC 2 fired his cannon. During maneuvering, BLUE 2 took a snapshot burst at NIG 1 at
3 o'clock position. MIC flight withdrew with no damage to either side.
8. ORDNANCE
(H p . flr«;d/ N o._ httO Bewarks
Cannon
' BLUE 2 1/0 Snapshot during Jinking maneuver.
MIC 2 1/0 Mlas.
1
1
% 11. DATA SOURCES
I
a
1
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Radio coamMnieatlona very poor. BLUE 1 had no receiver.
10. AIRGREU COMMENTS
BLUE 2: HIO attacked from above and showed low level of training/experience. During
later events, the HIQ attacks were tsore aggressive and attacked from below.
Project Interview !- BLUE 2, 15 March 1967.
Reports ; CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^
BLUE Plight of U P-105S was returning from a strike mission when BLUE 3 detected a
pair of Mic-173 at 8 o'clock. The MIG flight was about 2,000 ft above and crossed over
to the 3 o'clock position, apparently without seeing BLUE Plight,
BLUE Plight continued straight and level and MIO flight turn«-d to close. BLUE Plight
accelerated to 575 kt. BLUE 1, unaware of HIG presence due to radic malfunction, con-
tinued to fly straight and level but BLUE 2, 3, and 1 flew Jinking maneuver. MIO 2
attacked fron 6 o'clock position. MIC cannon fire was reported by BLUE 4. BLUE 2 fired
snapshot burst at MIO 1 at 3 o'clock position turning Jinking maneuver. NIG flight
withdrew, no damage.
% Ewnt .11-13
Alroraft Involved: your F-lOSDs v* four lixa-17t
• Result : Sighting only
^Idnlty of Encounter: 21*10 *N/104«30*B
1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
OateAlme: 10 May 1966/1621H
by eaKlfiiS^ "SfurJ^T^il RESCAP mission in t-o elfloenta when NIOs irere elghted
ei!oJ dSwI SrSJ^unS ??ri. "^"'^ ^^"^ * 5. BLUE 3 had bSn
2. MISSION ROUTE
Enroute to Odorn from a bofflblng mission in the vicinity of Yen Bal.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1, 2 Onknown
BLUE 1, 5 nrop tanks
i* ? external stores » silver color
MIO 3. 4 Unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Altitude Hesdiwe Fuel State
BLUE 1. 2 7,000 ft 2250 ^0^
2i!P/',5 " 225« 1200 lb
«I0 1. 2 7,000 ft 3150 -!
MIO 3, 4 — 2250
5. INITIAL DETECTION
fJ-PJ 1 and 2 visually detected two MIOs at 9 o'clock.
BLUE 4 detected the presence of MIOs by means of a MlO-tyoe armed vector mto t
^ «>'«l*>c>^ •» t»o -pecks at a rangJ^^Jf M^n Siw'and JlLlS
fast. The location waa between the Red and Black Rivers. closing
«. ACTION INITIATED
ourve!^"^ * * '^•"end as MIO 1 and 2 began a slow 30» bank Into a pursuit
to oloiS! ** ^* ***** <ie"cendlng, continued to descend. MIO 3 and 4 continued
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
«h..n mflf J 1 "° 1 and 2 closed to about one mile at 6 o'clock
SS?ef i{?Q 1 2id 2!" ^'^^^ ft AOL at a apeed of 1.1 Mach. BLUE 1 and 2 oS ie?ei:
deck S"SaJh'*r3-r4'lSJ'iSJ ! 5 "* ■"•rburner. They descended to the
aecK as nacn 1.3-1,11 and lost MIO 3 and 4 before reaching the Black River.
8. ORDNANCE
None.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLCNS
None.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
None.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interview ; BLUE 5 - Pebruary I967
Messages . Reports ;
TAP OPREP 101637Z OOCO-O 19229 Nay 66
7AP OPRE? 102117Z DOCO-0 19253 Hay 66
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
M,^ ^^Sfii'i'S^ !I2 I n*"" Ten Bai and BLUE 3 was shot down by ground
SSip.''Se'Ae«''«e*£eJ IHaiJirSLuJ I.""*'' " '"'^^ *
. RvMtt II>13
BLUE 4 and $ beeaiw low on fuel and departed for Udorn. BLUE 1 and 2 folloved a few
■Inutes later.
BLUE 1 and 2 sighted two MIGa at 9- o'clock in a alow 30*> bank aa If in a purault
curve. The HIOs closed to about one mile at 6 o'clock as BLUE 1 and 2 deaeended to
3,000 ft AGL and accelerated to Kaeh 1.1. The MlOa vera out accelerated. No attenpt «aa
nude to engage the MlOa because of the low fuel atate.
BLUE 4 detected the presence of MIQs by neans of a HlC-type amed vector. NIG 3 and I
were visually detected at 6 o'clock as two specks at a range of seven miles and closing
faat. BLUE 4 and 5 decreased altitude, BLUE 4 dropped tanks* and both lit afterburnera.
They deaeended to the dock at 1.3 Naoh and lost the NICa.
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B¥«nt 11-14
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs thres MIQ^lTa
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«10*N/10l|«30*E '
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
DateAlve: 10 May 1966/1800K
BLUE Plight was returning from a bombing mission near Yen Bal.
II. DATA SOURCES
DXA Intelligence Bulletin
12. NARRATIVE 0£SCRIPTIOII
BLUE Plight of four F-1058 was returning from a bombing mission near Yen Bai Mhen
they encountered three MIO-lTs. The NIQ flight nade three descending turns over the
flight coming as close as two miles. Apparently no firing passes were made.
A flight of F-ts was Informed of the Hiti's presence. The NZO flight withdrew on
arrival of the P-4s.
61
E»«nt 11-15
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s va four NIO-lTa
Result: One MZQ destroyed and two F-105s
damaged
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*33 'K/105*37»E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 29 June 1966/I31OH
Pour P-105S were on an IROM HAND mission In the vicinity of JCS Tarset 51 at
2l»lO'ii/i05»51'E. The fUght had left the target and was heading northwaat at *-5,000
ft AOL when attacked by four NIG-17s.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Flight took off from Korat at 1215H. They headed north at 0.8 Kach and at
lu.OOO ft to rendezvous with the Orange track tanker. After refueling, BLUE Plight headed
northeast at 18,000 ft and 020 knots ground speed. The flight proeeeded past checkpoint
Alpha and on to JCS Tarfr^t 51.
3. AIRCRAFT C0NFI6URATI0N
P-105P,
P-105D.
P-105D.
F-105D,
Aircraft
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
BLUE i;
All of BLUE flight camouflaged.
3 had vector equipment.
Tanks
(Inboard)
two, itSO lb
two, 150 lb
two, 450 lb
two, 450 lb
BLUE
SHRIKE
(Outboard)
one left, one right
^ UU-3A
(Outboard)
one left» one right
one left mm right
one left, one right
1 had vector and WILD VEASEL equipment. BLUE
ii« ^* .^^ ***** °" "^"8 *iP» on vertical stabiliser.
NO missiles or missile racks were observed.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Broken to overcnnt bet»wen 2 and. 12,000 feet..
Below the cloud base. the.
HIOs were closing with 50 to
Weather : ...^r-.. „ ^..^.w^cv wvi.n
visibility was about seven miles.
Altitude; 4,000-5*000 ft AGL
Spe ed ; 1|80 knots ground speed
State : 13,000 pounds
Flight Formation; Two elements of two F-105s. BLUE 3 and 4 approxlaately one-faalf mild
to rear and one-half nlle to rltfjt of BLUE 1 and 2.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE «l sighted MIO flight at 7 o'clock at 2-3,000 ft.
70 knots closing speed at an altitude of 2*3,000 ft AOL.
6. ACTION INITIATED
^trr^ V'^^H^^'^ffJ^} warning. BLUE 3 called for a hard left break, carried out by
BLUE 3 and 4. BLUE 1 and 2 apparently did not hear the warning. ««Tiea ouc oy
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT
on .Ji^Ll/i"^' ^^"^ J <f^"> " 3 and 4 break and dive, mo l and 2 continued
on and headed for the lead element. (MIG 3 and 4 followed but did not take active pSS in
i^^l'l E ^ ^ ***** *'*«^ * 1 sighted the MIO flight at 8
Sitw 5 :**S',5*^^*'* ^° ^l^^^ 6° afterburner, and Jattlaon ordnanea. MO 1 hit
BlS 2 S^ot d^ wo"?? overflew the target and ended up at «LUE 2>8 12 o'clock.
Meanwhile, MIC 2 attacked BLUE 1 causing damage. BLUE 4 engaged NXO 4. flrlnc 200
rounds of 20nm. blue 3 closed on MIO 2 and fired a fleeting shot! nnng zug
BLUE 2 departed due to damage and BLUE 3 left to cover BL'vE 2. BLUB 1 took a lens
range shot at two departing HIQs. "
8. ORDNANCE
Ho. Plred/No. Hits
SHRIKE cannon
BLDE 1
BLUB 2
VO
1/0
1/1
Remarks
Plred SHRIKE at SAM site. Site went down
40 seconds after launch. No BOA. Shor*:
burst 20mm, no damage.
200 rounds. Conflmed MZQ kill.
8. ORDNANCE (Cont'd)
No. Flred/»o. Hits
SHRIKE eannon
BLUE 3
BLUE H
MIG 1
HIG 2
1/0
1/0
VO
a/1
1/1
Event 11-19
SHRIKE fired Into the blind. 100 rounds of
ZOosni range 2,500 ft at high angle off.
200 rounds* no damagn.
Missed BLUE 3» damaged BLUE 2.
Damaged BLUE 1*
9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
hlE. EJl^fwL*^.'?? f?r*^!?"°" °" °^ cockpit and one ahell through cockpit. Theae
wtes knocked out all instruments except engine Instrumenta but Including the sun slcht and
tbe oxygen equlpoent. MIG kill make In spite of lack of gun sight. *^
Communication problems between aircraft prevented effective HIO warning.
)0. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
BLUE 3
Total
Hours
3100
P-105
Hours
lOOOt
Combat
Missions
25
Had no formal air-to-air training for 13
years. Qualified on DART twice a year.
Would have liked to hava had better pombat
training including more air-to-air practice.
BLUE 3 stated the P-105 needa better turn-
ing capability and a panic sMaiu to get Into
alr-to-alr mode. The equipment worked fine.
BLUB l,2,k Not Interviewed
n. DATA SOURCES
Project rnterview! BLUB 3, 6 January 1967
Letter ata teieent ! BLUE 2, 20 February 1967
Messages:
7XF/MMCC/2291150Z, 29 June 1966
7AP/OPBEP/Z291235Z, 29 June I966
7AP/OAI/C300226Z, 30 June 1966
7AF/AI0 913/0250627Z. 25 September 1966
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
To - BLUE Plight is divided into two elements of two. BLUE ? and H folloifinff «hA..<- . t..i*-
. mile to the rear and a half-mile to the rijcht All ar« flvin* «?^Mk; -Hi f »bout a half-
''^ approximately ^.aS^kSoS'groJJJ SJleJ'' Sful'J'^fS^tJS MJ^llSt
:u;iSSe"iJ%^?o1,JSo'?e%%' * ^ 3.Sio^f«t!"J„d"if l
l^A^A^aS i MIO warning and BLUE 3 calls for a left break. AoDarentlv BLtm 1
T2 - BLUE 3 and k continue their diving break. BLUE 1 PAdia* mm b, nttt^^ ^
This sSni snieS%sss'2?s ^ittI jr?SrS«i:"(p«?t'i;«"i;?«''rj ^'^^ '^''^''^^
J«JgJd MS instruments, except eSg^'„:\^2jSS:iU:^^iJ^ IfM^SS
MIG 2 fires at BLUE 1 and hits him^ in the vertical and horixontal 8tablll«.r
Event 11^15
BLUE 3 ends br«ak after 270 of 360 degree turn and find?, he Is separated from
BLUE 4. BLUE 3 heads Into clouds to lose any MIOs which may be attacking.
Tk - BLUE 2 announces he la damaged and heading for Point Alpha. BLUE 3 acknowledged,
said he would meet hlro there, and engages afterburner.
T6 - In heading for Point Alpha, BLUE 3 sees MG 2 on tall of BLUE 1. BLUE 3 takes high
angle shot at MIO who executes very sharp break. BLUE 3 dfsparts for Point Alpha.
T7 - mo 3 Joins with KIG 2 as BLUE 1 fires burst at long ranee. Ho damage.
Official weather forecast puts clouds at 5 to 12.000 ft. But both BLUE 2 and BLUE 3
mention clouds as low as 2,000 ft. The scattered clouds alternately helped and hindered
the BLUE Plight as both sides uael the available cover when necessary.
mm
REO BAHOW CVEIIT H-13 SUWHAHY
TIM
Nark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3. 4)
Other Friendly
Communications.
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1,2)
Remarks
Statu*
Action
^0
4-5.000 ft A6L
4B0 kt ground speed
Straight and level
Fuel 13.000 lb
84 catching up to flight
sights 3 NIG-17S et 7
o'clock at 2 to 3.000
feet A6L. at approx1>
■ately 2-3.000 ft range.
(A fourth H16-17 Is
trailing by 4 lilies)
81 .2.3. flying
straight and level ,
84 : nlbs at 7
O'clock."
83: 'Are you sure
they are HIGs?"
B4: "Damn right,"
nio riignt closing
at 50-70 knots.
Apparently Bt and
B2 did not hear
transal sslon .
83.4 full after-
burner
Hard left break and dive
to 1,000 ft AGL
81,2 continue
straight and
level.
83: Break* hard
left."
ni Ti res AC
HI6 flight con-
tinues on to 81 and
82.
1
81 and t btglfl Itft
turn
81 sights NIG flight
at 8 o'clock
83 and 4 In hard
left break.
83: "Glad you
called the HIGs."
81: "Brtak loft,
go to aftorburnort*
•nm jemson
ordnance."
MIG Flight closing
on 81 and 2.
HI daaagos 62 .
H2 damages B1 .
»
Transmissions not
heard by other
element.
84 cones out of
break at 2.000 ft
84 attacks N4
81 attempts to
evade M2.
82 slows down as
result of damage.
83 seeks out clouds
to 1 cse any HIGs
on tall .
Nl overflies 82.
N2 chases 81.
H3 closing on 82.
H4 avoids B4.
B2 loses 1ostru>
■ents and gun sight
as result of da«-
age.
82 fires at Ml . sees
flashes In left wing
root.
H2 at 10 o'cio k and
H3 at 6 o'clock and
closing. Evaded by
diving Into broken
clouds .
81 attempting to
evade H2.
83 circling In
clouds.
84 attempting to
reacquire N4.
HI hit. Rolls over
and does Sptlt-S
Into clouds at
2.000 ft.
M2 and 3 continue
after 81. N2
considerably ahead
of M3. H4 departs.
B2 credited with
confirmed kill .
9 '
h
83 goes to afterburner
to meet 82*
82; hit. I'll
see you at Point
Alpha. "
B3: "Ooger. will
meet you when I
can."
As above.
» (
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RtO BARON EVEWT ll-tS SO»IHABY
TIM
Nark
Action Alrcrtft (BLUE 1. 2, 3. 4)
Status
83 sights ttZ on
t«11 of i\ . Fires
100 rounds at high
angle off. Cannot
turn with M2.
Exits to Join B2.
B1 circles and
closes on H2 and
K3. Ffres at HiGs
at long range.
Action
Other friendly
Comoun i c. t1 ont
Eneaiy Actions
(NI6 1.})
H2. makes very tight
left break.
N3 Joins with H2.
Revarks
Event 11-16
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs one HI0-J.7
■ Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«40»N/105*30'E *
1. PRtMARV MISSICK AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: Mid June 1966/unknown
BLUE Plight was on a strike mission against Thnl Nguyen
11. DATA SOURCCS
Project Interview: BLUE 1-5 January 1967
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was Inbound on a strike mission against Thai Nguyen. They were heading In
direction north of Thud Ridge ?t an altitude of 1000 ft AOL and at a speed of
500 knots. BLUE 2 sighted a HIO at 10 o'clock at 5 to 6,000 feet AOL, 3 to 4 miles out,
And.headinc In a w*stcrl. direction. As the r-lCZ-s- had been instructed to hit the target-
«irst. they did not engage. Die KIG did not maneuver either and passed at a ran« of 3
to 4 miles. -
NIQ warnings had been broadcast but none were of any eoi^sequence to this flight.
Event II«17
Aircraft Involved: Two P-l'05« w two HIG-lTs. '.
Rei»ult : No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21' 36*H/10y 20*E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: Late June or early July 1966/150OH
BLUE flight of four P-lO^s were part of an P-105 strike force bombing a preselected-
target located at 10 "30* N/105 e37'E. BLUE 3 snd 4 had separated from BLUE 1 ^nd 2 during
a maneuver to avoid a SAM.
2. MISSION ROliTC
BLUE night departed Korat and Joined ORANGE ANCHOR tanker for prestrlke refueling.
BLUE rilght proceeded to check point near 22"N/10't''37*E and on to target near
21*'30'N/105*'37*E.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
BLUE 3> 1 Empty AER rack and two mmpty 450 gal tanks
HZG 1, 2 Silver color
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Scattered eunulus north of the Red River. Visibility 10 plus miles with hare on
the deck.
BLUE 3 and H
Altitude ; Approximately 1000 feet ACL
Heading ;' Northwest
Speed ; 500 KCAS
Fuel State ; 75^0 pounds Internal
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 3 sighted two :^Ii'-l7s at 3000 to 4000 feet AGL, traveling at a speed of 400 knots
and In a close formation, itange not reported. Bearing: 12 to 1 o'clock. MIGs were
identified by their high titil and their silver color.'
There was no MIO alert.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 3 called "Bogles at 12 o'clock high." BLUE 3 and 4 pulled up, went Into after-
burner, and chased the HICs. (BLUE 3 noted they were in afterburner for "a long tine.**)
7. SITUATION OEVELOPN^
BLUB flight had reached a position 30OO reet to the rear and 1000 feet over the MIC's
7:30 sector. BLUE 3 told BLUE 4 he would take the one on the left. BLUE flight rolled
and dove on the KIGs. At abcut this time the MIGs broke left. BLUE fired 3C0 rounds at
MIO 1 while BLUE ^ fired 200 rounds at KIQ 2. Neither BLUE member csuld hold his sight
on his MIO sr. BLUB flight disengaged by breaking (4 to 5 (t's) to the right.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 3 300 rounds 20om No damage observed.
BLUE 4 200 rounds 20mM No danage observed.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 3: Radar would not lock on target. It apparently was locking on the ground.
BLUE 4: Sight did not have a reticle and also could not get a radar look on target.
10. AIRCREW COKKENTS
Eaperlence
Total F-105 Combat
Hours Hours Wleslons Remarks
BLUE J UdO 600 BIS Very little ktH training, had
fired at CART 3 or 4 times.
BLUE 4 .Not Interviewed——*
CoBgperita or. thlc Knccunter
BLUE 3 felt this was a minor engagenert In that the two flights sort of ran Ir.tc each
other and one made a pass at the other and then left. When asked why he dioenpiceed, he
stated that he felt he was In a bad position so he broke it off. He knew he hac a speed ,
advantage and was capable of getting away. If he had hao an airplane that could maneuver
- Event IX-17
with the NIG, he would have stayed and fought (unlesn such action was contrary to SOP).
BLUE 3 18 or the opinion that it doesn't make sense to slow down with the NlOa or to get
Into a dog fight with a MIG-I7 because of its sianeuverablllty.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interview ; BLUE 3, 6 Jan 1967.
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTtON
To.Ti- BLUE flight of four P-105s bombed a target at approxlnately 21** 32'H/105° '»7*E.
As they were coming off the target at 2000 feet and a speed cf 500 knots CAS, BLUE 4
sighted a SAM and gave the warning: "Missiles, 9 o'clock, br<alc," BLUE 1 and 2 broke right
as BLUE 3 and 1 broke left. BLUE 3 saw the SAM and obferved It closing »t roughly a level
anftle. It passed at least 500 feet rrom hlB and blew up oehind the flight. BLUE 1, 2 and
BLUE 3, 4 continued as aeparate elements toward their return check point.
T}- BLUE 3 and k are continuing toward the return cheek point at 1000 feet ACL. 900
knots CAS when BLUE 3 sighted a pair of ilrplanes at approxlnately 1 o'clock. They were
recognised as KIG-lTs by their high tall and silver color. BLUE 3 radioed, "Bogles at
12 o'clock high." BLUE 3, pulled up and went into afterburner. (They stayed In after-
burner "a long time.")
Tj- When they reached a point 1000 feet over and 3000 to the rear of the MlO's 7:30
position BLUE 3 called, "I'm taking the one on the left." They rolled and dove as the
KIUs broke to the left. BLUE 3 fired about 300 rounds and BLUE 4 fired about 200 rounds,
but neither could keep his target in the gun sight. BLUE 3. disengaged by breaking
right.
»E0 B*ROII gVEKTlM7StJHMAft»
2000 ft AGL
500 KCAS clfnblng
Completed diving
brcAk. 1000 ft
AGL 500 KCAS
500 KCAS on full
"llltipy potfer.
10.000 ft
Approx. 7500 lb of
fuel tnternel
B1 .2 break right
83.4 break left and go
down with In 50 ft A6l
83 and 4 pulled up and
lit afterburners.
Aolled and dove to
•PPJOK. 1000 ft above
B1 and 2 flying as
independent'ele
ncflt.
B3 atte^ipted to follow torn, fired 300
round, (one burst). Could not h^ld ,f,ht
on Ht so broke right (4 to 5 q-.j ,„d
headed for check point. ' ^ ^'
" d!«Je"^ '*
B4: "Missiles,
« o'clock, break."
SA-2 nlssfle
fired at flight.
B3 to 1:
lost you.
'Have
An
going up the (THUD
ridge."
83; "Bogeys at
12 o'clock high.
SAM cane In level
4n<f passed SOO ft
behind and below
83. SAM exploded
behind the flight.
83: taking
left me."
HI and 2 in level
'light, close
fornatlon flying
slow (400 kt) at
3-4000 ft ACL.
HI6$ broke hard
left when B3 and
4 attacked fron
MlG's 7:30 posi-
tion, 1000 ft up
end 3000 ft out.
B3 felt he was In
a bad position so
broke off engage-
ment and utilized
speed advantage to
get away from MI6s
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1 .
y Event 11-20
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-IOSs vs two KIO-lTa
. Result: No danage
Vicinity or Encounter: 2l'3O»N/106*O0'E •
PRIHARY MISSION At'O .TACTICAL SITUATION
Date: 11 July l9^b/unknom
BLUE Flight waji Inbound to JCS Target 18.2* at 2l»33'H/106»30'E on a atrlke alaalon.
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviewa : BLUE 1, 5 January 1967.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION t
BLUE Flight vat north of Kep flying at 50 ft altitude heading eaat-southeast. Bomb
load was two 3,000 lb bomba per aircraft for use on a bridge target. ««« "o*
engaged unless they posed a real threat. Two MlQ-lTs were sighted at 8,000 to 10,000 ft
altitude headed south. So MIG warnings were received for this area. The P-10^
camouiiae,ca, .nakiii* tiieiu difficult to see from* above over Nortli' Vletn-weae terrain. The
night Bwabera felt that the NlOa did not a«e thea and no maneuvering took place on
either aide.
83
11
E¥ent 11-18
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSOs vb four MIO-lTs
. Result: No danage
Vicinity of Encounter: NE rail line
PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date: 7 July 1966/ unknown
BLUE Plight was on « strike alsslon against a target on the NE rail line.
DATA SOURCES
Letter froo BLUE 3.
12. RARRATIVC 0£SCRtPTION
As BLUE Flight was coming off a target on the HE rail line two NIQ-ITs junped the lead
element. BLUE 3 accelerated to Mach 1.1 to attain a more favorable position when BLUE ^
called out two more MIGs at seven o'clock. The latter MIOs overshot and BLUE 3 and 4
turned, tactc into them. Crvnt^ct was l-ssr. d'.:? to hr.::r 9nd the. encasement. endftd..without. loss,,
jor damage.
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Aircraft Involved: On* F-105F *nd on* r->10$D ■
vs two mo-zis
Reault: No donage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21oiS*N/10S«48*E
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: ? July 66/1615H
One P-105P (BLUE 1) and one P-105D (BLUE 2) on an IRON HAND mlaslon. BLUE 3 and 4
ground aborted. After BLUE 1 and 2 launched, a opare waa launched to fill In for one of
the ground aborts. However, after the spare Joined the flight. BLUB I decided not to
take a three ship flight on the misaion due to the HIQ environment and sent th* spara
home. BLUE 1 and 2 then proceeded to North Vletnaa.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight departed Korat, refueled in Orange Anchor, and flew to 21«55*N/104937*B
(Ml of Jfen Bal, and down the south side of Thud Ridge toward Phue Yen.
3. AIRCRAFT CUNFIGURATIONS
F«105F BLUE 1 and P.lObD BLUE 2
2 - AGH-45 on outboard stations
2 - LAU-3 on Inboard stations
650 gal tank on centerllne station
BLUE 2 had radar vector gear
MIO-21 MIC 1. 2
Dull silver color with no marking
KIO-l had 2 air-to-air oasslles (probably ATOLL)
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTtR
Weather; Clear with 13 mi visibility except for cumulus buildups over Thud Rldga
extending down to the mountain tops.
^ BLUB
Altitude ; 7000 ft AOL
Heading ; about SSS"
gP*5<> - 450 KCAS
Fuel State ; Unknown
Plight Formation ; BLUB flight in left turn
o
BLUE 2 500 ft out, aome distance back and slightly higher.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
«. ^^'^-i * MIQ-21 at 7 o'clock, low and called that a MIO-21 was attacking the
flight. The MIO, when observed waa about 5*000 ft behind BLUE 1 but was ovartaklnK
rapidly (at about 100 kt). ^
6. ACTION INITIATED
As the HIO paaaed over BLUE 1 the mo rovorsed to a right turn In an 11 o'clock hl^
position to BLOB 1. BLUE 1 also reversed hla turn to the right to follow the MIO.
7. SITUATION DEVCLOFNENT
After reversing to the right, BLUE 1 saw another NXO-21 close behind BLUE 2 and
tracking. BLUE 2 then broke left and down, (never sselng the KIO) and oxitad In after-
burner at low altitude.
BLUE 1 continued to turn right and descended but was outtumed by the MIO. The MM
ended up at 3 o'clock at about 90« angle off and with theae conditions and 2.000 ft ranae,
the MIO fired two alr-to-alr mlsailes at BLUE 1. BLUE 1, who was now unloadlns In after-
burner, obaerved the missiles to pass to the rear.
1 accelerated to high speed and low altitude and the HIOs were not seen again.
BLUE 1 and 2 subsequently rejoined and continued the mission without further Incident.
8. OAONANCE
BLUE 1, 2
MIQ-1
Event II.19
No ordnance expended
Ho cannon ordnance
observed
No. flrgd/Uc. hits
(aA Missile)
2/0
Remarks
Missiles fired at
high angle off.
9. EQUIPNENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2 a. Jettison circuit nalfunetlon - oould* not Jettison outboard stores.
b. Visibility severely United due to condensation around outside of canopy at
high Mach. An Inherent characteristic when flying in moist conditions.
10. AIRCREW CONNENTS
EKperienee
Votal
Hours
Conbat
Hours
Combat
Missions
BLUE 1
Front
Back
BLOE 2
2,000
>Unfcnotfn-
239
•Qhknoim-
15
Hemarks
Pour years/1500 hours
In B>52.
Cottnents on this Encounter
BLUE 2: In the high speed dash to evade RED 2, BLUE 2 had to slow down to decrease
the condensation around his canopy and consequently Increase his vlstblllty.
BLUE 2 estimated that RED I had approximately 560 kt on the first pass and this *
surprised him because he thought that the llia>21 was limited to 500 kt at low altitude.
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 2 felt that BIO EYE did little more than garble up Guard Channel.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
BLOE 1 Backaeat (9 Har 1967)
BLUE 2 (5 Jan 1967)
Messages. Reports :
Letter from BLUE 1 Backseat (July 1967}
Letter fMm BLUE 1 (7 July 1967)
7AF 071650Z July, DIO 29957
7AF 0717Q2Z July, DOCO-0 22483
7AP 07133'(Z July, DOCO>0 22483
OIA Intsuffl, 8 July 1966
OS^ ri^.t;r Veapons Center Bulletin CAD-7
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
^^'^iJ ^^°!? "^^^ nl*«lon. The mission route extended In the general
direction of 155" along the southern side of Thud Ridge, and near the end of thud Rides.
^^"^ fli.&ht received a strong signal and pulled up while B-1 lalmehed
t^'*^?? missile. After missile launch, BLUE Flight started a left turn back to the north.
BLUE Flight was at 8-12,000 ft altitude at about il25 KTAS. nor»n.
BLOE 2 sighted a MlG-21 closing on the flight at high cpeed with about 100 kt over-
2"** alerted B-l. The MIG was at BLUE 2«8 7 o'clock, and at BLUE 1-8 6 o'clock
5 ■ 000 ft behind BLUE 1. Hw MIO was passing from BLUE I's t o'clock to his 10 o'clock
£uE*i "* '° started slightly below BLUE 2, the MIO passed above
*
Due to the approach of the MIQ, it appeared that the MIO had been directed on a OCl
out'S front* " »• MO overshot B-1 and 2, and pas'ed
AS the NIO passed, BLUE 2 attempted to Jettison external stores and track the hlQ for
?-ffTi5* **f' "oj**"' 2 «a» too busy with the switches and could not simultaneously
Jettison stores and setup for an attack, before the MIO passed out of range
I!
(I
(I
Ik
♦ *
I::
event IX.19
«Tn passed BI,UE FUght, to the left, he started a right turn. Thl« put tba
ma at BLUE I'a 10 o'clock position but high above BLUE 1. At this time BLUE 1 also
started a right turn to stay with the MIG. The MIG was not observed to fire durlnK this
pftss ■
QTitir ^i*"^ ^ ^^'^ °" outside of the turn when the flight was turning left, but on
BLUE 1 8 right turn BLUE 2 ended up on the Inside. As BLUE 1 started to turn to the
fifnS^i *'nrne''r''*?/^"i^ ^LfJ^^l ^ o'clock at 2,000 ft range and apparently tracking
^t^^ £;«^^"Lf . '^^^^ 2 to break and BLUE 2 did so. although BLUE 2 never saw
V. * . ^ ^ indicates that his instructions were for BLUE 2 to break left, although
BLUE 2'8 actions were described as a break to the right.) ""usu
BLUE 2 executed a naxijnuin g descending turn to the deck, simultaneously going to
afterburner and Jettisoning stores (except for the outboard stores which huns). BLUE 2
descended to treetop level (about 500 ft) and accelerated to Nach 1.1. He went up a valley
through the clouds over Thud Rld^e. BLUE 2 left the Ridge on the north side, turned to
Sy cJoisfng bJ?k oJer T^l Jldge'*''^""*" subsequently Joined on BLUE 1 with a DP steer,
. ^ ^ continued to turn right, with BLUE I continuing to descend
- • — blue l however, so that after
^irl ?£ ^'^^ angle off to BLUE 1 and at BLUE I's 3 o'clock
position. The MIO then slnultaneously launched two air-to-air Bilsslles from 2.000 ft
ISri*LL«d^d°«i^ f S'T; '^!!'* "^"^l" P*^"*** behind blue l, as did the MIO and
reachinrs^o kJaI S„ ^K^^fr^****,^" afterburner) away towards the clouds at low altitude.
bl!I ? 5«^J J J? altitude was reached. The MIO was not seen again.
BLUE 1 was now heading back to the northwest on the south side of Thud Ridge.
»r,H ^til*^ "^^i) ^' crossed back over the Ridge, the flight turned around
Sf« B?nS ^°!:"-^^f "^'^se to continue the mission. Just before lea^ng the mlMlSn
t[:?i.?'rout'ei:"SSrin'i?ei:r'"'"* """'^ " ' ^s..rS a"
1
.1
1
81
Brmit tI-21
JUrorftft Involved: Part (a) one F-105 ve tw>
KI0>21s •
Pert ()>} one P-105 va two
Result: No Damage (One F-105 destroyed
when aircraft ran out of fuel —
pi lot recovered}.
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*30 • H/105* 40 'E
1. PRIMARY HISStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 11 Jul 1966/0705Z
BLUE flight > a flight of four 105s was on an IRON HAND SAM BUppreaslon miaslon
25 mil en northeest of Hanoi. Two separate engagements occurred In the vicinity of Thud *
Ridge as the flight Mas egresalng the target area.
2. MISSION ROUTE
The route of flight was from Takhll* direct to the tanker » direct to the northwest
end cf Thud Ridge, and eaat to the Kep area (northeast of Hanoi). The egress route was
back to Thud Ridge, southwest across the Red River to Takhll.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-105P BLUE 1. 3
2 - AQM-45
1000 rd 20iam
y-105D BLUE 2. 4
2 - LAU-3 rooket pods
1000 rd 20an
All 1058 6S0-gal bold} bay tanks.
MI 0-21
2 - AAM (Icnown)
Aircraft silver with Red Star on wing.
No- drop tanks .
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Broken clouds » 5/8 coverage, bases 3 to 4000 ft, tops 6000 ft, 5 miles In hase
below clouds, clear and 7 miles plus above elouds. BLUB Plight had Juat attacked a SAM
site and the flight had become separated frosi each other. All four alreraft were
4)proaohing Thud Ridge from the east individually.
BLUE 2 BLUE 4
Altitude : 6000-7000 ft HSL 6000-8000 ft MSL
Heading ; SSE 250" -270*
Spegd : ISO XCAS 350 KCAS
?uei State ; Bingo Bingo
Plight Pomatlon : Single Ship Single Ship
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Mio warnings had been received; however, they ware not ealled in the same area that
BLUE Plight was working.
a. BLUE 2 sighted two unidentified airoraft at 12 to 1 o*eloekt 4-5 mileat whieh he
asaumed to be members of his flight.
b. BLUE 4 sighted two llia'21a at 4 o*eloek» 2000 ft hlgft. in a pursuit eurte attaek.
6. ACTION INITIATED
a. BLUE 2 dosed In a tail ehaae atteiyting to join on the two unidentified airerftft
(MIO-218) assumed to be friendly.
b. BLUE 4 Jettisoned tanks and pylons* went afterbumert and dived atraight ahead*
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
a. Vhen BLUE 2 had closed to i^proximately 2 miles one of the then identified HZ0-31a
made a hard right climbing break and the other MIO continued straight ahead. BLUE 2
Jettisoned external stores, went afterburner, and initiated a hard right 180 degree turn.
As BLU?: 2 started to roll out of this right turn he saw a NIQ-21 "canopy to canopy"
approxlraately 30 degrees ahead, 500 ft high and to the right. BLUE 2 then broke right,
down, and under, rolling out "on the deck" and egressed the area auperaonlc at
minimum altitude.
- Event 11-21
»«fe l;-*I[i*rh!''S?n!"K"!I^ *° ^£?/^*^* * ''^^'^^^ ^"'i continued around to
SJi - This MIO broke up and to the rlc^t and BLUE U reversed
h?s ^;'^SrM?*T'^ *° ''••P ^" 'T^'^ tJeBan deccendlng in
2000 ft SeS Irf Vr^SiS"'? '° * ^ ^^^-a^l position,
ind Ri fiF h J2l The MIO started down throuEh the clouds or. a northerly heading
SSe t^-liH°?%?^f cllBbing turn toirarde hone. After establishing a climb; "
iil il !^?*? to clear his tall and saw the other MlO-21 approximately 2000 ft behind
JS-^StS JK^^e position. As BLUE k went to afterburner and broke hard left and down!
St^h R?nr aT^ air-to-air missiles which appeared to track to the left but could not
• i"" passed behind the P-105. The Hia broke up and to the left rolling
BMi^ J Li*'?.!!?'* "versing direction for a northerly descent toward the clouds. Although
?o^ii SKT'* * Poaltion on the MC by pulling up and rolling out over the
aSa considerations required hln to disengage and egress froa the
B. ORDNANCE
P-105 — Hone.
MIQ-Sl — One WQ-21 fired two AAMs at BLUE 4.
9. EqUIPNENT PROBLEMS
♦..rf- r.'. ? ^ modular cooling. I?P, and all flight Instruments during his low altl-
tude supersonic egress. The fuel quantity gauge was also suspected to be malfunctioning.
fhm hl^h^S Si?'?^^*"^*^ failure during the strike on the SAM site.
TOO bomb bay tank would not feed normally due to a continually popping circuit breaker.
10. AIRCREN COMMENTS
Experience
Total P..105 Cosibat
^o"Pa Hours ■ Missions Reaarks
^ 3000 350 31 Considerable tactical fighter
experience *
* — «w>t aTailable — Considerable tactical fighter
experience.
Hrn. "!f-! '^^5*w^* **** •fl«lPP«d with AAMs he mi«y have had a shot at the
KEOa. Also he would have been nore psychologically prepared for an Sr-to-alr encouSter.
The turning radius of the MIO-21 caught BLUE 2 by surprise.
.»t.,^!ll*^?'S°P' aircraft was completely obscured with vapor from 2 to 10
fi^ Sy.Sifi/MiTJi?*".," ^1 T" supersonic on the deck. This prevented hin
from clearing his 6 o'clock position to determine if the MIO had disengaged.
BLUE 4 commented that he thought the maneuverability of the P-105 at hlah an«*d
rs?sjoJS%s?;i°'' s"*^- ^^^^ ^^^^'^ mJt^c^ wjen L'iaSis tsrSio.s
6 o'clock position, he was too close to use an AAM.
Both pilots coii«)lained about the eoavUcated switch settings reouired to ehanoe froa
the ground attack mode to the air-to-air attack node. "quireo zo cnange rroa
tt. DATA SOURCES
Project Interview ; BLOB 2 (2 Peb 61) and BLUB 4 (6 Mar 1967)
Messag es ;
omP-3 DOCO-O 22712 Jul 66
AP Command Post Message S-12-02. 12 Jul 66
DAI Message 29966 Jul 66
Oet 5 Udom Thailand Message 30666 Jul 66
nSAP Plghter Weapons Center Bulletin - 7.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
a. BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 initiated a follow-up gun and rocket attack on a vlauaiiv
SS!;*S«?i?t'5SliIS'Sf*?5Af*^? a"""**- ^^"^2 became sepj;;"; Tron Ms^iaXer a.
both aircraft pulled off the target and entered a cloud Jinking to avoid heavy aa and
automatic weapon fire. BLUE 2 broke out on top at 5-6.000 ft on a IwterlJ SadlnT
toward the northern edge of Thud Ridge and requested a DP steer from BLUE I AftS'
Sri?!/5 ®° ^'f! ^''^ indicated DP heading, BLUE 2 Hw two dots of aircraft in
the distance on a southerly heading toward Thud Rld^. When the two aircraft J^dJ a iSft
turn to parallel Thud Ridge. BLUB 2 becaiee concemedUnd asked BLUE 1 if S wariS 1 llrt
turn. When BLUB 1 confirmed a left turn. BLUE 2 initiated a cutoff to Join Inl nSnJuvSred
fl?!!?.VSiS»i?g,?"".P<'»-.ti o« k sdle, be hind the two aircrart n5w n^ng iSw^JhSS^wSr'
aoout 3000 rt above the RidMlnyHBia^BLUB 2 dosed to a 2 mile- trail position.
Event 11-21
approximately 2000 ft ..low the aircraft he realUed that tS'y.nHeS'iwJuSlJs
He then noticed that hla reticle was °' . that Instant the air-
arrangements did not believe he -aa set up Jj/Jj* J^^^f JJ^ other aircraft continued
craft on the right broke »^arply up and tc the right ana the J^JJ^ identified.
Obscuring all rearward visibility from 2 o'clock and JJ." a, crossed Thud
tinuing a full military climb to 35.000 ft. ^^J^"*" '"^r.| " aTieS hiriFP was inopera-
descending through Uooo ft.
b BLUE H became separatcJ irom the flight as the flight * Inlill
^ finoff ft area or"uraulJS Clouds for a foUow-up attack after BLUE 1 launched a SHRIKE
2000 ft high and closing in a pursuit attack curve from J j'jlock. S^Jf^Jj^i^SJiJ^^'^SSS
tanks and pylons, went afterburner and accelerated to 600 KCAS in a straigm -^/""^
f? BLUE ? broke hard right and continued around In his turn to meet one of the HIGs
Je^d-on BlSJ 5 dW not See Ihe other MIG at this time. When the MIG broke up and to the
Jight! BLulTreversed his turn and entered a climbing left turn to ^Je MIG 1" sight.
^o^? rnn5?ro!rs^pJs.Jiit:if Lsrft b-eninS rn^iiT^ vy^ -rbH° ?s
iri; • mer tsiablishing-a 0^1^^*^ Resetting the fuel circuit breaker. BLUE 4 banked
SS'to cUlr"lJ tin aSd saw the other MIG-21 approximately 2000 " behind him in
■"perfect- firing position. BLUE H went afterburner and broke hard ^•f* ^J^"*?"" J/"
th* MB launched two alr-to-alr missiles. Although the missiles appeared to Initially
JSJrf ?r«SJSj ?o ?he left! llVE ^ believed that the hard break at 600 KCAS J«n and Into
gr"nS ciStter defeated missile guidance and caused them to pass
observed detonation. After firing, the MIQ broke up and to the left, '^^""S over the
too and reversing direction for a northerly descent toward the clouds. Although BLUE u
h2 Mhlwid I t«ll position on the MIG by pulling up and rolling out
his leS turn, fuel cSnslderatlons required him to disengage and J'^^ ^"Jj.
BLUE ""as able to successfully feed out his bomb bay tank by continually rwettlng his
circuit Seaker. He made a no-radlo recovery at Udom with 200 lb of fuel renaming.
Event 11-22
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs on* MIO-21
. Result: Sighting only
Vicinity' of Encounter: 2l'*38'H/lO*'50»E •
I. PRINAftV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 11 July 1966/Unknown
II. DATA SOURCES
MessatTes. Regorta ; Message 7th AP lit225«2, WO 0003, July 66, Part IV.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
A MIO-21 was sighted by BLUE Flight (four P-1058) at Zl^aS-N/lOiiosO'E near the Black
River. The MIC was low beneath clouds on a 120° headln,{. When BLUE Flight turned
toward the MIQ. the MIO turned to 50» and then to a 310* heading. The MIO was lost in
clouds before BLUE Plight could close. No markings were observed due to distance.
/ Bvant 11-23
Aircraft Involved: Eight J'-IOS* va four MlO-lTs
• Result* One P-105 lost; one P-105 damtgedi
three HIO-lTa daouged
vicinity of Encounter: 21»13'N/105»'»8'B
1. PRIHARY HISSlOli AMD TACTKAL SlTUATlOri
Date/Tine: 19 July I96S/16IIH
Pour fllghta of four F-105 aircraft on ROLUHG THUNDER niaalon to atrlke JC3-51, «
POL storage 7% nl north of Hanoi. Ttte flights were one to three minutes apart and follow-
ing Identical route. The first four F-105* (BLUE Plight) and the second flight of four
P-lOSs (GREEN Fllirht) were the only flights to engage hostile aircraft; however the third
?Ug^J iaf vJ.'al^SUhtlng of th. Lcou^ier. Two^RON HAND flights t^J-i;5a) *nd t^elr
supporting MIGCAP flights (F-i^Cs) were within 25 n ml of the target, one flight north and
thS other northwest of the target area. Also ABN/OCI EC-121 aircraft were supporting the
strike mission along with B-66 ECM aircraft. Por the location of theee alreraft, see
Figure 1.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Sixteen P-105s Including BLUE and GREEN Pllghta departed Takhll Air Base for pre-
strike refueling on Orange Anchor track extended N to 20o direct to 22«>N/104O32'E direct
21«U5'N/105''13'E direct target 2I010 •O8"N/105°59 ' 21"E. After crossing Red River and
proceeding on a 135" heading at '4,000 ft, four missiles were observed converging on
BLUE Flight. Missiles were evaded by changing altitude and heading. Plight eontlnuea
through heavy small arms and BSnn fire to vicinity 21013'N/105'>'»8'E where aerial encounter
commeHced. BLUE 3 and * became separated from BLUE 1 and 2 <l'»*'inK "^"ii' n??^^
One to three SAlla were also fired at GREEN Plight a.i they passed 21«>JI9'N/105''13'B. Post-
strike refueling was on Red Anchor.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-IOS BLUE 1. 1
5 - 1000 lb OP bombs
2 - 450 gal tanks
BLUE 2
.4 - 1000 lb QP bombs
1 - camera pod
2 - 450 gal tanks
BLUE 3
d . CBU-24
2 - AIH-9B
2 - 450 gal tanks
Lead aircraft I?P on, TACAN plus doppler. All aircraft eamouflage paint.
P~105 GREEN 1. 3. 4
2 - 3000 lb bombs
1 - 650 gal tank oenterline
QREEN 2
4 - CBU-24
2 - AIM-9B
mO-lT 1. 2. 3, 4
Silver color with Red stars and had afterbumera.
No external ordnanee or tanks.
MQ.17 5 (This aircraft net engaged, visual sighting only)
Silver color
Underwing drop tanks
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS rniOR to ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clear, visibility unlimited
BLUE Plight QREEN Plight
Altitude: 4000 ft AOL > 4^00 ft
Speeo ;
Puel S
480 kt • 480 kt
State : UrJcnown Unknown
Plight Formation
BLUB Plight not clearly determined. They probably started in normal fluid-four
Event 11-23
formation, aircraft lined abreast. 500 to 1500 ft out for wlngmen and 1500-3000 ft betveen
lead anc. No. 3. During missile evasion the elements became ooparated. the exact distance
of Sfsparatlon Is not known.
GREEN Plight formation was fluid four, aircraft abreast, wingraen out 50C-1500 ft.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Missile and MIG warnings were Issued on Guard Channel according to alrhorne QCI
aircraft's log. However, BLUE and GREEN Plights did not receive warnings according to
their reports. BLUE Plight was approaching Initial Point (IP) and had been Jinking to
E^^lf"? senerally heading 135" at 4000 ft with BLUE 3 and H a short dis-
S?? ^ Plight ono to three minutes behind BLUE Plight. Three
I? approached BLUE 1 and 2 from 6 o'clock position, slightly higher than level with
guns firing. BLUE 2 was the first to observe MlCs and called then over the radio. BLUE
lead eonfinaed. Tiise of initial engagement 1611H.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 2 called out MIGs. BLUE one trans[r.itted "Roger nils - clean it up." BLUE 1
and 2 Jettisoned all external stores and broke into the firing MIGs. This is estimated
5f,« f S'^*'^?''' relative MIO positions in their attack formation la not known.
BLUB 3 sighted NXCa attacking BLUE l and 2 and initiated a gun pass. ««»wn.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPNENT
«^ -Tn^"^ ^.*™*o«o'*!I**if '"^» *«*^ * o'clock firing. BLUE 3 closed
on MIGs, got a 90 deflection shot with gun at MIO 2 and observed pieces fly from the left
wing and a puff of smoke. MO 2 broke left, leaving encounter, leveled out and started
'^^t**^^"* toward Phuc Yen airfield. BLUE 3 and U continued after MIQ 2
While BLUE 1 and 2 attempted to gain advantage of MIC 1 and 3 . BLUE 3 set switches for
l*4nc»»e<» 1 at MIG ? U.OOO ft in trail at 3-4000 ft AGL. Missile
J5!;j^*irJ%S*!?4fK^fr""?V?? JPP^"'"'^ guidance. As MIC 2 started turn BLUE 3 launched
l^ll^Lt^'^f ^^\fhi target. Suspected reason for miss was mlsalle g limits
exceeded in turn. BLUE 3 continued attack with gun, observed no hits. MM 2 broke
Sharply for ground causing BLUE 3 to overshoot. BLUE 3 and 4 then continued to target.
BLUE ?^~J^T.5^r the encounter started. OREEN 1 asked BLUE I if he needed any help.
BLUE 1 replied "No, hit the target." As GREEN Plight passed the encounter GREEN 2
SJnn'Jf*2 ^^FL^'"^.^''"'^ ""-178 -going around In circles in a lufberry at 3 to
Jwge" • "^"^ contSuS on to
(Prom this point, the statements and reports are conflicting and confuslmt. All
■iMibers of BLUE Plight are "Missing in Action" or "captured" and were not available for
iSlST following is one logical sequence of events but the timing is not con-
crotely supported by all reports and interviews.)
BLUE 1 and 2's ensuing encounter with MIO 1 and 3 lasted for 13 to 15 minutes.
Maneuvers in "dosflBht" reached from near the surface to 7000 ft and from point of
initial encounter southeast to Phuc Ten airfield, with the majority of encounter in
Ti^lui^H ^ «» l «™* 2- Maneuvers
rRjpr^Srn*:^ H??^ turns- with maximum pcwer and -scissors." During this time
period. GREEN Plight hit fraggea target, probably ahead of BLUE 3 and U. During OREEN
Plight's delivery of ordnance. BLUE 1 requested assistance from both strike and CAP
riignts. GREEN 3 and * came off delivery run and proceeded NW towards foothills north
!?" "^T! \ V^J "potted, engaged in tight turns at 500-1000 ft oler
the terrain at the 6 o'clock position of BLUE I and 2. All aircraft were at low
UJI!''!? ^^y^ 1 and 2 losing out. GREEN 3 and H rolleo in from above the MIOs at
high airspeed, fired gun at MIQ with no results, overshot, and yo-yo'd up to kill off
airspeed and attempted to keep engagement in sight. GREEN 3 and i< lost sight of encounter
in turn reversal at top of yo-yo and proceeded south toward Phuc Yen A? Green 1 JndTl
SSf ordnance delivery. OREEN 2 was hit with ground fire. Since Q-l" orinlnle
ms for flack suppression, and not required, it was dropped on trains in target areas.
Thla caused separation of OREEN 1 and 2 and raquired a period of time for GREEN 1 and 2
to get rejoined and determine extent of damag> to GREEN 2.
t.r-^^'ii^ ?!!J5?HVr? ! ^•J°^"lne' BLUE ? and 4 delivered their ordnance on fragged
target and turned H toward Phuc Yen to answer BLUE I's rail for help. After OREEN 1 and
S??\SS7^°'/i:'* "^^^^ ^^"^ 3 and II proceeded northward. bLue 2 in st«p im t^J
was hit (believed but not confirmed to, be MIO rire). BLUE 2 broke rlKht and stated h« h»d
h!'; ^ ^'Hf* ''"'^ ^" ^^^^'^^ B^"^ 2 alloSlSg blSI ? to gSJ'SeSlnS
MIO 3 and damage horizontal stabilizer of MIc 3 with 20mm. MIQ 3 then broke of f bLUF 2
after aald he had to get out" and ejected at approximately 21-22»M/105o<»U'E. A beeo^r
vaa heard from * parachute soon after BLUE 2'3 ejection. BLtJB I then hit bJ MIO fire
and transmitted that ha waa over Phuc Ten with MIO in tall and hadbeen hit.
OREEN 1 and 2, now rejoined, were directed
2. observing HlOa on BLUB 1. attacked frc
92
llE 1 to his position and OREEN 1 and
ock with gun. QHEEN 1 started
i
i
lir
oi
oi
Oi
a:
Q
fl
a'
I!
a,
a
Event 11-23
firing at 3000 ft range and fired down to 50 ft damaging MIO I'a right wing, MIO I broke
left causing GREEN 1 to overshoot. GREEN 2 with missiles attempted to track and turn with
HIG 1 but was unable to track KIG using 6 gs. MIG 1 departed engagement and enabled BLUE
1 to disengage by use of afterburner descent, outrunning MIG 3,
As BLUE 3 and «l approached Pbuc Yen to aid BLUE 1, MIO U was encountered heading east-
ward. BLUE 3 and 4 rolled In behind MIG ii with BLUE 3 firing as the encounter crossed Phuc
Yen airfield fron East to West at 50O-100O ft. BLUE 3 overshot and MIO 4 broke off and
headed South. N'o nits observed. This encounter was witnessed by GREEN 3 and H as they
crossed Phuc Yen after their pass at MIG 1 and 3 behind BLUE 1 and 2. The North Vlets
were firing 37n.-n at MIG-« and BLUE 3 as they crossed the airfield. BLUE 3 and 4 made another
sweep around Phuc Yen observing a fifth MIG with underwlng drop tanks. This MIG not
engaged as BLUE 3 took a hit from ground fire and was below bingo fuel. GREEN 3 and 4,
encountering heavy flak, egressed area also.
8. ORDNANCE
(He. rired/No. hits)
0LUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
ORESU 1
OREEH 3
MIO 1
MIO ?
MIQ 3 ■
AIH-9B
0/0
0/0
2/0
2 0mn
VI
unk/unk
3/1
1/1
l/l
23/37irjn
yes/yes
yea/no
yea/yea
Reaarka
Hit HIO 3 with one burst ZOmm.
Pilot did not return froa mission, but not
suspected that he fired.
Plred two AIH-9B at NIG 2. First missile did
not guide. Second missile did not hit. Sus-
pected exceeding "g" llsiits.
Hit MIO 2 with 20mm. Plred second 20BBn burst
at MIO 2. No hits observed. Plred 20bui at
NIG i| with no observed hits.
Hit MIO 1 in right wing with 2Qmm.
Plred zona but observed no hits.
Hit BLUE I with cannon fire.
Plred at BLUE 1 and 2., no hits.
Shot dom BLUE 2.
9. EQUIPNeNT PROBLEMS
Malfunctions
BLUE 3
GREEN 1
First SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) headed for ground, no apparent guidance ,
Cunsight grossly out of calibration.
Shortcomings
1. Conanuni cations difficulties lue to rar^e limitations, altitude (poasHble terrain
masking) and single frequency usage by all strike and support aircraft. Neither NIOCAP
aircraft nor strike aircraft heard MIO warnings issued at 1«I28, 1555, l601L on niard
ijJJitloilal aircraft. All aircraft indicated radio equipment fulS
BLUE 1 called KIOCAP for help on strike frequency but MIOCAP did not hear BLUE I's
call and remained unaware of engagement. MIOCAP was 18 ml from sngagenent at altitudes
varying fr« 3000 ft to IM.OOO ft supporting iron hand Plight. Altitude of BLUE Flight
durins engagement varied from 500 ft to 7000 ft. NIGSAP is expected to react immediately
to a eall frcMs strike aircraft and NIUCAP la on the aame frequency as strike alreraf.:.
Frequency extremely crowded during engagement.
2. Inferior maneuverability of the P-105 against MlOa la. again, wall established
by the HIOs being able to make seven passes agalnat BLUB 1 and 2 before aaking a niataka.
Alao GREEN 2 was unable to gee eight on aaneaveritig NIG ualng 6 ga.
93
to. AIRCREW COHHENTS
E»perlence
OREEN 2
Total
Hours
500
P-105
Houra
300
Coatat
HlSBlona
«5
Event 11.23
Alr-to-air exptrlence
P-IOS checkout Nellls.
One dart ni salon » One
AIK-9B firing.
Experlinee unknown
OREEN 3
Connenta on thla Encount er
Radio connunlcationa were all but lapcsalble due to the entire atrike force, ECN»
VIU) WEASEL and Navy OCX aircraft being on the aame UHF frequency. When engaging enemy
aircraft and evading SAN activity the frequency cannot be used effectively (ORE*'^ 3).
There were Indlcatlona of ground control of the MIQs. The entire operation waa
unusual. First, they encountered SAHs, then heavy flak, then the MlOa and i* mqs QREEN
2 'a Impreaalon that thla waa a coordinated effort against the atrike force (uREEN 2).
NIO pilots weren't looking around enough (GREEN 2)«
GREEN I should have got MIG* almost collided with him.
Gun Bhooting to right (QREEN 2).
Reaaon for QREEN 1 making gun attack rather than allowing OREEN 2, who was configured
for alr-to-alr (2 AIM-9B), to make attack unknown. "OREEN 1 did what waa natural,^;
l.e.> GREDI 1 saw NIQ and went after Mm. (GREEN 2).
Comment from Overall Experience
Too many switches to change to set up mlaallea and gun. {GREEN 2).
HIOCAP mlsalona were not useful to strike aircraft. They were uaually toe far away
to be of any help. (OREEN 2)
The importance of having the N-6l cannon for HO eneountera at low level haaaeling
cannot be overemphasised. (GREEN 3)
11. DATA SOURCES
Project' Interviews ; QREEN 2 S Jan 1967
Message s ;
TAP OPREP 3. 1121152 Jul 66 DOCO-0 23171
3S5TFW Aircraft Mishap Report. 0 191157Z; DOC P-66-S0625 Jul 66
TAP Pastel; 2210u7Zi DOCO Pastel 197 Jul 66
7AP Plap Item Report, Z2302'>8Z; DOCO 23316 Jul 66
Other ;
Letter, OREEN 3
Letter, Member of third flight of four P-105*s against target JCS-51
USAP Fighter Weapona Center; Bulletin - 7
12. NARRATIVE OE^CRIPTIOK
aLUE and OREEN Plights Ci F-105S ea) were the first and second flights of four
flights of P-105S fragged to strike JCS target 151 (POL storage 7-8 n ml N Hanoi) on
19 July 1966 at l->3 minute intervals. IRON HAND, MIOCAP, CCI and ECH aircraft were In
target area to support strike. Both BLUE and GREEM Plights had SAHs fired at them
paaaing the northwestern end of Thud Ridge. SAMa were evaded by both flights but
separated the elements of BLUE Plight (lead strike flight). Missile and MIQ warnings
had been issued by airborne OCX but warnings were not received by Strike or MIOCAP
aircraft. At the SE end of Thud Ridge approaching IP, three NIC-178 attacked BLUE 1 and
2 from 6 o'clock slightly high. BLUE 1 and 2 jettisoned ordnance and broke into KIGa
allowing BLUE 3 who was a short distance behind to get a 90<^ deflection shot hitting
HIO 2 who then broke left, leaving engagement, and started u slight climb heading toward
Phuc Ten airfield. BLUE 3 and 4 pursued HIO 2 while BLUE 1 and 2 were engaged in a
15 minute "dogflghtf with MIQ 1 and 3. "Dogfight" consistca of "lufberry," "scissors"
and hard turns with afterburner and ranged in altitude fron surface to 7,000 ft AGL.
OREEN Plight, hearing and observing BLUE 1 and 2's encounter, offered assistance but were
advised to strike tcrget by BLUE Lead 'which they did. BLUE 3 launched two AIH-9B8 at NIO 2,
the first not guiding and the second missed possibly due to exeeedlug g limits. BLUE 3 made
follow.-up gun pass at NIO 2 observing no hits and overahuotlng as Hip 2 broke sharply towards
ground. BLUE 3 and I then proceeded to target and expended ordnance.
HIO 1 and 3 accomplished seven passes at BLUE 2 <rhlle OREEN Plight and BLUE 3 and 1
expended ordnance. BLUE 1 decided he needed help and calle<l for it. MIGCAP did not
receive call, however OREEN Plight responded. OREEN 3 and J came off target and proceeded
NV toward Phuc Yen AP where they observed BLUE 1 and 2 losing engagement. GREEN 3 and <i
made gun firing pass from above the MIG0, observed no hits, overshot with high airspeed,
94
^iiii^iSmjissg^^^ ......
Evtnt IZ-23
' '^1
I I
Ul
yo-yo'd up to reposition j lest sight of encounter antJ proceeded BOuth over Phuc Yen where
they observed BLUE 3 and <i In pursuit of NIC d heading east directly over Phuo Ten at low
altitude receiving 37nini flatc. BLUE 3 Tired gun at KZQ 4, observed no hits and overshot
aa KIO 4 broke south toward Hanoi disengaging.
• At this point BLUE 2, in ateep left turn, was hit (probably by MIG flra but not
confirmed). BLUE 2 broke right causing MIO 3 to overshoot and roll back in allowing
BLUE 1 to position behind KIG and hit horizontal stablllier of MIO 3 with 20mm, MIO 3
broke off BLUE 2 and got. behind BLUE 1 along with MIG 1. BLUE 2 called he was heading
out 2*0* and soon stated he had to get out. A parachute beeper was heard shortly there-
after. BLUE 1 was then hit oy MIG 1 and called "over Phuc Yen with MIO In trail and have .
baen hit."
GREEN 1 and 2, after some delay a.nd difficulty rejoining off target, were vectored
to BLUE I's position by BLUE 1. GREEU I, observing BLUE I' 8 |»redlcanent , elected to sake
gun pass rather than utilise his winginan's (GREEN 2) SIDEWINDERS. GREEN 1 opened fire at
MIO 1 at 3000 ft and fired d«.»wn to 50 ♦ nearly colliding with MIO 1 but getting hits In
right wing of MIG and causlrg MIC 1 to break off BLUE I- This enabled BLUE 1 to die-
erjage by nosing down, lighting A/B and outrunning MIO 3. GREEN 2, out of position when
GREEN 1 initiated pass, attfapted to position behind. MIC 3 ior_AIM-9B shot but waa unabie
to get into missile envelope due to high g (+6 gs). GREEN 1 and 2 overshot tiielr passes,
lost sight of MIGs, rejoined, and straffed trucks in area of enoounter. Heason fuel and
amunltlon not used for KESCAP unknown.
BLUE 3 and k meanwhile made another sweep around Phuc Yen airfield and observed a
fifth Mlu, configured with drop tanks. In turn over eaat end of runwaya. This MIO not
engaged as BLUE 3 received iilt from flak and egressed area. GREEN 3 and « also encounter ')d
heavy flak and egressed area. GREEN 3 and <i also encountering heavy flak over Phuc Yen
egressed area westward.
HLUE 1, 3 and 4 and all of GREEN Flight recovered safely. BLUE 2 was not recovered.
The third flight struck the target and sighted the encounter but took no active part.
The fourth flight also hit the target.
The NIC warnings issued by the F.C-121 Ethan Bravo were broadcast on guard frsquancy
1203.0) at l'i28H, 1555H, Lnd l60i»H, The MICCAP aircraft did not hear these MIO calla
although their radio equipment was operational. Their flight altitudes varied from 3tOOO
to lb, 000 feet ao the CAP flights could have been too low to receive UHP tranamlaslon.
This could also explain the failure of BLUE Plight to receive the MIQ warnings.
The HIOCAP waa called on- atrlke frequency (277.2) by BLUE 1 but neither flight heard
It, although they were close enough earlier to observe the SAN firings. BLUE 2 is listed
as alsalng.
I
I
1
i
• • • •
HEO BAROW EVEWT 1I-Z3 SUHHARY
Time
Mirk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 3. 4)
Other Friendly
CoMMunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
(HI6 1.2)
Renarks
Status
Action
BLUE Fllaht
480 kt. 4.000 ft
13S<> heading-
Jinking tc> avoid
flak BLUE 3 14
short distance
behind 81 A 2
82 calls HIGs. 81
confirais. 81 A 2
jettison stores and
break Into HIGs
GREEN Flight
1-3 Din. behind
BLUE Flight.
GREEN Flight
500 kt. 4.500 ft
goes to full «1l
power
82 calls HIGs.
ei "Roger - HIGs -
Clean ft up'
NIG 1, 2 A 3
6 o'clock slightly
high, firing on
81 A 2
IRON KANO. MIG-
CAP, ECH 8-66,
ABN/GCI on station
Supporting strike
HIG warnings trans-
altted but not
received by Strike
or NIGCAP aircraft
83 A 4 separated
from 81 A 2 due to
evading SAHs fired
at then earlier
h
B3 got 90* deflection
shot Mith oun hitting
N2 in left wing
GREEN night
closing on BLUE
Flight
H2 breaks left
when hit, leaving
encounter and
starts slight
climb toward Phuc
Ven. H1 A 3
continue 6 o'clock
B1 A 2
Pieces fly from
M2 left Ming with
a puff of smoke.
HtGs silver In
star markings and
equipped with
afterburners .
HIGs had no ex-
ternal stores
or ordnance.
83 & < 3-4,000 ft
Bl A 2 Altitude
and A/S varying
B3 & 4 behind H?
4,000 ft
83 launches AIN-9B at
K2 - No guidance
B1, 2 engaged In
lufberry and scissors
with HI, 3
GPt:ei night.
passing 81 & 2
Engagement, con-
tinues to target.
G2 sees B1 A 2
and HIGs
82 sees 81 A 2
and NIGs
GREEN 1 asks
BLUE 1 If he needs
help.
81 ^Negative -
Hit the target"
HI . 3 overshoot
and reposition
H2 wings level ,
slight climb
AIM-9B headed for
ground after
launch
1
1
83 launched second
A1H-9B at N2 turning
left. No hit
81 , 2 In lufberry
with HI, 3
GREEN Flight
accelerating
for pop-up
M2 starts left
turn causing
nissllc to niss
Second A1N-9B
miss possibly
due to exceeding
g Units
RED BAROW tVEWT 1 1-23 SUHMART
TUe
N«rk
Action Alrcrcft (BlUE 1. 3. 4)
Comauni cat Ions
Eneny Actions
(HI6 1,2)
Renarks
Status
Action
Other Friendly
T4
B1 I 2 altltadt froi
surface to 7*000 ft
In dogfight
B3 nade follow-up gun
pass at M2 '
No hits observed -
overshot
B3 i 4 head for target
&1 i 2 continued
engagcaent with N1, 3.
GREEN Flight -
pop up and deliver
ordnance.
Haxlnua Alt 12 -
IS, 000 ft ab^ve
ground
H2 broke sharply
B3 to overshoot.
H2 heads south
disengaging
Target 7-8 n ml
SOUvn rrluC T€n
Airfield
G2 went nisslles
air on weapon
select; search
and attack on radar
for sight, selected
outboard stations.
(Earlier checks had
obtained good
grounds on the
aiisslles)
63. 4 cllnblng
63. 4 off tareet, heed
for Phuc Yen to eitlst
61. 2
61 6 2 losing engage-
■ent
62 dalivers CBU
on trains In
taroet area.
61 A 2 separated
63 A 4 deliver
ordnance on '
target
Bl cells for
assistance
HIS CAP does not
hear Bl request
for help
HI A 3 Mile a
total of seven
passes at Bl A 3
during 15 nin
engagcfaent
Haneuvers In .dog
fight "lofberry*
"scissors" and
hard turns
T.
s
63 1 4 nake gun pass at
HI 6 3 behind 61 t 2.
63 t 4 overshoot and
yo-yo up lossing :1ght
of engafienent and head
south. No hits on
Ml 4 3 observed
B3 A 4 off target,
heed for' Phuc Yen
SI A 2 trying ta
rejoin
61 end G2 teU
Mblle trying to
Join up
ni a J aaintaining
advantage behind
Bl A 2
1 »,
B2 hit (probably by H3)
breaks right hard
causing M3 to overshoot
81 gets behind N3 and
hits N3 horizontal
stebUlser Mith 20n
61 A 2 rejoined
heed toward Phuc
Yen
B3 1 4 spot H4
heading east
approaching Phuc
Yen
62 calls he has
been hit "An head-
ing out 240o"
Bl A 61 talking to
establish contact
N3 ovfrshoots B2
and rolls beck in
on B2 allowing 61
to get In position
at 6 o'clock M3
»
BED BARON EVENT Il«23 SUHHj^Rr
Tin*
K«rk
Action l^lrcraft (BLUE 1, 3, 4)
Stittil
Action
Othtr Fritndly
Connunlcittons
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1,2)
Rtatrkt
83 ft 4 500 - 1.000
ft
B3 I 4 behind M firing
htading east - no hitt
observed - overshot
B1 1i hit by Ml't ftrt
63 i 4 observe
83 ft 4 In trail
with N4 over PhHC
Yen
82 calls ho has to
get out
B1 calls over Phuc
Yen, NI6t In trail
and havt been hit
H4 breaks and heads
south
N3 breaks off 82
and gets behind B1
HI hits B1 tflth
cannon
G1 ft 2 1S»000 ft
350-400 kt
In left hand torn
B1 trying
Ml 1 S
to tvado
61 Makes gun past at
Ml
62 trying to got on SI
wf ng
61 ft 2 approaching
engagenent
Fuel state 6000
lb
83 ft 4 nake sweep
of Phuc Yen after
breaking off M
63 ft 4 encounter
heavy flak over
Phuc Yen and
egress area
81 vectors 61 ft 2
to his position
62 sights Ml ft 3
calls
61 and continues
calling NI6
positions
61 does not answer
HI ft 3 In one nlle
trail with B1 : Ml6s
In left tarn at
3000 ft. HI6S at
cruise speed
82 ejocts
10
83 ft 4 fuel below
Bingo
61 hits Ml In rt wing
and overshoots
62 tries to turn Mith
Ml for nlsslle shot but
cannot get In
alsslle envelope (-*^6g)
81 lowers nose and
lights afterburner
83 hit by ground
fire
83 ft 4 stert to
egress
HI breaks hard left
causing 61 to over-
shoot
HI disengages and
departs
M3 trying to catch
62 looses his
position In the
turn, has to use
A/8 to catch up
since gets
separated by 2 at
G2 configured
with AIH-9BS set
up switches for
missiles but 61
kept lead, electing
a gun pass rather
than using 62
nissi les
63 or 64 has fuel
Malfunction
Parachute beeper
heard after B2
ejection
61 opens fire with
gun at 3.000 ft and
ceased fire at
approx 50 ft alnost
colliding with Ml.
61 gun sight
grossly out of
calibration.
6unshootlng to the
right.
d CP'
RED BAROW EVEHT II-?3 summjcv
Tine
H«rk
Action Atr cnft (BLUE 1. 3, 4)
Status
n
Action
Bt outruns H3 disengag.
Ing and egresses area
Other Friendly
83 A 4 spot NS
In turn over east
end of runway of
Phuc Yen biit do
not attempt to
engage
Gl « 2 lose sight
of HIGs so rejoin
and strafe trucks
In area of engage-
■ent prior to
eg resslBfl
Connuntcatlons
Cneny Actions
(H16 1.2)
M3 cannot catch 61
H5 over east end
Phuc Yen does not
try to engage
Remarks
MS had under wing
drop tanks
No attempt at
RESCAP Indicated
Reason for no
RESCAP unknown
l£2
\
1,
Event H-2«
Aircraft Involv«d: Pour P-lOSa »■ two MI0-178f
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Unknoim
PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTUAL SITUATION
Date/Time: July 66/unknown
■JS"5hJ;/i!I; " "PPO*"* «f aircraft in
the Phu Tho/Viet Trl area.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Unknown
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105 Bl. 2. ^. a
1 " Guns (Pull . 1,029 rounds) 20aa
WIG-IT MIQ 1, 2
Quna
4. FLIGHT COKOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: 3,500 ft broken
Altitude:
rieading T
Speed:
1-5,000 feet
2ii0»
540 kt
Unknoim
Speed ;
1*1161 State ;
Plight Pormation ; Unknoim
5. INITIAL DETECTION
i.t i:hS^SJ?4^iJ?^\''*? heading 24o' at 5*0 kt between 4 to 5.000 ft .when B4 aaw two MI0-l7a
at the flight's 6 o'clock poaltlon and flflnr. « nxu *i»
C. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight broke hard left and selected afterburner.
J. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
None, no encounter.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4
MIQ 1. 2
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Unknown
10. AIRCREM COMMENTS
Bjtperlence
Unknown.
Commenta on this Encounter
None
CoBmentafron Overall Eaaerlenee
None
Quna
No rounds fired
Unknown rounds fired
Remarka
MIOs did not hit any aircraft
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
B3
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
ch« ^^^^ ^^iP**' outbound after making a run on a SAM site at 4-5.000 ft. headlne 240*
T ""-^^2 ^ "'•^"S- called f5r a left KJak?' IHe'
?iiSS ^rKS^J af'^^^^i^rner and went into a hard left tarn and descended under the broken
iSJr ^^^^ disengaged in the turn and headed back for
Hanoi- BLUE Plight then cor.tinued on with the aiaalon and returned safely to home station.
lOT
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105= vs two "bogpya'
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*30 •M/105'35'E
1. PRlMARt HISSION AHO TACTICAL SITOATIOM
Date/Time: 20 July 66/03i>0H
BLUE Plifsht (four F-lCi5s) from TaSthll enroute to target In Package VI-A
4. FtlGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ERCOUNTER
Weather unknown
Altitude;
BLUE Flight
ft, 000 ft .
130*
540 rrAS
Unknown
Heading ;
Speed ;
Fuel State ;
Plight Porinatlon : Unknown
5.
IKITIAL OtTECTlOM ^
BLUE Plight indistinctly spotted bogeva at 3 o'clock slightly high, heading 270 .
3 mllea away.
6. ACTION INITIATED
The two bogeys turned to approximately 060* and launched two a^^^-^O'? "i"^^"*
BLUE Flight turned into the attack and the nlaalles approached from 2 ®
clocit and pas3ed behind BLUE Flight without detonating. The mla a Ilea were co
match BLUE Flight's turn. The launching aircraft rcsalned about 3 mies away, than
broke off the attack and were loat vlaually.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Plight turned on course and proceeded to their target.
8. ORDNANCE
Mo. Flred/tlo. Hlta
AA Missiles
. 2/0
Remarka
Passed behind BLUE Flight
RED Flight
U. DATA SOURCES
7AF 200855Z July 66 DOCO-0 2320i,
7AP 2011<t5Z July 66 [)0C0-0 23209
USAP Plghter V/eapons Center Bulletin 7
U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Flight enroute to target at ^000 ft. 510 kt TAS attacked by two MlOa (type un-
known) from a distance of approximately three miles at 3 o'clock. '1^8^*1^/18^ .J^'
Siarflred two alr-to-alr missiles from 3 o'clock. The missiles passed aft of BLUE
K?Jht it an unknown distance. The launching aircraft remained about three miles away,
"ik"o?f ?Se at?acJ and were lost visually. BLUE Plight turned back on course and
proceeded to target .
« y Event 11-28
9
fl
I'i
I'!
El
fl
[1
3
CI
El
0
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s V8 otM 1110-21 .
Results: Mo deoiag<;
■ Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'SZ'M/lOS'lZ^E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AMD TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: ?0 July 1966/1H46H
Pour P-1058 (BLUE flight) in Route Packaec VI-A for tombing mission against Thai
Nguyen POL depot (TOT HSOH).
2. MISSION ROUTE
Unknown .
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
BLUE Plight equipped with external tanks and an unknown number and type of bombs,
MIC was observed to have no external stores or missiles.
4. FLI6HT CONDITION PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
BLUE Flight
Altitude : 8,000 ft
Hewdi. - 100 degrees
Speed :" 050 kt
Fuel State : Pull Internal and some in the tanks
Fllf-'.ht Formation : Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
PU'E 3 called a bogey approaching at 9 o»elock, 1-1/2 to 2 miles out, 6,000 ft above.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight jettisoned fuel tanks, broke left Into the bogey. It was imwedlately
recoenlied as a MIG-21 by delta ^ing and :ack of camouflac* paint (it was silver). BUJEi
3 and H went high hoping to bo« In the MIG, but the MIC executed tight turn
unknown) and escaped to the south. The Mio closed to 6.000 to 8.000 ft from the flight.
The distance was never elnsed during the turn.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT
After the MIO escaped, BLUE flight continued on to the target and dropped their bombs
on the target.
8. ORDNANCE
None expended.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Hone
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience : Unknown except that this was BLUE I's first MIO encounter.
Cownents on this encounter : BLUE 1 commented that MIOs would usually depart anytime
you Jettisoned ordnance or tanks — he assumed he had acoompllahed his mission and departed
rather than actually engage.
n . DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUE 1-5 Jan 1967
Messages. Reports, etc ;
7AP DOCO-0 23226 201328Z July 66
388TPW OPREP-4 Plnnacle/6lO 20 July 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight was Inbound to a Package VI-A target when BLUE 3 called out a hogey 1-1/2
to 2 miles at 9 o'clock. BLUE flight Jettisoned tanks - retaining bombs - and vurr.ed
toward the bogey. The bogey, a clean MIG-21, executed a tight turn and accelerated and
escaped in the haie * -adlng south. BLUE flight turned with the MIO until they were headed
down the Red River. he flight then proceeded to attack the target.
ThrHIQ was LctUially in a position to launch a missile if he had oarrled cm.
E»ent 11-29
Aircraft Involved: Poup F-lOgs vs one flIG-21-
Result: Two sightings
Vicinity or Encounters: Zi^SCN/lOii^lS 'E
21°50»:i/10ii''<5'E
1. PRIMARY KISSIOM AND TACTICAl SITUATION
Date/Time: 20 July 1966/1602H, 1610H
S. INITIAL DETECTION
vest S"5.!Hf?*«i'"*"' P-lOSs) at 12.000 ft and Sl'sO'N/lo^'lS'E, approxlnately 35 miles
U 5,.^*^ observed a probable NIC.21 aircraft. The time was 1602H. The MIO «s
at 15,000 ft or higher heading southwest in th« vicinity of 21*40 •N/lolnS'S.
8. ACTION iNITIAfEO
Plight continued on eilssion.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
At -ii^af L^?0'E;/i21i'5?"f%"i^?^?['S;?^"^?'*- .^^"^ f"**"^ continued on the mission.
Th« MTq J^* 1 ^hf -3 i^'^^o?^"^ Fiight again observed a single probable MlG-21
Mst J?i^Jt ni-i-?"''? 21 5O'N/lO5^O0'E. altitude U.OOO ft anS sUr.blng. heading
n. DATA SOURCr
7AF DO! 3001(1 2023592 July 1966.
/
Event 11-30
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs three NI0-17k
^^^Result: Slchtlng only
if^^^Kf^ity of Encounter: 20*«0* N/104* 50 *E
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SlTUATlSf
Date/Time: 22 July 1966/1630H
«#. Plight was on a strike mission. They had delivered their ordnance on e
Of opportunity (unable to hit primary target dJe to weather) anS wr! eSSSJe So hJ^JLe
2. MISSION ROUTE
lO^^SO'"* *° unkno*n. Plight was returning from target and was at^20'*0»»/
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
tl»e Srwo"J?JiS?Jngf ^^"^ unknown. Flight wa. carrying external fuel tanks at
craft"*eLiLf?LL*'«? fi*'-«o-«i'-^rocket8 cr mlssilea. MIO 3 had no radome on nose of air-
craft . camouflaged on top (dark brown sandy color) and white on the bottoa.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER*
ra^S^opa^JboSS^HoSS^a? .e.tt.r«l to
mtHde Air Soeed Heading
BLUE 17.000 ft HOO kt about 200"
KIGa about 17.000 ft above HOO kt about 200"
Plliiht Pomatlon : '
5. IHITIAL DETECTION
BLUE ft called bogeys out at 5 o'clock about 4-5 olios out.
6. ACTION INITIATED
and lo.'r,igS?'i?%Jrbogey:?-' * '^"e>»* • cloud
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
l.ft. BLUE • thougS? o5??tSn!; afS^i'.!; , •"J'"",?"! """"^ aescndlnj to th.
tj. Cloud, h. ../„ioi ;t:=.°;;;r^^''aorfrJ.''?? . ;oS.''"SSe rh»i «? sssi'h^Jnj'
8. ORONANCE
BtWB 4 - approx. 60 to 180 rounds of 20imn cannon. — no hits
WO 2 - 2 alr-to-alr missiles > — dldn»t guide; no hits
igstlfluited to be AA.2/A by 7th Air Force - DIO 0055
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None mentioned.
Sv«nt 11-30
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Eytjerlence !
Total
105
Combat
Hours
Hours
Missions
BLUE 1
5000
200
20
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
UnknoMn—
BLUE 4
3800
650
ConnffntB
on this Eneouncep:
BLUE 1 - 11500 hours Jst time,
No forul gunnery school.
Korea experience. F-80» P-86, B-52» B-47.
BLUE 4 * Thirteen years In Jet. r-80, T'.33» P-84. F-100.
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : Interview with BLUE 1—1 Feb 67, and with BLUE 1—5 Feb 67.
Wessaeea^ Reports :
230825Z, TAP, DOCO 23352, July 1966
22153OZ. 7AF, DOCO 23353, July 1966
222236Z, TAP, DIO 0055, July I966
USAP Fighter Weapons Center Bulletin 7.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOR
BLUB Flight was returning fron a strike nlsalon on a secondary target. The primary
target was not hit due to weather. The flight was at 17,000 ft, .85 Mach, heading 3W when
BLUE «J saw two bogeys at 5 o'clock. The bogeys seemed to be following the flight, BLUE *
notified the flight. BLUE Flight went around a cloud (there were cumulus buildups to above
23*000 ft), and the bogeys followed. BLUE 4 now saw three bogeys and identified them as
NIQb. blue Lead called for a gentle left turn to keep the KlGs in sight and BLUE Flight
dropped tanks and went to AB. MIQs 1 and 2 then fired two alr-to-alr rockets or mlaailea
at BLUE 1 and 2. Missiles probably were Soviet AA-2 or 2A type of olaslles fired at a bad
angle and near clouds and thus failed to guide. (Reference: 7th AF OIOD) BLUE 4 called
the missiles and BLUE Plight broke left and down to a cloud bank. BLUE <t had spread out
slightly to keep the NIOs in sight. Aa BLUE 4 entered the elcuds he felt he was overtaking
BLUE 1, 2 and 3 ao he pulled up out of the clouds. Aa he came out of the clouds, MIO 3
appeared at 11 6* clock and passed under BLUE 4. BLUB 4 fired approximately 65'loO rounds
or 20fflm cannon but missed. The HIQ entered the clouds and was not seen again. BLUE Flight
•sited the area. No damage.
ETent 11-31
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105* v« two possible *'
Result: Ko Danaee
Vicinity of EneouPtert 20'20*N/IO3*3O<E
1. PRIHARY KISSION AttO TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlme: 25 July 1966/X020H
Pour F>105s (Blue Pllsht) from Takhll were on a strike mission.
11. DATA SOURCE
355Trrf 2505'»52 Jul 1966
12. NARRATIVE
Blue Flight was e^resoing from a strike when they received alr-to-alr vector signals
from 9 o'clock. They s&h two bogeys two miles awcy . The bogeys began a pursuit curve
and Blue Fli^t broke tov;ards the bogeys and Jettisoned external tanks* then reversed and
dlsenc:ared to the south.
Evvnt 11-32
olved: Pour F-105a vs two mo-lTB
Resui^^9Vl p-105 daiaaged
1 KIO-17 danaeed
1 KZO-17 posalble damage
Vicinity or Enqounter: 21"il9*IlA04"42*E
1. PRIMARY NtSSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dat^/Tiine; 12 August I966/IO88H
GREEN (4 P-I05a) and BLUE (3 P-105s} rUghts had eonvleted their prloary atrlln
alaalon against the La Danh POL storage area and were egresslng as separate flighta
northwest of Thud RldRt when GPIEEN 1 was hit by ground fire and ejected. GREEN 2 Jetti-
soned his external tanks to RESCAP GREEN 1. The remaining members of OREEN and SLUE
Plights continued egress for RESCAP refueling and returned to relieve QREEN 2 who then
departed for home with BLUE 3 aa an eaeort.
2. HISSION ROUTE
GREEN Plight departed Takhli AB, Thailand, refueled, and then proceeded on a north-
easterly heading to the target ar«a (La Oanh storage area). After Btrikin^ the target
GREEN Plight proceeded northwest oi' Thud Ridge to approximately 21°'(9'N/10>)°42*E where
GREEN I was downed, thence to the refueling area and back to this location.) BLUE Plight
essentially followed this same route approximately 5 minutes behind OREEN Flight, Joining
with GREEN 3 and 4 during RESCAP refueling.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-105 BLOE 1. 2. 3
2 - 2000 lb or 3 000 lb bOBba*
1 - Centerline tank
1 - N-61 Oatling Oun, 20am (1029 rounds)
P-105 GREEN 1. 2. 3. H
2 - CBU-Zft*
1 - Centerline tank
1 - N-61 Oatling gun, 20Dm (1029 rounds)
MIQ-17 MIQ 1, 2
1 - Qun (23nmi), clean wings
No camouflage, dull silvtr color. Rod 3tar on wing.
4. FLIfiHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Broken to scattered building cumulus. Bottoma at 3000 ft and tope at
IJ75?nPl5»il00 ft.
QREEN 3. 4 BLUB 1^ 2
Altitude : 5000 ft 10.000-1$, 000 ft
Heading ; Left Turn Left Turn
Air Speed ; 300-350 KCAS Unknown
Puel State ; Blngo Uttknown
Plight Formation ! BLUE 1, 2 about 3-5 n mi behind OREEN 3* 4.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Flight waa in a left bank when they sighted 2 Kia-17s at 11-12 o'clock, ranc»
of 2 n ml. trailing OREEN 3 end 4 in attgek position.
«. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 warned GREEN Plight of KIOs and after QREEN 3 confirmed preaance of MlOa
behind him at a range of about 1500 ft, QREEN 3 and 4 droppod tanks and beaded for tho
deck in afterburner. BLUE 1 and 2 turned Into tho attaek with BLUB 1 dropping tanks and
2 keeping his tanks.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPNENT
OREEN 3 and 4 split left and rl0tt, rospeetlvely . Then OREEN 4 turned on NIG 1 iriio
was behind GREEN 3. GREEN 4, however, received some hits from HIO 2, yet waa able to
continue attack of MIO 1. Neanwhile, BLUE 2 was closing in on MIO 2 and when he fired
KIO 2 broke sharply left into clouds, which previously OREEN 3 had done. BLUE 2 does not
know if he hit MI3 2. Meanwhile BLUE 1 was after HIO 1 who had aomahow gotten off of
OREEN 4 '8 tail and both of them (NIQ 1 and BLUE 1) when Into elouda as obsonrod by BLUE 2
^Dropped on target prior to fdO ongagement.
«i
Event IZ-32
8. ORONAllCe
BLUE 1
BLUE 2 .
GREEK 3
GREEN 0
NIO 1
NIO 2
Ho. PlredAo. Klta
1/1 (damaee)
1/0
0/0
1/1 (possible damaee)
Bewarka
Plred 157-507 rounda
Plred 700-750 rounda
Plred 580 rounds
Unknown no. of rounda fired
1/1 (danaged C4)
9. EQUIPRERT PROBUNS
BLUB 1, 2: Oun oaawrt film oane out black (apparently unespoaed)
10. ikIRCREH GOHNERTS
SEA Combat Mlsalona
Unknown
Unknown
Approx. 60
Unknown
Experience Total Houra P_-105 Houra
KiUE 1 Unknown Unknown
l-^^^ Unknown Unknown
OlfflBI 3 Over 5,000 Approx. 400
OWSBH I Ohknown Unknown
Ceaaenta on this Encounter ;
BI.UE 2: Unable to track KIO In turn. iStlll had external tanka).
Meed more maneuverability to esq>loy guna, uae of alaallea
rsqulree lesa positioning.
general Conments
BLUB 2: SIDEWINDERS carried at tinea were in poor condition (i.e..
scratched or pitted heads, etc.) ■
the training received did not Include sufficient live firing
experience but relied too heavily on simulation.
He felt the concept of alr>to-«lr nlaalles was good but should
be backed up with a good gun.
the mrnlng equlpaent carried on-board la good but falae alarna
(or Mfelgultlaa) should be eliminated. «i«"wi
TWO men are not a neoeaaity for type of nlaaion flown.
11. DATA SOUrtCES
Project In tervlewa ; BLUE 2 (16 Mar I967) and QREEN 3 (8 Nar 1967)
TXP 12 175*2 August 1966, 0000-24192, SECRET
7AP 12 2300Z August 1966. DOCO-24207, CONPIMNTIAL
12. RAftiUTIve DESCRIPTION
ORBEir Plight dropped ordnance on target as aeheduled. On the way home, fllaht
Observed truck traffic and proceeded to attack. QREBM 3 thought he wL hit by gJound
<^«P^''**d area as a preeaution aSS headlrfS a taS??^
OREEN 1 waa hit by ground fire on a subaequent paaa and waa forced to eJeet OffiEM 2
llZlr. " JetUaonild hia centerllJS tSk ao u to Siv In arei
V*^ ■eantlme, BLUE Plight, which was about five minutes behind GREEN Plight, had
iiLf5L**'P*' 0*^" i do'^- BI-UE Plight co: Slated of 3
S'^i!^*" J*"^*?"? ftlr-aborted prior to hitting the target. BLUE Plight proSeeSed
SJjSr-ffKlJjSSi ^''•y *^*"»"e for RESCAP If needed. BLUE^ 2
J?S*f»«^ 3 « returned for RESCAP and OREEN 2 and BLUE 3 were sent home.
BLUE 1 and 2 were flying at high altitude (10-15.000 ft) while GREEN 3 and 4 were fSing
at low altitude (approx 5.000 ft) looking for the downed pilot. * ^ nying
, ^^M™ ' ^" * 1 (L) sighted 2 MlOa on the tall of OREEN
3 end 4. BLUE 1 called the Information to OREEN 3 who at flrat thought th! MM wJe hla
wlngman. Upon verification GREEK 3 mw that they had 2 MIGs at 6 o ■fjloek at a ranle of
•pprcxlmately 1500 ft. GREEN 3 and 4 Jettisoned external stores, lit the StJrbSJSr and
!?r«£2S«*?*^'***^''i down to approximately 700 ft altitude. GREEN 3 turned left
5?nJ?5I «*versed and got on the tall of MIG 1 chaalng OREEN 3. and
thinks he hit MO I with cannon fire. , MIQ l waa firing at GREEN 3 but scored no hits as
the NIC '8 cannon fire went over the top of both wings. GREEN 3 waa able to duck into a
cloud and loot contact with the MlOs and the other P-105a. NIO 2. behind GREEN * wae
firing at GREEN 4 and hit him on the top of the left wing with caAnon fire but OREEM ! waa
able to continue. Reanwhlle, BLUE 1 and 2 closed on the two MICs who were stlll^warl
?^!?5'.S""r2?A ^^^'-^ \ jettisoned his tank but in the excltemenral^a did nSJ? SE5e
X and 2 Chased RIO 1 and 2 with a left descending turn, and in doing so BLUE 1 was sand-
SS*?.??*r "^2 ^ ?"J ^' ^ get into Attack posuJSn on «0 2 e^l clAU
BLUB 1(L) to break out due to MIC 2 on hla tall. Still in a deacendlng left turn. BLUE 2
approached firing position on MIO 2 when the MIG turned harti and reallj' out-tuJJSd BLUE I.
E-ii
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tl
I
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1
1
I
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I
11
I
i
Event 11-32
BLUE 2 fired approximately 700 to 7^0 rounds but th-sre was no Indication of a hit. BLUE 2
BLUE 2 broke off and up to -the rl^ht to get on top to be able to pick up HlOa a«:ain;
th- «?rl!\L^l!!«b!5 i!?/^^'! ^^"^ ^ reported that he thought he had hit a MIO and that
Lfi^'^K*'*'^ 1 2 rejoined and both refueled
Ull^ll SriuS eft^Jn^r??"' ^° ^o"**' "»<^"« service ^as postponed to the
IS ? Tu^"" unusable alnce they either were not exposed or under-
expoffJd to an extent that they could not be Interpreted.
f L*nJ«lL^°J"^'* °" returned hone, low on fuel. They had
«o recover at Udorn since no tankrrs were available to them.
I
I
i
I
Event 11-33
Aircraft Involved: Two P-1050e v« one MM-IT
■ Result: No danaee
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»10'H/105»5*'B
I. PRIMRT mSSIOII AHO TACTICAL StTUATIOR
Date/n»e! 17 August 1966/1516H
Tub P-105D8 from Korst (BLUE 1 and 2) were to attack JCS 51 » an oil depot north of
Hanoi? BLijE nnd^ al? aborted because one of the aircraft had radio problems and the
other escorted him back to base.
2* KISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight refueled over the Oulf . they then P«"««>«* "S***!***!* •SJl^
of Hanoi, turned north, passed Hanoi to the wist «PP«;<»*°»>«J ^^e target In a JJJtJJJ'*
heading. The bomb run on the target was made from the South (I.e., a northerly headingj.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1 and 2
2 - iJ50-gal wing tanks
6 - 750 lb bombs (centerllne MER)
1 - M-61 Catling gun, ZOmm (1,029 rounds)
BLUE 1 had ECM vector equipment (to provide SAM warning)
MQ-ITA
Quns
SllTor In color with Red Chinese markings
FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clear with 5 miles visibility with slight base. Thunderstorms over the
mountains .
BLUE 1 BLQg 2
Altitude : 3.000 ft AOL J^Jnown
P u el S tate ; Oaing Internal, but had B»tepnal tanks only .
fuel in wing tanks
Heading ; 090* 0*5«
Plight gorniation : BLUE 2 behind and to the right of BLOB 1.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
As BLUE 1 was pulling off target on heading of 090* , BLUE 2 caUed a MXG-IT eloain*
on BLUE 1 from his 7 o'clock position at 5.000 ft.
6. ACTION INITIATED
HIO was closing rapidly, firing at BLOB I. BLOB X fop deck and both BLUB 1 and
2 jettisoned tanks and went afterburner.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 accelerated away from MIO who continued to flro at BLOE 1. BLOB 2 got into
the MIOs 6 o'clock position and closed range. He fired at the HIO but
detected. BLOB 2 overtook HIO who was flying stralcht and level and barrol-pollod 200
foot over KIQ and flew straight ahead.
8. ORDNANCE
Ho. fired Ao. Hlta Remarka
••t» 2 1/0 Bspended approximately TS -
• rounds
1/0 NO hits moordod*
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLENS
BLUE. 2! Could not got his sight on. Bad to use center of wind screen for sight. Ifaa
mooting low.
US
Bvent 11-33
10. AIRCR!:W COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
P-105
Houra
Combat
Hlsalona
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
1500
Onknoim
«50
87
Comments en the gneounter t
BLUE 2: Everything happened so fast he didn't have time to set up for a gun pus.
If they had had a fll^t of 4 they could have sandvlehed the NIO and perhaps gotten bla.
NIQ did not have any alr-to-alr missiles. Believes NIG orbited target area and attacked
froa a high altitude to catch P*105 by surprise.
Comments frotn Overall Experience ;
BLUE 2; Felt he had Insufficient quantity of training for alr-to-alr type engagements.
Thought NIG-17 Mas not a threat to F-105 due to the hl^ speed on the deolc of the P-IOS.
F-105 needs a better gun sight. Would like to have AIH-9 faired Into the wine tips such
as the F-104. Didn't like the fact that tre radar didn't trork close to the ground beoause
of the ground clutter. Considers BIO EYE Is a waste of time for MIG tramings.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interylewa t BLUE 2, 5 January 1967
Messages ^ Reporta :
7AP DOCO 2 tit 03 August 1966, SECHBI.
Fighter Weapons Bulletin 7
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOfI
Tvo F-1058 (BLUE 1, 2) were on a strike mission to hit the Nguyen Khe POL storage
area. Enroute to the target* the aircraft refueled over the Oulf. Shortly before reaoh-
Ing the target after BLUE 1, BLUE 2 started to pull-up, BLUE I received a r*M warning on
his vector gear. BLUE 1 descended to S,QOO feet. Jinking to look for the SAM. When none
was sighted* BLUE 1 pulled up again to 12,000 feet and rolled in on the target to drop
six 750-pound bombs. BLUE 2 was behind and to the right of BLUE 1. As BLUE 1 pulled off
the target on a heading of 90". altitude 3*000 feet, BLUE 2 sighted a KIU-17A (HIG 1)
closing on BLUE 1 at his 7 o'clock position and at about 5*000 feet AOL. BLUE 2 at this
time was in the bomb delivery phase. BLUE 2 delivered his ordnance and during pullup saM
MIG I closing on BLUE 1 and firing as evidenced by seeing a flame of the small gun In the
MIO's nose and a cannon going off and sheila bursting. BLUE 1 and MIG were both In a
alight left hand turn. BLUE 2 called BLUE I to "break - you have a MIG closing". BLUE 1
and 2 went to after burner and Jettisoned tanks. BLUE 1 headed for the ground, maintained
4.5 g's and 400 kt in a left turn. MIO 1 outturned BLUE 1 and continued to close. The
MID fired when reaching range of 4000 feet and continued until the range closed to 1500
feet. BLUE 1 dove to approximately 5 ft AOL, so low he had to pull up to avoid rice paddy
dikes. MIO continued firing all the way. BLUE 1 finally separated at Maoh 1.2.
Estimated speed of NIG was 560 kt.
In the meantime BLUE 2 started to chase the MIO and set up his weapons by setting
the weapon selector switch from "bombs" to "guns-air", the radar to "alr-to-alr" and the
radar to "radar lock-cn" In order to obtain range Information for the gun. BLUB 2 hit
the button to reject farthest target but did not get a good sight picture. He then
oaneuvered the airplane to place the MIO in hla windscreen and fired (approx. 3/4 second
or 75-150 rounds}. At this point, BLUE 1 cut In front of the NIO and BLUE 2 had to eease
firing. Almost Inmiedlately BLUE 2 pulled up and barrel-rolled approximately 200 feet
above the NIO, BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 pulled away from MIO as NIO began to drop off at eomple-
tlon of turn and BLUE flight had established a high speed on a heading of 325*. Both air-
craft recovered safely, BLUB 1 had to refuel enroute home.
I
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Aircraft Involved:
Results :
Event 11-31
IVo F>105Da V8 one or tHO.
MZQ-lTs
Ho damage (P-lOSs Jettisoned ordnance
and aborted strike mission)
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*»05'H/105'*55*E
1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
DateAloe: 17 August 1966/1502H
BLUE Plight Wflts on a strike mission enroute to the Nguyen Khe POL storage area.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Altitude ; 3500 ft
Heading ; 315'
Speed ; 510 kt
11. DATA SOURCES
7AF. 172019Z, DOCO ZftftlS Aug 66, CONFIDENTIAL
TAP, 1714202, DOCO 24398 Aug 6b, SECRET
TAP, 180039Z, DIG 30251 Aug 66, SECRET-HOFORN
12. RARRATtVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight, consisting of 2 P-1058 on a strike mission enroute to target (Nguyen
Khe POL area) encountered one MIG-17 (possibly two MIG-17s}. At time of encounter, BLUE
Flight was at 21*05 'N/105'55 'E , altitude 3500 ft, speed 510 kt, heading 315". Aa the lUO
started to turn In, BLUE Flight attempted to turn left into the MIQ. BLUE 1 and 2
Jettisoned ordnance and tanks, but the MIO-17 continued to gain advantage. BLUE 1 and 2
lit afterburners and dove to 500 feet ending up on a heading of 90*. Contact with the MIO
tiaa lost during this descent; no firing was reported. BLUE flight reported heavy flak
cctlvlty Nhich continued during the MIO encounter and the MIQ as well aa BLUE Flight had
to fly through the flak.
AlxiP*ttil»f«li»<J: Two P-105B vi two MlO-lTi
■ ReBuJR^^ni^a 17 destroyed
One F-105 damaged
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^JO'M/lOS^SO'E
1. PIIINART MlSStOII AM TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TIM: .18 August 1966/1526H
One P-105F and three P-lOSDs (BLUE Plight) In an IRON HAKD flight, ""^f^^ '"S^SaS'
four S!I!c5Da in i itMkI group (OREEH, RED.^ELLOW) ,^^0" "f,\;"«^:^Q;|J„*U"llw«
aite» in support of the atrike group. :See Eventa 11-36 and 11-37 for OREEH and yellow
actions.
2. HISSION ROUTE , «
3. AIRCRAFT COMFIGORATIOKS
g-lOSP BLUE 1
2 - SHRIKE (AGM-45)
2 - Rocket pods (2.75")
1 - 650-gal external fuel tank
Pull 20nm ajDjnunltlon
gi^lOSD BLUE 2. 3. 1
2 - Rocket poda (2.75") .
2 - ISO-gal external fuel tanka
Pull 2aBB anmunltton
T-105D QREEM. RED. YELLOW
Loading unknown. Expect external fuel and 750-lb boiba.
C— ouflage
All airplanes had white underside, and green, top. surface..
Avionics
BLOB 1 - WILD WEASEL
BLUE 2 - Radar - Stby; IPP - Stbp; doppler - on
Others - Unknown
llia>17 MIC 1. 2
Unknown
4. FLIGHT COROniONS PRIOR TO ENCOUMTER
Weather: Scattered cloude, good visibility. •
IhSSd of BLUE 1. BLUE 3 and BLUE 4, OREEM, BED, and YELLOW fUghta wara In the
Innadiata area.
I. IRITIAL OETECTIOM ' ..^
*0BBd1 l"lInII°MO at BLUE 2«a 6 o'clock. Bott. BLUB 1 aM BLOB 2 bagan Baowiwarlng.
7. SITUATIOII OE»ELOPHE«T ,
BLUE 1 Mil .hooting. Si"* »,l>«"»l.yjj2J S?^ii S?md o*-i«"o8 flrliig «tth hl«
b* laaa than 2 nln.
8. ORDNANCE Event 11-39
BLUE 1 fired two SHRIKE ACK-45 missiles.
BLUE 2 fired about ?00 rounds of 20mra ammunition at a MIG-17 wh.Ue In 6 o'clock
position on Mir at 400- to 600-ft range. ' Both in gentle left turn. BLUE 2 did not have
a gunslght.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2 ordnance switches were set up for air-to-ground attack 'sode. BLUE 2 did not
sequence switches properly when switohlng to alr-to-alr mode, therefore, did not have a
gunslght. "
10. AtRCRCH COHNENTS
EKperlence
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
Total
Hours
3000
P-105
Hcwrs
600
Combat
Missions
102 Korea
51 Vietnam.
Re marks
Pilot was very experienced. This was
about 'o.ls 50th WILD WEASEL mission,
Althoup.h this was his first MIO en-
counter, he had previously evaded SANs,
Tketleal reconnaissance and tactical
fighter background.
Not Interviewed
Not interviewed
BLDE 3. <
OREEN. RED. YELLOW
Cosmienta on this Encounter
BLUE 2 - Pilot was encutobered by the complexity of swltehology In attempting to
Change ffom air-to-ground mode to the air-to-air mode.
Did not haw use of the gunslght when needed.
KZO aarly warning would have been helpful.
Cpemtenta from Overall Experience
More turning capability in a fighter highly desirable.
Veapon system should provide ranje to the target.
Pilot experience was a predominant factor in the auoeess of the engagement.
11. DATA SOURCES
Proleet Interviews ; BLUE l (Lead), 14 Mar 1967; BLUE 2, 4 Jan 1967
Message Reports :
7th aP/0?llEP-3/l8l52CZ Aug 66/DOCO 2440
OSA? Tactical Fighter Weapons School Bulletin No. 7
Oun camera film from BLUE 2.
12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
The mission consisted of four flights of P-105Ds and one ?-105P. The target was a
POL installation north of Hanoi. The lead flight (BLUE) was followed by three other
flights (GREEN. RED, TELLOH) . BLUE 1 (liiON HAND) was the strike leader. BLUE 2 was
wlngman for IRON HAND and with the section, BLUE 3 and BLUE 1 were to provido protection
for BLUE 1 (L) and to strike SAM sites in support of IRON HAIIO. BLUE 1 (L) was armed
with two SHRIKE missiles, two 2.75" i>ocket pods and a 20inin Vulcan gun, and was carrying
a 650-gal external fuel tank. BLUE 2 was carrying two i(50-gal external fuel tanks, two
rocket pods (2.75") and was armed with a 20mm Vulcan Kun. Both alrDlar.es were camouflaged
with white underside and green top surface. The mission departed Korac, proceeded east-
ward, and rendesvoused with the airborne tankers. Refueling was completed on a northerly
heading. The flight made landfall at approximately 19^22 'N/105o56*G at 4500 ft, 520-kt CAS
and turned westerly. The four flights (BLUE, GREEN, RED, YELLOW) were In trail at about
five-minute intervals. As BLUE flight approached the second checkpoint, in the vicinity
of Kin Diem a large thunderstorm blocked the desired course. After starting to circum-
navigate the storm to the south, BLUE 1 (L) reversed his flight and passed the storm to
the north. In maneuvering to avoid the thunderstorm BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 became separated
trem BLUB 3 and BLUE 4 and the fcllowlng flights caught up. The strike flights were no
longer in flve-mlnute trail but were within visual range of each other. The flights
descended to the deck and proceeded northerly ana passed directly over Phuc Yen. BLUE 1
and BLUE 2 climbed to about 6000 ft maintaining ^l^-kt CAS an they approached the targiet
area. Tnere were scattered clouds with good visibility in thfl ^'' rgeL. area .
n
s
0
0
0
a
1
NARRATIVE OESCHIPTIOfl (COMTD) / j i^W rllf Tr i E t I
SAM3 had been launched. VlJIariLhJlK! Jl^f;. lll^'Vi"" f^J"*""' received Indicated
warnlnjs. The flieht bioJcI il^?? !;f f ^ ©• clock conflrnwd the electronic
pasaed underneath? P'-^^*** "P ln*<» • cllmblnK turn aa a SAM
afterburner In BLUE 2 Anifh.! \tl ^* <;^ncus3lon from the blast blew out the
we« aiSUd^S«rifr|-„o*??^S:t^ lllZUZll {J^^iiifJiSSSa?^*^"'''^-
at thesis ^te?"*; S^RijrSiaJ^S ;ilJ't?e'SoJ'Sf irS^'i'* 2'*^'* '"J"'''- mJ"iles
called, "BUifi 2 you have a MIO w mIJ SJi - SMiP^i^f ^ Airplane In the area
on BLUE 1, " °" ""^"^ tall." BLUE 2 turned hard left and aaw the Mio wai
ordnaJ«lnd^?5ei JSk^^^flLSE^rt^tMlL^'^K?" " Jettisoned all remaining external
KUh thelr^Sd!^° ^^""^ Observed to enter an Inverted dive and Impact
P""^ through the fiuht without en^glng and deoavted the area.
Ught'dLge^Jro''?' .'H?ar'lL3E'5%fru hid Z'^'l'l^'' ' . ^
200 rounds of 20mn munition. P*"*'" ^^^^^ 2 had fired about
0ha„«e"^^Si\°L!L!^;:^un^"SJdr?S";rr^?o^J,5^:^^^^^^ to
srr:^fux;inrcis2rTtJj!"-rjsf e%'j?;;j; ::ra""Enj-\"r^^««" J'wSriruJj' rhave
destruction of the NIC. eiperlence was a predominant factor in the aueeeasful
0RE5N and -.KLLOi, Plight actions contained In Events II-36 and 12-37.
131
RED BARON EVENT II-3S SUMMARY
Ttme
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1.2)
Other Friendly
(GRECN 1)
Enemy Actions
(NIC 1,2)
Status
Action
Coanunlcatlons
Remarks
^0
h\ SHRIKE (2)
External fuel
tanks (2) 450
gal
Full ZUna
ammunl ti on
B2 2.75"
rocket pods It)
External fuol
tanks (2) 450
oal
Full 20aB
fltnmunl tion
3500 ft
525-kt CAS
B1.2 Sight
SANs. Both
Into burner,
begin diving
turn to the
left followed
by cliaiblng
turn.
CoaatAced
evasive
aianeuvers.
61 alerted
flight to
1au:*eh of
SANs.
Launched SAHs.
^1
2000-ft to
5000-ft 450 to
5S0-kt CAS
81 and B2
■aneuvered to
evade SANs.
B2 out In
front of 81.
SAN exploded
between Bl
and B2, blew
out AB In B2.
Bl Maneuvering
to fire SHRIKE.
81 was control-
ling flight with
voice csTls.
Launched SANs.
'2
61 launched
SHRIKE. B2
hard left
turn Mhen
alerted to
NI6. Saw
SHRIKE and
NIG on 81.
61 called. "Bl
you have a NI6
on your tail."
NIG attacking 81.
I ai I — ta I gia ( „
RED BARON EVENT 11-35 SUKHARV (CONT.)
Tim
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1.2)
iicn'^r rrienoiy
(GftEEH 1)
CooMuntcatlons
Enenjf Actions
(HIG 1.2}
Reaarks
Status
Action
Bl Jettlsonad
external
ordnance and
fuel tanks.
B2 Jettisoned
external tanks
and attempted
to switch
fros A- 6 to
A-A. .
B2 tn hard
left turn.
Bl broke
left and
doHn»
accelerating
In AS.
S2 called 81 to
break left. The
NIfi Mas on 81.
NIG attacking 81.
Bl broke hard
left, passed
under B2. 62
fro« a position
above and to
the right of
HIG naneuvered
Into firing
position and
opened fire.
81 called. "Get
the NIG off By
tan.*
HIG pressing attack
on 81 and firing.
B2 firing at
.MIG. no gun-
sight. Saw
HIG burst
Into flaae.
HIG burst Into flam*
rolled Inverted and
crashed.
'6
B1,2 Joined
and departed
the area.
81 called alert
that other HIG
Mas In the area.
Second HIG passed
close to B2 on
opposite heading
and cleared the
area.
Bvtnt XI-36
Aircwtt mvolwd: Four r-105Dt " two MO-ITi
ReauXt: No damage
" Vicinity of Encounter: 21»13'M/1I>5«5«»VB
PRIMARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATIOH ...,4u..«,uP l8 AugU.t W66-
S.« Ev.nt n-35. • .trlk. group, W *«8U
2. HISSION ROUTE
See Event 11-35.
3. AIRCRAFT COMF1 CURAT I OHS
P-105D
Unknown
MIG-17
Cne WTO wa»',»llver pray In eoXor.
4. FLIGHT CONOITIOdS PRIOR TO SNCOUHTER
Meacher: Unknown.
QREEM Plight
Altitude: aOO ft
Heading : 120
Speed : 500 KTAS
Fuel State ; Unknoirn
Flight Formation ; Unknown
:; ^^^^ ^
through. a headlns- of 090".
6. ACTIOH INITIATED
No action taken. Plight lo*t alght of MIO 1.
1 SITUATION DEVELOPMENT ^ ,
MIC 2 made a quartering, head-on pass from GREEN a lu aa S-^*?*-* 1-^0 kiq 2, While in
were not aeen again.
IK DATA SOURCES
Meaaages ;
7th AF/OPREP:3/1815202 Aug JJJJl
7th AP/OPREP-1/181721Z Aug 66/DOCO 2l«*7
Brent ZI-37
>lv«d: TWQ P-lOSOs va thiw* NIO-lTs
RSsult : ^Wdaoaga , '
Vlelntty of Eneountor: 21*22 *N/105"50*B
1. ■ PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 18 August 1966/lfi03H
Tvo P-I05D aircraft (YEIJXnr Fli^t) were the last of four flie^ts Into the target area
(see Events ZI-35 and 11-36). After looking 20 minutes for the target, the flight expended
their bonbs on a bridge and vera cgresslng the area when three HIO-lTa were encountered.
2. MISSION ROUTE
See Event 11-35.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-IOSD YELLOW 1. 2
'MER on centerllne
2 450-gal external fuel tanks
K-61 canr.on - full 20su9 annunltlon
Doppler - on
Camouflage paint
WIO-17 MIQ 1. 2. 3
Silver color - No other configuration information*
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS RRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Ceiling over Thud Ridge at 4 to S*000 ft.
TELLOW 1*2 MIQ 1 HIO 2. 3
Altitude ; 3iOOO ft ACL clifflhlng thru 4,000 ft Unknown
Heading : 310» 310» Unknown
Speed ; 450 KCAS Unknown U..iEnown
PXiel~3tate ; Unknown Unknown Unknown
Pllithfc formation ; YELLOW 2 TELLOW 1
TELLOW a Tm,LOW 1
^^—^"'^-^^^
5. INITIAL DETECTION
YELLOW 2 BSM a MIG-17 pass the flight 1-1-1/2 miles to the left and climb up into a
4 to 5.000 ft cloud layer. YELLOW 2 called the MIO out to YELLOW 1. YELLOW Plight had
not received any NIO warnings but had overheard other flights engaging NZQs and had aaan
the airborne fireball of a NIQ kill.
«. ACTION INITIATED
A few seconds after fUO 1 went into the elouds, it descended from the clouds about
1,000 ft in front of YELLOW 2 in a nose-low attitude. TELLOW 2 did not have an air-to-air
si^t so he pulled the nose up» pointed the pitot boon at the HIO and pulled the trigger.
No hits were observed.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
MIQ 1 pulled up in a barrel roll of sorts and was maneuvering for position on
YELLOW 1. At this time YELLOW 2 saw two more NIO-178 (MIQ 2 A 3) Just pulling in on
YELLOW l*B tall. TELLOW 2 warned YELLOW 1 and the fUght jettisoned all stores, ignited
afterburner and headed down and toward Thud Ridge. TELLOW 1 now had NIO 1» 2, and 3
behind hia and could see tracers going over his canopy. YELLOW 1 and 2 suoeesafullp
outran the MIQ flight, and recovered at hoBM base with no further incident and no aircraft
damage .
8. ORDNANCE
No. fired/No. htta
Cannon
TELLOW 1 0/0
YELLOW 2 184 rd/0
Kia 1. 2. 3 Unknown rounda/O
Remarka
fired without gun sight
iu.iwv«..pn,ii
Event 11.37
9. EQUIPHEMT PROBLEMS
YELLOW 2 Alr<-to->alr gun sight was out.
No other |>roblems notea.
10. AIRCREW COHttENTS
Experience
Total
Houra
Unknown
Unknown
P-105 Hra
Unknown
400
Combat
Nlssiona
Unknown
25
YELLOW 1
YELLOW 2
Commenta on thla Encounter
YELLOW 2 Very surprised at the oaneuverabllltj of NIG-17.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Intervlewa : YELLOW 2, 13 Mar 1967.
Messages, Reports :
7th Air Force/OPREP-3/l8a825Z. Aug 66/DOCO, 2*16.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
YELLOW 1 and 2 were heading approximately 310** near Thud Ridge at 3tOOO ft and 450
XCAS when a MIQ-17 was sighted at 9 o' clock » 1 to 1-1/2 miles, climbing. HIO 1 then entered
the overcast, cloud bases at H to 5,000 ft. A few seconds later HIG 1 descended out of
the clouds In a shallow dive about 1,000 ft in front of and above YELLOW 2. Without
benefit of an alr-to-alr gun sight, YELLOW 2 pulled up his nose and using the pltot tube
for sighting fired a burst of 20om. No hits were observed. MIO 1 pulled up into a
barrel roll type of maneuver towards the 6 o* clock position of YELLOW 1. YELLOW 2 then
saw two more MIQ<-178 closing on YELLOW 1 from the 6 o'clock. YELLOW flight descended to
the deck while accelerating and dlaengaglng aa they departed the area.
3
I I*'
140
RED BAROH EVEMT 1N37 SUMMARY
TIr*
Mark
Action Aircraft (YELLOU 1, 2. 3. 4)
Other Friendly
Eneny Actions
(MtG 1.2)
Status
Action
Communications
Remarks
0
Yl, 2
(2) 4SQ gal
external fuel
tanks.
NCR on centerllne
3,000 ft
450 KCAS
Hdg 310^
V2 sighted NIG 1 at
9 o'clock, .levelt In
a cItBb.
Yl 150-200 ft'
at 3 o'clock,
level
Y2 alerted Yl of
HIG at 10 o'clock
NIG ] climbed Into
cloud layer at
about S.OOO ft
No MIG alert
recolved.
Sa«e
Y2 fired hurried burst
of 20ui at MIG 1. Ho
htts obstrvad.
MIG 1 descended
out of clouds
approxinately
1 .000 ft in front
of Y2» slightly
high.
Air-to-air gun-
sight In V2 aal-
functlon. Used
pi tot boon for
sighting.
1
Saaa
VI and Y2 Jettisoned
external fuel tanks
and HER. Engaged A/8
and descended to
•InlBUH altitude while
accelerating Y2 sighted
two more KIGs.
•
Y2 called *V lead
you've got two
MIG's on your
tail. Jettison
everything and go
burner."
NIG 1 executed a
barrel roll over
Yl and Joined
MIG 2 and 3 at
6 o'clock position
of Yl at about
2,000 ft range.
Yl observed
tracers pass hit
canopy but was not
hit.
Accel froa 4S0
KCAS to 600 KCAS
nog 3iD*
YELLOU Flight dis-
engaged by outrunning
the NIGs.
NIGs discontinued
the chast.
Event 11-38
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105D* v» four MIQ-17». -
Results t Tmp P-1O5D0 doraaged
Icinity of Encounter: 21«15'N/105»47»E
1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOW
Date/Tine: 22 August I966/I626H
io^^«tr°tL'''J°5' Plight) on strike mission to JCS target 51. They were unable to
an!'NASi»5i'E! "'»'"*^"e "«* interdicted a road at approilnately
2. MISSION ROUTC
21-58^5/m*1vr*VI;°;; *° Red River at
ilrlL^d J« l^r^ U Crossing the R^d River the flight let down to 7000 ft. Increased
isSl To tVlir^ll fi!! "nJm%^?*K?*V"!**!f"' '^B*** *5 deg and flew diwn ihud
3. AIRCRAFT CON F I CURAT ION
F-105D BLUE 1. 3> »
2 - 450-gal tinks
6 - M-117 (750-lb) bombs
P-105D BLUE 2
2 - ISO-gal tanks
2 - CBtJ-2ils
carouflage'pJjnS?^'* ' ""^^ doppler off, IPP standby except BLUE 1,
MIQ-17S
Color unknown, tanks unknown, no missiles
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weathen; Overcast at 12,000 ft with 3-5 miles visibility
BLUE Remarks
I 2 3 JT
HeadingV o.„l!i?;! £ ^^"! "^B*'* generally scattered and
Speed?" ' IS i? ^ "Jjrr*"»"* altitudes. Specific
7ffi-3tate : • 8OOO to 10,000 lb conditions given In narrative.
Plight Formation :
^'^^ ^^'^ dropped ordnance and were not rejoined vet. BLUE 2
r2ii.:ni"s;idU is."""' """^ * "-"^ ^ -.'SAinS's? jt.„t
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Ko MG warnings were heard. BLUE 3 saw a MIG at bis 6 o'clock, 3000 ft range.
6. ACTION INITIATED
and dfJSS on'^S^^Mli!" ^ ' "° ^^"^ «*
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
*.K JK" I5°.?*'S** quickly inside BLUE 3*8 turn and started to fire. BLUE 2 dove toM»^
the MIO and fired at him. BLUE «I turned right and crossed behind BLUE 3 and thi MiS
but not before he scored hits on BLUE 3's right flap. A second MTO att«ek.d nr hf a *
and shot up his vertical- stabUieer. BLUE ii broke rieht as the Sia ^hoftfn-
^ ' "ring iio'JSMrb^jjr^'Mrjurj^s;
ss ^y^."^^c^};^l?f:^bur^:r:^i^^^^^^^ - ti^raSi the
1«3
Event II*38
8. ORDNMCE
BLUE 1
Ho. Plred/Ho. Hits
. Cannon
20iam
BLUE
BLUE
BLUE
MIO 1
NIO 3
150/0
1 burst/O
0/0
1 short burst/O
Cannon
Remarks
Plred on NIO attacking BLOE 4;
gun Jannned after 150 rounds
Snapshot at MIO on BLUB 3
Renarks
Plred cannon causing damage to BLUE 3's right flap.
Plred cannon causing daoage to BLUE 4*a Tortleal fin.
mos also fired on BLUE 2 In two instances and on BLUE 1 in one Instanee.-
9. CQUIPN£NT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 - Gun Jammed after firing 150 rounds.
l^^'^^ mechanical advantage shifter aotor out. This ma known before takeoff
but SLUE 2 assumed he would not be going over 5*0 knots. »«"re taaeorr
10. AIRCREW COMHCNTS
BLUE 2
Total
Houpa
1400
P-105
Hours
550
Combat
Missions
80
Remarks
Had experience In P-86 and P*100.
Has always been In TAC. Has air
combat maneuver training In P-86
and P-IOO. The only ACM training
In P-105 was non-scheduled traln^
Ing within the flight. Most of
P>105 ACM was due only to
squadron Initiative. Has qualified
on the DART.
Conanenta on this Encounter
BLUE 2: Has read MIG-17 flight manual at 7th AP which helped to develop Jlnklnie escaoe
maneuver since MI3 had airspeed Halt and needs 3-4 second tracking tlmS. ^ ^
post-night briefing decided that flak suppress.'on aircraft should bomb with
strike aircraft rather than split up and loae flliht Integrity, ias set up for
bombing required three switch changes to go to alr-to-alr mode.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUE 2, Dec 66.
Letter ; SLUE U, 2 Mar 67. '
kessapes. Reporta :
7AP 22215182
7AP 2215342
7AP 22225OZ
Aug 66
Aug 66
Aug 66
DOCO 24595
OPREP-4
DIG 30264
Aug 66 OPIIEP-3
Aug 66
USAP Air Staff Box Score
12. lARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOR
BLUE Plight waa on a strike mission, JCS Target 51, In Route Package VI-a Thew
were the last flight Into the area and saw the IRON HAND night on ingrSIs: HoweveJ
l^ul STf."""?^* ^^^'^^ flooding m thf target £n! the?i?J?I'
BLUE Plight elected to interdict a road near the sasiined target ind had not vet rMiln«l
ihjs'i!f'i?2- ^/"^ " °" but BLUE 2^;s cSr?"nr?wr«; ifi^
Which he did not drop. He was staying high to use then for flak auppreaaton In the
^5n**^*r*V. *" ^^"^ """S^* between 10,000 -nd 12.000 ft heading NW st between
500 and 550 knots. BLUE 2 and BLUE 3 were about line abroMt with about one Sle
lateral eeparation. with BLUE 2 on Che right or east side. BLUE 4 was flvlM in the
same direction but S« of them about four miles. "y*ng in cne
BLUE 3, at 2l»15'll/105«47'E, heading 320« at 11,000
at nls 6 o'clock position, 3000 ft range. He sailed out
to the left.
at 11,000 ft and 550 knota saw a niO-17
the MIO and broke down and
1««
a
a
a
'I
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
i
i
I
I
I
I
i
I
i
I
.•' Etrant ZI-38
21»16'M/105»*8'E, heading 315' at 10,000 ft heard the Kio call by
BLUE 3, inverted and saw the HIO under him and off to the left. The NZa was
at about 8000 ft altitude, <I000 ft behind BLUE 3 and ehootlng. BLUE 2 then went Into
?nn«*!? *S • -anapahof at tha MIO, overshot, pulled out at
»tS turned back north. Meanifhlle, BLUE 3 waa turning left irlth the
Mia following around the turn, shooting and scoring hits In his right flap.
As BLUE H pulled off his bomb run he saw a MM-17 closing on BLUE 3 from BLUE 3»s
7 o'clock BLUE 4 was higher than BLUE 3 and BLUE » turned right into BLUE 3 uid the
MG. As they passed In front of BLUE U at 21"12»M/105«»» 'E at 2000 ft altitude, BLUB k
fired a short burst at a high angle off under heavy g load. BLUE 1 pulled up Just
over the top of the HIO and as he did, he observed two MI0-17s at his 7:30 o'clock.
He then rolled and broke left and down at over 500 knots, pulled up from the deck and
lost them. However, a BLUE 1 saw the MIQs making a pass at BLUE 1 and BLUE 2.
The Kia disengaged from BLUE 3 after BLUE 4 made the firing ptsi at him.
BLUE 2, now heading 320» at an altitude of «>000 ft observed HlO-17 on his tall
(6 o'clock), approximately 3000 aft. BLUE 2 selected afterburner, unloaded and
continued heading NW, while Jinking, thus evading the MIO. The evasive maneuver con-
tt'^tiJ''t ? r&pld roil aiiu & »iuick pull to two to three g's then off to 1/2 a. He knew
the NIG had no missiles. The MIO rlred at BLUE 2 but scored no hits. (Tuls mu or
may not have been the sane MIO who hit BLUE 3), ^ — *
Vhen the NIOs were called, BLUE 1 was at 10,000 ft in a right turn at 21«»10'N/105«SO»E
heading 300". At the call BLUE 1 descended on down with BLUE 1, and was to the rlaht
behind and above BLUE H. BLUE * observed another mO-17 at 6 o'clock and broke rllht*
and down. The MIO moved to the Inside of the turn, fired and hit BLUE 4 In the vertical
fin knocking six Inches off the top.
BLUE 1, who was at 5000 ft heading 320» at 2in7'K/105-43'E breaka left and down
firing at the MIG who was firing at BLUE H, forcing the MIO to disengage. BLUE l»a Kun
^i^'i^S ^50 rounds. BLUE 1 then observed a MIO at hla 6 oTclock position
3000 ft aft and firing. BLUE 1 went to 100 ft AOL and egresaed at Maeh iTo"
All BLUE Plight continued to egress at a high rate of speed. BLUE 3 at '
21"19'N/105'*45'E observed four more MIOs, one at 6 o'clock, low, at 4000 ft altltudei
one at about 7 o'clock, low, at 4000 ft altitude; and two at 8 o'clock, high at
approximately 10.000 ft altitude. However, these MIOs were not engaged and it is not
«255»iJjS§Sj6?S^ ^^"^ J<»1«<» at'aJproxlSaiely
MiOCAP of P-104s were available but they were orbiting too far north of the
K^ven by BLUE Plight but apparently the
CAP flight did not receive the calls as they did not respond.
Despite a few contacts of Plrecan radars during the earlier part of the Ingress,
the last 20 miles into the target was free of Pansong contacts and except for some
sporadic firing, flak. Even in the pop-up to attempt to acquire the primary target,
no flak or SANs were observed. VAille searching for the road to bomb, no flak was
observed *
1*5
REO BARON EVENT I!>aa SUM<J>PY
I
Nark
Actfon Aircraft (BLUE 1, 2, 3, 4)
Connuntcatlons
Eretny Actions
(NIG 1.2}
itenarks
Status
Action
Other Friendly
Ta
Sane
B3 danaae to
right flap.
B4 turns Into B3 and
Ml and crosses behind
then and fired with no
hits observed; B4
pulled up over Hi and
saw two nore MIGs at
7 o'clock continued
left and down at over
500 kt. pulled up fron
the deck and lost then.
HI disengaged -
after B4 nade a
firing pasS.
It Is not known
where Ml went.
However, he may
have switched to-
62 after 84 fired
on him. B4 was
forced Into a high
angle pass - fired
one short burst
under heavy g load.
T,
Sane
Jettisoned CBU-29s
B2 level at 4000 ft
320*. HIG-17 at his
6 o'clock, 3000 ft aft.
Went afterburner.
Jinked and egressed to
Z1'55'N/105'43'E.
B4 saw HI6 at BZ's 6
o'clock after rolling
out of left turn
heading 3)5*.
B3 had completed
360* and heading
320*.
B4 said. "He Is on
you noM, 2."
HlG-17 trying to
close on 82. NIG
closed to 500 ft
firing.
This HlG-17 may or
may not be the
same one who broke'
off B3 - NIG dis-
engaged when 82
wef»t afterburner -
tried to drop
ordnance armed.
U
Sam
B4 has N16 at 6
o'clock. Breaks right
and down. 61 Is above
Breaks left and down
and fires on the HIG
who disengaged. B3
saw four HIGs. one low
4000 Tt 6 o'clock, one
low 7 o'clock, two high
10.000 ft 8 o'clock.
NIG OB B1.
B4 called, "HIG on
my tall."
KI6 firing on 64
scoring hits In
the vertical
stablllitr.
82 loses MIG..
MIG 3000 ft behind,
Bl fired 150
rounds of 20nn
when gun Janned^KKj
He did not hit W'
the MIG. V
B2 finally Jet-
tisoned ordnance
by using master
panic button.
Flak fired at B2
on egress.
T»
Sane
B4 dSMOe to
vertical stablltier
BLUE Flight tgress arte.
Flight egresses to
21*SS'N/10S*0S'E.
HEP BAROH EVENT II-3> SUWARY
Tiat
Mirk
Action Atrcrtft (BLUE 1. 2, 3. 4)
Stttut
Action
Othtr FrUndYjr
CoMunlcatlens
Enemy Actions
{HIG 1.2}
RcMrkf
Blue Y. 3. 4 Juit
bOMbc4 ttrgtt.
62 had two CBU-24S
Futl 8000 to
10.000 lb
Bl 11,000 ft. 300*.
550 kt;
B2 10.000 ft. SIS*.
5S0 kti
B3 11.000 ft, 330*.
550 kti
B4 11,000 ft. 330*.
S50 kt;
B3 saw on« MI6-17 «t
hit 6 o'clock
Had Just cone off
target - not yet
rejoined B2. Still
had two CBU-24S.
Was saving for
flak suppression
0ns MI6 3000 ft
bthlnd B3
Bt tt 9
B3 breaks left and
down Into NIG I.
B2 sees Ht left and
below set up the cick-
pit rolls Inverted and
dives OB Ml. firtt aiid
Kisses, leveled at
4000 ft. B2 did not
use afterburner. B2
overshot, was level
with NIG
B3i "Get hin off
vy talK' 62: 'I
S0O him. I CM
coalng la.*
One KI6 shooting
at B3, scoring
hits In the right
fUp.
No bit observed
fro« 82's firing
NIG pulls up and
to tho left
62 had to: (1)
shift radar aiode
froB ground nap to
air-to-air by
pushing a button.
(2) rotate weapon
■ode selector two
clicks to guns-air
position. (3)
depress action -
reject button.
Ca Ca' Ca O a cai Cai O cai cat rzm Csg crai c:=3» rzzu c:::a cz3Bi
Event 11-39
Aircraft Involved: - One ?-l05F and one F-105D va
three Hia*2l8
Result: No daaage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*20 'H/IOT^IS'E
T. PRIHARV KISSIOM ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlae: 9 September 1966/0900H
BLUE Plight waa 60 n ml northwest of Hanpl on an IRON HAND mlaslon departing the
target area. BLUB 3 and tt had left the target earlier due to low fuel.
2. HISSiON (tOUTE
Unknown.' Egresa was east to the Gulf of Tonkin.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
Unknow. WILD WEASEL aircraft In lead (P-IOS).
4. fLiCNT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO iKCOUNTER
BLUE 1 and 2 MTO . 2. and 3
Airspeed: *25«kt Unknoim
»faf^"g - 090" About 100<»
Altitude : 6000 ft About 6OOO ft
Forinatlon : BLUE 2 on right side In tactical formation.
HIGs silver; no markings seen. No radar return on P-105 vector box; no nlaeilea
observed; no external stores observed.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 2 noticed three KIO-218 at 6 to 7 o'clock high end 2000-3000 ft out vhlle 37—
was explodfng at 3 o'clock and in front of SLUE 2. No indication of MIGa from vector
box. No MIC warnings were heard.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE c called for a left break, and BLUE 1 and 2 broke- left and down. BLUE 1 and 2
Jettisoned ordnance.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BI/.'E 1 and 2 broke down and left, and NIO 1^ 2 and 3 followed BLUE 2. BLUE 2 leveled
at 2000 ft. BLUE 1 says, "MIGs behind you, break right." BLUE 2 breaks right and down
to the deck. Evades .MIGs and exits to the east. About one minute later BLUE 1 sighted a
MIG lu front of him and above. BLUE 1 closed and fired 600 rounds 20mii In two separate
bursts. No hits observed. MIG k started right turn. BLUE 1 returned to the deck and
exited to the east. No damage. BLUE 1 and 2 exited to the water and refueled.
a. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1 expended 6OO rounds of 20mm In two bursts.
MIG 1, 2 and 3 fired at BLUE 2; no hits.
BLUE 2 States he waa sure the shells were airburats and were from KlOa (iriiite ouffs
of »moke). r -
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None noted.
10. AIRCREH COMMENTS
Ttotal 105 Combat
Hourt Hours jtLaalona
BLUE 1 (Back) 2000 300 50
BLU£ 2 - NIOs were believed to be under OCX control. Tisibillty was bad.
n. DATA SOURCES
Pr oject Interviews ; BLUE 1 (Back), 9 March 1967
Messages. Reports; PACAP 17 0255Z DOCCO 064 Sept 66 { 7AP 09II8Z OOCO 256*9 Sept 66*
CINCPAC 1702462 Sept 66; 7AP 0909332 Sept 66 DOCO 25259 0PREP-3i
7AP 0912512 Sept 66 DOCO 25308 OPREPU ^'
Letters ; BLUE 1 Pront, Mar 67
BLUE 1 Back, Mar 67
BLUE 2 Pront. 22 Mar 67
Bvant 11*39
12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was on an IRON HAND mlsalon. BLUE 3 and H left due to BlnRO fuel BLUE
.^V^ heading 090°, at 6000 feet. BLUE Pligf.t was m a
tactical formation with BLUE 2 on the right wing. BLUE 2 saw whUe puffs of smoIJ o?? Ma
JiasiaSJs^i:? jisrt;::ciKs :s: «Sn%«"-"' •pp-aching^ro« 6-7 p-cipcrhi^s.
*ft.^^i's«.t on^i*** ^ ^""^ *nd Jettisoned ordnance.
?^nH t ?^ 2000 feet, BLUE 2 and all three MlOa had overshot BLUE
.1??? t^^^il ^ o'clock position. The ^llOa were stllX In trail of BLUE 2 at 2000 ft
altitude »-d 2000 ft distance, firing at BLUE 2.
^^i*"^ nr?D*^) ^o** BLUE 2 to execute a right break which he did, with the MlOs
following BLUE 2 In the break BLUE 2 descended to the deck In afterburner and accelerated
Kfi.!rS : "^^^^"8 toward the water. While the HIGs continued to follow, they fell
Behind and were lost from sight. BLUE 2 then headed to the Qulf of Tonkin for refueling.
-*-i.*^"i^2?.J^}!^ ^'J ^^^^ '° right, BLUE 1 continued In a left turr but lost
afSS ^ MIGs as they disappeared behind the hllla on tne ridge line.
BLUE 1 then reversed and followed down the same valley at 100 feet AGL, 650 ktas. About
cnL^i""^* later, at 09O3H, BLUE 1 3lghted me MIC-21 at hla 12 o'clock position about
I range. Both BLUE 1 and the MIG were heading approximately east with the NIO at
B?n2 r,??;^^^"'^*' '^'^ initially see BLUE 1 and was apparently looking for
BLUE 2. BLUE 1 pulled up behind the MIG until he had closed to about 2500 feet and fired
h!!!.f"r*-/*'°fi[« no hits. BLUE 1 then closed to 1000-1500 feet range and fired another
i?n2 H'^JH indicating to BLUE 1 that he had been
^ rolled off to the right and accelerated away to the east for egress.
No bits were received by BLUE I or 2. xw* ck^coo.
^ P-105B were never warned of the presence of the MIG-21's from any radar vector
2o8J;io?»; ILI^I of operation, the EC.121(B10 EYE/Ethan Alfa) orbiting at
zo H/iOT E contained no radar plots of this engagement.
At refueling BLUE 1 had 1000 pounds of fuel.
Brmit II>40
Aircraft Involved: Three P-105» va an .
unidentified aircraft
Result: Sightlne only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«50'H/107»15»E to
21«00»M/107«20»E
1. PRIMARY RISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TlBe: 11 September 1967/unknown
4. FLIGHT CONOtriONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
BLUE Plight Bogeys
19,000 ft 1,000 ft
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Ho MIC Karnlns=. HLUS Plish't 'saw bo^ey. Slant r'ange approxlaately 15 n m.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
n. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Rmpowtm- 388th OPREP-4/238, 11 September 1966.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
After _
their course
153
.•^ ■ Event
Aircraft Involved: Pour 7-105s v» two Nlg-I7s
Result: No damage
Tlclnlty of Encounter: 21*13 'N/lOfi^lO'E
21*ia»N/106«35»B
1. PRIKARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: lH September I966/I6H3H and 16il7H (approximately)
fK. nlZ"^ ^'n^^? ^^^H^ flight) on a flak suppression mission as part of a strike asalnst
the Dap Cau Railway Bridge. The flight had hit the target and wis egress Ing! ^
2. MISSION ROUTE
Th«».-f«l!f°^f„II^! °" ^^""^ Oul' 'ingress over the mountains,
Therefore, ingress and egress was north of Haiphong.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
r 2 430<-gal tanks
Expended CBU
No ECM pods
Caaouflage paint
WIG-17 MIG 1. 2
Silver color
1 missile under right wing
4. FLI6MT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Clear with visibility 10 miles.
BLUE 1. 2 BLUE 3. H
*iJ||H|£- 2000 ft AOL 3000 ft AOL
Heading: 095* 092*
iSlrltate. 500 KTAS
Fuel State . Apppox. 9000 pounds
Flight Formatloi^ ?
ha« Bf?iP***i[SS 2^ J****!"* <^ position with BLUE 1 and 2 In reasonably close
cSitScU * "* farther back and did not have visual
5. INITIAL DETECTION
ifTrt ,5^^ ^ finished a right turn to 095* after pulling off a run on the target. Two
SiSiiilj!*" detected at BLUE I's 6 o'clock position fiOO^ards behind SSt no f £lS w.
6. ACTION INITIATED
contact^SeidJSriSSh!** " ^^^"^
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUB 2> subsequently acquired two Kia-178 at 2 o'clock at 5 miles range and attaekeii
but his gun jammed. BLUE 3 and 4 were later attacked by two more MIQs. attacked
a. ORDNANCE
(Nb. fired/No. hits)
Cannon Remarks
JSI ? ft Jammed due to part failure.
"^"^ 3, •» 1/Q pi„a 3 BLUE 4
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2 - gun malfunction
1
The OPREP-3 and the RED BARON Interview conflict, in that the OPREP-3 says BLUE 2«8 gun
if^i ^^^r^* 3 ^r** " attacked by MIOs. The Inter^leiSe claimed tS Se
BLUE « and that while he attacked 2 MIOs and his gun Jaimned, BLUE 1, 2 and 3 never saw
n}?tl *'*?."!''*^ attacked. The reconstruction assumes that the interviewee was
BLUE 2 (Since It la Judged unlikely that two such occurrences could happen on the same
day) and he never saw BLUE 1 during egress. •^vt^" w
155
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Eiperleno :
Event 11-41
BLUE 2
F-105 Coisbat
Hours Hlaalona - Remarks
550 6 Baeksrpund was all TAC. Plghter Haapons
School graduate.
Comwtfnts on this Encounter ;
elght!**^ "^"^ '""^^^^^ ^^^^^ to go from bombing node to a full computing alr-to-alr
High speed at low altitude of the P-105 wia a good asset.
The enemy pilots mre poor.
If IIIS•«r^S.^'2eSil,^;.^^"„S'^ik.5! ««inE. «re indicative since
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Intervlgw«. BLUE 2, 17 January I 967
Hepor ts: 388TPW OPREP-| U September 1966. PINNACLE/308
TAP DAI 1423352, September 1966 DIO 30050
JAP OPftEP-3 112022Z, September 1966 DOCO 25526
TAP OPREP-il ltl737Z, September I966 DOCO 25527
TAP OPREP-II H>2024z; September 1966 DOCO 25532
12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
tar«f^^TJl^??L!l?'*«!"*''*5 ^^''^ suppression ordnance and was pulling off the
target. The flight was spread out and receiving quite a bit of flalc.
at «;QS'l?r«!'*in5^?^rt5*'^*?n?**\^^^ ^ finished a tight turn to a heading of 095« he was
Srs\°°dSJ?te^\ °2°o^ li?t*6oS%SJ: SSnS* T JjJjS ll lit SS""^ The'SlOs'Je?:'
appeaJ:d'tf bl sjJej'thl'r^Ji ivVr^i Tui^ <:ithJJ;;i^SLS^'*!JJ';j'*'» "^i-
other flight member at thls%'lne) r'^^TiJ^SSs^SSjJfS !t"f o'ciocratTSKj "lUS KL
is iJviraSs^id'jsrip^-eSj ?i^^;wa?i"^f^jp;- - ;i f --rl'"?' --^
nWe-an'^ssSurs: s.r s^""?rge?Tco^mS;?!S«^J!ghn«^v;j5
the afterSrS; aSd%5oSS"o*'JoJo%i":";eJd' Tl'cllli' '^STklot^lilVn rl^^ '^T
.team wipe Jhrou^ hlS%;^%rJC«iurfran^ Jh^S'lStlSeS ?0^JJJ:!?*?;%S; iS.^SJo'"""* "
a .heJrjJn'JJuJj^ "'^ « -topped firing due to
burst"^ i^tlvlng 85.. nr.. m barrage-type
After BLUE 2's encounter. BLUE 3 and 4 at 2l*i9*M/inK*9e»B> w..^.
at 3000 ft AOL, observed two MIO-lTs tSlQ \\na l\ IL^Cl ll^^ ll heading 092« . 500 KTAS
^ Event I 1-4 2
Alrerart Involved: Pour P-IO5D0 ve three HIO-lVs
• Result: No danage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«20*N/106*10*B'
1. PRlPfARY KISSION
Date/Time: ifl September 1966/I636H
Pour P-105D aircraft (BLUE Plight) on a atrlke flight against the Dap Cau Highway
Bridge 15 n ml northeast of Hanoi. This was one flight of four attacking the bridge and
o h ^1 operating In the area, some ahead and sone behind. Including an
F— H flight.
2. MISSION ROUTE
* * !f?"J ^0 Brown Anchor eaat coast of North Vietnam west along the ridge line
SaSlon'route*'" * the reverse of the Inbound route. See Figure I for
3. AIRCftAH Ctii'iFIGURATION
BLUE 1. 3 and 0
2 3000-lb bomba
1 650-gal centerllne tank
1000 rounds 20 m.fli. anrno
BLUE 2
2 CBU-2ls
1 650-sal centerllne tank
1000 rounda 20 m.m. aimio
MIQ 17
Ordnance unknotm
Silver color (did not aee markings) •
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Scattered thunder storms. 2-3 miles visibility but clear In the target area.
BLUB
1 3 » BLUE 2
*5oo ft 806-1000 ft
^ffCat.. 552-"" 550 KAS
Puel State; Unknown Unknown
Plight Pormatlon ;
"".f" ? 'i;*** •*»''WS out, lead aircraft in front and BLOB 3 and «
cutting off on the Inside to Join up. See sketch.
V t\ Tr
• •KM.
7 ll*
not
Tiio
S. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight was In a right turn. BLUE 1 sighted three MO-lTs headina aut
<. ACTION INITIATES
BLUE flight accelerated and continued to turn to egreaa heading,
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
ID* «Q» BLUB flight for about twojminutes. but never approached closer than
Ji!?*f*- ^2ri2«/«"" 2 *ttempted to attack one if the NlOa b5? could not ItEaln
poaltlon. BLUE % waa ahot down bp ground fire after the NlOa broke off but was reaaSS.
Event II»42
8. ORDNANCE
Ko ordnance expended
9. EQUIPHeNT PROBLEMS
None.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
E»p«r lance ;
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
BLUE 4
11. OATA SOURCE
Project Intervlewg ;
Total
Hours
4000
400
2600
Unknown
P-105
Hours
900
300
650
Unknom*
Combat
Mlaslona
UnknoHn
75
70
26
Remarks
Considerable fighter experience
P-86, P-100, P-105, F-9, P-11.
Completed P-105 gunnery school at
Nellie. This Mas his first assign-
Mnt.
Hessages ;
BLUE 1, 16 March 1967
BLUE 2, 17 February 1967
BLUE 3i 6 January 1967
7AF 15171BZ. September 1966 DOCO PASTEL NR 106
36Bth TFW OPREP-3 PINNACLE 317
7AP 142335* September 1966 DIG 30450
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight had Just pulled off from their bombing run on the Dap Cau Highway bridge
and were in a right turn Joining up about ^500 ft, altitude 500-550 KIAS. BLUE 1 was in
front followed by BLUE 3 and BLUE 4. BLUE 2, with flak suppression ordnance, had hit a
flak site about 2 miles north of the target and was trailing BLUE 1 by 4 to 4.1/2 miles
and BLUE 3 and 4 by about 2 miles. BLUE 1 saw three HI0->17s attacking from the west head-
ing 090*> and alerted the flight. The MIOs came out of the sun and two attacked BLUE 3 from
his 6 o'clock and 9 o'clock while the third attacked BLUE 4. Vfhen the MIOs were observed
the flight was In the vicinity of 21"»20'N/106«'10 'E heading 090" and BLUE 1, 3 and 4 were
at 4500 ft and 550 KTAS. BLUE 2 was about 800-1000 ft AOL. The KIGa were at
approximately the same altitude as BLUE flight.
The KIOs were also seen by BLUE 2 who was trailing the rest of the flight at BOO-IOOO
ft AOL. He called them out but the rest of the flight had already seen the MIOs.
BLUE 1 kept the MIQs and the rest of the flight in sight, while egresslng. The egress
was made at low altitude and high speed with horizontal Jinking, BLUE 1 observed the two
MIOs break off BLUE 3. BLUE 1 also observed the NIO break off from BLUE 4.
BLUE 2, after calling the NIQs and seeing none on himself, cleaned off the In-board
pylons and accelerated In afterburner in an attempt to attack one of the MIQs that was at
s o'clock high on BLUE 3, and about one mile away from BLUE 3. BLUE 2 started to close
on the MIO which was at about 5000 ft altitude (about 1000 ft higher than BLUE 3) and
about 2 miles away. BLUE 2 climbed and closed on the NIO until the range was about a mile.
The NIO then started a left hand hard turn (not a break) . BLUE 2 who had came out of
burner at this time had a good closure rate and started to turn with the MIO. The MIO waa
about 5000 to 6000 ft out and BLUE 2 was turning left at about 3 gs. The NIG turned
rapidly. BLUE 2 ended up at about 110 degress angle off from the MIO. It became evident
that the MIO and BLUE 2 would end up in a h«ad on pass, so BLUE 2 broke off to the right.
BLUE 2 had passed Just ahead of BLUE 3 since BLUE 2 had used afterburner. BLUE 3 waa at
this time descending In a slight left turn. BLUE 2, in turning right, went under BLUE 3*a
nose at a track crossing angle of 90^, about 300U ft in front. As soon as BLUE 2 crossed
under BLUE 3*s nose he reversed and climbed back to the left bleeding off airspeed to
sandwich the remaining MIO on CLUE 3. As BLUE 2 picked up BLUE 3, he saw that the NIQ-17
had broken off and was headed back toward Kep.
BLUE 3 heard BLUE I's Initial call. As BLUE 3 looked back to pick up BLUE 4, he saw
a MIO at 6 o'clock to himself at a slightly lower altitude and about 4000 ft range. BLUE
3 accelerated slightly. BT "E 3 also saw BLUE 4 with a KIQ-17 at BLUE 4*8 6 o'clock. The
MO was a mile or so aft o' )LU£ 4.
BLUE 3 had been looking aft to observe BLUE 4 and on looking right he saw a silver
MIO-17 at his 3 o'clock. The NIO Is 4000 to 5000 ft out and within 1000 ft of BLUE 3*8
altitude. BLUE 3 turned slightly into the NIO and when the NIO responded BLUE 3 dived
away Jinking to the left In afterburner. BLUE 3 at this time atlll retained two pylons
and a eenterllne tank. During the acceleration and descent ta 2000 ft» BLUE 3 crossed
BLUE 2*0 path, but never saw the Mia-17 which BLUE 2 waa engaging. BLUE 3* despite hla
1
i
i
|-|^ J
1 i
Hi
158
y Bv«nt 11-42 .
flent toitftr<i the MIQ, did not s»t up the sight for funt ftlr. Aft«r >om dlstanc** BLOB 3
went back to 5000 ft end continued to egress.
The MIO on BLUE d was a mile or more away, sliding into a 6 o'clock position. BLOB 4
was Instructed to break right and descend In afterburner, continuously Jinking. BLOE 4
did this and after traveling some distance lost the NIQ while heading in a southeast
direction. BLUE 4 >as directed hy BLUE 1 to turn baek to the northwest In order to rejoin
the rest of the flight.
BLUE 1, 2t and 3 Joined and about half way to the coast they made a 360 orbit to
pick up BLUE 4. Due to the speed of BLUE 4, he passed the rest of the flight so that when
contacted on the radio, a DP reading put him east of the rest of the flight. BLUE 1, 2
and 3 then ellDbed and also started egreeslng at 600 kts to eateh BLUE 4.
BLUE 4 pulled up Just before reaching the coast and BLUE 1 saw hla get hit by flak
(57mm). Half of BLUE 4*8 right wing was knocked off and the engine was danaged.
BLUE 4 ejected in the water close to land and the rest of the flight provided RBSCAP.
BLUE 4 was subsequently recovered.
BLUE 1 noticed that the flak stopped Just as he was rolling 1a on the tact«t although
it waa suraiaed that this was due to the presence of NIQs.
159
RED BARON EWE WT 11.41 %tmnkM
TiM
Mtrk
Action Aircraft (BLUE T, 3. 4)
Status
S50K
61, 3. 4 «t 4500'
B2 It 800-1000'
F11«ht In right
turn .
Acti on
BLUE Flight starts to
accelerate and descend
with constant S turns
to keep the NIGS froia
tracking.
81 continues to egress
82 acceltretes In A/B
after the Nlfi at 8
o'clock high to 83
B3 accelerates slightly
B4 divet away in A/B
Othar FrUndly
n sees NIGS and
calls to tho flight.
12 alto tees the
nGS and calls to
the flight.
M Is called to
descend and
accelerate.
CoMunlcatlons
Cnosy Actions
(MIG 1,2)
3 MIG-17S attack
BLUE Flight. HIGs
coning fron out of
the Sun, heading
East It about 5000*
NIGS are abnut 1
mile away froia 84
and 83.
1 HI6 Stayed with
B4 and 2 NIGs go
after 83. One at
8 o'clock at one
at 6 o'clock about
I wHa away.
Raaarks
All noMbtrs of the
flight saw tho NIfi&
B3 eoox
5000'
B2 abOHt 4500*
aboot 600 K
83 soos a NIG at
3 o'clock. 5000' out.
8 3 turns In toward
the MIG and when the KIG
reacts, divas away.
N2 at about 5000'
alt.
82 closes to within 1
nlle of Ml cones out of
A/B and starts a 3g
turn to track Nl.
Ml starts a kard
loft hand turn
I
riBP ifiP tii"^
«E0 BARON CVEKT 11-42 SUHMAKt
N«rk
Action Aircraft (BLUE U 3. 4)
Communication!
Cneay Actions
(NI6 1.2)
Remarks
Statui
Action
Other Friendly
B2 It 39
B3 was 110* an9le
off froa HIG.
Bt broaks right and
descends away fraa HI.
Ml has turned until
he Is heading back
toward B2.
B3 dtictndlng away
fvMM 111 In a/M
Tr9a HI ir h/v*
B2 dtsccntflna away
froa N2 In A/B.
B2 passes In front of
B) CQMtlniits on.
B2 pulls Up to B1
observes Hi and 2 break
off.
H2 breaks off.
B1 , 2, S egrotting to
Join up.
n calls B4 f at
PI3 has broken off
and for B4 to turn
to MM heading.
s
1
Aircraft Involved: Pour ?-10Ss vs ttro MI0-17a
Result: Sighting only
Vlclnitj of Encounter: 21**20'N/106*'*5'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 14 September I966/I638H
This was a strike mission. Pour P-105a (BLUE Plight was Inbound to the target
Chiang Mai petrol storage.) The IROH HAND support aircraft Has leaving the area so BLUE
Flight aborted at Zl'^lZ 'N/lOe^SO'E.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Unknown
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1. 2, 3 and 4 carried iron bombs. One Xligbt oeiBber had two CBU-24S.
4. FLIGitr CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Haze, with thunderstorms.
BLUE Plight - 9000 ft AGL at 360°
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Uad sighted two NIOs at 12 o'clock high (15,000 ft). HIQs were in a hard right
turn.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight Jettisoned ordnance and evaded.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Plight position now 2 1**20' N/1 07*^00 •£ at 4000 ft, heading 122®, whan HIOs were
again spotted at flight's B o'clock position, 5000 AOL. Plight passed through thunder-
Btorns and exited area.
11. DATA SOURCES
Mesa a ^e 9 , Reports :
388th Wing, OPREP '•/313, 14 Sept 1966
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was inbound to the target. The setting sun in haze dropped visibility,
and the IRON HAHD support was leaving the target area so Lead decided to abort the mission
at 21"12'N/106''50'E. The Plight turned right and at 21°20'N/106°45'E, heading 360 degrees,
and at 90OO feet AGL, Lead observed two MIG-17s. The KIOs were at BLUE Lead's 12 o'clock
position in the vicinity of 21"30'H/106^45'e, at 15.000 feet, in a hard right descending
turn. The KIG wlngman was sliding to the outside of the turn.
BLUE 1 called KIOs at 12 o'clock, and the Flight went to afterburner and began a
tighter descending right turn.
The MIQs were' lost tnomentarily but were sighted again by BLUE 1 Innedlately before
going through a southern fringe of a thunderstorm. BLUE Plight's position was then at
21''20'N/107''00*£ and BLUE Plight was 4000 ft AOL heading 122 degrees. The MIQs were at
BLUE Plight's 8 o'clock position at approximately 5000 ft AOL.
BLUE flight passed through the thunderstorm. Jettisoned ordnance (iron bonbs and
ceua) and returned to post-strike tankers.
16T
Event 11-44
Aircraft Involved: Three P-105s vs ttfo NIOs
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter:
1. PitlHAftV MISSION AND TACTUAL SITUATION
Date/TlM: IS September 1966/15S5H
2. MISSION ROUTE
Unknown
i. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
UnknoHn
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather; Unknown
2l*'OO'll/l07 37*B
Altitude :
Heading ?
Speed ;
Fuel State :
Plight Formation !
Finger tip
BLUE 1. 3
13>flOO ft
360*
450 kt
UnVnowtt
1 o
T I ir
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Waa ;:iade on their vector box gear which Indicated X*band radar at tbelr 12 o'clock
position.
6. ACTIO" TNITIATEO
None
7. SZTUATION DEVELOPMENT
Unidentified aircraft flaw by BLUB Flight and turned to tbelr 6 o'clock position.
BLUB night then broke right and observed two aircraft two* nautical miles behind. BLUB
flight continued turn Into possible moa and MIQs went Into a dsscendlng left turn and
were lost In tlw hase at about 2,000 ft AOL.
8. ORDNANCE
Unknown
mas
Unknowi
f. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Hone
to. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Bi perlence
Unknown
Co misenta on this Encounter
BfUE 1: HIQa could have been P-4s.
Cpgiaents from Overall Experience
BLUE 1: P-48 should be briefed on routes to be flown by P-lOSs and that they eall
y-105a If they are naklng identification paases.
n. DATA SOURCES Ev.nt
MM88£e3: OPREP-V237 388TPV 15 Sep I966
12. NARRATIVf DESCRIPTION
madf i i:jd desc;2S?ng"eft ?S™ ^ SZjriuJS^'jLfJJufd"? ^''f**? '"''"'"^ them, they
continued descending left tu'r?; aSroxliitSL § mS 55 Jftf" *£I'° PO"lble MlOa. and MIG»
Possible «1G5 not seen awin Th. f^T^K^l^Jj ^ t^^* An haxo.
I
Aircraft Involved: ?our P-lOSs vs four IIXG-21a
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«09*N/106«'45'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
DateAlme: 16 September 1966/l6ii5H
Pour F-1058 were on a strike mlaslon on the Dap Cau Railroad and Highway Bridge
(21»12'M/106*06'E).
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1, 2, 3. 4
20ms. Cannon (1,029 rounds)
Resw of ordnance unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
W eather ; Unknown
Altitude ; 1»0Q0 ft AOL
Heading ; 092°
Speed : 551 ktas
Fuel State : Unknown
Plight Formation ; ^ q
MOO* Mi
5. INITIAL DETECTION ^
BLUE-3 visually observed four NI0<-2l8, 4000 ft to hla right and 4000 ft ftbov* hla In
a left turn passing through 060 heading.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLI;l-3 went into aiterbumer. and afraaaad orM.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLIP Plight egressed without further incident.
II. DATA SOURCE
TAP, OPREP 3 1619'»72 Sept 1966 DOCO 25603
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight wa» outbound from the target area heading 092^ at 1000 ft AOL, at 550 KTAS.
BLUE 3 was 5000 ft behind BLUE 4 when he eaw four MIG 2Is 4000 ft to hla right and 4000 ft .
higher than BLUE 3 in a left turn, passing 060 . BLUE 3 then selected afterburner and
egreesed the area Jinking at 650 KTAS- MIG-Zls did not engage nor follow BLUE 3. No
damage to the aircraft or encounter logged and aircraft retreated safely to hone atatlon.
I
1
"»
r
1
i
i
i
Aircraft Involved: Pour P«105Da vs tfwo HI0-17s
Result: No dajuge
Vlemity of Encounter: 21**18*M/106»17*E
1. PRIMRr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TUne: 16 September 1966/1650H
H^AA ^-"5Da (BLUE Plight) on a strike target {JCS #16 - Dap Cau railroad and hl«hii»
tl ift "^H^" ^^^o'^^^S^- Aircraft were In a Pluld-J. with BtUE 2 p?obabiron tSe Slht
ISoSo^nJJJt^So'I:^^^ aioiS'N/ios-SS^E and an EB^66B SS In SltSfii *"
2. HISStON ROUTE
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-105D BLUE 1. 2, H
2 - ISO-gal wing tanks
• - CBUa (1 each wing station, 2 center line)
1 - gun
MIQ«173 MIC 1. 2
Ohknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather; 7-nlle visibility, scattered clouds.
BLUE 12 3 (I
Altitude; _ _ 6000 ft 5500 ft Unknown
Heading ;
Speed ;
gJtel State ;
Piight Pormatlon !
270*
5*0 KTAS
Unknown
270«
540 KTAS
Unknown
Unknown
Probably the same
270" 270*
SUO KTA3 5*0 KTAS
Unknown tftUcnown
1
1
I
i
i
i
I
I
I
o
o
5. INITIAL DETECTION
270« ^tlla'^Vt "1.1^^^^^°^ ^"!!? " ^^*5H. At l6ft8H at 21«10'N/106«»15'E. heading
?J2«-e5SXS iSAv^Jt'^iJ oS "it'iioT8.sj;sJo^j7?E°f rnj; lai ?;;'ss5-i7rs?^is^s'r3\
5J0 KTAS, 6000 ft alt. MZOs observed vlaually and called out by fiiiht Uad (BLUE iJ
2lbS2 ainhrHJoS!*^* through 330* at 4000 ft altliiS!;: All mSt
6. ACTION INITIATED
acended slowly,
were.
BLUE 2 followed lead. It i5''unknown''aB"to*wharBLOE*3 aS"5*s"aetlona
7. SITUATION OEVELOPNCNT . .
o*t» ^^^^ 2 broke hard into MIO 1 and 2 who were in a ri«ht bank nasainB ^^Q*
173
IP-
(No. ftred/No. hUa)
20m Oun
1/0
Remarks
No hits were recorded by BLUE 1.
fired.
66 rounds
Event II.«6
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2, 3. 1 None
I. 2 None
10. AIRCREH COHNENTS
Coaireenta on Thla Encounter
'^iS-^* Caged his gun alght when he flrat vlauall* sDOtted HIQa H« ata nn^
BLUE 2: I could have gotten a ahot at KIG l if I'd lust be#n a hh-i. k<«. t
to By right! *ln««««an pretty far out of position and he passed
Conments from Overall Experience
ifasn'?Thii accompllahed their mlaslon, we Jettlaoned our ordnance. It
wasn t a bad decision, we had to be able to turn or they would have eotten a ahofc a«
bLS £3 tS« ?f dumping their tanks to make it look iiki they dumped th!l?
bomba, and then go on to their targets. Tanks are usually empty by then. ™^
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
Heasagegj Reports :
BLUE 1 (Lead), 13 Bar 67; BLUB 2, 13 Mar 67
DTO 162356Z Sep 66 7AF Tan Son Nhut AB DIO 3OU56 Sep 66
Cont. No. C215«2/l/N? 1619472 Sep 66 7AF Tan Son Nhut DOCO 25603 Sep 66
Letter from BLUE 2
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
separation. BLUE 2 then would have had a wrn 1 k.,^ ^* <. f wixn agoo « approximate
right .ing fnd out of position. Both BLUE 1 and I «0. ooM?„S%Ji?- , f"
;i?s:^s;rfc^i ?Knr2ioS??N?iS?-i5?Hr "^^^^^^^^^'-^^^^^
*S3rn;":L"c:oa«!'*'''' "nsldenng the location. «id Int.rvl.ws, a northarl,
174
REO BARO>f EVEMT 11-46 SUMMARY
T1«t
Kirk
Action Aircraft (eiUC 1.2)
Other Friendly
Connunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1,2)
Remarks
stati't
Action
T*
Alt 6000 ft
Hdg 270*
Speed SOO KTAS
81 sees two NIGs at
10:30 o'clock, 1 to 2
■lies away.
83, 4 on left.
Hies called by Bl
Two MIG'17s (Ml .2)
in right turn
passing through
330 to 300 degrees.
One MIG slightly
high and another
1 ow . Lower MIG In
lead. MIGs about
4000 ft altitude.
82 saw only one
MIG-17.
The lower MIG Is
cllabing slightly.
Tl
Alt 6000 ft
Speed - Increasing
Breaking loft
SLUE Flight Jettisoned
tanks and ordnance and
went to afterburner;
B2 sees eecond NIG (HZ)
high and to the right
less than a alio froa
m.
B1 calls Jettison
ordnance and break
left.
Continue to turn
right.
Alt 5000 ft
Speed - Increasing
LH bank
B1 fires at Ml, range
2S00 to 2000 ft. quar-
tering head-on pass.
B2 does not fire.
Ntfi passes.
81 fired 66
rounds.
u
Alt 5000 ft
B1 passes MT with about
3000 ft lateral separa-
tion.
Ml then passes below B2
about 530 ft vertical
and 200 ft horizontal,
head on.
Flight breaks right.
82 then sees N2.
M2 off to the
right 45* fron 82.
1 «11e away and
1000 ft above 62.
Alt 5000 ft
BLUE Flight exits
NIGs roll out of
turn on e norther-
ly heading. .
* *
y Event lI-*7
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105Ds t« four MXO-lTDs
Result: No daoage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21^08 'N/lOfi^SS'S '
1. PftlHARf NISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/TlOM: 16 Septenber 1966/1647H
BLUE Plight (four P-1050a) were^on a strike mission against JC3 16.00 (the Dap Cau
Inland hlghvay bridge) 21°12<llV106°0S*<i<i". BLUE Flight was the last of several flights
that attempted to attack this target on this date. nu?ee of the other flights can be
found in Events ZX-45* 11-46, and I-S6.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Q Deoarted Korat and proceeded over the Gulf of Tonkin to refuel at approximately
19 W/108 E then proceeded north to Isle de Madelene and thence due west on the north side
of Haiphong Ridge to the target area. Return by the same route with post-strike refueling.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
F-IOSD BLUE 1. 2. 3 and 4
2 - 3000 lb borabs (one under each wing}
1 - Centerllne fuel tank and bomb bay tank •
1062 rounds ammunition - 20mffl ^
Camouflage paint
Radar turned off
HIQ-17 (with afterburner) MIO 1. 2. 3 and 1
Camouflage paint
No guna or ordnance reported
4. FLIfiHT CONDITIONS FRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Good visibility.
BLUE 1. 2. 3 and »
Altitude : 3000 ft MSL 500 ft AOL
Heading: 21^°
Speed ; 510 KZAS
Fuel State : Unknown but not a consideration in this event.
Formation ; Approximate
■ • • ■ • o - ■ ■
t 4 1
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Three NXOs initially detected by BLUE 1 Lead against terrain background at the
2 o'clock position, range estimated about "10 miles." Note: Sae Pilot Coaaents (Note d).
6. ACTION INITIATED
RLUE Plight assessed the situation as follows: \
1. The NXOs were not yet aware of the presence of BLUE Plight.
2. BLUE Plight could not continue to target without pemlttlng the NIQs to attain a
favorable 6 o'clock position on BLUE Plight.
Oh this basis the decision was made to turn and attemt to engage the NlOa from their
6 o'clock.
7. . SITUATION OEVELOPMENT
BLUE Plight turned on the MIQa 6 o'clock and closed to a range of 5030 ft vheii:
1. BLUE 1 aighta MIO 4 at 4 o'clock, low range.
2. MIO 3 Bade an abrupt raversal of flight path toward BLUE Plight.
3. BLUE Plight now broke down and left, and egresaed the area.
10. AIRCREM COHMEHTS AND EXPERIENCE
Eatperleno
BLUE 1
Total
Houra
3200
P-105
Houre
1200
Combat
m»8lon8
65
Ctr«nt Il-*7
Remarks
One training firing of a SIDE-
VZKDER; sixteen jun firings
on low targets.
Cowwenta op thla Encounter
a. Attained position to permit effective use of a missile. Kisslles wer* not carried
since AlK-9 pylon was a high-drag device that could not be Jettlaoned, Also the Installa-
tion and weight decreased the P-105 bonb-carrylng capacity.
b. The radar was turned off since It triggered the radar warning gear. The proced-
ure was for an Individual to alert other flight members before turning on radar and then
to make only a few sweeps.
c. Navigation was done by dead reckoning,
the coast.
The doppler was flied as the flight passed
Pra
Wis
jJect Interviews ;
issages. ReportaT
d. The niOs were seen Initially against a terrain background even though camouflaged.
BLUE 1 stated that he was able to sight the MIGs due to the fact that ho had acquired con-
siderable experience attempting to keep track of camouflaged P-I03s which seem to disappear
if not continuously observed. However, by lookinc for movenient instead of changes in color
they oould be detected.
e. BLUE 1 felt that NIQ i| was an instructor and the other three NIQs wars students on
■ training mission. The presence of BLUE Plight warned by MIG 4.
Comawnts on Overall Experience
f. Guns were bis best weapon.
g. The gunslght cameras were bad and the film not exposed correctly.
h. Caasra pods were heavy and created too maeb drag. Also switching was too era-
plicated.
i. Would prefer nonrefZeotivs silver paint on bottom of aircraft. Blends with sky
better than grey or white.
J. Likes .P-« SPARROW installation since It can always b*e«msd.
11. DATA SOURCES
BLUE 1, 5 January 1967
7k? 162356Z Sept 66 DID 30 456 Sept 66
TAP I61947Z Sept 66 DOCO 25603 Sept 66
3B8TFW OPREP 4/257 16 Sept 66
TAP 161724Z Sept 66 OPREP-4 DOC 02560
12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTtON
BLUE Plight was on* of four flights directed against JCS 16.00/616 the Dap C**.; rail-
•'Xw"?.**^?**-*? bridge. Two other flights were P-105 (Events 11-45 and II-46)and jne was
a flight of P-4s (Event 1-56). Tiie P-48 were carrying ordnance and at thia time hdd just
started accompanying the strike groups. The speed Incompatibility, for best cruise
between the P-1059 and Pr4s, made the P-4s short on fuel, consequently the flight tlmlns
was Important .
By the tine BLUE Plight had progressed to the vicinity of the target, the P-4 air-
craft which had been scheduled to precede BLUE Plight to the target, was behind the
flight. The P-48 had been Included with the strike group in order to provide protection
but did not do so that day.
BLUE Plight proceeded to the target, staying^Just below the ridge line in order to
protect themselves from SAMs. As they neared the target, three MIO-lTs In trail were
obaerved. The MIOs were In a gentle climbing turn. BLUE Plight determined that they
eould not hit the tai«et without permitting the MIOs to gain BLUE 6 o*eloek. Therefore
a decision was made to engage the HIQs. i^^wr.
T^J-B^*** Plight to close on the MIOs from the 6 o'clock position and
attack NIOs. BLUE Plight therefore started a climbing, left hard turn. The BLUE forma-
H®" J*!*.**?" V^t S'J °' 540 knots, closed fairly rapidly on the HIQs, who con-
tinued their right hard climbing turn. • ^ • » -
0 ^ 4* ?^PP*«* on 3 as BLUE Plight dosed to within 5000 ft of MIO 1. Hm
P-105 was equipped with a lead aomputing gunslght set up for « range of 1500 ft.
, '^"^ ^ • »in8l« MO *t < o'clock low approaching the flight, BLUE
1 called BLUE 3 and informs BLUE 3 that he will continue to attack the third WO and
for BLUE 3 and 4 to sandwich the lone MIO between the elements of BLUE Plight. Later
playback of WILD VEA8EL tapes indicated that BLUE 3 never received this transmission 6ue
178
II
II
II
0
0
D
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Event I1-*T
, tg radio lnterf«r*ne«: Since BLUB 1 had not asked for conflmtlon froa BLUB 3 he was not
1 aware that BLUE 3 did not understand the role he vas to play.
BLUE Plight continued to close on NIO 3 while NIG 4 closed on the flight. Nio's
suddenly executed a very hard left turn (described as an about-face by BLUB 1) back Into
BLUE Flight, but lost airspeed in the s«neuver.
Due to the position of HIG 3 «nd 4, BLUE Plight decided to disengage and broke off to
the left. BLUE 1 Jsttlsoned everything but pylons while the rest of the flight Jettisoned
both stores and pylons. MIC .4 stayed inside the turn for a few seconds and then broke off.
KIO 1 and 2 nade a less abrupt turn than HIO 3 In order to backup MIC 3*
BLUE Flight's turn after the initial break is not made too rapidly since BLUE 2 could
not light his afterburner. Conseauently , BLUE 2 turn was made in military power. BLUB
Plight still stayed together and due to their speed advantage, MIQ 3 did not pose a
threat.
Aa the turn was completed the HIQs were lost, but flak la noticed, with 37ssa burata
at 3C0O ft. The flight leveled off above the flak and proceeded out.
At the time that BLUE Pllfrht became engaged with the NIQs, BLUE 1 heard the 7-48-
a Iking end they acknowledged the KIG call that BLUE Plight cade. Shortly after that tha
;-4s announced that they were at Bingo fuel and departed.
\
\ .
X
179
RIO BAMW 11^47 S0Ht1*RV
Kirk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 3. 4)
Coaaunlcattons
Ineay Actions
(ni6 1,2)
Rensrks
Status
Action
Other Friendly
%
Alt 3000 ft fabAut
500 ft AGL) Speed
540 KTAS Heading
27S» radar off
aircraft. Flight
starting )eft turn
82 calls "MIGs"
three ttaes 81 (L)
ins vruccs Dc zo oe
quiet. 62 also
calls "Bogeys"
at 2 o'clock
MIGs in climbing
right turn at
about 500 ft AGL
Speed about 900
knots. NIGs are
In trail about 200
ft apart
Decision Is oade
to attack migi.
Particularly H3.
T|
Closing on nif,t.
In f ulf alii tipv
power. 540 KTAS
3000 ft Nalntain*
tng foraatlon.
Flight starts c11«b
mTWT HISS. 9011 up
a1r-to-a1r sight
HIGs continuing
gentle cllabing
turn to right
niGS ZSOU AGL
HIGs now at 11
o'clock
Ti
Alt 4000-5000 ft
nalntalning foraa-
tlon. Velocity
540 KTAS
81 sights lone MIfi
closing on flight froa
4 o'clock behind and
betotf
B1 calls 83 and
announces plan to
continue after 3
MIGs and let B3
and 84 sandwic't
lone N4. 81 does
not ask for con-
foraatlon
83 never received
the comaunlcatlon
since radio
transalsslon Has
blocked.
Range to NI6s •
4000 ft 80*> angU
off. VatocUy
540 KTAS
81 starts left descend-
ing turn starts to
light afterberner and
then does net. 81. 82
83, 84 Jettison bombs
at start of turn. 81
dfd fiol £l#an nff
pylons. 82 tries to
light afterburner and
It Hill not light. 83
and 84 stay with 81 and
82.
R1 f a 1 1 c #nv» hv>AAk
wj iignis aTier-
burner and breaks
back Into the
flight. M4 at
3000 ft and 4
o'clock. HI and
M2 go Into turn.
H4 stays Inside
turn for few
seconds and then
breaks off.
Descending H •
3000 ft S^ed
S40 kt
81, 82. 83. 8-4 lose
sight of MIGs. Flight
returns to coast as
they entered
Flak. 37Mi, bursts
at 3000 ft
I
1
q;=7
BvMt 11-08
Aircraft Involved: Three P-1058 v» one 100-19 wid
three MlO-t
Result: Ho danage
1. PRIHARf KISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time:' 17 Septeober 1966/0927H .
p.lOSa on a strike ml»elon, target being railroad bridge (21-33'M/106«30'E).
2. HIS5I0N ROUTE *
Departed Korat for Broim Anchor refueling over Gulf of Tonkin, banker drop off direct
21«06'M/107»27'E. Direct 2l«37'N/106n5'E direct target. Egrese by reverae route.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
?-10S BLUE 2. 3. ^
1 gun (1029 rounds full)
ICQ
2 unknown 1 KIG-19
Silver In color
4. FLI6HT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Clear, visibility 7 miles, and haie.
BLUE BLUE
1 — n
Altitude : 9000 ft 15.000 ft
Heading : ~i^2 T
Speed ; -9 Mach -.9 Haeh-
FUiT'State : Onknowi
Plight Forwation !
Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION . ' .
BLUE 2 saw a MIO-19 with a Red Star on tall at his 5 o'clock position. BWE 3 vls«aUjr
sighted three KIGs at 5000 ft AOL heading 180°.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 2 executed a Split-S to 2000 ft, BLUE 3 and BLUE » selected afterburner and dove
to the deck.
7. SITUATIOM DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 2- While in split, MIO fired at BLUE 2 who saw cannon fire P«"^nS ^Y*; ^iJll*^,
•ides^Sr^f^e. wien leJSl at 2000 ft and .95 «ach WO made another pas. at BWE 2, firing
his cannon. BLUE .2 lit afterburner and egressed area.
B^UE end H
Egressed the area without contact.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 2, 3, * cannon. Hone
ICO -19 Cannon, 2/0
Hxos ? Unknown
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Horisontal situation indicator was inoperative.
U, DATA SOURCES
Massages. Reports : . . ■ -
OPREP-3 2171355Z Sept St DOCO 25648
CCMUSMACV MACOl Soe Z P17 12522 Sept 66
FBIS OKINAWA P172»l5s Sept 66
•
12. WUiUTIVE DESCRIPTION . Event XI-48
BLIB Plight was outbound fron th« target when BLUE 1 was hit and BLOE 2, 3, and 4
orbited to follow BLUS 2 who Inqiaeted the ground. BLUE 3 and 4 then headed toward the
eoast and lost eight of BLUE 2 whom they, tliought was follOMlne then. BLUE 2 lost BLUE 3
and * and was following an Inaccurate heading. BLUE 2 was at approximately 15,000 ft and
.<( Hacth Nhen be saw a WO-19 at his 5 o'clock position. BLUE 2 then went Into a Spllt-S
WMvmv, The Mia fired at BLUE 2 during this maneuver and BLUE 2 saw cannon fire tcolng
over hla left and right wing. aLUE 2 recovered at 2000 ft at .95 Mach. He asked for a
LV steer which be received and headed again approxlMtely ISO*, 2000 ft and .95 Mach when
the KIO again mad« another firing pass. BLUE 2 then selected afterburner and egreaaed the
area. No damage to the aircraft.
'^SS'^i^ ' spotted three "10a of unknown aodel and type heading 180*» at 5000 ft
AOL. BLUE 3 and » hit afterburner and accelerated away from tba area at l.S.Maoh. No
damans to the aircraft was recorded and no encounter logged.
184
I
Ev«nt II-*I9
Three P-lOSDs va three MI0-17a
Aircraft Involved:
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l'39*N/106*37«e
t. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL jITUATION
Oate/Tliue: 18 September 1966/0931H
Three P-105DS (BLUE Plight) departed Korat AS on a mission into Route Package Vl-A.
Their target was the southwest Oao Quan POL storage.
2. MISSION Roure
See Event 11-52
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-lQjP BLUE 1. 2. i
Unknown external stores
««.IG-17 MIG 1. 2. ^
External fuel tanks
4. FLIGHT C0N01TI0N3 PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clear, visibility 5-6 ml In haze.
BLUE 1. 2. 1
Altitude : 7-8.000 ft
Heading; : 290
Speed : J»80 let
Fuel State : Unknown
Plight Farmatlon
Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
at abSif 6^7;JSo'f?.'!;e";i!;";6o5.***' " ««• ^--^
6. ACTION INITIATED
7. ■ SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
saw a?SV}ih?*iif^^^*°"*'*.*^^ external stores and turned Into the MIOs. When the HlOa
Sfrnr Jllfht Jettison ordnance the MICs executed a Spllt-S and departed the area.
St?! rj^5^ jUght of the HlGs and continued in a 3600 turn. BLUE Lead sighed the
HIGs ahead approximately *l-5 miles. In full A/B, the flight accelerated to 1.1 Mach The
WI05 were low 2-3.000 ft, while the P-105b were at 5-6.000 ft. As BLUE Plight oass^d
1 ^"^y although the MIQs were only aboSt l^^S
1-1/2 nlles ahead, BLUE Plight broke off the chaae and headed fo^the coast There wa.
Se"Io«K «o5^:ei'j;'thI^Si5"" '"^ •^•^'^•^ ^" tSe vlclnuy orSJsowiSI-S^E.
Tne Closest approach of the HIQs was approalmateJy one mile.
8. ORDNANCE
None expended.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
to. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
BLUE 1 (Uad)
Total
Hours
1750
P-I05
Hours
950
Combat
Missions
70
I85
. 'Event lI-*9
CoaMcntg on this Encounter
BLUE 1 (Lead) eipressed his opinion that the HICs w«re highly successful In making
P-105 flights Jettlstn thelp ordnance prior to roachlns their target. The NZOs would
then depart the <irea.
11. DATA SOURCES
Proleet Interviews : BLUB I (Lead) 5 Jan 196?.^
Me«aaire5. Reoorta T 7AP/OPREP-3/180T502 Sep 66/DOCO 2568$
12. ■ARRATIVE OCSCRIPTtON
See paragraphs 5> 6 and 7<
See also Events ZI>SO. 11-51* and 11-52.
186
Aircraft Involved
Iteiultt No duiag«
Vicinity of Encounter;
Event 11-50
Two F-105D8 va four HIQ^lTs
1. PRlNARt MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: IB September 1966/I6I8H
BLUE Plight, two P-105D aircraft, were en route on a strike mission against the Dap
Cau Highway/Railroad Bridge In Route Package VI-A. Prior to reaching the target the
flight encountered four HIO-17 aircraft and Jettisoned all external stores as the NIOs
attacked.
2. mSSIOII ROUTE
After departing Korat the route of the flight is unknown. The encounter occurred In
tbe vicinity of 2in2*N/106°19'B.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105P BLUE 1. 2
Unknown ordnance load, reference waa oade to external stores.
iao.17 HIQ 1. 2. 3. 1
External fuel tanks.
Quns.
4. FLI6HT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather t Unknown
BLUE 1. 2
Altitude: 1,500 ft
Heading : 25*
Speed : 5*0 kt
Puel State ; Unknown
Flight Formation ; . . ...
Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Four Nia-17 aircraft were sighted in the 9 o'clock position of BLUE Plight. The
nOB were on an easterly heading In a loose echelon formation at about 2,000 ft, 3-k
miles away.
6. ACTION INITIATED
The NIQa Jettisoned their external fuel tanks and <nade a hard left turn Into BLUE
Flight. BLUE Plight went Into a shallow, left downward spiral as they Jettisoned external
stores and accelerated to 600 kt.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT
As the lead .HIQ approached the 8 o'clock position on SLUE Plight, he fired a five-
second gun burst. No hits were reported. The closest approach of the MZQs waa 3,000 ft.
ORDNANCE
Me. flred/Wo. hits
1/0
WO-1
9. EQUIPMENT
None reported.
ir. AIRCREW COMMENTS
None obtained.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; None
Messages. ReportsT
7AF/OPREP-3/181638Z Sep 66/DOCO 25701 Sep 66.
7AF/DAI/182319Z Sep 66/DlO 30179 Sep 66.
Remarks
No hits
/
18T
. BvMit II 050
U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Two P-105D aircraft departed Korat AB on a mission Into Route Package VI-A. In the
vicinity of ai'ia'N/loe'Xg'E the flight encountered four MIO-IT airplanes at about 16«»8
hours. The flight was heading 254^ at an altitude of 1*500 ft when the niOa were sighted
at the 9 o'clock poslticn cn an easterly heading at approximately 2,000 ft. When the MIOs
sighted the F-1055, they j^^ttlsoned their external fuel tanks and turned hard left, from
an echelon fcrmation, tz attack the P-103s. BLUE Plight entered a shallow, left spirallng
descent as external stores were jettisoned and speed was Increased to 600 kt. As the lead
RIG reached the 8 o'clock position on BLUE Flight he fired a five-second burst from his
guns. No hits were reported. The closest point of approach of the MIOs was about 3,000 ft.
BLUE Plight continued their turn toward the hills in the vicinity of 21»15*N/106«20»E.
The Niea did not follow the P-1Q58. BLUE Flight then made a I80* turn to see if the MIOs
were following any of the other strike flights as they were coming off the target. The
NIGs had departed the area and although the direction was unobserved it was estimated
that they departed to the south. No distinctive markings were observed on the NIOs.
See also Events 11-51 and 11-52.
186
B
B
B
'-5
0
D
0
II
B
0
Bv«nt 11-51
Alrerar, Involved: Pour P-lOSs va two nO-lTS-
Result: Sighting Only
Vicinity of Encounter: 10 nl from D«p Cau Railroad/
Highway Bridge
1. PRtHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Datemve; 18 Septenber 1966/l6«ilH
A flight of four P-lOSs were on a strike nission against the Dap Cau Rallroad/Klgh-
way Bridge.
2. KISSION ROUTE
ProbRbly similar to Event 11-52.
3. Aircraft configurations
l=m BLUE I, 3,
? - 3000 lb bombs
1 - 650 gal c interline tank
1 • N->61 gun with full anno <1029 rd 20nm)
BLUE 2
* - CBU-27
1 - 650 gal eenterline tank
1 - 11-61 gun with full annto
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Unknown
BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1
Altitude : 6OOO ft
S£ce-_; 550 kt
Fuel State : Unknown, eenterline tanks had been Jettisoned
30 ml from target area^ Inbound
Plight Poraation : O
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Two MlC-17 flehtera were sighted by BLUE 2 in the 9 o'clock position of the flight
at a range of approximately 6 miles, level' in altitude.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight engaged afterburners and continued to the target aooelerating to 675 KCAS.
7. SITUATIOR DEVELOPMENT
Aa BLUE Plight accelerated, the NZOs were no threat. Heavy iSm AA gunfire was en-
countered so the flight descended to minimum altitude, approainately 50 ft.
8. ORDNANCE
Hone expended.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
10. AtRCREU COMMENTS
No specific connents.
11 . DATA SOURCES
Project Intervlgwg: BLUE 2, 15 March 1967
Messages. Reports ; 7AP/DAI/182319Z Sep 1966/ DIO 30«l79
Event IX-51
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOH
BLUE Flight «a9 Inbound to the target when BLUE 2 sighted two MIOb at 9 o*clock from
the flight. Immediately the flight engaged afterburner and accelerated In a shallow de-
scent. The mos were easily outdistanced. Heavy AA fire In the target area probably
cai!«ed the KIOs not to follow the F-105b. Ko specific markings were Identified on the
Mids and they were not sighted again.
1
r
I
I
I
i
I
i
I
I
•••1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
BT«nt 11-52
Aircraft Involvctd: Four P-lOSDs 7S four NZa-17a
Result: Ko dwwg*
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*08 'N/106*17*B
1. PRIMRV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dat«/Tlme: IB September 1966/1645H
Pour P-105DS (BLUE Plight) were the last of approximately eight fllghte striking the
Dap Cau bridge In Route Package VLA (21'>12*N/106O05*E> . BLUE Plight had split Into tvo
elements, and was aoecleratlng for their bomb run.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Plight departed Korat^ refueled on the Bro«n Anchor tracks then headed north up the
Ouir of Tonkin, and west Into the target area, Egresa was oade on the same general
route.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P»105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4
Onknown - Oeneral purpose bombs
2 - <i50-gal drop tanks
Camouflage palnc
IPP on; TACAN and radar on standby
HIQ~17 MIO 1. 2. 3. ft
Unknown
4. FLI6HT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather I Unknown along route - estimated scattered to broken. 2 to 5-mlle visibility in
target area.
BLUB
I 2 3 T
Altitude: 6 to 7,000 ft— ••»—
Heading ; 280«— -.^.h..^.
Speed : 500 kt — ^
Fuel State ; Approx. 10,000 lb
Flight Formation : Elements had separated approximately 2
north of track, and BLUE 3 and ft running south of track,
altitude.
n ml with BLUE 1 and 2 running
Elements were flying at tba
\
$. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 3 and 4 sighted four Kio-lTs at 9 o'eloek, level, heading 090**, approximately
400 kt. NIOs were about 1 n mi south of BLUE 3 and 4, and flying in a loose right
echelon formation. NIOs made a left turn In and behind the BLUE 3 element.
6. ACTION' INITIATED
ViDE 3 and ft Jettisoned their ordnance, nosed over for acceleration,' and made a hard
left turn back to the northeast. BLUE 1 and 2 were already in a pop-up maneuver on the
target; however, they dropped short when the NIOs were called, and turned back left to
pick up the NIOs.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 3 and 4 accelerated and descended to the deck heading back out 050*. The NlOa
had rolled Into their 6 o'clock position and HIQa 1 and 2 fired their cannons as they
rolled out of the turn. BLUE 3- and 4 received no hits as they had already accelerated
well out of gun range. BLUE 1 and 2 dropped their ordnance In the vicinity of the target,
and then broke back left to assist BLUE 3 and 4. ^,£^0^^ acquired the NIOs during his
• X91
Svent XI-52
turn, but his slenent rolled out 7 to 8 n ml In trail. BLUE 3 and <> continued their
egression heading 050®. The MIGs. unable to close, gave up the chase and turned off
tOHai*d the south. BLUE 1 and 2 were unable to close within firing range before they lost
vlsuml eontset with the MZO flight. .BLUE Flight rejoined and returned hone safely.
8. OROMANCE
mOs 1 and 2 fired their cannons, but made no hits.
10. MICREH COmCHTS
g»perlence
Co w ae nt s on this Encounter
BLOB 1 expressed the need for an aircraft with a much greater turn capability than
the P-105. He also stated a dealre for greater acceleration, rate of climb, and endurance
under combat conditions. Ke believes the P-105 needs better cockpit visibility, especially
Between 5 and 7 o'clock. Once again swltchology was a factor In the difficulty In chang-
ing the PCS froa the ooiab mode to the alr-to-alr mode.
BLUB 1 also feels there must be a reduction of the radio chatter In the combat area.
An l^»roveaent In our own OCX to facilitate a better and more specific KIQ warning system
Is required.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUB 1, 5 Jan 1967
Wessages. ReportTT
7tb AP OPREP-3, 181737Z Sept 66, OOCO 2^699
388th TPV OPREP-4/297. l8 Sept 66 (ReauM) .
12. lARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Items 4-7 adequately describe the narrative of this event; however, a question aa to
relative positions of all aircraft at initial sighting should be mentioned at this point.
This outline generally follows the Information contained In the interview with BLUE 1.
The OPBEP-3 differs In the following manner: BLUE 3 and 4 made Initial sighting when
on a heading of C500, altitude 3 to 4,000 feet. MIOs were heading approximately 240^
and co-altlt;ide. BLUE 3 and 4 were supposedly In a 360° turn taking spacing from other
flights already on the target. The possibility exists that BLUE 3 and 4 were actually
taking spacing on the lead element (BLUE 1 and 2), as confirmed by BLUE I's statement
that be had split his elements. The OFREP could then be picking up this event as the
MIOo were already rolling In on 3 and 4 since all following Information la In correlation.
See also Events XI-50 and ZI-51.
BLUE 1
Total
Hours
6100
P-105
Hours
500«
Combat
Missions
(560 hours)
192
%
RED BARON tVEWT 11-5? SUNNAfiV
I
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 3, 4)
CoMunlcatlons
Eneny Actions
(HIG 1.2}
Rcaarks
Status
Action
Other Friendly
\
BLUE Flight
Alt. 6 - 7.000 ft
SCO-SSO kts
Heading 280o
Full Ordnance
loid and 10,000
lb of fuel.
er and 2 accelerating
Just prior, to pop-up
•aneuvtr.
B3 and 4 sighted
4 MIR. 175 In
loose R echelon
at 9 o'clocic,
level . 400 kt.
B3 and 4 called
HIGs at 9 o'clock.
MIGs were In loose
right ec he 1 on
heading 090* at
about 7000 ft.
Speed about 400 kt.
•
h
Sane as Tn
Bl and 2 pop-up to
IZ.OOO ft but drop
short of target when
they hear M16 call.
63 and 4 observe
HIGs turning In
on then. 3 and 4
Jettison ordnance
dunp the nose,
AS, accelerate,
and begin hard
left turn to
heading OSO^.
B3 and 4 call
HIGs rolling
Into their
6 o'clock.
HIGs peel off
and roll in
behind B3 and 4.
Unknown
Both flights
dcscendlna and
accalaratiag.
81 (L) acquire visual
contact with NI6s
chasing 3 and 4.
BLUE 1 and 2 re)1 In
trail Mith Nlfis at
approjt. 7 n Hi rang*
B3 and 4 hold
heading 050°
and attenpt to
outrun the HIGs.
HIGs 1 and 2 fire
cannons at B3 and
4. The HIGs are
out of range and
B3 and 4 receive
no hits.
BLUE 3 and 4 are
accelerating on
the deck and
observe ordnance
from HIG 1 and 2
splashing Into ^
the paddies S
below then. [J
h
550 kt
3.000 ft ilt.
6.500 - 7.000 lb
of fuel.
81 and 2 are In trail
and closing on NIGs,
however NIGs turn off
to the south and are
lost In the haze.
B3 and 4 continue,
egression on 050"
heading.
HIGs break off
attack and turn
off toward the
south.
HIGs could not ^
close on B3 and 4.3
I
Event II-S3
I
I
I
I
I
Aircraft Involved: Eleven P-lOSs va four
MIO-178
Result: No daaaee
Vicinity of Encounter: Approximately ,
ai'SO'K/lOS" 30»B*
1. priharv hissior and tactical situation
Date/Time: 20 September 1966/I6U5H
OREEN Flight (three P-lOSDs) and BLUE Flight (four F-lOSDa) bombed a highway
bridge fifteen Biles northeast of Thai Nguyen. (JCS 78.62 at 2X*>kH' 30^*11/106^ O^i' 16"E)
PURPLE Plight (t«o P-105Dg and two P-105P Wild Weasel) was an IRON HAND Plight
supporting GREEN Plight, BLUE Plight aiid a flight of three P-UCa on strllte/CAP. BLUE
Plight was 3-5 minutes (approximately 30 miles) behind OREEN Plight and PURPLE Plight
was 8-10 minutes behind GREEN Plight crossing the Red River near Yen Bal. The flight
of three P-DC aircraft were assigned strlke/CAP with their primary tarf St in the
sane area and at approximately th6 same TOT as the P^lOSs.
2. MISSION ROUTE
GREEN and BLUE Flights departed Taktili about the time PORPLE Plight departed Korat.
PURPLE 1 was delayed ten minutes at takeoff after aborting his first aircraft. All flights
refueled on their scheduled tankers and proceeded north-northwest to cross the Red River
in the vicinity of Yen Bal. OREEN 3 aborted while attempting to refuel and GREEN
then moved up to fill In as GREEN 3. The flights flew east from Yen Bal passing north
of Thai Nguyen and then southwest to the target. Egress was via the reverse route to
post-strike tankers and then recovery at their respective bases. OREEN Plight descended
to 8 to 10,000 ft altitude after crossing the Red River while BLUE Plight descended to
tree-top level (approximately 3500 ft NSL). PURPLE Fli^t alao descended to 8 to 10,000 .
ft.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-.105D OREEN I. 3
5 * 1000 lb bombs
2 - 450 gal drop tanks
20mm ammo (1029 rounds saeh)
P-105D GREEN 2
4 - CBU-248 (flak suppression)
IFF. TACAN, and radar-off camouflage' paint
20mm ammo (1029 rounds)
P-105D BLUE 1. 3. 1
5 - 1000 lb bombs
2-450 gal drop tanks
20011 ammo (1029 rounds each)
P»105D BLUE 2
4 - CBU-2i(8 (flak suppression)
IFF. TACAN, and radar-off, camouflage paint
20mm ammo (1029 rounds)
F»105F/F-10SD PURPLE 1. 2. 3. t
2 . AGM-458 (SHRIKE mlssllss)
2 - LAU-3 (rocket pods)
20mn ammo (1029 rounds)
1 • 630 gal centerline tank
IFF, radar, and TACAN-off, camouflage paint
i mO-17 RED 1. 2. 3. 1
Not given - but only gunfire was observed. Silver color on right wing perpendicular
to leading eoge (as reported by OREEN 3)« One MIO was light gray-blue in color with RVN
■axiangs.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Clear with haze layer up to 10,000 feet
Altitude:
BLUE 1. 2. 3. »
100/150 ft AOL (Grd.
level approx. 3?00 ft)
OREEM 1.
8-9000 ft left orbit
^ee teat for locations of specif le encounters.
.ev«nt ZI-53
peed ;
Fuel;
Plight Pormatlorn
BLOE 1. 2. 3. 0
300"
500 KCAS-plus
10-11,000 lb
Defensive spread
GREEN 1. 2. 3
300*
450 KCAS
10<>11,000 lb
In trail
(rejoining)
PURPLE 1. 2. 3. 1
090"
450-480 KCAS
9»000 lb
Fluid- four (fighting)
Second element 2-
3000 ft lower than
lead and 4-5 miles
In trail
S. niTIAL DETECTION
Area MIQ warnings had been transmitted while GREEN Flight was inbound to the
target. After pulling off of his dive boab run* GREEN 1 orbited the target one time
in order to cheek BOA and then departed on a 300** heading at about 5500 ft NSL as
BLUE night approached the target. GREEN 3 delayed his dive bomb run for better
position and after completing the run pulled up Into a left orbit to rejoin bis flight
at alrrut 8000 ft, 350 KCAS, west of the target and was turning from west to south when
he first saw a flignt of four MIO-lTs passing few hundred feet below hloat his 3 o'clock
beam position. apparently headed northwest in a left turn. GREEN 3 lost the four MIOs In
the sun and haze as he attempted to turn and accelerated after them. Very shortly there-
after. GREEN 2 called that GREEN Plight was being bounced by MIGs and GREEN 1 acquired the
NIGs at his 7 o'clock high, 2 miles back in a left turn, with one element peeling off for
attack. BLUE Flight is on target and PURPLE Flight is about thirty miles west of GREEN
Pllgbt at this time. The P-4C flight position Is unknown but in the area. (No P.4C/MI0
encooBters were reported In this area on this date. Thus It Is assumed that the F-4C
fliglkt was unable to establish contact with the enemy after cleaning their aircraft off.)
ACTION INITIATED
GREEN Flight Jettisoned pylons and tanks. GREEN 1 held course after sighting
two of the four NIGs peeling off for attack. GREEN 2 initiated an attack on the
high MIQ element. OAEEN 3 Is approximately six miles behind his flight. BLUE Lead
eoalns off of target is made aware that he has a hung 1000-lb bomb on an outboard
station and will be unable to maneuver In a turning engagement. Me elected to egress
on tbe deck and attempt to avoid the MIOs. BLUE 1 ordered his flight to remain with
him and egress. PURPLE Flight, coming Into the area. Jettisoned fuel tanks and turned
to mid OBEEN -Pllgbt.
7. SITUATIOM OEVELOPMENT
SREEN 1 waited until the two MIG-17s were close to firing range ('vSOOO ft) with a high
overtake speed, and then performed a high-g roll to the right followed immediately by a
hlgh-<-c reverse roll back to the left. At least one of the MIGs fired a cannon burst at
OREES 1 as he broke right. The MIGs are at GREEN l>s 11 o'clock position in a tight left
turn as GREEN 1 completes his high-g break and reversal, but the NIOs dive for the deck and
EM 1 cannot track them in the turn or accelerate fast enough to close on them. GREEN 1,
and 3 elect to egress at high speed and rejoin on the south side of the Red River.
BLUE I sees F-105s and MIGs hasseling overhead but elects to egress on the deck supersonic
becaoM of the hung bomb on BLUE 1. One MIG dives after BLUE Plight but cannot close due
to BUBS Plight's high speed. PURPLE 1 sees two NIOs at his 12 o'clock and engages.
PURPLE 1, 3, and 4 fire their cannon at NIGs and three MIOs fire at PURPLE Flight members
with no apparent nits. . PURPLE Plight terminated the engagement by JettiSMtlng ordnance
and aeeeleratlng to supersonic speed.
8. MONANCE
_ t un
OREEa 1. 2, 3
BLUE 1, 2, 3, 4
PURPLE 1
PURPLE 2
PURPLE 3
PURPLE «
NIG 1
HIO 2
NIO 3
mo «
Wo. flred/Mo. hits
(CANNON)
0/0
0/0
460/0
0/0
150/0
200/0
Twlce/0
?/0 •
Twlee/O
Onoe/D
Remarks
At OREEN 1
and PURPLE 2
At PURPLE 1
and PURpLC 3
Event 11-53
9. CQUIPHCNT PROBLEMS
GREEN 3 - Could not complete refueling inbound.
tnoB,^ r bolt failed in outboard wing pylon etiwlng 1000 lb bomb to hans up.
;»nor^ \ * P«^ayed ten minutes at take-off after aborting first aircraft.
PURPLE « - No sight reticle during flight.
10. AIRCREW
CONHENTS
Total
F-105
Combat
Hours
Hours
Missions
Remarks
GREEN \
1600
100
8
2-1/2 yrs ADC In P-101
, and P>102, no missile
firing* fired at DART
two times.
BLUE 1
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Previous P-105 Instruc-
tor at NelUs
PURPLE 1
4000
1100
57
Vlld Weasel School,
PURPLE 3
P-105 IP at Nellia
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
TAC background, much
P-IOS time. Wild Weasel
School
PURPLE <t
1750
950
70
TAC background. Fighter
Weapons School Qraduate
Other flight laembers unknown.
P-4 Plight
- not Interviewed,
Comments on this Encounter:
|£UE^: Oun site camera produces haiy Images. P-105 a good aircraft for this tyoe war
BuTany new aircraft should be able to maneuver In high ^g" condition. Would llir
^-"5 c*n fight With Mlo-21 at low altiiCdea aScriiS to
Haj, John Boyd's Energy Manueverability Charts.
sSlt^he s. * "^^^"^^ '"^ method to select gun-air without changing so onny
Sfw^; «»^i?LJ?-*" «"ll*nt airplane, in. carrying heavy loads to distant targets.
InJ2^.5 J« k"?*"?.^*'''*'™*"" »ltit«d«8 at high speeds. P-105 pilots
?Si^h niJnf ^^^lo^xx. any air-to-alr fighter vs fighter training. CoSbat la a
«^hJ.Si % ?ni"''" r^**^ ? ^° survive in engagementi with enefflJ
(5o25 S'or liw)!*" ^^••^ "n"8"r«lon and light fSi load.
n. DATA SOURCES
Project I nterviews : BLUE 1 , 6 Jan 67 - .--'*'
QREEN 1, (Letter)
GREEN 3, M Feb 67 - — '
PURPLE I, in Mar 67 ^ — "
PURPLE 4, 5 Jan 67 "
7AP 201500Z Sept 66 OPR^.4-1Idc6 25793
Messagres :
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION^'
T GREEN Pl^rr'^HEEW Plight heard MIQ alert calls on Guard Channel while inbound
tS the^iarset heading Southeast at 8 to 10,000 feet NSL. 48oSota SJlnd aoJed
"Sr"Jit'cS!ir'* " oREEUpiigS? 5Sknf:Sio;^;;^he
Vj^^}"^^^^ ' Plight, about 3-5 mlnutea behind ORBEN Plight, was aolnir to
Js^rc^^'-frisS s^xs'fSiSre'ir?**" "ssx:^^
flym riead posft'U n ^JERfLE^f?'.??' ^"«^* • Weasel P-105P
to i-ft;?^? Q?« i:-?' ^^^l^ Plight's purpose was to supppesa SA-2 radars and attemot
intl!?i^ flights. This flight was three minutes late ^
entering the target area due to PURPLE 1 aborting his first aircraft Th«r.««! on-
t^^^:::^^^^ .d sJ^s^ht^^^^^
gSeS /i.^ tH^liJ**' aircraft ended up as essentially thJ^rsX^Jt! iKSaft.
300- oSeH 2 Is SirrtS*"?!!! Jf^S.***? ".5°° ^'^ 2000 ft AQL. and heldl^
kf- Jii! '° ^*8ht of CREEK I and a few miles to the rear. GREEN 3
cas» off of hia boslb run. pulled up to 8OOO feet in a left turn attempting to r^ln;
nr -
Event 11-53
OREEN 3«s alropeed was down to 350 KCAS as a result of the climb. As OftEEN 3 was turning
rrom w«3t toward south, he saw four HIC-178 passing beneath him several hundred
ieet on his beam at 3 o'clock. The HIOs were In a fingertip formation. He attempted to
^urn and accelerate after them but lost them In the hate and sun. OREEH 2 then called,
"GREEN Plight Is being bounced by MIQs."
BLUE Plight ; BLUE Pli^t was Just coming off target when OREEN 2 made hlb call.
BLUE 1 was acutely aware of a hung 1000-pound bomb on an outboard wing pylon. He elected
to avoid confrontation with the MIGs If possible because he could not maneuver with the
asymetrlc ordnance load. GREEN 1 called his flight to egress at high speed and descended
to 100 ft AGL at least 500 KCAS and headed 300*.
PURPLE Plight ; PURPLE Plight heard the call that MIQ6 had bounced OREEN Flight, and
turned to proceed to the area. The P-«JC flight on a strlke/CAP mission In the- area called
to clean off their aircraft but apparently were unable to make contact with the MIO.
T» CHEEN Plight ! OREEN Lead saw four MIO-lTs at his 7 o'clock, high about 2 mi range
and CteEft LeaTTelt that he was boxed In as he watched two of the MIGs peeling off in a
left descending turn. GREEN Plight Jettisoned pylons and tanks, OREEH Lead held his
course ♦Jhlle the two HICs closed to firing range at a high overtake speed. When one of the
MIGs rired, OREEN Lead did a high g half-roll to the right, followed quickly by high g re-
verse roll to the left. Both MIGs were then in front of GREEN Lead at 11 o'clock in a
tight turn to the left. He lit afterburner and went high on the MIQs because he coulti not
stay »lth them in the turn for tracking. The two MIGs continued down from about 2000 ft
AQL to treetop level heading south. OREEH 2 made one pass on the two high MIGs, but did
not obtain a firing position. OREEN Plight then returned to course, exited the area, and
rejoined south of tbe Red River prior to refueling and return to base.
BLLE Fllj^t ; BLUE Plight rejoined near the target and descended to 100-150 ft AOL In
-11 military power, accelerating until they had about 600 KCAS. The flight path took
phem wider the engagement^ and BLUE Lead could see the P-105s and MI0-l7s above him. BLUE
Lead observed a MIO-17 drop down toward his flight, but it was unable to close to flplng-lPttige
and sloMly feU behind. BLUE Lead estimatea that the IXLQ started about 1 mlle-«t'6 o'eloek
and was observed until he dropped below the rear of the canopy fraaw -at" roughly 3 mllta,
still losing ground. - '
PURPLE Plight ; PURPLE Plight continued Inbound at 480 KCAS, 8 to 10,000 ft, heading
090* Mlth the element spread about a. mlle'Whind PURPLE Lead. PURPLE Lead saw two NIO-lTs
at 12 o'clock in close formation- "headed south in a left turn at 4 to 5 miles range, and
slightly low. The sun, at PURPLE Plight's 6 o'clock, glinted off of the HIOs and aided
detection. PURPLE'Lead called *MIOs at 12 o'clock level, tanks off and afterburner now."
PURPLK'Pll^t Jettisoned fuel tanks (with about 1000 lb In each tank), retained their
-ordnanoe and accelerated In afterburner to 600 KCAS. [Notes PURPLE Plight never saw any
neober of the other flights during the encounter.]
T, OTEEN PllKht : CREEH Plight egressing individually, at 600 kts ground speed.
BLOE Plight ; BLUE Plight egressing at 600 kt ground speed at 100 ft AOL. BLUE Lead
It ill bas a hung 1000-lb bon^ on his outboard wing pylon.
PURPLE Plight : PURPLE Lead closed on the two MIQs in the vicinity of 21«50'M/105*15'E
(about fifty miles west of the bridge target) aa they turned back and forth between 110 and
190 degrees. PURPLE Lead attacked from the MIQs' 3, 't, 5, and, finally, 6 o'clock position,
PURPLE Lead attempted to change his gun sight from "bombs" to "guns-air" as he was closing
on the lUQa, but Inadvertently stopped the switch at "rockets" and obtained 40 mils sight
depreamlon where 0-10 mil depression would be normal for 1-2 g maneuvering. As PURPI£ Lead
closed to 3000 ft on HIO-1, he opened fire with 20nm cannon. PURPLE Lead fired two long
bursts at Nia l with no visible damage, when he noticed that he was ra^ildly closing on MIG
2 in bla 1 o'clock position. P4I0 1 entered a slow right turn from south to east as PURPLE
Lead nam at 700 KCAS opened fire on NIO 2 at about 1500 ft range. PURPLE Lead had fired
460 ronnds at the two NIGs with no visible damage and was preparing to fire another burst
at Hia 2 at about 500 ft range when HIQ 2 pulled his aircraft straigfit up and back over
PURPLE I.ead. PURPLE 2 saw a third MIO at his 4 o'clock, diving at 40* for PURPLE Lead's
tall firing ;^d called "PURPLE Lead, there is a third NIO trying to get on your tail."
PURPLE Lead could not see NIO 3 and called back that the NIO could not close since he had
now accelerated to 700 KCAS. PURPLE Lead entered a descending left-hand turn, Jettisoned
his orffenance (two LAU-38 and two AQM-458) aeeelerated to 750 KCAS on the deck and headed
back qp Thud Ridge.
T«. PORPLE Pllght i The MIGs then attacked PURPLE 2, and closed to 2000 ft firing as
PURPLE 2 Jettisoned his ordnance, accelerated after PURPLE Lead and outran the MIQs.
T5 PORPLE Plight ; PURPLE 3 and 4 were about 4-5 miles in trail of the lead element at
the outset and now had closed the range with PURPLE 4 about one mile behind PURPLE 3.
PURPLE 3 closed rapidly on MIO 3 vho apparently did not know anyone waa behind him, made
It is Slot exact Ij elear from the data whether BLUE Plight observed the actions of PORPLE
or OBEEH Plight. BLUB 1 Interview indicated GREEN Plight.
200
Event 11-53
» high angle descending paas, closing to 2000 feet and fired 150-200 rd with no visible .
?!?f^'p,iSp?ir^,"*i^h"'* ''•^"8 "^"^ ^""^^^ » high g pullup to the
k!5 : 1 ^" ^ shallow right turn and PURPLE U, who waa a mile aatem.
had trouble matching the MIQa zoom. Once the MIO was on top and had forced PURPLE 3 to
ovepshoot, he relaxed "g" and held his position until he obtained separation and then
J^i pn«T r**/*^^ ^? behind PURPLE 3 apparently not realising that PURPLE 4 was behind
a 1 V: °" 3 with at least 300 kt overtake, at 650-700 KCAS. PURPLE
J opened fire at 2000 feet with no reticle (known at take-off) in a right 20-30'* nose high,
turning pass, and fired 200-300 rounds as he kicked rudder and stirred the stick around In
hi a attempt to hit the MIQ but saw no visible dasuge. v**-*^* "»« •roumi in
T» PORPLEPUsht: As PURPLE k passed 200 feet to the left of MIO 3, WO 3 rolled to the
^i^l f*^^ ^'^^"^ ^^^^^ 3 and began firing. PORPLB « observed the NIO to b«
aJ^mJi?^^®?^™ ?<;nn oil^ ^ markings a* the MIO fired approximately HO to SO roiinda
at ewFLS. 3 from 1500 to 2000 ft range without any hits.
37 PURPLEm^ht: PURPLE 3 was In a descending. Jinking, leas than one g maneuver to - —
acceleratT-aHT^run the MIQ. PURPLE «t made a barrel-roll to the outside liTan attempt
J cJuW n«A:t?'fif^^,P^*"^°" 3. but KIO 3 broke off to the southeast and PURPLE
fllSt J3 pSpi^*?* ^^nlJ"?" of this maneuver. He headed west to rejoin the
riight and PURPLE 3. MIOs 1 and 2 broke off to the southeast when PURPLE 1 and 2 outran
tnen. This engagement started at dOOO ft and ended at about 1000 ft (about 2500 ft USD
and ia estimated to- have lasted 4 minutes. imous ouo rt naui
^ --r'*^"'**"" "ff^a In reference to the above narrative signify only a period durinc
which certain actions transpired, and are not aeeoivanled 6?^ drawSg. ^
overall mission route and general location of aircraft are shoMi in Pioure 1
while the detailed actions of PURPUE Plight are shown in the sketch. *^ *
ro4
22 -j-
GENBtAL AREA
Of f-*
LOCATION
o
SLUE HIOHT Dion
TooecK. cacEN
STAVS HIGH
Q
tOCATtON
ItONHAND
njGHT
CCNEXAL AREA
OF GtCEN FUCHT
CNCOUNTO
. ILUC PUGHT Aiour
NBC WHIN GRECN
•r ENCOUNTBEO MIOS.
TAROfr
18,000- AinTuoe
4MICT GROUND. SKEQ
3
i3
MP MMU ttftllT lumUBy
Tiae
Nark
Action Alrertft (PITRPLE 1, 2, 3, 4)
CoMunlcttfoni
Eneny Actions
(HI6 1.2)
Rtnarks
Status
Action
usner rrionoiy
Be-
fore
\
Gl "We are being
bounced by MIGs."
PURPLE flight had
heard GREEN flight
encounter MIGs.
and Is heading
toward the general
area of GREEN'S
target.
\'
Headlno: 090*
Alt: 3-10. 000 ft
Speed: 4S0 KCAS
Full Internal fuel
PI sees a glint at 12
o'clock, range 4>5 n1 .
H* %m»< that tt iw m
MI&-17. PI then saw
another NI6-I7 below.
Pl-4 drop tanks and
90 to afterburner.
P3 and 4 following
a bit lower and
4-5 Allies back In
trail.
PI has NIGa 12
o'clock.
Two NIG-17S In a
gentle left turn
heading south at
5000 ft.
PI looks down ao-
oentarlly to set
up sight. Gets
only rockets, with
a fixed 40 nil
sight depression.
He did not want
radar ranging due
to low alt. The
sight makes PI
shoot too high.
PURPLE closed from
MIG'S 4 to 6
o'clock.
\
■
PI 2 to 3000 ft
behind Hlfi-i
Hdg: 120*
Speed: 550 KCAS
Alt; 8000 ft
Closing rapidly
PI opens fire on lead
MU
P2 following P).
P3 and 4. In trail.
HIGs continue on.
H2 Is wlngman and
U on the right.
PI fires 2 long
bursts of 20aiai.
No hits.
PI closing rapidly
on M2.
Alt: 8000 ft
Speed; 600 KCAS
PI switched his attack
froa Ml to M2. flongt
ISOO ft down to 500 ft.
Rest of P-Flight
following.
H2 now on the right
side of PI (at
About PI'S 1
o'clock). HI
started a slow
right turn.
PI fired one long
burst at N2. No
hits.
1
KED BAROW CVgilT Il>5> SUHHAWY
Action Aircraft
(PURPLE 1. 2. 3. 4)
Other Friendly
CofliRunlcatlons
En«ny Actions
(NIG 1.2)
Remarks
TUe
Nark
Status
Action
<
PI still closing.
P3 and 4 about
Mach 1.0.
PI Starts to fire egain
at M2 but MI6 breaks
atnay before he can.
P2, 3. 4 still f0l<
lowing P4 about
1 alle In trail of
P3.
P2 and 3 call a
third HIG trying to
close on PI.
H2 breaks straight
up and over the top
to th(i rear of PI.
A third KI6-17 (N3)
at 4 o'clock to
P2 and 3, diving at
40", alt 7000 ft.
Third NIG Is pale
blue-color and Is
hard to sec
PI at 700 KCAS.
The action from thi
PI Jettisoned ordnance,
breaks for the deck, and
then departs the area.
On departure PI had
bingo fuel.
; point on describes only
P3 starts to attack H3.
P2 follOMlng PI
also drops ord-
nance.
the P3 end P4 eirci
P1 Indicates to P2
that H3 cannot
close on thea.
aft.
M3 closes to 2000
ft of P2 but could
not Zitch him,
N3 continues right
turn
\
P3 and 4 In right
turn slightly
descending.
P3 fires at K3 fron 2000
ft range.
Wh2n fired at N3
pulls up hard with
high g.
P3 fired ISO
rounds.
J.
P4 - 20 to 30* nose
high In full After-
burner.
P4 fired at the NIG.
Range 200 ft. P4 bed
2000 knots overtake on
the MIG.
N3 pulled up end
then rolled off
left behind P3.
P4 fired 200 to
300 rounds.' No
hits. (
P4 passed 200 ft to
MIG*s left as he over-
sum r^ jinKtiiy owajr.
H3 fires at P3 at
2000 ft range. Ho
hits.
^8
®P
P4 does a barrel -rol 1
but the HIG breaks off
end Is lost fro* sight.
P3 and 4 rejoin and
egress .
I
Event II-5»
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105B two IIIQ-21s
Result: No damase
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*15'N/106««I5»E
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 Septenber 1966/1027H*
Three P-105Ds and one F-105P WILD WEASEL aircraft on an IRON HAND support flight for
strike aircraft In Route Package VI-A.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed Korat then direct to Brown Anchor Tanker direct to 21"*12'N/107"»3'''E, direct
to 21«15'N/l06«'i<5'E. Egress generally the aaoe route. Altitude 8,000 ft, 150 kta.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-105P BtlJE 1. P-105D BLUE 2
2 AGM-45
2 LAU-3
650-gal centerllne tank
ZObd amno
BLUE 1
IPP operating: TACAN, radar » and doppler standby
Camouflage paint
P.105D BLUE 3
^ LAU-3
650-gai centerllne tank
20mm aouno
P-105D BLUE 1
U CBU-2'l
2 450wgal tanks on wing pylons
20aun ammo
KIC-21 MIG 1
Silver Color
MO-21 MIG 2
2 AAH
Silver Color
4. FLI6MT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EMCOUMTER
Weather: Clear; visibility 3 ml. in hase.
BLUE
r
T
8,000 ft
260«
450 kts
Pull Internal (10,000 lb)
OREEH
J
6,000 ft
04 0*
550 kts
Uhknown
Altitude:
Speed :
Fuel' State :
l ^Tl,' : Pormatlon :
Normal tactical formation with element almost line abreast 1000 ft to 1500 ft to the
rear and 2500 ft to the right.
5. INITIAL DETECTION;
A NTO call was received from another P-105 flight while BLUE flight was inbound to .
the target ar*a.
HIOs were sighted by BLU^ 1, 12 o'clock low, 2 to 3 ml. flying from left to right
at 1027H. ma warnings had been received, prior to sighting.
7.
ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight Jettisoned stores and started right turn falling in trail with MTO 1.
SITUATION OEVeLOPMENT
NIO 1 made a hard l80* turn passing BLUE flight almost head on. BLOE 1 flrea 100
rounds of 20 n.m. HEI in front of NIO 1 with no apparent hits. BLUE 4 observed HIQ 2 at
3 o'clock high 1000 ft out armed with missUes, attacking BLUE 3* On BLUE 4*a call,
•NOTE: Tine in OPREPS given as 0927H.
Event II-5*
BLUE 3 broke hard right Into MIO 2 and down, and then reversed. BLUE 4 and NIC 2 Jockeyed
for position In a brief semi-scissors maneuver^ with neither adversary being able to gain
a tactical advantage. BLUE 4 broke off the encounter by breaking hard left and down, and
accelerated to 740 kta CAS at 500 ft AOL. BLUE 1, 2 and 3 pursued MIO I for about 4
■lnute« and broke off with NIG 1 two to three miles In front of thm opening range.
B. ORBMNCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
BLUE 4
MIG 1
MIG 2
(No. flred/No. hits)
20mra
0/0
0/0
0/0
None observed
None observed
9. EOnPRECT PROBLENS
BLUE 1 — Gun Jaa at 120 rounds
BLUE 3 - Had difficulty seeing RlC 2 due to vapor from canopy at high air speed and g loads,
BLUE 4 « Has unable to outnaneuver HIO 2.
10. AUCREH COMMENTS
Ejtpertewee :
BLUE 3
Total
Hours
3400
?-l05 Combat
Hours Missions
780 80 TAC recorded and
TAC FTR background
hard to tell what la
Comments on this Encounter ;
BLDE 1 EHO rear cockpit, poor visibility, fron aft cockpit
going OB.
11. MTA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUE 1 (rear cockpit EWO)
Messages. Reports ; OPREP-3 2114332, September 1966 fTMl JAP
DOCO 25835. September 1966
QPREP 4/359, 21 September 1966 from 388 FTR Vlng Korat
Letterss BLUE 4
12. HMRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BZSE flight, consisting of one P-105P WILD WEASEL In lead position and three P-lOSDa.
was on an IRON HAND mission In Route Package VIA, Inbound to the target area in the vicin-
ity of 21'15'BI/106»45'E. BLUE flight heard another P-105 flight call MIOs. BLUE flight was
at B,0OO ft altitude, heading 260 at 425 KCAS when two P-105Ds were observed at 12 o'clock
2,000 ft low heading northeast with a MIO-21 about 2,000 ft behind them. A third P-103D *
waa observed about one mile behind the MIG-21. BLUE flight Jettisoned ordnance and tanks
and started a right diving turn to break up the MM attack and pursued the HIO about fif-
"F^S.^L**** vicinity of 21024'N/106«58'E. BLUE lead was closing on a heading of
040* , 6.000 ft, 550-600 KTAS at the MIG-21 'a 4-5 o'clock position ranae 10-14 000 ffc ih*n
SJ^'siJ?'^ ^ • "'^ BLuJ°ni?St hiaS-oJ!^* siSi l«2°i"a''*''"
slight left turn, still heading about 04 0« fired 100 rounds of 20 m.m. at the MIO with no
SJSS ?" «0^««j:n«<» through 270* in a shallow climb. The MIO was 1500-2000 ft
?K*JT2'*!'?L^**Ll!***"J?li^i:***- • «0» whiff eiMll turn and pupsuad
tha :ntt to ttaa north northweat toward Kap Airfield.
'SC?****" **? 7*000 " and between aircraft about 4.000 ft.
After tbe turn, BLUE 3 sighted a silver colored object at his 3 o'clock a few thousand ft
high. BLUE 3 broke into the object and identified it as a drop taSk floitlSj doS!!
^^^J ^'^^^ rejoin the pursuit of MIO 1, as BLUE 4 sighted a second
1110-21. 1000 ft off of his right wing and high. The element waa in tha vioinltv of
21«:!9»H^06''52'E, with MIO 2 attacking BLUE 3 from 5 o'clock high. vioi"«y or
«r.- M« 4 called the break and BLUE 3 broke right and down forcing MIO 2 to overshoot.
BLUE 4 tried to get behind MIO 2 and both Jockeyed for firing position in three or four
'S^«f- "ith neither being able to attain a firing position, BLUE 3 lost sight
of BLUB « and instructed him to depart the area. BLUE 4 then broke left and down and
^^"^ 2i<'30'N/106«49'E to 2ini'N/107"'30»E in afterburner at .740
Neaaiwhile BLUE 3, after evading MIO 2, rejoined BLUE 1 and 2 at 21«34»M/lo6«44«E ab
they punued " "^1" ^» Of BLUE 1 when BLUE 1 broke off
the chase at 21"»35'H/106»42»E and exited with a right turn direct to 21»ll«N/l07«>30'E
BLUE *««lted Route Package VI approximately two minutes ahead of the reat of BLUE Plight
and reiolnad during randasvoua with the poat-strlke tanker. 'iign*
Artnt IX-55
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105 vb one MIO-IT
Reaults: One KIQ^ danaged
Vicinity of Encounter: 21'>12*N/106<*ll3*B
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlae: 21 September 1966/1015H
BLUE Plight was one of several 7-105 fllghte in a etrlke againat JCS 16, a railroad/
hlghMay bridge 17 miles northeast of Hanoi, There vera alao two fllghta of P-M oi^itina
east of the target area as NIC CAP.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Aircraft departed Takhli, Thailand, direct alr-to-alr refueling out over the Oulf
of Tonkin, north to 21«»13'N/107'*2U'E, nest along the ridge line to the target. Bgreaa
route was the reverse course.
3. AIRCRAfT CONFIGURATION
P-105 BLUE 1. 3. <
5 • lOOO-lb bombs
2 - 450-gallon wing tanka
1029 rounds 20niffl
P-105 BLUE 2
4 - CBU-248
2 - 450-gallon wing tanks
1029 rounds 20mm
All P-105 aircraft canouflaged.
MIQ.17
Ordnance unknown.
Camouflaged.
4. FLIfiHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Scattered- clouds 3-5 miles in-hase. Han layer- to- 6000 ft, clear above hase.
BLUE 1. 2. 3. »
Altitude ; 4000-5000 ft
HeadlnR :" 080*
Speed ; 460-500 kt
Plight Formation ;
Plight in process of Joining
up after bomb run. BLUE 2 1500 ft
back on the left aide of BLUE 1.
BLUE 3 4000 ft behind lead and
BLUE 4 1000 ft behind BLUE 3 on
right aide.
S. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 3 calls bogeys at 10 o'clock. Lead logers the call and identifies the bogeya
as a MIC In trail of a F-4 approximately 2000 ft back. (See Event 46» Volume Z.)
MIO calls had been heard in the area prior to this eight ing. Also BLUE Plight sighted
two fllghta of four MIQs each, earlier, as they were eomlng Into the target.
C. ACTION INITIATED
The MIO rolled out of its turn almoat directly in front of BLUE 1. BLOB 1 moved
up to 2000 ft and began to fire.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The P-4 was in a left turn when sighted at 10 o'clock. The P-4 rolled out almost
directly In front of BLUE Plight. BLUE 1 Just moved up into the MIQ'a 6 O'clock and
at 2000 ft out began firing. At approximately 300 ft range the MIQ broke hard left and
down. BLUE Plight lest sight of the MIO in the hase near the ground.
- Event II-S5
8. ORDNANCE
BtUB 1 $68 Rounds 20nm expended.
HXG-IT Hot obsenred to fire.
fl. CQUIPNEHT PROBLEMS
The only problem aMa noted during this encounter vas: BVSE 1 did not appear
to cause the damage expected from 568 rounds of 20mm - possible sight problem. .
10. AIRCREW COMNERTS
Experience
REmarke
These figures are estimated. BLUE 1 vas
not Interviewed. He did have considerable
fighter experience.
BLUE 2 was a Junior officer* approximately
500 hrs total flying time. This was. his
first unit assignment out of Hellls
Gunnary School.
Tighter experience HOO hrs P-100 and
approximately 350 hrs P-86.
Ccnanents :
BLUE 2 •> remarked that a AAM probably would not have been a good weapon to use
during this encounter. The MZO was quite eloae and the proximity of the P-4 would
hav« restricted using a missile.
BLUE 3 - the turning capability of the MIO 17 made following him during his break
almost Impossible.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUB 2, 13 Hareh 1967°.
BLUE 3, 13 March 1967.
BLUE 4, 6 Pebruary 1967.
Heaaages. Reports :
7AP OPREP-3 258 2? September 1966.
7AP 0212352Z, DOI 30492 September 1966.
12. MARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Pli^t had just completed Its bombing run on the Dau Cau highway and rail
bridge and was In the process of Joining up. The flight had Just rolled out on a head-
ing of approximately 080^ altitude 4-5000 ft airspeed 500 kt. BLUE 3 called bogeys at
10 o'clock. BLUE 1 Identified the bogeys as a MIO chasing an P-4. The P-4 and HIQ
were in a left turn at this time so that their bellies were up to BLUE Plight and they
could not see tUem. It Is believed that the P-'l did not know the KIO was at his 6
o'clock position. The NIO was 2000 ft behind the P-4 and In a very good attack position.
The left turn carried the HIG almost directly in front of BLUE 1, about 2000 ft. BLUE 1
moved into position and began firing, and continued firing down to 300 ft at which time
the no broke hard left In what amounted to a Spllt-S and dove to the deck. BLUE Plight
turned left, attempting to keep the MIO in sight but lost sight of him in the haze aa
he Reared the ground. The flight then turned back right and continued to egress the
area. BLUE 1 fired 566 Rounds of 20mm at the MIO. He and BLUE 3 saw hits Tflaahea) on
the mo 'a right wing. The MIG was camouflaged - black, green, and red.
Total P-105 Combat
Hours Hours Missions
•BLUE 1 4000 800 70
•BLUB 2 500 - -
BLUB 3 ——— '-^Unknown——"
SBLOB 4 3000 375 60
• Batlmated from author's personal knowledge.
■vMit 11-56
"'^ Alreraft Involved: Vour P-105> vs two MIO-lTs
^..^-•^ " Reiult: On* MIQ-17 destroyed
^ Vicinity of Encounter: 21«20*N/106*17'B
1. JtMX^Sxt MISSION MO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 September 1 966/1 OOOH
One P-105F and three P-105D9 (BLUE Plight) were on an IRON HAND nlsaion with an
initial orbit point at Zloiii'N/loe^ZS'E. The IRON HAND Plight Mas to attack SAN sites in
support of the strike group consisting of a total force of forty P^lOSs and eight P-4ca.
The target was JCS l6. the Dap Cau HW/RR bridge.
2. HISSIQR ROUTE
Departed Korat on • northeast headlrs to the Gulf of Tonkin for an air-to-air refuol-
Ins with Brown Anchor. Entered NVN Just northeaat of Can Pha Harbor on a heading of 275*
altitude 6-9000 ft. and speed of 520 kt. Then proceeded to aatiffied orbit point.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
F-105P BLUE 1, F-105D BLUE 2
2 - SHRIKE (AGM-US)
2 - Rocket pods (2.75") UU-3A
1 - 650 gal eenterllne tank
Pull 20mm annunltion - 1029 rounds
BLOE 1 had IPP - on, TACAN - off, doppler - on» radar - atandbr
All P-I05 aircraft eaaeuflaged
g^l05D BLUE 3 and U
1 - Rocket Pods (2.75") LAU-3A
1 - 650 gal eenterllne tank
Pull 20ffls ammunition - 1029 rounds
ICC^IT
• ■ Ouns probably
Silver In color
No external stores
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ;
mm -
Speed ;
Puei:
Ghe>elght scattered clouds with hast below 6000 ft.
6000 ft. 4-5 miles in the haxe.
Vlatblllty unUaitad abov*
BLUE
1 ?
— — 7000 ft
110* to 120»— — —
10,000 lbs approx. (B-1)
Fllitht Ponnatlon
BLDE
3 T
—6000 ft—
-110* to 120*
— ttikn own— -
-Tank* eipty-
AimuH
5. WITIAL KTEaiOB Event 11-56
"^S* sighted visually by B*,UE H at HOOO ft. In BLUE l«a and 2'b 6 o'clock pool-
the"encounter 1 and 2 »•« In a right turn. BIQ EYE gave MM warnings during
6. ACTION INITIATED
A ^ *® *® *® afterburner and go Into an easy right turn". BLOE
1 com-
piled and departed the area.
7. SITIATIOH DEVELOPED
^^^^^ * turned Into MXQs vho irent Into a left turn after not beln« able to
overtak. BLUE l and 2. BLUE 3 got angle off on MIG-1 and flredhlttlng h?».
iSn'i tfh I "5"* * shallow right turn. MIO-2 broke left and in front of BLUE 3
and J. BLUE 4 fired a burst at «0-2 but stayed with BLUE 3- BLUE 3 again got anile off
and distance on Hia-l. fired and knocked a part off the right winrtlp! JSo-i Diiot
:i!ci'?,^Vr"l ^ * '*J^5J:S? V""^ f""*^*- 3 aid 4 thin swlJ;SeJ lelll at
rjhi> i?^ r^iJ**" ^2°?/* (5000?). ami 5 o'clock to BLUE 3 and 4. blS 3 «d
n than lit bumera and egreasad the area.
B. OROSmICC
BLOE U 2
BLUE 3
ELL'S 4
MIO-l, 2
9.
Oun fired/hit
0/0
1029/yes
150/0
VO
EqUIFNENT PROBLEMS
IPLOB 1 - Did not load tape recorder.
BLOB 3 - Could not Jattiaon esnterllne tank.
BLUE 4 - Oun
camera was not
10. AIRCREW
COMMENTS
Experience
. • Total
Hours
BLUE 1
Front
3800
BLUE 2
IftUonuMn
BLUE 3
600
aLOE 4
3500
Conaents on this Encounter
P-105
Hours
30
400
Cooibat
Missions
about 75
about 50
Raaarka
P-80. 86, 100, 105 (in Oeraany)
Fighter Weapon School Instructor
B * ? would have had a pretty fair chance of getting Mia-2 if ha had a mi>«<i.
Praised B.4 for staying with him and clearing his fi'o'SlSfk p2sltiSn^*w;ShJftf ""«her
BUB 1 does not believe MlOa were GCI controlled b»14*«a« t-t^mt- «.h,. »rrm-
CoBunenf fron Overall Biearlen^y
not leading properly. As the B-66b moved farther aw«w T Radar-directed AAA was
11. DATA SOURCES Ev«nt ZZ.56
Project Intervlewg ; BLUE 1 (Front), 3 Feb 1967; BLUE 3i 17 Feb 1967; BLUE 4, 6 Jan 1967.
Messages. Reports ;
7AF OPREP-3, Z21H21Z; COCO 25830 Sept 66.
7AP 0212352Zi DOI 30092 Sept 66.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Flight was on a WILD WEASEL Mission, northwest of Haiphong. BLUE 1, with BLUB 2
about 4000 rt back, Just finished firing at a suspected SAM site and was In a right turn
to come around for another shot. BLUE 2 and 3 Mere about 3000 ft low during the fire and
continued on the firing heading of 310^ for a few seconds to see if they could see the
missile hit, climbing to an altitude of 9000 ft. BLUE 3 and then also went Into' a right
turn 90* bcnk and descended down to 6000 ft. On reaching toOO ft both BLUE 3 and 4 saw
two NIQ-178 at 4000 ft closing in at the 6 o'clock position of BLUE 1 and 2 who were at
7000 ft In a right shallow turn. BLUE 3 then went to setting up his switches while BLUE 4
called out the NIOs to BLUB 1 and 2 telling then to go into an easy right turn. BLUE A
then asked BLUE 3 if be had the NIO to which he said. "Yes." BLUE 1 and 2 then rolled
wings level» nose up 10*, and jettisoned their tanks, keeping their ordnance. BLUE 1 and
2 then nocoJ ever, went Inta a rlgh* 30* bank turn In afterburner and tried to keep the
KIOs at dOOO ft distance while BLUB 3 and U attacked them. BLUE 3 and 4 meanwhile Jetti-
soned their ordnances but only BLUB 4 could Jettison his tank. They themselves then went
Into afterburner and rolled in on the NIOs. The MIQa atayed with BLUE 1 and 2 for a short
period descending and then broke to the left In a tight turn. By this time BLUB 3 and 4
were within 2000 ft range and BLUE 3 led HIO-1 and fired. BLUE 1 and 2 were descending to
the deck and out of the area. BLUE 3 hit MIO-1 and MIQ-1 rolled out level and then Into
a l-l/2g turn to the right. MIO 2 broke sharply to the left, passing in front of BLUE 3
and 4. BLUE k shot at him but did not record any hits. BLUE U stayed with BLUE 3 and
BLUE 3 again drew angle and lead on HIG-l who was in a right turn. BLUE 3 fired again and
this tine cut off a portion of NXO-l's right wing tip. Pilot's canopy was then observed
to be Jettisoned and pilot ejected past BLUE 3. BLUE 4 saw pilot In chute. Both BLUE 3
and 4 followed aircraft to th- ground at an altitude of 1000 ft and impact. At this time .
BLUE 3 and 4 swapped leads. NIO-2 was then seen again closing at the 5 o'clock position
at $000 ft. BLUE 3 and 4 lit afterburner and egresaed the area rejoining with BLUE 1 and
2 before reaching the ooast. BLUE Flight then refueled and returned to home base.
RED BARON EVENT 11-56 SUMMARY
'i Ime
Mark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 3, 4)
a
Other Friendly
CoauBunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
(HIG 1.2)
Remarks
Status
Action
Head 310'
Alt. 3000 ft
B3 and 4 continued after
launch on 310' to see If
they can see SHRIKE Im-
pact. CI lab to 9000
feet, then turn right
and descend to 6000
feet.
Bl and 2 are at .
7000 ft and laiincti
a SHRIKE at a SAN
site, then start
right descending
turn.
h
Head 120*
Alt. 6000 ft
In right turn. 83 sees
NIG, as does B4, at 2
o'clock. B3 starts set-
ting up switches.
Bl and Z level
wings, slight nose<
up, and Jettison
tanks. Then 61 am
2 drop nose, go
into a descending
right 300* turn
and engage after-
burner.
64 cells Lead. 'You
have two HIG-17s on
you. They're well
out. Just light
the burner, and
start an easy right
turn." "Do you
have them 3?^ 63
■R. I've got 'en."
"Say again alt."
B3, "Roger. 4000
ft."
HIG In rfght turn.
8000 ft out. 6
o'clock to 81 and
2 at 4000 ft.
WEASEL tape was
not loaded.
In turn 81 sees
KI6 1.
f:
M
m
Alt. 3000 ft
Speed 550-575
B3 and 4 closing on MIGs
In afterburner. B3 and
4 both Jettison their
ordnances and B4 his
tank.
61 sees B3 and 4
closing to the
Inside of HIGs.
61 and 2 passing
3000 ft at a
ground speed of
645.
B3 to 4, "Clear out
from behind ne."
'ok. I'm punching
it." "Burner."
Bl to 3 , "Oo you
have him 3?" 63.
"yes." Bt. "I'll
hold hlH here If
you can get on him."
MIGs not gaining
on Bl and 2 but
holding approxi-
mately 4000 ft
out Th»n HIG<
break off to the
left and descends.
63 Is unable to
Jettison his
centerllne tank.
64 jettisons
■^3
Alt. 2000 ft
A/S 550-575
3g turn
63 Is now 3000 ft out
end fires ahead of MIG l
and gets a few hits.
Bl and 2 head for
the deck and
between the valleys
NIG Is In tight
left turn at first,
then levels out and
goes Into a slow
reversal turn to
the right, MIG 2
follows at first.
Metal flew off
of MIG 1 later In
the reversal turn. •
BCD BAROW EV tHT ILSg SUMHav
Tlae
»«rk
Action Alrcn
Stotwi
ift (BLUE 1» 3, 4)
Action
Other Friendly
Comauni cations
Eneay Actions
(NIfi 1.2)
Rtaarlts
T.
4
Alt. 2000 ft
A/S 550-575
1-1/2 9 turn
04 Ti res at NI6 c a*
he passes In front*
84 ther. stays with
B3. B3 turns to the
Inside of NI6 } again
and draws Lead on
hia. Distance now
between 1500 to 1200
ft.
NIG 2 breaks hard
left and passes In
front of 83 and 4.
HIG 1 continues In
right turn.
Alt. 2000 ft
A/S SS0-S75
B3 fires at HIG 1 and
i«Kei orT a cnunk of
oetaJ off of right
wing. 83 sees canopy
fly off. 84 sees pilot
In chute pass hia.
84 to 83. "Good
shooting. " 81 .
'Did you get hia?"
B3. "I've fot hia."
NIG 1> lift Diio*
lilt, riios
ejects « Httlt
after.
84 does not see \
pilot eject. He
Is looking it
other NIG and
clearing B3't
fio'clock.
6
Alt IBOn #*
B3 and 4 follow NIG
down to crash point In a
right descending turn.
84 8000 ft back. Coaes
MP on the right and
assuaoi Lead.
"OK, you have oe.
Roger." says 83.
'B4 "Roger." 83.
"All right, ay gun
Is eapty at this
tiao. ay gun Is
•■pty. You take
the Lead." B4,
"Aog. I'M cooe Dy
on your right."
NIG 1 crashoi.
■ 1
T,
7
Alt.
A/S In afttrburnor
B3 and 4 see a NIG at
5000 ft and closing froa
their 5 o'clock position
B3 and 4 light after-
burner and egress area.
84 to B3: "All
right, let's light
burners. Let's
Just unload It and
10.*
— Hi
LOW on TUftI « ^
flejotfl with B1
and 2 before
reaching
coast.
I
7. SnUATIOH DEVELOPHEKT Event 11-58
BLUE 3 opened fire on MIO 1 but mlaaed. Mia 1 slid out, then back in behind BLUE
3. BLUE 3 headed for the deck with HIO 1 In trail and firing. Meantrtille MIO 2 was 2-
3000 ft behind MIO 1 and 7-8000 ft In front of BLUE k. BLUE >^ pulled hla noae through
MIG 2 and fired 125 rounds before his gun Jarased. After his gun quit firing, he broke
down and right and when he pulled out, he did not see any HlOa on BLUE 3* a tall. Before
breaking, BLUE 4 saw a possible hit on the belly of the MIO and a definite hit approxi-
mately 6-7 ft behind the canopy on the fuselage. As elements, BLUE Flight remained in the
area looking for MIOs but without further HIQ encounters. BLUE Plight then rejoined and
exited the area.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1, 2
BLUE 3
BLOE 4
(No. fired/No. hits)
Cannon
0/0
200/0
125/1
NZG 1
MIQ 2
MIO-17 Flight
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 Hone
BLUE 2 None
yewarica
BLUE 4 got a positive hit
on the fuselage of MIO <>.
t/0
0/0
0/0
BLUE 3 None
BLOE 4 Qun quit firing after 125 rounds (possible burst limiter Installed).
10. AIRCREU COMMENTS
Experience
No aircrew experience data available.
Copwents on this Encounte r
The flight felt that excessive UHP radio chatter greatly hampered the flight's
effectiveness when jumped by MIGs. So much chatter on the radio makes It difficult to
Mlntaln flight Integrity.
Comments fron Overall Experience
BLUE 1: The big problem encountered was the haze which restricted the visibility to
a maximum of four miles slant range. This Is a definite reason for having an aircraft
with a perr-nent-mounted gun. You would have to Identify the target visually prior to
firing and would probably be too close to the test for alr/alr missiles.
11. DATA SOU^tCES
fTO^ect Intervtewa ; BLUE 1, letter 3 Mar 1967.
Kesaages . ReportT *
Resumft of 388TFW PASTEL DOZ>03103, September and OPREP 4/358
7AP 211U32Z Sept 66 DOCO 25846
7AP 211053Z Sept 66 DOGO 25833
7AF 2I2352Z Sept 66 DIG 30492
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was Inbound to the target on a flak auypresslon mission to support a
force of about 48 P-105 and P-4 fighters attacking the Dap Cau RR/Highway Bridge, seven-
teen miles northeast of Hanoi. Ttila was about the third day In a row that this bridge
vas put under attack.
The entire force was eoaposed of twelve flights of four aircraft each with Individual
flight times-on-target spread over a period of about one hour. Thus, the flights were
attacking in trail with spacing of 3-5 minutes between flights. Two of the flights were
flak suppression, two flights were IRON HAND support and two flights of F-4c aircraft were
assigned strlke/CAP.
BLUE Plight was about mid-8tr«aa In the flow of attack flights at 21*14<N/106«52*E,
erulsins at 8000 ft, 450 KCAS and hvadlng 270* when they obrerved a flight of four Mia-178
at 3 o'clock approximately four miles out at the same altitude and headed the same dlrectlcm
as BLUB Pll^t. >?ea MIQ warnings had been received preT(|tt^|^gfi^||^the picket radars and
Event 11-57
Aircraft Involved: Poup P-105D* ra tmo HIO-lTs
Result: One MIQ destroyed.
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»15'N/106"22'E
1. PSIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 September 1966/1015H
. Pour F-1C5D3, strike aircraft Inbound to JOS l6, rallroad/hlghiiay bridge at Zl"!!*:*/
106^05 ■£. Several KIO warnings had been given. Could hear other flights engaging MIJs
In the target area. Numerous other flights (P-Dc and P-IOS) striking in the same area.
2. niSSION ROUTE
Departed Takhli refueling over the Gulf of Tonkin with coasting In due neat of the
target area to take advantage of the mountainous terrain.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1
6 - 750-lb bombs (or 5 - ICOQ-lb bombs)
2 " J(50-gal wing tanks
Canouflage paint, IFP off
HIG~17 MIG 1. 2
Both clean
KIO 1 - silver color with red star.
HIO 2 - Camouflaged. Lighter tans and greens than U.S. aircraft.
No insignia markings noted.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weat her : Clear with visibility 5 to 6 miles in haxe.
BLUE 1, 2 BLUE 3. H
Altitude : 5000 ft 6000 ft
Heading ; 270» 270'
Speed ;
t'uel. State:
500 XTAS 500 XTAS
Pull Internal plus some in wing tanks.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Numerous MIG warnings had been received and ELUE Plight heard other flights calling
out MIG sightings and engagements. Approximately 1015H, BLUE 1 saw a HIG-17 low at his
12 o'clock heading south in a right turn.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 called out the MIG and descended to the 6 o'clock position In afterburner
with BLUE 2 on his left wing leaving BLUE 3 and 4 as high cover. All aircraft retained
their external stores.
SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 came out of afterburner, closed In to 1500 to 2500 ft at 6 o'eloek and fired
one burst of 15" rounds. BLUE 1 and 2 observed hits in MIO's left wing. BLUE 1 passed
MIO »n left side ana broke hard left, descending, In afterburner while Jettisoning exter-
nal stores. BLUE 2 saw MIG light afterburner, pull up and roll left behind BLUE 1 as
BLUE 2 started shooting from MIG's 6 o'clock position f28o rounds) observing a fragment
leave MIG's aft section. BLUE 2 broke hard left, saw BLUE 1, then observed an explosion
in the area where MIG 1 could have hit If It continued the right descending break it
entered as BLUE 2 shot.
BLUE 3» witn H on his wing, at 5000 ft altitude trailing BLUE 1 and 2, spotted Kia 2
at 12 o'eloek, 4000 ft range In a shallow left turn as BLUE 2 Jettisoned external stores
and accelerated to Join BLUE 1. BLUE 3 (and i(> Jettisoned external stores and started to
close on MIO 2 as he decided to shoot from that range. BLUE 3 fired 135 rounds as the
gun Jamned and HIG 2 broke hard left dov,nward at the start of BLUE 3*8 firing. Ho hits
observed. BLUE 3 and 4 continued left descending turn and egressed.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
BLUE 4
MIO 1,2 - Clean
Rounda Fired
154
280
135
0
Result
MIG 1 danaged
HIO 1 destroyed
Probable miss
Rewarfcs
Oun Jam
Oun Jan
No attempt
9. CqUIPHENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 - Cun Jam, suspected cycle delay timer prevent rapid second burst.
BLUE 2 > Gun sight reset for alr-to>air too time consuming and distracting. Shot
•blindly" at MIG. .
BLUE 3 - Gun Jam. Suspected burst limiter installed. Should have been removed.
BLUE 4 > No malfunctions.
10. AIRCREU COHMENTS
Experience
BLUE 1
BLUE
_2
BLUE
BLUE
4
Total
F-105
Combat
Hours
Hours
Nlsalons
No data
300
86
5000
200
20
No data
Conments on This Encounter
BLUE 1 and 2 reel they would have each scored a kill if the suns had continued to
function as they expected.
TY,c switch repositioning for change over from air-to-ground and alr-to-alr weuona
system employment Is too involved, time consuming, and diatraetlng of vision and thousht
at a nost critical time.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interview s; BLUE 1, 15 Har 67; BLUE 2, 14 Mar 67; BLUE 3, 17 7eb 67
Message a :
7AP OPREP-3 211041Z Sep 66 DOCO 25627 Sep 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
«... ^b.!^ Plight was in Pluid-4 formation with BLUE 3 and U to the right side, 500 kts
CAS, 500 ft, heading west inbound to target when BLUE 1 saw MIQ 1 12 o'clock low. souther-
ly heading and a gentle right turn, BLUE I called out the KIG as BLUE 1 and 2 selected
afterburner In the descending turn to position for a gun attack. Everyone kept their
external stores with intentions of striking target after the engagement. BLUE 1 reposi-
tioned all necessary switches while descending and came out of afterburner when his over-
i*"^*"?' BJ-^ 2 stayed with 1 In a fighting wing position but did not set up
his switches for air attack (sight set for dive bombing).
,1?^°/ appeared to be below ridge tops (maybe 500 ft AOL) with 300 to 350 KTAS and
i^^- U *nfri*i?: , Numerous MiG warnings had been broadcast and scvral flights
bad engaged MICs as BLUE Plight entered North Vietnam.
..t.. ^ closed on MIO 1 with about 575 kts CAS in perfect position at 6 o'clock, with
cue MIO in a 15 to 20* banked right turn. He fired one burst (154 rounds) at 2500 ft
estlra^ed range and BLUE 1 and 2 observed th. hits on «I0 I's left wing. BLUE 1 repoai-
Si?il ^K*"'; P""* t"™- BLUE 1 brought the power to idle to reduce overtake
miiP i^^i f ^! ^l^H^^ eun again. Unable to atop the overtake.
SSLLfn:^ !nrf^^L^° "5° f"^" *he MIO and then breaks c.wn left 'in'
afterburner and Jettisons external stores. MIC 1 pulls up as BLUE I breaks and BLUE 3
positions to shoot from probably 1000 ft in trail. »"» «
.t «So ^^'^^Jnr^S'*!^''^"^^''"'*t,?^r^,^ shooting (280 rounds), BLUE 3 and 4 were still
at 4500 clearing the area when BLUE 3 saw MIG- 2 at 12 o'clock, 4000 ft range. BLUE 3
??.nS"^ external stores, reset the switches for alr-to-alr and observed a radar lock-on
?MlS?2-'?»,J"«T?"f'*^"/° • lock-on as he estimated HOOO ft range.
Thinking the MIO may start maneuvering at any movement. BLUE 3 decided to shoot immedl-
jtely even with the aim point slightly off. As BLUE 3 opened fire, MIO 2 InltlaS a hard
i5f iJttS^^^i'T' lY'^ 3's gun stopped after shoSting 135 wunds! BlS 3 obteJSJS
his jetti3onea bombs explodi ig as MIO 2 broke and thinks that caused the break or that
Event 11-57
12. RARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOH (Continued)
KIC 2 was observing KIQ 1 an<J saw hln hit the ground. BLUE 3 tried firing his gun again
without success while doing a left turn and watched KIG 2 level out at the tree tops
heading northwest toward Kep airfield.
As BLUE 3 spotted Klf. 2 and BLUE 1 was In the break fpora MIO 1, BLUE 2 (without a
gunsight) saw KIC 1 roll to the left as if trying to posit: on on BLUE 1 so BLUE 2 pointed
his nose at >'.1C 1 and started shooting, observing a piece cf the aft section departing
KIG 1. HIG 1 rolled right and BLUE 2 continued the left turn into a hard break to rejoin
BLUE 1 as both BLUE I and 2 saw an explosion In the vicinity of where MIO 1 was
foundering.
Ok
WED BAROW eVEHT 11-57 SUHHARY
Hirk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1» 2, 3. 4)
Connunlcatlens
Eneay Actions
(NIG 1.2)
Remarks
Status
Action
Other Friendly
T»
)
Heading- west. SOOO
ft, In F1u1d-4.
U9 1 V ro p vAn K
fuel. 6 - 750 lb
bo«bt
ei spots HI 12 o'clock
low oolhg south. Takes
sz, leaves B3 and 4
high, starts in after-
burner to position for ■
gun attack.
Rone
b: calls "HIG at 12
low," B2, 3 acknow-
ledge and spot HI .
B3 and 4 to look
Tor otner higs.
In gentle right
turn at approxl-
nately SOD ft.
Estlnated 300 to
500 KTAS. Clean -
silver color.
81 and 2 In de-
scending left turn
closing rapidly on
HI . Come out of
afterburner during
descent. Everyone
retains external
stores. 61 sets
up for atr-to-alr.
Tj
Est. 1500 ft
93U to a #3 CAS
NIMtarjr pwr.
Bl opens fire at estl-
nated 2500 to 1S00 ft
range. B2 1000 ft
behind Bl.
Bl calls MIG hit.
B2 conflms hits In
left wing.
Hit on nld-portlon
of left wing. No
lamedlate reaction.
Bl can't get gun
to shoot again,
overtakes HIG to
the left and
breaks hard left
as Ml pulls t:p
and rolls left.
Ti
SI clean aircraft,
oz. J Mftn storos.
B2 shoots at N1 In left
turn. BJ and 84 Jetti-
son stores and 83 re-
positions switches for
gun attack.
61 calls "Jettison-
ing stores." B3
calls M2 at his
1 9 M* *lM*k
12 0 ClOCR.
Hi receives fire
from 62 and rolls
right. 112 at 4000
AAA a_A^
ft. est. 400 kts
heading west In
gentle left turn
from 83.
B2 sees HI lose
piece of aft sec-
tlon. 63 tries
radar lock-on but ^
thinks 7000 ft Is
ground. Estimate
H2 at 4000 ft
range.
T|
AU cteaii.
Bl and 2 see snoke on
ground where Ml should
nflvv Dwn« opens
fire at est. 4000 ft.
Bun Jaa after 13S rnds.
B4 files Ming on
B3.
81 and 2 call HI
crashed.
HI assumed de-
stroyed. HZ starts
hard left break at
start of B3's
1 1 n ng .
Bl and 2 egres-
sing. 63 Starts
to follow H2 but
gun Inoperative,
continues left
turn to egress
with 61 and 2.
All BLUE aircraft
egressing cast.
H2 at tree top.
level heading
northwest for Kep.
63 and 4 observed
smoke In area of
HI cngageaient.
m
I
t •
I
i
i
I
I
i
I
I
1
I
t
i
i
i
Event II-5B
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-IOSP va four ICIO-17 and
tMo na-21
Result: One Hia-2l damaged
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*1<I»N/106*»52'B
PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 September 1966/1025H
P.iotiV'^/iiSll S^J?"''*?"^^^' Iff" ®" * ^^'^^ suppression mission with a force of forty
lllllt !JJ Ji?«I:J*^«/«'"'i"f«l**!:,?*P ra/Hlshnay andee at 21-U'K/106»05'b: BLUE
til* 5L-?\.**** first of five P-IO? flights from Jtorat. The Takhli force preceded
if LS?r K 1°"' °" '***.^2?5** ** flights and tlo P-»C
Jn'l'S?""''?'*** 2" °3t2»^°" P'^"*" *° BLUE Plight (fee Events 11-55
and 11-57 in this volume and Events 1-46 and J-*7 In Volume 1)7
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLDE Plight departed Korat RTAPB, Ihalland, proceeded directly to the Quir of TonHw
SSSfJR*/SSf''* J? 2in3;N/io7-22'E SeH to iiSlrS/iSfiosz^S; 2m ?J 2?SV
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. U .
* - CBU-2iJ
2 - 450 8*1 fuel tanks
1029 rounds 20mm
KIQ^IT MIQ 1. 2. ^. J|
Unknown ' ^
iao-21 mo 1, g
Unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENGAGEMENT
HSS£h££: Haae layer from surface to 6000 ft, vlalblllty four miles, clear above 6000
ft.
Altitude !
Headl ng :
Speed :
Puel State :
Plight Pormat| on
BLUE
12 3 T
270" I-I
—540 kt
—Pull Int.*—
MIQ-17
12 T
-—Unknown——
— ~Unknown— —
T r
Steep climb
—Unknown*-
—Unknown-*
—Unknowa—
5000 ft separation between elements
RED PLIGHT
Qtataiown
5. INITIAL DETCCTI ON
K^"!/"^i* heading 270* at 8000, saw a flight of MIO-178, 4 nmi at 3 o'clock on
S^^^^^}!?f1?? '^f""**;: "^^^t then descended to 4500, 270^ sJo lt° ^nS dirnot
IS^^ hS^^I? B^"E 2 called "Two MI0-21s'ari2 "clock.-
BLUE 2 had Just momentarially seen two MI0-21s as they passed In front of BLllK Rii»h* i« .
mil "\TH,f^^'^ ^^"^ ^-s can. blue 5 S"S So^lSJ cf.5S?dSii"Soi^ '
above and called for the flight to break as the NIOs were eloalng on the Lead eleSentr
6. ACTION INITIATED
^l'^?F5? f®*' flight to Jettison ordnance and break right. As BLUE Pllaht
Ill«n?. ^ ^ ^"""^ 3 in hlfaitack onlhe "fad
V ■,.«(■
E»«nt 11-58
• nuiiAer of previous attack fllghte that had or were In a njQ engagenent. In an attempt
to avoid an engagement while attacking the target, BLUE Plight descended Into the hate
lajer and leveled off at 5000 ft MSL and 5*«0 KTAS, about 2000 ft above the hlgheat terrain
In the area. The HIC-17a were not seen again. Slant range visibility In the hase was a
■axlnuffl of four olles.
A few minutes later at 21*12'N/ia6'''Jl'E (according to the OPREP) or about fifteen
nilee from the target {according to BLUE Lead's letter)* at 21*12*N/106*21*e, with the
second eleoent trailing about 5000 feet, BLUE 2 called, "Two MIO-ais at 12 o'clock." Ttoe
mos were observed c limbing from below BLUE Plight and passing through 8000 feet In a
steep climb. BLUE Lead did not see the MIGs and BLUE 2 called that he had lost thea and
that he had spotted them when the sun had reflected off of them.
Almost Immediately after that, BLUE 3 observed the NlOa aa they coaplettd a nodlflad
loop and attacked the lead element from 3 o'clock. SLUE 3 then called for the lead ele-
ment to break right as the KIGo were closing. BLUE Lead called for the flight to Jettison
the bottb load and tanks and started a right diving turn.
The MIO's attack maneuver brought him across BLOB 3'8 12 o'clock position and about
1500 feet in front of BLUE 3* BLUB 3 fired about 300 rounds of ZOnn at MO 1 but missed.
The KIO continued to turn right a.id pulled up Into a half chandelle approximately 800 feet
off BLUE 3'" right wing. BLUE 3 pointed his nose down and headed for the deck. The MIO-
21 followed BLUE 3 down firing since BLUE 3 saw tracers going by his aircraft.
KtO- 2 was 2-3000 feet behind MIQ 1 and 7-8000 feet at BLUE 4' a 11 o'clock. BLUB 1
lined up and pulled the F>105 nose up throu^ KZQ 2 firing 125 rounds of 20aa before hla
cannon quit firing. When hla cannon quit firing* BLUE 4 broke down and right and as he
pulled out he observed that both MTOs had broke off from BLtB J's 6 o'oloek. BLOB * ob-
served one possible hit on the belly of MI 0 2 and a definite hit about two-thlrdo of the
way up the fuselage, 6-7 feet behind the canopy.
BLUE Plight remained together In elements and started looking for other NIQs that
were apparently in the area at the same time. Uie flight was unsuccessful In ttwir hunt,
then rejoined and returned hone.
■
Fifteen miles from the target appears »ore
climbed, up from below the flight and would
position.
reasonable* The Nia-2l8 are reported to have
not have tJkA maneuvering room in the first
v' Bvant 11-59
«
Alreraf'. Involved: Pour P-105b vs three RIQ-IT*
Result: One NIO daaagedi
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*11 •H/106«i:":
1. PftlNAftY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Dftte/TlM: 21 Septenber 1966/103211.
Pour pwiOSs (BLUE Pll^t) were one fUsht of a twelve flight force Attseklns JCS
16, « rallroad/hlghway bridge at 21*11'II/106»05E. As BLUE Plight was enroute to the
target, three MIG^lTe Jumped them In the vicinity of 21*U'N/106*l6'B.
2. HISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight departed Korat, refueled over the Qulf of Tonkin, proceeded North and
then turned West to enter Route Package IV about 12 nllea North of Can Pha Harbor.
The flight then flew West to 21*l4'N/106«25'E and turned Southweet Into the Delta
where they were attacked by a flight of Nia-17s. Return route was the reverse of
above.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
y-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. »
. 2 • 3000 lb bombs
1 - center line 650 gallon fuel tank
1 - 20mm cannon (1029 Rounds)
All F<-lQ5a were camouflaged.
WIQ-17 MIO 1. 2. 3
1 HIO-IT appeared canovflaged.
2 MIO-lTs were grey silver In color.
4. FLICHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Hase layer from surface to 6000 ft. Visibility In hase <t-5 miles.
Visibility above haze - very good.
BLPg HIQ
1 ! 3 V I 5 J
Altitude ; 3.000 ft 3»000 ft ♦
Heading : 254" 25**
Speed : 550 550 ♦
Fuel State : Approx 10,000 lbs Unknown
Fillet j^omatlon ;
Unknown - probably fluid four vlth wlngmen spread 6-800 ft, 20«-30* baok, an^
elements apread 1500 ft about 10*-20* back. Apparently the element was deplos^'^o
the right. ^..^
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Area KIO warnings were being broadcast on a i^gular basls^Jby the radar picket
aircraft. The flight In front of BLUE Plight (Event II-60>«as attacked by HIQs as
well as about four other flights in front of BLUE Pligtjt^ The NIOs in this evsnt
were Initially observed in the 6 o'clock high poslt^AiT.
6. ACTION INITIATED ^
BLUE Flight Immediately Jettisoned. srdnanoe and tanks and broke hard right.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE lead passed wlthljv^O ft of one MIO, head-on. Neither fired. BLOB 1, 2,
and 3 beaded for the eoast^t a high airspeed. BLUE 4 was forced to modify his break
with a momentary turp'to the left and then back to the right in or-' r to avoid a
collision with BLVE' 3*9 eenterllne tank. As BLUE 4 came back to t right a NIO-17
was at his 6p>iflock firing. BLUE 4 broke left and down and shook ^he MIO. BLUE 4
again turpeoeast to rejoin his flight, saw a MIO-17 in front of hlc and fired,
obsery^-ng hits on the MIO. The MIO broke left and down with BLUE 4 passing 2-300 ft
ov^r ^a. BLUE 4 continued to the coast to rejoin his flight.
8. OROHAMCE
Ev«nt 11-59
(No. flred/No. hlta)
BLUE 1, 2, 3
BLUE k
Mia 1
nxa 2. 3
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Intervlewa !
tietterg : Noim
Hesgawe. Reoorta :
Cannon
0/0"
300/Yes
T«a/Ho
t/Mo
Bamarka
Sparkles on wing and fuaelaga
Fired at BLUE 4. no hlta.
None
Mama 388TPM DOI 03098 Sept 66.
3PltEP-3» 7AP DOCO 25836 Septfift-,'
7AD DOI 20H92 gapt"^
12. NARRATIVE OESCR
fll»h?!:^^fiif^^T^c°V^ ^-^°5Ds was about the eighth flight In a atream of ten atrlke
JiJU It " i;^ii!:°f^/hl«hway bridge located 16 miles northeasrof
Je^fsiHL^'^^^^^^
''f? "^^*: ""■ '"Bet "hlle BLOB FUtht «*« *t 3000 ft sso Icta i<.>d<n.
hln.ir S2*fcf.*?ffSJ*? 'Sk"^?'? f"Sht. he observed another MIIl-17 between
234
1
i
Bi
D
0
0
II
0
9
0
0
Event ZX-60
Alrerftft Involved: Two F-105a vs four NIGUlTs
Result: No Damage
Vicinity or Encounter: 21*11*N/106«13'B
1. PRtHARY NISSIOK AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 September 1966/1030H
^^^^ Plight) were on a strike mission against JC3 Target l6 (21«12»N/
J06'05'E), a railroad/highway bridge northeast of Hanoi. BLUB was originally a four ship
flight , but BLOE 3 had ground aborted for an oil pressure malfunction, and BLUE 4 aborted
for radio failure. Thl» was • multiple flight strike, and encounter took place as BLUB
waa approaching .their target.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Plight departed Korat via direct Brown Anchor refueling track, direct 21»11*H/107»30«B.
21»13'N/107-22'E. 2in3'N/106«»50'E, 21<»13'N/106''25 'E. 21«08'N/106«l8«B. 2ini'N/106»12»E.
l^!ii;Ii<J2Sni!5 engagement). 21»08'N/106»10'B, 2l«ll'N/106«3O'B, 2l»09»ll/107«25*B,
21*08 'H/IOT* 30 'E, Brown Anchor, dirwct Korat.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P^IOS BLUE 1
BLUE 2
2 - 3,000 lb bombs
1-650 gal centerllne tank
Camouflage paint
Vector equipment
MIQ>17 nia 1. 2. 3. »
Unknown
2 - CBU 27
2 - ^^50 gal drop tanks
Camouflage paint
Vector equipment
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Unknown
BLUE 1. 2 WIQ 1. 2
^0 3. »
12.000 ft
270"
500*
unknown
Altitude : 3,000 ft 2,500 ft
Heading ; 25** 270*
Speed ; • 475 KTAS SOO^
ruel State ; unknown unknown
Plight Permation :
Hide fighting wing with #2 on leader's right side.
S. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 2 sighted ..w MIQ-178 rolling Into his 6 o'clock position level at il>6.000 ft
range. He also spotted two more MI0-i7s at 6 o'clock high (spproxlmstsly 12.000 ft). TIm
was 1030H, approximately two minutes prior to TOT.
NlOs.
ACTION INITIATED
BLUB Flight jettisoned external tanks, lit afterburners, and broke hard left into the
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Flight made a hard left break Into the attacking MIOs. The MIOs overshot and
zoomed up and over the top of BLUE 1. BLUE 1 reversed back Into the MIO flight and picked
them up out front at approximately >i,aoo ft range. The MIOs were cllmbinic out through 6-
8.000 ft in a gentle left turn at high airspeed. The MIGs held their high mach (In after*
burner), and SLUE 1 was unable to set up for a gun shot before the MIOs went out of range.
BLUE Plight was now over the target area, and receiving 85 am AA fire, so BLUE 1 continued
his right turn back around to an easterly heading and cgressed the area. The total engage-
ment time was approximately one minute. The high element of MIOs (at 12,000 ft) never
descended to Join the encounter.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2 had one 4 50 gal drop tank which did not feed.
It was Jettisoned full prior to
the engagement.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Comments on This Encounter
BLUB 1 felt the HIQs had no Intention of continuing the engagement after he and number
2 Jettisoned their ordnance. The HIOs came in at a relatively high airspeed using their
altitude to gain overtake and angle off. When the HIOs overshot, they made no attompt to
ass
event 11-60
yoyo or gftln lateral separation. They merely cllobed away at high alrapeed probably figuring
their mlaslon was eoaqplete when they forced the P-105» to Jettison their ordnance short of
tha target.
Swltehology entered this engagement when BLUE 1 reversed and got behind the MIOs. He
atated he did not have sufficient time to reset his sight for an alr-to-alr mode before the
NIOs wera out pf range and pulling away. He felt that he might have been able to get a kill
if he had beeen carrying a QAR-8 type missile.
BLOB 1 waa also disappointed in the extremaly rapid airspeed loss of the r-105 when It
la racked into hard turns.
BLUE 2 had high praise for the P-105 eleotronlc eountenseasure equipment (warning sys-
tems, etc.) and felt that they should be In all aircraft.
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 2 sees no advantage In trying to make one single airplane a J ack-of-all- trades.
Pelt each different aircraft should be designed for a speeifio Job. He also sees only a
limited value for an aircraft with a two-man crew.
11. DATA SOURCES
?ro*«ct Interviews : BLOB 1, 4 Jan 67j BLD8 2, 15 Mar 67
Meaaases. Reports ;
7thAP OPREP-U/HyD Z11930Z Sep 66 DOCO 25857
388th TPW, OPREP-V355 21 Sep 66 001-0310
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was the first of five P-105D attack flights from Korat. Their target was
JCS 16, the Dap Cau railroad/highway bridge located at 21<»11'M/106«>05'E about 16 miles
northeast of Hanoi, The Korat force followed a force from Takhll on this date and this was
the second or third consecutive day that this bridge was under attack. Each flight was
fragged in with a TOT separation of 3-5 minutes, so that the target was subjected to waves
of attack for a period of 15 minutes to an hour.
BLUE Plight departed Korat, refueled over the Oulf of Tonkin, proceeded north and then
turned east to enter RP VI about twelve miles north of Cam Pha Harbor. BLUE 3 ground aborted
for oil pressure malfunction and BLUE ^ aborted for radio malfunction. Thus, BLUB Plight
waa redtteed to two aircraft* one carrying two 3iOOO pound bombs and tne other carrying four
CBU-2<i8 with BLUB 2 In spread position on the right. BLUE 2 had one 450 gal tank that would
not feed and Jettisoned it over the mountains.-''
BLUE Plight received numerous SAH calls, with indications of'SAH activity on their
vector equipment as they flew west from the coast toward the target. About 15 miles from
the target as BLUE Plight was descending out of the mountains into the flat delta, BLUE 2
ealled, "Taliy-ho two MZQs level-low, coming up, U-6,000 ft range at 7 o'clock.?* BLUE lead
waa at 3000 ft, 475 KTAS, heading 25'** with the two MIGs at about 2500 ft.
BLUE 1 did not receive the call dleirly because of excessive radio chatter, and thought
BLUE 2 said "MIOs high at 8 o'clock." BLUE I immediately Identified two HIO-178 at his 8
o'clock position about 12,000 ft altitude. .He was able to identify the M.ICs by their sil-
houette. The two high MIGs were in a pursuit attack, but too far out to fire. BLOB I
Jettisoned his empty 650 gal centerllne fuel tank and Increased his airspeed thinking that
ha could outrun the NIOs to the target as he had in fact done on the previous day, .where
the Nibs broke off when tjM flak became thick.
BLUE 1, now about 10 miles from the target, was still watching the two high MIOs
attempting to cut him off when BLUE 2 called "They are getting close." The excited tone of
BLUE 2's voice compelled BLUE 1 to take his eyes off of the two high MIOs and look around.
BLUE 1 Immediately saw two more MlCa at his 7 o'clock level about 3000 ft range and closing.
BLUE 1 had over 500 kts airspeed, but he could see the underside of the MIOs and knew the
MIOs had lead on him. BLUE 1 broke hard left into them. Jettisoned his bombs and as the
NIOs passed over him reversed.
When BLUE 1 Jettisoned his ordnance, the MIOs ceased tracking, unloaded the wings,
and with afterburner still going loomed over BLUE I. The MIOs were i-MOOQ ft In front of
BLUE 1 before he could pick them up again after reversing. BLUE 1 was attempting to set
up his sight for slr-to-air, but gave up when the MIOs were 6-8OOO ft going away In an easy
left turn toward Hanoi and the 85 mm anti-aircraft artillery In the target area began shoot-
ing at BLUE Plight. BLUE Flight had no ordnance at this time so they broke down and right
fo- the Mils. The position of the two high MIGs was unknown so BLUE Pllgiit accelerated to
1.15 (760 KCAS) and held this speed until well clear of the area. The rest of the flight
was relatively uneventful.
^It it possible that this la the tank dascrl*ied in Evmt
Event ZI-61
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vb one MIQ
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»35«N/lO«*ii9»E
1. PRIN«»V MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlne: 22 September 196£/08<>5il
#'««»-r°"''.^'T^°?' ^^b^^ Plight) were escorting and providing SAM coverage for F-105 strike
^ aircraft airborne, through tankers, and In target area on time. Weett.er was
1500 ft operating standards over the target area. Visibility 2-1/2 miles at
2. MISSION ROUTE
Bro«.«SlI5 liifll^..?*?*^*^? Korat and rendeavoused with tanker (Orange Anchor) and then
KSm 3*2?hii J«.?'J 5?nr%??^5"J° J*'* crossing the*north end of Thud .
f ^ : B^**^^*^ forced BLOE Plight back out of target area. BLUE Pllaht set ud orbit
'^^^ iff" for SAM^slte? while the si ??Je"or«s SSiJed
5?rShS hoL^S^'^''^"?;'^ ^'^^ "^l"** foi-«8 completed bomblngrBLra '
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-1Q5 BLUE L (P-IQ'^F). 2 (F-IOSD^
2 - SHRIKE (AGM-iJ5)
2 o Rocket pods (LA(J-3)
2 * 450 gal. wing tanks
20ns (M.61 gun)
F-105 BLUE 3 and it (P-105D ^
6 - 750-lb bombs, 2 - ftSO gal. wing tanks
(M-61 cannon)
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather; Clear - 3-mlle visibility In hase
Altitude: 9000 ft
Heading !" 18O*
Speed : H^O kt
PueTT 5-6000 lb
Plight Pormatlon : '
To
± ■
5. INITIAL DETECTION
left ?i?S/to;irt%!i?^" ' «• -••e.ndln, la
6. ACTION INITIATED
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
.Sf .if ijjM i'lAi; ;j2.'o"j j^hJS is jii. s'?.i/?jhJU";h:?r"k5s
Plight continued right turn and BLUE 1 observed an airplane high 5-10 000 ft? and
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews; Statement by BLUB Lead pilot, U Mar 1967.
Message Reports ; Incident Summary from OPREP-VPII»ACtE/377 (388TFW) 22 Sept 1966
12. iARRATlVE
See Sections S, 6 and 7.
/ BT«nt 11-62
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105e va one HIO-21
(possible}
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»*0»H/10<i«25'E
1. PRIMARY NtSSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/TlBc: 28 September l&66/unkno«n
A flight of four ?->105s (BLUE ?llgnt) egresslng froa unknown type mission In NVN.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ! Unknown
BLUE
^ 2, 3.
9.000 ft
210"
ISO XTAS
Unknown
Unknown
Altitude :
HeadlnaT
Speed ;
Fuel State :
Plight Formation ;
5. INITIAL DETECTION
ph^k!^!!^^* ?«^!!*?** delta-wlng aircraft (probably MIQ-21) directly above BLUE
f"*?^?"'* fl^Shtly off BLUE I'a left wing. Unidentified aircraft was In left turn, bead-
!I^oSJ.*2h!rJ?*5?J.*"""J',*'f ^Z'*^°° ^K*' Observation for oily 10
to 15 seconds when It disappeared Into haze.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight kept constant cheek of 6 o'clock position, but bogey was not seen again.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
rtesaat^es. Reports :
None
386TFW, OPREP 4/il66
1.
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105D5 ara four HI0-21S
Result: Slghtlne only.
Vicinity of Encouiiter; ai-55'N/lOUno'E
PRIKARY HISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: 28 September 1966/1725H
A fllRht of four p.-iOSOa (BLUE Plight) h«l Just crossed the Red River Inoound. Type
mission IB unknoMn.
2. MISSION ROUTE /
Qidoioim.
3. AIRCRAFT C0NFI6URATI0HS
P-105P B LUE 1. 2. 3. >i
Unknown
MM 1. 2. 3. »
Silver color
4. FLI6HT CONDITIONS PRTOR TO ENCOUNTER
Unknown (possibly undereast with hase)
BLOB 1. 2. 3. 1
13,000 ft
030*
He? kt
unknown
unknown
Weather ;
Altitude ;
Headin g:
Speed ;
Puel State :
Hi^t Poraatlon :
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLL-S Plight sighted four HIO-218 in modified fo'"?***'" f *J?jLi^S'Sl2*^^^
tlon. MI08 wire 10 to 20 nml awav, heading approximately 220», and altitude 10,000 ft.
Time of sighting was 1725H.
6. ACTION INITIATED
No attempt to engage was ewcuj-e* «>y o"5«f_"}f;*;
and apparently never had visual contact with BLUE Plight,
they went down into clouds and haze layer.
11. DATA SOURCES
None
388TPW, OPREP «/*78
mos were headed Into the sun, .
They disappeared from sight when
J J
Event 11-64
Involved: Pour P-105« v» two MI0-17S
P«j Reaults: No dosage
L vicinity of Encounter: 2l»13'N/105**l2'E
a 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
SD«te/Tlcje: 8 October 1566/1585H
Pour P'l05s {Bl,\}Z Flight] on strike nlsslon tgalnst a targec between Hanoi and Phue Ten.*
2. MISSION fiQti'ic
p BLUE Plight departed Takhlii route unknown.
m 3, AIRCRAFT CON F I5URAT lOHS
■ F-105 1. 2. 3. H
p B03D», external tanks, QBC-160 pod on left outboard station.
B 4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
i" Weather ; VPR, but clouds topping higher peaks along Thud Ridge.
St'JS 1. 2. 3. "
I Altitude : 2-5,000 ft AOL
Headli^: 315'
^ ^peed : 525 KTAS
li f\iel State : Unknown
R PUeht Poraatlon i Unknown
* 5. INITIAL DETECTION
L^' One minute out from target, BLUE Plight saw two MIG-17b at 2 o'clock. 2000 ft AGL,
B turning Into their flight.
p 6. ACTION INITIATED
I BLUE Flight went afterburner and used speed to outrun the HIQs.
7, SITUATION DEYELOPKENT
SBLUE Plight continued and hit the target. As th«y came off the target heading 315«
at 2 to 5,000 ft they were engaged by two more MIO-lTs (possibly same aircraft). One HIO
aade a head-on firing pass (cannon) at BLUE 3, and the other a 6 o'clock firing pass (can-
non) at BLUE '4. Neither aircraft received any hits, but low fuel prevented BLUE Plight
i, from engaging the MIGs. BLUE Flight's high airspeed enabled them to break the contact and
i egress Che area.
[ 8. ORDNANCE
BLUE Plight - no ordnance fired
n MIO-1 - or.e gun pass/no hits
W MIG-2 - one gun pass/no hits
* 9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
fNone reported.
10. AIRCREM COMMENTS
None
m It. DATA SOURCES
W, Project Incervlews ! BLUE 1 (Lead)
Messages, Reports ;*
Q 7AP 08lii3ez Oct 66, DOCK) 26722
FT 7AF 082232Z Oct 66, DIO 30617
* U. NARRATIVt DESCRIPTION
f> BLUE Plight's first MIC sighting was while inbcuiid to the target on heading 135« at •
r 2,000 ft AOL. BLUE Plight observed two MIQ-Zls heading KE at 21*26'N/105«»U5'E. These MIGs
S« Biade no attempt to engage flight. BLUE Plight continued toward target at satae altitude and
heading. As the flight passed 2nml SE of Phuc Ten airfield, they noticed several HIGs orblt-
ing the runway. The MIGs appeared to be meeting the P-105 strike flights head-on about one
M and a half nmi out, then atcer.ptlng to turn In and fall into a 6 o'clock position on the
W P-1Q53. BLUE Pllg:nt slrhted two .MIG-173 at t heir 2 o'clock position going to 3 o'clock
OPREP 08H382 gives target as JCS 71 jMfil^Aapparently garbled. '
»• E»«nt 11-6*
level, turning Into their flight at 6 nral range, BLUB Plight aelectcd afterburner and Irw
ereased their airspeed to 550 RTAS, the KlOe fell Into trail, but were well out of conbat
r«nft and unable to close. BLUE Plight continued on the aave heading and altitude for 60
aec, executed a pop-up maneuver, and delivered their bomba on the designated target. The
flight pulled off target end picked up a reciprocal heading of 315* at 2,000 to S.OOO ft
altitude. At Zl^li'M/lOS'SO'E two MIG-I7e (possibly the sane aircraft sighted prior to
pop^up) engaged BLUE Plight. One MIO got well lined up, and executed a heed-o n firing paa*
(cannon) against BLUB 3» while the other made a firing pass (cannon) at 5LUS i> from his 6
o'clock position. BLUE 1 stated that the rounda came cloae to BLUE 3, but neither aircraft
received a hit. BLUE Pllghv was low on fuel due to afterburner operation, and could not
remain In an engagemnt with tho HlOa. BLUE Plight was still carrying a high airspeed and
used thla advahtase to break contact and continue straight out on their egresslofi.
* BIG BTS BC-121 on station at 20*00 'N/lOT'OO'E had given eight MIQ warnings between 15*0H
and 161TH during the tine of this engagement. However, &ht MlOa encountered bjr bLUE Plight wer**
not apoolflcally oorrolated with theae wamlnga.
^ / E»«nt 11-65
\ ^ Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs four KXQ-21S
IteBult: No danag* eonflrmd (on« NIO, possible
damage)
Vlcirtlty of Encounter; 21*10'H/105*50*E
1. PRIMARY Mission AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 8 OetoHpr 1966/I5*5Ii
Pour P-105S (BLUE Plight) on an armed reconnaissance and flak suppression mission In
Package VI-A vere esreasing from target JCS 51< Multiple strike flights were deployed .
ag&lnst this target. No nentlon la made of BLUE 3 anJ 4 after start of this engagement.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Unknown - Pll^t had approached target area heading SB along the SV edge at Itiud
Ridge (approximately Sl'lO 'N/105*36'E) .
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105P BLUE l.a.S.H
Jl - CBU-2* each aircraft
2 - liSO-gal fuel tanks (in^oaz^ stations)
1 > QRC-I60 ECH pod (BLUE 1»3, and 4 only)
IPP and camouflage paint (all aircraft)
HIQ-21 MIQ 1 and 2
Silver color (shiny)
No notleeabis external tanks or ordnance
No Identifying Insignia
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Clear, sods low haze along Red River and around Hanoi area.
BLUE
I ?
Altitude ! 7000 ft 6000 ft
Heading :. Southerly, In a left turn coining off target
Speed : ^50 KIAS
i'uel State: Unknown (BLUE 2 had 5000 lb at termination
r
!>
[. ^ or attack.)
; I
t
|i
ii
'I
I
I
Plight Pormatlon : BLU.'? 2 was in a left elldblng turn approximately 2 n mi
behind BLUE l, and cutting him off In the turn for a
rejoin. They had Just pulled off a CBU drop on target.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight had been receiving MIQ and SAM alerts froa IRON HAND flights, and HIO
warnings from BIG EYE, EC-121 stationed at 20"00'N/107"*O0'E. BLUE 2 sighted four
KZO-218 In elements of two at 9 o'clock high (2 to 3 n nl range). The MTQs were in a
descending pursuit curve heading 270" at a speed of approximately 550 kts. The MIO
elements were In a close fighting wing position with about 500 ft linear aeparatlon
between leader and. wlngman, and the wlngaian 50-60 degrees behind the lead.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned their external tanks and HER racks, lit afterburner, and
continued In the left climbing tuni. BLUE 3 and 4 slid out wide about 2 n sd behind
BLUE 2.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
no 1 pressed attack on BLUE 1 and rolled out In front of BLUE 2. NIQ 2 passed under
BLUE 2's nose and was not seen again. NIC 3 and 4 overshot a pass at BLUE 2 and reinitiated,
but fell way back in trail and high. BLUE 2 fired 20 mm burst at MIO 1 (no visible damage).
NIQ I broke off attack on. BLUE 1, but BLUE 1 was hit by AA fire and flamed out. BLUE
2 broke off attack on HIO 1 to assist his leader. BLUE 1 made a successful alrstart,
and BLUE Plight rejoined and egresaed the area.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. flred/No. hits)
20 mm (HEI) Remarks
BLUE 2 1/0 BLUE 2 thinks he may possibly have hit
MIO, but. he saw no visual evidence.
235 rounds fired.
21)5
Bvrnt II-6S
Kta 1
23»ngi Cartnon
2/0
He mark 8
BLUB 1 atated HIG nay have fired
severU bursts at him.
9. CQUIPNEIIT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2*8 gua camera did not work.
10. AIURCV COfmENTS
Experience
BLOE 2
Total
Hours
5000
P-I05
Hours
200
Conbat
Missions
20
Remarks
BLUE 2 had previous ali^to-alr
experience In Korea; 66 missions air**
to-ground In P-86; 35 missions air-to-air
In the P-86. BLUE 2 estlniated he had
10-12 encounters and 5 or 6 engagements
with NIGb during Korean conflict.
Cpmwenta on this Encounter
a. BLUE 2 had no trouble turning with and tracking the MIO. He was able to hold
lead» but. initial range was too far out to fire. At 600 KIAS» holding 5 to 6 "g's",
he was unable to get a raold rate of closure even In afterburner. BLUE 2 felt MIO may
have bad control problems due to high airspeed. He was sure MIQ could have turned
tighter at a slower speed. MIQ appeared to be executing a Jinking maneuver dur5ng the
left turn. All of a sudden his right wing would tip down and he would make a quick
motion to the right. BLUE 2 originally thought this maneuver to be some sort of evasive
action, but finally decided the MIO was having control difficulties. BLUB 2 tracked MIC
for approxlnately 30 seconds, and felt he could have gotten a kill eventually if he had
not been forced to break off and help his leader.
b. BLOB 2 stated he thought our pilot skill and capability were far superior to
thOM of the MIO pilots. Pelt MIQ pilots to be somewhat timid in their attack - as
though they wanted to make one quick hl^ speed pass, and then get out.
c. Jud^ng by the type Intercept {pursuit curve) and relative position at Initial
Sigbtlng, BLUE 2 felt that the MIOs were under QCI control throughout the engagement.
d. BLUE 2 did not have time to reset his switches for "guns air" during his firing
paaa. Stated he was forced to put his head In the cockpit as he was trying to aat up
fposi bombing switch configuration to alr-to-alr configuration.
e. BLOE 2 stated all flights had a great deal of communications problems coming off
target. This was due to saturation of the radio frequency rather than being an equlpoient
reliability factor. •*
11. DATA SOUKCCS
Project Interview ;
Hes»«g!ss~
BLUE 2, 2 Feb 1967.
7AP
7*P
0000 26723
DIG 30617
08lil36z
0822 32Z
Oct 1966
Oct 1966
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
a Plight had just expended ordnance on the target and was pulling out at about
8,000 ft. altitude and turning left. BLUE 2 saw two HI0-21s and called out "21 attacking
at 9 o'clock high." He first saw two and when he looked back there were two more behind.
The mos were in elements of two. strung out with 500 ft. linear separation, but in a
fighting wing, 50-60 degrees back from the leader.
Ae the first two MI0-2ls came In, they singled out BLUE I. The lead MIO, in a 90*
bank, atten^ted to pull lead on BLUE 1 and passed in front of BLUE 2. The MIQ closed
to within 3000-6000 ft of BLUE 1. with about 100 kts overtake. BLUE 2 did not have
aufneient tine to set up his gunsii^t, and with t fixed plpper, depressed for bombing,
fired a 2 1/2 see burst. BLUB 2 pointed the .nose and visually estimated the lead
but no hits were observed.
The mo then broke off his attack on BLUE I and continued 1/2 turn with afterburner
going. The trailing two MIOs passed behind BLUE 2 in an overshoot, went high, and were
not seen again. The second MIG of the first section also passed out of sirttt below and
in front of BLUE 2. Although BLUE 1 was not able to turn with the KIG, BLUE 2 could do so,
Afl the first MIO broke off from BLUE 1, BLUE 2 cleaned off his aircraft snd lit the
afterburner, and followed the MIO. He then configured the weapon system for guns air
and set the radar up. AlthougTi BLUE 2 Is not positive that he obtained a radar lock, the
analO0ie was in the 4-5 position which indicated radar lock-on but that the target was out
Bv«nt IZ-65
of ran^. BtUE 7. contlnu«d to track the KIO and closed on tiln. BLUE ? was at 8,000-
10,000 ft altitude, 600 KIAS and was pulling about A g's. The NIO appeared to be jlnklnc
In front of BLUE 2 but he felt that the KIO was r«ftlly having control dlf fieultles.
After the HIQ had broken off froa BLUE 1, BLUB 1 and BLUE 2 were fired on by
85 mm flak.
As BLUE 2 closed on the HIC, ne heard BLUE 1 call that BLUE 1 had been hit by flak
so BLUE 2 broke off to Join rn BLUE 1.
BLUE 1 Mas hit by flak and at 15S0K, 16,000 ft, heading 270* and the damage caused
the engine to flame out. Vhlle attempting an air start at 10.000 ft at 21*09 *N/105*35 'E
he observed a SAM from & site at 210 12'N/105*3')'E on a beading of l8o degrees clinblng .
past and about 1,000 ft froa the aircraft. BLUE 1 did not see the nisslle detonate,
and no evasive action was taken due to the flaneout. Subsequent air start was successful.
BLUE 2 felt that either GCI or the second HQ element had warned NXQ-1 that BLUE 2
was closing on him.
BLUE 2 made a OP rejoin on SLUE 1 and the flight e greased.
RED BAHOM EyENT 11-65 50HMARY
Nark
Action Aircraft (BlUC 1. 9, 4)
Cowaynlcatlens
Cneoy Actions
(MIG 1.2)
Reurki
Statu!
Actloe
Other Fri.endly
To
4 to 5 g pull-up
450 KIAS 6>?000 ft
■f terburnar
BLUE 2 was cutting off
BLUE 1 In a left turn
for Join uD Aft#r honh*
Ing run. BLUE 2 sighted
4 HIG-2lt Initiating
attack froai hit 9
o'clock high position
(2 to 3 n k1 range).
BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned
tanks anc! KER. lighted
afterburner and con-
tinued turn.
BLUE 1 (L) in a
left turn cllMbIng
out froa target.
BLUE 3 and 4 went
wide 2 n «1 behind
BLUE 2.
BLUE 2 called
leader to Increase
his turn. BLUE 2
called Vis attacki
Ing at 9 o'clock
high.'
NIGs wort In a
descending pursuit
curve passing
through heading
of south. E>ti»
■ated 550 to 600
kt airspeed and
descending through
8-9000 ft altitude
Attacking bogles
were Inedlately
recognlted at
NI6-21 type
aircraft.
4S0 KIAS 6-7000 ft
altitude.
Accelerating in
afterburner.
BLUE 2 rolled wings
level and fired one
2-1/2 sec burst at MIG 1
at he passed in front.
After firing BLUE 2 ude
slight right turn and
then back hard left (6
or 6 g's) to keep in
trail with the HIG.
SLUE 2 tost Sight
of lead when he
rolled level to
fire.
NIG 1 rolled In
trail with BLUE 1.
NIG 2 passed un<1er
SLUE ?*s nose and
was not seen again
NIG 3.4 fell
behind as BLUE 2
accel erated.
BLUE 2 fired
without sight •
he did not have
tine to set up
the sight for
air-to-aIr
operation.
Descending tiire
5000 ft altitude
600 KIAS S to 6 0*1
SLUE 2 traUetf NIG 1 In
a hard left descending
turn.
BLUE 1 (L) was bit
by 8Sm AA fire.
Hit caused SLUE 1
(L) to f1aMe*out.
BlUE 1 asked for
BLUE 2's position -
BLUE 2 replied
"behind a NIG"
BLUE 2 asked
leader to transolt
for OF steer.
NIG 1 was In a 5
to 6 g hard left
descending turn it
600 KIAS. After-
burner on. MIG 3.
4 seen again brief
1y by BLUE 2.
BLUE 2 was In
trail with NIG.
He could hold
lead for firing
but his range
was too far out
(about 1 n mi).
BLUE 2 slowly
began to accel-
erate and close
on the NIG.
^1
sobo ft
600 KIAS
BLUE t broke off to the
right and dtsenrsged
froa the NIG. SLUE 2
got a OF stoor to rejoin
BLUE
BLUE 1 flancd out.
but finally oade a
successful air-
start.
BLUE 1 called out
"SAH nlssllcs
launch*
HIG 1 disappeared
when BLUE 2 broke
off. SAN was
launched at BLUE 1
while ho was
flaaed out.
SAN did not
guide and alssed
BLUE 1 by 1000
ft. 8LU* 2
rejoined BLUE 1
Just short of
Red River,
heading 270*.
crj era csa> cat
E#«nt XI- 66
Aircraft Involwd; Pour P-105a ve threa NI0-17a
and ttfo fiza-21a
Raault: No Oanage
Vicinity of Eneountar: 21»13*K/105**7'B . .
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOB \
Date/Tlae: 8 October igSe/XSilSH
2. MISSION ROUTE
Ihiknown
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1. 2. 3. »
Bitemal tanks (typs and sits unknom)
mo-17 MIQ 1. 2. 3
External tanks
4. PLI6KT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather; High cirrus, 5 raiie visibility In hase.
BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4
Altitude ; 1,000 ft AOL
Heading; 135a
Speed ; gHo kts
Puel State ; Unknown
Plight Formation ; Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
«™.®^?^ observed three MIO-lTs dinp their external tanks and turn In on then fron
BLOB'S * o'clock high position at a range of 6-6,000 ft. w »n«i iron
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight went afterburner and accelerated to 6OO kts.
7.. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
K*"°* r!*"? '^1°^ ""^ ^'^'^^ ^" ^ o'clock position. BLUE Plight popped up
and began their dive bonb run. During the dive run, BLUE Plight sighted two MIO-218 at
3 o Clock, apparently initiating an attack cn BLUE Leader. After bomb release. BLUE Plinht
jettisoned their external tanks and turned in behind the MIQs. The MIOs were In a loose
fc^Sii formation, and slightly offset to the side. As BLUE Plight closed in at 6 o'clock
Ji'?!2/l.r?"5*' MIQs broke up and left towards the south. No engagement followed. BLL-E
thi aieS ' 500 ft AOL, accelerated to 755 kta, and egressed
8. ORDNANCE
None
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience ; Onknown
Consents on this Eneeuntei
attack node. He felt the NIOs may hsve had a radar warning syatem,
IK DATA SOURCES
Project Interyjewa i None
Messages. ReportiT
Letter from BLOB 2
TAP Message 082232Z Oct 66 DIO 30617
Event 11-67
Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOSs vb four HQ-lTs
Result: Ho Diunage
Vielnltj of Encounter: 21'»11'N/105*'S0*E
1. PBINARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dete/Tlise: 8 October 1965/15'»1H
A flight of four P-105a (BLUE Flight) were on a multiple flight etrlke mission
agUnst JCS Target #51, at 2X«10'M/105'*50»B. Plight was making a final test on the
QRC.160 EON pods.
2. NISSIOR ROUTE
The overall route is unknotm; however, th» flight made Its ingress and egress to
target along the N. side of Thud Ridge.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-IOS BLUB 1. 2. 3. » '
6 - 500- lb bombs
2 - il50-gal drop tanks
1 - QRC-160 GCM pod
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Unknown
BLUE 1. 2. 3. »
Altitude : 12,000 ft
Heading ; Approx. SB
Speed ; 500 kt
Fuel State ; Otaknowa
Wight Formation :
Unknown on Inbound leg. Loose extended trail (coming off target) with a alight
lateral separation between the wingman and leader of each element.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 3 made the first sighting. Inbound, when he spotted two HZQ-lTs at their 3 o'eloek
position at approximately 6000 ft altitude. These MIGs approached BLUE Flight, but either
did not see them or elected not to give chase because of the P-105 speed advantage.
As the flight came off target (right turn out), BLUE 2 sighted two bogeys at their
7 o'clock position, 3 to 4 miles. Seconds later BLUE li called two more NIOs at his
6 o'clock closing.
S. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight proceeded on in to the target after the first sighting as the MZOs made
no attempt to engage. BLUE Plight went afterburner when BLUE 2 called out aecond sighting.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Nothing occurred during the first sighting as the MIOs made no attempt to engage.
BLUE Plight went Into afterburner when BLUE 2 called second sighting. Shortly after
BLUE 2 called bogey's range decreasing to 2 to 3 miles, BLUE ft called out two more MIOs
in his 6 o'clock position. BLUE Plight continued straight outbound for approximately
two minutes when BLUE 2 Initiated a cross-over on lead to check position of the HlCs.
BLUE 2 observed a MIO-17 at BLUE ii*s 6 o'clock, range 6000 ft. During the cross-over,
the Nia broke off the engagement, pulling up and heading back towards Phuc Yen. BLUE
Plight was low on fuel, and the leader decided to proceed home rather than turn back
and engage the MIOs.
8. ORDNANCE
None expended
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
H«ie
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience : Unknown
Comments on this Encounter:
BL'bE 2 feeia that the fighting wing position (500 to 1000 ft behind lead within a
60* cone) in the P-105 is not conducive to mutual support. Due to the reduced visibility
in the P-105, he felt that a wider spread formation, stacked either level or slightly
low was far preferable to the fighting wing position in a defensive environment. BLUB 2
E»«nt 11-67
«a. unabl. to th« «0a In trtll with BLOE U until he actually turned and creased
from one side of BLUE leader to the other. mt.-ii*- they orobably
BLOE 2 stated that If the MlGs had been equipped »^"""; S PllSht had
nlsslle firing range. ,
n. DATA SOURCES
Prolect interviews ; BLOE 2, 3 February 1967.
Sasiagea : TAP 2232 Z Octobar 1966, 010 30617.
12. NAflRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Sea Iteics 17 and #10.
Event XI- 66
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105a vb one RIQ-19
and one HZd-lS or -17
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*15 *N/104«00*E
1. PRIMARY HtSSlON AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tiae: October 1966/Selieved to be daylight, p.m.
Pour P-lOSs (BLUE Plight) on atrlke nlaslon against highitay bridge (Route Package V).
Nlaslon was ore of several In general area and along Red River.
2. MISSION ROUTE ,
Departed Korati then to unknotm refueling track, thence via TACAN Channel 79. via
TACAN Channel 97 to target (approx. 21«15'N/10it<*08'E}.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
p. 105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft
6 - 7$0»lb bombs (Hkii.?) outboard emd 4 centerline)
2 - 450-gal fuel tanks - inboard
1029 rounds 20autt (HEI)
TACAN operating - IPP standby - radar standby
Camouflage paint
BLUE 1 and 3 only - ECN vector equipoent
MIQ 1. 2
Unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather t Scattered cirrus at various levels over Laos - broken layer at 10,000 ft W of
target - patchy scattered clouds in target area with visibility 50 Biles plus.
BLUE
I 5 3
Altitude: 13K 13K 15K 15K
Heading ! , NNE
Speed ! 480- kt
Fuel State ; 11,000 lb ^^^^
Plight Porreation ; Fluid-Four.
o
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight received MIQ warnings fron IRON HAND flight In area. BLUE 3 saw two
bogles in close formation at 2 o'clock position high.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight was nearing target and elected to continue straight on in Mftlls kMplag
the unidentified aircraft under observation.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT
The bogies paralleled BLUE Flight's course for a few minutes, then turned into them
with a gentle turn. BLUE 3 identified them as MlO-type aircraft and chilled for flight
to turn right. BLUE Plight made a 360 degree turn, passing approximately 5000 ft below
the HIOb. hIGs did not engage, rolled out ..eading W and egresned the area.
a. ORONAKCE
No ordnance expended.
9. CQUtPHCNT PROBLEMS
Wen* reported.
I I
Event 11-68
10. AIRCREW COMMC:US
EKperlgnee '
BLUE
Total
Hourt;
4900
?-105
Hours
350
Combat
Ula along
80
ReiiarkB
Had received P>105
ACM training >tt Yokota,
Japan.
BLUE 2, BLUE 3, 15 Ptebruary 1967.
Copg»at8 on ithl8 Encounter
a. BLUE I 3 felt F-105 needed better turning capability.
«:o — J'^'^'iL^ mentioned need for slapler giinslght control (too many switch operations
targeS; f^S^t^e'e'Sf r«S^r':hS'Jnrre3u' aPP«ached^
11. &ATA SOURCE
Pr2,i et Intervlpw i
i^eg; Hone
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
When BLUE 3 first called bogles, he could see only two dark soeeks in the akv
is^^a"„^s?j;n^^jur?;sJ! .r /
5!?'!^ 5 ^"'^f appeared to be a MIG-15 or -17. and the other a HiallQ blue •
eal ed for a right turn, and BLUE Plight .rade a right descendlL ^eo' 4 J,'.^ '
afri^rbumer; passing 5000 ft below and underneath the MiSJ? MlL'made^o a^emSt
5Lu''f%'UteS'S:'feit"?2/?"?r^; ?^!:^ "^^•^'^ resui.3 oSursflnd p^o^eeSeS tfJ^J^et.
sSie^t'iSftS: KiSslooiSfJS: ^^^^^ • '^^^ ln.cructor%Uot showing a'
-4
256
/ Event 11-69
Aircraft Involved: Pqur P-105* V8 tvo NXO-Zls
Result: Slitting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*13* N/106* «2*E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TlBe: 3 November I966/1556H
A flight of four P-IOS* (BMIE Plight) was proceeding outbound from a target In
North Vietnam.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Dnknown.
3! AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
Unknown .
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Unknown*
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight Sighted two NZQ-Sls, heading north, approximately 3 n nl away, at
3000 ft AOL.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight gave chase on the MICs, and accelerated to 650 kt.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Blue Plight chased the MIGs north, but could not close the distance between flights.
Blue broke off the chase at 21*>29'N/106oU0 'E. The NlOa had been in a gradual clijnb» and
continued out of sight toward China.
8. ORDNANCE
Unknown.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Unknown.
10. AIRCREU COHNENTS
Unknown.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; None
Heaaanes. Reports ; 7AF, 03232ilZ Nov 66, DID 07ol
12. .NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
See Items 5-7 •
« Bvvnt II-71
Aircraft Involved: Poup P-105S ont NIO-Zl
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Approi luately
1. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Tine: November 1966/unknoHn
A flight of four P-ioSs (BLUE Plight) were on a multiple flight strike alaalon
against the Phuc Yen POL (JCS Target 51.10). BLUE Plight had Juat entered the target
area and reached a point 10 ml NW of Fhuc Yen airport.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Flight took the normal overland route via Yen Bal. and then SE doim Thud
Ridge to the target. Point of origin la unknown.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
3LUE 1. 2. 3. ^»
1 - QRC . 160 ECN pod
WO
Unknown
4. FLISHT CONPITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Heather: Unknown
BLUE 1. 2. 3. >
Altitude: 2500 ft
Heading: S£
Speed: Unknown inbound* 650 kt during egression
Fuel State: Unknown
Flight Ponaatlon: Unknowi
5. INITIAL DETECTION
HtUB 2 sighted a Mia-21 rolling in and paralleling BLUE Plight's dlreetion. The
MIO held at their 9 o'clock position, level, at 4000 ft range.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Aa the MIG posed no Innediate threat, BLUE Plight took no evasive action, and
- continued on their bonb run*
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The Mia-21 followed BLUE Plight Into the target. When BLUE popped up to 10,000
feet for their bomb delivery, the MIG remained at 2500 feet and made a level 180*
turn. The MIC made no attempt to engage. BLUE Plight came off the target, and made
their egression on a reciprocal heading to the Inboard leg, increasing their airspeed
to 650 kt. The MIO was last observed breaking off, and turning back towards Phuo Yen.
8. ORDNANCE
None
to. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience : Unknown
CoKments on this Encounter:
BLUE 1 felt the MIO pilots were not at all aggressive. He spotted several more
HIOS in the area during their egress, but none of then bothered hla flight. BLUE
1 eomnented that the MIGa over Fhuc Yen didn't, venture over 6 n ni from their own
hone base on that particular day.
Comments from Overall Experience :
Starting in the middle of November as the chances of being shot at by a SAH on a
given day decreased, the probability of being sttaeked by HXQa increased.
V Event Il-n
n. DATA SOURCES
Pro4«ct Interview : BLUE 1
ttessagea. Reports : None
U. RAftftATlVC DESCRIPTION
S*« ItVBS 5-7 k 10
'I
i
i
i
:l|
I il
!
I
1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Btrmit ll'U
Alrertft IitTolnd: Pour P-105Da vt thrt« flZ0-2U
Result: Sighting only
Vlfllnlty of EncountAr: Onknown
I. PRINART NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlae: November 1966/unknOMn
A night of four P-l05Da (BLUE Plight) on * strike mlsslOR In North Vietnam.
II. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; None
M essages. Reports ;' Letter froa neaber of BLUB Plight
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight saw three MIQ-2la high at 9 o'clock while inbound to the target. BLUB
JSUH?^!?^*'* *■ they were pulling off the bomb run, the MIQs turned into
the flight. BLUB flight accelerated and the NIQa turned away.
Event 11-73
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-l05Ds vs one MIQ 21
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Unknown
I. PRIIIART NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: November 1966/unknown
A flight of four P-105D8 {BLUE Plight) on a strike mission In North Vletnaa.
II. DATA SOURCES
Wessages. Reports ; Letter from BLUE 1,
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLOB 1 sighted a MO-Zl at 9 o'clock high, 3 to « ml away. The MIO turned away.
i
i
i
263
Event IX>74
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105» vb two HIO-lTs
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: SW side of Thud Ridge
1. PRIMRT niSSlON AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: November 1966/unlcnown
Pour P-1058 <BLUE Plight) were proceeding southeast down the southwest a We of Thud
Ridge, ;SfcounS tdlaS a tifgei at thS south of the ridge. Due to the proxlwity of
Phuc Yen, the flight started a hard 180"* turn.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTtR
Weath er: Clear along southwest side Of Thud Ridge i the ridge Itself was capped by
T5w clouds.
Altitude:
trading :
Speed :
BLUE 1. 2. 3. "
Unknown
Approximately 090* in a hard left turn
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
Spee d :
F uel State :
Flight Formation :
5. INITIAL DETECTION
After about «I5 degrees of turn, BLUE « sighted two MIO-lTs sliding by his tall in an
apparent overshoot.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Flight continued turn, as BLUE U was only man to see the HIOs, and did not c«H
them out until flight had rolled steady, heading northwest,
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
After the overshoot, the MIOs did not attempt to reattack. They proceeded southeast
and entered the Phuc Yen lefense area. BLUE Plight proceeded northwei,t, then crossed Thud
Ridge at the north end, h^iaded back down the northeast side of the ridge, and on to hit
their target. No more MIO sightings were made. BLUE 1 had executed this round->ai»out
routing to avoid overflying the Phuc Yen area defenses.
10. AIRCREW COMHENTS
Etperience
P-105
Hours
800
Combat
Missions
Unknown
Remarks
None
BLUE 1 Unknown
Comments on This Encounter ; None
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 1 made the following comment concerning MIO tactics In the vicinity of Thud
Ridge. He felt the MIOs and their QCI network had a very well coordinated effort, and
good communications. He described the following tactic which was used continually when-
ever there was a thin cloud deck In the area X2-Z000 feet). The MIOs would position
themselves on the opposite side of the cloud deck from the attacking strike flights; then
allow GCI to vector them into the strike aircraft's 6 o'clock position. When approximately
1 to 2 nml In trail, they would pop either up or down through the cloud layer and right
Into shooting position. Such a maneuver gave the strike flights little or no time to
acquire the attacking HIGs before they were in a firing position. The MIOs would also use
a staggered trail formation (possibly 1 nml apart) during this tactic; then If you made a
hard break to avoid one,- you might be setting yourself up right In front of another as he
popped through the clouds. BLUE 1 stated this tactic was normally employed using three
KIGs rather than four.
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interview : BLUE 1
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
See I tens 5-7.
Brent 11-75
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-X05« va four MI0-2aa
Result; No Damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»l8'H/105»*9*E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: ? December :966/lil?5H
Bombing strike on the POL storage area at the end of Thud Ridge (JCS 51.10). BLUE
Flight was one of several F-105 nights In on the target. As the flight came off their
bonb run, they were attacked by two MIG<-21s.
2. NISStOK ROUTE
The aircraft departed Takhll direct to Oreen anchor* direct to Channel 97, direct to
Red River, direct to Thud Ridge, down Thud Ridge to the target. Egress the reverse route.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-IOSD BLUE 1. It
6 - 750-lb bonbs •
1 - AIM-9B missile
1 - QRC-160 ECM pod
2 - wing tanks
1029 rnds 20jja aruno.
BLUE 1 had IFF on, rest of flight had TACAN receive only, doppler on, radar in
standby and IFF standby.
P-105D BLUE g. 1
6 • 750<-lb bombs
2 _ ti^o-gal. wing tanks
1 > QRC-160 ECH pod
1029 rnds 20in.D anno.
All F-10^8 camouflaged.
HIC-21
2 > AA missiles
NlOs were not camouflaged
23 or 37mm cannons unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; 8000 ft overcast 2-3 miles in haze below clouds. Cloud tops 9-10,000 ft clear
above. Cloud cover extended from the Red River Valley down Thud Ridge to Just
short of the target. The target Itself waa open.
Altitude ; 8000 ft
lieadlnK : 310« ^0" dive
Speed : 550 KCAS
Fuel Sta te: 9000 lb
FllFiht Formation ; BLUE Plight was In its bomb run at the time the MIGs were sighted.
BLUE i ft 2 had dropped their bombs and were heading up the north side of Thud
Ridge. BLUE 3 was in the bomb run Just prior to drop, and BLUE- 4 bad rolled
in and was in his dive.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 3 In the bomb run sighted two HIQ 2l8 at his 2 o'clock position, two to three
miles away. BLUE Plight had heard HIO calls from Big Eye all the way down Thud Ridge.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 3 dropped bombs on target, engaged afterburner, end Jettisoned the HER raeli»
turning slightly left into the MlGa 8 o'clock position.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT
As BLUE 3 pulled off the dive bomb run, he saw two MIO 21b. attacking BLUE 2. BLUB 3
called a break as the MIG fired a A AM at BLUE 2 from range of about 1 mile. BLUE 3 again
called break as the MIG fired a second AAM; by this tine BLUE 3 Mas abreast of the NIQ end
as he turned Into the MIG, the MIGs broke off to the right.
Five to six miles further up the Ridge. BLUE Flight was again Jumped by two MI0-21S
attacking from 9 o'clock. The MICs overshot BLUE 4. BLUE Plight waa at a high speed by
this tine and were able to outrun the NICs In afterburner.
1
261
Evfnt U-Ti
a. SRONAflCC
(No.
MIG 1
fl red/No. hits)
Soviet *AH
2/0
Rem grka • •
The 2 AANs fired could only be seen by BLUE j iS
long as the rocket motor burned. He was unable
to tell if they g^ulded or not. It is assuraed
that the violent maneuvtjrlng by Bi-U5 2 when
the mlsalles were fired caused the nlaslle to
miss. Plred at BLUE 2.
9. CQUIPMERT PROBLEMS
BLOK 3 was not able to complete the switch changes necessary to change from a ground
attack mode to either missile or gun's air. Recommends a more simple arrangement.
BLUE 4 alao commented on the switch problem. There are too many steps Involved and It
requires that you take your eyes off the target and look In the cockpit. The
rearward vlsablllty In the P-105 is very poor. It requires excessive maneuvering
of the aircraft to clear your 6 o'clock.
10. AIRCREV COmENTS
Experience
BLUB 1. 2
BLUE 3
BLUE 4
Total F-105
Hours Hours
Unknown
250
1700
2600
600
Combat
Missions
48
35
Remarks
BLUE 3 gun and missile firing experience
lioated. He had fired one missile in AOC,
some air gunnery during transition training.
Pilot had fired the AIN-9 and the M>61 cannon
during gunnery training at Nellis APB, Nevada,
lie had flown several air tactics flights in his
permanent organieatlon, Yokota AS, Japan.
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE 3 overshot a good firing position and was up line abreast of the MIQ. A reason
for this was his preoecupaticn with trying to set switches for missiles air. He never
did get bis *swltehe8 set properly to fire a missile or the gun.
BLUE 3 could not yo-yo to get on the lead HIO due to the cloud deck.
BLUE H did not have an AIM-9i he did have an opportunity to fire one on one of the
Mias as It pulled up high on an overshoot. BLUE 4 reeomnends a low drag AAM for external
carry on the 105- Possibly an AZN-9B. The high speed capability of the P-105 to outrun
the mcs at low altitude was the big factor In this engagement.
BLUE 4 - The HIO warnings past the first one were not useful since specific informa-
tion about the NIGs altitude and flight direction were not given.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
Hessane Report s:
BLUE 3 (4 Peb 1967). BLUE 4 (2 Dee 1966)
TAP OPREP-tt
TAP OPREP-4
7AP OPREP-3
7AF DIA
DOCO 296^6
DOCO 29688
DOCO 2967t
DIA 002
021630Z Dec 66
O30835Z Dec 66
O302OIIZ Dec 66
022247Z Dec 66
12. MRRATIVE DCSCRIPTICN
BLUE Plight was In the process of bombing JCS Target 51.10, an oil storage area at
the aouth end of Thud Ridge. BLUE 1 and 2 had bombed and were pulling off the target-
BUB 3 alghted two HIG-21s at his 2 o'eloek position in a diving turn In pursuit of BLUE 2.
BLUE 3 was in his bomb run and dropped his bombs, engaged afterburner, Jettisoned the MER
rack and turned slightly left to engage the MICs. BLUE 3 called BLUE 2, advising him that
he had two MIG-21S at 6 o'clock. The MIGa were now in position on BLUE 2 and MIO 1 fired
an AAM. BLUE 3 called "break left, break, break." 3LUE 2 broke left, then right, and the
missile nlased. BLUE 3 was able to see the missile as long as the rocket, motor was burning,
but lost sight of it at motor burnout. BLUE 3 was overtaking the MICa at a high rate of
elosare; he came out of aftert)umer. As he came line abreast of MIG 2. the MIO broke hard
righA away from BLUE 3 and out of the fight. HIS 1 fired a second AAK at BLUE 2 BLUE 3
called break, missile away. BLUE 2 made a hard turn and the missile went past behind his
aircraft and hit In the hills. BLUE 3 was now closing rapidly on HXQ 1, trying to chanae
switch settings In the cockpit to missiles-air. BLUE 3 pulled up on the left side of the
HIO approximately 200 ft off his left wing. BLUE 3 turned into the HIO and the HIG broke
hard right and out of the engagement. BLUE Plight continued NW up Thud Ridge; app'ioximarttly
^ , Event "-75
^'Sfrn:^^"^ 3 spotted 2 MlO-218 at hie u o'clock In a left diving turn on
tJalf JoJi;f<o«^.\K?"!f «° afterburner. BLUE Plight .wa. strung out In a
trail rorraatl on at this tine and doing approximately 600 KCAS at an altitude of 6000 ft
MSu along the top of Thud Ridge 500-1000 ft above the ground. BLUE 1, 2 and 3 had no
5*v*? s.^ll^rr^25 ^^"^ 1"*^ ""^^ t*'* string, did make a left
»^ w-5r Srn/J^'' ^^^^ approached his 8 o'clock position. The MIOc overshot
:Se::!i Eif a?Sa'Sfh'ihe"^rr'c?;;e";?ij5r """"^
ojis-SiiSl'Jt^Si^
tne radio concnunlcatlon anong the nembers of BLUE Plight.
On egress BLUE 1 observed a SAM fired on Blue 1.
HEP BAROH EVENT HW5 SUHHARY
T1r«
Nirk
Action Atrcr«ft (SLUE 3)
Other rrltndly
Coamunf catlonf
Cntmv Actions
(MIS 1,t)
-
RfMirki
Status
Action
\
In bomb run about
h«1 f way down
8000 ft
40* dfv« L
SOO fct
Drops bonbs
83 spotted ? HIGs
Initially as he was
about half-May through
bonb run.
83 pickled boabs off on
target.
Lead out ahead of
flight. 82 was
pulling off target
at 5-6000 ft.
84 had trouble
dropping bonbs--
lost mutual
support position
on 83.
33 said "BLUE 2
there are two KIG-
21s rolling In on
you." KIG calls by
Big Eye prior to
entering target
area
2 HIG-21S.
83 first saw HIGs
high 1 o'clock
about two miles.
Whole area overcast
(8000 ft) except
for hole In target
area. In target
area clear with two
mile visibility In
haze. Haze up to
8000» overcast 1000
ft. BLUE Flight
had jettisoned wing
tanks on Thud Ridge
prior to the target
aft«r receiving HIG
warnings.
T,
83 pickles HER
S to 6000 ft
In afterburner
50O-5S0 kt
83 cuts off HIGs In
turn, Is at 8 o'clock
one quarter lalla froai
HIG.
82 does violent
evasive maneuvers.
Hlsslle misses.
B3 yelled to 82
"Break left, break
right, break,
break."
Lead HIG fires
missile at 82.
Range is about one
half mile. Seemed
too close to 83.
83 attempted to
switch to missile's
air but cannot
manage It and keep
his eyes on the MIG
at the same time.
5 to 6000'ft
SOO-SSO KCAS
out of eftorburntr
B3 Is 200 ft or so off
Ming of lead HIG. Has
cut off HIG to Inside
of turn.
83 broke left hard
Initially and
then cane back
right.
B3 called to 82
that another
Missile had been
firod.
Lead MIG fired Znd
missile. H2 does
hard right break.
Lead HIG Is 6
o'clock.
All aircraft are
now below overcast.
Factors in enemy
missiles not
bitting 82. Air-
craft maneuvering,
cloud , and hills
in the background.
S to 6000 ft
S00-S50 KCAS
B3 broke Into load H16.
82 continued
Jinking.
Lead HIG made hard
right break in
about 90" bank
angle. Not seen
again.
83 could not do
yo-yo to get into
position on lead
HIG since yo-yo
would have taken
htm by Into clouds.
He did not want to
get into a speed
disadvantage situa-
tion by using speed
brakes.
Cdi a a rr* nai c^a c!!3i era c=3 crai nra crsa a=a cna cn» rr,ia ozxm nioa
RED BARON EVENT II-7S SUMMARY
Action Aircraft (BLUE 3) |
Other Trlendljr
CoRRunlcatlons
Enemy Actions
(HIu > (Z)
Remarks
Ttnf
Hark
Status
Action
T..
310-320' Lead
5000 to 4500 ft
Both aircraft went
afterburner.
B3 spotteiJ two more MIGs
11 o'clock. '2-3
utiles. Aircraft
accelerated to 600 -
650 kt.
OZ leading egress.
B2 one quarter to
one half mile
ahead of B3.
B3 called "B2 we
have two more
coming In on us -
push It up."
Two MIGs co-alt to
maybe 500 ft
higher. HIGs In
pursuit turn on
F-105S only about
30' of bank.
The MIGs are flying
about 2000 ft
apart.
U
i
B3 fuel st«te
about 6000 tb.
B3 lost Sight of HIGs
at about 8 o'clock -
500 ft above and still
turning. B4 behind B3
about 3000 ft makes a
level break Into the
MI6s . The HIGs over-
shoot and go high. B4
goes back right and
egresssts Mith the
flight.
This Is the last
B3 saw of HIGs.
These MIGs made
about a 90* pass
on B4. {They nay
have actually been
In this path at
this time - that
Is not In an
attack on B2 and
63.
B4 felt he could
have pulled up and
f 1 red a missi le
when the MIG went
high during the
overshoot but he
was not configured
with an AIM>9.
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Event 11-76
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105» v» one MIO-21
Result: No demage
Vicinity ftf Encounter: 21«»17'N/105»12'E
t. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 2 December 1966/1*1 30H
BLUE Flight of four P-105Ds on a bombing strike against JCS 51.10, a POL fjorage area
at the South ind Ir Thud Ridge. There were several other flights in the area at the time,
with a total strike force of approxlnately 18 aircraft.
2. MISSION ROUTE
TakbU, direct to Green Anchor extend, direct to north station, direct to Bed Jlw,
• - -- - — .-.^ J- — 1. •- Reverse route on tne egress >
direct to 2l»H6'N/105''l3'E direct Thud Ridge, direct target
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
y-'iob atUE 1 ai 3
6 _ 750-lb bombs
] - AIM-9 nlaalle
1 - QRC-160 rod
2 . ti50-sal wing tanks
1029 rnda 20inni amino
F-105 BLUE 2 t 1
6 - 750-lb bonbs
1 - QRC-160 pod
2 - 450-gal wing tanks
1029 rnda 20nun amnio
All aircraft camouflaged.
MI3-21
Configuration unknown
Not 'zamouflaged
4. KlGHf CGHOlTiUnS rklGk TO LNCOUMUR
Weather: Solid undercpst clear above with good visibility.
AltUucie
He adlncT
Itt.OOO ft
090«
500 KCAS
10,500 lb
Modified Pluld-Pour. The wlngmen 1500 ft out and 500 ft high or low to
SpeeU ;
fuel State :
Flight I^or.natlon
provide a good &CM area of coverage.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
MIO sighted at 2 o'clock high 2-300O ft approximately 5 miles out. Heading In the
opposite direction.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Flight engaged afterburner and continued straight ahead descending and
accelerating.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHEKT
The MIO-21 made a slight descending pursuit curve as he approached 5 o'clock and
2000 ft out. BLUE Plight made a hard right break into the MIO. The MIO broke off left
and disengaged. No nisslles or gun firings observed.
8.
10.
ORDNANCE
No ordnance expended by either the P-lOSs or the KIO-21.
AiRCRCw cohhe:nts
BLUE 1 was a former B-52 pilot, 250 hr in the P-105. No other Information on pilot
experience available on this event.
BLUE 1 felt that since all he saw was one HIO and that the MIO broke off the engage*
ment as soon as he overshot when the flight broke into him that It waa probably a single
and that he did not want to tangle with a flight of four.
n. DATA SOURCE
Project Interview! BLUE 1 (Mar 1967)
275
Evvnt II«76
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was on top on an undercast flying lU^OOO ft altitude, 500 KCAS heading
090» approximately 15 miles NW of Thud aidge. BLUE 1 sights a single MIO at 2 o'clock,
2-3000 ft high, 5 miles out heading approximately 270*. The MIG started a right turn in on
BLUE Plight and made a pass from out of the sun. BLUE 1 called for afterburners and
accelerated straight ahead in a slight descent. As the MIO approached 5 o'clock, 2000 ft
out, BLUE 1 called a right break into the MIO while retaining ordnance. The HIQ waa Identic
fled aa a IIIQ-21, silver In color. The MIO overshot in the turn, he evidently continued
up north because he was not sighted again. BLUE Plight rolled out after approximately 90*
of turn, checked th; area visually for MIGs, then did a 180' left turn back up to Thud
Bidge and continued on into the target. There were no other MIO engagements during this
flight. BLUE 1 felt that he did see another flight of MIGs on Thud Ridge, but he was not
sure their relative position could be ascertained; consequently, they are not entered in
this report.
In reflecting back on the attack by the Nia-21, BLUE 1 felt that it was probably a
single NIG, he made one high side pursuit pass on the flight. When the flight broke into
the MIO, the MIO did not continue the attack. Xt Is felt that this confirms the fact
It was • single and did not want to tangle with a flight of four. The MIG was not observed
to fire either missile or guns.
BLUE Flight had seen two P-^Cs hit by SAMs jMst before they reached the turning point
«t the HV end of Thus Ridge. Only three flights were able to hit the target on this
strike aa the remaining flights had to Jettison ordnbnoe due to NXOs.
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105s va two NZa-31s
Results: No damage.
Vicinity of Encounter: 21050'N 10^I''25'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AMD TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 3 Dcce-^ber 1965/1220il
BLUE Plight was on an armed reconnaissance mission in Route Package V. (We&t
northwest of Hanoi 30 to 100 n ml) The flight was inbound to the target area ^outh
of the Rnd River, at 15,000 ft, when two HIG-Sls attacked the flight.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Korat direct to Oreen Anchor, direct to north station, direct to Red River,
direct to target area (Route Package V). Return, reverse course,
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
6 - 7S0 lb bombs
2 - 450 gal tanks
1029 Rounds 20niia
All aircraft camouflaged.
MIC-21
Ordnance unkno'«n.
Silver (not cainonf laged) .
4. FLIGHT C0*JOITI0N5 PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Solid undereaat top* 6-8,000 ft, good vlBlbllity above the clouds.
Altitude : 15,000 ft
Heablnp. : 032«
Speed : U80 KTAS
Fuel State : 12,000 lb
Plight l^oBnatlon ; Tactical spread vlth element on the left.
b, INITIAL UtrECTlON
Blue Flicht received Big Eye warnirigs of MIGs in the Hanoi area, but were not
expecting enemy aircraft in iJunediate area. At 1220H Blue Plight received MIG warning
from another U. S. flight in the area concurrent with a MIG sighting by Blue 1. Blue 1
reported two KlQs at 10 o'clock, SOOO ft high and 3 Mies out.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Blue Flight continued on heading of 032". The MIGs passed on the left descending
from 20,000 ft maintaining 210* heading.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Blue Plight turned to 360* heading to keep MIGs in eight. MlOa observed to br>.«ak
hard left and position themselves at 7 o'clock and 5 miles aft of Blue Plight.
10. AIRCREW COHHCNTS
Blue 3 stated that sighting KIGs "that far south and west of Hanoi came as a
surprise." In general the MIGs never operated that far from the Hanoi area. The MIGs
appeared to be under OCI control and were vectored to Blue Plight. Blue 3 believed
the MIGs accomplished their nisslon when Blue Plight Jettisoned ordnance.
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BtUE 3, 16 February 1967
Wettsajre P*port3 :
7AP 0PREP~3 DOCO 290708 0313112 Dec 66
7AP OPREP-H DOCO 29712 031550Z Dec 66
TAP OPREP-3 DOCO 29727 032210Z Dec C6
7AP DIA DIA 003 OHOOIOZ Dec 66
ii*4jLi^im!ii
L.:
Bv«nt 11-77
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE PliKht of four F-lOSDs Inbound on armed reconnalasance to Route Package V,
western section of N. Vietnam, altitude 15.000 ft, airspeed «l80 KTAS. Juat aouth
of the Red River, heading 032". BLUE 1 called MlQa at 10 o'clock hlch. They
irer« two K:c-21a. approximately 5Q00 feet high heading In the opposite direction.
As the MIOs passed to the left. BLUE Plight turned left to a heading of 360 to keep
the WQs m sight. As BLUE Flight turned the MIGs started a left diving turn to BLUt
Plight's 7 o'clock position. The MICa were about 3 miles In trail. BLUE 1 called to
Jettison ordnance and to go afterburner. BLUE Plight made a left break Into the BXM.
The MICs nade a right turn breaking off the attack, rolling out on a
approximately UC" . BLUE Plight rolled out of Ita left break on a headins of Zio
and egressed the target area.
27a
RED BAION EVENT tl-77 SU?<MART
I
Tine
N«rk
Action A^rcreft (BLUE 1, 3, 4)
Other Frierdly
Connunl cations
tr efty Ac 1 1 ons
(KIG 1.2}
flenarks
Status
Action
\
Four F-105$ In
f lold-four
formation, 15,000
ft. 480 KTAS,
heading 032",
tine 12Z0H
Plue 1 sighted two HIRs
at 10 o'clock , Fl ight
continued on course.
Other fHqhtt, in
the area.
Previous "IP alert j
received from Big
Eye but not for
this area. BLUE
Fl ioht heard an-
other flight in the
area call riGs.
BLUE 1 called MIGs
10 o'clocV.
Two 'iir,.2]s altltu<
20.010 ft, heading
210* .
e MIC alert was for
the Hanoi area.
This encounter
was west of the'
normal KIS threat
area. mt
I
Headlno 032", 480
KTAS. AU. 15.000
f t . keeping MIGs
In sight off to
the left.
BLUE Flight made a
left turn to keep the
Mir.s In sight. HIGs
were at about
B o'clock position.
BLUE 1 called HK>s
turnino Into the
flight.
Hiti Started a lef
descending turn
Into BLUE Flight.
i
Heading 360", 480
KTAS. Alt. 15.000
ft. HIGs «t
7 o'clock n ml aft
BLUE Flight Jettisoned
ordnance. Engaged
afterburners. Started
a left break Into the
HIGs.
BLUE 1 called
.]evCiso«^ ororiantc.
Afterburner left
break .
HtGs at BLUf
Fllqht's 7 o'clock
3 n ml af t . After
BLUE Fl Ight broke
MICs turn rt. roll
out on a heading o
130' .
HIGs saw BLUE
Flight Jettison
ordnance. This
may have been
their prloary
r mission since
they did not
press the attack.
Heading 210*.
12.000 ft.
SCO XCAS.
8LUC Flight egressed
the area. No other
encounters.
Heading 130*. did
not fire.
BLUE 3 suspected
thtt the HiGs
were 6CI
control led.
Aircraft Involved
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter:
fvent 11-78
Four P-105* v» two MIO-
17b or 19a
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 3 December 1966/12'lOH
BLUE Plight attacking JCS 19.000 at 21'05'M/105'55'E.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Korat, Thailand, directly to air refueling area, Vhlte» Orange or Red Anchor.
Directly north station directly to target, Ariaed reconnaissance In Route Package V after
hitting target, return route directly Udorn, directly Korat.
AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
6 - TSO-lb bombs, 1020 mda 20nm
2 * k^O gal fuel tanks
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS
Weathe r; Unknown
Altitude :
Heading:
BLUE 1,
apeeq
Fuel i
State;
15.000 ft
230°
440 KTAS
10,000 lb
HIO 1
25,000 ft
SIS'*
S. INITIAL DETECTION
No HIG warning for this area from Big Eye. BLUE 3 called bogies at 4 o*elcok high*
BLUE 1 sighted the bogles, two* silver aircraft, heading northwest. Aircraft appeared to
be MIO-17 or -19 type.
C. ACTICK l;;iTUTLd
BLUE Flight began right turn, keeping MIQs in sight.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Plight continued in turn, completely 360<*. NIQs continued on northwest heading
dlaappearing from sight.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE Flight - 6 750-lb bombs/'1029 rnds amuo
MXO - Unknown - silver color
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
BLUE 1
Total
Hours
4200
P-105
Hours
500
Combat
Missions
40
Hemarks
Pilot background primary fighter
test-pilot level. Korean War
experience in F~80. Had com-
• plated a short refresher course
at Nellis in the P-105 prior to
arriving in SEA.
BLUE 4 2400 ISO Unknown Pilot background noatly ADC
F-94C and P-102.
Comments on TMs Encounter
BLUE 1 - A low-drag missile to be carried by the F-IO? would have been useful In
this case. BLUE 1 did not want to Jettison ordnance and chase after the MIQs for two
reasons: (1) thr primary mission was to deliver bombs and (2) the MIG-17 can out-turn
and out-maneuver the P-105. BLUE 1 did not feel he had a good chance of a kill with th*
M-61 gun only.
r Bvent 11-76
10. AiRCRCW CONNEHTS (Continued)
• The gun alr-to-alr node requires too many switching operations ehanges when changing
from ground-te-air oode. The present radar for air-to-air la inadequate for a faat-
deve loping haasei close to the ground. It Is unreliable for lock-on and requires too much
In the way of avitches and controls.
The ECM capability of the CRC-I60 Is good but the drag and reliability at high speed,
and low altitude la questionable. Recommend an Internally mounted ECM capability..
The rearward visibility In the P-IOS is very poor.
11. DATA SOURCES
Pro ;|eet Interviews ; BLUE 1 and 1-15 February 1967
HesaaKea .Reports :
TAP OPREP-1 DOCO 29697 031014Z Dec 66
TAP OPREP-3 DOCO 29720 03195SZ Dee 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
See Items 5 and 7. No additional details.
Event 11-79'
Aircraft Involved: Four F-lO^e vs one lfIO-21
Result: Sighting only.
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*42*N/101*53'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tltne: 3 December 1966/1213H
BLUE Plight on ROLLING THUNDER Interdiction nlealon. JC3 19.00 target.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Korat, Thailand, directly to air refueling area. White, Orange or Red Anchor,
Directly north, station directly to target. Arraed reconnalaaance In Route Package V
after hitting target, return route directly Udorn, directly Korat.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
F-105 BLUE I. 2, 3. ij
6 - 750 ib bor.Ls, 2 ~ ftSC gal fuel tanks
1029 rds 20nin ammo
4. FLIGHT CUNOITIONS
Weather: Unknown
BLUE 1. 2. 3. » HIO 1
AllUude.: 17,000 ft 20.000 ft
HSLaOinfc: 230* lao*
Speed : HkO KTAS
Fuel State : 10,000 lb
5. INITIAL DETECTION
i5no ^I'l'^/lie^t sighted one MIG-21 at 12 o'clock position, 3 to 5 miles distant on
120«» heading. MIQa above P-lOSs at 20,000 feet. No hostile action. *»»
11. DATA SOURCE
TAP orhrr-o rcc? 29720 0:13552 doc €6 '
TAP OPREP-il DOCO 29697 0310JfJZ Dec 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
See Item 5
Event 11-80
Aircraft Involved: Pour P~105a v» one MIQ-17
Results: Sighting Only
Vleinity of Encounter: 21«23*II/10l|"19E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 4 December I966/IOOOH
2. MISSION ROUTE
Plight departed Korat to strike JCS Target 19.00.
11. DATA SOURCES
7th AP 0122502 Dec 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight, on a strike at JCS 19.00, heading 360* at 16,000 ft. observed a MIQ-l?
estimated altitude 30.000 ft, heading I80«*pas8 overhead. The MIO turned Ml i„i
from sight.
I
I
i
i
i
I
I
!
I
E
t
I
Ky • Event 11-81
Alx*crart Involved: Four F-IOSDa vs one NIO 7
Result: Sighting only
W Vicinity of Encounter: 21*00 <N/10ti" 20 'E
■ 1. PRIHARY NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
p- Date/Tine: 3 December 1966/unlcnown
W Four F-lOSs (BLUE Plight) were egresslng fron a strike on North Vietnam.
■ n. DATA SOURCES
I " Project interview with a nenber of BLUE Flight (15 Feb 67).
H . Vi, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was esresslng Route Package V heading toward TACAN Channel 97. The
flight was at about 22,000 feet when a VdO was seen following the flight at an altitude
of about 35,000 feet, and eo-speed. The MIO followed the flight to about 20 nlles south
or Ci.:ii.]icl il uz. viiilch point it: loade a large diameter left turn and headed back toward
North Vietnam.
Event 11-82
Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOSs vstwo possible MIQs
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity: 21*50 ' N/1 QJ*" 15 'E
I. CftlHARy HIS&IOM AND TACnCAL SlIUAllON
Date/Tine: it December i;o6/10llOH
Plight of four F-lOSs on an IRON HAND mission (SAM suppression). Heading 330*.
altitude 12.000 feet.
II. DATA SOURCES
RED BARON MIQ Incident summary.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE 3 observed two possible MIGs at 2 o'clock, 10 nml out, heading southwest. BLUE
3 called out the bogeys and BLUE flight turned Into them. The bogeys turned north and
disappeared. BLUE 3 was the only one to see the aircraft, both bright sliver. He was too
far away to determine type.
287
3
i
i
i
I
i
Event 11-83
Aircraft Involved:
Four P-105S V8 Eight
to Ten NIO-lTs
Result: None, except BLUE 4 damaged by
ground fire during target strike
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«l6*N/10S»ii8<E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Time: H December 1966/l637H^
BLUE Plight (four P-105s) was the fourth flight of a flve-f light strike force
fragged to attack JCS 51*10, a petroleum scoraffe area northeast of Phue Yen airfield.
Events II-8K and 11-85 describe the NIG encounters for other flights In this sasie strike
f oroe ;
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Flight departed from Takhll, refueled enroute* then flew from Laos across the
Red River to the northern, edge of Thud Ridge and>doHn the western side of the ridge on
a ttoulhubst Ituiidlng bo lUa lai-gut uma* Z^waa waa iwaJe on n norlhweei heading up Thud
Ridge and then to the west across the Red River.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F.105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4
6 " 750-lb GP bombs
I - 20mni Cannon
1 - QRC-160 {ECM pod)
2 - JJSO Gallon tank
(BLUE 1 carried a strike oanera pod)
MIO-17 ALL
MIQs carried an unknown mix of alr-to-8lr nlsslles (probably Atolls) and cannons.
All KIGs were silver In color and no external tanks were observed. At least one KIG
was configured with afterburner,
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
y'f.iyi*!:- f'*"'" 'XPunrt l«»vel to 7000 ft with vjni.biuty 3-5 miles into the eun and
•7 nlles away from the sun. Scattered cumulus clouds, oottoms at 3000 ft, 2/8
coverage, and clear visibility above the haze.
Altitude ;
Head In gT
Speed ':
Fuel State ;
Flight Formation ;
BLUE 1. 2, 3. t
8-10,000 ft AOL
100-^50 KCA3
10,000+ lb
iaG-17 CO
10-15,000 ft AOL
sso^-sfio*
Unknown
Unknown
g
&
s
Pop-up: BLUE 1 rolling In over the top
BLUE 2 and 3 spacing for roll In
BLUE 4 sliding Inside BLUB 3
S. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight was alerted to the presence of MIOs while on their Inbound leg
approximately 2 minutes prior to TOT when the preceilng flight In the strike force was
engaged by MICs at the target (see Event IJ-84). Shortly thereafter, BLUE 2 saw a single
HIO-17 that was turning back toward the target area from a northwerterly heading along
the south side of Thud Ridge; however, this HIG did not attack or follow BLUE Flight.
This Event occurred subsequent to Event ZI-84, however, this time (as reported In the
OPREp) Is the best available from official sources. The Event actually occurred at
about 1611 - 1617H.
289
■ j. ■ n f art Vs»i* I • life
Event 11-83
A5 the flight approached the pop-up ^o^nt 3WE 2 an<i i "P<';J«5„5J;%*%;»;e!;"
estimated 8-10 MIGa orbiting near the pop-up point, hlRh, In the vicinity oirnu^i^n
airfield! A3 BLUE Flight was climbing through 8-10.000 in the pop-up, ^LUE 3 called
SiJ i fl EhJ Of four MIG. diving down^n a quartering h«d-on pa3« fro. 1 o'cloc^^^
approximately one talle out. These four aircraft were positively IJentlfled by blue s
aa NIG-lTa shortly after initial detection.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Flight continued the planned target strike with aircraft individually
rolling m left on a dive bonib run that would put all ^o"^ Pl^pSs In a trail attack
?vol different headings approximately 10° ^-15; apart As BLUE ^^jJ^^^^^'^^JJ^S^S'^Sm
tariet. the MIGs rolled into attack the flight. BLUE 2 "red a sho.t^u rouna^u m«
«Jnon burst at a MIO-17 that suddenly appeared in front of J}™ ^S?"^"^ f ^^^^.^^f
to left as BLUE 2 started into his delayed offset roll-In behind BLUE lead. This
HIO yo-yo*ed to maneuver In behind BLUE 2 on his bomb run.
As BLUE 3 started his nose high, left roll In, he asa^-" »P«tted MIG-lTs in a
20» to SO" dive passing from a 1 o'clock to a 12 o'clock position. BLUE 3 continued
around in a left turn long .ncugh to fire 75 to 100 rouiida of 20»m cannon in a 90
degree deflection shot at one of the MIOs.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
While BLUE 3 was firing, another one of the MIGs f^"f,-a^"SIDEWINDER-type"
(probable Atoll) nlsslle at either BLUE 1 or BLUE 2. (BLUE a missile pass
bis aircraft and continue toward the ground -ith the motor still »>"rnl"8;) . ^^"JJ
could not turn with the MlOs and lost sight of then as they "all passed on by him
In their dive. BLUE 3 then rolled out and delivered his bombs on the target.
Jettisoning his HJO-gallon drop tanks right after boir.b release as did the other
wmbers of the flight . BLUE did not encounter HIGs In his dive bomb run; however,
he was hit by automatic weapons fire In the pull out and lost his Pi hydraulic system.
BLUE PllRht pulled off the target and started a low-altitude egress northwest
alonE Thud Ridge. BLUE 1 was In the lead with a «ia-17 on his tall, which was
tttnl pursued by BLUE 2. BLUE 2 also had a MIO-17 on hl» tall that. MS being fired
on by BLUE 3. BLUE <t was Just off the target and heading northwest. ^(*"hough
unobserved at this time, there was at least one additional MIO-17 at BLUE 3'8
2 o'clock position, 2 to 3 miles range, maneuvering to attack BLUE Uad or BLUE 2.)
BLUE 3 fired a single burst of approximately *50 rounds of 20mm cannon at the
MIG behind BLUE 2. Before BLUE 3 could fire another burst this MIG broke hard left
for 45«. then r. versed his turn as BLUE 3 pasaed him. Since BLUE 3 was going better
than l.l Mach :» ; continued straight ahead realising that this HIO was no longer a
threat-.
Althou^ not sequentially correlated, at about this time BLUE 1 sighted a MIG-17
coming head on from 12:30 o'clock at an estimated range of WOO ft. BLUE 4 began
firing at an estimated 2000 ft and expended 95 rounds of 20mm cannon before the MIO
passed behind him.
During the above sequence of events, BLUE 2, unaware that the MIQ under attack
by BLUE 3 was behind him, was closing on the MIO-17 that was now at 5-6 o'clock
position approximately 2-3000 ft behind BLUE Lead. Just after BLUE 2 started firing
at this MIG, BLUE 3 aaw still another MIO 2-3 miles out at his 2 o'clock to 2:30
o'clock position, launching a "Sirr.;iNDER-type" missile at either BLUE Lead or BLUE 2,
BLUE 3 called for a "BLUE break" since he didn't know which aircraft was under attack,
BLUE Lead broke right immediately and BLUE 2 hesitated since he had a good firing
pass going and the break did not specifically Identify him. After BLUE 2 had fired
approximately 100 rounds the MIG-17 lit his afterburner and made a hard right break
Just as BLUE 2 ripple fired, smoking missiles with motora burning passed within 10-20
ft of BLUE 2'8 canopy. BLUE 2 did a hard left 120* roll, breaking down Into the
(round. The missiles detonated at an estimated 2000 ft and 150 feet, reapttctivcly.
ahead of BLUE 2.
The MXOa dlsen^ged at this point and the flight continued up Thud Ridge to Join
at the north end and egress for an uneventful post-strike refueling and recovery at
Takhll. BLUE Flight did sight two additional MIGs, southbou.nd , low at approximately
2-3000 ft ACL in a valley as they crossed the north end of Thud Ridge; however, no
hostile action was Initiated by either adversary.
8. ORDNANCE
No. fired Soviet AAM
20nm (Possibly AA-2) Remarks
BLUE 10"
BLUE 2 150-200 rd In two bursts
BLUE 3 5*3 rd In two bursts
BLUE 4 95 I*^
HT0.17 • ^C:A'*^!»e«/ Probable ATOLL
1110-17 ' Probable ATOLL
290
Event 11-83
9. CQUIPHCNT PROBLEMS
PI hydraulic system Inoperative due to automatic iteapons gi'ouncl fire hits.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
BLUE 1
BLt/E 2
BLUE 3
DLUE a
Total
P-105
Combat
Houra
Houra
Missions
650
370
76
250-275
60
«50 *
60
Remarks
First flying assignment
out of basic pilot and
combat crew training.
Plew P-47s m WWII,
Comments on this Encounter
B^UE?: Needed more rearward visibility and a snap-shot capability. Had* a fair
BLUE
3: The ?-Q6 and F-lOO systems for changing from dive bomb to alr-to-alr mode
ii^TTar superior to the F-105, whose system leaves much to be desired? The two-
S«^"?hf««L °" Oat ling gun Is another drawback to the systeu.
More than one gun would be desirable because of gun jam problems.
S^TT^L^f"*,**^'^?!! reject button to change the manual sight to an alr-to-alr sight '
SS^S? Lo'cSn'fJs'C*""* '° '"^ ^^"'^^ *
11. DATA SOURCES
gSgg^nteilllews: BLUE 2 (5 Peb 67). 3 (6 Feb 67). and 4 (Feb 67)
OftllflOZ Dec 66, SECRET, DOCO 29769 Dec 66.
omiOOZ Dec 6^, SECRET, DOCO 29759 Dec 66.
OU2250Z, Dec 66. SECRET,. DIO 30926 Dee 66.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
JBLUE Flight descended from a cruise altitude Of 15-16 000 ft a<i th*»w vt,-
Red River Inbound toward the northern edge of Thud Ridge fir a strfJe S^JC? ?? ?o
alrflell The fllgS?^pro?eede3 SJSS ?Je "ste^i *
lit tLlc'i.rr^lJt l^n^li 'r^et on a heading of approximately IS?' at "sSSS ft
?0 TOT B?5J^MiL S!.'*^^''?"!J**/P'S^; ^^^^ approximately I minutes prior
n r f r^s^^^^^^^ BUS? l^^ShMlS!n^^^i^^^il;lnd• j^-'^
Sar^^r^r^I iuho^iJ^SJy'fuJ^^^r-ri^J^fJS^J-JJJlSir '"^ "^"^ ^--^^
8-10 JlG''??/?ifw.r?! afterburner accelerating to 550 KCAS for pop-up. BLUE 2 saw
n Jn MtJnftid fi ?n Jnn°$i°r' "''"^ distinguished wings) In orblJ
• rSS/^Mn J " ^" ^^''S^* ^SLUE 2 had crossed over to form
fn ?Srrt^J?^J """"^y abreast, so the flight could make a lert^oll
i! SlSe p5f^ii i*r!5J*'K,*"?S'' individually varying bomb headings by 15 to 20 degrees.)
Stelf lJ5^^?US JcS^ ^JT^'' ^" 'hallow pip-Jp on apprSxH
H?«?n^ « ^''^O J(CAS, 20«» pitch angle). BLUE 3 identified a flight of M silver MIO-lTa
AS blSi ?^"^s^5;jt'?e^i;; rSir?n!^?;?i.jra::j2Le^rLidiSirirj;s!;tTf
i*IL-? ^i^"'- n't'^ P^^'^^e 2 to 3 g's foJ the ron ?; In ?S
i^ *'^ 50-round burst using only the co-ubinlng glass — no miaht
for aiming. This MIC yo-yo'ed to maneuver in behind BLUE 2 Is he^AtereS hJs^Sonr*
iL^h^'-P?*"*' ^^^^ 3 had started a nose-high, left roll
in a 20« to 3o» dive passing from his I o'clock to his 12 o'c
continued turning to hold the HIOs at 12 o'clock and was able
2;« /«f^n"^" * 5® degree deflection shot, 1500-2000 ft
^^^0^ ^/''''''^ * ^O'-tiO- nose-up pitch attitude, angl
30« to 60°, airspeed bleeding down from 400-300 KCAS. Since
depression, he sighted through the wind screen only) While
saw the lead MI0-i7 fire a missile "apparently at BLUE Lead"
in and spotted "Mia-17s"
lock position. BLUE 3
to fire 75 to 100 rounds
range, at the "number 3"
e of bank Increasing from
he had a 116 mil reticle
he was firing, BLUE 3
who tfas at 12 o'clock
Event 11-83
to the MIG at 2000 ft or less range, "headed down." (BLUE 2 saw a missile paw his
aircraft and sontlnue toward the ground with the motor atlll burning.) BLUE 3 could
not continue turnlr.g with the KICs and loat sight of them as they "all passed on oy
film" In their dive.
BLUE «l did not encounter any MIOs during the bomb run; however, he was hit by
automatic weapons fire in the pullout and lost his PI hydraulic system. All flight
members Jettisoned external tanks Inmedlately after bomb release and remained In
afterburner from pop-up to final dlsetigagement with the MIGs. The external tanks
were going dry at this point and all flight members had 9000-10,000 lb of fuel aboard.
BLUE Flight pulled off the target and starL::d a low altitude egress northwest along
Thud Ridge. The flieht "pulled off pretty well close together. There was not ouch,
or any resemblence of a formation; we had everybody In sight." BLUE 1 was in the lead
with a MIG-17 on his tall which was being pursued by BLUE 2. BLUE 2 also had a Hia-17
on his tall that was being fired on by BLUE 3- BLUE 1 was Just off the target and
heading northwest. (Although not observed at this time, there was at least one
additional MIG-17 at BLUE 3's 2 o'clock position. 2 to 3 mile range, maneuvering to
attack BLUE Lead or BLUE 2.)
BLUE 3 pulled off the target and looked up to see a silver MIO-17 at 11:30 o'clock
low, same heading, straight and level at approximately 'JOOO ft range. (After bomb
release he had reset switches to radar standby, radar search and attack, weapons
selector knob conventional, and missiles air.) He began firing a continuous burst of
approrlmately tSO rounds at an estimated range of 3000-3500 yards, airspeed Mach 1-1.5
accelerating. When nothing happened he then realized that his present sight setting
with the plpper on the target gave him 800-1000 ft range so he pulled the plpper high
and kicked the rudders with no apparent results. While he was f.'.rlng he noticed that
this MIO was "sitting behind another F-105" (BLUE 2). BLUE 3 stopped firing to close
on tte MIG; however, before he could fire another burst this MIO broke hard left for
45"», then reversed his turn as BLUE 3 passed him at 9 o'clock, 3-1000 ft range. BLUE 3»
now going 1.15 Mach, did not attempt to turn with this MIO and continued straight ahead;
however, he had lost sight of BLUE 2 watching thla HIO break.
Although not sequentially correlated, at sometime during the egress engagements
("about 2 minutes from the target"), BLUE •> sighted a MIO coming straight Into him
from 12:30 o'clock at an estimated range of ^lOOO ft, 2-5 degrees deflection. (BLUE H
was at 560 KCAS, 5000 ft altitude, heading northwest up Thud Ridge) BLUE 4 cranked his
flx2d reticle to 20 mils, pulled up for an estimated sight picture, and fired 95 rounds
from 2000 ft range until the MIu passed over his left wing. Because of the high
closure rate, BLUE 1 estimated the rounds went low and behind the MIO. The MIG did
not fire but banked away from BLUE 4. BLUE 4 banked to hold a head on firing pass
until the MIG went by and then BLUE * continued a northwest egress up Thud Ridge.
During the above sequence of events, BLUE '2 unaware that the HIO under attack by
BLUE 3 was behind him, was closing on a MIG-lT that he had "called out* at 5-6 o'clock,
approximately 2-3000 feet behind BLUE Lead, (BLUE ?. was accelerating from 550-600 KCAS
at about 2000 ft AGL. Although he tried to crank his depression to the caged position,
he had no reticle for aiming.) BLUE 2 began firing at an estimated 1500 ft range as
he closed on this MIG. However, Just after BLUE 2 began firing, BLUE 3 saw a flash
of a missile being fired off to his right by still another MIC-17 at his 2 to 2:30
o'clock position, 2-3 miles out. BLUE 3 called for a "BLUB break" since he didn't
know If the missile had been launched at BLUE Lead or BLUE 2. BLUE Lead broke right
Immediately and BLUE 2 hesitated since he had a good flr.''.ng pass going and the break call
did not specifically' identify hlra. After BLUE 2 had fired approximately 100 rounds
of 20mm cannon the MIG-17 lit his afterburner and made a hard right break Juat as 2
Atolls, ripple- fired, passed within 10 to 20 feet of BLUE 2's canopy, — smoking with
motors still burning. BLUE 2 did a hard left I20o roll, breaking down Into the ground.
The missiles detonated at an estimated 2000 feet and 150 ft, respectively, ahead of
BLUE 2.
BLUE Plight continued northwest up Thud River at about 1.1 Mach at low altituda
and the MIOs disengaged. The flight Joined at the north end of the Ridge with
approximately 7000 lb fuel remaining and egressed for an uneventful post-strike
refueling and recovery at Takhll. The flight did sight two additional MIOs, southbound,
low at approximately 2-3000 ft AOL in a valley as they crossed the north end of Thud
Ridge; however, no hostile action was initiated by either adversary.
I
Event 11-84
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105p va sixteen HIG-lTs
Result: One NIG7I7 probably destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: Pl^lU'N/lOS'Sl'E
1. PRIHARV MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: H December 1966/1642H
P-105S) was the first flight of a five-flight strike force fragged
T? t\ tZ^ ir at 1^^* fwP*!r°^*!!J" •to«'a6« ""^^ northeast of Phuc Yen airfield. Events
ii-tf3 and 11-85 describe the HIG encounters for other flights In this same strike force.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BI-UE Plight departed from Takhll, refueled en route, then flew from Laos across the
Red River to the northern edge of Thud Ridge and down the western side of the rld« on a
southeast heading to the tar-et area. BLUE Lead egrcssed to the southwest directly
towards Laos while the other flight members departed northwest up Thud Ridge and then to
zno vrest across the Rod Klver.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. k
6 - 750- lb CP bonbs
2 - 150-gal tanks
1 « QRC-160 (ECM pod)
1 - SOnsn cannon
(BLUE 3 and 4 were camouflaged )
MIC- 17
All 16 MlGs sliver i.n color. North Vietnamese markings observed on bottom side of
wings of several HIGs (broken yellow bar with yellow star In center, all outlined
in red, covered approximately I/3 of bottom wing). No missiles observed. Several
MiGs used afterburners. Several fired 23mm cannons. No external configurations
reported.
4. FLIGHT COKDITIONS PRIOR TO. ENCOUNTER
Weather: Haze from ground level to 7000 ft with visibility 3 to 5 miles into the sun
and 7 miles away from the sun. Scattered cuinuloua clouds, bottoms 3000 ft 2/6
coverage, and clear visibility above the haze.
Altitude ;
fepced :
Fut:l State :
Flight Formation
BLUE 1. 2. 3. k
12,000 ft
14S« to HE
400 KCAS
10,000+ lb
MIO-178 (I-I6)
Est, 7,000 ft
NorthwQst
Est. 450 kt as
Unknown
Wingmen;
Elements :
Flights:
1500 ft out,
25»-30'' back
1/2 mile spacing
1-1/2 mile spacing
Pop-up In afterburner, 20* to climb
angle, 400-450 KCAS, elinblng through
8-10,000 ft AOL.
S. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Flight popped up from 7000 ft AOL to 12,000 ft AOL for a left roll in to dive
bomb the target on a northeast heading. As BLUE Lead was rolling over the top with hla
S:a%%JrSoJ?Sieft^T.£Lrmo"« '^'"^ ''^'"^"8
293
Evsnt 11-64
S. ACTION IHITIATEO
BLUE tead calleu ciit the MIGs; howyer. the flight «°"tlnued the bombing attack. As
BLUE Lead pulled off the target he made a left ^00 ft to aeek out^^^^
engage the MIQs. Since BLUE PUsht had not seen the MIGs and "^J a left
intended to attack the MIGy , they nade a pre-brlefed right Jinx off the target with a left
turn to depart northwest up Thud Ridge.
7. SITUATIOH OEVCLOPHENT
The MIQ8 had continued on ccurae as BLUE Lead turned from a *°
northern or northeasterly heading to atart a diving attack ^^^^ coVJJnued
second flleht of MIOa. This MIG started a right turn while the rest of the «IGs cor.tlnuea
"^ri" BlS "ead closed with an estimated 150 to 200 U overtake, opening fire at
isOO feet and stopped firing at approximately 200 ["^ * J^J'^.JJJS^ ^LhJ
rlKht BLUE Lead lost sight of this MIG as he went over the top of him In a »ii8«*
Sis; cllmting in afterburner keeping his airspeed up. A. he Jooked back and down for the
first MIG. he saw two other KIOs in fighting wing formation atj» o'^^o^k, 1800 ft range,
beclnnlna to pull lead on hln. There iere two other «Gs further bac*. straggling behind
wJth^bSSt 1/2 mile separation between tnerr,. BLUE Lead tightened hl« '^Kj;?/,^^" llillait
diftoMd hta nose and used hard right rudder to cause the two threatening HIGs to overshoot
oStSlSe Of ?Se ?:;n SSsriSg about 3-500 feet above him BLUE Lead J^- J^<»«^ •
ahoved the nose down and reversed into a gentle turn to the left back over tj»
n«tin» that these «IGa were no longer a threat as they were going away from hlc his
?o-J!ocS UuJon iS a JShS bink! BLUE Lead saw numerous «IG-17s a. he ^^n^lnued chls
?u?n, tut kll were too well protected to attscl:. Although the ^'^f "%fj;o" ^JJ? P?i^^ "
thTAext encounter are somewhat ha^y. BLUE Lead was ^hreatened by two additional MICs
senewhere In this turn. As he maneuvered for separation In a dive a^ ^''O"^ .7°$*^^^"^
thTtarget, he spotted a single MIG-17 about 2000 feet below hln coming head on about one
mile away flying straight and level. As BLUE Lead turned in and cent inuel his dive
SlO'a lS "clock position, the MIQ otarted a climbing turn into BLUE Load
BlS Lead opened fire at about 1500 roet with 20min shells lnpa«"ng from low on the left
Sdi if the'^MIO'a noae up across the cockpit and to the tall when B^'f^^ead stopped firing
and pulled up over him. Although the WIG was firing at BLU.. Lead he was in*^"««J'*
BlncS BIUE L?ad was approaching the MIG from his 11 o'clock to l^-*30 o'clock position for
?Ms pass. Looking bk?k from a right cllnblng turn, BLUE Lead -J" ^Gentle
descending turn with pieces coning off the aircraft. H» also saw "little flashes gclng
Ml. canonv and diverted hla attention to three Mlir-lTs at 4:30 to 5 c'clocK, two or
SiShinSS ?«t in -nici wJng- formation. As BLUK Lead tightened his turn the
MOB both fir me. slid toward 6 o'clock with the wlngman crossing to his leader's left
"Se! Sl5e LelS^^oSunueS Vn a slight diving turn using alternate 1*;* J^JJ"
to SDOll the KIOs' aim. After three or fjur Jinks, he realized he was
the H?Gs '"and rolled level and dived to tree-top alMtude as the last cannon balls passed
hlgh^ove his canopy. As he crossed the Red River outrunning the MIQa at 1.15 toch on
the deck, he turned southwesterly to egress the area
When BLUE 3 had realized that BLUE Lead was engag?1 with MIOa, he reversed turn
towarTthe target area (BLUE 2 and k made a confused high speed departure northwest up
S^ldS SSh BlS£ S atiemptlng K-j Join on BLUE 2 who was trying to outrun BLUE M as a
auipected ICQ.) As BLUE 3 turned through a southern heading at an estimated 9000 ft AOL.
he saw a flight of four MIG-17s about 2000 to 3000 feet below hln In a tight orbit over
t«rJ-t He also saw another flight of two unit? ent If led MIOs going away froa him at
5 ?'c?of; ^o-altJJSSe! uTsUghi dfscent. The four-ship flight split Into two element,
and BLU? 3 lost sight of one element as he tried to drop down In trail the other
element. However. BLUE 3 did not maneuver Into firing range since he could not match
thJlr tim? He broke off this attempt to engage these MIQr. when BLUE L«ad advlaed that
S wla dllingajlnrand departing the target area. The MTOs did "ot attempt to engaBa
BLUE 3 as he departed northwest up Thud Ridge without further Incident.
S. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
Ist MIG Attack
(Single MIQ)
2nd HIO Attack
(3 or 3 KIOs)
(No. flred/No. hita)
Cannon
2/1
I/O
I/O
Caoh
Remarks
Ho hits observed during the first firing
attack on the #2 MIQ in the second flight
of the four- flight formation.
Estimated 15 to 25 hits (probably kill) on
the aceond MIO attacked head-cn over target.
KO hit by BLUE 1 on haad-on pass.
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Event 11-84
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 — cunslght would not operate properly. The reticle sight picture would
disappear when the "act'lon reject" button was actuated for radar lock-on.
10. AIRCREW COHKCNTS
Experience
Total
P-105
Combat
Hours
Hours
Missions
Remarks
1000
800
55
Extensive air-to-air gunnery
training and ACM.
3000
250
28
Mostly ADC, P-102 time.
BLUE 1 (5 Feb 67) and 3 (3 Feb 67)
BLUE 1
dluh: 3
Conrients on This Er.aounter
BLUE 1: "1 was quite confident of my airplane, my equlpmen*^ , and myself, frankly,
.... The frame of mind that I was in was that if J. ever got the chance, I was defi-
nitely going to have a KIG .... I Just flat wanted to mix it up with a MIO.'-
Coninentlng on the F-lOb, BLUE 1 would like better naneuverabillty , more acceleration,
nore time In afterburner, better visibility, digital rather than analog gunslght readouts,
a simpler switching system going fron ground attack to air-to-air mode, and a better radar
lock-on and performance capability.
BLUE 3 ' Cockpit set up Is completely Inadequate, Too many manual operations required
to change attack modes. The dual role concept comprc-nlses the capabilities for both
missions. You can't aggressively pursue a target while looking into the cockpit or worry-
ing about getting the right switch settlnc^s.
Need a missile with a bigger firing envelope.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
0ill505Z Dec 66, SECRET, 7AP 29772 Dec 66.
0109123 Dec 66, SECRET, 7Ay, DOCO 29751 Dec 66.
010920Z Dec 66, SECRET, 7AF. OOCO 29752 Dec 66.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE night descended from cruise altitude as they crossed the Red River inbound
toward the northern ed^e of Thud Rldgu for a strike on JCS 51.10, a POL storage area near
Phuc Yen airfield. The flight proceeded down the western side of Thud Ridge toward the
target on a southeastern heading at 7000 ft AGL,
The flight popped up from 7000 ft AGL to 12,000 ft AGL "fanning out" to gain spacing
for a left roll in to dive bomb the target on a northeastern heading. (In the pop-up,
BLUE 1 slid Inside of BLUE 3, which delayed BLUE 3's roll In and eventually resulted in
BLUii 1 coming off of the target ahead of BLUE 3. As BLUB Lead was rolling over the top
of the pop-up with his nose coming down (1Q«) starting the dive bomb run, he sighted four
flights of four sliver HIC-178 co.-aing from his right heading northwest at about 70U0 ft
ACL. (The MIGs were In trail with approximately 1/2-Mlle spacing between elements and
1-1/2-nlle suaclna; between fllehts. The nearest flight was at BLUE Lead's 9 o'clock low
position, approximately 1/1 to 1/2 mile out.} BLUE Lead continued his bomb run advising
the flight that therfc were "MICs under us and AA fire around us." (It was later deter-
mined at debriaflng that the other flight members, who had not seen the airborne MlGs,
thought BLUE Lead was referring to the HIQs that could be seen taxiing for takeoff at
Phuc Yen airfield during the pop-up.) As BLUE Lead pulled off of the target in a left
1-1/2 to 2 g's climbing turn at 600 KCAS, he selected afterburner and Jettisoned all of
his external stores except his QRC-16O pod and selected "guns air" and "radar search and
attack". (BLUE Lead had a full internal fuel load at tills time.) BLUE Lead continued
the left climb to about 12,000 ft AOL on a westerly heading whin he again spotted the MIGs
at his 9:30 to 1:00 o'clock low position, 3-mlle range, 7000 ft AGL and still continuing
northwest In level formation at an estimated I50 kl, (HLUE Lead believed the MIGs had not
seen BLUE Flight and were apparently under OCI control being vectored to intercept the
rest of the Inbound strike force.)
Meanwhile, BLUE ?, 3, and 1, unaware that BLUE Lead had broken left in pursuit of the
MIGs, continued with the prebrlefed right break off of the target and a left turn to
depart northwest up Thud Rldgc. BLUE 2 was In the lead with BLUE 1 attempting to Join
with him, having assumed that BLUE 2 was BLUE 3. BLUE 3 was actually back off of BLUE ft'a
right wing and had both BLUE 2 and BLUE 4 in sight.
BLUE Lead continued to close on the KIGs at 60O KCAS and apparently crossed high
above the MIGs since he made a diving turn from "a west-.-rly heading" to attack the number
two y.lO Ir. the second flight "from the southwest." BLir; Lead estimated that he start-d
the attack from the HIG3 ' 7:30 to 8:00 o'clock position, high, 5OOO fcc-t behind with 150
to 200 kt overtake. The MIO apparently saw BLUE Lead and started a right turn while the
295
Event II-8*
remainder of the HICs continued strilght ahead. BLtlE Lead was trying to get a radar
lock-on; however, every time he would hit "action reject" the reticle would disappear.
As BLUE Lead closed In a right turn he used an imaginary sight picture on the combining
glass to track the KIG and began firing at an estimated 15C0 ft range. The MIQ made a
hard rlgnt break after BLUE Lead began firing. BLUL Lead stopped firing at 200 ft, relaxed
the 3-1/2 to ^ g's held during the attack, and passed over the top of the MIG In a alight
right-banked cllssblng turn at 600 KCAS In afterburner. No hits were observed. As BLUE
Lead looked back and down for the first KIG, ha saw two other MIC-17a inside of his turn
at * to k'.^o c'clock, "Inside of 2000 ft, stllX outside of 1500 ft" range, beginning to
pull lead on him. The wlngMn was flying a nice lighting wing position. A third KIG-17
was "on back out quite a ways" with a fourth MIG an additional 1/2 mile back. BLUE Lead
tightened his turn slightly with aileron, dropped his nose down, and used hard right
rudder which caused the two threatening MXGs to overshoot to the outside of the turn
crossing 3-500 feet above BLUE Lead's canopy. BLUE Lead, now doing 500 KCAS, relaxed
rudder, shoved his nose further down to gain airspeed, and reversed into a gentle left
turn back towards the target area. BLUE Lead discounted any further Imnedlate thrrat from
these two MICs as they continued In a right turn going away from his 2 o'clock position.
BLUE Lead saw numerous HIG-17s as he continued Jils left turn; however, all were too well
covered by other MIGs to attempt another attack. BLUE Lead was still observing heavy AA
flak around him at this time.
Althouch the details from this point to the next encounter are somewhat hazy, BLUE
Lead was threatened by two additional .^Gs in this turn. (NOTE: possibly the third and
fourth MIG from the previous encounter.) However, he was able to maneuver to keep them
from reaching a firing position. As he maneuvered for separation from these KIGs In a 600
KCAS dive at about 7000 feet over the target, ha spotted a single KIO-17 about 2OC0 feet
below him, coming head on from 10:30 o'clock about one mile away, flying straight and
level. As BLUE Lecd turned in and continued his dive towards the MIO's 10 o'clock posi-
tion, the KIG started a. left climbing turn into BLUE Lead. (On the pass, BLUE Lead held
down the "electrical cage" on the sight to obtain .^n approximate 1000 ft fixed ranging
reticle which he placed ahead of the MIG and then pulled through the HZG as hL was
firing.} BLUE Lead opened fire at 1500 to 2000 ft range and continued firing until the
"bullets were obviously going behind him." BLUE Lead observed 15 to 25 20mm shells
Impacting about a foot and a half apart starting low on the left side of the MIG's nose
and continuing up across the cockpit and through the tail. The MIG was firing at BLUE
Lead from 3 guns on the bottom of the aircraft; however, the HIQ's fire was ineffective
since the BLUE Lead was approaching from the MIO's 11:00 to 11:30 o'clock position on the
pass. BLUE Lead pulled up over the KIG to look back from his right climbing turn and •
observe the HIQ In a gentle descending turn with pieces coming off of the aircraft. He
also saw "little flashes" going past his canopy and diverted his attention to three MIG-17s
.at lliio to 5:00 o'clock, two of them within 2000 ft and another further back. Again, the
wingman was flying a "nice fon&ation". BLUE Lead could see Islands in the HIQ Intakes and
fences on the wings. He could see the guns flashing and could hear and see the "little
vhlte" cannon balls going past the cockpit. As BLUE Lead tightened hla right turn, the
KIGs, both firing, slid toward 6 o'clock with the wlngnan crossing to his leader's left
side. BLUE Lead continued in a slight diving turn using alternate left and right rudder
to spoil the KIG's aim. After 3 or Jinks, he no longer could see the KIG intakes and
realized that he was pulling away from the MIGs in his afterburner dive. (BLUE Lead was
indicating 630 to 6'*0 KCAS at about 3000 ft ACL.) BLUE Lead rolled level and dived to
treetop altitude as the last observed cannon balls passed high above his canopy. As he
crossed the Red River outrunning the KlOa at 1.15 Maeh on the deck, he turned aouthwesterly
to egress the area. (BLUE Lead had 6000 lb fuel remalnlns as he crossed the Red River.)
Vhen BLUE 3 had realized that BLUE Lead was engaged with NIQa In the target area, he
called the flight for a right turn and immediately reversed direction toward the target
area. It is not clear whether or not BLUE 2 and •» heard this call; however, BLUE 2 and *
did continue on a high speed egress to the north out of the area with BLUE 4 attempting to
ioln on BLUE 2 who was trying to outrun BLUE 4 as a suspected attacking MIG. (BLUE 2 and
discovered each other's identity after or 5 minutes; however, they had expended so
much fuel that they reached the refueling tanker with only 600 lb and 800 lb of fuel,
respectively.} As BLUE 3 turned right through a aoutherly heading at an estimated 9000 ft
AOL, he saw a flight of four MI0-17s at hla 10:00 - 11:00 o'clock position, 2-3000 feet
below him in a tight left orbit over the target at 2000 ft horizontal range. He also saw
another flight of two unidentified KIGs going away from him at 3:00 o'clock", co-altltude.
In a slight descent. (BLUE 3 was at itCO KCAS accelerating In full military power with his
nose down. BLUE 3 carried a center^lnc KER, two USO-gallon external fuel tanks, a
QRC-160 pod on his right wing. He had about 7000 lb of fuel remaining.) BLUE 3 asked BLUE
lead's position and found out he was now approaching the Black River on the deck for a
southwest egress from the area. The four-ship NIG flight split with "number 3 and 4 break-
ing right and away from 1 and 2 at high speed." BLUE 3 lost sight of the second element
as he entered a to 5 g descending turn from 9000 ft ACL to 6000 ft AGL trying to drop
into a trail position on the lead element. At this point BLUE Lead called, "Hey BLUE
Plight, :>>t*5 get out of here:" Since BLUE 3 saw that he could not match the KIGs turn or
have enj^i^h overtake to maneuver into firing range, he brcke it off and egreaaed northwest
up niud Bidge and out of the area. The MIGa did not attevpt to engage BLUE 3 during this
tlae; however, there waa a considerable amount of AA flak seen, aome bursting behind the
KZOs.
296
01
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y Event X1-B5
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105» vi Xvo MIO-17*
and two niQ^-Zlu
Reault: No danaee
Vicinity of Encounter: 21 ll'H/105 SX'E
1. PRIHARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Tine: l» December 1966/l6t5H
BLUE Plleht (four F-105s) was one of five flights fragRed to attack JCS 51.10, a
petroleliJ^ a?!! Soi?h«»t of Phuc Yen Airfield. Event* 11-83 and ll-S^i de.crlbe
the wa tncountera for other fllKhta In thla suae atrlke force.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Not glvan. See Events 11-83 and II-8ft for route flown by other flights In this sane
strike force.
3. AIRCRAFT CONPlGURATtONS
6 - 750-lb GP bombs
1 - QRC-160 (ECM pod)
1 - ZOnun cannon
MlO^n (1. 2)
Gray color, used afterburner^ fired 2Ztm cannon.
HI 0-?1 (1. 2)
AAKs (Type unknown)
4. FLIGHT CONOITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Not plvfn. See Events 11-83 and H-B*. (?-105« were In pop-up for dive bomb
attack on JCS 51.10.)
5. INITIAL DETECTION
As BLUE 2 was following lead in the pop-up, he sighted two MIO-lTs at 12 **«iof^»,_-
7 n wl rnn?e, PT»pmyi«iMit.ply Jioop ft, tuminn: throui;h north from eaat, cloalng on blue beaa,
6. ACTION INITIATED
One mO-17 maneuvered Into a position 500 to 1000 feet behind BLUE Lead, which also
placed this HIO at 9 o'clock to BLUE 2. BLUE t Jettisoned his bombs and external stores
and turned in to attack this MIC causing him to break off from BLUE Lead's tall position.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE U closed on this HIG-17 and fired ^UO rounds of 20irjn cannon at a range of 800 to
1000 ft with no apparent hits. This HIG broke and was not seen again. The second HIO-17
maneuvered from BLUE iJ's 9 o'clock position into a position "very close to his tall* and
made an unsuccessful 23rara cannon firing pass on BLUE BLUE ll dove and Jinked away from
the MIC who disengaged and was not seen again. The MZG-17a were observed using after-
burner during this encounter.
Meanwhile, two MIG-21s slid In behind BLUE Lead and BLUE 2. As the MIG-21 behind
BLUE Lead passed BLUE 2*s 9 o'clock position, BLUE 2 saw the apparent flash of an AAM
launch at BLUE Lead; however, BLUE 2 did not see a missile in flight. BLUE 2 Jettisoned
his ordnance armed and turned Into the Kia-21 on BLUE Lead's tail. The MIOs disengaged
and were not seen again.
BLUE 3 had seen a gray colored MIO-17 sliding from his 2 o'clock to his 5:30 or
6 o'clock position as he was going through the top of his pop-up; however, since he was
rolling away from the HIO and would pick up adequate (teparatlon speed in the dive, he
ignored this HIG and continued his bombing attack. [NOTE: Ho further account was given
of this MIG-17 which could have disengaged or perhaps been one of the KI0-17s that were
engaged by BLUE t.] BLUE Lead and BLUE 3 successfully delivered ordnance on the target
although BLUE 3 was hit by ground fire during this attack.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUB k
MIQ-17
llIC-21
(NO. flred/No. hits)
Cannon
I/O
Soviet AAM
Rer^rks
440 rounds 20mm
Probable firing
297
1
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Bv«nt IX-65
P % l!^! ^^A^^ doppler navigation by ground fire. He lost his
r-i and utility hydrauilc systems , radio communications, DC electrical power and fuel
transfer system. (Although he hod a fire lyid a cut control cable In the «hMl nell, he
Mdo a successful emergency landing at Udorn Alrbaae, Thailand.)
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
E»perlence
Unknown
Cotnents
• i^rJr^* /!^f*-,'T2" **** inherent perforunce llnltatlona of the P-105. Inadequate
^^ training and the ceapllcated switch-setting problema are the major reasons why
Ic5 St R?u**^Sliif?i"^ ^omblt m the P-IO?. The flvr?Ueh?J in
iSi «J,m^fT™J?f^r"' ^""W ••'<=conneU are net adequate and because of fuel
SC? «i ACM training cannot be accomplished In SEA. Many of
l«k oJ In flight Integrity which can be directly related to
i!?in «r ^hi J?ft\.?f' a BUltl-oiaslon aircraft should also include a conelder-
s:L^d?nVfy%Ji"if'i}«i%ii\5?X iJii:"" • "^"^
n. DATA SOURCES
Project I nterviews ; BLUE 3 (17 Kar 196?)
Meaaagea; 0423392 Dec 66 DOCO 29795 Dee 66
0SC253Z Dec 66 DOCC 29604 Dee 66
0422422 Dee 66 DOCO 29792 Dec 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
tlon Su'J:"JSiJeS":r'?Jt.':eSnJ?''"*'"' therefor., no n«T.tl« deacrlp-
298
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Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSDa
Results: Sighting only
four Nia-i7a
zini'N/ios^sa'E
vicinity of Encounter:
1. PRIMARY HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: l» iJeceraber 1966/17O6H
BLUE Plight (four F-ioSDs) was on a strike mission against JCS 19.OO, a railroad yard
2-1/2 n ml north of Hanoi. The strike force consisted of '♦O P-105s. The first wave of
righters assigned to strike this target llC aircraft), aborted the mission due to weather
in the target area,* BLUE Flight waa one of the flights in the second wave of fighters
aaalgned to hit the target. BLUE Flight sighted two KIG-lTa as it approached the target,
two unidentified KIGa orbiting over Fhuc Yen airfield, and two MIQ-17S orbiting over the
target. BLUE Flight did not engage the MIGa, however.
2. HISSION ROUTE
Korat, Vhalland, directly to tne Rad Anchor extended, directly to the Bad River,
directly to Thud Ridge, directly to the target. Return route reversed.
3. AIRCRAFT COKFIGURATIONS
F-105D BLUE Flight
Jj - CBU-S^l"
2 - k^O gal wlngtanks
2 - QRC-160 ECM pods
1029 rounds 20nsa ammo
All aircraft camouflaged
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Prom over the Red River, to the north and down Thud Ridge, scattered to clear.
Juai off the end of Thud Ridge, 10,000 feet overcast with five n oi viaibility in haae.
BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft
Altitude ; 10, goo ft
^peed : $40 KTAS
Flight Formation ;
Modified Fluid-Four. The wlngmen in to 1,000 to 1,500 ft to provide a better ECN .
coverage. The element on the left at this time.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Vhile inbound to the target Just off the end of Thud Hidge, BLUE 1 sighted two KIG>17a
at 1 o'clock low In a left turn, § to 8,000 ft altitude and 2 n ml range.
6. ACTION INITIATED
The HlOa did not pose a threat at this time.
SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Plight continued on and bombed their designated target. The flight egressed the
target area at high speed (auperaoni.:) at an altitude of 6 to 8,000 ft on a southwest
heading. The flight did not engage the HIQs.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE Flight 12 - CBU-2'l8 on target, 20miD expended
BLUE Flight continued on to the target.
NIG-17 <
• Not observed to expend - silver In
color
10. AIRCREW
COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
P-105D Combat
Hours Missions
Remarks
BLUE 2
3300
*i50 11
Pilot background primarily TAG,
P-100 and P-105.
P-86.
BLUE 4
2900
ISO
Pilot background primarily AOC,
and 102.
P-86
'The firat wave hit the
alternate target, JCS 51
,10 (see XZ-a3 to 11-85).
299
''* Event 11-46
Too many switch changes are required to change from the ground attack to the air
attack oode. The pilot must take hie eyes off the target and look In the cockpit to make
the proper switch settings.
The QRC-160 pod adds considerable drag at high speeds. Reconnend Internally mounted
ECN equlpraent.
An loproved bombing system designed to reduce exposure time to flak and SAKs would be
desirable.
}}, DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 2, * Dec 66, and BLUE 4, 17 Feb 67
Messages. Reports ; 7AP 0U22502 Dee 66
U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
AS BLUE Flight departed Thud Ridge on a »:eadlng of 130** at 10 to 11.000 ft altitude
and "^tiO kr.ota, BLUE 1 sighted a flight of two r.IC-178 at 1 o'clock low <5 to 8,00C ft) in
a left turn 2 n ml out. The KlGa continued in a left turn and ELUE Plight continued or. to
the target. The MJCs passed BLUE Flight'- 9 o'clock position heading northwest and were
not seen again. As BLUE Plight rolled in on the target, heading southwest, two unidenti-
fied MIGs were seen orbiting Phuc Yen airfield and two mere KIC-178 were seen orbiting
the target area at approximately 6,000 ft. BLUE Flight, after completing ita bOKb run,
egressed the area on a southwest heading at high speed (supersonic in afterburner). There
vaa no atteapt to engage the KlOs and they were not seen again ae the flight egre&sed tr.e
area.
Bvant H-8T
Aircraft Involved: Pour ?-105» va four HI0-17a
Reault: One MI0*17 destroyed
Vicinity Pf Encounter: 21*11 'H/lOS'Sft'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITOATIOK
Date/Time: 1 December 1966/1705H
BLUE night (four P-IOSD.) «aa on a atrlke "{"iSV/jJ"!* J" "^SJ-ftr""!?:' o?
2-1/2 n ml no?th uf Hanoi. p« atrlke for« con.lated of
flghtera In on the target {16 »ircraft) abwted tt« olaaion aue " aaalgned to strike
arSa. BLUE flight «as one of the fllghta in *he ajeond «ve of JJSJJJ'^JiJJJJ*;^. off It.
this target. The flak In the target area vaa extremely heavy, as iaib"*
boob run, it waa Jumped by four MIC-l7a.
2. MISSION ROUTE ^
Korat, Thailand, direct to Red An.hor extended, direct to the Red River, direct to
Thud Ridge I and direct to the target. Return route reveree.
3. AIRCRAFT COHFIGUKATIONS
y-lOS BLU E 1. 2. 3. t
6 - 750 lb bombs
2 . QRC-160 poda
2 - »t50-gal. wing tanks
1 - 20mm cannon
All P-lOSa camouflaKed.
HlG-17
23mm cannon
Silver color.
4. FLIGHT COSDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUKTER
weather: Prom over the Red River to the north and down Thud RJJSe. scattered to clear.
jllt Irr the end of Thud Ridge and over the target, 10,000 ft scattered to
broken with 5 n mi visibility base.
mm
i- — ■ T
Altitude : *lfiS«"
P^pfi^ 550 KCAS
MifCate: • i^So'SS.
Plight Pormatlon ;
The night was Just coming off Its bomb run and was etrung ^^ii-.^JS"!-?- ,
was approximately 2000 ft behind BLUE 1. BLUE 3 -as approximately 5000 ft behind BLUE 1
and 2. BLUE 4 was 4000 ft behind BLUE 3<
5. IRITIAL DETECTION
Hhlle the flight was Inbound to the target. MIQ ''arnlnp 5*2-S'??/S«''J?aS?.d"*'*
Channel from BIO EYE. As the flight rolled in on the target. 4 MIG-17s were sighted
directly over the target several thousand ft below the flight.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight continued with its successful bomb run. As BLUE 3 came off the ttrget,
he saw MIGs 1 and 2 at his 1 o'clock position attacking BLUE 1 end 2, who were heading
norJSiest toward Thud Ridge. As BLUE 4 cane off of his bomb « ""-JJ
!t his 2 o'clock position attacking BLUE 3. BLUE 1 and 2 were outside of •fj«tlvs gun
»nrt w«* ouiiina away from MIQs 1 and 2. BLUE 3 started to maneuver his aircraft
JffL" o"c"criM?fl" Sn !SSs 1 sni IT BLUE 4 attacked MQ 3 who was attacking BLUB 3.
Mia 4 was maneuvering Into position to attack BLUE 4.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 and 2 continued on a northwest heading toward '5'hud Bldge with MIOs 1 and 2
slowly dropping farther back out of range. BLUE 3 had closed to 1500 ft behind HIQ 2 and
was Just about ready to fire when BLUE 1 called that ne was hit by ground fire. BLOB 3 •
?Sen b"ke off his attack to assist BLUE 1. BLUE 4 fired at MIO 3 who was attacking BLUE 3-
MIQ 3 reversed his turn to the left, but BLUE 4 followed him and continued to track and fire
until SIS ? burst into flames. BLUE 4 then broke off and discovered that MIO 4 -"^J^hlnd
him firing. BLUE 4 dived to the deck and evaded WJG -» In a supersonic egress up Thud Ridge.
'The first wave hit the alternate target. JCS 51-10.
301
Ev«nt 11-87
8. ORDNANCE
(No. fllTd/Mo. Hlt»)
Cannon Remarka
BLUE ^ 1/1 700 rounds ZOnm
HIO 3 1/0 23801 eannon
KIO 4 1/0 2ym eannon
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEHS
BLUE 1 had a pitch mechanical advantage malfunction warning light on during his
supersonic low^altltude egress.
10. AIRCREH COKMENTS
Ex perience t
Total P-105 Combat
Hours Hours Hissions Remarks
BLUE H 4300 100 4 Type of fighters flown: P-86,
P-86D, P-IOIB, P-102. Mostly ADC
background. Completed the F~i05
fighter course at HcConnell prior
to SEA. Pilot suggests a better
air tactics training course.
Cemaenta on this Encounter i
BLUE 3 and <• both commented on the MIG orMt over the target area., It was felt that
the MIGs were orbiting In a corridor that had been coordinated with the' antiaircraft flak
sites. The flak was extremely intense and yet the HlOs were able to operate right under-
neath without apparent danger.
BLUE 3 came off the target and changed his switch settings from ground to missiles air
when he saw the MIGs. He Indicated that he was able to accomplish this change before he
broke off the engagement; however, it did present a problem. This switch setting only
provides for an electrically caged sight for gun firing. He did not attempt to set up the
guns air and radar sight mode which la the designed means of firing the gun air to air,
because it la too complicated a procedure and the radar Is not reliable that, close to the
ground.
BLUE 4, being the last In the flight off the target, did not have time to aake awltoh
changes in the cockpit. He did not change his sight setting from the manual bombing node,
consequently he had 122 mils depression in his sight as he attacked the KIO. BLUE <4 simply
pointed his aircraft at the MIG and started shooting. BLUE 4 recommends a simple switch
arrangement for changing from ground to air attack, that would not require the pilot to
look in the cockpit to make switch changes. Re also recommends a low drag AA missile, a
better turning capability, and an improvement in the rear visibility. The P-105 requires
excessive aircraft maneuvering to clear back at 6 o'clock. The QRC-160 is an effective ECM
item buc the warning or monitor lights are on the right console and cannot be seen unless
the pilot looks down over his right shoulder. The monitor and reset button should be up
front so it can be seen with a glance and you don't have to look In the cockpit. The
QRC-I60 is a rather high drag piece of equipment when operating supersonic at low altitudes,
iibv to mention the limitations of the equipment. He reeomnwnds that this tjpe of equipDent
be mounted internally. BLUE 4 also stated that the P-105 radar is Inadequate for rapid
target acquisition or air-to-air use close to the ground.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 3, 15 Pebruary 1967
BLUE 4, 16 Pebruary 1967
Weesages. rteports ; OPREP-4 041445Z, December I966, from 7AF DOCO 29770
DAI 0422502, Oeoember 1966, DIO 30926
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight encountered heavy AA fire as they approached the target at 10,000 ft AOL
Just below a cloud layer. Rather than fly through the heavy 83->100mm flak that enshrouded
BLUE 1 and 2 on roll-in, BLUE 3 and 4 pulled up and over the flak going Into the clouds
as they entered their left roll-in to bomb the target on a south to north heading. (As a
result, when SLUE 3 came aut of the elouds, he was 4*5000 ft behind BLUE 1 and 2 in the
dive bomb run. BLUE 4 had lost sight of the flight, but was about another 4ooo ft behind
BLUE 3.)
As BLUE lead rolled in he called out, "MIGs over the target", having sighted a flight
of four 1110-178 over the target in two-ship elements with 3-4000 ft spacing between ele-
ments. BLUE 3 looked down as he started his roll-ln and saw nwo NIOs going from south to
north one or tvo miles northeast of the target at an estimated 3*4000- ft AOL. Aa BLUE 4
302 ^P^vr
\
Event 11-87
f?S?nJ fiJ^"*" * dive, he spotted tNo MlG-178 crossing low over the rail yard
ml^t ilnl JSns! 3 and <. both lost sight of the SlGs wSuJ «Sc"iia??S
■ « , 5^V^«^ ^ '^^^ target together heading north towards Thud Rldne As BLUF
Jinked left, then right, off the target at 14000 ft. 55O-.0O KCAS, looking for BLUE 1 and 2
slant range to his right at 1 o'clock, 500 ft low, pressing an attack on BLUE 1 and 2 He
Jni -ffJ^^^*" r " ^^"P'^- 5 c'clock loS behind BLUE 1 and 2 ?n a flgW-
ing wing formation, 200 ft apart. Since BLUE 1 and 2 were beyond the MIOs' effective aS
nCSr11?0-m ?o'Sf Ts^rU^s'r accelerating. b[Se 3^5^ no? consHei'thf^:
.l^Hnrfl InJ -4? « serious gun tnreat to the lead element. BLUE 3. with both an
Sa^i a? tJ^?r 7 S^M^f ^''Sf initiate a gun attack on the MICs from 2000 ft
their 7 o'clock poslt-.on. BLUS 3 selected missiles air and radar search and attack
which provided hir, with a 150r ft fixed range "g" only computing gun sight BLUE^ wS
to eniage BLUE 3.)*^ "^^ c^u.w.«d ^.u overtake. These HIGs did not atteir
mr iwi«?n'^t"f! *^f"'» nust regress slightly to time phase BLUE H'b encounter with a
(MIG 3) was at BLUE U's 11 o'clock position at i-Hooo ft in a right turn B^Jl ^ t^ll
the deck. BLUE k ^oin*.rt hi. ri^-it *.£ * ^l: r* '^^'^ ^ again after diving for
(BLUE H's) fuel tanks. ^^-"^ " ^hat MIO H may have collided with his
Event 11-88
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs nine HIG-lTs
Results: No Damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*<13*N/105**29»E
K P8IHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 4 December 1966/1715H
BLUE Plight was part of a llB aircraft strike force assigned to strike JCS target,
19.00, a railroad yard, 2-1/2 n mi north of Hanoi. The flight was Inbound to target in a
modified Pluld-Four formation at the time MICs were sighted.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Korat, direct to Red Anchor extended, direct to North Station (TACAH Channel 97),
direct to the Red River, direct to Thud Ridge, direct to the target. Return route re-
versed .
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-105 BLUE 1, 2, 3. 1
6 - 750-lb bombs
2 - ftSO-gallon wing tanks
1 - QRC-160 ECM pod
1 - 20mni cannon
All aircraft camouflaged
MIG-17
Configuration unknown
Silver color
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Scattered to clear. Oood visibility at flight level.
B LUE 1. 2. 3. 1
Altitude: 15,000 ft
Headlnp : O90
: jiio KTAS ■ .. - • •
Fuel at ate : 9,000 lb
Fllp;ht For~allon :
Modified Fluid-Pour with the element on the left wlngnan 1500 ft out and slightly
back.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
KIG warnings had been received by the flight from BIG EYE while Inbound to the target.
BLUE Flight, on a heading of 090° at the north end of Thud Ridge, sighted a flight of
four M1G-17S at 5 o'clock, approxinately 8 n mi south. BLUE Plight turned on a heading
of 140 down Thud Ridge and when the MIGs were line a::reast on a reciproca
Ridge
made a right turn into the flight.
3 to 4 n mi out .
iprocal heading they
The NIGs were low at approximately 13,000 ft altltuae.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight continued on to the target.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Flight continued on to the target and the MIGs broke off to the left without an
engagement. As BLUE Flight was going; oown Thud Ridge, they sighted another flight of four
MICs at 9 o'cloclt, 9-10 n ml out. Again no attempt was made to engage by either side.
BLUE Flight continued on to attack the target. As BLLE Flight was coining off of the
target, a single MIG-17 was spotted at 7-6 o'clock low, 3 n ml out. No attempt was made
to engage. BLUE Plight egressed the area.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
BLUE 1
Total
Hours
3100
P-105
Hours
1000
Comoat
Missions
55
Rerrarks
Pilot background considerable TAC experience In
P>84G and P, P-IOIA/C and P-105. He did not
attend a CCVS and had limited air-to-air experience.
BLUE 2 « 3 Not Interviewed
BLUE 1 2500 150 20
*' Event II-6B
CoBMitentg on thla Encounter
BLUE 1; The P-105 mlaslon Is to deliver bombs on the target and not to engage MIOs.
For thla :.:j3lon, the F-105 Is adequate In that It Is a good weapons delivery aircraft
and m can outrun any of the present aircraft in uae in North Vietnam. The acceleration
and turning capability of the P-lOS limits i«:a use as a fighter. Fuel Is always a problem.
You are either too heavy with fuel to be naneuverable or too short on fuel at fighting
weight to make It back home safely. There are too many switches Involved going from
ground to air attack mode and the pilot has to look in the cockpit to make the changes.
BLUE 4: The switchology problem and the cockpit visibility problem In the F-IOS are
not good for day fighters using guns.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 1 and BLUE * - 15 Feb 1967.
Messages^ Reports ;
TAP OPREP-4 DOCO 29774 OI11526Z Dee I966
TAP DAI DIO 30926 0422502 Deo 1966
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight, on a heading of 090° {15, 00^ ft AGL, 5*10 KTAS) at the north end of Thud
Ridge, sighted a flight of four MlG-17a at 5 o'clock, approximately 8 n mi south. BLUE
Plight turned down Thud Ridge on a heading of approximately lilO and started a descent
because of clouds ahead. The MlOa made a right turn into the flight when they passed
abreast of BLUE Flight on a reciprocal heading; however, BLUE Plight continued on to the
target and the NIGs broke off to the left on a heading of 320°. The HIOs were low at
approximately 13,000 ft AGL, 3 to 4 n mi out.
As BLUE Flight continued Inbound to the target on a heading of 130°-lH0° down Thud
Ridge, they sighted another flight of KIQ-17b at 9 o'clock, 10 to 13,000 ft, passing 6 to
10 n nl to their left on a 320*^ reciprocal heading. Neither flight deviated from their
course to attempt an engagement.
As BLUE Flight came off of the target heading 320° at 8 to 11,000 ft AOL, 550 to 6OO
KCAS, Jhey sighted a single MIG-17 at 7-8 o'clock, slightly low, range 3 n mi, on a heading
of 350 . BLUE Flight speedily out-distanced the MIQ and contact was lost. BLUE Plight
also sighted a flight of two Hia-21a at this time that were heading 280° preparing to
land at Phuo Yen airfield.
At 1734H", when BLUE Plight was on an egress heading of 210° at 30,000 ft AQL
(coordinates 21 10'N/10U"i5'E), they sighted an unidentified flight of four aircraft,
assumed to be HICs, who took up a position some distance behind the flight at 8 o'clock,
altitude 37,000 ft ACL, This flight made a 180° departure to the left at 20 00'M/103°30'B
at 1754H without any further action.
Event 11-89
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-1056 vs two MI0-21s
Result: Siehtlne only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«>57'N/105*18»E
1. PftlNARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SIIUATION
Date/Time: H December 1966/1713H
BLUE Flight (four F-lO^s) was on s strike mission against JCS 19i a railroad yard
2-1/2 n tni north of Hanoi. BLUE Flight sighted two HIG-218 40 to 50 miles northwest
of the tartlet. . '
n. DATA SOURCES
Wessa^eg. Renorts i
7AF, OiJlftOHZ, December 66, DOCO 29767
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Fllcht slechted tuo RIG-Sls at 21*'B7*tI/10&<>ib>E at a range of approximately
5000 ft heading northwest. Ho additional information is available.
» EDITOR'S JIOTE: ^Jio route or flight for other strike aircraft against JCS 19 indicates
this should be 21»^7'N or 2l''UTH.
]
307
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Event n-90
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105DS vs two KIG-ZlS
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^ZS'N/lOS'SS'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: • 5 December 1966/1012H
GREEfl
Four F-mSs (BLUE Flight) returning from weather reconnaissance on JCS 19.00.
Plight (Ref Event 11-91). IRON HAND support, wjs approximately 9 ml Nb riy*"8
genlrally the same heading and observed HIC« near BLUE Flight. There was no HIGCAP on
this mission.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Aircraft were, from TAKHLI
FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
v: T:.£ v.i-i:.c;' i.w^i p.:-:-Vtj t,'"'"^ i«' '^-''^ ^^'^"^ ^^^^ cncounttsr but was poor in the
target area as the strike had been celled off.
Altitude :
Heading ;
Speed :
Fuel State
2^00 ACL
328"
ii50 mi
Unknown
Unknown
Flli-nt Fo mat ion ;
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE U Observed two MIG-21S at 7 o'clock, one - two miles behind flight.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Engaged afterburner BLUE 1 and 2 broke right. The element broke left.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
MlGs broke off to a northerly heading proceeding over the ridge toward GREEN mght
U. DATA SOURCES
None
Pro , )ec£ Interviews ;
Message Heoorts ;
DAI-0D5 0!>2317Z Dec 66, frr»rs 7AP
DID 3093'« „ .
7AF OSlKllZ Dec 66, 0PREP3 DOCO 29838
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Flight was egrossing from a weather reconnaissance for JCS target 19.00, and
vere heading I'fio at 2?00 AGL^ln the vicinity of 21^ 25 ' N/IOS" 35 'E. BLUE J observed two
MIG-21 aircraft at the 7 o'clock pc-ltlon apprcxlr.?.tely one to two miles behind the
flight. The m:G.- were In tactical formation. BLUE Flight selected afterburner ^^UE 1
JiJ BLUE 2 broke right . number 3 and k broke left. BLUE PUcht reached speed of 550 kts
and observed the MIGs turn to a northerly hearting proceeding over the ridge to CREr..l
Flleht (Event 11-91). No ordnance was fired by either BLUE Might or the MIGa. Blue
Plight rejoined and proceeded to Yen Bay.
I
I
Event IZ-91
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs k WIG 21a
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: ZI'S^'N/IOS'IO'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND VACTICAl SITUATION
Pate/Tlme: 5 December 1967/lOlSH
Pour F-1058 (GhEEN Flight )(F-105P, 3DS} IRON HAND In route package 6A Strike Plights
had aborted due to weather and all aircraft were cgresslng target area. They were sup-
porting BLU!: Flight (weather reconnaissance see even'c 11-90} who was paralleling their
flight path on the southwest side of Thud Ridge. All aircraft flying approxlnately 315**
There were no MIOCAP aircraft on this mission.
Z. . MISSION ROUTE
TAKKLI had departed JCS 51>10 and were egresslng on a northwest heading fron
JCS 51.10
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
F-105P BLUE 1
2 - ti^O gal tanks
It - CBU 2li
2 - ACM tSA (SHRIKES)
P-105D. BLUE 2. 3. ^
2 - 450 gal tanks
6 - 500 lb bombs (HK-82)
All aircraft doppler and IFP on, all other avionics passive^ camouflage paint.
P~105D ORHEH 1. 2. 3. t
not given
MIG-21 HIG 1. 2. 3. H
not given - but at least one had AAN missiles.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Bad in target area, good in vicinity of encounter.
GREEN
1 5 "5 IT
Altitude ; 500O ft
Heading ! 317 ft
Speed : 500 n m — —
Pucl State : — not given — -
Flight r'orniiitlon ; — — not given — «
5. INITIAL DETECTION
GREEN Plight was level at U500 ft flying 317* when nuraber 1 called a MIQ had fired
a mlsalle at number 3- Prior to this, GREEN Pllg^it had seen MIQs In the vicinity of BLUE
Plight and were watching them for a possible chance to get a pass on them.
6. ACTION INITIATED
^ Jettisoned tanks, selected afterburner and accelerated rapidly to over 600 kt.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
NlOa were not observed after GREEN Plight accelerated.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. fl red/No. hits)
Soviet AAM
GREEN Plight - none
KIO 1 or 2 1/0 nlsQcd and ran into
the grouiid
10. AIRCREW COMHCtlTS
Experienc e
not given
Event 11-91
Comment a on this Encounter '
GREEN 1 does not think the MIQs were the sane ones who were foUowlne BLUE Plight,
but two different ones due to the timing. Thinics MIO mast have fired from above and
missile had picked up ground clutter. U-hen they looked back MIGs were fairly close and
above GREEN Plight. Not enough time had elapsed from the time the MIGs wer* last 8«en
on the other side of the ridge for then to cross o«fer and fire a missile.
Comments on Overall Experience
There were MIO days and SAM days.
11. DATA SOURCES
Pro.lect Interviews ; OREEM 1 (Lead) 8 Feb 67
Mesaaaes . Reports ;
DAI-005 052317Z Dec 66 » from TAP,
DIO 3093'»
OPREP-3 0507192 Dec 66, from 7AP,
DOCO 29821
OPREP-3 050527Z Dec 66, front 7AP,
DOC 29812
12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
GREEN Plight, during their IRON HAND mission had observed MIG-21 aircraft near BLUE
Plight (Event II-90) who was on the opposite side of Thud Ridge from OREEN.
were seen on the opposite side and 2 MIO-Zls were seen on the same side as OREEN. OREEN
FllKht was able to intermittently keep track of the KlOs. BLUE Plight's radio trans-
missions were also monitored by OREEM Plight. GREEN Plight saw MIGs cross Thud Ridge but
the MIGs were far behind the flight. OREEN Plight then lost contact with the MIOs.
In a very short period of time GREEN 4 called that a HIO had fired a possible AA-2
missile at GREEN 3. GREEN 4 had seen the missile go by and hit the ground. He then
detected 2 MI0-21S who were in firing position at 5 to 7,000 ft altitude, at GREEN I'a
6 o'clock high, and close range.
GREEN Plight Jettisoned their J15O gallon tanks and accelerated to 650 kt at low
altitude. The MIOs were lost from sight during the acceleration and not seen again.
312
3
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Event
Aircraft Involved: Three P-105D» va one MIO-17
Result*: No danage
Vlcinltr of Encounter: 21»13'N/105»51'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAl SITUATION
Datc/Tlnc: 5 Decemher 1966/1530H
base, leavlnc three aircraft. .
2. MISSION ROUTE
Not giver, but BLUE Flight was from Takhll.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F.'OSD BU-E 1. 2. 3
Undetermined number of CBU Z«»8; QRC-160 pod
MIC-17
Silver color
<. FLIGHT COHOITIOKS PRIOR TO ENCOUHTtR
Weather ; Solid undercast, undetermined level.
BLUE 1. 2. 3
Mtltude;
Speed :
Fuel State:
6-7,000 ft
340*'
1150 kt
unknown
Fllrht Formation ; „,mf 1 BLUE 3 1500-2000ft line abreast BLUE 2, 500-
1000 ??°o:?TnS'S?^oi? n;iinSei:t!'"lLiE 3'S» In lll'urt Of BLUE 1. BLUE 2 on the right.
S INITIAL DITCC'IOK , . ^-
Ir a left turn, BLUE 3 observed one KIO at about - o'clock, very high, coming out of
the north, and called this to the flight.
6. ACTION INITIATED „ ^* mao
Has not seen again.
8. ORDNANCE
None expended.
9. rquiPNENT PROBLEHS
BLUE 2 lost UrlF redlo during the flight.
BLUE ft aborted on the tanker for unknown reasons.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
P-105
Hours
Combat
Wlaslons
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
— Not given
- Not given - 3*
Remarks
Plew for 6 years; flew P-101 In TAC * ADC;
came direct to SEA from P-105 school.
Comments on this E ncounter
None
r»mrit-n ta from Overal l Experience i-k. p RA The
313
"* Event ZI-92
nose e«ar steering button to ellmlfwto tbo bomb function of tht gun sight to bring It back
to an alr-to-ftir alght.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Intervlewa ;
BLUE 2-16 Mar £7
BUm 3 - 16 Nar 67
WeasaKas. Rap&rts !
OPREP-3, 051H1Z Deo 66, from 7AP. DOCO Z9636
DAI.005. 092317Z Dec 66, from 7AP, DIO 3093*
U. NARRATIVE OtSCRIPTION
BLUE Plight who had be<:n fragged on Target JCS 19, were In a left turn at 6-7,000 ft,
*50 kts after expending CBU-24a. They here turning back, becauae of bad weather on the
target area. Aa they passed almoat over JCS Target 51.10 turning through about B^O*, BLUE
3 obaerved a single HIG-17 at 4 o'clock high about 2 to 3 miles away. BLUE Plight selected
afterburner, broke to the left and jettisoned their 430 gal tanks b-it retained their re->
malnlng CBU-24. They rolled out on a heading of 270*-310*' and accelerated to 600 kts. The
HXG now at. 6 o'clock and two miles In range was unable to close on BLUE Plight as they eon-
clnued northwest to drop the ordnance on a target of opportunity. The MXO-17 although
lined up on a firing pass fell behind and wa<s not seen again.
BLUE 2 had radio failure and did not hear the KIG call; how<>ver, he saw the tanks
leave BLUE 1 and he did likewise. BLIT. ?. then looked over his shoulder to the right and
obaerved a single M70-17* starting down from two nllea out and making a pass on the flight.
3l«
Event 11-93
Aircraft Involved: Two F-105F8, two P-105D8 w.
four MIG*2is
Result: No dBmage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2X«25'N/X05*35'E
I. PRIHART MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlate: 5 December 1966/1630H
Four P-1053 on IRON HAND mission In Route- Package VI -A.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; unknown
BLUE 1, 2, 3* 1
Altitude ; 7,000 ft
Heading : HO'
^^^T^Zi^ not plven
Fuel "State : not given
Plight , Formation
not given
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Four inG-21s observed In BLUE Plight's 2 o'clock position.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Flight selected afterburner.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUi: Flight out-accelerated the MICs,
B. ORDNANCE
none expended
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ! BLUE 3. 16 Mar 67
Messaccs', Reports T
TAP DIA-005 052317Z Dec 66 DIG 30931
TAP 051t)<i52 Dec 66 DOCO 29843
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
At approxir-.acely 1630 Local BLUE Flight, two F-105F and two P-105D aircraft on an
IRON HAtlD r.lsslon, observed a flight of four MIG-21 aircraft. BLUE Flight was flying at
7,000 ft, headins 110*. The HIGs were level at the sane altitude, heading 290* and were
seen at BLUE Flight's 2 o'clock position commencing a turn to attack from about 5*000 ft
out. BLUE Flight selected afterburner and outran the MIGs.
Event II-9ti
Trcriift Involved: One P-105P, three P-105Ds vs
two MIO'lTs
Result: One P-103D lost.
Vlclnltr of Encounter: 2l**55'K/105**20'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 5 December :966/l65?H
One F-105F and three F-105Ds on IKON HAND support In route package VI A. BLUE
FllRht was supporting four strike flights. Two EC-lZls were orbiting In the vicinity of
20 /107 and 20V103 . EB-66s were In the vicinity of 22°05'N/10&°10'E and 22°15'H/10***0'J
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed Korat Air Baae, Thailand, direct Green Anchor (l8°ll •N/101°l8 'E) refueling,
direct 21 S^'N/lOS OO'E, direct vicinity of 21°55'N/105 20'E, flight encountered HIC,
returned to base generally the reverse route. Using Orange Anchor { 18°10' N/102 10' E>
Post Strike Refuel.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGUHATIONS
F-105 BLUE 1 . 2
Not elven
F-105D BLUE >*
2 - ttSO gal, external tanks
2 - CBU-24S
F-}.05D BLUE 3
Ordnance net given.
Doppler and TACAN on, radar off, IFF standby, camouflage paint on all aircraft.
KIO-17 KIR 1. 2
Drop tanks on.
Paint not given.
4. FLIGHT COKCITIONS PRIOR TO £NCOUKT£R
Weathbr ; Clear and 10 miles visibility.
BLUE 1. 2. 3> ft
A ltitude ; : 0,000 ft
Heading : 090
Speed : ItJO KTS
Fuel State ; Not given
Plight Formation ; BLUE 2 on left; BLUE 3 and * on right.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Rcceijved MIG warnings earlle'r'but not for this area. BLUE Plight was turning right
when BLUE 3 called MICs at BLUE 6 o'clock. BLUE 3'3 transmission was blocked by BLUE 4
saying he was hit approximately 1651 local tine.
6. ACTION IMITIATEO
BLUE 1 and 2 turned 180*^ Jettisoning stores and egressed the area. BLUE 3 and 4
turned right.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
ThehlGs over&hot che formation and started a climbing left turn. BLUE 3 maneuvered
to their 6 o'clock position but BLUE 3's gun would not fire. BLUE <i was on fire and
crashed a «hort tlise later. BLUE 3 departed the area nfter he saw BLUE H hit the ground.
The HlGs pursued BLUE 3 but could not catch him.
Event 11-94
8. ORDNANCE
(No. Plred/No. Hits)
Cannon Bemarks
BLUE 1, 2,, 3, * 0/0 B-3 cannon would not fire.
MIO 1 1/1 Shot part of B-Ij'b tall off causing air-
craft to catch fire and crash.
HIO 1/0 Fired at B-3 but missed.
9. EgUIPKENT PROBLEMS:
BLUE 3*3 K-61 cannon would not fire. Post flight check found gun control box to be
inoperative providing no power to the gun.
10. AIRCREU CONKENTS
Experience
Total P-I05 Conbat
Hours Hours Missions He narks
BLUE Ip 2» 1 Not Xnteryiewed
BLUE 3 1300 900 SO Gunnery school at Luke APB in P-IOOS.
P-1058 in Europe - did some alr-to-
air gunnery In P-105>
Comaents rn this Encounter
The first time BLUE i has had a gun that wouldn't fire. BLUE 3 would rather use the
electrical caged sight than try to get a radar lock-on.
Cojinents from Overall Experience
It 13 not hard to fire the AIN-9 inadvertently during a bonb run because of the
sultchology In the F-105.
Poor turning rate and visibility of P-IOS.
KIO pilots not very well trained. They should shoot down more aircraft but they
don't seen to take advantage of the situation. They don't seem very aggressive.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 3 (17 Feb 67)
Messages. Heports :
DAI'005 052317Z Dsc 66, from 7AF
DIG 30931
OPREP-3 O52310Z Dec 66, from 7AP
DOCO 29868
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was on an IRON HAND mission in Route Package VI A. They were making a
right hand turn, heading about east. The Plight received a MIO warning at 1651K (about
one minute prior to the encounter) but the MIGs were not Identified with the ai*ea of BLUE
Plight.
At 1652H two HIG'-lTs attacked from the direction of the sun, high and at BLUB Flight's
6 o'clock. The MIGs were not observed until they were close to BLUE Plight. BLUE 3 was
looking back to check on BLUE >> , who was 500 to 600 feet behind and sliding around the
turn, when he (BLUE 3) saw two MI0-17s. one of which was firing at BLUE 4. The closest
HIO when seen, was 1000-2000 feet away with the second HIO about 1000 feet behind :he first
in trail. BLUE 3 called for BLUE 1 to break but his transmission was blocked by BLUE ^I's
eoomiunleation that he was hit. BLUE h while hit, continued a right turn and headed SV
tOHard the Red River.
BLUE 1 and 2 jettisoned their external stores and ordnance, and broke right and down
in afterburner. After completing a l80 turn, egressed the area. BLUE 1 and 2 did not
see the MIGs.
BLUE 3 saw BLUE 4 take some cannon hits. BLUE 4 started to shed a few pieces, the
drag chute .came out and part of his tall came off.
At this tine both HIOs overshot BLUE 3 and 4 and one went Into a climbing left turn
in front of BLUE 3, 500 to 1000 feet away. BLUE 3 was set up for "mlsslles-air" sight-
node which gave fixed range computation. As the MIG passed in front BLUE 3 tracked the
MIG and squeezed the trigger several times but the gun did not fire, due to an inoperative
g\in control box. [The practice of clearing gun after take off had been diecontlnued due
to malfunctions after the short clearing burst]. At firing attempt the MIG was at 12
o'clock and BLUE 4 was at the MIG's 3 o'clock and both were nose up.
Event 12-91
BLUE 3 continued his right turn and Jettisoned stores. BLUE 3 sighted BLUE i) , who
was burning from the side, and heard BLUE <( make several calls that he haa control of the
airplane but was losing power. BLUE k crashed on a wooded hill in the vicinity of
21 35*N/10S''o6'E short of Lhe Red River at 16;>7H. Ho chute was seen or beeper heard.
While following BLUE 4 out BLUE 3 observed In his mirror a KZO at his 7 to 7:30
position 3-4000 feet away, closing and firins at BLUE 3. BLUE 3 does not know whether
this was one of tne orl(;lnal two HIGs or not. BLUE 3 then went to afterburner and aeeel*
erated away from the KIC, losing hln.
BLUE 3 passed BLUE It during the acceleration but observed BLUE 4 crash and later
Joined BLUE 1 and 2 about 30 nlles south of the location of BLUE It's crash.
I
I
i
I
i
I
i
319
REP ihm gvEHT n-9# $wnhKi
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. S. «)
Other Friendly
Comnurilcatlons
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1.2)
Remarks
Tint
Nark
StatHi
Action
^0
BLUE night
10000 ft
450 kts
B-4 2XCBU-24
B*1.2,3 no PATA
Turning right, 6-2 left
wing eleaent on right
wing, e-4 is hit by
cannon fire froa NI'j-17.
6-3 called MIG 6
o'clock; trans-
■lislon was
blocked by B-4
saying he was hit.
2 PIIG-17 2000 ft
behind B-4 and
shooting; NIG-1
2000 ft back;
KIG-2 In trail
1000 ft.
MIGs apparently
cane In from above
and behind. Mere
not seen until
they started
shooting. B-4's
aircraft was
coming apart.
Part of the tall
came off end the
drag chute cane
out.
BLUE Flight Jtttltof
storti; B-4 air-
craft danage losing
power} B-3 2g turn
400 ktt.
61 end 2 turned 180* and
departed area; 6-4
turned right toward Red
River; B-3 naneuvered
behind the MI6s, who ovei
shot In a left climbing
turn. B-3 attempted to
fire on NI6s.
>_
B-4 made calls that
he had control of
the aircraft but
was losing power.
HIGs overshot 6-3,
4 and climbed to
the left with B-3
behind then.
When the HIGs
overshot the for-
natlon B-3 was
500 ft behind
them. B-3 attemp-
ted to fire cannon,
but It would not
ftre. e-l. 2
turned toward the
■ted River but
direction of turn
Is unknown. They
did not see the
M t r a
HI bS •
Sana
B-3 cannon fnopera-
tlvt; B-4 aircraft
on fire.
B-3 turned back to Join
B-4 Mho was flying
toward the Red River.
B-1» 2 egressing
the aree.
B-4 still had
control of aircraft
but losing power -
thinks he can aake
the Red River.
HIG 1, 2 turned
back toward 6-3,
4; they closed the
distance and fired
cannon at B-3.
B-3 after deter-
mining that the
cannon would not
fire turned back
to Join B-4. The
HIGs turned back
behind hin on an
attempt to fire on
B-3 j'-orlng zero
hi tj.
h
Saiaot B-4 eraihed.
6-3 In afterburner
accelerating away froa
HIGs. At 1.1 Mach B-3
returned B-1»2 30 al. S.
B-4 crashed Into hit.
8-1,2 agrekslng.
HIG 1 ,2 were unable
to keep wItMn can-
non range area. 6-3
went afterburner
and broke off.
B-3 passed by B-4
and saw hin crash
Into a wooded h11 1 -
did not see a chute
or hear a beeper.
Event 11-95
Aircraft Involved; Pour F-lO^s vs eight
unidentified aircraft
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*50'N/10<»no«E/
21»32'N/10*»20'E
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time; 5 December 1966/16^5* 1710H
Four P-1058 (BLUK Plight) on a strike mission to JCS Target 51.10 in Route Package
VI<-A. They were 2nd or 3rd in a group of five flights.
10. AIRCREW COHMENTS
Experience
Total F-105 Combat
Hours Hours Mlaslons Remarks
BLUE 1 2800 a75 Not f;lven P-8Ua Gunner
School In 1955
(No other rieured time prior to F-105 BTU. October 1966)
Commenta on this Encounter
.'lone
Comments from over-all Experience
If MiGs are observe'd soon enough it Is possible to continue on into the target
area at a fast enough speed to keep out of firing range. If the tanks are Jettisoned.
tht KIGs will generally break off the attack If the tanks are Jettisoned as the HIG
will have trouble closing above 550 kt.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE tl6 February 1967)
Messages; 7AP OPREP-3 06C013P NDEC66 DCOCO 29870
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUF Pllj^ht observed two unidentified a5rcrBft while flying at 17000 ft on a
heading of 025*, position 21»50' N/10'<°'«0' E. Unidentified aircraft were at 14,000 ft
on a southeasterly headlnc and passed In front of BLUE Flight 5 n ml distant, turned
south and departed. Tlne"was 1655H. At 1710H BLUE Flight again observed two
unidentified aircraft. BLUE Flight was at 21" 32* /Id' 25 ' , 18,000 feet altitude heading
200*. The unidentified aircraft were on a reclproc*! heading at 25i000 ft and
continued on course.
BLUE Flight, were about halfway down Thud Rldge^ heading southeast toward
JCS 51.10 at 14,000 feet. BLUE 4 saw and called MICs to the south at 2 o'clock
three to five miles away. The HIQs were heading northwest and two flights of four
were seen.
[Note: In his Interview, BLUE 4 only recalled the last sighting in the narrative].
••^ • Event 11-96
Aircraft Involved: Bight P-1058 ys at leaat
eight HZO-Zls*
Resulta: No losses due to encounter (one P-105
lost I probably due to AAA)
vicinity of Encounter: 21*33'M/105*33*E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TiRie: 6 December 19'>6/1615H
At least four flights of four F«105s each striking JCS Target 19. BtUE Pll^t
(Strike Cocunander as Lead) and GRKEM Plight were the only ones who reported NIQ encounters.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Launched from Takhll, refueled Inbound and outbound, approach to target was down
Thud Ridge.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
V-lOb bLUiL 1, I, 2m ^
5 - CBU-ZUs
2 - 'tSO-gal external tanka
Camouflage paint
1 - QRC-160 pod
P-IOS GREEN 1. 2. 3. 1
6 - 750-lb bombs
2 . iJ50-Bal external tanks
1 - QRC-160 pod
Camouflcge paint
Doppler on, radars standby, TACAN and IFF off.
MIG-21
Missiles (Atoll)
One MIQ sray camouflage paint, all others silver
4. FLIGHT CONOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Vwavher: 1500 ft overcast, visibility unknown.
BLUE
J 5 5 q-
Altitude ; • 12,000 ft
Heading: 133'>
^peed : 550 kt
y^uei . State ; 10,000 lb
PllKht Formation ;
Pod fomatlon with element on the left in BLUB Pllfcttt, 2-3,000 ft between elements
and about 1.000 ft wlngman separation. QREEN Fllgnt about two miles behind and offset
to the right.
5. INITIAL OETECTION
Plight was inbound to the target and at least halfway down Thud Ridge. QREBN Plight
called out two HIGs at 6 o'clock to BLUE Plight. MIGs were almultaneously In pairs
attacking BLUE and GREEN Plights. MIQs were at 2-5 mile range when first sighted.
(. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight Initially Jettisoned tanks; later broke to right and Jettisoned CBUa In
the turn, went afterburner. GREEN Plight continued toward target, spotted MIGs on their
own tall. Jettisoned tanks, then oninance, went afterburner and broke to right. GREEN 2
delayed slightly In the break aa GREEN 3 and 4 broke past hlro, then he dropped bombs and
broke.
7. SITUATION oeVELOPHEHT
One MIC fired a mlaslle at QREEN 2 which missed. MIG 1 fired 2 Atoll tnlBsiles at
BLUE 3 which detonated 1,000 ft behind BLUE 3. BLUE 1 and 2 continued their turn toward
HlOa chasing GREEN Plight and the MIGs broke off and went Into the overcast. GREEN Plight
continued right turn to attack MIGs chasing BLUE 3 ar.d 4, these MIQa broke off into the
overcast also.
GREEN
I 5 T
11,000 ft
133»
550 kt
10,000 lb
'Reports also indicated encounter of 2 Mia-17s by CRfEN Plight but this did not speci-
fically appear In the interview data. These could have been the MIGs attended to by 04.
Evant 11-96
6. tlONMCC
(Ho. ftMd/No. Mts)
SoTlat AAN
(Probaoly AA-2}
NIO 3 2/0
NIQ 5 1/0
Hwiarke
Detonated 1,000 ft behind BLUE 3 - no danage.
Plred at QREEH 2, no damage.
9. COUIPME^i' PROBLEMS
BLUE 3 - Radio Inoperative, could not b« contacted.
10. AIRCREM CONHEMTS
Eiperlence
Total ?-lD5
Houra Hours
BLOg X 5500 200
Receiver may have been working.
Combat
Bleslona
30
2750
750
35
80
Remark B
Plew all fighters from P-l»7 through P-106
except F-g't - led THUNDBRBIRDS for three
yefcra. Inatruetor FWS Nellia APB. Flew
114 Bisalona and had HIO encounter In
Korea (P*60, P-84).
Fighter Weapons School, P-XOO, P-105.
P-81b TAC 6 yecrs. P-101 In TAC, ADC.
P-105 since March 1966.
BLQg 2
BLUB H
aVEBM 2
Comiwmta on Thla Encounter
^ " seemed very well organlred, coordinating their nan-uv*™ .r
Z ^t^S shades of Navy grey, scalloped In lines from nose to tall *«tP««lil»
flcult to pick out against a cloud background. This MIC hv h?m«.ii i-5 .r^T^i'* i"
directing the reat. Looked like the mI^IS^ RuiJJan £AS"n^^r«S^" ^
BeUved KIOs were out of range when they fired at BLUE 3. Did not think
Conmenta from Overall Experience
an aiS^i^;: *ff ■•ttlnga to change to go from a bombing mode to
an alr-to-alr node. Likes the QRC-160, seems to be effective if used orooePl» Sauid
in r^ SJTi^^JJii'*^ '° "5^^ ^ alr-to-alr mlssJli JaiJwwS.*"??: Sloti S"lng
i?J!r^«J 5fS4iI^.°i^*f adapting to the mission very well. The young meS
liS£ ; SaSJeJ JiS.JoS°«in*h??.^° ^'"'^ It'''' ^•'•^ the best wlngSenr P^lSI
■ ?S •»»*I>»i|«* capability, something you don't have to track a long tine The
BLUE 2 - Would like to oarry the AIM-9. Believes fighters should have two enginea.
There la no need for a two-pilot fighter. Future fighters need better visibility to the
rear than the P-105.
SLOB % - F-105 does a very good Job as a strike fighter. It does an outstanding Job
in this typ* envlroniDent. However, It is really not an alr-to>alr fighter.
2-1 big problem is In the switch changes to change alght settings. In other
aircraft, when you punch the electrical cage button, you get a caged sight. In the F-105,
you have to change two switches to get the sight change plus hit the electrical cage and
this cannot be done without distracting your eyes from outside the aircraft. If you
could hit a button, get the sight to Jump Into cage position, hit the button again and
have the sight go back to the previous mil setting you wouldn't have to switch your eyea
Into the cockpit.
The alr-to-alr radar lock-on warning device in the P-105 l» cut off because the
other aembers of the flight have their own radar on. It Interferes with your vector, and
it's ■ore of a dlatrartlon than an aid. I suggest we put in a change that will strobe In
the direction of a OCI radar locked onto the flight. i»omethlng a little extra to go along
with this would be separate little black box in the rear of the aircraft that will detect
any radar algnals from any -un radar likely to be carried in an aircraft, that will
liluBinate a separate lig; or other device on the panel near the canopy line to catch
your eye while looking ou-:..da the aircraft.
QREEN « - The best flying Job In the world today Is flying Mia-21s out of Phuc Yen.
Their advantagea on us are that they have turning radlua, vlalbllity, and a hlgh-
'perfanuuie* airplane that can aoeelerate real weji.
I
I
I
t
Event 11-96
The thlnss In th& F-105 that limit us are the turning radius, a result of too much
airplane.
An air-to-air conbat is still a turning game - the airplane that turns has the.
advanJSee In ?he future we need a big power plant, an airplane that can t"^" ^"J,, J'J^
SnS Scce?;rat? well and that can carry ordnance all the way from short to several miles
range Also both high and low altitude capabilities at the same time.
11, DATA SOURCES
ppolect Interviews;
BLUE 1 (Lead -
BLUE 2 ■ -
BLUE l»
GREEN 2
CREEtl t
6 Feb 67
2 Feb 67
16 Mar 67
5 Feb 67
15 Mar 67
Ke ssaees. Reoerta :
7AF OBlO'iSZ DOCO 30009 Dec 66
7AF 03l3U|jZ DOCC 30018 Dec 06
7AF DIO 30961 Dec 66.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Flieht was the lead flight and PLUE 1 the "l = slon Cor.mander for a on JCS
Target 19. Thev were flylns down the ridge line at 21"33'yi05^33'E heading 133 , 12.000
ft ind about 350 V.t In pod fortnatlon. GREEN Plight was a few miles behind them going to
the sane tar-et GRE^N ^'lUnt observed four KIG-21a attacking simultaneously in pairs,
JSo S!S!25rin OREElff igit and two MIC-21. on BLUE Flight The MICs were called out and
BLUE and OKEEN Flights jettisoned the HSO-gal tanks in an effort to increase airspeed in
order to get to tht target. However, BLUE n observed the MIGs to be clo3l"5 f^^^^^. °^
5 o'clocic BLUE 1 called for a right turn and then to Jettison the of^nance through a
hole in the undercast. Sor.ewhere during this tur.n or ^''^"t t5K-,''p?!.hJ*^ ?hi SsaUea
V.IGS fired two AAMa at BLUE 3. ^he firing was observed by GRLL.J Flight. The talsslies
detonatH aSJut 1 000 ft behind SLUE 3, GREEN Pllpht =aUed out the firing about the
sanie tine BLUE U saw a m:g-21 pop out of the undereast behind GEibN Flight. BLUE
called out the MIC.
At- about this saice time GREEN Flight saw two MIGs approaching them and dropped tanks;
the HICs dlsensa^fld. GREEM nicr.t saw other MICs and lead called J°^^J"PPi"S •
afterburners, and a RTCHT break. As GREEN 3 and ^ crossed behind GHEEN 2, GREEN J tOid
OREE;i 2 to hold his fiorr.bs to avoid collision. GREEN 2 held mo,7;entarily, then plcklett,
then broke. Just as he broke, slightly behind the others, MIG 5 launched a missile at •
CHEEM 2 which [T.issed. BLUE 1 and 2 turned Into the MIO «»>o was attacking GREEN Flight.
When the HIC saw BLUE 1 and 2 turninE irto him. he broke off. Meanwhile BLUE 3
turned to the west. At this tine BLUE 5 had UHF transmitter trouble, because no tra..s-
missions were heard from him. BLUE 3 broke left and down through a hole In the undereast
and Jettisoned his MER. BLUE 0 also Jettisoned his MLR and followed BLUE 3, flyi-"6 *
normal flcl>Ung wing- BLUE told BLUE 3 that he was at BLUE 3' s ^ o'cjo^"* P^i^Jon*,..!!
because BLUE 3 n:ay have mistaken BLUE U to be a MIG. BLUE 3 did not acknowledge f-he call,
but did discontinue the hard left turn and continued normal Jinking while heading west,
below the overcast. B3 was supersonic. BLUE «i moved up and flew In his 9 °' «
tion maintaining enough lateral separation to clear the 6 o'clock PO»J"°"- . J^^"
una'Jle to keep in- visual contact with BLUE 3. They were flyi"B into the afternoon sun
which was reflecting off the rice paddles. BLUE 4 lost sight of BLUE 3 when they flew
into this area of gi?re. They passed through the Blare at supersonic 8P«<>». fHj f*^/
was unable to pick up BLUE 3 again. About this time BLUE J heard • «P«'-ug^i"|j,* "J*
up an orbit west of the Red River and alerted rescue. During the egress BLUE « observed
some 37mm flak but had no indication BLUE 3 had been hit.
After the MIGs disengaged from GREEN PllKht , BLUE 1 observed a lone camouflaged
HIC-21 dive past BLUE 1 and 2, at a hlc;h rate of speed, through the same hole BLUE 3 and
* had flown. BLUE 1. not being sure where BLUE 3 and 6 were called, "Two F-1058 who
Just went into the hcle In the clouds, you have a MIO on your t-^^^ ' „^
of here". BLUE 1 and 2 followed the MTG. The same MIG then popped back up on top making
a 90° left climbing turn. GREEN Flight unloaded and tgressed to the northwest. BLUE 1
and 2 turned toward the MIG, who turned 130«> and went back Into the clouds on a ««terly
heading. BLUE 1 and 2 cgressed the area and Joined BLUE and then returned to base.
I
327
ififni III - -^-------^^^^■-^^^'^^-^^^^'^^-^^ " - '-^^ - - -• ■-■ -■■^ -
y ^ Event 11-97
Aircraft Involved: ?our F-105a vb one MI 0-21
Result: Sishttng only
Vicinity of Encounter: ai'SS'N/lOS^ZO'E
1. PRIMARY Mission AMD TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 13 Deceniber 1966/I6IOH
Brown Flight (4 F-IO53) were on an Iron Hand mission scheduled to operate up and
down the east side of Thud Ridge. Concurrently there waa a strike on JCS-19-00 which
encountered nueierous MIGa. (See Event 11-98)*
2. MISSION ROUTE
Korat. Red Anchor, vicinity Zl'SS'M/lOl'SS'E, vicinity 21«50'N/105«»2O'E to 21»25*M/
lOS^HO'E to 21"'03*M/10*l'''»3'E, Red Anchor to Base.
P-ICSD
Bi'own
2
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105P
Brown 1
2 AOM ^5 2 AQM J>5
2 CBU-21 2 CBU-24
2 Wins tanks 2 Wing tanks
Ho QRC-160^
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Scattered low clouds becoming overcast In the east,
the weather as poor.
6 500 lb bombs
2 Vlng tanks
Pilot Interview rated
Altitude:
Heading ;'
Spee d !
Puel State:
BLUE FUOHT
12,000 feet
220*
525 kts
Unknown
5. 6. 7. 8. See Narrative Description
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Brown 2 had l/CBU-2ll that would not jettison.
10. AIRCREU COMMENTS
Experience
Tot Houra
Brown
Brown
11
3500
P-105 Hours
1100
CMBT Missions
approx. 65
Remarks
All time In single engine jet
DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
Brown 3-16 February 1967
Messages. Reports, etc .
TAP 1322052 0PREP3
TAP 1316I6Z 0PREP1
TAP 1322312
DOCO30317
DOCO30309
CIO 30996
December 1966
December I966
December 1966
12,
NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Brown flight - an Iron Kand fllpht-was In spread formation making a right turn when
a MIC-21 passed through the formation. The MIG came through at a high angle off in a
right climbing turn from ^ o'clock toward 10 o'clock at an estimated airspeed of 500 kts.
The NIG-21 then made a descending turn back toward the flight. At this point Brown 2 and
4 jettisoned their ordnance (number 2 had a CBU-21 thit would not jettison) and Brown
flight made a max power right descending turn to heading 330 and out ran the MIOs.
IPllot reported that S£M pod was not carried, 0X0 messaga indicated that flight was
QRC equipped.
Event 11-98
Aircraft Involved: 16 P-105D8 vs numerous MIO-Zls
and MIG-17S
Result : No daJnage
Vicinity of Encounter: See (1) below
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 13 December 1966/1600-1620K
The flights were a strike force briefed to hit JCS 19.00 (Yen Vlen RR Classification
yard). There were 5 individual encounters, as listed below:
Vicinity of Encounter
it F-105D3 V8 2 MIG-21S 20"55'N/105*37'E
H P-105D3 vs it HIO-218 _ »
k k MI0-17S Sl^SS'M/lOS'ZS'E
1 F-105Da vs 2 KIG-21a ^ ^ ,
4 3 HIO-178 2055N/105'25E (H-17)
H P-105DS vs 2 HlO-218 gl-SZN/XOS'^O 'E
* P-105DS vs 2 MIC-21S 20'55N/105*37E
BLUE. CREEir. YELLOW, and ORANGE Plights constituted the force of four strike
flights proceeding to th? target. They wore preceded by PURPLE Plight (^,P-i05Ds)
which was in a flak suppression role. PURPLE did not see any vaOs, but PURPLE 3 was
downed by a SAM prior to the MIC -ncounters. BPOWH Plight was on an IHON HAflD
mission In the target area (see Event 11-97 for details of BHOWN's MIG encounter).
2. MISSION ROUTE
Plights departed Korat , Thailvid, refueled, proceeded via Channel 97 TACAH and then
down east side of Thud Ridge to the target.
(Part 1)
(Part 2}
BLUE Plight
GREEN Plight
(Part 3} YELLOW Plight
(Part i»
(Pfcrt 5)
ORANGE Plight
BLUE Plight
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-105D
BLUE 1,2,3."
YELLOW 1.2,3»^
6
2
1
GREEN 1.2,3,0
ORANGE 1.2.3.t
750 lb bombs
450 Rallon wing tanks
QKC-160 ECH pod
Camouflage paint
NIG>21
Silver color
Missile equipped
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Scattered clouds west of target and over target, overcast east of Hanoi.
Vlsibility->good.
Part 1
Part 2
Part..!
Part 0
Part ?
BLUE
GREEN
YELLOW
ORANOE
BLUE
1.2.3,1
1.2.3,0
1.2,3,0
1,2,3,0
1.2.3,0
14,000 ft
12-16 ,000
16,000 ft
16,000 ft
16,000 ft
ft
26O'»-270»
138»
135*
135'
530 kts
5tO kts
S'lO kts
600 kts
less than
est .
full
10,000 lb
internal
Altitude s
Heading :
Speed :
Puel State;
Plight Portnatlon ; Plights ware In pod formation.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Part 1: While inbound, BLUE «! saw 2 MIG-218 pass at 3 o'-slock with opposite heading to
mght.
Part 2 ; ORKEH flight sighted 0 ^Q0-21s at 11 o'clock and 0 NlC-178 at 1 o'clock at an
approximate range of six n ml with opposite heading to flight.
Part 3 : YKLLOW 3 sighted MIGS, approximate range of 3 1/2 to 0 n mi heading of 2/0*
approximately co-altltude, quurterln? on YELLOW Plifcht. MIOS turned and ended up
approximately 6 n ml In trail of flight. After leaving target, YELLOW 3 saw group
of probable HIQ-L78 orbiting beloti and turning towards Hanoi.
Event 11-98
Part 0 : ORANCE Pllgnt algiited 2 M1Q-21S on a reciprocal heading about 3-* n nl omet,
tiiey tu rned l80« and ended up approxlnately 3 n ml In trail of cranOE Plight.
Part 5 ; After pulling off target. BLUE 1 (L) sighted 2 MIO-SIb at 5 ,000 ft heading 90*
f?^l8 10 O'clock position at a range eatlmated to be approximately 3 n ml.
8. ORMANCL EKPCNOEO
AAM
175
Cannon
mo-i
KXC-2 2/0
No alr-to-alr ordnanee Mas expended by U.S. flislits.
10. AIRCRCU COHNENTS
Experience ;
Remarks
Hlaaed. detonated 300-100 ft
behind ORANCE 1 and 3
Pired 2 bursta» both missed.
Total hours
7-105 hours
Combat
Missions
Remarks
1150
750
Unknown
All TAG fighter
background
Unknom)
63
All TAC fighter
background
3700
130
20
Mostly ADC experience
1200
160
30
All but P-105 tlBB is
KC-135 and student tine
3700
1500
13
4300
100
15
BLUE 1
BLUE 4
GREEN 3
GREEN <
TELLOU 3
ORANGE 3
Cocmenta on this Encounter ;
BLUE (Part 5) was surprised that the MIO-21 would attack because of altitude
advantage (approximate 10,000 ft) of P-105.
Q ppFM ant. zed at nsaneuverablllty of HIG-21.
' Comnents from Overall Experience ;
BLUE 1 felt that aircraft aodlf ications (e.g.. SAFETY PACK II, Ca.aera8, Vector Gear,
etc.) bad compromised aircraft capability by Increasing drag.
YELLOW 3 felt that P-IOS was an excellent airplane for the Job due to Its superior
airspeed capability and because of Its ruggedness.
Switching from air-to-ground to air-to-air mode Is too conplieated, should be
able to d3 this with a single switch.
QRC-160 switches and indicator ll^ts are In an inconvenient position.
ORAHQE 2. The only maneuver for the P-X05 against the KIO-21 is to head for the deck
in maxim > power. The P-105 cannot out-tum or out-ellnb the KIQ-21.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interview ;
BLUE 1
BLOB «
ORANGE
ORANGE
16 February 1967,
18 February 1967,
15 February 1967 »
4 February 1967 •
Neaeaaea. Reports t
TAP OPlffiP-3 ,
7AF
7AF
7AP
7AF
TAP
TAP
TAP
OPREP-H,
m
I
Intell.*
BsBsagei
130925Z.
131628Z,
132205Z,
I316I62,
1316512,
I3I6SIZ.
132231Z.
1512152,
DOCO-30291,
DO CO- 30307,
DOCO-30317,
DOCO-30309,
DOCO-30310,
DOCO-30311,
DIO-30996 ,
0X0-3 1005 f
GREEN 3
GREEN 4
lELLOW 1
TELLCH 3
Deeeaber 1966
15 February 1967 «
15 February 196T*
letter,
18 February 1967 >
SECRET
m
(X}NFZDENTIAL
H
M
SECHBT/NOFORH
i
I
I
I
I
1
I
I
Bv«nt II-9S
U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
This event represented the second time since 2 December 1966 that there
was an integration of SAHs and laCs In the NVN Air Defense systeci. ' Between 1606H and
l62kH in approximately an 18x26 n ml rectangular area WSW of Hanoi, the following
activity was i-oported: 6 KIC-213, 9 MlG-lTs , 17 SAYs fired, four AAA reactions,
16 F-1053 anJ 19 Navy aircraft. One K-105 was dr>wned by a SAM (PURPLE 3) and 3 Navy
aircraft were hit by SAKs. The P-1053 were reported egresslng at between 15-16.000 ft,
KICs were reported at 6,000 ft, 9,000 ft, and 7.8,000 ft.
SAKs were sighted before and during MIG activity by BLUE, GREEN, and YELLOW flights .
BLUE, GREEN, YELLOW and ORANGE Plights were flying In a group forrnatlon proceeding
to the assigned target {JCS 19.00 Yen Vlen Railroad Classification Yard). BLUE Plight
wRs the lead flight followed by GREEN' and YELLOW with ORAIJCE Plight being the trailing
night. YELLOW Flight was to the left of GREEN Plight. In case of MIG attack, ORANGE
Plight was to drop ordnance and screen the rear of the strike force.
Part 1 ; While inbound to the target BLUE Plight spotted two MICs approximately
10,000 ft below thea flying in opposite heading to the flight. They were seen at
3 o* clock and were then observed to turn oehlnd the last fli^t (ORANGE Plight). The
strike force had already Jettisoned Khelr tanks prior to going Into the target.
Part 2 : GREEM Flight was about halfway down Thud Ridge, inbound to the target,
when GREEN k sighted it MlC-21s at 11 o'clock on a reciprocal heading and offset about
6 n ml. GREEN 2 sighted 1 MIG-173 at 1 o'clock very low. Identification was readily
made due to the delta wings and silver color of the airplane. The MIC-lTs pressed on
without attacking anyone. The MIG-21s started on a left turn to attack the trailing
flight behind GREEN. GRKEN Flight was not engaged by MIGs and struck the target as
briefed.
Part 3 : YELLOW Flight sighted 2 MIG-213 at 1 o'clock on a westerly heading. At
the time, YELLOW Plight was on a heading of a 135°, and approxlr.ately 15 miles from
the target area. As the MIGs passed YELLOW'S 3 o'clock position they started to turn in.
YELLOW Plight did not take any evasive action and shortly thereafter YELLOW 4 called out
the MIGs apprsxinately six miles In trail. The KICs were positively Identified by
their silver color. Y'iLLOW Plight then rolled Into the target In almost a spllt-S
naneuver her.dlnc glrtcst west. In the pulJout fror. the target , YELLOW *i had becone
separated from the rest of the flight, and shortly thereafter, he (YELLOW U) called
out that he had two MIG-213 on him and that he was cleanln; off the racks and
Rcceleratlng out. YELLOW ft exited to the west at Kr.ch 1.3 at about 5,000 ft and
successfully outran the KICs. Njeanwhlle the remainder of YELLOW Plight climbed out
together at Kach 1.15 also exiting to the west. Gn the way out they saw numerous SAHs
in the area as well as numerous KI0-17s orbiting low, none of *.'hlch pursued YELLOW Plight.
They also saw the MIGs that were chasing YELLOW give up and turn back towards their -^j^
home base. Nuirjber 1 rejoined the flight over Laos. .5
Part ORANGE Flight was about halfway down Thud Ridge when 2 MI0-21s approached
on a reciprocal heading, displaced approximately thi*ee miles to the right of the Flight.
The KICs executed a right 180** turn to fall In trail approximately three miles behind
ORANGE Plight. The KICs closed rapidly In loose formation and at a range of about a
half-mile* one MIG (the one on the right) lined up between ORANGE 1 and 3* and launched
an air-to-air missile. At the tine, ORAKGE Plight was in pod formation with the second
element on the .left. GRANGE li saw the missile being launched and called for a right
break. All aircraft In ORANGE Flight Jettisoned their tanks and ordnance before and
during the break which was dov;n an6 to the right. ORA.^IGE 4 observed the enemy missile
explode approximately 300 to »IC0 ft behind #3. The second KIG, which was on the left
wing of the first one, pressed In on ORAMGE << and fired his cannon as ORANGE >( forced him
to overshoot. KIO 1 followed up his ml&slle attack by firing his cannon at ORANGE i|.
ORAt.'GE 1 in maximum power executed a 160° turn down to the cloud tops. MIG 1 Btarted
to follow and then stopped about two-thirds of the way around the I80' break as
ORAtiOE Plight was moving back into defensive formation. At this point ORANGE 3 called
out a KIG crossing from left to right In his 6 o'clock position. All members of the
riisht then lost sight of this KXG. In the meantinc^, another MIG closed In on ORAtiCE 4
in his 7 o'clock position, snapped off a burst and then broke away. This NIG was seen by
ORANGE 3 before it fired &t ORA.\'CE ^i; however, it wus originally ml s Identified as a
friendly aircraft. When ORAI.'GE 3 ivalized that it was a MIO It was too late to call a
break. Two PiIGs continued to shadow the flight until egress from Route Package VI.
Part 5 ; After pulling off the target 3L0E Pllf^it saw 2 MIG-21S on a reciprocal 1
heading below them at 5,000 ft. They were sighted In BLUE*s 10 o'clock position at ^
a range of about 3 miles . As the MIGs passed abeam of BLUE Plight they attempted to
c."- rndelle up to then. However, they were too far away and too low to be able to
co-plete the attack so the MIGs broke off and headect back towards Hanoi. BLUE Flight
recovered without engaging any MIG aircraft.
Source: DIO 31005, December 1966 (see Item 11) SECRET/NOPORN.
333
NOfORN
I
Event ZZ-99
Aircraft Involved: Four P-IOSD vb at leMt six
MX 0-2 la
Result: One P-IOSD lost
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l»05'»/105*55*B.
1. PRIMARY mSSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 11 December 1966/162SH
Four F-105D (BLUE Plight) aircraft were on a strike mission. The flight was par>-of"i
total force attacking JCS 19.00 (2l'05'25"N/l05»55'15''E) . Plights originating from.*Takhll
were to strike the target first followed by those from Korat. The IRON HAND Pllg^its
(Events 11-103 and II-IQIJ) preceeded the strike forces. The Takhll forces (In cwder of y'
striking the target) were composed of the aircraft In Events 11-105 (TOT 08l6Z>i 11-100'
(TOT 0817Z}, 11-99 (TOT 0619Z) and 11-102. The Korat forces were - composed of/the aircraft
In Event 11-106 and Event 11-101. which was the last strike flight on the target. Also in
the area were EC-121 aircraft waiting in the vicinity of 20/107 and 20/103 iind EB-66B's ^
and C'a orbiting in the vicinity of 22»10'N/105»20'B and 21«»15'H/10l«»25*E/ The USN was
•Iso conducting studies in the same general area.
2. HISSIOK ROUTE /
From Takhll AD direct to Green Anchor for refueling direct to 21.^55 'N/lOl'SB'E,
direct to Zl'S^'N/lOS^lS 'E, direct to ZlosS'N/IOS'SS'E direct to 21*Z6 •N/105''l2 'E
direct to 21*l6'N/105*56'E direct to the target (JCS 19-00) and egrpss to 20«57'N/
105*27*E then direct to 20^'(6*N/105"05'E direct to Green Anchor to/ post strike refuel.
BLUB 1 and 2 recovered at Takhll but due to fuel BLUE 4 recovered/at UDORK.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION /
P>-105D BLUE 1.2.H
6 750 lb bombs **
2 450 gal. tanks
1 QRC-160 POD
P-105D BLUE 3
6 500 lb bombs
2 ^^0 gal. tanks •
1 QRC-160 POD .
KIO-21 HIO 1 .2,3.<».5.6
All Aircraft Silver
Missiles carried by at least one KIO.
No other information available. Those KtOs Identified as having the large
radome (PZSKBED D) are so specified in the narrative.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Low broken to overcast deck, bases 3-'»,000 feet, tops 8,000-10,000 feet -5 mllea
vTslblllty with haze.
i
Altitude ;
Heading T
Speed ;
Fuel State ;
Formation:
5.
BLUE (1,2. 3. Don ingress to target
2,000 feet AOL
135*
550 kts Plus
10.000 lbs
Pod Fomtion
INITIAL DETECTION
After crossing the RED RIVER, while on their Ingress to the target, BLUE Flight
continuously observed MIC-21 aircraft In the area. However, the first HIOs to threaten
the flight were seen by BLUE 2 prior to pop-up. Two KIG-21B were seen at 2 o'clock,
co-altitude, 3,000-4,000 feet range. BLUE Plight was at the HIOs 2 o'clock, as the
KIGs. In a hard turn, atteavted to turn in behind the flight.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Flight continued on the mission as the two HIOs overshot.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT
BLUE Plight made their bomb run and popped up and during the dive to the target
two Pi^TC MI0-21S passed through the flight , but no firing was observed. A'ter ellmblng
throu&»i the clouds, BLUE 2 saw a single MI 0-21 at 9 o'clock, then two more, silver HIC-21s
335
i
Mm
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
' Event 11-99
he e.cJpn^by*5S;rnr?i;i|i.^rJHr " *t BLUE K's 9 o'clock which
down with a missile, and he broke off Thf .? and one attacked BLUE 3 and shot him
attacked by BLUE 2 Cho fired « the Sic I? h.^i^%'' ^'i"""?.!^"^ ^ '"'^ subsequently
Joined the rest of the fir^t JeJ eg^J;! ^''"^ ^ ^ cr«h wd then
8. OADMANCE
(No. Plred/No. Hlta)
BLUE 2 ^
pdQ ' 350 rounds - no sight.
Nana a<> ^"^^ destroyed BLUE 3
10. AIRCREW COHMENTS
Cowment s on this Encounter
Never attack a Mio. unless i to o <
... OAT«SOU,«S ° ™ P... »a ..C.P..
Project InterviPwj,- BLUE 2 (5 Feb 1967)
Keaaages. Reports .' "
?« SSS HH532Z Dee 66
52^° ^51 211905Z Dec 66
7AF TOCO 30371 OPREP-* 1'<1312Z Dec 66
TAP DOCO 31359 OPREP-3 1<J0952Z fifi
l«nror""^'''°''", i50557Z Dee 66
S*^r««;-?°f"""^S*^^<'"" during the mlsalon
Aa »oJi°J."Jf fir^t°crJs«d''Se"ilf °Rjve"r ''To.f.^ 'T^r attacking JCS 19. 00.
altitude, numerous SAKa we" fl^d at tJe ?iiS? 1^^/^°"^*'' " f««
did not track very accurately Ju,? after iifii;.i"^K^''o^^*:''yP* volleys, but they
calls of MIGs from the flak supp„|sior?uSt ! (Ive^t ^^"^ ^^^Sht hea?d
engagenent they jettisoned tanks^d Dylon«*V.*r*;fr II-lp5) and expecting an
and the QRC-I60 POD. :.e tan^^! w^^^JiJJJaJJJ;!";!;! XlofloLilVlf ^ L'lToV
the cIS^d^i^^'r.'^lLSIlJiiSrhJlrd'tSe'^^r.?"^ f ^"'^ ''^^'^ descended through
being Jumped by MiGs aJJS b?JS?n« th«^£ .hf ^T*"^ transmit that tSSrSSe
2,000-3,000 ft. ACL and 550 kH tSf J?f^h? ^^'^ S^fud layer, and descending to
30-40 MIC-17S, MIG-igrand mS-Iis Jn re JfELSt Airfield and observed
•round In the area and two were sLn f.T^r^SS?*'* MIO-215 were seen flylni
BLUB Plight started t6 re^elvrhH^ n2. ** 1" alSC
«w .55 JSPleSlS^'M?;: w"Jo'1^=re^?^?oJ:roS5^?e^?°a:ar BLI^ 2
a^'^^h:•Sof^^^e%^e^d^"^^is'^i^„^rs"" "
passing from 3 o^Io?k%STo'e™cJ ^5 sD:?^f^^^fi'^'* .^^^ '.'"'^•^ t^^ mlVaB
Of BLUE Plight. the'^M.Gs .^.l^.o^Tdli rjiJlnTp^lSo^^- J SSiy^- s£..
dii^^jSi'nrtSeir^-s fTa^^rsuris^^^i^-^.C^in^^ "
was under heavy ground finest th:%':„;\\2'L'^,%*SiSJ';„»J.S^,^^P"^
towarS'JSr hn?r"aSd°?h:iiL'J^Rj;er\'t' 6^^^^"^;^?^°"^ ' •outhwea;erly direction
aaw a single MIO-21 (HIG-5) at 9 o'clock 2 H^f!.H^J **'''*"™f''' " "me. 3LUE 2
2,,™ i ""out in front. BLUE 2 and 3 we^-e ah^-.^o rn^ "P*"** At this time
t ii
1
I
i
«
r
\
Event 11-99
BLVE Plleht came out of afterburner and climbed on top of the clouds. BLUE 1, 2,
and 3 were approximately line abreast extending about t.OOO feet across the front.
BLUE U was tack and to the right about 1 mile and lower. BLUE 3 sav 2 MIC-21a (KIG 6,7)
at 3 o'clock with ether MIOs and a SAM to the South. BLUE 3 called the KtGs. BLUE 2
also saw the two MIC>2l5 as well as the others In the area. Due to his position,
BLUE 2 observed the two vacs to be at 6 o' clock high and diving into position behind
about 6,000 feet away. The HICs were silver.
BLUE 1 called "burner" and the flight descended into the clouds to evade the MZGs.
On descending through the clouds the flight began to receive Intense flak. After
Jinking for sev-iral seconds (no more than ZO) and reaching the mountains Southwest of
Hanoi, the flight again climbed on top of the clouds and although no MICs were
Immediately seen, the flight had some SAMs fired at then.
A short time later (estimated kQ seconds) another HIG-21 (MIQ-8) was seen by BLUE 2.
This MIC was close to BLUE 4. The KIG was at BLUE it's 9 o'clock, about 1,500 to 2,000
feet away from SLUE H and turning into BLUE k from a line abreast position. BLUE 2 saw
ttie MIC-21 outlined against a cloud, as both the MIG and BLUE 1 acknowledged and broke
down into the clouds with the MIG after him. Just before BLUE 4 dived into the clouds,
rallffl "BTUK ft vnu h(»v«» two Vina p>t vnur 6 o'clock." fwhat was meant to be
transmitted was "BLUE 1 and 2 there are MICs at your 6 o'clock."] The two MIGs
approaching the flight were unseen by BLUE 1,2, and 3. A short time later, BLUE 1
peeped back through the clouds without the HIO.
The flight began to climb, and a target report was given, BLUE 3 called BLUE 1 to
"pull It up" and then BLUE 1 called for a shift In frequency from channel 2 to channel I
to give the code words that the target had been hit. At this point the SAM activity
(as Indicated by vector strobes) had subsided and little flak was present.
The flight at this tine was spread out with BLUE 1 in the lead and BLUE 2 on the
left. BLUE 3 was about even with BLUE 2 to the right of BLUE 1 and out a bit farther
than BLUE 2. BLUE H was very far out to the right and behind the flight. As they
climbed through^ 10,000-11,000 feet and at a speed In the category of J»00 KIAS, heading
between 230" to 260° degrees In the vicinity of 20»H7'N/105°08'E, time 1625H. BLUE 2
in looking back to clear the other flight members, saw 2 MIG-21b (MIG 9, 10)2 (piSHBED D)
BLUE 2's wing and another KIG-21 off to the right of closest MIG-21. One MIC-21 was In
the 6 o'clock position of BLUE 1 and the other was In the 6 o'clock position of BLUE 3.
The HIO on BLUE 1 appeared to be inside missile range.
As BLUE 2 noticed the MIG-21D behind BLUE. 3, that HIO launched an air-to-air
missile (DLUZ 2 sa;; the Ldssllc Icuvc the VIQ) which hit SLUE 3, blowing the aft end
off of the F-IOS before a warning could be given. Immediately after missile launch
the HIC-21 broke off and was not seen again. This was the first U.S. aircraft to be
ahot down by an air-to-air missile over North Vietnam.
BLUE 2 broke into the ffitO that was on the tail of BLUE 1. BLUE 2 simultaneously
called for BLUE 3 to eject, which he did in the area of 20*>'46 'N/IOSOOS'E. BLUE 2 was
canopy to canopy with the HIO but the KIQ broke away and BLUE 2 dived with the MIG
down to the ground.
BLUE 2 still had his sight set up for the air-to-ground mode with a depressed piper
for bombing. He fired 350 rounds of 20 mm In a single burst at a few hundred feet range,
diving, but observed no hits. BLUE 2, In afterburner, broke off from the MIG as they
neared the ground,
BLUE 2 saw the chute of BLUE 3 and another parachute about 3 miles apart (suspected
to be the drag chute of BLUE 3s aircraft) 3. He reversed to go back after the other
parachute and while in a left bank 500 to 5S0 knots, BLUE 2 saw another silver MIG-21
(either HIG-9, or 10) in a right bank, turning toward him 2,000-3,000 feet range,
canopy to canopy. BLUE 2 rolled back to the right an(* apIit-S'ed down to the deck and
barrel-rolled In afterburner and went down Into the Black River Valley and lost the MIG. ]
After BLUE 1 and 3 were Jumped, another MIG-21 (KZG-ll) maneuvered behind BLUE 4 at
hla 7 o'clock but BLUE 4 escaped by going to afterburner and diving through the cloud
deck. BLUE 1 reversed and saw BLUE 3*8 aircraft going down in flames. He then picked
up a MT.C-2\ at hla 7 o'clock so he dlaengased and egressed.
BLUE 1 and 2 and 1| egreaaed. BLUE 2 had 1,800 Iba of fuel when he reached the
tanker. Search and rescue forces picked up BLUE 3 at about 17'>3H (location was 251*
magnetic heading, 43 n mi from Hanoi), despite ground fire. At 1745H all aircraft had
departed the area.
The only MIG warnings that the flight received were communication from other flights
that these other flights had been Jumped by KIGs and one broadcast from the picket ships
of "MIGS AlP.BORtJE. "
^OPREP quotes 6,000-8,000 feet but this la low -considering the weather. However, In both
cases, the MIQs Jumped the F-105s shortly after the 105s emerged from the cloud layer.
It was surmized by BLUE 2 that KIGs 6 and 7 were the same as MIG 9 and 10, with the MlOa j
executing a Yo-Yo to get back on top of the clouds
^BLUE 2 thought he saw a man In the
337
REP BAROW EVENT IN99 SUMMARY
Tim
Mark
'0
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 2. 3. «)
Status
BLUE Flight In Pod
Fora. At 2-3000 ft
and 550 kts.
600 kts In aftvr-
burner.
550-600 ktt 1«v«1
8000 lb fu*1.
BLUE back
Action
BLUE Flight sees Ml at
3 o'clock •tteiapting to
attack. BLUE presses
on, popping up and
striking the target.
BLUE pressing out froA
target - comes out of
burner. B2 sights M5
at 9 o'clock 2 nlles
out at co-a1t1tude
straight and level at
high speed.
B1 , 2 . and 3 1 f ne
abreast with B4 back and
right 1 mite. B2 and 3
set H6 and 7 coving In
from 6 o'clock high
closing rapidly. BLUE
selects afterburner
and orops through
clouds.
B2 sees MB on 84
and warns 4. B4
goes Into clouds
Hi th H8 chasing.
About a minute
later he climbs
b4ck up without MB.
B4 sees H9 and 10
at 6 o'clock to B1.
2, 3 and wartis theai
B1 , 2, 3 do not see
M9 and 10.
Other Friendly
Communications
B2 warned B4 of Ml
82 calls "Kie at
9 o'clock" hut call
delayed due to
traffic on the
radio.
B3 calls
MIGs at 6
o'clock-.
B2 calls MIS at 9
o'clock on BLUE.
B4 calls "BLUE 4
you have 2 HIG-21$
at 6 o'clock" -
meanl ng B1 and .2
instead of B4.
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1,2)
RED 1 and 2
attempted to attack
BLUE Flight but
could not catch
them and when BLUE
came Into the flak
at the target they
broke off.
HS do«s not attempt
to attack BLUE.
M6 and 7
attacking from 6
o'c'ijck high -
abodt 8000 ft out
when BLUE went into
clouds.
86 was 2000 ft at
9 o'clock to 84
turning In. He
chased 84 Into
clouds and then
broke away. M6
and 7 possibly
yo-yo'ed up when
BLUE night went
lito clouds and are
now coning back in
Remarks
MIGs silver -
Immediately
Identified by
delta wing.
BLUE drops out
under clouds but
due to flak and
luwerlng ceiling
they cllnb back
on top.
I
82 saw the NIG
from about 2 ml les
away against the
clouds. BLUE
Flight has several
SAMs fired at then
- none hitting.
t^3a cz3m csa
RED BAROW EVEBT 11-99 SOMHART
Time .
Hark
Action Aircract (BLUE 1. ^, 3. 4}
Other Friendly
Communications
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1 .2}
Remarks
Status
Action
U
BLUE on top of
Claud deck.
BLUE Lead not
getting any more
SAM activity and
feeling safe from
MIGs due to dis-
tance away slows
to climb speed -
in « climb - and
goes to different
frequency to make .
strike report.
J
BLUE Flight
climbing at 400 kt
fu!l - SOOO ft
B2 sees M9 and 10 at 3
o'clock and sees H10
shoot down B3 with
missi le. 82 breaks Into
H9. 61 on different
frequency Is unaware of
MIG activity.
B2 switches over
to guard and tells
83 to eject.
M3 fires a missile
Into t3. then
breaks away. M9
break: down to
evad3 82.
B3 shot dt.
82 chasing N9.
B1 reversing.
B2 chAses H9 to the
deck firing but nisslng.
82 pul 1 s up and
reverses back tohard
B3. Ql reverses to see
B3 In flames and MIO
attacking. He runs to
evade MIO.
HIO attacking 81.
H9 Turning from 82.
82 fires 350
rounds at close
range but missfS -
no gunsight. Did
not have time to
set sw i tches •
Just pulled nose
through M9 while
firing.
B1 and 4 departing
area. 82 turning
toward 83.
1
B2 sees two chutes
comi ng down . As he
reverses to check the
second chute he sees M9
coming In. b4 makes a
maximum speed dash
south - loses M9 and
then recovers Udorn.
HIO disengages and
departs. K9 was
at 82' . 9 o'clock,
2-3, 0;0 ft out when
B2 started high
speed escape.
SLUE 2 says 'Never
attack a KIG
unless 9 to 3
o'clock low - so
you can make one
pass and escape.*
Il
!
I
f
f
s
I
I
I
Event 11-100.
Result: Ho damage
Viclnit, or Encounter: ll^OJ'.iJ/JJi:^^:!
1 PRIMARY HISSIOH AND TACTlCAt SITUATIOH
Daf/Tl»e: 1" December 1966/approx. 1630H ^^^^^^ ^^^^^
Pour F-105D3 (BLUE Flight ) strike on target In Route t^acK.s * u^o-gal tank hang.
«; ?oSpo.ed of th. aircraft in Ev.nt> '^/S^tw .Ircr.ft In Event
Jtrlke"golng at the same time.
2. HISSIOH ROUTE In over the Red
Siri'turnad around at 5l5 SKert then aouthwest to poat atrlke
BLUE 1 and 3 fxew west from vl.e .arget
refueling.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
p ^nc^n RriiP 1, 2. 3 t
2 JJ50-6al tanks
$ 750 (M117)
1 QRC~l60 pod
Camouflage palnt Receive Only, Doppler silent, IPP standby
^ns, :r.Si:prs«°-"^o^f rxH.9"s%BL.. i ana 3 o„.,
,. FLIGHT COKDITIOHS nm TO ENCOUNTER
BLUE
T
T
Altitude ;
Heading ^
Speech :
Fuel State ;
Plight Formation :
7000 ft
3HO
175
6000 ft 6000 ft 7000 ft
SE SE 3*^0
550 550 '•TS
BLUE J» m ^«latlon to BLUE 3 Jf-^^he time of their first
flying above and behind BLJ& i th. tareet BLUE 2 came off
illhtfng after BWE i,^"S.^Jr'5KJt J/^ «l' fr^S of BLUE 1.
first and during egress »»« wa» aj^^J
at the tl«e of their second alghtlng.
5. INITIAL DETECTION . ^ ^he area,
on the .a, to the "rset received "^"„|"f ^^.^i? \l\tT^'. »• BI."| ' »
BLUE J Observed six brown jnoUe trails S""f,'"",Jter bomblne the tarjet, BLUE 2
S.s".'r.c.^s'ifi;^t ir;oii"Kior.:"i^"o'cio;^ lo.. .bo^t ^.v. .i. n,in. .o..r*
«d . <.aa s.P=""d fro. tbe Lead ele..ntj^..r.^m 3«0.__.t^«.00^rt .^^^^^
?s%Lftnrro'r"?b^^riu.°tUi t:'ir.!;;wrSpJ-i..t.i; i«oh
3*3
I
,,- Event 11-100
8. ACTION INITIATED
th. V"?w^ ^^^""'^ sighting). Selected max power. Made attempt to close behind
foSr MIGs sighting SLUE Plight turned In to the approaching flight of
BLUE 3 and t turned Into the NlOa, which they encountered.
7, SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
away lo^lhl Vltt\ni°lniir°^ "^^'jS 5"^ achieving range the WOs hroke up
Sifip ; . ^? , ! SLUE 1 and 2 proceeded on to the target. On the second observation
m^ll^l IZ^'tVnVrtX'' " approached. T^e KIOs started to tXriJ^JJSJnd
^h.nrf?nf J^*!?^*'*'/^****^*?''^"^ * °" P*"" '° '^^i* the MlQs did a semi-
8.
ORDNANCE
None expended.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 3 was unable to Jettison the right (I50>gal fuel tank,
was reported not operational.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience ;
The QRC-160 pod on BLOE 1
BLUE 2
Total
Hours
600
P-105
Hours
350
Combat
Missions
62
Remarica
Oradueted from flying
school. Oct 1965* direct
to P-105 school and then
to SEA. Had fired 1
AIM-9 in training and
fired gun on the dart.
* . 2290 KOO Firat MIO engagement.
Cocments on this Encounter ;
«n»*.^yfh5;«.^*'**S!5**^ '"i" "^^^ *° set a kill with an AlM-9 on their
BLuS pfiSJ ?Si„.r??L''£?5 ^''SJ?* "^""^'^ ^^'^"Se m targets. All of
SSeSliS iSijJjtr^iS SJg:*"* blue 2 thmk. there ls%oordln*tlo«
contrSi^SaJ JSJtrgSSi? •'"h hung tank above 500 kt. Below 500 kt
far oS^f*;osmSJf ^"
Coaments on Overall Experience ;
♦■K- ^ ^^^J^. too difficult to go from bombing mode to alr-to-alr mode. It reoulrea
SLi°, VoL'C r"'"''):' *° '^^^^ 80od intelligence available and SSJ
BM PVP ?«%^*;Sn?»,''[!°T^*^^:?v.°^ capabilities, but w, need better target photography.
?I w clutter up the strike freq. with long MIQ calls™ CanS
should be brief. I.e.. "KIOs Thud Ridge- and get off the air.
pas. ft^the-flJgJrhS'Sar'lS?"'""" *
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
Messages. Reports ;
BLUE 2 (« Feb 67)
BLUE 3 (15 Mar 67)
BLUE 4 (3 Feb 67)
TAP lil2201 Dec 66 DIO 3100Z
TAP 141850 Dec 66 OPREP 3 DOCO 30393
TAP 111357 Dec 66 OPREP H DOCO 30375
341
Event 11.100
«^
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight Ingressed to the target, and after starting down Thud Ridge, the flight
prepared to Jettison tanks, In an anticipation of potential MIG encounters. They had had
a MIQ warnlns from BIO EYK of MICs in the area. The left tank of BLUE 3 would not Jetti-
son, so BLUE 3 and H separated from BLUE 1 and 2 at 21»30'N/105"30'1£. BLUE 3 and « began
to proceed outbound, hit a target of opportunity and return home. BLUE 1 and 2 proceeded
on to the primary target.
BLUE I and 2 continued on' toward the target encountering heavy riak but few SAMs.
About 7 ml. from the IP BLUE 2 caw 6 black smoke trails and MIOs about 3000 ft above at
12 o'clock ft ml. away. The aircraft were not Immediately Identified, and were not
positively Identified by BLUE 2 as MIG-17s until the MIGs turned. There were a >ircup cf
four MIGs parallel to two others who were separated out several thousand feet. BLUE 2
called the MIGs, but BLUE 1 did not see them immediately. The MICs were golns away and
since BLUE 1 and 2 were closing they tried to attack the MIGs. BLUE 1 and 2 accelerated
In afterburner and approached to within 1 to 1-1/2 mi. when the MIGs broke up and to the
left. The MICs were lost from view In the haze as they passed off to 9 o'clock.
BLUE 1 and 2 continued on and hit the target. As they were egresslng In the vicinity
of :i''QZ'"/'-'''''-Z'T' - '-|-t,-j- ui. 1- o'clock af.J 2-1/2 ;:iil'i3 range on un
opposite heading. The bogeys in two elements and 1000 ft low. BLUE 2 turned to go after
the MICa, and notified BLUE 1 of his intent. BLUE 2 was set up at this time with a non-
eonputlng gunslGht (fixed plpper at zero depression). The MIGs saw BLUE 2 and turned to
climb, passing behind BLUE 2 In a YoYo, but broke away Just prior to BLUE 1 and 2 being
threatened by a SAM. BLUE 2 made no positive Identification but tentatively classified
the MICs as 178 or 21s.
BLUE 1 and 2 were somewhat separated at this time and continued to egress, on
egress BLUE 2 saw a four-ship flight of bogeys in a right turn at about 3 ml. range.
BLUE 2 turned toward the bogeys and closed to about 2000 ft and started pulling lead
on a bogey which was now at 11 o'clock. At this time BLUE 2 identified the aircraft
as Kavy F-8, so he made a hard right break to a heading of 3'»0'» and stirted to egrees.
BLUE 2 continued on out when he saw two unidentified aircraft at 10,000 ft altitude
5 mi. away at his 6 o'clock. The aircraft were in close formation. BLUE 2 called that
if they came at him he was going to turn into them despite 'his fuel state* but the
bogeys turned away and were lost fron view.
BLUE 1 and 2 noted SAMs during Ingress and egress. On egress BLUE 2 noted a SAM
detonate 1/1 to 1/2 ml. b^^hlnd the element at 21*10'!</105*2?'E, three other SAMs were
seen to explode at 20,000 ft altitude above the east side of Thud Ridge, but these
and four SAIls the flight saw detonating on the east side of Thud Ridge during ingress
were not bursting near any aircraft that BLUE Flight could see.
BLUE 3 and H after leaving BLUE 1 and 2 proceeded to egress back up Thud Ridge.
BLUE 3 and il- reached the northwest end of Thud Ridge, and by this tine had climbed
through the overcast and were about 2000 ft above it in the vicinity of 21»38 'N/105''25'E
heading S^O* at 7000 ft and climbing at approximately >i75 KIAS. BLUE 1 was almost line
abreast to BLUE 3'3 right when he saw two KIG-21S at 2 o'clock low, right on the top of
the overcast at a range of 2-3 mi. Pue to the cloud backgro'ind the MIGs ^h«re was easily
discerned and Identification was immediate. BLUE 1 called BLUE 3 and alerted him to the
MICs. BLUE 3 looked up and saw two MIC-213 high and at 2 o'clock. Although initially
BLUE 3 and 4 each saw only two MIGs, the MIOs were In a fllghv of four with the lead
element nigh and the low element about one mile in trail. The MIGs were initially orbit*
ing in the vicinity of 21*ii5'M/105^32'E and approached the flight on a heading of 195
degrees with the high element at 6-10*000 ft. altitude.
BLUE 3 called to Jettison all ordnance and go to afterburner and turned left into the
high element of MIG-21s in an attempt to make a gun attack. The high section of MIGs
turned Into BLUE 3 and H In a descending pass. Due to the closing velocity, the lead
(high) element of two HI0-21a passed BLUE 3 and 4 head-on about 50-100 yards away and
a bit lower than the P-105s and were first seen by BLUE at this time. The lower
element climbed and crossed at about 6000 ft range. As the HIGs p-issed without firing
they were identified as MI0-21D with the large radome. They were clean except for missile
launchers on pylons, but no missiles were seen.
BLUE ti broke right to keep track of the MIOs as the lead element passed by and
attempted to get on the tall of BLUE 3 and 1. BLUE 3 and <! then reversed by breaking
down and to the left to a heading of about 240-260*'. The two MIOs executed a barrel roU
to the Fight (described as seml-ehandelle) ending up about a mile behind BLUE 3 and 4.
The low element of MIGs were not seen after they passed the F-1053. BLUE 3 and <!
accelerated to Hach 1.2 at "SOO ft altitude. The high element of KIGs dived into the
clouds and were lost from view. BLUE 3 and k came out of afterburner. One emerged
again shortly with Increased airspeed. However, ^he MIG was 2-3 ;,ille5 In trail and
BLUE 3 and accelerated in afterburner to Mach 1.3 and the MIO fell behind (BLUE 3 and 1
were opening at about 100 kt). BLUE Plight contlnucl on passing over the 6-7000 foot
mountains and the MIO followed to the vicinity of 21^27 'N/104<*40'E when he broke off.
1^
Event II-ICO
t«k«;'2lt^ SJo\r"'Se5?' «ilh'.bout 9000 lb Of f«.l. BLUE * got to the
BLUE 1 snd 2 got to the tanker with only about 1000 lb of fuel.
•ctloS?"^ * "P alr-to-air due to the rapidity of the
346
RED gAflOW EV!-MT lUlQO SUMMARY
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1 . Z)
6300 ft
550 kt
Had Jettisoned
450-gal ^4nk
6 750 lb bombs
] QRC-160 pod
9000 lb fuel
Other Friendly
ComRignl cations
B2 above and behind Bl.
Clearing - B2 saw 6 MIG
17$ at 11:30 went
Hax A.B. to Close from
the rear.
Lead did not see
smoke trail,
initially.
Clinbtng «nii
4cceler«t1ng to
about 7000 ft
BLUE Flight closed on
the Mies, made positive
identification didn 1}
give chase but continue
on Into ttie terget.
BLUE 2 called
"Bogeys at 11:30
or 12 o'clock.*
Lnemy Actions
(MIG 1,2)
Bl acqglretf the
HIGs.
1
300) ft above
healing about MO*
slcer than f-105s
Remark i
62 first saw the
smoke trails brown
color, not like .
F-105 smoke. B2
spread out going
after bogeys. BLUE
Flight had jetti-
soned tanks prior
to this time due
to MIG alerts in
the area and 3 SAM
detonations observed
I NIGs broke up end
' away to the left.
KOTE- BLUE 1.2 proleeded to the target -Uhout any«oro
delivered the ordnance and were egresslng at the tine
They
Conf. clean and
QRC pods had
dropped bOBbS OD
target .
550-575 kt
82 started a
reverse but lost
MIGs -- continued
egress on Hesttrly
headlng^^
B2 turned toward MlGs
constant 3$ turn keep-
ing HIGs In sigtit.
Lost sljht of lead
B2 called "9 bogeys
12 o'clock - I am
going In on then.
When MIG got to 9
o'clock they were
lost in the haze.
B2 f el t the MIG must
have had GCI warning
When MiGs turned
away BLUE Flight
did not pursue them
but continued on to
target at hlgh^ate
of speed.
First element
broke Into B2 and
up. (MIG seemed
a little slower
than B2.}
B2 lost lead. Did
not join until
tanker.
SAH went off 1/4
to 1/2 mi. behind
82.
RED BAROW EVEWT 11-100 SUHMARY
Tint
N«rk
Action Alrcrift (BLUE 1. 2)
St«tys
Action
Other Friendly
CommunUAtlons
Enemy Actions
(MIG 1,2)
Rentrki
S«w 4 unidentified
Aircraft. Turned right
Into bogeys.
Bogeys In right
turn 3 mi . rtnge.
550 kt
Recognizes bogeys as
F-8s. Turns right
to 340*.
Hone.
Identified bogeys
to be 4 F-8s.
550 kt
In left hand turn
toward the west.
SAH detonated at
5 o'clock 1/4 to
1/2 «i. co-
altitude.
5$0 kt
Flytng west jinking.
82 called 2000 lb
fuel.
QRC-UO MOP
Red and Green'l Ights
5S0 kt
Flying west sees 2
aircraft flying west at
IC.OOO ft 6 o'clock In
close foraatlon.
2 unidentified
aircraft heading
west In close
formation.
550 kt
Continued west Jink-
ing; lost sight ot then.
B2 called "If they
cone at ae I will
turn Into theai."
Unknown,
RED BARON EVEhT 1I<100 SU»1MARY
r
I
Ti
Action Aircraft {BLUE 3.4)
Other Frientlly
Connunl cat Ions
Eremy Actions
(HIG 1 .2)
Remarks
me
rk
Status
Acti on
1
^Oa
Alt. 7000 ft
Heading: 340»
A/S 475 kt
6 750 lb bombs
1 QRC-160 pod
B3 had 1 «50 gal
tank.
Observe 4 MIG-Sls
B3 saw 2 at 1-2 o'clock,
BLUE Fl Ight jettisoned
their ordnance and
turned right into Hit 1
2 In afterburner.
84 called 2 HIGs
at 11 o'clock.
B3 called "Dump all
ordnance." Go A.B.
Fly Ir g heading' of
195*.
Still nao oronance ,
84 dropped his tanks,
but B3 had one 450*
gal tank hung up *
on the a 1 rcraf t .
They had aborted
the original target
because of B3's hung
tank and were
looking for d target
of opportunity.
la
B3 1 450-ga1 tank
B4 clean
Alt. 6000 ft
A/S &50 kt
Passed MIG head on 50
yds separation then
broke left 260*.
Called for left
turn.
MIGi did serai-
chan'^eMe to the
righ:. After
passing BLUE Fligh
HIG tiement was
1000 ft lower.
BLUE Flight unable-,
to bring guns to
bea r on HIGs - -
HIGs did not fire.
B3 identified them
to be K1G-210S.
Clean aircraft
except for missiles.
In A.B.
Slight negative
"g" accelerating
to 1.3 Hach.
Flying west trying to
outrun HIGs.
Ro1U>d out behind
BLUE Flight trying
to catch then.
B3 expericr.ced
difficulty jr.
lateral control
•Dovc nacn i wicn
hung 450-gal tank.
In A.B.
.Approx. 700 kt
Flying nin. alt.
Gaining separation on
HIGs. Crossed Red
River 1000 ft alt. 1.3
Mach.
NIGs disengaged
as ttjey were 1osin<
distence on BLUE
Flight.
The last MIG to
break off kept
trying to get
his nose down to
gain possibly
to fire a missile
but kept losing out
and f Inal ly ga«« up
the cftast.
Event 11-101
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs two KlO-lTs
Revult: No <iORaBe
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»32'H/105''10*E
1. PRIHARY MISSION AKO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 14 December igeS/l-fOTH
BUtE' Plight was achedulcd to strike the Yen Vlen FR classification yard. Upon reach-
ing the target they found It obscured by weather. They wore turning over the target to
the egrebs headlnp when this event occurred. The flight was part of a total force attack-
ing JCS 19.00 (21''05'25"»/105''55' 15''E) • The flights originating from Takhli were to
strike the target first followed by those frc-n Korat . The IRO.v HAHD Plight Events 11-103
and II-lOl preceded the strike forces. The Takhli forces (In order of striking the target)
was composed of the aircraft In Events II-IO'^.TOT 08162), 11-100(TOT 08172), 11-99
{TOT 08J92), and 11-102. The Korat force was composecJ of the aircraft In Event Il-lOo
and Event 11-101 which was the last strike flight on the target,
2. NISSIQN AOUTE
See Event 11-99. BLUE Plight, from Korat. was refueled Inbound and outbound.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1
6 - 750 lb bombs
2 - 450 gal tanks
1 - GRC-160 Pod
All avionics standby/off except doppler
Camouglage paint
HTO-l? MIG 1. 2
Configuration unknown
Silver colored
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
'..'eavhor i nr;::en clonic and hase at lower IcvelSi clear above.
BLUE
T — 5 — 3 — «r
Altitude : 16,000 ft
Heading : 135** Inbound, about 250° outbound
Speed : —510 k^: O.S.
Fuel State : 10,fOO lb-—
FlTrht PSnnatlon Pod formation
1S00'
353
I
I
INITIAL OCTECTION
Event 11-101
BLUE Plight cn a heading of 135* w» turning right to a westerly heading when they
•aw two NIG-178> coming from the west, out of the sun, and turning In behind them. The
HIGs were at 7 going to 5 o'clock about 6000 ft range and ?00 ft higher than the flight.
The flight had heard BIG EYE KIG warnings at the tanker but nothing specific.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight Jettisoned their bombs, descended to 10,000 ft In naxifflum power, and at
Hach 1,1, out ran the Hias.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPNCNT
See Item 12.
10. AIRCREH COKHENTS
Experience
Total P-105 Combat
Hours Hours Hiagjons
BLOB 1 3600 1000 25
Remarks
Highly qualified flgbter pilot.
ponments on this Encounter
BLUE 1 felt that BIO EYE was useless*
Comments froiti Overall Experience
BLUE 1 ;
1. Pelt that the peace time operational outfits were negligent in air-to-air training.
i. Pelt that the double canopy and accumulated scratches on the canopy caused a glare
problem which restricted visibility.
3> Felt that too many switches were Involved in changing weapon delivery modes.
4. Pelt that a two pilot concept Just wasted one pilot.
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 1, 15 Peb 6?
Measagss. Reports ;
7AP DIG 31002 142204 pee 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Ab blue Plight turned over the target, aborting the drop dui; to weather, they saw two
MIG-173 at 6000 ft back at the 7 o'clock position, th-; flight wai at the MIO'a 10 o'clock.
BLUE Plight Jettisoned their ordnance and dived down to 10,000 ft at Mach 1.1 to evade the
MIQii. The NIOs were in a fighting wing with No. 2 MIO on I.eft. Shortly thereafter all
members of BLUE Flight got launch lights on their vector gear so they disregarded the l-ilGs
to prepare for the SAM attack. The SAMs were not seen nor were the KIQs seen again as
BUIE Plight returned home. Plight cgresaed without further Incident.
i
i
i
iB-4 reportedly saw two more.
Ik
w
w
I
I
i
i
i
1
i
1
I
I
I
Event ll'lOl
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-1058 V8 two III0-178
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»32'N/105«*0»E
1. PRIKARY MISSION AltD TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: V\ Deceraber I966/I707H
BLUE Plight was scheduled to strike the Yen Vlen RR classification yard. Upon reach-
ing the target they found It obscured by weather. They were turning over the target to
the egfuss heading when this event occurred. The flight was part of a total force attack-
ing JCS 19.00 (21*O5'25"N/105''55' l'j"E) . The flights originating from Takhli were to
strike the target first followed by those frori Korat . The IROW HAND Fllfsht Events 11-103
and Il-lOit preceded the strike forces. The Takhli forces (In order of striking the target)
Mas composed of the aircraft In Events II-IOS(TOT 08l6Z), II-100(TOT 08l7Z), 11-99
(TOT OSIQZ), and 11-102. The Korat force was ccaposed of the aircraft In Event 11-106
and Event 11-101 which was the last strike flight on the target.
2. KISSION ROUTE
See Event XI-99. BLUE Plight, from Korat, was refueled inbound and outbound.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. ^
6 - 750 lb bombs
2 - Ii50 gal canks
1 - QRC-160 Pod
All avionics standby/off except doppler
Camouglage paint
KIG-17 WIG 1. 2
Configuration unknown
Silver colored
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Vppfher : Broken elsuds and hase at lover levels, clear above.
^'■•v BLUE
Altitude ;
Heading :
Speed :
^uel State :
FllKht Formation
135
16,000 ft
Inbound, about 250" outbound
—5^0 kt G.S.
... 10,000 lb
Pod i'ornation
500*
f-
\m 1500*'
tSOO'
soo*
4
1500'
353
5. tHITlAL DETECTION
Event 11-101
BLUE Plight on a heading of 135« was turning right to a westerly J"f^8 Jj''^ *J«J
saw two HIC-I73I coming from the west, out of the sun, Jj^^n}''-*, J" J^JJ^ JSi fllSt.
MiCa were at 7 going to 5 o'clock about 6000 ft range and 500 ft higher than the m«ht.
The flight had heard BIO EYE KLQ warnings at the tanker but nothing apeelfic.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight Jettisoned their bombs, deacended to 10,000 ft in naxiam po^er*
Nach 1.1* out ran the MIQs.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
See Item 12.
«ttd ftt
Reaarka
Highly qualified fighter pilot.
10. AIRCREM COMMENTS
Experience
Total P-105 Conbat
Hours Houra Mia 5 ions
BLUE 1 3600 1000 25
Commenta on thia Encounter
BLUE 1 felt that BIO EYE was uaeleas.
Commenta from Overall Experience
BLUE 1 :
1. Pelt that the peace time operational outflta were negligent In
2. Pelt that the double canopy and accumulated aoratehea on the canopy cauaad a glare
problem which restricted visibility.
3. Pelt that too many switches were Involved in changing weapon delivery aodoa.
4. ?elt that a two pilot concept just waated one pilot.
i A
11. DATA SOURCES
Projec t Interviews ;
Messagea. Reports !
7AF DID 31002
BLUE 1» 15 Fob 67
1422011 Dae 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
AS BLUE Plight turned over the target, aborting the drop due to "father, they saw two
IOO-ItJ at 6000 ft back at the 7 o'clock position, the fUsht was at
BLUE Plight jettlaoned their ordnanea and dived down to 10,000 ft at Mach 1.1 to evade the
m08. The MIGs were in a fighting wing with Mo. 2 ^ao on left, fjo'-tly thereafter all
flwttbers of BLUE Plight got launch lights on their vector gear so they disregarded the HM8
to prepare for the SAM attack. The SAMa were not seen nor were the MIGs seen again aa
BLUE Plight returned hone. Flight egreaaed without further incident.
iB«4 reportedly saw two more.
35*
I
I
t
• 1
I
I
i
i
i
i
i
1
1
I
I
i
i
f
I
• Bv«nt 11.102
Aircraft Involved: Pour P* 109ft v« t«9 NlO-Sla*
Results: No Danase
Vicinity of Encounter: 2I"28'N/104««8*E
1. PRIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: lH December 1 966/16 15H
BLUE Plight (four P-105a) were enroute to JCS-19. The flight was part of a total
force attacking JCS 19-00 (Sl^OS ' ZSN/IOS'SS' 15E) . The flights originating from Taichll
were to strike the target first followed by those from Korat. The IRON HAND flights
Events 11-103 and 11-10'* preceded the strike forces. The Takhll forces (in order of
striking thtf target) was composed of the aircraft In Events 1I-105<TOT 08l6Z), 11-100
(TOT 0817Z), ll-99(TOT 08\7Z) and TI-102. The Korat forces was composed of the aircraft
in Event 11-106 and Event 11-101 which was the last strike flight on the target. There
were BIQ EYE EC-121 aircraft orbiting at 20<*N/107*>C and 20<*N/103''F-. EB 66Bs and Ca were
orbiting at 22»10«N/105^20«E and 21<'15'N/10<i"25'E. ■ Also the Navy was conducting at strike
in the immediate vicinity. The flights were about two minutes (18 mi) apart.
2. HISSION ROUTE
The exact route la unknown. However, it is known that the flight had refueled
and was just approaching the Red River inbound to the target on a northeast heading.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105S BLL'E 1. 2. 3. 1
6 - 750 bombs on controlling
2 - (150 gal tanks on inboard stations
1 - QRC -160 POD
1 - AIM-9*B (BLUE 1 only)
Blue ll had camera pod on LHOBO.
Camouflage paint
BLUE 1 TACAN IPP doppler all on and radiating
BLUE 4 doppler was on; IPP standby; TACAN receive; radar standby
M-61 cannon
M I0>21 HIO 1. 2
*Alr'to-air missiles
Silver paint " no markings
Cannons
One of the KZQ-218 was identified as a Pishbed D.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Veather t One check at 1000-8000 ft broken and another at 5000 ft overcaat visibility
unknown.
BLUE
Altitude :
Headlng T
Speed :
Puel State ;
Plight Formation ;
11,000 ft (about halfway between closed layers)
050°
500
Pull internal plus (about 11,000 Iba)
Elements aLuost line abreast
G
O
INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 2 called, "MIGs at 6 o'clock." The MIGs at that tine were coning down from
a eloud deck which was at 15,000 ft and the only reason they were seen was the vapor
trails - water vapor coming off the wing tips. The Kris were 1 1/2 miles away and
closing. Although the flight had head MIQ warnings, none was given for the area in
which they were flying.
' The OPREP messages cite two MI0-17s, however, the aircraft doscrlbed and identified
in the Interviews are NiO-Sls. Also annotated mission tape Blue 2 of Event 11-99 also
indicated that the MIGs were 2l8.
355
Event XI-102
6. ACTIOH INITIATED
the H?SJ?"':t%'wr?rmr''52ul'J5f:!:t^t'v.} • ^^-^ ^ confirmed
started ; left brJa" ' Jettisoned ordnance and tank., went burner and
7. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT
in an easy left turn ftnrf Rr tif% !«; S f ^ " "O damage. With BLUE 1 and 2
3 and S! JuUed yo-yo Met Jn Sn%ES^^**r^S; ?iS2n^""? ^ closed In on BLUE
the cannons. By this time BLUE FliirJ? h»H i*?! 4 ? "^''^^ }^°° " started firing
Md had selected mail mu« power B^UE ? Jnd*'; ii^.^** f'^S'"" '^^^ ^"'^ P^^*
out running the MICs. Meanwhile blSe i ^rH o^'^'* accelerated to Mach 1.1 and were
A» BLUt 1 dropped bJ^k anHeiersef ^hi S?fl. t° Pos^^on behind the MIOs,
lower cloud dbck. Durlnrthrhn!?; BLU? ?*hfJ"S25*^*5 5' dropping down into the
i?Mnd^J.%%^- H-i? K*otSir^ia.';er '
8. OROtlANCe
(No. flred/No. hits)
BLUE Plight No ordnance expended
Ca""0" Soviet AAMUTQLL'
HIC 1
1/0
2/0
Remarks
Detonated behind BLUE 3 and
No damage
P-105
Hours
Combat
Missions
Remarks
1150
600
55
All TAC PTR background
Pirst MIO engagement
11
All TAC FTR background
Pirst HIO engagement
10. AIRCREW COKHENTS
Total
Hours
BLUE 1 3500
BLUE 4 1100
Conmientg on -this Encounter
BLUE 1: :;o"l<J Jjve liked radar to have been able to maintain contact with NIO
-oays pilots need more air to air training
-Would have liked capability to .Ian EW radar
JJ^* * larger envelope for error at low altitude
w ;2 H^* "celeratlon and turn capability
-Would like range readout on gunslght
"al^\ri?J snitches to change to go from ground attack to
"JS^fSgresoi?"*"" ****** training, good flight dlsclpll„-but not
BLUE 4: -Wants tighter turn capability
-Wants better air to air training
-Wants more acceleration »
-Wants better visibility to 6 o'clock
-Says "Lucky to be alive."
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews = BLUE I 2 Feb 67, BLUE 4 14 Dec 66
Messages. Reports ; TAP DIG 31002 142204
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
3 and 4 accelerated ta Lll i t J'It J V^,^ f"'* opened fire with his cannon. BLUE
ptTw 1 ..-S^ ° ^'^ ^" ^^'^ break and escaped undamased Meanwhiii.
1
I
356
REO 6A»0>I E VtHT 11-1 Of syitMtav
Alt 11,000
Hdg 043-050*
about 500 KTAS
10.500 lb of fuel.
S«ne at T,
82 saw 2 Mifis (Mt, 2)
closing on the flight,
BLUE rllght Jettisons
Stores and tanks and
goes to afterburner*
B3 anft 4 start a left
break and nose over
rapidly after gilsslU
launch.
B1 and 2 start a left.
B1 sets switches for
AIN>9B and sights In
alr-tO'alr'node.
B3 and 4 descending
In a left turn
4.5 g
525 KTAS. B1 and
B2 In 4g turn at
higher altitude.
B3 and 4 at COO
KTAS. stin in
hard turn to keep
airspeed up.
Altltuds 6-70C0 ft
B1 and 2 at about
9500 ft.
BlUE Flight B2 called HIS at
eienents separated 6 o'clock 1-1/2
by about 2000 ft.
miles from Bl -
"Old you say BLUE
Flight" 82 conflrns
From Bl "Jettison
bombs and stores.
HIGs In tight
fighting wing, M2
about 40-60* back,
300-1000 ft out
fron HI. HIOs had
good overtake.
Ml fired tMO AAHs
at B3 and 64. The
two Atolls alss.
84 saw two silver
aircraft and was>
able to Identify by
color only. HIGs
seem to have
contrails from the
wing tips.
HI6s g/> after 83
and B4. start to
cut Inside cf B3
and 84s turn.
MIGs In tight
formation to pre-
vent 'overshoot »
the KIGs execute
a yo-yo.
MIG at BOO-OOO ft
from 84, an • fires
cannon.
Nissi les explode at
about 5 o'clock at
about 50 yards
range, somewhere
beyond closest
point of approach.
Bl has no plan to
use radar lock for
radar ranging.
To-yo Is perfectly
timed and executed.
B4 saw white puffs
of smoke from
underside of air-
craft. Inter-
mittent puffs from
lead NIG only.
RED BAROM EVEHT 1I-1P2 SOHHARV
TiM
H«rk
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1. 3. 4)
Status
Action
Othtr Fritndly
CoMMunlcatlons
Eneny Actions
(HI6 1,2)
RtBtrfcf
81. 2 at 9500 ft
3-4 g tiirn
81 and BZ start to
rtvtrst to the right.
Coae out of afterburner
B3 go«s Into clouds.
B4 reverses to right
and Joins 81 and 82.
81. 2 and 4 set up an
orbit at 10-11.000 ft.
n called "Where a
4IGS"
14 answered that
4I6s had gone Into
ctouds.
Lead tells 83 to go
hone.
niGS reverse and
dive Into the
clouds.
Event 11-103
Aircraft Involved: Tko P-105» vb two poaslble
NIO-178
Result : No damaga
■Vicinity of Encounter; 20»llO«M/105«05»E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 14 December 1966/17i»OH
flights (Events 11-10^ and Il!ioi4[*orL;H;H ^ ?, ^^'^'^ ^"0^ «AND
(TOT 0817Z). II-99(TOT 08"z) and ?hJ JoJ:rf«;ioL'"'= "-^^CTCT -^162). II-IOO
In Event 11-106 and Event 11-101 which Jaa thJ fSI? fof«s were composed cf the aircraft
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
No Information except that BLUE 1 and 2 carried tanks.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
5. INITIAL DETECTION
6. ACTION INITIATED
Jettison his tanKs but one^^ouW nit of? Bl5e Jl?i^h? ^iLl'f " ^^"^^ atter.pted to
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
This event terminated when the HIOs disengaged and disappeared.
9. IQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
BLUE X had one Hgo-gal tank that he could not Jettison.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience : Unknown
Conunents on This Encounter
the alifieid"'?).""' '^^^ the, vera ao far from
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interview i BLUE 1, H Mar 1967.
7AP DIO 31002 ll;220ilZ Dec 66
7AP mesoz Dec 66 OPREp-3 doco 30393
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
in the area and *<ore seen bC *I UF Plight ""^e two other >-1059
Event 11-103
12. NARKATIVE DeSCRlPTION (Continued)
At this time BLUE 2 called bogeya at 7:30 o»clock. BLUE 1 never saw the bogeys but
Khen BLUE 2 called that they were shiny, BLUE FllKht punched tanks and broke left and
down. BLUE 2*a tanks came off but only one of BLUE I'a jettisoned.
The HIGs were coming from the 8 o'clock position sliding Into the 6 o'clock and
were 2-3 mllea out when first detected.
As BLUE Plight broke into the MIGs, they executed a hard climbing turn and headed
back towards Hanoi. No firing was observed and the NIGs never dosed to less than
3000 ft.
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-lC5s vs two HI0-21b
Result : Sighting
Vicinity or Encounter: 21«55'N/105'"»0'E
The
1. PRIMARY MISSION AtiO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 14 December 1966/1650H
BLUE PUBht (one F-IOSF and 3 F-105Ds) fro. Korat -as on an^
fVtlixtL the taret t . There were KC-121 aircrdTt orbiting at ZO^N/ICT'E and 20 N/lOi t. as
I"l « S8-6f9s"Sd'6s o?5itlne at 22- 10 ' fV105<' 20 'E and 2invK/10UO25-E, The Navy «a
also conducting' strikes in the Immediate vicinity of JCS 19.00.
2. HISSION ROUTE
Generally followed the other flight routes (see Event 11-99)
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIOt:
Unknown - ordnance on SLUE ^ was bombs.
BLUE Flight had no AIK-9Ba.
MIOs were sliver.
4. FLIGHT COHOITIOHS PRIOR TO EMCOUMTER
Weather: Unknown, but In this rase not a factor.
BLUE Plight
Altitude : IM.OOO ft
Speeci : «80 kt
;?ueT_ ?^tate : Unknovn
Formation " Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE H looked overnead and saw two possible MIG-Zls passing over the formation at
6 o'clock hlffh. BIO EYE had called out MlOa In the arta ahead of BLUE Flight. The KIGS
wore on tne same heudlng as BLUE Plight a.nd were at 23,000 ft eltitude.
6. ACTtON INITIATED
The MICs were about 0.2 PTach faster. As they passed overhead and for about three
minutes after, BLUE watched the MIGs press away.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE did not attack and the MIOs soon disappeared in the distance.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Eiperlence
— Total r-l05 Combat
Hours .lours Missions Remarks
BLUE 1 2800 Unknown Unknown Mostly ADC experience.
BLUE H 1300 100 15
Comments on This Encounter
BLUE 1 felt that If ne had a SIDEUT»DER he oould have killed these NIOs.
Comments from Overall ExperienCfe
n . DATA SOURCES
Pr otect Interview BLUE 2, 2 Feb 67; BLUE U,'* Feb 67
Me saages ;
TIP DID :iO02 1'1220*«Z Qec 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
£ : as Item 7.
363
I
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If
f
f
Event 11-105
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105» vb nuinroua MlOa
Result: No damage
Vlclnltj of Encounter: 2l»l5'»/X05*«0»E
1. . PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: l** December 1956/1613H
BLUE Plight (four P-1058> waa the lead flight with flak auppreeslon responBlbllltles
for JCS target 19.00. BLUE 1 waa the force commander for this strike. The flight waa
part of a tStal force attacking JCS 19.00 (21«05' 25"N/105''55' 15"E) . The "l«ht« originat-
ing from Takhll were to strike the target first followed by those from Ko»;a.t',^™«
HAND flights (Events 11-103 and II-IO) preceded the strike forces. The J*^*^}!
order of striking the target) were composed of the aircraft In Events 11-105 (TOT OOlBZ),
11-100 (TOT 0817Z), 11-99 (TOT 08IQZ) and 11-102. The Korat force was composed of the air-
craft In Event II-I06 and Event II-lOl which was the last strike flight on the target.
On station were EC-121 aircraft orbiting In the vicinity of 20"N/123*E wjd 20«N/10rE
also m the area were EB-66B8 and Ca in the vicinity of 52*'10'H/105'20'E and 21»15'M/105*
25'E. The Navy was also conducting strikes In the vicinity of JCS-19.00,
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLVE Plight departed Takhll, refueled, flew to the north tip of Thud Ridge, and then
down the west side of the ridge to the target. (See Event 11-99)-
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1
5 - 750 lb bonbs
2 - 150-gal tanks
H-61 cannon/1029 rounds
All aircraft had QRC-160 pods
MlOa
Unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Overcast - Bases 1,500 ft and tops 5,000 ft, heavy rain and bad visibility
un3ecneath. • These conditions prevailed except right over the target where the sky Condi-
tion was clear.
Altitude !
Heading ;
Speed ;
Puel State ;
PllKht Pormatlon ;
Unknown
BLUE 1. 2. 3.
3,000 ft (approx)
Approximately 138"
580 kt
Pull Internal plus
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 1 had Just descended through the cloud layer when he got a HIQ call putting NIGs
at his 3 o'clocic. The flight waa in the vicinity of 21"15'N/105''»0*E.
6. ACTION INITIATED
As the MIC (type unknown) passed to 5 o'clock, BLUE Flight lit afterburner and
climbed back on top of the cloud layer.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
As BLUE Plight came up above the clouds, a SAM waa fired at them. MlOa were also
seen, -80 BLUE uent back down under the clouds. And as they passed Phuc Yen they saw
several MIOs taking off to the north. MIO-21 followed BLUE 1 until he pulled up for bomb
delivery. BLUE Plight popped up into a l*Jft, approximately 270" turn, delivered their
boobs on the target, and departed for home. Outbound at l6l7H two unidentified aircraft
were observed In formation at 20*55 *N/105'*0<E, heading 090*.
a. ORDNANCE
BLUE Plight expended no alr-to-alr ordnance (bombs only).
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2 had one tank that would not jettison.
365
Event 11-105
to. AIRCREW CONHENTS
Exp&rlenee ;
Total F-105 Coab«t
Hours Hours MKglona
BLUE 1 5500 200 30
Cowmenta on thla Encounter ;
hut JSiH^JiJ^^^, ^^^^ "uppreaslon was tremondously effective — that CBUs were oood
but they got only the crews and that 3.000 VT boaba would get the crews and the guns .
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interview ;
BLUB 1 - 6 Feb 67
Messagesi Reports ;
7AP OPREP-ft DOCO 30373 I'HSIZZ Dec 66
7AF 1II320UZ Dec 66 010 31002
7AP 141850Z Dec 66 QPREP-3 DOCO 30393
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOK
See Itena 5» 6, and 7 above.
Event 11-106
Aircraft Involved: One P-105D vs two Nia-21a
Result : Sighting
Vicinity qf Encounter: 21»0O'll/l05'*00*E
1, PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 111 Oecenber 1966/unknom
BLUE Flight of four P-105Da were egreaslng from a strike mission. The flight was part
of a total force attaclclng JCS 19.OO ( 21»05 ' 25"N/105'55' 15"E) . The flights, originating
from Takhll, were to strllce the target flrat, followed by those from Korat . The IRON HAND
Plights (Events 11-105 and II-IOU) preceded the strike forces. The Takhll forces (In order
of striking the target) were conposed of the aircraft In Everts 11-105 (TOT O816Z). 11-100
(TOT 0817Z), 11-99 (TOT 08192) and 11-102. The Korat forces were composed of the aircraft
in ^^''"^ 11-101 which was the last strike flight on the target. There were
EC-121 aircraft orbiting in the vicinity of ZO^N/IOT'E and 20*'N/103"E. Aluo In the area
were EB-66B and C aircraft orbiting in the vicinity of 22*10'ri/105°20'E/2l*X5'll/10il»25'B,
Navy aircraft also had a strike In the vicinity of JCS 19.00.
2. MISSION ROUTE
®TT^n£^^**** departed Korat and proceeded along a route slnllar to that deacrlbed In
Event IX— 99*
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
2500
P-105
Hours
150
Combat
Mlaslons
About 20
BLUE ii« 15 February 1967
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interview ;
Messages : None
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
PLfJE Plight w«ia <!?r-aplne. Pt 2«,000 ft altitude 510 KTAS, BLUE ft sighted two MIG-21a
(recognired because of their silver color and delta wing) at 7 o'clock high. The HIOs
were 5 miles away and about 10,000 ft abcve BLUE Plight at location 21**M/105»E. The HIOs
closed on the flight until they were at a range of about one mile at location 20*30'K/
101* 35 'E, at which time the MlOa broke off and were lost from view.
ivMit iz-ior
Alrenft Involved: Pour P-lOSDs va two NIO-lTs
and two Klo-218
Result: Mo ^MUne
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*25 'N/105* 45*8
1. PRIHART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 19 Deeeaber 1966/1557H
ios«>iiJ??I"FT^°^SH.^?i'"^'"^*^*'fr* * olMlon against JCS 51.10 (21*l6«00"M/
frL Jiikhif^;^ Itl of the strike force was from Korat and preceded the foree
from Takhll to the target in s "gaKle" with the five strike flights Ir. a dlaoond forma-
I?!!! . "P*^^- ^^le force was led by a flak suppreJ-
^''•"S 11-108 (TOT 08002). followed by the flights In Event II-U2 Event II-
110 (dropped at 08052), Event II-lll ^TOT 08062) and Event II-IO? (TOT 08082) *
ri» "•'Tw**?JS°Ii.!il""^ flights (one each for Korat and Takhll) In the area, but no
CAP flights. The IROM HAND flights did not encounter MIQs. (It Is assumed that the auo-
noJ iJallaSlo!)" on atation although apeolflc OPRBP reformeo waa
t. MISSION ROUTE
♦K. . J«P"f*«'l„Kfrat refueling en route to "T" in the Red River then down Thud Ridge to
2f.*; k ^f^"*^ reverse route. The mission route was slaillar to tha Takhll flight
route. Refueling was on Qreen Anchor « «A*Bn»
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIfiURATIONS
P-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. »
6 750-lb bonbs
1 SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B) on B-l, 2 and 3
1 QRC-160
2 4S0-gal droptanka
MIQ-IT and 21 MQ 1. 2. 3. »
Silver color
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Wififiep: Scattered clouds with tops estimated 8,000 ft. Visibility 3 to 5 miles In
low altitude hase with good visibility at altitude. *n
Altitude ; IJJ.OOO ft
keaainB ; 135*
Speed ; 540 lets 0.8.
Fuel State : Unknown
aifih^ gormation; Finger tip with element on left side 1,000 to 1,500 feet out.
BLUE flight trailing one mile and to the left of lead flight
(Event ii— 113).
5. INITIAL DETECTION
°' ^» «*^«' BLOB flight was in straight and level
fJi^^^r^? ^^"^^ f'L^f^ ^ o'clock, low. BLUE 3 Mtiaated them to br?. 000 feet
low, climbing and starting to turn In behind BLUE flight. When first seen, the HIQs vera
at a range of 4 to 5 oiies. The four HlOa were in two elements.
6. ACTION INITIATED
« K ^ l^^^^ 3 o'clock low. range 6.000-7,000 feet starting to turn
St?!SJ!fd'2Ji?!^i?2p^i"^/^J«5'/*' jettison extemS* sto«s aAd break.* bS5e l! i? ^^^4
<SS M?I^^^?i!:}I5*;r^m"?" K^^'^. down right and probably monitored KIO 3 and 4
(HIO-Zls). . BLUE 2 trailed BLUE 1 as BLUB 4 trailed BLUE 3.
jBombs dropped at 1557H.
The OPREP sources Identify these as Ml0-2as. B-3 wa« only certain that 2 (HIG 3. 4) were
21 's, while B-l was certain that HIO 1 and 2 were MC-17B due to high tall.
369
7. SITUATION OemOPHENT
Event t 1-107
l80--SS5/^Jnr?^e"?:™'S'iiE''?^JJ'i"f IrV^ '° ^« continues it for about
turned back to the right on a northwestern heading to egress uo Thud Ridw aft^/uniL^-
BLUK^ blSI "J^?' 5"!,?^^ '^K*** "^"8 and explode 100 yards In front of
Jt^o2;tloi^l«iJ?S)lS; 2^1'' i;i':t*?n':i"^\r'^ ^ expended oJ * eeJondS^y tJrs.t,
x»«i,ion ^1 14, M/ioi, 2i ^nd at the same time Inadvertently expended his AIM-9B.
a. OUNAJICE
■LOB nisbt
■10 3. 4
9. CQUIPNENT PROBLEMS
■one
10.
None
Unknown
(Pcsslbly missiles, rockets, guns)
AIRCRFV COHMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
BLUE 1 3300
BLUB 2 I
BLUE 3 3500
BLUE * Unknown
Cooaents on this Encounter
BLUB 1 MIO pilots not highly skilled.
BLUE 3 Hone
Cocments from Overall Experience
1
F-105
Combat
Hours
Missions
Remarks
450
25
18 months as Z.P.
I
Est. 65
1100
70
In the P-105
NIGa- should not have overshot.
11.
12.
lY^Ji I^"^*"^f clutter Guard Channel and are useless. Having the AIH-9B
^StSSwv^nf^n"; of the Sight plpper should be exfct (1 o" 2
SeJ 1. ™ i?!^/**''' improvement. Visibility in the P-105 to the 6 o*cloek
MTA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
■eseajcea. Reports ;
BLUE 1 (15 February 1967), BLUE 3 (16 February 1967).
7AP DAI-011 0192218Z December 1966 DIO SlO^Jl December 1966
388 TPW KORAT OPREP 3 WlUlZ December 1966 5oi SSIzo ^
oecenoer l9oe
MRRATIVE DESCRIPTION
(S«« ItMa 5. 6. 7)
1
I
f
f
I
I
I
I
f «
I
f
f
f
f
f
f
f
Bvant II-IOS
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105b vb one IIZ0-21C
and four HXQ-t
Result: Sight Inge only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*16'H/105*90*I
1. PRIMARY MISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlrae: 19 December 1966/1600H
ioi;*.:J?5L?T"^2!! t^L'JE Plight) were on a strike nlealon against JCS 51.10 (21»16'00"N/
J?^I^?Iv!^f^;„ JJ! the strike force was from Korat and preceded the force
;f^« ^5 5° ^O',^?'*^*? ^" * "gaggle" with the five strike flights in a diamond forma-
Jimitiin ll'^ih :J°^*k"^^^' -^^5. The force from T.khli follow?? In a^all
I?^ 2 ^^t JT*?5S'.S££"h*^*'°."^""^'* 'P*^^- The force was led by a flak suppres-
fii*^*''-^''S"Jaii:J°f followed by the flights in Event 11-112, Event 11-
108, (dropped at 08052) Event II-lll {WT 0806Z) and Event 11-109 (TOT 08082).
CAi. r7?!^/*'?*,!''?»i2°[!.i!i"5,r48^*» "'^^^ Takhii) in the area, but no
"Jft^'i «??J"Sn"SS "l«hts did not encounter MIOs. (It la aaauaed that the
IS'nS iSailiwi?) ^3'=raft wore on. station although epeclflc OFRBP referee
2. HISSION ROUTE
to 20^8'S/?Sio;,T^!/?^ "JJ "as Takhll direct to Red Anchor extended, direct
2^12'S/lS^oS^^^'^fi" ^5.000 ft; direct to 21«30'N/105n0'E at 15.000 ft; direct to
21 32 N/105 27' E at 6,500 ft; direct to the target at ft, 000 to 3.000 ft. Baresa was th«
SJ^JSnJ? " 30.000'to WhUe'tochS vo.fnJ?lS
A total of 18 MIGs were sighted by all flints.
dxrecSS!" **' '^"^ ^ • S«ner»Uy northerly
BLOE 2. H
2 - 150-gal tank
CBU-2il8
M-61 gun SOimn
1 • QRC 160 POD
3. AIRCIIAFT CONFIGURATION
P-105 BLUE 1. 1
2 - Ji50-gal wing tanks
4 - CBU-24S
1 - Mr6l gurt (1,029 rounds 2(Mnoi} ^
1 - QRC 160 POD
1 - AIK-9B
1 «IC-21C Unknown
ft MIU-T Unknown
4. FLIGHT COHDITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather; Broken cloud layer at about 3,500 ft.
Altitude, head, airspeed, and flight formation unknown.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
^?,!i5^M"5!..!«r!.'«P?'*«--. one waa a .ingle MIQ-JIC below the flight and the other
! eiouda at 8.000 to lo.ooo fi:.
ACTION INITIATED
No action was initiated to attack any of the KIQa sighted.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPED
The Mlo-21 turned Into the flight but did not engage.
6. ORDNANCE
Hone —
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEHS
Unknown,
10. AIRCREW COKHENTS
Comments of overall Experience ;
11. OATA SOURCE
371
Event 11-108
11. OAT* SOURCE ^
Project Interviews ;
BLUE 2 (16 Mar 67)
Meaaagea, Reports ;
TAP OPIIEP-3 1911132 Dee 66 DOCC 28235
TAP 192248Z Dee 66 DID 31U«1
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
^Annu^bifJ}tf*^/l''^^^ °" ^' *• 3» 2 and surrounding) at
ifSS pi^^in? ttn^'^i^'^ by very light, Inaccurate AAA. During the popup at the target.
Si^;^,fi^' "^^r^^s on tn* ground at Phuc Yen. Also during popup to the target one
H10-21C was seen below. The MIG-21 turned into BLUE Plight but did not engage. On
5P**2Lf night aaw four MIGb of unknown type above clouds at 8 to 10.000
slghtl «lo"<*» "<» tgressed the area. No engagements » only NIQ
372
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Event ZI-109
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-10508 v» four Ria-T
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity; 21*>32'N/105«»23'E
1. PRINASY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 December 1966/1605H
^^^^ Flight) were on a strike mission against JCS 51.10
(zme-OO-N/lO^oSO'Sft-E). The first part of the strike foJce wa. froJ Korat and
fr^f. M t ^°^ff f»'o™,'''a>thH to the targfet In a "gaggle" with the five strike flights
J^iiT"'* r°"??"'>"- ^<Events II-113, -107, -116, -115. -IH) The force from TakhU fol-
■ ^''^H ^««r'?^^°" flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by
?J fJ^^^^^^f^^oHl^^^' followed by the flights In Event II-
112. Event II-110» (dropped at 0805Z), Event 11-111 (TOT 0806Z). and Event II-109 (TOT 08o82),
Jlf'* ^?2L"ii!?L'i*Sht» (one each for Korat and TakhU) in the area, but
no CAP flights. Th0 IRON HAND flights did not encounter NIOa. (It la aaaumed that
JiJ.^^Sjnii=„li'Sv;ki.il;,:- ''-'-^
2. KISSION ROUTE
Pf TakhU (take off lUlf^H direct to Red Anchor extended
direct to 20<»28'N/103«'?3'E at 15. 000 feet; direct to 21» 30'N/105no 'E at 15 000 fe^t^
direct to 21«32'N/105«27'E at 6,500 feet; direct to ths target at S.OoS to S.OOO f«t
Xn^esa was on the SW side of Thud Ridge and roll-ln was on a generally northerly
55 *ri"** Egreaa was the reverse route at 6,000 ft altitude to the Red River then at
30,000 ft to White Anchor post-strike refusilng.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-X05 BLUE 1. I
6 - T50-lb bombs
2 - 450-gal tanks
1 - gun {W-61)
1 - QRC-160 pod
1 - AIN-9B
BLUE 2. »
6 - 750-lb bombs
2 - ISO-gal tanks
I <- H-61 cannon
1 - QRC-160 pod
4. FLISHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Broken clouds at 3,500 feet, haze.
Altitude : Unknown
Headlnt^ ; Unknown
Speed: Unknown
Puel ': Unknown
Ponnatlon : Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
On Ingress BLUE Plight saw four MIQs In two elements of two. The MlOa in tttm
21'»«;n/105«32'E were at 16.000 feet heading' 3S6-:"'*iyprM;ii?;fi;.«;n
was not naae due to distance.
6. ACTION INITIATED
toward^the^fiSht!'*"*** dropped on the target, at 1680Z. The NIOa made no move
7. SITUATION DEVELOPED
The flight aaw no flak, and egreased without further Incident,
n. DATA SOURCE
Messages. Reports
355TPW 1911132 Dec 66 OPREP-3 DOCC 28235
TAP 1922I8Z Dec 66 DIG 31041
i
pjipnYHHisiE TO rociflBi?r
373
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Event 11-109
12. DESCRIPTIVE NARRATIVE
BLUE Plight was egressing fcrea at 21* 32*M/105*23*E where they saw four MIOs In
two elements at 16,000 ft heading 320<» and climbing. MIOs were at 21»32'N/105*23'E
and were at such a distance that model type was undetermined. No engagement attempted.
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Ev«nt II^IIO
Alrcr4.ft Involved: Pour P>105Ds vs sis MI0-17a
Results: Ko damage
Vicinity: 21»25'00"N/105"'»l*iO"E
1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 0«cember 1966/1603H
Pour F-105DS (&LUE Plight) were 3n a strike mission against JCS 51-10 (21*16 'OO'N/
105*50'2U*E) . The first part or the strike force was from Korat and preceded the lorce
from Takhll to the target In a "gaggle" with the five strike flights In a diamond forma-
tion. (Events 11-113, -107. -116, -115, -111.) The force from Takhll followed In a trail
formation with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a flak suoprea-
slon flight. Event II-108 (TOT O8OOZ) followed by the flights in Event 11-112, Event 11-110
(dropped at 08057), Event 11-111 (TOT 0806Z). and Event II-IO9 (TOT O808Z).
There were two IRON HAND flights (one each for Korat and Takhll) In the area, but no
CAP flights. The IRON HAND flights did not encounter HIOs. (It Is asauined that the
supporting B-66 and BIO EYE aircraft were on sti)tlon although specli'lc OPREP reference
wj-3 not availiibl-'. J
2. MISSION ROUTE
The mission route was from Takhll direct to Red Anchor extended, direct to SO^SS'N/
l03'*'i3'B. at 15,000 feet; direct to 21*32'N/105"27'E at 65OO feet; direct to the target at
1*000 to 8,000 feet. Ingress was on the southwest side of Thud Ridge and roll-In was on
s generally northerly heading. Egress was the reverse route at 6,000 feet altitude to
the Red River then at 3.')00 feet Co White Anchor Post-strike refueling.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-I05D BLUE 1. 3
- 750 lb bombs
• 450 gtil tanks
gun (20mm)
QRC-160 pod
AIM-9B
P-105D BLUE 2. t
6 - 500 lb bombs
2 - 4^0 gal tanks
1 - M-61 (20mm)
1 - QRC-I60 pod
1 - Camera pod (BLUE 2
only)
TACAN in rec only, radar off
Silver
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clouds at 600 feet, scattered k,000 to 6,000, broken 5 miles in hasa.
BLUE Flight
Altitude: 1500 feet AOL (apprpx. 3300 feet indicated)
Heading ;
SpMd:
"state;
southerly
550 kt
9000 lb approx., external tanks empty
S. INITIAL DETECTION
Initial detection was made by BLUE 1 at his 11 o'clock position, level two miles out.
Warnings by BIO EYE of MIGs being all over t*ie area were given throughout the flight. HIOs
were heading northerly approximately I60* to BLUE Plight. They were Identified as MXGs
initially by the sliver color. Positive ID a« HIO-lT occurred as the MIGs rolled up to
turn In behind BLUE Flight,
«. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Flight had already dropped Its tanks earlier. When MIOs turned Into flight at
1 1/2 miles from BLUE k at BLUE t's 8:30 o'clock position, BLUE Plight engaged afterburner
•nd accelerated away,
7. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT
None.
8. ORDNANCE
None .
f. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
IIP
375
4
it
Total P-IOS
270
375
Mission s
61
17
irvent ZI-llO
j»
10. AIRCREW CONKcNTS
E»pertence Total Hours
BLUE 2 3000
BLUE 4 ilOOO
Comments on this Encountc-r
BLUE 2: Never saw then turn Inso flight. Would have seen them even If they had been
camouflaged. Didn't sec any external stores. Just noticed a plain Red Star on the air-
craft. Didn't notice any afterburnor.
BLUE When they went afterburner, he dlJn't worry about IR mlaallea because HIG3
were too far back. No KIGCAP in area. Only saw two HIGs conlnp; after flight. Even if
HICs camouflaged, he still woula have seen then as soon as we did, maybe sooner. No indi-
cation of GCI control. MICs move in without wlngman falling out. Didn't see any markings
on MIGs.
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 2: Rather than sullt the flight and Jettison their bombs and get Into a turning
contest, they Just kept rignt on going. Traininr. was not adequate for the engat^ement.
Never had the opportunity to do visual laydown or radar deliveries. With mora training
could get better at dive bombing. Enough information displayed to use guns. Bcllex'e In
leas automation in Jettisoning equipment because there are tlrries when one wisher, to keep
things on the aircraft. Peels he doesn't have tc throw very 7>any switches. Had no prior
knowledge of enemy weapon system capability and learned most of it from older heads.
Assesses enemy pilot's capabilities by saying they are undertralned. Are getting more
aggressive though. Once we Jettison our ordnance, the mission is shot and HIO accomplishes
hla objective.
BLUE 4: Generally with a MZO there won't be a SAM day; not a hard and fast rule
though. It is possible that tanks could hit slab and cause control problems. Good idea
to put charges in tanks, so when they come off, they would explode and give an enemy some-
thing to think about. Sufficient Information available to use gun. Usually cages his
sight when he uses gun. Would rather use a depressed sight. When carrying a GAR-8 (AIH-9)
bombs cone first, then after leaving target he sets uo for alr-to-alr. At low altitude
radar Is not the answer to firing the gun. Can't see in a 30* cone behind aircraft - mirrors
help some. The only answer to the 6 o'clock coverage is you cover the other element, the
other element covers you.
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 2, ^ Feb 67; BLUE «l, 8 Feb 6?
Measapies . Reports :
7AF OPREP-3 19.H1BZ Dec 66 DOCC 28235
355TPW OPREP-'* 191022Z Dec 66 DDI 5121
7AP 1922t8Z Dec 66 DIG 310ai
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
While Inbound to target, BLUE 4 observed a flight of four shiny silver HZGs at 11
o'clock two miles low altitude with the flight. One more KIG 2000 feet higher wis anead
of this flight of MIGs, ell of which were in trail with an outbound flight of P-lOSs. The
HICs were falling tehlnd as the F-105s were doing about 600 knots. BLUE >i observed two
MIO-lTs out of the flight of four turn Into flight as the MIGs passed hi 3 8:30 o'clock
position approximately 1 1/2 miles out. The MIGs were eo-altltude. The MIGs were lost
from view as they passed to 6 o'clock. SLUE 2 got a glimpse of two MIGs before they passed
out of his vision. BLUE Plight had already Jettisoned their tanks so all they did was
light afterburner and head straight to the target at 1500 feet. They dropped their ordnance
on the target in area B-2 at 0805Z and Jettisoned. BLUE Plight saw no HIGs uhile outbound.
I
376
^ Event i:-llJ
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSDs vs four NIG-2ls
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*30*M/105»Xf 'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: 19 Seceiaber 1966/1600H
Four P-105D3 (r.LUE flight) were on a strike Mlatlcn against JCS 51.10 (21*16' OCN/
105'50'2'»"S). The first part of the strike fore- was from Korat and proceeded the force
from Takhll to the target l;i a "gaggle" w3th the flv« .itrik- flights in « diamond forma-
tion. (Events II-113» -107, -115, -115, -11')). The force from Takhll followed In a trail
formation with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was ltd by a flak siippres-
alon flight. Event II-iC8 (TOT 0800Z) followed by the flights in Event ir-l.l2, Ever;t 11-110
(dropped at 0805Z>, Ev»nt 7.1-111 (TOT 080J2).and Event 11-109 (TOT 0808z).
lUere were two I?.ON HAND flights (one each for Korat and Takhll) in the area, but no
CAP flights. The IRON .HAIJD flights dl4 not encounter MlGs. (It Is assumed that the sup-
porting B-66 and BIG EYE aircraft were on station although specific OPREP reference vas
rot "vjif lahJe, >
2. MISSION ROUTE
The mission rovte was from Takhll (take off 0615Z) direct to Red Anchor extended,
direct to 20«28'N/1G3"'U3'E at 15,000 feet; direct to 21«'30'N/105«'»O«E at 15.000 feet;
direct to 21«>32'N/105°2?'E at 6,500 feet; direct to the target at IJ.OOO to 8,000 ftet.
Ingress was on the SW side of Thud Ridge and roll In was on a generally northerly heading.
Egress was the reverse route at 6,000 feet altitude to the Red River then at 30.000 feet
to White Anchor post strike refu^linK.
3.
AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
BLUE (1. 3)
6 750-lb bombs
2 tso-gal tanks
1 QR(M60 pod
1 AIM-9B
KIO-21
Silver
BLUE (2, 4)
6 750-lb bombs
2 450-gal tanks
1 QRC»160 pod
TACAN receive only standby on radar and IFF
4.
FII6HT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Broken clouds at about 3,500 feet haze.
BLUE 1, 2, 3, H
3.000 ft AOL (6,000-7»000 ft indicated)
Altitude ;
Heading ;
^peed ;
^uel State :
formation:
135'
500 kts
500-700 lbs in external tanka
Unknown — probably in pod forBiatlon
S.
INITIAL DETICTION
BLUE flight heard calls from BIO EYE and from the preceding flights who saw MIOa.
BLUE u and another flight member saw four silver aircraft at 11 to 10 o'clock, range 5 miles
^^^^ at 10.000 ft altltucs and were on an opposite heading 'to the
flight. The MIQs were spotted by the silver color shining in the sun. BLUE 1 identified
i^r/nnJ^S"^i^. ^" elements With the Second about one mile in trail!
and 2,000 feet higher than the lead.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight continued on past the NIOs.
7. SITUATION OtVElOPHENT
the MIOs passed to 9 o'clock !{ to 5 miles out, the first, and then the second. MIO
?i!'!r? '"eht. 2LUS 1 tnen- called to Jettison bombs and engage
J^oSn'aSS'?^; a?l"\J"§?5.'"'^T'^\*' "0-575 knots and went down into the SlJf at .
B,,.; o ' £ ? ^^^^ *» ^he flight popped up over Phuc Yen.
under BLUE ij the MIO turned away and was not seen again.
8. ORDNANCE
None.
Event 11-111
EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Mom.
10. AIRCREU COMMENTS
? Tot3il unknown
BLUE « 1,200
new SSSriheS SSniSid."' »l.lblllty sine. MIO. «re l«t f«»
P-105
675
Ml a 8 Ion
13
11.
12.
DATA SOURCES
Interview: BLUE
355TPW
7th AF
«l (1 February 1967). BLUE 2 (ft February 1967).
191113Z
1922482
December 1966
Oeeember 1966
OPflEP-3 DOCC 28235
DIO 319*1
NARRATIVc
See Items 5. 6, and 7.
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Event 11-112
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105» vs two KCG'-irs
ftnd two HIOs (typ* unknown)
Results: He damage
Vicinity: 21»2H 'N/lOS^ag'E
1. PRINARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Tine: 19 December 1966/1603H
Pour P-lOSDs (BLUE flight) were on a strike mission against JCS 51.10 {21«l6*00"N/
105*50 •2'«"E). The first part of the strike force was from Korat and proceeded the force
from Takhli to the target in a "gaggle" with the five strike flights in a diamond forma-
tion. (Events 11-113, -107, -116, -115, -111). The force from Takhli followed in a trail
formation with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a flak suppres-
sion flight. Event 11-108 (TOT 0800Z) followed by the flights in Event 11-112, Event 11-110
(dropped at O805Z), Event II-lll (TOT 08062) and Event 11-109 (TOT OSOfiZ),
There were two IRON HAND flights (one each for Korat and Takhli) in the area, but no
CAP flights . The inON HAIID fllshts did not encounter MIGs. (It is assumed that the sup-
porting B-66 and BIO EYB aircraft kere on station although specific OPREP reference was
not available.)
2. MISSION ROUTE
The mission route was from Takhli direct to Red Anchor extended, direct to 20*'28'N/
lOS'tJS'E at 15,000 feeti direct to 21*30'N/105*E at 15,000 feet; direct to 21«32»M/105'27'E
at 6,500 feet; direct to the target at 4,000 to 8,000 feet. Egress was the reverse route,
at 6,000 feet to Red River then at 30,000 feet to White Anchor post strike refueling.
Ingress was on the southwest side of Thud Ridge and roll in to the target was aade on a
northerly heading.
BLUB 2 and 4
6 750-lb bombs
2 150-gal tanks
1 QRC-160
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1 and 3
6 750-lb bombs
2 4 50- gal tanks
] QRC-160
1 AH 9B
camouflage
NIQs
Silver color
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Scattered to clear, haze up to 5000 ft; visibility 3 to 5 miles.
BLUE HlQs
Altitude ;
Heading ;
Speed :
5.
8.000 ft
l45"
SlO kts
about 5,000 ft
about 325"
Unknom
INITIAL DETECTION
At approximately 1603H. when BLUE flight was at 21*2U 'N/lOS'Sg 'E, Inbound BLUE 2 saw
two MIGs (type not known) at 12:30 o'clock low pass under BLUE flight as BLUE flight pro-
ceeded down Thud Ridge toward the target. The MlCs were 2,000 feet under the flight, and
were following a flight of P-lOSs.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 2 called MIGs and received a reply from the flight, and BLUB flight continued to
the target.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The flight proceeded on the bomb run. Within 2 miles of the target, as BLUE fli^t
started a poo-up, two HIG-17s (BLUE 4 identified them as MI3-198) were seen orbiting the
target. The" MIGs were about 4,000 feet above and 2,000-3,000 feet out. BLUE 4 recognized
it first as a MIG due to the silver color. The tentative Identification was made later by
referring to photographs.
The MIGs ma(3e a feint toward BLUE flight but did not follow, BLUE flight continued
on the bomb run and was near supersonic speed as they left the target and exited up the
NE side of Thud Ridge. During roll In on the target one SAM was seen one mile south on
an apparent ballistic trajectory, neadlng west.
379
■■w■♦•lif^^fr•^ilfl>a*
8. ORBKANCe
Hons*
9. EQSIPHCNT PROBLEMS
■one Bentlwwd.
10. AIICREU COHKENTS
BLOE 3, 70th miss ion, 300 bours* F-105.
11. MTA SOURCES
Project Interviews: BLUE 3 (6 February 1967) and BLUE 4 (5 Pobpuary 1967).
Hessaces, Reports: 7AF 192248Z December 1966 010 31041
12. IMRATIVE DESCRIPTION
y Event 11-113
Aircraft Involved: Four F-105I>s va Two HIQ-Zla
Reault: No demage
Vicinity of Encounter: ZlozS'N/lOS^tg •£
\. PSIMASV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 December 1966/15U9H
Poup P-105DS (BLUE Flight) were on a strike mission against JCS 51.10 (21«16 •00''N/
105*'50»2i>"E). The first part of the strike force was from Korat and preceded the force
from Takhll to the target In a "gaggle" with the five strike flights in a diamond forma-
tion. (Events 11-113, -107, -116, -115, -ll*)). The force from Takhll followed In a trail
formation with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a flak auppres*
slon flight. Event 11-108 (TOT O6OOZ) followed by the flights In Event 11*112, Event 11-110,
(dropped at 0805Z} Event 11-111 (TOT OSO6Z) and Event 11-109 (TOT O8O8Z) .
There were two IRON HAND fllehts (one each for Korat and Takhll) In the area, but no
CAP flights. The IRON HAND flights did not encounter MIGa. (It la aaaumed that the
supporting B-66 and Big Eye aircraft were on station although specific OFREP reference
was not available).
2. HISSION ROUTE
Departed Korat, refueling enroute to "Y" In the Red River, then down "Thud Ridge"
to the target. Return by reverse route. The route waa approximately the same aa that
of the Takhll flights.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft
U - CBU-21S
1 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B)
1 - QRC-160 pod
2 - 450-gal wing tanka
IFF and radar standby
TACAN - Receive only
Doppler - on
MIO-Zl MIO 1. g
Silver (no markings oUserved)
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Estimated 2/10 coverage with tops up to 8OOO ft.. Visibility S to 7 miles
above 8000 ft.
Altitude ! — 17,000 ft
Headlng T ikO" — -«""
Speed : 520 kt
Fue;l Stat e : Unknown
t'li'eK't'yonnation : elesMnt on left side - almost line abreast
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Had recelvisd warnings of MIOs in the area. Plight waa in straight and level flight
when BLUE 1 spotted two MIG-218 at 1 o'clock level, about IS'JSH. HIQs were at 17,000 ft,
heading 320" and were about 5 miles away and offset k-^ miles away. MIOs were in element
with wlngman, approximately lOOO feet to the outside. The MIOs were Immediately identi-
fied due to color and then by the wing planform.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Flight observed NIOs Jettison tanka and turn right when passing 3 o'clock
position. KZOs turned thru 5 Into 6 o'clock position as BLUE Plight started a right turn,
then broke hard right, descending aa BLUE 1 called to Jettison everything and break.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPMENT
After approximately I80* of turn MIOS were met head-on and observed to be reversing
to the left. BLUE Plight had selected afterburner and descended to 6000 ft altitude for
separation as contact was lost. At 21<'55'N/10')*50*E during egress, BLUE Plight was
climbing thru 17,000 feet heading 272o , and 520 kt nhen BLUE 1 spotted what he thought to
be a HIO-19' at 21*55 'N/lOU' 38 T., altitude 3 to ftOOO AGL. (5000 to 8000 ft true altitude)
>ltSG 1922462 and 1914132 cites it aa HIO-17.
Event 11-113
heading .ppro.l-afly 210- making gentle left and right tume. Ho other flight »e»beni
could eonrirn this elehtlng.
10. AIRCREW COmCNTS
Ex perience
BLUE a
BLUE 4
Total
Houra
6200
2600
F-105
Hours
120
Eat. 150
Combat
Missions
jRemarks
Interceptor background
Bomber background
Approx. 20
Approx. 35
Conmenta o " Encounter
BLUB ? - NIGs appeared to be from Phuc Yen and under GCI control
Zl I . Did noJ^hlnk a KI0.21 could turn so rapidly, .elt that the HIOs h. saw -re
HIO 3 *n4 ''^
11. DATA SOURCES
P^n^.nt: Interviewe : BLUE 3, l6 Feb 67; BLUE 4. l8 Feb 67.
^..L..^. ReoortT T 7AF DAI-01'. igSS^SZ Dec. 66 piO noi^l^Decje
SflBTPH Korst OPhEP-3 191'»13 Dec 66 DOI 01721
12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOK
the target
BLUE Flight w« one of five strike flights Ingresslnj do^ Thud Ridge to the t
at the end of%he ridge line- ^.fS^ ^ were »PO«ed by BLUE J f ^i>„ ^is
position, level heading opposite to 8^^^ Flight. BLUE 1 caiieaou ^^^^
Of Mia 1 and 2. , ^ „w«i«
In the turn BLUE * attempted to set ^Pjls sight _but was unable to do JJ^Jhlle
Jettisoning his stores at the same "ne- The Jlrst went past in an axm ^^^^
Jass. wl.h *-?oo"" JSS fee?^way TrJ^ ?lSe ^ canSpy to clnopy. BLUE
"i^ in Tturi II 500 jSotf! AuSJu^^he secoAd KlG passed head-on. the
iio t^ iitcheS^vfr III Mght shouldeTand "w the intake lip as the «G
"urnod^IxT tl^tly behind BLUE 4. BLUE 4 accelerated «ay and lost the MIQ.
At 21-55»N/10i>-50'E climbing thru 17,000 ft heading 272% 520 |ct, BLUE J "JJ jjjj J?
this sighting. ^ ^
vans snr„j wu»iT»^M^^sjj»^^
altitude is BLUE Flight. These MTOs made no pass at BLUB Flight nor were they seen oy
any neaber of BLUE Flight.
WED BKMH mm 11-113 SUMMARY
Tine
Nark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1, 3, 4)
CoMiunI cat Ions
Enemy Actions
(HI6 1.2)
Remark I
Status
Action
utner rrienaiy
Heading SC 520 kt
See 2 HIG-21S at
about 4 «1
Alt 17,000 ft
Tried to maintain
Integrity.
Just Matched HIGs irhlle
pressing In
Two friendly flight!
3f 4 each close to
41GS
There were two
ather strike
flights astern
83 and others
called out KIGs
Opposite course.
2 o'clock, low;
climbing at high
rate of speed
about 2000 ft
lower than F-105s
One of the first
big formation
gaggles.
(5 flights)
" Continued
i3 cal led turn.
Lead said keep your
iyes on them. 83
:aned HIGs In B3s
i o'clock petition
MIGs turned 160°
to right and ended
up on SLUE'S
5 o'clock
Co-altitude
h
Seat altltudt
Started turn right and
dropped tanks and bonbs.
Nent to afterburners.
Hade hard right 4 g
descending turn.
Lost sight of HIGs for a
wnife. Mttenpted to
pull up
.ead called break
right. Jettison
:>oBbs and tanks.
r 1 ne f fia At K
o'clock in trail
formation. Remain
co-altitude
h
B3 and B4 sighted
HIGs again "canopy-
to-canopy". Both
still turning right
BLUE elemnts split
diving. 83 and 04
about 14.000 ft
Garbage on the
radio
Climbing attitude.
HIGs apparently
reverse course
after passing
canopy-to-canopy.
CI Inblng and
turntd In «t. wlcal
Only one MI6 seen
3-5 ft on oppo-
site head1n<).
Lost sight of him
again when HIG
went up over B3.
V
■ vm
2 O
0 c
3 «
z
•J m
« z
« -I
O
1 -o
C O
*1 I
3 fW
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30
_
RED BAWOW EVENT I Nil 3 SUMHARY
TUt
Nark
Action Aircraft (BLUE 1» 3. 4)
Status
Action
Other Friendly
Communications
{neny Actlonf
(MIG 1.2)
RtBirkt
PuUlft) up. Pick
up MIG 4 o'clock
high. 5000 ft, 2
■lies tmtf In food
poiUlon. B3 ond
B4 St 10.000 ft.
Tightening turn and
pulling up, then he saw
MIGs higher and gttting
good position.
F-105 lost fir speed.
Broke hard left and
down. Stayed In after-
burner accelerating
rapidly. Disengaged
Mith spted.
This flight did no
communicate until
trying to reform
on way out.
Had speed advan*
tage getting In
good position.
Objective seemed
to break up forma-
tion and cause
Jettison. Then
they trere Just
harassing.
QRC Horktd througl^
out.
Lead three flights
all Jettisoned.
No F4 CAP this day
Last tMO flights
got to target.
I
i
iTiiiffiilii I Til if rr? I ffn?! I ^.-^.:Cai._..ca^-^ca- ,ca7^ tS3vl.ca.^,c=3.... c=3.... ca ca,.. .cr 3 cs ... C3. ..c£
• Bvtnt 11*114
Aircraft InTolved; Pour P-lOSn va Ik HIQ-lTa
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«»47*N/105*lB'E to
21»25^N/105'*8'E
1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 December 1966/15'»5H
Pour P-105D5 (BLUE Flight) were on a strike mission against JCS 51-10 {21»l6*00"N/
105*50 ' 2U"E) . The first part of the strike force was from Korat and preceded the force
from Takhll to the target In a "gaggle" with the five strike flights In a diamond formation
(Events 11-113. -107. -116, -115. -11«). The force from Takhll followed in a trail forma-
tion with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a flak suppresalon
flight. Event 11-108 (TOT 08C0Z) followed by the flights in Event 11-112, Event 11-110
(dropped at 0805Z), Event 11-111 (TOT 06062) and Event 11-109 (TOT 0808Z}.
There were two IRON HAND flights (one for Xorat and Takhll) In the area» but no
CAP flights. The IRON HAND flights did not encounter KIOs. (It Is assumed that the
supporting B-66 and 310 EYE aircraft were on station although specific OPREP reference
was not available.)
2. MISSION ROUTE
Korat, Thailand direct to Red Anchor extended, direct to North Station, direct to the
Red River, direct to 21*'5'»'N/105*12'E, southeast down Thud Ridge to target. Return route
reverse. The flight followed the same general path as those from Takhll.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIOMS
P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3
6 - 750 lb borabs^
1 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B)
1 - QRC-160 ECM pod
2 " <I50 gal wing tanks
1029 rd 20nm ammo
P-105 BLUE U
6 - 750 lb bomba
1 - QRC-160 ECM pod
2 •* 450 gal wing tanks
1029 rd 20inm ammo
MIG-17^ MIG 1-11
Unknown
Silver color
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Tops at 11.000 feet
BLUE 1 - Doppler operating* ZPP standby, TACAN
receive only
BLUE 2 - Radar and doppler off, IPP atandbjr, and
TACAN receive only
Altitud e
Hcadln
Heading !
Speed :
Puel State:
Plight Formation:
BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1
12,000 feet
130*
5*0 KTAS
9,000 lb
Modified Pluld-Pour due to QR:-160 ECM pod coverage.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
MIO warnings for the area had been called by BIO EYE on Guard Channel. Radio calls
from preceding flights also confirmed that MIGs were In the area. BLUE Plight at 21*30'N/
105»30'E Just north of Thud Ridge sighted 2 MIO-lTa at 9 o'clock low.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight continued on toward target.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Plight had sufficient Speed and the MIOs that attacked from 9 o'clock were too
far back to present a threat, so SLUE Plight eontlnubd on course. About one-half way down
the ridge, four more MIG- I 7a attacked from 1 o'clock, eauslnc Sr/JE Plight to Jettison bomba.
^In thf 2*1 7 50- lb bombs carried, 23 were general purpore and ore was VT.
^Although the OPREP 1914102 states that all four merabei's of BL* light validate the numbar
sighted. BLOP. 2's Interview Indicates that tie thought the tin -nd Inst groups seen were
MI0'21s.
Event ll-llk
Near the south end of Thud Ridge BLUE Plight mad* a 180« turn back ud the rldce and
unable to get within gun range
B. ORDNANCE
None expended
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None
10. AIRCREW COMHEIfTS
Experience :
Not available
COBwents on thla Encounter:
th-t ^iH^urL Mrnlng by BIO EYE are of limited value. All EIQ Ere can tell vou la
H r-"lli- -?hi;g-- itiii sn^ - S
llntft'^ has3le With eifher th« HlS-17 Ir T. SL!? * i?yo!'Jo^« KJe'^"de?ISt"%d-
vantage in the attack you had better not attack a MIQ The «.n ^h- k^!; TiL *
north, in that you have to get close enough to make a visual identification befo?^?SrlSg"*^
verv rM^^«Si?!^i^fI!^*.^?°^ ^' "S^ maneuverable enough In a MIC encounter, aleo It has
It. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews t BLUE 2, 15 Pab 67
Weaaages. Reports ;
TAP OPREP-3 DOT 01718 igi-tiOZ Tec 66
7AP DAI-DIO 31011 192248Z Dec 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
(Bven?i:"?l!nf*lSr 111 ^??^>^iJ?S^^^**'^^°"* traumg the preceding flights
ir?!;i"MM;'J?;ei;ine"She"?ilIi'?oJS:!'^"'°""
cs^e ?^o"s rijf?%'^^cis p:s!t5rit'?:sorrt":!?;!i;je°''ijA5s?':^i?r^
obaarved. BLJ'E Plight continued on down the ridge and lost sight of thJ MlS.
Approximately one minute later, at 07I6Z, BLUE 1 observed four Mia-17a at 3' 10
5;6 nml out heading 200\ 10.000 ft. but lost'slght of the^lftej^ust a flw Jewnds tS2 *
vicinity of 21»30'N/105«30'E. Approximately 30 sJSSndJ lI?e"?SJje*weS
four MI0-17a flying parallel to the flight at thel? 4 o'clock posJuon 1-3 nS? out
although Che MICE had good speed they were not eloalns rapidly. BLUE Plight lettlaoned
their boobs, m the vicinity of 21»30'N/105«35*E at 07«9Z and turned Into the SlOa'rJe
NIOb overshot and then broke off. Ho firing ms observed.
BLUE Plight followed the rest of the strike force down the rldae and ni>o<<«*ii«ri f«
make a left descending 180« turn, when BLUE U observed fSu? MM-f?. coSSg^^SJ^oJ from
1 O'clock high and to the right, pass over and slide into BLUE PlUhS^rS^'Soiroom^
^^'T 'Ititude, heading 300*. No firing w2 obwJwd wd thrfuSi
eoavletad the turn and egressed back up the ridga. The NIOi wire not leen agSn
^- Event 11-115
Aircraft Involved: Po'ir P-105D» V8 nine Hia-17s
Result: Sightings only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»31'N/105'35*E
and as noted
t. PRIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 19 December 1966/1S<>7H and as noted
Pour P-105DS (BLUE Plight) were on a strike mission against JCS 51,10 (Jl^ie'CCH/
105*50'2*"E) . The first part of the strike force was from Korat and preceded the force
from Takhll to the target in a "gaggle" with the five strike flights in a diamond forma-
tion. (Events 11-113, -107, -116, -115, -H"*). The force from Takhli followed in a trail
formation with Che flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a fl«^ »"PP^5"7,,»
slon flight. Event 11-108 (TOT 0600Z) followed by the flights tn Event 11-112, Event II-llO,
(dropped at 0805Z) Event 11-111 (TOT 0806Z} and Event IX-109 (TOT 0808Z}.
There were two IRON HAND flights (one each for Korat and Takhll) In the area, but no
CAP flights. The IRON HAND Plights did not encounter KIOs. (It is assumed that the
suDportlntt B-66 and Big Eye aircraft were on station although specific OPREP reference
vas not available).
2. NISSION ROUTE
The flight departed Korat and took what Is referred to as the mandatory route. This
route followed the Takhll force route which was described In Event 11-99 •
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-IOSD BLUE 1. 2. 3. J>
* - 750-lb bombs—
1 - SIDEWINDER {AIM-9B)
1 - QRC-160 ECM pod
2 - 450 gal external tanks
WO- 178
Unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clouds 3-<i,000 ft, 5/8 coverage; visibility 5 miles In haze.
BETirT: 2. 3. 1 1st sighting 2nd sighting 3rd glghtlng
A ltitude ; 16,500 ft " unknown 12.605 ft
Heatilng : 135" 285^ J2^L*„
Speed ; 520 KTAS unknown t*0 KTA3
Suel State ; unknown unknown unknown
PTfght Ponnation; ; unknown ufdcnown unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Three separate aightlngs occurred, which are described as follows:
a. Cist sighting) BLUE Plight was inbound to the target area at 21*31'M/105*35*E.
BLUE 1 spotted four MI1-17a at 3 o'clock, 14,000 ft, heading NW 1-2 mile range. Two
NICs continued KW, and the other two rolled into BLl^E Flights 6 o'clock position at
1-1/2 n ml. BLUE Plight jettisoned their tanks and made a right turn Into the MXQs
doing 550 kt (no aftepbumer). As the MIOs got in trail, BLUE reversed back to the left
and observed the KIOs breaking off towards the NNW. The HIGa made no attempt to fire
on BLUE Plight. BLUE Plight continued on to the target.
b. (Second sighting) At 1550H BLUE Plight was starting their roll-in on their
target, heading 285*> when BLUE 1 sighted two NIO-lTs 1-1/4 n nl to the SE. BLUE continued
the strike and lost the MiGs as they passed through a cloud layer on the dive bomb run.
The MIOs were not seen again.
c. (Third sighting) During BLUE Plight's egress at 21»40 'N/105''27'E. time 1555H,
they observed three MI0.178 at their 9 o'clock position, 3-4 n ml away, at 3 to 4,000 ft
ACL. The MIGs were on approxloately the aame heading as BLUE Plight, and paralleled
BLUE Plight's path for 1 to 1-1/2 mln. until they disappeared In the weather. *io markings
were seen on the MIQ aircraft.
6. ACTION INITIATED
See Item No. 5<
7. SITUATION DEVCLOmNT
See Item No. 5*
8.
OROHAMCE
Event 11-115
None expended.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 4 stated that when operating the QRC-160 ECM pod, the only feature of the
vector gear that remained reliable waa the launch light.
10. AIRCREW COHMENTS
Experience ; unknown
Cowmenta on this Encounter : BLUE 3 commented that their flight waa the last of approxi-
mateiy five to go Into the target. Only the last two flighta actually hit the target,
because MI0-21a making head-on passes had forced the first flighta to Jettiscn their
ordnance and abort the strike.
Comments from Overall Experience : BLOE 3 mentioned the rollowlng shortcomings on the
P-105:
a. Ho need for an Internal bomb bay as all ordnance could be carried on an external
station.
b. If bomb bay Is retained, then the several vhousand pound plunger should be
removed. This would either reduce weight, or space could be used to enlarge the internal
fuel tanks.
c. He feels that all aircraft should carry an AIM-9 type missile.
d. Effective range of the guns should be increased,
e. He feels the aircraft control system is too stiff and heavy, and also that
aircraft is difficult to trim.
f . Peels that "toss bomb computer" is an excellent piece of equipment, but that it
should be designed for greater accuracy.
g. He wo'jid like to see a combination doppler and inertlal avionics system inatalled
in the aircraft.
BLUE t stated that most people fly with the X-band pickup of the vector gear turned
off, because radar from our own aircraft causes excessive chatter and blocks out other
returns.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUE 3, 15 Peb 67 and BLUE 4, l6 Feb 67
Hessagea. Reports ; 386TFW. CPREP-3. 1911112 Dec 66 DDI 04719
7AF, MSO 192248Z Dec 66 DIG 310ill
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOK
See Item No. 5 for details. Of the nine MI0-17s sighted, there were no repeata.
Of the first flight of MIQs, one pilot saw only one, two pilots saw two, and one pilot
aaw all four. The second and third flights were seen by all members.
390
^- Event 11-116
Aircraft Involved: Four P-IOSE** v» four Klg-2l8
he suit: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»31*H/105»'»1
1. PRINAilV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 December 1966/15*>5K
Pour P-105DS (BLUE Plight) were on a strike nlsslon against JCS 51.10 {21«16*0Q"N/
105''50'2*l"E) . The first part of t^e strike force van from Korat and preceded the force
from Takhll to the target in a "gaggle" with the five strike flights in a diamond forma-
tion. (Events 11-113, -107, -ll6, -115, -ll'i). The force from Takhll followed In a trail
formation with the flights about two minutes apart. The force was led by a flak suppres-
sion flight. Event 11-108 (TOT OSOOZ) followed by the flights In Event 11-112, Event 11-110,
(dropped at 08052) Event II-lll (TOT 080£Z) and Event II-109 <TOT 0808Z).
There were two inOH HAND flights (one each for Korat and Takhll) in the area, but no
CAP flights. The IBON HAtID flights did not encounter MIC.'. (It is assumed that the
supporting B-66 and BIG EYE aircraft were on station although specific OPREP reference was
tizl available).
2. NtSSION ROUTE
Departed Korat refueling enroute to "Y* in the Red River then down Thud Ridge to
target. Return by reverse route. The route was about the sane as that of the Takhll
force.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105D. BLUE 1> 2. 3. 1
6 - 750 lb bombs
1 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B)
1 - QRC-160
2 - ^50 gal ECN pod drop tanks
HIC-2I HIG 1. 2. 3. *»
Silver
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNieR
Weather ;' Scattered to broken with tops of cumulus type clouds at 8,000 feet HSL.
Altitude ; 10-12,000 feet HSL.
Heading : lao*
Spged : Estimated 520 kt
Flight Formation ; r'ourth of five flights, in a pod formation.
5. INITtAL DETECTION
Had received MIQ and SAM warnings fron BIQ EYE and previous flights. BLUE 1 spotted
4 HIG-21S at 10 o'clock on a reciprocal heading, k to 5,000 ft high at approximately
I545H. The NIOs were 2 to 3 miles out. BLUE 2 did not see the MIOs until they «ei3
abreast of BLUE flight. They were identified by their silver color.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight observed MIOs starting a descending turn behind then well out of range.
The closest approach was eatinated to be no closer thrn 2 ndles.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 kept his formation intact while descending and weaving through the cumulus
clouds Into the target area. MIGs were no longer observed to be a threat. The flight
hit the target (areas C and B-1) and egressed. After leaving the target BLUE 2 at 7,000-
8,000 feet and 600 kt, saw a single MIG-21 at 12 o'clock high. The MIC was in the
vicinity of 21*10'N/105"'»0'E heading 170* at an altitude of 9-10,000 feet. The MIC made
a descending Split-S and was lost from view as he moved to 6 o'clock on BLUE Plight.
8. ORDNANCE
None expended
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None
1100
Est. 90
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Erierlenca
Total Hours
B1.UE 1 2950
BLUE 2 3100
Cg moenta on thla encounter
tarce?^"^ ^ *^ allowed BLOE Plight to hit the
BLUE 2 first miasicn In Route Package VI-A and first JIIO eneounter.
Cc BJttenta fr^m Qyerall Experience
b:llt?''o? IL^f'-IIs^.'"'' ^"'^ the lo« altitude speed capa-
U. DATA SOURCES
P roject Interviews
Meaaagea. Reports :
7jFTJXTtoT3ri922li8z Dec 66 DIO 310«H Dec 66
388TPW OPREP-3 191120Z Dec 66 DIO oinl
'2, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOH
(See Items 5. 6, and 7).
BLUE I, £17 Feb 1967), BLUE 2 (17 Feb 1967)
392
••^ Event 11-127
> Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSDs vs two Hia-2l8
Result: No (lamae«
Vicinity: Qnknoim
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: December 1966/Unknoi*n
Strike mission In North Vietnam
5. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
BLUE 1. g. ^ and U
I M-61 (full - 1,029 rounds)
1 QRC-160
MlOa
Silver In color
4. FLIGHT COliUniONS »hIOK TO tNCOUNIEH
Weather: Clear
BLUE 1. 2. 1. H
Altitude; 18,000 and climbing
Heading ; jiiQo
Speed ; Unknown
Fuel State; Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
fllBht was at 18,000 ft heading 2<*0* after dropplna their ordnance on tai.ff#t
6. ACTION INITIATED
tumeJ^?n^I!^?h ^^f"*"* f"!"'^^?? "^^ht 8:30 o'clOCk position. BLUE flight
iJtraSaJ from ni3a? ^ ^"'^ '° ''"^ ^" "^S^t and ac'celerated dJwn
7. SrrUATIDN OEVELOPHENT
None, no encounter.
B. ORDNANCE
None expected.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total F-105 Combat
BLUE 2 1200
Unknown
Comments from Overall Experience
tl:^J: ^^"Vlng mt one SIDEWINDER la not really a waste of time but carrying two
"srii wjij fi^i s?!EiiiJjind!" "-"^ ^'^'^ ^'^^ co^rorTisiSet ^
11. DATA SOURCE
Project Interview - BLUE 2 (16 Pebmary 1967)
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
„w ^"'^5 r^?^^ *'ter striking target heading 21l0« at 18.000 ft and «n«,hir,-
a%\"a%; Vn^ ITn^tlH Tell JL^ltJJeJy^ldlSJJh^d^is^^Sia ^KS^ ^ n\ ,
I
I
I
I
i
i
i
i
i
i
I
Two P-lOSDa and, two P-105Fa
vs ttfo Nia-2ls
SX^OO'N/IOS^OO'B
AlrerAft Involved:
Ito8ult:| Slghtlnis only
Vicinity of Encounter;
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Time: 2 January 1967/1 51 OH
2. MISSION ROUTE
th. ,ufSuT=m!l"b;,%°""»*' " ' •""".bin* l.ft-l«M orbit, in
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
uLUb' 1 and j
2 - AGH-«I5 I
2 - AIM>9B
1 - 650 gal round eenterllr^ tank
1 - M-61 OatUng gun (1029 rounda)
y-lQ5D. BLUE ? and t i
H - CBU-248 (centerllna station)
2 - t50 gal wing tanks i
2 - A0M-15S ■
1 ~ Qun
I
No QRC equipment
MIQ-21S
Unknown
4. FLIfiHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Heather;. Overcast, 3 to 4.000 feet broken, tops at 9,000 feet.
BLUE 1. 2 BLUE 3.4
15.000 ft 18,000 ft
270* 270*1
Unknown Unknown
Unknown Unknown
Altitude ;
Headinn ;
Speed !
I'uel State :
PltKht Formation !
15,000*
18,000*
3000
5. INITIAL DETECTION
6. ACTION INITIATED i
BLUE Plight continued to turn left, engaged afterburner and deacendedto 10.000 feet.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
8. ORDNANCE
alr-to-alr ordnance ezpende<t.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None.
itTSfllitfS'MllTiTi'''' iiiiiiri iiaiiaMM^iiBMM -■-i';--,",wi±'ttejit«i) ExA?
^0. AIRCREW COfWEHTS
Eaperlenei.
BLUE 3
BLUE 2
Event II-1I9
Total Hourit
Unknown
P-105 Houpg
400
Combat Mia«io».
Approx. 21
Remark 8
Thought the night
. could have attacked
the NlOa If they
had turned right
DATA SOURCES inataad of left.
Project Intervlgwa f
Heaaaf-;ea . Report «> •
355TFW 021345Z Jan 67. PASTEL DOl" 0028
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOII
at^O.OoS reel In I J^"?, ^"r"i..^"«««
BLUE 2 (16 June 67) and BLUE 3 (17 Peb 67)
330" to 270» when BT MP » l"^! 000 feet. BLUE Flight ^^l\r, L 3. 000 feet
BLUE 3 called Jn" ! * observed two MIC-2ls at 5o nnn ? ^urn. headlr
)96
Event 11-119
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs one MIC-Zl
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20''l3'N/10<l°21'E
1. PRIHARY MISSION At«D TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 6 January 1967/153^H
Four P-105» (BLUE Flight) was on a strike mission north of Hanoi. Strike mission
could not get to asslgi^ed target area due to weather.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOft TO ENCOUNTER
Weather! Very bad. Actual conditions not knoH.i.
Altitude ;
Fuel Status ;
Plight Formation :
Unknown
10. Ai^CREW COMHINTS
Total
Hours
BLUE 1. 2. 3. *
16,000„
010°
150
Unknown
p-ia5
Hours
Unknown
WIQ 21
22,000^
01 0<*
ISO (estimated)
Unknotirt
Combat
KlSBlona
70
Experience
BLUE 1 3600
Comnents on overall experience ;
BLUE 1 - Considers the F-105 Is the best airplane for the Job of bombing N. Vietnam but
not an air-to-air fighter. The P-105 can out-run anything at low altitude,
which is excellent defense.
11. DATA SOURCES
Pilot Interview : BLUE 1, 17 Feb 67
Wessagea ; JSETFV JOPREP OFREF-0 RT 022 SEA. 6 Jan 67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was m a 360** turn. A KIO-21 was observed on left side of BLUE Plight
and flew parallel to BLUE Flight at 1.5 miles distance for 3-ll minutes. HIG-21 then broke
off and departed the area of BLUE Plight.
Aircraft Involved:
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter:
Event 11-120
Pour F-lOSs vs four NIO-Sls
21»4ll«N/lO««52'B
PRIMARY KISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tltre: 7 January 1967/late afternoon
Pour P-1058 (BLUE Flight) was providing MIO cover for a strike force of P-X05 aircraft
operating out of Korat, T. Weather caused the strike force to divert to targets of oppor-
tunity along the Red River. BLUE Plight was heading vest along with the strike force when
the encounter occurred.
2. HISSION ROUTE
All aircraft In strike force departed Korat, T. Proceeded northeast to TACAK #97 and
thence eastward (OSO" heading) to Red River, to primary target area <JCS 51>10>, back to
Red River (vicinity Yen Bal). Strike force egresaed to poat-strlke refueling (Orange
Anchor) and tc home base.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
H F-1058 BLUE I. 2. 3. k
Not given, but bombs were carried by BLUE Flight.
HIG-21a 1. 2> 3. 1
Not given.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Broken to overcast below 9*000 ft. Visibility good above clouds.
1
BLUE
T
Altitude :
Heading :
Speed ;
Fuel State :
15,000 ft
In orbit vicinity Yen Bal
not given
not given
0
'ORG 160 formation
1500/2000 ft horizontal separation
500 ft vertical separation
5. INITIAL DETECTION
No MIG warnings were called by ELINT aircraft. HIQ-215 were first sighted by member
of BLUE Plight (BLUE 3) 10 to 12 niles off to the right of BLUE Plight. MIO-218 were low
approximately 10,000 ft (heading 020«, speed not given). NIOs were positively identified
as they closed to within 5 miles. *
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Flight started a right turn to keep the MIOs in sight.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
As BLUE Plight started a right turn, the MI0.218 broke off by pulling up and started
down after the IRON HAND flight but broke off all together and left the area. The MiQa
were not seen again by BLUE Flight.
8. ORDNANCE
None fired by either side.
9. EqUIPNENT PROBLEMS
' None
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience : Total Hours
BLUE 1 4,300
BLUE 3
not given
?~105 Hours
100
not given
Total Missions
20
80
399
CoBuaentB on thla Encaunt*.* 11-120
BLUE 1
f-JOS can't out>nwneuver NIQs.
BLUE i «fnc«lty i„ Changing fro« one firing »od. to ««,th.r.
It doe. is clutter !p ?S SdlS" «*rnlnge on Guard channel. All
11. DATA SOURCES
JnJ*''''J*'' ll'^l ^' ^5 February 1967
Pilot Interview BLUE 3. i8 February 1967
Pilot interview BLUE 2, 3 OctoSS; 1967
U. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
J^f5t'?^r^""i"% Off aa BLUE Pii,.t started a
P-105S that were in the same areiTaB BLUE PllSS^ s.J 1° 5° ^V'^'' mother flight of four
the area completely. "'"^ Plight but broke off before closing and left
10. AIRCREW COKNENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
BLUE 1
BLUE 4
11.
P-105
Hours
Combat
Missions
80
50
Event 11-121
Remarks
Swltehology Is bad In P-105 for SNlteh-
Ing to alr-to-alr.
DATA SOURCES
Interviews: EIUE 1, 14 March 1967
BLUE *, 7 January 1967
12. HAWATIVE DESCRIPTION
S-"M^tLTSf s[5r?}??st'j„rbi- S E^O -J^F «c"i: "siJ<.".'r
turn Into the MlC-ils. ™ *" BLUE Plight started to
identlff theS" "* ^'^^'^^ then could not positively
0
D
Event 11-122
Aircraft Involved: Twenty P-105s vs two MIO-218
Result: Ko danage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"35*N/105*OO'B
1. PRIKARy HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: 7 January 1967/083OZ
2. MISSION ROUTE
#97 tSS*n*? "T** *? tfnlce" for refueling continued north to TACAN station
f97 tnen east to Red Hiver and on to target, north of Hanoi.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1 and 2
2 CBU-Z^JS
20nun ammo
1 630>gal centerline drop tank
BLUE 3 and H
6 500olb bombs MER plU8/20imii
1 SIDEWINDER AIK-9B
1 'jRC.l60 pod
2 1150-gal drop tanks
All Aircraft
Camouflaged color
IFF. radar, TACAN (0?P in target area)
MIG-21a
Not given
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather. ; Not given, except there was a low undcrcast and a haxe In the area of operation,
r
BLUE
T
Altitude:
Speec ■
Fuel State;
17,000 ft
East
Not given
Not given
Plight Formation
QRC-I60 pod formation (star gaggle).
5. INITIAL DETECTION
at 1:30 o'clock to formation, 3 to 5 miles a«ay. The MlOs were at 12.000 ft. The SlOe
were easily Identified by their shape and shiny silver color.
t. ACTION INITIATED
r.r^^V:^! lli^^l the MIGa. The MIO-218 turned left and flew parallel to the
JlJiJda further left and flew away from the formation, going down into the
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Flight mistakenly made an attack pass on a flight of P-105 that was flying
fSi^^rV* f?'''«»"0'» " the MIO-218 flew away. BLUE Plight broke off the attack if Sr
Identification was made. BLUE Plight dodged a non-existent SA-2 missile then brought up
E»ent 11-122
a treawndous amount of flak (37/57Mm) by flying low (2*000 ft). It waa a wuapeeted "dry*
launch since they got a launch light on the WILD WEASEL gear but never aav a SAN.
8.
9.
ORONANCC
None fired by either aldei
eqUIPMENT PftO&LEMS
>oae given.
10. AIRCREH CONNCNTS
Experience
BLUE a
All others not given.
Total
Hourj
2.000
P-105
Hours
800
Combat
Mlaalons
10
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
BLDE 2. 15 February 1967
BLUE 3» 16 February 1967
40«
^- Evant 11-123
■ ' Aircraft Involved: Four P-105D» va four NIO-Zls
Reeultfl: Sighting only
Vicinity: 21°30'N/10«»°27'E
1. PRIHARV KISSION 4llD TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 8 January 1967/0825H
Four F-105DS (BLUE flight), part of a strike force operating out of Korat, Thailand,
was to hit a prebrlefed target In Route Package VI>A. Weather prevented entry Into Route
Package VI- A and BLUE flight was looking for a target of opportunity along the west side
of the Red River.
2. Missiui; Roun
BLUE flight departed Korat, proceeded north to the tanker, then ME to the Be* River,
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1. ?. 3. 'i
6 - 500-lb bor^bs
1 - AIt-:-93 (SIDEWiriDEH)
1 - QflC-160 ECM Pod
2 - il50-gal wing tanks
1 - Mk«6l Gatllng Gun (1026 rounds)
KIC-21 (1. 2. 3. ")
Sllvfr Color
4. FLIGHT COrtOlTIONS PRIOR TO eNCOUHTER
Weather
Low overcast condition In primary target aren.
blllty above clouds.
BLUE Plight
Clear, with unrestricted vlai-
MICs
Altitude ;
headlng T
Speed ;
Fuel State:
10.
AIRCREW COMMENTS
13-10*000 ft
NW along Thud Ridge
480 Kt
Unknown
Wunbe r of Hours
total
3100
150
21-22,000 ft
Opposite heading
Unknown
Unknown
Combat Missions
approx. 30
BLUE 2
General Coinments
BLUE 2 - Unable to use X-band warning gear when using QHC-160 pods.
Turned off IFP and TACAN to minimize electronic enlsalons vlien over North Vietnam.
Would prefer better geographical reference when receiving MIG warnings.
F-105 doesn't have sufficient wing area to permit turning with NXOa.
n. DATA SOURCtS.
Project Interview : BLUE 2 (undated)
12. hARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight (vicinity of 21*'30=N/10l°27'E) was heading NW along Thud Ridge when they
observed a flight of four HIGs at a range of 6-8 n mi heading In the opposite direction.
When the KIGs passed aoeam (BLUE'S 3 o'clock) at 3-* n mi, the MICs turned left towards
BLUE flight In an attempt to get into the 6 o'clock position. BLUE flight made a descend-
ing left turn In order to pick up airspeed; they did not Jettison ordnance. Aa the flight
went through l80° they looked to the left and noted that the MIGs had made a turn in the
other direction and were departing the area. The MIGs were never any closer than approxi-
mately 2-1/2 n ml. Identification was easy even at 5 n ml because when the NIO pulled up,
the top to bottom profile clearly showed the delta wing.
E
E
i
5
J
Evmt 11-124
Aircraft Involved: Bight P-lOSs ve four MIG->21s
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2O°tO'N/10^°30 'E and
1. PRIMARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 15 January 1967/1615H and 1617H
Four P-105S (BLUE Flight) and four F-105S (GREEN Plight) were part of a strike force
bombing a railroad bridge S.E. of Thai Ngyen BLUE Flight and CREEH Plight had hit the
target and were out-bound when the MIG sighting occurred.
2. NISSION ROUTE
Departed Korat headed north to rendezvous with tankers, then northeast to the Black
River then east to the Red River arl target (vicinity of Thai Ngyen). Egress by same
route to post strike tankers.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS
Weather: Clear, 2-ii mile visibility In haze.
AltUude ;
heading"
Speed :
Position:
BLUE 1, 2. 3, k
11. goo ft
210^
^500 Kts ^
20°40'N/10Jl°30'E
GREEN 1,
15,000 ft
195^
„5*0 Kts ^
21°15*N/10JI°U2»E
Pod (QRC-160)
MIQ 1, 2, 3^
20,000 ft
030«
WIG ^. 6. 7. 8
22,000 ft
030*
_ _ Unknown _
2O*'40'N/10'»*'30'E 21°l5'N/10l**ft2»E
Approx. finger tip elements In trail
Plight _ Forr.at Ion : Pod (QRC-160)
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight sighted a flight of four MIG-218 at 1615K. The nZQ-2l8 w«r« at
1 o'clock high on a reciprocal heading to BLUE Flight. GREEN Plight sighted a flight of
four MIG>2:s at iSnH. The HIG-21a were at 22,000 to 23,000 feet, 8 o'clock to GREEN
Plight heading C-30 .
b. actio:: i::itiatlu
BLUE Flight continued on course and lost sight of the MIG-?ls. CREEM Plight
observed MIO-21'3 move behind them to within 2 nl. GREEN Plight lit afterburners and
descended to the mountain tops losing sight of the MIGs.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
No further action on either side no engagement resulted.
6. ORDNAhCE
None expended.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
SLUE Flight: None
GREEK Flight: None
10. AIRCRiH COMMENTS
Total Hours
650
Hot Interviewed
Hot Interviewed
P-IOS
600
Combat Missions
17
BLUt 2
bLU£ 1, 3, <)
GREEN 1, 2, 3. t
n. DATA SOURCES
OPREP-il RT 0«I9 - SeSTPW 151310Z Jan 67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight (four P-lOSs) sighted a flight of four MI0>21s at 1615H. BLUE Plight
position 20<*40*N/10<i°30'E heading 210'. altitude ll.OOO feet, 5^0 kts. MIG-21a were at
1 o'clock high 20,000 to 22,000 ft. MIG-218 began tu-nlng toward BLUE Plight. BLUE
Flight continued on course and lost sight of MIQ-218.
HREf-ri Plight sighted four MI0-21s at 1617H. GREEN position 21*15'N/101'»»I2'E
heading 195*. altitude 15,000 ft, S^O kLj. MIO-213 w.»re at 8 o'clock to GREEN Flight
heading 030" at 2?,000 to 23,000 feet. The HIO rolle-l In behind GREEN Plight and
closed to 2 miles of OREEN Flight. GREEN Plight lit -ifterburncrs descended to the
mountain tops and lost sight of MIO>?ls.
»07
y Event II-W5
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105Ds v« one KIG*2I
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: North Laos
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 15 January 1967/1615H
Pour P-105S (BLUE Flight) outbound for the target.
II. DATA SOURCES
Project IntervleK : BLUE 3, l6 Peb 67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
SLUE 2 sighted an aircraft believed to be a MIO-21. There la some doubt whether
It Mas an P-^i or a HIO-21, since BLUE Plight was in North Laos and MIGs were not known
to operate in that area.
BLUE 3 felt that the single SIDEWINDER armament In the P-105 la inaufflclent.
Event 11-126
Aircraft involved: Pour P->105s vs probable four NIOs
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20"57'N/105*'0**E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 16 January 1967/0818H
Mission and tactical situation not contained In data available.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
HICa
Silver color.
4. FLIGHT C0NOITI0t:S PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
BLUE Flight MIPS
Altitude ; 18,000 ft 35,000 ft <est.)
He'a'grng" 069* In a left turn
Speed : 500 kt Unltnown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 2 sighted four silver airplanes at an estimated range of 25 mi to the
northeast at approximately 35*000 ft. The contacts quickly faded out of sight.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
KIG9 faded froia sight.
IK DATA SOURCES
Project Ir.tervlowj ; BLUE 3» 17 Feb 1967
Mesaatrea. Reports :
Project RED BARON Event folder contains an extract from an OPREP-A concerning
this event.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Sighting only.
y Event 11-127
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lO^s vs two NI0-21S
Result: Slghtine :nly
Vicinity of Encounter: 21'37'N/10'i"55*E
\. PRIMARY NISStON AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Time; 16 January . 1967/0838H
soath^SlfThi^RlSgJ!*'**^*' Plight, were part of a strike against a POL storage area
2. MISSION ROUTE
with Some^JnJSJs^fS'^^SeJJSg!""" ^^'^ ^« rendeavou.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105 BLUE 1. 1. U
1 Mk-6l gun (SOinm)
MIG-gl MIG 1. 2
silver color.
4. FLI6HT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather; Clear. 8 to lO-nlle visibility with light haze.
BLUE
— I 5 3 5—
Altitude : 20,000 17,000 15,000
Heading ; -200*
Speed : HgO-S^O kt
Fuel State : 6-65OO lb— — — i-
Pllght Formation ; Loose finger- four.
5. liiniM :ET::T::ri
.K..,.-^HI^ * o'clock almost directly over the flight about 2000 ft
above them. The KZGa were heading in an opposite direction and were quickly out of sight.
to. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
P-103
Combat
Hours
Hours
Missions
BLUE
1
1100
900
50
BLUE
3
1200
150
20
BLUE
4
3700
700
15
Remarks
Plghter background
150 20
700 15
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE 3 No opportunity to attack the NZOs developed from the head-on encounter.
BLUE 3 and 4 Both pilots were Inpreased with the turning ability of the IIIG-21.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews; BLUE 1. 17 Feb 1967; BLUE 3. 15 Peo 1967J BLUE ft, 18 Feb I967.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
— . fJ'^Lfi^^^l was egresalng from the target area in a loose formation when the MlG-21s
;inky*SJ«ppJS; from sigh?? "''"»»«^ "«W"vered to attack. The MI0-21a
«f thr'Sl^STr ^i^^^''''%V!r* "^S^'^** ^^'-^c** shortly before or shortly after the sigh tings
?f^! S°"«2' conditions were very similar with no attempt to engage made by elthir
J"« mnU * ^^"^ P""'* opposite heading at a wSge^oJ aSSSt
I
[
t
1
I
.1
I
I
Event 11-128
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs one MIO-21
Result: * Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: ai^SO'H/lOS'W'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time; 16 January 1957/0825H
Pour P-105S were departing the target area as the third of four flights on the
strike mission.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. k
1 - QRC 160 Pod
2 - Uso-Kal external fuel tanks
1 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B)
1 - M-61 Gun (20Run)
MIO-21
Silver cjlor
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
BLUE Plight
Altitude:
Heading;
Speed:
Fflght ^orcatlon ;
18,000 ft climbing
South«(est
550 kt
3000 lb
5, INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 4 first sighted the MIS at the 4 o'clock position In a 45** dive, approximately
5000 to 6000 ft above BLUE 4 at a range of approximately two miles.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 3 and 4 started a hard, descending turn to the right.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The HIO was observed to break off from his attack and to depart the area.
AIRCREW COHKENTS
TO
Ejcperlence
BLUE 4
Total
Hours
3,500
P-I05
Hours
110
Combat
Missions
15
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 4, "I (rot 60 hrs In the P.TV Program and most of that was Just learning to
fly the airplane with little emphasis on tactics. Whnt little tactics we learned
fere not valid once we got over here because the tactics change so rapidly. The people
In the RTU who were veterans of SEA... didn't even know anything atout (QRC-'l60) pods."
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 4 17 Peb 1967
Evvnt 11-128
U. MARRATIVE OESCRIPTION
one anfbJhKS Il^^I anS^r'Th'^'JlI^St*:!! %'l?:Lf '-J^-'^'^^y approximately'
when BLUE H alghted a MIG 31 -n fh. i , *f "=^1"*^"8 through 18,000 ft at 550 kt
descending a, he engaged afterburner Jrfr? J ^^"^ ^ turned hard right
atay with BLUE 3. Visual contact Sfth fh^MJr*"^^^?'* afterburner and maneuvered to
broke off hia attack and departed thl\Jll aLu?%'?'^.'*i?i ^ reported the NIG
t«... and rendezvouacd -Uh^T^m^^^:„cT^;„J^",^^i;^fS5o*;ro^•fSir^^^^^^
«
Event 11-129
AlrerAft Involved: Four P-105b vs two HIC-21a
Result: Sighting only
vicinity of Encounter: 210 36'N/1Q4«ST*E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 16 January 1967/0805H
Four F-105S departed Takhli AB on an IRON HAND mission in support of a strike nlsslon.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed Takhli AB and refueled with GREEN ANCHOR before proceeding to TACAN Station
97. From the TACAIJ. the flight proceeded to 21"37'N/104<>56'£ then to 21«34 'N/105^33*E.
The MIC sighting occurred at 2l*36*H/10*«57'E. Return of the flight was by reverse route
with air refueling prior to return to base.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
£:1P" BLtE Jj_2,_3, J
2 - il50-gal external fuel tankc
1 - H-61 Gun (1«029 rd 20ffln ammo)
BLUE 1 and } (F>10^F)
2 - SHRIKE (AGM-li5)
't - CBU-2tl
BLUE 2 (F-105F)
2 - SHRIKE (AGM-'*5)
6 - 500-16 bombs
BLUE ft (F-105D)
6 - 500-lb bombs
BLUE 3 , » , ft
TACAH/Off; Radar, IFP/Stby; Doppler/On
MIG-21 HIC I. 2
?llvor ccZor
4. ELIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Low stratus cf heavy haze which restricted visibility to the eaat to 1-2 miles
and to the west to 3-ft miles. .
BLUE 1 . 2 . 3 . II • ISk®
Altitude : 16,000 ft
Heading ; Southeasterly
Speed : 550 kt ^8f^5^
Fuel: 12,000 lb
Plight Formation :
5. INITIAL DETECTION
®
BLUE 4 first .sighted two MIGs at 7 o'clock at a range of approximately 1/2 mile
diving toward the flight In a descending turn and approximately 2,000 ft above the flight.
An area MIG warning had been heard by BLUE 4.
«. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE ft Jettisoned his wing tanks as he called a break. BLUE 3 broke hard right and
down as he Jettisoned external fuel tanks.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned external stores and maneuvered to counter the MIQ attack. Aa
BLUE 3 and 4 entered the haze, where visibility was approximately one mile, they lost
sight of the MIG and of BLUE 1 and 2.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE ft was having difficulty with one of the bayonet fittings on his oxygen nask
allowing the mask to fall away from his face with mcveoents or from g forces.
10. AIRCREW COHHSNTS
Ewnt 11-129
Total
Ho ur 8
1,700
2»290
P-105
Houra
Conbat
Mlaalona
50
75
Remark a
BLUE 3
BLUE 4
1,000
400
TAC background
B-ii7 background
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE 3 - The MIOs were not very aggressive . Generally the MlOa go after the Wild
Weasel and know which airplane In Che flight is the Wild Weasel.
BLUE it - Could not stay with BLUE 3 In the defensive naneuverlng.
CoBunents from Overall Experience
BLLrE 3 - The EMO in the F-105P Is very helpful as a lookout because of the poor
visibility to the rear. . The MIGa can out-turn the F-105 so it is a difficult situation
with a MIC at 6 o'clock.
BLUE t - BIG EYE area warnings Just clutter the radio. Heed coordination anong the
different types of aircraft and missions- When using QRC poda, the SAM doesn't appear to
guide and AA doesn't follow a flight aa effectively.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
BLUE 3 6 Feb 1967
BLUE « 3 Feb 1967
Messages. Reports ;
355TFW OPREP-3 1602152 Jan 67 DOI 0218
355TFW OPREP-3 160515Z Jan 67 OOTO-0 10176 Jan 67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was flying down the south aide of Thud Ridge at an altitude of 16*000 ft
maintaining 550 kt. BLUE 3 and H were approximately one mile behind BLUE 1 and 2 with
BLJE 4 trailing BLUE 3 by 500-1,000 ft. BLUE 4 sighted two MICs at his 7 o'clock in an
attack. The flight was alerted to the presence of MIGs by BLUE H, The lead section,
BLUE 1 and 2, jiettlsoned all external stores and dove into the haze layer in a descending
right turn leveling out at 6,000 ft and egreasing from the area. BLUE 3 broke right in
a descending turn and jettisoned his external tanks. As he tried to follow, BLUE 4
Jettisoned hla tanks, engaged afterburner, and then Jettisoned hia bombs. When BLUE 3
entered the haze, while reversing his turn, BLUE t lost sight of BLUE 3 and the HIQs.
BLUE 4 executed a modified Spllt-S and leveled out at J4,00C ft in the haze and departed
the area. BLUE 3 continued into the target area but when he discovered he was alone he
returned to base. BLUE 1, 2 and 4 rejoined in the refueling area and returned to base.
y Event 11-130
Aircraft Involved: Poup F-IOS0 vs Four NI0-21b
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter; 2l®36'M/lO**55*E
I. .PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: I? January 1967/0759H (or 23592 on 16 Jan 1967)
Pour P-105 aircraft (BLUE flight) froa Korat on a strike mission.
II. DATA SOURCE
RED BARON MIG Incident Summary (Reference PACAP CP31).
12. RARRATUt OkSCRIPTION
BLUE flight was engaged Mlth four MG-218, no damage.
&rentii-i3i
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s va one IIIQ-21
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"22*li/105"03*E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOK
Date/Time: 16 January I967/1538H
Pour P-105 aircraft on an IRON HAND mission.
II. DATA SOURCES
RED BARON HZO Incident Summary
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
This was a sighting only. No other data available.
Event ZI-132
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSe va two NIO-21*
Result: Ho danaga
Vlelnlty of Encounter: Approx. 2l°50»H/105*50»E
K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 17 January 1967/O838H
ing outbouna co noSe oaaeT * «/l05"51'03"E) by Thai Nguyen and were proceed-
2. MISSION ROUTE
north?:irJo^If 5iie;'^^%':' Lt'^lL^nS i** J*"*^*" ^S' P^^-^nke refueimg. then
AT»eB«fr*coiirTRijimTToi«
B LUE 1. 2. 1. ft
1 - QRC-160 pod
1029 rounds 20miD
2 - use gal wing tanlca
Centerllne tank
^ iKo2??a|e*S*2or5?'J^fnt"''* '^^PPl*^ o"-
. _6 - 750 lb bomba
y-105 BLUE 1 and }
1 - AIK-9
MIC-21 MIQ 1. 2
2 * AAH nl as ilea
Sliver color
4. FtlGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
W*ainS£: Clear, vlalblllty one to two milea in haze layer up to 60OO ft.
^ B LUE HI 0-21
pSedT- -North-
ruel State : 9000 lb-—
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Kach Sf tSifSS SSn^^ri^fpSHed'r^o «l'cs 'S^SeiTS V'.Vr' ''^ ^'^
at an altitude 5f 10.000 ft. Thev weri !l u?«°^?"^°''^ poalt on, one mile out
their ahape aa seen Ciien tSiy jCJ^rS. " ' -''•<»l«tely. du, to
S. ACTION INITIATED
tiiiS'T'J?n:2,.%SSt"«!!" 1" »•"■«' BUS
7, SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
« t.-sii? r»%-JL%'M'ci;.*:^S";s:«j^? „«ti„u.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total P-105 Combat
Houra Houra Hiasions Remarka
V""^ \ '•SO 200 20 very experienced pilot.
Commenta on this Encountef
factor?n"^M3 ZTou'llr: "Sey'^SSS 'flS? i'go'Sr^*' low altitude waa the saving
turn capability. * cannot fight a HIO alr-to-alr due to the MlO'a auperlor
Comment s from Overiii] Rirperlence
help rJi}ii;%io;s2-x?"s^/LK"s.::stJi:%?r,js; £:Su^^^"fir-^^-s^^-
n. DATA SOURCES Event 11-132
Pro ject Intervlgw : BLUE .4, 6 Feb I967.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Flight was the last one In ffon Takhll, It was about eight alnutes late and
KLtrtll !°V*^ °" f^ftfon the second wave which was from Korat. Flight
M^T.^r ^ schedule^ to come in approximately 10 minutes after the flight from Takhll
* congestion in the taxiway that morning and the airplanes
n^iii !J ^"^.f^^/"* i!!^ ^""^ ^° planned airspeed it was difficult
L L ««?ther -as clear with about two miles visibility through a haze
is rMShi?„*?«*Jii*li'**.'' ^"S*'^ Sighted the target by the 85mm that
I« !!^« * barrage that was Impossible to miss. Very little fire
was jn«ountered coming in. When moving out from the target, and making a turn at about
^Ll ^J^rrl f^UE U spotted two MIGs at 9 o'clock and a range of one or possibly two
a i?!;^ u started to turn in behind tUe BLUE Plight. BLUE k called two bogeys at
90 clock and turning m. At this point. BLUE 2 punched his tanks off. BLUE Plight
«Tf«7''^TTJ!?*iL*lf''" "1°*' lo»^"« any airspeed, and no break or heavy
r iTJ^^ ^t"-*" '*11 ^" "^^l^'^ «t 7 o'clock. The Mias
lilTi «rJ i^f mlssHe range but they weren't within the
angle off. The mcs had a range problem and couldn't close in on BLUE Plltfit. The MIOs
dropi.*d back and BLUE Plight continued up the hlU where a SAM was uSnched at them.
but r!IIl*fn?^!S/ii*?^iT"K'L'''* 5°** "*^«' turning they sighted two more MIOs,
.•' Event 11-133
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs HIOs
Result: Ho dlaoage
Vicinity of Encounter: Approx. 21^30 'N/IOS^IO'B
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 17 January 1967/25 minutes after sunrise (approx. 08l5H)
Poup P-105S were on a strike mission to JCS 21.11 (21°33'*l"N/105''51'O3'*E) when they
sighted MIGs. BLUE Plight was preceeded by a flak^suppresslon flight and another strike
flight.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed Takhli, refueled and headed northeast until reaching the Red River where
It crosses the 105° longitude. Then proceeded southeast to target.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
NIOS * Silver
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Cloudy with an overcast over the mountains to the west and scattered Into the
valley leading Into Hanoi with 1 mile visibility to the east and 3 miles to the west.
BLUE
I 5 g r-
Alt itude : 8,000 feet
Reading : Northeast
Airspeed : Not reported
Fuel ^tate ; Not repoi'ted
Plight Formation ; Unknown
5. INITIAL UETECTION
BL'JE Plight initially acquired sun glints at his 10:3C o'eloek position, a few miles
probably from MTns m an orbit.
6. ACTION INITIATED
KIQs Started a turn toward, descended and paralleled BLUE Flight's courses then
BLUE Plight descended into the haze.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPED
The KIQs followed BLUE Plight for 3 or 4 minutes. As BLUE Flight descended, BLUE 2
lost sight of the MIQs and they were no longer a threat.
8. ORDNANCE
None expended.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None
10. . AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total P-105 Combat
Hours Hours Hiss ions
BLUE 3 4000 37S 17
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE 3: NIOs seemed to be under OCX control and were directed on another flight.
11. DATA SOURCE
Project Interview: BLUE 3 (B Feb 67)
ET«nt 11-133
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was separated from the other flights since they were 2 miles to the right
of course and the others were 2 miles to the left. BLUE Plight was Inbound to the target
at 8,000 when BLUE 3 saw .>oiRe flashes of sunlight to the northwest at about his 10:30
o'clock position. The HIGs seemed to be In an orbit and then started to turn and descent
Into BLUE Flight at first but then continued on around to parallel BLUE Plight's course.
BLUE 2 kept them In- sight and the MIGs stayed with the flight for about 3 minutes, 3 to 4
miles outside of BLUE Flight's position. During this time BLUE 1 was In a descent into
the haze layer which when reached all sight of the HlQa vanished. BLUE Flight continued
on to Che target and then home. The HIQs were never Identified as to type.
i
«22
ft
i f.
i
I
I
I
I
i
I
r' E»«nt H-131
Aircraft Involved: Three P-J.05s vs one NIO
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l»35*N/10li'**6*E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOB
Date/Time: 17 January I967/I609H
IRON HAND mission for strike on railroad yard at 21®33'M/105°51'E.
2. MISSION ROUTE
. Plight from Korat flew over Red River and egressed with strike force from target.
Thai Nguyen. o »
3. AIRCRAFT C0NFI6URAT IONS
P-lOSr BLUE 1
2 SHRIKE nlsslles
2 CBUs on wing
P-105D BLUE ?. i\
b 500-lb bombs
2 450-gal tanks
SIDEWINDER
QRC-I60
NIG
Silver In color
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather;
Altitude :
Headlnj^T
Air Speed ;
hiel State .
PHrht Forma 1 1 on
S.
Not reported
9000 ft
Not reported
580-600 kts
Not reported
Net reported
INITIAL DETECTION
»i« K??^* by unknown member of BLUE flight at the same altitude, 2 or 4 o'clock from
night's position at a distance of 5 n ml. Unidentified aircraft thought to be a HIG,
6. ACTION INITIATED
MIC trailed BLUE flight for a short distance and then BLUE flight lost sight of it.
, 7. SITUATION DEVELOPNENT
The aircraft took no aggressive action and disappeared into the clouds.
e. ORD.^ANCE
None expended.
9. EQUrPHENT PROBLEMS
^^^S^^^"^*^ warfare operator's vector gear. (BLUE 1)
BLUE 3 aborted on tanker.
BLUE I's heading indicator.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience : Unknown
Comments on this Encounter ;
h.^ .IHifJ**'*^^*'"^*** * WEASEL and two wlngmen due to the fact that Number 3
had aborted, so we were Just more or less staying back in a fighting wing poaltlon!
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 2, 15 February 1967
Hessage: 0PRf;p-3 0-1716592. 17 January 1967 from 388 TPW for DGCO
»23
» Event 11-135
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs two MIG-17s
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'ST'N/lOH^SS'E
1. PRtKAftV MISSION AKD TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 17 January- 1967/0820H
A strike mission of four P-105S. (BLUE Plight) from Korat*
2. MISSION ROUTE
Not reported.
). AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
Not reported.
«. FMfiHT CONOITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Not reported.
BLUE
I S 5 y
Altitude ; 15,000 ft
Hc adinfi T Not reported
S£eea: 5^*0 kts
Fuel State ; Not reported
Plight Ponnatlon ; Not reported
5. INITIAL OET£CTION
Made by BLUE 2 at his 10 o'clock position, 1 miles distant.
6. ACTION INITIATED
None
7. SITUATIPH'n?VP!.ePKO
Sighting only.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None .
TO. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total P~105 Combat
Hours Hours Miss i o n s
BLUE 2 1200 200 20
Coaments from Overall Experience
BLUE 2 woulc} not want to give up speed for turning capability. If he fought would
want to be low, never high, and In the 6 o'clock position. Would never turn with any
MIG. Training was not adequate in alr-to-alr tactics to cope with MIOa. The lights which
operate off the pod are in the wrong place, and one has to look back and down to see them.
The radio is in the wrong place. Would like to see the guns checked out Mith boreslghting .
High speed at low altitude is an advantage. If we pull i* Q's, we have defeated hla weapon
Byatems .
11. DATA SOURCE
Project Interview ; BLUE 2, 15 February 1967
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE 2 saw a MID at his 10 o'eloek position, 4 nllea distant and level with his
flight just as they were about to roll In on the target. BLUE Plight was at 15»000 ft and
about 5*0 kt ground speed. When sighted, the HtQs were turning. No action was Initiated,
flight dropped bombs on target and returned safely to home base.
BLUE 2 did not Identify the aircraft. It Mas not until later that It was positively
Identified by other members of the flight and correlated by another flight in the gaggle.
Aircraft Involved: 7our P-1Q50» VB four iua-21s
Result: No damage
Vicinity or Encounter: 21*06 'N/105*05*E
1. PRIHARY HISSIOK AND TACTICAL SITUATION
■ Date/Tine: 21 January 67/081411
Strike Diaslon by four F<-105Ds (BLUE Plight) on the Viet Trl RR yard at 21«17'56"M/
105*26 'lO^E. There was a MIOCAP on this olsalon. The strike flights which encountered
the MIOs were those In Events 11-136, 11-137, 11-139 and Il-m. The aircraft in Event
11-136 was the lead flight.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed Korat , Thailand to tanker (refueled on Red Anchor), direct to Channel 97,
direct to target (21oia'N/105*>26^E) and returned the same route.
3. AHCP*FT f(»«>mimTO«l
F^XOSD BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft
4 - CBU-2US
1 - qRC-160 (on B-4 for certain)
1 - AIM-9B
2 - <i50-gal fuel tanks
1 - gun (1,029 rounds)
MIQ-21 HIQ 1. 2. 3. ft
Unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : 12,000 ft overcast tops at 16,000 ft Mlth breaks In the overcast, visibility
was 10 miles.
BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft
Altitude: 15,000 ft
Heading; 062»
Speeq : . ^00 )tz
Fuel Sta te Unknown
Format Icn ; Pod formation
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Pour MIG-21S were seen by all four flight members at their 8 o'clock position going
to 6 o'clock, high, heading 240« at a distance of 3 miles. No prior HIQ warnings were
received.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUB Pllghc dropped ordnance and tanks, made a hard right turn then reversed It wltn
a Split-s.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPKENT
MIQa fired, overshot SLUE Plight, and climbed out of sight. No encounter developed.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. flred/Ko. hits)
Cannon Remarks
BLUE None
Nia-2lB 1/0 Used by one MIO as seen by B-ft.
11. DATA SOURCES
Hesssgea :
OPREP-3 Z 210527Z Jan 67 from 3S8th TPW Korat EOI 0208 Jan 67
OPREP-ft ROLLINO THUNDER 034 21 Jan 67 386th TFN
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
The niEhts In Eventa 11-136, 11-137, 11-139, and II-lJJl were proceeding to the target
In a box formation, and the tox formation had 2 flights In the lead, line abreast, followed
by 2 more flights, lino abreast, about one mile to the rear and about 1,000 ft higher. The
flights flying line abreast were 1,500 to 2,000 fi ai;art, with the aircraft in Event II-136
(the nlssion commander) on the right front, and those of Event IX-lftl on the left front.
/ Event 11-136
U. RARRATIVE OESCRlPTiON (Continued)
Pollonlng were the aircraft In Events 11-137 and 11-139, with the aircraft of Event 11-139
on tbe right. The placement of the elements within each flight Is unknown.
At least two flights of «lG-2la (probably 3-4 aircraft each) made a pass on the
formation, one descended from 9 o'clock and very high passing through the formation in a
steep dive, between the lead and following flights. The other MIGs were able to attack
the lead two flights closing to within 1/2 mile.
The action occurred at sone time between OSJiOH and OSHUH and lasted about 1.5
105*05 •£ 1*'^*"'* first attacked, the formation was In the general vicinity of 21*07 'N/
¥hile the action was restricted In time and place, the accounts are such chat cor-
relation of sightings cannot be accomplished precisely. Moreover, the flights did not
visual contact with each other; therefore, the reconstruction of the
action of each flight has been documented separately.
BLUE Flight was inbound to the target at 15,000 ft altitude heading 062«. at 500 kt
SSJ "^^^^ MIC-2I3 at their 9 o'clock 3 miles range, high heading
2J0«. The MIOs were in two ship elements, with 3.000 ft between elements and 500 to 1 000
J^Sni^r!" element . KIGs were then seen to roll In on BLUE
Plight from the 9 o'clock position, to the 6 o'clock position with I50 kts overtake soeed
and closed the flight to within 3.000 ft level, at which tine BLUE Plight Jettisoned thSlr
ordnance and tanks (at 21<>06 -N/IOS^OS 'E) keeping their AIM-9Bs. BLUE Plight then eiecuJeS
SrlS'tJ 5* turn, then reversed back with a Spllt-S. The MIOs were seen to overshoot
BLUE Plight and climb sharply out of sight and BLUE 4 observed white smoke streaming from
one of the MIOs, assumed to be cannon fire. BLUE Plight did a iSo* and returned to base
safely with no damage to any aircraft.
Th« .?i:I!Ji'*J!*'5^T!? ;-«>an'» /Isnal on his vector gear immediately after the encounter.
The signal »aa 2-1/2 to 3 rings at ti o'clock, and could have some from either the HIOs or
;;°B?Si JiJ:iS^i:,fi^S*'-TS!/i'r* ^tf^^^r* warnings. There wai no co™uni2at?on
by BLUE Plight with the HIQCAP before the sighting or after.
*Sl"artic!lilS''fllJhtr"''" ^^"^^ 'owees as to time and place, depending on
^ Event 11-137
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105D8 vs three NIG-218
Result: No Jamage
Vicinity of Qficounter: 20 miles from target
(approx. 21*'27'M/i05 07'E)
1. PRINARr NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 January 1967/0812H
Mission was a strike mission on the Viet Trl Rfl yard (2l'*17*56"N/105**26'10''B) . The
strike nights which encountered KIGs were those in Events II-13fii II'l'il, II>139 and 11-137.
Here MICCAP aircraft In support of this mission.
2. HI:>$ION ROUTE
Departed Korat Air Base, Thailand for Red Anchor to Channel 97 • then direct to target.
i, AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-lCSDa BLUE 1 . P, ? , J*
6 - 750-lb bombs
2 - 'JSO-gal tanks
1 - SIDEWINDEK (AIK-9B)
1 - Cun (1,029 rounds)
MIO-21
Unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ! 8000 ft undereast
BLUE 1. 2. 3. H
Altitude: 14,000
Reading ; 062°
Spee d: Unknown
Fuel State : Unknown
Plight Pornatlon: Pod Pomatlon
S. INITIAL DETECTION
I 9 o'clock position, in trail formation* high, wj
l-l/2-:> Biles out, heading 100°, flying straight
positive overtake of approximately 1-1/2-2 miles out, heading 100 , flying straight and
level.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight turned hard left Into NIQs but MIGs did not follow or flra at BLUE Plight.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
MIGs were then seen at 11 o'clock and diving on the flight in front of BLUE Plight
who went intc a sharp right turn Jettisoning their ordnance. [This flight was the flight
of Event I I- 111.} BLUE flight also Jettisoned ordnance and followed the turn.
8. ORDNANCE
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported
10.. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience : Unknown
Comaients on this Encounter ; Hone
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 1: It would be Ideal if we had one switch that we could throw that would make
us able to fire the AIH-9 after being In an air-to-ground mode.
r,. DATA SOURCE
P roject Tntervlews : BLUE 1, 10 Feb 67
Ressages: OPREP-3 Z 210505Z Jan 6Y, from 380TPW Kera^ 001 0211
Event U-137
12. NA.TRATIVE DESCRIPTION .
The flights In EventsII- 1 36 , 11-137, 11-139. and II-li;i were procccdlnR to the target
In a bo« formation. Each flight was In a pod ffcrraatlon, and the box formation had two
flights In the lead, line abreast, follOMed by two more flights, line abreast, about one
mile to the rear and about 1,000 ft higher. Tne flights flying line abreast were 1,500 to
2,000 ft apart, with the ali-craft In Event II-I36 (the mission commander) on the right
front, and those of Event II-lUl jn the left front. Following were the aircraft in Event
11-137 and 11-139, "1th the aircraft of Event 11-139 on the right. The placement of the
elements within each flight is unknown.
At least two flights of KIG-21s (probably 3-1 aircraft each) made a pass on the for-
matlor., one descended from 9 o'clock and very hl^n, passing through the formation In a
steep dive, between the leading and following flights. The other MlGs were able to attack
the lead two flights closing within one-half mile.
The action occurred at sometime between OSliOH and 08'4'iH^ and lasted about I.5 minutes.
When first attacked the formation was in the general vicinity of 21'07'N/105'05'E. *
While Che action was restricted in time and place, the accounts are such that corre-
lation of sightings cannot be accomplished precisely. Moreover, the flights did not main-
tain continuous visual contact with each other; therefore, the reconstruction of the
action cf each flight has been documented separately.
The flight was in the pod formation with other flights. Inbound to the target. At
about 20 miles out from the target the flight saw three M10-2ls at their 9 o'clock posi-
tion in a positive overtake, high, one and one-half miles out, heading 100°. BLUE Plight
was at It, 000 ft, heading 062°. BLUE Flight then turned left into MIGs but they did not
turn into BLUE Plight, attack, or fire their cannons. BLUE Flight rolled out 0700. ^t
in Bllea out BLUE 2 called out MIGs at 11 o'clock at which time BLUE 1 looked up and saw
what he thought was an afterburner igniting^ from a diving aircraft. BLUE Fllsht then
heard BLUE 2 and k of this flight call MIGs at 6 o'clock.
Shortly after the MIGs passed through the formation (these MIGs were not seen by
BLUE Plight, only inferred from calls from other flights), BLfE Plight heard a call from
an IBOM HAND Plight that there were SAMs launched. Three SAMs were then observed to come
out of the oversast. BLUE 1 estimated only 30 seconds elapsed between the MIGs and the
SAM attack. The flight directly in front of BLUE Flight broke left, the flight on the
right broke right and up, and the flight out in front broke right and down. Jettisonlns
ordnance. ^
With the weather conditions compounded by SAHa and MIQa, the decision was nad* to
abort, so the bombs and tanks were Jettisoned at 21009 ' N/I05015 » e at OSftSH, altitude
13,000 ft, speed HOO kt , heading 020 deg. The AIM-9Bs were retained. BLUE Plight then
proceeded outbound to Channel 97- During egress BLUE 2 and t called out MIO-215 behind
the fli^t and on a reciprocal heading. BLUE 1 did not see these, only the afterburner
light as the HIGs engaged afterburner.
•There are minor differences in the OPREP sources as to time and place, depending on the
particular flight. ^
2BLUE 1 did not see any MIGs in this instance, only the afterburner light. All flieht
members saw the initial three MIG-21s. **s««.. lAigni
Hi
I
I
t
I
1
I
I
I
I
I
Event 11-136
Alrerairt Involved: Pour P-lQSs v."* eight
, NZO-lTs and two NIO-218
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter:
I
21»25'N/106»27'B
1. PRINARr NISSIOK AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 January 1967/1605H
Four P-105B (BLUE Flight) waai one of a group of flights on a Strike mission on
a railroad yard 15 miles north of Xep airfield.
2. MISSION ROUTE '
The flight was from Korat but the route la unknown,
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1
(Drop oraiiancc unknown)
1 - AIM-9B
1 - QRC-160 ;
1 - Gun (1,029 rounds)
2 - 450-gal fuel tanks
HIO-17 (MlOa 1 to 8)
Crey in color
HIG-21 (MIO 9. 10)
Silver
* •
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; 10,000 ft. overcast > .
BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft
9,000 ft '
Passing through 135*
150 kt
Unknown
Unkniowi
Altitude:
Heading:
Speed :
Fuel:
Plight formation:
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 1 saw the MlOa low while In a left turn at his 1 to 2 o'clock position*
about it, 000 ft altitude ehaaing lanother flight, of P-lOSs.
6. ACTION INITIATED t
BLUE Plight Jettisoned their ordnance and' set up for air missiles. By this
time. BLUE Flight had overtaken the MlQa so that the MZQs were at S o'clock and
were lost from sight.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPED
Tne flight continued, and sighted more HIfr-17a and MI0-21S, but no engageDent
evolved.
10. AIRCREM COMMENTS ..
I
Experience
Total ij P-105 Combat
Hours ' Hours Missions
BLUE 1 3.300 450 15
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE 1: MlGs were lost visually partly because he had to aet up missiles and
take his eye off them. Takes tjoo much time.
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 1: When carrying QP.C;-160, Z have noticed the 85mm flak is quite inaeeurate
and obviously visually fired.
n. DATA SOURCE
Project Interviews ; BLUE 1, 15 Feb 67
Messages: 6^^£P-J| ROLLIHG THUilDER O86, 21 Jan 67 fron 388TPW
«31
Event 11-138
12. MARRATIVC DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was the lead flight of a four-flight gaggle (Including GREEN Plight)
attacklHK a railroad yard on the northeast railway about 15 miles north of Kep airfield.
The strike force encountered very heavy and accurate 85mn flak from 21'*30'N/106»?7'E to
the target (approximate location 21<*37'N/1C6»3«'E). The weather was restricting the
operation since clouds were at 10,000-12,000 feet.
Two aircraft in the number two strike flight collided while dodging the flak,
bursting at the flight's altitude, which was about" 1,000 feet below the overcast.
When the flleht got to the vicinity of the target an unidentified voice called
"there are MlOa back there," BLUE Plight turned left to check, but .10 MIGs were
observed. The distraction, combined with the flak, caused BLUE Plight to overfly the
target and so the flight started a left turn.
In the left turn, when passing through a heading of 135-100 degrees BLUE 1 saw a
niRt.t of F-105S (CREEIJ Flight) paralleling BLUE Plight's course about a mile out and
belo«. BLUE Plight was at 9-10,000 feet at the tine, and GREEN PllRht {one of the
strike flights with BLUE Flights) was at about C,000 feet. BLUE 1 also observed two gray
Hia-»7» at 1-2 o'clock, which were chasing the OREEN Flight. The MIGs were at about
*,0OO ft altitude at GREEN'S 1-5 o'clock position about 2 miles behind GREEN Plight.
Blue Plight was going faster than GREEN Plight and by the time BLUE Plight set up
the switches for clssiles air and Jettisoned ordnance, the MIGs were at 5 o'clock.
BLUE Flight turned to the left to cone back on the HIGs but BLUE « turned right.
By the tiae the remaining three membera of BLUE Plight had joined, the MIGs and P-1058
were lost from view.
BLUE Plight (BLUE 1, 2, 3) then returned to the target area to provide coverage
for possible separated aircraft, while BLUE U exited. BLUE Flight made two 360 degree
turns before exiting.
At approximately I6IOH (it is not known whether BLUE Flight was orbiting or
egressing at this time) when at 21«25'N/106°30'E, heading 075* at 8,000 ft altitude and
500 kt, BLUE 3 saw six gray MIG-17s Immediately below the flight in a left hand race-
track orbit at 3,000 ft altitude. At the same time, BLUE 2 saw two silver MIG-2I3
at 4,000 ft altitude heading 210 degrees. All of the fllgi.ta with BLUE Plight Jettisoned
ordnance without striking the target. However, one other fll^t of another group did
hit the target.
B
II
II
S
I
»3Z
y Event 11-139
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-lOSs va one NIG-21
Reault: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20 mllcB from 21»l9'N/
105*26 *E (approxlofttely
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oat«j/Tlir.e : 21 January 1967/08'JtH
Four F-105S (BLUE Plight) in a pod formation were to strike the. Viet Trl RR yard
(21«18'N/105'*26'E). BLUE Flight was part of the strike force consisting of the aircraft In
Events II.136i 11*141, 11*139. and 11-137. There was a KIQCAP for this mission.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed Korat and refueled » then direct to Channel 97 « and from there direct to the
target .
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1
1 - 6lmr\ gur. (1 ,029 rounds)
2 - 450 gal tanks
1 - AIM-9B
Unknown bomb stores (probably six 7S0 lb)
KIC
Unknown
4. FLI6KT COKOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ! Overcast with minimal visibility.
Altitude ;
Speed ;
f uel State ;
WiKht Formation :
BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4
15.000 ft
062»
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
The MIO was seen at 9 o'clock by BLUE Plight at 35,000 ft displaced out to the side
a 1-2 Qlles. The MIO was seen only by BLUE 1 who saw a NIO-21 high, in a deaoendlng spilt
S, but Immediately lost the HIO agalnat the sky background.
«. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight continued on until NlOa rolled In and went below flight. Plight then
Jettisoned ordnance when the other members of the formation Jettisoned and turned to south.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPED
Flight egressed without further Incident.
8. ORDNANCE
None
9. CQUIPNENT PROBLEMS
None
TO. AIRCRCU COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
P-105
Hours
ISO
175
Combat
Missions
67
Unknown
BLUE 1 Unknown
BLUE 3 2800
Conmen ta_ o n This Encounter
BLUE 3: Apparently the MIQs knew we always seen to go up to the targets this way,
and they were up there that day and waiting for us. I think they were so steep that they
couldn't have fired at this point. The HlQa made a very aggressive attack.
Event 11-139
r'
10. AIR CREW COMMENTS (Continued)
Coowents from Overall Experience
BLUE 4: On break-up flights flew through each other, Cftualng some confusion.
n. DATA SOURCES
Pro/.-'ct Interviews : BLUE 1, 18 Feb 68 j BLUE 3, 16 Feb 68
Kessagesl
388 TPW OPREP-4 ROLLING THUNDER 03* 21 Jan 67
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOK
The flights m Events 11-136, 11-137, 11-139, and Il-lUl were proceeding to the
tarcec In ? box formation. Each flight was In a pod formation, end the box formation had
two nights in the lead, line abreast, followed by two more flights, line abreast, about
one mll'j to the rear and about lOQO feet higher. The flights flying line abreast were
150C to 1000 feet apart, with the aircraft in Event II-I36 (the mission eontnander) on the
rl^l.t frcnt, and those of Event II-lll on the left front. Following were the aircraft
in Events 11-137 and ZI-139, with the aircraft of Event 11-139 on the right. The place-
7.<»iit of elenents within each flight Is unkno%m.
At least two flights of MIC-21s (probably 3 to ^ aircraft each) made a rass on the
formation; one descended from 9 o'clock and very high, passing through the formation In a
steep dive, tetween the lead and following flights. The other MICa were able to attack
the lead two flights closing to within 1/2 mile.
The action occurred at some time between OSiJOH and 0894H and lasted about 1.5
minutes. When first attacked the formation was In the general vicinity of 2l*'07'N/
lOS'OS'E. (Thire are minor differences in the 0?REP sources as to time and place,
deper.dlng on the flight.)
While the action was restricted In time and place, the accounts are such that cor-
relation of sightings cannot be accomplished precisely. Moreover, the flights did not
maintain continuous visual contact with each other; therefore, the reconstruction of the
action of each flight has teen documented separately.
Plight was Inbound to the target when someone called out MICa at 9 o'clock high to
BLUE Flight who was heading 062°. BLUE 3 looked up and saw a flight of F-ts go by on a
reciprocal heading, slightly high. BLUE 1 saw them also but looked up higher to see some
MIG-21S In a spllt-S maneuver from 35,000 ft but then lost them In the blue. BLUE Flight
never saw them but It Is thought that the MIGs rolled out beneath BLUE Flight and pulled
up In front of them and fired at the lead flight In front of BT.UE Plight. BLUE Flight
Jettisoned It's crinance when it was called by the mission cor nder. The lead flight
(who had made a IbO" turn) flew through BLUE I's formation. ' Plight then turned to
the south, asking the lead flight for DF steer but could not see the MZOs though BLUE
Plight was behind the flight being hounded bv NIOs. BLUE Flight then made a few 360"
turns, during the first of which BLUE 3 and 4, become separated from all BLUE 1 and 2.
•3«
Evrnt 1I-1»0
Aircraft InvolvQd: Pour P-lOSs vn two
HZ0-17N
Reault: No danage
Vicinity of EfMounter: Bpproximately
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 January 1967/Approxlaately 1525H
Pllght\"ve^t7l.l\^"''' suppreaaion by four P-lOSa (BLUE Plight) preceded by an IRON HAND
Z. MISSION ROUTE
Departed Takhll for the Gulf of Tonkin for air refuelliw then waai:m»^ i>a
and returned same route. BLUE Plight waa SeSJxJd bHh SJjS^d «S ^"KSS.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
hLljsL 1 utio 3 BLUE 1. 2. 3. H
} " ?T5*i«° 5 - CBU-ZHa
1 - AIM-9B 2 - «50 gal tanka
BLUE had a QRC-I60 1 - gun (1,029 round.)
pod radar standby,
TACON-on IPF-on
(lead only) Doppler-on
BLUE 1, 3. K had QRC.160
pod a
MIG5 - unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ;
Ondereaat. acattered to broken above 20,000 ft; 5 mlXea. vlalblllty In hate.
BLUE 1. 2. 3. »
Altitude ; 6,000 ft
j>cdali. e.; We»;,efly (270*)
A/S: 525 - 550 KCAS
Puei: 10,000 lb
Plight Ponnatlon ; Pod
5. INITIAL DETECTION
»if4tf!Ji^^^ waa heading westerly when BLUE 2 observed 2 M10-17s heading easterly. CO-
altitude, 1 to 1-1/2 mllea out, 80- off the right wing (about 2-2:30 o'clock)".
6. ACTION INITIATED
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Plight continued on and the NlOa ware loat froa sight.
8. ORDNANCE
None.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Nona.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience Total p-i05a Combat
BLUE 2 1,100 700 30
Comments on This Encounter
BLUE 2: It looked like they still had a lot of fuel In their tanks for they aarked real
well when they got rid of them. Didn't appear to be OCI controlled.
Bv«nt 11-140
^*
Ccaaaenta on Overall Experience
BI^ 2: If we see a MIQ carrying an IR missile we drop It down and get out of hla
envelope in the ground noise. If we see him in time we can out run him.
If you see the HIQ first, press a high speed attack, hit hln, and get
out.
11. DATA SOURCE
Project Interview - BLUE 2 (3 Peb 67)
BLUE 3 and < interviewed on U Peb 67 but could not add to the data on this avtnt.
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTtON
BLUE Plight was inbound to the target at 6»000» on wasterly heading at 525 to 550
kt. BLUE 2 then saw 2 MIOs (either 15 or 17a) 80» off his right wing heading easterly -
I- 1/2 miles out, at approxlnately the same altitude. BLUE 2 called It to the other
nenAiers of BLUE Plight, and saw the MIGa fly to the line abreast, when they then dropped
their tanks and turned Into BLUE Plight. BLUE Plight then dropped their tanks and In-
creased their airspeed to 575 KCAS. MIGs dropped back at BLUE'S t:3Q position and BLUE
Plight Just outran thetn. BLUE Flight t^sn hit target and on egress from area never did
see KIQs again. All aircraft returned safely to home base.
Shortly after crossing the coast line BLUE Plight heard the IROK HAND Plight {Event
II- 141) encounter MIGs and although the radio transmissions were Bonitored inbound and
outbound the flight never saw the aircraft Involved.
y tvent ii-m
Aircraft Involved: Poup P-105Da va nine
or ten MI0*-21ft
Result: No damftKe
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*07'N/105*05*E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 January igeT/OS^OH
P ioJ^fSrnp%^''^n'** !!Iw^*i?!? **** "^^^ y***** (21«17'56"N/105»26'10"E) by 4
F-l05a (BLUL Plight). . The flights In Events II-136, -141, -I39. and -137 were also ttmrt
of the strike force. There was MIOCAP for this Blaslon.
2. MISSION ROUTE
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
BLUE 1. 2. 3.
6 - 750-lb bombs
2 - tanks
1 - QRC-I60
I - AIM-9B
1 - 20mn cannon (1,029 rounds)
MlO-21
Unknown
«. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
BLUE 1. 2. 3. k
Altitude : 16,000 ft
Heading: 050 o
Air speed ; 480 KTAS
Kue 1 :. Unknown
mght formation ; Pod formation with 1,000 ft vertical and horisontal separation.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE ? and 3 simultaneously saw and called out three Kia-21a at thm rifirhft.
6. ACTION INITIATED
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Someone then called MIGs at 3 o'clock And nrtiir dh.w* , ^ , ^
BLUE Plight then reversed the ?urn, aSd Sin Se SiSs lilSS Vmrl if*?h^
position to down below the flight. Tanks were i.itJ.^SlS !!- ?* * o'clock
^they're coming «p from helo'iJSliuE^JJJlhrSni'SiJrS?^ t'CJn^a'S SJJiSc..
9, EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
rid o?"Ee^.'''"""'* Jettison bombs normally so had to Jettison MER rack also to get
TO. AIRCREW COHHCNTS
Experience
Total P-105 Combat
Hours Hours Missions
2 3^500 no 15
approx.
^ Event 11-141
Comioepta on thla Encounter '
BLUE 2: The MIC appeared unable to track during his attack and did not attempt to ,
salvas* his run by turning Into BLUE Plight.
Cowmenta on Overall Experlencg
BLUE 2: We have a good system (F-105) as It la right now if we had a tetter
power«-to-wel^t ratio.
11. DATA SOURCE
Project Intei-vlgw : BLUE 2, 17 Jan 67
Messatres : 38BTFW OPREP-3 210525Z Jan 67 DOI 0206
12. MftRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Tlie flights m Events 11-136, 11-137, 11-139, and II-lUl were proceeding to the target
in a box formation. Each flight was In a pod forraation, and the box formation had 2
fllriits in the lead, line abreast, followed by 2 more flights, line abreast, about one mile
to the rear and about 1000 feet higher. The flights flying line abreast were 150 to 2000
feet aoart, with the aircraft In Event 11-136 (the mission eononander) on the right front
and these of Event 1I-1»1 on the left front. Following were the aircraft In Events 11-137
and 11-139 with the aircraft of Event 11-139 on the right. The placement of the elements
within each flight is unknown.
At least two flights of MIG-21s (probably 3-'' aircraft each) made a pass on the
formation, one descended from 9 o'clock and very high, passing through the formation
In a ateep dive, between the lead and following flights.- The other MIGs were able to
attack the lead two flights closing to within 1/2 mile.
The action occurred at some time between 0640H and 08<(4H^ and lasted about 1.5
minutes. .When first attacked the formation was In the general vicinity of 21^07'H/
105°O5*E.^
While the action was restricted in time and place, the accounts are such that
correlation of sightings cannot be acconpllshed precisely. Moreover, the flights did
not maintain continuous visual contact with each other, therefore, the reconstruction
of the action of each flight had been documented separately.
BLUE Plight was Inbound to the target at 16,000 ft heading 060" at HBO let when
SLUE 2 and 3 saw a flight of aircraft at their B o'clock position at 35,000 ft altitude
2 nmi out. At first, BLUE 2 thought they were P-iis but then they dove on the flight
and sooeone called out "they're Hia-21s." lead then went into a shallow left turn.
BLUE 3 and 4 called out MI :1s at 3 o'clock high and lead turned to the right. HZOs at
8 o'clock were now 1 nml behind, however, the NIGs on the rl;ht appeared to be diving
on another flight and Lead reversed back to the left, descending in time for BLUE 2
to see Mics dive below the flight's 6 o'clock position 1/2 nai out and low. These
NIGs were not seen again.
As BLUE Plight reversed, BLUE 2 heard other flights call MIGs at 6 o'clock and
shooting. BLUE Flight then saw the other flights Jettison their tanks and they did
the saate. Then s«neone from another flight called out "they're coming up from
6 o'clock low." At this point everyone started a hard turn to the left in after-
burner at which time BLUE 1 called for Jettlaonlng of the ordnance In the vicinity
of 21*X2»K/105'*12'r
BLUE Plight was now at 12,000 ft 420 KTAS, heading 010" at 21"12*II/105"12*E,
0841H, in a left turn and descending through a cloud layer. While descending BLUE 3
observed 3 BK>re NIC'-21s' immediately below then at 3,000 ft altitude heading approxi-
mately ISO". BLUE Flight continued In left turn to the west and egrosaed the area.
Plight returned safely home.
During ittgreaa BLUE Plight experienced moderate flak exploding about 1,000 feet
below them, starting about 30 miles out from the target. After the flight's iSO**
turn, and during egress, very little flak waa seen, and It was not in their Imnediata
vicinity.
^There are minor differences In the OPREP sources as to time and place, depending on
the pmrtlcular flight.
^Of the 24 boMba in BLUE Plight l8 were dropped armed. BLUE 3 Jettisoned safe due to
failure of normal release.
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105Ds w flw MM-lTa
Re»ult: No dainage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*1X*«/106'»46'B
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: 21 January 1967/15J2H
«r. iTe Xoi,'Z,u''lif;^i,'llU!iA fi'JiS '^t" «S 18.23. Th.r.
2. HISSION ROUTE
to 21*J?'J/l"7'58'E'5l'Jeit'?S 5^'u?^/IS2^J;.^°!:,"'J^•il"f Bro«n Anchor then direct
Egreee was the reverse of iSouid ro!!u? 21-WN/106»12'E to tarje?.
3. AIRCRAFT C0NFI6URATI0HS
* ?-10S BLUE 1, ^
? - 3.000 lb bombs
1 - QRC-160
1 - 650 gal t»nJcs
1 - «un (1.029 rounds)
P^IOS BLUE h
6 - 750 lb bombs
1 - QRC-160
2 - t50 sal tanks
1 - gun (1,029 rounds)
MIQ>17 Mia 1, p, „^ ^
Sliver in color
4. fLUHT CONOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
!M= Cloud. X200 ft scattered to bro ken; visibility 3 mile. In base at 6000 ft.
I 5 3 7
—1500 ft AOL--
Headlnp;: j^^o
Fuel State ! Uhknom
Plight F ormation : Tactical
5. INITIAL DETECTION
?':'5V^;„L%^nSS!.°^&'»'^"S.»J,«;»4 contact .a. „
lUGs were low, on the deck. was at ^500 ft altitude heading 276® and
6. ACTION INITIATED
lit *S!JbSMr^S^Jc«llrated''iiaJ.°'^ ^' «»n«-*>»l' mie. back, BLUE Plight
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT
.galn^S!? Jii'^iei?'^ .gain .a. tto.. this time at 10 o'clock but
9. EQUIPHE.'fT PROBLEMS
BLUB 2, 3, 4 QRc Pod didn't work
* Had ft compressor stall and had to divert
Into Danang. Unable to refuel alno.
BLUE 1 Overload on battery - had to shut It down.
10. AIRCREW PROBLEMS
Experience : BLUE H about his 52 mission.
Comments on this Encounfc*!* !
control"^ecauai SriSe'SiirLj;?."'"' '^"^ 3 or 4. n,e Hio. must have been under OCX
439
y Event 11-144
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105s vs five to eight
MIG-17a
Results: One P-I05 damaged
Vicinity of Encounter: 21^13 'N/106**2«*E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND* TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 January 1967/approxlmately I62OH
Four F-1055 on a Sah suppression nlsslon in support of a strike In the Hanoi Delta
region. The strike force was to hit the Bac Olang railroad and highway bridge (JCS 18.23),
2. MISSION ROUTE
Takhll to air refueling over the Oulf of Tonkin, then north to the coast at 21*00 »M/
107'21'E. Direct to 2I''13'N/106*24'E. The egress route was the reverse.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F -lCiF BLU^ 1 and |
2 - ACH-1*5
2 - CBU-2II
2 - i*50-gal tanks
1029 rounds 20min atr.110
P-IO5D BLUE 2 and ll ^
6 - "jOO-lb bombs
2 - 'JSO-gal wing tanks
1029 rounds 20rBn amcio
All aircraft camouflaged
MIG-17
Dull sliver with Red Star
Armament unknown
Had afterburners
Drop tanks were seen as they were jettisoned
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Clear 3 to !> miles visibility below 7000 ft.
BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4
Altitude : 2500 ft
Heading: 090
Speed : 500 KTAS
Fuel State : 10,000 lb
Flight Forr.atlon
The flight had just fired a SHRIKE at an altitude of 6000 ft on a heading of about
300 degrees and had completed a right diving turn to a heading of east. BLUE 1 in front
and BLUE 3 and k off to his left 2-3000 ft out. BLUE 2 was Inside the turn and 6-7000 ft
back. BLUE 2*3 burner went out in the turn.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
MIO warnings had been received by the flight prior to entering the target area froa
BIO EYE. But none were received for this specific encounter.
BLUE Plight heading east, 2500 ft altitude, and 500 knots. BLUE 4 called two MIO-lTs
at 10 o'clock, 500 to 1500 ft high and parallel to the flight's direction, about 1 mile
away. Three to four seconds later BLUE 2 called HIGs at 3 o'clock high. The MIGs at
3 o'clock were at close range, but opening on BLUE 2.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight jettisoned tanks and ordnance; lit afterburners and attempted to outrun
the MIOa.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The MICs at 10 o'clock attacked BLUE 3 and 4 causing then to break left and separate
fro« the rest of the flight. Tlie MIGs inflicted two hits on BLUE 4 before BLUE 3 and 4
were able to accelerate away from them.
Tr»e MiOs calle-l at 3 o'clock, dropped In on BLUE 1*8 6 o'clock position and fired at
BLUE 1. BLUE 2 called a break md fired at the HIGs. The MIOa broke left as BLUE 1
broke right. Then two other MIGs attacked BLUE 2 ani chased him for several nilea firing
several rounds of anno. BLUE 2's afterburner was ln.)peratlve consequently he was unable
to outrun or maneuver away from the KIGs. Finally t.y HIGs broke off and SLUE 2 egreased
the area.
pi:*' ' •. --Si.-*^
«3
Event 11-144
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1. 3, and 1
BLUE 2
HIGs At least four HIGs fired at the flight
NIG 2(one of the about <i} ?3mn hits in BLUE 4*b aircraft
None
'310 rounds 20mm In 3 bursts
Danage unknown
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2*s afterburner went out and wound not relight. His gun did not fire after the
second burst for a few seconds. He pulled the trigger several tines before it began to
operate. The two ailrrors in the F-105 do not offer real good coverage of the 6 o'clock
position. There is also a lot of reflection with the double canopy and at some angles
you can't see through the canopy at all. He was not able to change switch settings from
ground to air attack In time, consequently did not have a sight.
10. AIRCRCU COMMENTS
Experience
BLUE 2
BLUE 4
P-105
Hours
200
Combat
Missions
20
*00 200 20 BLUE 2, after completing flight school,
attended F-105 gunnery at Nellis AFB direct
to SEA.
3800 1000 Unknown Has flight experience In the P-S^lp, P-lOl,
and F-105B/D.
BLUE 2 had problems switching from a ground attack mode to alr-to-alr; recommend a
switch on the throttle to switch over. Also the mirror is inadequate due to the reflec-
tion of light through the double canopy. BLUE 2 felt the only reason he was not hit was
because he was so close to the ground the HIGs could not track. Ke felt the speed capa-
bility of the P-105 was excellent under normal conditions but since his burner did not
work ho was not able to get any air speed.
BLUE 4 felt he was able to outrun the MICs quite easily and this is the reason they
broke off the attack.
BLUE 2. 17 March 1967; and BLUE 4, 8 February 1967
355 TPW. 211i(10Z, Jan 67 OPREP 3 DOTO-0-1026U
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
Messages. Reports :
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight had Just rolled out on a heading of east, after launching a SHRIKE missile
at a Pansong radar. Speed and altitude were 500 KTAS and 3000 ft. BLUE 2 was 6<»7000 ft
back and Inside the turn, and his afterburner went out when he applied g*8 In the turn,
as a consequence he was not able to keep up with the flight.
BLUE 4 called MICs at 10 o'clock, BLUE 2 called MIGs at 3 o'clock. (Plve to 8 HIGs
were sighted, things happened too fast from this point on for the flight members to
recall how nany aircraft were Involved.) BLUE 1, 3 and went afterburner and BLUE 1 called
for the flight to Jettison stores. All members of the flight Jettisoned tanks and ordnance
(BLUE 2 still did not hav- ar. operational afterburner.)
The MIGs at the 10 o'clock position made a left diving pursuit curve on BLUE 3 and 4
Inflicting two 23mm hits on BLUE 4 one hit the left wing and the other the left flap.
BLUE 3 and 4 brok< left .Into the HIGs and becoming separated from BLUE 1 and 2. acceler-
ated, outrunning the KIQs and egressed the area.
The NIOs that were called out at the 3 o'clock position made a pass on BLUE 1.
BLUE 2 called for BLUE ] to break right and fired at the MIG between him and BLUE X. At
this time BLUE 2 was at 400 knots and 3-4000 ft altitude and 6000 to 7000 feet behind
BLUE 1. The MIG was pulling high, opening, and the angle off was high since BLUE 2 had
a good planforn view of the MIC. The MIG broke off left as BLUE 1 broke hard right. At
firing BLUE 2 was approximately 3000 ft or better behind the MIG when he fired. He did
not Observe any hits. He did not have time to switch from ground to guns air and conse-
quently still had a fixed 108 mil depression In the sight. .He fired primarily to scare
the MIG off realizing he did not stand much chance of hitting without a sight. Ke fired
three bursts. On the third burst the gun wouldn't fire until after he had pulled the
trigger several times.
^^"^ ^ ^" **** *'^Sht turn so then they were almost abreast and heading
south. BLUE I's EWO in the backseat called, "break". BLUE 2 broke hard left and down as
37«m cannonshells went by the canopy. The HIG started shooting again and BLUE 2 reversed
turn to the right descending to within 20-50 ft above the ground as the bullets went by
th* canopy. BLUE 2 could see the shells hitting the ground in front of the aircraft.
BLUE 2 then loat track of BLUE I while at 370 knots heading louth. He turned back to the
east and BLUE 2'8 airspeed was now about 350 knots. He was right on the deck with two
MIOs on his tall; one on each side about 3000 ft back and slightly high. The MIGs fired
Conmenta from Overall Experlencf Ev«nt 11-142
BLUE 4: nie QRC Pods are good. n«« NIQs are a lot less threat than the 3Alls and the
n. DATA SOURCE
Project Intervlewa : BLUE 4, 4 Feb 1967.
Message*. Reports ;
366 TPW DNQ PASTEL 552 OPREP.3 2U244Z Jan 67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRrPTION
BLUE Plight Inbound to the target at an altitude of 1500 ft AOL beading 276* where
BLUE 4 sighted four MIG-17S at hi3 3 o'clock position. The NIQs were tl*pee miles out, and
at abou.^ ground level (about 1000 ft below the flight). The MIGs turned into the flight
and went around the back to BLUE ft's 8 o'clock position, 6 o'clock to BLUE 1 about two and
one-half miles behind BLUE 1. BLUE 4 then called then out to Lead who went afterburner
and accelerated away.
BLUE Plight then dropped ordnance on their assigned target. On egress about hilfway
out along the rldge» at 21«»25'N/106'»36'E, BLUE 4 saw one MIG-l? at his 10 o'clock position,
low, 3-4 miles out, heading approximately 90° from BLUE Plight who were ar, 2500 ft, head-
ing 096". The MTG turned and paralled BLUE Flight's path. The KIO turned to a reciprocal
heading, about 1 mile north of BLUE Plight and went by, disappearing behind and below.
BLUE Plight continued on and egressed the area for an air-to-air refueling.
BLUE 1, 2, and 3 returned home safely but BLUE 4 diverted into Danang because he was
unable to refuel and because of an engine compressor stall. No aircraft received damage.
Event 21-14}
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105Ds V6 two KI0-19;i
Result : No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21 14'N/106 18*E
1. PRIHARr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 January 1967/L621H
Four F-105D aircraft (BLUE Flight) were the last strike flleht attacking JCS 18.23.
They were part of a larger strike force which Included, as support, a fllcht of P-4Cs which
was at an unknown location near BLUE Flight during the encounter.
2. MISSION ROUT€
BLUE Flight was from Takhli but the route Is unknown.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4
? - 3, POO fter.t's
The other stores are unknown but probably Included a QRC-160 pod and a centerllne tank.
11. DATA SOURCES
355TFW 211400Z Jan 6? OPREP-3 DOTO-0 0265
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
At 0820Z while BLUE U was In the vicinity of 21<'m'N/106*l8'E at 6,000 feet he saw
2 MIG-19S under the flight approximately 2,000 feet below on a heading of 150 degrees.
As BLUE k continued on the KiGs relied around behind BLUE 4 and made a left hand
climbing turn under the flight.
As the flight rolled In on the target, (at 0821Z) BLUE 4 went Into his dlvebomb pass
with the /.IGs now at 3 o'clock waiting for BLUE k to co-e out of his bomb run. BLUE 4
reieeaed his ordnance on the target and then started up and to the left, then turn-d to
the right at which time the MIGs attacked at l.ooo feet. As BLUE began to turn into
the MIGs the MIGs attempted one pass. BLUE « t!,en went to afterburner and left the s-'ICs
in a rlgnt descending turn about jO seconos after leaving the target.
BLUE 4 was the only flight nexber Invol .ed with the .'HQs.
»„H i-it.c r, ,4 u ^ ^ . ■•' Event Il-llJlt
and LLtE 2 Jinked left ano rlchl. attenptlng to turn Into each attack as the MIG turned
In to fire. The MlG's fire passed to either side of him. Thla situation lasted for 5 or
6 miles; the KIGc shootlnp and BLUE 2 dodelns bulletj, and staying low. Finally the HlCs
either got too far from Kep or ran out of anmunltlon, since they quit firing and broke
off to the right and BLUE 2 turned left toward the coast.
• BLUE I, on ef.ress, heard the calls of BLUE 2 and started to turn back to helo BLUE 2
but hy then the :;iCs had broken off so BLUE 1 turned to an exit heading.
i-> .'"'^^^f ee^'ess. BLUE U , at 5000 ft altitude and 600 knots saw one M1G.17 at
12 o clock low 1.1/2 to 2 Riles away. The HIC was at 500 ft altitude on a reciprocal
course. No action was taken by either the HIC or BLUE ft, and BLUE H continued to egress
to the tanker.
y. Event 11-115
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105B v» four Mia-17»
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^lT'H/lOS'SB'E
1. PRINARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlrae: 22 January 1967/0936H
Four F-105S were on a strike mission. The target was a group of railroad tracks at
Thang Quang siding. The flight was one of four In a gaggle fomation and was last flight
in on target.
2. HISSION ROUTE
Departed Korat and refueled. Then proceeded ME to the upper end of Thud Ridge to
pick ;*p F-i* escort. Then do*m SE to target. Came off target In Boutherly heading and
vent into right turn to proceed up Thud Ridge.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
F-105 BLUE 1. a. 3. 1
6 - 730 Ih OP bombs
2-430 sal tanks
1 - QRC - 160 POD
1 - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9)
TACAH - Rec. only; Radar, Stby, IPP/Stby, Pod/On, Doppler/Off
MIO-17 mo 1. 2. 3. 1
Armament unknown
Silver color
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Broken variable scatter, tops at 5,000 ft. Visibility 10 ni in hate.
3 t 1
BLUE
1 i 2
AltltuJe :
KeadlngT
Fuel State;
7,000 ft
290'
550 kt
Unknown
4,000 ft
Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
MICs first seen by BLUE 1 while in a left turn at his 8 o'clock position 5-6,000 ft
out at 4,030 ft altitude at 0936K.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 stayed in his slight left turn and continued ahead. He was already in front
of MIQ3 and his speed was up. BLUE 2 want high. BLUE 3 and 4 turned and closed on MIQs.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPED
BLUE 3 and 4 closed In on MIO 1 and 2. BLUE 3 went after MIO 1 who never got any
closer than 3,000 ft on BLUE 1. BLUE 3 fired his missile which seamed to be at good
range whereupon BLUE 1 broke hard right and downward and HIO 1 broke very hard left and
deseeded very rapidly. Missile did not appear to guide due to high g load. All air«
craft continued up Thud Ridge.
S. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1, 2, 4
BLUE 3
MIO 1. 2, 3. t
Mo. flred/No. hits
SIdewIKdES
AIM-9B
None
VO
Remarks
Did not guide.
Unknown
Event II.l«5
9. EQUIPNCNT PROBLMS
BLUE 3 had two bombs hung up and also a missile that appeared not to guide during HIO
hlgli g turn.
10. AiRCRCH COHHEHTS
E«perienee
Total Combat
Hours Hours His a ions
BLUE 3 2600 70 50
CoBMcnts on This Encounter :
BLUE 1 MIGs possibly Just came out of Phuc Yen talcing off to the SE and making a
180* turn to the left. They already had tne speed advantage and didn't want to alow
dom. Didn't feel it was wise to chase them down to the middle of Hanoi.
BLUii 2 Missiles did not perform the g load required tc take it.
BLUE 3 As he set up for the missile, he thought that he heard the missile tone and
eveiything appeared perfect. The visibility was bad that day and so it could have been
that because of the haze layer that the SIDEWINDER did not track properly. NIGa mad* no
attempt to follow the BLUE Plight.
Conments irom Overall Experience :
BLUE 1 The F-105 system Is an air-to-ground weapon system. Therefore* it is not
as agile as a pure fighter system. It should not be required to do so much maneuvering
In order to defend itself in the air superiority role. The P-IOS should have a weapon
system that can work around the clock.
BLUE 2 Thla la probably the flrat firing of a missile from a Thud so it might have
surprised the NIQa quite a bit.
BLUE 3 To go from a bombing mode to an air-to-air mode requires at least four steps
In tbe fire control system. Heed more SIDEHINDER firings in training.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
BLUE 2 and 3, 16 Feb 67
Measages. Reports s
saamr 220600 jan 67 » oprep 3. doi 1225
12. NARRATIVE OESCRXPTtON
The flight cane off the target In a right turn through a southerly heading. BLUE 2
was Joining on BLUE 1 who had gone into a left shallow turn and was 2,000 ft back.
BLUE 3 did some S-turns off so that he and BLUE ^ could rejoin as BLUE 3 had hung ordnance
and wanted It confirmed by BLUE U. BLUE 3 Jettisoned the ordnance armed in the vicinity
of Sl'SO'S/lOS'lO'E after the encounter. BLUE 1 heading 290*. 7000 ft altitude, and
350 kts CA5 observed four MIGs at his 8 o'clock position climbing in a left 10*> bank turn
out of 4,000 ft In an element of two, heading 300^. He called the MIOs out to the rest of
the flight at which time he observed the MIOs turning into him and closing to within
3,000 ft. This is as close as the two MIGs ever got. No one else in the formation ever
saw MIC 3 and * and BLUE 1 lost sight of them after the initial sighting. Meanwhile,
BLUE 2 high speed yo-yo'ed on the MIGs in an attempt to get into the 6 o'clock. BLUE 3
and 4 also saw the MIGs at their 9 o'clock, turned into them to engage, rolling out at
their 6 o'clock 7,000 ft behind with a positive overtake, BLUE 1 then called for the
fllSht to set up their missile switches which BLUE 2 and 3 acknowledged. BLUE 1 then saw
the HIGs approaching the 6 o'clock and began Jinking. The HIGs stayed with them. By this
tine BLUE 2 Is line abreast with the MIOs and is about to turn Into them when BLUE 3 calls
that he is about to launch the mlsslJe. BLUE 2 then calls out that he will stay out of
the way and BLUE 3 closes to within 3,000 ft of MIO 1. MIQ 2 meantime, is on the left
wing of his leader following him and BLUE U is on the right of BLUB 3< BLUE 3 then calla
Diaalle away, Alt 7.000 ft, speed 530 kt and BLUE 1 goes into a hard turn to the right
and down. HIO 1 simultaneously goes into a very hard, steep descending turn to the left
after the missile Is fired. Missile seems as though It is unable to keep up with the
g loads of the MIC. BLUE 3 at this point cannot see MIG 2 since he has overflown him and
la under his aircraft's nose. So BLUE 3 does an S-turn to the right and BLUE 1 pe^'forma
a turn to the left. Both see the two MIGs in a descending turn to the south towards
Hanoi. BLUE 2 then rejoins with BLUE 1, with BLUE 3 and It 3 to 5 miles behind, and all
four aircraft fly up the ridge and head home. They do not follow the MIOs due to a high
SAM threat In Hanoi area.
fi^mi ffiiSf
ggp BARON 1^.145 SUMMART
—
Tine -
. Action Alrcraf
' Status
t (BLUE 1, 3, 4)
Ac 1 1 on
Other Friendly
Comnunicatlons
Eneiiy Actions
(MI6 1.2)
ftenarks
K}t: 7.000 ft
c1 ioblng
Speed: SSO kt
Head: 290*
Bl sees MIGs at 8 o'cloc i
S-6.000 ft back 4.000 ft
alt at approxinately
4S0 kt.
83 & 4 had re- i
joined off target i
AS 63 had hun^ <
ordnance and ^ad i
to jettison tUm.
83 sees MIGs et
9 o'clock.
J1 called out 4 MIGj
It 8 o'clock. 83
rails B4 "Those are
I16s." 84 "Roger".
>iI6s \r, left turn
10* head 300*. Sees
81 roll right to
engage.
me appear to be In
traffic pattern and
Just taking off froi
Phuc Ven.
83 jettisoned the
ordnance after the
encounter.
h
AU: 7. SCO ft
Speed: SSO lit
81 begins scissors. Call
63 to set up switches
92 goes high trying to
get behind HISs
83 t 4 turn Into
HIGs and roll out
7,000 ft behind
M lU 1 » O O C 1 K •
B4 on wing of 3.
Bl calls 83 to set
lip switches. 83
calls setting up
switches as does B2
13 in afterburner.
83 calls ready to
fire nisslle.
HIG date to within
3.000 ft of 61 's
6 o'clock position
and Jinx with Bl .
AU: Descending
Speed: increasing
Bl breaks downward to thi
right. B2 line abreast
with H16s and stays high
and out of the way.
> B3 fires Missile
at 3,000 ft. Loses
sight of HI6 2.
Begins an S-turn to
to the right.
83 calls missile
away. 62 calls
staying out of way
and high.
MIGs break hard to
the le^'t and down.
After being in a
right 20* break to
the right when
nisslle fired.
Missile appears to
track at first but
doesn't seen to be
able to withstand
high g's forced on
it by MIGs tight
turn .
Bl goes Into left turn
and sees Ntfi descending
left.
83 sees NIGs in
descending left
turn .
Event II-lW
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSa vs four
HI0-17S
Result! No Daaase
Vicinity of Encounter; Approximately 21*10«N/
106<»3O'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATtON
Oate/Tlme: 27 January 1967/Unknown
Pour P*1058 on a Btrlke alaelon agalnat a railroad yard northeaat of Kep*
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed Korat RTAPB for the Qulf of Tonkin for air refueling, then direct to
20«08*N/107<>43*E, direct to 21*10*N/107*3t*E, directly west to target.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
e-lOji iilbL 1. i, j. H
1 - AIM-98 (SIDEWINDER)
1 - Gun (1,029 rounds)
Other armaaent unknown
MIQ-178
Unknown
4. FLIfiHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Overcast with tops at 5*000 ft. Visibility was good above the clouds. Target
only area open. Area south Of target 6xoUd ooverda.
BLUE 1. 2. 3. <
Altitude : 15,000 ft
Heading : Westerly
Speed : 500-520 KTAS
Fuel State ; Unknown
Plight Pcrmation : Pod
5. IHITIAL CONTACT
BLUE 3 initially sighted the HTGs at 10 o'clock position, low and cllnblng at about
12 nllea. Clear silhouette of MIQ-r.Ta.
6. ACTION INITIATED
When niOs turned Into flight, BLUE Plight turned left into MIQs.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
HIGs broke off and continued reciprocal heading. No engagement.
8. ORDNANCE
Hone expended.
10. AIRCREW COHNENTS
Experience
Total P-105 Conbat
Hours Hours msaiona
BLUE 3 1200 TOO 67
BLUE 1 4300 100 30
BLUE 2 and 4 Not Interviewed
Ceaments on This Encounter
BLUE 3 - MIQs were probably QCI controlled.
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 3 - P-105 needs more wing area and more power. One Improvement to our training
would be to practice against other aircraft, such as an P-102 which la highly maneuver-
able. Enough Information is displayed for the guns out range should be digital readouts
and not analogue. "Terrible visibility from the 4 to 8 o'clock position" In the P-105
and mirrora are useless for other than watching wlngaan during taxiing. Seems that MXO
pilots aren't very experienced.
Event 11. H6
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Intervlewa ; BLUE 1 and BLUE 3
U. HAKftATlVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was Inbound to the target at 15,000 ft, heading westerly at 500 to 520
knots when BLUE 3 spotted two MIG-lTs at 10 o'clock position and low. (Other members of
flight reported total of four HIOs.) It appeared as though the MIGa had Just taken off.
The NIGs turned Into the flight as if to engage, and BLUE flight turned left into then.
The HICs then broke off the engagement and continued In an easterly direction and
cUnbing. After 30* of turn, BLUE Flight headed toward the target, dropped
ordnance and egressed the area returning safely to home station, tto damage or encounter
l^-^ini^l^ 11.-1*7
Alrcran invoXve'.:' Pj-,[;^°5D. v. three •
Reault: No damage -.icn.u/
Viclnit, Of Encounter: JPgroxljately 21 20 M/
, PRIMART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 29 January 1967/Unknown Northeast Railroad.
Pour P-l05Da (BLUE Flight) -ere on a strike mls.lon ag
U. DATA SOURCES •
... .... interview : Member of BLUE Plight. 15 Feb 67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^.h*.»,t Railroad. They Ingreseed to the
BLUE PllKht was on a strike against the Northeast Rallroaa. :^ ^^^^
IFilHi ^^^^^ - .....
Event 11-148
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-l05s vs four HI0-21b
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 22*00 'N/l 05*^35 •£
1. PRIMARY MISSION AKO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 4 February igeT/oStieH
faetoJr2r«Jh«Ii*?^*'Jhf Pfi«»«-y target, the strike group was diverted due to unsatls-
iBctory weather In the target area.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Unknoim
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
Unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
BLUE 1. 2. ^. 4 MIQ 1. 2 MIQ 3. 4
iiS^iHde: 14,000 ft 25,000 ft 28,000 ft
Heading: 270** li6'» oSO^
5. INITIAL DETECTION
the initial detection are unknown. Pour MIG-21 airplanes were sighted In
flights of two airplanes each. Both flights quickly disappeared to the southeast Closest
approach or the MiGs wasj estimated to be five miles. ^pp""" " southeast. Closest
fi. ACTION INITIATED
Ko action 'cy either sld*.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
None. Sighting only.
8. ORDNANCE
Noi\!e
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
10. AIRCREU COMMENTS
No data.
11 . DATA SOURCES
Messages: 338TFW OPREP-3 040355Z Feb 67 PASTEL DOI 156 Feb 67
388TPW OPREP-3 0405 OZ Feb 67 DOI 0357 Feb 67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
* initial detection are unknown. Pour MIG-21 airplanes were sishted
in flights of two airplanes each. Both flights quickly disappeared to the southeast
Closest approach of the MIOs was estimated to be five miles. soumeast.
^ " ^ '"^ Event 11-119
Aircraft Invplved: Pour P-I05s va six HIO-218
Result: SlgJ^tlng only
Vicinity .of Encounter: Zi^lS •N/10l"20*E
\. fRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Tine: «l Pebruary 1967/0730H
2. MISSION ROUTE
Unknown
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. » (Ordnance load estimated from limited available data)
1 - AIM-9B
4 - CBU-24 pods
2 - ^50 g:i1 external fuel tank-.
1 - N-61 Bun (1029 rd mno)
MIOs - Unknown
4. f LIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
BLUE 1. 2, 3> 1
Altitude ; 18,000 ft
He ading ; Unknown
Speed ; tOO KIAS
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 2 first sighted two MIOs at 2 o'clock, high, at three miles.
6. ACTION INITIATED
P-105B engaged afterburner and maneuvered mildly to keep the MIQs In sight.
7. siTL'ftTior. :evelop;i:;;t ' ^ , .
Two Mias were approaching head-on with two additional "IQ^ approximately 6 000 ft in
trail. The first two MIGs pulled up Into a steep wingover and dropped In at 5 o clock,
then the MIGs broke away.
8. ORDNANCE
None expended.
9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
^^S^S£l£BS£, ^^^^^
• Hours Hours Missions
BLUE 2 150 200 20
BLUE 2 was very impressed with the turning ability of the MIO-21.
11. DATA SOURCE
Project Interviews : BLUE 2, 6 Peb 1967.
12. MARRATIV )E::RIPT10N
BLUE Plight was enroute to the target, at 18.000 ft, HOO KIAS, when BLUE 2 sighted two
MIOs at 2 o'clock,%lgh, at approximately three nlles. BLUE 1 (lead) then saw two more
approach head-oi? co.altl?ude. BLUE 3 saw another section of MIGs 'J?"* ^'^OO ft.
i«w in-trail with this lead section. As the MIOs passed head-on they pulled up into a
s?e;p ilngiier anS d^Spirinto the 5 o'clock position on BLUE Plight. The MIOs suddenly
broke away and dis*»ppeared . No ordnance was fired.
Event 11-150
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105b vs three
unl'lentl fled aircraft
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity or Encounter: 21^30 *N/10l|«30*E
I. PRIMARr HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Time: 4 February I967/O859H
dlverferfroi^th^^^^J""" * S**"^ ' S^oup. The group had been
aiverted from the primary target due to adverse weather in the area.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105 BLUE 1.2 , U
2 - 3,000-lb bombs
1 - AIM-9B SIDEWINDER
1 - M«6l Gun (full 20nni asuso)
5. INITIAL litTECTION
6, ACTION INITIATED
The flight Jettisoned bonbs.
II. DATA SOURCES
Hesaagea :
388TPM/OPREP-3/01I03552 Peb 67/DOI I56 Peb 67.
Other:
RED BARON MIO Incident Summary.
•53l^65WEar^ Even*; 11-151
Aircraft involved: Pour P-IOS* vs two ;iia-17»
Result: No danaee
Vicinity of Encounter: ZO'ze'N/lOS'lS'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 1 February 196V/i.600H
Four P-105 airplanes had completed an attack and were departing the target area.
2. KISSIOK ROUTE
Unknown
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-105 Bl. g. 3. t
1 - N-61 gun
1 . SIDEWINDER (AIH>9B}
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Visibility leas than five miles In haze and SDoke.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 3 sighted two MIG-l? airplanes on a heading of 220° In a descending, right turn.
The HICs leveled off approxinately 1/2 to 1 n mi, 20o to the right of the nose of BLUE 3,
and 500 ft above BLUE Flight.
6. ACTION INITIATED
The MIGa limnediately pulled up into a steep, climbing, right turn and disappeared
into the haze.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Just before the MIGs disappeared BLUE 3 launched a SIDEWINDER that appeared to follow
the MIGs into the haze. Ho detonation of the missile was observed. BLUE 3 engaged after-
burner in an attempt to regain contact with the HIOs.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. rired/No. hits)
SIDEWINDER
AIH-9B
BLUE 3 1/0
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
10. AIRCREW COHHENTS
No data.
n. DATA SOURCES
Message ;
355TFW/OPRE?-3/c ;i320Z Feb 1967 DOTO-0-10l»36 Feb 67.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight had cortplcted an attack and was egrensing from the area when BLUE 3
sighted two MIG-17 airplanes. No previous MIG warning had been received when BLUE 3
called a warning. The MIGs were on a heading of 220o in a descending, right turn. After
leveling off approximately 1/2 to I n ml , 20«» to the right of BLUE 2, and 500 ft above
BLUE Flight, the MIGs pulled up Into a steep, climbing, right turn. Just before the
HIGs disappeared into the haze, BLUE 3 launched a SiDc^WINDEn toward tne NlSs. The mis-
siles appeared to track but no detonation was observed. BLUE 3 engaged afterburner in an
attempt to recain contact with the MIGs. There were no further MIC sightings as BLUE
Flight returned to base undaraaged.
Remarks
Results unobserved. Lost Sight of the missile
and the MIG in the haze.
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CO
WSEG REPORT 116
AIR-TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA (U)
Volume. IJI: Events from 1 M.irch 1967 to
1 August 19<>'^ and Misccliancous EvCiits
February 1969
i'
c
it
IN
f .
1 I
Comprising
IDA IU:P0 H.T R-{:s •/
John S. Artin'.'l:o. Pry'ic: LijJtr
O-
o
OCT 24 1975
D
IDA
• . ;.'~f
I i
INSTITI.TH FOR DEFENSE AN.U.V5FS
SVSTi-MS EVALUATION DIVISION ....
"EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECUSSIFI CATION
schedule;^ PRESCRIBED BY L 0. 1165Z/
'X' i: A C N i i Y : T L- V. S L V A L r A T 1 0 N G S. ( ; [ :
5 0 li /. Pv :,l Y ■ N A V Y D R P; E . A Iv ! N G TO X . \'
DDC CQI'ITR
I
(Thto page to u n cle— tflagg
D D C
OCT 24 1975
"EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL D EC USSIFI CATION
SCHEDULE." .. PaESCRIBED BY L 0. 11652^
t
- I
J
0
0
B
s
0
0 I
0 i
.1
AIR.TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA^^g^
Volume riTWjvcncs from I March 1967 to
I August 1967 and J^isccllancous Events ^^/^ '^^^^
February 1969 ^ i^jM^
Thil raport Kn been prepored by the Systetm Evaluotion Dtvtiien of .
th« IratiHite for Deferwe Anolyies in re«pon>e to the V/eopoin Syttetitt '
Evoluotion Group Task Order SD-0AHCI5 67 C 0OI2-T-IO4A doted
6 December 1966. r' " . — , /.
In the work under this Tojk Order, the Imtitute Koi^.?een cusisted fay
militor/ personnel anigned by WSEG. , _ _
•HAIIOHtt SECURinr IBFOmUTIOH-K '"^ ~ ^
ID/I
OCT 24 »75
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
" SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION
400 ArmyrNavy Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22202
"EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
cv^urnHi r ti PDro^rRIRPn RV F 0. W(\W> ^
IDA Log No. HQ 69-9621
36 1
UNCLASSiFlEa
FORlWORO
This report Is a product of the Systems Evaluation Division
of the Institute for Defense Analyses In conjunction with the
Weapons Systems Evaluation Group in response to WSEG Task Order
SD-35-T-10il, as modified In a memorandum for Director, WSED,
troa Director s WSEG, dated k August 1966. The memorandum re-
sulted from a request by the Deputy Director, Tactical Warfare
Programs, ODDR&E. The Task was coordinated with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, (J-3 and J-5).
Hie RED BARON Project produced four volumes. Those mem-
bers who made primary contribution to Volume II were as follows:
John S. Attlnello Howard IC. Hostler. MaJ . , USA
Velma M. Archer Ralph L. Kuster, Jr., MaJ., USAP
Douglas N. Beatty Richard C. Stewart, Capt., USN
John W. Rublno John W. Walden, Cdr., USN
Charles W. Gardner David D. Young, LCol., USAF
Earl A. Thomas Charles R. Shaw, Col., USA
At its inception (October I966) the RED BARON Project team
consisted of:
uJ John S. Attlnello, Project Leader
Douglas N. Beatty, Ass*t Project Leader
•V/j John W. Walden, Cdr., USN, Senior Navy
vj^ llalcolm J. Agnew, LCol., USAF, Senior Air Force
Phillip J. Conley, Jr., LCol., USAP, and Thomas J. Hughes, Capt.,
USK, also worked part time on the project from its inception,
primarily acting as an interview-debrief team. LCol. Agnew and
•V^ Cdr. Walden were the other team.
In November John Rublno, Charles Tiffin, William Eason,
Capt., USN, and Charles R. Shaw, Col., USA, Joined the project.
UNCLASSIFIED m
UNCUSSIFIED
1 In December. Robert J. Lynch. Jr.. Cel., USMC. Joined, and
Philip Brooks. Col.. USAP. became Senior Air Force representative.
■ Richard C. Stewart. Capt.. USN, was assigned in February 1967-
These later military arrivals shared their time with other WSBG
projects.
While developing interview methods and techniques, the
project was valuably assisted by two psychologists from IDA/RESD,
¥• Slnalko and W, Richard Kite.
Par Interviews in the U.S., teams consisting of military
and civilian project members supplemented the two teams designat-
ed initially to collect data in the combat theater. In the SEA
theater, two Navy-Air Force teams (Conley-Hughes and Agnew-Walden)
conducted the Interviews. LCol. Agnew and Cdr. Walden also Inter-
viewed SEA returnees at European bases.
As Interviews were conducted. It became apparent that much
more data were being collected than had been Initially estimated
traoL official reports. lUerefore, a rapid Increase In qualified
personnel wis needed to collate the data for publication.
Roy a. Anderson, Rear Admiral. USN, Senior Navy Member of
WSEG, through appropriate channels, obtained the services of
four Mavy fighter pilots for a period of two weeks. The assist-
ance to the RED BARON Project of the following Navy pilots is
acknowledged:
Dennis E. Becker, Lt., USN
Benjanln Cloud, LCdr., USN
Samuel C. Plynn, LCdr.. USN
William D. Kiper, LCdr., USN
A. J. Beck. Major General. USAP, Senior Air Force Member of
WSEq'" with the cooperation of Headquarters. USAP, obtained the
services of nine tactical fighter pilots for a thirty-day period.
The assistance to the RED BARON Project of the following Air
Force pilots is acknowledged:
5^
1, l^rXLASSlFlED
UNCLASSIFIED
Thomas H. Curtis, MaJ., USAP
Leslie C. Long, Capt., USAP
Robert S. Maxwell, Capt., USAP
R. P. Moore, MaJ., USAF
Sam P. Morgan, Jr., Capt., USAP
Michael G. Pennacchio, Capt., USAP
William P. Robinson, Ma j . , USAP
Ronald W. Scott, Capt., USAP
Ronald J. Ward, Ma J., USAP
The project also acknowledges the assistance of the follow-
ing individuals who assisted the interview teams In the data
collection phase:
J. J. Berkow, Col., USAP, ARPA RiD Pleld Unit,
Bangkok, Thailand
R. Hiller, Assistant for Operations Analysis,
CINCPACAF Staff
E, Kapos, OEG Representative, CINCPACPLT Staff
G. Koy lades, COMNAVOCEWJO
R. Llnsenmeyer, Chief, Scientific Research Advisory
Group, CINCPAC Staff
J, V. Patterson, Col., USAP, ARPA R&D Field Unit,
Saigon, Vietnam
B. Powers, OEG Representative, CINCPACPLT Staff
H. L. Wood, Col., USAP, Headquarters, 7th AP
D. a. Lynch, LCol, USMC, OPNAV
Hie commands, whose cooperation. made It possible to reach
the participants of alr-to-alr engagements, are also acknowledged.
COMMANDS
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Pleet
Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces
Commander, Seventh Air Force, Tan Son Nhut AB, Vietnam
Commander, Task Force Seventy-Seven
Deputy Commander, 7/1 3th Air Forces, Udorn Airfield,
Thailand
Commander, 8th Tactical Fighter Wing (TPW), Ubon Airfield,
Thailand
Commander, 366th TFW, Danang AB, Vistnam
Commander, 355th TFW, Takhll AB, Thailand
Commander, 388th TFW, Korat AB, Thailand
UNCUSSIFIED
V
UNCLASSIFIED
Commander, ^32nd Tactical Reconnaissance Wing, Udom
Airfield, Thailand
Coonnandlng Officer, USS KITTY HAWK (CVA-63)
Commanding Officer, USS TICONDEROGA (CVA-41)
Commanding Officer, USS BON H0t^4E RICHARD (CVA-3X)
Commanding Officer, USS ENTERPRISE (CVA(N)-65)
Commanding Officer, USS HANCOCK (CVA-19}
Director, ARPA R&D Field Unit, Saigon, Vietnam
Director, ARPA R&D Field Unit, Bangkolc, Thailand
Commander, 4 1st Air Division, Yakota AB, Japan
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces, Europe
Commander, Seventeenth Air Force, Ramstein Afl, Germany
Commander, 6lst TFW RAF, Bentwaters, England
Commander, 36th TFW, Bit burg AB, Germany
Commander, 50th TFW, Hahn AB, Germany.
Commander, Naval Air Forces, U.S. Pacific Fleet
Commander, Fleet Air, Miramar, California
Commander, Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Nellls AFB,
Nevada
Commander, 13th TFW, HcDill AFB, Florida
Commander, 831st Air Division (TAG), George AFB,
California
Commander, 835th Air Division, McConnell AFB, Kansas
Commander, 3525th PT\'/, Williams AFB, Arizona
Commander, ^5 31st TFW, Homestead AFB, Florida
Commander, A 5 3rd Combat Crew Training Wing, Davls-Monthan
AFB, Arizona
UHCLASSiFIED
uNcusimnp
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
Data Sources
Data Presentation
DATA DEFINITION AND COLLECTION . . .
Background - Goals and Limitations
Approach
Description of Interview Procedure
General Comments on Data ....
EVENT RECONSTRUCTIONS
UNClllSSRKD
mm
I
I
4»
I. INTRODUCTION
At the request of the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group has undertaken
a study of air-to-air encounters in Southeast Asia. The project
code name is RED BARON. Data that have been collected on
approximately 400 such encounters through 1 August 1967 will
be analyzed primarily to assist in the selection of suitable
research and development programs for future high-performance
fighter aircraft. A secondary purpose of the study was to pro-
vide data for use by the military services and of the scientific
conanunity. This volume is a partial documentation for the
secondary purpose,
A.. DATA SOURCES
Data contained in this report were taken from two sources:
the official reporting media and personal interviews with par-
ticipants. Past IDA/WSEG experience in collecting combat dataW^
has shown that the official reporting media, which are designed
primarily for military operational and statistical needs, are
inadequate for many analytic purposes. The projtct groups con-
ducting these earlier studies found that personal interviews
with participants were necessary for R&D analyses. In Project
RED BARON, interviews were considered the primary data
source, supplemented, where available, by official reports.
iWSEG Staff Study 13^ Adequacy of Data from Southeast Asia
r.nm h^t Air operations for Research and Development Analyse.
HFAlFc^ft Losses and Danages CUK SECRET, February l967.
2WSEG Report 101, Requirements of Defense R&D fo.r_
Data from Combat Air Operations in Sout heast Asia. SECRET,
August 19bb.
For purposes of this study, encounters that were investi-
gated were defined to include the following types:
• Sighting of enemy- aircraft (either visually or by
radar) ,
• Either U.S. or oneny aircraft Initiating hostile or
e vas i ve maneu ve rs ,
• Either U.S. or enemy aircraft expending ordnance, and
• Loss or damage in combat cf either U.S. or enemy air-
craft.
During the data collection phase, an effort was made to
assure the exhaus tiveness cf the information contained in this
report. However, it was established that certain aspects of
alr-to-alr combat could not be included. For example, during
the conduct of CAP and escort missions, frequently it was neces-
sai'y for the fighter force to intercept radar contacts which
proved to be friendly aircraft. Also, during the course of
missions, aircraft sighted were initially identified and called
as enemy, only to be recognized later as friendly. These occur-
rances were not reported and therefore are not documented in
this volume.
While numerous sightings of enemy aircraft are contained
in this volume, it is believed, that there are many other sight-
ings which were not documented (and therefore not included).
This is partially substantiated by the numerous instances which
were mentioned during interviews for which no date or location
was recalled and which were not correlated with reported sight-
ings.
The first type was considered in detail only if the sight-
ing was of R&D interest, e.g., if a U.S. aircraft made no
attempt to engage enemy aircraft because of Inferior or malfunc-
tioning U.S. equipment. Where no R&D implications were indl-
'cated, sightings were noted to record the information collected
for potential use for other analyses.
since "test type" Instrumental; ion does not exist on nost
combat aircraft, the validity and quality of data are limited
to the tolerances of human senses and recollections (aided
where possible by official and personal records » notes, tapes,
etc.). A decailed account of the precautions taken to insure
the validity and quality of data gathered In such interviews
is presented In Section II.
Originally the data sample oc .listed of 2U8 encounters
through 1 March I967. However, from this date through 22 May,
65 mort enc ^;inters were identifU-d (not including "sightings").
In the 23-[r;-.nth period from first encounter to 1 March, 4?
"confirmed plus probable" MIC ;cills were reported. In the six-
week perJc: in April-May 1967, the 65 engagements resulted In
37 "conflrr^d plus probable" MIQ kills. ^
B. DATA PRESENTATION
Thcugii the analyses to be conducted in the RED BARON study
were to be limited to exposing problems for R&D considerations.
Interest in the basic data was expressed in maiiy areas of the
mllltatf'y and scientific communities . To satisfy these needs
the data nave been formalized and are published in three volumes
as follov.'s:
Volune T: Account of F-U and F-8 Events Prior to 1 March
1967 (U) (WSEG Log Wo. 126571)
No. of Encounters
q.S. Aircraft Involved to 1 March 1967
F-^C 55
P-8 8
P-IOM 1
U-2 1
Total Events Reported Volume I "fB
Concurrently, there was a shift In targeting policy (NVN air-
fields were bombed by U.S. aircraft from 23 April) and the in-
troduction of new equipment (e.g., SUU-16A guns installed in
some F-4C aircraft). Because of these factors the additional
engagements were included in the RED BARON data base.
Volume II: Account of F-105 Events Prior to 1 Rarch 1967 (
No. of Encounters
U.S. Aircraft Involved to 1 March 1967
F-105 151
Voluiae III: Account of Air-to-Air Events from 1 March 1967
to 1 August 1967, and All Miscellaneous Events
(U). Total number of events, 3l6.
For ease of study and analysis, the available Information
has been summarized under the following headings:
•Primary Mission and Tactical Situation
•Mission Route
•Aircraft Configurations
• •Flight Conditions Prior to Encounter
•Initial Detection
•Action Initiated
•Situation Development
• Ordnance
• Equipment Problems
• Aircrew Comments
• Data Sources
Following the above, an edited narrative Is presented which
Integrates all the information -sources pertaining to the desig-
nated air-to-air engagement.
The names and official call signs of the participants
have been replaced by standardized nomenclature to give
anonymity to the interviewees. This precaution was followed
throughout to encourage frank and honest answers to all
questions posed by the interview teams.
UNCLASSIFIED
II. DATA DEFINITION AND COLUaiON
A. BACKGROUND - GOALS AND LIMITATIONS
The broad goal formulated for the data definition/collec-
tion effort was to obtain sufficient data to enable reconstruc-
tion of the various alr-to-alr encounters In appropriate detail
with maximum accuracy and completeness ("reconstruction" being
the key word) .
The scope and degree of detail was not simply defined.
It revolved around the needs of the R&D community and the
limitations of the available data. The primary limitation was
human ability to sense and recall. There were no recording
devices in U.S. aircraft, and, therefore, with few exceptions
(such as taped communications and photographs), all data had
to be extracted from the minds of participants and observers.
There was also the question of the adequacy, for event re-
construction, of data reported from Southeast Asia through the
standard reporting systems, IDA/WSEG experience ^ showed that
while these systems offered certain worthwhile Information for
R&D purposes, they were far from adequate for the purposes of
this specific study.
It was decided that IDA/WSEG would interview participants
in air-to-air encounters as the principal source of data.
WSEG Report 101, Requirements of Defense R&D Agencies for
Data from Combat Air Ocerations In Southeast Asia (U), July
1966, (SECRET). WSEG Staff Study 13^ > Adequacy of Data from
Southeast Asia Combat Air Operations for Research and Develop -
ment Analyses of Aircraft Loss and Damage (U), February 1967^
(SECRET).
UNCLASSIFIED
5
UNCLASSIFIED
B. APPROACH
The data collection program Involved several interrelated
areas of operations. They were:
1. Identification of air-to-air encounters and the
participants.
2. Development of more specific data needs and resolution
of needs with limitations.
3. ' Collection of appropriate documentary information on
Southeast Asia air-to-air encounters.
^, Development of optimum Interview techniques.
5. Location of and arrangements for interviewing
participants .
These operations were not necessarily sequential and were
continued throughout the data collection phase.
Items 1 and 3 initially were interrelated, i.e., the means
of identifying encounters was through search of existing docu-
mentation — various formally and informally maintained "box
scores'* and other files.
Early information was gained from the Office of the Chief
of Naval Operations and the USAF Air Staff. Additional basic
documentation came from the USAP Tactical Fighter Weapons Cen-
ter, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, COMNAVAIRPAC , and the Commander,
7th Air Force. It was quickly determined that the various
"box scores" did not agree. This was attributed to a variance
in definition of what constituted an air-to-air encounter/
engagement and possibly administrative or communications
failures within the commands.
Additionally, early in the study, the CNO and the Chief of
Staff, USAP, were advised of Project RED BARON and requested
to provide reference to appropriate documencat? on . Numerous
replies were received from various offices within the Services.
6
UtlCLASSlFiED
UNCLASSIFIED
Gradually, sources of documented Information were In-
creased until they included: standard reporting system (OPREPs,
COACT, Navy 3^*80 Reports, Guided Missile Performance Reports);
various reports of associated studies made by OEG representa*
tives and other analytical groups; letters from pilots who
could not be Interviewed; various records kept at all levels
of command; gun-camera films; tapes of communications made by
pilots; and miscellaneous message traffic among military
commands.
Identification of participants was a particular problem
since there is no existing mechanism for providing this infor-
mation. With a relatively few exceptions, names of partici-
pants were not included In reports. However, names were
gradually acquired through informal communications with USN
and USAP pilots and, as the interview program proceeded, other
persons were identified by the interviewees.
Some specific items of data desired were defined by visits
to various Service RiD and training organizations and through
meetings with representatives of various industrial organiza-
tions concerned with components of U.S. fighter weapons systems.
(These visits and conferences also provided information on the
technical and operational aspects of the weapons systems con-
cerned.) Eventually, a categorized list of data specifically
desired from each encounter was formulated.
Having established the data requirements, an intervle;?
program was desired which would:
• Allow the greatest number of interviews, while
• Maximizing the quality, depth, and scope of informa-
tion obtained from each interview.
There were uncertainties about the interview program,
however. They involved such considerations as the human
ability to recall stressful incidents and the effect of elapsed
time between the event and attempt to recount it. Large numbers
UNCLASSIFIED
7
UNCUSSIFIED
of people throughout the world had to be Interviewed, great
quantities of interview data had to be reduced, and time and
manpower had to be considered.
With the assistance of IDA psychologists, H. W. Sinalko
and W. R. Kite, basic interview concepts were delineated.
These concepts stressed unhurried informality, anonymity of
the interviewee, a chronological approach to the entire flight
In question (not Just the air-to-air encounter period of it),
and much use of visual aids — maps, sketches, airplane
models — to reconstruct events.
A systematic program was developed to interview a maximum
number of participants in the combat theater and throughout
CONUS and Europe. There was little chance to control the
elapsed time between events and interview. As a result, the
elapsed time varied from days to more than one year.
Efficiency- of operation was approached in various ways.
Several levels of encounter were defined according to their
complexity and Intensity, ^ and the basic interview procedure
was somewhat expanded or abbreviated according to the level of
encounter and the knowledge of the Interviewee. Data formats
were devised which attempted to facilitate the recording (and
subsequent reduction) of informartlon while stimulating the
memory of the Interviewee.
A total of ten persons were trained as interviewers.
Where It was possible to communicate with a participant but
not practical or possible to interview him, he was contacted
by mall.
While there was the desire to interview a maximum number
of pilots, it was superseded by a desire to maximize coverage
over the largest number of encounters. Consequently, where a
^Sighting only (visual or radar); either side taking hostile
or evasive action; expenditure of ordnanca by either side;
loss or damage by either side.
8
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
Choice had to be made as to whom to interview, breadth of
coverage was the first consideration.
At the start, various test interviews were conducted,
their results evaluated, and improvements made before a large
scale program was undertaken. Minor changes in procedure were
made throughout the program.
C. DESCRIPTION OF INTERVIEW PROCEDURE^
In spite of the small changes that evolved and flexibility
Included to accommodate each situation, the basic interview
procedure remained largely constant after the early test cases.
Ideally, the interviewee was given advance notice and. a
general Idea of what would be discussed. The interview team
consisted of two persons, one a military pilot with a signifi-
cant amount of flying experience and the second person a mili-
tary officer or civilian. The team would meet with one crew-
man at a time in a closed room, with minimum distraction, and
with what was intended to be more than ample time allotted for
the meeting. The team attempted to create an air of relaxed
Informality.
The interviewee was given an explanation of the study,
how it came about, what it hoped to accomplish, and what his
role was. It was emphasized that his name would not appear
in print and that, in general, attempts would be made to pre-
serve the anonymity of the persons interviewed. This was done
to encourage frank and honest answers. The complete interview
procedure was explained in detail.
Next, the pilot was asked to give an uninterrupted narra-
tive of the encounter in question. He was asked to start from
planning for the mission and discuss all aspects through the
flight's return to base. He was first given examples of the
kind of detail desired. Early in the project it became stan-
d ard for the interviewers to u se a tape recorder for the
*A more detailed discussion is presented in Volume XV of this
report .
UNCLASSIFIED 9
UNCLASSIFIED
narrative phase. This, of course, depended upon the Inter-
viewee's consent and he was always free to go back and erase
anything he wished from the tape. He was assured that the
tape was only for the use of the Interviewers In gaining com-
plete, accurate Information from the meeting and Its use was
limited to the project.
Next, depending on the Intensity and complexity of the
encounter, a sketch of the action was made. Again, the sketch
covered a greater part of the mission than Just the air-to-air
encounter, dealing with ingress and egress as well. The
technique was to put a transparent paper overlay on a large
scale map and trace the paths, in plan view, of the various
aircraft known to have been present (as fchey were believed to
be) relative to known geographical points. The third dimension
to the picture was introduced by means of a keyed time-sequence
vs. altitude plot at the top of the overlay.
With regard to time, early in the study it became clear
that the air-to-air combatant rarely had any reasonable concept
of the time duration of events or phases of the combat. He
could, however, recall well the sequence of events. This
caused the Injecting of time-sequences into the interview
process. The procedure was for the interviewer to "stop the
action" at a point where something significant was occurring
and try to elicit a detailed account of the scene at that
Instant — the location and altitude of each participant;
status of the interviewee U aircraft in the way of speed, g»s,
fuel state, avionics modes, etc.; action by the individual and
his reasons therefor; communications which took place; enemy
actions; etc.
After such a stop the description would continue until the
next significant event occurred at which point the action would
be stopped again. These stops correspond with the "T" (or
"Time") marks in events and pictures. While one team member
10
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
worked with the pilot In making the sketch, the other kept
notes on a specially designed note pad.
Upon completion of this step-by-stap microscopic phase,
the interviewers consulted their checklist on data items and
asked specific questions about points which had not come out.
Finally, the interviewee was encouraged to comment on the
whole range of considerations which might be of interest to
the study — comments derived from his experience in this
specific encounter as well as from his overall experience.
The duration of an interview was from minutes to several
hours, depending on the significance and complexity of the
encounter and the knowledge of the Interviewee.
0. GENERAL COMMENTS ON DATA
The Project identified 2^8 air-to-air encounters that
occurred prior to 1 March I967. Participants In 164 of these
encounters were Interviewed, with a total of 331 Interviews
conducted.^ In addition, 37 written accounts of engagements
were received. In general « priority was given to the more com-
plex encounters; events for which no Interviews were conducted
were usually a sighting only, with no R&D significance.
The study group found that human ability to recall the
details of incidents stressful to them Is sometimes quite
remarkable. With regard to the validity of recall, various
comparisons were made between OPREP reports of the encounter
and interviews and between interviews of various participants
in the same encounter. There was generally good agreement.
Where significant discrepancies appeared, they could usually
be traced to the confusion of a fast moving, complex situation
If an individual was interviewed in connection with two or
more different enccu.iters, this would be considered as two
or more interviews.
UNCLASSIFIED
11
UNCLASSIFIED
rather than memory failure or some psychological phenomena.
(Discrepancies between various accounts of the same event did
cause some difficulty in the final reconstruction process. In
almost all cases, discrepancies were resolved through repeated
study of the data, use of logical deductions, and/or
relnterview. )
Intuitively, It might appear that the best Information
would be obtained by minimizing the time lapse between encoun-
ter and interview. However, there are opinions and illustra-
tions which counter this. The thought cannot be proved or
disproved at this time. As noted earlier, elapsed time between
encounter and Interview ran from a period of days to more than
a year. Dates of events and interviews have been included in
the published data.
The interview techniques, in general, were highly regarded
by Interviewees for effectiveness in stimulating accurate,
detailed recall. In some cases, through the procedures used,
interviewees were able to correct and clarify their concep-
tions of events.
E, EVENT RECONSTRUCTIONS
The account of each event Is presented in at least two
basic parts: (1) An outline which gives an abbreviated pres-
entation of the highlights of the event, and (2) A narrative
of the encounter.
All of the events contained in this Volume are summarized
in the following tabulation. A Glossary of Terms was devel-
oped to aid in the interpretation of the events. The glossary
also contains descriptions and Illustrations of the more
common aircraft maneuvers.
The events In Volume III describe encounters with enemy
aircraft which occurred during the period 1 March 1967 to
1 August 1967. In addition, other encounters which occurred
12
UNCLASSIFIED
ONCUSSmED
In the time period covered by Volume I and Volume II are also
described. These events. Involving aircraft which rarely
encountered MIGs or about which little is known, are Included
since a knowledge of their occurrence Is important for a com-
plete picture of the alr-to-alr war. For this same reason, also
Included are those events with suspected MIGs, whose presence
was only surmised from electronic contacts. It Is felt that
this comprehensive coverage Is prerequisite for total undex-
standlng of the alr-to-alr operations In Southeast Asia.
UNCLASSIFIED ^3
LIST OF EVENTS
I
1
4
-4^
J**
I
I
Ev«nt
tn-1
mo
III -4
Ilt-S
in-7
1II-9
111-12
llt-U
H1*M
ni-is
iu>it
111-18
111-19
111-20
111-21
111-22
111-23
111-24
in-25
in>26
111-27
Ilt-28
111-29
III-30
111-31
111-32
ni-33
III-34
111-3$
lIt-36
ni-37
111-38
111-39
111-40
111-4)
111-42
111-43
III-44
11I-4S
111-46
111-47
Ilt-48
111-49
III-SO
Ill-Si
IIt-52
111-53
tll-54
111-55
111-56
111-57
111-58
UI-S9
Oate/T1«t
3 Apr"
4 »pr'
4 Apr'
14 ntf'
20 H«y*
20 May'
20 Jin'
12 Oct'
15 No»'
16 Now'
25 NOV'
6S/inoK
6f/nS0H
6&/'jnknown
6S/123SH
65/nOOM
65/183SH
6b/<Hy
6S/U4SH
6S/1638H
6S/1448H
Aircraft Involved
Ho . -Tyoo
U.S.
25 Ko*"65/1510M
26 NaV6S/1123H
IS Jm'66/1200H
19 J«fl'66/0950H
19 Jati*66/0953H
20 ^•il'66/0e32H
S Fcb'66/1000H
10 Ftb>66/1349H
12 F«t>'66/144CH
20 Ftb'66/Utilino«ii
IS Mir*
17 N»r'
8 Apr'
12 Apr'
27 Apr*
28 Apr'
29 Apr'
12 Jul'
66/n21H
6(/1222K
66/0906H
C6/Unkno«n
66/UnkftOMn
66/UOSH
66/1 745H
66/n3SH
24 Jur66/1805H
29 J«1'66/1610H
16 Aug*66/--56H
23 Aug'66/n35H
10 Stp'66/0830H
10 Slp'66/0941H
10 Stp'
24 Stp'
5 Oct'
6 Oct'
9 Oct'
10 Oct'
10 Oct'
Now'
28 Nov'
2B Nov'
66/2020H
66/2020H
66/023SH
66/O026H
66/1013H
66/Unknuwn
66/U50H
66/UnknoMn
66/1 1 55H
66/1412H
2 D»C'66/1420H
4 0tc'66/0818H
4 Dtc'66/n3aH
5 0«c'66/1057H
14 DlC'66/1602H
1 J*n'67/1545H
2 J«n*67/1315H
3 Jin'67/0734H
6 Jon*67/0919H
1$ Jin'67/0905K
16 J«n'67/1035H
16 Jifi'67/1555H
16 J«n'67/ieSSH
17 J«ii'67/1539K
Entay
Results
Lo«t/O<woed
U.S.
* A-4C
^ F-tOOO
4 F-10QO
7 F-104
1 R&-66
MIGCAP
4 A-1H
RF-1G1
r:F-lQt
Rf-101
M-4C
A-4C
RF.8A
RF-101
I 8F-8A
1 F-8C
2 F-4e
1 EA-3B
1 EA-3B
1 F-4B
1 EA-3e
1 F-4B
1 EA-3B
2 RF-tOl
1 EA.3B
1 F-4B
RF-101
RF-lOl
f -40
i(A-3B
F-4C
F-48
A-1E
A-4C
A.4E
1 EC-121M
1 RC-47
4 A-4
2 A.4
EC-121
il EB-66«
14 F-4C
2 F-4B
2 F-48
1 F-4a
1 E-IB
4 A-1H
EA-3B
4 R.4C
2 RF-101
2 F-BE
|4 F.4C
k1 E8-66C
4 F-48
eB-66C
2 F-4C
2 eB-66
USH A/C
2 RF-101
1 RF-4C
1 RF-4C
2 EB-66
1 c-ns
1 RF-101
1 EB-66
1 RF-4C
1 E8-668
1 NI6-n
1 NIG-W
? NIG-17
7 KIG
1 KIC
MIC
MlC-17
MIC-17
NIG
MIG
NI6-17:
2 NIG-19
4-6 NIG
1 NIG-21
2 unldentlflotf
3 Uildenti fled
2 U»1dtnt1f1t4
I MtS-170 (Pott)
1 MIG
8 NIG
1 NIG ?
NIGt
T Unldentlfltd
1- Unldintlflod
1 NIfi
1 MIG-IS
1 NIG-15/17
1 NtC-21
NlGs
2 N16-17
3 M16-17
1 M16-17
2 MI6-21
niGi
1 unltftntlflid
Unldefitlfltd
Unldentlfttd
4 NIG-17
Unldentifltd
Untd<nt1f1*tf
2 ttlG-19
NIG (Pass)
NIG (Potl)
Unldentifltd
2 HlG-21
2 UnldentlfUd
1 NIG-21
1 NIG-21 (Ross)
NIGs
2 Ufttdentlflttf
1 un1dont1f1«d
2 NIG
1 NIG-17
1 NIG (Post)
2 NIG-17
2 HtG
1 HI6-21
0/0
0/0
I/O
0/0
S<9ht1ng
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Slahiing
0/0
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
Radar
Radar
Radar
Radar
Sighting
Sighting
Radar
0/0
;/ot
0/0
0/0
0/0
1/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
I/O
0/0
Radar
Radar
0/0
1/0
Sighting
Radar
0/0
1/0
0/0
0/0
sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Radar
Radar
Radar
Radar
0/0
Radar
Radar
Sighting
Radar
Radar
Radar
Sighting
Radar
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Radar
Sighting
Radar
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
15
MM
LIST OF EVENTS
Aircraft tnvoivtd
Results
Lokl/D«n'<]ed
Lwcnt
Oatt/TU*
U.S.
Entay
U.S.
EttMy
III-60
111-61
111-62
111-6}
111-64
I1I-6S
111-66
111-67
111-68
1 1 1 -69
111-70
111-71
111-72
111-73
17 Jan'67/1540H
20 Jan'67/0955H
21 Jafl'67/0825H
21 Jan'67/I6)]N
21 Jan'67/1620M
22 Jan'67/1600H
22 Jan'67/1t30h
28 Jan'67/1620H
28 Jafl'67/1629H
28 Jan'67/1632H
4 Fab'67/UnknoMn
$ Ftb*67/11$4H
10 Ftb*S7/1416H
16 Ftft*67/1624H
2 RF-IOI
4 F-IOS
2 F-4C
3 F-4C
4 F-103
2 F-102
1 B-66
2 RF-ICl
4 F-105
4 F-105
3 F-105
3 F-4C
IZ RF-101
11 IL-14
14 F-105
14 F-4C
3 F-105
4 F-4C
4 F-105
2 RF-4C
4 F-IOS
1 RF-IOl
1 RF-4C
1 RF-4C
4 F-IOS
2 RF-4C
2 RF-4C
4 F-105
1 RF-4C
14 F-4C
14 F-105
4 F-105
12 F-IOS
2 F-IOS
4 F-105
4 F-105
4 F-4C
2 RF-4C
4 F-105
4 F-IOS
4 F-105
1 8-66
2 RF-4C
4 F-IOS
4 F-4C
3 F-4C
1 B-66
4 F-IOS
4 F-4C
4 F-IOS
4 F-105
2 RF-4C
4 F-105
2 F-)04
4 F-105D
4 F-105
2 F-48
4 F-)05
2 RF-4C
4 F-105
14 F-1QS0
12 A-U
4 F-IOSO
2 untdenttfltd
2 MIG-17
2 MIC-21
2 UnldentirUd
1 NlC-17
4 Unldtntirittf
1 NiG-17
2 HIG-17
3 NtG-21
4 N16-17
2 HIG-21
1 Unidentified
1 HIG-19/21
1 NIG-6
2 MIG ?
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
111-74
111-75
111-76
111-77
III-78
111-79
111-80
111-81
111-82
in-83
in-84
III-66
111-88
in-87
111-88
111-89
lit -90
111-91
111-92
111-93
III-94
111-9$
111-96
111-97
111-98
111-99
111-100
111-101
111-102
111-103
111-104
111-105
111-106
111-107
111-108
111-109
111-110
111-111
I1I-I12
I»l-113
lit-114
111-11$
111-116
iir-117
19 Feb'67/08S9H
19 Feb>67/0902H
22 Fflb'67/162«H
23 Feb'67/I500K
23 Ftb>67/1S32H
25 Ftb*67/0948H
25 F«b'67/t105K
5 M4r'67/0703H
S Nir'67/161SH
7 ll«r*67/1618N
8 Mir'67/14O0H
8 Mar'67/1603H
9 H4r*67/03S1H
10 Hir'67/1S53H
10 Har'67/1556H
10 Mar'67/15S6H
10 Mir'67/Antr.
noon
10 Har'67/15S8H
11 Mar'67/Unkno«n
12 Kar'67/
16 Mar'67/15S0H
26 ll«r'67/1616H
26 N«r*67/1613tl
26 f1ar'67/10l7H
26 Har'67/1620H
26 Mar'67/1645H
26 Har'67/1620H
26 Mar'67/UnknoHn
26 Mar>67/161SH
27 Nar'67/1617H
29 Nar'67/1641H
29 Nar'67/Unfcnown
30 ltar'67/094SH
30 Mar*67/1641H
8 Apr'67/U10H
B Apr'67/1635H
11 Apr'67/1325H
11 Apr'87/1615H
12 Apr'67/1239H
13 Apr'67/141SH
19 A0r'67/16S5H
19 Apr'67/UnknoHn
19 Apr'67/US8H
19 Apr'67/1702H
3 Unidentified
2 MIG 7
4 MIG-21
2 NlGs
1 NlG-21
2 Unidentified
2 unidtntlfltd
7 MIG
1 MIG-1S
2 NIG-17 (Poss)
n HlG-17
14 unidentified
2 NIG-21
1 NIG (Pots)
1 HIG-21
3 NI6-17
12 NIG-21
14 NIG-170
4 H1G.21
1 N16-17
1 NIG
2 HIG-17
1 Nre-n
14 NlG-17
)1 NIG-21
1 HI6-i7
2 unidentified
1 NIG-21
I NIG-17
3 NIG-17
8 MIG-17
1 MIG-21
2 unidentified
Unidentified
3 NIG-2t
2 HI6-21
2 HIG-21
2 MIG-21
1 NIG
3 MIG-21
2 Unidentified
1 NIG
8-10 ^.IG-17
2 NIG
II NtG-17
11 N16-17
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Rtdar
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
0/0
1/0 (Prab)
0/0
0/1
1/0
0/0
G/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Q/0
0/0
2/1
0/0
0/0
1/C
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
1/0
0/0
2/0
111-116
19 A»r'67/I700H
2 NIG-17
0/0
0/0
LIST OF EVENTS
III<]I9
III. 120
111-121
III-)22
ni023
III-t24
ni-i2s
[[I-i26
(U-127
in>)28
III<I29
111-130
Ill-ISi
III-I32
III-U3
IM-134
111-135
III-I36
IH-137
III. 138
[I [-139
IlI-MO
111-14)
III-M2
in-143
IIt-t44
III.14S
!II-I46
111.147
III-M8
III. 149
III'ISO
III-ISI
111-152
II1>IS3
III-1S4
ni-1S5
ni.is6
I1I-1S7
111*158
111-159
III-IGO
111-161
III-ie2
1 11-163
IM.IS4
III-I6S
I1I-I66
lll-t67
[11-168
111-169
1 11- 170
111-17)
111-172
D«te/riiie
Atrcrart InvoUtA
U.S.
Creny
«9 Apf'67/1700M
19 *pr*67/l70iH
20 *pr67/0856M
20 Apr'6r/091]H
21 *pr'67/1629H
21 *pr'67/1653H
22 Apr'67/J534H
22 Apr'57/!63SH
22 *pr'67/1542M
22 Apr'67/1635M
22 Apr'67/)638H
23 apr*67/1622H
23 *pr'67/1623H
23 Apr'67/16S5H
23 Apr'67/1652H
24 Apr'fi7/094SH
24 Apr>67/161SH
24 A»r*67/16t2H
24 Apr'«7/I64SH
24 Apr'67/1619H
24 Apr'67/1700H
24 Apr'67/I700H
25 Apr*67/1002H
25 Apr'67/!005H
25 Apr'57/1002H
25 Apr'67/IOOOH
25 Apr'67/1005M
25 App'67/1005H
25 Apr'67/n09H
2S Apr'67/1000H
25 Apr'67/I017H
25 Apr'67/ni2H
25 Apr'67/I006H
26 Apr'67/]616H
26 Apr'67/16I7H
26 Apr
26 Apr
26 AT>r
26 Apr
28 Apr
28 Apr
28 Apr
28 Apr
28 Apr
28 Apr
28 Apr
28 Apr
'67/I620H
67/1620H
'67/1620H
'67/1624H
'67/!640H
'67/I630H
'67/16S3H
'67/1630H
'6//1635H
'67/I636H
'67/I636H
'67/)648H
28 Apr * 67/unknowo |
28 Apr*67/)653H !
28 Apr'67/J/OOH t
29 Apr' 67/ 1 nOH !
29 Apr'67/1615H
29 Apr'67/I615H
29 Apr'67/]615H
F-1050
■4C
•4C
■4C
4 f-105
4 F-105
4 F-IOS
j4
{4
U F-4
F-105
f-105
RF-4C
r-105
F-1Q5
F-105
F-105
F-105
3 F-4C
4 F-4C
1 F-4C
4 F.I95
j2 F-IOSO
12 F-105F
2 F.4B
4 f-105
4 F.4C
I A.6A
4 F-1Q5
4
4
4
3
4
2
il
2
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
Z
4
4
\l
4
4
4
1
4
F-105
F-IOS
F-105
F-105
F-IOS
F-8E
f-105
ES-622
RF-4C
A-4C
F.105D
F-105
F-lOS
1050
105
1050
4C
4C
105
105
105
1050
1050
105.
105F
1O50
105
105
105
-101
105
4 F-IOS
4 F-IOS
7 MIG-17
4 NlC-17 (POSS)
2 MIG-17
2 NIG-W
1 MIC-17
I HlG-21
7
2 HIC
2 MIC-W
1 HIG-21
2 M(G-17
NIG-)7
1 M1G.2I
4 MIC-17
2 UnUentl fled
1 MIG-21
2 MIG-21
6 K[G-21
3 Unldenttfled
4 MIG.21
1 MI6-17
1 NIG-21
1 MIC-17
6 MI6.21
4 ttlG-17
J HI6-I7
is MI6-21
11 M1G.17
3 MIG-17
1 M[G
.10 MIG-J7
1 2 HIG-21
I MIG-17
1 HIG-17
MIGs
3 MIG-17
2 MIG-W
2 NIG-17D
3 HIG-17
3 NIG.2)
2 MIG-17
4 MIG-17
4 MIG'17
fS MI6-17
11 MIG-21
8 MIG-17
2 MIG-21
2 MIG.21
10 MtG-21
2 HIG-21
8 MIG-17
2 HIG-1 7
8 MIG-17
9 MIG-17
1 M1G.I7
1 MIG-i;
5 HIG-17
1 MIG-J7
I KIG-17
1 NIG-17
) HtG-21
12 MIG-21
U MIG-17
i MIG.I7
I HIG-17
Rtsul tt
lO»t/D«iinq«d
U.S.
C/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
sighting
Sighting
0/e
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
S< ghting
0/0
Sighting
0/0
O/O
0/0
1/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Enemy
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
2/0 (Prgb)
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/1 {?9St)
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
1/0
0/0
0/0
1/0
1/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
LIST OF EVENTS
Event
0«te/lt«e
IM-P] 29 *pr'67/l6)2H
111-174 29 Apr'67/WOON
29 «pr'67/1615H
3C Apr'67/0226M
3V Apr'67/09OON
30 At(r'67/0900N
JO Apr'67/090$H
.0 Apr'67/0926H
?a A3p'i7/09?3-.
":0 Apr'67/)52»H
30 Apr-67/1648H
31 Apr'67/I«24H
30 Apr'S7/]7}SH
3J App'67/1713M
1 >4«y'67/1015H
^ H«y'67/1250H
I Niy'f7/1008H
) Nty'67/I021H
1 M«y'57/10nH
I M«y '67/Unkn»Mn
I Niy'67/UnknoMn
I Niv'67/124SH
1 M|y'67/I248H
1 H«y-67/12S6H
1 M»y'67/1255H
1 May'fi7/1244H
I W*y'67/1710H
1 Hly'67/1718H
t tt«y'67/Unlino«>n
1 f'«y* 67/ 1 725H
Z H«y'67/0951H
2 Hay'67/09I7H
3 Miy'67/U30H
3 Hay'67M705H
3 Nay'67/143SH
Atrcrift Involved
lo . -Type
U.S.
3 M«y'67/1710H
4 H«y'67/U25K
4 N«y'67/1433H
4 N«y'67/1435H
May
Hiy
May
May
Hay
H«y
May
8 May
12 May
12 May
12 May*
12 May'
12 May*
12 May'
12 May'
12 May'
12 May'
13 May'
12 May*
13 May*
13 «ay'
13 May'
13 May'
■67/1435H
'67/1615H
■67/1441H
67/14S3H
67/1730H
67/14S3H
67/Unl(noMn
67/0343H
67/1636H
67/1638H
67/I644H
67/I642H
67/I642H
67/I643H
67/164SH
67/1755H
67/1618H
67/1610H
67/1623H
6//)623H
67/16I0H
67/I620H
67/16;iH
»-4C
r-io$
F-IOS
F-105
RF-4C
f.105
f-105
r-ios
F-10$
KF-4C
F-IOS
F-IOS
F-t05
F.IOS
F-IOS
F-4e
f-4C
F.4C
F-105
F-105
F-)0$
f-K
F.8C
A.4C
A-4C
A-4E
a.4c
a F-505
7 F-4
F-4C
F-IOS
F-ias
aF-iQi
RF.4C
F-4C
4 F-4C
4 F-4C
4 F.4C
4 F.105
4 F-105
2 RF-4C
4 F-105
1 E8-66C
4 F-IOS
8 F-105
B F-IOS
1 RF-4C
4 F-4C
12 F-IOS
F-4C
F-105
F-105
F-IOS
F-IOS
F-105
F-105
RF-4C
I F-IOS
4 F-105
4 F.4C
F-105
A F.4C
cfitay
13 NIG-17
2 MIG-17
I MIG-21
1 MtG-!7
1 HIG
4 NIG-17
2 MI6
12 HIGl
2 MIC-17
1 Untdentlfled
MIG
Untdentiried
MIGl
MIG-21
NtG-21
MIC-17
MI&.17
i NI6-17
8 1116-17
MIC-17
HIC-17
NiG-17
NIG-17
NI6-17
MtG-i;«
MIC-17
NIG-17
Unldtntlfltd
NIG-17
7 MICs
1 MIG-17
1 HtG.21 (Pass)
2 MIG-17
1 MtG
1 MIG-21
2 NI6-21
NIC-17
Unidentified
Unidentified
H MI6-17
14 NI6-21
[] NIG-21
[2 NI6-17
1 MIC-21
2 N(G.|7
1 N16-21
1 unidentified
2 NIC-21
1 Nia-21
2 MIG-21
unidentified
MIG-21
MIG-21
HlG-17
NIG-17
NIG-17
NIG-17
MIC-17
MIG-17
1 MtG-21
6 MIC-17
1 MIG-21
1 MIG-17
4 N{G-17
9 m;g-17
3 MIC-17
to MIG-17
)S
2-3
2
Reiul ts
Lost/Da»aqed
U.S.
0/3
1/1
0/0
Rader
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
2/0
1/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
sighting
0/0
sighting
0/0
Sighting
sighting
'/O
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0^0
0/0
8
I
I
I
I
I
I
t»«nt
ni-?38
111-239
111-240
lH-2<2
Ml-243
III-244
II1-24S
III-246
III-247
111-248
III -249
1 11-250
111-251
III-2S2
(tI-2S3
!n-2$4
III-2S«
(11-257
111-258
III-2S9
III-260
II1-261
II 1-262
in-263
tIl-264
in-2u5
III-266
III-267
III-26B
111-269
II 1-270
III>271
III-272
ni-273
111-274
11I-27S
111-276
m-277
111-278
111-279
III-280
!tl-28)
III-282
Itl-283
111-284
in-23S
III-286
111-287
111-288
111-289
111-290
111-291
111-292
LIST OF EVENTS
Dit«/Tiat
13 M*,
13 M«y
13 Hiy
n H«y'
14 ffjy'
14 Way'
14 K4y'
14 Hay'
14 H«y<
67/}621H
67/i622ri
67/1617H
67/16nH
6;/l605H
67/161 IH
67/I600M
67/1600H
67/ISTlH
14 N«y'67/1614M
19 Miy
19 M»y
19 May
19 May
19 May
19 May
19 May
20 Ma/
20 May
' 67/Unknowfl
*67/Unknown
'67/A.H.
'67/n40H
'67/1530H
'67/1630H
'67/1641H
■67/1629!1
'67/1610H
20 May<67/1630M
20 May'67/lB30H
20 Hay*67/}630H
20 May*67/1630H
20 May'«7/1625M
20 H«y'67/162BH
20 Nay'67/I630H
21 May*67/0853M
21 M>y'67/OaS6M
21 nay
21 ray
21 Hay
21 May
21 Ma>
21 May
21 May
22 Hay
22 May
21 May
'67/0900M
'67/090$H
•67,1420H
'67/16I6H
'67/1620H
'67/1Q34H
* 6 7/UnknoMn
'6;/09O3H
'67/1351H
'67/lSOOH
22 May'67/1445H
22 May'67/1527K
?2 M*y'67/1527M
22 Nay'67/160SH
22 Niy
22 May
22 May
22 Ma,
24 May
25 Mjy
30 May
30 May
30 May
20 Mdy
30 May
30 May
30 May
30 May
•67/1605H
'67/1606H
'67/1611M
'67/Unknown
'67/171SH
'C7/0858H
'67/1610H
'67/1516H
•67/1612H
'67/1616H
'67/1616H
'67/16I6H
'67/163SH
'67/16S6rf
31 May*67/155IH
31 May'67/]610H
Aircraft ln«o1vt4
Wo.-Typt
U.S.
F-IOS
F-IOS
F-IOSO
F.t05
F-4C
F-4C
F-10SD
F-10SD
F-1050
F-IOSF
F-10SD
F-8E
F-8C
F-8C
A-6A
A-4C
F-4C
F-IOS
F.4C
F.4C
E8-66
F-IOS
F-4C
F-IOSO
F-1050
F-IC
F-I05
F-105D
F.105
F.4C
f-105
F-4C
F-105
RF-4C
F-IOS
F-4C
EB-66
A-4
F-4C
flF-101
A-4E
2 IIF-4C
4 F-105
4 F-4C
4 F-lOS
F-4C
F-105
F-t05
F-tOS
F-105
F-4C
F.4C
F-105
F-105
F-105
F-lOS
F-IOS
F-4C
F.4C
Cncny
4 F-4C
4 F.4C
5 NIG-17
3 KI6-17
6 NIG- 1 7
7 MIC-17
16 MIG-17
10 NtG-17
2 MIG-17
6 MIG-17
/: HIG-21
14 NI6-17
4-5 HI6-17
2 NIG-17
1 MI6-17
2 MIG-17
3 MIG-21
5 HIGs
1 Untdantlfltd
4 MIG-17
12-15 MrG-17
1 Unidtntlfltd
7 NI6-17
n NIG
11 Unidentified
2 MIG-17
8 MIG.17
4-5 MIG-21
3 MIG-21
1 MIG-17
1 Unidantlfied
/I MIC-17
(2 Unidcfttlflcd
2 Unidentified
2 Unidentified
Unidentified
2 MIG-17
2 MIG-17
1 HIG
3 Un Identified
3 MIG-17
2 MIG (l»rob)
12 MIG ?
II NIG-17
3 Unidentified
2 MIG-17
2 MIG-17
n MIG-21
)1 MIG ?
4 HIG-2tO
2 NIG-21
2 MIG-21
1 MIG-21
1 MIG-17
1 Unidentified
2 Unidentified
4 NI6-17
4 NIG-17
4 MIG-17
4 MIG-17
1 MIG-17
7 unidentified
/6 NIG-17
U MIG-21
4 HIG-17
1 MIG-17
Results
Lost/Pawaged
U.S.
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
:/o
Sight in9
Sishttng
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
1/0
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Si>)h(ing
0/u
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
1/0
0/0
Enemy
0/0
2/0
0/2
0/0
2/0
1/0
0/0
0/0
2/0
1/0
1/0
0/0
4/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
2/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
2/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
19
nwsMHnqae'
LIST OF EVENTS
Atrcrtft Involvttf
Wo. -Typt
U.S.
Eneuy
Rm ults
U.S.
31 n*y'
31 ntf'
31 Hay'
31 M*/'
31 nty'
2 Jiin'
2 Jufl'
Z Jun'
2 Jwn'
2 Jun*
2 awn'
3 J«n'
67/164eH
67/16S0H
67/16S0H
67/1650H
67/1 700H
67/093QH
67/1S28H
67/I01SH
67/1630H
67/1633H
67/1«28M
67/I640H
9 Jm<67/1<50N
3 Juil'S7/165IH
3 JlM*C7/1653H
3 Jun*67/1CS2N
S Juii'67/163SH
S Jufl'67/1«43H
S JHn'67/1646M
S Jun'67/17«2H
S Jun'67/1S4SH
5 JiM*67/1S3SH
6 Jyn'67/04)2H
6 Jun'67/1S40H
7 Jun'67/2137H
11 Jun'67/0900H
10 Jun*67/M12H
11 Jun'67/0909H
J<j»'67/091S
II
11 JUA'
11 Jun'
11 Jun'
11 Jun*
12 Jun'
13 Jun'
13 Jun'
16 Jun'
18 Jun'
19 Jun*
20 Jun'
21 Jun<
23 Jun'
23 Jun*
27 Jun*
67/0930H
67/164SN
67/1634H
S7/165aH
67/16Q4H
67/U36H
67/1639H
67/16ISH
67/0902K
67/0931H
«7/1635H
67/0900H
67/OOSOH
(7/OOSOH
67/091 SH
III-34S
26 Jun'S7/1732H
27 JuR*fi7/0920H
29 Jun'67/17T0H
11 jur67/ae3eH
17 Jul ■S7/090QH
18 Ju1'$7/t402H
19 Jur67/I630Z
20 Jul' 67/16S2H
21 Jur67/1S19H
27 Jur67/1600H
F.IOS
lOS
10S
4C
10S
4
10S
4C
tos
F-4
F-40
F-4C
F-4C
F-40
F-IOS
F-IOS
3 F*105
4 F-IOS
4 F-105
4 F-IOS
F-4C
F-40
F.4C
F.40
F-4C
1 AF.4C
4 F-105
1 F-105F
4 F-105
2 RF>4C
1 F-IOS
4 F.IOS
1 RF-tai
4 F-105
F-IOS
F.ias
F-105
F-t05
F-IOS
RF-4C
F-IOS
F-105
F-4C
F-105
F-105
F-105
f-4C
1 F-4C
7 F-lOS
? F-4C-0
2 EA-IF
A-4
F-a
A-4e
A-4E
F-40
F-4C
A.4C
F-8C
F.4C
2 NI6.21
4 NI6-17
2 MIG-17
6 HIG-17
1 NIG-W (Post)
2 NI6-21
8-10 N[G-17
2 MIG-21
1 HIG-17
4 NIG-17
8*10 Nt6.17
5 NI6*I7
2 NIS-17
1 MtG-21
2 MIC-17
'2 MIG-21
)1 MIG-17
3 NIG-17
iS HIC-17
(3 NIG*21
6 MIG'21
(3 NIG-21
U NIG- 17
6-7 MtG-17
4 NIG-17
8-12 ni6-17
1 MtO (Poss)
1 MIG-17
1 umccnttffed
1 NI6.21
1 HI6-21
2 NIG
12 MIG-17
12 HI6-21
1 MI6.2I
3 unidtntlfltd
2 NI6-17
2 Un.1dtRtirfi«
?
10-11
I MIG-21
MIG
MIG-21
1 HIG-17
1 HIG-21
2 MIG-21
2 Unidentified
2 HIG
1 HIG
1 Unldtfftirtdd
1 MIG-21
1 Unidtntlfltd
2 KI6-17
2 HI6-17
2 unidtntlfltd
S HI6-2I
2 MIG-21
4 HIG-21
a MtG-17
1 MIG-21
a HIG-170
2 HI&-21
0/0
Slghtlnt
Sl9ht1n9
Slgbttflg
Slghtlna
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
Stgiiting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
Radar
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
. Sighting
Sighting
0/0
0/0
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
Sighting
0/0
Sighting
I/O
Sighting
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/2
C/0
UHCUSSIFIED
GLOSSARY OP TERMS
(All Terms Unclassified Unless Otherwise Stated)
AA - air-to-air weapon
AAA - antiaircraft artillery
AAM - air-to-air missile
AAWC - Ant 1-Alr-War fare Commander
AB - afterburner
ACM - air combat maneuvering
ACT - air combat tactics
ADF - automatic direction finder
AEW - airborne early warning
AGL - above ground level
AIM-7 (DiE models) (SPARROW) - semiactive radar type, air-to-
air missile
AIM-9 (B&D models) (SIDEWINDER) - passive IR type, alr-to-alr
missile
AIM-9C (SIDEWINDER) - Radar guided air-to-air missile
AI radar - airborne intercept radar
Aircraft commander - a pilot designated pilot-in-command of a
given aircraft (Air Force name for front
seater in F-4)
ALKALI - Soviet air-to-air missile - radar beam rider type
ALQ-51 - Broadband deception ECM system
ALQ-71 - Noise Jamming ECM pod (production model of QRC-160-1)
ANCHOR (Various colors) - see Figure 9 on page 3H - code names
for specific refueling tracks
AN/APA-157 - CW radar illuminator and fire control computer
for SPARROW missile system
Angle-off - angular position off the tail of the reference
aircraft
APQ-72 - airborne intercept radar In F-^tB aircraft
UNCLASSIFIED
21
UNCUSSIFIED
break X - minimum range indication for missile launch. X ap-
pears in the radar scope at minimum range.
I
I
I
I
APQ-91* - airborne intercept radar in P-8E aircraft
APQ-10 0/109 - airborne intercept radar in F^UC/D aircraft^ | 0
APR-2S - vector homing and warning system - P^o^^^^^K ;
APR-25 - ^^^*°^iSnal warning of threat signals in certain bands ;
with instantaneous bearing to radiating source. | .
APB.26 - crystal video airborne warning receiver to detect SA-2
guidance signals
APR-27 - airborne radar warning receiver
an... reconnalasanee - ^^^/^^'^^^iT^^^^^^^^^^ I
of ooportunity, i.e., enemy materiel, 0
personnel, and facilities in assigned
general areas or along assigned ground ^
communications routes, and not for the ■
purpose of attacking specific briefed
targets. ^
ASE circle - allowable steering error - circle on radar display g
provided by fire control computer.
ATOLL - Soviet air-to-air missile, infrared seeker type m
autotrack - automatic tracking in which a servo mechanism keeps ■
the radar beam trained on the target.
Back - the individual occupying the *^ack seat of the F-U; in g
JIavy called RIO, in Air Force called pilot or «IB. •
BARCAP - Barrier combat air patrol - a MIGSCREEN for one or
more missions
barrel roll - See Figure 2 (page 27) - a 360« ^^^^^''^ '"^"^^^TLo
barrel roii ^^^s^ ^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^.^^'^^^Eh? I
a helix about the intended direction of the flight. |
BDA - bomb damage assessment j |
BINGO (fuel) - minimum fuel quantity reserve established for a I j
given geographical point to permit aircraft to 9 < •
. return safely to home base or aerial refueling j
point. 8 t
bogey - unidentified aircraft i !
boresight mode - in the boreslght mode the radar antenna is ' ,
*^ aligned and locked to the roll axis of the ■ r
aircraft . i 1
break - an emergency turn in which maximum performance is desired - ! j
instantly to destroy an attackers tracking solution. ■ ^
I
I
"i
22 ORCLASSinED . |
1
CAP - combat air patrol - an aircraft patrol provided over an
objective area, over the force protected, over the
critical area of a combat zone, or over an air defense
area, for the purpose of intercepting and destroying
hostile aircraft before they reach their target.
(NAVY) Condition I CAP (Standby): aircraft ready for immediat.e
(maximum delay of two (2) minutes) takeoff. Aircraft
with engine not running (starter batteries plugged in)
will be positioned for take-off. Pilots in cockpit and
deck drew on alert .
CAS - calibrated air speed (knots)
CBU-214 - canister dispensed air-to-ground bomblet type munition;
the canister is carried externally on the aircraft and
opens after release at a preset altitude.
centerline tank - a fuel tank carried externally on centerline
of aircraft.
chaff - a type of confusion reflector, which consist of thin,
narrow metallic strips of various lengths to provide
different responses, used to create false signals on
radarscope .
Channel 97 - A TACAN station located during the period of the
study at 20® 27 ' M/103° ^3 *E used for navigational
aids. (SECRET)
chandelle - a maximum performance climbing turn in which speed
is converted to altitude while reversing direction. ^
CMR-312 (Little Ears) - aural radar warning receiver
CROWN - call-sign for rescue force commander
CRT - Combat Rated Thrust - maximum augmented thrust condition
of engine
DP - direction finder
DfE - distance measuring equipment
dot - (aim dot, steering dot) - electronic dot appearing In
radar scope when radar is
locked on providing computed
steering vector information
element - Air Force term for the basic fighting unit (two air-
craft)
EWO - electronic warfare officer
PANSONG - tracking radar for Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile
system (CONFIDENTIAL)
fighting ( wing) position - an area for the wingman in which optl
mum coverage and maneuverability is achieved in
maximum performance maneuvers.
finger-four formation - see Figure 6 (page 29) - also fingertip
formation - a four-plane formation in
which the aircraft occupy positions
^ suggested by the four finger tips of
V either hand, the fingers being held
together in a horizontal plane,
flak - antiaircraft fire
fluid element - the second or supporting element in fluid four
formation, flying In a high or low element
position.
fluid- four - see Figure 5 (page 29) - a tactical formation having
the second element spread In both the vertical and
horizontal planes to enhance maneuverability,
mutual support and look-out ability.
fragged - mission directed by fragmentary operational order
from higher headquarters.
Front - the individual in the front seat in the F-4 aircraft;
in the Navy called the pilot, in the Air Force called
the aircraft commander.
g - unit of acceleration (32.2 ft/sec*^)
gaggle - slang for a number of aircraft operating in close
proximity, not necessarily In any semblance of
formation.
GAM-83 - BULLPUP; air-to-ground guided missile
GEOREF - See Figure 11
GCI - ground control intercept
GUARD - emergency UHF radio channel usually monitored by all
aircraft and ground stations as a secondary frequency.
Hard turn - a planned turn in which the intensity of the turn
is governed by the angle-off and range of the
attacking aircraft,
HEAT - armament switch setting for using Infrared missiles
hot mike Intercom - intercommunication system continuously
active (hot)
IAS - Indicated air speed
ICS - Intercommunication system
ID - Identification; to make Identification
IFF - identification, friend or foe; aircraft transpondlng
beacon received by radar distinguishing friend from foe.
Iramelmann - see Figure 8 (page 30) - maneuver In which the air-
craft completes the first half of a loop and then
rolls over to an upright position thus changing di-
rection 180<> with a simultaneous gain in altitude.
IMN - Indicated Mach number
21
CONFIDENTIAL
IP - initial point; a well-defined point, easily distinguish-
able visually and/or by radar, used as a starting point
for a bomb run to the target.
IR missi?e - an infrared or heat-seeking missile
IRON HAND - a code name for a flight with special ordnance and
avionics equipment whose mission is to seek and
destroy enemy surface-to-air missile sites.
JCS target - a target appearing on the JCS target list
Jinking - constant maneuvering in both the horizontal and
vertical planes to present difficult target to enemy
defenses by spoiling the tracking solution. Bank,
pitch and velocity are all simultaneously changed in
this maneuver.
karst - a limestone outcropping or ridge
KIAS - knots indicated air speed
let - abbreviation for knot (nautical miles/hour)
KTAS - knots true air speed
LAU-3 - a rocket launcher adaptable to external bomb racks
holding 19 2.75 inch air-to-ground folding fin rockets
LAU-17 adapters - stub pylon on P-^
loose deuce - a term to describe fighter tactics in which two to
four airplanes maneuver to provide mutual support
and increased fire power.
Lufberry circle - a circular tail chase, ascending or descending
M - abbreviation for Mach number
MER - multiple ejection rack
mi - nautical mile, as used in. this report
NIGCAP - combat air patrol mission whose actions are directed
against KIG aircraft
HIG SCREEN - mission wherein protecting fighters are placed
between the threat and the protected force In a
specific area
military power - maximum unaugmeuted thi'ust condition of engine
missile free - authority is granted to fire unless target is
identified as friendly
missile tone - audio signal indicating AIM-9 is locked on to
an IR source
MRT - military rated thrust - see military power
MSL - altitude referenced to mean sea level
OPRHP - message report in joint operational reporting system
PANAMA - call sign for GCI site located near Danang
CONFIOENm
25
CONFIDENTIAL
Ant nf llitht within
plpper - aircraft weapon sight indicator dot
pipp«r ^ lighted ring)
fo^.ation A^l|^ or^^-rflr'^S^Ur l^^se^^er MXO
threat. (See Fig. 9)
PRP - pulse recurrence frequency
QRC-160 • noise Jamming ECM pod
RAG - replacement air group ,
use ^
RED CROWN - voice call for USS LONG BEACH (CLN-9)
RESCAP - rescue combat air patrol
RHAV - radar homing and warning
RIO - radar Intercept officer
RO - abbreviated form of RIO
interdiction - - vent ^or^hin.^
ROLLIMO THUNDER - code name for air strikes against North
Vietnam
in«ire 9 - eeographloal division of North
Route Package - ««,^^"^^/p„,^osf s of air strike targeting
,«,.er reversal - l^ll^t^ll^^^,^^^ ^^^^^
craft's vertical axis
SA-2 - soviet surface-to-air missile system
SAM - surface-to-air missile
t^^slorr-leellg^ri (page 27) - a f^-fJ'.^ftraS 'aSt^mpt'
to'tclltlvf offrnsrvrrft^r fn%S:t the attacker.
— - ^airr^af^^^s^U^V ^^'^^l^f^ -
flights of four ,
SHRIKE (AGM-itS) - air-to-surface radar seeking missile
: SIDEWINDER - see AIM-9
" SIDEWINDER tone - see missile tone
COHFiDENTIAL
26
SIP - selective Identification feature - electronic device with
variable codes for Identification
SILVER DAWN - a code name for an '.ntelllgence collecting air-
craft (SECRET)
"S** maneuver - a weave in a horizontal plane
Snap-up - a rapid pullup to establish a climb in order to launch
a weapon
SPARROW - see AIM-7
••Spllt-S" maneuver - see Figure 7 (page 30) - I80*' rotation about
the aircraft longitudinal axis followed by a
180 3 change of heading in a vertical plane
(half loop starting from top)
STBY - standby
steering dot - see dot
Swltchology - a coined word addressing the human engineering
considerations of switch arrangements
TACAN -> tactical air navigation • an active electronic naviga-
tional system which locates the aircraft with respect
to another installation
TARCAP - target combat air patrol - aircraft assigned the alr-
to-alr defense role in the target area
TAS - true air speed in knots
TCA - track crossing angle - the angle between flight paths
measured from the tail of the reference aircraft
Thud Ridge - A nickname given to a prominent geographical fea-
ture in North Vietnam, If. is a ridge running in a
general NW-SE direction frou 21®'*0'N/105*'25E to
21*20 'N/lOS^^ia'E.
TOT - time over target
TRACK (various colors) - see Figure 9 - code names for specific
refueling tracks
TROJAN HORSE - a code name of a U-2 air reconnaissance program
(SECRET)
unit (of turn) - divisions on an angle-of-attack indicator on P-U
aircraft
UHT - unit horizontal tall (applied to F-8 aircraft) - a tail
design whereby the whole surface rotates about a pivot
point
unloading - decreasing g's
V - closing velocity (relative)
c
vector box - see APR-25
WILD WEASEL - F-105F soecially equipp-sd for locating and attack-
ing SA-2 sites (employeil on IRON HAND missions)
m 27
yo-yo - See Figures 3 and k (page 29)
High speed - an offensive tactic in which the attacker
maneuvers through both vertical and hori-
zontal planes to prevent an overahoot In
the plane of the defender's turn.
Low speed - a dive for airspeed and a pull up for
position closure.
ZUNI - five inch air-to-ground ungulded rocket.
FIGURE \ . Scissors
As Portrayed in Perspective Sketch
FIGURE 2. Bgrrel Roll
A 1 1
\
^ PH ^
OH
AH
mm B •
NC /
>
PC
OG
AC
HANOI*
BG
CC
PF"-'
o)
AF
HMtNOM
BF
r
CF
-
V
r —
? OF
AE (
f
OD
•
\
A 1
' AD \
BD
1 1 2
1
— p:c —
4 1 3
1
\
/
/
V
AC \
B
CC
V^OfMAtCATION IIN(
THt COOftOIN
AS
/
^TES ARE GIVEN | /
, ate.
1 ^
FIGURE 1 1 . Map of North Vietnam Showing GEOREF Coordinates
4 %
Event XII-1
Aircraft Involved: Pour A-UCa v« one MIO-17
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: ig'Sfl^N/lOS'Sl'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time; 3 April 1965/UlOH
^ , _ . r . iif. fp- 'F PM-v-t) were oart of a atrllce force (nine A-*iEs, ten
Two elements of A-«Cs i3-vE f-it,-^* were P°*^ "» _ ^ suooort was by a
A-UC5 and el£ht F-eta) attacking the Thanh Hoa ^rldee. Part of the J^PPo^^ j^^g
night of fJs (Se. Lvor.t I.l) l-<=i-fi 1" |?A??o5i*SSd !2o ^iSESlMolRs/ At the tl»e
were to provide TAKCAP and were arnel with two ^PARP.Wfs ana two aiw*. *
of the event, the F-HB9 were In the target area.
2. MISSION ROUTE
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
Unknown
4. CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER , . .
levels at tioes reduced to a mile.
BLUE 1. 2 BLUE 3
Altitude- 10,000 ft 15,000 ft
&lilnlr oSo-090- about 090«
5. IHITIAL DETECTION ,^„«.,fi,d
6 o'clock. , rf
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 2 called the «I0 and both BLUE I and 2 started to break.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 and £ turned and the HIG closed, shooting. After turning almost 120 the HIO
broke off.
ws?o5r.fr? isii s-xo^ssM^tss M ssn^ s«Sn!
the MIO broke off.
a. ORDNANCE
Mo. fl red/No. hit
Cannon
HIG-17 1''°
11. DATA SOURCES
Hessaees. Reports: Air Combat Report 3 "80 from the USS HANCOCK
Hessap i esi nepor^a p^^^^.^, statements. BLUE 2 and BLUE 3
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
CTO 77.7 OPREP I* 031'<5iZ April t'5
CTC 77.7 MSG 0U0202Z A^rll ^5
CTG 77.7 MSG Of022lZ April 65
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
The strike force from the HANCOCK followed a strike by a force from the Coral Sea,
who attacked the target at 1035H.
The HANCOCK attack elements (19 A-Ws Including the JLUE elements) cruised In a
Event in-l
Sea strike elements were detected about 10 degrees left of track and 30 "11" ahead on
AI radar and were Initially called as bogeys but later Identified as frlendlles.
the target by divisions, on a neaaing oi ii» aeereeB, i;xi.«.ux..6 ""^-"^ '-"-Z^"
Fifteen A-* (BLUE elements) remained over the target completing the final l»o««»l"«,fM"
BLUE 1 was the strike leader. Four F-8E aircraft (Event I-l) preceded them for riax
suppression.
BLUE elements struck the target and rejoined as separate elements.
Vhen the F-8 cf Event I-l reported being hit (at this time It was not <*«terrained
to be by MlGs) his call was received by the BLUE elements and the A-Us proceeded outbound
to rendezvous with hia.
Since BLUE 1 and 2 were separated from BLUE 3 and *, the actions of each element will
be described separately.
BLUE 1 and 2
BLOZ 1 and 2 were unaware of «IOa in the area and on hearing the report of the P-8
iged, they Ji
kgree headlni
o'clock from BLUE 1).
They were climbing through about 10,000 feet, still in the haze layer as they crossed
the coast. BLUE 2 saw two contrails ccnlr.g from the south over the coast at 3 o clock,
and also saw two A-^Cs in a left turn at 10 o'clock, 3 miles away and slightly higher.
As BLUB 2 looked back he saw a single MIO-17 at 7:30 o'clock going to 6^0' clock two
miles away, level, and closing in a pursuit turn. BLUE 2 called "MIC at 6. BLUE 1 break
left now.* This was the first time that any call had been made concerning enemy aircraft.
BLUE 2 Jettisoned his tanks as BLUE 1 and 2 started to break left and down. After
about 120 degrees of turn BLUE 2 saw tracers off of his right wing and could hear cannon
fire. As the turn continued and BLUE 1 and 2 passed through a heading toward Hanoi,
the KIO broke off.
BLUE
36
I
I
The HANCOCK strike force attacked the target commencing at 10!j2H and retired frd« Q
the target by divisions, on a heading of Up degrees, cltmblng_toJ2,^^^
e
Q
e
belng"da«aged','"therjolnerir20M to~rende*vousT climbing out on a m
0»0-090 degree heading. BLUE 2 was flying tactical wing to the right (500 feet at 5 H
I
I
i
e
BLUE 1 also observed the attack and breakoff. He called the HIO disengaging and
2 saw the MIC going from U:30 to 6 o'clock with distance increasing.
BLUE I and 2 then rolled out on a heading of 130 degrees and egressed.
BLUE 3 and 0
After their last bombing run, when about two miles south of the target, BLUE 3 heard Nj
the P-89 call that he had been hit, and was proceeding outbound. BLUE 3 then decided to ■
follow innedlately in an effort to Join, as the P-8 Indicated he was alone. ^
A short time later, BLUE 3 heard BLUE 2 make the call of a MIO on BLUE I and 2's
tall.
BUR 3 continued toward the P-S and as he crossed the coastline east of the target,
he saw three aircraft at 10:30 o'clock about 3 to U miles away and below him 2000 to
3000 fee«. BLUB 3 was at about 15.000 feet altitude at this time.
At first BLUE 3 thought they were A-'tCs; however, as the group closed, he realized
that the last aircraft was a MIO-17. About at this point, the MIC was observed to fire
(Irevldenced by smoke puffs). BLUE 3. with a full load of 20rm, was two miles abeam at
this DOlnt and broke left into the MIC. Before he could obtalr. a firing position, the m
KIG broke off and headed north, climbing. BLUE 3 called the MIG breaking off. but only M
BLUE 2 heard it.
BLUE 3 then proceeded to the carrier on heading of 130 degrees.
All Of the foregoing events took place In a period of thout 3 to 1 minutes.
The P-U TABCAP from the Coral Sea were assigned an altitude of 25,000 feet. The \
TARCAP leader checked in with BLUE 1 Just prior to the HANCOCK attack on the target, and _
Indicated he was back overhead. (The F-^s had provided TARCAP for the Coral Sea strike B
iSd Sad re?Ir^d some 7? miles for aerial refueling.) All HIG action occurred after thi Q
?Sr«twn attacked and occurred below 16.000 feet altitude. After the MIQ action had
IrXn o??. B^Se 1 aSIised the TARCAP thai there was a reported r4IG in the area that was •
^ possibly aA A-i*. that HANCOCK forces were clear of the area, ard TARCA? was cleared to n .
^ retire. g |
i
1 I
Event III-2
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOODs V8. MIO-17
Result: One MIG-17 probably destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 19»00'N/105»«»8'E
1, PRIMARY MISSION *H0 TACTICAL SITUATION
of a larpe force of F-iOSCs f ^ ^"J^^* '^f Jji^of t Hoa Bridge, and to
nigrit was instructed to orbit Ju3c off f ""5""!%2LAran^ then to work with Search
minltor the prlr.ary nisslon froruency "J^J^ "J^J'^tt ?8.?00 ft lultSSe. 325 KCAS. with the
and Rescue. Th.- flU;ht was r> a left-hand °f sone of the F-105 flights were
•eaternrost portion of the "U-.n path 2-3 Jj^j^f ' ^ ?he flights were briefed by
}St2I?}U:To :nec?VlS ^:t5?^ir.icaise"tfis^iL^?Sf^5ay .fter the first niO encounter
In Southeast Asia.
Teplrteroanan, Air Base. S'^^^and proceeded dlrectly^to the^
JJMJeiiiS Sni then returned directly to Danang AB.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-iooD gp '^g" 1- 2- 3. t
2 - 335 gal ext fuel tanks
2 - LAU-3 2.75 FFAR PODS (19 Rocket Pods)
<t - M-39 ZQiKit cannons, 200 rds HEI each
2 - empty Inboard pylons
Empty centerline pylon (on 2 and « only)
MI0-17S
Guns
No external stores
Chlcom narking
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Heather:
3000 scattered layer. 15.000 thin broWe layer 20,000 ft tjin overcast clrrua
layer. Haze from surface to about 12.000 ft with 3-5 ni via sxoi
layer. ^ „
Could see water and coast line.
^j:|iOODs ^ ^j^^^^
Altitude: 18.500 ft Slightly high
Head^ntr: Left orbit passing East
through west
■ 1500 (t In ext tanks - ^
It^^r,;. » |}«"arr.t'?r. U:1o"oToit!^ST.JtlSn ..c. 2-1/2 to 3 .1 =« on .
near reciprocal heading and closing fast.
a fo^-SO" nose low turn to come In behind t.*ie fllsht.
MIC 1 attacked GREEK 3 and «», who also ''r°$«„i*"' l^^^he MIC RlEht after the initial
III ihen settled on GREEN « wh^^ ,ail. GREEN 2
break, GREEN i-^^* ^^Ued CRct:. 2 to break na^^^ Aft.>r the MIC passed behln-l CP.EEN 2,
[;ircaU:d''?;ar1ho'°S5GVarno-;%rh;J!"SS^lN 2*re-4aed and fired a burst of 20^. out
Event tZI-2
of range at HIC 2 who pronptly aplit-S atraluht down. CREEH 2 followed him, ring a
second burst and then at IO.OOCj rt rired a Ion*; burst and noted a hit on the right hori-
zontal stabilizer of MIG 2. GREEN 2 started his pullout at 7000 ft, pulUn?; enough g to
■grey out" and recovered Just above the wave tops. Other sources Inolcate a HIG loss on
this date, Kost probably the MIC described above..
CRfiEN 2 and 3 rendezvoused, refueled, and flew search and BESCAP In eonpany with. an.
HU-17 helicopter for cne of the downed P-105 aircrew (see Event II-l) until almost out
of fuel. They recovered at Oanang.
8. OROKANCC eXPENOCO
CREEN 1, 3. - No att».'r.pt
QREEM 2 - iJOO-StiO rounds ^0^^^n
NIG 1 - One burst at GHEFN 3
Other burst at GREEN 1 and ^ likely
9. EQ'JIPKENT PROBLEMS
QREEN I - Both rocket pods failed to jettison electrically on first attempt. (Old
Jettison manually under fire)
OHEEH - Could not Jettison stores.
GREEN 2 - Plio pack had stripped sprocket holes - did not obtain flln of Incident.
10. AIRCREW CONNENTS
Expertenee
This squadron had one of the highest levels of tactical aircraft experience In SEA.
All pilots had nany F-lOO hours (up to 2,500) and about 20 combat nlsslons In SEA (escort
and R^/N close air support).
Comment S i
P-100 could not satch KIC turn. Plight members were expecting MIO activity since
they had talked to the F-6 pilot who had been hit by MlOa the previous day and had
examined his aircraft.
GREEN 2 - The haze complicated Join up. Found GREEN 3 quickly. CREEIJ li
eilted area with all stores and CREEN Lead atter.pted to find and accompany <i.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; GREEN 2, ft Novep.ber 1968
Aircrew Letters : GPEEN 2, 19 February 1968
Messages, r.gports :
2AD 060?U0; April 1965
2AD 0U1H37Z April 19^5
2AD ZODC-CP-009'<6 April 1965
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
GREEN flight (four P-lOODs) was fragged to fly rescue air patrol for a fore* of
F-1058 attacking the Than Hoa Bridge at 19*'50'H/105*'*8'E. A second flight of P-lOODs
was on NXGCAP for the same force (see Event 2B). On the day previous a tlavy P-8 Crusader
was attacked and damaged by HIO action, the first KZC action of the Southeast Asian
conflict. The members of both of the P-100 flights had an opportunity to view the
resultant damage to the F-6 and to talk to the pilot after his recovery at Oanang* Thus,
the P-lOO aircrews were expecting KIC activity as they pointed their aircraft toward North
Vletitan on this date.
GREEN flight departed Danang AB in South Vietnam at IQiiSH and flew out the 335*
radial of the Danang TACAN for "0 ml to rendezvous with the XC-135 tankers at 1102H and
took on a full load of fuel before proceeding up the coastline to thslr orbit position.
The Instruction to GREE>J flight -was to orbit Just off 3hore an the P-105 egress route and
to monitor the strike frequency until needed, at v-hlch time they were to switch to the
rescue frequency and aid in any rescue attempt with search for the aircrew and CAP for the
rescue aircraft. The southwestern anchor point of the orbit was at 19*00* H/105* 'E, with
the flight passing about 3 ml off shore on the western side oT the left-hand orbit. Orbit
altitude was 18,500 ft for the lead elenent and about 20,000 ft for the second element
which was flying Just below a 20,000 ft thin cirrus overcast. The flight was at loltexr-
speed of 300-350 KCAS and attempted to fly a fluid four formation as much as possible
within the confines Imposed by the orbit.
The weather In the area was generally hazy with 3-5 mi visibility in the haze layer
which extended from the surface up to 12,000 ft. A broken layer at 3*000 ft and a thin
layer at 12,000 and 20,000 ft completed the picture, but the aircrews reported that they
could see the water and the shoreline through the haze.
When GREEN flight switched over to strike frequency, they noticed a great deal of
radio chatter. About 70 aircraft were on the frequency inclualng both Air Force and Navy
mission and direct mission support aircraft.
Event III-2
GREFN fllPht was Just entcrlnR the second orb.t at abuut 1150H when they heard the
P-100 MICCAP nisrht (see :;vent 111-3) call MIGs and the enaulna; calls confl rnin;i; that
the MlCs were In fact "IGs. At alnoat tho same clr.e as the lead element of GHEEfJ fllPiht
passed throurh a westerly h..'3illnr;, the rilpht saw a Doii:ey at Lead's 1230 position aboui
2 1/2 to 3 ml ranJC, sllrhily hl.^h, and clostnj; alnost head-on. Two of the fllRht neisbers
CAlled the bogey as It flacriefl out of the haze and passed In front of the lead element.
The bogey was^de'lnltely Identified as a ::I0-17 by tJRBEH 2 as he observed the KI'l roll
Into a 70*-80* left bank 'urn into the fllttht fror. his, GREEH 2's, 9 o'clock position.
The mo was turnlns; sllr'itly nose low, so OREEfJ Lchd an^ 2 tlt^htened the left turn,
enter-ed a shallow climb, rin<l jettisoned the fuel tanks (with about 1500 lbs of fuel In
each)* pocket pods and vr.].ly pylons. The first MIC swun;; in behind the second element
while t second :'.IG-17 swunp: In behind the lead elt-r.ent, attacking GREEN 2.
GREEN Lead saw MIC 2 on GREEN 2's tall and c^.j'e'l, "GREEN 2 break; there's one on
your tall." GREEN 2 lit afterL-urner ani pulled the P-lOO into .-naxlmun "i;", blanking out
GREEN Lead, and he aav* the second MIG about 2000 ft at his 7 o'clock position. The second
MIG was nose low on GRE^:: so GREEN 2 raised his nose more and held the to insure
what was already an overshoot. The MIG overshot GREEN 2 and slid In behind GREEK Lead
as GREEN 2 chanired his node selector froa sianual sight to radar and then started a
nose high rudder reversal. At f^hat time CREEH Lead called, "The KIC's on me now." GRE^N
2 noted an airspeed of 250 KCAS dS he lowered his nose and observed the MTC at 2,000-3,000
ft below hln, 5,000 ft ranire. a.nd about 2, COO ft behind GREEN Lead in good flrlns position.
As CREEN 2's airspeed was bullolna, he uncaged the 3l?ht and set the wlngspan lever at 12
ft. Then GREEN 2, reallzlr.? tJ^at he did not have enough time to close on the I4IG, pulled
hia nose up to show belly '.o zT.e MIG and fired a burst of 20mm cannon hoping that the XIO
would see the guns flashing and break off his attack on GREEN Lead.
The ruse was successful because the MIG reacted Inr.edlately by reversing from the
left pursuit curve to a rl^^ht bank. GREEN 2 was still outside of effective gun range,
noticed that his airspeed had built to U50 KCAS, came out of afterburner, and eased back
on the power as he called, "Rottn Lead reverse, 2's on the MIG now." But GREEH Lead did
not hear GREEH 2's call and, noting that Ms airspeed was about 250 KCAS during the Initial
break, had lowered his nose to accelerate as the XIG approached him. As the MIC approached
hln» he continued to accelerate and go for separation as MIC 2 broke off.
As soon as MIG 2 saw that GREEN 2 hitd matched his turn fror left to right, he re-
versed back to the right In a modified split "S" arid headed straight down from an estlnated
I'J^OOO ft. GREEN 2, wary of an cvershoct , went Into a nose high roll to the left, looked
for lead, and called a second time that he was on the .'IIG. (GREEN Lead did not receive
the call. This was cccurlne at the sarne tL-ae that the F-lOO VllGCf? and P-1058 were en-
gage'd by MIGs). GREEN 2 could net locate GREEN Lead in the hase but did complete his
roll to the vertical straight down attitude and added power to close on the MIG. GREEN 2
attempted to track the MIG fron strai»;ht above at =ero "g"; but being unable to do so,
electrically cas:ed the slg.ht and fired a burst with no observed results. He then checked
the altimeter passlne throuch 10,000 ft, put the plpper on the MIC 'a tailpipe, and fired
a long burst to 7,000 ft where he observed a flash on the MIO's right horizontal stabilizer
and started his pullout.
The pullcut was begun aggressively, causing almost a complete loss of vision
(althouKh GREEN 2 did not blacl: cut). GREEN 2 pulled the power to Idle, threw out the
speed brakes, held maxlr.um "g" Just short of blacking out, and pulled out of the dive on
a southerly heading at "wave top level". The P-100 was overstressed as a result of the
pullout. CREEN 2 stated that he had an inpression of the MIG starting his pullout to the
wetft. GREEH 2 recovered Just southeast of the town of Than Hoa, about 1 1/2 mi off shore.
(Other sources list a probably KIG-17 kill due to 20mn cannon fire at this time and date
and is most likely the result of this encounter).
> Meanwhile, the first MIG overshot GREEN Lead and 2 and attacked GREEN 3 and U .
.1 GREEN 3 and ft also broke hard left into the attack and attempted to clear off their alr-
i craft but were unable to electrically Jettison their external stores. GREEN 3 was able to
manually Jettison his external stores as the MIG fired at him from a 90* angle off de-
flection. The MIC then pulled in behind GREEN a vt.o could not Jettison his stores.
! " GREEN ii broke harder and was able to dive away fron the MIG and accelerate away from him
in afterburner.
The flight attemcted to rejoin after the encasement but was hampered by the haze.
GREEN 2 and 3 were able to get together quickly; ar.d t.'ien, GREEN Lead, noting that 2 and 3
were together, elected to follow GREEH ft and provice cover for hlra as he egressed the area
with all external stores.
GREEN 2 and 3 set up a search pattern for the downed P-105 pilot (see Event II-l)
until they reached Bingo fuel. They then returned to the tanker, refueled, and returned
to the search area to continue searching for the dcwned aircrew and CAP the rescue heli-
copter. At th-* second Bingo fuel, GREEJI 2 ar.d 3 returned to Danang and recovered. The
fillet time was 3 hr and 35 Kin, and no fnember of GREEN flight received any damage.
m
Event III-3
Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOODs vs two
MIG-178
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20*00 • N/105* 50 'B
1. PRIIUaV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
0«t«/Tiqie: 4 April 1965/1 150H
PURPLE flight (four P-lOODa) was fpagjred to fly MICCAP support for a fopcc of P-105»
attaeklntK the Than Hoa Bpldw at 19**50'N/l65*'>8'E. Their aaslF.ned orbit was north of the
target between the IfIC airfields near Hanoi and the target . At least one flight of four
F-lOOi vma in th* area to fly RESCAP for the same mission (See Event ZXI-2).
2. NISSIOH ROUTE
PURPLE :iiait departed Oanang« proceeded to rendezvous with a i(C*135 tanker and than
paralleled the eoaatlln* ahout 10 ml off shore to the orbit area.
3. lIRCkAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-IOOD PURPLE 1. 2. -j. H
2 " AIM-9B IB SIDEWINDER misalles (at least one on each Inboard pylon)
2 - 335 gal eitemai fuel tanks
* - K-39 internally mounted 20mm cannons. 200 rds HEI for each cannon
HIC^IT WIG ip 2
4. FLIGMT COROITtONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weathers 3000 ft scattered, 12,000 ft scattered, 20,000 ft thin cirrus overcast with
3-5 ml vifliblllty in a haze layer extending from the surface up to 12,000 ft.
PURPLE MIQ
I a — 3 — IT I — 7 .
Altitude s 18,500-20,000 ft About 17,000 ft
Heading : Southerly About 225*
Spggd : 300-35- KCAS About 450 KCAS
Fuel State : ' Fuel In drops Unknown
Plight Pprmation : Fluid Pour Echelon
5. INITIAL DETECTION
The lead element was tuminR through an easterly heading In a loose right orbit at
18,500 ft when PURPLE 2, flying on lead's right wing, ele:nent high left, saw two MIC-lTa
at his 9 o'clock about 3 ml away, 1000-2000 ft low on a southeast heading. Just prior to
the HIO sighting, PURPLE 2 observed a flight of two F-105Ds at his 1 to 2 o'clock position
about 5 ml away and about 2000 ft low in a left orbit passing through a southerly heading.
PURPLE 2 felt that the MIGs were being vectored under OCI control toward the P-105s.
6. ACTION INITIATED
PUIIFU 2 called the MIGs to PURPLE Lead and started looking for the MIQ alert code
word to warn the P-1058. PURPLE Lead saw some P-8s at his 10 o'clock high and thinking
theae were the aircraft PURPLE 2 was calling, he continued che loose right turn and called
back, "Negative - friendly aircraft", attempting to keep radio chatter to a minimum.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPNERT
PURPLE 2 replied that there were confirmed MIG-17s now at 11 o'clock low, and crossing,
and PURPLE Lead acknowledged with a quick reversal to the left and called, "Let's have
at them." PURPLE 2 vectored lead back to the right . In c descending turn In afterburner
and the element was able to close on the MIGs, but not "jefore the lead MIC shot
and critically dastai^ed the lead F-105. PURPLE Lead fired a nlfisils that passed over the
NIQ*s rlj^t wing without detonating and PURPLE 2 followe'1 the second MIO up Into the top
half of a loop. PURPLE 2 yo-yoed over the top as the second MIG cosnoleted his loop and
started a second loop. PURPLE 2 then dove to the right and net the MIC head-on firing-
280 rds of 20mm from about 1500 ft down to 800 ft wltn no observed results. The first
HIO broke left and up hard, then yo-yoed back down on the second P-105 critically enough
that the pilot was forced to ball out near Danang.
PURPLE Lead and 2 rejoined and resumed MICCAP with 3 and t*.
Evenc XIZ-3
OKDMKCE
(No. flred/No. hit)
Hls5lle» Cannons
PURPLE 1
PURPLE 2
PURPLE 9
PURPLE k
MC-17
1/0
1/0
2/2
1/0
2/2
Remarlts
280 rds HEI
No target
Hit two P*105DS
EQUIPKHT PROBLEMS
ittioned.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
P-100
Time
Combat
Missions
Remarks
PURPLE
1
7000
700
20
Sqd CO., ADC background
P-40, P-51 in WW IX
PURPLE
2
2600
1800
30
PURPLE
3
Unknown
—Very experienced
in tactical fighters
PURPLE U Unknown —Very experienced in tactical fighters — -
Comments on this Encounter
PURPLE 1 and 2 - Too much chatter on primary frequency. Plights were attempting to
practice radio silence &ut Just too rany aircraft on one frequency.
PURPLE 1 - Day flehters not too effective over enemy CCI environment. MIOs easily
slipped around small number of MICCAP aircraft.
PURPLE 1 - Mavy aircraft passing through the target area added to the location,
idbntlfieatlon, and discriminative task. , ,
PURPLE 1 - P-1058 orbiting on Ingress and egress were very iiazardous.
PURPLE 1 - Peels his flight of P-lOOa did a poor Job of maintaining flight integrity.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
PURPLE 1-6 November 1968, and PURPLE 2 - U November and 6 November
1968.
Messages. Reports : 2 AD 0607*0, April 1965-
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
PURPLE flight, consisting of four P-lOODs piloted by four very experienced tactical
fighter pilots, was assigned a XICCAP mission in support of a force of P-105s attacking
the Than Koa Bridge at 19*50 ' N/105'''»e 'E In North "letnam. These aircrews had an oppor-
tunity to view the damage to an ?-8 Crusader that recovered at Danang AB on the previous
day, the first U.S. aircraft damaged as a result of air-to-air conflict in SEA.
PURPLE flight departed Danang, proceeded to take on a full load of fuel from a KC-135
tanker and then paralleled the coastline about 10 ml off shore to their orbit area Just
north of Than Hoa. The flight established a figure eight orbit at 18,500 ft for the first
element, about 20,0C0 ft for the second element, and were attempting to hold fluid four
position at 300-350 KCAS.
The orbit was mostly over land with hazy weather conditions limiting vlaiblUty, a
broken cloud layer at 15,000 ft and thin overcast at 20,000 ft further restrlctea vlsl-
Snity over enemy territory where the enemy had a CCI capability U.S. Navy r-^i and P-fl
strike and BABCAP aircraft were in the area. U.S. Air Force P-105s were orbi-lng prior to
being called into the target, were shuttling In and out from the target, and t^ien were
orbltlS over the water for rejoin which further complicated the task of acquiring Identi-
fwlM and stopping MIG aircraft vectored Into the area by GCI radar. Another complication
wasthe need for atrlct discipline in reducing the use of the single mission frequency
used by about 70 aircraft. PURPLE Plight was instructed to call out only positively
confirmed MIG aircraft. However, the radio chatter between the mission coordinator and
P-105 flights under his direction ralrly blocked the frequency.
When the action started, PURPLE Lead was turning through an easterly heading In a ,-
shallow rlKht turn at 18,500 ft with PURPLE 2 on his right side and the second element was
ball II thf left and Just under the overcast at 20.000 ft. PURPLE Lead had Just observed
Event III-3
a fllRht of Navy P-8 aircraft at his 10 c'clock, a llttU hU.t,, far out when J
Identified two KlC-17s In close formation at hla 9 o'^lo^l^ai-out 2,000 ft Jo*. J Jl ranej
m a looie left turn. The HICs were oovln«: faster tnan PUPPI.fc flight and the MlCa south-
east heading would take thera In fronc of PU!?P!.E fllRMt toward a fUtjht of F-lO^a that.
PURPLE. 2 had Just seen at h!3 1 o'clock position about 5 nl range. * "J* /"i^^'
left orbit turning frsn we?t to south and a few thousand feet below PUIIFL&
observed 5n
night* probably at about
300- KCAS
(see Event II-I).
When fURPLE 2
aircraft and '.n an
friendly aircraft
called
effort
"Let's have at them", and
the MIG alert and called PUHPLB
In front of the P-lOOs by thla
a rlKht descending turn that
A few more vectors from
the MIG-17S, PURPLE Ltad thought he was referring to the Navy
to reduce radio chatter replied, "negative PURPLE fllffht,
. . PURPLE 2 also saw the Havy aircraft and replied that they wer« con-
firmed MICj-lTs passln^ under PURPLE flight's 11 o'clock low, on a ft5* an^le. At this time
P'JRPLE 2 was looking for the KIG alert code word to relay the warning to other aircraft
In the area.
At the second call from PURPLE 2. PURPLE Lead called,
racked the P- 100 up on the left win;;. PURPLE 2 transmitted
Lead to a rifcht descending break since the MIGs had passed
time. PURPLE Lead and 2 lit afterburner and reversed into
eventually put the MIGs at 11 o'clock about 10,000 ft rar.ge
PURPLE 2 put the :iIGs at the lead element's 12 o'clock position. The ?-100s were initially
falling further behind, but were able to accelerate In the afterburner descent to .9 to
»95 Mach ttSO to SCO KCAS) and close on the MIGs as the MIGs closed on the P-lOSs. which
were still In a loose left orbit.
PURPLE Lead and 2 saw the lead KIG-IT fire on the lead F-105- PURPLE 2 saw hits on
the P-105 with debris coning off the P-105. The llujober 2 MIG aalntalned cloao forma-
«tlon on the lead HIO's right wing and was not observed to fire. PURPLE Lead hesitated to
fire an AI.M-9B IR r.lsslle at the rilG because of the proxlr-.ity of the P-i05 ar.-J by the time
he was sure the MIG was the target, he had closed to within 3000 ft of the :;IG. PURPLE
Lead fired the SIDEWINDER as PURPLE 2 was calling that "He had his pipper on a MIG - Was
he clear to fire?**
The SIDEWINDER missile passed 10 ft over the right wing of the lead SIO, but now the
P-105 was in afterburner. PURPLE Lead elected not to fire the second missile for fear of '
hitting the P-105 and decided to close for a gun attack.
He cleared PURPLE 2 to fire and glanced over his shoulder to verify the position of
PURPLE 2.
The two MIGs broke hard up when the first missile passed thera, MIG 1 turning a little
to the left and «IQ 2 a little to t:.e right, both flight paths about 20" off the vertical.
The P-105 went Into a sharp descending spiral so that when PURPLE Lead again looked for-
ward, there were no MIGs or F-105s, The first KIG is reported tr have yo-yoed onto the
second P-105 and danaj^ed that aircraft enough that the pilot could not attempt a landing
and on bailout, experienced a chute malfunction. Both F-105 aircrews were lost.
PURPLE 2 followed the second MIG into the vertical but could not match the rate of
turn and overshot the KIG's flight path. The MIG contl.nued over the top pulling Into a
tight off vertical loop ind continued up In a second loop which would put him behind
PURPLE 2. However, PURPLE 2 pulled up Into a sort of high-speed yo-yo rather than the
loop and when the MIG started back up into the second loop, PURPLE 2 whipped his F-lOO
Into a right descending turn and cut Into the top of the '110 's projected flight path.
PURPLE 2 put his pipper on the Min and fired 280 rounds of ZOirjn HEX in a 35° to «0* dive
at the MIO with about '«00 KCAS fron a rant^e of 1500 ft down to about 800 ft but did not
observe any hits. The HIO was inverted and PURPLE 2 was rlrht side up. PURPLE 2 had
good tracking with his sight set on alr-to-alr, uncaged and rnanually ranged to 1500 ft.
PURPLE 2 passed over the KIG, belly to belly, passed through the MIO flight path
with a bit of turbulence and banked to look for the MlO. The HIO went down into the
cloud deck and was not seen again.
PURPLE Lead called the flight together so that they could be reformed and ready for
additional MIC attacks. PURPLE 3 had Jettisoned all stores including his missiles with
the enernency Jettison button and PURPLE ^ had Jettisoned his tanks on the initial MIC
break PURPLE Lead and 2 Jettisoned their tanks after rejoin to be ready for the next
attack. PURPLE U fired an AIM-9a missile without a target, apparently to confirm Its
operational capability.
Event I I 1-3
PURPLE Lead reportd that a nlaaile passed tetwecn nls aircraft and the MIG when he
was Initially about 10,000 rt behind the MIG. PURFLE Lead does not think that the missile
Mas that of PURPLti l» but rather a rnlsslie fror a »avy Crusader.
PURPLE friKht did not see any additional MIQa and returned to Danang with no further
incidents.
'i3
\ I
-i
i /I
t ";
,1 J
Event IIX-4
z
Aircraft Involved: P-IOls vs MIGa
Results: So damage
Vicinity or Encounter: Unknown
11.
12.
PRIMAIIY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Data/Tine: 14 Hay 1965/Unknown.
DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67.
KAmnvC DESCRIPTION
No other Information la available except that the MZOa Involved were from Hlnan
Island.
Event
Aircraft Involved: One RB-66 vs HIO
Reaulta: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 19*13*N/105"55'E
K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 20 Kay 196S/1235H.
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
A B-66 saw an unidentified type MIO at 20 lallea. The unidentified aircraft was at
2S»000 foot altitude and was turning away. »
♦
Event ZII-6
Aircraft Involved: MIQCAP Flight vs two NlOa
Results: No danage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20**20'N/105*^44<E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 20 May 1965/I300H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight, composed of aircraft of an unknown type, was on a MIQCAP mission when
they saw a silver flash at 31,000 feet altitude. The HIO then Jettisoned tanks and
reversed course when approached. A second HIG was then seen alongside the first. BLUE
flight started to go after the MZGs but stopped after a brief chase and broke off due
to fuel.
B
I
I
f
i
8
I
I
i
i
i
1
Event III-7
I.
Aircraft Involved; Pour A-lHs vs two MIC-lTs
Result: One XIC-I7 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter; 20«10'H/105«25'E
PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTlCAl SITUATION
Date/Tine: 20 June 19C5/lB35tI
Pour A-lKs were on a rescap mission. One other flight of four A-lHs were about 30
miles distant » but were not on the same mission.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE flight penetrated :IVM coaat approximately 5 nlles south of Thanh Hoa, thence
northwest at heading of turning to 315» about time of action.
3. AIRCRAFT CONPIGURATION
BLUE 1. 2. 3. "
800-20cim rounds (i<-2 0rxi cannon)
two LAU pods, 19 rounds each
Two 300 gal ext tanks
IFP, radio, Tacan
HIQ 1. 2
Two rockets each (about 8" DIA) •
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
solid celling 13,000 ft, clear, dusky as sun was starting to set,
[■* ■ 5000'
leather : High overcas:
Altitude : 9000 ft
Heading : 310 degrees
Speed : 150 KIAS
Fuel : Unknown
Flight Formation ;
5. INITIAL DETECTION O
warning of KICs was first r«elved by report from a Picket ^"ti-oyer ;;;i^;;^'a3
tracking KICs as they closed on rear of first section. Visual recognition of the MICa
occSrrSd as they oveJtook the first section of BLUE flight and passed it to the right.
6. ACTION INITIATED
After MIGs passed 3LUE flight they turned back to launch a head-on attack. BLUE 1
Observed YIGs firing two rockets. BLUE 1 ordered BLUE flight to reverse course and dive.
All BLUE craft executed a spllt-S and started a rapid descent.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHEIIT
After the WICs turned back to attack BLUE flight, one MIO pursued BLUE 1 and 2 while
the other MIG pursued BLUE 3 and 1. This pursuit took place at very low altitude in the
form of a circular route around a riage line. The engagement lasted about 5 IJinutes
without one MIG breaking off. On the final attack cne MIG attacked BLUE 1 and 2, and
BLUE 3 and ft on a head-on pass fired on the MIC. obtaining hits. One of the MIGs, hit by
BLUE 3, then crashed.
8. ORDNANCE
Ho. fired/No. h .
BLUE 3
BLUE 4
HIG 1
HXC 2
Cannon
2/1
3/0
No firing
1/0
Rockets
2/0
2/0
Remarks
About 30 rounds per gun
About 30 rounds per gun
Plred unknown number of times
9.
EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 3 indicated that his radio becaise Inoperative en route to the area. Radio
le operative later. No ether significant proM^^.s, although as a result of the
became operat
encounter three of r;he four engines were overboosttfc .
Event II 1-7
10. AIRCREU COHNENTS
BLUE 1 Believed that, had he realized the hostile rocktts were of the ballistic
type, they could have aowned the KIGs at the outs.jt with thtlr 20min canncn, Instead of
talking evasive action.
The SAR deacroyer*s CCI assistance was fantastically helpful.
The HIG pilot that stayed with then was good*
BLUE 1 was surprised at the «I0-17 raaneuverablllty. The A-IH could not coRplete a
180* turn In the tlise It took tiie Mir.-17 to execute a wing over and roll In for a good
attack.
11. Om SOURCES
MesaaKes. Reports ; Debrief of BLUE 1 (17 Jan 67)
Debrief of 3 (17 Jan 67)
CTG 77.6 MSG 201523Z
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
The four A-lHs entered IJorth Vietnam fron the sea, penetrating the coast about 5
tnilea south of Thanh Hoa. They then took up a heading cf abciit 315", at 9000 ft and 15Q
KIAS. The flight was In two sec*.lons abeam of each ather and about 5000 ft apart, with
BLUE 3 and U to the right of BLL'E 1 and 2.
When at a position of ZO'IO'II/ICS'SS *E the SAR picket destroyer reported two non-
squaklnp;, high speed contacts closing from a bearing of and and rrtlles (about 135
Biles from the SAH destroyer). The destroyer tracked the bogies and called them at 1,
3, and 5 o'clock to SL'JE flight. The contacts vier^ lost at 12 niles at 6 o'clock froa
BLUE flight. (It was felt that this was due to the fact that the targets had turned tall
to the ship.
BLUE 1 looked behind hin, and within a short tis:e picked up two bogles at 6:30 to
7 o'clock about 3000 ft above BLVE flight. (This pat the bogles at about 12,000 ft ai^l-
tude and 500 to 1000 ft below the overcast.) Vhen seen, the bogles appeared tc be about
2 miles away . )
The bogles, on a straight course, paralleling that of the A-lKs, passed off to the
left about 1 to 1-1/2 r.lles away v/lthcut changing altitude. The bogles were estimated to
be flying at aoout 35C to 'iOO kts. The wlngsan of t.^.e bogies was on the right and they
were in a tit^ht fsroation.
As the bogles passed out ahead, they were identified as MIC-17s due to their outline
and shape. 3LUE flight turned slightly toward the y.JGs and started a slow descent.
BLUE 1 felt that the :!IGs were heading for the other A-lHs , having lost contact with BLUE
flight. He therefore called the other flight to warn them cf the MICs' presence.
As the KlCa 50t about 5 nlles In front of BLUE flight, they abruptly turned 180°
to the left and started tack in a descent towards BLUE flight, approaching froa 11 to
11:30 o'clock. At this time BL'JE flight was «t 3000 to 8500 ft altitude indicating 180
to 190 kts.
BLUE flight set up for a head-on pass at the MIGs since this type of attack was best
for the A-ls. 'rfhen the yiQs reached 3 to miles range,' tne lead KIC ("JG-D launched
two large rockets. BL'JE 1 felt that these were alr-to-alr TJlsslles and broke the flight
off from the head-cn attack and started to execute a spllt^S to the right and down.
During this maneuver, BLUE 1 observed the rockets to burn out on a ballistic trajectory
off to the right. BLUE 3 also observed one smoke trail to his left, after about 3000 ft
of descent.
In the 50 to 60 degree dive, BLUE flight reversed course and leveled off at 150 to
200 ft AGL. BLUE flight was then heading about Ito degrees, toward the coast; and BLUE
3 and 4 were several hundred feet abcve BLUE 1 and 2 and were off to the beaa.
At this point, BLUE flight chserved the MIGs to be close behind them. One NJO waa
following each section of BLUE flls:.t.
BLUE I observed a KIC- to be 150 to 300 ft behind BLUE 3 and 4, firing steady (not
In bursts). The tracers appeared to be passing' beneath BLUE 3 and 4, Although there
was a MIG close behind BLUE 1 and 2, he was not observed tc fire.
BLUE 1 and 2, who had full power at this time, Jettisoned tanks and broke right,
around the edge of a karst cliff, putting the karst between then and the MIC.
As BLUE 1 and 2 broke right, BL'JE 3 and li observed snoke trails and a rocket explod-
ing on the ground in front of BLUE 1 and 2. BLUE 3 saw the KIGs behind then and Jet-
tisoned tanks and rolled off to the left. He observed the KIG behind hia to continue to
fire. BLUE 3 kept .T.oying in and out of the KiGs' fire as the KICs tried to pull lead.
'Due to the lighting conditions, the range was difficult tc estimate.
Event 111-7
Finally the KIG (KIC-2) ovenshot and cllnbud away. As the :!IG did su, BLUE 4' ^ot a snap-
shot but r.lssed.
This MIG (KIC-2) then cllrbed up above liLUc flight, and althousjh he stayed fqr the
rest of the incident, did r.ot atjaln enter t\.c night.
BLUE 3 and tt oLserve:^. t:ie other MIC (rUG-l) to follow ni.UE 1 ar.d 2 and falling on
one pass, reversed for another fror. head-on. However, the ''.IC did not make it success-
fully and broke cff without rirlng. 1 2nd ? were at this tire pulling maxiniu."a,g's
(in the buffet) and were In naxlnun power, kecpln;^ the airspeed at aoout 200 kts.
BLUE I and 2 ended up cii the opposite clde of the karst rida^e from BLUc 3 and 'J.
The f'UG,, by cllnalr.g ar;d executln*: a nose hltrh reversal, could reposition on cLUE 1
and 2. BLUE I and i /.ept the ."IG from fetttns a eood position on the-Ti by maneuvering to
keep the ridge between trjea ana tne t'lC as the rac relied in. This was don? by naneu'/er-
Ing through a saddle in the ridge. The KIG made several passes In this manner by use
of the yo-yo r.aneuvcr.
After going around several tlnie-j, SLUE I observed the MXG to be above then In a 90"
bank as they passed through tr.e saddle.
BLUE 1 and 2 car.sed through the saddle with the MIG behind. At this time BLUE 3 and
* came back up over the karsc at a 90° deflection to the t'lG, and SLUE 3 fired but missed,
observing the tracers to pass in front of the MIG.
Tne KIG then turned In to 3LUE 3 and In a cll.nblng pass as 3LUE 3 and 'i descended
to¥'^rd the MIG. On a head-cn oass, 3LUE 3 and each had a good shot, as the XIC passed
underneath BLUE 3 and above BLUE
BLUE 3 held the nose down to stay on the MIC; and Just before he broke off, he
observed tracers go into the "IG and pieces core off. 3LUE 3 and t turned back on him
as BLUE 1 got off a quick burst but r.lssed ,
The KIG slowly increaaei his angle of tank and Inpacted the ground, exploding on
impact and burned. The MIG -.vas In t- 90° bank when he passed BLUE 3 and ^4.
BLUE 1 and 2 heard SLUE 3 call the hit on the r'lG; and after passing to the other
side of the karst, saw the burning wreckage.
All members of the flight then saw the otner /IG depart toward Hanoi, climbing into
the overcast. 2H.'£ 1 and 2 started for the coast, with 3LUE 3 and »f followln;;; by about
15 miles. At this tire the ZAht destroyer called to say that there were numerous uniden-
tified contacts comL-.g to intercept them, so 3LUE flight stayed at low altitude to the
coast. The contacts broke off as BLUcl flight passed over the coast.
BLUE 3 and I* pulled 3 to U g's during their maneuvers. Alrhough the rocket pads
were armed, they were not fired for fear of hitting the other section. BLUE 3 fired
with a fixed sight, with the plpper set to zero deflection. SLUE 3 utilized the tracers
to assist m aiming.
BLUE 1 did not expect the r<IG-17 to try to get down low and mix it up with the
A-ls. During the engager.ent the altitude never exceeded about 700 ft except for the
MIC's yo-yo which went up to a^.out 2000 ft.
MIG-1 was never observed to fire his cannon.
Event III-8
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-lOls vs two MIG-17s
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«»'J5'N/i04«'05'E
I. PRIMARr MISSION A»D TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 12 October 1965/day
8. ORDNANCE
MiGs fired cannon.
II. DATA SOURCES
Messaires. Reports ;
CiriCPACPLT staff Study 3-67.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Two RF-lOls on a reconnaissance mission near Yen Bal were attacked by tuo HZQ-lTs.
Ko damage.
17
Event ni-9
1.
Aircraft Involved: Two RF-lOls va t«o MIGs
Results: No dp:aage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«lil'H/10«i«58'E
PRIHARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 15 November 1865/l<i45H
Two RP-lQls (BLUE Plight) were on a photo* reconnaissance near the city of Yen Bal,
HVK.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Unknown
BLUS
Altitude :
keadlng ;
Fuel State :
yilght formation :
r
9.000 ft
Unknown
Unknown
Loose staggered trail with wlngman on the left<
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 2 slchted two MIG-type (model unknown) aircraft at U o'clock high (15,000 ft)
crossing above and behind BLUS Flight. Positive Identification was oade at this time.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight maintained course and engaged afterburner for acceleration.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The HIGs pullert up to a high perch position on the left side of BLUE Plight, then
broke down to the right and opened fire (cannon) on SLUE 2 who was left and behind BLUE 1
BLUE 1 completed his photo run, and then broke down to the left while BLUE 2 maintained
course. BLUE 2 pulled up Into i steep climo until reaching 30C kts, then did a spllt-S
down to 500 ft with the MICs In pursuit. During this maneuver, BLUE 1, ahead of BLUE 2,
was able to elude the MIGs and make a naxlmum speed egress toward friendly territory,
BLUE 2 Increased to maxl.-na-n speed and descended to 100 ft AOL. He elected to cross Yen
Bal at lew altitude In hopes of exposing the MIGa to their own ground fire. (Yen Bal Is
a heavily defended area with approxlnately 200 guns.) BLUE 2 crossed Yen Bal at 100 ft
while receiving intense flak and AW fire; however, his high airspeed kept him out In
front of the ground fire. One mln and 30 sec after crossing Yen Bal, BLUE 2 entered a
fog-filled valley and executed a rapid climb to 1(4,000 ft. The MICs were not seen after
this maneuver. Neither BLUE 1 or 2 received any damage and returned hoise safely.
8. ORDNANCE
NIQs - cannon fire
- no hits
11. DATA SOURCES
2nd AO. OPREP-3. 151536Z Nov 65, OOCO^ 07312
12. NARRATIVE
See items 5-7.
Event I 11-10
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-lOls vs two MIQ-?
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»36'H/106»15*E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time 16 November 1965/16 38H
II. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Reports :
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight sighted two JttOS; aj
and lost sight of MIGs
48
range. BLUE Plight popped Into the clouds »
Event III-H
1.
Aircraft Involved: Six A-4Es and two A-lCs vs
at least three MIG-I7a
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*0**N/106«'32'E
PRIMRY HrSSISN ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time; 25 Ilover.ber 1965/1'*'»8H
Eight A-i»E3 (BLUE and PURPLE Plights) and four A-lCs (aREEN Plight) were on a strike
mission against the Ke Xa Highway Bridge (JCS 18.66).
this Mission.
2.
There were support aircraft for
NISSIOK ROUTE
The aircraft were from the USS Tleonderoga, operating from YANKEE Station.
a. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
A»J<E BL'JF and PVRPL';
2 « MK-82
2 - MK-83
A-<C GREEN
2 - NK-83
Bonbs
8. ORDNANCE
(No. fl red/No. hits)
NIC
MIG
«IG
9.
Alr-to-Alr
Rocket
1/0
1/0
Cannon
1/0
Remarks
One rocket at PURPLE Plight
One rocket at PURPLE Flight
EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS *
One member of BLUE Flight's gun Jammed (either SLUE 3 or BLUE i)}.
11. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Reports :
CTG 77.7 251030Z OPREP-3
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
USN COMBAT REPORT FORM 3<t80-4
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
The weathe" was one-tenth cloud cover with 15 ml visibility. At 144511 PURPLE Plight
was retiring; at 500 ft altitude and I150 KIAS from a bombing run when they were attacked
by two MIG-lTs which fired rockets without obtaining hits. PURPLE Plight was »jnaware of
this attack which was witnessed by BLUE 1 and 2 frora 10,000 ft altitude as BLUE Flight
rolled in on the target. The MIGs attacked PURPLE from 2000 ft altitude from the 5:30
o'clock high position.
A single HIG-17 (MIG 3) made a pass on BLUE 3 and while they were In their dive
bomb run and fired 23m.Ti or 37nn ce.nr.on. BLUE 3 and I* made an abrupt turn into the MIG
and forced him to overshoot and pass between BLUE 3 4, under BLUE 3 and over BLUE 4.
BLUE 3 and 4 were at 10,000 ft at the time and 350 KIAS, and the MIG made a pass from
8000 ft altitude from >( o'clock low. Either BLUE 3 or 4 got Into a gun tracking position
but his guns would not fire. SLUE 3 and 4 then continued on and bombed the target, having
received no damage from the MIG attack.
As GREEN 3 and 4 acproached the bomb release point, they were attacked by two HIQ-lTs
which fired cannon. GREEN 3 and 4 were at 6000 ft and 450 KIAS and the MIO attacked from
3000 ft altitude at 6 o'clock low. BLUE 3 and 4 jettisoned their tanks and one of the
A-4s was hit by a single 23mm round. He retired from the scene at 1415H and recovered
without further incident.
The other A-4C was repeatedly engaged by three .<*IC-17s at 3000-5000 ft altitude Jfuat
east of the target area for about 5 mln (he disengaged at 1653H). This A-4 encountered
MIGs a total of rive times. Although the MIGs, In five separote passes, fired canr.on,
no damage was sustained. The flrct encounter wns ty a slnp;le MIG-17 who made a flat pass
from 9 o'clock, firln?; cannon from 3000 ft range. S^th the^MIC and the k-H were at
3000-5000 ft. and the A-4 was at 500 KiAS. The second encounter was an attack by two
HIG-17S, one from 7 o'clock and another from 4 o'clock In flat passes. The MIGs were at
i I
Event III^H
UOOO ft altitude and fired cannon from a range of °[^i"5c.nr-ho*n«!di f pSJ"
w.re It 3000-5000 ft and tr.e A-^^ -as at 500 KIAS. dLeiaaaed from
1 r.ssT..tusr?ir s;? ;t?,i'jiro=.4r.^^s%?^i'^/ni?^!.^^^^
yellow border.
Event III-X2
Aircraft Involved; Two RP-0A» ve two
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20»08'N/107«ft2»E
K PRiHARY 'mission AHO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 25 Noveaber 1965/1510H.
11. DATA SOURCE
Prelect Interviews ; None.
Messages , Reports:
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67.
Mho apparently did not see BLUE Plight.
I
B
B
B
B
a
B
I
B
I
3
I
Aircraft Involved: Two RP^lOls vs four to six
HICs
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21" 7 ♦N/104*' 59 'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 26 >.Vve!nber 1965/1123H
Plight of two HP-lOls {BLUE Plight) in MVTI.
5. INITIAL OETECTION
and oble^J^gun' ?[ishw! ^^"^ attacking
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight executed a left break In afterburner and descended to 200 ft AOI,.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
No hits were sustained by BLUE Plight, and the HICs made no further pursuit.
8. ORDNANCE
Cannon
HZOs No hits
n. DATA SOURCES
Wesaages. Reports !
CPP 26230 IZ Nov 65, (Navy Msg)
CINCPARPLT Staff Study 3-67
Event III-14
Aircraft Involved: One RF-8a and one F-BC vs
one MIG-21 (probable)
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 19»ftO'?I/107"30'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 15 January 1966/1200H
th. pK?o';?^[j„'i': t"i%",i.?v,'';???„r«° ««???'• """" «•
5. INITIAL DETECTION
ig^iJO-wI^foP^O'E li'^TlLlJ^l^'t wing sliver aircraft on a westerly heading at
dlreetl^ oJer BLul K^^h?^!."! ^ (probable MIC-21). The unidentified Slrcraft passed
7«r^^:Lf r 5^^^ flight at an estlnated altitude of HO, 000 ft. The bogey made no hHS
Ing change, and no engagement followed. «a8ey maae no head-
11. DATA SOURCES
CTG 77.3, OPREP-V068, 150658Z Jan 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
See Item 5.
51
Event 111*15
1. PRIMARY HISSION AND
Aircraft Involved: Two P-ftBs and one EA-3B va
Radar Contact
Results: Radar contact
Vicinity of Encounter: 19»1I5'N/107®20»E
12.
TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Oate/TlBie: 19 Jan'uary 1966/0950H
Two P-4B8 (BLUE Pl'lgtlt) were on BIG LOOK CAP.
DATA SOURCES |
CTO 77.6 190420Z Jan 1966 OPREP-3
NARRAnVE OESCRIPyiON
BLOR Plight held two targets on airborne Intercept gear at 50 ml at approximately
0950H. The estimated position of the targets was 30 ml southeast of Kalphong with an
estimated speed of 350^375 kts and estl.-nated altitude of 25,000 ft on a northerly course.
The SAH DD could not cbnflrra targets and directed BLUE Plight to remain with BIG LOOK
EC-121 in the vicinity of 19n5'N/107«20'E.
Event III -16
1.
Aircraft Involved: One EA-3B vs Radar Gontaet
Results: Radar contact only
Vlolnlty of Encounter: 20«30'N/1D8»18*E
PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 /anuary 1966/0953H
An EA-SB (GREEN Plight) from the Kitty Hawk was on ELINT mission over the Gulf of
Tonkin.
11. DATA sources
CTO 77.6 190420^ Jan 1966 OPREP-3
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
GREEN Plight » In position 20«30*H/108»l8*E, altitude 30,000 ft, called HIG attack
imnlnent at 0953H wh,'en a steady, apparent lock-on from a SCAN ODD signal was received
from a bearing of 300T. GREEN Flight broke away from signal and accelerated. The signal
ahlfted to search mode and the lock-on was not re-acqulred. GREEN Plight returned to the
carrier without further Incident.
No visual contiet was made at any time.
event III-I7
Aircraft Involved: One F-iiB and or* EA-^B vs
Unidentified contact
Kesults: .la^^tr contact
Vicinity of Encounter: 19"<i4«H/106*30*E
1. PRIMARY HtSStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tltne: 20 January 1966/08 32H
An EA-3B (GRtEN Fllcht ) escorteu by one F-AB (BLUE Plight) was flying ELIHT In
support of a BL'.'E TREE nliislon.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO EMCOUNTER
Weather ; Unknown
BLlfE GREEN
AltltuJe : 30,000 ft 30,000 ft
Heading: 3Z0» 320«
SpeeJ P .7 IMN .7 IMN
Fuel State ; Unknown Unknown
Flight Forwation ; Unknown Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
GREEN Flight received a signal from a bearing of 350", with contact elostnc froJi
20«20'N/106«'25'E.
6. ACTION INITIATED
GREEN broke away and BLUE Flight attempted to acquire contact on radar.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
See iten 12.
8. ORDNANCE
None
11. DATA SOURCES
CTO 77.6 20052ZZ Jan 66 OPREP-S
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION -
GREEN Flight, eacorted by BLUE Plight, flying ELINT In support of a BLUE TREE mlsalon.
received Indications of MI3 airborne intercept tracking at position 19' 'N/106* 30 'E
time 0032Z. BLUE and -^REEH 'lights were flying at 30,000 ft, course 320", and speed*
Hach 0.7 Indicated at the time. The signal was first received from bearing 350* and the
contact appeared to be closing from position 20»20'N/106''25'E. GREEN Flight gave warning
to BLUE .Plight and then broke away. GREEN Flight lost contact Immediately after breaking.
BLUE Flight turned into the contact but was unable to acquire the target either
visually or on radar. GREEN and BLUE Plights then returned to the carrier. Approximately
2 nln of tape of the signal were recorded.
Event IH-19
Aircraft Involved: One EA-3B vs three Contrails
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 20*00 •ri/Ul»50'E
1, ■ PRIHARY MISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 10 February 1966/1349H
One EA-3B, BLUE Flight, flew a alsslon to update the electronic order of battle of
Hainan Island.
2. MISSION ROUTE
The mission track is shown tn the following tablu:
Trac;: Coord! mtps Ti ne
Launch Cubl Point 03IOZ
17«36'N/110"23*E 0*t322
18*00'N/1C8''15'E okuaz
19*00«H/108*00'E QtiSez
iS'OO'H/loe^lS'E 05HZ
IT'Se'N/llO^SB'E 0523Z
20*00 • N/ 111* 50 'E 0547Z
17"36'N/HO°23'E 0613Z
Land Cubl Point 0730Z
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Clear with visibility ununited. Contrail level unknown,
BLUE
Altitude ; 30,000 ft
Heading ; 030"
^peed : Unknown
Fuel: Unknown
Plight Fornatlon ; H/A
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight observed two contrails at 8 o'clock high.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight reversed course.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
See Item 13.
11. DATA SOURCES
VQ-l CVBI FT 10123az Feb 66 OPREP.4
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
During the nlsslon the majority of Intercepts were of the EW/GCI type. A SCAN FIX
ECN Intercept occurred a few seconds after the contrails were observed, and the height
finder at Lung Men was active. BLUE Plight reversed course at 05^92, oosltlon
20«00'H/111°50'E, rjalntalnlng visual contact and Increased soeed to .82 Mach, Bogeys
reversed course and rapidly overtook BLUE Plight on parallel" course commencing at
5 o'clock position. At this tln:3 a third contrail was observed.
When two bogeys reached the 3:30 o'clock position, they turned toward BLUE Plight
and pushed over in a descent. Just prior to leaving the contrail level, the bogeys
became visible but unidentifiable.
BLUE Flight commenced a rapid descent at O^S^iZ position ig^SS'N/Ill^SS'E as bogeys
descended from the contrail level. The db level increased from 12 to 2^ as the bogey's
bearing moved aft. SCAN FIX and height finder contacts were lost in descent.
BLUE Plight commenced climb at O6OIZ position 18050 'N/lll^lO 'E and SCAN FIX was re-
acquired at 060itz at I8db as BLUE passed through 14,000 ft at 18^35 'N/lll^OO'E. Closest
approach was estimated to be 7 n nl.
1. PSIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 12 February .66/l'»''0a
A night of two RP-lOls
in NVH.
U. DATA SOURCeS
2nd AD OPREP-3, 1220ft9Z
qiHCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67
Event 111-20
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-101« vs 2 Bogeys
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 22«35'M/103«05'E
(BLUE Plight) had just completed a photo reconnaissance run
Peb 66 » DOCO-0 13328
12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight sighted two
at an altitude of 10,000 ft.
to the west at time of sighting
bogeys in the vicinity of the Chinese border (22*35 'H/IO 3^' E)
Bogeys were on a southerly headlnj. but inade an abrupt turn
No positive Identification could be made.
Aircraft Involved;
Event III-21
EA-3B. F-4B vs possible
HIC-170
Result: Radar contact only
Vicinity of Encounter: l8°'»8'Il/107°l6'E
I, PRIMARY MISSION ANO TAcjllCAL SITUATION
DateAlme: 20 February] 1966/UnlcnoHn
An EA-3B(0BBEN Plight) {was on an ELIHT collection nlssion. while an P-*B (BLUE flight)
was on BLUE TREE Mission escort,
8. ORDNANCE
None
II. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Reports:
USAF Fighter Weapons School, Bulletin No. 3>
12. NARRATIVE
Qreen flight had received and held an ECW contact evaluated as SCAM ODD radar
(carr^n Sy MIo!:i7Srsigndl. QREEN flight estimated ,that the «IG was 1",^ .JJ^^^P*
iSn oMltlon and irjnedlately Initiated evasive action, and called for BLUE f light
SSSp??? fioS bEuE TrIe mlSslon escort. BLUE flight made radar contact and Initiated an
?itS?ceDt The bogey turiied and headed for the shoreline In the Thanh af"^**
pCJs"? WM broken off du! to the SAM envelope and no visual contact was made. Radar
contact was lost when the bogey crossed the beach.
Event I 11-22
Aircraft IiivolveU: Two RF-lOls va one MIO
Results: niRhtlng
Vicinity of Encounter: 20»50*M/105*00 'S
1. PtlHAUT mSSlOII AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dat«/Tlne: 15 March 1966/1121H
BLUB Pll^tt was on a reccnnalasance r.lsslon.
4. FLIGHT COKOITIOMS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Al titude :
Heading:
BLUF
I ?
15,000 ft
Unknc-i'n
UnknoMn
ao,ooo ft
225"
600-600 kts
INITIAL oeTECTIOR
BLUE 1 and 2 sl»:hted bogey above.
6. ACTION INITIATED
None
7. SITUATION DEVELOPKENT
Bosty made a 1B0« turn 25 nl after being slRhted. Ho incidenta.
8. ORDNANCE
None
11. DATA SOURCES
160833Z, 2nd Air Division, ;OCO-0 15359. Mar 1966
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTTON
B»,fc. I 3 v.f* 20 n -nl nort^ cf Sam Meua at l'«,000 ft. They sighted a bogey at
20»50'Hno -;S•E^b:^eved^o^^^MIO b^^use of his flight pattern) at ^0 000 ft head-
ing 225-Aner iicut 25 n nl, tne MIG nade a l80» turn toward Hanoi at point
20«25'M/ioH«i5'E and contact was lost. There was no further sighting.
57
Event IXZ>23
■i
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-lOls vs eiehC NIGs
Results: Slg^itin,;
Vicinity of Encounter: Near Hanoi
1. KIHART NISSIOII AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 17 Karch 1966/1222H
A rilEht of RF-lo!ls (BLUE Plight) on a reconnaissance mission near Hanoi, NVN.
5. IHITIAL OCTECTION
BLUE Plight sighted four nights of two NICs each.
6. ACTION miTIATED
■one
7. SITUATION OCVELOPNENT
First MIC niRht ,was seen at 1222H. The MIGs approached to 5 n ml, oade a l80«» turn,
and headed toward the (Hanoi area at 1229H. The -•cond and third flights of MIGs approached
to within 20-25 n nl, imade a 180' turn, and deputed. The fourth flight closed to within
10 n al, broke off south as If to set up for an Intercept, but then departed toward Hanoi.
All NIC nights were dstiaiated to be at 30»000 ft altitude.
11. DATA SOURCES
CINCPACAP, 18003^Z
12. MRRATIVE DESCRIPTI
Sm Itema S and
Mar 66. DIE 20481
ON
Event III-24
11.
Aircraft Involved: Two P-ftCs vs Bogey
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l"15'II/107''30*E
PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 8 A|lril 1966/0906H
Two F-iJCs OLUElpllght) were on a SILVER DAWN/BIO EYE Escort mlsalon.
DATA SOURCES
35 TFtf Danang pAsTSL at 1510Z 8 April 1966
-12. iARRATIVE OCSCftimON ...
At 0906H, BLUE Plight, while flying a SILVER DAWM/BIO BYE mission at 30.000 ft
altitude, 510 KTAS on a heading of 0U0» TRUE, and at a location of 20»15'N/1G7«30'E
received a call from Ethan Alpha that he had a radar lock on a bogey. *
Ethan Alpha vectored BLUE 1 ano 2 on a heading of 360" and at that time DLUE Flight
picked up a radar lobk. The bogey was heading 270". The radar contact was acquired at
10« right and 15 cl pange. BLUE Flight descended to 7000 ft altitude and the bogey was
painted on radar above then, ° '
BLUE Pli.3ht elinbed to 10,000 ft altitude and closed to within 3 nl of the botrev
and lost radar contact. Visual contact was not made due to heavy haze. The weather-
was heavy haze belowj 10,000 ft with visibility 2-3 n ml. weaxner
BLUE Plight started a search orbit at this tine but broke off the search when thev
discovered they were; over land. At 0910K, BLUE Flight turned to a heading of 120» to
depart the area. Ethan Alpha lost contact with the bogey before BLUE Plight lost "ontact
Event III-2S
Aircraft Involved: KA-3D va MIGa
Results: One KA-38 lost
Vicinity of Encounter: 21**IJ/110*E
I. rRINARV NISStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 12 April 1966/Unknown
A KA-3B was enroute fron Cubl Point to USS Kitty Hawk.
II. MTA SOURCES
mCSD Listing of US Aircraft downed by MIGs
OP*05U Box Score
12. URRATIVE DESCRIPTION
The KA-3B was tracked northeast of Hlnan Island to Chinese coastline. Was downed
by C8IC0K mo cannon fire. Suspect crew oxygen system r.alfunct^.n was contributing cause
to loss.
Event III-26
Aircraft Involved: Two ?-UCs vs Bogeys
Results: Radar contact
Vicinity of Enc^^unter: Unknown
K fllKART MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Dattt/nne: 27 April 1966/Unknown
11. DATA SOURCES
DIA Intelligence Sur-nary '<-?6-66
12. JIARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Two USAP P-^C aircraft at 26,000 ft iltltude, on a MICCAP mission for a B-52 strike
at Mu Ola Pass, picked up two bogeys on radar approximately 25 mi southwest of VINU.
Event III-27
Aircraft Involved: Two P-IBs vs Bogey
Results: Radar contact
Vicinity of Encounter: —
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 28 April 1966/1'405H
Two P-4BS (BLUE Flight) were on BARCAP.
II. OATA SOURCES
CTO 77.7 2810372 April 1966 OPREP-*
12. MRRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight, from VF-96, were vectored on a bogoy by an E-IB and a SAR destroyer.
The bogey began to retreat toward Hanoi at this tine (I'lOSH) at an altitude of MOOO ft.
BLUE Plight broke off the chase when they crossed the coast. They could not close less
than 15 lai *.irge and achieved no visual contact.
Event I II -2 8
Aircraft Involvcl: One A-IE vs >tIC
Results: A- IE lost probably to MIC
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*30'H/10't"'i5'E.
I. PRIMARY HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlrae: 29 April 1966/17it5H
Two A-lEs (BLUE Plight) were on a RESCAP nlsslon for a downed RP-101.
II. DATA SOURCES
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
7th AP 292155Z April 1966 OrRE?-3 0000-0-1865*
KKCSD Listing of US aircraft downed by NIGs
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE 1 and 2 from Udorn were on a RSSCAP mlaalcn. They were In the area of the
donned RP-lOl when a «IC alert was received. BLUE 1 and 2 then Ismedlately dep«irted the
area but became separated.
When MIGCAP was re-establlnhed, BL'JS 1 proceeded baclc to the orbit area and at this
time noticed chat BLUE 2 was tnlcsing. Radio contact was attempted without success.
BLUE 2 had sufficient *\iel to reaaln airborne until 2030H,
Event III-29
Aircraft Involved: Two A*JtCs and one A-4E vs
one NIO-15 and one MIO-15/17
Results: Sightings
Vicinity cf Encounter: 20*55 ' H/IOS* 50 'E and
21«02'«/105''35'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 12 July 1966/1135H
Two A-JJCs (BLUE Fll?ht) were part of a force attacking the Co Tral railroad orldges.
(2i«ii2»N/i05'55'E. ) The strike force also Included some A-^Es,
II. DATA SOURCES
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
CTQ 77.8 1206502 Jul 66
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
An IRON KAKD elenent BLUE Plight reported one MIG-15/17 taking off from Haiphong-
Oal-Lan airfield (21''02»N/105''35'E) at il35H.
An A-1E also sighted one MIC-15 flying at 20*55*N/105"5B'E heading 120*. The MIGs
avoided contact in both sightings.
Event III-30
Aircraft Iiivolved: Cne EC>121H vs one KI':-21
Results: Ladar contact only
Vicinity of Encounter: 19*15*H/106«»53'E
t. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 2li July 1966/I9C5H
An EC>121 frcn Dananc was on a BIG LOOK mission over the Gulf of Tonkin.
n. OATA SOURCES
CINCPACPLT Corputer Listing of KIG Events
VQ-1 S'liS'ts: July 1966
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
An EC-121 BIG LOOK aircraft Intercepted a CROSS-UP IF? algnal at a range of n ml.
The contact appeared to be a nakln?: a low level Intercept. As the contact was
ml away, the EC-121 ccm.-.enzed a dlvln;; right turn and headed for the SAR destroyer.
Two P*<iB3 on DARCAP were vectored to Invest l(;ate but the target f<id«d.
This Incident is thought to be the first observed attempted low altitude intercept
by NVN aircraft against U.S. aircraft operating over water in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Event III-3I
Aircraft Invclved: One RC-kJ V8 MIGs
Result: One RC-U7 lost
Vicinity of Eneountor; 20*12 'M/IO*" 17' E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 29 July 1966/1610H
The was an a combat support - other mission.
II. DATA SOURCES
Messages / Perorts :
7 AF 2922'i5Z July 19f'6 DID 30105
7 AP 2207 3OZ August 1966 ;4SG 29211
XOXS C7->2567 > Description of alr-to-alr losses
MMCSD listing of US aircraft lost to MICs
DIA Intellige:.ce suranary of I'JQ events
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67
12. NARRATIVE OE.'JCR I PTI ON
An on a combat support mission was hetrd to transmit that he was under attack
by hostile fighters. The call was Intercepted by A-IE3 in an orbit south of the C-47
and relayed.
SAR and RESCAP aircraft were scrambled but the C-47 did not return to base. The
C-47 was downed by MIG cannon fire and the crew Is missing.
Event III-32
Alrcrart Involvec: Pour A-fts vb two HIG-17s
Result: No daciage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«06»H/lO5'51'E J r|
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND ACTUAL SITUATIO.1
Oate/Tlia«: l6 August 1966/O656H
BLUE Flleht (four A-iJEs) and GREEN FllRht (two A-^iEa) on a search and destroy mission
had located a train. BLUE 3 and ^ had expended all weapons and departed. BLUE 1 and 2
had also expt.'nd-»d all weapons but were renalnlnK in the target area to assist GREEN Plight
(on an IROi: KMIO nlsslon) that was inbound to help BLUE Plight destroy the train. There
was a BARCAP ril£r:t over the target.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Unknown
3. AIRCRAFT CO»F[GUftATIONS I
Pour A-^E5 3L'JE Fltyht
6 - KK-31 bonbs
6 - MK-82 bombs
400 tank
20mn cannon {port gun not armed)
Two k^^Zz OREEN Flight
U - MK-81 bombs
2 . SHRIKE missiles
MIC-17
Silver
External tanks
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Scattered clouds at 2000>30ca ft.
BLUE GREEH
T ? I ?
Altitude ; 5000 ft Unknown
Heading : Approx. 30O* Approx. I60*
Spee d: 30 0 kts Unknown
Fuel State ; Unknown Unknown
Flight Formation : Element Element
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 1 saw the MIGs ecme across target low and fast on a reciprocal heading.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Flight executed a left 270* turn to a heading of approximately east* In this
turn the MIGs yo-yoed up and left and landed up at 6 o'clock to BLUE Plight.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
GREEN Flight was coming up to Join BLUE Plight. The HIOs started firing 37mm at
BLUE. BLUE 2 did a hard right 3oO* turr. and as he did this, the MIGs broke off and de-
parted.
a: ORDNANCE
(No. flred/No. hits)
Cannon Remarks
HIO 1 and 2 Unknown/O Pired 37inn only
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total Hour'i A-'J Hours Remar k s
BLUE 1 3600 3200 Second Combat Cruise
No other experience Information available.
62
I
I
d
I
I
I
I
a
8
I
e
a
Q
Event III-32
Comments on This Eneountep
BLUE 1 - Recoranends saving 20mm any time striking north of Thanh Hoa In case MICa
attack. The KIG acquisition of the A-*i8 should have been easy.
KIC shooting was poor.
Comments on Overall Experience
BLUE 1 . Likes gun In fighter.
Want» a "super SPARROW" that can hit any target as long as the target la In the
trinasereen at launch.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; SLUE 1, 3 Kay 1967
Jtessages. Recorts ;
CTC 77.6 i6l222Z Aug 66 OPREP-3
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight of four A-^JEs was on an early morning nlsslon and had arrived at the
coast before sun-up. They crossed the coast near the hour glass rivers and turned south
towards Thanh Hoa. At about 0628H they saw a train at 2O»05'H/lO5»52«E and began to at-
tack it with both bomos and ^uns. They made runs expending all cf their ordnance and
then called in an IHON HAND filjht (GREE:: Flight) which was ortlting off the coast. BLUE
3 and departed at this time. The IRON HAND came In and attacked the train and BLUE I
and 2 stayed to provide direction for the attack. After the IRON HAND flight had attacked,
the force had made between 20 and 3C passes on the train. At this time they had been on
the target about a half hour.
BLUE I and 2 were at 5000 ft altitude, at 300 KIAS, east of the target, heading
approximately northwest when 5LUE 1 saw an aircraft coming off of the target . The range
was about 3 ml at 9 o'clock at SLUE 1. It was seen against the dark background and BLUE 1
recognized It as a KIO-17. The MIC was heading southeast and was pulling up at 2000 ft
altitude. The MIQ, at ^50 kts, was observed to drop his tanks and light his afterburner.
BLUE 1 then called MICs ar.d instructed the necbers of CHEEN Flight who had Just
pulled off the target to egress.
^-rr...^^""- ^ ^ turned 270« Into the KICs. at 5 "g" In buffet, and Joined on
GREEN 1 and 2 In a line abreast formation.
During the turn, BLUE 1 saw a second MIG trailing the first.
As BLUE 1 and 2 made their turn, the MIGs executed a high speed yo-yo and ended up
at 6 o'clock, pulling lead and firing their 37r-"n cannon. It was observed to fire slowly
and the shells were seen to detonate in front of the A-^^a. The MICs were 2000 ft away
and at co-altitude (about lOCO ft ACL).
BLUE 1 felt that the situation was not too critical so he did not Jettison his tanka.
At this, BLUE 1 switched to guard and called HIGs and his position.
At this tine, the four A-^is (BLUE 1 and 2, and GREEN 1 and 2) were egresslng to the
east. BLUE 2 at this time broke off to the right and the KIGs broke off and departed the
area toward the northwest. sLUE 2 completed a 360** turn and joined the rest of the A-4s
for egress.
The BAHCAP did not hear the A- it's HIG call.
t
Event in-33
Aircraft Involved: Two A-^ia v« three MI0-17»
Results: SlEhtlngs only
Vicinity of Encounter: ZO'SO'N/IOT'OS'E
I. PRINAtlY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
tat*/Tlaa: 23 August 1966/113SH.
II. DATA SOURCE
Project Interviewa i None »
Heaaages. Reporta :
CIMCPACFLT Staff Study 3-67.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
No vaminss ware heard by BLUE Flight.
Event III-I**
Aircraft Involved: EC-121 vs one HIO-17
Reaulta: No danage
Vlpinlty of Encounter: 19"»7*N/107'00*E
i
8
e
i
i
NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIQN g
Two A-»JEa (BLUE Plight) observed MIC-17s on two individual encountera aeparated by B
10 nlnuf^a.
In the first encounter, BLUE Plight observed two MIG-lTs heading aoutheaat to lie do
Cac Ba at 3000 feet altitude. These MIGs were observed to turn 180 degrees and return to g
the vicinity of Haiphong. At the point of closest approach the MIGs were flva Biles away. H
A third HIO-17 was sighted as BLUE Flight was outbound from the target. This HIG
was at 25,000 feet, heading west. The MIG turned toward 2LUE Flight and then proceeded
w«8t again and disappeared. m
1
I
g
I
i
1. PRtHARY KISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dato/Tlm: 10 September 1966/Q830H
It. OATA SOURCE
CIMCPACPLT Computer Run Listing NIO Events
7 AF 1122 320Z Sept 1966
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION g
A BIO LOOK aircraft detected a conical scan, SCAN ODD airborne Intercept radar slg- ■
nal. The signal strength was 5^ decibels at a bearing of 265° from BIG ^-00^. At 0827H, ■
BIO LOOK issued a MIO warning based on a bearing cutting the coastline at GEOREF ca-*»
(area northeast of Haiphong}. ^
Shortly after the warning, the PIRAZ ship (Red Crown) directed BIO LOOK to turn H
south. A turn was made to a heading of l8o» true; the bogey pUtforra was estimated to p
be within 5-10 ml range in lock-on aiodo (conical scan).
At 0811H a rapid bearing charge of 300* In 1.5 ain occurred counled with a signal
strength of 64 decibels indicating that the MIG circled BIG LOOK as BIG LOOK completed ■
a turn descending into the clouds at 8000 ft. Q
The SCAN ODD signal faded at 0832H on a bearing of 330" as the BARCAP alrcra.^-t were
vectored In pursuit.
BARCAP Intercept was broken off as the MIG approached lani and no visual sightings K
were obtained. H
Kote: This is the second attempted Intercept of BIG LOOK aircraft (see Event III-lSA)
The ECM data from this Intercept Indicated that the MIG circled the EC-121 as the m
EC-121 descended Into a cloud bank. Q ^ \
The MIG aircraft was tracked by the PIRAZ ship which vectored the CAP toward the NIC.
The HIG ran for the beach and r.o visual sighting was ever held as the BARCAP intercept was
broken off as the MIG approacned land.
4
64
0
1
•I;
^ Event III-35
Aircraft Ir.volved: One EB-66B and four F-»C5
V8 two HIG-Zls
Results: Sightings
Vicinity of Encounter:
Zl'ttj'N/lOU'lft'E
K PRIMARY HI'iSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 10 September igee/OP'HH
Pour P-UC3 {BL'JE Flight) were escorting two EB-66 (CBEEH Plisht) aircraft who were
on an ECM nl:»slon.
11. DATA SOURCES
CiriCPACPLT Staff Study 3-67
k60 TRW lOO^tiHZ Jeotenber 1966 CCE 11306
7th AP 112320 September 1966
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
The B-663 were in their orfclt pattern between 22»15'H/10liO06'E and 21'52'N/10j;02'E
from about 09 35H until 1013H. The lead EB-66C (GREEM 1) was at JO .000-32 ,000 ft altitude
aSrthe E3-66B (GHEESJ 2) was at 28.000 ft altitude trailing GREEN 1 by 15 ml.
At 09UH -REEtl 2 observed two MI0-21S at 21 000 ft heading 050*. G«E2N 1 was at
ai'^S'N/int'll'E at 23,000 ft altitude heading 24C». The MIGs passed below OREEIi 2.
They were in sight 5 sec.
Three nin later, BLUE Flight reported lock-on with the same HlGs but had lero over-
take. BLUE Plight then broke off the chase and continued escort.
OREEM Plight had received three MIG alerts prior to the sighting but none were In
the Issnedlate vicinity.
Event III-36
Aircraft Involved: Two P-ftBa vs HIOs
Results: Radar contact
Vicinity of Encounter: 20''25'M/107''20*E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 10 September 1966/2020H
Two P-*Bs from the USS COKSTELLATION were cn a night escort mission over the Gulf of
Tonkin.
II. DATA SOURCES
7th AP Computer Listing of MIG Incidents
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
TWO P-«B aircraft rade radar contact with MIG-lTs after being warned of the MIOs
presence by the agencies.
65
^ event Iir-37
Aircraft Involvec:: Two P-4B9 vs Bogey
Results: Radar contact only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20*0O»N/106»a5»E
I. PKINABV HtSSIOX AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 2« September 1966/2020H
II. OATA SOUUES
CTG 77.8 24I530Z September 1966 OPREP-U
12. MRRATIVE OtSCRIPTION
TWO BARCAP aircraft, BLUE 1 and 2, were vectored by Red Crown to Investldate a con-
ib'Sit*?OoTfrSl?Jt'i;de°f 20O00.N/106O2..E. The tl.e was^020H and th^ co"^ic"\": lt°°"
tr-^f^yS!;! ^? 30 BLUE Flight was Instructed to break off the intercept
vector due to tentative assessment of the contact as a possible friendly ilrcraS!
on tte^!!L;"fl!^JJ*''*?? t°«^sune normal BARCAP station but were reeosmitted at 2030H
si^j «?rir?;rnciStrof"is?So?;/i52S2^?s!'^" w -i th. co^t
a r.oJ^.tlry cS^ic't^irnis'^adar' """"^ ^^"^ ^ «^°»«^ *° »^
overlJid?'^^* contact turned inland and accelerated from 250-500 lets and was lost
BLUE 1 and 2 broke off the run about 10 ml from the beach.
Bwnt ZIZ-38
Aircraft Involved; p-liB vs Contact
Results: Radar contact only
Vlqlnlty of Encounter: 20"35'!I/107»26'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time t 5 October 1966/0 2 3iH»
II. DATA SOURCES
CTO 77.6 0423052 October 1966 OFREP-i|
12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
20«35»SAS746TJt\?35J'™L%ijS'^^^^^^ in the vicinity of
m the area and one possible SnSnSn! SontLS iL b?oJeS SJ^ia^rSur? f^^"'"
identification. v«ni.«ct was orojcen at I83iiz due to no positive
^Or 4 October » 183S2.
Event III-39
Aircraft Involved. E-IB vs Contacts
Results: Radar e-mtact only
Vicinity of Encouiter: 20" 35' N/107' 20 •£
I. PRIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
rate/Time: 6 October 1966/0026Ht
II. DATA SOURCES
CTO 77.6 052136Z October 1966 OPREP-4
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
An E-IB aircraft held an unidentified high speed air contact In the vicinity of
20*35*N/107*20*E at 0035H, heading 200«.
The BARCAP was vectored to intercept » however, the bogey turned north and disappeared
from the E-IB scope In the vicinity of 20*50'N/107*00'E at 0030H. The BARCAP did not
acquire the bogey on A I radar.
or 5 October I966/I626Z
Event III-OO
Aircraft Involved: Pour A-lHs vs four MIG-I7s*
Results: One HIG-I7 destroyed and one NIC-17
dansKed
Vicinity of Encounter: 20» 32' N/105" ^i^'E
1. PRIKARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 9 October 1966/1013H
Pour A-lHs were orbltinis with a helicopter at 19*U5'N/106"»10'E In a SAR position
for a possible RESCAP for a downed strike aircraft.
2. MISSION ROUTE
The route was from the ship to 19""»5'N/106«10'E, Then when called, entered coast
heading 295* to 19*53'M/105"57'E for 15 olles, then JSO" for 25 mlloa, then 030" for 12
nlles and then vectors to 21"32'N/105"''6*E. Egress was via the same route.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFICmTIONS
BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1
2 LAU 10 rocket packs
20mm cannon (800 rounds}
MIGs
Guns
Blue-s^'ay with red stars
4. FLIGHT CONOITIONS PRIOR TO EKCOUNTER
Weather : Scattered to broken cXouds at ^iOOO feet with tops to 6000 to 7000 feet.
Visibility restricted by haze.
dLUE 1 and 2 BLUE 3 and U
Altitude : 500 ft 1500 ft
Heading :' Unknown Unknown
ITr Speed : Unknown 260 kts
Fuel : ~ Unknown Unknown
Plight Formation r Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Warning was given by an E-2A aircraft of bogeys approaching from the north. BLUE 2
then observed tracers going by BLUE I's wing from 6 o'clock high.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 and 2 then broke and descended Into valley with the HICs following.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 2 saw two MIGs follow BLUE 1 so he broke left takii g two MIOs with hla. He flew
in and out of valleys which placed the attacking aircraft in difficult situations. The
HICs then attacked BLUE 2 but on thetr attack passed in front of hln at which time he
fiped cannon and rockets at them, achieving cannon hits on one aircraft. By this time,
BLUE 3 and H arrived with the helicopter and attacked the KiGs. BLUE 3 saw two HIGs
on BLUE 2*8 tall and naf.e two passes iit them. BLUE 1 saw a MIG on his right, rolled
In and destroyed the MIG.
8. ORDNANCE
Mo. fired/r.'o. hits
20mm ZWII Cannon Remarks
BLUE 2 '''7/1 Several/0 One HIO damaged
orntr 3 3/0 Two beam, one head-on
BLUE U l/l destroyed
^^Q, Many/0 Once at BLUE 3 and many times at BLUE 1 and 2
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None.
^There were initial reports that these were SU-7
Event IlI-HO
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience : Unknown
■ Cofaincnta an this Encounter ;
BLUE 3 - Observed open In-take cn head-on puss.
BLUE (t - Aircrart had or.e Urge tailpipe.
All BLUEa: Delta wln£s, wine .nounted on fuselage with wing root guns.
Comments fron Overall Experience ;
BLUE Pll.ht: Ccnsltier rou?h terrain and low altitude as a major factor In their safety.
Success:ul flight due to E-2A calling and bocey* and radar vectors to search area.
n. DATA SOURCES
Ke asaaies. Reports ; 0PHi;P-3 ZOSCHZBZ October 66 from CTG 77.5
— OPREP-3 Z0907!»5Z October 66 fron CTG 77-5
OPREP-3 Z091719Z October 66 from CTG 77.5
OPREP-3 Z091'Jiez October 66 from CTG 77.5
Recos-xiendatlcn for Awards F 100108Z October 66 from Intrepid
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Flight of Cour A-lHs launched from the Intrepid at 0700H from a position of
19*17 'N/lOb^jl'E as tar.-et R£i-CA? for Phu Ly strike. The flight arrived on station at
19*«>5'M/106*10'£ orbltlns over z*\e rescue helicopter. At 0922H the flight was advised
that an ?~>*a was dowi. ind their assistance required at 20**32'tl/105'*''6'E.
BLUE 1 and 2 proceeded to the SAR scene with BLUE 3 and U remaining to escort the
helicopter. The flight crossed the coast at 19°53 ' rVlOS"?? ' E on a vector of 295' for 15
miles, then they proceeded on a vector of 350 degrees for 25 miles, then 030 degrees for
12 miles as dir-cted bv the E-2A aircraft. BLUE 1 a.nd 2 crossed the coast at 0925H at
UOOO feet altitude, cli^nbinE- to 6500 feet. BLUE 3 and U followed by about 10 minutes at
altitudes between 6C00 and 9000 feet. Both sections encountered moderate, Inaccurate
37tna flak, concentrated r.ainly on the helicopter. Flak became very light after crossing
the Song Ma River at SCOO*?!.
BLUE 1 and 2 arrived =n the rescue scene at 0953H and descended to »»500 feet for
search. At lOlOH SLUE Flight was warned by E-2A aircraft of bogeys approaching from the
north at 27 miles. BLUE 1 and 2 headed for the mountains 8 miles away to get cloud cover,
descending to SOO feet above the terrain.
Shortly thereafter (about 1013H), BLUE 2 observed tracers f r. m 6 o'clock hich going
below and ahead of BLUE 1 ind called a break. BLUE 1 broke right descending further into
valleys tc reciain below the ridge lines. BLUE 2 saw two aircraft follow BLUE 1 in a
climbing turn and then he broke left. BLUE 1 saw two other aircraft follow BLUE 2.
BLUE 1 made no attack runs and had no firing opportunities.
' BLUE 1 and 2 then lost contact with each other and BLUE 2 soon observed himself
under attack by three aircraft. BLUE 2 found several narrow valleys between ridges about
800 feet high. By flying Into the valleys and around the ridges he forced the attacking
ai'-craft Into difficult r.aneuverlng situations. The three aircraft attacked successively
from all aspects, beginning runs from within low clouds. During these attacks each air-
craft would usually pass In front of BLUE 2. At such time BLUE 2 would fire 20mm and ZUNI
rockets. He obtained no rocket hits but at one time he saw his 20mni hitting the MIG as
he fired from t.*ie enemy's 9 o'clock position. He observed debris coming from the wing
root and smoke or fuel trailing as the MIG retired. BLUE 2 made no attack runs but was
able to fire about" 7 times.
After BLUE 2 had damaged the MIG, SLUE 3 and ««, escorting the helicopter, arrived
on the scene at 1025H. BLUE 3 and U were at 1500 feet and about 260 knots (as a result
of en route descent) BLUE 3 saw BLUE 2 low at his 10 o'clock position and under attack by
two aircraft frcn the rear. BLUE 3 rolled left Into m attack run and made two high side
runs from abave, firing 20nm. After the second run 3:.UE 3 rolled out Into a head-on
situation with the enemy a'.rcraft. 3oth fired at cacn other, but no hits were achieved.
BLUE U, after BLUE 3 began his attack, saw an aircraft low at 2 o'clock, about
1500 feet away. BLUE '* began a high speed descent closing on the target. The enemy
aircraft saw BLUE U and started a left climbing turn. BLUE tt began firing at 300 feet
and closed to 200 feet observing 20mn hitting the tailpipe section. The enemy aircraft
then dropped sharply on Its right wing and dove thrcuijh the clouds followed by BLUE H.
Beneath the clouds BLUE 1 saw the aircraft and the pilot ejected and the seat separated
from the pilot.
The enemy aircraft disengaged at 1035H. BLUE Flight continued the SAR mission until
1015H when BLUE 3 and J? departed with the helicopter. BLUE l and 2 departed at 3105H,
and crossed the coast at 1120H. _
i
Event
navigation vectors was also a sUnlflcant factor.
based on the crew's description of th* fuselage* wing anu a i^v^
on the fuselage.
BLUE 1 and 2 landed on the carrier with about 300 pounds of fuel.
Event I II -41
/.Irerart Involvnd: EA-3B va Bogey
Results: Radar contact only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«»08*K/107*'l6*E
I. PRIMRr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 10 October 1966/UnknoHn
II. DATA SOURCES
Meaaares. Reports :
FEC 13C055Z October 66 PECPOC
FAIHECOHRON One 121500Z October 66
TAP 152237 October 66 DIG 30666
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTrON
«<«*.^lII.^f"P "^^il? Gulf of Tonkin reported Intercepting a SPIN SCAN B
.-l-?r^ intercept radar. The intercept frequency was 9320 «CS and was received In both
searen ana track mode.
.SS.?' 330* true from ZO'OS'H/IOTOU'E was reported. This bearing Indicates
the signal source was in the Cat Bl - Haiphong area.
K«-^i'"^?w'^^?^^'"*^.-^^!''* conflmed bv analysis as belonging to a MI0-21D equipped to
SSirt missiles. However, no quadrant marker pulses which
would Indicate missile guidance were observed during this intercept.
This was the first confirmed SPIN SCAN Intercept In HVH.
Event III-J42
Aircraft Involved: Four F-<»Cs vs Unidentified
Result: Radar contact only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20 nral from NVN coast
1. PRIHARr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 10 October 1966/lft50H
n. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Reports ;
CINCPACFLT Computer listing of MM Events.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
h.iH initiated a flight of P-4C to intercept an unidentified aircraft. PIRAZ
2m b«;eJ"o?f M JSJ JSii'^Ji""** monitored the progress. The Intercept
China. • " unldentlfltd aircraft faded over southern
for GESREJ*cJ-Jrc"?or!'" * ^"l*""" broadcast on the air
Event III-'»3
Aircraft Involved: Two RF-lOla V8 two HIG-Wa
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter; Unknown
I. PRIMARY HI5SI01 AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/rime: November or December 1966
Two RF-lOla (BLUE Plight) on a photo reconnaissance mission in KW,
II. DATA SOURCES
Letter from BLUE 1.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLrrs Plight saw two XIC-l9s at 6 o'clock about 5 ■! away. The R?-10l8 accelerated
and left the MICs.
Event III-Kt
Aircraft Involved: Two P-8Bs vs possible MM
Results: Radar contact
Vicinity of Encounter: 26«39'K/106''09'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 28 November I966/1155H
IK DATA SOURCES
CTQ 77.4 280848Z November 66 OPHEP-3/OOli
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Just prior to 1155H» two F-SEs fron the USS TICONDEROGA , who were on a BARCAP mis-
sion, were vectored by PIRAZ (Red Crown) to Intercept one possible MIO aircraft.
At approximately liSSH when the two F-SEs (BLUE 1 and 2) were at 20»39'N/106«09 'E,
they were fired uoon by six SA-2 nlasiles. At this tine the ?-8Es were heading 300 at
7500 ft MSL above a solid cloud layer with tops at 5000 ft wh-sn a missiles away t-ans-
nisalon was heard on guard channel.
BLUE 2 Immediately reoorted a flashing red APR-27 light. BLUE 1 saw a SAM at BLUE
2's 6 o'clock about 1000 yd away and called a hard right break. This SAM detonated 500
ft from BLUE 2 and a second detonated 1500 ft from BLUE 2.
BLUE 2 then saw a thli-d missile at BLUE I's 6 o'clock and called a left break. Thlc
SAM detonated about 1*00 ft above BLUE 1. BLUE 1 then reversed and a fourth SAM detonated
about 1000 ft at 10 o'clock. Two more SAMs passed between BLUE 1 and 2 and detonated
2500-3000 ft above the flight.
The hard break evasion tactics were successful in avoiding the missiles and the
lowest altitude reached by BLUE Plight was 5500 ft.
After the SA-2 firings, PIRAZ observed fo-ar additional possible MIGs on radar which
were trailing the original single bogey. BLUE 1 and 2 were then vectored clear of the
area. It was believed that this was a trap to lure the BARCAP Into a SAM envelope.
However, no damage was sustained.
1
Kvunt III-U3
Aircraft Involved: ?ou.- ?-HC3 and one E3-66C
v:: possible MIG
Results: Hadar contact
Vtclnlty of Encounter; 20"35'M/10'»'02'E
1. PRIMARY HISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATIOM
nate/Tlrrt?: 28 ::ove:T:l;er 1566/ltl2H
11
12
DATA SOURCES
't3? TRW 28l.1i;r)2 I.'ov-niLer 1966 CFP.EP-'* CCE 18915
RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
One ED-'i'^C (G?^EEH 1) ar.^l Its Ji!r.h cover of i--lCs (BLUE Plight) were on an ELINT
collection mission In "lorth Vler.nan and Laos.
GR^Zti 1 d»rirted Takhll at 12!*0K and was on watch 1312H at a position of
i7«>tt?«M7ini-o?-^ -^^e l-'''a^ oolnt was at 20«03'M/10a<»t0'E. The route continued
iL^LK ^l•^.2•"/i03-«^^■■ -4^1 t^rSurh 21<'««2'!}/10a«»30'E; then throueh 21«33'H/103*'^8'E
(;ri!52H): tJ;en to I J'^O v:/lOi**S'E ' (at' lU?ftKj -nd w*..l off -atch at 1^32 at
18»12'H/103'*'"«'E-
At IKQQH G^iEE'I 1 picked ur ar. A! radar In sear=h r^ode dt H o'clock position. At
this Jini I was a? lo=:^'l:/lor59'E heading l£5° and at 27 .000 ft. GREEN 1 was in
JSe cleSJ above ar 9000:i:,0 C ft broken deck. GP.E-N 1 Inquired of BLUE Flight If they
i!?e JaJStJ^B InythSne a^ that tearing. BLUE Flight confirmed a single return at 1^ nl
range with a speed of 50 J kts.
At li^lOH when at 20<'^1 ':;/lD3°59 'E, CIREE:! 1 reported that he was lock-on by an AI
radar aL'J^ "llrh- roocrt.i the Ccrey at 3 nl -an?e frori 'JREEN 1 and closing, "either
See- " or BMF -.erb-:-: =av; tne bcrey at any tin- during the l.ntercept. As the bogey
passed [bove or belcw ohll:: 1 the AI fadar returned to search. The fly-by occurred at
in2H at a Iscation of 20°35'-'/lOH°m'E.
OCI radars were unusuaily active and ?TrECAII signals strong all during the Incident.
7t 's bellevei that the octjev could have been lockec on chaff which had been dispensed by
GREEN 1 (both RR-1»» and P.R-59 were beinr droppsd at this time).
Although the Intercepted AI radar signals were siollar to that of the F-^C AI
radan (APQ -72), the presence of a single F-UC In this area was highly unusual.
73
Event III-116
Aircraft Involved: Four F-tBs vs Bogeys
Result: Radar contact
Vicinity of Encounter: ZO^BO'N/XOT'fO'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/71ne: 2 December I966/l'i20H
Four F-UBs (BLUE Flleht) frora the Coral Sea were on a frik suppression aisslon for a
ROLLING THlNDER 52A strlk*. The target was at approximately 2i»23'«/106»l6'E.
II. DATA SOURCES
Coral Sea Report Ho. 016
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight, amed with MK-82 bonsbs, perfcmed a flak suppression function on active
flak sites located .near 21°23 '.V106^I6'E, between 1351H and 1358H.
SAM guidance radar was detected by th« APR-27 at 1400H and chaff was drcpped froiR
12,000 ft altitude.
The weather was clear, with i*-5 mile visibility in haze.
At 1112CH, BLUE Flight detected two possible bogeys at 20^ 'N/107*'»0'E. These bogeys
were detected on radar and were at 15 nlles rsnge , lew and cioslni? at a rate of 600 kts.
At this tine BLUE Fll?h: was at 25,000 ft altitude, r.eadlng 18O deg at 1*50 kts. ^
The bogeys turned to a heading of 090 and the closing rate dropped to 50 kts, with
BLUE Flis.ht m a 0.8 n !sl trail position. Since It was determined that BLUE Flight couid.
not overtake, due to fuel state, the Incident was reported to RED CROWN, Thtt P-ts were
soon thereafter diverted for a SAR mission.
Event IH-«7
Aircraft Involved: EB-66C va two KIG-218
Result : Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 22«25'N/105'*22'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: December 1966/08iaH
Two £3-66, one B and one C, (Blue Flight) were on an ECK nlsslon.
II. DATA SOURCES
Messages p Reports :
U32 TRW OJ*I900Z Dec 66, MSG 19992
7th AP 0i*225t)Z :ec 66, MSG DIO 30926
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 3-6?
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE 1 sighted two MIG-21s flying north at 11 o'clock position, approximately eltcht
miles away. At the time of sighting, SLUE 1 was flying west on the first orbit at 0318K,
position was 22<'23*N/10.^^22'E. Both MIOs made left descending turns to the clouds and were
lost from sight.
Iinmedlately after, fighter bonbers telow were heard to call alerts for HIGs. Some
fighter (no call sign heard) was heard to say, "Who got hin'" Response was, "Nuaber 3
or number 4 got him." This was believed to nean one of the HIGs was shot down. (Note:
Possibly refers to Event 7t), Vol. II.)
Q
Aircraft Involved:
&
Q
Q
a
a
Q
Q
Q
i
B
Q
0
Q
a
g'
S
F.vtnt III-18
Two P-1C8 V9 two
unidentified aircraft
Result: Radar contact
Vicinity of Encounter: a'OS^H/loe^lS'E
I. PRIHARV HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlrae: '* Decenber 1966/1I30H
Two P-ttCs (BLUE FllGht) were on CAP over the Gulf of Tonkin, under the 'direction of
RED CROWN.
II. DATA SOURCES
Meaaages. Reports ;
7th AP OK3230Z Dee 66, DXO 30926
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
At RED CRO'^J called MIG alert for area AF-2. and ^Smlnutea later BLUE I and 2
were vectored toward two bogeys orbiting at ^500 ft in area M-^i. B^^^^ towaroa
BLUE Flight but turned hack at approximately 21°0^'"^J0^;''5'E- J^JE ^J-f^
back southeast and bogeys went Into an extended left-hand racetrack orbit.
BLUE Flight was vectored toward honeys three tines between 1130H and lUSH, as the
bogeys attempted to draw U.S. aircraft into SAM envelope.
Each tme the boKeys turned back to west when BLUE PllKht reached the coast BLUE
Fligh?'^ ei^renS position wL ao^SO'N/lOT^OO'E and mlnlnium distance to bogeys was 20 n ml.
No visual contact was nsade.
75
Event IlZ-49
^jlUPfilliHl ' Aircraft Involved: Two EB.66s vs one HIG-21
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2I*05'M/1Q***07*E
1. PRIMARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 5 December 1966/1057H
Two E3-66 aircraft orbiting between 20»3O'N/10't'»30'E and 21«20'M/10«i«30'E. They were
on active/passive ECH support for armed recce mlsaions numbers PB-55«3-3 and D— 3A.
2. MISSION Roure
Departed Takhll, direct to IS'JS'M/IOS'SS'E, direct to 2l»15*N/lO»»*0*E, direct orbit
between 2O»30»H/10li»3O'E and 21*20'N/IOU«'30'E, direct IS'IS'M/IOJ'IO'B, direct Ta<hil.
Refueling was as planned.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Heather: Hot given.
BLUE
I 7
Altitude : not given
Heading ; 30,000 ft
Speed : not given
Fuel State ; not given _
i^light {formation ; BLUE 2 in trail with BLUE I; undetemlned distance, saRe altitude.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Received MIQ warnings: MIO, 6A at 0950, 1006 and AG-1 at 1009, 5fl-2 at lOl?, AQ-1
at 1017 » and AG-1 at 1025. Observed possible Hia-21 at 1057H.
10. AIRCREW CONNENTS
Hone.
11. DATA SOURCES
Mesaatres. Reports :
TthAF DIAC005) 052317Z Dee 66 DIG 30931
M32TRW, OPREP-it X Electronic Warfare 053 050922Z Dec 66
il32TRW 19005
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
An EB-66 and an EB-66B at 21"»05*M/10'*°07 observed one silver, delta wing aircraft
(possible MIO-21) heading east to west at true course of approxlBsately 090« , altitude
10-15,000 ft and estimated airspeed of 350 kts. The aircraft did not alter Ita course
nor appear hostile.
Event 111-50
Aircraft Involved: USN aircraft vs one possible
HIC.21
Result: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 20« 57' N/105* «7»E
I. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOll
Date/Time: 11 December 1966/1602H
II. DATA SOURCE
CTC 77.7 OPREP-3 PINKACtE 0002/CHl, H December 1966
12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
A possible MIG-21 sighting was reported by USN aircraft flying from the USS
Roosevelt. One sliver gray aircraft was seen heading 230" at position SO"?? ' 30"N/105"»7'E,
with a speed In excess of 500 kts. The altitude of the bogey was 200 fc and the tine was
1602H. No aircraft markings were observed.
The flight who saw the bogey lost contact ImmecJlately after the sighting due to SAM
evasion.
The weather for the coast In to west of Thanh Hoa was scattered cloud cover at 5000 ft.
In the foothill region, there was broken cloud cover, with bases at 3000 ft and tops at
5000 ft. In the target area there was .rcattered clouU cover at 5000 ft. In general the
visibility was 5-7 miles.
Event III-51
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-lOls vs HICs
Results: Radar contact only
Vicinity or Encounter: 21-08 "N/lOii-U'E
1. PRIMARt HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 1 Janii--^ry 1967/15'»5H
Two RF-lOls (BH;e Flight) on a photo-reconnalssance mission In MVN. A BIO EYE air-
craft had Just called a KIG alert In area QO-3.
2. HISSION ROUTE
Plight depar
and cllmhed to !0,000. Then direct .u-h,^.^ ... itr"^iien"drrect to
5Q«3S'M/loS»5l»" headlnKSlO- 8.000 ft at O.yS Mach. (MIC chase began here). Then
«wct aJSieJi/IoS^Sf 'S^eaSiAs ^5- It 1.05 Mach; and then direct to Odom on a heading
of ZOO®, 25,000 ft, 5»t0 kts.
4. FLIGHT CONOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Unknown
BLUE
Altitude: 20,000 ft
Heading ; OBO*
Speed : 0.98 Hach
Fuel State : Unknown
Flight FoTwatlon ; Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
At 15^5H BLUE Plight got a vector equipment lock-on {X-band strobe) aJ.^J^i'* " .
o'clocJ Josltion novmi to 9 o'clock. The continuous strobe moved on around and held at
their 6. o'clock position. At IJi^SK MOTEL called MIC alert in QG-3.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE FllEht nade a break toward the Laos border, heading 210». descended to 8,000 ft,
and then took up Theading of 240-. As BLUE Plight broke, the strobe, which was contln-
uous, moved to 6 o'clock.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
MOTEI then called a MIG alert at 15*7H in QP-2.
BLUE FlUht esressed on a heading of f'lOS speed 1.05 Mach with the HIQs l^^^^
oh»*^- however neither aircrew r.ade visual contact with the MlGs. The BLUE Filgnt was
a? 2SnS-J/Iou°l?'E When a MIO alert was again called In QF-2. The «K»
ehase at 20° 20 ' H/10l»35 'E, at which time they were at or across the Laotian border. The
J«tor ilgnal was on one ring at the start of this attack and had Increased to over two
rings when the MICs broke off.
11. DATA SOURCES
1I32TFW OPREP-3 0111502 January 67 PASTEL 00016
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
See Items 5-7.
Event III-52
Aircraft Involved: One RF-lC vs two unidenti-
fied
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l«30'N/103'17'E
K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 2 January 1967/1315H
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE TREE aircraft saw contrails and w as fol lowed brlsfly by contacts until they
broke off to the north. ^ -
78
Event Iir-53
Aircraft Involved: One RF-4C vs Bogey
Results: Radar contact only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20^26 'N/10 3" 13 'E
\. PRIMARY NISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 3 January 1967/0 7 S'^H
An RP-4C (BLUE 1) tias on a weather recce nlsslon In the north Laos NVN area.
2. NISSION ROUTE
BLUE I deponed Udorn at 2135Z and oroceeded directly to Mekong River 18«»18'N/103''16'E.
BLUE 1 turned north to Channel 97 ( 20»26«ri/103'13*E) . Forty miles south of Channel 97 he
picked up an X-band strobe on radar.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
Center line fuel tank
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; 10.000 ft overcast, clear above. Visibility 10 ml.
BLUE
Altitude: 15,000 ft
Heading ; 011»
Speed ! unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Forty mill south of Channex 97. BLUE 1 received less than a one-ring return on X-band
strobe at his 2 o'clock position.
6. ACTION INITIATED
No action was taken. BLUE 1 continued heading Oil**.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Still headln? Oil", the strobe moved to BLUE I's 6 o'clock position and increased to
three-rings. Signal became Internilttent as BLUE 1 turned to 030'^ at Channel 97. BLUE 1
turned to I'lO" and descended to 10,000 ft. The strobe disappeared. BLUE 1 turned back
to course (030"»). As BLUE 1 turned to 030", the strobe came up again to three-rings at
6 o'clock. The pilot decided to abort the mission. He did a IflO" turn at 21'10'K/104®25'E
at 0739H to a heading of 190", 10,000 ft, squawked emerpeney IFF and dropped centerllne
tank, proceeding directly to BAN BAN (19" 30 ' N/103°30 'E) . Heading varied slightly and
airspeed Increased to Mach 1.3. Strobe continued Intermittently from o'clock to 8 o'clock
position. Strobe signal diminished and quit at 19" 30 'N '103°30 'E, BLUE 1 proceeded to
18*18'H/193°16'E and then directly to Udorn. No bogeys were seen visually. A ground
operational check of APR 25/26 equipment showed fully operational. However, It never lit
up in flight.
11. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Reports ;
0301K5Z Jan 67 2EL FASTEL TUOC 00055 Jan 67
Event III-54
Aircraft Involved; Two EO-66s vs tHO MIGs
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*00'N/103'33'E
I. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 6 January 1967/0919H
II. DATA SOURCE
RED BARON KIQ Incident Sunmary of PACAF CP Event 9,
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Two MIOs of unidentified type attempted to attack the 6-668. No danagt occurred.
Event IXI-S5
Aircraft Involved: One C-135 vs one MIG-17
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 19* 30' N/108* 30 'E
I. PRIHARr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time; 15 January 1967/0905H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
tanker'^iEIJt'miiSjef L;:?"b!;i%:r:«'*M?.^"5?? '""^ P-IO" rendervoused «Uh
earlier iTpackSI^e VIB? ** "arnlng had been passed HQ nlnutes •
Event II 1-56
Aircraft Involved: One RP-101 va one HIC
{ probable)
Reaults: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter; 20''.7*N/i02*36'E
1. PRtHARV HtSStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlne: 16 January I967/IO35H '
nalasSSe^Sa^Joi^iifMS!*''* »
2. mSSION ROUTE
*o 18»18'H/1C3*'16'E; then direct to 20» 19 • N/10«l«'01 th«n to
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
HsaaSfii:: Thin eloud layer at 12,000 ft» clear above and below, visibility unlimited.
BLOE
1
Altitude I 22,000 ft MSL
Headlns : 330*
Speed : link nown
Fuel State ; Unknown
Plight Format Ion : Single Ship
5. INITIAL DETECTION
.Mn ^5;I!^^K.r-J^r/2"^P"'f?^ ^^"^ ^•"^"'^ signal at l o-clock for approximately 3
S i?*" 'JShted a silver, swept wing aircraft at 1 o'clock, H nml rSeeTiSd 3000
ft above hlra. Bogey appeared to be in a quartering head-on attack. Jooo
6. ACTION INITIATED
cloud^MkJ * *® * heading of l80« and descended rapidly Into a
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
11 ^^'w*^ continued his turn to a heading of 050» and leveled off at 12,000 ft MSL In ■
full military po-er with a TAS of 590 Jets. He continued making evasive tirns along a
reaching ig^^S •N/103«»15*E. At this point BLUE 1 cliSbJd
back to 22,000 ft and returned to Udorn via 18=19 'N/103°10'E without further IneldenJ
After the Initial sighting, BLUE 1 had no further visual or electronic ron?rctSltrtA«
J^Ir^IJU iV^tJ S°"*'r ''*''2h"r5 ?" P'-io'* the encounter. Due to the
brief time of the encounter, BLOE l could not positively identify the aircraft eneQunt««»d
as 11 swept wing. However, he did not believe the alrcrift was a delta wl^ Qpe?
10. AIRCREH COHNENTS
Eaperience:
BLUE 1
Total
Hours
4150
RP-lOl
Hours
78
Combat
Wlss jons
Unknown
II. DATA SOURCES
Messages J Reports ;
432TRW OPREP-3 ISOSI^E Jan 67, PASTEL OO397
432TRW OPREP-3 16073^2 Jan 67, PASTEL OOK05
432TRW OPREP-3 160914Z Jan 67, PASTEL 00406
Remarks
Ho prior alr-to>alr engagements
Event 111-57
Aircraft Involved: One E8-66 V8 W K1G-17S
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'SO'N/lOft^ftS'E
K MIMARt Mission ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Data/Tina: 16 January 1967/1555H
11. DATA SOURCE
RED BAHOM MO Incident SuBoary of PACAP CP Event 29 «
U. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOM
The ere* of the B-66 sighted two MIO-lTs. No other action occurred.
Aircraft Involved: One RF-*C va two MICs
Result: No daiaage
Vicinity of Encounter: Approximately
2l«'0il*N/10^*'»5'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dat*/TliM: 16 January 1967/1855H
Oiw RP-4C (BLUE Plight} was on a photo reconnaissance mission.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight departed Udorn and proceeded to Channel 97 at 25.000 ft; then to 20*03*N/
10<i*37*E, deacendlns to 8,000 ft; then to Pop Point 21"ftO'N/lOtt<»52*E in a left 90* turn
over TOT, descending to mountain top level; thence to 2G"'49'N/10it»01'E. From there he
made a climb to altitude then proceeded direct to Udorn.
i. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
RF«ltC BLUE 1
No araament
MIQs
Unknown type
Sliver
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clear
BLUE 1
A?.tltude : 8000 ft
Heading : 2*»0"
Speed ; 5^0 KTAS
Fuel State : Unknown
Flight Fortnatlon : None
5. INITIAL DETECTION
HIGb were detected visually at the 3 o'clock position, three miles away and turning
Into BLUE 1 on an intercept course. The MIGs were heading 150 deg and were turning in
on BLUE 1.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 went Into full afterburner, descended to the deck and accelerated out of the
area at 700 KTAS.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 lost sight 0^* the MIOs as they approached his 6 o'clock position and never
regained sight. Due to sunlight glinting off the APR-28/26 scope and other strobes on it,
BLUE 1 was not able to determine If the MIOs were registering on the X-band radar warning
gear.
8. ORDNANCE
Rone'
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None
r,. DATA SOURCE
432 TRU 160619Z Jan 67. OPREP-3 TUOC QOmo
U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE 1 was a lone RP-UC on a reconnaissance mission at 8000 ft at 20®0it'N/10't''U5»E
when he observed two MIGs, silver In color, at his 3 o'clock position, 3 ntiles away,
heading 150 deg. BLUE 1 was heading 210 deg at 5^0 KTAS. The "IGs turned into BLUE i at
whif^h tlae he unloaded the aircraft, descending to tree top level and accelerating <io
700 KTAS out of the area all the way to Channel 97. BLUE 1 then climbed to altitude and
returned home safely.
Event I 11-59
Aircraft Involved: One EB-66B V6 one MIC-21
Result: Sighting only
Vlclnitjr of Encounter: 21''50'N/X0i»'">5'E
I. PRIMARY HISSIO« AHO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 17 January 1967/1539H
II. DATA SOURCE .
RED BARON MIO Incident Summary of PACAP CP Event 31.
11. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION ^urrmA
The cre« of the 8-66 sighted on. Mia-21. No other action occurred.
Event III >6o
Aircraft Involveci; Two RF-lOla « two
unidentified
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l«»0'K/l04n7*E
I. PRlHARt MISSIQH AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/TliMt U January l967/15tOH
II, DATA SOURCE
cmCPACPLT Staff Study 6-69.
i
Event I I 1-61
Aircraft Involved; Pour P-105s v» two H10-17a
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'Sfi'M/lOS^ST'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dat«/TlRe: 20 January 1967/0955H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Armed reconnaissance fUaht at 15,000 ft saw t«o MICs at 8-9000 ft on perpendicular
heading.
Bvent III -62
Aircraft Involved: IWo P-4Cs va two KtO-Zls
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 22"30'N/105«15*E
I. URINARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TlBe: 21 January 1967/0825H
II. 0ATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Lead of ECU escort at 31,000 ft saw two MIGs, possible Mia-21s. at 5 o'cloclcj HICa
maneuvered and headed away; MIOs closest i^olnt of approach was five miles.
Brent III-63
Aircraft Involved: Three P-4C8 va two
unidentified
Results: Ho damage
Vicinity of Encounter; <i.*28«H/106'»15'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 January 1967/1613H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Remaining thre<* nsmbers of flight of aircraft downed by ground fire were in vicinity
of downed aircraft; L»ad saw two bogeys at 1-6 miles :umlng In behind flight; flight
broke right and up and -larae under intense ground fire; lost sl^t of unidentified aircraft.
J
I "3
t
' i
Event Iir-6'<
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-1058 v» one KIG-17
Results: 51p;htlng only
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^ll •N/106°U4'E
1. PRIMARY HISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 January 1967/1620K
n. DATA SOURCE
CIKCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68,
12. NARRATIve DESCRIPTION
After pulllns off target, strike flight at 6000 ft aaw MIC very low on opposite
heading.
Event I II -6 5
Aircraft Involved: Two p-1023 vs four
unidentified
Reaulta: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20»30'N/10H-10'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATXOM
Date/Tine: 22 January 1967/1600H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
CAP Flight at 27,000 ft saw four unidentified aircraft at 18,000 ft; closest point
of approach was 8-9 miles; unidentified aircraft may have been friendly.
Event III-66
Aircraft Involved: One B-6S va one MIO-IT
Beaults: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 22«»20'H/105»28'B
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/THae: 22 January 1967/113CH
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Sv-udy 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
ECM aircraft at 28,000 ft saw MIG at 10 o* clock; MIC closed to two miles and turned
away.
Event 111-67
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-lOls vs t«fO MIC-17»
Reaulta: Sighting only
Vlelnlty of Encounter: 22»00'M/105«15»E
I. yRIMRY HI SSI OH MO TACTlCAt SITWTIOR
D«t«/Tlme: 2% January 1967/1620H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. WWRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Photo aircraft cllnblng through 10.000 ft «u"A-i2S Si.JJn!*
in orbit, apparently did not see flight, which descended to 100 ft and coutmiea »u.
Event III-65
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105a va three MIG-218
Besulta: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2in6'N/I06'"»i'£
I. PRIMARY HISSIOH AMD TACTICAl SITUATION
Oate/Tlne: 28 January 1967/1629H
II. DATA SOURCE
•CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68,
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Inbound flak auppreaslon flight saw three MIOs 5-6 miles away; no hostile action.
Event III-69
Aircraft Involved: Four F-1059 vs four KIC-l7a
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l«l8'N/105*'»5'E
I. PRIIURT MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 28 January 1967/1632':
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68,
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight inbound to sane target as flight of Event III-68 saw MICa at miles.
9 o'clock low; flight began turn Into MIGs. but MIOs evaded.
Event I II -70
Aircraft Involved: Tnree F-105a vs two MIC-2ls
Results: no dasiage
Vicinity of Encounter: 23«13'M/10'»"25'E
I. ?RINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlm»: k February 1967/Unlcnown
II. OATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight at 18.000 ft saw HIOs breaking away fron rear; MIGs turned sharply and dis-
appeared.
Event 111-71
Alreraft Involved: Three P-ICs vs one unidenti-
fied
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 18*07 ' N/105* 30 'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 5 February I96l/ll5'iii
II. OATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT. Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight cllmbln; off target at 22,OOC ft saw contrails at 3 o'clock; thr«e minutes
after sighting, unidentified aircraft was seen descending toward fllg^^*-! unidentified
aircraft remained at 5 miles off starboar;! wing for one minute; subsequent actions of
unidentified aircraft indicated it may have been friendly, although silver tn color.
Event II I -72
Aircraft Involved: T-^o RP-IOls vs one MIG-19/21,
one IL-lU and one KI-6
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20<'25'N/103''55'E
21''27'N/103''17'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 10 February 1967/1 1l8H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Photo flight at 21,000 ft sa-i silver, swept wing aircraft at 35,000 ft on u recipro-
cal heading, range 10 miles; l£ ninucea later at second position shown, cargo plane at
^000 ft seen coming from Dlen Jler. Phu; flight flew over cargo aircraft to obtain photos,
which subsequently revealed helicopter in vicinlt>, also.
86
Event III-73
Aircraft involved: Four P-105s and four K-J*C» vs
two H1G3
Results: Slgntlne only
Vicinity of Encounter: 22«05'M/10t«30'2
I. PRIMRV NISStON ARO TACTICAL SITUATION
Dat*/Tlme: l6 February 1567/l62«H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Starr study 6-68.
12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
P-105 IRON !1A.'.'0 rili^r.t at 12,000 ft saw two possible 'mIGs pass in front at eight miles
range; six alniitea later, r-^JC night saw two unidentified aircraft at 20 miles; P-105s
and P-'iCs in sane general ar«a.
Event III-T*
Aircraft Involved: Three P-105s vs three
unidentified
Results: Slanting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«J4-H/10U«5U«E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Tlms: 19 February 15S7/0853K
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight at 15,000 ft saw three silver aircraft flying ever at 36,000 ft; no attack
made; unidentified aircraft may have been F-iO^a, but were headed generally for area of
Event IIX-75.
Event III-75
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-^Cs vs two MICs
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20*58 •N/105" 02 'E
I. PRIHART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: 13 February 1967/C902H
II. DATA SOURCE
CIMCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Escort flight at 12, COO ft saw two HIGs descending from I o'clock; flight turned
Into HIGs and gq^ lock-c- %C 17 miles, but was unable to close; MIG.-t continued and flight
broke off; five SA-2s tr. fired at flight.
Aircraft Involved: Four F-lOSa va four KIG-Zis
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*31*:[/105«36»e
WIWRT HISSION MO TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Oit«/TlM: 22 February 1967/l62f»H
DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6.68.
■ARRATlve OeSCIlIPTIOIf
Strike flight Bade sighting ac 6000 ft.
Evtnt IH-77
Aircraft Involved: Two RF-4cs vs two NIQs
(probable)
Result : Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l»«5*N/lO'»<»05'B
1. PRIMARr NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 23 February 1967/1500K
A flight of two RF-^Cs (BU^ Pll^tit ) were inbound on a photo reconnaissance mission
of the Tung Tu (6K 1692) and Thang ^uang (6H 1836) railroad sidings.
2. NISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight departed Udorn direct to TACAN Channel 79 at 23,000 ft; then to 21'19*N/
103«30'E at 20,000 ft; then to 20»5'»'H/10'i«H»Ej then to 22«12'N/105"06'E (abort point),
and returned via sane route.
3. AIRCRAFT COKFIGURATIONS
Rp.HC BLUE 1. 2
Vector equipnent
MIC 1. 2
Silver color
4. FLIGHT CONOITtONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Clouds, 6,000 ft broken to overcast. Visibility 2 to 3 miles in haae.
BLUE
Plight Forraatlon : Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Both BLUE 1 and 2 picked up strong X-band strobing at 21*li5'N/10';*0S*E. Strobing had
lasted for 1 1/2 minutes when BLUE Plii^ht made a visual contact on two bogeys at 9 o'clock,
1 n mi range, at 15,000 ft. Unidentified aircraft were silver in color, and were flying
a looae abreast fomation.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight broke down and right, and lost contact with the unidentified aircraft.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
No engagement took place; BLUE Plight aborted their mission ana returned safely to
Udorn.
8. Ordnance
None
11. DATA SOURCES
432 TRW OPSEP-3, 220930Z Feb 67, PASTEL 01398
I 7
Altitude ;
rieadlng :
Speed ;
Fuel State:
20,000 ft
Generally NE
Unknown
Unknown
Event Iir-78
Alx^iMtiNiittMN^ • PQ^J. p«x05s vs one t4IG-2I
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»20'N/l03«55*E
I. PRIMARY HISSIOli AMD TACTICAL SITUATIOR
D«t«/TlBw: 23 February 1967/1532H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE OESCkIPTION
night Joining up at 10.000 ft after target rum MG »"« « 1*-15,000 ft; no engage-
sent due to low fuel.
Bvant 111^79
Aircraft Involved: One RF-lOl vs two unidentl-
fleu
Rasttlts: no damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20-23*V10«»03*E
1. PRIMARY Mission AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Tine: 25 February 1967/09<'8U
M. DATA SOURCE
CIHCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. RARRATlVe OESCRIptlOM «nd indication
.lr.r.f. in turn « Zi OOO " piC.d up 5-;jn/;/-|rn S\"2-iS"«J«
of lock-on for n.tt 30 ••"ndj; »« /J:"^"'" "o aircraft pulling. contrail.;
.Sp«.rt o? tS unld.ntlfl.d aircraft 12 ill".
Event III-80
Aircraft Involved: One P?-i«C vs two vinldentl-
fled
Heaults; Ho damage
Vtelnlty of Encounter: 21*00 *N/102*S0'E
I. PRIHARV MISSION AMD TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Time; 25 February IroT/llOSH
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12, HARRATIwe DESCBIPTION
Event IZZ~8l
Aircraft Involved: One R7-UC vs ? MIO-?
Reaulta: Uo dainase
Vicinity of Encounter: ^J^lO^N/lOt^lS't,
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOB
Date/Time: 5 Marcn 1967/0 703H
n. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
and '^V.:.r;'^To^\%^^^^^^^^^ -a'-i aircraft lit afterburner
overeat; ml,alon ab^r^r/^aiJli^die^r^eatSer^'afie'r ^tl SSL^''"*'"'
Event III- 82
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOjs vs one HXQ-lS
(probable)
Reaulta: SlghtlnR only
Vicinity of Encounter: i9"30'M/10*«30*E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/?lDe: 5 March 1367/16 15H
II. DATA SOURCE
CIMCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
1
Event IZI-83
^0
1.
11.
12.
PRIMRf NISSIOll MO TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: 7 March i967/l6l8H
OATA SOURCE
CTN!PACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
MRRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-UCs va two NIC-17s
(possible)
Results: Slstitlnt; only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*00 'H/IOS^SO'E
no.es'lsss •t"SJv:?~;;is.n"in^;S°ai«r:?: r:ini'^''vj''''7'' '-^^^ ^'-^
clouds. uniaentiried aircraft furned right and pnoto flight broke down Into
9«
B
i
I
I
I
a
I
I
B
B
B
B
1
B
B
B
B
I
}
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
i
I
!
Event IXI.8«
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-4Cs va one MI3-17
and 4 unl dents
Results: No damaise
Vlemity of Encounter: 2X»X3»N/105*O0*?
1. PftlHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 8 Karch 1967/aboit li*OOH
Two RP.4C8 (BLUE Plight) were on a re^onnalasance mission against the Chi Pan RR yard.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE PlJ^ht departed Udorr. ind "-.roceeded to Channel 97 at 19,000 ft. Prom there they
proceeded to 21"»13';J/105°00'E at 1000 ft AOL. They then climbed to 6000 ft altitude.
After encountering the MlGs they proceeded to 21024 •N/105*'09*E and then to Channel 97.
8. ORDNANCE
11. DATA SOURCES
'»32 TRW 081110Z March 1967 OPREF-3 TUOC 01722
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Prom 1558H to 1602H, BLUE Flight turned fron the target area and climbed to about
6000 ft on a heading of 230". They were on this heading about 1 1/2 mln when an X-oand
strong (1 ring - steady) appeared at 3 o'clock.
The crew of BLUE 1 (Lead) saw .♦'our unidentified aircraft at 3 o'clock In two ele-
ments of two each, In trail about 500 ft apart. The lead element was seen to move tuward
the C o'clock position but visual contact was lost with both elements.
The X-band strobe continued and moved to the 6 o'clock position and Increased to
3 rings. BLUE 2 then turned right acrosr 3L'JE 1*3 <:rack to check the 6 o'clock ar.i saw
one swept wing, blurt-noae sliver aircraft identified as a MIO-17 about level with
BLUE 1 and within 2 r.l ran^e.
BLUE 1 and 2 went to afterburner and descended to about 1000 ft altitude. The
signal remained on during the descent, went off at level off, and cane back on at 2 1/2
rings fr';r the 5:30 o'clock position after about 30 sec, and remained on 20-30 sec.
The signal then went off and stayed cff. The flight proceeded to channel 97 and
had climbed to 28,000 ft 25 ml prior to Channel 97.
The weather was broken to overcast.
BLUE Plight heard HIU calls for AP-3 about 1605H.
Event iri-85
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs two MIG-21s
Results: No damage
Vleinlty of Encounter: 22"00'N/l0S«ii0*E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 6 Karch 1967/1603K
n. DATA SO'JRCE
CZNCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Inbound arn^ed reconnaissance flight at 8000 ft saw two MIOs approaching at 15,000 ft.
MIOs passed 1 mile ahead, lit afterburner, and turr.ed, trying to get behind flleht.MIGs
broke off from 3000 ft Just after completing turn and no firing was seen.
95
I.
2.
Event III«86
Aircraft Involved: One RP-4C W possible MIG
Results: Radar contact
VXc*-Uy of Kncounter: 22*0'»*(I/IQ4''»0'E
PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL jITUATION
Date/TlP.e:' 9 March 1967/0351H
One R?«4C (BL'JE Plight) was on a reconnaissance mission.
MISSION ROUTE
Departed Udorn at 0?I2H, then proeee<2ed rtlrect to Channel 97 (21'27'H/103*'»3*E)
arriving at 0336H. BLUE 1 then headed to 21"»22'!;/13 3*'<»3'E at BOOO ft «SL, arriving at*^
OS'iSH. On a heading of OSC , BLUZ I then descended to 5000 ft MSL and proceeded to
22*'05'N/io»J<»3*fE. At O350H BLUE 1 turned to a heading of 117", deseendlng to 4000 ft NSL
(1000 ft ACL) vlth a speed of 540 kts.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
While on a heading of 117° at 22<'0i 'Jl/lOifUO 'E at 1000 ft ACL, BLUE l began to re-
ceive fluctuating power and activity llp.nts for a few seconds and then launch lights at-
0351H.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 made a left turn to 080**, varying altitude and airspeed.
7. SITUATION TEVELOPHENT
Thirty seconds later, BLUE 1 received a 3-rlng X-band audio strobe and light from the
6 o'clock position. At the sane tlrae he received fluctuation activity, power, ana launch
lights as well as S-COflS frcn t^ie 7 o'clock position.
BLUE 1 Increased h.ls sceed to 600 kts plus and turned to 300*' descending to 500 ft.
AGL. He maintained that heading for 1 r.ln, then turned to 27C* heading for a few minutes,
then to 230" at 22*QO'N/103''56'£ at 0357H.
The 3- ring plus X-band strobe remained at 6 o'clcck for 6 mln until BLUE 1 got to
the Black Mountains at Sl'^S'ii/lOS'SC '£ at O'^OOH.
No further signals were received after this point. BL'JE 1 then went direct to
Channel 97 and then hone.
S. ORDNANCE
None observed.
11. DATA SOURCES
432 TRW 082225Z March 1967 TUOC 01734
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Additional eomcients:
BLUE 1 was to have oasfed near the Thai Nguyen Iron and rteel works at
21«'33'N/105*52'E, and weather points at 21*itO'rJ/105*4o«E and 2l*4o»M/l05*OO'E. This part
of the nlssion was not accomplished due to the MIS encounter.
During the mission* DLL'S 1 was In an overcast with tops at 8000 ft M5L, bottoms at
500 ft AOL. Visibility was 10 ir.l above the overcast and less than 1 nl below.
No warnings were heard.
The possible enemy tactics used were to give false SAM launch signals to make BLUE 1
turn northeast (a turn south would have placed BLUE 1 in a SA.M ring). When BLUE 1 turned,
a probable NIC jumped him.
>8 March 19(^7 1951Z
96
S
B
E
9
I
I
I
I
1
Q
D
I
I
I
B
Q
0
% i
n 11
event IZZ-87
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-^Cs and four P-1058 vs
one MIG.21
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"55'N/I0l»55*E
1. PRIKARV KISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tloe: 10 Xarch 1967/1552H
BLUE FllRht (four F-lO'is) was e^resslns fron a strike on Thai Nguyen Iron and Steel
Works (JCS 76.00). CFKKr; Kllgnt If-aa) was assUned a STRIKE-CAP mission.* The flight
had completed Its scriV-e on JCS 7%i>C0 and was egresslng, trailing P-IOS flights. GREEN
had rendezvoused with atrllte force over Northern Laos Inbound target and naln»
talned position aDove and tenind :he last ?-i05 flight for Ingress and egress. Strike
force probably consisted of IPCK HAND leading, followed by a flak suppression flight,
followed by three strike flights and the F«4 STRIKE-CAP flight.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Inbound unknown. Outbound, force was proceeding westerly from target toward Thud
Ridge when attacked.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105 BlOE 1. 2. 3. 1
6 750-lb bombs
(Probably carrying two i50-gal. wing tanks and QRC-60 pod.)
Camouflaged
P-4C GREEW 1. 2. 3. ^
6 7S0*lb bombs
» SPARROW (AIM-7E)
1 370-gal. wing tank
1 'iSO-gal. centerllne tark
1 QRC-60
Camouflaged
MI0»21
Sliver color
Atr-to-air missileCs)
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOINTER
Wegther: Scattered to broken clouds at altitudes below egress altitudes.
BLUE GREEN
jL 2 2 !l _1 t a 1.
Altitude ; It ,000-18 ,000 ft 16,000-20,000 ft
(altitudes are not clear — GREEN Plight was above BLUE Plight)
Heading : 300" 300"
Speed : tOO KCAS tOO KCAS
Puei State : Unknown 7.500 to 8,000 lb
Plight Formation : Both flights In pod formation.
5. miTIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight observed a single MIO-21 apprcachl ig from below at 6 o'clock, detection
range above 5 miles or greater. GREEN 1 (front) ot served the MIG at 10 o'clock, very low
(nearly underneath him) just before the MIG fired a missile at BLUE Plight. Eatinetcii
altitude of the MIG was about 3000 ft. There waa no evidence of MIQ warning in this case.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight continued egress, taking evasive action when MIG was observed to fire
missile at them. GREEN 1 had Inoperative radar and on sighting MIG called It out and
told GREEN 3, who was on his left wing, to go after him.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Flight observed the MIO fire a missile frtnn extreme range (several miles or m'—e)
and took evasive action by turning and climbing toward the sun. The missile was ob-
served to approach to about 2 miles behind the flight, then lost momentum and arched
toward the ground. MIC broke off and BLUE continued egress.
■Mission carries bowbs and air-to-air missiles; assigned to strike a given target, but
Jettison bombs and protects F-1053 if MiGs become a jlear threat on Ingress. Follows
P-I05S out on egress to protect against MIGs.
CREtIN 3 banked ahar-ply to g*t a better view and both fron*: and back sighted what
appeared to be a HI<:-Ci below. At about the aar.e tline UREEN 3 '.front) observed a missile
leaving: the MIG, Tollowed by a prominent white trail or sr-.&ke, GREEN 3 could not see whaf
the NIG was shootlr.K: at du.? to brc>:en clouds teiwj^n the "IG and G'.'.EEli Plight. GREEN 3
then rollea Invertea, ncse town, anJ fired a SI'ARPCW, without a radar tareeti In an
atteapt to divert the MU. The »IC broke right and GHEEN lost sl»:ht cf him under cXouds
shortly after the r.lsslle firing. He was not detected again. CP.££!« 3*s missile followed
a ballistic path, missing the MIG ty about 1/? mile. GREEN Pllriht continued egress.
Lat^r, at a point on the Red River Juct below Yen Eal , with GRSE*; Plight trailing the last
flight of F-1053 by 3 to miles, T-^ia and F-lOSs about lU.ooC Vt altitude, a flight of
four MIG-ris was ctsi-rvt-J closing :Ke r-105s fron 5 o'clock, lev.-l. GREEH I radar was
now operatlnr; anJ GREEN Flight turned toward the KlGs who then did a hard turn away and
departed the area. G.KslEN continued to egress with the P-lU5s. GREEN Flight was Just
about at B:;:go fuel.
8. ORONANCE
GREEN 3
(No.
rired/rro. hits)
SPARROW
I/O
Remarks
Fired without lock-on as a diversionary
measure. Missile went ballistic.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
10. A{RCREli CONNEMTS
Experience ;
Green 1 radar was inoperative part of the tine.
GREEN
GREEN
(front)
(front)
Total
Hours
30O0
1500
Combat
Missions
55
52
Remarks
10 years In ADC.
Most of time In fighters or
Interceptors; ICO missions In
Aorea In F-SO; AOC after Korea.
Comnents on this Encounter :
CREEH 3 (r.-ont) - k missile system which pemlts launch end missile guidance without
fine tracking of the target would be highly desirable In a situation like this.
Coamenta fron Overall Experience !
GREEN I (front) - The visual Identification requirement is necessary In the SEA
environment with .-aany friendly aircraft in the air and our lack of ability to discriminate
by other than visual means.
The SPARROW Is basically a good missile — It Just needs better reliability.
Releasing the centerllne tank offers problems In maneuvering to release and keeping
the fUgbt together as well as In [r.alntalnl.«g position on the P-105s. There .laws been
aircraft hit and damaged by centerllne tankb
You always want more speed and maneuverability although the P-i has the speed It
needs and definitely h4s the maneuyerablllty .
The 7-H can dlsengajje frco a MIC-21. If you have a HIO-21 making a pass from the
rear quarter (either co-altltude or diving on you) you pull a hard break and cause him
to yo-yo high. If he does this Just right he's still in an awkward position. What you
can do Is break Into him or. If he goes high enough, you can just unload, put the burner*
In, Jink to spoil his tracking, and get out.
The P-*'s ability to accelerate Is a great advantage. It can turn well, and what
It does beat Is roll. You can roll the airplane all day and this makes a big difference.
You absolutely have to have a pilot In the back seac of the P-U rather than an RO.
It would be difficult for an RO to understand the various tactical situations, and a
pilot in the back could bring the aircraft hc-ne if the front seater is hurt,
GREEN 3 (front) - Two people In zhe F-H work out well. In addition to needing the
other man to operate the weapon system, it's helpful to have j-.omebody else 'coking around
There have been a nunber of cases where the extra set of eyes have spotted things.
The practice of having an RO In the back seat rather than a pilot is sound for day
work or in Just an Interceptor role, but in night air-to-grcund work it is extremely
valuable to have a man to watch the instruments and this requires a pilot or a very
experienced RO.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
GREEN 1 (front) 6 March 1967
CREEK 3 (front) 10 March 1967
g
I
I
!
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
Messages : 38fiTrrf Korat OPREP-3 101139Z, March 1967, DOI 0750
8TPW Ubon OPREP-3 1012UQZ, March 1967, DOI 03223
7AF message 110107Z, .March 1967, DIO 32589
»
98
0-
3
I
I
I
J2. HARRATIVC DESCRIPTION
A3 Jn poracrapha 1 throuch 7 above
1.
IK
PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: IC ."arch 1967/1556H
DATA SOURCE
CINCPAC?!-T Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Event Iii-8a
Aircraft Involved: F^^ur P-105a vs three Klg-I7s
Results: Slehtlni; only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l"i4 •N/i05»lJ0'E
Ev*nc : 11-89
Aircraft Involved: "wcive P-I058 vs two MIG-Zls.
•inrt four Mia-17Cs
RMult: Twc Hta-i7Ss killed, one MIC-17 damaged:
Vicinity of Encount-.-r: Zl^afl'N/lOS^ttS'E
PRIMAAY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oace/TlRe: lO *!arch 1967/1556H
BLUE Plleht (four P-lCSa) was tne mission lead for a strike of sixteen P-tOS aircraft
rro:n Takhll. The target was tne ThM Hjuyen steel mill. Primary mission of BLUE Plight
sjppreaclon in and around the target area. IRON !1AKD flight, EB-fifi ECK flights.
HIGCAP and other support aircraft were alrSorne In connect Ion with this nlsslon wnich
took place on the sane day as the Initial strike on this target.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Takhll to GREE:; anchor extended to North Star TraeklniC Station, to Red River, east
to Cho Ml, then sou'.h Into *.he target. Egress west to Bed River.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P»105 BLUE 2. 3. >*
* CBU-?i» (centerline)
2 150-gaI. wing tanks nboard)
1 ArM-9B (left outbo.i: ' (BLUE 1 and 3 only)
1 QRC-160 (right out c .rd)
All camouflaged and carrying ZOmsi cannon.
MI0.17
Cannon
Silver color
Not canouflaf;ed
MiQ-ai
AAM
Sliver color
Not eafflouflage4
4. PLIGHT CONOITIOKS PRtOfi TO ENCOUNTER*
Weather: Clouds 3000 ft s-attered, visibility about S miles In haze over the target and
In the valley around the tirget area.
BLUE
1 2 2
Altitude : '',000-5,000 ft
Heading ; 280*'-290«
Speed : 55O KCAS
?uel State t Approx. 1000 lb above aiNGO
Plight Ferret icn; Left es.'-elon alnost line abreast, BLUE 3 on the right, with 1, 4 and 2
to the left, in that order.
5. INITIAL OetECTIPN
Numerous HIG warnings In the area froir BIG EYE and the preceding strike force.
Coning off the target, as -.ne flight was rejoining, BLUE 1 sighted four MIG-17Da at
2 o'clock, approxlmacely 2C00 ft down, distance 1 te 2 nlles. MICs were in a 70» echelon
to the right. 1500-2000 ft oetween each airplane, on a westerly course.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 and 3 rolled Into the MIG-lVs, attacking fron the MTGa 7 to 8 o'cltck position.
BLUE 1 did a descending barrel -oil, rolling In behind the first two HtGs, but ahead of
the second two. BLUE 3 followed BLUE 1 with a high side pass frOTTj 9 o'clock, pulling in
behind the fourth MIG. SLUE 2 had lost his radio receiver when popping up to go in on
the target and was not aware of the situation. He lost contact with rest of flight and
egt^'ssed. SLUE U's actions are not known.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 rolled In between KIO 2 and 3 and tried unsuccessful 1« to fire his AXM-9B
at the MICs ahead. (He had thrown the wrong switches and the missile would not fire.)
BLUE 1 fired cannon and dane;;ed MIG 2. BLUE 3 fired cannon f after experiencing jw.ltching
•Refers to the encounter with four MI0-i7s.
inn
ft.
a
Q
a
a
Q
s
a
s
a
a
i
a
a
Q
Q
a
Event III-89
problerr.j In trylnc to fire his .-nUslle) at MIC U nn the MIG was firing at tUJc. 1 and
downed tfie MIG. ELU:% 3 then took XI-T 1 under ciinnun fire (al-.c-r .-UG 3 ^rfht.-'Sw ^
BLUE X) and scored M',:. r-.na a procabU- kill. /UG 1 tuccesafuliy disengaged; b-Lt Flight
did not f.Lve chase due to fuel ani r.lssloi consldtrrat Ions .
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE I
BLUE 3
MXC>17s (3. 1)
9.
(No. flred/t.'o.
20san
Unic/1
hits)
975 rd/dana;:lnj^; I
downlnt; I
Unk/O
AAM
I/O
Remarks
Tried to fire AIW-9B Out failed to throw
proper switches.
Wanted to fire AIM-9B but unable to
tl»row proper switches In tlr.e. Did not
use gunslgnt — too much switching
rcqu 1 red .
:o fire as a MIC-21 crossed ahead of hlsi.
'bad contact."
Pilot attrl-
EQUIPKENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2'3 radio receiver becar.e Inoperative as he popped up for his pass at the
target. Later, his s'Jn fa lie;
bu^ed the gun failure to a
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Expepience :
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
Comment a
Total
Hours
F-i05
Hours
Cor.bat
'•missions
Remarks
3277
76
TAC background. Had several
MIC encounters before this one.
900
12
Completely TAC background.
This was first rilsslon into
Route Package VIA.
•«.2650
300
79
ADC and TAC background. Had
never fired a :nissiie In F-105.
on this Encounter;
BLUE 1 - Could not get a missile off because he missed one of five switches that
must be thrown. Cculd not get the gunslghc set up l»i tL-ae to get any use out of it even
though switching was practiced every day ~ in the excitement of the encounter, one switch
was forgotten.
BLUE 3 - There is a reed for a capability to go simply and instantaneously from air-
to-ground to air-to-air T.cdes. Did not go air-to-air coming off the target because was
too busy with speed brakes, afteroumer, flaps,
Convnents fron Overall Experience :
BLUE i - There Is always a lot of apprehension -tbout the enemy's capabilities, but
once you really see what they car. do — the weaknesses and limitations of their equlp-
nent and personnel — then it can be see.i that our people are more effective.
BLUE 2 - No MIG-21 pilot I've ever seen Ms been very aggressive.
BLUE 3 - To get an electrically caged gunsight an ?-105 will put the sight right
on top of the combining glass. This is no mils depression. Everyone uses various
methods to bugger the ?-105 system.
The Mr0-2l8 sometimes run right through their o'./n flak. Sometimes they follow
the P-105S up in the "pop" r.aneuver, through the flak, and try to attack over the target.
ELUE 1, 17 March 1967
:L'JB 2, 29 May 1967
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
BLUE 3i 17 r-'arch 1S67
M essages ; 355TrJ OPREF-3 lOli^COZ, March 1967, DOTO-0-10782
7AP message 1101072, Karch 1967, DID 2253}
355TFW OPREP-3 1109'J'»Z, March 1967 DQTO-P-S-1080'*
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Just as the flight apcroached the target he-'idln- 170°, 550-600 KCAS, altitude 3C00 i
in a left echelon for a right ."oll-ir.. BLUE 3 siijhte • two MIG-21s at BLUE I't: '-i o'clock,
101
Event I 11-89
5,000-6.000 ft out. The MI33 fired a nlssil^ as SLUE 1 pulled up In his pop maneuver.
BLUE 3 In his pop brcke Into the KIGs as he ma-le his rlgLl roll In on the target. The
night lost sl(5ht cf '.fi« HIC-Zls at this point ar.'l, since they were in their bomb run.
did net attempt to uncage.
The flight car.B off the tarnct on a westerly heading. Vhlle In the process of
Joining up (5 or 6 .T.lies west of the lar.-et) 3LUF. i sighted four KIC-lTs at his 2 o'clock
low 1 to 2 nilea cut. The flight fcmation at; this t lr:e was eLUE 3 on the right with the
flight echeloned lert. BLUE 1 calleJ tr.e MIjS; ELUE 3 ackrowledtjed the call. BLUE I
initiated tne attaclc by turning rli^ht, Into the '/.IZa friklng a right hli;h-g barrel roll
coning out on the first 'AZG el^.-r.«frit ' s 6 o'clock position.
BLUE I tried to firs his M^-'-yb at the :'IG-175 ahead but the missile would not fire
because he had not thrown tne proper switches. MIGs 1 and 2 toak evasive action with
BLUE I following at speeds cf ^lOO to oOC KCAS, tjclng barrel rolls and 3-tums between
the deck and about 4000 ft. fiLL'E 1 fired cannon ai MIS 2 without a sight and observed
sparkles on the MIC's wing. The MIG-ITs disengia.-ed by turning sharply. BLUE 1 did not
Attenpt to reengage since it was not his mission to pursue MJGs and because of being at
aXNSO fuel.
BLUE 3 rolled in irjnedlately after BLl^r. 1. He made a 90* high side pass on the
second MIC element rolll.ig out on WIO ^»'s 6 o'clock position approxiraately 1000 ft back.
BLUE 3 Jettisoned hi.-* wlrs? tanks and went aftercurrer as he started his pass. He also
attempted tc set his arnanent switches for "ni^siles air" but was unable to acconipllsh
this due to the tlr.e required and his proxL-nlty to the eneny. As he reversed his turn;
on the KIGs, he saw two MIG-213 cor.lng toward his 5 o'clock. He disregarded these two:
aircraft and pressed his attack on the MIGs In front of hin. (The MIC-21S were not
sighted again.) As BLUE 3 closed on MIG U the MIG was firing cannon at BLUE 1. BLUE' 3
fired and the MIC turned right, 2LUS 3 fired again observing hits on the HIG at this
time. The :4I3 then broke .»^ard left. As he passed In front -if BLUE 3 at 3,000 to ft, 000 f t »
BLUE 3 fired again observing hits on t.^e aft fuaeiase, canopy and a fire starting In the
left wing. T?-.e MIG rolled dow.i ar.d went strai^r.t In, exploding upon Icpact with the
ground. BLLT 3 pulled off '.o the rl?ht. At tnls point MIG 3 crossed In front of him froa
right to left. The ;':I3 was attacklnj BLL'E I, Tiring Its cannon. ELUE 3 pulled up and
left, abreast of the MIG. The MIG. seeing BL'JE 3. turned right. Into BLUE 3> BLUE 3
fired his cannon at this tl.T.e and he thinks he hit the KIG. Then the KIG broke hard
left, and 3LUE 3 fired again. The MIG ccntlr.jei left and disengaged. BLUE 3 felt he
also hit the MIG In the left turn. At this point ELL'E I called to disengage and BLUE 1
and 3 egressed the area without further Incident.
At no time' did BLUE 3 have a gunsight (unable to i.hange switch settings). He used
the top of the eonbinlng glass and ^*ust pointed the aircraft in the general direction.
Kost of his shooting was done within 600 ft or so.
BLUE 3 was in afterburner moat of the tine and had observed the HI0-17s light
afterburners.
BLUE 2 had lost his radio receiver in his pop maneuver going in on the target.
Coming off target SLUE 2 lost sight of the rest cf the flight and was not aware of
contact wl'jh the MIG-17s. He Joined with the first F-105 he saw and, upon Joining,
learned that It was an F-105? trying to hit a SAM site. A MIG-21 turned In on the
P-105F and BLUE 2 trlea to fire his gun at the MIG, The gun v»ouid not fire. As BLUE 2
turned into the MIC, the MIG turned away. SLUE 2 was at BIKCC fuel and egressed.
Actions of SLUE 4 are not known.
The HIO-lTs that were engaged by BLUE Flight were also engaged by tw other flights
of P-105S, GREEN and PURPLE.
At 1556H GREEK Flight, on egress frora the target, was at 21«3'» ' N/105* "JO'E, heading
273* » altitude 4500 ft when GREE.V 3 observed two silver HIC-17S at his 3 o'clock position*
approximately 7 miles away at the same altitude, beginning a turn to the southeast.
GREEN 3 continued tc pick up speed and lost visual contact with the MICs. While near
21°H5'M/105*25'E, heading 315°, altitude 50CO ft, GREEIi ft sav. one silver NIC-17 at his
2 o'clock position 5 to 7 nlles away. The XIG was at 10,000 ft altitude and was executing
a wing over. GREEN ft passed out of the area without further incident.
At approximately 1556H, PURPLE Flight of four F-105s obstrved a SAM detonation
directly over the target at 11,000 ft. On egress, when at apt roxlmacely 21° 35 'N/105*ftO*E,
heading 270°, altlt'jie 6000 ft, PURPLE sighted a i-:iC at his 3 o'clock position about
200C ft to the right. PURPLE 4 called bogey at 3 o'clock and went to afterburner. By
'.ite time the MIC-17 was able to roll in behind PURPLE Flight, they were at 580 kts and
pulled away.
102
Event I I 1-90
Aircraft Involved: Two P-lOSt* vs four MIG-21a
Results: No Oanage (except by ground fire)
Vicinity of Encounter: Near 21»35'N/105'''i5'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 10 Karch 1967/Arternoon
BLUE Flight was on an IRCM HAHD mission for a strike In the Thai TIguyen area,
n. DATA souRces
Heasa^es. Reports ;
USAP citation quoted in AF/ Si>aee Digest
I?. NAR,;ATIVE DESCRIPTION
nre ^ '^^^ ^^^^ ^ withdrew due to battle damage, both caused by ground
ii^i;l!L^???«^II!''«.2"ff''"'*,*'*.!''® on separate encounters, while BLUE 3
and « were attacking SAM sites in the vicinity of the target.
Event III-91
Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s vs one NXO-17
Results: Mo damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21°35 'M/105*tto*2
1. PRIHA^Y MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlrae: lo March 1967/1558H
U. - DATA SOURCE
CTKCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
rlrtit^iw*«!J*.2?/rK" liguyen at 6000 ft. BLUE H aaw MIG at 2000 ft off
mfSoJiS^oJ? In. afterburners and outran HIC at 58o knots' before
Event III-92
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs one KIO-17
■ Result: Sighting Only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"31'N/iO'l*10*E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 11 March 1967/Unkr,own
BLUE Plight (four P-lOSs) sighted one MIO-17.
II. DATA SOURCES
WESG team visit to Southeast Asia
Event IZI-93
Aircraft Involved: ?our P-1Cs vs one MIG
Results: Slshtlns only
Vlelnlty of Encounter; Unknown
I. PRIMARY MISSION AN} TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Oate/Tlme: 12 Mal'ch 1967/Un^nown
BLUE Plight slgh'-jed one HIO, type unidentified. There waa no naneuverlng.
II. DATA SOURCES
UESG team In Soutlheast Asia.
Event III-9ft
Aircraft Involved: Two RF-lCa va two MIQ-I7a
Results: Sighting only
Vlelnlty of Encounter:
I. PRiNARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: i6 March 1967/1650H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Photo fllgnt at
descended and acceleratsd, losing MIQs.
24,000 ft saw two XICs at 8 o'clock high, 1-2 miles rang9. Flight
Event III-95
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105» v» one KIO-17
1. PRIMARY MISSION
Results: Sighting only
Vlelnlty of Encounter:
21*02 'R/IOS* 30 •£
AND TACTICAL SITUATION
DateAlne: 26 March 1967/I6I6H
11. DATA SOURCE
CZMCPACPLT Sta^f Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
when
At I616H, second flis;ht (same force as Event 111-96) of P-lOSs was pulling off target
Lead saw one HXG-17 maneuvering with P-HC flight (Event III-102).
Event nr-o6
Aircraft" Involved: Four P-lOSs vs four
HIC-lTs and one MIG-21
Result: One MIC-17 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^Ol'H/lOS'SS'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIONS
Date/Time: 26 !<areh 1967/161 3H
Pour P-1056 (CREKJ; Tllirpt) hnd .fust pulled off target in the Hoa Lac area when they
spotted RICs and en^areJ tuew. GREEtJ FllflEht was part of larger strike force.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
OREE?{ 1. 2» 3. t
Guns
WIGS
AA mlssll*
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Visibility 3 miles In haze with a broken cloud condition.
GREEN
I — 2 — 3 — V
A ltitude : ''OOO ft
Heading : 250«
Speed : 520 kts
t\iel State : Unknown
Plight t^omation ; Unknown
5. miTlAL DETECTION
Inaaediately after GREEN Fii?,ht pulled off the tarpet, GREEtl Lead observed ^ne KIG-17
taking off from Hoa Lac Airfield at approximately 1613K.
6. ACTION INITIATED
GREEN Lead and GF.Zzr. 2 began a left turn to approximately 150 degrees tr. follow
MIG-I7 for possible engagement.
7. SITUATION DEVELCPrENT
At this time QHEE:) Lead observed three more MIG-17 aircraft orbiting the airfield
at Hoa Lac. GREEH 1 and 2 then concentrated their attention on the nearest MIC-17. The
MIO began a turn to the rlp;ht. GREEM Lead started firing and observed ordnance impacting
on the left wing of the MIO with pieces of material tearing off MIO after 271 rounds of
20ffla had been fired. KIG began a hard left descending turn. GREEN Lead and OREEN 2 over
flew the MIG-17 and lost sight of him.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. Pired/No. Hits)
20Bim AAM Remarks
OREEN 1 27'>/several Hit MIO-17 in left wing.
GREEM 2
GREEN 3
GREEN H ^
!Sc-2i ^* ^* ^* — ^^'^^ *o left of OREEN 3 and
II. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Reports ;
OP.REP-3 261330Z r^rch 1967 from 355 TPW DOTO-0-10987
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
GREEN Flight (part of larf^er strike force) was engaged with HlGs and missiles from
time over tari^et (OBl.U to 062"ZK Imedlately after GREEN Plight pulled off the target
(headlnp' approximately 250 dei;rees, altitude approximately l«000 ft) GREEN Lead observed
one MIG-17 taxing off from hoa Lac Airfield. Lead and GREEN 2 began a left turn to 150
degrees to follow KIG for possible enpiagement. At this time GREEN Lead observed three
more KI0-17a orbit inc. the Hon Lac Airfield at approxistc.tely 300 ft in single ship :;rall
with 3000 to 5C00 ft spacing. KIGs were sliver with rtd star. Lead and GREEN* 2 then
eoneencrated their attention to the nearest MIG-17 and pressed the attack. As Lead and
105
Event III-96
CREEIl 2 closed on the I-!IG, thie Kia bcp;an a rl^ht turn. Lead and CREEM 2 followed, turning:
Inside the MIG. Zl'.Eb'.ll Lead bp^an rirlnp; and obGcrved ordnance Inractlnf^ on left wlna;; with
pieces of rraterlal tearlna; off .YIG after 27" rounds of 20an had been fired. WICJ went Into
hard left descending turn. Llead and GREEN 2 over flew the MIG-l? at this tire and broke
right lodin;^ sight of the NIC. Th-? altitude of the fllrht at this time was approximately
2500 ft In the vicinity of 2ll«»0l'N/105"*29'E, the tine 0820Z. At the sane tip.e BLUE Plight
(Event 111-102) observed a KIjC!-I7 Ir.nict In the sane vlslnlty. GREEK Uad and GREEII 2
then turned left to heading df 190 ie;;rees then back to 3t>0 decrees to sweep target Area
and to provide CAP for the remainder of the strike force.
CREE!.' 3 and >i were junpJd by one protable KIG-21 Just as they pulled off the target
at altitude uooo ft, alr3pee<j| 520 kts, headlnj? .ipproxl.T.ately 270*. r.rc-2l was approxi-
mately 3300 ft above and descending; to tr.elr 6 o'clock position. Gi^ZEU 3 made a hard lef^
turn to 16g dej^rees. As GREiN 3 and started to rull away from r-'IG, MIC fired an ATOL
missile which passed level and approxlr:acely 500 yaras left of GREEri 3 and 1. Airspeed at
this tls:c was 550 kts, altlt-i:de 35C0 ft. CREEtl 3 and H were turnlni; back to a westerly
heading to Join with CREEtl Lead and SRSEN 2 they observed a canouf lasted surface-to-air
nlsslle launcned fron vicinity of 20*53"-'0"N/lCS''l'2'2C"E. Plight altitude approxlnately
•lOOO ft, airspeed 520 kts. illcslie did not appear to i^uide fcui was climbing at approxi-
mately a decree angle and passed 200 yarua low and behind GHEEN 3 and On a south-to-
north track, detrnacion was ijbservcd by G.REE.'.' 3 to be at atout 12,000 ft. CREEn 3 and ^
then pressed the attack against point of nlsslJe launch which is approximately 3.5 miles
north of Lead 53> After attpck on position, GRE£;j 3 could not relight afterburner- and
was forced to leave the are^
1
4
f
I
Event II 1-99
Aircraft Involved: Two HP-'*C3 V9 ore HIG-21
Results: No daiaige
Vlctnlty of Encounter: 20»*i3*N/l05*»05'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 26 March 1967/16U5H
TVo RP-i»C» (BLUE Plight) were on a reconnaissance ralsslon against Hoa Plnh.
n. DATA SOURCES
432 TRW 2611102 Marc^ 1967 OPREP-3 TUOC 021?8.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight departed Udorn and v/roceedfid to Chanr. :1 97. From Channel 97 they pro-
ceeded to 21*00 'N/10U° 55 'E at 30,000 ft altitude. From there, they proceeded to
20*5O*J!/10v'*20'E descending to 15,000 ft.
At uisH, when BLUE Flight -as at 20'52'N/105'»2O'E and 15.000 " altitude, they saw
three SAMs at 11 o'clock. When seen, the SAKs were 2000 ft away. BLUE 1 and 2 broke
left and down.
BLUE 1 and : then erressed separately from the target, Jlnklnp; from 12,000-18.000 ft
altitude and changing heading. When BLUE 2 was at 20°ti3'N/l05«12'E, he saw three more
SAMs- one was out of control, another passed to the right, and the third exploded «
3 o'clock Wei. 1500 ft awa^. BLUE 1 saw cne MIO at 20»fi3'H/105-05 'E at 2 o clock high
ibSut S nl iway'tuJning into BLUE 1. The MIO ?PP«^*J.^?'-;,i" "^Ji «
and de'ta wing. BLUE 2 was about 1 al in front of SLUE 1 at this time.
Tl-.e weat^ior was clear with 5-7 ml visibility.
Httacroua MIC calls were heard but no SA-H calls.
Event III>97
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105 vs one KIG-17
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»0ii'M/105«31'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 26 March 1967/10 17H
II. DATA SOURCE
CIMCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68,
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight pulling off same target as that of Events 111-95, 96, 102 saw a MIO 6000 ft
below but no attempt was made by MIO to engage. MIO may have been one Involved in engage-
nent In referenced events.
Event III-98
Aircraft Involved: One B-66 vs two unidentified
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 19*'»5'M/106«37*E
I. PRIMftY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 26 March 1967/1620H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Jamming aircraft saw two swept-wing, silver aircraft and turned 180«: no further
contact. ^nSmmiMf.mm^^
H^iii^ 107
Event IIi-ioo
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs one :iia-l7
Result: No Damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Weat of Hanoi
1. PRINMT MISSION AND TACTIcAl SITUATION
. Date/Time: 26 March 1967/1620H
I
I Pour P-1059 on a strike mission vest of Hanoi.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGUftAT IONS
4. FLIGirr CONDITIOMS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Uuther: Visibility 3 miles fn hase with a broken cloud condition.
BLUE 4
3.500 ft
Unknown
Unknown
Altitudes
Headlnp T
jpeed ;
Puel State :
Pl ^Kht Poraatlon ;
Trail for target engagement
5. INITIAL DETCCTION
BLUB 4 obaerved a HlS-lt In ehaa* on an unknotm flight aa he was coming off the target.
6. ACTIOa INITIATED |
BLUB * Jettisoned his bombs and engaged the MIG-17>
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Aa BLUE 4 came off the target he observed one MIO-17 in chase on an unknown flight
at 5 o'clock, low. 9LUE U rolled m on the HIG in a sclssor3 maneuver from 3,500 ft with
the MIO at 3,000 ft. After blue made one gun-flrlng pass, the MIG broke left and away
from BLUE ft and the friendly flight he has been chasing. Encounter ended at 1621H.
BLUE 1 estimated no damage to HIO.
B. ORONAflCE I
BLUE 4 fired guns - nusber rounds unknown,
ma-n - unknown.
9. EQUIPNENT PROBLEMS
%JSZ 4 - bombs failed to drop during pass on target,
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUE (Lead)
Messages. Reports :
OPREP-3 261330Z March 67, from 366JPW
TAKHLI RTAPB OOTO-0-1097
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
See Ztema 5. 6* And 7.
4>
Event Ili-ioi
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-'fCs vs three MIG-17s
Result: No dami^e
Vicinity of Encounter: N-ar Koa Lac Airfield
{2l«»01'N/105*29'E)
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 26 March 1967/unknown
Pour P-^Cs on a f-TFIKE/CAP mission In the vicinity of Hoa Lac Airfield.
3. AIRCRAFT COItr tSURATIONS
?-UC BLUl I. 2. 3. "
Boabs
Alr-to-alF annament unknown
UnknokfH
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO CI4C0UNTER
Weather ; Scattered to broken clouds with haze.
Alt I tilde: Unknown
Keadlng; ~ Unknown
Speed: Approximately S^O kts.
Plight Pornation
Trail for bomb dellvery
5. IHITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 2 spotted three MIG-17s as he pulled off the target- Time unknown.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Lead did net spot KIGs, but Instructed flight to go get them.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Pllsht was pulling off the target when BLUE. 2 spotted three HlC-17s on downwind .
at Hoa Lac Airfield. BLUE 2 called the MIGs and Lead replied » "Rog, t don't have them;
go get them." BLUE 2 rolled up, trying to get some lateral separation. At this tlm«>
BLUE 2 hit BINGO fuel and troke off. Lead said to rendezvous at Alpha Point which was
about midway In on the egress ana coining out of the target area. About one ninute later
BLUE 2 saw a SAM hit BLUE Lead. Lead was at about 15.000 ft when he was hit. BLUB Lead
called out, "We're over Alpha Point. We've been hit. We're bailing out. We're balling
out."
11. DATA SOURCES
Pro.1eet Interviews ; BLUE 2
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
See items 5, 6, and 7.
109
Event 111-102
t. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTI
Date/Tine: 26 Karcti
Aircraft Involved: Three P-*Ca v» elgiht WO-lTa
Result: No damage
Vicinity pf Encounter: 21»02»M/105"22'E
CAL SITUATION
1967/1615H to 1627H
on a STRIKE yCAP mlasion. BLUE 2 aborted in the air due to
tareft was Son 7ay, the Araiy barracks Just east of Hanoi, and
Three f-UCa (BLUE Plleht)
the loss cf his ECX pod. The
the Hoa Lac area.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Cepartei Ufcon and refueled on ORANGE ANCHOR. From there to Channel 97, then direct
to 21*0'*';i/lCU'» 32'E, then direct tc i:l'*C7'N/105''28'E, then dlr?ct to within 15 nlles
of the target. Egress was direct to Jl'Oft'N/lOl^SZ'E then to Channel 97 and then to
air-to-air refueling on ORAIiai ANCHOR.
}. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
p.HC BLUE 1. 3. ^
1* - SPAftpiJ
6 - 750 lb boRba
1 o Left outboard wing tank
1 - Centerllne tank
1 - ECM pod on right outboard station
MIO-173 MIC I through 8
AAM missiles
Ouna
Silver color
Ho AB noted
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR
Weather; visibility 3 nlles
0 ENCOUNTER
in haze with
BLUE
a broken cloud condition.
Altitude ;
Heading ;
Speed ;
Puel State:
Plight Pornatlon :
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 3 sighted the HIQs:
6,000 MSL
107"
5tO kt^
Pull Internal plus
some ih external tanka.
Unknown
at BLUE flight's 8 o'clock position at appro xlnately l6l5H.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight dropped external stores, lit afterburners, and went into a hard left
turn. BLUE t fell out on the first turn.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE flight enroute to
15 to 20 miles southwest of
from target with el^t KLQa
target area broke out of weather &nd Into clear In a valley
target and almost Inanedlately they spotted P>105s egressing
in close pursuit and attacking the F-lOSs. The KICa spotted
BLUE flight and came off th^ P-lOSs and approached BLUE flight at their 8 o'clock position.
BLUE fllg.1t Jettisoned ordnance, lit afterburner and went Into a hard left turn. BLUE 1
fell out on the turn. BLUEl flight continued turning in a big horizontal circle with the
MICs In pursuit firing their cannons. This engagement lasted for approximately 10 minutes,
BLUE flight hit BINGO fuel bmd the AlOi departed one way and IJLUE fll-j^iit ;mother.
Evidently the :iIGs were alsp low on fuel. During encounter BLUE I locked on, interlocks
out and armed » but missile would not fire. Several opportunities to fire raisslles were
prevented because of proxlnjlty to HZOs. BLUE flight received ground fire (37-57mm) while
engaging -.hese MIGs.
8. ORONAHCE
' The only fire waa fron the KICs (cannon fire), fo hita.
Event III-102
9. EQUIPHENT PROBLCMS
BLUE 1 - Rissllif failed to fire. ... nisaloii
BLUE 2 - Lust tcx pod and aborted early In the alsalon.
10. AIRCREW COMHENTS
Experience ■
Total
Hours
BLUE 3 3.000
p.d Combat
Hours Missions
2«0 65
and worked r.ore In the vertical.
Comrents on Overall Exp erience ^^j, mig, in the area. Also flak will be
5aKs will be n.-^d at V=^**^' hetwee-> AAA SAMs and /IGs. A tactic Is
fired. Ther« Is a hl?h decree of "ordination betwee^ AAA^ jaw an
for a KI^i-17 to keep at low altitude, noplng to dra- you 1 . to a ii-k p
have happened on 20 "ay 15t7.
11. DATA SOURCES
Prn|»rt Interviews : BLUE 3, 3 June 1967
Messages, reccrts ;
8 TFW 2616 ta3Z Mar 1967 OPPEP-3 DOI 036 J9
8 S5 261220Z Mar n67 OPREP-3 DOI 03639
8 T7W 2705J40Z Mar 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 03665
1^. NARRATIVE ,,,,, ,0T was about 10 odnut.s behind the
BLUE flight was on a STP.IKSl'CAP nlsslon. ineir i stning out with 2-3 n«lles
e.i:.4 KIOS .t 3 o'clock. 3^„j
n O-'i mile radius of Hoa Lac airfield. ^ , ^
a ntiie raoA hassled with some
In the break BLUE H became separated from J- ^*
of t»ie MIC-17S but then was able to disengage and egress. , ttt oAi
During his fight BLUE . si^.ted a silver MIO-21 In pursuit of an P-IOS, (Event III-96)
.ut only for a short tl^ and dl no. see « ^ ^^^^^ ^„ ^
Shortly after the break Into tu: ^^J-y ^J^^^J^^i and corkscrewing toward the
15 degree "^e do-jm attitude. 30.0 ft belcw^h^ y P Although BLUE « did not see
ground. The altitude of the '^^^-^^/".f^rSlt thepe was no way for the MIG to recover.
£he impact due to his engagement, he felt that JJ^r!/?' r right wing surface. This
- ^^"^Ti^^^ s.„rx-aio-;.i''t.r«vis. --'^ -^^^.^
BLUE . wa, fired on »y cannon I" «o airf.rjnt h.ad-^
tlm. n. »aa fired on at vne ff?"„Ji|'' '■zii ma overshot and at this time BLUE «
'rJ:rl.'oH±ll° 1t5^ 3°«, aM, t. a., the tracer, fired at tne. ^
D„. to tne S.« actlvlt, that day Cone aircraft 5J?,^ral'°The"fo*r^ VLS'l^aSd^l In
the encounter) BLUE 1 elected not to operate f (sevcMl thousand
h^^r^'i:^^'^'^^'!^^^^^^ -^riSlS? Lad on eUE 3 -ho ...
outsld. of BLUE 1. interlocks out and nlsslles
.r™.d°".tlJip»°d trS' a SrB.Owr°°!io'',»;jxe U .h. aln.l». • A ^-o-* »'
1X1
Event iri-102
the aircraft had ne,?atlve results. Th« system and "lilies ^'^^^f J.^^ ue^'to^lelU!"
5tlU on the aircraft, but no reason w« found for J^^,"'* 2^^;i^"fo;nd IHA
The missiles were r««.vf.d and c^heckt-d and althoufrh a "•■»"°[„J^'*;^^"^J^*^hl'ch «uld have
snd a slight pildance problen was found In another, no reason «a5 found which wouio nave
prevented the missiles fro.-n fliflng.
In several other opportunities, missiles were unable to be fired because BLUE I was
voo close to the HIG.
After a short period (BLUE 3 estimates 10 minutes) the '1°^ '"^Jf^J' **|l?KeS'*al50
At this tine BLUE l and J were at dINCO fuel, and It was '"f-fj/'f f ?^ Sid
prohnbly out of fuel or aruaunltlon so they broke off. Previous to this BLUE l ana i nau
not been In a position to disengage.
BLUE flight received 37/57mn flak throughout the engagement.
11.
12.
Event I II -10 3
Aircraft Involved: One S-66 vs one HIG -21
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20°50'tl/10fl«lO'E
PRIHART NISSIOM AMO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 27 Kareh 1967/1617H
DATA SOURCE
CIKCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Aircraft on SCM orbit
was not seen by 3-66 escorts.
at 23.000 ft saw HIO pass 2 miles ahead. MIO turned away and
I
I
«
I
1
I
4
I
I
Event III-i05
Aircraft Involved: Four E-UCs v» Unknown
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21^26 *M/iq6*5S*E
I. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 29 March 1967/Unknown
CINCPACPLT Starr Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Inbound strike flight Jettisoned ordnance when MIC call was received.
I
I
I
I
S Plight concluding armed reconnaissance siw slnrle MIO at 3 o'clock high. KIC was
Joined by two others to rear of flight but no engagement ensued. MIQs were probably on
defensive yatrol. *^ '
Event III-106
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s va three HIG-21s
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Enwounter: 21'»10»M/10'i«08'E
t. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlae: 30 March 1967/0945H
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Starr Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Event riI-101
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vs two unldenll- !
fled I 4
Results: Sighting only ! f
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«20'.V108»00'E !
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION j
Date/Tliae: 29 r^rch 1967/I6UIH ' \
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARPATIVE DESCRIPTION
Inbound iRC;i HAND flight at 16,000 ft saw two contrails above 35,000 ft. MIG warn-
ings had been heard.
I
Date/Time: 29 March 1967/Unknown i im
I 11. DATA SOURCE J [
i CINCPACPLT Staff Studv 6-68. i
Event III-1G7
Aircraft Involved: Four F-105S va two WIC-219
Results: Slghtms only
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^OO'H/lOS'OO'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 50 K^rcti 1967/1600H
n. DATA SOURCE
ClKCl*ACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
P 101 flight at 'C.OOO ft 8a« two MICs at •>* o'llock high and 4-5 mile a ran«e; no
•ngager^i?! SlJf ieJe ipiarentlly patrolUng Hoa Lac Airfield defensively.
I.
Aircraft Involved
Results: Mo damage
Vicinity of Encounter
Event IXI-lOa
Two RP-*Cs vs two MIG-21S
21«20"S/103«5'»'£
•ruoc 02500
PRIMARY MISSlOr; AHC TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlae: 8 ArrJl 19B7/1610H
Two RP-ftCa (BLUE Pllgl^t) were on a reconnaissance nlsslon asalnat the Yen 9al air-
fields.
n. DATA SOURCES
U32 TRM 08103'»2 r.pSEPj3
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION . . ^
BLUE Plight proceeded fron Udorn to Channel 97 and then headed direct towaro Yen
BaI The visibility was 2,' ml in haze.
. w^,J<«., f^r mic at 10 000 ft altitude saw two m:o-213 below them at
21-2o'NAOr ."Tn/f«3rSe?: JJiutnoJS'JJ'bfiow BLUE Plight at 3 o'cloc. and were In
"right climbing turn towird BLUE Fllgnfs 6 o'clock.
BLUE Plight went to ifterourner and broke down and to the right. Jettisoning tan«,
and departed the area. ^ ^ » w j
The MIGs were lost fUn sight after the turn. The R?-««C8 had been receiving X-hand
strob^ 0? tio rTn.3 IntemltteStly icr 1 :.ln prior to the sighting.
After 4-5 min frcn. tke abort. BLUE Plight heard MIQ calls In AC-1 and then in AG-tt.
114
8
B
1
I
B
B
E
B
B
S
B
a
B
1
0
s
i
3'
Event 1 1 1-109
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vs two KIG-21s
Results: Slghtlns only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l°25'H/10'««02'E
1. PRIMARY NISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 8 April 1987/16 35H
BLUE PllRht was to strike Rt. 601 Highway Bridge.
n. DATA SOURCES
Meaaaaiea. Reports
TAP 0821132 DIG 22856 April 1967
12. NARRATIVE OCSCRIPTION
At BLUE Plight was at 21° 25 'N/IOH'OS 'E rolllnjr In on target (Rt. 601 "iej;"*^
Bridr*) rrcn 17.000 Vt 5h«n ?wo iUG-21 aircraft were sl.n.ed The -J^^^ were at 30.000
ft in level fllrht at a headinr. of 280", 10 o'clock high with respect to BLUE. The /ICs
B^de one wide Srhutapparently at same 'altitude. They then rolled out on a heading of
45" an.', disappeared.
Event III-llO
Aircraft Involved: Two P-IO* vs one MIC
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 19*'«7':«V106'»29'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 11 April i967/1325H
II. DATA SOURCE
CXNCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Tumlng P-10*ts saw silver colored aircraft and contrail at SS-'fO.OOO ft heading
west over iSulf of Tonkin; unldent reversed direction and headed for Hainan; although
may have been a friendly (DD held friendly track In area), other similar activity
occurred in days following.
I
I
Event ni-lU
'Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOSDs vs three MIC-21s
Result : No danag-;
Vicinity of Encounter: 20"50'ri/10'»'*00*E
K PRIMRY NISSIOrilAND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: U April 1967/1615H
«pnent"?t''a?S8'S/p?iS.?^''''^* '"^"^*>" Package VI. Target hit -as road'
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIgIjrATIONS
P-IOSD BUIF ^ i and U
6 - M117 bombs
1 - AJH-9B (carried by 3 aircraft only)
I - M6J Cannon I '
Anonle» - Unknown {probably had QRC-160 ECM pods)
4. FLifiHT CONOITIO.IS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
BLUE 1. 3. ^,
Altitude:
Headlnt^ :
Speed ;
Fuel State
18,000 ft
Unknown
Unknown
5. IKITIAL DETECTIpN
on a SelSlJ/Sr^o?/''" approximately 10 .lies away at 20.000 to 22.000 ft,
n. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Reports
388TPW liuiofe PASTEL DDI 1735. for DOCO. April I967.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
20-50^lMo%o'SS?E"r3bE^?e%ro^*^en\?J.l''.e°%^- ^-^^r^ ^'^O-, at vicinity
270° turn on an attack heading on BLUZ -liJ^- l-r-- -^rV'" 'md -xecute 3
executed a 37C° turh for eventual head-en for;^»oK ^.'""t2 '"T" afterburner and
approxl=iately 500 KCAS nnd 'till -aJ^vlnS ^l^^ltl^ ^^^^ -"^l^?"^ at speed of
BLUE -light observeb the MlSs break liav^-or J* ^P->^l»«te ran^e of 7 :nlles.
Off the cha,.. 'blSe ^lUhtl^^n^C^n^^lI^Crta^g^t^Snf J^;^- ..JJ^if t leader broke
Event riI-H2
Aircraft Involved; Pour P-I05s vs two Props
Basults: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 17«<:4'K/zo6«30'E
1. PRtNARY MISSION
Date/Mae: 12 kprll 1967/1239H
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Sta^f Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
One of P-1C53 ;aw two silver colored low wm^ ™^
too snkll to be A-la and «««b^^d ^21^."°"°-^^°^ P^»"" « 3500 ft;
unldents were
116
I j
Etent 111-113
Alrercft Involved: Two P«AB vs one niQ
Results: No Damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 19*'52 •H/lOfi^'JS 'E
I. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Pftte/Tlme: 13 April 1967/H15H
II. DATA SOU«CE
CINCPACPLT Starr study 6-68.
12. KARRATIVe DESCRIPTION
o.e./.»o^*'*^*' under E-2A control » made radar contact on unldent at 12 miles; both
BAKCAF turned to Investigate and wln^nan briefly saw what appeared to be a MIG>17 tyoe
aircraft i unldent dived into clouds and contact not regained.
1^
t
Event III-llU
Aircraft Involved: Four F-I05a vs eight to ten
. NIG-17S
Result: F-105F Xoas to a MIG,* one MIC-I7
shot down
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«»53'M/105»25'E
1. PRIMARY Mission AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Tin'?: 19 April 1967/1655H
BLUE flight (ccnalstl'ng of four F-105F WILD WKASEL aircraft) was fragged to 5"PP«=3
SAM acMvlty wM le a force of 16 ?-10533 anJ 8 F-UCs attarke-l JCS 22.00. the Xuan to 1 Army
Barracks at 23'": 3 •:.V105'' 35 ' E^- The F-«C aircraft w*re assigned strlktf/cap which gave then
the secondary nlsslon of ilr super" orlty. Six other flights nad :«C encounters In this
area. (See Events 1I1-U«, -UT. -llB, -U9, -120.)
MISSION ROUTE
BLL*E flight departed
->.K Takll AS, flew to CREEK ANCHOR for refueling, direct: to Channel
97, and direct to the Blatk River at J0»58 'JI/lOS'^l'S. Their fVlrMry target -as a series
of SAH sites atcut 5 ail sputhwest of Hanoi. This route would pass a few nlles north of
Hoa Blnh but the IHOK HAND flight route would vary as they pr-pared to attacK known SA -2
sites The first '^IG encbunter cc.-?urred Jujt north of Hoa Blnh. Return route was direct
to GREEN refueling anchor]' and frcn there dependent on the aircraft. BLUE 2 was shot down
in the vicinity of 20»»H»'|K/105"32'E.'
3. AIRCRArT CONFIGURATIONS
h - F-I05F3 ^ I
1 - 650 gal centerllne tank
2 - C&U-2'<s on Inbd stations
1"- AGM-U, (SHRIKE)
1-- QRC-160 EC«POD
1 - M-6l 20nn cannon
WO-17
Red star with yellow border outline on top of wing.
All - Large red star cor:pletely covering vertical stabilizer.
All - External fuel' tanks (dropped).
Ungulded (2.75 FFArt type) rockets.
One MIO camouflaged - others sliver - red star on side.
Possible booster on one tXIS.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clear, 7-10 ml visibility
Encounter 1
BLUE
T
Encounter 2
BLUE
5,000 ft
070"
500 KTs
• 10,000 +
Rt hand echelon
In pop up
Northerly
450 KTs +
10,000 +
Trail
Altitude :
Heading :
Air Speed ;
Fuel State :
Flight Forrnatlon :
BLUE 3 had reported equipment trouble so BLUE 4 was flying In the elenent head
'position.'
-S. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE flight was li^bounri to the target area descending through 5,000 ft MSL on a
heading of 070* and preparing to attack a FANSONG radar signal emitting from their
r r^rrted as probable loss to Ml'J in pre sent official "Box Score"; however, eyewitness
(terSa.ivent Ill-lie) saw MIC shoStir^ at P-105P "ith debris coming off P-105F,
iRoute of flight described in 432TRW OPREP-3, TUOC 02772 April 1967 is completely errone-
ous after Channel 97.
Jl)32TRW OPREP-3 02771 April 1967. OPREP-3 Indicates two F-105Fs and two P-105D$; however,
BLUE 1 named two crew memoers per aircraft for this flight.
r>BLUE 1 carried 2 AGmL^S missiles and no Qf\C-l60
118
i
B
B
I
fi
B
i
fl
B
B
fl
B
B
B
B
B
B
g
B
a
e
I
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
a
Event 111-114
5H
6 o'clock position When BLUE b saw el?ht MIC-17s In two fllt^hts of four aircraft. The
MI3s were attac'<in;- alr.cst head-on from BLUK iJ's 2 o'clock position. The time was
and tr.la first encounter occurred in the vicinity of 20«'53'M/105"25'E (about 5 r»i nortn-
east of Hoa Blnh) .
6. ACTION IHITIATEO
BLUE U called a MI'; warnlr»- to the flipht and with BLUE 3 on hla rlRht wing, broke
rlRfit into the MIGa. The flr.^t riUht of "lOs fired ungulded rockets fron a range or
3,000-ft.OOO ft. The rockets Ineffective. The second flltrht of MICs was attacking
BLUE 3 and U as the first fllrr.t ovsrshot. BU'S 3 and H selected afterhurner, J«"i»®"«;^
fuel tanks and cr:inance but retalnea the 0RC-16C anJ A0«-i*5 missile. BLUt 1'a afterburner
did not light and, as a result, iiLUE 3 accelerated past BLUii »i and thoy becane separatea.
BLUE 1 and 2 continued In their attack on the PANSONG radar.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Three separate en?acemencs ensued. BLUE H. without after burner, was the victim of
three or four "IG-lTs for a few minutes. The MIGs fired about 17 rackets In groups or
three or four and r.aUe rultlcl^ car.:icn passes until they either becane bored or ran out
of amr.unltlon and fuel. BLUE « stayed In the area attempt inp; to aid in tne rescap ana
then egressed, refueled, and returned to Takhll. BLUE 3 was able to separate from the
KIGs and attempted to return tc the troll area. He was acaln engaged by MICs, managed
to escape and egressed, recovering at Udorn AB.
BLUE 1 and 2 fired an AGM-i45 at the FANSOKC radar about 5 ml southwest of Hanoi and
followed up the attack by dive bombing with the CB0-2fts. They were attacked by MIGs
during the nop up and durln» the recovery from the dive bomb run. BLUE 1 attacked and
shot one MIG-17 down rverlfled by film). BLUE 2 apparently waa hit by a second M 10
during this time, called that ho had a "hot air overheat llcht" on, and thin caliea a
second light on and aald he would have to get out. BLUE l observed the chutes and re-
ceived two ?cod beeper signals In the vicinity of SO"^!* 'N/IOS" 32 ' E. See Event III-116
for more infomatlcn on BLUZ 2.
BLUE 1 orbited the ball-out area while he Initiated rescue procedures and attempted
to establish connunlcatlons with the downed crew. He was Jumped by more HIGs and forced
to withdraw due to low fuel. BLUE 1 refueled and returned to the ball-out area where he
was acaln attacked bv 'MZz during the rescue attempt. {See Event III-117 »or related ..^j
engagements during the rescue attempt In which a second .Mia was shot down and an A-i was
lest to a MIC). The rescue attempt was not successful and BLUE 1 recovered at JUorn AB.
8. ORDNANCE
{rio. flred/No. hits)
Cannon Remarks
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
BLUE H
NIG 1
MIQ 2
MXG 3
3/1
1/1
Confirmed MIC kill
Yes plus ungulded rockets
Yes plus ungulded rockets
Yes
About 17 rockets total
In groups of 3 to 4
9. EQUIPHENT PR0BLEK5
BLUE
II .
AB failure
BLUE
2 -
Reported Hot
to get out.
Air Overheat
Light on. T
BLUE
3 -
"Lost all his
equipment"
- apparently \
10.
AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
P-105
Hours
Combat
Missions
BLUE
1
Unknown
Unknown
Unknown
BLUE
2
Unknown
Unknown
Less than 10
BLUE
3
Unknown
Unknown
About 95
BLUE
4
2100
503
61
Then a second llftht on and they' would have
Remarks
TAC background
TAC background. P-105 instructor
Nellls. F-105 tour In Germany.
9 yrs. rated, 4 nos. In SEA
119
Event III-IIO
BLUE H feels that the' MIC-17's ability to stay with him .it 450 kts CAS. make a firing
pass, and easily reposition for another firing pass is inportant.
BF'JE 1 observed that
he Mas straight and level.
3LUE
the HIGa only fired at him when he started to turn and not when
3 (Pilot and EVO),
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
Messages, Repcrts ;
U32TRW OPREP-3, 02771 April 1967, 1913002
H32TRH OPREP-3, 02772 April 1967, iyi315Z
355TFW OPREP-3. 1127^ April 1967 » 1917572
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight .fas a fl'lght of four P-105P WTLD 'TEASEL aircraft on " I™« JJ*™
assigned the task of supf^raaalng SA-2 FANSOKG radar and mlssUe operation. The task was
in aupport of a large fonce of P-105 and F-H aircraft attacking JCS 22.00, the Xuan Mai
iS-^ BS?«<:k; tnd lnsur,3ncy School loc.ted about 12 ml southwest of Hanoi
initial HIC attack, the f^llght split intj three separate unltD . with BLUE 1 and Z attacK
ing an SA-2 site. BLUE 3 |attemptlng to separate fror. Mia aircraft and return to -he task
of suppressing SA-2 sites, and ELUE without an afterburner, attenptlns to survive the
attack of three to four MIG-173.
As BLUE flight appriached the target area, they were In a descent from 15,000 ft
passing through 5.000 ftL on a heading of 070% In the P^°«=e»%° ^JiSi*'^:"* iJ^tlo
ACM-U5 against a PANSONGl radar signal enittln? at their 12 o'clock when BLUE ^
mghis Sf MIG-175 attacking from his 2 o'clock position BLUE f JjJ"; •^f^J^J"?
position as a result of BLUE 3 experiencing equlprsent failure. The flight waj In a right
ScSelon so tSat the elerJent could "look through the flight" for SAMs or «p» £r°»^5»^«
threat area. I.e., the d^lta around Hanoi, as they were passing about 5 ol north "o*
Blnh m the vlcmUH^f |20»53MI/105<'25'E. BL-E U called the MICs to tHe re»t of the flight
and. with BLUE 3 onlls right wing. lm.-.ediately broke right l^^o then. All of the MICs
were observed to arop zAeir fuel tanks with fuel streaming ou^ of '^^^."gS^Jg-^i"^ J^e
Jettisoned the centerlltie fuel tank and the f..Q CSU-i-^s. retaining the JSC-ieO and the
AGM-tt5 Shrike missile. Both aircraft selected afterburner power. The first flight of
SlS; fired ungulded rocllets from a range of 3.000-a,000 ft but the rockers ^PP^^^f ^o
ti^le about 1.500 ft in front of the >M'Zs and were completely i^efrect.ve. The r^rst
mght of MI3S overshot I but the second flight of m:-.? turned Into BLUE 3 and A^out
thirtlBC. BLUE i»'s afterburner failed to light and BLUE 3. m afterburner. Pa««J BLUE J
^.d thej became separated for the rest of this flight. BLUE 1 anj ? JJ* ""JjJ JJ^J'^*
KIC attack at this tine and were able to continue the attack on the SA-2 site. Jhe MSt
S this reconstruction LiU cover each nenber of the flight "Pa^«*;ij; /J^SJ^J SirJnS Se
BLUE 3, and then BLUE ll and 2, although all three entitles were engaged by HIQa during the
sane time period. I
BLUE U. attempting to get his afterburner lit. unloaded his "
down from 5 000 ft to |aln some airspeed. He was only able to „^
feet becausi of the ooUntalnous terrain but increased his almpeed to about tt50 kts. He
turned fron his easterly heading to 2K0« ani headed back across the Black RJver. The MIOs
SSSked BLUE 4 during Ihls naneuvor and one car.e Into BLUE view a, he turned BLUE k
fired U7 rounds of 20mm HEI at the MIG as he passed the nose of the F-105, and BLJE «
estimates that the MIC was damaged. The MIQ continued away froia BLUE 4 and was observed
pulling out Just above the treetops.
In the vicinity ot 21»50*N/105«12'E. two more MIGs rolle'1 in behind BLUE 1 and BLUE Jl
was forced into a scissormi engagement lasting about k nln. BLUE ft Ji^JiUS
h.7n^ * stabilized tarKet for the repeated firing oasaes and Jettisoned his ordnance as
he SIrlssed' fiJs? Jhef centeJuSe fuJl tank and then the CBU.2«.s. Before BLUE Jettisoned
th. JS-Jl one silver-colored HIO-17 with a red star on the side flew up to a position
ISS n ^0 thflefi o?>£Sl ISd sat there for 3-^ sec looking over at the ACM-JS Shrike
Sasne on the outboaid wing pylon. The MIC broke away when HLUE H turned Into him.
BLUE a continued to fly the mountainous terrain contour attempting to unload, dive.
Mid increase airspeed when the terrain pennltted. But due to the rising feature of the
?Sj^i?n " ?hJ aJea (a rlJe from about 2.000 ft to almost 10.000 ft) he war unable to
-trr^iUat^ an al-s5eed over U50 kts. With each hard Jinit to avoid a MIO pass, his
aJrsoeef 3ould faniff ?o abLt\2^ kts. The Electronic. Warfare Officer (EWO) In
?ir^!!S ^nrknlt was idvlslrg the pilot as the MIGs were coming in, relaying the enemy
the rear =°^^PiJ„^".f^^J^'n*triink In order to avoid the MIO fire. As BLUE 4 crossed
position, and -J^J J^gf^J^"" J^i^Hn ^ Send Of the Black River Valley between 3,500 ft
nHkarthrr" wjje ?Srfee Sr^?ouJ M?Gs\?tacSl^ but the 37nm antiaircraft batteries
peaks) there were tnree w Hcw^ver, the V.IG:: lonttnued the attack zs BLUE <t
opened "P »>Jth JjlJ'JJ^ jnd jhe MIGs . ,hase one at a
ll^l^nllt lVJi\ll%f oll M?G'!^ft. aSd this 5ia turned b.-.ck at about 20">i.5.N/105-OO.E.
Event III-UK
BLUE U heard BLUF 1 call i.hat BLUE 2 had balled out. BLUE ft reversed course and re-
turne?'^ ra'r'as'h^a'r.d .nowlnr. t.at he could -t engare any
threats without ordnance. He was able to relay radio calls to ^^%^"f "* i.roost-
regained In the area until his fuel ran lovi. He then ecrcssed to GREh.i ANCHOR To. post
strike refuellnic and returned to Takhll APB.
c limbed away.
BLUE 1 then turned In an -.ttenpt to return to the target area but observed another
MICI? on his tall but couLi not ,et thl= MIG to fjershoot. BLUE 3 ",^^*,2^^J,S%o
tween the hill: accelerating as he dove and J^'st the MIG. BLUE 3 once a|^^^
Biol r.T.l'Tor -"att^f.-op eVia thln.ln. that
the attacK ""*,^^'7" , hin A short time later, the RWO infonned BLUE 3 that
JSS SeniS oi'the'^r tal? B^rat'th^s tlr.e. BLUE 3 'was below 31n.o fuel He went to
!?ril^^urne- accelerated away frcn the MIG on the deck, and eK™sied. BLUE 3 did n. -
SiU enoSs^'rS" to at?er.pt a' rendezvous with a tanker and elected to recover at Udorn APB.
Return aKaln to the Initial encounter to reconstruct the fUtrht path JJ;"^,^
A, ni^;5ou"l? ttateS. 3LUE 1 and 2 were not under Imnedlate MIG attacK when BLUE 3 and H
lLa«d ?"e for" of elr.ht m:g.17s. BLUE 1 continued to prepare for an attack on the
?lu%t raSara? their i2 o'clock position, and both BLUE 1 and 2 launched an AGM-45
shrike missile Jt a SAM site In the vicinity of 20'>52'N/105''*5 'L.
BLUE 1 and 2 prot^ably swun? ri^ht In a southerljr heading while waiting for the missile
^ .1 l.lv rt^ kill s^'l a-d *^en swung back around to their right in the pop-up for
liml Seme^v %eUverrJ»ad?ng !4 «ihe'north with release at J.OOa ft BLUE 1 ob-
sSr^ed a ciupli of 5lG-17s atte=:ptln« to get into his 6 o'clock as they ,?PPJ°f J^^^
servca a woJH* ^ .„„ close and were not a .hreat at -nac
SA-2 site J"f./PP*^*f r^^'/*" he picked up a MIG-17 low at his 9 o'clock posl-
l\Tn'i L^ l u^re5 ?o get tehJnd l'l M G and paralleled his course. Tho MIO turned
Si?Jh- tofafd : A rfeld and BLUE -oUed In from above and fired J -st^of^.Omn.^
J'J.?? n^the Ml5 iVthe lefi winS. bJSS I observed the left wing start tc dlsinte-
butst hitting '^JJinHon wlih the MIO, and watched it crash in a rice pr.ddy.
Spring ?S"l?t«k Sn'^Ms 5?G. ILSS fuSht moved*5-10 mi from the target toward the west/
southwest. ,
Durlnff the tine that BLUE 1 was shooting at the MIG-17. he thought that BLUE 2 w^d
«i«f hut in the nrocess of coming off of the target, BLUE 2 apparently becamt
froi BLU'' 1 aS cane Snder atfack of another ilC . BLUE 2 called that he had a
25Sr!?J Lf^e Overheat ?1«S? on" and shortly thereafter repeated the first njessage with
In L5}?lon2l wlrSnf ll'-K on and that he would have to get out. BLUE 1 advised BLUE 2
Jha? Se ias iot In sfght and to head southwest. BL'JE I headed in that direction and picked
uS Jwo ciJuUS in the Vicinity of 20«4i.'N/105«»32'E. Two good beepers were also heard. See
Event III-116 for more mfomatlon on BLUE 2.
RLtiE 1 orbited the area attempting to locate and talk to the downed Pllo*",''l*hout
his fuel vfarrunni^ he observed a MIQ-17 at his 6; 30 o'clock poal-
??«n He lU af?e^SSini"aSng!lssed the area to GREEN ANCHOR to refuel. Prior to leav-
ii^";he"?escap arek! TreqSested aid until the choppers could effect a pickup. The
P-105S m Event 111-117 and two A-ls responded (see Event III-117).
. J^^lit^nS «uJS 15ld^:Jr?es*^u: 'frrle%f JSenSS^^riJrrvtnrJn^tS? lUT^LUE 1
caU^S S"S5iRr?ha"i? iSf hiI?dT5Sy bJief beeper ?n response. BLUE ^^^^^^^^ -P^^^^^^^^
M GUARD Channel for the next 7 aln but. received no further response fror.> the ground. - . .
'There is a disparity between the action reported by the 'J32TRW OPREP-3 and the Infcma-
tlon relayed to the interviewers by BLUE «» and his backseater. BLUE 4 states, "I dis-
cussed the incident with riajor (BLUE 1) in detail, later, After we «e^f„?",^^'Vf
Md I'll try to explain exactly what he told me". The above follows BLUE Vs narration,
however, accordlni; to the OPREP, the reader Is led to believe tnat BLOE ^ ^^o*^^^-,;;^;:, .
SSirSfter BLUE 2 balled out and was ^n the ground with the MIG heading 090° when Initial-
Iv seen by BLUE 1. The OPREP appears to compress the action as reported by BLLE i ana
reduces the number of MIO encounters to a total of two MIG-17s. The correct story cannot
Se determined because BLUE 1 was lost to possible MO action about 10 days after thls_
occurrence.
121
Event III-llU
BLUE I objervcd four more MI0-17s orbiting the area and pul!ed In on one and fired. The
nia dropped hl3 fuel tanks but did not fso down. BLUE 1 thought that he had hit this MIG
but had to let hln go asl two more MIGs were nanwuverlng cn hlra. BLUE 1 went to arterhurner
and exited the area to ai position about 20 ml west of the downed crewnen. BLUE 1 madj one
Dore pass througn the area as the F-105s In Event III-117 arrived, but observed nothing
and was forced to depart] by low fuel. BLUE 1 recovered at Udom AB. BLUE 1 fli'ed a total
of 700 rounds of COmn HEI on the three passes.
BLUE 1 and his EVO jreported a red star with a yellow border outline on the top of the
wing on the MIGs which they engaged.
Event ni-115
1. PRIMARY KISSION AND
Date/Tlp.e: 19 Apr^l
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-4C5 v» two MI6»
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: ai^OS'H/lOl^ST'E
TACTICAL SITUATION
1 1967/Unknown
Two RP-UCs (BLUE Plight) were on a reconnaissance mission against the Son Tan amy
supply depot an^ alrfle'ld" located near 21''05'N/105'30*E. At 20'''*5'H/10l»*04*E It was
determined that the weather would preclude the mission acconpllahment so BLUE Plight
started a left turn to proceed to Channel 97.
11. oAfA soui^ces
432 TRW 19133CZ
Ajiril 1967 OPREP-3 TUO? 02773
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was a^ 21"'Q5'N/10i*<'57*E at an altitude of 19,000 ft In a left turn to
a heaeif.s of 210" when
Ing to BLOX Flight '3 7
SLUE 2 sighted t-rfo unidentified aircraft. The aircraft were turn-
o'clock position, 3000-'»000 ft above and 1 1/2 ml behind. BLUE
Plight lit the afterbufners and' 'Outdistanced the unidentified aircraft. No further
contact was made.
Numerous MIC calls were received throughout the mission.
The weather was coverage with tops at 12,000 ft and bases at 6000 ft.
122
Event IXI-116
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs eleven
MIC-lTs
Results: Two ecnflmed MZG-17 kills
One P-105D slightly 6arzfied
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«<t5'N/10ti**30'e
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 April 1967/1658H
ORANOE flight (fo'jr P-105Dp) was th* first of four P-105D strike flights and two
P-lJC strike/cap flights frapged to attack JCS 22,00, the Xuan Mai Amy Barracks at
20*53' N/IOS" 35 'E. The force also included a WILO '.riASEL flight (Event III-ll^) which
preceded the attack force Into the target area. All of the flights listed above were
attacked by MiCs on this date. (See Events 111-114, -117* -ll8, -119, -120). The
flights were In trail with Tlne-on-Target separation of 2-3 min.
2. MISSION ROUTE
ORANGE night departed Takhlt RTAPB and proceeded directly to GREEN ANCHOR for re-
fueling, direct to Channel 97, at 19°28 'N/103'*'»3 'E , direct to the Slack River at 20
20*55'M/105''21'E and direct to the target at 20"'5 3 ' ;i/105° 35 'E. Egress was planned via
the reverse route with post strike refueling on GREEN ANCHOR and then direst to Takhll.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105D ORANGE 1. 2. 3. t
,6 - K117 bombs on centerllne MER
2 - ^50 gal fuel tanks on Inboard wing stations
1 - QRC-160 ECM Pod on outboard station
1 - AIM-9B IR missile on outboard station (1 and 3 only)
1 - M6l 20inin cannon 1029 rds each
MIO.»lTa
Cannon
Three designs were seen: camouflaged » white, or silver; all with Red Stars.
4. FLIGHT COHDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Clear near the target with 10-15 ml visibility. Broken cloud buildups to the
south and west of th? target over the mountains.
ORANGE MIG
I 2 3 5" 1 - 11
Altitude ; 6,000 ft 6,000 ft
Heading : 066«» 2<»0"»
Speed ; 550-600 KTAS Unknown
Fuel State ; 10,000 lbs plus
Plight ."omation i Standard Pod Two elements of two
5. INITIAL DETECTION
As ORARGE flight approached the pop-up point, heading 066°, at 6,000 ft and 550 KCAS,
ORANGE Lead and 2 observed four MIG-17s approaching from the opposite direction at their
1-2 o'clock position. Two of the MIOs were 1500 ft above and two MIGs were 1500 ft below
ORANGE flight.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
ORANGE flight (four P-105Ds) was the first strike flight in a string of four P-105
and two P-fiC flights fragged to hcmb the Xuan Mai Amy Barracks, 12 ml southwest of Hanoi.
A P-105P WILD WEASEL flight preceded ORAMGE flight Into the target area by about 3 mln and
wa!« Jumped by MIG-lTs upon entering the area (see Event Ill-lli*). ORAIJGE flight departed
Takhll RTAFB, flew directly to GREEN ANCHOR for pre-strlke refueling, directly to Chann<»i
97 for a precise doppler navigation system fix, directly to 20°53'N/105''00'E, and then
direct to the pop up point at 20''58*N/105*'32*E with a planned right roll In on the target
and a right roll off the target to egress over the reverse route..
As ORANGE flight passed the Black River (their push up power point), they lit the
afterburner and accelerated preparatory to going into the pop up maneuver on the target.
Shortly before the pop up point, ORANGE 3 and U , vho were flying pod formation with the
element on the right (so that the element would be looking out over the valley toward
Hanoi), saw an P-105P (believed to be BLUE 2, Event III-llU) ccmlng head-on from ORANGE
3*3 12 o'clock and OrlAMGE >i's 11 o'clock position li a cllmblrip; left turn with a 'MG-ll
on his tall firing. The F-I05F was climbing In a 2D°-30° left climbing turn and passed
within 3000 ft of the flight before It exited at Lh» 3 o'clock position. ORANGE 3 observed
the MIO-17 firing and saw smoke trailing from the F-105F. Two beepers were heard shortly
Event III-116
arte-. After the MIG fired ai^d hit the P-105P, he «"fj|irj«i:fJ^J^t"'*»,J"H"sn..ed*'''
on ORAMCE flight but was no threat because of the range and OKAHCE night's high speed.
ORANOE flight was at 6000 ft, 1 550-600 KCAS. headed east.
Aa the P-105P and MIQ were pacslng, ORANGE Lead and 2 saw fo"**
colored and one silver) approaching fron the opposite direction with two "f^* ^^OO rt a.
above ORANGE flight and two m£cs 1500 ft below. The MtOs apparently In J^e right
front quadrant because the twp low MIGs pulled up In a wing over and s"^ted to come in
at ORANGE Lead's 5 o'clock wh,lle the two high HIGs nade a sweeping turn ^S*' J*«2ttl!on
attetrpted to come In behind OP.AMGE 3 and At this time, 0^*^-0^: Lead called «o Jettison
and lead; 2 and H cleaned off the bomb racks and tanks retaining the JC«pods and SIDE
WINDERS. ORANGE 3 and u did not see the four rtlCs and c:^«:GE 3. thinfl"? havl'tL
was talking about the lone MEG chasing the F.105F, atterr.pted to "11 lead and have the
flight retain the ordnance since this lone MIG wa-, no longer a ^J^^f^t the airspeed of
550-600 kts. ORANGE 3 also Jeared for the safety of the aircraft since the f"e^l^^^»
almost 200 kts over safe Jettison speed. He elected to retain the ordnance and proceed
to the target. ORANGE Lead and 2 broke right Into the MIGs and narrowly missed having a
■Id-alr collision with 3. The MIGs broke off the attack when ORANGE Lead and 2 turned in-
to the pop and bombed the target. ORANGE a stayed on ORANGE 3*s wing.
ORANGE Lead and 2 reversed back to the left to cover 3 and ^ P°P; ^JL^JfJ.
turned from south to northeakt at 6000 ft 550 kts. Lead saw ^wo «10-1J» in looae foraat^^^^
at about 2000 ft altitude In his 10 o'clock position ^"ded 080- . ORA .OE Jjad reengaged
afterburner and broke Into a' right descending turn to attack the lead MI 0 who aade a hard
right break. ORANGE Lead cut the MIG off In the turn, obtained a good firing tone, ana
filed the AIM-98 at about 2000 ft range. The MIG continued the tight turn
paaaed about 200 ft astern without detonating. The 'MO then reversed back J°the right
and ORAMCE Lead broke contact, orange 2 attempted to bre«k right with the MIG but was
unable to turn with him and broke off to rejoin Lead.
During this t'.rcefrane, ORANGE 3 and H went through the pop up. ORANGE 3 selected
a building and released his ordnance on the target. He then saw ORAfjGE 1 f"^^ 2 attacking
the two MIGs and a third lor^e MIG-17 pull Into their 6 o'clock. ORANGE 3 J'"^*'^"*^ S?*
fuel tanks and empty MER rack as he pulled out In a shallow right turn to
As ORANGE 3 pulled Into the
came In behind ORA.VGE 3 and
MlC's 6 o'clock, the MIG broke Into a hard right turn and
vw ^- ^ GRANGE 3 called «» to afterburner, entered a right turn
toward the hills, and the MIG fell behind and broke off.
The flight rejoined ovLr the hills and decided to cone back Into the area to look for
other MIGs while the rest of the strike force attacked the target. As they were maneuver-
ing In the target area. ORANGE Lead saw a MIG-17 (dark cclcr with Star) turning from
a heading of north toward elast at 2000 ft. ORANGE Lead made a hard right turn to position
SlS!?If ?nslde of the yiC's turn, closed to 600 ft at the :.:iG's 5 o <: lock and fired about
200 rounds of 20 at the HIG. He did net observe any ordnance Impact but did
the WC was damaged. OPANqE Lead overtook the MIC and passed 75 ft over the MIG's canopy
and broke away from the MIC which was no longer observed.
As ORANGE Lead was closing on the above MIO-17, ORAJIGE 3 observed a second MIG-17
climb up from below ORANGElLead and pull into his 6 o'clock. ORf^E 3 rolled over and_
started to drop In behind the MIC but the MIG reversed hard to the right and down. ORAMCE
3 ?S^ed hard ?lght to sta^ inside of hln but the MIC came back at ORAKGE 3 In a quarter-
ing head-on turn! ORANGE 3 turned the M-61 cannon on at 150C ft range and fired 500-600
raSnda down to 100 ft range. The MIG new through the scream 20mm shells and 0RAHCE^3
•an aany hits on the wing and along the fuselage with decrls ^o^^lng off of the J^e
MO passed over the canopy smoking and was lost in the large blind «P0* i^*^;-*?? » „
6 o'clock at about 2000 ft altitude. ORANGE t reports that he -as attempting to maintain
position on 3 during the series of high "g" turns and maneuvers and was unable to keep
track of the MIGs after the first encounter. However, other sources Xlat this aa a con-
flmed kill.
ORANGE 3 Immediately
turn to keep his airspeed
1500 ft headed northwest.
6 o'clock and closed uslni
NIC up for a missile shot
dropped his nose In afterburner and went into a awirging right
up and saw another MIG two miles to his left and going a«ay at
f-om 2500 ft. ORANGE 3 and u dove to the treetops at the Mia s
intermittent afterburner. GRANGE 3 was attempting to set tne
-rr- un .op a a.^Ja/alnst a Sky background. At this nlme , ORANGE saw another
ntll {;?nlng in from left and called 3 to break hard. nRANGE 3 did not hear the
Vjn due to the confuslon|on the channel and U again called for a break as the MIG selected
/ for a ta-eet and closed inside of 3000 ft. ORANGE n called once more for a break aa
.. MIG was oreoarlna to iflre, and when no response came from 3, broke to the left.
'>i;ANM U fu^anerJSJner Lnd ias able to accelerate away from the MIC. ORANGE 4 could
not contact ORANGE 3 to afrange a rendezvous so he headed west: and departed the *^
Grange 3 closed to about [3000 ft on the MIG he was pursuing. •:he MIG broke hard left as If
lltlmA bv radar or anothe'r MIC of ORANGE 3's approach. O.^ANGE 3 broke left with the MIG
noS ?? range attempted to fire the ca.nnot but could only get about 10 sporatlc
-ounSs to fire as he Jiggled the stick and recycled the trl^-r until at about 1000 ft
A--t i?-h 50- angle cf? and 500 kts. OHAIIGE 3 saw a puff on the right wing about midway
■ thi center of the wing. There was no flash. Just a puff. As ORANGE 3 overshot the
IKJ's flight trajectory, he dumped the nose In afterburner and accelerated away, rfhen he
12 >
a :
3 i
3
■a
3
3
B
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Event III-I16
unjui'.a to the left to reenter the area. v,..rf,„,
ORANGE Leaa and ^ n.neuverln. J;,^;;:,-7„f,--;,-r.!SoS ?rartrtidS!*'reld
at 5.000 rt and 500 kt3. ORAN'ir. f */:^^^:fi:^i?''Jehtnd the MIC. But the MIG entered
ft..jde a har.: ^eft turn and descen'i..a P<^* *^ J J. ^^g^ to 3,000 ft and
aated that the MIG was probably destroyed, -^ter this rfas cnan^.u j^^^ Incidents. While
o» It, and hit th. Mr, «Uh snoke cosine rrcm t.-.e «I0. . „ „,„k. „.
r.^rr„t-t^rr£ T^pp^v
fron under nose an^ In a^ast atte.„^^ ^^^^^ observed as ORANGE
range hoping tr.at the "b- v-g«s let-wash. The turbulence created by
Lead overshot the r-f^^J^'S- of Ihl "sUck S th^ed his head down, causing him
the Jet-wash tore Oa^-wo 3 s ^jan^ o.. 01 L.je recovered In a descent at 500 ft AGL and
52aT?S"?' ? - VhtTau'a^^lc^e It' 3 o'cioc^-lo" Believing that was the last P-105
IriA ^l:L^T^^^r^i^^r:^ ^ri;;^^/li Ta.h!l with no further problems.
^„ VH* ►-ini^-" '^.^AWE 3 r.oclced a deep oval shaped gouge In the bottor.
While enroute to the wanKe. , 3 r.o^. extending from a few Inches from
left corner of the fc-^ll«'^-P^°°V''^^t^"^3i^,wi**f J in ionf iTs In wide, and at leart 1/k
the bottc.. of the pane toward the ,JS,i«?f;ei'?ro. one of the MIGs but
in deep. ORANGE 3 fe" that Ris -as a c * jiigaj,,nt. More probably the gouge was
2iSsed\;'5;i;it cf^lnS^r? cniVr^he^SlSs. on Return to TaKhll, ORANGE 3 observed that
his cannon was con^pletely fired out.
ORANGE flight returned to base -1th no other da.-nage than the windPhleld.
5i»
Aircraft Involved:
Ewent III-H7
Four F- 1059s and two A'-lEs
vs elRven HIS-lTs
Results: Ore A-IE lost to KXS-17
One'NIG>17 killed by
Pour NIG- 17s damaged
Vicinity of Encounter: SO'SS'N/lOS^aS'E
(1st Encounter)
I 20« 37 '11/105' 18 'E
(Znd Encounter)
I. PRINARr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Cate/Tlme: 19 April |l967/1702H (1st Encounter); 1718H (2nd Encounter)
BUPP flig^.t (four P-105DS) was the second strike flight fragged to attack JCS 22.00,
the Xuan Mai Amy Barracks at ZO'SS'N/IOS'SS'E, The force consisted of four F-105D strike
flights, two F-i*C strike/cap flights, and one P-105P WILD WEASEL fllgnt. The WILD WEASEL
flight arrived In the target area first and was Jumped by MIG-lTs while Infiound. The
first strike flight (Event III-llo was at.acked by MIG-lZs In the target area. BUFF
fi:.ght did not see any .^ICs until
they were outbound after bombing the target. BUFF
iiter occurred after post strike refueling when BU?? flight re-
fer rescap of BLUE 3 In Event III-llO. SANDY flight (two A-lEs)
fllgnt's second MIS encou
turned to the target area
responded to a downed pilot call and proceeded to the area of BLUE 2 in Event XII-I14,
where they were Jumped by
2. MISSION ROUTE
BUFF fllfsht departed
Ing, direct to Channel 97,
four Mia-17s.
Takhll RTAF9 and proceeded directly to GREEII ANCHOR for refuel-
at 19"»28'NV103'''3'E, direct to the Black River at 20°53'N/105*35'E.
Egress was over the reverpe route with a MIG encounter In the vicinity of 20° 53 •'1/105" 35 "E
and then direct tc Channel 97 and GPECJ AKCHGR. BUFF flight refueled and returned direct
to 20''37'N/l05'l9'E where! a second MIS encounter occurred. The flight again egressed
di 'eetly to !3REEr: ANCHOR and subsequently recovered at Takhll. SANDY 01 and 02 departed
Udorn RTAF3, flew direct jto Channel 97, and orbited east of Channel 97 u.ntll called by RED
CROWN to croceed to the 089 radial at 103 i^-l from Channel 97, The flight was Jumped by
four MIG-i7s In that vlsijnlty, ZG'' ^0 ■ N/105° 30 'E , anil SAfiDY 01 was lost to HIC fire. SANDY
02 egressed direct to Channel 97 and recovered back at Udorn RTAFB.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. t |
6 - MT,17 bombs on c^nterllne >ER
2 - 'J50 gal fuel tanks on Inbd wlnj stations
1 - QRC-160 ECM pod
1 - m61 20rjn cannon
A- IE
on outboard station
1029 rd3
BLUE 1 and 3 carried one AIM-9B IR missile on other outboard station.
SANDY 01 and 02
2 - CBU-22
5 - LAU-32
1 - LAU-32 WP
4 - mi
l| • 20an M3 cannon
1 - SUU-11 (7.62mm)
HIC»17
Unknown
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS
Weather t
^ittx 200 rds each
1600 rds
PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Clear near the
layer starting
the south and
refueling".
target with 10-15 ml visibility. SANDY 02 reported a 300 ft cloud
•jo ml west oi Hanoi to Channel 97. BUFF 1 stated broken cover to
west because "we were in the clouds on the way to 97 and during re-
Encounter 1
BUFF
Altitude:
Heading :
Speed ;
Fuel State :
Plight ^orr.ation ;
126
T IT
5,000 ft
25C«
500 KCAS
6000 lbs
Fluid 4 with
element on right
aide
Encounter 2
BUFF
— 2 3 T
5.000 ft
OflO° about
700 KTAS
8.000 lbs
Element 1.5
n ml In traf.l
SAWPY
W. — (S?
2,000 ft
Turning from W to N
150 KTAS
Unknown
Vlng
Event III-117
INITIAL OETCCTION
Encounter 1 - BUFF fllpht had been alerted to y.TZa In the area by radio calls from
other rilji:.':t3. ^7hey Ccrb*-! the target anl were ej^resolnR on a headlntr of 270' at U^OOO ft
NSL altitude, 50n KCAS when 5JF? Lead siw two MIG-173 at his 2 o'clock position; he headed
south at about 2,000 ft altitude, 3,000-1^,000 range.
Encourter 3 - BUFP fUf^ht ujed tne UH?/CF to heme In on SANDY 02. The mos were o6-
servcd about 2 o'clock at several nlles ranpe with the elements making butterfly fasaes
on SAm 02. SANDY 02 was right on the deck.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Encounter I - BUFF Lead called the two MIGa cfos.'-.lns at 12 clock and his Intent to
attack. He entered a lazy left wing over descending to 1.500 ft with BUFF 2 crossing to
his right side.
Encounter 2 - BUFF Lead and 2 flew through the middle of the flight of MTGs causing
them to scatter. BUFF 3 and swunt? in behind one elenent of the MIGs and engaged In a
Lufberry chase. BUFF Lead and 2 then entere^l a wide turn and reengaged. SANDY' 02 eace
under attack a few more tines and then managed to duck under a 300 ft cloud layer and
egress.
7. SITUATION DEVFLOPMFNT
Encounter 1 - BUFF 1 and 2 each Jettisoned the empty MER rack and the two errpty ^50
gal fuel tanks, lit afterburner, and went Into a nedlun bank, 2-3 "g's", descending turn
and leveled our at 1500 ft about 3, COO ft behind the MIGs, closlnp; at 600+ kts. BUFF 3
and ^ stayed high In trail and covereu the leaj ele.Tient. The two MIG3, unaw- "e that BUFF
was behind the.itj nade a left 90° turn to"^:a the target area as BUFF Lead e .ed to 1500
ft range and prepared to fire. Just as B'JFF Lead started to fire, he saw a I'llght of
P-I05s head-on and about 200 ft above hl.-n (see Ev^nt III-119). This diverted hla attention
and he momentarily lost track of the .11 3s, The "lIGs were reacquired over the town of Koa
Blnh In a left turn. BUFF I closed to an estlTiated 80C ft, tracked one of the MIGs, and
opened fire with the 20nn ca.'-.non. He Irrnedlately saw sparkles In the left wing root area.
BUFF 1 also saw sparkles on the other KIG ar>d realized that BUFF 2 was firing. The MIGs
snapped into a hard left nose down spiral fron about 1,000 to 1,500 ft, right over Hoa
Blnh.
BUFF 1 and 2 could not begin to match the turn so they rolled wings level and started
back. to Channel 97. The MIGs were not observed again.
As BUFF 1 and 2 broke off from the two MIGs, 3'j?F 3 saw a lone .IIG at his 9 o'clock
position about 1,000 ft low headed toward hi.?!. BUFF flight was In a left turn through
north at 5.000-6,000 ft, 500 kts. The MIG "nade an Instantaneous turn into our 6 o'clock
position'*, in "perfect gun range". BUFF 3 and 1 Increased the rate of turn and BUFF 3
told >i to "slide to the out.ilde cf the turn and high", and to Jettison the tanks and go
afterburner. The MIC, Initially at 1,000-1,500 ft, had opened to about 2,500 ft, broke
off rapidly to avoid the tanks and .MER from the second element. The flight then rejoined
and egressed to OHEEN ANCHGR for post-strike refueling.
Encounter 2 - BUFF 1 and 2 attacked a MIG and fired an AIM-9B with gooa tore but
probably Inside r.ir.lnum range. The rlsslle tiassed ibout 5 ft under the KIG without
detonating. SUFF 3 broke into the lead MIG that hal gene back after SAfJDY 02. The se-
quence of alr-jraft was >;IG 1, 5V"F 3, ■•■I'^ 2i BUFF 1, and two .Tiore MIGs behind BUF? tt.
SAHDY 02 was observed depar-.lnr the area.
"IG 1 and observed hits on the left wing and fuselage (also
after firing the missile), BUFF 1 called, "BUFF 3, break
- break right now; 173 firing on you". BUFF 3 observed the
- the r'tlG 2, 500 ft behind him. BUFF 1 was firing on MIG 2
off but missed. BUFF 3 at about 275 KCAS, was able to wallow
udder and used full forward stick to drop the nose and dive
hin and escape the MXG.
, attacked MIG 3 behind BUFF t and forced MIG 3 to break off
Igh speed yo-yo and rjattacked, firing at the MIG fron about
straight away. With the pipper on top of the canopy,
area was observed imrnediately . BUFF Lead pulled up to
KIQ blew up underneath him slamming his head down on his
As BUFF 3 opened fire on
observed by 3UTF 1 immediately
right, 3 - break right, F-105
"big red balls" going past frc
from 200 ft with a high angle
into a right turn using" full r
Into a cloud in a valley below
BUFF 1 with 2 on his wlnr
to the right. BUFF I nade a h
1,000 ft range as the MIG flew
"Sparkling" behind the cockpit
avoid ramning the MIQ, and the
chest .
BUFF 3 returned to the engagement and caw an F-105 firing on a MIG with two MIGs
behind him. One of these two MIGs was flrir.f; on th'? F-105. BUFF 3 attacked the two rear
MIGs as he observed the F-105 l-.lttlng the 'AlZ in front of him. BUFF 3 fired his Xiy[~9B
and observed it turn directly for the MIG but was forced into a scissor maneuver with the
second MIG and could not observe the results. During one of the crossovers, SUFF 3 fired
at the niG but missed and then dove for separation.
BUFF 1 called for egress and Bl'FF flight rende ::voused with the tankers. The tankers
pretty far north to pick up the fighters who w.»re extremely low on fuel, BUFF
127
1
m
mmgmmmm
wsmmmm.
Event IXI-1X7
flight returned to Takhll RTAPB with no further prcblerr.a. Thf second MIG eneaeement
lasted about 6 nln with an overall f light time of about 5 hrs.
8. ORDNANCE
1/0
1/0
(t.o. flred/No. hits)
Cannon Missiles
3/2
2/1
2/1
l/l
I/O
1/0
Unknown
Ren» i 'k9
926 rds 20mffl total. One MIO kill; 1 damage
Damage observed
Extensive rianage observed
Damage observed
BUPP
BUPP
BUT?
BUTP
MIO 1
NIQ 2
MIO 3
HIO 1-8
HIQ firing dees not Inelilde at least eight firing passes on SATOY 02 (the A-IH) or
the MIG firing pasj on SANDY Lead which resulted In a hit and loss.
9. EQUtPNENT PROBLEMS
BUF? I - Gun camera film did not work
BUT? 3 - Strike camera was inoperative
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Einerlenee
P-105
NVN
Hojirs
Missions
61
900
r
900
35
Reaiarkg
BUPP 1 1300 900 61 All TAC background
BUPP 2 .
BUF? 3 1200 900 35 All TAC background
BUPP *
SANOT 01
SAMOT 02
Comments on this Encounter
BUPP 1 - Plight felt MI3 pilots were very aggressive and made no mistakes.
BUPP 1 - After refuelllig. the flight returned to the target area at 30,000 ft because
''it waa obviously a NIG day|'.
BUPP 1 and 3 - Need better turn cepablllcy in P-105.
BUPP 3 ' Played their slow-speed game because of situation with SAHDY 02 demanded It.
SANDY 02 - Missiles ard P-Us would be no good In this "on deck hassle". Thankfu:.
for the P-105 gun.
SANDY 02 - Pelt that as long as he could see the MIGs initiate their pa»« or Jut
p-lor to firing, he could ifvold them by maneuvering In the c^^S^/"^/*;^'?' ?J
Sountalnous terrain. He does not feel that he could have crossed the 10 ml JJJij;^
successfully while under attack and that the MIGs could have hit him in the karst forma-
tlon where he stayed if they had teaned up on him from opposite sides.
Comments from Overall Experience
BUPP 3 - Don't ever, lever attempt to stay at low airspeed and turn with a MIO-IT.
BUPP 1 - Mlaslte shovlld arm immediately after leaving the rail even if we lose a few
aircraft in training. I
SAMDY 02 - A-IH has much better visibility than A-IS. Had to lean way forward and
toward the right to see MIGs coming In from that direction.
SANDY 02 does not think the MIGs were very proficient.
BUPP 1, 31 May 1967; BT..'F 3, 29 May 1967; SAKDY 02, 21 October 1968
U. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews
Messages, rieacr-.s : j
OPREP-3 - 355Trrf, DOTO- "-11274 , 191757Z, April 1967
OPREP-3 - tt32TRW, Tl'Ct 2776. 191 3102, April 1967'
Combat Less Report r A-xE. l8tt5H, 19 April 1967,
128
a
3
3
3
3
i
0
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1 i
I
i
Event I I I- 117
4 »-
r '
I.
[
;• [
r
• 1,
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i;
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Encounter 1
BUFP fii(?ht was ihi? second strike flight of F-105s frasged to attack JCS 22.00, the
Xuan r'al Amy Barrackn, located at the foot of the mountains about 12 ni west/southwest
of Hanoi. Time on tar.'-t was scac-d about 2-3 nln aoart so that the nif^hts were si.«ced
about 20 ml In trail of each ether. BUFF flight was about 'l ml to the rl^ht (3outh) of
the fllr.ht m front of hlm (see Event III-X16) and to the rear when that flight called
they wer'e unaer MI-T attack. The ner-.bers of H'J^'^ fllj;ht strained to acquire the MIG tar-
gets but wer" unatlf to see tnen - orL-sarlly because the action approached the other
flight :rori tr.it fUi-nfa 12 o'clock. BUFF Lead deternlned that t.nere waa no threat to
hls^fllr:;t and proceeded to the tarset .
After bombing the target, 3';?? flight was caressing to t.ie west crossing the Black
River for the first tlr.e north of Hca Blnn, when they heard a second flight call that they
were und»^r attack. The flight proceeded to the second cneck point on the Black River
Juat to the east of Hoa Slnh at about «,000 ft, 500 KCAS, when BUFF Lead saw two MIC-lTs
at his 2 o'clock at about S.COC ft altitude headed south. The MICs proceeded south pass-
ing about 11,000 ft In front of HUFF fllgn: whc lit afterburner and executed a wlngover to
a left descendint: turn wnlcn xas :onpleted at about 1,500 ft, 3,000 ft behind the M"3-17s.
BUFF "I'rht was flying: fluid ft-ur ftrT.atlon v.lth the element on the right sp*. ead beyond
norinai pod rorr.at Ion distance fcr tetter MIG lookout. BUFF Lead was able to Identify the
HICs by their shape ar,d color.
Apparently the MIQs did rot know that BUFF flight was behind them because they entered
at lis* bank burn and turned to a heading of about 090®. BUFF Lead thought that the MIQs
had seen the Thuds behind then and that the MIGs were turning to engage so BUFF Lead and
2 Jettisoned the eianty MSR rack and the two er.pty J*50 gal fuel tanks, retaining the QSC-160
and ArK-9B on the outboard ststlcns. BUFF 3 and- J* turned with the lead element but stayed
2|000 ft high and to the rear for cover but did not clean their aircraft off at this time.
BUFF Lead with 2 sn his rlrht wing (BUFF 2 crossed over during the initial turn),
closed at 500 to 600 KCAS, and just started to squeeze the trigger when his attention was
diverted to a flight of F-lCf^ ccnlnr head-on 200 ft above him (see Event III-119) . BUFF
did not have encuj-h tine to break ?ro^. his course; tut when he attempted to reacquire the
MIGs, he' could' not sick then cut of the ground clutter. The MIGs were silver with red
stars on the tail and red flaps ar.d ailerons. The next tine he saw them they were In a
2 "g" "left tu-n rl^ht over the zovn cf Koa Blnn, BUFF Lead elcsed to 800 ft, put the
plpper*on the" noae^of the and fired a 2 sec burst. He Ininedlately saw the left wing
and wine root area start scarklir.s from the hits. BUFF Lead also saw sparkles on the
Number Two MIO frcm cannon hits a^ 3UF? 2 fired at VIC 2. BUFF Lead's sight was set at
"guns air" with the radar set in "search and attack standby" which ::hould have given him
about 1^500 ft fixed ranre ccrputlng only". BUFF 2'3 sl^ht setting is unknown. The
MIGs were in a loose echelon formation with SO'-IS" of bank and snapped into a staep nose-
down spiral as they were hit. They were last observed In the spiral at abrut 1,000 ft
altitude over the town of Hoa Blnh. BUFF Lead stated, "It was absolutely Impossible for
us to follow then through that turn". Mo smoke or debris was seen coming off of the MIG.
Shortly after the lead elenent passed over the MIGs, BUFF 3, turning through north
ordnance, and go cfterburner. At this time, the second element Jettisoned the empty HH.R
rack and the empty fuel tanks right In the HI3 pilot's face. The MIG apparently lost some
speed In the turn because his ran.re had opened to about 2,500 ft; and at the last time he
was seen, the tanlfs were headed right for hln. BUFF 3 Jlnxed back and forth a couple of
times to make sure there were no nore enemy fighters and then rejoined the lead element,
and the entire flight headed for Channel 97 and then to OREEN ANCHOR for post strike re-
fueling.
On the way to the oost strike refueling tankers, BUT'P heard that a WILD WEASEL P-105
was down (Event Ill-ll't) but did not hear RED CROVN direct any support flights In to assist
In the rescue attempt. BUFF flight volunteered to return to the area but RED CROWN was
reluctant to grant permission because of the lack of external fuel tanks and tiie resulting
short time on station. However, since no other aircraft w-re available to return to the
area BUFF was (rranted permission to take on a full internal load of fuel and return.
When'the night comcleted refueli.ig, they were about 200 ml southwest of the downed air-
crew. BUFF Lead took the flight back Into the area at 30,000 ft altitude to conserve fuel
and because "it was obviously a "W day".
DLUE Lead (Event III-ll'*) was just arriving back in the area of the downed aircrew
as BU'^'F fljght was coming off the tanker. BUFF flight and BLUE Lead were In contact with
each other and BUFF flight knew that BLUE Lead was under MIC attack. As BUFF flight was
l-ttin? down about 20 ml west of the area, SLUE Leac called a.id said there were MIGs all
over the area, and he cound not raise either of t.'-ie aircrew on the radio. F was out of
gas and would have to depart the area.
i:
129
Evmt III-117
As BOFP flight descended throuph 10,000 ft, SAIIDY 02 (A-IE wlnetaan) called that four
HIO-173 had Jumped the flight and tJ;at SANDY 01 had been hit and was jjolng In. He rather
excitedly requested the|F-1053 to "come back and help me". At this point the story will
digress and cover the actions of the A-IE flight which led up to this situation.
SANDY was a flight of four A-lEs which departed Udorn RTAFB and fie* direct to their
orbit position a few inliea from Channel 97. Their arrival at thla orbit cosltlon was
timed with the air strikes further north so that they would be In the cost cptlrzua posi-
tion to assist In any riscue attenpi-s. Briefly stated, their nlsslor. was to proceed to
the position of a downejl aircrew l.-r.edlately upon notification by CHcm (the rescue co-
ordinator) ami »ake charge of the rescue attempt, determining whether the position and
enemy defenses were ar.eh-ible to rescue attempt. Cn the scene they would vector the
Jolly Greens" In and cpordlnate ener.y anti-rescue fire suppression U3lilK both their ord-
nance and that of any available jets In the area.
On this date, SAHDY flij^ht was orbiting east of Channel 97 when CSOm called the
aircrew down at 20«»«Hj'f.yio5''3<»'E and for SAWDY 01 and 02 to head toward the border and
hold there a couple of mlnutej.. Enroute, CROWN called and directed SAIIDT 01 and 02 to
proceed to the 089* rad|lal of Channel 97 frr a distance of 103 ml (20*>30'rr/105''^2'E) ,
about 32 ml southwest of Hanoi and to hold west of t>ie downed aircrew until aom» fighters
arrived. SANDY 01 and |02 flew into the area at 11,000 ft, liio-l60 KCAS, with SANDY 02
flying echelon fomatlon about 100 ft left of 3AHDY 31. With the arrival of BLUE 1 (Event
III-lli*), the A-lEa prorceeded up to the area of the downed aircrew at 11.000 ft MSL. SANDY
02 saw the Thud burning and had located the position of one of ths downed aircrew when
BLUE 1, orbiting In the area, was Ju.T.ped by MICs . The SANDIES returned across a snail
valley to their position at 20''30'N/105*32'E (aoout 15 ml) and arrived at 1,000 ft AOL,
about 2,500 ft 'ASL. They made a iSO** turn to the right and were Just rolling wings level
headed .north when SANDY 02 saw four MlG-173 at hla 5 o'clock position, 3,OC0 ft high. The
EI:SE«"5r? ^? »l«">enta of two with one element attacking each A-lE. SANDY 02 was on
SANDY 01*3 left wing, level In altitude and about line abreast at a dlstan':e of 100 ft.
The NIGs started flrlnrt 2-3 sec after 02 pick^jd them up.
SANDT 02 called, '|3reak right" as he broke right over SANDY 01 Into tie HXCs. As 02
passed over 01, he observed 01 In a 15* right bank roll rapidly to the left: with pieces
of aircraft (or poasltly but not likely ordnance) coming off of SANDY 0l*s left w+ng from
about halfway out to the wing tip. The MIGs missed and overshot SANDY 02 and as he com-
pleted 180" of turn heided for the weeds, he saw SANDY 01 In a 120* banked spiral hit f-e
top of a piece of karsif. At this tine he was calling CROWN appraising then of the situa-
tion and urgently requested help. CROWN called back and said, "They rfould send someone
up", SANDY 02 did not observe a chute or beeper from 01.
As SANDY 02 rollecf out on a southerly heading, the MIGs started making Individual
passes from the four cardinal compass points and appeared to be well disciplined in not
Interfering with each ^ther's pass. They appeared to favor a quartering stern attack but
did not let this interfere with their turn.
SANDY 02, at about 100 ft AGL, Jettisoned all of his ordnance except the 3UU-11
after the second MIQ piss and with full power maneuvered around the Karst formation at a
inax airspeed of lUO kta slowing to 90 kti In the hard breaks. He was able to observe the
MIOs as they started their Individual passes and followed the policy of tlghte'ilng the
turn Into the MIG as the MIG approached firing position. Upcn rolling wings level after
one of these passes, SANDY 02 saw a MIG approaching head-on, slightly above hln, firing
from 500 ft range. SANDY 02 cla.-aped down on the trigger and fired the SUU-11 at the MIG
without aiming but did kick the rudder back and forth hoping that the dispersion would jcet
the MIO. However, no damage was observed. The WIGs made at least five firing passes be-
fore the P-105 flight arrived.
I
As BUPP flight returned to the areia of the downed P-105F aircrew, they were In radio
contact with BLUE LeadI on GUARD Channel and learned that the SANDY flight was In the area
and waiting for the arrival of the rescue choppers. BUPP 3 reported that ha. "Thowtht he
heard something to the effect -SANDY 01. I*m hit; they're killing me; SANDY 01 is going
in**. No other flight Members report hearing this. Shortly after, SANDY 02, who had been
operating on the rescue frequency, cane up on GUARD Channel and said that SASDY 01 had
been shot down by MIGs| and that at least four MIGs were attenptlng to shoot hln down
SANDY 02 naturally sounded pretty excited. BLUE 1, the WILD WEASEL leader, ansuered'hlm
with, "Get the .... down on the ground, down on the deck and keep U covins. Just start
turning and keep It r.dvlng". Sandy 02 replied, "I can't get away".
BUPP Lead told SAN'DY 02 to stay on the deok and keep turning, that the MIGs could
not match his turn and to transmit for a DF. Both BUFF Lead and 3 were checklna for the
F.I!!!*^ indicated th4 l»-5 o'clock position.' At this time. BUFF flight was down to about
5,000 ft traveling at [about 700 kts In an attempt to close on SANDY 02. EU^s" m^^ht swuna
. into a steep right turn with the D!?3 continuing to Indicate right. After about 2 mln
SANDY 02 saw the four [F- 105s at his 2 o'clock position at about 3.5 ml range, headed about
^ west/northwest and called, "F-105s, I'm at your 3 o'clocV:; ct.me right, cccc rlg.ht» cone
■r right". SANDY 02 wasjheaded south/southeast but had to take Im-Tiediate evasive action and
V rolled out headed northwest. At this time, SANDY 02 saw the Thuds due west of him, about
Event IXI-117
one mile anay and a little high In a tight right turn through T^«^5^"^ /"^^^s
were in loose trail with a KIG-17 behind them. SAHDY 02 called, "F-1055 drealc; one of
those are on your tall."
. At the tine of the first call in the above parar.raph BUFF 3 sa« the <'l"_f''^;;^SANnV
Ol's aircraft and then SASDY 02 right on the treetos Jlnxin? In/iard turns with the four
MICs naklnr. r.unnorv-type pasae:* on hln. fUeht -as perpendicular " J^^^"
Ing aa they tjrck^ rlcht !nto thf; MIGa with the second F-105 elerent "^"J^.,
eU«-.ent by about a r.Ue on -he outside of the turn. bUFP Lead did not ^2*"
he was relat^v^ly cloae to then and rather than pull of to attack a • ^1'"!°.
the night for tne center of the MTG formation in an atter.rjt to divert the MIGs fro^ tne
A-1. The MIOs scattered as BUFF 1 and 2 went thron-^h their formation but one 0^
recovered and was rolling cack In on SAMDY 02. Bt>..- 3 aaw this r^IG and elected to rack
the P-105 into a hard l^ft t::rn to attack this MIO ana itnmedlately got into a ^o'^.a^JJi"'**
left handed Luffberry at an airspeed below 300 ktr.. The order of aircraft -as MIO. BUPP 3.
HIO, BUFF 1, and two more :iIGs,
BUFF Lead made a wide sweeping turn back and saw a Mia turn and head north toward
Hoa Lac Airfield. The MIC was flying straight away as bUFP Lead pulled Into the Mi-G s
6 o'clock position and fired an AIM-9B at an eatlnated range of 1,<J00 " and 500
?he nlsslle pass.d 5 ft under the MIG but did not detonate, ^^he pro. Inlty fuze P^J^bly
did not have enough tlr.e to zm.) BUFF Lead was closing on the MTG with a clea. blue sky
for background and a good tone prior to firing. He then turned bacK to the right to
enter thi fray and Innedlately observed the Luffberry with BUFF 3 firing and hitting AIQ I.
Juat aa EU^^ 1 started firing. BUFF H called. ^'BUFP 3 break right; BUF? 3 break right;
P.105 Sreak%?ght noJ- 5lS-17 flJlAg on you". BUFF 3 ^ad pulled 6-7 l'^'^" f "^^^J, "^3°
the MIGs' 6 o'clock and as a result was slowed down to 275 kts and only able to puU 2-3
«K«8- for tracking. However, tne rfllG was not pulMnf: It In tight and RUFF 3 was able
tralk and hi? the MIG alon;^. the left wing and Ju.t aft of the canooy on the fuselage As
he was flrlnr. BUFF 3 saw the orange balls going over the canopy and decided that
1? wal time to br-ak right; but when he atte.Tioted to reverse, the F-105 was slurgish to
respond":* to high angle of attack. BUFF Lead finally fed In full rudder and forward
stl?k and dove into a .nearby cloud hoping that there "wasn't a mountain °" ^^J}'*' '
?he MIG continued to fire as BUFF 3 rolled the aircraft over and entered the =1°^^ but
was not behind BUFF 3 when he exited the cloud. During this time, EUrF a ^a^ firing at
thl ill behlSd B'jVp 3 fron a ran^e cf 200 ft with a fairly high angle off but apparently
missed: BUF? LMd Observed the situation and thou?r.t that the MIG was going to blow up
at apy time but he did not observe any hits on the '^IG either.
A, RIJPP Lead clos-d on the Luffberry, BUFF H called, "Somebody cone help r.e; I have
» MTr ^ nrtatl and lian-t "hake hlm'\ 5UFF 2 called that BUFF Lead's tall was clear
Jn^'su?? LLS'a J?'- oo'jts waf easily able to sUdc ln behind the -^I^^^iJ" [i^ij*
on BUFF H. BUFF Lead had changed the gun sight switches to 'Missiles air" prior to flrlne
?he A1S-9B but changed oack to ''Guns air" as he entered the luffberry circle. BUFF Lead
fired a short burst at the MIG and the (410 broke hard right. In order to fvold an over-
shoot BUFF Leadreversed rl=ht Into a high speed yo-yo; and as he was again sliding down
SJSnd the Miorthl -IC broke up. BUFF Lead In afterburner closed '"^Pi'^l^ <^^°r:
«v*rtftlfe) to 1200 ft placed the plpper on top of the canopy and opened fire, ^a-nedlate
tltl llrl observed behind th/canSpron the fuselage; and as BUFF Lead closed to about
w5 fr the "Started a slow roll. BUFF Lead snapped up hard to «vold a collision with
the MIG and was passing over the MIG when a violent explosion cccurred «lth fire on both
sides of SSprLad^s afrcraft. The explosive force ^japped BUFF ^-^f
faTlt2^rL're2;irerJie^e^S?;.'^R I r^^SI? ^Sad"l^h5f JlJ''' . ^bSp^ lll^ ^iljedt.
iSrSid aSIly ?o"5e soSthwest. and checked his aircraft over. After he had found no
ScSt!;^ of damage! he called. "BUFF Lead is okay", and reentered t.e engagement.
The MIG-17S ma(<e at least three more firing passes on SANDY 02 after the arrival of
th. P 105s but thJ? we" not nea-ly so well organized. SANDY 02 continued to maneuver
?he pilot'- a^ ISi SJ i«?IId 0W vall.y at 160 Kts, wld^ -P'" =ne MIC
southeast of Channel 97. clinging up one time In rcute to get a steer from SANuf 03 and Ot.
SANDY 02 recovered at Udorn with 30 min of fuel lelt.
When BUFF 3 exited the cloud he dove into to shake the MIG on his tall, h« accelerated
and c^^ ed - OCO ft .nd turned back t.w.^rd^t^^^^ T^^i.o^l^^'^^^r^i^
?i'be BUtTT) ?i°?n' af a 'nt 5n froSt o^Wm and vJth twc !1IC-I?s behind him. BUFF 3
observed the F-io5hlf the MIG as he rolled over ard descended toward the MIG that was
Event III-117
firm, on the P-105. /t t^;- tl^ BUPP Leaa saj tHl; ;»uat-n^-^,5 '"'^'^i^^^^^^
MIO at his 2 and 10 o'clock PO?i"??» " t" MIGs broke hard right Into BC?F Lead,
one MO from a fairly high 5"«J%°;^[„J";*grt Sack at hln, chased by BUFF 3.
BUPP Lead found one of the MIGS coming rignt started track-
AS the MIG. broke right li front of 3. BUFF 3 reversed right a^^ start^^
ing onl of the -ICs but did not think he JSJJ^JJ^/^^JIk,! ^frcn 2.500 ft range, co-
hUh rate of turn and the rangg. BUFF 3 then rirea .t. ^ walteJ until
SiSpeed at about 350 ktn. at ?.500 ft jj"''*^^* JjJ^^/^ ,oSd growl tone, "pulled the nose
the HIO was above the hcrUon .&nd J^^'^.JfJJJ/JSf ^ Jfue a belter chance" and fired,
UD Just a little bit ahead of the -I'^^^^/i'* ,^ r„^p Vdld not observe the results because
SsinS -ent directly ;f ^;|;\^^°»/^iJP^frrced to"coujter b?eL l^ the MIC.
the other MIO broke into hln and he was rorcea to ^» chooping
BUFP 3 and the second Ml3 entered a series J^=J--,rrunrh?i'2 ^"^iclk!' S5f?*3
power and throwing speedbrakefi In an a^-enpt to ^ne ^^^^ better
felt that afterburner, "nlo*'*!"^' "^"Si^J^l^fJ^SS ari^wd tne requlrenent to keep the
course of action If it were "Pt/^*^ ^he A-1 In the JJJJ J distance of 600 ft and
5lOs engaged. The two adversaries below 300 kts at 1.500 ft of altl-
"Joked Ir^each other for a ««°"'*» JS^tirShlt to do next as he attempted to roll
tude in mountainous terrain. |BUF? 3 ^^S^^^JS^n^^red by rollln? down and left under
over the top of the MIO ',n his right. The MIG counterca > faster than the
SuFP 3 and then turned ^'ack tp the right But BUFF 3 was sl^ ^^g ^^^^ a«"burner.
MIO; and as the MiG cane back to the J;Sht. BU^J 3 Q continued to descend to the
Bingo established on the way In. J^w^i l^^n at 1.000 lbs of fuel, not enough to
Sufman at 2.Q0Q J^* °^^rifef'?!n5eriOO ?he taAker "ported at Channel 97 and
return to Udorn and the relltef tanner ^""^ faster the tanker said he had It fire-
;Sen BUFF Lead asked if the |;S^*[ea5 estimates 'thlf the 'tanker probably pl«>*«'» ^heni up
rvii"Soifh^?!^?n^r^BJS-3 iestina^fe^ started taking on fuel with less than 30
sec of fuel left. BUFF 3 refueled first. hmfp 3 started to overshoot
AS the flight closed aJ high =P«d,^°"?^l,Ji%Jriir'iurt LLlnfunSer t tanker
and uJed all avlllable ^ragldevlces JI^, to iSi rlscue ^l"'^-? <=^^;«:i?e
as the tanker entered a cloi^d. *r„°°°?Sp L"«* "I Ltl
vectors to BUFF 3 for hook-yp. .h.s time, Burr u ^^^^ ^^^^
rhraSSM^JnVlSJfn: iiirJ'SSP^S ZlZ^ on SA«DV 02 aircraft eith.r.
Event III-118
1.
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-X05D8 vs two MIC-lTs
Result : No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20»56 'N/105*20 ' E
PRIHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 19 April 1967, 1700H
PURPLE fllKht (four P-105D8) was the third strike flight fragged to attack JCS 22.00.
See Event III-116 for further details.
2. MISSION RO'.'TE
Same as Event III-llS.
3. AIRCRAFT CnNF I GURATIONS
7-105 /URPLE 1. 1. 1
Same as Event III-116.
MIO-17 1. 2
Silver
MIO-17 3
Olive Orab
4. FLICHT CONDITIONS PPlCR TO CNCOUNTER
Head in.- ;
Speed :
Fuel State;
tt.OOO ft
Unknown
Cnknown
Unknown
to. AIRCRIU COHMENTS
Experlenc?
PURPLE (Lead)
Total
Hours
5650
P-105 Combat
Hours Missions
370 Approximately 75
11. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Reports
355TPV, 201121Z. DOTO-0, 11296, April 1967 SECRET"
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
PURPLE flight on Ingress to the target spotted two silver HIG-17s at 20*56 'M/lOS'aO 'E
at an altitude of 7,000-8,000 ft. At the time PURPLS flight was crossing the Black River
at 2O"»56'H/105"*2O'E, the MICs were in a left hand turn and attenpted to roll In behind
PURPLE; however, PURPLE flight continued to the targ-st and the MIGa broke off.
On egress fron the target, PURPLE ^ spotted one camouflaged MIG-17, olive drab In
color. He was sighted at PURPLE 1's 8 o'clock position, approximately 3.000-i**,00C ft
behind PURPLE Lefld, PURPLE 2 and 3 attempted to move Into firing position but the NIG
broke right and disappeared from view as he passed to the left of PURPLE 2 and 3. There
Here no further sightings and the flight returned to Takhll.
Event III- 119
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-l05Ds va seven Mia- 17
Result: Ho danage
Vicinity of Encounter: ZCJJS'N/IOS^OS'E
jrht was one of approximately ten flights striking JCS 22.00, the Xuan Kal Army
20*53'N/lO5*35'E, aoout 15 ml southwest of Hanoi. Encounters by
Other fllehts
1. PRIMARY HISStON ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 19 April iUt/ITOOH. »
TAN flljrht was one
Barraclcs at 20*53 'N/105 ^> i-, -- -
are described In Events ILI-114, -116. -117, - 118, -120.
2, MISSION ROUTE
The rlssion route was not given but appears to be from Takhll RTAPB, to rttfueling
rendecvous, to Chanr^el 97 ft 20«28 'N/lOS'^S'E, and then direct to the target with rTanned
egress over the reverse route.
I. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
Not slven but most probaMy 6 x 750 bombs centerllne, 2 x 450 gal fuel taiiks on the
Inboard pylons with TAN Lead and TAN 3 carrying 1 x AIH-9B and 1 QRC-160, and TAN 2 and «
carrying 2 x CRC-160. |
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clear but reduced visibility (approximately 5 ml) In haze at the lower altitudes.
TAN
! 3
Altitude:
Heading :
Speed :
Fuel 5*- a te:
FllKh'; f^'rnatlon:
TT
5,000 ft
066'
SftO kts
Unknown
Line abreast fomation. No. 3 on the right.
S. OVDNANCE
(No. flred/Ko. hits)
Cannon
TAN 1 2/0
9. EQUIPMENT PROUEHS
None reported.
Remarks
Fired two bursts; both were too far out; no hits
10. AIRCREU COMMENTS
Experience
Total I F-105
Hour a Hours
TAN 1
TAN 2
TAN 3
TAN 4
approx 1200
approx 5000
Combat
Missions
825 71
not ln«.ervlewed - - -
850 not given
Remarks
All TAG background
Most of time In fighters.
P-80 icisslona In Korea.
Plew 105
not Interviewed --------
but was an ex-
perienced P-105
pilot from Qemany
Conmenta on this Encoui^ter
TAN 3 - Because ofl the MIG activity, there was a lot of talking on the radio and
TAN 3 had difficulty In warning rest of flight on presence o: MIGs, As a result, when he
broke to engage a MIG that was attacking another F-105. he became separated from the rest
of his flight, tncludinp; his wlngman No. who did not see him break away. Thus, No. 3
did not drop his ordnance on target but was forced to Jettison it when he discovered that
he was without a wlngman and could net continue to the target alone. One of the earlier
flights (ORANGE flight) had Jettisoned their ordnance load (see Event III-11&) and did
most of the radio calling thus, in effect, Jamning the channel.
iTlne estimated.
Event III. 119
Conents rrom Ovgrall Expgrlenee
TAN 1 - Normally has seen MIOs In a low position waiting on a known Ingress op eeress
route OP at least In an area where they can cover one or more of these. Generally two to
four MIOs ape orbiting. This type of activity has Increased since the U.S. has started to
bomb airfields. When the MlGs see the ordnance drop, they disengage. Occasionally the
P-lOSs have been anle to fool then tiy dropping the wlncitanks . The P-lOSs like to keep
their tanks in case a RESCAP situation develops since the wlnptanks provldt additional
•nduranee on station.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : TAN 1, 29 May 1967; TAN 3, 29 '^ay 1967
Messages . Reports :
355TF'*/ 20 1121Z April 67 OPREP 3 DOTO-0 11296 SECRET.
12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
TAM flight was the last flight of the strike force and had been alerted to the
presence of MIGs 1 1 the tarpet area by MI3 warnings and radio chatter c*" other flights
engaged with r^IGs. TAN flight Initially sighted four MI0-17s at 3 o'clock low while in-
bound to the target. TA;J Lead told everyone to hold their ordnance and continue In to
the trareet. The MICs were at a range of about 1 n nl and, although they started to turn
Into TAK night, tt was core or less as a token try since TAN flight ■♦as inbound at high
speed and the MIGs were positioned f:r the egress route rather than ingress. The MIOs
could not press the attack and TAN flight continued In and all aircraft except TAN 3
dropped ordnance on the target. (TAN 3 separated from the flight .lubsequent to this
sighting and rejoined on egress. TAN 3*8 Individual HIC encounter follows this flight
narrative. )
TAN flight came off the target slightly south of ingress route (near Hoa Binh). As
they came back to the pldge line, they encountered several MIG-17a. TAN 1 pursued a MIO
at his 2 o'clock position thinking he was In a tall chase on this MIO. TAN 1 began firing
"way too far out"; and when he aulckly realized that the HIG was approaching head-on
rather than going away on the sa.Tie heading, he stopped firing and broke off this encounter.
Then a second MIG came across TAN I's nose. TAN 1 did not sight hi.r. until he started
crossing his nose and then fired a ihort burst, hoping to hit him but does not believe he
did. MIG 2 continued on his way and TAN flight continued their egress.
'a third MIO was approaching TAN 1 head-on and he relied Inverted and started "coming
down" to fire and stopped when he saw P-105s right in trail in the way (BUFF flight - see
Event 1X1-117 prior to RESCA?;. TAK flight disengaged and proceeded to Channel 97. (All
three of the above encounters nappened In about a minute and a half period of tine.)
TAN 3's Individual Encounter
TAN 3 reported that while Inbound to the target after the Initial sighting, he saw
an P-105 with two MIG-17s chasing hln (later identified as BLUE U - see Event III-ll'i.
They were coming from above and went down past TAN 3's 6 o'clock position. TAN 3 was at
S.OOO ft; the MICa were very close to SLUE 4 and the forr.ation passed TAK 3 within 2,000-
3,000 ft. "There was so lauch chatter on the radio at the time," that TAN 3 was unable to
call out the MIGs or cill for a break, but he pullei straight up and finally was able to
get off a call that there was an F-105 behind them In trouble with MIGs. TAN 1 and 2 did
not see TAN 3 break and , unknown to TAN 3, TAIJ k also failed to see the break.
TAN 3 pulled behind the MIGs and they broke off BLUE <i. One MIG went northeast
towards the rest of the flights and the other was below TAN 3 and scissored for a few
turns. TAN 3 still had his ordnance and was undeciied what to do (i.e., drop bombs or
pursue MIO). He still thought that TAK k was with him.
The MIG turned and headed back ip the Black River in a northwesterly direction. When
TAN 3 called, "Okay flo. H , let's press on to the target," TAN 1 advised TAN 3 that he Mas
still with the lead element. Tn'J 3 then Jettisoned his ordnance and attempted to follow
the MIO but lost him in the haze.
He then went north and found the flights of F-lOSs coming off the target. - Although
they were still calling off YICs at various clock positions, TAN 3 could not find any
MIGs. TAN 3 turned and left target area. He caught up with the rest of TAN flight as
they approached Channel 97.
Aircraft Involved: 1)
2)
3)
Event I I I- 120
Four P-UCs vs four pass.
NIG- I 7s
Pour P-4C5 vs two MIC-173
Pour P*l>Cs vs two MIG->17s
Result : No damage
Vicinity: 1)
2)
3)
20*55'N/105**22*E
2O»HO'N/105*30'E
20«53'N/105'' 35 'E
K PRIMARY HISStON AND TAtTICAl SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 April [l967/1709H, ITl^H, 1715H
BLUE Plight and GREEM Plight consisting of four F-UC aircraft each attacked target
JCS 22.00 at 20*51 'M/105''^'»'E. BLUE Flight preceded GREEN Plight by approximately 1,000
ft. They were part of a larger strike force, which Included eight flights ?f ^-105a, of
which four had MIG encounfiers (see Events III-116, -117, -118, 119. and an IROM HAND
flight (see Event Ill-llt
2. NISSION ROUTE
Danang to WHITE ANCHOR, to Channel 97, to 20«53'N/105'21'E to target. Return to
20»30»N/105*25'E to 20«»10 ~
hung ordnance Jettisoned
tanker and before retumlhg to Danang.
H/IOU^SU'E to WHITE ANCHOR to Dananu;. BLUE Flight which had
;.t In Ordnance Jettison area 16«05 'N/loS" 3B'E after leaving
3. AIRCRAFT COKFIGURAT IONS
p-llC BLUE 1. 2. 3. q / CR^N 1. 2. 3. ^
6 - H-117 bombs
4 - AIM- 7 (SPARROW)
1 - ALQ-71
2 - 370 gal wing tanks
1 - 600 gal centerll'ne tank
TACAN on, IFF (GFEEM 3) off
MIG-17
Part I - 'silver color, no marking
Part 2 - silver color, one with stars on wings, one - no markir^
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PrJoR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Clear
(Part 1 unknown)
Part 2»3
Altitude ;
Headlng T
Speed ;
Fuel State ;
Plight Formation ;
Part 1 BLUE;
Part 2 BLUE:
Part 3 GREEK:
BLUE
10,000 ft
200*
500 ms
unknown
GREEN
r~
5,000 ft
185*
520 KTAS
8-9,000 lb
Pod formation
Pllgiht had Just eonre off the target, formation unknown
Egre'sslng target - GREEN 3 and >i about 4,000 ft behind lead element
straight and level - not yet In Pod formation.
5. INITIAL OETECTIOH
Part 1
Just prior to .striking target, BLUE Plight sighted four silver aircraft , .possible
HI0-17S, approximately f miles abeam on reciprocal heading, low. Estimated position of
suspected MIG: 20»55'N>fl05*22'E.
Part 2
BLUE Plight sighted one MIG-17, silver, no markings, at flight's 4 o'clock position,
low, and MIG 2 at 9 o'clock position, 2,000 ft from BLUE 2. MIG altitude estimated as
2,000 ft AGL, heading ojf 202'* true.
Part 3
CRE^N 3 encounter<;d a MIG-17 at his 10 o'clock position, low, at a range of U.OOO
ft. The^HIC was flying at '-iOO kts at an altitude of 2,000 to 3,CC0 ft ACL on a heading
ofSfiO* in a left turn.
Event III-120
6. ACTION INITIATED
^lon ws ta..n b, either BLUE Fllr^t or the .liver aircraft.
7. SITUATION OEVeiOPHeNT
Part
hit targets.
8. ORDNANCE
GREEN 3
(No, flred/Mo. hits)
Renartcs
Mi««ilea rired In boreslght mode. Interlocks
SiJUt Jas iraiS ft AGl! Missiles fell shcrt and
Impacted ground,
as expended.
No other ordnance
EQUIPMENT PPOBLEMS . There was
friqnency .
10. AIRCREW COHHENTS
Experience
Total
Back
Hours
3,015
616
768
330
Combat
Missions
115
95
Remarks
Instructor at McDlll for two yrs
teaching AIM-7. Participated in
"Charging SPARROW" program.
Participated in "Charging SPARROW*
program .
Cf^mmmnts on «-hi« Encounter
""^P.!.' 'r»PQ-100 «. poor r.dar ror ""'^r.^f/r ,°4uS~r."?urn!%.tn.r-
S„r,ln. ««-9 or »an »ouU «ave ».n J,, p u ^^^^ ^^^^^
n. DATA SOURCES
CPEEH 3 (Front), 22 June 67
366TPy 23C500Z DOC 00121,
7AP 2016072 DIO 22957 April 1967
(superseded by message 1 above)
137
Ev«nt XlI-120
12. NARRATIVe OESCRtPTION
Part I :
See Iten 5.
Part 2 ;
BLUE PUrht. at 12,000 ft. heading 100". 500 KTAS, slehted the target. BLUE lead
roll4 in on target at k U5« dive armle. At B.OOO. ft altitude, heading ijj'.
i-:.--! " iV7« H» was followed by BL'JE 2, 3, ar.d U, each drocplng six bonbs
n :S?'roJ-BL>,?":ho "r v-UtJ. Vlnl^u. Tue
r» fi-iUht ro-a^n^d at "5 000 ft for a tine then cllir.ted on new heading of 235 • ^mie
5;in"if 1- 5bo*?t t?e filrht oMerved two MIG-Hs with no Tiarklnga, silver In color.
Ji? fl^'^nt's 5 o'clock P03-.lon and y.lG 2 at flight's 9 o'clock position. lo« at
2 000 ?J ^iSs JeJe flylSz a? unknown speed on a heading of ?02« . MIQs appeared to be
Ik'lMleo San^ ^"10^?^ clbU on BLUE 5. but ro'^f-^; ^i^SeiTreHrSSS 'ToO
then ipxiediately broke rljtht and back Into the heavily defended area of J" -Z.oo. ror
thlS reason! BLUE Plight did not offer pursuit. No ordnance was expended by either aide.
Part 3 ;
G^EE^J ^li;rht while flying at 14.000 ft altitude, airspeed ii 80 kts, heading 100 ,
at 20»51' Uo^^sS-E/slghted target JCS 22.00. Lead and -^REEN 2 rolled In on "'f^* *fiT
dive angle. At 8,000|rt altitude heading l80« , Lead and caEEN 2 released Jl« K-llT
hn!h, rRr^N ^and u folloled. using .same tacTilcs, releasing five bonbs each. Minimum
alfi?ude attained 2as S^oSSf ft It this point, GREES 3. on ^ heading of 185» .encountered
5 MQ 17. The enernj alrcrak was 10 o'clock low, in level flight approximately U.OOO
ft awav The MIO wis flylnfe ac a speed of ^oo kts ac an altitude of approxinately 2 000
" ]yo'0 fJ l^L on I headiril of 36o' in a left turn. This jjas about 5 -^1?
taraet and GREIN Flts;ht -as Just be3lnr.ing to refortn. GRE^N 3 noticed ^hf* "JJ^**"
"ticking GREEN U. He called QREEH <» to advise hi.-n that .-.e was under attack and did an
oU?-the!too barr;i roll to the left. The HIO reversed to the right and rolled of hjjj-
?ng north. Apoarently CRE?:i ^ did not receive the MIG call and Proceeded straight ahead.
H. «M called araln. but aks:.' 3 still received no response from GREEN H , CHEtJl ft
Sr^^HdSd trthroS^t-Str'ke Icln-up point. GREEK 3 deEcended to the MIG's 6 o'clock
SSH'on s^lgf-tiriow" ^han tiS MIg' who was then at ab=ut 5.000 ft altitude and n«r»
5? iess stra 'ht-and-levelf .He obtained a full syster lock-on at ^-y^ miies «lth
approximately 'an 30 kt rat,e of closure. At this time an F-105 closed in ^^ont of CBEEM 3
III Ar^ at the f^IG, striking the «IO'a left wing with cannon fire. Event Ill-Uft)
The MIG was observed to make hard roll and descended In a hard turn to the rlp-ht. The
SS'! amIudS .«r2pp?oximately 2.000 ft AOL when descent was ^^i^J^t***,?2^S?i'-°SES'
Mde at about 200 ft ACL In a right hand turn. The F-105 disengaged to the left. GREEN
r?on?5nSeS backing anS ittenptld to fire a missile but the AIH-7 did not fire as the
Jadar broke lock at^hat i>olnt. The MIO regained on the dectc and was orbiting at an
altitude of about 100-200] ft ACL. GREEN 3 set up a highspeed yo-yo on him and tried to
Sreak him ouf of the ground return .ith the radar, but could not do It . OREEN 3 njcurned
?o b5res?gSt and Interlocks out. Two r.ore lock-ons were sade, but l.-n«edl at ely broke lock:.
CFEeS' 3 fired without a ibck-on In borealght as minimum range was very close ^ "oj
already exceeded. The AIM-7 went down and left. The MIG reversed and started a hard
left tirn. still at 200 dt AGL. To prevent an overshoot, GREEN 3 nosed into the rflCs
6 "clock position with l'-l/2 miles separatlcr. at 5,000 ft. He then started down, going
to idle t-ylng to lock-dn from boresight. Again, the radar would try to lock-on tut
iouJd contlnie^o cycle to a break lock. GREEN 3 ^"cended to the fO'! •""J'*?' J^JJi"*
to about one inlle. At tbls point, tracking In boresight he *IJ-7j^88lle.
The AlM-7 was observed to strike the ground and explode between 200 to WO ft to the left
and behind the MIO. ThefMIG made a hard turn to the right and as OREEH 3 waa about to
overshoot, he started another high-speed yo-yo reversing right.
At this point, another MIG-17 entered the encounter at 3REEM 3*a 2 o'clock position,
mo 1 reversed back to the left, remaining at 200 ft. MIG 2 went over t.^e top of the
first MIC at about IBO' !out of phase. At the top of GREEN 3'3 high-speed yo-yo. he
reversed -0 the left and Into the first i^IG's 6' o'clock position with 1-1/2 alles of
seoaratlon. GREEN 3 started down very steeoly in idle and nulled out at the :iIG s
altitude He made anotKer lock-on at one mile and closing and fired a third AIM-7. which
?moac?ed the ground but|dld net explode. HIG 2 waa maneuvering towards GP.EE.J 3's 7 o clock
oMlJlon. Whereupon GRE^N 3 executed a.nother yo-yo and continued a hard right turn, closing
Sn MIO 1 GpIIn 3 descended toward the second MIG, because MIG 2 was higher (approximately
?on ft AGL and In a better position to attack). MIG 2 was at 90« to GREEN 3'3 course in
a rlKht hand turn. GREEN 3 made a bores Izht lock-on but by then the KIC was head-on. He'
» fourth AIM-7 atfa ranee of one mile. Almost Irrjnediately , the radar again broke
lock CR°EM 3 contmue'd tracking with his reticle, but the .•nisslle went left and short.
GREEN 3 then reversed t'o the right, pulled up In a steep clif*"^ disengaged, Jo in^
the remainder of the flight and returned to base. At no time did the HICs fire any
ordnM«. GREED 3 had tS disengage at this point, because he had exhausted his ordnance.
Event III-120
Miss He Firing Parametgrr.
Airspeed at launch, KTAS
Altitude at launch, rt ACL
G-loading at launch
Aircraft target altitudes
Overtake velocity, kts
Relative an^le of attacking
Aircraft to target fit path
Range and angle-off of target
Mlsa Distance and direction
Radar lock-on
Launch node
MIO warning retjelved
Method or Acquisition
Cdr evaluation
HlBslle
1
2
3
k
150
500
500
500
200
200
500
1
1
I
1
level
level
level
left turn
left turn
so
100
100
901
io»
10*
0»
00' ,10"
lO^/l 1/t
10»/6 0'
headon
o'clock
nm
cloek/1 nm
1 nm
« - - yea-
broka lock
Interlocks out, boreslght mode, kept enemy in
gunalght reticle to missile impact
OCI OCT OCI OCX
Visual ' Visual Visual Visual
AIM-7E does not htve a capability against targets
in described envlronnent. Ground return presented
n APC-lOO radar negates lock-on capability at low
a.titude. The MIO-17 »as easily out -maneuvered
using high-speed yo-yo tactics.
Event III-121
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s va three HIG-17s
Reaults: Mo Damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Unknown
I. PRIMARY MISSION AWO TACTICAL SlTUATIOM
Date/Time: 20 April 1967/0856H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68,
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
PllKht Inbound to ALFA target saw two MIGs at 3 miles range; MIGs went into
afterburner, benan roll-in. and disappeared; fllfht saw another MIG while egressing;
MIG passed 3000 ft overhead without hostile action.
Event XIX-122
Four P-1058 vs one MIG-21
Aircraft Involved:
Results: Ho Damage
Vicinity of Encounter:
Unknown
K PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SlTUATIOM
Date/Time: 20 April 1967/09 13H
IK DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
MIO observed ct U.COG ft. 6 miles range; ::iC! began attack, but P-105s turned Into
it; MIO broke off; point of closest approach was « xlles.
Event III-1Z3
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-1053 vs two MIGa,
two MIG->173 and one Mir:->21
Kesults: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«»22.'K/107»02 'E
I. PRtHARY HtSStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 April 1967/1629H
II. OATA SOURCE
CZKCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIve OCSCRIPTIOII
Strike night saw two MiCs while Inbound before cloud Intervened; Two mlnutea later*
two MIO-lTs 8e«n at 10 miles; (flight continued on course and lead saw one MZG-21 Inverted
before cloud Intervened.
Event III-12U
Aircraft Involvd: Po"r P-105. v» two MIG-17*
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20-28 •M/107»26'E
I. PRIMARY Mission AMD TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 April 1967/1653H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight egressms at 19.000 ft saw t-o .liver HICa headed north froB the vicinity
of orbiting tanker; no hostile actions.
Event III-125
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-I05a va six MIC-lTa
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: fio miles ME of Hanoi
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlme: 22 Anrll 1967/153*"
II. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Peoorts :
DIA Summary of Air Ensagementa over North Vietnam, 2 May 1967
12. NARRATIVE DESCHIPTION
P-105 attacked by MIC. Mp ordnance expendltura reported.
Event III-126
Aircraft Involved: Two BF-^Cs vs one NIC-21
Raaulta: No Damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20»25'N/103'"i8»E
I. PRINAftV MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 22 April 1967/1635H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOK
Photo flight at 30,000 ft saw MIO at 3 miles range; MIO made several attempts to
gain position, but was outmaneuvered and finally broke off j X-band strobing received
throu^out encounter*
Event in -127
Aircrart Involved: Four P-105* vs four MIC-17s
Results: "o dasiage
Vicinity of Encounter: Hon Cay
I. PRtHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
D*te/71r.e: 22 kpr^l/liiiZH
*
II. DATA SOURCES ;
12. NARRATIVE OESCAIPTION
P-lOSs attacked Ly Mia
DIA Sur.nary of Air Eng igenenta over North VIetnan, 2 May 1967
I. ."-lOSs evaded attack. Ho ordnance expenditures reported.
a
3
D
3
3
3
0fl
J
9
a
3
Event III-128
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105a vb two unldentB
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»13'N/107«25'C
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 22 April 1967/1635K
II. OATA SOURCE
CIMCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight at 17»000 ft saw two silver unldents at 3 o'clock; no attempt
at engagement.
Event 1 11-12 9
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOgs vs one MIO-21
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20°08'N/107*25'E
K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 22 April 196 7/16 38H
11. OATA SOURCE
• CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike night Inbound over Gulf of Tonkin at 16,000 ft saw NIC 1 o'clock hl^;
HIQ passed above and behind; KIG silver.
Event III-130
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105s vs two MIG-21S
Results: Ho Damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21" 6«M/10««55*E
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 23 April 1967/1622H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plak suppression fUffht Inbound to ALFA target saw two MIGs 9:30 O'clock high; MlOa
dived toward flight, but were engaged by MIG CAP flight Event 118.
Event III-13i
Aircraft Involved: Eight P-105s vs six MI0-21s
and three unldcnts
Results: tio Damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl-IS'M/XOS^SO'E
I
U PRIMARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
DBte/TlMt aj April 1967/1623H
11. MTA SOimCE
CUCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. MCRATIVE OCSCRIPTION
Tmo fll^ta inbound to same ALFA target Incident of Event 647; one flight observed
naneuvers of other! with NIGs; flight which maneuvered was Inbound at 20,000 ft when two
MICs seen at 8 mllbs; HIC CAP In Event ll3 engaged these MICs, which were the same HIGs .
seen In Svent 6k7il 2 minutes later, flight saw a lone MIG which began tall attacK. but
broke off when F-lO^s punched tanks; a single NIG was seen three nlnutes later; MIO did
not BanBuver; thr«;o unldenta seen 10 minutes later beneath flight; two HIGs seen 15 minutes
later; flight began climb to engage, but broke off due to low fuel.
Event I I 1-132
Aircraft Invclved: Three P-^JCs vs four KIG-21S
Result: One MIO destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 22»05'N/105'05*E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 23 April 1967/1635H
BLUE flight on a CAP/STRIKE mission cook the place of a F-105 f iigl^.^^^^Jf f
aborted due to poJ loss to strike target. While Ingresslng to target BLUE flight
encountered two flifihta of two HICs each.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Proa Danang refueling In and out and back to Danang.
3. AIRCRAFT COKFIGURATIQNS
P-4C BLUE 1. 2. 3
6 M117 bombs
Ulng tanks
4 AIM-7 nlsslles
«. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Generally clear, one cirrus trailing a cunulua-nlmbua thundarhead to the waat
0/ ThTa Nguyen Steel Mill.
Altitude : 15,000 to 18,000 ft
Speed : 1*50 kts
Pviei~State : Full internal
Plight Ponaatlon ; 3-shlp formation
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Plrst flight of two HIG3 sighted after several warnings. In addition to general
Geo-Re? warnlri=. other fllghta preceding BLUE flU^-t called MIOa. JJ-^E J/'PjrSl^*^''*
the first two MIGs crossed in front in a zoom type cilsib from right to left. blue, j
reported that the two y.ZZs were crnlng In^from the ^';'V^Sl''i?*^^^"^i^?^thS°i^ter
reported that she second flight of two MIGs came In irom the right. It is the latter
two with which this event Is prlciarlly concerned.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Raveraed to attenpt engagement.
7. SITUATION DEVEIOPHENT
After detecting the first flight of two MIGs. BLUE flight Jettisoned boobs and
wlnff tank and started "left turn to pursue." (BLUE I's statement). The MIGs apparently
saw BLUE flight and "started a dlvln? turn back to our left" and having higher air
soeed at the time were able to separate on a heading of approximately l80» from that
of BLUE flleht. BLUE fllzht reversed to the rlg.ht to rejoin strike force and detected
ttfo more MIGs "passing off our right wing" about 3.000 to 1,000 ft. At the time of the
second acquisition BLUE flight was at approximately Zl.OOO ft, about Mach .9, heading
Mat with about 9500 ib fuel. BLUE flight turned to engage MIGs. BLUE 1 was able to
obtain full lock-on against HIG 3 losing sight of MIG H. BLUE 1 fired an AIM-7 at MIO 3
which guided and followed MIG 3 Into thin cirrus-type clouds. BLUE 1 did not follow with
fllKht Into the clouds because of the presence of activity and the high altitude.
BLUE 3 crossing back of BLUE I, detected MIG H above at about 32,000 to 3^,000 ft, pull-
Ini? contrails In a left turn toward the north at about 10 or II o'clock position.
BLUE 3 pursued MIC 4 achieving full system lock and fired one AIM-7 which Impacted on
the rieht aft fuselage and detonated causing at least severe aircraft atructural damage.
Enemy aircraft slowed, turning over from about 30,000 to 32,000 ft and descended Impact-
ing ground. No chute was observed.
B. ORDNANCE
<Ho. flred/Ho. hits)
AIM-7 Remarks
gLUE l 1/7 Plred full system.
BLUE 2 1/1 Wped full system.
BLUE 3 0/0
•9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported. ,^ ■ -i-^r'^iiM
10. AIRCRey COMMENTS
EKD«rlgnee ;
Event- III-: 32
ToUl
Hours
BLUE I
BLUE 3
3400.3600
3500
P-1
Hcura
220
200
Combat
Missions
91-92
Retnarlts
Strategic Fighter Wing 55-56.
Plcw F-Sft'Ss, F-81F3 and F-lOlAs.
Instructed U years on F-105.
Then went to Air Conaaander and
throueh HTU to P-1C.
TAC fighter.
F-SI* In Korea.
P>100 and F-^C School.
Conm ents on this E ncounter;
BLU^ 1- "At the alr-to-alr ranges we were working thla day the SPARROW was best
weapolrS^don't think SIDEWINDERS would have dene any better for »»• ^ |hoatlng
awlnst a blue sky and good radar. We've had other engagements pointing down at low
altltud*. The SPARROWS ljust ain't any good down there.
BLUE 1: -The one thing 1 learned Is that you can't afford to be "">P^«»"*
there ToH" have to keeo looking around. He (MIO «i) thought he was out of the fight,
hoS free. He made no 2vasive maneuvers. I don't think he ever saw me or knew what
hit hlB."
11. DATA SOURCES
PT»o, |eet Interviews : BLUE I and BLUE 3 (front)
MeaaaEes- OPPEP-3 366Trrf PASTEL 705 April 1967
Hessafies . j^^^jy p^jTEL 711 April 1967
12. HARRATIVE OESCRIPtIoH „ .
arfw rno-ht of three P-UCs were on a CAP/STRIKE mission against JCS 76.00. Prior to
^"L^liSL^ flight o" 105 3 aborted and BLUE flight took their place. While
channel 97 another fllsht o. . io^|aDor^eaj ^ .izhted two HIOs.
ingressing to target a
sighting they had heard
strike force. There Is
or vice versa. Howev
la not too pertinent,
pursue HIQs. Lead was
about 22«05'N/105'05'E BLUE fUcht sighted two JJO*- P'J-J^ \l 1^1
several MIC warnings from central Geo-Ref and ^^if^" J"
here Is sor.e inconalstancy as to whether the P"«Vm?S/JK d?5Ll!fon
However, since BLUE flight was unable to engage these two RIGS the direction
BLUE flight Jettisoned bombs and tanks and started a turn -o
MTr« caa was cassed t5 BLUE 3 who was on the left. "The HIGs saw us. They
?;i^!^LS5^ataJ?edTJl"nrtu?n back to the left; in other words, it made our turn so
JSfiS SiJen'? going to Ske any ncney on them at all because they had more ape^d than we
5^5 ?^*n^?r,i " The ImiCs ended up heading ISO" from BLUE flight. BLUE 1 resumed the
did at the tine. ^^J'H^i'^J-^J^oinPjJ^ike force and sighted two raore MGs passing off
tSe'rJ^St'wiig SZ tiol iere Je^rJbei as Sing a loSg cylindrical fu»elage and delta
the I'ieJJ. «f2nkei" on the leading edge. The vertical stabilizer was wide with a
lu.fl III tSI ho?;^oSta? sJaSiuters werf swept back. The canopy resembled an F-100.
5^SS.M^rld«!llnr;ah Sown the spine of the fuselage. T^..y were bright silver In color.
J« iiSwi If any tJS were observed. The aircraft were MIC-21S. At the time of sight-
No markings or any typp "^r niKht was now at about 2<«,C00 ft and at approximately
Bwi 5 ?ed turn pirfSmrMiS 3 which was niw about 1-1/2 to 2 miles ahead
Minh In turning to pursue! the MICs went afterburner and MIC 3's wingman began
and in a climb. ^" Jg"^"^;* J^aSg^t of MM 4. BLUE 1 maintained near level flight in order
Sliding outside. ^Jf5J:.^?"%gj°'^to reduce t^^ argle-off and obtain a boresight lock-
II "^"ScKS ur»5Sed1S;h i??erbirnfr!%IuE 1 started'cllmblng also and -as able to pull
-id iSt his olopjr on the HIG, who apparently did not see him and continued in at t
^*?Jo^Snk climSiSi BLUE 1 began to pull up on the MIG a.nd after obtaining a bo -
lillt J^Lon swUch^Ho full systeS and maintained the lock-on. The "nge gates were
sight 10^''-°" pi-ht the m-range light on, I hai Interlocks In and we had a
"■'StN^rclJsSrrrate tS if kt^on hii!"' BL^ 1 noticed that with the negative closure
^ffhrwas Ipppoathlig inaSlSum range and "squeezed the trigger." After a nomenta^ delay
lkSn°hed so the Interlocks had been satisfied. The missile was 2^f"^f^ ^°
^iliiit aSSd bulidlrg up speed apparently locked onto the MIC which at this tine was
go straight ahead J^^JJJ^^^P^^Piij, ^^luE 1 fired at about 27,000 ft with 20* noseup
high enough to be pulling ^concraiis^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^^ ^^^^
pulling approximately
(BLUE I's estimate),
cirrus cloud with the
1-1/2 g' 3 at speed of about Hach .95. The MI3 was doing about l.l
The missile apparently tracked well and followed ^^e HIQ Into a
. ^i«„rt «ith tna missile about 1500 to 2000 ft behind and closing. BLUE I took
i?Mo^ nlss the cloud and lead his flight down to an altitude where they could
evasive action to miss -ne ciou ^^^^ 2, «ho was on the out«
"f^^^^hL ?2?lin SeM^d S trail estimated to be 6 or 7 miles. BLUE 3 crossing back over
^^f.^l^^ lifi SlnS liSked up to foUow the missile and sighted MIG 4 In a gradual turn at
!i! .inJrill- iJv I. IBLUE 3 went afterburner and closed rapidly obtaining a radar lock-on.
the contrail lev i. \duu^ locked on. BLUE 3 "pulled up Just on a simulated perch position,
iJ5aJe?lrs m.c'-l ni f ?e5 an S M-7 which^nltlaliy appeared to be going to the right
if MllTbit maSe ; ild!course correction, detonating on the right aft fuselage. The hit
Event IZI-132
was also observed by BLUE 1. The MIG slowed rapidly, turned over and descended to Impact
on the ground. BLUE 3 followed it down and did not 8«c the pilot eject, but the canopy
was turned away from him most of the time.
1»>7
1.
Event m-l33
Aircraft Involved: Kour P-*C8 vs one MIG-17
R«8ult: No engas*>nent
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«33'N/105"51'e
PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 23 Aprllj 1967/1652H
BLUE Plight of four iP-4C8 from 366TPW on Strike Hisalon JCS 76.00 (Thai N«uy«n Iron
and Steel Complex)
2. MISSION ROUTE
Depart Danang, refuel prior. to target area.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F«<IC BLUE 1. 2. 3. 1
K - ALQ-71
Zk - XY 17M bonU>8
16 - AIM -7
2 - External fuel banks
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PrIiOR TO EHCOUNTER
BLUE PllUt
Altitude :
Heading:
Speed:
5.
14,000 I^t ACL
060« I
500 KIAS
WIG 17
1000 ft ACL
170»
INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 3 prior to roil In on target sighted one allver KIG-17 at his 9 o'clock poaition
low with approximately a reciprocal heading.
6. ACTION INITIATED |
Since MIQ had approximately a Z mile vertical separation with reciprocal heading,
BLUE 3 elected -to strike target rrther than attempt to engage MIG.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Plight polled! Into target. MIG was lost to view almost Immediately. MIG
exhibited no hostile Iritent but seemed primarily interested in clearing target area.
8. ORDNANCE
None expended.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
No Interviews.
11. DATA SOURCES
366TPW ONO 23 April 1967, Change 1 to OPREP 3>
148
Event III-IBI
Aircraft Involved: One F-««C vs one MIG-21
Results: No Damase
Vicinity of Encounter: ai'OS'H/lOS^tT'E
\. PftlMARV NISSION A«0 TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Time: 2i April ly67/09i»5H
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. WARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
in turn.
Event III-135
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs one MIO-17
and six MIQ-Zls
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*35 •M/105n5;E
21*2O'N/l0U"'15'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Time: 2U April 1967/1615H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Armed recce flleht .ade two sightings; one MIClT and one MIG-21 seen at first
coordlnlJes shown, and five HIG-21s at second.
Event lli-136
Alrcrart Involved: Two P.105Dr. and t-o P-lOi.Ps
vs four MIC-l/s
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»30'"/105»00'E
PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tloe: 2H April 1967/1612H
BLUE Plight of four -105S was "'^"^.[[f ''''''
Ridge. Flight was from iSth Squadron 3^8 Tr*< Korat .
1.
NtSStON ftOUTE
BLUE 3 and * recovej^ed at Udorn with low fuel.
AIRCRArt CnHFIGORATIpNS
1 - AIM 9
6 - Kk-82
P-105F
1 - AGM-'*5
2 - CBU-2'*
Cloud cap over end of Thud Ridge, otherwise clear.
6000 ft
«. FLIGHT CONDITIONS P^IOft TO ENCOUNTER
Weather :
Altitude
Headinc : ll**"
Speed : Unkno**n
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Observed "o-.r MIgJiTs in a loose fingertip formation at range of 6 to 7 miles at
9 o'clocSr The MIG-17S were lower at 3000 to UOOO ft. heading 300«.
6. ACTION INITIATED ^ »k h
BLUE Plight contlkued on course and MIGa were lost to sight on other side of Thud
Ridge .
7. SITUATION. DEVELOPWEHT
Piakins a turn around Thud Fldge, BLLT Flight on a heading of approximately
5J!r,^5 2fl MIG-175 closing fron the 7 o'clock position at range estimated about
JJSo'f? S^S? r?an?d ilOs aJd Sent afterburner, breaking up over the ridge and Into
jSe oSuds in an essentially STO^ turn,_ccmlng down over^the^west^slde of_thejldge
i^adJiliU^ ^JgSrinr he Jt^ir tiS^llGrxTrhearing lio- and Just'about abeam about lOCO
heading ^i5..».^^B"':^'}pyj^^jj^^ p^^^ lead on MIG I but was able to on HIG 2.
ft below. BLUE 1 was
8.
ORDNANCE
BLUE I - 337 rounds ZOicm (M-61)
Sight set with 15a mils depression and not computing (air-to-ground node.)
9, EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
After 100-125 rounds, gun malfunctioned firing from one barrel only - a less
effective rate of fire.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
There should bJ a simpler way to change switches when going from the atr-to-ground
to alr-to-alr mode. '
n. DATA SOURCES
Pro ject Interviews ;
Messages . fl^pgrrsT
Red Baron Interview BLUE 1, front and back
OPREP 3 355 TRY Takhll D011295 24 April 1967
12.
NARRATIVE ^ ^ ^
B'trr pn»h*- fi'vlne flak and SAM suppression mission up >.nd down both sides Of Thud
B-UE Plight riyins ^wc ao«aT.«n-iv same MIGs resultlne In i
^"V hrii^nnrlvTctiTa and later encountered the apparen-ly same MIGs resulting In a
Ridge sighted ^°"^p-^°r>4 1 RLUS 2 never did get into position to fire his AIH-9. The
brief firing P^" JV/^r^ii" cosUion against BLUE Pli«h? . 3LUE 1 fired 337 rounds of
^Sfin at'S Si rargliS%?oi uSS R dS5n to 800 ft at to 90= deflection. Hew-
20mm (M61) jj:^ F^^^fl^S* iCt two-thirds of the rounds ex pended, BLUE I's ^un was
ever, for approxi^f^el/ the last two tnir^^ observe the MIG to snap
'^'f'^Mi^^rfhri^Jl Mif S^nt afterburner Seaded scu.h. BLUE Jettisoned tanks and •
leS 3lf flight oJt of th e area as h is mission w^s completed since the strike
force was also egnesslng the area. '
[
[•
[
[
Event 111-137
Aircraft Involved: Two F-^Bs V8 seven MIC-178
Result: Two MIGs destroyed (probable)
Vicinity of Encounter: Near Kep Airfield
1. PRIHARY MISSION ANOTACTICAL SITUATION |
Date/Time: 24 April 1967/l6ii5H |
Two P-KBs (QLUE fllr.ht) retiring from TARCAP Station after strike at Kep Airfield i
received airborne reports of MIGs In the lirjnedlate area* ]
2. MISSION ROUTE |
YAHKtt STATION to Strike Kep Airfield, JCS 9.1. I
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS |
BLUE 1, 2 SIOEWIIIOERS AIN-9D f
Probably SPARROWS |
NIO-17 Alr-to-Alr missiles |
5. INITIAL DETECTION j
After reeelvlng' airborne warning, BLUE flight reversed course and observed a flight of |
four HIOs low over the ground and another flight of three HICs directly ahead, apparently ^
on reciprocal heading.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight made a hard reversal to reacquire M13 after It passed head on at approxi-
mately 100 ft range. It was observed to be silver with a single red star on fuselage.
j 7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
*■ • BLUE 1 launched AIM-9D at MIG 1 fron approximately 3000 ft rar.?e, 6 o'clock position.
Missile observed to detonate on MIGs rii;ht wing. MIj began smoking and descent towards
K- ground. BLUE 2 called BLUE L to break Because of attack by another MIO. BLUE 1 broke
j left and up. Crew ooaerved an air-to-air ttiIssIIb pass approxlraacely 500 to 1000 feet
I- abeanu After BLUE 1 broke away, Bt^UE 2 was able to launch an AIM-?D at (41G 2 which had
attacked BLUE 1. Missile was ocserved to enter tailpipe of MIG 2 but apparently did .not
detonate. MZO 2 began sraoklng and descending toward ground. [4IC 3 (KIG 2*a. wlngroan) broke
/ away retiring toward the southwest at low altitude.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1 t 2 each fired one AIH-9D SIDEWINDER
HIG 2 fired at least 1 AA Missile .
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 2's wing fuel was observed after the engagement to be not transferring aft.
11. DATA SOURCES
crG-77.5 251638Z April 67
CTQ 77.5 2110452 April 67
Letter from W. L. Kurtze Subject Missile Firing, 27 April 1967
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight of two F-UBs retiring from TARCAP station after a strike at Kep Airfield
where heavy ground fire and SAKs were observed, received airborne warning of MIGs in the
y//. immediate area. BLUE flight reversed course and observed a flight of four MIGs low against
t'' the ground and another flight of tnree MIGs directly ahead. MIG 1 passed through BLUE
flight approxlnately 100 ft away. It was observed tj be silver with a single red star
on the fuselage. BLUE flight nade a hard reversal t? reacquire MIG and maneuvered towards
fr its 6 o'clock. At approxlnately 3000 ft rar.ce BLUE 1 (Lead) launched an AIM-9D observing
};/ missile detonating on MIC I's right wing. "A ball of fire and debris were seen," MIG 1
U: commenced smoKlng and descending toward the ground. Lead's wlngman called BLUE 1 to break
as he was under attack by the ot^.er two MIGs. BLUE I broke left and upwards and Its crew
observed an air-to-air n-.lsslia rasa about 5,000 to 10,000 ft abeam, '-.'hen Lead broke away,
r~ BLUE 2 was able to launch an Ai:'-9D which guided up ;he tailpipe of MIC 2, but did not
1 ; detonate. "The KIC rolled over trailing streams of smoke and headed toward the ground."
V.'- MI(3 3 broke away and retired toward the southwest at low altitude.
151
Event Hi- 1 37
BLUE 2 then observed a low-fulel warning and discovered that his wlnR fuel was not
?ansrerplng. "After a thorough Ire-check of aircraft switcher," BLUE 2 headed towards the
$arest coaatout oolnt, towards Bhe tanker. Radio contact was made with the tanker but
tatance and altitude separation prevented rendezvous. Prior to fuel
Jected and were picked up twenty minutes later and delivered back to YAtiKtt STATIOH in
ccellent condition.
isa
3
11 \
3
3
a
3
11
0 ^
3 '
0 1
A
0 1
•1
A
3 i
Event III-13B
Aircraft Involved: pour F-1055 vs six HIG-Zls
and one MIC-17
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«>30'N/105'tO»E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOR
Date/Time: April 1967/1619H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight saw several MIGs. but no attempts aade at engaeement ; while inbo^nj.
MT? s-ii - allea alav- 5 ulnutes later, after hitting target, one MIG-X7 seen at
rSlKS; inr;;o:2? «:n'IS'Ainu?« "SJer. and four more seen the following «lnate.
Event III-I39
Aircraft Involved: pour P-«>Cs vs three MlC-l7s
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21'05'M/105*30*E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AKO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 2ti April 1967/1700H
II. DATA SOURCE
CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight saw MICa at 1000 ft when In bosftlng run; MlCs scattered from formation when
ordnance hit ground.
Event III-140
Aircraft Involved: One A-6A va one MO
Results: Ho Oanage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»22'K/106»23'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: April 1967/170OH
II. DATA SOURCE
CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 6*68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Member of airfield strike flight downed by AA; wlngman orbited position of downed
crewman until warned by downed 'zrewman that MIG was attacking; orbiting aircraft out-
naneuvered and evaded.
Aircraft InvoLved;
Event tll-l"!
Pour* P-IO59 vs ten MIG-I7a
and I wo HI0-21s
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: ai'OS'H/XOS^Sl'E
1. ■ PRIMM HISSIOH AHO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 25" Aprl
1967/1002H
Poup P-105a (BLUE nieht) were attaekln; an Alfa target,
the same target are those of Events Ill-l"*!, -1«3, and -lie.
B. ORDNANCE
(No. rired/Ko.
ZOlWB
1/0
Other aircraft striking
BLUE
IK
hit)
200 rounds
DATA SOUItCES
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE «'llicht was eniaged by four MIC-lTs (which may have? been the same " ff.
Events IIl'An. --l"*af^^ on In^resc and one MIG fired from 3 o'clock but missed.
BLL'E H fired 200 rounds at a passing MIG but achieved no hits.
The MIGs tried to feverse and pursue but cauld not catch the P-105s as they rolled
in on the target.
Six more MIG-lTs akd two Mia-2l8 were seen orbiting over Phuc Yen.
Evenc Ill-m?
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s V8 one MW-17
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"08»N/105'52»E
1. PRINART HISSICN AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 25 April 1967/Approxlnateiy 1005H
.nd .3S force, to Jettison o.^nance'S'^tles ^S^/Si^JL^Sfnr JSrHr^Jt"'"^
ob.erJed'S'n't'if'farl^rarea?'''"'"" ^^e target area. No hit, .ere
Nuaero^ui\s^5Jlj.r;snrth\";jcJJ(t^^^j?^^^^^ KraJ?fj:ij."
11. DATA SOURCES
Messages :
355 TPW OPREP-3 2509302 April 67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
See Events Hl-Uft and -151
Event 111-1*3
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105» va one MIG-l?
Result : No damags
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»08'H/10;»50' E
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 2^ April 196|7/1002H
4. FII6HT CONDITIONS PPIOA TO ENCOUNTER
BLUE
T
Altitude ;
Heading ;
Speed ; "
Flight Pomatlon
6,000 ^t
320"
480 kt
i. miTIAl DETECTIOn
BLUE 3 sighted a sllven
oately 2 miles. In a left tujrn with 30" of bank.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Hia-17 at the 12:30 o'clock position at a range of approxl-
As he continued his left tum Into SLUE 3, the KIG was observed to be In afterburner.
At a range of approximately [750 ft, 3LUE 3 fired at the MIC which was now in a very hard
left tum. Possible hits w^re reported.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 3 broke off to the right and headed for Thud Ridge.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 3
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Hon* reported.
10. AIRCREW CONNENTS
Eaoerlence
Total
Hours
rired/No. hits}
Remarks
Possible hits
F-105
Hours
BLUD 2
1000
150
11. DATA SOURCES
BLUE
Combat
Hissions
50
Proi ec t Interviews ;
Messages :
?88 TPW OPREP-325053Z
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
See Event III-148.
2, S June 1967.
Apr 67
i
t
I
B
8
B
B
B
8
8
B
8
Event Ill-mu
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105s vs several MICs
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l*08'N/105'52'E
I. PRIMART niSSICN AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Datc/Tlne: 2b A^ril lCJG7/Approxinateiy lOOOH
This nigf't' Of fo-r F-lOSo was part of a strike against the Hanoi tranaforiper slfsht
(JCS 82.24 Strike).
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total P-lOii Coubar
Hours ^9Ji:JL Wisslons
BLUE 3 1200 900 UO
II. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUK 2
Messages :
355 TPW OPREP-3 25O930Z April 67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Or. the way !nto thu target 3LUE Flight encountered heavy flak. BLUE 2 was Shot down
by 85niiB AAA. BLUE 3 becu::.e separated fro.T. the rest of the flight as he proceeded to the
target area. While at atou^ 10.000 ft BLUE 3 sighted a ;<:iG-17 approaching his 6 o'clock
position. As he broke to the right, BLUE 3 Jettisoned his bombs and headed out of the
area. In the vicinity if Phac Yen he saw three or four nore MIG-17s. Continuing toward
Thud Ridge, twu mere MIC-lTs approached tne 6 o'clock position on BLUE 3. He engaged
afterburner and evaded i:;e aIGs. Airspeed and altitude at this time were over 500 kts
and about 6,000 ft, respectively. The i^ICs were silver In color. (See Events III-l'il
and 111-151.)
Event Ill-ms
Aircraft Involved; Three P-105a vs three
MIO-lTs
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»00*N/105"30'E
1. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Oate/Tlme: 25 April 1967/1005H
n. DATA SOURCE
CZNCPAC?LT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight at POOO ft aftt:r pulling off sane ALPA target as Events IlX-143, -148, -138
8Bi# three NIGs In a descending left turn; MIQs continued turn and departed.
Event 111-146
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs two HIG-17s
. Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*05 'N/IOS" 53' E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlme: 25 April 1967/1005K
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight striking same ALFA target as Event III-135 sighted two MIGs.
157
I'" ■■III -Ml ■ i« III mmmmm^m , ii n i, ip^n.^p
1.
Ewent IIl-lti7
Aircraft Involved: Two P-8Es vs two or more
KIG-17DS
Result; Possible daniai^e to one niG
Vicinity of Encounter: Haiphong
PRIHARY HISSION yO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 25 April 1967/1109H
BLUE 1 and 2 were one of three sections of F-Ss asdlgned the aission of flak suppres-
In «.Jnr,n,.^ = strike group.
slon In support of a
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed YANKKE
(JCS target i*?)
STATION and proceeded to the target in the vicinity of Haiphong.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-8E BLUE 1, 2 I
8 - ZL'HI Rockets (Vt fuzed)
U - KK-12 2Q:ra guns (28U rds)
ALQ-51; APR-27;
MIC~17D MIG 1. 2
Dull sliver colior
Afterburner
IFF/Stby; TACAN/On; Radar/IR mode
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Altitude:
KeadingT
Speed;
Estate;
S.
r
BLUE
MIG
3,000 ft
Northerly
350 KIAS
5,500-6,000 lb
500 ft
170»
INITIAL DETECTION
The HIGs were Initially sighted by the strike flight leader. BLUE 1 acquired visual
contact with the' KIC at 1 o'clock, 70» down at a range of approximately 3.000 ft. The
altitude of the MIG was 500 ft.
6. ACTION INITIATEp
.... c*'.*^* '^^^^ * gentle left turn toward the strike group, BLUE I maneuvered Into
the 6 o'clock poi.tlon on the KIG, tracked, and fired a burst of 60 rds of ZQrm This
hurst was fired at [a range of 1.500 ft while In a 2 g tracking run. Sparkles, indicating
hits, were observeo near the left wing root and In the left mid- fuselage. When the MIO
saw the tracers he br.oke hard right.
7. SITUATION OEVEtOPHENT
BLUE I closed the range to 1,100 ft but his guns would not fire. He then Increased
his lead to 100 MILS and fired two VT fuzed ZUNI rockets. A second pair of rockets were
fired and observed | to pass the MIG low at 6 o'clock. The «IC reversed his turn. BLUE 1
reestablished a tracking lead and fired a third pair of rockets. One rocket detonated
approxlnately cne-haif wing span oi-.ince from the MIG at H o'clock. No reaction from the
Irfhlle BLUE 1 was attacking MIG 1, MIG 2 was trying to maneuver behind SLUE 2 and
after the second turn reversal ended up on the outside of the turn. BLUE 2 encased the
mo, attained a firing position, fired aonm and six rockets with no success.
8. ORONANCC
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
(No. fired/No. hits J
2 0m ni ZUWI
60 rJs/prob. 8/0
aemarks
Observed probable ZOnm hits.
One rocket detonated approximately 20 ft
from a MIG.
Unknown
6/0
9. EQUIPMENT PR08LEMS
BLUE 1. Guns ja-id after firing one short burst of aomm. Posr. flight inspection revealed
two extractor springs Broken, one feeder mechanism failure and ane aamo chute Jammed.
10. AIRCReU COHMCNTS
Comments on this Encounter
Event III-117 |
i
BLUE 1. P-8 had sufficient maneuverability to turn with the MIG . Estimated no more •
than 1 g required in this engagement. Used afterburner fully modulated to the nlnlnum \
gut put position.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUE 1, date unknown.
Messages:
CTC 77.7 OPREP 3 2506K52 April 67 • '
12. NARRATIVE OCSCRIPTION
Three sections of F-8s were to provide flak suppression for a strike group of A-'is. :
As the group approached the target area, the strike leader sighted the MIGs below the
strike group. The F-8s engaged the HIGs allcwlng the strike group to continue to the
target. i
After engaging the ttlQs in close ccnbat for approximately 2 1/^ minutes, the F-8s ^
disengaged due to no usable ordnance. Upon departure, one MIG was observed to be trailing |
light grey smoke from the left wing root. j
During this saz-.e tlT.e, approximately 15 SAMs were fired at the strike group that was j
only 2 to ^ miles away from the MIQ engagement. |
See Event III- 150 •
Event III-llS
1. PRIHARY KtSSION AND TAC
TKAL ^
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vs three
MIG-17a
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l«»03'M/l05''53'E.
ITUATICN
Date/Time: 25 April 1967/lOOOH
Pour P-1058. BLUE Pllgit, were providing flak suppression during a strike against the
Hanoi railroad yard.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. » |
2 - 450 fcal external fuel tanks
1 - QRC 160 pod (B2 arid ZH had 2 pods)
1 - SIDEWINDER (AIN-9B on BI and 3)
1 <- ?X 61 20aa gun
HI0«17 WIG I. 2. 3
Sliver color/M-1, 2
Camouflaged, possibly ^M-3
4. PLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Clear sky. goodlvlsiblllty , BLUE Plight MS recovering from an ordnance delivery
run In which CBU-2'J/29 were dropped on flak sites.
Altitude ; Approximately ^,000 ft
HeadlnuT
Speed;
SW-W
550.600 kts
t
5. INITIM. DETECTION
BLUE 2 first sighted MIG 1 low at 9 o'clock st a distance of approximately I 1/2 miles.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 2 continued oul^bound to rendezvous with BLUE 1 and to establish the ECM Pod
for«a?iS L Sic 1 !as Si l^Jedlate threat. At about this ;i-%t^"%SA:.3 ^^^^JJ^^^.^J^JJ
3 miles off to the left. I BLUE 2 turned rl?ht to Icok for 3LL^E 3 and u and saw two .-lIGs In
^r!" "t a raSge of aboui 1,500 ft. The lead KIG flrea at SLUE ft without success.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The range between BLUE f and the HIGs was Increasing and they were no longer J threat.
BLUE 2 resumed his outboJInd heading and reacquired a visual contact of .<IC 1. "^J"
time the MIG had closed to a range of mile and U.300 ft be law B-^E 2. At this time
BLUE 2 became concerned with the improving accuracy of an BSncn AA gun firing at hln with
thrrounS^wstlng betJeen hlrn and the MIG. BLUE 2 broke rlsht to f«t away from the A A
but ob^Srved heavier flik in that direction so reversed back to the left, "ow the MIG
tad cJo^rTto a distance of 1.500 ft. slightly back of 9 <''^i<'«\*2?i«''Kri;S Siike 2w«
low. The MIG appeared to be tracking BLUE I at this tloe. Eventually the MIC broke away
without firing at BLUE 1 or 2.
8. ORDNANCE
MIQ 2 fired guns at BLUE O without scoring a hit.
9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
10. AIRCREW COHHENTS
Experience
Total P-105 Combat
Hours Hours Missions
BLUE 2 3800 7j'oO-800 >iO
Co mments on this Encounter
iZiir2. Impressed with the turning maneuverability of the HIO-17. and with the density
of the flak over Hanoi.
11. DATA SOURCES
Pn»l >et Interview : bLuS 2, 6 June 1967,
Messages : 30H 'iT w OPhEP-3 2503'»2Z April 67.
u
160
3
s
Q
0
a
0
0
Q
0
0
D 1^
Event 1II-1«<8
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION of Gla Lam air base.
Four 1055 were c.n a fUk suppression "l"^^" ;^•^^'JJ3Il5^y^^ters attacked the F-1055.
While ricoveJm^ froa, the ordinance '■^'^livery run ^Vj^cfp^Itlofon BLUE 1. ELUE 2 turned
HiS 1 was ooservea by SLUE ^ x.neuver ro a fa o jJ^^^^J'^J .hen the MIG saw
accelerated ar.J outran the KIGs.
See Event III*1'«3-
Event II£-1^^
t
1.
Aircraft Involved: Two EB-66s, and two
RP-4CS vs three MIG>2Is
Result: No dairage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21°10'N/10I»''00*E
PRINARY NISSICrit AKDITACTICAL StTUATtOK
Date/Time: 25 April 19fi7/1017H
Three EB-66s aircraft (GRrKU flight) with fcur P-^C escorts (BtUE flight) were on an
ELI::t/ECM mission ov.-r
2. MISSION ROUTE
I'JortJ. Vietnan. At the time of the encounter GPEEK 1 and BLUE I
and 2 were at the northprr er.^l of a North>£outh orbit. BLUE 3 and 4 were escorting
GREEK 2 and 3.
rJ
The time that GREE.*: flleht was «t various points In Its track are given in Table 1.
TABLE t(S)
LOCATICN
TXMe(H)
Depart Tiiiilhl
0840
i7*22'rV103°57'E
0916
l^ighter rendezvous '
jat 190:0 •N/10'*O0O»E
0936
21°U7»N/:0«i^l^J«E
0951
trblt through IF at
1 2lO08'!.Vl03°5'*'E
1015
Encounter
1017
lArrive Takhll
1121
April 1967 0PP£P-3 PASTEL 30 8
11. DATA SOURCES
U32 TRW 2507302
12. NARRATIVE.
At lOllH, when at 21^25 'N/lCi^lS 'E at 30.000 feet, heading I88 degrees, GREEN 2
notified BLUE 3 and his cover, to set up an orbit In a clear area while GREEN 2
and 3, In a close font<s^^cn, entered a hazy cloud deck. They were instructed tc rejoin
on the ether side of the weather.
Upon completion of a turn to the North, while In the haze, GREEN flight learned
tnat all the strike flights which they were supporting had returned to base. Therefore,
at 1015H, GREE!) 2 r.otjtfled 31'JS 3 and t that GREEN 2 and 3 were departing their orbit
on aheadlng of 215 degrees. VHP conraunl cations Jaamers were off as was nor.Tal in turns
to clear UHP for periodic listenings for warnings.
Hinutes later, without indications on the APS-5'<i GREEN' 3 called contrails high at
12 o'clock, on the sdne heading. QREEM flight was at 2loiO'K/10ii<>00'E and the time- was
1017H. GREEN 2 saw tjhree centralis 600-700 feet above, forward and weaving as If the
aircraft were attemptjlng tc slew down. GREEN 2 Identified three silver HZC-21. aircraft
since they continued to turn silhouette up while weaving.
The nuoiber two KIG broke down Into a right turn for spacing for a left, high side
pass. Into GREEN 2'si8 o'clock position. The number three MIG brcke left and down but
hazy clouds obscureij further view. Later BLUE 3 stated the third MIG attecpted a pass
also. The number on^ ^10 remained weaving 600-700 feet above GREEN flight. GREEN 2 and
3 dived down in a clrru.^ cloud deck patched with cumulus dropping 200 units of RR-4tt
chaff and 50 units oir RR-59. They then took up a heading cf 180-220 degrees at a^i.OOC
feet and remained ln[ the clouds fcr about 20 minutes climbing gradually to 28,000 feet
to maintain cloud cC|Ver.
KIG warnings' were not received ncr did BLUE flight see the KIGs until after the
initial encounter. I
Subsequent MIC warnings were heard as shown In Table 11.
TABLE II
Hig Warnings (s)
Origin TlmeH Location
MISMATCH 1038 QG«3
MOTEL IQtib QU-3
MOTEL 10 Ue AQ-Jl
r
Event III-150
Aircraft Involved: Two A-4C3 va two MIG-17s
Result: One A-UC lost
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«48'N/106»«H'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 25 April 1967/1112H
The two A-4s (BLUE 1 and 2) were part of a strike against the Haiphong ammunition
depot. A total of 25 attack- aircraft participated in the strike. As the strike f.roup
approached, the Er.ultiple SAr-'s were obser/ed and heavy barrai^e and tracking 37/57/85mm AA
fire was encountered throu^'iouc the strike. Two niG-l? aircraft were observed to take
off rroffl Kien An airfield.
2. MISSION ROUTE
The strike group departed YANKEE STATION and proceeded to the target area.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
A-JlC BLUE 1. 2
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS ?RIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Clear sky with 10-ml visibility In light haze.
BLUE
I ?
A] tltude ; 3tOQO ft (approximately)'
Heading :
Speed : 450 kts
Fuel State ;
Flight Formation
Section of two airplanes
5. INITIAL DETECTION
.While In his bombing run, BLUE 1 sighted two MIOs approaching the 6 o'clock position
on his section.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 released his bor.bs and called a break to the right. BLUE 2 released his bombs
and broke rl^ht behind hlc leader as the flight descended to 2000 ft.
7. SnUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 called BLUE 2 to "pull harder", tighten his turn, and he then ■ reversed his turn.
After several turns the A-^s were scissoring with each other, providing rriutual defense,
BLUE 2 Jettlscned his bomb racks during the defensive maneuvering. Because a fIG was
^ firing at hlci and he had to execute a hard turn, approxinately '4 g, BLUE 2 last saw SLUE 1
I trailing light grey smoke. It was estimated that the 'AlO fired three one-second bursts at
I BLUE 2, after maneuvering in hlgh-g turns down to apprr>xlr.ately 1000 ft.
8. ORDNANCE
The KIGs fired on both bLUE I and 2 an unknown number of rounds.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported
10. AIRCREH COMMENTS
BLUE 2. "Could not evade the KIQ at maximum speed, no afterburner. When attack air-
craft have inferior capability compared to enemy aircraft, CAP cover has to be very good."
11. OATA SOURCES
Messai^eSf Reports :
CTG 77.7 OPREP 3 250620Z April 67
CTG 77.7 OPREP 5 251810Z April 67/008
Modified Aircraft Combat Lnss Report (Navy)
12. ilARRATIVE
As the strike croup approached the tarj^et prea. heavy AA fire and SAMs were encountered,
Prior to roll- In for the bombing attack the strike leader observed four r-tlO-lTs at an alti-
tude of approximately 1000 ft. While BLUE 1 and 2 were In their bombing run, BLUE 1 saw
163
I
I
I
I
r
I
Event I I 1-150
two «IGs maneuverlni; into ihl» 6 o'clock position. He released his bombs and called u rl^jnt
break. After heavy wane uv|e rim: BLUE X an-1 2 ended up In a scissors. BLUE 2 last saw blwE
1 tralllns light snoke. Other r.e::.bcrs In the strike saw BLUE 1 burst Into flame and crash.
A red star was obserJed on the winp; of the HIGs.
The TARCAP was not with the strike proup but was nalntalnlnR an "on call" station just,
off the coast. Alrhougn the TAF.CAP attempted to locate and enp;a«e the MIGs, f.o contact was
made.
See Event IXX^lXT.
Event III-I51
Aircraft Involved: Four F-105Ds vs four NIG-lTs
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»13'N/105«50»E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 25 April 1967/Approxiniatel.v I005H
This fllcht of four F-105D? (fcLUE Fllcht) was part of a strike against a transformer
plant tliJtJ JfSaSol Sekvydet-eises. including SAHs. flak and MIOs were encountered In
the tarr.et area.
2. MISSION ROUTE
The fllKht approached the r.oi-thern end of Thud Bldge from the 'west and headed south-
easterly down Thud Rldee Into the target area.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105P BLUE 1. 2. 3. t
Armed with bor^bs and equipped with external fuel tanks.
MIO-17 WIG 1. 2. 3. "
Dull, Silver color
External fuel tanks.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIOHS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Considerable bad weather enroute to the target area. In the target area the
weather was clear with good visibility.
BLUF.
I S 3 5
Altitude : 6-7,000 ft
Keadlne: Southeasterly
Speed : 500 kt CAS
TueTstate: 10,000 lb
Plight Format Icn
Approximately line abreast
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE ^ and H slighted four MIGs at aoout 9:30 o'clock at a range of approximately one
„ile Jitl Ltut 5o' angle off headed towaras the F-103». MIO warnings had been received.
6. ACTION INITIATED
yhiie in an echelon formation, the KlOs Jettisoned their external tanks and rolled
iiirn So Close to the 6 o'clock position on BLUE Plight. When BLUE Plight saw the
Hill the? SngagJi i?tirbirner and accelerated to 550 kt CAS In a shallow dive descending
approximately 2000 ft.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The P-1058 opened the range on the KICs and continued into the target area.
8. ORDNANCE
No alr-to-alr ordnance fired by either the P-105s or the HlQs.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total P-105 Ccnbat
Hours Hours ^1= a Ions Remarks
BLUE ft 6ftO directly to P-105 from flying school.
Comments from Overal ' Experience
~ gj^yg J,. "The F-105 is a far.'-astic airplane for this mission."
•On VPR strike missions ycu don't need two people."
165
Event III- 151
11. DATA SOURCES
Pi-o jeet Interviews : BLUE 30 Ksy 1967.
12. MRRATIVE OESCRIPTIOM
■ As stmced in paragraphs 5. 6, 7.
S«« Eventa 111-137 a^a lII-l'iU.
Bven*. III-152
Aircraft Involved:
Pour P-105* »» four
HIC-I7S
Reaulta: Slanting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21'»08'H/105»51'E
1. PRIHART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tltne: 26 April I967/I6I6H
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff
Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight strllclng sarje target as Events III-157 and -153 saw MIGs orbiting north of
target! il5 hivrSeSS Micl as some of those In referenced incidents.
z
Event 111-153
Aircraft Involved; Four P-1053 vs elijht
KIG-173 and one HIC-21
Result : No damav.e
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«20'N/105'*37'E
\. PRINARV fllSSIOU ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time 26 April 1967/16 17H
Pour P-105D3 (BM'E Flight) w'^re part of a strike force attacking the Hanoi transformer
yard vJCS 82 2"^). "^fr- Etrli<e fore ^cnrlsted of 20 F-105s of which four were IRON HANU,
and four F-UCs as KIDNAP (Event III-157). Thv -ncounters of the strike aircraft with rjIGs
are descrlte<l in Evetivs 111-153, -107. ar.d 156. -pproxlmately the sane tine tlcjOK,
another Kroup of elosht F-I05s was conducting a strlhe against the Hanoi railway and high-
way brldfce (JCS-13.00).
4. FLIGHT CCNDITtONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
BLUE
Altitude ;
KeadingT
(J, 500 ft
150»
5. INITIAL DETECTION
On Ingreac to the target BLUE Flight observed four MIO-173 on a 290" heading at 4,500
ft.
6. ACTION INITIATED
AS KIOs crossed in front of flight, BLUE I fired a M-61 three-second burst at one
KIG. No damage noted.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
At this point two cf the KICs broke richt to .-:cne in behind flight and the other two
turned left and down. £LiJS 1 and 2 v-rr.en in tei^.lr.z two MIGs, foilowlng ther. down to
anoroxi-a-elv '0'>C ft Iz was est'.r.a::ea that the y.l'^r. w<ire flying at a maxlr.urr. spee- cf
Sao k^ BLUE'l tried rl^ir^fn failed to fire. rLlJE 2 pulled to within 1000 ft _
of one MC and fired a cne-secor.d Lurst tefore i;r?2/ln(; off. No daria^e was noted. -LU- 1
and BLUE 2 overshot the MIGs du- to considerable overtake speed. The .JlIQs broke away ana
the BLUE rllp;ht proceeded to tarsez.
On ezresslnir lust after Lulllnr off tne tarcet the BLUE Fll«ht crossed Phuc Yen Air-
field at 35So?t. heading 3fcO« . sceea of 630 kts. They observed four HI0-17s cn approxi-
matit; ?5o» heading a? t.:li^ u'o'block position, and sa.e altitude. The HIGs were n a
left turn descending in scattered trail fcrr.atlor.. Leaalr.g .-.IC was flrln? at ^--'^l^
(orobablJ'Eve" Ill-isi) which were ,'ust west of tr.e Ridge Line and proceeding north, .ne
MlSrSasLd in front of BLUE Flight and cL'JE 3 fired at one MIC. Another mc turnec tc
Sis^.i" nlnsSlf ap5roxl.-nateIv 6^00 ft .enlnd BLUE 2 The MIG ;«ff f'l^ljf ,S".%J'^*„r?;'5e
Eas excessive and he was unoer leading. While BLl-E 2 was in a left turn with .tlG still in
JosiHon! BLUE 1 pulled up ana t.en oown. causing ti,. MI3 to break .^.ard right and aown.
This concludea the encounter.
At the sa-ne tine as tne above encounter. BLUE ^ observed a :ac-21 at the saine altitude,
in his 10 o'clock po3ltlcn on a heading which would place BLUE «• In a flrln= position.
iowJCer the HIG began a left turn. BLUE U positioned hinself behind the MIC ^onentarlly
and fired, but could not stay with the MlG's turn due to the overtake speed. 9LuE 4 broKe
Sf without any visible damaje to the KIGs and continued to egress without further
sightings.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE I
BLUE 2
BLUE 4
MIG-17
(No. rired/No. hits)
20nuB Cannon
1 Atteaipt/O
I/O
Remarks
Palled tc fire
1/0
I/O
At BLPr
111-15-
and at aircraft in Event
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE I's «-6l gun failed to fire.
11. n«TA SOURCES
55 TFW 261555' April 67 OPREP-3 DOTO-0 un^
167.
t
Aircraft Invoived:
Pour F-105DS v
MIG-17S
Even!; ril-l5«
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter:
Approxlisately
21*»20'H/i05*''»C'E.
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 26 April 1067/Approxlniaiely 1620H
Four F-lOODs (BLUE Fll.-ht and GHEEIJ FlUht) were part of a strike force attackln? the
Harol transforrner yard (Jds 82. The Etrllce for-e cor;,l3ted of 20 F-105S, Of which fo*jr
were IRON HAND, and four F-^Ca as MIGCAP (Event III-lb7). The encounters of the strike
aircraft with MICs are described in Events *II-153, -15'«, and 156. At approxlsiately the
sane time (1630H) another ^roup of ela;ht F-I05s was conducting a strlxe against the Hanoi
railway and highway brldg^ (JCS 13 '00}.
0. ORDNANCE
(No. flred/No. hits)
Alr-to-Air Missiles
MlGa '•/O
Ksg DIO 26438
11. DATA SOURCE
7AP 262332Z April 67
U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
As BLUE Flight came loff the tartlet they sighted four r:iC-17s approximately 10 miles
east and no contact was made. BLUE Plight sighted four MI3-173 on egress. The MiGs fired
two salvos of two missiles each which missed as SLUE Plight turned. The MIGs did not rive
further chase.
Event III-155
Aircraft Involved; Pour F-105s vs two
MIG-21S
Results; No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«19'H/105*52'E
1. PRINARV KISSION ANt
Date/Time: 26 Apr;.
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff
TACTICAL SITUATION
1 1967. 1620H
Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE OESCRtPTION
Strike flight egressing from same ALFA target as Events III-153 and -157 while
at 8,000' had two' MIGs pass through flight; KIGs passed about 2,000' behind lead
and 3.000* ahead of #3; no firing.
168
B
i
S
e 1^
5
n
Event 111-156
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lO^Ds vs two MIG-3Is
Result: Sighting only -
Vicinity of Encounter: Approximately
Zl'ZO'N/lOS'tO'E
1. PRINARV HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 26 April 1967/Approx Imately 1620H
Four P-105DS (hLUc FUi^ht) were part of a stride force attacking the Hanoi tranrforner
yard (JCZ 82, 2t). 7hx: :;trlk.» force consisted of 20 F-I05s, of which four were IROH HA!;L/,
and four y-'*Cj as ."•tinCAP i Event 1 1 1-157). The encounters of the strike aircraft with KICs
are described in Eventu III-153. -15<t, and -156. At approxlnately the same time (1630H)
another croup of ei^rnt F-lOSs was conauctlng a strike against the Hanoi railway and high-
way bridfte {JCS 13.0C).
11. DATA SOURCE
7AF 262332Z April 6? .'-^s? 010 26*38
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOI.
BLUE Flight sighted two :4IG-21» during egress but no contact was nade.
Aircraft Involved;
Event III- 157
Pour r>'<Cs v8 approxlisaitely
ten MIG-2IS
Result: One destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: General area of
Zl'lJ^H/lOS'SO'E
1. PRINARV NISSIOR AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tl«e: 26 April J967/I6O7H to l62»!H.
■Pour P-«»C8 (BLUE Fllgnt) were flying r'.lG CAP for a strike on JCS 82.21, the Hanoi
tranaformer site located ati 21"O8'??"N/105°50'55"E. T^ie strike force consisted of
twenty P-1059 of which four '.ere IRON HAND. The encounter3 cf the strike aircraft with
NIOs are described In Event* I II- 15 3, -IS", and -156. At approximately the saae
of eight P-1058 struck JCS 13.OO.
After refueling the
rect to
On egress
tlate (I63OH) anotner group
2. HISSION. ROUTE
BLUE Plight departed barang and refueled on Vfhlte Anchor. After refueling
flight Lro3eeded direct toTchannel 97, then direct to 21<'ii6'K/10'l''tt7'E, then dl
21«»U3'»/105*17*E, then direct to 21"»20'N/105'*^3*E» then direct to t»>e target
the flight again refueled White Anchor.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
p.i>C BLUE 1. 2. ft
4 • AIM-TE (except for BLUE 1 who had three AIM-7E)
H - AIH-9B
1 - 370 gallon external tank
I - Q!IC-16Q ECH pod I '
1 - 600 gallon centenllne tank
IPP and TACAN. (Both On.}
MIQ-2I3
Silver
No marlcings visible
Clean.
4. FLIGHT CONDITICNS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : TT.ud Ridge obscArred by cumulus clouds. Five to six-eights broken to the south.
Bottonw at 5-9000 feet MSL, tops at 10-12,000 feet. Good visibility above and below
the clouds.
Altitude :
Heading ;
Speed :
Fuel State !
Plight Format ion
Pod elenent on the lb ft.
BLUE
123'*
11-12 »000 feet MSL
1U6 degrees
ftSO KTAS
12,000 pounds
5. INITIAL DETECTION
While proceeding down Thud Ridge BLUE Plight heard the ISON HAWO Plight call MIQs.
The first contact was i '/isual acquisition of a single MIO-21 by BLUE 3 at the flight's
9 o'clock positions. EllJE 2 (backseat) also saw the MIGs at about the sasse ticie. The
NIC was at 6000 feet KSL [heading 320 degrees. There were no warnings from thr agencies.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Blue lead Instruetea BLUE 3 and ft to attack the KIQ while BLUE 1 and 2 followed
to provide cover. |
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMcNT
The MIC -ch BLUE 3 and ft were attacking disappeared ir.to the clouds, but they saw
another MlC-a. and attacked tnls MIG. At this time BLUE 1 and 2 saw a HIQ-21 chasing an
P-105 and split the fllgjit to follow the MIG.
Prom this point cn BLUE 1 and 2 and BLUE 3 and ^ were operating independently.
BLUE 3 and ft subseQuentli? attacked other MIG-213 but were never able co achieve a firing
position before the XIGsl disappeared into clouds. At BLUE Z's blnco they egressed.
After the f'lG on t.^e F-i05 disappeared Into cloud cover BLUE 1 and 2 attacked other
HIGs with BLUE 1 firing '2 SFARRCVs and 2 SIDCWIHCEBs at a HIC-21, all of which missed.
170
s
e
§
a
a
a
a
I
I
a
8
a
u
I
B
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
8
B
B
i
8
0
0*
0
Event 1 1 1- 137
He then fired a single SPARROW at another HtG-21 and, although BLUE 1 did not see the
missile Intercfepn, he Is credited with a Jclll. When BLUE 2 reached bingo fuel the flight
egressed.
While eKressing BLUE Plight saw two MtQ-Zls and one MIC-17 In the area of Phuc Yen.
8. ORONANCC
(No. fired/No. hits)
AIM-TE AI«-9a
SPARROW SIDEWINDER
BLUE 1 3/1 2/0
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total ?-U Combat
Hours Hours Missions Remarks
BLUE 1
Pront 3100 350 60-70 1900 hra in P-lOO,
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE 1 had no probl.m identifying the MIGs due to their sliver color and delta wing
shape.
Pelt that they coulu turn with the MIG-21, possibly due to the ability of pilot.
Although the MIGs made several passes they could not turn with the P-^.
The MIGs appeared to be In an orbit, operating singly.
The P-tts kept turning to defeat not only the MIC-21s but also the SAHs and AAA.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE l-Pront, 23 Jure 196?.
Hessaggs. Re^torts :
366TPW 261120Z April 1967 OPREP-3/OO8 PASTEL 739.
366TPW 26l8'i52 April 1967 OPREP-3
Section I Pastel 8O6
Section II Tastel 307.
366TPW 2710002 April 1967 KSC DCO 922.
Raytheon Letter Subject Missile Plrlng DID 28 April 1967.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was providing MIG CAP for a force of P-105s. The F-IOS?, from KORAT
wre ingresslng In a "gaggle" with BLUE Flight trailing the formation.
While ingresslng at 1607K, when BLUE Flight was at aoproxlmately 21"'38'N/105*09'E,
heading 082 degrees, at h'jO KTA3 and 15,0C0 feet altitudP, they observed three SAM
bursts of dirty brown smoke at the same altitude at approximately 21° 32 ' N/i05°18' E.
No SAM calls were heard at this time or at any other time during the mission.
At 1611H. when BLUE Flight was at 21'»24 • M/IOS" 38 ' E , heading IU6 degrees at 10,000-
12,000 feet MSr. , they observed tv/o SAK detonations at approximately 3000 to 10,000 feet
MSL at approximately 21">17'N/105° 38'E. About 30 seconds later, with the speed and heading
the sane, BLUE Flight saw three more SAKs In flight, neaded approximately 330 degrees, at
8 nautical miles range at 2 o'clock. These SAHs were at 6000 feet HSL, and climbing at
a 60 degree angle. None of the SAMs slgnted during Ingress were fired at BLUE Plight.
At 1612H BLUE Flight was at approximately 21'»20':i/105'»'»3'E, at 11,000-12,000 feet
MSL. heading 146 degrees; they heard the IRON HAND Flight lead call MIGs. Very shortly
thereafter, BLUE 3 (as reported by OPSEP) and BLUE 2 backseat fas reported by BLUE i)
saw one MIO-21 (MIO 1) at 9 o'clock. MIG 1 was at 6000 feet MSL and was heading about
320 degrees.
BLUE 3 and 4 were high on the left and weri Instrueced by BLL'E lead to go after
MIG 1 with BLUE l^and 2 following In trail to provide cover.
BLUE Flight had Jettisoned their centerllne tank when It becatre empty (at approximately
the time when the flight crossed the Red River). When the engagement starfd BLUE 1 failed
to Jettison the outboard tank. However, it was eispty and was retained throughout the
encounter.
171
l.il I I I JILIIJ.I,.. ui
nla of BLU
Event in-l57
As the elements of BLUE PUsht turned left to er-care HIG ? ». ::ah pass-.-d l^f'^^^" t*'*
eletren?9 abo" 2006 feet In front of BLVE 1 and 2 , hcadlnp 3'»0 dr^-rces. Tr.e tine was
^nraJd ?hf poSSilon apJJoxlSately zme'II/lOS'SO'E. No bunt= wure observed nor did
the missile appear to track.
As the fltghtl continued their left descending Uivr, MIC 1 broke to the deck and
disappeared Into the clouds at about 5000 feet MSL.
At this time
one nautical mile
(161IJH) SLUE 3 and «• saw another KIQ-21 (HIO 2) at 9 o'clocl: low,
distant, heading 280 decrees, and turned left Into him-
'JE 1 and 2, after corpleting about iSO degrees of turn saw a [aG--21
Meanwhile, BL'j& *. aiiu c, ww. ■^"^....0 "7 ■, j ^ a- rr
(MIO 3) chaslr.s an F-105. MM 3 was below and to tho l.-ft of F...-. I and f^^^
lead «Ued BLU2 i and U and told then, he w«s breaking off fror tr..a:^a^^ "n-^ U «e^^
elenents to cover the F-105. Pron this point on BLoL 1 and 2 and BLUE 3 an- t *:er.
operating separately.
continued on after MIO 2, who broke down and left, disappearing Into
BLUE 3 and
the clouds.
As BLUE 3 and t were turning right through a heading of 150 degrees to -Jf " ""^J^®
other element: th'ey spotted two «ore «"-21s (MIC K 5) 8:30 o'clock low a, pr«
5 nautical miles distant, turning through 250 degrees, '^^^ i. and 5 were ["J^jJ^J^
BLUE 3 and 4 continued to turn right toward Phuc /en and spotted anct»jer MG-?i ^"^^ °'
at 3 I'clock low on the downwind leg of the airfield's traffic {.attem. headlnp about
260 degrees.
BLUE 3 and 4 made a descending right turn to engage but KIG 6 turned J^ft and broke
^^tr. ^in,.ri-land dlsaooeared. 3LUE ^ and U made a I80 deeree turn south of -he field
SrsiC*L»oiSe^i?S-2f tSS 7) at 2 o'clock low Just north of the field heading northwest.
They gave pursulK but HIG 7 broke left and down disappearing l.nto clouds.
At this tlml, about 1521H. BLUE 3 and k had two SAMs In booster
approximately 1-1/2 seconds apart. The closest missile passed
directly above BLUE When attacked by the SAHs BLUE 3 and t were at 8000 MSL
at 21-18' "105^37 'E heading 320 degrees. The SAMs were heading 330 degrees and passed
close enough to jhave caused a proximity burst had they been tracking.
Shortly thereafter BLUE 3 and 1* heard BLUE 2 call bingo fuel and they egressed.
At no time did SLUE 3 and K achieve a position to fire on tny of the HTOs.
While BLUE I 3 and k were pursuing their MIGs independently. BLUE 1 and 2 were similarly
engaged As soin as the flight split into two elements. BLUE l and 2 broke
Info 5lO 3 MIC 3. who was on the F-105 '8 tall. Immediately troke off from the F-105 and
disappeared Into cloud cover.
BLUE 1 andl 2 on looking around saw several more Mia-2l5 orbiting over Phuc Yen between
fionn AnraooQ feet MSL They picked ud one (MIG 8) at 10 o'clock, heading south in traffic
pa??e?f abSSS f!l)2 Sies awy and Sroice left Into him. MIG 8 turned left and BLUE I and 2
followed. j
BLUE 1 held 1-1/2 mile separation on MIC 8 and went to boreslght for acquisition.
After l^k on in bor^slSt the backseat went to full system. Interlocks l"" /'^J^^ P^J^^J^'"
BLUE 1 flied two AIM-7E missiles in ripple. They both went out of sight beneath the
nose maintaining a straight flight path in reference to launch, and one was observed to
3e?ona?i jSst ilu?h o? Phuc Yen! .vSlther missile appeared to guide and the second one
appeared to barrel roll.
wTr. iMsI in a leisurely left turn at 6000 feet when attacked by BLUE 1. The missile
select ?lghS Us Sein on foJ « leait five minute, previously but BLUE 1 had Placed the
Jtwlle o?w" Iswltch to standby after the five minute tune-up period. Upon reaching the
?i«ei he nic'ed missile power switch on once again but had It only 5 seconds prlor to
pSSSg mlssule am switch to arm. The select lights were all Illuminated Just prior
to arnlng the ISPARROWs .
MIO 8 waJ outside of SLUE 1 at 1*5 degrees off BLUE I's flight path at If. ^'clock.
At iPunch BLUE 1 was at i»OC KCAS at 6000 feet MSL pullinir 3-\e's. BLUE I had 50 knots
overtake on MIG 8 and was from 30 to 15 degrees angle off at -5 n ml range.
The bit theck previous to take off was satisfactory and -^n return the system was
carefSly chefcked. but no explanation of the failure of the f'.rsc two ml.sUes v..as
discovered, f « j
BLUE 1 then pressed on after MIG 8 and fired tv.-o :iDEWI!l.-F.H3 In ripple, as :^..G 8 had
i^ln^r- llll turn BLUE 1 focused on one rlsslle v.hich started tc Rulde
5;rir?io'rta- a^/louS'he'rSled'rr? Into It an. the nl.:.ile .Id not follow and
missed at 6 J'clock by 100-200 feet. The otner missile was n.-l observed.
BLUE 1 llad selected the SIDEWINDER due to the failure of the first tx^o SPAPROW3 and
had ripple fired to increase the chance cf success.
At flriilit MIC 3 was 20 degrees off the nose of R'-UE 1, ii a left turn at 60Cn feet
MSL. BLUE I was at%50 CAS a? 6OOO feet MSL pulling 2-2 1/2 g's. His angle off from the
172
Q
ft
i
§
e
§
f
j
0
i
Q
§
i
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B
3
3
0
i
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a
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e
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0
s
a
a
3
>
i
1
Event IZI-157
MIO was 20 degrees and the range was 1 mile. BLUE 3 .ia<l a good tone ^ir.J had kept the
target In the gun slcht reticle bel'ore and during ilrlng. Although tone definition was
good on nisslle firing the SIOEWIMDEP.s could have h&mcd on the cloud background which
was present.
BLUE I lost sight of 'MQ 8 as he went into the cloud. Other HIG-21S were still seen ■ !
circling at 10 o'clock. SL'JE l spotted one co-altltude at about 2 miles away and pulled ; .
in a hard turn ar.d got Ir.slde of MIO-21 (MIG 9). Due to r.he cloud buildup BLUE 1 went , i
back to radar node and at 2-1/2 miles mad"; a boresight acquisition and lock on. A switch j !
to full sy St en was then tr.ade , Interlocks In.
HIG 9 was also In a sentle left turn and at 2 T.lles rnrge BI'JC 1 fired a SPARROW
and after a short delay the r.lsslle launched and tracked the target nicely. At this tine
however, MIC 9* with the ^.Isslle tracking i2;ood and closlnK from 1000 feet ran^e, made a
slight right roll and encere^l a cloud. bLUE 1 follcwed th-? contact for a while until the
radar broke lock. BLUE l felt that he had held lock loni; '^noup^n for intercept and since
the NIC was taking the rost leisurely evasive action and the missile was guiding, he was
credited with a kill. The tine was about 1622H.
At launch BLUE 1 was at U^O KCAS at 6000 feet MSL. The MIG was also at 6000 feet MSL
with both in a left turn. BLUE 1 was pulling 2 e's and had 6o knots overtake on the MIO.
The MIO was 2 miles away at 12 o'clock and 5 degreec angle off.
The MICs last known position was ZOOig'N/lOS'SO'E. altitude 5000 feet MSL, heading
3^0 degrees, speed about ~20 K7A5.
At this time BLUE 1 saw another MIG-'Zl (KIC 10) low at 10 o'clock and turned to engage
when BLUE 2 called bingo fuel. The flight then started to erresa from the target area to
the northwest, and while egressing they spotted two :^IC-21s and one MlC-17 in the Phuc
Yen traffic pattern and fsur silver MIGs, Ide.itlty undetermined and two IL-288 in
revetted sites on the field.
Throughout the enj^agensnt , the MICs seened to nalntain their left orbit at 6000-8000
feet altitude tightening their turn and ducking into a cloud when attacked. BLUE 1 and 2
remained in a general left turn working nostly in ti:e horizontal. B.UE 1 did go into high
speed yo-yo to attack MIG 9, but their altitude ranred only from i^Of 0-8000 feet, and the
speed was never below uoo knots. Both BLUE 1 and 2 used afterburne.' In hard turns to keep
inside of the .MICs. Althcuish all the .MIGs were In the sane general area, they seemed to be
operating as singles, -ue tc chelr pattern the KICs were acq-.lred at 10 o'clock. However,
some HJG-21S T.ade very high angle off passes at BLUE I and 2. They could not match the
turn -however and posed no threat. BLUE 2 saw this sit'jatlon on several occasions but did
not bother to call then cut. The MIGs were not In afterburner and BLUE 1 had no trouble
getting a 6 o'clock position on them.
The battle took place close to Phuc Ye.r and as BLUE 1 and 3 passed close to the field,
they cajne under AAA fire, despite the proximity of MIOs. All of the flight members felt
that the MICs could have landed at Phuc Yen at any tine but cnose instead to lure the
flight over the field and there appeared to be a coordination between SAHs , MIGs and AAA
whlci: was abetted by the lew clouds. The operationr Joucucted ay SLUE ?ilght had to
account for these defenses when conducting their search.
BLUE Plight started to egress about five minutes after the strike force had left the
target. While egresslng at IH,000 feet MSL heading 270 degrees, the flight observed one
more SAM, to burst at their altitude 5 miles away at approximately 21<'23'N/105''12'E at
1624H. In all some twelve SANs were fired at the flight.
t
173
Event III-158
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-*Cs »s two MIG-Zls
Result: Sighting only
I Vicinity of Encounter: ZO«55'»/105«X3*E
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Time: 28 April 1967/Shortly after .I6U0H
Pour F-!«C8 (BLUE Flleht) -ere to provide MICSCREEN for ^ he strike force from-. TakhU^
which'«re'at?IcUln.|JCs !e.33 ^he f rl . force con. l^ad of l6 stM^^
rE«lV-lll/'.iJri6V^ ii«D%u'g;t^utrt Iir.^l6.) al.o encountered HIOs.
Z. NISSION ROUTE " « ,
direct to Channel 85, and then to Oanang.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
iJl-Tank configuration unknown but probably one centerline and one
outboard.
F»tC BLUE 1. 2
4-AIM-7E
4.AIN-9B
1>QRC-160 pod
Silver
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Clear visibility unlimited
I BLUE
■3 ^
17,000 ft AOL
2H0»
Altitude :
Heading:
Speea :
Fuel State :
Flight Formation
Pod ^
5. INITIAL DETECTION
While outbound BLUE 3 saw MIQ-Zla below the flight,
altitude, headlngj 2^0«, turning left towards Hanoi.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Thp HIOs were at 2000 ft
BLUE Plight
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
HIQs were Ipst from view.
8. ORDNANCE
None
EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None
AIRCREU CONSENTS
None Interviewed
continued on, while keeping the HIGs under surveillance.
9.
10.
t1.
12.
DATA SOURCES
366 TFW 7813OOZ OPREP-3 PASTEL 865
NARRATIVE
BLUE Pllrnt was fragged to fly HIOSCREEN for five strike force flights. (These are
.K- rTi^hJinlEvents 111-161. -162, -I63. and -l6H plus one other which did not encounter
iiL i SlSE ^ Hh? stayed with the'fUght' of Event 111-163 f.om rendezvous to ^ar^et and
return.
flight m —..J
of the strike force was JCS 18.38.
17*
3LUE FllRht stayed with the riignc oi cvenv vi.i.-j.uj ; : u... i^^^^.v,-- -w ,.
BLUE FUKht rendeivoused with the strike force at lt):.6H. They stayed above the
1 El;er.riII-l63 t"the target and set up an orott at 21«0VH/105«39'E. The target
Kvent III-15B
At 1633H, BLUE ft, while flylns at 18,000 ft AGL. and 500 KTAS, was In a left turn,
turning through 360" had two SAM missiles detonate iiear the aircraft. BLUE k vaz the last
aircraft In a Pod turn forriaHon. BLl'E 3 saw a SAM missile detonate at BLOS it's 6 o'clock
position within 75 ft of the aircraft . Approximately 7 seconds later BLUE 3 vitv a second
SAM detonate at BLUE 4'a 6 o'clock position within 75 ft.
The second SAM was in booster and after the burst the crew saw the boor.t?r section
continue out of the burst and go above then. The two bursts were orange in color and
appeared to be the size of a dirigible.
BLUE 4 had a total of 12 holes in thv stabllator, aft ruselac:'.-, and low?:- wing. BLUK
t lost PC-2 hydraulic systen, but SLUE Flight was able to return to hcne base without
further Incident. The missiles appeared to be trav*?lln? In a near vertical path. They
were not observed prior to detonations. All Q.itC-lcJ \:ere operational.
On the outbound les fron the target, BLUE 3 saw two MIC-21 aircraft below the flight.
The MICs were on a heading of ZftO* turning left toward Hanoi. The MIOs stayed at 2000 ft
and disappeared to the east toward Hanoi. BLUE 1 (Lead) elected to maintain flight dis-
cipline and escort BLUE 4 out of eneny territory. Four crew members saw the XIOs.
1.
11.
12.
Event III-I59
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs eight
KIG-178
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 20»52 'N/105*20'E
PRIMARY MISSION AND^ TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlno: 28 April 1967, 1630H
DATA SOURCE
CXNCPACFLT Staff
Study 6-68.
NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flient IngresslnR to same ALFA tarwt Event III-162 saw three silver MIOs
cross Its track at 1,000 • AGLj when about 2 miles away, KIOs began sweeping turn,
but no further contact made; one minute later, #3 saw x'lve silver at 10,000
>-8]inll<
altitude and 6-
Les range.
Event iri-l60
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vs two
MIG-17S
Results: No dainase
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«58'«/105«2«*E
I. PRIMARY KISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlme: 28 April 1967, 1653H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Pll^t retiimlng from strike on target of Event 111-165 saw two MICs orbiting;
tk began turn
but lost sight of KIGs.
Event III-I6I
Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s vs eight
Mia-17s In 3 separate
encounters
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounters: 21«02»N/105''30'E
1, PRIHARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATIOR
Date/Time: 28 April 1967/1630H
o - p in*;- fBLUE FlljTht) were cart of a strike force attacking JCS I8.38 Dan Phuong
cause^ariri Us'SiSt oJ'iJnoir^fhrother aircraft !« this strike force including sup-
port aircraft) which encountered MIGs are those of Events III-158, -162, -163,
2. HISSIOH ROUTE
Departed Takhll and proceeded overland to the target. The general route after
leaving Channel 97 is about the same as that described In Event III-150.
J. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-105D BU IK 1. 2. 1. «»
6 - 750-lb bombs
?;L''con?28"'ation unknown, probably each had a QRC-I60 pod. caaouflaged.
MIO-17
Silver
Ho external stores of tanks
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
On ingress BLUE Plight saw three MIQ-178 2 to 3 miles ''ut on the right.
6. ACTION INITIATED
The MIGs were no threat due to their position and the flight continued on.
7. SITUATION DEVEIOPHENT
BLUE Flight delivered ordnance on the target, and on egress a flight of two MIG-I7a
were out-maneuvered by BLUE 1 and 2.
An additional flight of three MIG-lTs nade a head-on pass at BLUE Plight, and fired
at the flight. BLUE 1 fired at these MIGs but obtained no hits.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
NIO 1
KIG 2
KIC 3
9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
None reported
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
BLUE 3 *2500
<No. flred/No. hits)
CAHtlQN
3/0
1/0
1/0
1/0
1/0
Remarks
B bursts at the last 3 MIGs
Fired at BLUE Flight at least once.
BLUE 3 only saw MIO 2 firing.
Plred at BLUE Plight at lease once.
BLUE 3 only saw HXQ 2 firing.
Fired at BLUE Flight at least once.
BLUB 3 only saw MIG 2 firing.
P-1C5
Hours
400
Combat
Missions
Remarks
Had ADC experience
Comments on this Encounter
Tough to coun-.er a head-on firing pass.
177
■
1 .
11. DATA SOURCES
Pro 1 get Interviewa : BLUE ;
Measages :
355 TFW 28x800 April
Event ItI-161
§7
, 31 May 67
OPREP-3 DOTO-0 ll'»39
12. • KARRATtVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE PiiKht was inbound and about 2 minutes fron the target "h*" they saw a "ISht or
three «G-na* TJeHiSsS?e Off the right 2 to 3 mUes . BLUE 3 "J^^?/^^*?, ^ ITiSl
VZZ. rt^tLt hut BLL'E 1 aaeeptained that the KIGa were of no threat since ELJE Flight
S.Vri«ii?"lncriLei'spier"";hrJun'?n to the target. ^^Jo nigjt continued on past
Koa Lac and received heavy AAA fire froa an estimated nine 85njn batteries.
The flight struck the target and egressed to the west. In this interval the MICs came
east to the egress route.
On egress, a flight of two MIG-17s was out -maneuvered by BLUE 1 and BLUE 2.
BLUE 3 and U were abJut three-quarters of a :.Ue behind ^LUE 1 and 2 "Jj "^J^Q^^^y
then. The MIGs were in a
turn and BLUE 3 got a good top view of them,
a generally head-on pass to BLUE Plight and made a l^JO" pass
Tbe MIGs ended up in _
(l80* would be exactly nose on).
BLUE 3 was at 3000 tk UOOO ft altitude at 600 MAS with BLUE * on the left. BLUE 3
let up for Qlsslles-alr, since the wlngman was in a good position.
& MTG that had orevlDusly been unseen, came across In front of BLUE 3. passing frca
the itrt Se m5c -as urleen unHi he filled the wind screen about 500 ft away and due to
the high rate of closure passed quickly off to the right and disappeared.
A MIC that had been seen at BLUE I's one o'cloclc position ^-oli*** 'J^Pi'^i;" ^
and the muzzle flashes were seen as the MIG passed to the o'clock position and out of
sight. BLUE 3 could not ^ " - -~ ^-
BLtlE 1 fired deflect
fire due to the position of BLUE 1.
ion bursts of ZOmrn at each of the three MIG-17s as It broka away.
Ttwre was -no further contact after BLUE Plight passed through the MIGs.
178
I
B
I
I
I
B
B
B
0
fi
B
B
B
B
B
I
B
i
1 -i
.it:-
1.
Event III-162
Aircraft Involved: Two P-10?Ds vs at least
nine MIG-lTs
Result: One NIG-17 destroyed
Vicinity or Encounter: 21''06'H/105»3«'E
PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOK
Date/Tine : 28 April 1967/16 30H to 1635H
Pour F-105D3 {BLUE Fllrht) vfere part of a strike force of 16 P-105s in a strike
against JCS 18.38, the Dan Phon?: Hlf^hway causeway, 12 miles west of Hand. BLUE Plight
was the first strike flight and followed the fla!^ suppression flight (Event III-163).
The other aircraft In the strike force which enco>;.Tti;*ed MIjs are those of Events III-I6I
and -163. One other strike flight saw no SICs.The actions of IRCM HAND flight are described
In Event III-16'*. The actions of the F-t support aircraft are given in Event III-158.
Also, there were the norrftal aunport aircraft such as B-66 and BIG EYE,
After hitting the target BLUE 1 and 2 were separated from BLUE 3 and 4. Conaeouently ,
most of the action Involves only BLUE 1 and BLUE 2.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight left Takhli and refueled on GREEN AHCHOR. Prora aerial refueling the
flight proceeded to Channel 97 and then Ingressed directly to the target on a heading of
^out 0*1 8*. * o •»
P-105D BLUE 2. H
2 - 3000 lb bombs
1 - QRC-I6a Pod
650 gal eenterllne tank
IFF - Sauawklng; TACAK - receive only
Caffiouria^e paint
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIfiURATIONS
P-105D BLUE 1. 3
2 - 3000 lb bombs
1 - Air;-9B
1 - QRC-160 Pod
650 gal eenterllne tank
IFP - Squawking; 7ACAN - receive only
Camouflage paint
HTO-l? HIO 1-9
Silver color, no marking noteu
* External tanks
4. FLIGHT CONOtTIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : VPR. Clear with 15 miles visibility
Plight condltlona unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight saw MIG-173 on Ingress to the target. The HlOa were at * o'clock 5 to
6 miles out of the line of flight. Although MIG warnings were received, they were not
correlated with the MIGs that were encountered.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Flight Increased speed and the NIOs were left behind,
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Plight continued on and hit the target. As BLUE Plight pulled off the target,
BLUE 1 and 2 pursued one MIG-17 in a turning chase, firing one AIM-9B which missed.
Two more MIG-173 nade a hoad-on pass and both BLUE 1 and 2 and the MIGs fired without
effect. SLUE 1 and 2 continued hard right and sighted another y.lO-lT . Both BLUE 1 and
BLUE 2 fired on the MIC with BLUE 1 scoring a kill. While firing on this MIG, BLUE Plight
was attacked by two more aiG-178 fron 5 o'clock firing. These MIGs broke off as BLUE 1
and 2 broke hard rlKht.
While egresslng a single MIG-17 made a head-on firing pass but scored no hits.
Shortly thereafter, the BLUE 1 and 2 were attacked by two more MIG-17s, one from 5 o'clock
and the other from 7 o'clock; both were firing. BLUE Plight unloaded and outran the HIGs.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
MIG 2,3.5,6,7,8 i 9
(No. fl red/Ho. hits)
20mm AIM-i^B Cannon
2/1 1/0
1/0
1/0
Remarks
Expended 600 rounds. One HIG-17
killed by cannon fire.
Expended 1000 rounds
Each nade one firing pass, no hits
179
Event XII.162
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 - The gun cera was Inoperative,
10. AIRCREU COMttEMTS
E«p>rl*nee
Total
Hours
BLUE 1 3000
Comments on this
P-105
Houits
Combat
Missions
78
not
The sun was
success .
and .amlng of attacking HI^.. Thl. «a. du. to the fact that BLUt „i„tter.d
""trcro:;. i» unacc.Jt.«.. ^Xt^n„d.^t. al^unad. ™. ..it..oio„
rtvanSSe'^ni -« Stttlzc^ aucc.fully . 4.r.~. «n.«».r.
Cammenta from Overa U Experience ^
:5r.'r4J?;n;"o?«ri?i r/ni°s:i.idrs%^i.5t di.ta«ca.
U. DATA SOURCES
pTOleet Interviews
Maaaages ^ Reoorcs:
355 TFW 2912'»0Z
355 TFW 281823
355 TFW 281800
BLUE
1, 30 May 1967
Aor 67
Aoi* 67
12.
Apjr 67
HARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOp
OPFEP-3
OPREP-3
OPREP-3
DOTO-O
DOTO-0
DOTO-0
0H'*56
011041
11«»«1
BLOE night (consisting »f/°;'/-i'>l'i.;jL ''■'1=" S^r i^aUS? ! - - ,
or tne Ainc <<• _ . in«t fi«oni view.
On crossing
6 nlles out
and the HICs fell behind
BLUE Flighty hit the
BLUE 3 and 4.
and were lost from view.
3 and , '^nS^rd%SlWt«Kn^^^^^^ 1
Ehs! BESi"'iS3 f d!;i"n.rr.ru::t's» :JSo?rs;r a.... .... .ir.r.ft
<E«nt III-129A). ^ ^ ^ . pttiit 1 .,« . Hlo-17 at J o'clocit about
»a BLUE 1 and 2 «cU.r.a fron the »»;% ;;-,=^f3Jorft aultid. (about XOOO ft AOL)
to that mode. In doing so. BLUE P.-^f ^^^-o vered that the MIG had gained 15* to
rockplt. On looking bapk at the 1 dls overea ^ ^^^^ ^^^^^
iSS^S? turn on him and fas Increasing the ^vo seconds prior to launch
pipper up to place °K ^S^.^^^'Th^J^pi S5eJ uCnch was not recalled. In order to
Snd held the tore '^[-^i^l^^^^Sg i K(3 to puil over 2 1/2 g's.
put the plpper on the .p. 3LUE nao . altitude ACL and at -00 kts. BLOE
BLUE 1 then ^^^^^^l^T^k aSSSt^S-^'iSgl Sf"and the range wa, 3000 ft.
TlSI I'-aJ io'a'slUhJ^ul^ing right turn with about 15- of bank.
Event:il-l62
BLUE 1 that the HIO was probably ^22 ^1 ibout 1000 ft AOL. background IR
even before this maneuver. Since '.he target was at aoo-w auuu i.. « ,
radiation may have affected tracking.
The ml.slle appeared to ^ulde towards the HIQ. but th. missile passed about 1000 ft
behind and '•00 ft below the MIG.
»rt.r . 360- turn. BLUE PU... <BL.E I a.. 2, t.e„ Tjn. 2
turt..d toward tno «"t for «i!r«». ""'SS-"" The SlSriKd BLUE 1 aAd 2 turr.od
... two MT'7-173 ("I- J. 3) " Soth th. «IGs and SLUE 1
jif. 'rrr^dt'^SLS^rdtf „i;-:^/?.;"«=^"-?;. ""K.; a„d „o .it, ».« -"--o-
BLUE nuh. p.3„d :«= P and 3 on the !,» . h«d on In a rl.«
continued a hard right turn, they =JJJ«!*.?""''",^;°.i%'"u„ out. BLUE I and 2 »ere
?i\Je"ric?Si;r^r%So5 1^'^ F ".i' o J2 f.%t;r.-;t-Mis fi^-
S:„%" l":"d r^er^'ao-K t'o" ?ur'r;-i.%>i.'r.^d^I,%:ro2.°1nt^° ran^se^f-BLU. I and 2 „ .
BLUE 1 started "^.n, at 1000 t. 1300 ft r»M and .rter a^burst^of^200^to^.OO^^
round., BLUE 1 .« ;Se r;?S'e? at =u=h an anjl. that BLUE 1 felt
up for manual gace. ™' I", ^ c- \ 'r«it that had the MIO heen turning
S!:x.rt!;^%"r'o;.'"i«5 : c rn^r'hrvr^en'jc^ai^i;}! 'isi JS.... .u app..r.d t, ».
haraer, tne proper xeau n^v,^. or i-? ka-71 strike camera.
In the left wing root as recorded by BLL.C. 2 s (vA-^i sifim c«B«jro.
ornc 1 «* !«;•» to 20° anzle-off ani down to 800 ft range. A.- "he MIO begin to
BLOE I fired at 15 to „^"|^'' * t^chtened his turn to the left and entered
AS the MIG started to out turn BLUE 1 and 2, BLUE 1 Started a high yo-yo to the
outside to position for another firing pass.
At thi, ti.e. BLUE 2 -"^^J-tSoiriooS-n' .' ^e iTttl 'frrS^ "*BL5ri and
I ;;nra?;d v-ii^i =?j„rL:fef.?^.i .^^^i.-. t^i; ;j«.rj??!rhanh:'r.nJi-ru„.
?2?ti ;ji:j.nrierarp5?oSj/5sr;?.?°^s»t;=-..i"?hi tss^^rihia ti™.
'on emaa a .Inale MI(3-17 (MIO-7) nad. >. short head-on ineffectual firing paaa, and
contlnl.5 to the north as BLUE night continued sou-.h-eat.
BLOE 1. ».th BLUE 2 on the |';°;:'l[ot"*?.o''MSr««
HIO 7. BLUE 1 and 2 ""f ^^^JnJk^^f SrOa "ir. abJut 10o6 to 1500 ft rang,
at 5 o'=lo«J '5?^'?" ""h^rJuSd. p«i c^e? tSe canopy and the muzzle flaahe. on
u,d ..r. "--'Jf- igj"^- biXt 1 iSd" wnt to afterburner and negative g and de.c.nded to
3SS SrtoS'frah™ ih.^uid. Ti. ?llsht rapldl, ouUl.tan.ed the «IC. and ,afel,
™!".ngagement. were .11 •"«.»°J,J;,'rtC 'eSagS'nn/IEur'rtighfiS lltll
163OH and 153SH.
1.
Phc
Eventni-163
Aircraft rrivolVetlT" Four F-105D3 va one HIO-17
Result: One MIG-17 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»01»M/105°25'E
PRIHART HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlrc: Tb April 19,67/l636H
your '?-:00Lo (BLUE FUHht) were nart of a strike force attacking JCS l8.38f the Dan
nn: Highway Causeway, 1? tU'-s west of Hanoi. BLUE ?li»;ht was the flak suppression
fUpht and le-J. iii-: strike ftjrce to the tartr/zt. The other aircraft In the strike force
which encounte-vt MIGs ionc flight did not) are those of Events II1-161 and -162, The
IT.O'.l HAND su^.p'.»rt aircraft ([or this strike were those described In Event III-16<I. *he
CAP aircraft wtro the fliphL of Event 111-153.
2. KISSION ROUTE
Departed Takhli and a
Channel 97, over the same
MAS the reverse route.
er aerial refueling proceeded to the target, directly from
rpute as the strike flights ^Event III-161 and -162). Egress
3. AIRCRAFT C0.'tri6URATI0»S
F-105D BLUE 1 , 3
BLUE 2. ti
1 - QRC-160 Pod
2 - <<30 gal tanks
k - CBU
Pull 20mm load
1 - QPC-li'O Pod
2 - ^50 e;»l tanks
1» - CBU
Full 20m7\ I
1 - AIM-5B (SIDEWINUERi)
IFF: BLUE 1 operating!, BLUE 2, 3, 1 on standby
TACAN on receive only
Camouflaged
MIC- 17
Drop tanks
Dark Olive drab
TO ENCOUNTER
4, FLIGHT CONDITrONS PRIOF
Weather ; Clear, with 15 mile visibility
BLUE
1 5
a6oo-io,ooo ft
Southwesterly
^50 kt
6000-9000 lb
(Egreaslng) In a right hand turn
Altitude ;
rieadinRT
Sp^fd :
Fuel State;
Flight Formation :
Pod, almost line abreast, element on the left, BLUE 2 on the right of Lead.
MIG warnings so they knew that MIG^ were airborne. On egress
The Mia-17 was chasing an P-105F.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight had heard
BLUE 1 saw a MIG-17 and callled it out.
6. ACTION INITIATEC
After making a posltijve identification of the MIO-17, the flight attacked.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 set up a SIDEWII^DER attack and fired but the missile failed to guide. As
BLUE 1 turned off to follijw the missile's f light , BLUE 2 closed In and fired at the HIG.
'The first burst missed and on the second burst the gun Jammed.
BLUE 1 then moved in and fired 20mra at the HIQ. The KIG exploded, resulting in a
kill.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. fired/Mo. hits)
SIDEVriKDER
AIM-93
BLUE
BLUE
1/0
Cannon
20i!m
1/1
2/0
Remarks
Missile failed to guide. Cannon made a kill.
Qun Jammed on second burst.
Eventlll-i63
9. EQUIPHCNT PROBLCNS
BLUE I - Gun canera did not operate
BLUE 2 - Gun Jammed
10. AIRCREW CONMCNTS
Experience
Total
P-105
Hours
Combat
Hiss ions
76
Hours
BLUE 1 5000 285
BLUE 2 3100 200
CcHwgents "^n this Fnsjunter
BLUE 2 felt that the MIG never them,
attacked was a second MIC.
BLUE 2 Inltlalii- thought the MM 'Shat he
11. DATA SOURCES
BLUE 2, late May 1967
'^Vi'hlie Inbound. BLUE ?light had <-,onniunicated with the supporting CAP
t 2II-I53) but did not contact them during egress or during the MIO
Project Interviews :
Messages . Reports ;
355TFW 281900Z Apr 67 OPREP-3 DOTO-0 lll^JO
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Flight had attacked the target and was egresalng, when BLUE 1 visually acquired
an unluentirted aircraft and called it out. He delayed his attack a few seconds to make
a poBltlv« idtntifleation.
When seen the HIO was at 11 o'clock at 1 to 2 miles range.* passing from BLUE
Plight's left to right. The :-:iG was In a right level turn {20* to 30" of bank) heading
approximately 330°, and was trying to set up an attack on an P-IG^F. (From the time and
location, prooably onz of the aircraft from Event I :i-l6U) . a: the time of sighting,
BLUE Flight was at 8000 to 10,000 ft altitude and t; * MIC" was at ?0OG to 7000 ft altitude.
Although previous MIC warnlrigs had been heard BLUE Plight was not warned of this
specific I'.LCi.
aircraft (Event
enc(}unter.
When the MIG was identified, BLUE FMeht turned Into trail of the MIC. It was
surmised that the MIG never saw BLUE Fllg!>r ->ake thi attack. BLUE /light did not Jet-
ttaon stores, but went to afterburner to close on the r^IG .
BLUE 1 closed slightly on the MIO and fired his i_DEWi:iDEH when in range. Although
BLUE l had a tone for to 5 SAConds orlor to launch, the missile failed to guide, and
went high and to the left. V/hen he fired, ELL^ was 1 1/2 miles* from the HIG at about
30*. anele off at the MIG's o'clock. Both BLUE 1 and the MIG were in a right turn
with BLUE 1 pulling 1 1/2 g with about 10» of bank in a slight descent. BLUE 1 had about
200 kt of overtake at launch, and both aircraft were In the 6000 to 8000 ft altitude
region.
As the SIDEWINDER took off, BLUE 1 momentarily broke off his attack and rolled out
to follow its flight. In order to assuro tha; It was not going to guide on the F-105F
that the Min had been attacking. The P-105P at this tine was about ttOOO ft or more
ahead of the MIO and appeared to have the MIO In sight. The P-105P was unloading and
keeping the HIG at an angle off.
The MIC tightened his turn slightly and slid across in front of BLUE 2. BLUE 2 went
to afterburner and made a firing oass but was not In good tracking position. During this
aasa BLUE 2 flr«*d 277 rounds from 1500 to 1000 ft range but observed no hits. BLUE 2
then closed further and with a good tralllns: position attempted to fire again but the gun
Jammed. BLUE 2's gun car.era flln showed the ?-:iG to be In good position for the second
attcmot and the plocer to be on the HIG. The sight was set for miss lles-alr, and BLUE 2
had not attempted to attain a radar lock. During the firing passes BLUE 2 pulled 2 to 3
g'sand was at about 550 kt airspeed. The overtake was between 50 and 100 kts.
Du'-Ine the attack of BLUE 1 and 2, BLUE 2 had maintained position on the Inside of
the rleht turn and the element (3LUE 3 and U) had automatically moved into a coverlnR
nosnion. After his gun ^amned, BLUE 2 tried for a little bit longer to make the gun
fire, then cane out of his right bank and moved outside to 3LUE I's left wing. Aa soon
as BLUE 2 broke off, BLUE 1 came back in and closed on the MIG.
1^
*^hls e3tiT.ate is based en StUE 2«s «*000 to 5000 ft estlnate and the 1 1/2 mile firing
range.
^BLUE ? estimated 1/2 mile.
1B3
Event 111-163
The Mia steepened this turn to about of bank and BLUE I closed to 1500 ft and
nred^i* 'Sm^ cSnSS, BLlfE I eipended approximately 700 round, a. he cloaed from 1500
to 700 ft range, with about IC angle off.
The MIO took hits in ihe left wing and erupted In a Jarge JjU of "
aided the MIO chen began a slov diving right spiral with the left wing on fire.
BLUE I's ttun camera did not work and he did not =ee the MIG impact the B'0"nj
BLUE I iSd 3 oh«ri:rSe Impact and ail members of BLUE Flight observed the resulting
«xploaion at location 21«orN/l05''25'E at l63oH.
BLUE Plight took another look around for any other HIO aircraft, and not seeing
any then continued to egress.
EventIII.i6<>
Aircraft Tr.volved: Pour P-105s V8 one MlO-17
Result : Mo danase
Vicinity of Kncounter; 21-02'N/105'*30'E
1. PRtNARV RISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOK
Date/Tloe: 28 April 1967/1636H
Pour P-1059 (BLUE Plight) were on an IRON HAMD mission In support of the strike
fore* atcactclnit JCS 16.38.
2. MISSION Roure
Departed TaJchU and In^ressed overland. Se* Event HI-I58 for general route after
leaving Channel 97.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
At least three of the aircraft in BLUE Plight were P-105F8, and carried AGM-ftSa.
Other stores unknown.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. flred/Ko. hits)
20mm Cannon
BLUE 1 at least 1/0
BLUE 2 I/O
11. DATA SOURCES
Hesaages. Reports :
DIA Summary of Air Engagenents
355 TFW 281300 0PPS:P-3 2070-tJ ll'«39
RED BARON MIG Incident Sunnary
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLU2 Plight provided IHON HAND suDoort. Durln?. the mission ten MIG-lTs were sighted.
In addition BLUE 1 and 2 engaged and fired on one MIC-17. One AGM-U5 was launched at a
PANSOHG signal with unknown results.
Event III-t65
nrcraft Involved: "Jj^y^ '„iG.l7r
Result: »c damage .a/io5-22*E
'.umlty of Encounter. 20 «
tM tarc«t« carried
a
9
9
I
Mi^mther : Generally
Clear. vUlbillty IG i8ll«
State:
3:
5000 ft
Unknown
Unknown
Unkr..-n»n
3
1
I'
^ ttTTiE 1 saw three more
5. I«TUL "^"CTIOH ; 3 - J JS?'
HIO-175 at a [ ^ 3, and U broke down
6. KTIOH INniAT,£0 ^e had »^n. BLUE 2. 3,
BLUE 1 »tart.^d to attack the two
^ to the left. I
7. Sni>»^TIOK OEVEUOP^HT , g,,,i„g °"„?tirdeftectlon. The lead
BLUE Flight .Attacked the t« «IGs wi^ second KIG «it^^ Joii"m%or an attack. BLUS
on a head-on pa»J and another^b HIGs then started
MIC fl«*^»\^StirDurnSr and exlf.<» the area.
Plight f^r.t to a! -erou*
I
a. ORDNANCE
CMo. flred/«o. hits)
GUH
BLOE 1
ICG 1
9 EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
bLuE 1 - HO 5li^t reticle
10. AIRCREW CaMMENTS
c*^«trience
Total
I/O
BLUE 1
Hburg.
3900
P-105
Hourj
900
Combat
y.l salons
U8
SSS .inc. M"
C0S2£n£i-2IL-^^ , th^a event .es to -^'liV^rr^^tSf from'Sni' "
aide and a single from tn ^^^^^ expccte...
-The aica f-rr.ed nuch more rap-ai>
186
[i
Event 111-I65
11. OATA SOURCES
Project Intgrvlewa ; BLUE I, 6 JtiM 1967
Messages. ri»?portg ;
388 TPV 281405 April 1967 OPREP-4 001 1367
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Pllf^hc was on an IRON HAND mission. They had Cirei once and observed the Impact
or one missile and th<? explosion of the white phosphorous warhead. The launch sequence
was for all four ril^ht ncmbers to pull up and each launch one ailsslle simultaneously.
After the shrike launch, the flight had a SAM launch Indication and the fllsht broke
around to the left.
BLIJE Pllprht proceeded to an area west of Koa Lac airfield (which was still operational
at this tlmo)^ and while in the vicinity of ZO^SS'N/IOS'SS'E on a heading of 350' at 5000
ft altitude, BLUE 1 saw two MXG-lTa at 12 to 1 o'clock 3 to 4 miles away. The MIGa were
turning around a hill and appeared to be turned toward the north.
BLUE 1 called them out and BLUE ?ll(;ht started to attack. At ibout the sane time
that BLUE 2 saw these two MTGs, BLUE 3 saw three more MIG-17s; however, BLUE 1 never saw
the latter three MlGs.
BLUE 1 proceede'f to attack the two Mia-17s that he had seen while BLUE 2, 3* and U
broke down and to the left. Due to the range and the consequent time lapse, BLUE 1 waa
able to set up his sight for air to air. However, on firing, no sight picture was avail-
able.
Both BLUE 1 ind the lead MIC-17 (MIS 1) pulled in toward each other, ending up In a
head-on pass. BL'JE 1 observed muzzle flashes In three positions on the MIO's nose, and
BLUE 1 fired 150 to 200 rounds at him (the gun camera film did not show the flaahea on
the MIO's nose). MXO 1 passed about 30 ft below BLUE 1.
Immediately behind MIG 1 was the wlngnan (MIG 2) and BLUE 1 got a shot at this NIG
also, with a little deflection, on a quartering head-on shot. BLUE 1 thought that he
observed two hits on the outboard rlRNt itlng. However, the pun camera film did not con-
firm this. However, the gun camera film did indicate a puff of smoke came from the MIO
which waa unnoticed by BLUE 1.
After passing MIS 2, BLUE 3 reported that the other three MIQs were eonlng In for
an attack. BLUI Flight Jettisoned four CBU-ZI and 12 MK-82 In the vicinity of
21^0l'N/105^19'E, went to afterburner and exited the area.
I
I • j
ii'. . '
I
■i
\
•r.
i
187 I
Event ril-l66
Wrcraft Involved : Pour P-1058 « one MIC-17
Result: Slshtlng only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21-05 'H/105"^0»E
1. FRIKARY MISSION AND TACTlCAl SITUATION
0*te/Tlme: 28 April 1967/Unknown (TOT was 1650H)
itouT. P-10«50a fBLUE PlUht) was one of four strike flights from K^^*^ attacking the
Hwiol'SIlJwS'Sli «S5:!!feniiS Shoj3 (JCS 20.OO). The flight m Events Ill-l.a and -165
were other neabers of thla strike force which encountered Mics.
11. DATA SOURCES
HeegftKey, Reports ;
38eT7V 28111052 Apr ^7 OPREP-H
DOX 1367
U. URKATIVE OESCRIPTIOH c.c
BLIIE Ml«ht Struck the target at 1650H and orbited in the vicinity of 21*09'N/10* ^5 E
RKCAP fir tie aScraft lost in Event 111-158. Sometime during the ''^"lo". ^LUE
niS? ib.e?Je5 on. 5?S!l,t at 10.000 ft altitude. Two F-^s were in pursuit of the MIO.
BLUE Plight carried !aIH-9B amament (at least three), and 2* M-117 boats.
During the mission. [blUE Flight observed t..o SAM bursts at 12,000 to lH.OOO ft
altitude, to 1 mile away at 12 o'clock.
I
I
I
I
i
i
188
Event ZZI-167
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-I05s and one
MIC-17
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20»50'N/105'10'E
r. MIMRT HtSSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlae: 28 April 1967, l653H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
It. MRRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight from aane ALPA target as that of Event III-165 saM HXQ below;
NIO turned In; night punched tanks and accelerated away.
EvmtIII.l68
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSa and one
M1C-X7
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 21^*05 *N/105'*20*E
I. PRINART RISSIOn AND TACTICAL SITUATION
DAt*/TlB*: 29 April 1967, 17Q0K
II. DATA SOURCE
.CINCPACTLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight egressing from same ALPA target as that of Event III-165 saw
a no at 10,000* being pursued by two P-<>s.
Bitent III-169
Aircraft Involved: One RP-101 vs one MIG-21
Results: Sighting ^
Vicinity of Encounter: 2I'OO*N/lO5"0O*£
I. PRINARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIpN
Date/Time: 29 April 1967, lllOH
II. DATA SOURCE
CIMCPACPIT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Photo A/C covering Hoa Lac airfield fired on by SA-2 when at 15,000*; MIO
sighted at k o'clock, 6 miles at same time; MIG cllniblng; no further sighting.
1 1^ I
Aircraft Involved:
ev«ntIII-170
Pour P-1059 va Cmo KtG>21»
and two HI 0*179
1.
12.
tIct
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter:
Hanoi
ICAL SITUATION
1967, 1615H
PRIHAfiT MISSION AND
Date/Tine: 29 April
DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Starr Study 6-68.
RARRATtVC OCSCRIPTIOI
Plak auppreaslon night ror strike gn bridge In Hanoi saw two HIO-lTs at
8000* and two MIQ-21s at 17.000' while inbound. ffIG CAP waa aircraft of SvenelII-173'
Event III-171
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105a vs one KZQ«178
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: Hanoi
1. PRINART HISS ION AttO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 29 April
DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Starr St\idy 6-68.
U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight
atten^ted turn, but
1967, 1615H
I
I
i
i
3
3
i
n Hanoi bridge saw MIG-3 minutes before target at 8500'; KIG
waa lost, MIC CAP was aircraft of Event III-173.
1. FMHARY MISSION AND
Event III-172
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs vs one KIG* 17
Reaulta: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: Hanoi
FACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 29 Apri; I967, 1615H
n. d;va SOURCE
C3NCPACPLT Starr study 6-68.
11. NARRATIVE OESCRtPUON
1
9
I
i
I
Another strike flight on saine target as aircraTt Jn Events 111-170, -171, -172
and -175 saw MIO whlUe pulling ofr; no attempt to engage since ftIO CAP eeen nearby.
190
3
i:
r
c
r
i.
Event IIZ-173
Aircraft Involved: Pacr P-ftCs va thirteen HIG-I7s
Result: One MIG-l? destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter; 20«»»9'»/l05*3^'E
1. PRIHfcRY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TL-ne: 29 April i967/l6l2H to lo?bii
Pour F-«»C5 {SLUE Plight) were on a MIGCAP nl;,slon for » strike on JCS 13.00. (There
la no report of the F-105 f^rc- encounter Im", KlOa.)
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight left Danana: and refueled on WHITE ANCHOR. From alr-to-alr refueling,
tie flight proceeded direct to Channel 97 » and then direct to 20'*55*H/i05''37 'E. The
return route was to Channel 97 and past strike refuel on WHITE ANCHOR.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
BLUE I. 2. 3. H
U AIM-7E
4 AIM-9a
1 600-gal. centerllne tank
1 370-gal. outboard tank
1 QRC-160 pod
mG~17 (1-13)
Not MIG-17D
12 were silver
I was camouflaged nottied brown/green with no narklnga.
Some arred with alr-to-alr rr.lsslles
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Scattered clouds with bases at 10,000 ft.
BLrtE
1 2 3 i*
Visibility was 10 milea.
Altitude ;
HeaflingT
Speed :
Puel State :
Plight Formation ;
5. INITIAL DETECTION
12,000-1'4 ,000 ft
About 160° (In right turn)
5tlO KTAS
Full Internal
Pod
MOTEL had called HIGs In the Incident area but therp were nc specific warnings for
the MIGs engaged. BLUE Flight was at 20° 1^9 '.V105°3^ 'E when QLUE U s^hted four HIG-17s.
The strike force also callecl the MIGs to BLUE Flight. The MIGs were at 20*52*30 N'
105*32'30"E heading 290° at 3,000 to 5,000 ft AGL. When seen, the MIGs were at 9 o'clock
to BLUE Plight. The baekseater was the first to see the "ilfis in SLUE 3.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight turned to attack the Miaa.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The flight of four MIGs split, with BLUE 1 and 2 going after the lead element, and
BLUE 3 and spearated and engaged the trailing eleT.ent.
BLUE 1 and 2 attacked the HICs and BLUE 1 fired an AIM.-9B which downed a MIG-17.
BLUE 1 and 2 were subsequently attacked by numerous KlG-lTs which fired both cannon and
alr-to-alr missiles. During the engagement BLUE 2 was hit and destroyed by 37/5 « AAA
fire.
BLUE 3 and 1 engaged several MI0-17s two elercents of which fired on BLUE 3 and «
with no damage.
3. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
MIG 5
MIC 6
(Ko. flred/Ho. hits)
ATM-9 B A AM Cannon
1/1
2/0
2/0
Remarks
AIM-9B recorded a kill
Two bursts of three seconds each
Launched at DLL'E 2
191
4»
(No. rir«d/No. hits)
AIH-9B
AAN
Cannon
NIG 9
NZO 11
9. CQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
None.
10. AIRCREU CONNENTS
Experience ;
Event 1-173
Rewarka
At least 1/0 fired at BL'JE 3 and K
At least 1/0 fired at BLUK 3 and 4
Total
Hours
blOO
Hours
350
Combat
Missions
60-70
BLUE 3 (front)
Ceaaents on this Er.countlgr ;
MICs were very agrejaalve and would not fight tn the vertical. The HICs wcjld not
follow the P-Ua In a climb and stayed near the deck. As the F-tts attacked, a pair cf
MIGs would be vectored iinto the fllg.ht's 6 o'clock. The MIGs kept then o the defensive.
A gun would have bJen of value to attack the MIG that reversed Into then (HIG-13)*
but this was the only cKanee to use a gun that he had.
The ability to cllrib and unload and accelerate worked well against the KIO-17. Every
tine he looked back there were two MIG-lTs at 7 o'clock.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project J ntervtews
Messages ;
BLUE 3 (front). Hay 1967
366T7W 29171^ April I967 OPREP-3 FASTEL 916
366TFW 3009302 April 1967 OPREP-3 FASTEL 933
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTjlON
BLUE Plight was Inbound with the strike farce when at 161?H, while at 20«53'30"M/
1050 m'E, BLUE ''i slshcejd a SA.^ lift off fron the vicinity of load 15 f'/^I-Cfl3) at the
flight's 3 o'clock position. T?^e night was heading 07 ie?r?os at 17,000 ft AGL at
480 KTAS In Pod • foraatlbn. This SAM did not track and passed low and to the 6 o'clock
position about 300C ft [awayi and was not observed to detonace.
The force continued on the sane heading to 20*58 •K/105* 31 'E when at I6IIH, the
entire flight observed jthree SAMs lift off. One was from Lead -^1 (V!;-002) and two others
at 10 o'clock were from VN-015. When Che SAMs were launched BLUE Flight started a slightly
descending right turn to put the SAMs off to the left, however, the SAMs were not observed
in flight. |-
In the rlyht turn! as the flight passed through a heading of l6c degrees at It, 000 ft
AOL and S^JO kts, BLUE 4 sighted and called a flight of four MIC-lTs. BLUE 3 backseat
sighted the MIGs alr.ost simultaneously. BLUE Flight had Jettisoned the centerline tank
before entering the area, and at the call Jettisoned the outboard tank. BLUE Flight was
at 20*'<9'N/105''3t'E atlthls time. The MIGs which were Just called by the strike f«rce,
were headed 290 degrees, at 300 to 500 ft ACL, and at 20°5r ' 3C"ri/105'32*30"E. They were
at 9 o'clock to BLUE fiighc. The MIGs appeared to be positioning themselves on the last
strike flight. BLUE Flight continued their right turn and started to descend. BLUE 3
lost sight of the MIGslnicmentarlly and during this time the MIG flight split into two
elements with the trailing element about 2 miles to the left and one lalle behind on a
parallel course. BLUE Flight continued to turn to the right and as they turned through
west BLUE 3 saw BLUE 11 and 2 start after the lead element of MICs (HIO 1 and 2), which were
«t 3 o'clock. Shortly! thereafter BLUE 3 saw the second element of MIGs (KIG 3 and 4) off
to their 10 o'clock abbut 5 miles, heading in the sane direction as BLUE Flight.
At I6I6H the elements of BLUE Flight split with BLUE 1 and 2 continuing a right hand
turn after NIG 1 and 2» while BLUE 3 and U about one mile on trail turned left to engage
MIG 3 and Since trie actions of the elements occurred Independently of each other,
the actions of BLUE 1 and 2 will be described first followed by those of BLUE 3 and
BLUE 1 and 2 pressed in on MIG 1 and 2. BLUE 1 was unable to hold lock-on for an
AIM-7 firing due to ground clutter. BLUE 1 then closed to 300J-28CO ft range, and
zero angle off, and 50 kt closure fired a SIDEWiriDER at MIG 2. The time
position was ai^Ol ' rJ/iOS" 19 ' ?: . 3LUE 1 had 1 g on the aircraft at firing
ACL, and 5«;0 KTAS. TJp.e missile guided nicely and closed to wl:hin about
MIG 2 broke hard right (estimated 5-6 g*s) following MIG 1. The missile
ever the left wing anijl detonated about 100 ft forward of the MIG's nose,
as a kill due In partfto the sighting of wreckage by BLUE U .
iTjnpdtatoly after the missile detonation, BLUE 1 saw HIO L contlnuf to bres.'< right.
BLUE 1 and 2 unloadedl and pulled up, loslnic sight of MIG 1 and 2. BLUE 1 and 2 levelec off
at about 13,000 ft in' the vicinity of 21«'0U'30"N/105'*26*E; at this tlr.e (iGlEH) BLUE I
192
with
was 1617H and the
and was at 6OOO ft
100 ft, when
passed about 50 ft
This was credited
11
3
a
a
3
3
(3
a
1
0
a
Event III-173
observed two MIG-17 (MIC 5 and 6) closing on their 6 o'clock dosI'-Igh from 3000 ft range.
At the sane tine 3LL'E 1 also saw two more KlG-lTs («XG 7 and 9) at his 1:30 o'clock
P'>sltlon,
BLUE 1 and 2 attempr.ed to accelerate, unload and continue theJr turn to egress from
the highly coordinated and massing MIG force. At this tlsie with KIC 7 and 8 In front and
MIO 5 and 6 behind BLUE I observed a SAM detonation at co-altltuie (13,000 ft ACL) at
o o'clock about 250 ft range. The burst was white In color, and a sharp buffet of short
duration was fen as a direct result of the blast.
At this tine ?'.l*E I observed MIC 5 (the lead MIG) at 6 o'clock fire about two bursts
of 3 seconds duratlsn each fpon his canncn. 7hese rounds passed about 15 ft above ana
left of BLUE I's cancpy. Still unloading and accelerating BLUE 1 and 2 winged over from
13,000 ft ACL down to 6000 ft.
BLUE 2 was In position on the Inalde of the turn, still attempting to disengage from
the MIGs. As DLUE I and 2 bcttcntrd out, with BLUE I at 6000 ft and BLUE 2 at about USOO
ft, BLUE 1 backseat cftse.-ved a heavy concentration of ground fire. BLUE Plight was at
20'*5tt 'N/IOS" 32 'E, and the AAA fire, presumably 37/57irjn, cane from 20''52' 15"N/105'' 32 ' 30"F,
and alnost enveloped SLUE 2. BLUE 2 rolled over to tr.e right about 135 degrees of bank,
45 degrees nose -Icwr. , and dove towjird the ground. The time was i622H. Just prior to
Impact BLUE i frcntseat observed the white part of a chute. BLUE 2 was observed to
Impact at 20*54 • 30"f!/l05*3'»" lO-E. At no tlise was any beeper signal or voice conwiunlcatlon
h«ard.
As BLUE 2 rolled over, engulfed in heavy ground fire, BLUE 1 front observed two alr-
to-elr missiles launched from the second of the two MIC-173 on the talis of BLUE 1 and
2 (MIO 6). He saw these alsslles drop, one fran each aide from the wings of MIC 6 and
launch toward the spot where BLUE 2 had been. The mlssllea, unidentified as to type,
went off Into space and were not observed to detonate.
At l62ftH BLUE 1 accelerated to 550 KTAS at 6000 ft AGL, and reversed hla course '-o
heading of 250 degrees and Joined BLUE 3 and U. BLUE 1 was unable to contact ETHAN to
Initiate a SAR effort.
BLUE 3 and » had followed BLUE I and 2 during their initial right descending turn
after MIGs 1 and 2. Vhlle r.eadlng afc.ut 290 degrees descending through UOOO ft AGL at
550 KTAS, and following sLLE 1 and 2 by about a nlle, BLUE 3 and t^ spotted KIG 3 and «i
at 10 o'clock low atiout 5 nlles distant. MIG 3 and -* were abei.m and slightly south of
BLUE 1 and 2, who appeared tc be unaware of the presence of MIO 3 and k.
eLUE 3 and t turned slightly left to engage MIG 3 and H. As BLUE 3 and k cane in
MIC 3 and saw then and started up to the right. BLUE 3 and h overshot due to their
high speed and so they pulled up. The MIGs out-turnfd BLUE 3 and '-i so BLUE 3 and H kept
climbing. As they continued twg more MIC-lTs (MIG 9 and 10) closed on their 6 o'clock
firing. The MIGs were In range and BLUE U saw the shells pass his aircraft.
Prom that time on BLUE 3 and ^ were on the defensive. Although BLUE 3 and ti used
the vertical, the MIGs would follow only a little way up and then would bi-eik off. As
BLUE 3 and k would attenpt to dive to reattack, two -uore MIC-178 would attack. This
happened at least one more time (MIG 11 and 12) with these MIGs also firing at BLUE li .
During one of the passes that BLUE 3 and 4 made, they were coming down in a t^ght
turn accelerating from UOO kts. There were two MIGs at their 6 o'clock and another
MIC-17 (HIC 13) ca.T.e into view and crossed Into the inside of BLUE 3 an- 4's turn.
MIO 13 then did a rudder reversal back into BLUE 3 aiid *». ending up in a head-on pass,
and passed BLUE 3 about 100 ft away. » ao,
BLUE 1 subsequently Joined BLUE 3 and 4, who were In a left turn. BLUE 3 and H had
MIGs on their tall at this time, who broke off when BLUE 1 approached. BLUE 1 did not
obaerve these MIGs.
^^"^ 3 " egresaing BLUE * saw an aircraft burning on the ground at
L.i",^" vicinity of 20«55*H/:05"l8'E, which was later surmized to be the MIG 17 that
BLUE 1 had downed with the missile.
During their engagement with the MIGs, BLUE 3 and M's altitude varied from 200 ft
AGL to 6000 ft; while their speed varied between 400 kts and Hach 1.1, Tho MIGs rntver
climbed above 3000 ft.
Of the returning members of BLUE Flight four crew members validated nln*» MIG-17 3
and two crew members validated an additional four MIG- 17s. One crew mensber validates the
camouflaged MIC* 17.
Aircraft Involved:
Event III-lTft
Two P-1053 V3 two HIClTs
Two P-lO!is vs one NIG-31
1. PRINARY NtSSION AND
Oaee/Tlae: 29 April 196T/1700H
Ing
Pour P-lOSs (cLUE
JCS 20.00 (location
Result: One P-1'15 lost/one P-IOS uoma^ed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21'30'H/iOit*30'S to
2l»12*H/10H»l8'E
TACTICAL SITUATION
lix^it) were the flak suppression flight in the strlSt^ force attack-
21«03'N/105*'53*E). A description of the other M 10 en-ioantcrs of
this strike force are contained In Events 111-165 and -166. *fter hitting the tar^^et.
BLUE 1 and 2 were separated froni and behind BLUE 3 and U, Only SLUE 3 and 4 ^encountered
the HIG-2i. BLUE 1 and 2 separately encountered two fiic-l7s. ?here was no CAP aircraft
for this Blsslon.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight departed Korat at 1505H, and had pre-strlke refueling on RED ANCHOR. Prom
Channel 97 BLUE Plight then proceeded direct to the target on a heading of 010* at 16,000
ft. On egress '.fte flight proceeded to 2l'*k^'H/10U'>U6'Z, and then back to C.'iannel 97.
BLUE d landed in Udom jaue to low fuel.
3. AIRCRAFT CORFIGURATlION
P-1C5D :
BLUE 1. 2
3-IcBU-21
l-;CBU-29
(I^rob 2-460 gal
tanks and pods . ]
Bl probably
carried 1 AZM-9B
BLUE 3
i*-C3U-2«t
l-qRC-160 pods
1-AIM-9B
BLUE 3
1- CBU-Zd
2- «RC-l60 pods
2- 4 SO s»X tanks
HIC-21
Clean silver
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Scattered to
broken clouds 10,000 to 12,000 ft
Haze at lower ?ltltudes-
TTslblllty was good (about 15 miles) above clouds. The weather was generally clear
over the target ai^d bail out area, and broken In the incident area.
BL.
T
9.000 ft
34b»
BLtJE
1 IT
18,000 ft
220"
450^500 CAS
9*000 lb
separated from BLUE 3 and 4 with BLUE 1 and 2 about 10 miles behind.
Alti tu d e:
Headln*; :
Speed :
Fuel State :
Plight Formation
BLUE 1 and 2
BLUE H was on BLUE 3's' right.
5. INITIAL DETECTION j
BLUE 1 and 3 headli j 3*'0* and at 9000 ft, saw two MlG-17s at 5000 ft heading l4o* and
turning right. This dightliig occurred previous to that of BLUE 3 and 4.
BLUE 3 and 4 in tlbe vicinity of 2X''30'N/104«30 'E saw an u.nldentlfied silver aircraft
at 7 o'clock position 16 to 8 miles away. BLUE 3 and 4 were heading 220" at 18,000 ft.
The unidentified aircraft was on a conversion course; BLUE 3 and 4 were alert for HIGs
since they had heard ^LUE 1 and 2 call MIGa.
6. ACTION INITtATCO
BLUE 1 and 2 turned to follow the HIG-17S that they had seen. BLUE 3 and 4 turned
into the unidentified aircraft.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 and 2 lost the MIC-17s In a low deck of cloud.t over Thud Rldf;e, hase, and low
setting sun. BLUE l and 2 then broke off and continued te egress. During erress they
heard BLUE 3 and « encounter the MIG-21.
BLUE 3 and ^ were able to force the KIG-21 Initially to tw-rshoot but the f'lG then
executed a barrel rcil, xrd despite the -Ttorts of BLUE 3 and '-i to uiuocd, aai to cum
and accelerate away in afterburner, the MIG gained a firing position. The i-;iG-21 shot
down BLUE 3 and da.'aaged BLUE 4 before breaking off.
[
^ Even* III-17U
a. OROKANCC '
(No. flred/No. hits)
P robaM <' C.-if.ron
*^ ^•''•'■•^ ^^2' BLUE 3 lost and I LUE H danag-d
9. EQUIPMENT PR08LEHS
Ir.oporatlvi!* '° P^^P«^riy tver the target. BLUE 3 QRC-;50 pod was
10. AIRCREW COK.MEHTS
Expepienee
Total p. If.*; Cf.:r.l-.r
SLUE /I 1000 150 50
CoTTicnta on t.v^tr Encounter
preci:S:d"32cSii=r.revKl1;.. '^^'^ had . good overtake, which
11 . DATA SOURCES
Protect Ir.tervi*.... 3HJE t, 9 June 6/
Messages, frescrt .t :
388 TFW ?a:3i^: O?.-!?-;, DCF 1360
Air Staff LSA.- XCX3 'S7-.-.{;7 Cc-cat Uss F-105D SK 53-1151
12. HARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOfj
BLUE ?U.-},t was cn a '"'-k -.i-..
diz-ectly to tne -^ar^e. f ro~ 'c:^nn"l' 07 "r-l^fr" ^^"fu"'"'''' "^"^^ -'"''^O- "^^e ^^isf^' proceeded
target. A. freJGu; thrrSfe^e^n^f of'""''J?Lr?';. = '^*= ^^^--^-^ 3ldes of t.e
mllL-s when they ca.T^e off t-" 'a—eT Thl rwr^r^^*"" -eparated la'.eraily several
'•''^i'''^ :n K:-cVi6:cbb ft v.-?' n attacked t:.e target frcn r. headlnir of
AGL (about ?50D ft r-'-TL) ancJ recover-/ w-"4.in l^f' i?* release aitltade was 80nc ft'
BLUE Plleht dropped on a ^o^Sinrcf's d?i;i'«i^J''6BU ^J'^'^'^ '"^"^^ and
and were later Jettisoned. ^ failed tc release over the target
^- flight then turr.-d to a headi'>c- tldo „ ^ ,
2 turned to foUaw and started to ac^a^k -h^'vr'r: \ . , ^^'^ ^'^ ^ ^^^--^ BLUE 1 an'd
l l "'■''S - ^•■'^ on -.ne plT.ned cour^r 2^1,^5"^?^ arprcxlr.ately 6c .-ll.s ahead
and 2 heard ELUE 1 call aLL;: ftfa?"?!:., ?~ eJ,?J2"!= I'J". (-'t abcut 1704H) BLUE i
that he hit. ahd heard ELU£-r;epiJrcn„"t!ac/by" ^im^^l'^'" ''^"^ 3
f ; a, 0.?.'"Ldlaf a'd"lT.rr:r'?.?'.' cL™':i',1"'S?„ri^|-' "l-'" -^ich „aa ,ive„
L: the dowr.ed alrc-^rt cu-n'r- rn- r"2 ■ =r ^ ^ observed what was assuned to be
'''T^ri::..:": r^^":"^"^^ ^^^^^^^^
f.' back tc'Iards^ChSniel $r\V^dI ■'poJI'*^!! "^f"'^ '^"^ o-'' "-'^d Rldce and started
k They had >-.eard ^he -^n^ou-;, c^B'-J- / .'n. : altitude with a ^peed of 'i'^O-'^oS K^AS
received no oth-ir ;;arr:?rr v-.^^ 7"'-- - "T;. for :^IGs. How^ve^. they
tanecusiy observer Jn^iSlder-V'U .u'.^a'^'r^r^' ?J^30;ri/loi;=30- BLUE 3 and J^iJSul-
' ■ I -2nd >.ere in a clearln^ -Jd ^^r^r'M^'''", ".^ " '^lo"'^^ O"
stratus type ciauda with to,.= at 20 COO 'r hottn^' w ^ ^^^^^ some
mountain top. It ... ..ok., to ove?^S=?. ".?^??JS?Iur. "^Sfcl^ar l^^^^^
. -'^-^-^^ Sl^r^-^n^nco Lype as unknown. <:a.n.non is ir.dicH-:.d based on BLUE
195
Event III-lTt
When seen, the alrcrJft -as at 7 o'clock, coaltltao- 2-3» nU" '^^ aircraft
«aa on • conversion course ind had considerable overt-ike
BLUE 3 and U started e loft level turn Into the an: lentl fled aircraft. JLU^J J«tt.
bOned tanks and followed Mediately by BLUE 3. As t.ne *l«-'=-''art closed It -as «^CRn
as a rignter-type and then a MIC-21. 7ne MIC turned wl'h nhe flUht -hlch. on recognizing
the aircraft as a 'MO, 3I.UE 3 ani " unloaded to accelerite.
BLUE ft was m afterbLrner -na since It «as on '.ne rlirnt started to cross ^^er behind
BLUE 3 m onler ♦:c stay it.slde of the turn, Aa BLLE cro3S-*d ovei , he feU a
took a hJt. (One hcle in[ speed orake petals and one cn the afterburner can.) BLUE u did
not observe the MIG flrlnl.?.
The MIG appeared to o/ersh Dot . with e crossing ir.gle of 30« to |«0-. The JIC ca^
hlKh (about UOOO ft abovJ the flUht) and overshot to the rir.ht. BLUE U looked to the rlKht
and momentarily observed the Mn high, as If he had >xecuted a barrel roll.
tfhen ne»t seen the rllG was able to reposition o^i.lnd I:LUE 3 and i« tt about 1
distancJ BLUE 3 Snd% were ftlU In an afterb.-mer iescenaln? turn. Attempting to lose
rhi S?? BLUE ft ther sawTthe underside of the 3 and assMsed that the HIO was flrlr* at
SS:.'!' irieSaJelS Jh^UnJr Su-E i called that he «a3 hit. (This was the only .ornunlca-
tlon from BL'JE 3-) ..... ^
, descending through lO.OOO ft. BLUE 3 1'™*'*!^^^-' ^dv-fm;
fire and ssioke In BLUE 3's aft section, and xt?- "^-^'ir?^- r,^-.
-craft BLUE 3's aircraft started to descend and erupted In fire
■■approitlP.ately 1 silnute after initial aircraft danage.
JuE ft was doing wide "S" turns In an attespt to keep both }
dLUE H saw the MIG a few times during this period out the «!□ aia
aLL'E ft did not observe any firing.
BLUE 3 ejected at icoo ft AOL at ITOftH on z headl.v of 2ft0», at "PPfo;!"*"^^ ^1° 13' H/
lOft-lS-E? BLul ft sa- -.fo black objects separate from 3L-JE 3's aircraft and the aircraft
impact. BLUE ft did a j5o» turn but was unacle to see a chute or hear a teeper.
After snaylng in 'he Ir.-aedlate area for 1 t. 2 nlr.utes. SLUE « -|?,;^:"f J^^f 5*^'"'
the iScItlon of the MI^ ana was unsure of nls « ^I'^ll due Jo l^^ fuel.
K.trinir r»i to s e A 'Rutc or hcar a beeper. SLbs, ■» lecoveres at uaarn, aue
5; is SU!e \l r;?u^; SSe trir-sufriclent thrust, resulting In unstable airspeed. Tha
cause was battle daaagej.
During the e:.cou.-.tLr BLLT ft did not see the MIG fire, and observed the «1G to be clean
of external stores. ^ ^ . "
Although a SAR waJ initiated, it was called off at lBl8H and BLUE 3 -as listed .«
Blaalns*
JThen hit, BLUE 3
down, and BLUE ft coul'l
ELL'S 3 to abandon the c>
from the right wing ba
During this tine
and the MIG In sight
not press the attack,
TtJIToPREP-S £61205 Uves o-'a miles, but tMs appears to b.' long considering the weather
description and ens
:ing action.
* Kvur.l iII-175
Aircraft Involved; Pour P-105s v:; one KIC-17
Results: .'lo d:ama«;e
Vicinity of Encounter: ZO'SS'lViO'^^oe'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 29 April 1967, l6l5H
II. ' DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTION
Plight egresslng froa same as Event III-172 saw MIG at U o'clock low, went Into
afterburner. Jinked, and lost MIQ.
Evr>nt III-176
Aircraft Invclvt.1: One RF-tC MIG
Result: .Radar contact
Vicinity of E.ncounter: 20®'t7'H/10'»°55'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time': 30 April 1967/C226H
Bance"misslJS."^^"" "^'^ Ingresslng to Hoa Lac airfield or. a reconnals-
II. -OATA SOURCES
1*32 TRW 290011Z OPREP-3 TUOC 03020
12. NARRATIVE
on a heading or 067 degrees at 500 feet AGL when he
M§SiMi?i^hO-c^^^''°!;-^w^ "^"^ ctrosinp; fron 10:30 o'clock. SLCE flight was at
f! nlwi^S ^r-w*"** target run was aborted at 20056 ';j/lC50l6'E
?«2? in valleys and MIG alerts being called for Q?-U and
On egress, at 21°00»N/10'i°JJ8'E. on a heading of 2^^0-21*5 degrees, and 500 f^ev ACr
x-b«nd strobing was again received varylnt; in intensity from 1 to 2 1/2 rinrs and
moving from 5 to 7 o'clock position during Jlnklrig turns. The tir.e was O233H.
in^oJ^^'^^'S^MS^rw":^""*'^ a point about 20 nlles south of channel 97 (20°20';i/
JS^fJ iii^^'' tracked through a scries of hard jinklnr turns and charE«^
in^fi'i^"'^*/"'" 2°*°°° "2^- 3LUE 1 was at 1.0 Moch throu^hcurand''?h^
audio tone (sweep) was steadily becoming more r-ipid. tnrou^ncL. atu cne
Break In the intercept was abrupt with ternlnation of radar signals at 02i4^H tic
visual contact was made with the other aircraft. MIG alerts were received throu^hou"
J!;%he"2eTat%h;j°??^e!' ''^ ' "° '^''•"'^^^ kr.own'to be
4>
I. PRIV
Da*.
II. 0*:
12. KA-
Event III-177
Aircraft Involved: ?ocr K-lOJis vs four
MIC- 175
Reoults: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l«*28»M/106»23'E
TACTICAL SITUATION
: 1967. 0903H
-fly 6-68.
;aht saw at least four sliver wiGs at 10-12,000* above
■'d Involved with other flights.
I. PRir:
Car-.
II. OAT
12. NA^
Event III-178
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-I05a v« two HIG-?
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«29'N/106»27'S
:actical situation
. 1967. 0900H
-jdy 6-68.
:Dfi
.rs for target of Event III-17T saw two HIGs trailing an P-105
'.sly that of Event III-179.
198
V
1^
i:
c
[
c
c
c
r
I..
L
C
1.
Event III-179
Aircraft Involved: Three F-^tCs vs two MIG-^JVs and
two Mia-2l3 ttt 0902H; two HI0-21s
and two HlG'lJz ot 090 3H; four
NIG>175 at 090Sil. Also see
Event III-137.
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: - Route Package VI-A
a. 21'28'30"N/106'»^l'On"E at 0902H
b.
c. 21«2a'N/106'»5'»'E at 0905H
PRIKARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SlTUATIOfl
Date/Time: 30 April 1967/0905H
BLUE 4 aborted due to radio problems after Z5 minutes of flight leavln? three P-4Cs
to fly MIGCAP for strike force of P-105s attacking target at 21«»26'N/106°20'E.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Danan? AB direct TAM ANCHOR direct 21''0?*M.'107"38'E, direct 21*'33'N/106*2U 'E
direct 21'»29*N/106»17'E direct cover over target direct 21«10 •N/107'»15'E direct
21«O8'N/107°38*E direct TAN ANCHOR direct Danang AB.
3. AIRCRAFT CnNFIGUR/TtONS
P-^tC BLUE 1. 2. 3
4 - AIM-7E
ft - AIM-9B
SPARROW
SIDEWINDER
a. MIC-17 HIG 1. 2
b.
All MIGs sliver color - no marklnfcs observed
Cannon
Mia«2I HIG 1. 2
Silver color - no nnrklngs
Alr-to-alr missile
e. 'MIG-17 HIO 1. 2
Silver color
Cannon
4. FLIGHT CnNOITlOfS PRlOk TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Clear. Haze layer at 12,000 ft.
Visibility below haze 7 miles.
a. Conditions at 0902H
BLUE
I 2 J
Visibility above haze 15 plus miles.
rjic
1
Altitude :
Heading :'
Speed ;
night Formation;
10»000 ft
280»
500 kts
'QRC fighting formation"
below 10,000 ft
b. Conditions at CI903H
BLUE
Heading :
Plight Formation ;
Conditions at 0905H
BLUE
Altitude :
He'adlngT
Speed :
T
6000 ft
090°
460 kts
MIG- 21
I f
200*
Loose trail, MIO-lTs in front followed by
NIG-21S. MIC-21S left niC>17s during BLUE*.^
turn and not sighted again.
MIG-21
I ?
(less than 460 kts}
INITIAL DETECTION
At 0902H ?-is trailing high and to rear of last F-105 TUvht lr>eund to tftrc.et
sighted two MIG-173 at 2 o'clock, low posiwion, heading 030".
199
Event III-17V
ehulng four eFtresalnT
10 o'clock low position.
At 0905H, as BLUE
two additional Mir.-21s
headins ZOO".
rr,;: rn:rr cirro "u.^ . ...... «x==
attacking the P-I05a. 0905H. one of the
c. BLUE ni.ht Joiaed in agaln« J"- « ^jji,"" 5 .'^.I; S| 'flJ;* « .{r-to-.lr
tM mfl-21» "<>proa=>-.ini! fro. 3 o'clock J^J^SJJJ'l'J.Uted to .t£ac« th. four J"' P";
HIO-2IS and lost contact with thera.
7. SITUATIOH DEVELOPMENT ^^^^
BLUE fUBht completed ^.^^ht turn to a heading oj JJ^ Zl^ulng the --105=. Tt,.
began closing i>*0 «» °'*r^''^L SlS !7rhad left t^e formation and BLUE never observe'^
MIG-215 originally Jj! "JSe iJa^^IG!l7 and when riG was at 12 o'clock.
theo again. BLUE lead which went to f.ll syaten as the first
depression, lead received a ^°;"ij;;_J°^;/2 5 miles. One second later » second
8. ORDNANCE
(He. fired/No. hits)
SPARROV
AIW-7E
2/0
0/0
SIDEWINDER
AIW-9B
0/0
0/0
R emarks
Hired two AIM-7E "full systen"
Fired cannon
Plred one mlssxle (BLUE flight uwble to
ascertain whether ATOLL or AU^ALIJ
SUU-16 gun would have been more effective weaoon in this eneountei
BLUE 1
BLUE 3, 3
Mias->17-1*2
NIG8-21-l»->
9. COUIPMCHT PROBLEM
None
10. AlRCRti CnHHEMtS
* Proa BLUE lead
n. DATA SOURCES
Messages , Reports:
366 TPW JOPPiP OPPEP-3
366 TPW JOPR^P OPPEP-3,
Raytheon Conf J
,2. riARRATIVt DESCRIPTION ^^^^^^^ ^
BLUE flight n°26%/Ic6'2o"! (k^^ «• aborted due to ^a"*!:"^ P^°^J«?»
of P-105a attacking t^r^^t at trailed hlch and to rear of last ^-^Q^f^'il^*
,Uh no aiatlngulsnabl. !;ar,ilr.?! in a loo.e . a o'clock lo. fosltlon. The ;-.-0-17
?'\i;riSrp"ont.:S l^^r-^-l^nr:'^ <.^» .t t« 7-105.. blue cane.
« roll in a,ai...... '-.e «I=s.
SJ|i^5n!^4rra°.ln^rn^''a,^'atrac.:'fn-iL5."?U« rr^ ... 3 o.olcc.
"ASTEL 929 1200UU2 April 19^7
• OPREP-3 FASTSL 932 1200711 April 1967
Hemo R. E. Klein to C. Kaough dated 2 May 1967
f
I Event IIZ-179
I
Jo, -CBltlon, The MIC-21S In a pop-up sAneuver on a SOO- heading were f.?***^?
*• BLUE' at apppox'tnately 15*. SLUK 3 observ.:^ an alr-to-air nlsslle approaching BLUa aight
; Mhauatmra -hlte vapor trail anci cllrnbln>: at about lb'* al:;o. Thl3 J*';^
•oiall to be confused with a ZAA t.ut BLUK 3 crew could net determine whether It was an
^ • ATOLL or ALKALI missile. Althourh the enemy alr-to-air nlsslle appeared to S^JJ* » J^"^^*'
rolling maneuver '.to Begin the attack agalnct the first, Rroup of four MIGs) <»f fff ^f'*^*^*
■lasll*. BLUE moiiwntarlly lost sight of the two MIG-Zls which launched the missile and
I these MXa*2l8 were never sighted again.
L BLUE completed Its rl?ht turn to a heading of 090" and started closing on the two
WG-lTs pursuing the P-I05s. The two H^i-l'ls originally with the HIG-17s were no longer
In the area and were believed to have left '.he forrtatlon of four while BLUE was In the
r turning maneuver. BLUE was at 6000 ft, uyu" heading at teo kts (dO kts overtake speed)
I pulling 1 g with the trailing at if^ad's 12 o'clock position and 5" depression
I- innle. BLUE lead received a boreolght look-on which went to full system as the first
AlS-7E was fired. One second later the second AIM-7 was fired. Both missiles launched
Gwtf appeareo to be tracking.
Aa the AIM-73 closed to within 200 ft of the MIG-17, the HIO turned right and down-
waf^ In a 2 1/2 g maneuver deft;?'-lng the missiles. The two missiles continued on a
straight course, passing behind and to the left of the MIC. The missiles were never
Conserved to detonate.
BLUE flight climbed and Joined last F-105 flight egresslng the area. All aircraft
and orevs recovered normally.
201
Aircraft Involved.
Event Z 11-180
One P-105 va two HlG-17s;
(BLUE flight of four P-lQ5s
encountered seven MIC -17s in
this event) AUo see Event
XII-136-
Result: One MIG-17 killed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«»28*M/106*31'E
Route Paekage VI-A
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAt SITUATION
Date/Time: 30 April 1967/0906H
t at 21*26'N/lo6'>20'E. Rail yards approxlnately 1* ml northeast of
fliiht was the third flight on target.
Strike on targf
Bae Olang. BLUE
2.
MISSION ROUTE
TakhU direct to BROWN ANCHOR to middie of Gulf of Tonkin for dopplor update to
tip Of the lie Bamun. direct to reservoir (2l«28'N/106''31 'E) .
). AIRCRAFT CONFIG JRATIONS
F«10S DIUE 1
2 - U50 gal tanl:3
6 - 750 bombs
2 - AIM-9B (SIDEWINDER), left outboard
1 - QRC-160 Pod, right outboard'
P-10? BLUE 2
2 - 450 gal tfnks
6 - 750 bombs
2 - QRC-I6O Pods
P»10S BLUE 3
2 - tt50 gal tanks
6 - 750 bombs
2 - a:m-9B (SIDEWINDER), left outboard
1 - QRC-160 Pol, right outboard
g-lOS BLUE ^
2 - 450 gal tanks
6 - 750 bombs
2 - QRC-160 Pad=
Silver color ttith red stars
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Plight cominJ In south of target on 2U5' heading,
were pulling up sSlghtly to acquire target.
Weather;
Clear with scattered clouds
BLUE
Altitude ;
Heading T
Speed :
Puel State;
S.
At last turn
three HIC-17s at
T
T
Had descended to 5000 ft and
Remarks
!>800 lb
4500 to 5000 ft
215'
550 kt
BLUE lead had 1500 to 2000 lb
^^^...ahove 7.8 BlBgo
INITIAL DETECpON
point, south or target (Reservoir at 21« 28 ' N/106»31'E) BLUE * sighted
iiu-*,a «u |j O'clock, level position, approximately 1 ml range. BLUE 9 called
KXGs. Lead instrlucted flight to maintain position and hold ordnance.
After BLUE lead dropped ordnance on target (i*?00 to 5000 ft altitude), two MIG-17a
were sighted at £ o'clock high (7000 ft altitude) at 1 ml range,
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight continued to target as KIGs turnei into the flight at right angles
(abeam) and began firing at 1500 ft range, the tracerc appearing well behind the flight
since the MICs were not puUlnr, lead. BLUE flight continued to target as MICs could
not make turn orjaccelerate to the ?-105 speed.
Event 111-180
Still In afterburner. After attack on target, lead dropperl both USO gal tanks, set
S«n slent, and f>urr.upd the MIGs at apppoxlr.ately 100 kts overtake speed
(550 kts after conlni; off tar.-'Jt).
7. SITUATION OEVELOPMFHT
BLUE flight continued to tarret.
BLUE lead estlirated dl.it.MKes as less than 1 ml and too close for missile attack.
*8 distance closed, the y.lOz t'.irhtoned their ri^ht turn and bejran descendlnjj. Lead
believed .^ICa did not detect attack, but were beglnnlnf; an attack themselves. As
lead tightened turn at hlRh owizaUr zptf.A, he was required to pull so much lead that
the plpper disappeared froR ch-; cMsblnlng clasa ( approxlnately H g's). Uad then decided
to estimate lead without sight - using the pilot boom for a reference.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1. 3. 3. a
1000 rounds iOcjn each
2 AXM*9B IR mlsitllea each
MIC.17 1. 2
Cannon
9. EQUIPHENT PitOBLEHS
None
10. AIRCREW COHHENTS
Experience
Total ?'105 Combat
] Hours Hours .^tlsslon Remarks
L. BLUE Lead 1300 900 (200 Mavy hours?)
Comments on this Snccur.ter ■
r The "new" orocedure for calling MIGs was In effect - Charlie Hotel - Bravo Hotel,
i. etc. "Though they call then, you never know where they are. They give you what general
•re» they are In and you look fcr them and get a stiff neck and never 8e« them. Then
the other times when you do not hear a call, there they are."
[.
c
r
p 11. DATA SOURCES
L. Project Intervie ws; BLUE lead, 29 May 1967
c
355TFW Takhll Air Base, Thailand, JOPREP/OPREP-3 , 300915 April 1967
12. RARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight was the third and last fllsht of F-105s striking rail yards northeast
of Bae Clang (21''26»N/106«20»E) at approximately 0900 hours local time. The reservoir
south of the target was the last turn point and as the flight, which had descended to
5000 ft altitude on a heading of 2U5' , began pulling up slightly to acquire the target,
BLUE U called, three MIC-17s at 3 o'clock, level position, approximately I ml away. BLUE
lead determined KIGs to be nc Immediate threat and Instructed flight to maintain position
and hold ordnance.
BLUE flight, accelerating, continued to target as MIGs turned and approached abeam
(90«» to BLUE flight). When ibout 1500 ft away, MIGs began firing cannon whose tracers
appeared well behind BLUE fllcht since the MTGs were not pulling lead. BLUE flight
continued to target as MIGs could not turn nor accelerate to become a threat to the
P-105a. BLUE flight pepped up and :-olled In to target. BLUE 3 was attacked by a MIG-17
as he came off target. BLUE 3 Jinked through flak and the MIG broke off the attack.
Aa BLUE lead came off th^; ta~eet on a heading of approximately 080"* and speed of
550 kts (afterburner), lead sighted two MlC-17s at 11 o'clock, 3000 ft above and a mile
r away. The iMIGs were In a nentle right turn. BLUE lead Jettisoned fuel tanks, set up
j< guns for alr-to-alr and with approximately 100 kts overtake speed, closed on the HlOs.
The flGs did not appear ;o be aware of BLUE lead » a attack but they began Increasing
their rleiht turn and descendinc- A? ran,-- closed to approximately 1000 ft, lead required
•-; SO much lead on the tar?;et that tha plpper mnved cTf the comblnlnK glass. (BLUE lead
J*. estimated pulling aoprox Innately h c,'z). V.'lthcut a sight, BLUE lead sighted estimated
t.', -«ad on the enemy wln£r.an vlth tho pilot boon as a reference point. Lead fired cannon
ahead of the MIG and then swept the fire rtown and through the tarj^et. Lead noted impacts
■« • on KIC 2*3 left side, beglnnln£ at the nose end enillns? at the wing root. Lead had onlv
fire approximately 150 rounds boff:re th<» d stance to the KIG became so short
; that it appeared he would collide. Ke broke left ?;o avoid running Into the MIG and
I Climbed In a yoyo. KIG 2 slowly roiled out stralKht and level, smoke and flame pouring
f
i
203 .
fron th? left wlnftp pha
the KIG. BLUE 2, about
that It Mas in a spin
Bv«nt IXI-lSO
alng to BLUE lead* a 5 o'clock position where lead lost slf^t of
1 mi m trail from lead, sighted the burning HIO and reported.
Neither BLUE lead or BLUE 2 saw the MIG impact the ground.
3:
a
a
a
a
a
t
204
a
a
a
a
a
0
r?.
Event III-181
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-1053 vs one
unldent
ResuUs: Slghtlns
Vlelnlty of Encounter: 2l«»25*N/l07«»00*E
I. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOII
Oate/Tlme: 30 April 1967, 092 3H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight egreaslng fion an ALFA target at ITiOOO' saw a silver unldent on
reelproral heading; unldent turned and disappeared to south.
Event III-I82
' Aircraft Involved: Two RP-^Ca vs two HIOs
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: '21' 5"* M/ 10 «i»l<*'E
I. PRINAPT MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
DateAlne: 30 April 1967, 1521H
II. DATA SOURCE
•CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Inbound photo flight received KIG warning, followed by X-band signal Increasing
in Intensity; maneuvers did not decrease Intensity, so RP-ts turned and dived; '
two KtGs seen at 11 o'clock while In dive; speed Increased and HIOs not seen again.
Event III-I83
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs two unldents
Results: Sighting
Vlelnlty of Encounter: Unknown
Z 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TUne: 30 April 1967, l6't8H
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Egresslng AL^A strike flight at 17,000' saw two afterburner ll^ta at
35-'tO,O00', but could not see aircraft.
205
Aircraft Involved
Event III-184
Two P-105a vs unknown number of
MICs. See also Event III-138
Result: Two P-I05a lost
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«>20'N/10'>«56:B
Route Package ?
1. PRIHARY HtSSION AN^ TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: 30 ApJ>ll 1967/162HH
BLUE nu:t\t InRrelslnc at 8000 ft altitude at 560 icta enroute to are* of JCS 82.2*
target to provide IROMj HANT support.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
Possible NX0-21S - not
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS
Weather
sighted
PRIOR TO eNCOUNTER
Pew scattered clouds, visibility T ml "down sun" and ft ral "up sun*
BLUE
Altitude ;
Heading ;
Speed;
— 1 — r
80(io ft
560 kts
5. INITIAL DETECTION
At 1617H BLUE fUght heard MIG-21 warnings for the { geographical) **;r«^«!;^;J;^*''»
they were flying. They did not see MISa at any time though two were shot down.
Plrst indication of Jn^k/'s presence- was at 162«»H when BLUE I observed BLUE 3 torching,
flane out and then allrcraft go out of control.
6. ACTION INITIAUO
Two "good" paradhut
turns while chutes
and 2 were unable to
were
3
i
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
es sighted and two beepers heard. BLUE 1 and 2 sade three 360
i-B descending and established voice contact with 3LUS 3. SLUE 1
establish voice contact with BLUE U and assuraed BLUE also downed.
7. SITUATION 0EVE10?M£NT
As BLUE 1 and 2 circled the two oarachutes fror. BLUE 3 (Pilot and EWO) , tracers and
four puffs of 37nuTJ cknnon xere observ-d passing over the chutes but no enemy aircraft
Sighted. Both chutes landed at 2in6' 3O"M/10U°59 * '*0"E. Aircraft lnP«ted at
21*17'00"N/105''01'50f'E. BLUE 1 and 2 returned to tanker then escorted Sandy_i_ana^^
back to RESCAP area
to base.
'blue l"and 2 orbited area untl" 'ilngo fuel reached then returned
a. ORDNANCE
No US ordnance expended
9. EQUIPrtm PROBLEMS
None reported
10. AIRCREU COMHENTS
BLME 3 CF-105F )
Front
EWO
blue tj (F-105D )
Front
n. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Reports :
S'^STFW Takhll
355TPW JOPREP
Total
Hours
3840
1315
573
F-105
Hours
"UE"tlme
1190
318
311
Conoat
Missions
93
93
dl
Remarks
Seven months In theater
Seven months In theater
Five months in theater
I
3
3
3
3
RATFB 3017Q8Z April 1967 JPCCO FASTEL 355 DOTO-0 lltSI April 1967
OPPXP-3 PINHACLE 030 (AH aa«e message)
206
p Event 111-164
12, NARRATIVE DESCRl?TIO»
BLUE fllfcht or four F-105S were Inbound to the area of .ICS target 82.2* In vicinity
of 21»20'N/l0»»o56'E flyln? at 8000 ft altitude on a headln? of 85° at 560 kts to provide
TROM HAim support. At 1617H the flight received a MIG-21 warning for the area through
which they were flying. At UZHH BLUE lead observed BLUE 3 (an P-105P with a two-man
crew) torching. SLUE 3 flamed out shortly afterwards, and the; aircraft was observed to
go out of control.
Two »ood chutes were seen and two beepers heard. BLVK 1 and 2 beKan c^^cll^E the
chutes as' they descended naklng voice contact with BLUE 3 pilot but not the EWO. BLUfc i
and 2 made tnree jbO" turns In the descent durlnc which thtv observed tracers and four
puff^ of 37r.n cannon fire pass over the tops or the chutes. No enemy aircraft was
obaerved.
Both chutes fror BLUE 3 landed at 21» l8 • 30"M/10ii»59 r':-: and BLUE 3 aircraft Impacted
at 21"»17'00"N/105'»Ol'5O"E. Voice contact again estab llsr,-; i with BLUE 3 but two other
beepers were heard atlll transmitting. BLUE 1 and 2 attempted to contact BLUE J< but
were unable to do so. BLUE lead reported downed pilots to CP.OWI, also adding that BLUE •«
was also probably down, rielthc- lead nor BLUE 2 saw BLUE 5 hit or receive (messageaj.
BLUii 1 and 2 returned to the tanker to refuel and then escorted two RESCAP aircraft
to the area of BLUE 3. (See Event III-138). BLUE 3 pilot reported several tines that the
RESCAP aircraft were directly overhead. BLUE I and 2 orbll-id the area until Bingo fuel
was reached and then they returned to baae.
Event III-185
Aircraft Involved:
Pour P-105PS v9 two «IC-21»
Also see Event III-139
Result: One P-105 lost
Vicinity of Encounter:
1. PRIHARY Mission AND TACT|KAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlr*: 30 April 1967/1715H
Strike on Hanoi Transfor«er Station, JCS target 82.
reverse route.
3, AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIOIIS
6 - M<117 bombs
1 - AIM-9B
4.
FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOH TO ENCOUNTER
In RE3CAP orbits BLUE
Weather;
1 and 2 low. BLUE 3 and t high
Scattered visibility 7 to 10 miles
I BLUE
T
Altitude:
Heaaing :
r
low
r
liow
Speed :
Fuel State :
Plight Farmatlon ;
15-16, 000»
approx 260"
when hit,
counterclocK-
wlse orbit
15-16.000*
3
B
3
i
3
3
3
3
3
ortlt! Mgh (15-16.000 ft) OB RESCAP.
6. ACTION IHITIATEO ^ „ ,.~ BLUE 3 brok. l«ft an4 4e«i. BLUE «
BLUE « instructed JLOE 3 " »'"«^J|f5-.„^S .eco^S Hla-Jl m BLUE 3 tupn^l
^*s»»y.wA Kic-21 3 o'cloik and high, bluc •» BnB«6«»
J^U 5w Swch hid made the initial attack.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT ^^^^^^ »P?T?i^-
„teirxl2orrt\rtrtuK."KS^ ra^d^ ?h^?. Srad^d^o. Chann.1 97 for refueling.
B. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
BLUE U
MIG
208
(Mo. I'lred/Nc. hits)
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
unknown/ 1
Remarks
U.S. expended no ordnance
BLUE 3 sighted bill of flam* - BLUE »»
3
3
3
3
3
c 1
Event III-185
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None reported
11. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Perorts :
•»32TRW fJXCC 3012 352 April 1967
12. NAPHATIVE DESCRIPTION
BL'JE rUcht Df four F-10:O alrcrafl dep.irted "jl'.nJl IbO'jH, 30 April 1957 for strike
on JCS B2.2ii tar^-t , .Hanoi Trinsforr.er Sta:lcn. pre-strlke refueling on GREEN
ANCHOR, fll.-r^r proceeded ',o :arrec. ~.nrz,uic, Zlr'k'r "^orce Cor.-nander aborted the strike
mission to aet up HE3CA? fsr a downed "-13^1-' CTet Kv-.nt III-lS'l). A good beeper signal
vas heard fron the downed crew and the Strike Fore** Cor.niander bellevetii rescue possibility
was high.
BL'JE fll^nt set up a hl.'h cover at 16,000 to 2 7,000 ft altitude over the downed
aircraft near Sl'Sl •r:/105''05' r.. When the lew ccver altitude alrcrift (GREEN 1, 2, 3,
reached Bingo fuel and prcceeoed to tr>e tnr.kers fnr refucllnj;, BLUE 1 and 2 went to
low cover altitude and bl.\J'£ 3 .and 1 stayed high at !Q,000 to 16,000 ft in a counterclock-
wise orbit at 353 kcs.
Then the second elenent cf GREEK flirnt (GREEV 3 and 4} recurned to the rescue
area and directed the Incsninc: 5An alrcr&rt.
At 1715K on a hea^ilni; af approxlnately 260'*, SLUE U "felt a Jolt and heard a thud"
and Itrjnedlately calle-^ 3 to break left "because of MICs." As BLUE 3 broke left
and down, he saw a :j!IC-21 on '-he rl^ht ro'ng out tc his 3 o'clock position and high.
BLUE 3 turned int ) tne MIS as the XIG continued his left turn returning across and to
the left of BLUE 3> BLUE 3 then saw a second MIC-?1 engaging BLUE <>.
BLUE 3 and i» lit afterburner, accelerating to '^ach 0.95 and Jinking heacfed for the
clouds at apprsxlrately the IC.CQO ft level. BLVT. Z and headed for Channel 97. Enroute
BLUE 3 asked 3LJE ^ several tir.es if he "had hlr. In sioht." BLUE 1 answered affirmatively.
At 1720H, acproxlniatc ly 10 iiecmds after las; trans i.iss ion, BLUE 3 looked behind and saw
a ball of riar.e which he ass'aried was BLUE . BLUE; '■i went down at approximately
21<'03'M/lCi.'55'E.
. BLUE 1 and 2 called to 3LUS 3 and reported slrhting BLUE k going down and that they
also saw a chute with a nan waving. BLUE 3, low on fuel, continued to Channel 97 for a
tanker wher* he refueled and recovered at Udorn. A cursory check of the aircraft after
landing revealed no visible battle damage.
Event II 1-186
Aircraft Involved: Four F-lOSs vs two
MlC-?ls
Results: No <J^;-A£e
Vicinity of Encounter: 20-52 'M/IOS-SS'E
1. PRIHART NIS5I0N TACTICAL SITUATIOR
Bate/Time: 30 Apkl 1967. 1713H
U. DATA SOURCe |
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. tiARRATIVr DESCRtPiTION
IRON km::: flight retumlni! from Hanoi Shrike firings with reoalntler of
ALPA strike I'orciz at 26,000'. two MICs drove through force on near-reciprocal
hearing at sa.-ne latitude ; no attempt to engar.e*
1.
11.
12.
PRIHARY MISSION
Date/Tlnie: l
Event II I- 187
Aircraft Involved: pour P-105s vs six to
eight HIC-17S
Results: No damace
Vicinity of Encounter: 20*58 'H/IOS" 10 'E
AINO TACTICAL SITUATION
my 1967, 1015H
DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
NARRATIVE DESCrIpTION
F-105 MIO
flight broM
turn; HIGr were
on the ground
no further MIOs
after
CAP flight at 3000' when 6-8 KIGs approached from 5 o'clock low;
er receiving .MIC warning from aircraft of Event 111-186 and nade 270
attacked by other flights; BLUE lead observed a burning MlC-17
after Initial break, BLUE was out of position and unable to engage;
sighted.
1.
11.
PRIMARY MISSION
Date/Time: 1 I
Aircraft Involved;
Event III-188
One ?>-4B vs two KIC-lTs
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»25'N/ia6«25'E
AND TACTICAL SITUATION
lay 1967. 1250H
DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Sta'ff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE OEsJrIPTION
;aw F-8E shootdoun of MIG
dea^-iibed In Event III-196; leader of F-iiB TAR CAP flight then slchted another KIG
at ir o'clock] low and was pursulns HIG at 200* altltudo when hit by autosatlu weapons
flr«i F'^B returned to snip.
TAR CAP for strike (diversionary for Kep strike)
.ibed In Ev
Event III-189
Aircraft Involved. Four F-UCs vs eight «IC-i7s.
Result Of Kncounter: Sight Ings only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20*'32'N/103®03'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION Af^U TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 1 May 1967/100S:i
Plying MIG SCREEN OrOlt, .6 Mach
2. MISSION ROUTE
Oanang to WHITE AMCKOH for refuel, direct to Chann-Jl 97, thence to orbit station.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
Hot stated but probably i AIH-7 and ft AIM-gB each. Absence of {5uns positively stated.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Clear 7 mile visibility. Little haze.
Altitude ; .8 Mach AGL
Heading ; 210°
Speed ; 4^0 lets
Plight Formation ; Pod
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE flight observed three to five HIG-lTs approaching from 9 o'clock to engage the
night .
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight l.Tj;.edlately descended to engage MICs at an altitude below 1,000 ft.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
b'lUE 1 and 2 sought to maneuver to open range cut lost sight Of MIGa. Several other
MIGs were subaequenrLy slanted j^ualiy very low and low heading In opposite direction.
BLUE 3 and 1 attenpted to engage another raG-17 but lost it in the haze and hills.
Another KIC-i7 passed across tne frcnt of BLUE 3 ana 4 but with speed and cllnb separated.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 lost transmitter and interphone for tanker frequency.
JO. AIRCREW COMMENTS
BLUE 1 and 2 said that they had about 20 seconds of close ran^e tracking and probabi-
lity of a gun kill -would have been excellent.
BLUE 3 and U also reportea that they would have had a good opportunity as a MIC flew
close from left to rlgnt.
11. DATA SOURCE
OPREP 3
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
This event is characterized by a lar^e number of friendly and hostile sightings so
that it ^3 difficult to determine the exact nunber of separate hostile aircraft actually
sishtPd/ Other friendly flights were simultaneously enr^^in^ MIGs in the sane vicinity,
mwr r^-d 2 aft»- los'njr sight of the initial flight cf MIOs tho-j?ht they saw a SAM
nvlnl wh?c.? was'!, faci^h:^^pact of a MIG-IT shot down by PURPLE fU.n:. PURPLE flight
Jarre* IlO""^' cr.t another comm.- their v.-ay. BLUE rilE^^t again attenpted to engage
Jur^as una-^r-o cctaln a position for r:l3slle firing. BLUE 3 and k sighted another
M^C-n aS ;;nt in lo-. and rolled In but the MIG T.aUe a hard turn ana was J" ^J*..?*"
ard t'-e h'lis Afte- reconolterinp, the area for ter. iT-oro minutes without additional .-ilG
slghtingsi the BLUE flight egreJsed the area to Channel 97 and the tanker.
Event I 11-150
Aircraft Involved: Four P-«»Cs vs eight KIC-lTs
Result: One KIG destroyed
VlclnUy of Encounter: 20»35'«/105''l5'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Datt/Tlme: 1 May 67/1021H
BLtiK fiiRht was one of two flights scheduled for HICCAP Barrier with P-105 flights
coverlnr a KF.SCAP miss
2. MISSION ROUTE
Depfirted Danang,
to MIGCAP area SCBO'l
jre-strlke refuellnR with WHITE AHCHOR , proceeding vift Channel 97
IJ/105"00'E to 21°10'S/105'30'E.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
y-lIC BL-JE 1. 2. 3.
4 AIM 7-E QRC
4 AIM 9-B Lef^
MIG ITS
Cannon
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS
Weather
Pod right outboard
outboard and centerllne tanks
PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
> to 10 miles, clear
Visibility
Altitude : 5.000 AGL
Head In.- ; 030®
Scead: 5C0 kts
fruei S ta'-.g ; Approximately Itt.OOO lb, Centerllne Jettisoned
flight tj-pfnatlon i Poid stacked left
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE 1 detected 2 or 3 bogeys approaching from 11:30 o'clock approximately BoOO
ft and descendlnK. kuE i called the bogeys to BLUE flight and to the preceding fl^^h.
of JC^O^rarAcI! iooS ft. ELL-E 1 then changed the call to HIGs which were closlr^
rapidly in an apparant head-on pass.
6. ACTION' INITIATED
The preceding flight of P-lC5s broke <ior.Ti and left. ?LUE flight: pulled up in a
vertical and relied fco the right and the MiGs passed thru the hole. BLUE flight s
maneuver enabled It ko end up at the 6 o'clock position of MIC I and 2.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE I and 2 pJessed, continued to press repeated attacks against MIG 1 until It was
destroyed and then h^eca.-.e engaged with additional HIGs that subsequently entered the
engagement without Result. BLUE 3 and 4 first engaged MIG 2 and then other MIGs without
result .
8. ORDNANCE
(No. flred/I(o. hits)
aIM-7E AIW-9B
3/0
I/O
3/0
2/0
BLUE 1
BLUE 3
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUK I was una,Me to ot=taln a lock-on with the AIM-7 thrcughout the ^n^af^"*"^
when in one instanS conditions were Ideal. Post-flight equlpoent check revealed that the
?Mdei no?n wM bSSned out. It is not determinable at what point the failure occurred.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
BLUE 1
Total
Hours
3300
At this tine
90C
Combat
Missions
90-95
•»'s t'ne the .MICs were befl;lnnlni? the tactic of staying low and contlnuausly
frurnlnc- The onlyl thlr.t^ I did different was perhaps to rcay v 1th the sir.e <-...u.
5"haJ o'^,or c.pcr^UltlJr. to grab another «IG . I stayed with 'his ?f "^rhe clSwhed
out of r.y si^hc. £ kept pressing the attack. Every attach right on rlss until he ciutcr.ec
up."'
212
3
3
I
3
1
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
Event 111-190
11. DATA SOURCeS
Project Interviews : BLUE 1
MessartfS. Repor'.a : OPREP 3 PIWHACLE/033 366TFW c « A?
— A.F. Staff Message Suppleaent to OPREP 3 ("0732) 5 May 67
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
After the maneuver was initiated, the two elements of BLUE flight operated inde-
pendently and are narrated separately for clarity.
BLUE 1 had attained a 6 c'clocic position too quickly to allow time for setting up
the manual procedure (sutssquent ly to be described; and attenpted a boresight node firing
of the AIM-TE, The rirlr.c: u.-isuccessrul and the MIG then broke down and went very low
to the ground. This was apparently at this tire a standard defense procedure against
AIM-7 attacks. BLUE 1 t^.en nar.vuvered for an Air-:-9B attack pulling up In a high-speed
yo-yo and back down on the MIC's 6 o'clock and fired an AIK-9B. The AIK-9 was observed
to go straight out and, in B-l'£ I's assessr.ent, couid not distinguish between the plane and
the ground. BLUE 1 was also ef the opinion that the repeatec missile attacks were having
a psycholofcical effect on the KIG ollot as revealed by the violence of his maneuvers.
"I was shaking him up a little tit' and he was really beginning to crank it around." BLUE
1 executed another hlgn-dpeec yc-yo and went to tiie manual system with the AIM-7E.
[Note: Since BLUE 1 interview was so explicit In the details of the manual procedure
he attempted they are Included in the description of this event for what Informational
value they may have.] "We have a track switch which we call auco-track or acquisition on
Jam. In this manual position, you can lock onto an Imaginary target anywhere you want to.
You Just squeeze it into full system and It locks on. It then B;lves you a Vc baaed on
a little switch we call :nanual Vc and we set it for 150 knots." This requires the
pilot to estimate the rate of closure: "But It isn't as difficult as it sounds ; because
we are always coming in frcm the 6 o'clock, it is merely necessary to assume that you will
be closing on him and tnat vou will not be closing faster than 300 knots." It searches
the area between 0 and 300 knot3. The 300 knots is below ground speed which is necessary
to prevent lockln? on the ground. "So this Is what we (sic) recommend and any time we
come from a 6 o'clock, we put on this 150 knot closing." "Now we lock on to our imaginary
target, and we get the full attack display every bit of it pure nonsense, none for real,...
The only important thing is that the missile has been put into the narrow gate to search
the area between zero and 300 knots."
Coming back down out of the maneuver BLUE 1 again in the 6 o'clock position fired on
A1M-7E in ♦■-he manual procedure described above. The missile appeared to be tracking well
but seemed to "loose out at the last minute." BLUE 1 could not be sure that he kept hla
reticle on the MIG illuninatln? it continuously for the whole missile flight. The missile
did however pass close to the ^:I0 which again reacted by turning severely. BLUE 1 again
executed a high speed yo-yo repositioning at the MIC's six o'clock again set up for manual
firing of the AIM-7E. BLUE 1 fired the AtM-7 which appeared to track well with the speed
gate locked on. However, it was BLUE I's opinion that with the sharp right turn the MIG
waa pulling (50 ft above ground levelj, the missile was going to pass behind the HIG's
$ o'clock. At this point the MIG hit the ground and was destroyed.
In the above time interval at least 5 or 6 additional MlOa had Joined the battle and
there was another flight of P-^a and two flights of ?-l05s all Joined in the melee.
To continue the action of the first element of BLUE flight, BLUE I immediately picked
up anothsr MIG we can designate as MIG 3 and had no trouble seizing and maintaining the
MIC's 6 o'clock, using the same verticle maneuvers as in the previous encounter. BLUli 1
made two firing passes at MIG 3; one was dry, the other was an AIH-9B shot that was
outnaneuvered .
In the last maneuver against MIG 3, BLUE I's wing man, BLUE 2, had become separated.
BLUE 1 states that whenever he came Into the top of the high-speed yo-yo he would check
to see If his Number 2 was still with hln and he had been unt.'l the last maneuver. BLUE
1 looked around and observed BLUE 2 down .on the deck at about 350 kts turning with a MIG.
BLUE 1 called BLUE 2 to break right and go afterburner, but he didn't. He was observed
to fly a couple of "wifferdllls" and was upside down and there was nother MIC joining the
attack. BLUE I, who had lost airspeed, now got turned around and started down from
12 000-l'»,000 ft to aid BLUE 2. As he came in high at the MIC's 6 o'clock they broke off
their attack and started turning ae;aln. BLUE 1 instructed BLUE 2 to Join on him which
he did and the element resumed the offensive. BLUE 1 sighted a MIG high, 5000 ft,
running 3tralght and level at about miles. BLUE 1 started to close on the MIG, keeping
low. Everything was right for an AIM-7 shot and the MIG was clear on the scope. However,
continuous attempts to lock on v.ere unsuccessful. BZ-UE I, by then closing rapidly, switched
over to AIM-9B and at about I mile range fired th« AIM-9. The MIG apparently saw the
SIO'^'WINOER and though the AI.M-9 had good tone and was guiding well the MIO was able to
••flat out-turn" the AIM-9B. "The SIDEWINDER was giving her all she's got but it just
couldn't begin to hack It."
After this shot BLUE 1 was fairly close to Hanoi and approaching BINGO fuel, so the
element egressed the area.
213
Event IH-190
j:
Details on the 2nd eleaent are not complete since there wa, no l""*"*^'-"
3 and . engaged a total of three niO. and ^i^jtj. four c. ^Jve additlonal^on«.
Ho.t If t^l MWs .Irl Sliver colored but two ^ere canouflaeed The f.r-^ JIG^ ^^^^^
JSrned hard left and BLUE 3 *as ""atle to Jlje. A not guide and
turn. BLUE 3 «ot a lock-on VTrt'J^call A third WIG was sighted and
the second Al«-7 f.^S^Pj^JlS^'tJi^J lS%"i«l9B tt his HIG while in a hard left
turned hard left into 8LLE 3. BLUE 3 fired an Ain at attained a rear
tiS at very close ran«e and It missed. ^^Jannon at BLUE i>. BLUE 3
iSrter position on BLUE 3 and V J"^, f 'B[iS% repS??e<l that be would have
and * were aUle to dlsenRa^e by Increasing alrspeea. ^^^^^^^^^^ broken off alter
Seen able to hit MIG 3 If ."^e had J^^* SJ^lSJe of ensageaenta varied
Sr2irJ^'LloSS"?r:a£!"'/ni;IlUyian'io no S*H or AAA activit, reported.
On* WO was reported to have afterburner.
Kvent III-191
Aircraft Involved: Pour r-105s V8 elRht MI0-17s
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«36'K/105-ie'E
1. PRIHARy KISSIOH AND TACTICAI. SITUATIOH
Date/Time: 1 Kay 1967/lOllH
BLUE flUht was flying BARCAP for a RESCAP mission.
2. MISSION ROUTE ^
Departed Ubon, normal routing, refueling at North Station before proceeding to taKe
barrier position.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
y-lOS BLUE 1. 2. 3. '*
Uln^ tanks and QRC
2 AIH-9BS
20 ffln gun
MI0>17s
Afterburner spec iric ally mentioned several times.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO SNCOUNTER
Weather : Visibility 5 to 7 miles, clear.
Altitude : 5,000 - 7,000 ft
Beading " Northeast
^tst.:'"5«°««:d .t l...t X-i .inuf. Mfor. BmOO.
';^rSio!"r!""Lx »..<.!«, U. 12 .-CIOO. P....* una.r fll«h.. No KIO warning
received prior to this slgntlng.
6. ACTION INITIATED . , u -k. Tht
'blue rii,^-- -r-^-^f^^-^^rr.n'tt^^rirrn^^ut^iS!.' « .'"'AT'
attempted a quartering ^ead-cn pass against tnis o sclssors-type r.aneuver.
among those previously slehted.
7 SITUATION 0EVEL0PH2NT ■ ^
, w ^1. Qftte> 1 nriiF 2 fired an AIM-9B under difficult hign-g
In the ensuing melee both BLUE 1 f^"^ BLUE 2 JJJ^J ^"^JJ^^xlmately 5000 ft when the
v-rs without success. The first nlssed tne ^'^-'^y^Vl^. ^.^^ ^.^.^ „,,v. excessive
maneuvers without Success. The first "issea .ne ^'^^^^^^^^^^S^;;;' ^red wU^. excessive
5?G initiated a hlgh-j turn J ^Hh^^e foCr snapJSots with 2CaT. during
angle-off. BLUE 1 and BLUE 2 «ach attempted ^™ °Jj.lght lasted atout 15 minutes aftej
thi dOKfUht but ;Ce! -rSSlr flSt then Increased airspeed and
Which BLUE 3 and BLUE U reached BINGO fuel. Their fll| ^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^ ^ ^^^^.^
I'^ivTlToo llVlt r^o^Jh^ly heiSlSg as it egressed the area
8. ORDNANCE
(No. flred/No. hits)
AIH~9B 2Qmm gun
gj^y^ ^ I/O 3 or H snapshot bursts
aLus^. 2 1/0 3 or «• snapshot bursts
EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
yourself before ne &u. v -
maneuverability and turning radius.
215
'■^'■'fiim^^ Event III-191
11. DATA SOURCES
Pro ject Intervlgwa : BLUE I
He-sagea. Reports ;
OPREP FASTEL 11501 Hay 6?
OPREP 3 335 TFW PINNACLE 02
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Interceptlna: an offense or a defense.
keep their 6 o'clock clear. BLUE ^ 'J^J*' *;*y,^|^^^-^t%^,arter of BLUE 1 cro=3lng
course of the maneuvering one MIG pulled up , ^"^.J^^ ^ climb with the HIG which
at about 45- Bolng a«ay to the left Torward BLUE 1 £5? i couW not
immediately turned over Into a "-JiZj^lSf "w'*;iJ''i^^J;?r2frtrspU with at 5.QCG-
5tay with him m this maneuver. The fi^^J^iJ^.^; „IC low in a gentle turn.
6.000 ft." BLUE 1 coning out of this encounter '^f*--". *"":*^'^^L^^^>,i,,j. -t about 7000 ft
vi,uwv BT [Tf 1 attenoted to roil In and Deffon tracKuiR »>' auu-" <
Believing he was • ^J;^^. * S?; "J" a 270« turn In "oractlcally no space at all
out. He then realized that the MIC had rade a 2^0 , turn i . ^^^^^
and M«8 comlne back on hlni at about J5 angle. ELU J '^^^^ ^ ^j,^ ^I„.9B tracking
SSi"M;;S?:^1here7eVe on^ S^^^„r:rbs:5;e^i^^Jpo??JnUle. for fleeting snapshot,
Mlthout apparent effect.
i:
c
G
c
c
l;
[:
C
c
♦ Event III-X92
* Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s va four MI0-17a
Result: tlo DamaRc
Vicinity of Etiooiinter: 20no'N/105''lB'E
I. PRiriARy HISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 1 May 1967/unkr.own
BLUE flight of four F-105s on strike mission.
4. fLIGHT CONOITIOMS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Unknown, not a factor
All liuJe: 6500 ft
R?adtnr: 035"
^peed: " ''50 lets
Flight Fornar:lon: Pod
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE flight observed two flighta of two KIG-178 divine from hl;h out of the sun at
10 o'clock position.
6. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT
BLUE flight started a turn Into the MICs when the KlGs parted a left turn to come Into
the 6 o'clock position. BLUE flight went afterburner and Jettisoned bombs.
'8. ORDNANCE
P-105
Sot stated
MIG-lTs
Guns
9: EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None
11. DATA SOURCE
OPREP 3/PINMACLE-COl
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Two flights of twj MTG-lTs dove out of the sun from the 10 o'clock position on BLUE
«»-K» rfilS! Lns as rh-v cane. BLUE flight attemptea to turn into the MIGa but when
Iil"25;, ine*a l2't 'urn"L attain a 6 o'clock position, BLUE flight Jettisoned bombs
iS5 S5 mJrSuin;'."^*'^!^ flight passed ov/r BLUE fll,ht aPPrjJJJ-tely 1500 ft ana
Sre then engaged by a flight of P-^a. No further contact by BLUE flight.
217
3
i
a
1
i
Event III-193
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-X05a vo two MTC-17s
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Koa Lac Airfield
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SZTUATIOH
Date/Time: 1 May 67/unicnown
BLUE flight had Just completed a strike on Hoa Lac Airfield when It was attacked by
two MIQ-17S.
2. MISSIOM ROUTE
Inland route to target.
3. AIRCRAFT CONTtGURATIONS
P-105 BLUE 1. 2. 3. "
Vlng tanks » Fod, Guns
BLUE I anJ 3
AIM-9B
MIC«17a XI'^ 1 and 2
Guns
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Clear, good visibility
Altitude ; 5000 ft
Heading ; West
Speed : 500 Kts
Puel'State ; Approximately 9000 Xb n
5. INITIAL OeTECTION
Coating err target BLUE ^ sighted two HIG-17s at BLUE flight's 6 o'clock, and alerted
flight .
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 3 looking back on BLUE fi's warnlnjc saw two MIGs at 6 o'clock high on a tight
left turn. The lead MIG appeared to be firing on BLUE flight. BLUE 3 went Afterburner,
punched fuel tanks and broke left. The MIGs then reversed and departed the area.
7. SITUATION OeVELOPNENT
The NIGs' apparently attempted only a single firing pass then separated without
attempting to conrlnua the engagenent.
8. ORDNANCE EXPENDED
{Ko. flred/No. hits)
BLUE flight 0/0
MIQ lead Cannon fire
9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
None
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
"On that (fay their tactics were Just hit and run. I have seen that subsequently.
They seem reluctant to engage in a prolonged battle with the 5s
IK DATA SOURCE
Project Intervlevs : BLUE 3
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight, following? a strike against Koa Lac Airfield, was regrouping and depart-
ing the area at approAl.-natcly tiOOO ft, headed in a x-sterly direction. 3LUE 3 and ^ wei-e IJ
almost a half mile behind BLUE 1 and 2 a.nd claslng. BLUE 4 then called NIGs at o o'clock. g
BLUE 3 looked back and saw two MIG>17s at 6 o'clock, high in a tight left turn attacking w
the flight. BLUE 2 punched fuel tanks and went aftorturner and could see little puffs of
smoke coming from MIC lead which appeared to be gunfire. BLU-i 3 broke hard left attempting
to turn Into the MiCa. BLUE i», accelerating rapidly, passed .'Ight throug.". the MIC fllsht I;^
I
I
i
s
§
218
2
Event III-193
before he could fire. BLUE 1 and 2 pulled high to the right planning to coir.e down behind
the KiGs. Before any of this could be accomplished, the NICs reversed to the rlr.ht and
departed the area.
INTBODUCTIOM TO EVENTS 111-19^, -■19:>. -196. -1-97 and -198
On 1 May 1967, carrier aircraft from the BCN HOKM£ rtlCHArD 5t,rusk Kep Airfield
(JCS 9.1 at 21*23'26"N/106»15'58"E) with the primary taipets belnr ".I'" aircraft in the
rlvetted area at the northeast end of the airfield and the support iirfia south of the
runway. The strike force composition by aircraft type, nurr.ber, an-l the tine on target
Is given in Table 1, as well as the event in which MIC action ap:aln3'w the force la
deierlbed.
T«b1t 1 (S). BON HOMHE RICHARD STRIKE fQUt (U)
Aircraft
Ke. Typt
Function
Target
Tine on
Target
Event No.
Sli A-4C
Str1k«
jc: 9.1
1245H
Tao A«4C
Flak Suppression
Flak sites
I244H
Four A*4e
Flak Suppression
Flak sites
1244H
Four A-4C
IRON HAND
1240H-1247H
No MI6l
Encountered
Four F-8C
TARCAP
Four F-8E
TARCAP
Also airborne In support of the foreo were four,A>lK for RESCAP, two EA-IP ECN
aircraft and two P-8E and two P-8C as BARCA?.
The strike aircraft launched at IISOH. The target weather was clear with 5 miles
visibility in haze.
The strike force encountered intense AAA fire at the target although flak suppression
and IRON HAND sorties had silenced several sites prior to the roll-in of strike "aircraft.
Hia-17 fighters Ksre also encountered in the target area both before, during and after
the attack. No SAM opposition nateriallzed, although enroute to the target, the aircraft
of Event Ill-*194 saw a possible SAM explosion at very high alcltuden over the target.
Only one mecber of this flight encountered ALQ-51 lights, but no APR>27 was received.
All attack aircraft were equipped with APR-27/AL.Q-51 .
The strike aircraft sighted a minimum of seven Mlus on the field and at least four
airborne .
Pour sorties dropped VT fused MK 81 bombs in the revetted area while two other
sorties dropped VT fused MK 82 In the support area. Two other so.'^tles {the aircraft of
Event III-195) attacked two MIG-17 aircraft on a taxiway with 29 VT fused 2UHI rockets.
Post strike photography showed three Hia-178 burning. Flak suppression with CBU-24 was
aceontpllshed by four IRON HAND and six other flak suppression sorties.
/ total of ten AGM-ttSs were fired, five against FIRECA« and five against FANSONG
radars. One explosion was noted in a flak site and the site was silenced. Two sites
were silenced by CBU-Zts, Although flak was generally suppressed to the south of the
target* heavy 37/57/85mm fire continued to come from the northeast sector adjacent
to the runway.
At least four HIG-17S were airborne and the MIQs pursued their attack through
areas of heavy flak. The results of the aerial battles were two confirmed kills and
two HIOs damaged.
All friendly aircraft returned on board with one A-4C of the strike force (Event
III-196) damaged in the wing by ground fire and„another A-^C of the flak suppression
(Event III-197) damaged by ground fire.
Also on 1 May 1967 aircraft from the carrier ENTEHFRX5S attacked cargo ships , at
1255H (exact location of this strike is unknown).
Event
Aircraft Involved: Two F-8Es vs four
MIC-17S
Results: One MIG-17 destroyed
One MIC-17 damaged
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»26'N/106«»28*E
1. PRINART mSSIOH AHO TACTICAL SITUATiqH
Date/Time: 1 !-'ay 1967/12'«^>H.
Four F-8E (BLUE Fllfiht) was TARCAP for a strike on Kep Airfield. Although BLUE
Flight Irgressed as a unit cnly BLUE 3 and * encountered MICs. The actions of BLUE 1
and 2 are unknown.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed Yankee Station and aerial refueled just after launch, then proceeded to
the target.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
7«8E BLUE 3. 1
1 - AI«-9C
2 - AIM-9D
(Dual fuselage pylons with <) LAU-7A launchers)
28'4 rounds 2Cnmi
ALQ-51 - APR-27
IPP~On; TACAN-Cn; Radar-On.
KOTE: Configuration of BLUE I and 2 unknown.
MIC^17
MIG-17D r.odel
SoM armed with AAM.
». FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clear. Other conditions unknown.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight heard calls of MIGs from the strike leader. These HIOs were first seen
when BLUE Flight observed two afterburner lights high at one o'clock. They then saw two
separate groups of '^TGs In sections of two pass fron north to south.
6. ACTION INITIATED
The other TARCAP flight (Event III-I96) turned after these MlOa and BLUE Flight
continued to the target.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
After reaching orbit station, BLUE Plight spilt into two sections. BLUE 3 and 4
saw three MIQ-17S pass below the flight and attack the trailing MZQ, destroying him
with a SIDEWINDER (AIH-9D).
On egress' BLUE 3 and saw a MIG-17 chasing an A-U (BLUE 2 of Event III-19t). This
MIG was attacked but BLUE 3 could not get a missile tone; however, BLUE 4 fired 120
rounds of 20trm fire ut the MIC hitting the HIG In the left wing.
8. ORDNANCE , ■
(No. flred/No. hits)
SIDEWINDER
AIM-9D
BLUE 3
BLUE
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 3 - Pressurlzatlon turbine was running hot. The failure to achieve a tone during
the second attack was caused by the fact that the second AIM-9D was fired first
and that there was no automatic stepping for the next Dlsslle. A good tone was
later achieved on the first AIM-9D.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience ; No data except BLUE it was an Air
Cannon Remarks
One MIO killed
1/1 One HIG damaged
hange officer.
Event lll-lSti
Conunenta on this Sncounter
BLUE 3
The swltcholcgy to set up the missiles for firing Mas a problem.
The AIM-9DS were short &o only two were carried. The AZn-9C was loaded at the
pilot's desire.
BLUE U
Would have preferred a Gat ling gun.
The F-8 sight was poor. The sight ladder was confusing since it was highly lighted
and the egro plpper passed through it, which was disconcerting.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Intervlewa ; BLUE 3 and BLUE June 1967.
Messages. Reports ;
CTG 77.7 011550Z May 1967 OPREP-^ RT 554.
CTG 77.7 0117002 May 1967 OPREP-5 001.
CTG 77.7 010655Z May 1967 OPREP-3 001.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was one of two TARCAP flights supporting a strike on JCS 9.1. On Ingres*
to the target BLUE Flight heard calls of MIGs from the strike leader. Near the target,
BLUE Plight observed two aircraft afterburner lights high at 1 o'clock, passing north to
south. There were two separate groups of MIGs in sections of two, which were subsequently
seen, for a total of four MIGs In all.
The other TARCAP flight (Event II 1-198) turned to engage so BLUE Plight continued on
to the target and set up a CAP station 3-5 miles northeast of Kep. At this time the
actions of BLUE 1 and 2 became unclear. It is not known if they engaged MIGs although
they must have sighted then, BLUE 1 and 2 are not mentioned In the accourt of BLUE 3 and
1's actions.
While the strike group was on the target four MIG-17S were observed to take off from
Kep and pass under the 3LUE Flight. The MIGs were heading east northeast at 1000 feet
altitude In order to jusip the strike force. At this time, SLUE Flight was heading west
at about UOOO feet altitude. Two MIG-17s (MIG 1, 2) were In a lead section but the
second section had split and the third MIG-17 (MIG 3) was alone and about one mile behind
KIG 1 and 2.
BLUE 3 and H made a hard descending right turn to attack MIO 3 not using afterburner.
The MIGs apparently did not see BLUE 3 and iJ's attack. BLUE 3 gained a 6 o'clock position
to MIG 3 and at UooO-6000 feet range, 1000 feet altitude and Uoo knots fired an AIM-9D,
Th* sdsalle was observed to fly directly up the MIG's tailpipe and explode. The HIG was
net In afterburner. MIG 3 disintegrated rapidly, and MIG 1 and 2 were not seen again.
With the element to echelon right, BLUE 3 and U returned to CAP altitude. Shortly
thereafter while turning south BLUE >i saw another MIG-17 (HJO li) chasing an A-U. The
A-4E in this case was BLUE 2 of Event III-195.
BLUE 3 and k were at 300Q to 3500 feet altitude and about 350 knots. The HIO passed
below BLUE 3 and k from right to left on a heading perpendicular to that of the F-88. The
NIG was at about 500 feet altitude.
BLUE 3 and 1 broke left and down, and called the A-U that he had a MIG on his tall.
The A-4 was weaving to prevent the MIG from tracking. The MIG was in afterburner and
about 2000 feet In trail of the A-J*. The A-'t headed for a hill located at 21«2U»N/106»28'E.
The MIG apparently noticed BLUE 3 and ft on his tall and broke left on top of the hill.
The A-'J broke right and disengaged.
BLUE U first fired about 40 rounds of 20mm at 10-15 degrees angle off at the HIG 'a
7 o'clock position. BLL'E U was coaltlcude at 2000 feet rarge closing. The MIC disengaged
when he saw the 2Cmra by breaking left and down. One continued to fire for a total of about
120 rounds of 20mm with the plpper tracking as the MIG broke. BLUE 4 saw numerous hits
in the MIG's left wing as he closed to 1200-1500 feet range.
MIO k continued the left turn with lower speed than BLUE k and BLUE H had to oull un
and break off due to a hill. *^ ^
The MIG was In afterburner; however, except for an initial use to accelerate, BLUE h
did not use afterburner. BLUE t had sufficient g capability to adequately lead the MIG.
BLUE 3 then engaged MIC . Although he was able to attain a good position on the
MIG (iiOOO to 6000 feet astern of MIQ U as MIC U made moderate to violent hlgh-g maneuvers
and returned to a northwest heading at low altitude), BLUE 3 could not gee a SlDEWltlt'ER
tone.* Although BLUE 3 shifted to t.he AIM-9C he was unable to obtain a radar lock due
to ground clutter.
a
1
0
i
i
I
B
S
B
a
a
a
■See equipment problems, paragraph 9, ^^^ig^^e cause.
222
Event III-19*
MIG 4 attempted to draw BLUE 3 Into a heavy flak area ^l^sr N/106''22'E.
but BLUE 3 disengaged. BLUE 3 and U rejoined ^^%gr«?irnJ?eS time
2l^25'N/106°25'E until the Enterprise group was off the target. The estlmatea time
of departure from final CAP station was at 1257H.
8.
Event III-195
Aircraft Involved: Four F-8Ca vs two MIG-I7s
Result : No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»15'N/X06«l6'E
PRIHARY HISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 1 May 1967/12«»8H.
Four P-8CS (BLUE Flight) w^re parr of a TARCAP supporting a strike on JC5 9.i.
AAM
2/0
None .
HIO 17
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
Messages. Reoorts :
CTQ 77.7 O11550Z Hay 1967 0PREP-J4 RT55A.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
r.s?snr.^:n"« ^^^^^ T.^
aircraft.
223
V
Event III-196
1.
Aircraft Involved: Three A-»»Cs vs MIG-17a
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter; ana'N/lOT'OT'E
PRIMARY HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOR
0»te/Tlff.e: 1 May 1967/1256H.
Three A-UCa were part of the six strike aircraft attacking JCS 9.1 <»•• Table I
of the Introduction to this event).
8. QRONANCE
RZQe rired cannon with no hits.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : None,
Messages. Reports :
CTQ 77.7 011550Z May 1967 OPREP-".
CTO 77.7 011700Z May 1967 OPREP-5.
12. MARRATIVE DESCRIPTtOH
AS BLUE Plight ingressed. the first lefenses encountered were two """"s which
p.sse5 uSS^ tie filgSI at approximately 21" 26- N/106^26' E without atteirptlng to attack
iir fire. , . . _
Sriirii. ?;c.I«<.'^ar?U "a " %SS"o .uppre..lo„ aircraft hitting th. target
area first.
on the bombing run or.e nenber of BLUE Plight saw four MIG-17s
of the flight m Event :il-195. BLUE flight continued tn- run and
egresslng they observed the F-8 of Event £11.15^ to down a MIG-17 with !,|^°^J^;"°^?-a
Si MIG'f tall was blow., off and the HIO tuir.bled and Inpacted at about Zloae'N/IGS 28 E.
observed the. right wing tip to be missing-
All aircraft recovered on board safely.
Event iri-197
Aircraft involved: Two A-tlCs vs two KIG-173
Result: One MIG destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»21' N/106* 20 'E
1. PRIMAitr MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 1 May 1967/12<i(iH.
Two A-bCs (BLUE Flight) were part of the flak suppression support for a strike on
JCS 9.1.
2. NISStON ROUTE
Prom BON HOKME RICHARD, north Co the Ingress p:)lnt (probably north of Haiphong) and
west to Kep. Egress was the reverse route.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
A-<tC BLUE 1. 2
4 _ LAU-10 rocket pod loaded with VT- fused ZUNI rockets (mounted on TER3)
90 rounds 20am
400 gallon cencerllne tank
grey and white paint schene
IPP-Offi TACAN-Off; ALQ-51 . APR-27 On.
4. FLIGHT CONOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Unknown .
5. INITIAL DETECTION
As BLUE 1 and 2 pulled off the target, they saw two MIG-17s coming from the southwest
The MIOs were Inside BLUE Flight's turn at 1500 feet range.
6. ACTION INITIATED
As the MIGs attacked BLUE 1, BLUE 2 attacked the MZGs, while calling for BLUE 1 to
break.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
•BLUE 1 executed a hlgh-g barrel roll and forced the MIGs to overshoot. As the MIGs
split, BLUE 1 selected the second one of the MIGs and fired three ZUNI rockets at him,
one of which hit, resulting in a kill,
BLUB 1 then attacked the lead MIG but his guns would not charge.
8. ' ORDNANCE
(No. rired/No. hits)
ZUNI
Cannon Rocket Remarks
BLUE 1 3/1 One MIO-17 killed
BLUE 2 2/0
NlOa At least 1/0
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1*3 guns were Januned.
BLUE I's radio transmitter became inoperative during the engagement.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
BLUE 1 was on LSO. Had considerable experience in F-4, as well as A-l.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLLiE 1, June 1967.
Messages. Reports ;
CTG 77-7 011700 May 196? OFREP-5/001.
CTG 77.7 011550 May 1967 OPREP-<t/007.
1?. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight r.f two A-^iCs were part of the flak suppression aircraft assigned to a
strike on Kep Airfield. -
Event Iir-197
Since no rxa. site, on the -rthea^t -Ue were o.serv.d active Uhe a„i«ne. tarjjO
V BLUE nil 2 attacked XICs on ^^'^S^i^lXJi^/^So Jw^^U aircraft In Area D of the target.
^ ZUNI (VT fused) and BLUE 2 expended l6 ZUNI on two ?iio ^
BLUE 1 and 2 had attacked on a north-south run ^J^^^J^^f J^.J^ of the. southwest,
left roll out °"/°i^/SEG^hi^h^s ^ef^tI^S iid cJosei'to 1500 feet range..
The MIGa were Inalde of BLUE Flight 9 leic T,wn attack on BLUE" 1.
AS the «IGs Closed they -er, hot BLUE 2 and joncent rated J^5^J,-5S;^^,,°SluE-, 1.
with both MIGs firing ""IJ^^^^.J^J^^J^^LiE f to TrSak!
BLUE 2 got behind MIG 2 and caiiea lor du« attempted
BLUE 1 went into a Se'?!™ ""s'JSJ Sw.'pSilerup «red\«0 buTSta
to follow but could not r.atch the turn. AS the nws pu*
blue 2 Droke right and disengaged. ^ ^ , mtc 2 but it missed. He then added
BLUE 1 fired one ZUNI with 50 I'jj^f ^'a^piaJ v^eS of thrniG at about 30/
irg?e"ofP ll^rniil It ^rrSuN?^oS:?:: luSi^Cas ooser^ to detonate. After
using the'zUTlI pods they were Jettisoned. ^^^^ contact with
BLUE 1 rolled hard right to «5«!*.^J%^?: = Jr5 5erai 1^0-010 k in a sixty degre. dive
MIO 2. AS BLUE 2 PuUeJ^J^k ^e.^jT.J^JJ.Se^'j^. ^S^l?' Tm^^^bserved black anoke rising
.rter checking his 6 o' cJ-J;. ^^SrJe*'" (I^'pS" fUgJtr^^^^^ rnlpi«loS'?he rad
(MIO 1) but BLUE i's guns would not charge. Un post; ixis"
has clips were found to be Janaed.) g minutes
BLUE 1 then .ls.„ga,.d. K. IjTt JJP„S» '^ZTXlr^^^ B^IThid Ic.
his transmitter. He flnaiiy arnwu ai. _ thought
Post fUsht inspection ,ho«* J •"".J'lJ.i;^'" " ""^
to be from AAA i'lre and not a,-e to the MIC a attacks.
226
Event III-19B
Aircraft Involved: Pour A-«tEs va three MIG-lTa
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«23*N/106'>15*E
I. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIC"
Date/Time: I Hay 1967/after l?MH.
Pour A-HE (BLUE Plight) were part of the flak suppression support for a strike on
Kep Airfield.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. flred/No. hits)
Cannon SSEfiEia
gj^yg ^ 1/0 Estimate possible damage.
MIG 2,3 At* least once/0 At BLUE 2 .
II. DATA SOURCE
Project Interviews ; None.
Messages. Reports ;
CTG 77.3 011550Z May 1967 0PREP-V007.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
During egress from the target MIGs appeared In the area. One MIG-17 (MIO 1) passed
m fron""? BLUE I In a slow tu?n. BLUE I fired 20mn> at MIO 1. and MIC 1 then rolled
inverted and pulled down, recovering at low altitude and departed the area. BLUE i
estimates possible damage to this 'MQ.
BLUE 2 was Jumped by two MIQ-175 (MIG 2. 3)» with the HIQs at 3 o'clock Position.
BLUE 2 descended to extremely low altitude and /aded MIGs by a series of hlgh-g turns.
Two P-eEs TARCAP (Event III-19'>) chased the MICs away.
Even*. 111-199
Aircraft Involved: Two P-»iC» ve two unldenta
'^■^ Results: Sight ing
Vicinity of Encounter: ao-HO'H/lOTOftO'E
I. PftlHARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: I May 1967, 1710H
IK DATA SOURC.
CIMCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
TWO bogey sightings separated by 5 minutes by CAP orbiting at coastline
for drone flight; bogejs above 30,000' ; distance too great for Identification.
Event IIZ-20.Q
Aircraft Involved: Eight ?-105» « at least
three HIC-l7s
Results; Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 21-50 'M/IOS- 30 *E
K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlae: 1 May 1967, I718H
IK DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight of four P-1053, part of ALFA strike on Thai JS"!;!" JJ**i_JJSS'for
saw t« Sgs at first time and position .^jljiS^'^iiS^Jip'Si b^en
15 miles until two F-J*C MIO CAP (see Event I"-"^) closed, WlO CA^ naa
following strike force; while egreaalng. second P-105 flight saw two silver
aircraft which turned and were lost.
Event XII-201
Aircraft Involved: ? P-*? vs t KIO-?
' Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: Hear Chinese Border
K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 1 May 1967/unknown
IK DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Silver MIGs sighted by F-i* aircraft near ChlnaA"/N border.
Event ni-202
Aircraft Involved: Four F-iCa v8 three MlClTs
Result: Ko damaf.e
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«50'N/105«30*2
1 PRIHART KISSIOK ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
force .
for ingress to the target down Thud Ridge.
3. AIRCRAFT CONflGURATIOMS
Each F'-IC
4 - AIM 7E
i| - AIM 9B
ECU PoU rlKht outboard
370 F.al. tank Left outboard
Center line tank
WIG- 17
Silver, no marking
4 FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
weather: Scattered, broken deck of clouds. 7 miles visibility.
Altitude: 11,000-12.000 ft
g- oeed: " ^00 kts
gSm§F;.tion : ;od°?oriatlon. stacked slightly low.
5. IKITIAL DETECTION ^^^^^ 3 ^
.ere Sfut\!SSS JJ^JSJ IKS? tSo^Jlei^aU. \he MIGs «ere silver.
• Tri^FrlltTLcad) i-dlately looked at -deep 6 o^clock;^^^^ th„. Jjjta winged
SM-lVJ SiSItroS^JSt^o-a^^iVtrriik^dSSS Inl-S^tS going afterburner.
T'Jirto 220O diving turn BLUE 1 closed at the B o'cloc. position and
r.aliMrt^.%ire°. lldl^ircllfl iSre F-.s. The MIQ, «re gone.
B. ORDNANCE
No firing.
9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEHS
None reported
11. DATA SOURCES
pgn BABOM Interview : BLUE 1 Front
ito««*ires. heports;
OPREP-3 011300 May 67, 8TFW - DOI 05015
19 NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Jh! « u . Of t.l. .vent 1, =a*. cl«r.r by an explanaUon ra.Her than • ;-r.ti.e.
The proceaure nad been "aj 'f ^.^^J J^^^^^ 5oef So? plcS It up l^edlately, he .111
Event iri-202
<l«lt. wlnned aircraft low 2.000-3.000 ft that turned out to J^* J;^- ^Jf 'bJ5e fJtght
hlin eleortlnie another strike f light ten minutes earlier but were late. J^"^,^"^"''
!U uSSS tS^rlaqulre the HlOa -Ulch were very io- in the mountains *lth the lew
scattered puffy rain eloude.
BLUE f light saw no SAMS.
«n.« «t-h.,. p-ti fiiirht which was leading the strike force, was frn-^^K.-d to orbit In
th. wSlnJ^J of 20-32 'fT/VoS^^^^^^^^^^ to 2in6'N/105°l6'E. The flight flvw ^Jlrect from
ChLlSf 97 to 20-35.S^^^^^^ arriving at 1725H. Due to poor vlslbllir., (2-3 jnlles In
SS) thrfl?ght deternlnei to'cover thl strike force egress ^:\^^3i^S?S5lSi-5o»E
sSnial InatrSctlons. At 1726H the flK^ht proceeded to the v clnlty of 2ino'M/lQ^ 30 E.
All atrlke flights egressed at 1715Z without seeing nlGs or ^«.-.3.
Event III-203
Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOSs vs one possible
MIC-21
Results: Sighting
VtelnltjT of Encounter: 20*54 'M/10ii«22«E
I. PAINAftV HISSTON AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 2 «ay I967, 0951H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE OCSCRIPTION
i««i,J*w2'^(lf^''^r*''!/^^^*'^ " 17.000' saw single bogey at 26.000'; bogey, which
looKed like MIG-21, disappeared Into clouds without hostile action.
Event ril-ZOft
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs two MIC- 17 J
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l»'jO'M/107«05'B
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: 2 Kay 1967, 0915H
II. DATA SOUftCe
• CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68,
12. NARRATIVe DESCRIPTION
Egresslng strike flight at 6000' saw two MiCs make oass from 9000' and
9 o'clock; MIGs rolled In to 2000' behind « P-105; flight went supersonic
and left KICs; no firing seen.
Event III-205
f Aircraft Involved: Two RF-iois vs at least
f one MIG-?
^ Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21°'iO'N/105"33*E
f. 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
I' Date/Tlma: 3 May 196 7, 163CH
.J 11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Photo flight saw black puffs 25-50' away and observed single MIC tracking
2 miles to right; no further contact.
231
Event I I 1-206
Aircraft Involved: Three RF-'»Ca vs One MIC-21
^, Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«51'tl/10'" 13'E
1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 3 May 1967/1705H ^
Three RP-UCa (BLUE Plight) were on a reconnaissance mission against JCS 82.24. J
B. ORDNANCE
Alkalal AA-1
NIQ-21 2/0
232
8
I
}
11. DATA SOURCES
1132 TRW 031200Z (toy 1967 OPREP-3 TUOC 03211 —
432 TRU 040000Z Hay 1967 OPREP-3 TUOC 03244 l«
12. NARRATIVE
At 1657K while heading 019 degrees at 25.000 feet MSL. at 2O«45»ri/a04«50'E, BLUE ^
Plight received a 3-rlng x-band from the 11 o'clock position.
At 1704H while heading 019 degrees at 20.000 feet MSL when at 21«51'N/104«'13'E , still ^
inbound to the target* BLUE Plight noted the x-band signal move from 11 o'clock to 9
o ' clock .position. i%
Thirty seconds later BLUE Plight observed a single silver MIG-21 with no markings
at 24,000 feet HSL, at 10 o'clock high, in a pursuit curve slipping to 7 o'clock position. ^
BLUE Plight broke left and down, and at this time two missiles were seen to pass off
to the right. One missile was observed to explo'le off the right wing, 300 feet away » at
the same altitude. The missile appeared fat and stubby resembling the AA-l Alkalal.
During the high s evasive maneuver, the missile seemed to be on a straight trajectory ■
rather than tracking his aircraft. The backseater observed the missile to detonate in a "
white puffy burst.
BLUE Plight dropped tanks and exited the area in a descent at Mach 1-4.
signal continued at 6 o'clock with a strength of three rings until 20"40'N/103°25*E. ™e
tins that the MXO broke off was 1710H.
On sighting the MIG-21, the flight dispersed 8 carts of chaff.
BLUE 1 and 2 Jinked to channel 97 at 10,000 feet altitude and BLUE 3 continued his —
descent to the deck and proceeded to channel 97. ■
BLUE Plight felt that the Mia-21 was GCI vectored for about 10 minutes prior to
contact since the flight received strobes of 1-1/2 to 2 rings and the signal moved from
1 to 2 o'clock position while the flight was or a heading of 019 degrees.
The weather was 2/8 coverage with tops at 12,000 feet MSL. The visibility was 5-6
■lies In haze.
One mender of BLUE Plight received a MIQ warning "Bandits at 70 miles."
I
1
I
»
I
I
i
4
Event III-207
Aircraft Involved: Four va a) two KIC-21«
b) five HIG-17a
Result: One MIC-21 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: a) 21°08'N/105»51;E
1. PRtNARV HISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TliP.e: * May 1967/ 1* 35H
Four P-4CS (BLUE flUht) were on a HTGCAP mission In support of a force of 20 P-105s
fron Takhll which were strlklnr JC3 32. S". In addition another flight of F-«Ca were
also on HICCAP for this force. The fllRhts of F-105a which encountered MIGs are those of
Events HI-2U and 111-212.
2. HISSIOR ROUTE
Departed Ubon and effected rendezvous with the strike force at the ORANGE ANCHOR
drop off. From there the force proceeded to Channel 97- Prom Channel 97 direct to
21°37'H/10U«5^'E then direct to 21" 3't 'n/lOS" 33'E, then direct to 21«08 N/105«51 E down
the right side of Thud Hldije. Egress was the same route with post strike refueling on
OPANCE ANCHOR.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-ftC BLUE 1. 2. 3. t
H - AIM-7E SPARSOVf
4 - AIM-9B SIDEWINDER
I . QRC-160 Pod
1 - 600 sal centerllne tank
1 - 370 gal wing tank
MIC~21
Clean
Silver
MIC>17
Clean
■No afterburner
Sliver
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS ►RIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Scattered clouds at 2000 to <»000 ft, visibility 15 miles,
3 LUE
^ ^ ^ jj.
A ltitude : l«»,000 ft
Heading : 150«»
Speed : 500 kts
Fuel State ; 12.000 lb
flight formation :
Pod Mlth BLUE 2 high on the right and the element (BLUE 3, on the left, slightly
lo«» almost line abreast.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE flight received MIG warnings and knew MIGs were In the area. They heard one
of the first or second P-105 flights call HIGs . BLUE 2 saw two MIQ-21a, at U o»clock
level, attacking a flight of F-105s and called them out.
6. ACTION INITIATED
^ "BLUE flight warned the F-105a and brofte Into the MIC-21s going to afterburner
and Jettisoning tanks.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 fired three SPARROWS at one of the MIG-21s, missing with all three. He then
fired four SIDEWINDERS, one of which hit the MIC-21 resulting In a kill.
Outbound from the tartr'jt BLUE flight engaged five MIG-173 in the vicinity of Hoa
Lac airfield. During this engagenent, BLUE 2 fired three AIM-93s without scoring a hit.
BLUE fllg.1t then disengaged due to Bingo fuel and egressed.
233
L
Evt
111-207
8. ORDNANCE
(No. flped/No. hits)
SPARROW SIDEWIHDEB
BLOE 1
BLUE 2
KXQs
9.
3»/0
Non«
3/0
Remarka
All fired at MIG-21.
Pired at MIG-IT
One HlC-21 killed.
EQUIPNCNT PROBLEMS
BLUE I's cockpit mounted camera did not work due to improper loading,
left outboard tank would not Jettison.
10. AIRCREU COMHEKTS
E«perlence
Total P-tt Combat
Remarks
BLUE 3*8
Total
Combat
Houra
Houra
Missions
BLUE 1
Front
4900
230
50
Back
350
90
86
BLUE 3
Front
4200
815
20
SLUE 2
Front
2750
430
Back
720
41C
Second MZO kill,
engasement .
Third alr-to-alr
First encounter with NtG-17
Comments on this Encounter
BLUE I (Front) fired everything he had at the J1IC-21. With a gun, he would have got
a couple of XIC-lTs In the second fight. He made many dry passes at them. For other
cownents see Events III-102, -207, and -252).
BLUE 3 - It was the first time that he had seen -.he MIC-17s get Into a tight little
turn and stay there. It was amazing how the MIO-17 turned. The turns effectively
negated the missile attacks . Since the P-4s hod no guns, a tight turn oroitlng xow to
the ground was a successful defense.
To combat the MIO's defense tactics should be to work two elements in the vertical.
One keeps the MICa busy, and the other should drift off to cet separation. Whfn the
aeeond element returns he should call the first element to pull up and away, leaving
a SPARROW shot for the second element.
BLUE I, 4 June 1967; BLUE 3, 2 June 1967
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
He^sages. Reports ;
8 TPW 0^111202 May 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 05080
8 TPW 0M1H35Z May 1967 OPREP-3 tX)I 05086
AIM 7D/E Missile Performance Reports for BLUE 1
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight was one of two flights of P-4Cs providing HIQCAP for a force of F-105
striking the Hanoi transformer station, JCS 32.2!J.
BLUE flight rendezvoused with two fllgnts of P-1053 which was the flight of Event
III-211 and one other (GREEN flight). This was accomplished at ORANCiE ANCHOR drop off
and CAP position was taken Inmedlately. The force proceedei to Channel 97 and orbited
waiting for the rest of the strike force. After two orbits, rendezvous was completed
and the Ingress course was set.
3
3
3
<3
f
3
3
3
> Although official sources indicated BLUE 1 fired 3 AIM-7E, both BLUE I's Interview and
BLUE 3'3 Interview state that BLUE I had no ordnance remaining during the en^a.-jenent
with the MIC-17S. It is concluded that one A1M-7E on BLUE 1 did not tune properly and,
therefore, was unable to be fired. BLUE l*a firing sequ'.-n;e tends to conflrn this.
Event III-207
The force from Takhll flew flights In trail. The first escort (P-HC) fHPlht was
iiear the front of the formation. That placed the IRON HAND flight out front. The strike
force was led by the sjlsslon comnand'sr with the first flight of F-Us a little high and
out to his right. BLUE flUht was about 1 to 1 1/2 ml In trail of the last P-105 flleht
(SREEN rilpiht) and about 2030 ft higher. The flight In front of GREEN flight was the
night of Event 1II-2X1.
The flight Jettisoned the centerllne tank about Yen Bal. During Ingress MIG calls
were he«trd for the target area via the BULLSEYE system.
After hitting the turn point at 1K3?H, BLUE flight proceeded down Thud Hldge for
about 3 minutes. Durln,? this tine the first or second F-105 fllpht made a call MICa at
9 o'clocJc low." This alerted BLUE flight to zhe rilGs location direction.
When about 5 to 6 nl from Phuc Yen (li^SSH), Bi.UE 2 saw two HIG-21s and called them
out. BLUE 1 Immediately spotted then. Instantly Identifying them as MI0-21s, and called
to Jettison tanks and go to afterburner. BLUE 3's outboard tank did not Jettison.
When seen, the T'lGs were at 10 to II o'clock from BLUE flight level and crossing
left to rlcht angle off , They were at about the same altitude as BLUE flight and
had apparently chandelied up from off the deck. The MIGs were turning in on a fllgnt
of P-1058 (GREEN flight) lr.T.edlately preceding BLUE flight.
The MICs were at GSEEH flight's 7 to 8 o'clock position, about 1 ml back.
BLUE 1 also saw some HICs attacking the other flight In frunt of OREEM fll&iit.
CThase are the F-l05s in Event III-211] and called this flight to break right.
BLUE flight broke Into the two MIG-213 which were crossing rapidly from left to
right. One MIC continued to turn after the GRESM fllr.ht but the second MIG broke right,
going down and under BLUE flight turning 130° and diving for the deck. This MIG was not
seen again.
BLUE flight started after the first MIG and vector rolled for position. BLUE 1
obtained an Immediate lock-on, In boreslght. This HIO broke right and started an evasive
maneuver.
The MIG outturned BLUE flight but 3LUE 1 and 2 went high to stay with the MIG's
turn. BLUE 3 and 'i also went high but wfre unable to match the turn and ended up high
and to the ou-.slde. The MIC then reversed as BLUE 1 and 2 came over the top. As the
MIG reversed to the left, BLUE 3 and 4 were looking head-on at the MIO and would have
had a SPARftOW shot If BLUE 1 and 2 had not maintained position on the .MIG. However,
BLUE 1 and 2 were able to reverse their turn and stay with the MIG." The HIG passed
under BLUE 3 and ^ as they went high and outside of the turn again.
Sometime during this turning fight BLUE 1 rlonle fired three SPARROW missiles at
the KIO, according to the firing reports. There It some Inconsistencies in the data
(flth OPREP 0111112 Indicating a firing Interlocks in at about a mile range. Interlocks
is also supported in OPREP Oi«Iiii35.
The missile firing reports give much larger firing ranges and Interlock out. Ton-
slderlne the type of action encountered, the firing range of ml which was given seems
large. In all cases the MIG-21 target was given at 8500 ft altitude. 0.9 T'ach and at
20* aspect to BLUE 1, who was at 8000 ft altitude and at .9 ^lach pulling >* g's with a
slight overtake. The .ulsslle select ll(?ht had been on 5 minutes prior to launch.
The first missile failed to guide and went ballistic and rapidly passed out of sight.
The second and third missiles appeared to guide but passed behind the MIO-21 and were
lost from view.
One source, OPREP 0H1120Z, reported BLUE 1 firing three SPARROWS, Indicating that
the third one was fired out of oaranetera at the MlC after the first three SIDEWINDERS
were fired. No source Indicates more than three S?ARROWS were fired.
No further SPARROW firings by BLUE 1 were Indicated In this event; however, after
flrlnir the last SIDEWINDERS, DLUE 1 was reoorted as being out of ordnance. Since BLUE 1
was loaded with olght missiles, It Is concluded that one AI!^-7 must have detuned and,
therefore, was not able to be fired In the fight. It Is a possibility that a fourth
AIM-7E was fired by BLUE 1 and not Indicated In thJ OPREPS; but due to the consistency
of the report of three SPARROWS fired, this situation Is considered unlikely.
The HIG-21 continued to turn and started to climb with BLUE 1 violently maneuvering
to stay behind. At about 17.000 ft the HIC-21 was a little slow and he reversed. BLUE 1
observed the MIG to be down sun and high against a clear sky.
BLUE I went to HEAT and got .i good tone, then pulled lead enough to put the target
on the edge of the missile field of view. BLUE 1 fired two SIDEWINDERS which passed
behind the MIG. The third SIDE'rflNDER fired .BUlded , and exoloded 5 to 10 ft J^"^er tne
MIGs tall at the 5 o'clock position. This missile scored the kill. A fourth SIDEWINDER
was fired while the HIG was In a violent evasive mmelver and burning, but it T.lssed
and Its furtner flight was unobserved.
Event III-207
Por all launches a .ood tone -« ;f J^^^^red'HSlJo^K^Ss' lllT.tle
prior to each launch For all jf^J^^f.J^^^^J^.^^'^^^^L^ ^^and 3?!ghtly cllAblng: with.
25» with the «l98lle which scored a hit being fired at 20 .
After the third exploded, no Pl«es were objjrved to cone off JJ'/^^^f J/^J^^
the MIG »ent Into a violent maneuver, pulling hard to the IJ^^^J^^^J^J^f J^ut this
IS^e-SViS UTrilk .TlZ\irii^rt^^^^^^ « th. «ia, Which did
not Euide • a
Th. mo kept tuning «d tn.n i.v.i.d SldS'Sln^^SnilSffJS-
BLOE flight follo..- the «I0 « asout l/J -ng. '^/S^'^-'^.^IS JlS;,!*"
on^nJ c",rtS^ run-ay to Impact 100 ,ard,. south of th. runMy ntar « «5«> «•» »"••
No ojectlon froni the MIC was observed.
After breaking right to a heading '^"^."'S;^,?"*.*.^" ""'"inf Se««n
10.000 ft and then made a turn to th. west of Phuc Jen, „.adlng east. '^^^^^^
±1 'tr2Trl^\Tl Jiii?J.'r:2.5!'"llJ?e%M2!%SUJL„t. t.,e flight had
not bMn able to regain their pod foi-mation.
Just as BLUE 3 rolled out from the turn a SJM Passed through^the flight .he^SAM
passed 100 to 300 ft ""der the nose of BLUE 3. The a sa^^ ^^^^
IJorfrS^-hJirthrSiS^lrSrlgSnSiS^n^s'!;: JSflid out. alcth-r exploded 500 ft
off the right wing.
Th* P-105 force had by this time egressed uu Thud Ridge so BLUE flight descended
and el^^ss;i out o"r tSe Jalley heading for Hoa Lac. »o flak was observed.
When at about '•COO ft altitude and about 5 ml east of Hoa Lac, BLUE ^
Hia-m"i*rclfnJiheTelJ BLUE 3 and U .ere ir^^^/^^^^J-^, ^--i-.^.^SiSSirft
:;^iru^e.'•s^?h^ni^i1^:5^^'iIS"bor9oo^^"li irf^ei .i. at about 550
BLUE flight had heard no MIG warnings for Hoa Lac.
TeTirdU no. ..tempt to shoot at Br."^ flight as BLUE 1 and J and BL0E^3 and^,^^^
JSSrS StSSdr m.'™i«"!;.rk2E°filgJr.-^s ^itSfrlc^ =l=se^or a SP.P.ROV, shot
piuinS tio nwiy COT t SIDEWXIIDER attack,
oesplt. thU. BLUE a attempted to fire a SIDE.INOEH 5'-^™hSSS^.
rs5 ^h^l:*lS^^K'^- s £ifj'^^^and . 000 0 30.0^^^
2 to 3 B's. The MIC-17 was nose Jif l^" J ^rosslnran^" ISs about 30" at firing. The
"r^JL^ras^'^oSo'?? S5?o°rt^ ^'"3o''UJrSfr"i:%rn «a3%ood for^U launchea. BLUE 2
JtS'So ?ldar°lock and the nlsslles were launched visually.
After several turns wit. the BLUE 3,and J Pulljd ".p -J ^jlS^f.^SnhL"
„1 to the east and turned to cone ^^^^^-..^LJE 3 got * jadar iock ^^^^ ^^^^^
were still under attack Jj. f^^f^J^J^^^^ier frSx bSe 1 . 3LUZ 3 faUed to connunlcate
fSreiScrsiJuJu^n' SSw?"i:inrBLSS''rand% did not pun .ut Of the MlCs pattern
to allow a SPARROW shot.
ea.apAu ,h.M- BLUE T rressfed on in for a SIDEVIMDEH attack and.
Not setting the SPARROW ^hg^, BLUE 3 pre. s fed on ^^^^
«lth a good growl "l^*®*^ JVnc uo It ?he MIG . started to close Into firing paran-
.ho.t»ih°l t'aSfo! ^^^^^Vi^i'^-^^ S^iiJ-af LiSlMSS
and the flight broke off and egressed.
Event III-207
J . Mr IIP 7 wa-T-"! bv BLUE 1, saw a MIG-17 at hlB 7 o'clock
edsas which tapered off towards the Vuselav.e .
Dunns egress, SL'JE U jettlson-d four Ari'-Ss due to fuel conslderatlOM. After
refuellne with ORAHCE AKCHOH, the flight returned to base.
Event tir-208
- ■« J Pour "-UCa V8 two to three
Aircraft Involved: Four
ur>ident
Results: No damge
Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»32'M/l0r57'E
PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Dat«/Ttme: 3 Kay 1967. 1710H
1. DATA SOURCE
Ci:;CI'ACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
2. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
^nO CP fU^t r.r ».,A "rl^e .eld to -"^^.ro^/iS-rhf^^"-"'""""*''
four .ms UP vortex condensation "all» «^ » InTZn ", 30 «lle. from fUgMi
Event 111-209
Aircraft Involved: Four P-IC v» two unldent^
Reaulta: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 21°20'N/10U«»25'E
1 PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlr,e: 4 t-tay 1967. 1«'25H, 14<iOH
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPAGFW Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
pos!
A/C
2r;000'''anrpassrd'fll8ht~rn>lle8' to right,
Event 111-210
Aircraft Involved: Pour P'^Cs vs four
MM-cra*v mo- 178 and four fuO-Zia
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 2in5'H/105-n'E
1 PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlne: «» 1967, 1M3H
11. DATA SOURCE
CIKCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68,
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
«.o a^ ifi DQO' was IneresslnR alont; Thuc. rldee when lead spotted
KIG CAP flight at l6»59°^^^jTrt-i7 heading directly beneath; a cllrJulng
three silver and one <:a-noanaEed '^^^'J^^^^^J^^Ji ^ics disapceared before
■ -j::;:..^!.s;.no"i a? . ^^^^^ -
( Event III-211
t
%
Alrcrcft Involved: Fcur P-105s vs one MIG-21 and two
MIG-17S
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Near Zl'OS^N/lOS'Sl'E
1. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Datc/ritr.c: *J May 1967/ about l'»35H
Pour '■'-lO'jDa (BLUE flight) were part of a strike force from Takhll attacking JCS
?:-.2ii. Which included l6 strike aircraft (ef which BLUE flight was one and the flight of
Fvent 111-212 and GREKH flight of Event III-207 wei-e also menbers). In addition, the
I force Included a flak suppression flight and an IhZ'.i IIAHD flight was in the area between
i n^-iH^U/UVjO^yz and 21"?1'?I/105"'>5'E.
The strike force was supported by a MIGCAP of eight P-*Ca. The flight of Event
III -207 was part of these.
11. DATA SOURCES
."■essages, Rororta :
355TFW QUI 3 30 Kay 67 OPP.EP-3 DOTO-01i557
12. NARRATIVE OESCPIPTION
BLUE flight was warned of a ■•IIG attach: by Its P-** cover {Event III-207) and was
directed to break right. The flight broke retaining ordnance but when warned a second
time, dropped Its ordnance in the vicinity of phuc Yen airfield. The flight observed
one HIC-21 break off after a single pass.
Two HIG-17a pressed an attack on egress but the flight successfully evaded them.
Event III-212
Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s vs one MIC-21
Result; No damage
Vicinity of Enchanter: Wear Zl^OS'M/lOS'Sl'E
I. PRIMARY NISStON AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: H May 1967/Shortly after lt35H
Pour P-105a (BLUE rilsht) were part of a strike t'crce from Takhll attacking JCS
82. 2^4 , which Included 15 strike aircraft <of which BLUE fllBjht was one and the flight
of Event III-2L1 and GREEM flight of Event III-207 were also menbers). In addition, the
force Included a flak suppression fll?:ht and an IROH BAUD flight was In the area between
'21*iH*fl/lQ5^3l'e. and Zl'Sl'N/lOS'lS'E.
The strike force was supported by a «IGCAP of eight F-ilCs. The flight of Event III-
-207 was part of these.
8. ORDKANCE
Soviet AAH Remarks
Mia-21 1/0 Ptred out of range
II. DATA SOURCES
Pro.lect Interviews : 3LUE 3, June 1967
Messages . Reports ;
355Tr#* 041330Z May 67 DOTO-0 11557
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight was part of the strike force and was armsd with l8 x 750 lb bombs and
6 X 500 lb bombs. It is not known which nenber carried the 500 lb bombs. BLUE 3 had
2 X '•50 gal tanks, an AIM-9B and a QRC-160 cod. The bombs were mounted on a MER rack
on the centerllne. BLUE U had two QRC-l£0 pods, two U50 gal tanks, and bo:nb8.
On egress from the target, still retaining the MER" rack, AIM-9B, pod and tanks.
BLUE 3 and U headed up Thud Fiid?e. They were at about 8000 ft and 550 kts --hen BLUE 3
looked down and saw a single, silver MIG-21 with red markings.
The MIO was about UOOO ft below and 2000 ft out at 8 o'clock, paralleling their
course. The MIC fallowed BLUE 3 and >i about a t^uarter of the way up Thud .^Idge when he
started an easy left turn and disappeared.
Although not seen by BLUE 3, on egress a MIG-21 launched a missile at BLUE flight
but the launch was out of range and the nisslle was ineffective.
It was surmised that the Mia-2l seen by BLUE 3 was the same MIO who was drying to
catch up with the flight for an Interception when the flight turned at the top of Thud
Ridge.
Event 111-213
Aircraft Involved: 'No KF-tCs vs Two HIG-17S
Result: Slf.htlng
Vicinity of Encounter: 21^59 •H/10'<°30'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: H May 196T/1615H
I ■ II. DATA SOURC£S
[ 132 TFW 0U1200 May 1967 OPREP-3 TUOC -3267
12, NARRATIVE
r* Two RF-JJCs were on a mission against JCS 32.2'». The weathtr was scattered clouds with
two-eightj ccverafic, with bases at U500 feet MSL. Visibility w&s 7 miles in haze.
The flight departed Udorn and flew to 18*25'H/103''25'E at 20,000 T'ej;, ^5°™
they proceeded to 20°26'N/103-'»3'i then to 21°55':i/10a«lii'E and then to 21»58':J/10I.»30»E.
\ Frort there, at 2000 foot altitude, they proceeded to 20«'26'H/103*13'E and then to Mom
I at 29,000 feet.
At i6l'iH when at ai^SO^M/LOti^SO'E tha two RF-*»Ca heard a MIC call from Red Crown of
"MIGs heading 310 degrees IJorthwest. " At the same time the flight received a yellow
T" border violations :all.
I Descending from 20,000 feet to 2000 foot altitude, the flight did not receive any
signals.
At 1615H when at 21''5'«':4/10U"'30'E In a descent on a heading of 010 degrees the
r • flight observed two MIG-175. The KIOs were at 10.000 foot altitude at 10 o'clock poaitlon
I heading 310 degrees.
^ • The RF-14CS descended to the deck and broke left and did not notice the MIGa to make
any move to engage. The .-nisslon was aborted and the flight returned to base. Ho markings
were observed on the MIQs.
t
Event III-21J*
Aircraft Involved: ?our P-I05s vs one 1110-21
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter; 21»28'N/105'10'E
1. PR! HART NtSSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 1 Kay 1967, lt41H
n. DATA SOURCE ,
CINCPACFLT ,ftmf r Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
ALFA strike flight saw HIO four miles ahead; flight was descending through
10,000*; KIG made no hostile moves.
Event: ZZI-215
•**lreraft Involved: One EB66C vs one unident
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*o6 'N/loa^SS 'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dat«/Tl«e: May 1967, lft53H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
ECM flight at 32,000' escorted by the aircraft In Event III-209. observed a
dark, unident A/C making a low pass, coming In to 6 miles from 1:30 o'clock and
then departing.
Event III-216
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs two
Mia-2l8
Results: Sighting
Vlelnlty of Encounter: Ten Vlen RR Yard
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 5 Hay 1967, 1730H, 17^fiH
II. DATA SOURCE
CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
ItuBiber 4 of ALFA strike flight, after completing bcmb run, saw one MIO and
recovered at alternate base due low fuel; at second time shown, remainder of
flight was egress Ing at 22,000* when It saw cne KIC, 20 miles away at 8 o'clock
position In a eight orbit; no hostile action observed.
Event rn-217
Aircraft Involved: Eight P-1058 vs one HIG-21
Results: No damage
Vic m It? of Encounter: 2l»06'W/103»55'E
I. PRIMARY NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: Hay 1967, IftSJH
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Starr Study 6-68.
12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Two fllRhts reported seelnc: one KIG-?I in the seneral vicinity of
Sam Neua in Laos; yilO nade a desAcnciJnf; pnss on ^2 of one flight and came
Hlthin 4.000' before broke hard left and lost sight of MIG.
Event III-2I6
Aircraft Involved: Eight P-105s vs two MIC-Zls
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: SO^SS'N/IOS' 33 'E
1. PRINARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
C ate/Time: 5 May 1967. Unknown
n. DATA SOURCE
• CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight unable to acquire target due to poor visibility and heavy cloud
cover; flight leavin? target vicinity when they heard another strike flight call
two MIGs at first fil.-ht's 6 o'clock position; first flight Jettisoned ordnance
safe but did not see any KIGs.
Event ZII-219
Aircraft Involved: Onn RPIC vs ? Unldent
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"20'N/104«37'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 8 Kay 1967. 03f3H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
U. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Inbound photo A/C received X-band signal ahead while at l.OOC altitude;
subsequent stronger X-band signal at 6 o'clock led to nlsslon abort; photo A/C
broke right and egressed, followed for 8 minutes by X-band slpnal.
243
3
Event III-22Q Ij
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-«C. V3 t« MlC-Zla
ReauU: Sighting oaly ■
!> Vicinity or Encounter: JPJ-^-i^i^o?"" H
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION ^
Date/Time: 12 May 1967/1638H ^„,.,«^ TaRCAP for a strike group of l6
A fllpht of four P-tCs (CRANGE flight) P';''^^'*^"* "J"! " „Ties northwest of
P-lOsJ. The target »as the Ha Dong Army barracks/supply area three miles
Hanoi. JCS 31.00.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
T«o MIG-213 -ere observed to be In pursuit of four P-lOSa.
6. ACTION INITIATED emraaed the MIG-2la. (3
The F-1058 continued toward the target area as the P-Wa engage Va
11. DATA SOURCeS
Mi.*»g gea. Reports :
V^;r^E;P-3U11552 «ay 1967 OP«»V OP^ Box Scor.
U. ll»«ll«tIVE OESCBIPTIOII , h,., aLUE OREEK, and BUCK tllghW fl
Sixteen F-1053, m "'^•■"^f^/r'^r"",^ n™b""!cf 3i:oo"'S.-Don5/m^^ U
target area. r.l05s) was briefly ^
While inbound to the target area BLUE ?,^{J^|,\Si/were engaged by ORAtlGE
pursued by two KIG-21S. The MiGs broke off the r atta.K a^^^^ _ , Ingress to the
Tulll Sheen night -tner ' ^ftLn ^^rengage was .-de^^^
BU« fSeh? ( 'a rlllht of f-loS) sighted four MIQ-17s while inbound to
no attempt was made to engage.
a
244
a
9
a
a
R
s
3
f
r:
i:
V
I
1,.
Event III-221
Aircraft Involved: Twel v F-105s vs two HIG-218 and five MIG-17s
Result: Siehtlng only
Vicinity of Kncounter: Approximately 3 to 13 miles northwest of
Hanoi
. 1. PRIMARY HISSIOH Ano TACTICAL SITUATION
I Date/Time: 12 May I967/1C35H
^- northi.,t ,f Hanoi. A-r!r.eS?1r":ic= ir.^^^^ ".liL^^'n
I . 2. MISSION ROUTE
The strike group from Korat, approached the target area from the northwest.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATI QMS
F-105 BLUE 1. ?. ^. a: ERCV ::? 1. 2. 3. ii: BLACK 1. 2. 1. »l
6 - M-117 bonbs
1 - M-61 CREL-N
F-ia5 QRZEU I. 2. 1. li
H - CBU-211
I - H-61 grf.e;i
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
«fc «S! '"ii"*!-?!!^^? •"cour^cered intense AW/37/57 and 85 mm AA fire from the tar-
area- An extremely hostile environment of heavy flak, SAMs and HIGs prevailed In the
5. INITIAL DETECTION
... urn !!^^^* ^^'^ ^^'■5^^ ^'•'^*» ^'^''-^^ "as briefly pursued by two HIG-21s Tha
i '^^^^-^ attack as tney were enrac«--d by a flight of F-^s (see Event tit 330^
f GREEN flight Observed two MIG-21S during Ingross to the tlrge? a^d one 5?C-n LJlng
*5f?"; J° attempt to engage was r.ade by either side. BLACK flight sighted four MIO -17a
while Inbound to the target but no attempt was inade to engage. *sn*ca ^our am xfa
' ' 6. ACTION INITIATED
t. . None.
11. DATA SOURCES
f -
{■ • Messages: 388 tfW OPREP-3121155Z May 1967
L. CINC PACFLT staff study 6-68
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
See paragraphs 1. H and 5.
2H5
Event 111*222
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-4Cs va five MIC-ITa
Result: One F-IC lost
Vicinity of Encounter: 20"59' N/105* 30 'E
1. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 12 May 1967/l6'<i*H.
A flight of four P-'«Cn (BLUE Plight) was providing MIOCAP for a strike group of
P-105S. Inboun'j to the tnr^et the entire strike forces encountered SAMs and AA fire.
No KIG warning was received prior to the sighting of the KIGs.
2. HISSION ftOUTC
BLUE Plight departed Danang and proceeded to the WHITE ANCHOR refueling area then to
Channel 97 and directly to target JCS 31<00. After egress from the target area the flight
refueled at WHITE ANCHOR and returned to a position to miles northwest of Hanoi to provide
RESCAP for an P-103 pilot who had been shot down earlier. When at BINGO fuel* the flight
proceeded to RbO ANCHOR for refueling and 'hen returned to base.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-»C BLUE 1> 3
2 SPARROW (AXM-7E}
2 SIDEWINCEH (AIM-9B)
1 20inin Run (SU(J>16)
1 QRC>160 ECK pod
P-IC BLUE 2. U
4 SPARROW (AIM.7E)
« SIDEWINDER (AIH-9B)
1 QRC-160 ECM pod
WlG-lTs
Sliver with red star on top of wings.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clear in the area of the encounter.
BLUE
I
I
I
I
J
I
I
I
T 2 3 IT
Altitude ; 5000 to 7000 ft
Heading : northwest
Speed : llOO to 500 kts
Puel State ; No external tanks
Plight Forwatlon ; Fighter escort In two elements of two fighters each.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
As the p-105 strike group began egress from the target area with BLUE Flight pi^o-
vldlng fighter cover, the backseater In BLUE 3 called, "MIOs 11 o'clock, low." No MIG
warning had been received.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 4 was told by BLUE 3 to close up the formation and BLUE 4 replied that he was
experiencing difficulty with the afterburner in the left engine. BLUE I (Lead) reported
contact with the KIGs at 10 o'clock low and that he waa initiating an attack. BLUE 3
acknowledged and Indicated support of the attack.
7. SITUA7I0N DEVELOPMENT
Moments later BLUE 3 sighted two more KIGs at 9 o'clock and reported to BLUE 1 that )
he was terminating his support to BLUE 1 and was attacking the second section of MIGs. -
While maneuvering to attack, BLUE 3 sighted a fifth KIG naklng a run on him In his 7-8
o'clock position. A SAM missile call at this time directed the attention of the crew of
BLUE 3 elsewhere and the diversion waa sufficient to cause BLUE 3 to lose sight of the
MIfis. In an effort to relocate the MIGs, BLUE 3 rnade a Jinking climb to approximately
9000 ft- Pron this position BLUE 3 saw a fireball at one o'clock low which was BLUE H.
Prior to this, BLUE 1 and 2 pursued the first section of KIGs. BLUE 1 gained a
firing position on MIG 2 and launched a SPARROW (AIM-?) rlssile in the boresight mode.
As the missile war, launched, I'lO 2 tlr.hter.ed his turn. After- guidlntr directly toward the
MIG, the missile detonated at approximately 100 ft, 6 o'cloci* fron MIG 2. BLUE 1, with
BLUE 2 on hla wing, yo-yoed off and .naneuvered Into position again. Once again the MIG
I
8
1
I
i
9
OLiVs. c an ma win(^, /w-jruc;u w. i aim ^iiaiieu versa j.nbu poaib^cn again. unce again bfie niu m
tightened his left turn and the SPARROW, although tracking nicely at the MIG's 6 o'clock ft
position, burst approximately 100 ft short of MIG 2. Again ULUE 1 and 2 yo-yoed off high, ^
[.
f:
i:
; Event 111-222
1
but this tlrae a single F-itC was observed, low, on a reciprocal heading, with two HIGs slowly
B^?'*^"^ ^-^^ ^ o'clock position. Repeated warnings were given over the radio but the
. il> failed to take any evasive action. When finally hit, the F-^JC burst into flame. This
' P-'iC was BLUE k.
^ 8. ORDNANCE
I (No. fired/No. hits)
3PARR0V Gun
, AIH-7E SUO-IS Remarks
1 2/0 1/0 Qun would not fire.
BLUE 2, 3 0/0
^ One P-IC shot down.
9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 - Gun would not fire. No firing pulse to the electric primer, electrical leads
broken.
BLUE 3 - APQ-100 failure. No SPARROW capability. Generator malfunction indicated after
refueling during ingress to the target.
BLUE tt - Experienced some difficulty with the afterburner on the left engine.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
BLUE 1 (Lead) - BLUE Plight was using a discreet coiwnunication channel for internal
flight coouaunieatlon while monitoring the strike group frequency on an auxiliary receiver.
Guard channel was also being monitored for any MIC warnings. None were received.
IK DATA SOURCES
Project I nterviews : BLUE 1 (Lead) front, 22 June 1967.
Messages ; 366TPW OPREP-3 121330Z May 1967
366TFW OPREP-3 12?1C0Z May 1967
366TFW OPREP-3 1314252 Hay 1967
AIM-yn/E Missile Fi.'lng Report
12. .NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
A ni 5ht of four P-^Cs (BLUE Flight) wa-s provliln? MIGCAP for a strike group of F-1058
_ against target JZS 31.OO. While In the target area the flight encountered SAMs and AA
fj.re. Previous to entering the area BLUE i test fired his gun, but it failed to fire.
As the strike group began egress fron the target area on a northwesterly heading,
BLUE Plight was provldlni; fighter cover. Four MICs were sighted at L o'clock, low, by
BLUE 3 (back). When directed by BLUE 3 to close ud the formation, BLUE li advised that
he was experiencing diffieulcy with the afterburner on his left engine. BLUE 3 decided
at that time not to use afterburner to insure that BLUE t couid maintain a fighting wing
position. Within seconds BLUE 1, with BLUE 2 In fljhtlng wing, and BLUE 3 and ft providing
support, initiated an attack on MIC 2 (the second MIC of the section). A moment later
BLUE 3 sighted two nore MIOs at 9 o'clock with approximately one mile separation from the
lead section, BLUE 3 called BLUE 1 and reported the MICs stating that hi.i element was
^ separating from the lead element to attack this second section of MICs. BLUE 1 acknowl-
edged this transmission and pressed on with his attack.
The lead element, BLUE 1 and 2, made a lescending left turn in behind the lead MIG
section and closed the range to about one mile for the trailing MIG, MIG 2, which was in a
L gentle left climbing turn at approximately 1*500 ft AGL, 500 ft below BLUE 1, at the 12
o'clock position. KIQ 2 was acquired in the boresijht mode and BLUE 1 launched one SPARROW
(AIM-7E) missile. As the missile fired, MIC 2 tightened his left turn. Although the
missile appeared to be guiding directly toward the >!IG, the fuze detonated the warhead
100 ft short of the target at the MIG's 6 o'clock position. To prevent overshooting the
MIC as he continued his left turn to the insidt, BLUE I and 2 pulled up Into a higher
yo-yo. At this tirie BLUE 1 feels he could have nr.d? a successful gun attack against the
MIC if his gun had been operating properly. As he .maneuvered down from the yo-yo, BLUE 1
(i* kept MIG 2 at his 12 o'clock and descending to eo->altitude , 5000 ft AGO. .''IIG 2 was ac-
quired in the manual track node and another SPARROW was launched from a range of 1-1/2 mile.
Once again MIG 2 tightened his left turn and the missile, although tracking nicely at
the MIC 'a 6 o'clock position, detonated approximately 100 ft short of IMG 2.
Again BLUE 1 and 2 yo-yoed off high to gain sesaratlon. At this tine BLL'E 1 saw an
P-'IC at II o'clock low, on a reciprocal heading. In a slight left turn, with two MIG-I7s
slowly closing fron his 7 o'clock position. It Is possible, according to BLUE I, that
the two MICs were MIG I and 2. After check! th.T* BLUE 2 was still in his fight Intc wing
position, 2LL'E 1 called over his radio, "Single you have two MICs on your tail I"
This F-4C was BLUE 1 v/r.c had become separated from .LUE 3. BLUE 1 called several tines
for the P-U to take It down and left but there was ao visible response. The single F-^
C...- continued In a slight left turn as the MIGs closed ',he range to approximately 1500 ft and
L
217
Event III-222
fired two burats of what appear»M to be 37nim which missed. The F-J* then began to cllreb
slightly while still In a left ivvn and the MICs contlnuefJl to close to about 1000 ft In
range. BLUE 1 then called, "Ok, tnkt; It up!" hoplnsr, that the KIGs would p.iss under the
P-^. But, once again the F-*» (i.LlT t) failed tc respond and continued In ^ =ll3.^t, left,
cllmblnR turn. The closed to a range less than 1000 ft and fired three more bursts
at BLUK a 33 the entire aft section of the al:-plane burst Into flames. After about five
seconds during which t.he Liirnlt.t: ■•JnUane maintained pltcn and bank, the left bank In-
creased and the airplane pltchfi :.i>5e down. As the nose of the airplane passed through
the horizon, BLUE I saw one sea-, eject and saw a good chute open. BLUE 2, who was trail-
ing BLUE 1 saw one crute collap'.l'.f, on or near the ground and saw another good chute
approximately 2000 f; abcve it.
From the point wl-.ere aL'JE 3 r.ifhted the second section of MICs the two BLUE elements
separated. Because 0." a radar fftlli:re, BLUE 3 did not have a SPARROW capability but did
have two sidewinders md a 2C:r.:. j:!l!i-i6 gun. As BL"E 3 maneuvered to attack it Is not
definitely known wh^-th-^r BLUE 'I followed, although from his previous position, and In the
absence of any radio i ransnlssic:; to the contrary, it was assumed that he did follow the
maneuvers. As BLUE 3 ."^-ade a descending 3 g left turn towards the MIQs (MIG 3 anJ 1) he
was attacked by a single .MIG O'.ICi ■.) from the 7-3 o'clock position. Continuing in a left
descending turn, BLUE 3 lncrea3t.'i to about U g which was more than adequate to cause
MIG 5 to overshoot. At this tine a SAM call directed the attention of the crew of BLUE 3
elsewhere and although the SAM was not sighted the diversion was sufficient to cause
BLUE 3 to lose sight of XIG 5 as well as MIG 3 and U . A Jinklne cllnb at high speed was
made to about 9000 ft in an effort to relocate rhe MIGs. The niGo were not sighted, so
SLUE 3 maneuvered to position h'.a element opposite and above the lead element In an ef.ort
to get a rear quartering; shot at r.ne MIG which BLUE 1 was chasing. After at least one
360 degree, low-g turn at speeds fror. t20 kts to 500 kts between altitudes of 5000 ft and
10,000 ft, all during heavy flaJc and occasional SAM calls, BLUE 3 sighted a flreoall at
3 o'clock low. His first lr.preE."«:on was that an P-105 had been hit by a SAM but a quick
visual and radio check ccnflrBea iJLUE * was not with BLUE 3. Just prior tc seeing the
fireball, BLUE 3 heard the transir.! scions of BLUE l. BLUE 3 observed one chute, well away
from the fireball.
While making a circle of the chute BLUE 1, 2 and 3 received a loud and clear signal
from one emergency beeper.
During the entj
:reir.ely heav, ... -. , . , ^ ,
the area with BINGO fuel, proceeded to WHITE ANCHOR for aerial refueling, ana
to a point ^0 nlles northwest of Hanoi to provide RE;S;:AP for a ?-i05 pilot whc
:ire encounter, which lasted four to five minutes, BLUE Flight encoun-
tered extremely heavy flat:, five :-:iG-17 enemy ^*lshters, and several SAHs.^^BL'J^^
departed
returned toapoxnv-.^ ..- — - -
had been shot down earlier. Intense ground fire was encountered wnlle trying to pinpoint
a beeper signal. At Bi;:cO fuel, ELUE Plight proceeded to .RED AtlCHOR and aerial refueled
bafore returning to base. Flight duration was 4 hours. 50 minutes.
NtSltU rtaiM MUMTtHS
SMMOM U1S>H) riillM IT KOC >
AttMiat
ITCH («T Tint OF ruma)
1
t
AIlCtiFT TTPC
F.«C
F*4C
ALriTHOI
•MO rt
SUO ft
MCH
.M
.If
NCMIHC
ATT 1 roof
Uvtl
iMtl
riCMTCa JlSftCT TO TAKCET
10*
0* AHfifarr
TMUT TTPE
Nie-17
HI6.I7
M,TtTaOE
fooo rt
loeo ft
svcb
NACH .1i
MACN .11
NANEUTEI
l«f tun
FltmC lANCf
1.1/4 ■lit
l>l/2 all*
FtBIM MM
■■rttliht
Htnml tr4ck r«*|«
••If
rOLAItZAflDN CLUT1E« GATE SELECIieH
•IT CHECK ANn AIAOT AKS SEltCT LldHT
with rtnqt trict
ltftt<r o««rr1dc
N«rroM l«tltfact«ry
ntrrtm tttllftctdrr
KSOLtl
Aftir (Mttttt 4r»t
AIM'7 9Ut«(« M» tn*
ttlC'l till but turit
ibout ICO It '.tiort
tt th« H)G'> i
•'clock.
Siat It flrlt rlrl«f
L.
li:
F.vent ni-223
Aircraft Ir.volved; Four F-lOSs vs five HIG-17s
Result: No damage
Vicinity of i-ncounter: 2lM5'N/105«'95"E
1. PRIHARt MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oaf/Tin,e: 12 May M/l^M^ suppression for a foUowlnc strike
Pour F-105S (BLUE FUcht) wer« providing riaK -upprosawn
flight of V-105S. (See Ever.t II1-22^J.
"i^'mirL.oac... .... ..r..c .re. rn» '.^ n=rt...... r.yln, ,c„..c..terl, .lo„r
the west side of Thud Ridge.
3. AIRCRAFT COtIf IGURATIONS*
Fwipg BLUE 1. 3
2 U50-gal. external fuel tanks
6 75a-lb bornbs
1 sioewi:::er (ai«-93)
1 QRC-160 EC.'-: pod
1 M-61 20inni gun
P,10S BLUE 2. 1
2 Ji50-gal. external fuel tanks
6 750-lb bcmbs
2 QRC»160 ECM pods
1 H-61 20n'jn gun
4 FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
JeatL- LOW. scattered clou.s at 2500 ft with good visibility under the clouds, tops
BLUE ^_
Altitude : 2000 ft AGL
550"k?s Plus
Plig ht Pomation ; QRC-lSo ECM Pod forrcatlon
, - A night of rour MIG-17S was sighted
BLUE 1 (Lead) called, "MIGs at 12 o clock. * "^f ^ °i The KIGs were
at a VZ^\r.lVro\\l.^^Vx, TTo IWA .iUV front of BLUE .light
heading in the opposite direction.
"rpuill .rtT^rnr ^ ..n.lm.*. on c=ur« ..e «I0. ..neu-.r.. to,.r.
the rear of BLUE Flight.
7, SITUATtOH DEVELOPMENT
7, siTUAiiu" Ht.ii.. rii<jht of fou- MICs was sighted, a single MIG-17
At approximately the same time the JJ^B^t of rou nios a s ^^^^^^^ qlUE Flight
!f- was sighted very low at 3 o'clock. "J^^";^" ?he -Teht in the formation of BLUE Plight.
} Ind fired his gun at BLUE U who furthest to ^^^J - Jff ^f^jj^^ 5he range, the MIG
h BLUE Plight had accelerated to "l^^^^^f ^'anrf ISlch fell short by 2000 ft. The
t/- BLUE fired a burst from his gun without effect. j
8. ORDNANCE
(Ho. flred/No. hits)
20iPJn
3LUE H Short bursr/0
23/37mra Rocket s/ftAM
5 Unknown/ 0 2/0
. Usnlnate. conflsuratlons c«aln«i fro. .n .Ircre- In or.l... but not d.flnltcly lO.ntl-
; fled with this event. -^-^^^^^
2U9
Event IIZ-223
10. AIRCREW COHHCMTS
E»perlcnc<» :
Total P-105 Combat
Hours Hours Mlsalona
BLUE 2 600 70
BLUE 3 SOOO 85
BLUE « 600 338 68
Corrjients on thla Encounter ;
It looked like areas had been set up.
arta nearer the target.
Remark a
Instructed In the RTU
First a MIC area followed by a heavy flak
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
BLUE 2, 30 May 1967
BLUE 3, 30 May 1967
Messages ; SS'STFW OPREP-3 121359Z May 1967
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTION
During Ir.gress to the target, BLUE Flight was intercepted by a flight of four MIG-173
and by a slnjle Mia-17. The flight of four ?1ICs approached nearly head-on and were unable
t3 attain a firing position on BLUE Plight, whlgh had Increased speed to more than 600 kts.
The single KIG made a ellr.blng, turning Intercept into a position behind BLUE Plight.
After firing at BLUE i* with a gun, MIG 5 launched two AAMs or rockets. Mo hits resulted
from either the gun firing or the rockets. At some time during the encounter BLUE 4
fired his gun. No hits were observed. BLUE Flight opened the range on the HICs and
continued to the target. After tionblng the flak sites the flight departed the area
heading northwesterly along the north side of Thud Ridge and crossed to the west at the
northern end of the ridge.
A MIG warning had been received that positioned the HICs relative to Kanoi.
allowed BLUE Flight to determine that the MIGs were in their area.
See Event III-225.
This
e
a
i
a
§
I
9
9
a
a
I
3
250
I
I.
Event IIZ-2211
Aircraft Involved: Pour P->105s vs KIG-lTs
Result: H? damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^lS'N/lOS^IS'E
t. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 12 Hay 1967/About 1642H
Pour P-105S (BLUE Plight) were part of a large strike force from Takhll attacking
a target near Phuc Yen aircraft. BLUE Plight was attacking with the flight of Event III-
223. The force also Included the flight of Event III-225.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
Although the AIH*9B that BLUE I earrl<td cheeked out all right on the ground, he
could not get a tone after becoming airborne.
11. DATA SOURCE
Project Interview; BLUE I, June 1967 (See Event I II -22 5 for experience)
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
m8 blue Plight came off the target, BLUE 1 was several hundred yards In front of
BLUE 2, 3 and U. At this time some MIG-lTs eaoe In from the right and rolled In behind
the trailing flight members.
BLUE Plight was at 600 kts and stayed ahead of the MIGs. There was no firing.
251
Event Iir-225
^ Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105S vs four NIG-17s
Result: One NIC-17 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l«15'H/105*li4«E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time; 12 May I967/1613H
e«r«n"i??fJ'iS:\!?ii?'Lrr!.i"??""?J? '^r?" on a bombing mission.
Ah
A flak
(See Event III-223),
suppression flight of F-105. was a„;oxi;atei; 2 to fiPJ muls ah«5!
2. MISSION ROUTE
strike group departed TACAN Channel 97 and proceeded to Thud Rldze then south,
easterly along the west side of the ridge toward the target area.
3. AIRCRAFT C0KFI6URATI0KS
P-IOS ams 1 and 1
2 '»50-gal. external fuel tanks
6 750-ib bonbs
I SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B)
1 QRC-160 ECM pods
1 M-61 20mitt gun
P-105 BLUE 2 and k
2 "ISO-gal. external fuel tanks
6 750-lb bombs
2 QRC-160 ECM pods
1 N<»61 20mm gun
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Low, scattered clouds at 2500 ft with tops at 5000 ft. Vlslbllltv was aaoA
b?Io5-the clouds and was approximately five miles Slth ha« a;.;;g t!irs«"JrS cl^a.
Altitude ;
Headin g ?
Speed :
Puel State:
BUTE
r
6000 ft
150*
600 kts
11,000 lb
QRC-160 ECM Pod fonaatlon, echelon to the right.
Two
Plight Formation ;
5. INITIAL DETECTION
A HIQ warning from the lead flight was received prior to sighting the MICs.
MIGs were sighted p.s they were maneuvering to attack the flight ahead.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 (Lead) turned right about 25* and fired approximately 200 rounds of 20mn at an
angle-off of about 60* (it o'clock to the MIG) at a range of UCOO ft.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT
r®^?A^n**.!''*^?I i"^" ^"'^ coBL-nenced a descending turn to the left, BLUE '
2 J^* ^^""""^ approximately 200 rounds to a range of 800 to 600 "ft
with 90* angle-off (9 o'clock to the MIG). blue l broke off his run at 3000 ft of alti
nS' o"Jef?%SJ2 '"Su'i"!^:!:?'?.?'"^ J^J """^-"^^ m a sJelp'^Jve'c^S-) w'ltS'aSoui
130 or left bank. With about 75' angle-off, at a range of 1200 ft. SLUE 2 fired a ahart
5?IuS,^hur"^;H''«K'^i "JJ^ "'"'^^"s- SLUE 2 lost sigSt of thi SiS duJ IS*"
clouds but did observe a flash on the ground which could have been the MC.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
(Ho. rired/No. hits)
20mra
100 rds/unk
Remarks .
Gun was fired In two bursts of about
200 rounds each. Hits not observed;
however, the MIC was trailing smoke after
the second burst. Fired one burst. May
have fired mpshots at HIC 3 and
See paragrapi 10.
3!
3 I
B
9
3
'i
1 li
3
3
3
3
3
3 j
252
r
[
I ij
I
J-
i:
tvent I 11-225
! 9. EQUIPHCilT PROBLEMS
, rather than the alr-to-alr code because he did not have time cq cnangt
; the cockpit.
10. AIRCREW CONNENTS
Experience ;
Total P-105 Combat
Hours
Hours Missions Remarks
\,\ *" BLUE I 2912 1115 85
r«m«-nt« on •hM ^ndfun''*-' SLUE ' (Lead) — BLUE 3 and may have fired snapshots at
HlH an/". ihe^hlgS^p^^ d o? th^ ptlSs (600 kts plus) prevented the MICs Trom
attaining a flrln? position on the F-105s.
n, DATA SOURCES
Pro.lect Interviews ; BLUE I (Lead). 29 Hay 1967
Messages ; 355TFW OPREP-3 131'»312 Hay 1967
12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plleht was cart of a strike group chat encountered HIG-17 fighters while Inbound
to the tareeJ AS ?he Uad flls^.t, a flak suporesslon flight of four approached
JSe ?Irge? ar;a the strike groSp -^as Intercepted t>y five WIG-17s. In trying to Intercept
the 5eld fUgh? the MIGs endld up in position for BLUE Flight to attack One HIG was
S^^agefand llthough not actually observed to Ixpact with the 8?;°J!"<»V»/J?SS'lir? Jhe
sighted below a cloud whi=h was attributed to the crash of the MIC. The KIOs left the
area and BLUE Flight continued to the tar?et without further MIQ encounters.
r"
! Event III-226
t ,.
Aircraft Involved: ?our P-lOSs vs two HIG»17s
r -
J . Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»17'N/105'''»9 'E
i' 1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
L Date/Time: 12 Kay 1967, l6<t5H
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight ingresslng to target at altitude 6000' and Jinking observed two
silver MIGs pass on a reciprocal heading at the same altitude.
253
— - —
Event IIX-227
Aircraft Involved: Two F-X05DS vs one MIG-21
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter:
21*08 TJ/lOft'ig'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time; 12 May 1S'67/1755H
Two P-lObn airplan-;:; (3LUS ?ll.:ht) were on a road interdiction nisslon but were
diverted to Ki-SCAP. Vn'. 1..- perforn::'?: tKe RESCAP rlsslcn a MI'3-21 launched an A AH at
BLUE 2. The Missile nec apper.r tc track and rlsbed BLUE 2 by abcut 2000 ft. Bi<UE
Plight was in a turn at .m altitude of 20,000 ft when the MIC launched the missile. The
KIG broke off his attack ai'ler launching his missile.
8. ORDNANCE
MIG-21
C'lo. fired/Ko- hits)
AAH
I/O
Remarks
Missile did not ai<pear to guide,
missed by ;;000 ft. BLUE 2 in a
turn at 20,000 ft.
11. DATA SOURCcS
Messages : 3867FW OPREP-u 1212362 Hay 1967
FA3TEL DO! 1633 May 1967
Event III-228
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vs six MIO-17«3
Results: No damage
Vicinity or Encounter: Zl'ZS'n/lOS^aa •£
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tln!»: ^3 Xay 1967, l6l3H
V,, DATA SOURCE
CIHCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flls^it in ALFA group at altitude 9000* observed two silver KIGs approx
five nlles out and approaching flight from 9 o'clock, sulnglns to 7 o'clock; lead
lowered nose to increase speed as a flight of F-J»s proceeded to intercept MIGs; on
egress, n and 1, while In vicinity of 21-35/105-35 at altitude SOOO* were approached
by «* MIGs fron 10 o'clock high in descending left turn; :tIGs were attempting to pull
into 6 o'clock position; when #3 first observed ''JCs, he called for afterburner
and turned on westerly headJng; HIGs came to within 3500' of #3 at H's 6 o'clock
position, but broke off as section gained speed.
I
I
[
L
[
L
[
r
V
Event III-229
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-^iCs va one MIG-21
Result: llo damage
Vicinity of Encounter: W^S't'M/lO'fZO'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 13 May X967/l6lOH
II. DATA SOURCES
Messares. Reports :
ii32TKy 131108: May 1967 TUOC 03717
432TRW 131325Z May 1967 orREP-3 TUOC Oi72>i
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION w.ni.«^n.p
TWO RP-^CS (BLUE Flight) '^-^^-^1^^^^^^^^^^^^^
fhev then proceeded to the tareiet (Route 7, segment J) at q-q jt was
The weathe? was broken clouds wUh four-elGi'ths coverage with tops -.t 12.000 ft.
dear above the clouds with good visibility.
At 1610H. after completion of the target run BLUE Plight cU^ Jt;.^^e»<i-
mg 098% with a soeed of 5jO kts Wher. _^;^lf J^'N/IO^ JC E. BLUE l^^ ^^^^^ ^
altitude in an attempt to make a tall pacs.
BLUE Plight broke left, Ut afterburners and turned Jnto^::5,-^--«;5i3 JStnt'boiS'
seemed to be In excess of KACH 1 and could not ^urn with the RF-«c. ^nij p
BLUE 1 Front and Back Identified the aircraft as a MIC-21. In the tarn, the air
were about I nl apart.
The MIG.21 then departed the area heading 360<» . BLUE 1 ""^If^J *J;'"/iVSoSi
X-band?WS and range only for 10 sec as the MIO was making th. pass fron. 7-8 o clock
position.
BLUE 1 then rejoined BLUE 2 and returned to Udorn.
The P-102 pilots fron lidorn «ere ^^-^l'^ ^^f^.^^^^^rrP-SSJ JSaJd Jk'c!us"Js! '
pass on any aircraft during this time. Another flight of RP-JCs ^"J^J JJ^,^^,
:^^^i^^er^ ri^r.nSil^ieirSS-otSif Fi4ln%2i area at the tine of the
Incident .
L
255
Event III-230
Aircraft Involved: Oriu P-105 va one MIO-17
Rctsults; One NIC- 17 destroyed
Vicinity or Encounter; 2in9' 11/105" 36 'E
1. PRIMARY HISSIOK AflO TACTICAt SITUATIOH
Date/TlKe: 13 May 1967/Just after 1623H
pour P-105. (BLUE PllgM) part of a r-", "r'^J'^f^^/'^ "."f^JiJ'.'^i^SlKS
that of Events III-230. -231. -235. and -238.
2. NI'SSION ROUTE ,
Departed Korat and after refueling proceeded overland, vj. JJ^Jinel 97. across the
R«d River delta to the tarsst. Egress was overland. (See aUo Event III-Z33J.
3. AIRCRAFT C0NFI6URAT10HS
P-105P BUJE 1
6 750-lb bombs
\ AIM-9B
2 U50-gal tanlcs
1 QRC-160 pod
IPP standby j ti \
(BLUE 2, 3. M were probably identical except for the lack of AIH-9B on 2 and
KTQ-17
Drop tanks
CanouflaKed
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
weather: Visibility very good, some scattered cumulus clouds in the target.
BLUE 1
A ltitude ; • 7000 ft
Heading ; 280-300'
Speed ; 550-600 ktS
S!lIr?o?; aition : BLiE'fSad Just pulled off the target. Oth.r flight members strung
" out behind.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
On Bulllnie out from his bomb run, BLUE 1 saw a camouflaged airplane at 10 o clock
low, SrSiii S Uft. The airplane was about 1000 feet away.
6. ACTION INITIATED
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
Th. HIO apparently .la not ...BLUE 1 -J,"";-' "Sj^f JrJM°aS"« "
with a kill.
8. ORDilANCE
(No. Flred/No. Hits)
Cannon
2 Omni get^ar^ts
gj^yg J 2/1 Two bursts for a total of 500 rounds.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEHS
None
Event III-230
10. AIRCREU CONMCNTS
Experience :
Total P-105 Combat
Hour a Hours Missions Retaarks
BLUE I "000 900 53 Primarily TAG experience.
Conuaents on this Encounter ;
Pelt his training and long experience helped, since things happened so fast that
he was forced to react witnout thinking auout It. An Individual with less experience
would have had some proDlens. 1
Would have lilted a shorter-range missile.
Comments fro!r. Overall Experience ;
Wants to be able to switch from ground attack mode to alr-to-alr attack without
letting go of throttle and stick.
Would like a computing gun sight that can be used for mlsslles-alr at the same time.
The enemy does not hesitate to use flak even xhen there are MIGs In the area. They
appear to have a system In which the AAA outside a given corridor will shoot across or
over the corridor where the I'lGs are operating. In this case the HIC3 apparently have
an altitude restriction. SAKs are also fired when the MIGs are up.
11. DATA SOURCES
Pro.1ect Interviews : BLUE 1, 6 June I967
Messages. Repori-.s ; 388TFW IJllOSZ May 1967 OPBEP-3 DOI 165^
' ^ 388TFW 131208Z May 1967 OPREP-3 DOI I658
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was one of four flights attacking! JCS ^H^OO, BLUE Flight was the last
flight to hit the target, and the force had proceeded inbound in a gaggle.
Inbound to the target EL'JE Flight got launch ll,;hts intermittently but no SAMs were
launched. The IRON HAtID Flight, which proceeded the strike flights, indicated that It
was probably a MIG day. ."CTEL, the warning agency, also was broadcasting numerous HIO
warnings over guard channel. Ho flak was seen inbound.
A3 BLUE Flight proceeded Inbound, they heard the first flight to hit the target call,
"MICs over the target." BLUZ 1 concentrated on acquiring the target, and as he rolled in
he heard members of previous flights calling that they were engaged with MICs.
BLUE 1 concentrated on the target, and dropped his ordnance. As he started to pull
the nose up he looked left and low and saw a camouflaged airplane. At this time BLUE I
was at 6 000 to 7,000 feet altitude, in full afterburner, heading 280» to 300*, with a
speed between 550 and 600 knots. The MER and external tanks were still on the airplane,
BLUE 1 felt that it was not unusual to see a carouflaged airplane, when hitting a
taraet due to the proximity of other friendly aircraft. When llrst seen, the aircraft
was about 1000 feet away at 10 o'clock low. The aircraft was In a left turn and was
going faster than BLUE I.
As BLUE 1 continued to observe the aircraft he saw red stars on It and therefore
recognized It as a MIC. (BLUE 1 felt that perhaps the MIO was attempting to position on
F.iols which had already struck the target and never saw him.) BLUE 1 then saw the big
vertical tall and Identified it as a MIO-17. He did not notice the external tanks until
they were seen In the gun camera film.
The MIG made no evasive maneuvers and BLUE 1 pulled In behind the MIO and started
firing. He observed no hits, and realized that this was due to the rixed-8lg.ht pipper
which was set at 126 rails for bombing.
BLUE 1 then stopped firing and was going to set up the sight when the MIG reversed to
the rl«ht. BLUE 1 then had to puH hard to stay with the MIG. BLUE 1 pulled his nose
oast the MIG and started firing i^taln, still without a computing sight. As BLUE 1 passed
his bullet stream through the MIG. he observed hits on the MIG's right wing tip. and
then an explosion at t.'ie right wing root. BLUE i alao saw hits on the MIG's nose and some
pieces coming off the airplane.
When he opened fire the second time, BLUE 1 scored hits at about 2000 to 2200 feet
range. The first attempt was made at a closer range since the MIG was pulling away from
BLUE i.
When the MIC was hit, he broke down sharply and to the right. As the wing exploded,
BLUE 1 stooped firing, then broke left and passed ovnr the MIG. The MIC at this time was
at about 110° to 120" of bank, BLUE I heading in a r.enerally southeasterly direction
could then see Thud Ridge.
Event 111-230
BLUE I looked back and saw the other r.er.t>^ra of hlE rilcht at 7 o'clock, 3000 to
*D00 feet back. He continued to turn and the MlGht i-cjointd. No flight member except
BLUE 1 actually saw the KIG-17. licwever, when coralnr, off the tarp;et one other flight
member (OPREP Indicates BLUE 3, Interview sitya bLUE 3) saw an explosion and thought that
BLUE 1 had tieen hit. S'hlle scelr..:: inio, the fiight nenber was turniRR right as a pre-
planned post-target Jink and whvn he turned bai;k to the left BLUE 1 came up In front. No
flight member saw the MIG Impact.
The whole encounter was estimated by BLl/E I to have laated 5 to 90 seconds.
In all firings BLUE 1 expended a total of approximately 500 rounds of ammunition.
BLUF. I fired the frun at the MIG ^ecause he was too clohs to fire the SIDEWIIJDER. By the
time the MIG had gained separation, he was K«meuverlriG too mucn for BLUE 1 to use the
missile .
While in the target area 3Ll'E ^ saw a SAM but no eva-ive action was required. The
rilSht did encounter Intense 37/57/85n.Ti AAA from the target area.
Event III-231
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-1055 vs 1 M10-17s
Results: No dannge
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«17'»/105*35'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION ANQ TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 13 May 1967/about 1623H
Four P-lOSDs (BLUE Plight} were part oC a strike Torue of l6 aircraft attacking the
Vinh Yen Array Barracks (JCS 3**. 00), BLUE Filpht vras performing flak suppression for the
other flight -iiembers. The actions of the other aircraft of this force are described in
Events 111-230, -233 1 and -238. The probable order r,f flights striking the target were the
flights of Events III-230. -231. -233> and -238.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed Korat and after refueling proceeded overland via Channel 97, across the Red
River delta direct to the target. Egress was also overland. (See also Event III-235)-
3. AI8CRAPT CONFIGURATIONS
F-105D BLUE 1, 2. 3, 1
4 080-243
2 <i50-gal tanks
1 QRC-160 pod
1 AIM-9B :;IDEWINDER on B-1 and B-3 only
HIC-17
Silver
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Visibility good with scattered clouds ovnr the target.
BLUE 1. 2
Headin g: 250"
Altitude: 6,000 ft
Airspeed ; Unknown
Fuel State : "
Flight Formation : "
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Flight sighted 2 MIG-17s over the target as they rolled In.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight hit the target. Ignoring the HIQs.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
As BLUE 1 and 2 Jinked off the target, 2 KIG-IT^ appeared in front of them. BLUE 2
got a shot at one of these MZGs but scored no hits. Also a single HIG-17 passed between
BLUE 3 and 4 as they started ti<eir roll-in.
8. ORDNANCE
(Ko. flred/No. hits)
200111
Cannon Remarks
3LUE 2 1/0 Fired UltQ rounds
9. eqUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None .
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience ;
Total P-105 Combat
Hours Hours Missions
BLUE 2 ~ 300 55
Comments on this Encounter ;
BLUE 1 - Since they were dropping CBUs and did not require precise slshtlns;, the alsrht
was set up for guns-air. The HIC was too close to :;et up the sight If It was already set up,
n. DATA SOURCES
Event III-231 ^
Project Interviews ; BLUE I, 7 June 1967 f|
Kes yages. Reports : 388 TPW IWOZ Hay 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 1655 ||
& — I 1 i3i208Z Hay 1967 OPREP-3 DOI lo5o
12. NARRATIVE „ ^ , H
BLUE Flight -as one of the first two flights on the target ^JJ/^JJ^JSii-^J^iJ; Jjji ^
sighted 2 KIC-17S (KIG 1,2) right over the target. By the time tney expenae«
nance, however, MIC 1 and 2 were out of sight. , , „ _
immediately after pull off fron the target, -hen BLUE Sj^^^JJI^ ^ 'l^^ 9
altitude Of 6.000 heading they saw c^^ g
f ^clicSVlnl 2riS'i'cISrAri!^oS%rra^ge! ll'lr. turning in front of BLUE 1. .
wins tanks. The other MIO was not observed again. „Tf- it »
t.h.n in th. t.rg.t .«. BLUE Plight ow.r.«l »«A and . S«l -hleh bur.. In front or tb. «
flight about 300 ft in front of BLUE . J|.
1
I
3
a
3
s
■ o.i.
'.Suspected to be one or tne others seen.
Event III-232
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-ICs vs nine KIG-lTs
Results: Mo damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21<»<tO'N/105''12'E
1. PRIKARY KISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION
DateAlne: 13 Hay 1967/1610H
e .... V nr. fRrur Pllcht) w*re flying MIC3CAP for a strike force which was attacking
JCS llTo uJe'EicSs lH-230. JIj . and^233 for strike Torce MIG encounteres) . The
fllCht of Event 111-235 also was part of the MIGCAP.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Pllaht deoarted Ubon and after aerial refueling proceeded to the ^
of i-hSS RlSgif I? !m in tht; Slcmuy that the engagement occurred. (See Event III-235.)
3. AIRCRAFT COKFIGURATIOHS
P-OC BLUE I. 2. 3.
* A1M-7E SPARROW
k A1M-9B SIDEWINDER
I 370-sal external tank
1 600-gal centerllne tank
1 QRC-160 ECM pod
MIC-17
Bright silver
Red star on vertical tall
One*HIG"had°roSr* broad orange and green stripes around rear of fuaelage
Had aft*rburn*»r3
One had black rails on the wings
4. FLIGHT CONOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Scattered clouds at UOOO feet with tops at 6000-8000 feet. Visibility good.
BLUE
"I 2 3 5~
Altitude: 9-10 000 ft
iiliP^ 5'.0°KTAS
iSffistate : 1^.-16.000 lb
pii Rht Pormatlon ; Pcd formation on the left rear of the strike flights. Elements to the
right, hUiZ on the left.
5. INITIAL DETECTION i
ntiiF PMirht heard MIG calls from the agencies an-i Inbound strike flights, but not for
..h* M?cs thai SLi Flight saw. BLUE 1 backseat InltlUly acquired four MIO-lTs at 9 o'clock |
{S!. ?he !;?G, were in an east-west turn at about 5000 feet altitude. j
6. ACTION INITIATED ^
BLUE Plight went to manual frequency and turned left Into the four MIGs. !
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT \
T« ry,^ turn BLUE Pllcht was Jumped by four more MIG-17s. BLUE 2 was unable to !
-.««nuMca?e S?th*BLUE 1 because he was on I different frequency, and becar.e separated from ]
S i when iSe iafattacked by two MIG-17s. one of wnlch fired a: him. BLUE 2 then dlsen-
gageti and tgressed. |
261
z
BLUK 1 then a\
one Mir;. Both "Ih
six more passes :it
never saw ci MlO fl
of rarif:e>
Durlnp the Ir:
BLUE 3 ard H the:
dlsenf^^TRed agalr..
BLUE 3 a:.d ti;fi:<-
MIGs wort? firlnf.
fuel, tht-y egre.-r-
8. OROKANCC
Event III-232
u.ukcd the Kins that were orlRlnally sighted and fired two SPARROWS at
"'?t.*S missed when fired In the boresl^ht tnode. BLUE 1 s^bseqiiently made
the KIOS but could not achieve a flrlnp; position. Although ULUb i
r« at hlB, BLUE 1 backseat observed one MIO-17 to fire at tnem from out
lilnl turn, nuJE 3 and h were attacked by four MIG-lTs who overshot,
r.fi'-ted to 'OT-e back but were fired on by two more MIC-lTs. BLUE 3 and •»
rr. return ^ to the battle area, they saw four more HIC-17a, low^. As
10 attack the MlGs, they were, in turn, attacked by two "O"^ Wf°»;, ^ne
C:.o of the low KIGs made a head-on pass, and when BLUE « reached BINGO
(Ho, flrea/No. hits)
SPARROW
AIM-7E
BLUE 1
MIC«17
HIG-17
MIC-17
MIG-17
MIG-17
Mia-i7
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None
10. AIRCREU COMNEUTS
Experience ;
BLUE 1 (Front)
BLUE 2 (Front)
BLUE 3 (Front)
Comments on this Er.e
2/0
Cannon
1/0
1/0
1/0
1/0
I/O
1/0
Remarks
Plred In boreslght
At
BLUE
2
At
BLUE
1
At
BLUE
3
and
4
At
BLUE
3
and
U
At
BLUE
3
and
H
At
BLUE
3
and
4
P-4
Hours
250
200
170
Combat
Missions
65
65
5*
Remarks
ADC experience
TAC and KG- 13 5
TAG background
3
1
!
1
1
a
BLUE 1 (Front) Should have tried for more separation on the attacks.
BLUE 2 (Prone) - WJirp. enRaged. his airspeed was too low. This was due In part to the
requirement to stay with the F-105s. Due to the location of the encounter the P-105s had
not started to increase their speed for the run into the target.
It appeared that the KlCs were staying in a fixed geographical area. Therefore the
tactic was to enter this at high speed and then dash out after the attack.
BLUE 1 (Front) - The lack of visibility at 6 o'clock prevented BLUE 3 from knowing when
ihe Mldis had alsengased .
The biggest lesson learned was the experience gained for the backseater so he could
know when the enemy was In a really critical position. The backseater needs to be ab^- to
provide this information since he can see more to the rear than the frontseat.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project In terviews : BLUE 1 (Front), 1 June 1967
BLUE 2 (Front), t June 1967
BLUE 3 (Front), June 1967
Measases. Reports: 3TFW ljl600 May 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 0523^
Wessap j es, nepor^a . ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^^ oPREP-3 DOI 05229
8TFW 1^10711 May 1967 OPREP-3 DDI 052'43
AIM-7D/E Klsslle ?erformanee Report, BLUE 1
12. NARRATIVE 0E5CRIPTI0N
BLUE FllfTht v(L-. part of the MICCAP for a Strike force attacking JCS 19.00. BLUE Plight
was tralUnc tV." sirlhc force about 2000 feet high and one-half to three-quarters of a mile back,
and the other F-^ rilchc (Event 111-231) was about half way up the line of bombers.
When the centerllne tank became dry (at near the point wh5re they crossed the Red River)
it was Jettisoned.
On -he way into the tarpet. Just before the flight reached Yen Bay, they heard a MIC
cAvi^ith"t the KIOS w-re north and west of Hanoi. The lead F-* flight (Event
in-23n also^aUe.i fsln^Ie Ki§ II 9 o'clock. Consequently, BLUE flight was looking
for MICs at 9 o'clock.
BLUE 1 backseat then saw four sliver MIG-173 circling low at 9 o'clock. BLUE 1 then
started a left descending turn Into the MiGs. At this time BLJE 1 called the flight to make
262
Event III-232
a prebrlefv ! ;; .:inp:«? frn::i the common strike frequency to a manual frequency which would be used
Just by fHi F, rili;ht (a charR^ not made by bLUE 2).
As P! nu-.hz turned to attack the four low MIG-i7s, other MIG-17s made a coorrllnated
allack 0!i :'r/;:: rilpht rrcr. the rlp;ht and hli^h. These latter MI3-17s were not seen by any
mr-r.bpr of ; i.c .itMke force or the other fllRht of F-'»Cs. As a result of this attack, BLUE
rilf.ht 3p.I*. , and the actions of the three Independent units will be described separately.
bUtE 1
BLUt 1 to the left after the four low MIGs. Since he did net know that BLUE 2
was out of f-Jlo contact, he assumed all was well since no calls of KIGs at 6 o'clock was
received. Af -p about 90 iegree of turn, BLUE 1 looked for BLUE 2 but could not find him.
However, bl c;. 1 contlnuoo to maneuver, mostly In tho vertical, and subsequently lost con-
tact with L- J and 1 also.
As b;.U^ 1 continued to turn, he again saw the original four low MIC- 17s going around In
a sr.all crMt. at about 2000 feet altitude. BLUE 1 was in a good position so he started an
attac;?. Haw-^-.'-.r, since the aircraft he was actackina; was tall on, he was not sure If they
were BLV?. 3 nnl or KIGs. At a rant;e of about 2 miles, BLUE 1 made positive Identification
and obtalr.cc a lock-on In the boreslght mode. At about one and one-naif nlles, BLUE 1
fired a SPAHhOW nlsslle. When he fired, BLUE 1 was at 1j80 KTAS, and jOOO feet altitude
pulling a ? J, In a slight ellnb. The MIO-17 was at about 3C0 knots. About the time BLUE 1
fired, the t<:Q-'.7 had tightened his turn and was pulling 6-8 g's in a gO degree bank.
BLUE 1 kept cracking the MIO with the plpper during the missile flight. The SPARROW
seeded to but did rot make the turn and missed t'le HIG by 200-300 feet, passing
behind .
BLUE 1 then pulled some lead on the MIC-17 and about one-half .nlle range fired the
second SPARfiO'.;. PLUE 1 had pulled sufficient lead so that the MIG was Just on the radone.
The nissllc v*-.-::'. ballistic and passed 100 feet In front of the MIC. When the second
missile wad fired, BLUE 1 and the MIO were at about the sane altitude and airspeed as the
first shot, with the HIG still In a hlgh-g turn. At the second firing the KIG was almost
go degree an^le off to BLUE 1.
Althoi:t;h blUE 1 thought he was firing In full svstem, interlocks our, the backseat
had not switched to full system. Therefore, BLUE 1 fired in the boresi^Iit mode with a
ranee lock.
Before firing, the select and ready lights were Indicating satisfactory. The polari-
zatloQ was linear and clutter was normal. Gate selection was wide.
BLUE 1 then went Into a high speed yc-yo to reposition on the MIGs. He pulled up to
8-10,000 Cef^l altitude, clearing his 6 o'clock. The KIGs were still turning in their
"wagon wheel," so BLUE 1 went ii-5 miles away and then descended low and approached the
MIGs at 600 k.nots, trying to get a lock-on. BLUE 1 old not stay high for long periods due
to the thre.TC of SAMs. BLUE 1 made 6 passes, similar to the one described above, and
although he obtained a radar lock-on to a target on two of these, no ordnance was fired.
This occurred, since that by the time acquisition and lock-on was completed, BLUE I was too
close. As BLUE 1 would start his attack, the MIGs would start to turn into him and three
of the attasks resulted In head-on passes. The passes were not all made on the same MIG.
All of the iock-ons that BLUE 1 achieved were made In the boreslght mode. Due to the MIGs'
maneuver.", BLUE 1 was unable to achieve a tall shot with a SIDEWLNDER.
During the maneuvers BLUE 1 backseat was clearlr.f^ the 6 o'clock, since he was able
to see MIGs closer to the 6 o'clock then BLUE I front. Although the MIGs tried to get
Into a firinc position, they were unsuccessful except for one case. In this situation
BLUE 1 back saw a MIG- 17 firing but the MIG was out of range.
BLUE 1 called BLUE 3 and >i , and after 3-'* minutes located them. Sometime during BLUE
I's passes he S2w BLUE 3 and k making a head-on pass with a MIG.
BLUE 1 reached BIMGO fuel as the strike force was passing back through the area, eo he
egressed. When BLUB 1 reached the tanker, the flight of Event had preceded him.
BLUE 2
During Ingress BLUE 2 heard HIG calls, one for a silver airplane, but was unable to
identify then as having been made by any specific flight. When BLUE Flight was several
minutes prior to the turn point, BLUE 2 heard a call of MIGs at 9 o'clock.
BLUE 2 tiinn saw BLUE 1 start a gradual left turn, but BLUE 2 did not see any KIGs.
BLUE 2 continue'! to look for MIGs and then noticed that BLUE I had Increased his turn to
the left. At this time BLUE 2 went to afterburner and executed a barrel roll ever the top
to (;et on ti-.c outside of BLUE I's turn and get Into position.
As BLUE 2 dropped down on BLUE I's right wing, BLUE 2 front looked to his left and saw
a single MIG-J7 about 1200-1500 feet away, r.aklng a diving turn from 7-7:30 o'clock. BLUE
2 was headtr.e; abcut east and the MIC was appruachlr.i- from a southerly hendlng.
BLUE 2 frcr.t had prebrlefed to have the hackneit charge radio chinnels, bu' this was
not accoTiplIshfjd. Therefore, the other Tllpht me-nh.-r j d).<\ not hear BLUE 2*3 call of
"HICs at 7 o'clock." Also BLUE I did not see SLUE 2' 3 situation.
Event Ill-iji
BLUE 2 did not realize that he was on the strike frequency so he then started to
" * turn right to permit BLUE 1 to sandwich the MIG. As BLUE 2 started to turn, BLUE 2
-4 r back called for a tank arop, and since ELL'E 2 was at 3-0 l^IAS at this time, he? Jettisoned
the left outboard tank. (The centerllnc tank had been previously Jettisoned.) When the
tank was Jettisoned the first MIG broke off. (This was seen by BLUE 3 backseat.)
As BLUE 2 continued In his right break, he was attacked by another HIC-17 who was
shooting at BLUE 2. This MIC was about 750-1000 feet away. bLUE 2 backseat could se-i
the underside of the HIC and the tracer arjaunltlon. BLUE 2 at this time was at 6 g In
burner but at a low airspeed.
With the backseat keeping track of the MIG, BLUE 2 then unloaded and tried to pick up
alrspeert, and at the same time attemp-.ea tc Jink sufficiently to spoil the KIG'c tracking
solution. BLUE 2 passed throui^h a cloud at about 4000 feet aM then saw the hed Hiver.
He did a l80 degree turn and since neither the MIG nor the other flight membcps were seen,
BLUE 2 then egressed to a position outside of SAK coverage. On Instructions, he then
went to the tanker.
• BLUE 3 and U
BLUE : and «» heard the MIG calls from the P-1053 Indicating KICs to the left. They
followed as BLUE 1 went Into a left turn, selecting afterburner to stay with him. The
left turn tuok them away from the strike force and after about 20 degrees of turn BLUE 3
saw a MIG-17 off to the left, making a 90 degree, low attack on BLUE 3 and The MIG
was pointed directly at BLUE 3 at this time, making It difficult to Judge the distance to
the MIG.
BLUE 3 continued to unload, thinking that BLUE I had seen this MIG; therefore, he
did not call It. As the HIO closed, BLUE 3 and *« tightened their turn and the r4IG over-
shot. There were three more MIGs behind the first one. The second two were together,
followed by a single MIG at the end. During this turn BLUE 3 backseat called a HIG-17 on
BLUE 2.
At this time BLUE 3 and a split off from BLUE 1 and 2, turning inside from the right,
and unloaded and accelerated to about 600 knots, after about l30 degrees of left turn.
At this tine BLUE 3 started to pull the nose up to turn back, but the backseat called two
MI0-17S at 6 o'clock shooting. Although the MIG-I7s were at about 1200 feet range, they
were not visible from the front seat, and BLUE 3 felt they were not an Imredlate threat.
He continued a 2 g descending turn and headed for the Red River.
BLUE 3 could not tell when the MIG disengaged due to the |)Cor visibility at 6 o'clock.
He also was not communicating well with the backseater (semantics confusion, not equipment
problems) .
BLUE i» stayed with BLUE 3 throughout the encounter. They both came under 85mm AAA fire
from along the Red River. When BLUE 3 reached the Red River he came out of afterburner,
turned, slowing to ^lOO knots and Jettisoned his external tank. Then BLUE 3 a.nd « selected
afterburner and after contacting BLUE 1 returned to the battle area at 520 knots, and
5000 feet altitude, heading east. The fuel state at this time was about 8000 pounds..
BLUE 3 then saw four MIC-173 in a left turn at about 10 o'clock low. The MIGs were
at about 3000 feet, so BLUE 3 started to execute a high speed yo-yo to 10,000 feet altitude
to position for an attack. As he passed through 6000 feet, BLUE 3 backseat called two
MIG-175 at 6 o'clock. These MIGs were shooting at BLUE 3 and
BLUE 3 and 4 then unloaded and continued to turn. The two MIGs at 6 o'clock fell
b( nd, out of position. The MIGs which were seen at low altitude reversed in a right
turn, and as BLUE 1 continued his left turn at 3 g he spotted a MIG-17 in a right turn.
ELL'E 1 was about degrees angle off and considered shooting, but the backseater was
looking at the trailing MIGs. At this time another aircraft cane Into view. The aircraft
was heading toward SLUE 3 and BLUE 3 had a shot, but hesitated for a moment to make a
positive identification. By this time the aircraft, identified as a MIG, was Inside
missile range and after approaching to several thousand feet, the MIG broke right.
BLUE U at this time called BINGO with 6000 pounds of fuel so BLUE 3 and U egressed by
unloading and accelerating to 600 knots. As they crossed the Red River they again received
AAA fire and a SAM was fired, parsing between BLUE 3 and 4.
BLUE 3 and U then continued to the tanker.
BLUE Flight was engaged with the MIGs for about 12 to 15 minutes.
It was felt that the MIC tactics in this encounter were to decoy the P-^s with the
low flight of MIGs while a high flight of MI0-17s performed the attack.
Event III-233
Aircraft Involved: Five P-105» v» three HIG^lTs
Results: Two HIC-173 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: ?1°28'N/105°30'E
1. PRIKARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oatc/Tlne: 13 May 196 7/ About 1620H
Four F-105D5 (CREEJJ Flight) were part of a 20 aircraft strike force attacking the Yen
Vlen Railroad Yard (JC3 19.00). The other flights of this force which encountered MIGs
were those described In Events 1 1 1-237 "nd -238. The MICCAP for this force was provided
by the aircraft of Event III-232.
There was IRON HAND, and ECM (B-66 aircraft) sup{jort for this mission.
2. NISSION ROUTE
GREEN Plight departed Takhli and proceeded to refuel on GREEN ANCHOR. The flight then
proceeded to the Red River on a heading of 030 and then on a heading of 090 to Thud Ridge.
They then proceeded down Thud Ridge to the target. Eifress was the reverse route.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
y-105D GREEN 1.3
Centerllne MER rack (Stores had already oe>.n Jettisoned on the target)
2 ii50 gal tanks (dry)
I AIM-9B
1 QRC-160 POD
P-'105D GREEN 2. H
Carried a QRC>160 pod in place of the 1 AIM-9B.
. IFF-standbyi TACAN-recelve only
raG«i7 '
Dull silver
One was observed to have an afterburner
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO F.NCOUNTER
Weather : Scattered cumulus, clear below the clouds.
GREEN 1. 2. 3. ^
7000-7500
260^ turning from 310^
0.9 Mach (550 knots)
8000 lb
Plight Formation; Pod formation modified for MIG defense. GREEN 3 was line abreast of
Flight Formation ; rod formation
Lead. Element was to the right.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
While egressing two MIC-l7s turned in front of GREEN Plight > about a mile away.
6. ACTION INITIATED
GREEN Flight attacked the NIGs.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
GREEN fired a SIDEWINDER at a MIG, resulting m a kill. GREEN 3 attacked another .MIG
and also shot him down with a SIDEWINDER. GREEN 3 v as subsequently attacked by another
MIG>17 who fired at him. GREEN 3 disengaged and tht flight egressed without further
encounters .
265
Event III<233
8. QRDMANCE
C?£Ztt 3
MIQ-6
9. LQUIPHCtiT PROBLENS
Hone ,
10. AIRCREW COHHCNTS
Experience
GREEN 3
SIDEMIMi-ER
AIK-9B
1/1
1/1
Cannon
1/0
Remarka
Onr NIG destroyed
One NIG destroyed
At GREEH 3
Total
Hours
2500
P-105
Hours
3-40C
. Combat
Hlaslons
Remarks
ADC Experience
Ccniaents on this Encounter
Don't try to turn with a MIG-l?. Must attack only those MICs tha: * ^
degree cone In front of the F-105, so that the speed can be kept up, and the NIG closea
on rapidly.
A KIG flying In between other aircraft is a difficult target. During ingress the
aircraft are spaced too tightly to fire.
If yea have a two mile separation of flights, the SIDEWINDER can be fired at MICa
between the flights,
GREEII 3 liked the SIDEWIKDER. and if the MlOs i.tayed cut in force he would propose
carry * the vwo missile pylon.
11. DATA SOURCE
Project Interview ; GREEM 3» June 1967.
Hesaanes. Renorta ;
355 TPW ISHOOZ May 1967 OPREP-3 DOTO-0-H685
355 TW 131531Z May 1967 OPREP-3 DOTO-0-11691
12. NARRATIVE
GREEN Plight was the Ifeat flight to strike the target. On Ingress, as GREEN Flight
turned to go down Thud Ridge, the escort flight of F-K (Event III-232) broke off to the
left and becajce engaged behind GREEH flight, to 'he east. This engagensent was still
under way In the sane area some four minutes later when GREEII 3 came back up the Ridge.
While -coning down Thud Ridge. GREEH 3 had seen the IRON HAHD aircraft off to the left
at 10 o'clock, firing their SHRIKE mlasiles toward the target area.
Durlna Jnpress MTGs were called by KIG alert, which indicated that the MIGs were at
Hanoi and were moving to the northwest of Hanoi. GREEK 3 did see soiae KIG afterburner
llKhts aa the MICs broke through the overcast about three minutes prior to the target.
(This was at the same point at which KIOs were met on the way out.)
GREEN Flight expended its ordnance on the target and started to egress up Thud Ridge.
A m-nber of a previous strike flight had become separated iu-j to engine trouble, and this
p-iOS (BLUE 2 of Event l62) had Joined and was flying foraation with the four merabers of
GREEM Flight. CJRSEN 2 was on left of Lead, C?.EEN 3. CRSEN ^ and BLUE 2 were stacked -ip
to the right of Lead.
The flight of f*ve laembera proceeded up Thud RlJge at a i'.eadlng of about 310 deg.
They passed through a cloud for about five seconds and on soailng out found thenselves
at the turn point at the northwest end of Thud ^idge .
As they started to turn to the left one, of the other flights called MICs at the turn.
RSEH 3 then saw two MIC-17s (MIC 1, 2) aboi^uoa^d^ off t". the rl;tht and about a mile
way GREEH 1 called for the flight to atg|^^H^|^3. a?."EH 2 lit his afterburner at
GRE
away
this time to gain speed
266
i
Event III-233
When sighted the f light was st 21°28'N/105°30 'E , heading 260 deg, at 550 knots
at 7500 feet altitude. The KIGs were at about 3 o'clock to GREEN 3 and were at 7500
feet altitude, slightly descending, and turning Lo the right. This put GREEN flight
at the MIG's 6 o'clock.
CR£E!< 3 rolled right and selected the KIC on left of the pair (MIO 2). As soon
as GREEN i centered on tne 'AIG, he received a cone from the SIDEWIflDER. GREEM 3 had be-n
ore of The target for several rtlnutes and he had set up for missiles.
At the sane tliae as GREEN 3*s attack. CREE» 1 selected the other MIG-17 (MIG 1}
and ,;on«neiiced on attack, GREE.'I 1 fired his SIDEWINDER and the missile impacted directly
on or very near the tall pipe. Pieces of MIG I tm.T'^diately began coning off of the air-
craft and grey sir.oke was trailing from the aft 3ectlcr. MIO 1 immediately broke hard
left and headed down. GREEN 1 followed MIG 1 down and observed its Impact at 21 33 'N/
105 28 'E. This Impact was also observed by BLUE 1 of Event III-237.
HZO 2 who was under attack by GREEN 3, started a left hand turn, however GREEN 3
had no trouble tracking the '/.IG with about 10 deg cf left bank and only 1 g on the
aircraft. At 4000 feet range level, GREEN 3 fired and the missile tracked true and
exploded at HIG 2's right rear quarter at t o'clock. Just after GREEN j fired, CREEIJ 1
crossed over in front, but was behind the SIDEWINDER fired by GREEN 3.
When hit, fUG 2 immediately rolled up into a steep left bank to dbcut ^iS dag cf
bank with oil or a light grey smoke emanating frc:n the rear.
GREEN 3 lit afterburner and pulled up into a hard left turn to try to keep MIG 2
In sight. HIG 2 &t this tine was heading about 120 deg and going back to GREEN 3*s
a o'clock position. GREEN 3 pulled up to 8-9COO feet and In doing sc reduced his speed
considerably .
Since GREEN 3 heard more calls of HIGs in the area, he continued a left turn but
started down to pick up speed. At ^hls time, he lest sight of MIG 2. When last seen
MIO 2 had started a right turn. BLUE 2 saw MIG 2 impact at 21°31'N/105 28'E, and
observed the tail to come off previous to the crash.
As GREEN 3 lowered his nose, he had co.Tpleted about l80 deg of turn from his original
heading. At this time GREEN 3 picked up a HIC-17 cn the inside of GREEII 3'? turn. This
MIG-17 was MIC 6 of Event 111-237. MIG 6 was above GPEEM ? and pointed at him. Although
KIG 6 was shooting in the general area of GREEN 3* MZG 6 was too far away and was not
pulling sufficient lead to threaten GREEN 3.
GREEN 3 felt that perhaps G.^£EN >* was trailing ?nd might be under attack so he rolled
up and headed down at aboun a 30 deg dive until he reached 550 knots. By this time GKSEN
3 could not see KIG 6,
GREEN 3 had separated from GREEN 1 and 2 on his initial attack on MIG 2. GREEN t
had remained with him throughout the engagement although he did not see GREEN 3' SIDEWINDER
detonate or the attack by MIG 6. GREEN 3 and k then egressed and by the time they reached
the RED RIVER they had been Joined by BLUE 2 and a single F-UC.
GREEN 3 did not see GREEN 1 fire his missile.
267
Event HI-23<t
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-^Cs »s at least
ten MIG-173
^ Results: Two MIG-178 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l»3l'H/105«25'E
1. PRIHARV MISSION AKO 7ACTICU SITUATION
Date/Tlrae: 13 May ]i.67/l621H
Pour P-'»C5 {BLUE PiW,ht) were part of a MIGCAP lor a strike asalnst JCS 19-00 { f or
atrlke niBht ev;St», a«.e"lll-231. -232. -233). The fllRht of III-235 «a also part
of the MIGCAP.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight departed Ubon and refueled on yRAHGE ANCHOR. Prom refueling, they
proceeded direct to Channel 97. then direct to 2i;38'N/l05-55;Ej then direct to 21^^^^^
105»33'E» then direct to 21«»05'N/105»55'E, then direct to 21«3*'N/105'33'E, then direct to
21*38'N/105*55'E, then direct to Channel 97.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
F.ftC BLUE 1. 2. 3. t
U AIM-7E SPARROW
4 AIM-9B oIDEWlNOER
1 370-«tal tank
1 QRC-160 pod
1 600-gal centerline tank
CaBouflage paint
mc«17
Bright silver, red stars bortfered in gold on the wings
Had afterburner
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Scattered clouds at 1000 ft. Tops at 6000-8000 ft. Visibility good.
BLUE
T 5 3 5"
Heading: 270° turning from 330"
• Altitu de : 9000-10,000 ft
Airs peed : 550 kts
t^uel Ita te ; 9000-10.000 lb
j Plight Formation : Pod element to the right, BLUE 2 on the left.
: 5. INITIAL DETECTION
' While Inbound. BLUE 1 backseat saw two MIG-17s low at 9 o'clock and called them.
! These MIGs were not a threat however and BLUE flight continued on with the strike force.
! On egress BLL-E 1 saw a MIG but It was lost In the clouds. Shortly thereafter, BLUE
Plight saw an engagement between F-105s and MIC-17s.
6. ACTION INITIATED ^ , ^ ,
I BLUE 1 and 2 broke to go after the HIOs on the P-105s and BLUE 3 and 1 stayed high for
\ cover.
\ 7. SITUATION OEVSLOPHENT
I BLUE 1 startpd to attack one of the MIC-17s and fired two SIDEWINDERS at hUn as the
MIG reversed. One SIDEWIftrZH hit the MIG for a kill.
miiF 1 saw two more MIC-17s high and fired a SIDEWINDER at them. BLUE 1 did not have
a tone Sd thfrnlssl^e 'issScl/ BLul 1 attacked a third MIG with a SPAR:^0W but the MxG and
missile both disappeared into a cloud.
During the Initial br.'ak, BLUE 2 became separated and egressed separately from the
rest of the flight.
BLUE 3 and 1 saw a KIG and SLUE 3 locked on and fired three SPARROWs at the MIG.
One hit and destroyed the KIO.
BLUE Flight then egressed .
268
[
[
[
r '
L
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 3
KlG-17
9
(IJcj. flied/Ho. hits)
AIK-Y!-:
1/0
3/1
SIDEWINDER
3/1
Cannon
1/0
Event III-23'4
Remarka
Tried to fire two SPARROWs; one
MIG kill
Tried to fire two SPARROWs; one
MIG kill
At BLUE 1
Total
Combat
Hours
Hour:
Missions
BLU?
1
(Front)
uzoo
825
22
BLUE
i
(Front)
?600
150
25
BLUE
3
(Back)
450
250
68
BLUE
tt
(Front)
3500
150
EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
The centerllne tank on BLUE 4 would not Jettison.
10. AlKCREM COMHENTS
Experience ;
Total P>4 Combat
Remarks
Second Route Package VI mission
All fighter experience
Conurienta on this Encounter ;
BLUE 1 - This was the first tine that he saw indications of coordinated tactics between
two flights of MIGs. This required the F-^s to keep flight integrity and element support.
The offensive split Is not any good If you are outnumbered.
The MIG tactic aisplayei on this day was as follows:
•There were two groups of HTG-lTs. One was a low element who stayed In a tight turn.
There was also a high element of two or a flight of four, i-s the F-^s would attack the
low element, the hjgh fllp;ht could achieve an attack position. As the ?'^s would dis-
engage, the MIGs would switch v/lth the low element floating high, and the glgh flight
staying low.
BLUF 3 (Frent) - On this dcy , SAMs were fired at then, and the P-^ts dropped ch-ff. It
was feit that the SAMs exploded In the chaff clouds. The Air Force and the Nuvy ha.- exper-
ienced good results fron chaff aralnst SAKs. However, the F-^ts had no chaff dispenser so
the chaff was carried In the speed brakes. The chaff was dropped Just before a tum since
the ECM pod coverage was limited during mft:ieuvers. There should be an intergral chaff •
dispenser on the aircraft.
Must stay in the vertical In order to successfully fight the MIG-17. Host of the
flghtSr PUO? trllnlng and experience Is to get In close for a gun klU and this has become
«oS»thln« of a reflexT It will take a lot of tralnlj.s to ?du^ate pilots to keep back In
|a?Lcte«. Due to the lack of experience, pilots returning with a little excess
fuel were practicing air combat tactics.
BLUE 3 (Back) - Even though the first lock-on failed, a second try was worthwhile since
the sLonS loc k-on held. It pays to keep trying. The battle Is not over Just because
you have fired.
BLUE 1 (Front) - The man In the backseat was helpful due to the extra set of eyes since he
could keep trac k of the KlCs. The failure of the centerllne tank to Jettison could have
caused real problems if they had not dls-.ngaged when they did. The performance with the
tSnk on is reduced sufficiently that BLUE ^ felt he could not successfully disengage or
right the WIG- 17.
The flight was prebrlefed for the wlngman not to call MIGs unless they were a real
threat.
It was important for the P-H to be worked in the vertical. The vertical was used for
two purposes, to out-zoom an enemy and Lo help reduce your turn radius However, the
maneuver was not used for both purposes at the same time (i.e., either/or).
The roll axis was used (i.e., a roll about the longitudinal axis) to reduce the angle
off for AIM-9 firing.
When the element lead pulls out from 'a vertical naneuver. the wlngman must use a roll
opposite to the leader's clJection of turn in order to stay in place. This makes the roll
?"e important, as well as slab (horUontal tall) authority,
11. DATA SOURCE
Pro.lect Intervit.-..s ;
BLUE 1 Front, 2 June 1967
BLUE 3 F.'-t;iit, iJ^te June 1967
BLUE 3 hack, June 19t>7
BLUE t Front, 1 June 1967
269
Event III>23tl
Mgsaagca. Report a : 3TFW 1312?2 May 1967 OPHEP-3 DOI 05229
8TFW May 1967 OPRKP-3 DOI 052': 3 C.;ctlon.-: I and II
8TPW 131600Z May 1967 OPREP-B DOI 052 3'*
8TPW IH0926Z Kay 1967 CPREP-3 DOI 05?52
AIH-7D/E, MlsslXe Perfonaance Report BLUE 1 an^i 3
12. NARRAT!VC DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was part of a NIGCAP supporting a strike force ec-Rpcs-.-d of 20 F-IOS
aircraft tfhleh were attacking JCS 19*00. The first three F-105 fliiihtr. were In a "V
formation; two other flights followed 2 miles back. BLUE Flight wi:s with the first three
flights while the other HIGCAP flight (Event 111-233) trailed the lasv F-lf}^ flight.
The centerllne tanks were Jettisoned near Yen Bay but the tank of BLUE 4 would not
release. Although this could have caused an abort, it was decided to continue on with the
hung tank.
As the flight turned right to a heading of east» they heard HIG calls of 30 miles;
10 miles and then 50 miles northwest of Hanoi so they felt that thoy woiiid see MTGs. About
halfway between the Rea River and Thud Ridge, BLUE 1 backseat saw two Hrc-178 vory low at
9 o'clock and called them out. BLl'E 1 fronn did not see these HXCs ss they passed under a
cloud, but BLUE 3 did. Since the MIGs were not a threat to the strike force* BLUE flight
maintained position and continued on.
About one minute later, MICs started to thi-eaten the last two strike flights and the
other CAP fllsht (Event III-332) went after these MIGa. BLUE 1 heard the communication
from that flight that they were changing frequency and, as prebrlrfod, BLUE Flight also
changed over to an auxiliary channel. At this Time the strike frequency was severely
cluttered with SAM, AAA, and HIG calls from the strike and IRON HAiJD flights.
As BLUE Flight started down Thud Ridge, they heard Ihe coraraunlcaticna' .resulting
from the start of the engagement described In Event III<-231. BLUE 1 contacted the lead of
that event and inquired If help was needed.
The reply waa "I've got one" and BLUE 1 Interpreted this to mean there was one MIC,
so BLUE Plight continued on with the strike force after advising the other F-** flight.
As BLUE Plight continued down Thud Ridge they received and S5r3i flak from the
southern part of the ridge. Also four SAMs, In trail, were fired at the flight but they
did not appear to guide. As the P-105s hit the target, BLUE Flight nade a turn and
positioned to escort the egressing P-105 flights back up Thud Ridge.
The F-105' force was spread out as they started tack up the ridge. There were singles
as well as groups of four and six; seme were going up the wes^ side, ar.d others were going
up the east side of Thud Ridge. BLUE Flight elected to stay with the group on the east
side. Although BLUE Plight could see the P-i05s on the west side of the ridge, they were
partially obscured by the broken cloud deck. BLUE Pljght found It difficult to keep up
with the egresslng force due to the F-I05's high airspeed. Also during this tine, two more
SAMs were fired at BLUE Flight and BLUE Flight dropped some chaff.
On the way up the rlage, BLUE U called a MIG at 10 o'clock V3ry low. BLUE 1 did not
see this MIG and called BLUE U to take it. BLUE 3 then saw the mG at 12 o'clock but he,
too, lost sight of the MIG as It went Into cloud. Several menbers of the flight observed
the MIG at different times but they were unable to maintain contact long enough to start
an attack.
All durln? the egreaa, BLUE Flight had continued to monitor the conversation of those
members of Event III-235, which were engaged with MIGs. The number 3 man of this event
requested aid; and at the northwest of Thud Ridge, BLUE Flight turned west to assist the
Other F-^is.
At this time, BLUE Plight was 2-3 miles east of Thud Ridge; and as they turned to a
westerly heading, BLUE Flight saw at 10 o'clock a dogfight on the west side of the ridge
between four F-105s and four MIC-17S.
The MIGs were first seen as flashes of silver at 5 to 10 mile range, and then were
identified as enemy at 2 to 3 miles. The MICs and the F-105s appeared to be in a level
left turn at about 6O0O-7COO ft altltuie in the vicinity of 21°30 'NV105'»25'E.
BLUE Flight Jettisoned tanks (except BLUE ' s centerllne tank), went afterburner,
and approached In two elements in trail. On reaching the are;i of the engagement, BLUE 1
and 2 broke down into the .MIGs while BLUE 3 and U crossed over to prov'lde high cover.
When they reached the area of the F-lQ5a, BLUE Flight was at Hach 1.2. The elements split
and the following description covers first, BLUE 1 and 2, and then BLUE 3 and .
BLUE 1 and 2
As BLUE 1 and 2 started after the MIGs, they observed the F-lOSs to be scattered.
BLUE 1 and 2 concentrated cn one F-105^ with two MIG-i7s about 1000 ft hehlng, firing at the
P-105. BLUE 1 observed this from 2 miles out while he was ir. his descent. Since I3LUE 1
was descending in afterburner, he was overtaking these MIGs ripidly,
'Such as "You pot MIGs at To'clock"; "Little burner"; "Pull m-.ire g's"; "Get your airspeed
back up."
^BLUE 1 thinks there could have been two F-105?.
Event 111-234
The P-105, which was In a hard left turn, executed a 270* hlgh-g snap roll underneath
^> and headed for the deck out to the right. The MIGs were forced to overshoot anJ started to
reverse to the right to go with the P-105.
BLUE 1 had been In a slight left diving turn and when the HIOs reversed, he started to
pull up because he no longer had a good attack pass. (BLUE I could not turn with the HIOs.}
Just before the MIGs disappeared under the radome at 6000-7000 ft range, they reversed to
the left; so BLUE I continued his dive, put the plpper on the second of the MIGs, and fired
two SIDEWINDERS.
1 When he fired, BLUE 1 did not renember (as per Interview) having a tone, although a
good tone was reported In the OPREP sources.^ He was a", about 500 kts at 6000 ft indicated
altitude with the wings level In a slight dive. The MIG was in a slight left turn and
(BLUE 1 was about 10" angle off. He had 200 kts overt ak? on th<» MIG. BLUE 1 had been unable
to obtain a radar lock-on in this situation due to ground clutter. BLUE 1 had Just pushed
the stick forward and put the plpper on the MIC. He had less than 2 g on the aircraft at
firing.
f After firing, SLUE 1 pulled off hard to the right and then reversed back to see the
I first SIDEWINDER detonate 30 ft behind the HIG. The second SIDEWINDER was unobserved.
The MIGs, when first seen, had been In afterburner and had continued so for the entire
engagement .
f- After the SIDEWINDER exploded, the MIG-17 continued on around to the left in a tight
I diving spiral, leaving his leader. The MIC was on fire from the left wing root all the
(. way down the left side of . the fuselage. Although BLUE maneuvered to try to keep contact
with the MIG, the HIG was lost from BLUE I's sight as U nal.italned the diving spiral.
However, BLUE 4 backseat observed the .MIG to enter a spin at 1500 ft altitude, burning
p fiercely. Ho ejection was seen. Although no flight member saw the MIG impact, 3LUE 1 is
I credited with a kill.
Shortly after losing sight of the MIQ that he killed, SLUE 1 saw two HIG-173 high at
10 o'clock. The KIGs were in a hard left turn. BLUE 1 Immediately pulled the nose over
r- and without a tone, fired one SIDEWI^IDER. The missile went ballistic, but BLUE l felt
that it was fired too hastily to permit guidance and was fired outside g parameters.
At this time BLUE 1 was at 12,000-15,000 ft altitude. He then saw two Mia-17s at
8-9 o'clock heading down in a st.'aisht descent toward a cloud. The clcud was at about
3000 ft altitude. When seen, the MIGs were headed in the opposite direction to BLUE 1.
j BLUE 1 turned and got behind one of the MIGs, within SPARROW range and with plenty
l... of overtake. BLUE 1 achieved a lock-on in the boresight mode and switched to full system,
interlocks cut, although BLUE 1 was looking down on the HICJ. BLUE 1 attempted to ripple
fire two SPARROWS but the first one did not leave the aircraft.
I When he fired, BLUE 1 was at about UOOO ft range. The HIG was at 5000 ft altitude
L. and 0.78 Mach, heading about 200*.
BLUE 1 was at about 6000 ft altitude and 500 kts in a slight turn. He had first seen
. . the MIO at about 2 miles range and lock-on was achieved at 1 mile. BLUE 1 fired under
\ conditions of linear polarization and clutter override.
I. The SPARROW seemed to be tracking and both the MIG and the missile disappeared Into
the cloud at 21'»36 'N/IOS^ZS'E with the missile following by 1-1/2 to 2 seconds. BLUE 1
followed with a lock for sufficient time for missile intercept and then pulled off. Due
to the size of the cloud, BLUE 1 was unable to check to see if the MIO came out of the
cloud.
At this time, BLUE 1 recognized that he had lost BLUE 2 and was operating alone.
Therefore, he called for BLUE 2 and both egressed.
BLUE 1 did not know exactly when BLUE 2 became separated; but during one turn, BLUE 1
turned hard into BLUE 2 and at the same time, BLUE 2 came very close to hitting an F-105.
As BLUE 2 came over the top to dodge the F-105, he lost contact with BLUE 1. BLUE 2 then
egressed.
BLUE 3 and k
AH of- BLUE Plight saw the battle between the fI0-17s and P-105S about the same time.
As BLUE Flight entered the battle, each element of £LUE Plight started after a separate
target .
As BLUE 1 and 2 went after their MIGs, BLUE 3 backseat observed BLUE 1 to fire a mis-
sile and the missile to detonate near the wing root and the fuselage of a MIG-17.
As BLUE 3 and 1 entered the fig.^it in a dive, BLUE 3 saw P-105s with two MIGs on their
tails. He al3o saw two MIG-17s high but these were no threat. BLUE 3 also saw two more
MIG-lTs, Inverted, In a rolling turn ever the top, trying to dive on the P-105s. Tho KIGs
were at 10,000 to 12,000 ft altitude.
1}
n'he" Mfp£R was set for the kl'/i-S so 6LUE 1 should 1-ave had a tone.
\
271 ^
4
bvent 111-23'^
jT BLUE 1 was at Mach 1,2 at this tine and since the l.-iGt two Ml^-iVs were alow, he
^i.^ pulled up In an attempt to get a radar lock on them. iiLUr! I sav. t.i.,'it, he was col»g t-i be too
close so he pulled up and barrel rolled to the outside. Air,er r»U'Clng this nancuver,
he was still too close, ao another one was exe«*5:ted. .*.t this tint-, BLUE 3 was In a g^ooA
position and achieved a radar lock-on on** oi' the KIGs as Li.c ocler .'.yii*: off.
BLUE 3 attempted to fire only two mlssJles from an overhea'l 'tr-ink but Inadvertently
fired three. BLUI^ 1 had acquired the MIG In the boresi^ht rr.ode an; had switched to full
system. Interlocks out. Just after the first missile was i'lre:!, lU-j radar broke lock.
BLUE 1 backseat Inuned lately, went back to bcreslghc and obtained &::;;tlii>r lock>on and then
switched back to fulJ system. Shortly after the second radar Iccic vis achieved, the second
missile was fired followed by the third.
The first missile was fired when BLUF. 1 was ac aboui 10,000 ft altitude, at Mach 0.9,
pulling 2-3 g's. The MIC was at about 8000 ft ar Mach 0.3 headliu?; about 220° in a slight
diving turn. BLUE 1 was in a 2Q° to 30** dive with about 20* ar.fje erf. not In afterburner.
The closing velocity was 50 to 100 kts. BLUE l had detected and locked on to the MIG at
2-1/2 niie range. For all firings, the system was set for linear polarization, normal
clutter and narrow gate.
The first missile dropped below the nose out of BLLF- 3*s sl^:hc, failed to guide, and
missed the MIG by a*>out 100 ft. The second missile, fired In aocut the sane conditions as
the fl'^'^t except for a slightly lower altitude, dropped cut of but reappeared, and
was jeen by BLUE 3 to impact the MIC-17 on top of the fusclepe Jlisi behind the canopy: The
MIO-17 disintegrated, resulting in a kill for BLUE 3. When the second missile was fired,
the system had been switched to full system by the backseater and interlocks were still
out. The third missile was fired In the sar;e parasieters as the second. It was last,
observed apparently guiding to the vicinity of the destroyej MI3-17. When hit, the HIG
was at about 6000 ft altitude. All firings were made at ^000 to 50UU ft range.
Shortly after the third missile was fired, BLUE 3 was at a ran^e such that he needed
4 to 5 g's to keep track of the MIG.
Shortly after the MIO exploded, BLUE 3 heard a call indicating KIGs at 3 o*'cloek. No
call signs were given so BLUE 3 turned and checked that position but ho MIGs were seen.
BLUE 3 reversed and started to look for other y,lGa but BL!'S^ 4 called BI7IG0 fuel.
BLUE C had stayed wlch BLUE 3 throughout the fight despite the hindrance of the
centerllne tank.. (BLUE 3 had purposefully limited his use of afterburner.) When BLUE 4
called BINOO, he had 3000 pounds less fuel than 3LUE 3-
As BLUE 3 and 1 entered their vertical maneuver, J use prior ro BLUE 3*s firings, BLUE
observed a NIQ-17 make a pass. BLUE Mas climbing at the time and the MIG was making a
level turn, and had about ho° angle off. Therefore, although ch«.' rllG was firing his cannon,
he was not a threat to BLUE 4 and this MIC was not called to BLUE 3.
BLUE * watched BLUE 3 reverse in the vertical and fire his mir.slles and as the MIO over-
shot, BLUE U rolled in the opposite direction of BLUE 3's "cversal and observed the first
missile to miss the MIG-17 by about 100 ft: the second one hit the MIG. BLUE ^ did net see
BLUE 3's third missile but he did not have 3LUE 3 and the MIG under constant observation.
After BLUE 4 called BINGO, BLUE 3 saw two flights cf P-lOfs with MI0-17s after them
but the P-1058 were accelerating away from the MIGs and were net in trouble. He saw the
MIGs start t-o break away and BLUE 3 and 4 then unloaded and jinked out. Joining some F-105s
for egress.
BLUE 3 first saw BLUE I's MIO spinning and also saw BLUE 1 once during the battle.
Although BLUE 3 was looking down on the MIG when he achieved a radar lock, the use of
the boreslght mode put the ground line in a different location than the NIQ return and
permitted acquisition.
BLUE 3 front did net realize that three missiles had been fired until he noticed during
egress that three of the lights were out. BLUE 3 front was not certain which of the missiles
hit the NIQ. His plan was to fire two missiles at the first MIG and then drop back and fire
two at the second MIS.
BLUE Plight reported 37/57rara fire from 21"30'N/105*25'E durlns the MIO encounter.
As part of the overall action of 12, 13 » and It Kay 1967, the U.'iAF Tactical Analysis
Bulletin 67-4 indicated that intensity of MIG operationr on those dayn was the highest that
had been experienced at the time of the Bulletin publication (June 1967),
The aircraft of Events III-232 and 111-233 could hr.vo encountered the same group
of enemy aircraft; therefore, some of tne MIGs seen by BLUE Flight of III-23I could be
the same HIGs as taose seen by the F-4s of Event III-231 •
I Event III>33S
• Air;; raft Involved: Pour P-105S V8 5 MO 178
hesults: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l'*19'N/105®36'E
[
[
G
C
C
[
[
L
K PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION ;
Date/Tioe: 13 May 1967/1 62 IH
Pour P-lOSs (BLUE fllcht) v.ere pan of a strike force of l6 aircraft attacking the
Vlnh Yen Anny barracks (.ICS 3-. 00). T:.<; actions of the other aircraft of this force are
described In Events 111-230, -231> a:i>i -2)8. The probable order of flights striking the
target were the nights of Events III-2i'i. "221 » and -230*
2. NISSION ROUTE
BLUE flight departed Koiat ard rer.'rll.^d on FED AflCHOR. Prom RED ANCHOR the flight
proceeded direct to 20''23 • fVlC 3"*^ 3 ' E th-n direct to the target 21'»19'25"N/105'36 'Sl'^E.
Egress was direct to 21*00 'N/lOt'S^'E, then direct to RED ANCHOR for post strike refueling
The altitude to the target was l6,00C feet; from the target 10,000 feet.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-105D BLUE 1. 2. 3. "
6 7S0-lb bcir.bs (one aircraft had 6 500 lb bombs instead of the 750 lb
bofflbs)
2 i(50->gal. wing tanks
1 AIM-9B (BLUE 1 and 3 only)
1 QRC-160 pod (BLUE 2 and H had 2 pods)
HIO-17
Silver
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO IHg ENCOUNTER
Weather : 4/8 cover of scattered clouds. Visibility 15 miles.
BLUE 1. 2. 3. t
Altitude ; 15,000
Heading ! Unknown
Speed ! 0.9 Haeh
Fuel State ;
Plight Fortaation" ; - Pod formation modified for MIG defense.
The element was up about 2000 feet high, with wingman alaost level. '
All nenbera about line abreast.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Just prior to roll in, BLUE 1 saw two MZ0-17s, low. Inbound, BLUE flight had received
HIG warnings from the agencies so they were looking for the MIGs.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight prQceeded to roll in on the target.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 ktpt In contact with the two MICs, and after bombing the target, started to j
attack then. Before he could fire on them, BLUE 1 was attacked by three more Mia-17s ,
from 4 o'clock high. The lea^ KIG of this latter three fired on BLUE 1, and as BLUE 1 i
broke, the MIGs overshot and disengaged. ^
8. ORDNANCE ^ * \
Cannon ;
raG -3 1/0 at BLUE 1 f
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS 1
Hone . I
273
Event 111-235
10. AIRCREy COHKENTS
Experience Total Hours Co:..bat Remarks
Kuur3 Msna
BLUE 1 5000 350 50 Had flown most of
* Century series
fighters ar^d the
P-ll.
CoBBsnts on this encounter
The MICs had used a bait to try to trap the F-105s.
Comments on overall experience
BLUE 1: Liked the light Indications on the F-105 to tell when the bombs eoffle off.
There Is a real swltchology problen in going from air-to-ground to ?if-*«-**-';_^^^
This needs to be simplified. There are too many switches to throw. In this engagement;
there was not enough time to do it.
Pert the HIO-17 would not uae his radar for gun tracking so the radar warning would
not do any good.
Liked the high speed at low altitude capability of the P-105.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews BLUE 1, 5 June 1967
Messages ^ 1312082 May 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 1658
388 TPW 1311tlZ Hay 1967 OPREF-3 DOI 1656
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight was tht lead flight of a strike force of 16 P-lOSs and BLUE I was the
force commander. The I6 F-lOSa were in a "box" fonnatlor with two flights line abreast.
Two flights of P-tia from Danang provided MICCA? , flying behind and about 2000 feet higher
than the strike force. While inbound to the target, BLUE flight heard warnings from the
agencies (ETHAN), that MIGs were in the area. While at. 15,000 feet tltl'^uae and Just
prior to roll In, BLUE 1 saw two silver HI0-17S (HIG 1, 2) flying in trf^l foraation
about 1000 feet apart. MIQ 1 and 2 were about 10,000 feet below BLUE flight and did net
^pear to be making any attack.
BLUE flight then rolled in and Just after setting up his bomb run with a roll Into
the left, BLUE 1, looked to his right and observed MIG 1 and 2 descend, almost parallel
to BLUE I's course, and start to make a left turn towards BLUE flight. At this time,
it was not clear to BLUE 1 if the MIGs had seen him.
BLUE 1 released ordnance at 8OOO feet, and as he came off the target he was going
0.9 to 0.92 Mach in minimum afterburner. The external tanks were still on. As soon
BLUE 1 got the nose up off the horizon he again saw MIG 1 and 2 who wsre at 10 o'clock
level. The altitude was about 5000 feet.
BLUE 1, with the flight following In fingertip formation made a hard right turn to
put the MIGs at 12 o'clock, and then, with the KlGs at about 2000 feet range in a hard
left turn, ^LUK, 1 nade a hard left turn to make a high deflection pass on MIO 1 and 2.
At this time BLUE flight was at 21*19*N/105®36 'E, Heading about 3*0 degrees and the time
was 162 IH.
As BLUF 1 began to pull l^ad for a gun attack, he was f.ttacked by three more MIG-lTs
(riG 3, and 5). The MIGs were in an echelon with yilG-H tr.d niG-5 sllghLly behind MlG-3.
These MIGs were silver Ir. color with no marklncs no red. They made a quartering stern
Attack on BLU2 1 from 4 o'clock high. MIG 3 coi:i.*:iended firing across BLUE I's left wing.
On seeing MIQ 3, ^ and 5 attack, bLUE 2 calJt>d for BLUF' 1 tc break right. He called
a second time that bullets were pdssjn;; BL'JE I's v/lng. BLUF 1 had MIG 1 and 2 In the wl.id
screen and was estimating lead (he d-d not have time to switch to a computing sight). When
warned the second time, BLUE flight broke right ani after about 'lO degrees of turn
reversed back to the left.
The right break caused MIGs 3» '*» and 5 to overshoot ard they went over the flight
to the south and were not seen again. The first two MIGs, 'the bait" (MIQ 1, 2} had
(
u
r ^
L
Event 111-235
initiated a hard cUinbine turn once they hod brouef.t ^^K flight behind them and were
noM 180 degrees out from BLUE flight headlns In an opposite direction to MIGs 3. ana 5,
After the engaeenent BLUE f light egreaued on a heading of 250 degrees at 10,000 feet
altitude in KIG defensive formation (see ^>araEraph «).
BLUE fitght observed AAA In the target area and saw two SAMS detonate in the dis-
tance but took no evasive action.
BLUE 2 was close enough to MIO 2 to see the spoilers on him.
275
Event III-'236
Aircraft Involved: tour P-I05s V3 three KIG-178
Results: Two Ktg-I7 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21°33'H/105''25*E
1. PfdMAKY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
D«te/Tlm: 13 Nay 1967/1623H
Pour P'lOSa (BLUE flight) were part of a 20 aircraft strike force attacking t,he Yen
Vlen Railroad Yard (JCS ig.OCO). The other flights of thij force which encountered MIGs
were those described In Events III-237 and -238. The MIGCAP for this force was provided by
the aircraft of Events 111-232 and -233. There was an IROH HAND fllcht and B-C6 SCM support
2. MISSION ROUTE
Q BLUE flight departed Takhll and after refueling crossed the Red River at about
21 37'N/IOU 55 'E. Prom there they proceeded to 21 3'''N/105°33'E. They then proceeded
down Thud Ridge, north and east of Phuc Yen to the target. Egress was back up Thud Ridge.
The attack on the target was on a south-southwesterly heading.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
P-105D BLUE 1. 3 BLUE 2. »
6 750 lb bombs 6 750 lb bombs
2 450 gal tanks 2 450 gal tanks
1 AZN-9B 2 QBC-160 pods
1 QRC-160 pod
BLUB 1 aquMklng IFF. Rest of fUght IFF. off TACAN receive only
TACMI raeelve only
MIG-17
Dull Silver
No external stores
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Scattered cumulus clouds bases 3-4000 feet, tops S-SOOO feet. Visibility good.
BLUE 1. 2. 3. 4
Altitude: 7500-800 feet
320®
550 kts
8000 lb
Pllitfit Formation ; Pod formation* element (BLUE 3 and 4) on the right of BLUE 1« almost
line abreast, 1000 feet out, level.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
While egresslng, BLUE flight detected three MIG-17s at 1000 feet, about 10 miles away,
The HIGs were In a climbing right turn, heading west.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight turned left to position at the HIG's 6 o'clock.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The MIGs continued to turn right and started a head on pass at BLUE flight. As they
turned BLUE 1 fired a SIDEWINDER which missed. As the .'^Gs continued to close from head
on, BLUE 1 and 3 fired their cannon. BL'JE 2 saw one MIC start to trail smoke and the
following flight saw the pilot eject from one !UC and anorht-r spinning. BLUE 1 ani 3 are
each credited with a kill. The MIGc were not observed to fin .
Event III-236
8. ORDNANCE
(.To. n red/Ho. hit s )
SIDEWINDER
1/0
Cannon
20mm
1/1
1/1
Remarks
One NIG killed
One NIO killed
Retnarka
This Mas third MIC
engagement .
This waa third NIC
engagement .
BLUE I
BLDE 3
9. EQUIPneNT PROBLEMS
BLUE 3 had d pressurlzatlon Tallure.
10. AIRCREW COHNEfTS
Ex{>eri'incs
Total F- 105 Combat
Hours Hours Missions
BLUE 1 3300 690 97
BLUB 3 I'lOO 'i50 82
CoBBBnts on this Encounter
BLUE 1
The gunsight Is bad. The radar is such that a lock-on for ranging cannot be achieved
at below about 10,000 feet altitude due to ground return. Unless full capability is used
(radar mode) the sight does not ccnpensate for bullet drop. The sight is not suitable
for the environment. The awiteholory necessary to activate the sight is bad.
BLUB 3
Although he heard MIC calls Inbound they did not register as being significant,
The aggressiveness of the flight enabled them to get the MIGs .
The pilots entering the theatre do not have sufficient experience.
The nngagement was fought on terr.3 advantageous to the P-10S<
It. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 1, June 1967; BLUE 3« June 1967.
Hessages. Reports
355 TFW 131^00Z May 1967 OPREP-3 DOTO-0-11685
355 T7W 131*572 May 1967 OPREP-3 DOTO-0-11687
355 TPW 131616Z Hay I967 OPREP-3 DOTO-O-II688
12. «ARRATIVE
BLUE Plight was on a strike against J.CS 19* 00, A strike force from Korat {See Evi-.its
157. 158, 159, 160) was hitting a target In the vicinity about 5 m'.nutes after BLUE Flight
TOT. This target was in the vlclnlt;/ of BLUE Flight's egress route, consequently they
were expecting to see MICs.
On ingress, the force flew In a string of flights in trail, about one mile apart.
Although NIG warnings were received, no HXCs were seen by the flight either Inbound or in
ttie vicinity of the target.
BLUE Plight struck the target first was the first flight out during egress. Since
HIGa were up but SLUE fllcrht .had not be<>n attacked, they anticipated that they would see some,
While egresslnc up Thud Hlir?-, it 2l"33'- ': '■^"-'■•'E on a heading of 320 dej:, BL'JE flight
saw aircraft Ihru^ftteJ i,-jlr.st ir.f vr.lte clc. l... hr alr^r^rt «er<- in a clir.r !r,,-, rSfht
turn, heacir.f- itc-t utsi, IC ril^s awny, at lO-lT-.l} o'rlcc:< to LLJH fUiht. -ir-en first
se«n t!*e NISs were « little bit lew. Al! if the :;i:ht strAcn siM ihen'stBaltaneouaiy.
•an
Event I I 1-2 36
After 3-« «c=nd, BLUE 1 and 3, "CcgnUedth. .Ircraft a. «0->7. ««•
ThR three MIGs were In an element with a wlncman In a ribntins wing
?S ll?rl hIg-U miG 3) trailed a3 a single aircraft element,
BLUE 1 cane, for an attac. - the «ia3 -. BLUE FU.ht lit t;;e/i^---rcrou5;To
on the MIGS. The tanks were Jettisoned. ^-^"J^^y^^ ^ their rlBht tum but
BLUE Fllsht descended A3 the flight closed, the ,4IG3 |^ayed in pn^^^^ ^^^^^^^
before BLUE FUcht could get ^^^J^"^!* held^on pass at BLUE Flight,
they tightened their turn to the right, to start a neaa «n
At this tl»c BLUE 1 concentrated hla attack on MIG lead while BLUE 3 concentrated
his attack on KIC 3< -
AS the «rcs continued to tum right Into BLUE Plight, the flight had to reduce their
left hand turn.
When th. HIO, reached about 5-6000 •"Sf.^^'^ ?. "otTavf "a'ton. .
At firing BLUE 1 va» .Imost head-on ",f =/"-V;l!3 JJe^nsil' to "y ?o "reaK up the
BLUE 1 .is stralsnt and level In l-e/JJf '.^S^":'" "J Jjr.a hid gone high In their
s?;* S5'2S« 2j=ei5irg''iuih^irai ^s:/M?ir iz fui... ?h. »i..u.
ballistic and passed 2O0 feet from the MICs .
A, the HIC. had turned, BLUE 3 had a 'ln.?I„M?"ti. ^ii'"^^^!t''^.^
d..„i! 'r;-gh?nnS^?;:JtU ^^^ii i^^i^rf k^°i^\x.i^^\T7,'^^^''
S:?n tr«Sng tS. HIO. well, a. the, cloMd to about 1000 feet.
The HlCa passed Oy very ralpdl, Hlthln 300 feet of BLUE PUght. A. they pasaed.
BLUE rsa« ihlie s-jKe ulth a pink eMt tr.Ulng fro. one of th. HIO..
At firing BLUE 1 had the sight "'/"-."JJ^^j^n^d aPoul1oo'rSS.rai°?hrSlo!"'
sLS ; ^i^t^s'a^th%^!l^?"roo?'diL.«'r•dl«."'r3^,^^^f^^ .-*i th. of firm.
Mas enough to cover the MIG.
.Kich^srr-oSU r ti,^ 'tJui vzi
.lr=ri?t'5lhSrtReT'^He-?^en'^fu.VroMU^^^^
reversed to the left, rolled, and broke for the deck.
The only aircraft BLUE i saw were about a -die behl^
that the flight was not In a good posture to turn after the hiqs ana luex
flight egressed.
BLUE 2 and 4 did not fire.
Event III-237
UlrcMft Involved: Three ?-105Da vs six MIG-lTs
Result: Two HIC-17s daiojeed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«13'«/105****E
1. PRtHARy MISSION AND TACTICA!. SITUATION
Date/Tine: 13 May 1967/1617H
Pour P-105S (BLUh; FllRht) were part oV a 20 aircraft strike force attacking Yen Vlen
Railroad Yard (JCS 19.00). The other flights of this force whlnh encountered MIGs were
those described In <ivents III-236 and -238. The MICCAP for this force was provided
by the aircraft of Events IXI-232 and -233.
2. HISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight departed Takhll and Ingressed to the target overland. Egress was via the
reverse route.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
MIC«17
Silver
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCQUmTER
Weathtr ; Scattered cumulus » clear below clouds.
BLUE
Altitude ; 6000 ft
Heading : 325"
Speed : Unknown
Fuel State : Unknown
Plight Formation : Unknown
5. INITIAL DETECTION
While egresslng BLUE 1 sighted a single MIG-l? at 12 o'clock, who made a head-on
pass at the flight.
6. ACTION INITIATED
The' flight continued on.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
About one minute later BLUE Plight saw three KIG-17s and BLUE 1 attacked one of
these, firing his cannon. Although BLUE 1 had to break off his attack when threatened
by another MIC-17, the MIG was damaged.
Later another MIC-17 fired rockets at BLUE Plight without effect.
BLUE Plight also saw a MTC-17 crash, and another In a descending spiral, and saw a
MIQ attacking the number 3 aircraft of Event III-236. BLUE 3 SOt on this MIG's tall and
damaged him.
8. ORDNANCE '
(No. flred/No. hits)
Cannon AA
20mm Rockets Remarks
BLUE 1 1/1 ^^'^ (janasjed
BLU£ 3 1/1 One MIG damaged
MIG 1/0
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Expe rien ce :
■—^ Total P-105 Combat
Hours Hours Missions
BLUE 1 5800 350 30
Event 111-237
n. DATA SOURCE
Hessaggs. Reporta ; 355TPW UV^OOZ May 1968 0?^KJ--i DOTC-0-11CB5
— 355TFW 131«56Z May 1966 Q?Hr:r-3 DOTC-0-1 l!iri9
355TPW 13161": Kay I966 0I>REP-3 DOTO-u- 11690
12. NARRATIVE OESCRfPTION
After hitting the target BLUE 2 became separated from the flight.
While ejtresslnr the ta-Ket arsa In the vicinity of 2 1° 1 3 " N/105*"t1 ' E at l6l7H, at
6000 ?2 alfuSder'DLDE 1 slchte. one MIC-H C'lG 1) at 12 o'clock «I0 1 made a head-on
pass at co-altltudc. MIC 1 and bLUE Plight continued on their respective headings without
firing.
BLUE Flight continued on a 325=" headinp: for ^PP^?^!"'^' 'llj""^' "Jf^^^^
105«'3'»'E BLUE 1 spotted three X10-17s (MIG ?. 3. M In a C^'^^^^^J*'^^ *'^^Vo.S^«L
10:30 high position at 8000 feet altitude, BLUE Pllsht w^is at the MIG's 6 o'cloclc.
BLUE 1 positioned himself on the number ?/.IC (tWG 3) and f^fn firing. BLUE 1
flrel froT, loOO to 'too feet ran^e. with an angle off of ^0- at MIC 3 » 8 <> '"^""y
hlBh. BLUE 1 was forced to breal^ off the attack on «IG 3 when the number 3 MIG (MIG «)
threatened BLUE I's 6 o'clock position. BLUE 1 claimed da-ia.:e to MIG 3.
BLUE Plight continued on course, Jinking between 6C00 and JOOJ, '["^^^^^^'f! -blJ? 1
^w- ,.7^AT.il^ 7,r 5i<»^r>">i/iQ';«'?0'E one MIG-17 (KIG 5) atteinpved to fire rockets at bluc 1
f'fioi ^heJr'r l'Zcl\ll posulon.° TLVockJta fell short and dropped off without
threatening BLUE Plight.
m the area 21°38'N/105*28'E, BLUE 1 saw one KIO-17 In a ttescendlng spiral. The HIQ
crashed Into the ground. This waa GREEK I's kill of invent ia-233.
, ^^,„ icoDM RFM- 1 "iiff^nted a KIC-17 (MIG 6) closing on GREEN 3 of Event
TTT ^''cSlEi 3 was Tft'^tSo otLr So^nt; one of';.hlch was trailing white smoke.
SiiSi Pgot Jnto flMng posUl'n on «IG 6 and fired one good burst, observing hits, before
NIG 6 broke hard right and was lest from sight.
BLUE 2 «w another HIG-17 crash In the vicinity of 2l»3'' ' V105-2B'E. This was
OREEN 3's kill of Event III-233.
BLUE Plight had received «IG warnings prlcr to their J^^^^
tact with the CAP flights in the proxlailty but did not request support.
^ Event 111-233
Alrcral't InvoU'..'«l: Four K-105s V3 seven MIG-17s
ViclrM'.y Of Encounter: 21° 19 ' N/105' 35 ' E
1. PRIMARr MISSION KHO TACTICAJ. SITUATION
Date/Tine: 13 "-y lK'7/l*--js' ^
. > -.r-f -V 'ore* of I6 aircraft attacking the Vlnh Yen
Four F-1053 (bu:- rW^t) v-r.' part of •» "^fj^* .^r.^ oe-cr«bcd in Events
Amy Barracki (-:s ^-.-'-J.^^^e -.V.;:^: = uini;' ...iw.' r'. Tor thU mission, i.le
JJJSJ; rnW--. r^U.r^nftaU f»*U of UI-W. -231.
-238» anJ -230.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Wtp.t •''lr>35.'''"'-«."«"S'T!;!3'S?SS o°ve?Un.
target froci Channel 57 iree event i..-c3J). -te-o -a- up i.iu ^
for re/ueling.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P.lQ ^D gt.'JK I. 3
€ - 750 ItJ bcT.as
2 - 450 eal tankj
I - Am-93
1 . QRC-160 poJ
Canouflar.vd
P-106D 3L'J£ 2. "
6 - 7'>0 lb bona 3
2 - U50 -ral tanks
2 - QRC-iCO cad
»fin«i7
Silver with red smr on fujel-.^e *
Drop tanks
4 FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
y^eather: Scattered cunnl.s with fc.oes at about 10.030 ft. clear with <sood visibility
below clouds.
BLUE
A ltitude ; 15.000 ft
Heading ; 300'
Speed : -50 kts
5fS^:.M-n. Bf-''l'-?t^wa". a dive starting a bonb run. BLUE 1 and 2 were
FlJfTht Forr.atl-n . B-.-^--^Jt ^a- -"^ ^„ distance behind. BLUE 3 "
JSIItheJ (BLUE was only several nundred feet away from BLUE 3).
5 INITIAL OETECTION
The fllsht'had heard 'MO call-s and were looking for MIGs. BLUE 3 saw two KIG-17s at
low altitude as h<e started to roll-In.
6. ACTION IHITIATED
BLUE Plight Ignored the MlOs and continued the bor.b run.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPHENT
At various stages of the bcn:b run. Individual ncmbers of BLUE Plight encounterea
"'""'"'iE 1 was attacked by a sin,ic yn-17 durin, P^^'l^-t from the target. The MIG
fired at BLUE 1. and HL^J- 1 escaped ty breaking for the deck.
^ „, „t- ■> 11 MT"- t-na b'T.b rvjn but the first MIG he saw was one
th.. puU.d ;rS=rof'ni:"rS"H''o-4;5ci"- ii^ I nr.. at the «I. but no Mts were
Observed. m fi>^ saw two m^G-ITs following himself and BLUE
Ourl.v his dive on the target, HLJE i ,r.° t ^ > „..».,^h«i- rt iif ■» "pa-i q o'clocV'
Immediate IV thereafter, three HIC-Ha ir. tral- o.err^hot DLUc 3 .ron 9 o ciock
high BLUE 3 then saw' BIAiK attacking some MlCr v;.inn .o ,o.n ..In.
BLUE 3 for ecress.
281
Event III-238
6. ORONANCE
?Qtm
Cnnnon
BLUii «• 1/0
MIO 3
9. EQUiPHkNT PR09LEHS
None,
10. AIRCREW COftHENTS
Kxpcrlenee
23/37mm
Cannon
1/0
Remarks
170 rounds
Several hundred rounds
Fired at BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
CoHT'en.ts on Th
P-105
Hours
200
700-800
Combat
Htsslons
*5
60
Remarks
Kncounter
BLUE 2 - Tf.e swltctiology prevented switching from air-to-ground to alr-to-alr, con'-
sequently he had no sight. He would like a minimum of switching required to 50 Trom
air-to-ground to alr-to-alr like a gunslght with trigger actuation.
The M-61 cannon Is a better alr-to-alr weapon than a rocket » due In part to th« low
altitude of the engageisent.
The SIDEWi;{!)£R Is llMited by "g^s" and therefore not too useful In this environment.
BLUL 3 - The MICs which attacked during the bomb run were sufficiently distracting
to cause the bonhs to miss the target.
The flight Integrity was lost (BLUE 2 and it left their element leads). This pre*
eluded successful attacks on KIOs in the target area after the bomb run was complete.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project ^ Interv * rws ; BLUE 2, June 1967; BLUE 3» June 1967
Hessa.Tea, K<»corC5 ; •
388TPW 131201Z May 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 1657
388TFW 131308Z Hay 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 1658
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTtON
BLUE Plight proceeded to the target In a gaggle. Inbound, MIO warnlnca were heard
which indicated were In the target area. The HIGs were first encountered by
the menters of BLUE Flight after the bomb run had commenced. Since each member encountered
MICs at different tines &nd were separated from each other, the actions of each are de-
scribed individually.
BLUE 1
During pullout from the target, BLUE 1. observed a single sliver MIG-17 (MIO 3) at
5 o'clock level, approxlrately 1500-2000 ft away. HIG 3 w firing at BLL'E I. BLUE 1
then rolled over and broke right and accelerated away on th^ deck, losing MIC 3.
BLUE 2
As BLUE 2 was bottoming out from his bomb run at about 1^500 ft altitude, heading
northwest at 550 kts, a single HIC-17 (MIG ^) pulled out In front In a clisib. Although
BLUE 2 had heard BLUE 3 call MIGs during the dive bomb run, this was t:<e first MIG he saw*
NIG 4 was at 11 o'clock to BLUE 2 and about 2000 ft range and filled the windscreen.
BLUE 2 did not have tlr.e to switch to air-to-air, so with a fixed ploper depressed
for bosiblng, BLUK 2 fired at MIO I*. BLUE Z gues:-"!! at the lead necessary' and fired 170
rounds but none -.ere observed to hit. MIG rolled left to fen almost inverted altitude
a.'jd dlvi»d for the ~rcund heading west, ^^hls was the last BLliE 2 saw of MIO k, BLUE 2
retained his tanks throughout the engagement.
BLUE 2 saw another MIG-17 during egress.
BLUE 3
Wh
Icc/ced d
He 3tartlnp his roll in to the target froT. 17,000-18,000 ft altitude, BLUE 3
down anJ caw two IlIG-lTs. The KTGs were at a very low altitude and were In the
target area directly underneath BLUE Flight. After setting up his dive, BLUE 3 looked
eround to ch*:-ck ELUE * who was on the right. At this time, f.LUE 3 saw two MIC-173 (MIG 1
•r.nd 2) comlnc down at the sa-Tie dive angle as BLL'E 3 and li. i:iG 1 and 2 were not gaining
on BLUE 3 and and were at BLUE 3*3 4-5 o'clock position. 'Jhe MICs were below the plans
282
I
1
I
i
1
I
i
3
i
i
3
Event III-238
of BLU!: 3's flifsht path but were back far enouf:h to be above BLUE 3- Althouf:h MIG 1 and 2
were rollfwins: the bcnsb runs, thpy were not In flr'r.K position and were not a threat.
Since thcr-j wsa another fllsht of P-1053 behind bL'JE Plight, the MIGs could not maneuver
to attack BLUE 3 and " without coning under attack.
As BLUE 5 looked back to acquire the target » he saw three more MIC-17s (Ml'f 5, 5, and
7) In a level turn at his 9 o'clock. As MIG 5 pasaed ui.dfernoatn, BLUE 3 felt that MIG 5,
6j and 7 could make an attack on QLUE 4. All three MIG- overshot and when BLUE 3 looked
back, he could not rind SLUE 4.
After rclllnE ovpr and lookln»; for BLUE k, BLUE 3 acquired hln as BLUE H wa= going
after some MIGs. BLUE 3 then went or. and r^rlea.Te-i ordnance on the target. Due to the
discractlcns caused by the MIG attacks, BLUE 3 drcpoed his ordnance a little lon^ of the
target.
BLUE 3 did not see the NIG attacklne BLUE 1.
On pullout from his bomb run. BLUE 3 took up a heading of about 030 to pick up
BLUE *i. BLUE 1 wns attacking a MIO at this time. In front of BLUE t, BLUE 3 observed
two siore MI0-I7S followed by two P-1055. These F-105s were followed by two nore "IC3
who were In turn followed by two more P-105s. [BLUE 3 suspects th*3e P-105s were from
Takhli.]
After BLUS 4 unsuccessfully attacked the MXG, BLUE 3 Joined on him, and BLUE 3 and t
egressed up Thud Rid^e, Joining BLUE 1 at the top. They then came back across the delta
In a formation for egress.
BLU?. '-i
During his dive bo:sb run, BLUE 4 observed MIG 3 attacking BLUE 1 and went after MIG 3.
BLUE k fired on MIG 3 but no hits were observed. MIG 3 broke off to the right. BLUE t
then started after another HIO-17 that was in a descending left turn. MIG 8 went Into a
steep dive at 4000-5000 ft altitude and BLUE 4 broke off. He then was Joined by BLUE 3
for egress.
BLUE Flight saw no AAA or SAMs during this mission. The MIGs seemed to Se aware of
the target area and were orbiting there, waiting for the strike force. The MlG attacks
seemed to be well coordinated.
2B3
Etrent X 11-239
Aircraft Involved: Four P-*Cs »s 16 HIG-lTs
Results: Two MIC-17s destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: SO^IS'B/IOS'OS'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlne: 14 May -^fir/Between l605H and I625H
Pour P-JiCs (blue: Flight) were part of the CAP escorting a strike force of P-lQ5s
fron Korat which was attacking JC3 31. CO, fcur miles scuttiwest of Hanoi. The other strike
force, from Taichll, was attackln,^ north of Hanoi. Th" strltce fllKhts which encountered
RICs were these of nvents llI-cUl, "2^2, -243 and the other CAP flight which encountered
NIOs are the aircraft in Event 111-210.
There were the normal B-66 and IRON HAND support aircraft f.or this mission.
2. MISSION RO!.'T£
Departed Danang and refueled on WHITE ANCHOR. Pron aerial refueling they went to
Channel 9?, from there direct to 20*59*M/1Q5*'*8*E, then direct to the target area, then
direct to ZO^SO'N/ICS'OO'E, then direct to IS'IO'IJ/IOS'SO'E and then back to home base.
BLUE 2 missed aerial refueling due tc an incorrect vector, since he egressed with another
rilSht (Event III-2>to} and recovered at Nakkon Phanoin due to low fuel.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
p,llC BLUE 1. 3 P^UC BLUE 2. >i
2 AIM-9B H AIK-9B
2 AIH-7E k AIM-7E
1 SUU-16 gun pod 1 pod
1 ClRC-160 1 6oo-gal tank
2 370-gal tanks I 370-gal tank
BLUE 1 IPP on, TACAN receive only
BLUE 1 had no gun camera on the aircraft.
WIC-17
Afterburners
Dull silver
Red stars on wing tips and fuselage
Quns
At least one with missiles
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTFR
Weather ; Tops 3iOOO to 4,000 ft In some places; visibility good.
en's
3"
Altltude ; 19,000 ft
Heading : 075**
Speed : 500 KTAS
Fuel State ; (12,000-13,000 lb Internal tanks)
(1,000-1,500 lb external tanks)
Plight Formation : Pod; element on the zlght.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE Plight heard MIC warnings when they departed the tanker. The lead F-105
(Event III-241) flight called the CAP that KIGs were at 12 o'clock low. BLUE 3 called
bogeys at 9 o'clock. BLUE 1 then spotted two F-105s outbound being chased by four
MIC-17S, in two elesients.
«. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 and 2 jettisoned tanks and started to attack the one eleisent of NIGs while
BLUE 3 and 4 started to attack the other element and Jettisoned tanks.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The engagement separated into different parts, each fought by an element of BLUE:
Plight.
BLUE 1 and 3 lost the element of MIGs as the MIGs turned away. BLUE 1 and 2 subse-
quently fired two SPARROWS and some 2Cein at two other MIG-17S. BLUE 1 then successfully
attacked another MIC-X7. In dodglni; the explosion BLUE 2 bcc::se separated and egressed
St?parately. BLUE 1 then fired an AI.*4-9 at another MIS and followed with a gun attack
but was out of ammunition, and egressed.
Event III-239
BL'Jh 3 and t flrvJ an AIH-7 at the HIGs without success. Another attack was nade on
another .'•;iG-17, anU t l:<.'i another AIK-7 without succt-sa. BLUK 3 then selected another
HIG-i7 and attacked «ltn the gun, scoring a kill. BLUE 3 and H then egressed.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. Flred/:Jo. Hits)
SIDEWIHOHR SPAPPCW
AIH-9B AIM-7E SUU-16 Cannon
BLUE 1
BLUE 3
MIC-17
MIO-17
1/0
2/0
2/0
3/1
1/1
Soviet
ATO[.L
2/0
1/0
Rewarka
One Mra-17 killed. BLUE I uaea
all of his 2Cmm ammunition.
One MIG-i7 killed.
Seen by aircraft of Event III-2'<0
High angle off.
9. CQUIPNeNT PROBIENS
BLUE 3 had an cuttcard tanic that would not Jettison.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
EKperlenee ;
Total
Hours
Hcurs
Ccmbat
Missions
Remarks
BLUE I
Front
I15OO
250
63
Back
360
93
11
BLUE 2
Front
2900
350
72
Back
60Q
330
Consents on this
Encounter:
First mission In Route Package VI.
Two years In P-1053.
BLUE 1 - Front
The MI'J pilots were aggressive and good.
The KIG that SLUE I hit did not see him.
The MISs usea afterburner freely, as seen when nhey passed across BLUE I's nose.
When In trouble, they would go to afterburner and descend into the cloud deck.
Looking at the radar scope will not permit dete'Jtion of the MIC's movements In
sufflelent tir.e to follow him.
Never had a chance to shoot the SUU-I6 alr-to-alr before this encounter.
Some ZQ!rm were wasted on head-on passes. The tracers that they got later will help
a lot. Would like to have had a lead -computing sight.
The SUU-16 was a very good gun.
The tackseater was used for lookout, much the same as a wlngman, slnct the frontseater
who was flying wing had to pay too nuch attention to flying In order to stay with his lead.
The SAM was shot at them when they went up high, which could account for the fact that
the HIGs did not follow then up.
The enemy appeared to use the P-H's IFF to sort out the F-fs from the MI0-17s.
The second AIM-7 failure to guide could have been due to being locked on the
ground clutter.
BLUE 3
The initial WICs that were seen were probably vectored to attack outbound elements
of the Takhll force.
The MIC-17 ta-.**.lcs were good. Missile capability is degraded by tne low altitudes,
because the radir -"jr.ds to lock on to the ground return. An IR missile with a good
caoablllty again" a hlg.^-g target would be best. The SPARROW system has suffered
from reliability fusing problems. The AIH-7 Is not the answer to this environment.
The kills with the gun mode could not have been made with a missile. The MIC-21 kills
by missiles have heen due to the MIO-21 climbing awa;; against a clear sky, giving the
missile a good target.
The SUU-16 was a very good syctem.
2B5
Event I I 1-2 39
Conancnts on Overall Experience ;
BLUE 3 ^ .
The "C- model P-* U limited in station capability Since ?P?"*r*tS
pairs It 13 iSpcsalble to make an Individual station Jg^"'
Slrcraft. Lack of nlnor Items such as cannon plugs have complicated making the
modifications.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
BLUB 1 and 3, 22 June 1967.
Messages :
366TKW 1U18CCZ Kay 67 OPREP-3 JPCCO PASTEL J»63 (Pt 1)
UeTVA lUlBOO: ^ay 67 OPREP-3 JPCCO PASTEL ^69 2)
366TFW 1808302 May 67 OPREP-3 OCO 00157 (Sections I and 2)
366TFW l^llOOZ May 67 OPREP-3 DCOI fti*3
Utter-Raytheon OLD 0413, 15 May 67
II. NARRATtVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight -as trailing the strike force, to provide coverage. BLUE PUgh^
««• first alefted to the presence of MIGs In the targe area t>y * M.O -^^J-Jf ^jj^^^j^jj
fro- the agencies for HTne /iG c2 s i^re ci^se to
KorS?S'MS:^2ii:r-rSr"JSi':e;?:"the crufcontmued an t... wa, to the
•nsagenent .
Tn the ensulnK encounters l6 MICHs were seen by members of BLUE ?ll8ht, "^ea
of whSh SJre Jnglle" E?ght KIG.178 were seen by BLUE 1 and 2. and an additional eight
ll BLUE 3 IS tS. MIG fngagenent permitted the strike force to attack JCS 31.00.
At 1605H While ingresslng 2000 r«t above IntfJfJ 'J^JJJ I^lzJu^'TSSMIoi
BLOE Plight heard MIGs being called by the lead F-105 flight (Event n.-ZOl). xne .hub
Mre called for 12 o'clock low, coming under.
. '""fh^i^'■°s^^re"^ilrhfs'' Hue r?h:rcauef ioge^ri:^; inj^cr!:w"nrind?ai:r-
J^r^^fel 1h rwe're'ili5!*-At'thts\l?rBL^^^ Jas at 19.000 feet altitude, about
500 iClIs (ioO IAS) neadlng 01-.= at 2C'U6 -N/lOS-Oe'E.
wriP wiiffht turned left, and BLUE 3 recognized the bogeys as two P-105s. which had
aDi,ea?tf siiJf? 'ro^tJe dllianSe. It was seen that the two F-105s '""J*"**"'
IhrtSuially were on a reciprocal heading to BLUE Plight) were t>«l"S Jj, J^JJ
;iw-17s in tio elements of two aircraft each with the elements separated In trail by about
one mile .
BLUE 1 and 2' selected the lead element of MIGs and called th&t they would attack
them anf continued a left hand turn to engage. BLUE 1 and 2 Jettisoned tanks.
BLOE 1 and U chose to attack the rear element and from t.hls point on the battle was
f«a»h? KcarSely The actions of all meabers occurred within a 15-mlle arc, north^ and
i«t of "o'uS'N/iOS-iS'E; over land enclosed by a horseshoe bend in the Black River.
Plrst Element - BLUE 1 and 2
a. miiE 1 and 2 dived on the lead element of MIGs (MIG 1 and 2) , the MIOs reversed
^ J!e P-?05s and turi^ ?nto BLUE 1 and 2. The HlGs made a diving left turn; and aa
SS JSJnJd Jnslde of i and 2. they passed head-on and were lost from view as they
«nt«r«d the cloud deck.
The HlOa operated close to the cloud deck throughout. Due co the alt""^«
««mtal!» in tS general area, BLUE Plight did not descend beneath the cloud layer.
BLOE 1 and 2 then pulled up to the right to exchange airspeed for altitude. On
Peach?if 7J0S feet. bZuE 1 saw Numerous «G-17s In the area. At this time the other
night of P-fte (Event III-240) Joined the battle in the general area.
The P-105S continued on to the target and after striking the target, egresaed back
through the battle area.
Prom 7000 feet altitude BLUE 1 saw two «IC-17s (MM 3 and «) in trail at 2 o'clock
low snd made a right diving turn Into MIGs-
After maklnK the first pass at MIG 1 and 2, the subsequent engagements were the
resuU o^ BlSe ?s;Jectlng a^HIG and attacking. He attempted to pick |
n he cnuld with the backseat attempting to attain a radar lock ^0^^* SPARROW shot.
SLSto** color blended with the clouds, making larg^ separation difficult. When the ,
ITos lml llilr ^iTcT, they turned Into BLUE 1. resulting m a high rate of closure.
By the^tme a lock could be achieved, they were Inside minimum range.
BLUE 1 Obtained a boreslght acquisition on . 3 . 1°^^^^;;^^ Sji'fl? U I'illl^
» .^-1, Th. missile was launched from the MIG 'a 4 o'clock, with MIG 3 at 11 o ciock
SS'SL-:-r!E: J£Se i Sai arioo liiloJJ true airspeed, .nd 6000 feet altitude, pulllns 3g
266
/
r
I
■ ' _ ^
Event III-239
In a rli'.ht turn an.! had 150 knots overtake. 7he fU: war, at :000 feet altitude, and the
track crossing angle was 110 dep;rt-e5. BLUE 1 oad Interlocks out, linear polarity, and
^ wide gate, he was tJlvldlng his attention botw.-en th? radar scope and the HTG and was
1^ visually estlroatln.: the lead. The CPARROW w:ts flrfl at one and one-half miles range,
- and the nlss.Ue select Ughl h.id been on for 10 minutes prior to arming.
The nlaalle went 3tral»:ht for th»» frrour.d and failed to ^u^de, dropping quickly from
sight. (The OPREP lioS^OZ May 67 Inalcacps that, th': mlssllf was launched In a clutter
environne.it, at ar.prcx Inately nlnlrr.un ranpe.)
Bl.U.'v 1 contlr.jed his attack on MIC 3 and switched to the gun and fired one burst at
the MIC with no results. The MIG by this tirr.e was at a rar.^e of about 1500 feet, and had
tlghteni'd his turn tc the rlsht. When he fIrel.feL'.E I was In the MIC's forward quarter.
The KIO passed tenoath bL'JE 1 and 2 and duckt'd ln-3 the cloud deck. The altitude was at
I 4,000 to 5,000 feet.
BLUF 1 and 2 then elinbeO again and when level at 8000 feet altitude spotted a
single MlO-17 (KIG 5) at 2 o'clock low, heading south. SLUE 1 made a rl.tjiit diving turn
Into the MIG and at 2 relies out acquired a lock-on In boresight, and then switched to
a full systems lock — iriterlocks out. With the MIG at 12 o'clock, about co-altitude,
BLUE 1 fired another SPAPaOW.
At firing, BIVE I was at U*;! knots, and 6500 feet altitude, pulling g's. MIG 5 waa
at 6000 feet In a level turn. SLUE i was at UO** angle off frcsi the ^■:G so the pass was
a quarterlnc head-on. Altho'igh th° scuroes e'-'-'^? iOO knots overtake, the geometry would
Indicate that the actual ^loslnB; v.;l,;clty was nuch higher (j.ore like 700 knots). SLUE 1
attempted to fire with the act centered. The niissil*; did not guide and dropped out of
sight. There was conslderatjle grcund clutter and this could have contributed to the
missile not guiding on the intended t?rget.
BLUE 1 and 2 continued to press cn after MIC 5, and BLUE I fired a long gun burst at
MIC 5 as It crossed beneath hl-n In a steep right Lank and the MIC was lost from view
before he crossed the bullet flight path.
" BLUE 1 tried to keep his airspeed atiove 300 KIAS and stay at high speed and execute
J high-g pull ups. 3oth front and backseat were looking around for enemy aircraft and
possible 3A.V5.
Although the :-:iG3 engaged by ELL'E 1 and 2 kept turning, they were unable to set up
: a complete wagon wheel pattern as BLUE 1 and 2 were able to break out Individual (lIGs.
• , After firing the second SPAHHOW at "IG 5, r.L'JE 1 pulled up tight tc try tc get behind
' the .XIG after the head-on cass. In dolr.g so, his speea was reaucec tc just at 300' knots.
BLUE' 1 then saw a >:Ij-17 (MIG 6) comlnj; In with a scod angle off. 'M(: 6 was flrlno; cannon.
BLUE 1 tightened his turn and let the MIG overshoot. BLUE 1 then reversed, and unloaded
and went to afterburner. As soon as BLUE I started to accelerate In afterburner, :<I0 6
broke off. (Although not seen by BLUE 1 this nay have been the MIC which fired two AA
Elaslles.)
BLUE I then climbed tc 3000 feet and sighted ir.ore :aG-17s (MIG 7 and 8) In a spread
i formation turning right at 2 o'clock low, and 3000 feet away. BLUE 1 reversed and
started a right turn with the HIGs, who were in a 60" bank. BLUE 1 seleeteo MIG 8 and
'* started to close cn him.
BLUE X had a fixed 25 mil depression on the sight. This had been done so that the
top of the ring could be used for ml&slle firing plpper. Therefore, SLUE 1 estimated
; . the required lead and with the MIG at about 30C-35C knots and BLUE 1 at ^^50-^00 Knots
(about 150-200 knots overtake). ELUE 1 started to fire at 2500-2000 feet ranc;e, over-
leading; the MIG. SLUE 1 planncl to let the sight drift back across the KIG-17 hoping
for the bullet stream to rake thrcugh hlr,. As BLUE 1 closed co ICOO feet, still firing,
the MIG started to tighten his turn. As SLUE 1 clcsed to about 300 feet range, and was
ll
1
\ .
Just at the point of breaking off the attack, he saw the MIG fill his windscreen. He
then saw his shells hit rlaht behind the canooy and flares break out. The vJC exploded
almost innedlatelv. Mo chute was observed and The oosltlor. was about 2no?7 'M/IO?" 20 'E .
^) As the MIG exploded BL'JE 1 reversed and went hl?h, and reversed -iicaln and turned around
the MIG. As the MIG descended, It broke In half. BLUE 1 lost contact with his wlngnan
While avoiding the debris.
BLUE 2 saw EL'Jhl 1 pulling lead on MIG P but 3L'JE I was pulling so r.uch lead BLUE 2 |
, felt that perhaps ?Lb'£ 1 did r.ct se,* the MIC. During the attack, ELUE 2 moved high and -
out a little. When ELUE 1 broke, he went under 3Ll£ 2'3 ncse and as ELt.'E 2 turned aside f
}•■.. from the exploslcr., he lost contact with BLUE I. BLUE 1 and 2 achieved raalo
and ascertained thnt they were not in visual contact. BLUE 2 immediately Joined another
flight of F-Hs and continued with them through egress, eventually recovering, at -lakon ;
Phanom due to BINGO fuel.
Phanom
While calling fcr BLUE 2, SLUE 1 spotted another single MlG-17 (MIC 9) 10:30
o'clock low. The MIG was In a level left turn. BLUE 1 dived to the left to slightly
Jbove and trail of MIG 9. and with a good tone, fired a SIDEWINDER. (BLUE I had only
SIDEWINDER missiles left.)
287
mm
288
i
i
Event Iir-239
The SIDEWINDER -as fired from 3500 to "000 feet ran^e with a good tonrr. However, tnz
BlssUe passed brMnJ and beneath the MIG by 200 feet rtue to excessive g s about
The missile -as Ir.i^nchea Tron the KIC's 7:30 position. BLUE I -as at ^00 "tnots at 7000
feet altitude nullLtu- The Min was at a'jcut 7500 feet and was at about 20 angle or..
A good tone was caialned and held far two sfcond2 prior to launch.
BLUE I continued In for a p.un attack, :>cUnr. that he had a better attack_on this ; \
MIO, since It was felt that the ;-5ir, did rot =^e bL^J- 1. BLUE 1 '"oj ''"^ ■'g: i
jo-Cced for separation and cane down on the sa.-re MIO's tall but slightly above. BLUh^l 9
attenpted to fire his fun from ?CCD feet cut but Jlsccvvred that he had •»P«"^ * L Lrt
_v ..e. -. .V . ^1,-- a <TT?'.«.vTf:nPH nttaek. Although he naa
i
1
attenpted to fire Ms fun rrom ^luu leet cut ov.l -.iawi.v.,-» v..«- ..^ ..-^ — harf
the ?Onn ar.iur.lti.'.r.. SLUE 1 was then tcc close for a Sir.EWi::DER attack. * I though he had
plenty of fuel ar.-! one SIOEWIfJDEH left, he did rot have a wlr.snan. Therefore, blue. i.
crossed over tne KIG and broke In the opposite direction and etjressed.
At this tln:e KIGs were belnij called on the egress route and BLUE 1 decided to ^eep
some ordnance In case he was attacked during egress. As BLUE I egressed he called BUUfi 3
and 4 tc Join hln on the outbound track.
Second Eler.ent - b^L'JK ? anfi ^
When the elern-^nts of BLUE Flight split. BLUE 3 and t began to pursue t?*
elenent of two wr.lch were initially at BLUE Pllgnt's two o'clock position, lo». turning
from right to left. BLUE 3 and U rolled around and in a tlRht descending left turn
JlSghJihe MlCs as they crossed and obtained a 6 o'clc^k position on J^*/"J^^"« "^2 "f^^ ^
the element of two. BLUE 3 attempted to ctstaln % radar locK In boresljrht. As they rolled J
iS! lire 3 and 5 jettisoned tanks! One of BLUE 3's wing tanks failed to Jettison and It ^
renalned on (with fuel In it) throughout the engagenent.
The MIO Inmedlateiy broke down and to the left, headln? for the ^eck. The MIG was at ^
6000 to 7000 ?eet initially, and slnoe BLUE 3 and the MIG were below '0.000 feet and with
bLSI 3 liokln, down on the MIC. BLUE 3 was unable to get a loc. and as f fl^^/^^^^li^ ^
mlnloun missile range, he fired a SPARROW In the boresl^ht r-.ode^ ^^J^, f ill
go but never saw it come out from under the nose of the airplane. At i?""'^^. J^J^f-^ _
it 5000 to 6000 feet range and about cc-altltude at 2000 to 3000 feet with the MIG who was m
at BLUE 3's 12 o'clock. BLUE 3 was in a 3-^« turn with ^50 knots overtajce and the {J»
appeared to pull about 5-6g. BLUE 3 pressed in. turnlns and t-ockiRf the HIG. BLLE 3 W
attempted to fire the gun but could not reach the gun switch. The KIO tightened his
turn and disappeared frc-n BLUE 3's view.
BLUE 3 then pulled up Into a hl?h speed yc-yo and rolled oyer and J!'^ '^J"
at 9-10 o'clock 30W. BLUE 3 and u dove to engage In alr.cst an Identical attack to the
flrJt one. In bcreslght mode, BLUE 3 (back) was able tc attain a radar J^^"
craft MS equipped with a switching device which auton-.atlcally switched to full system
after a bores Ight lock-on.
BLUE 3 th--n fired another SPARROW missile which like the first, was felt to leave the ^
ulreraft but was unobs-rved In fllrht. At firing BLUE 3 had a full system lock with
?in"ock3 ou? T^e MiS -as at BLUE 3's 12 o'clock In a left turn aPP^rently pulling
5-6g'J? IlSe was also in a left turn at «S0 knots. UOCO feet altitude pul a ng 3-Jg's. -
He wascloslnc in on the MIO at 100 knots and the range was about one mile. The MIQ was y
at a track crossing angle of 20<» with lero angle off.
Both SPAr^ROW missiles were fired at low altitudes where radar interference can cause
the system to break lock or to shift lock to the ground.
After firing the SPARROW, BLUE 3 pressed Ir. r.aklng an increaslng-g turn and again
did a high speed yo-yo and rolled out at 7000 feet aitltuoe.
BLUE 3 immediately saw two mere KIC-17s in trail at 9 o'clock low in a left turn,
SOlng BLUE 3 and 1. BLUE 3 set up for a gun attack at this tine.
All of the HICs seen were *n a big left hand orbit. It was not certain If B^lfE J
fired on the sane MIGs more than once, however, he had the definite imprssslon that he
was looking at a new group of airplanes.
As BLUE 3 and 1 dove left to attack, BLUE 3 noticed a thirl r4IG-17 trailing the
arevlous two by about 3000 feet and chose to attack this one, to keep .rom getting J
sandwiched between the trailing KIG and the other element. W
BLUE 3 started a yo-yo and a right barrel roll to position himself on the third MIG-
At the top of the barrel roll. BLUE 3 observed a SAM to cross from east to ^"t and ^
detonate approxlnately 1 mile away. BLUE 3 had no warr.lng and took no evasive ac-lon but a
continued to attack the MIG, *
As BLUE 3 Dr»s5-->d In from 6000 to 7000 feet out, the MIG started to tighten his turn.
Then JhelilG feSe^sed to the right. SLUE 3 reversed with the MIG and pulled 150 mills of
leM a^d opened fire at 1500 to 2000 feet rar.ee. At firing BLVE 3 had about 100 Jtnots
iJ^?take aSd almost 90" angle off. He fired a 2 to 2-1/2 seecnd burst and as soon as the
s?artc3 shSl^e he s!w fire coming off the KIG BLUE 3 PHirirS" -"ed
lead and was not shooting in front of the MIC as he had ^• '^-'Sht. The bullets Imp... ^
in the HIC's midsection causing fire to burst frcr, the fusca^:-. The MIO started burning
on the right side about the wing root and aft along the fusrla^.e.
i
i
Event
To keep rron overshooting KLUE 3 'Jl'i a high spec! yo-yo and observed the KIC at
? o'clock lo- still na-:lr:P., but in coritroUoJ fllEht In a nose low level descent. As
BlSe 3 rolUd ?n for another- .v.tu:k and as he pa^sert nhe MIG he sas flanes also con n?
from the eft hand sl'io of fLiselage. At that tine the MIC burst Into massive flanes
fr«M eo-JcBlt a!-r obscur'n.- the tall. ?h- r-SIG rollel hard rl^ht 135* and pitched down,
J:ro"«Stro!. anfprs^c^^^^^^ tfie un-iercast at ^000 feet «SL position 20«5«« 'N/lOSne'E.
BLUE 3 Is credited wlrh a conrirned kill.
At the same tlr- bVjL 3 saw another vertical tno'.ce trail from a crashing MIO-17
approxlTately ? miles east.
BLU*:^ 3 ai-'d 'i cllrrLie'l to feet and looked down and saw a 5lni;le P-J» (BLUE 1 of
Event III-?'"') chaulnr. a rilG at fairly slo*< speed. The MIC was weavln? back and forth
and the K'i was observed to fire three ntsslles at the KIO. Mo other HIGs were seen.
BLUE then reached BINGO fuel, and BLUE 3 and U egressed at 1?,000 feet and ns knots
Indicated until they were outside of the Sfy. defenses.
At one tine durinc the er.gager.ent BLUE 3 saw a MIG at 6 o'clock to an P-J "ho/"
firing missiles at a HI': m front of the F-*. BLUE 3 watched the trailing WIG fire for
several seconds, ELUE 3 cuspecio she KIO fired out. The MIC was not closing and was
firing out of ran?e. Thv 'MG siored no hits.
BLUE 3 saw another MIC and an F-'" go by on one of the tlaes when BLUE 3 was firing
but he did not pay much attention to them.
All of the HIO encounters of BLUE Flight occurred between 1605 and 1625H.
d69
Event III>2i»a
Aircraft Involved: ?our P-«»C8 vs 10 HIC-17s
Results: One XIG-17 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'SO-N/lOS^ZO'E
K PRIMARY MlSSlOlt ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: Ik Kay 1967/16UH
Po.:. (BLVL FlUht) -ere P^«/{„^^^ve'nf Mr^lS?""-." Tt'ri!;: Tl/c^f ;?S'th«:
other CAP flUht's actions are described In Event -II-Z39. siriKc airer»
of Events III-2'*!, -2*12. -2»»3.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE PllBnt departed Danang and refuelled on WHITE AKCHOR Fro.^^ ?S^SJget tSen
to Dan&ng.
3. AlRCRAn CONFIGURATION
BLUE a BtUES BLUE-.
? S SlISl tank 2 3:o4al tan. 1 SOO-gal tanjc
1 ^TO.zal OBD tank 1 SUU/16A gun pod 1 370-6al tanlc
i wtlto pod I QRC-160 pod 1 QRC-160 pod
Camouflage paint
HIC-17
Not "D" model, shiny silver
At least one had nlsslles
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: 6/8 cloud cover bases at 1000 tops" at 7000 ft. vlaltlllty 10 miles.
BLUE Plight
• "-13.000 r.
Alrsceea: 525 KTAS
i^uel 5'£^tg : Unknown
Plight Forrnatlon : Pod
5. IMITIAl DETECTION
Qrrp 1 h-ar-H vTG call from the F-105S. but did not see the MICa. (They were enaaged
by the F'is\!i i;en"lII-239') He'lhen sighted four silver MIOs at 11 o'clock low and
two more at 11 o'clock level.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 Jettisoned the centerllne tank and chose to aetac;: the four MIQs. When gatting
within B-"* miles they were positively Identified as HIG-178.
7 SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
n.w MTr. -Ar*. In a waeon wheel formation. Bt.UE 1 fired two SiDEWINDERS at a MIG but
it turS'ed"^! ;hrmi»h:TlSs:5!*'BLUri and 2 attacked another MIC and -ere subsequently
attacked brt«o more MIG-17s. which fired eX BLUE 1 and 2.
BLUE 3 and K attacked these Mi:s with BLUE «» firing two SICEWINDEHS without results
and BLUE 3 a??er.pt?nrto fire a SIDEWIUDER which did not leave the aircraft.
3LUE U lost the MIGs and then BLUE was fired on by a KTG. but was able to lose him.
*««^v,.r MTG nulled m -ront and BLUE it fireO a SIDEWINDER wlf.-.out success. At the same
JJme |[ue1 SSf«nsasea"??Sm I MIG at .his 5 o'cluck. BLUE 3 a:.d i* then egr.ssed, following
a flight of F-1D5S.
BLUE 1. after the second engasenent, saw a MIG-17 at the U:30 position and at.acked,
firing two SPARROWS, one Of which hit the MIG, resulting in a kill.
Shortly thereafter i SAM was fired at BLUE 1 and 2, and Just after the burat BLUE I
engageS another MIgIiT and fired two more SIDEWIHDERS but they missed. BLUE I then fired
ripARROW but it too missed, and BLUE 1 and 2 egrcssed.
290
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE ft
MIC- 17
MIC-17
MIG-17
Event 111-2*0
(No. rire':/Ko. hits)
SPAHRCV
3/1
5:r-Fwi:;i:EP
_
1/0
3/f
R enarkj
One AIM-7ii
1/0
I/O
1/0
EQUirHiNT PROBLEMS
BLlTt I'f. radio Ma.a r.ot j>;e:-a*-lr.p. corr-jctly ind he did not recslvi the MIC calls from
the otht-T fllr.nt .Terr.Sors.
10. AIRCREM COMMENTS
Combat
SLUE 1 (Front)
BLUE 1 (Back)
260.1
63 missions; was a ^10
In P-893 m ADC.
First RP-Vt Klsslcn
CorTTTients on t^.is Encou iter:
BLUE 1 ,
and U all fel". t:
r.r.at the SUU-16 would have b^en r.uch more effective against
tne MIC- 17s than any of -.nc -ils.il 1-3,
BLUE 1 felt that they cculd not ^et set up for a head-'^.i shot.
The HIC'3 wagon wheel was efT-.^ctlve as a counter to thtt R^lsslles but It was purely
a defenslv • maneuver. It Is si;tj^cc ^c attack' with a B;un, however.
Need a nisjllR with sho.-t .T.lrjl.T.u!r. rar.^c.a.'id can attack a tariref lea.neuverlng at 5
or 6 g's.
BLUE 1 r«ir
chance to use it
11. BATA SOURCES
tr.at. Willie a .-un woultl be '
;?fnl a.-el,
the r^.loSl
a KIG-17 he uculd no:
CO aeai with tne i'.IG-
-t a
Intervlevs : 2LU;
Mesr.ageij, Reports :
3o6Tr-t' l^i^^lCZ y.2y 1967 OPr.EP-3 DCOJ ^^8
356TF'.V l-llOC^Z y.sy 1^-67 0?P.E?-3 DCOI i^t2
366irw 13.:=30Z ."ay i?67 0?r£?-3 DCO-G 0153
Raytheon, letter, Old C*J13 15 May 1557
12. NARRATIVE
BLUE Plight was If-srcssln;: to the ta^aet area with the strike force, soaeed between
the rii^Rts o? event 111-2^2, -2«3. Atout b .T.i:e£ fron the target, at 17-13,000 ft altl-
';ude, 525 KTA3, heDdln^ 070° In fa-j forr.a*. l3n , SLoE 1 happened to loi'K down and his acten-
ticn 1*35 drawn by several silver fia.vt;c-5, wnlch '■jn ;lc3er look appeared te airplanes. .
Due to the silver aol.^r tnoy w:;."e i.r.ned lately assu.T.ej to be .'-'IGs. The'"e were fcur MTGs
at 1.1 o'clock low and two more iC il o'clock level. All of the ."IGs were atter'.piin?; to
enpicge the strike force. .
PLUE Flli^ht l.Tinedlately dived tc er.»ai^e the fo-ir low MIC3, and after approaching to
within 3-I1 T.lles, BLUE 1 coula ':ot ermine that they were MIG-173, In a left hand crfclt about
1,000 ft above tne cloLid tops iatcut 6,000-7 ,000 ft .'-^SL). BLUE I estimated there were at
least 10 I'lIG-lTs In various pcsltlons In a left hanJ SeO" turn. Vhlle the .MIGs were In
the pattern, they were puilln?" 2-3 i'/s. No director aircra«*t w-;re observed. On seelr.;?
the HIGs, GLUE 1 dlti not Jettison storec, because h» had already Jettisoned the 60C-gal
tank. He kept the 370 on throughout. rL'JE Fil.-.nt positioned at the 6 o'clock of the four
KIG-17S, but tr.e ."ICs each oroke In a separate clrejtlon. SLUE 1 selected one of the ."'lIGs
(MIC 1) for his attack.
BLUE 1 closed to 3,50C-ft rar.^e
•nlasiles In nlr.l.r.fiTi tl-e, Atout tr.<?
a rraxlriu-;-^ -.ar.ei: ver . The XIJ tjrr.>?d until E-L.UE 1 could 5ee a plan view of the MZG frcTJ
7. 0 top, iind tr.e 'M'j was 50'^ to BLUE i's hcadin.-:. .Both missiles apnarently did not f^uldfii
i.-.j .T.lsseiJ, passlr.^ off tc tne rear of me MIG , ICQ fr to 50C ft away and level.
At flrlnir, cI.UE 1 had a falr-to-j—od clssllo t-.n^, and ho hold tne tone for 3 seconds
prior to launch. He was at 3^0 r'.IAo. at 5,000 ft altitude, p;Ulln;- ; c;, with the MIG also
at 5,000 ft. liLUE j h.tu nz overtake and was .ir.i-lt -^ff from the MIG. BLUE 1 had r.ct
achi'?ved r7ji:-:r Ice;, v.'h'^n he flrt.".: the misciies. 1: :-r« was cloud backr.round with reflection
which co'ild have contributed to tne inlsslles' mis-.
;lth the :ar3;et 30* off the nose and fired two AI"-9B
.ire of firlnr, the "IC ^1,-htened his left hand turn
291
1
I
3
J
I
3
3
a
£vcnt I£I.*2.itQ
As the nls::lles nl^seil, bLUZ 1 Pll,-ht started t;^ execute n hltrh sp^ed yo-yo reposition.
^ on the other Ml'Jr. , mho still ralnt.ilneJ tr.o left har..: "waKion-w.teei" pattern.
-V^ BT/JE FlUnt rolled over the '.'.r> and ?o:ltlcn'.'d ihenselves bc-hlnd another single .>!T<j-1,7
(KIG 2). Thtf tl.re was r.ow iCl^:!, nnd tr>e pocitl'M v^s within iO mlies cT Lead 39 .SA^? olLe.
The entire en^a^er-ent took place In 3 iO-r.lle ra llu:. cf this site.
BLL'E 1 at:d 2 atte.ipt-i to po':!tion cn y.in i, '.nd 'M.VK 3 and movcJ to a p-DRltion aborjC
2,0CO fr out and :.:/,fi. 'AIG 2 rolled and .llveci Int the cloud aeck ani cantact was loct
[BLUE 1 felt that he could have fired a 3i;u-l6 iur'.np th.s time as he h&d gocd pofltlonj.
While SLL'E : and 2 werrr chasing MIG 2, fcLUE 3 and U otserved and calle*: out t>:o
KIC-17S {yilZ 3 ani :>) wno w- re rraklr^ a desc*'rdln? hard left turn to position cn 2LuE I.
SLUE 1, due to a ridlj rr^alf ir.ctlon, did not hear '.!\3 calls fron BLUE 2, 3, and Both ^
MIG 3 and H were flrlna; cannons.
BLUE j and ^ atter.ptec to position thencelves "r. XIO 3 and li and BLUE * fired two
AIM-9B3 at MIG 3 who was at 6 o'clock to nLUf: 1 hr.i firlni?. These slsailes did not appear
to traclc ani were not ctservtd as;aln. The rissl.es were fired out of pararneters with no
tone in an jttenpt to dls'.ract 'AICj 3 from BLUE I'a till. The alsslles were fired asainst
a dark cloud and ^r^und baclc^round.
Miu 3, apparent , fired nut and slid tc th» cut side and ahead of BLUE 1. At this time
BLUE 3 with a good ■. ne trl^Kiered one Al"-9B tut the claslle did not leev- the rails.
At this tlr:e ' u was cn the tall cf BLIT-I ? a.nd flrlr.R. BLUE 2 broke down 8nd left,
and went Into the c ud snelf and then eaT.e bd< k out an top. The MIGs had now dlstppeared.
BLUE 2 rejoined on .^'E 1 at once.
Also at thlc • .T.e, the pllc-t In BLUE U saw a MIG-l? (y.lG 5) at his 7 o'clock. 2,GQC ft
ran$e and closlns. :!IG 5 ''as flrlr?, and closing with the projectiles p&sslni; the t.-p left
side of the cano;:y -.bcut 15 ft distant, BLUE « uiilDrfled, went afterburner, broke dawn and
then back up, Jlnkl-.g. When he leveled off at 12,C3C ft, vi": 5 was gone.
BLUE 1 Irmec lately saw another MIG-17 (MTG 6) In a left tirn, then pulllnj; up In front
of hln. 3LUE rir--'d one AIX-vB fron the 'MZ's 7 C clock. 2 ,0Z0 ft hl?h, 2,500 ft range
with a weak tone ar ' a cloud 13 bactrgrcund. The nlsslle care off the rails but Its flight
was not obaervec. i^LUE i felt that If ne had hac a £UU-i6 he ecu 12 nf.ve ctitalned a ijcoU
position to use It this :'IC . ] The MIG broke l'»ft and SLUE Joined BLUE 3,
Wh'le BLUE " Kas nttcnptlnsi: tc dlrenia^e fron MIG 5, who was on his tall, SL'.i 3
observed still another MIG-l? (KIC 7) clos'lnr on hla 5 o'clock frost about 2,000 ft ran&e.
«IG 7 did not r- and BLUE j disengaged by turning Into MIC 7 anc going to afterburner.
BLUE 3 an-i ~ -.hen Joined up at about l6l3H, eld a 360° turn and proceeded to sost
strike refueling, fcllcwln? a fll^^nt of ?-;05s. BLUE 'i was at BINGO fuel at this time.
After br-jaklr..- off their entace.Tient with HIG 2, liLl^E 1 and 1 visually acquired a lone
MIG-17 C'lG f: In .1 left tarn at 11: 3C o'clock, 2,3C0 ft hlirh and 3,000 ft distant. With,
boreslsht acqulsl.lcn BLUE 1 locked on and thr bac.cseater switched to full systeir.. Inter-
locks In. The radir scope showed a "break X." BLfE 1 pulled the trigger about three tlrres
but nothing rapper, fi. He then went to Idle power, becajse he surnilsed that he was Inside
mlnlnun ran?*,-. Af'-?r openini? slightly on 'AIG 8, BLUE 1 fl^ed '.wo missiles In salvo at
"R mln." One mlsrllo went straight ahead and did not guli-?, tie other SPARROW guided
nicely and l.r.pacte- cn tr.e right wing root of MIG 3.
BLUE 1 and KII 8 were In a level, left hand turn during the attack with both In a 30*
left bank at 5,00C ft altitude, pulling 3 s's. KIC 8 was "O" of:' the nose of BLUE 1 and
both were at about 350 KIAS. At firing the track crossing angle was about 2C", with zero
overtake.
The missile which failed to r-ilde passed to the target's 6 o'clock position about
1,000 ft away. T;-.- missile which -jcored the hit was observed by BLUE 1, to go straight
out and then break left from the outside of the turn to explode near the right wing root
of the MIG-I7< '-'I-j 8 burst into flame and pitched up about 30°, stalled out, and des-
cended t£ll first. In a nose high altitude at a rapid rate .'nto the cJoud deck.
The tine was .-.ow about i6l6H and BLUE 1 Front and BLUE 2 Back observed a SAM burst at
their 10 o'clock lovel (5,000 ft M3L) ij.dOQ ft distant. Tt was felt that Lead 39 was the
firing site and wa^ atteriptlng tc hit BLUE Fllsht.
Juct after tho SAM burst, BLUE 1 enra.-^ed another ."IIG (MIG 9). The ."?IG was in a
left hand turn, In a bank and appeared tc be pullln.; about ^ g. At 3,500 ft range,
BLUE 1 Increased his turn to 5 1/2 to 6 ? and put the plpper ahead of the .^IG and released
g to let the KIC acne back through the slcht. BLUE 1 (E.-^t a tone (for about 2 seconds) and
with .riC 9 20* off the rxce (TCA SO") and BLUE 1 at 350 KIAS and 6,000 ft altitude with
:./2 to 1 E on the -aircraft, in a level "turn 60" bank tc the left and 50 kts apenlne, BLUE I >|
fired two SIDF.Wi:;Di;.^S . The 31 DEWI:;DEPS ruided partially but the MIG started to pull naitl- \9
r.'M e'r and pL.IleG away fron tne 3IDEV;IIJD£.'!3 r%R,ldly. Tn'e missiles passed aft of the MIG
, ^ by 500 ft, and detci;ated atoiit 2 seconds -jfter-they pasned ih-.- "10. Tiure was no clcud
IR background for t.nese firings, a.-sd SLUE 1 had a goodt^e. t«
a
9
n
%
I-/;
Event i:i-2'iO
BLUE 1 :^.n .rC. off went .0. -^..-w^^- ^^'j^^J^ ^fLiS'^eJo:
echelon rcr:-..-! '.or. . DHJE 1 "V^ed out cnu- o ^^l^'^';,^' ,rhe fir^d 0 SPAFPOW.
t^ri.c;L?':;;"r;;rci;?:.^r.r?n-:.f 5::;';^r.^^",- i^™; BLUE ,.ouc
KIAS and b.O-;: ft altlit-vJv.
I The ie vr.it oo«» off to th« rlr.nt anc «a= n^t observed araln.
! .,T^ .70 T„.« '-nllcwe-l t^-T tNro'jyh ::evor2l 3^0* turns slttlna;
BLUE 1 t^..n .n-.Ts ;"^^.:'='^^!^r^,.\:;;,'^r?, , and :.LLE I was clear, with
on the tall r:.- ;.•■•-*/; .'I rj;: 4 .,.a- -,o 5tiv Jnuile tne turn but was
j always to:- cr "'V ''r' ,v.f tam r-LUE 1 was aole to Keep position
' onlil"":" ^l^;TT,r"nr^;ir.u:;;/.^to^thrcycu^=an. W.S nut .een .rain. Tne MICs wln^an-
had previouniy -J Inaj-r. -sar-ri .
i i , The tl.:e ::cw w.c -2^^ ani BLC=: 1 and 2 aft«r c:e.rlrr the area ana observing no nore
!i i eneny alrcrart ;r:>ceed-d -iir^zM-j to post-s: rlkt: re. v... K r.,- .
S . ^t,*, YTT" w*-<»n B-rt-^n'- ^.^d contln'je'j to stay In the left
, , Thrournout the er/a^-3"ont .he ?:.r.;h:^n v.. --c r.ac::ea a.out u.OOO t't ranw,
r I' hand pat-em, Ir.r -^i -^^ '.T: s-^r-t" tc l'.o = . out at aaoJt 6 i:. Howev-r, the
■? ! woulJ cirhtt-n t.h-.- t.irn ar::: ---^ Cl;^.";/; M -w::,,;?...! yo-vo.' ^jsplce the capability
; ■ Jr?ep«^e/5nU°=:SK'?:i^ -r^^i:""'^V?r?c^;ly irc^i^nln, ..cceSsful nlsslle launch
/\ conditions due t^, the 'M'Z -r^tr.euvers .
r i . , 3ttt" ^.-^,rf.-'>r- ''IG 7, all of HLUE Fl'siht observed one MXC-17
i- prior to f^^^i/^r:':^:" a' E^- ar.>.'le into t ho cloud shelf. (One of the
Sii'' in h?;rr;U v:^*^ ^ :hi:. of white ^.c.e traiUn. the aircraft
' ; (another of the Kills cf Event HI-;?;.
' * 4v ....n.—i'-'v ^-'5H HL'JE I ?rcnt 52w ore .••nn-l? fir..' :wo ATOLL nlssllec at
At aoprox .a.ew --o^ . . ^.trai;;::: ahead and :nair.-
< : Jainift^;' ?L ''/o?'th/;io:-'7hrv::^ri.;..d.d t.rr^ts .a-ntalned a perpendicular
1 ■ ATiX pa^h 7he\?;.lle3 appeared to r.t.. -y about 5.000 I't.
I , ^ . ,,-4 a- ►he ton rolled over to an Inverted position. On lookln.~
S:n'"^:Si'br-oth;r'n:;5-l7^1;oulS^rco.ln. through and an o-t.lde roll would then
rive the F-H a favorable position on the MIG.
4 =ritF 1 ard fie OPrXr :;c-:->:^ dc not conpietely ai^ree on the order
?°-.n..r'i1 Jr^T^: o? S.1n.Vr5^.. cr:;.r_,... .... followed in ..hi. ca=e
Of its inclusion cf the otner aircraft In the fils-u.
293
I!
Event tlZ-SOl
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-105Da vs two MIC-173
Results: Ko damage
Vicinity cf Encounter: 21«00'M/105''50'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Tine- Kay 1967/cetween I6OCH and I63OK.
pour P-105 (BLUE Fn,.t) -er, par- of »3»/inriLnSi''?or«"<iSlS°r"'T,"'«S;r
ine the Ha Don/, Anty Barracks ("^^S 3i.0O) . BLUE leac. was riI-2«2 and -243.
lit-n?'. ?h. 2a? ifri?t,»"Mcn ;iprorted thl. «rr« ar, th. .Ircrat. -hose
actions art' covered in Events llI-*37 and -238.
II. DATA SOURCE
386 WW ' 141225Z May 1967 OPBEP-3 DOI l67»
12. NARRATIVE
Inbound. BLUE lead sa« MIO-178 In the target area and called HIG at 12 o'clock.
These were not engaged.
BTtiF i*ad observed two silver HIG-17» In the target area a« the flight began
egre.SiS. eiuE nirJttSmptii to attack them but had to break off when he cane under
3A-2 attack.
The SA-2 defenses were particularly »i.rong. BLUE fiiS'^J^J"'^^^'^ causing se!er«
BLUB 2 from the target area under continuing SAM attack as well as MIC threat. In all,
seven SAMs were seen.
BLUE 2 bailed out in the vicinity of 21«19'M/10«in9'E due to danase from the SAM,
and the rescue was successful.
Event III-2it2
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-i05Ds vs at least
six MIG-17S
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: About 20"53'N/105'12'E
I. PRIMARY MISSIOrt ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 111 May 1567/Between I6OOH and 163CH,
Pour F-105 (BLUE FlUht) were part of a 19 aircraft strike force frofl. Korat attack-
ing the Ha Dong Arr.y barracks {JCr> 31.00). The other strike flights which encountered
MIOs are tho=.e deacrlL^ed in Zver.t. riI-2U3 and The "tions of the .r^A "f „
support aircraft whi=n encountered MIGs are descril.--.l In Event IJI-S^O- rV:!."^?! Piir
which supported this strike are the aircraft whose actions are disclosed In Event- III-2«»C
and 111-201.
II. DATA SOURCE
388 T7W 111225 May iS6T OPREP-3 DOI 16.1.
12. NARRATIVE
BLUE Plight saw two unidentified aircraft go oown in flames In the vicinity of
20»53'N/105''32'E. One of these was also seen by the aircraft of Event III-2U0.
BLUE Plight also observed tne five KIG-l7s attack the IFOH HAND Flight (Event III-23?)
as veil as a dog fight between MIC-17s and F-tCs at 20«»52'N/105°12'E.
4r ».
295
Event 111-213
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105D3 vs two MIG-2X*
and four MIC-17s
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20»50»H/105»20'E
fron BLUE 1.
BLUE flight saN one unidentified aircraft go dovrn in flanes and they put the
location of their sighting at 2l»Q0'N/105»32'E.
296
3
3
3
3
\. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 1* Kay 1967/l6nH.
o-..- e inR (MitF Pllfht) were oart of a 19 aircraft strike force from Korat aicacK-
Pour F-105 (BLIIE Flight) were Par^ * y atrlKe flUhta which encountered
Ing the Ha Dong Amy Barracks (uCS 31.00). '^^^^^^^^^''^if^ actions of the IROM HA;'JL «.
and III-ZUi.
n. DATA SOURCE
388 TPW 1«41226 May 1967 OPREP-3 DOI l67'»
366 TFW ItUOO May 1967 OPFEP-3 DCOI uuz.
12. NARRATIVE „
As the strike force appr:.ached the target area two :^IC-2l3 ana ^^"^ "J*^
.«en !j BlSe night but these pcsed no threat to the force since the P.«3 on MICCAP
3
3
seen oy ouuft lugnv uuu v>ivi><^ y^^^- -- - ^
(Events lIl-2'«0 and III-239) Inaediately engaged ..en. A
BLUE flight Observed three SA-2s in the targ.v area. One of which passed 100 feet ^
0
a
'I
B :
0
3 •
_ .J.
Event III-2*t*t
Aircraft Involved: One P-105P and three P-105D8
vs four or five MIS-lTs
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter; 20«53'M/10i»««2'E
1. PRIHAitV NISStON *H0 TACTICAL SITUATIOJi
Oate/Tlme: m May 1967/l6l*H.
Four F-105 (BLUE FUcht) from Korat -ere providing IRON HAND support for a «rllce
against JCS 11.00- The strike fUgnts which encountered HISs ^re the flights In E/ents
II1-2U1, -21? . -2Ui. The CAP support fliehts which encountered HIGs are those In
Events Ill-^yi. -J**';.
2. MISSION ROUTC
Departed Karat and «ent to Channel 97 (probably with alr-to-alr refuellnft). After
departing Channel 97 went overland to the target area.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-IO^P BLUE 1
2 • ACr-t-^S
2 * CBU-211
1 - 650 gallon tank
P-IOSD BLUE 2
2 - AGM-tS
6 - 500 lb bombs (MK 92)
P.IOSD BLUE 3
6 - 500 lb bombs (MK 82)
1 - AIK.9B
BLUE ^
6 > 500 lb boRbs
MIG-17
Silver
Tanks .
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Some cumulus In the area. Good visibility.
BLUE
8. ORONAKCE
None expended.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None.
297
T 2 3 ^ I
Altitude: 8-10.000 ft .
heading - 230-250 degrees
gpeed- 550 kts. accelerating
jgnr ' 9-10.000 Xbs I
Plight Formation ^
BLUE 2 and ft in front of BLUE I and 3 by about 2000 feet and 500 feet below BLUE 1 j
and 3. i
•5. IHITIAL DETECTION \
BLUE Pll>iht had Just launched SKRIKE missiles at a SAM site and had completed a |
wing-over to the left, when they saw 4 or 5 MlG-17s making a descending, head-on pass. i
6. ACTION INITIATED ■ 1
Tne KlOa quickly passed through the flight and two of them turned to position on ♦ j
BLUE 1 and 3- ' }
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHEtii 1
BLUE Plight continued to accelerate and the MIGs could not close to firing position. j
10. AIKCRCU COHHENTS
Experience
^ Total
Hours
BLnE 1
Pront 1500
Back Unknown 100
CoMwents on this Encounter
BLUE I Front surmised that the MIGs had been tryln? to follon then through the
SimiKE launch and did not catch up until BLUE Flight turned.
The F-H HIGCAP certainly nelped out, even though they were somewhat separated from
the F*105s-
Amazed how quickly the Kia-17 could turn around to follow them without Icalng much
speed. The turn rate of the MIG-17 was amazing.
The speed and acceleration of the F-i05 was a saving factor.
Felt the PANSOMO radar was directing the MlOs. The FAMSOMG had opportunity to* fire
and was illuminating them, but did not fire.
Comnienta on Overall Experience
Felt the QRC-160 pods did a good Job, although they are not used by the IRON HAIXD
aircraft unless there is a SAM launched. While searching, the pods are not operating.
This is due to the fact that with pods operating, the electronic gear that is used to
locate the SAHs is blinded.
If you can see the SAM in time, it can be outmaneuvered.
The IRON HAND aircraft are Jumped by MIQs because of their role and the fact that
they are separated from the strike force.
U. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 1 Front and BLUE 1 Sack, 6 June 1967.
Messages. Repoi^ts ;
388TFVI IU1230Z May 1967 OPHEP-3 001 1675.
388TFW 141225Z May 1967 OPREP-3 001 l67t.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Flight had detected a SAM site at 21»0i<»N/lCU°i»it'E which was giving high PRP
at 2-1/2 rings Intemittant activity. «-hen at 20''53'N/10ti» u2 ■ E at l6llH, SLUE 1 in a
50 degree loft, launched two SHRIKEs, one with a white phosphorus and one with a high
explosive warhead. BLUE 2 launched two SHRIKEs also. At launch, BLUE 1 and 2 were
heading 355 degrees at 16,000 feet, and ^00 knots, and were 12 miles slant range from
thw site. BLUE 3 and H were on the right in fingertip formation (BLUE 2 on the left).
Immediately after firing, BLUE Flight executed a hlgh-g wing-over to the left,
and descended to gain airspeed. During this maneuver , BLUE 2 slid to the inside and
ahead. BLUE 1 lost contact with the flight momentarily and the first one he saw was
BLUE 2 so he Joined on him.
On completion of about 130 degrees of turn and still descending BLUE 2 and U were
out in front of BLUE 1 and 3 by approximately 2000 feet and below them by about 500 feet.
BLUE 2 with BLUE iJ on the right bottomed out at 8-10,000 feet and 550 KCAS and a heading
cf 250 degrees, and slightly left of BLUE 1 and 3.
At this time four MIO-173^, In a diving pass from 11 o'clock passed through the
flight. The MIGs were silver in .-olor and no markings v/ere seen. Small drop tanks were
seen by BLUE 1. The HIQs came through almost head on and quickly passed through the
formation. The MIGs were seen by BLLH 1 and 3 to be in trail in a disorganized pass such
that they passed between the two elements of BLUE Plight.
The first two MIGs turned into the flight and ended up In trail 2000-3000 back of
BLUE 1 and 3, with a slight negative overtake. BLUE 1 obser/ed the 3rd and Oth MM
to roll Inverted but did not see them after that although they could have been going after
BLUE 2 and U.
No firing was observed from the MIGs.
BLUE Flight continued to accelerate and Join-d In a defensive fingertip formation
and egressed at 8000 feet altitude headin.- 26o degrees.
OPREP states 4 or 5 MIG-17S.
Event 111-244
P-105
Hours
Combat
Missions
900
15
15 background
Event Ill-Sit
On «elng the MIGa . BLUE PUsht Jettisoned ^^IjJ^O gallon tank and ^ jStt^Jo^d
started to turn behind the flight the remaining ordnance (IB HK 02 DO...05;
at 2C'*53'N/10i4''42'E. . .^^
Although the BULLS EYE system was In effect at J^J* "T? ' "J^^i^^rJSJSfJerH Iny
for the area in which the flight was operating. Ho X-band signals were recexvco ^j,
tine.
I
L.
299
Event ril-2ft5
Aircraft Involved: Two P-8Es vs t«o NZG-ITs
Result: Two KIC5-l7s destroyed
YXclnlty of Encounter: 'Jnknown
I. PRIMARY NISSiON ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 May 1967/ur.lcnown
BLUE Flight (two F-SEs) were providing TARCAP and were covering strike aircraft's
departure fron the target. Aircraft were based on CVAs at YANKEE STATION.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-8E BLUE 1. 2
SIDEWINDER (AZH-9D)
ZOmiu cannon
5. INITIAL DETECTION
An k~us called that he had a HIG on his tall. BLUE 1 sighted the HZQ. At a later
time, after BLUE 1 and had rejoined the strike group, BLUE 2 observed a HIC-17
naking a pass on an P-8 aircraft ahead of him.
C. ACTION INITIATED
In the first sighting, BLUE l broke downward and commenced tracking the MIQ, In the
case of the latter encounter, BLUE 2 called a warning and engaged the WIG,
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 fired an AIM-90 at the first MIG. The missile did not guide, but apparently
caused the KIC to level his wings and break off his attack on the A-^i. The MIG commenced
a turn as BLUE 1 fired another AIM-9D. This missile detonated Immediately behind the
enemy and severed his tall assembly. The MIC rolled inverted and dove Into the ground.
In the second encounter, BLUE 1 fired 20ma! and the HIG broke off his run on the P-6.
BLUE 2 fired an AIM-9D which did not guide. BLUE 2 continued to track the MIC, firing
20ara and finally two additional Ai:j-9Ds. Both of these last two missiles impacted In the
tall of the MIG. The entmy nosed over and crasned.
8. ORDNANCE
<Ko. flred/No. hits)
SIDEWINDER
AIM-9D 205OT
Remarks
Plrst missile failed to guide.
BLUE 1
2/1 Unknown
BLUE 2
3/2 Unknown
11. DATA SOURCES
Messages ; CTG 77.0 OPREP-3 191103Z, May 1967
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
As above.
300
Event 111-216
Aircraft Involved : Four P-8C3 vs one MlG-17
Result: One KIG-17 destroyed
Vicinity cf Encounter: Unknown
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tls:e; 19 May l^Cl /unknown
BLUE Flight (four F-£Cs) an flak suppression mission. Aircraft based on CYAa at
YAKKEE STATIO;:.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-8C BIVF. 1. 2. ••i
On- aircraft carries ZUMI rockets and SIDEWIHDERS {AIM-9D).
Conflsuratlon of rest of fltgSit unknown.
4. INITIAL DETECTION
One of BLUE aircraft was pulling out of a ZUiJI rirlng run when . MIC passed In front
of hlra.
6. ACTION INITIATED
The BLUE aircraft which sighted the MIG turned and comnenced tracking.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE fired an AIM-gO which olew the tail off the KIO. The KIG crashed. There was
no ejection observed.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. flred/!Jo. hits)
SIDEWZI.'DER
Ai:-'-9D
BLUE
11. O.^TA SOURCES
Messages :. CTCI 77.0 OPREP-3 191^*03Z, May 1967
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
As above.
'4 b-
Event ril-ZH?
Aircraft Involved: 'f*:o P-8Ca vs tMO Hia->17a
^» Result: One NIG-17 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 20**lO*K/105°30'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 May 1967/inornlns
BLUE Plight (unknown number of P-8Cs) providing TARCAP for Navy strike In the Hanoi
area. Aircraft based on CVAs at YANKEE STATION.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-SC BLUE
SIDEWINDERS (AIM>9D}
ZOm cannon
5. INITIAL DETECTION
En route to tar^-et area a MIC-17 was sighted directly behind an A-6A. In the target
area one of BLUE Plight observed a MIG-17f low, at hla 6 o'clock position.
6. ACTION INITIATED
In the first sighting, two menbers of BLUE Plight turned to attack the MIC. In the
sighting in the target area, one mecber of BLUE Plight maneuvered to attack the MIQ.
7. SITUATION OevCLOPMENT
One of the two BLUE Plight members who attacked the first MIO fired two AIM>9D
missiles plus ?CiRin. The MIC dove away and BLUE Plight proceeded to the target area. In
the case of the latter XIC, r.ne of the SLUE Plight perfomed a high yo-yo and maneuvered
behind the MIC. He then fired an AIH*9D at a range of kooo ft. The MIG exploded and the
pilot ejected.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE
(No. fired/No.
SIDEWINDER
AIM-9D
3/1
hits)
20mm
0
11. DATA SOURCES
Messages : CTG 77.0 OPP^P-3 191 ''03Z, May 1967
12. NAitRATIVE DESCRIPTION
As above.
Event 111-248
Aircraft Involved: Two A-6A8 vs three HlC-Zla
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20*15 'N/105*25 'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dftte/Tlae: 19 May 196? . llOOH
11.
12.
DATA 5;0URCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
P***** °^ '^^ strike ?roup, egresslng froa target area at
10. 000* af-er weather abort observed three ^.ICs far belcw; estimate MIGs were
12°''^°"*' KIG broke upward, passing In fronc of flight; flight Jettisoned
MK-82 and proceeded to coast out point; no further contact with MIGs.
30L
i
1
1
3
I
i
a
a
a
a
1
a
a
a
a
Event III-2*(9
Aircraft Involved: Two A-UCs vs five HIGa
Kesults: Sighting
Vicinity of Encpunter: 20"59'N/lO5*'26'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Time: 19 May 1967, 1530H
II. DATA SOURCe
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
IROSi HMID flie:ht from Kitty Hawk observed five KIOs of unknown type very low
In valley; no attempt to engage made.
Event I I 1-250
Aircraft Involved: Three F-ttCs vs one unldent
Results: Sighting
'vicinity of Encounter: 20"H0'H/104"30 'E
I. PRIHAkY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 May 1967, I63OH
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12.' NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
ECM escort flight at 31,000* observed a silver A/C; unable to distlnwilsh
type due to altitude.
' Event I I 1-251
Aircraft Involved; Four F-lOSs vs four HIG-17a
Results: Slating
Vicinity of Encounter: Kep A/P
I. PRI^'ARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 19 Kay 1967, 16«J1H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. KARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike night observed four MIGs over Kep airfield; MICs apoeared to be In a
traffic pattern and In the process of landing or takeoff, at an altitude of
approx 2500' .
303
tvent 111-252
Aircraft Involved: Eight P-UCs vs twelve-fifteen
MIO-173
Results: Pour Hic-lTs destroyed and
one P-iiC lost
Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»20»N/l06'25'E
1. PRIMARY NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Osts/Tlne: 20 Hay igST/from 1629H to 161»0H.
Eight F-<iCs (BLUE and OREEH Flights) were providing MIG CAP for a strike force from
Takhli, which was attacking the Sac Le Railroad Yirds at 21*31 'M/j.06'26'E (JCS 1079 and
IBS'*). The flights of the strike fcrce which encountered MIOs are those of Events
III-2i5»-2H6,-£i7. There was IRCH HAND and EB-66 support for this strike.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE and GREEN Plights aeparted Ubon and refueled on TAN ANCHOR, Prom refueling,
they proceeded direct to ig^OO 'N/loe^UT'E , then direct to Jl^OT'NVlOT'BS'E, then direct
to 21**20'N/lC6*'32'c, and after the engagement egressed to 21«07' N/107' 38 'E. Prora there,
they proceeded direct to TAN ANCHOR, for alr-to-air refueling, then direct to Channel 109
and then direct to Ubon.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-^C BLUE 1. 2. 3. ti and GREEN 1. 2. 1. ft
U - AIM-7E SPARROW
ft - AIM-9B SIDEWINDER
1 - QRC-160 pod
1 - 600 gallon cenierllne tank
1 - 370 gallon wing tank.
BLUE 1 - IFP-Off, TACAN-On.
MIQ-lTs
Silver, red star outlined In yellow with heavy red bar on each side of the star.
Markings on top of winga and fuselage forward of horizontal stabilizer.
No external stores.
Had afterburners.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TC ENCOUNTER
W eather ; Clear with scattered patches of clouds at 10,000 feet. Visibility was good.
BLUE CREEH
r-2 3 — 5- r-5 — 3 — ^^
Altitude: 8,000 feet
Heading ; West
Speed : 5IIO KTAS
Fuel State ; 15,000 lb - sone fuel in outboard tank
Plight Formation
Pod formation modified to give MIG coverage; BLUE Flight's element was on the right
100-500 feet high.- BLUE 2 was down about 200 ft. There was about 1500 ft between
aircraft .
5. INITIAL DETECTION
BLUE and GREEK Plights heard HZC calls, indicating MIOs at 8-11 o'clock. As these
were seen, other MIG-17s were detected at 2 o'clock. The HICa were low, and, since they
were silver, were easily seen and recognized at long ranges (up to 9 miles) against tha
dark background.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Flight went after the M'^s at 8 o'clock and GREEN Fligh': went after ciiose at
2 o'clock.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 engaged a MIG-17 and fired a SPARROW which missed. Ha then engaceC a Mia-17
who was attacklnc •Z?.EZ:i 1 and killed the MIC with a SIDEWINDER, ."earwhlle BLUE 3 engaged
a total of three H1G-17S and fired fcur SPARROWs and three SIDEWIIlDERa but achieved no
hits.
GREEN Fl'^ht att:acked the MIG -179 and GREEN 1 fired two SPARROWs acnlevln? a kill.
^JJurlng the flr*r attack, CP.EEr; 2 --as shot down by a MIG-17. JREE!! Flight was, fired upon
^ y MIGs m thr(»e separate 'nstances, as QSEEN 1 fired two acre 2P..aSCWs and a SIDEWINDER
tflthout success.
Event 111-25?
•1
V, t
I
CREEH 3 ani « i* tacked a XIG-l? and QhKb.'A 3. after firing a SPAftftOy which rlcsed,
flreU a JIIDEVir.lhi- wnl = r. kl'.lv: the MIS. 3 rut>=«fiufritiy fired three more ^IDEWINDERs
and txn s.orv Jt A!-.: -.'..'a without r.ucc«S3. GKK-i.'J ii "ifngaged two y.IC-l7a and fired two SPARROWS
without success.
BLUE and Zr.y.V.l f'H.-hta then started to vrress but OKEEJI 1 reentered the area, and
got b«low a GRiiEN 1 launched two CIl'LU'INDEHs, cnc of which hit and killed the
MIC.
8. ORONANCE
BLUE I
BLUE 3
GREEN 1
CREEK 3
GRESri it
MIC-17
HIG-17
MlG-17
MIG-17
2 MIC-17S
2 MIG-17S
2 HIC-17S
flred/!Io. hits)
3 r ARROW
AI^;-7K
1/0
4/0
3/1
2/0
2/0
Cannon
1/0
1/0
1/0
1/1
1/0
1/0
:/o
Remarks
Attemptfcd to fire one
other AIM-9B
Attempted to fire two
other AIM-7E
At BLUE 3
First pair that fired
at GREEM 1
Kit and destroyed
GREEN 2
At GREEN 1
9. EQUtPKENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 - The radar scope In the rear cockpit 7f BLUE l failed.
10. AIRCREW COMHCrtTS
Experience
BLUE 1
Front
Back
BLUE 3
Front
Back
GREEN 1
Front
CREEH 3
Front
Back
<;reeh k
Front
Back
Comments
Total
Hours
3000
2500
250
4900
31
500
3500
500
Hours
300
U50
215
80
225
200
20Q
150
100
Combat
Missions
82
85
Renarks
69
23
56
87
92
36
19
Six years In B-47s
Had been In previous MIG
engagements; two NIG
kills previous to 20 Hay;
wing commander
Had been In fighters all
of his career
One live tnlsslle fired;
no almu ror runs.
BLUE 1, Front - the elements of BLUE tiyi'A GREE:; F
ordlnatlcn was nececsary 'ind the win£ir.an ri<J lO Su^.y
to deternlne wno the elements were (whether tiLUF: or J
llCMSs vere coordinated. This co-
•fii\i\ his It ••■■nc i~pos5ltle
J'.EEN) since there wersf no marking:
305
Event I 11-252
on the ?'>is. Although they were coordinated, sometimes SLUF. and GREEH elener.ts were
worklne together.
It was difficult tj get Into SIDEWINDER firing parameters ac:3lnst ^he riIC-l7.
Used only rlnlKun afterburner so the wlngnan would have full afterburner to use to
keep up.
AlthoufJ. 5/ "3 end AAA had been observed to be used In conjunction with the MtGs In
previous ecga^ec^nts , none were used ihls OLy. Tnore were Instances In the past where
MrC-21s lured F-lC js Into SAM rings and otlier 'AtOt would attempt to lure fighters up
valleys into flak traps.
After the ra-lar dlcplay failed, SL'JS 1 no longer expected the AIH-7E to work so he
tried to use H£«T for the rest of th'; f light.
Two flight:! of F-Ua are needed to provide adequate coverage for the strike force.
Mutual support tetwtsen these flights Is necessary. The prebrlefed tactics of using the
vertical agaln.^t the M1G-L7 were successful.
Wlt^". the ;.lze of the Mia attacking force It was lsip03Slble to work as a flight. At
best, they wer - left with coordlr.dteil eler.ents. The wlngnan stays with the element
leader and doesn't attick unless instructed to do 30 by the leader. A .-.Ingl- aircraft
or a three-ship flight is In a daneierous situation ir. this type of battle.
The chaff carried In the speed brakes helped against SAIIs. If SAH:; were guiding.
It forced the Mghters down to the deck and Into flak. There were recorded cases of
SAMS guiding at 200 feet ACL.
The MISs are getting more aggressive.
BLUE 3, Front « by keeping his speed high, he could effectively fight the KICs.
Commur.lcaMons were a prsbleir. since t.hL^ backseater and the wlngnan missod several
rails by BLUE 3, Front. BLUE 3 had trouble communicating with the baekseater due In part to
both tenseness and noise on the radio.
GREEN 1, Front - the turning ab.' llty of the KIO-17 Is fantastic. It nuat be seen
to be believed.
Ther*! was a lot of nol-'j on the radio.
The :!Ij-]7, when used as It -.ds this day, is a more forsildable opponent than a Kla-21.
The MIG pi lot J were respected and nust be. We must know the capabllltlss and advantages
of our air-craft.
The cour.ter to the MIG's wagon-wheel defense requires coordination and timing between
two F-i* nights, with each of the flight's elenents operatln? ar. a coordinated pair. By
coming In low and ccr.lng up at the wagcn-wneel (which can be done In those areas without
flak), a coordinated pass with one element keeping the MIGs busy should permit some MIGs
to be broken out of the circle.
As long as the MIGs stay In the circle they are very difficult to attack. If a
tangential attack is made from outside the periphery, the MIGs can break Into the attack,
turning Inside of the V-H, If an attack Is made by cutting across the circle, a MIG can
easily get on the tail of the F-c. The attacker cannot go to the inside of the circle
since this is usually ancnored ever their home base, with corresponding dense flak.
The Hl:3-17 wagon-wheel is strictly a defensive maneuver against the P-''. However, the
MIGs could use a low flight In the wagon-wheel pattern, and with n high flight for attack,
have some offensive capability.
The addition of the gun on the F-t would complement the missiles. It could be an
advantage at low altitudes and close ranges. However, the gun is not a primary weapon.
In som: cajes, achieving the parameters for a gun shot, would permit attack by the MIGs.
The MIGs are growing more aggressive. The HIG-21s on the second of January (Event
III-52) were not the problem that the MIG-17s were this day.
Due to MIG attacks on IRON HAND Flights, the IRON HAND Plights are now getting CAP
support. However, the F-^ cannot get roc close to the IRON HAND flight due to the ECH
pod interference with the GAM detection gear.
The P-105 force is better protected since the F-1Cj5s started to bunch up In gaggles.
They are difficult to protect when they were strung out.
GRF.iN 1, Bad? - the problem with a boreslght lock at I'.w altitude la x,ha.t the target
returr: is difficult to rind If the gyro Is "in" due to the pround line. However, the
target 13 a distinct blip if the gyro is "out". However, the gyro should be replaced m
to "Ui" before flrin?. The autor.atic switching to full system Is a good feature. ■*
By using the glare shield as a hand hold, and by keeping the shoulder harness lock
open, *he baekseater can pull himself out of the seat and see well back towards 6 o'clock.
3 ♦
3
3
3
3
S
3 •
3
3
0
3
S
^ G5-;F.EN I* - Initially the fights of 3LUE ,.ftnd jfeEN Fllfht s started 5eparately In H
; dlff«r?nt locations. As Irng as '.he fights stayed apart, t; ? F-^i? wer<: on the defensive.
But wnen the eights merged, the three elements of SLUE and (KEEN Flights were able to work *^
306
\ t
[
?.vent III-252
to an attack, a >tIG would either cut across the circle to r.eet their attack or one wouu
come up rron low.
-The MI2 wason-wneel tactic sce.ed like a ,oo<l P-^^^^;;* J^f J^^..^ .^"rlenSid ones,
emclently. if there were a lot cr Inexperienceri pilots and or..y a lew exne. .-ncc
A w»aDon 1" n-d.-'l so -hat xineuverlnR tare;et3 may te attacked l^^l^^ JSOO-ft range.
A weapon i- n--jt j , r-r,-t ••• -i-rt tbf •nlr.lnuin ranee on the Aj.."-'*
ehunic Of spacc wf.ereln the P-t cannot actacK tn»s m-j. ^^,„„
Saie adcpJ^d tactics to defeat the ■nlscUcs. mostly by high-fi iKineuverlng.
TO nght the MIG.17. the ?-U .u3t be wor.e. In the , J^^^Jf Je'an futolllT
P-tt nust be worked In the horlzortal plane ^^l^^J^^ J?^^^^^^''^^^;^;^^^^ The crews
or training.
arite i Pron* 3 June 1967; SLUE 3, Front. U June 1967; CFEEH 1 ,
FTfnt\\ jlni\l6Ti GREEN 1. 3ack. 3 June 1967J GREEN K Front.
U. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
itJune 1967.
Hessages. Report 3 ;
8 TPW 2012 15Z «ay 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 05363. '
8 TPW 20 15 352 Hay 1967 OPREP-3 DOI 05365.
8 TFW 2102»»5Z May 1967 C?REP- 3 DI 0537? Sect. I, II, HI*
An.:-7D/E Hlssile Performance Report for CRSEN 1. GREEN 3. GREEN . BLUE 1 and BLUE 3-
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLbT. ar,d GREEN Fll£ht3 were provl^ln^ MTG CAP for a ^SJf^^rJf forcrwas'^n.resstnr
P-lO'i fllKhc-^) £LUE 1 was the HIO CAP fores cewnander. .he strike force was -n^rres^in^
p-105 liipcFj, arii^ tMio.hr un'i rivinK l*"e nbreast with the second F-105 fllc^t. olnce
as a gaggle and ELUi .«ilight ''^^ flying i-^c dores^t x
the irsreas was fron the eist (heaalnc ;:;:-i^'fo^aMc^ waf a PoS formation slightly
P-lOSs and about 3000 feet higher, .he ^^-^^^..^^^^ '^4^", ^ii-Kt wa^ to the rlgho and nigh
Th. force tn,r.».. f.-c. t.e_=uir »f Jo-Jn.-^^/'.^^^J CrrlJ«'S!te°°t5Si.1i"t!;.""
P-Us Jettisoned their oen.e. line ,3nks. as '^^^ n o'clock. Just as Che
site. The SAMs inrr.ediately stopped juidlng. amr<!PVR
At about the time th^ SAMs were seen, one o; the «f "^"e^^eencles using the B^^SEYE
warning system called "Bandits, 3ULI3EYE. loW^^ !?"re«?V^ SSSi^at lo^aUltudrL
l^-S^J^rt^f (2oJ?h5" '.lTArl!Si tlllcllll t^Saf J!Ss^:Siirbe"^SSin^it"8.n o'cioc. fro.
BLUE Flight. • o «^
The F-105 force had planned to split and hit two targets or. the Northeast Rj-l^^°ad
and thfclp'force had alsS planned to split In orde^^^^^^ S?G3'arr o • clock
'T'hese MIGs were in ORZZli I's 9-10 o'clock position.
immediately thereafter, a n^ember of 'JREEtt Flight called ^^JG:^. at 2 o'clock, low.
headlirsouth. The warning agency had n»t indicated these latter MIGs.
At this tlM the F-105a started to see HICs and called them. The MlOs at 3 o'clock
were still out about 5 nlles.
At this time BLUE Flight .-started left to attack the MIC-17s seen in the 3 o'nlock
i;/ rRc«-'frFl<cht turned rlghc to attack the KIG-lTs seen in the 2 o'clock
Sos tlo?" '¥h/-^:er;';?f to M.^ht MIg!i73 in e.ch group and. at first th. engagement.".
Ifi- rnd G?kE!} Fl rhts were sf>parated by 2-3 r^iles . The fights gradually Coalesced
or BUU- . na •■'•■^-••^ ^',rh nic^ r .T^tl-.- .•■eparately to provide Liupport to other
however, wltn the oldn^ents Ox e^cn ' ^ '■fc' '^ • 'J", "''^'■J,,^ ^K. 3io-n«'i/irk«?<;'E
elements. The enga^enents took place within a .0 :nlle radius of 21 .-0 a/lCb 25 E.
307
Event 111-252
Due to the actions which followed, and the fact that each element fron J^, Jj!*' .
was working with different elements (but not always certain of the specific Identification)
the actions of each element will be described separately.
As the P-t engaged the MlOa, the P-105 force proceeded on to their assigned targets.
BLUE 1 and 2
Aa BLUE Plight went to afterburner and turned left to attack the MIGa. the MXGs had
turned left and cUrabed, to attack the F-1053 from over the top. T^^lf P"^^^^«
BLUE Plight's 10 o'clock position, with the F-lis behind the MISs. BLUE I did not
isuaediately drop the outboard tank since It still had some fuel In It.
The MIGs continued to turn left and BLUE 1 concentrated on two MIC-17s at 10-11
o'clock. BLUE 1 locked on in the boreslght irode. The backseat then =«ltchcd to full
systen. Interlocks out. gyro out, and BLUE 1 pulled lead on the MXG and ^J^J SP*JJ°*-
The missile guided perfectly but 2-3 seconds before Intercept, the radar scope in the
backseat went blank. Although only a faulty fuse had caused the back presentation to
turn off (the frcntseat scope was still operattni?) this was unknown to the backs^ater who
then broke lock to go to boreslght and the missile missed.
BIXJE l had been descending, and he had obtained a lock on and fired at 7000 feet
range. At the time of firing BLUE 1 was at about «ach 1 at 5000-6000 feet altitude,
pulling 4 g's and closing In on the MIG at 350 knots. The angle off was 20-30
The polarisation was linear and the clutter was In the override position. The wiG-i?
was In a left turn at about 5C30 feet altitude.
Dtw to the overtake, BLUE 1 closed on the MIC and when about 2000 feet away at several
hundred feet altitude, he pulled up In a high speed yoyo, and switched to HEAT.
BUE 1 made some other passes on MIGs and during one he saw an F-H pass In front of
hln on rire. At this time, as he was coming back up In a left spiral, he saw an F-« at
12 o'clock high, completely on fire. The tall and right wing were missing anj^a;®;;^^^?*
burning F-JJ were two parachutes. BLUE 1 saw the parts of the F-4 fall but lost contact
with tbe chutes.
BLOE 1 made another pass on a NIG-17 but was unsuccessful In achieving SinEWINDER
launch parameters. BLUE l was In minimum burner all of the tine. As he worked In the
vertical (in a left turn) he repeatedly could see, many MIG-lTs, all in a left orbit,
at 10 o'clock.
BLOE 2 was clearing BLUE 1. and from 85C0 feet altitude BLOE 1 saw a single F-U (GREEN
1. reeomised since he was a single) with a HIG-17 on hln. BLUE 1 chen started ro attacK
this MIO. Before he could alert GPHEll 1. GREtN 1 broke hard left. At this tine GREE" 1
was about 1-1/2 miles away from BLUE 1. As GREEN 1 'jroke , the MIG-17 overshot. The MIG-17
made no move to reattack GREEN 1, but rolled to the right and headed straight toward Kep
Airfield. (BLUE 1 could look past the »4IG and ?ee the runway about 8 miles away, J ihe
MIG had been at about JlOOO feet altitude and was diving towaro the ground at about 30
degrees, with about one g on the aircraft, and not turning.
BLOE 1 got a good tone and fired a SIDEWIMDER. Vfhen he fired, BLUE 1 was at 550
knot . at 2500 feet altitude with one g on the airplane. He was closing on the MIG at
250 knots. The .MIO was straight ahead (0 degree angle off) at about 1500 feet altitude.
The missile detonated to the left of the tailpipe. The MIG relied o>^er to the left, on
fire, and went straight down from 1500 feet altitude. BLUE 1 is credited with a confirmed
kill.
BLOE 1 and 2 then turned left and went back up to about S500 feet altitude and returned
to the battl« area which was about 4 miles behind them.
BLOE 1 and 2 then made an attack on another MIG-17. This MIG was low, at about 200
feet altitude, and although BLUE 1 chased the MIG around, he could never get In a position
for a SIDEWIMDER attack. BLUE 1 could not get below the MIG so he could look up and get
a tone differentiation.
Uhen BLOE 2 called bingo minus SOO pounds, BLUE 1 and 2 disengaged. By this time the
MIGs were seen moving off towards Kep, ar.d BLUE 1 and 2 egressed without further incident.
BLUE 1 and 2 had not been be lew 500 knots Indicated throughout the fight.
BLUE 1 and U
As BLUE 1 and 2 dived to engage their first MIG, BLUE 3 and U stayed high and behind
for about two turns in order to provide support. After that, 3LUS 3 and 4 lost track of
BLUE 1 and 2 due to the confusion of MIGs and F-^s.
BLOE 3 and U then attacked a KI5-17 (MIG A) that was low. As BLUE 3 came in on the
HIC he was unable to obtain a lock-on so he put the plpper on the MIC an. fired a aPARRO/i
In the boreslght mcde, looking down about 10 degrees on the Ml^. The missile missed,
without appearing to guide. The MIG was In a turn. The range at firing was about 1.5
miles. CSee firing 1 of Table 1 for parameters.]
The MIG reversed his turn and BLUE 3 obtained a full systan lock. With the steering
dot centered, and the in-range light on, BLUE 3 fired his secsnd SPARROW at MlG A. The
Event III-252
t
nlaalle seeT.»f(l to guide InltliUy but missed MIG A. [See firing 2 of Table 1 fop
additional details.]
With interiocics out, BLUK 3 pulled some l«ad on MIG A and fired his third SPAR"OM
at the MIC. The missile paiisod Just behind KIC A. [See firing 3 of Table 1.1 The MIC
at this time Mas In a left d»>scendlnR h.ird turn. BLUE 3 with good overtake, then went
Into a left climbing turn above the MIG. Tlie HIC made no attempt to follow and did not
come close to BLUt^ 3, and CLUE 3 successfully disengaged.
BLUE 3 and It cane back around and rolled In on another HIG-17 (MIG B). BLUE 3 put
the plpper on the MIC and achieved a lock-on. before BLUE 3 could fire, two other F-'is
came between BLUE 3 and MIC P..
At the time that SLUE 3 and 1 rolled out, Just as the other F-'is got between them
and MIC B, BLUE 3 noticed another HIO-17 at 5 o'clock, rirlnR. DLUE 3 could see the
top of the wing so this MIG was not a threat to 'ilm but the KIC was close to tracking
BLUE so BLUE 3 and u went to full burner and started a climbing turn. The MIG started
tc follow but fell oack and was cnly a threat for a few seconds. BLJE 3 and 4 then
climbed to altitude to position fcr another attack,
BLUE 3 saw a lone MIG-17 (HIC C) and turned In on him and attempted to fire two
SIDEWINDERS. One SIDE*I!«'DEH hun? and the other missed. [2ee firing and 5 of Table 1.]
By the time BLUE 3 had got into r.inge , MIG C had neen him and had started a break. In
addition, BLUE 3 had a weak tor.e on the SIDEWINDER , The CIDLWINDER which missed, fell
short cf the MIG.
BLUE 3 and ti then broke off since the MIC's actions Indicated that BLUE 3 had been
seen. BLUE 3 and k climbed back to altitude (i^bout 8000 feet) and on checking the fuel
state, determined that they were close to BINGO, so they started to egress.
BLUE 3 then saw a lone MIC-17 (MIG 0) low and to the right. The MIG was at a very
low altitude and appeared to be heading for Kep.
BLUE 3 and ft had enough fuel for one :nore pass, so they went to afterburner a>"d turned
right and down. When he saw the MIG, BLUE 3 was between 8000 and 10,000 feet altitude and
climbing. The HIC was below 1000 feet.
BLUE 3 achieved a radar lock, and went to full system. With the In-range light on
and the steering dot centered, he fired his last SPARROW. The SPARROW did not track at
all and dived into the (ground. [See firing 6 of Table 1.]
Since BLUE 3 had a good rate of closure, and the MIG had apparently- not detected
BLUE -3, he closed slightly and descended to 200-300 feet AGL In an attempt to get a good
tone. BLUE 3 was unsuccesg Tul , and fired a SIDEWINDER against a green hill background
with a weak tone. The missile appeared to track and was headed for the tailpipe but fell
short. [See firing 7 of Table 1.] BLUE 3 felt he was In range although he does not
remember if the backseater called It out. It was indicated in the OPREP source that
BLUE 3 had a radar lock during the last two firings.
BLL2 1 then fired his last SIDEWIfJDER and the SIDEWINDER detonated to the right
of the KIQ» Just outside of the wing. As the missile detonated, MIG D went i.nto a sharp
left turn and when the fire ball subsided the NIG taas still flying. Since BLUE 3 was out of
ordnance and fuel, BLUE 3 and <> started a climbing turn and disengaged. [See firing 6 of
Table 1.]
Altnough BLUE ii had stayed with BLUE 3 throughout the encounters, and was calling to
clear BLUE 3, BLUE 3 had difficulty hearing BLUE U. BLUE 3 retained his outboard fuel
tank until egress, and did not notice any performance degradation due to it. The lowest
speed that BLUE 3 achieved was <t50 knots.
OREEN 1 and 2
GREEN Plight turned right to engage the MICs that were seen coming in from the north.
OREEN I and 2 made several turns with the MIGs. During these turns, GREEN 1 and 2 had to
maneuver to avoid collisions with friendly aircraft. Due to the confusion GREEN 1 and 2
were unable to fire any ordnance.
Early In the engagement , GHEEN I had to break off a hard turn in order to avoid a
collision. GREEII I pulled up and reversed and the next time he saw GREEN 2, GREEN 2 was
on fire, stalled out, and above GREEN 2 were two parachutes. During this time, GREEN 1
Back was checking the 7 o'clock, and as GREEN 1 was In a left bank, GREEN 1 Back saw an
V~k (GREEN 2) slide to the inside, alow, in a nose high attitude, on fire. He also saw the
crew eject.
GREEN 2 was lost at about l63'tH in the vicinity of 21*25'N/106*'25'E. When first seen,
the aircraft was nose low, with fire coninc; from botn wing roots and was at an altitude of
7000 feet. When next seen, the aircraft was In a nose high attitude at ^000 feet. The
aircraft was engulfed in flame and debris was falling away. Shortly thereafter two seats
and two good chutes were seen, hut no beepers were h^ard. The aircraft was seen to impact
in the vicinity cf 21''25'fi/i06°25' E. The cause of l:)ss was a KIO-17.
After OREEN 2 had been lost, 'JREEN 1 re-enter€'d the fl^ht and attacked a MIG-17 (MIG
E) which was out In front. From a bore3lg^B|l^3|^^g^on and lock on, GREEN I went to full
" 309
» f
Table 1. BLUE 3 FIRING ATTEMPTS
Firing Atttfflpt
1
2
3
4
9
7
8
Ordnance
Target
AIM-7E
HlG-17
HI6 A
AIM 7 r
AIn-/t
HIG-17
MI6 A
a iM..7f
w J w— # t
HlG-17
H16 A
AIM-9B
HlG-17
HIG C
AIN-9B
NlG-n
NIG C
AIH-7C
MlG-17
NIG D
A1H-9B
MIG-17
HIG D
AIM-9B
HIG-17
NIG 0
1)1 UE 3 Flight
Condi tions
Altitude (ft)
Speed
5000
0.9 H
4000
nay
4000
n 0 H
4
1000
0.9
1
Level
N
1000
0.9 H
1
1000
0.9 H
4
200-300 AGL
0.9 H
1
200-300 AGL
0.9 M
1
G
Haneuver
2
Slight
3
Diving Turn
Oivlng Turn
to Left
Level
Level Turn
Level
Level
Target Flight
Ccndi tions
AU1 tude
Relative Altitude
Speed
Haneuver
4000
BeloM
0.6 M
Turn
3000
Below
0.6 M
Turn
3000
Below
ABM
Turn
1000
Same
0.6
Break
M
1000
Sane
O.B M
Break
1000
Same
O.B N
SOO-1000 AGL
Same
O.B N
Same
0.8 N
Geometry
Track Crossing
Angle
10'
40*
40*
0»
0*
30"
0*
0*
Relative
Velocity (KN)
Firing Range
200
1-1/2 Bl
200
Setween
& 1 mi
200
1 n (Bi
100
100
200
About
1 n Bl
100
100
AIM-7E Firing
Mode
Clutter
Gate .
Select Light*
ruiar i Zdtion
Detection Range
Lock-On Range
Boresl ght
Normal
Narrow
Satisfactory
Linear
t-1/2 m\
Full System
Norinal
Narrow
Satisfactory
Linear
1-1/2
1-1/2
Full System
Normal
Narrow
Satisfactory
Linear
1-1/2
1-1/2
FuM System
Normal
Narrow
Satisfactory
Linear
1-1/2
1
Full System L
ock Retained |
AIH-9B Firing
Tonel>
Results and Reeiarks
Missile did
not guide*
nlssed
500 ft.
Steering dot
in Ase
circle .
missile -
guided
Initially
but missed
by 300 ft.
Interlocks
out dulling
lead.
Ueak
Ordnance
hung .
Weak
Hill back-
ground* the
missile
missed by
100 ft short
of the NIG.
Low Alt.
missile hit
gnd Ifl bach
of NIG.
Interlocks
out, missed
500 ft.
•1 e a K
Hill back-
ground .
missile fell
short by
20 ft.
i^ea k
HiU back-
ground ,
miss Ue
detofiited
20 ft away
fcut no
kill.
■The AlH-7 missile select Hght had been on 60 seconds prior to arming.
^On firing the tone became « low background chopping noise.
Event : I 1-252
system and rlpple-flred two SPAHROWs. [See firing 1 and 2 of Table 2.] One of the
missiles was not otserveJ, the second tracked well and detonated in the vicinity of
MIG E. The MIC caught fire and went down to the left, resulting In a kill for GFEEK 1.
The Impact was observed by a member of BLUE Flight.
GREEN 1 did not see the r.lssile detonate since he was under attack by two othor
MIG-17S. Just before CHiEri 1 had fired, CJHEEtl 1 Back had seen the MIGs cor.lnft In from
8 o'clock high going to 6 o'clock. The MIGs were 1-1/2 to 2 miles away and GKEEt'! 1 Back
called ther. cut. These HIGs started firing at GREEN 1. By the time CREEtl 1 had fired
hla srARRCWs, these KIGs were In good position and OREEH 1 Front could see the underside
of the HIGs. GREE.'J 1 then made a levu-l loft break (aoout 7-8 g's) but the MIGc stayed
with him during the turn shooting. GF.EEW I then started to climb and the MIGs broke off
to the right when BLUE 1 attacked them. When GKCE:: 1 cane around again. HIG E was burning
on the ground.
CREEM 1 continued to try to attack other MICs in the area. As GREEN 1 would come
across the wagon wheel to attack a MIG who had his tall pointed toward GREEN 1, he in turn
would be attacked by other MIGs. This happened three separate times.
During these attacks, disengagements, separations, and reattacks, GREEN 1 fired two
SIDEWINDERS and one SPARROW, without success, at three different Mj>!s.
The first SIDEWINDER was fired out of parameters, and passed behind the target Csee
firing 3 of Table 2], The second SIDEWINDER was fired under conditions like the first
[see firing k of Table 2]. The SPARROW firing was from inside minimum range, and as the
HIG broke, the missile passed behind [see firing 5 of Table 2].
GREEN 1 reached bingo fuel and after calling the other flights, started to egress.
As the friendly forces left, most of the MIGs had left except for a single MIG-17 I),
circling in the area. At this time GREEM 1 decided to attack this MIG so he descended to
low altitude, and from 10 miles away started to approach the MIG. Before he reached firing
range the MIG saw OEEEN 1 and started to ta^e evasive action.
The MIC stayed low, turning, and GREEN 1 followed, attempting to stay below the MIG.
GREEN 1 throttled bacit and stayed behind the HIG, 3000 to ttOOO feet away. The MIG turned
up a valley and as he came to the end he flew over a ridge, and was outlined against the
sky.
The MIG popped over the ridge In a right turn and Im-Tiedlately reversed to the left.
GREEN 1 got a good tone and launched two SIDEWi;.*OEF.s. The first was unobserved and the
other exploded under t.^e i-IIG's tail [see firing 6 end 7 of Table 2]. The SIDEWINDER
exploded 5-10 feet on the right side of the MIG and pieces were seen to come from the
HIG as t\.v MIG turned left and down from 200 feet altitude. GREEN I Is credited with a
kill.
GREEN 1 then broke over the MIG to clear his 6 o'clock and lost signt of the MIn.
GREEN 1 then egressed with a 2000 pound fuel state.
GREEN 3 and 0
After GREEN 1 fired his first missile, GREEN 3 and t were Instructed to attack other
HIOs. As GREE.N 3 and U attacked from a vertical maneuver, MIGs would cut across the circle
to counter their attack. GREEN 3 fired six missiles in separate attacks on different MIGs
[see Table 3 for the firing order].
At the tine that GHEEN 3 fired his first SIDEWINDER, GREEN k fired a SPARROW at a MIG.
GREEN h fired Interlocks out, with a full system lock on. The SPARROV/ was observed
tracking but GREEN ^ was unable ta keep track of it as he had to maneuver to stay with
GREEN 3. However, the radar stayed locked on for about 5 seconds after he lost visual
contact with the HIG. At firing, GP.EEN 'i had 5 degree angle off and was at 8500 feet
altitude and 2 g's. The speed was Mach 0.9. He was firing down on a MIG- 17 who was at
3000 feet altitude and 0.3 r-iach. The overtake was about 300 knots. The firing range
was about a mile, with lock-on also occurring at one mile. The switch settings were:
polarization, linear; clutter, normal; and gate, narrow. The select IJght had been on
5 minutes before arr.li.g.
About the second cr third tine around the circle, GREEN 3 and were In a left
vertical turn reversal, heading back dcwn when GREEN ti saw GREEN 2 pass In a 20 degree
dive with fire coming from the wing roots. (GREEN U thought he was firing his missiles.)
Previous to this GREEN U thought he heard a call of "GREEN 2, MIG at 7". As GREEN 3 and
f headed down, thev selected some MlOa which had broken off, and after GREEN 3 a id U
fired at then, O.^ESN 3 and 'A then went back up and as they did, they saw GREEN : in a stall,
on fire, and two parachutes.
On the previously described descent, GREEN >i fired nis second SPARROW, under conditions
identical to the firs*, firing except the track eror.slns angle and angle off were 20 degrees,
and he had 3 g's on the aircraft. Again, a maneuver prevented GREEN i* from observing the
BlsFlle flight.
GREEN U subsequently atteT.pted to fire tv/c more SPARHOWs but they (the two aft missiles)
would not fire and did net leave the alrcrjjgmmKbrr^
I
T«b1« 2. GREEN 1 FIRIHG ATTEMPTS'
Faring Attempt
Ordnance
Target
6R£EN 1 Flight
Condi tfons
Altitude (ft)
Speed
6
Haneuver
Target FHght
CondUions
A1 11 tude
Relative Altitude
Speed
Maneuver
<tgt)
Geometry
Track Crossing Angle
Rela ti ve
Velocity (KN)
Firlnij Range
AIN-7E Firing
Hode
Clutter
Gate
Select Light
Pol ari zatlon
Detection Range
Lock-On Range
Interlocks
AIH-96 Firing
Tone
Results and Remarks
AIM-7E
KIG-17
HiG e
9 K
3000
0.
Z
Level Turn
3000
Sane
Left Turn
0-20*
200
0.8-1.0
n a1
Full Systen
Override
Narrow
Satisfactory
Linear
7000 ft
In
Not observed
AIM-7E
HIG-17
HIG £
3000
0.9 M
2
Level Turn
3000
Sane
Left Turn
0-20*
200
0.8-1.0
n ml
Full Systen
Overr 1 de
Narrow
Satisfactory
Linear
Missile
detonated
about to ft
i^ij, NIG
was destroyed
AIH-9B
MiG-n
HIG r
2000
0.9 H
3
Low
Turni ng
0-10*
200
AIM-9B
HIG-17
HI6 G
ISOO
0.9 H
Z-1/2
Level
Tumi ng
0-10*
200
Yes
Missile
fired out of
parameters ,
missed
Ves
Missile
fired out of
parameters »
■Issed
A1N-7E
NI6-17
NI6 K
100
0.9 N
1
Level Turn
500
Low
0.9 H
Hard Turn
O-IO*
200
About 1 ttf
No lock
boreslght
Override
Narrow
Satisfactory
Linear
1-1/2
HIG broke,
alsslle fired
too close and
■Issed
AIH-9B
MIG-17
NIG I
2S0
0.9 H
1-1/2
Torn
200
Above
0.8 M
Turning
Left
O-IO*
200
2-1/2 ml
Yes
Unobserved
A1H-9B
MlG-17
NIC I
2S0
0.9 N
1-1/2
Turn
200
Above
0.8 H
Turni ng
Left
0-10»
200
2-1/2
ni
Vei
Detonated
near the
HIG. A
km
'no source reports that GREEN 1 attempted to fire the other SPARROW,
been nadet however.
Due to the nature of the battle* an attempt may have
1 suj e:^
tsa sua fin I
Ji IT in ■ I I- I •■■a>a"fftliirar-iiT'ir*
Tftbit 3. GREEN 3 FIRING ATTEMPTS*
Firing Attempt
Orilnance
Target
6PEEN 1 fUght
Condi tions
Altitude (ft)
Speed (kt)
G
Hsneuver
Tjrget Flight
Conditions
Altitude
Relative Altitude (tgt)
Speed
Maneuver
Geometry
Track Crossing Angle
Relative
Velocity^ (KN)
Firing Range
AIM-7C Firing
Mode
Clutter
Gate
Select Light
Pol ar t za tion
Detection Range
Lock-On Range
interlocks
A!M'9B Firing
Tone
Results and Renarkt
1
A1H-7E
MI6-17
MIG J
2000
500
1
Slight Dive
2000
Sane
0.8 N
Turn
150
a>1 ml
Bcreslght
Override
Narrow
Satisfactory
Linear
A1H-9B
H16-17
HIG K
20C0
500
1
Slight Climb
2000
Sane
0
150
No guide
Hiss
Yes
Missile hit.
target kill
AlH-7£
KIG.17
HIG L
2000
500
4
2000
Same
0.8 H
Turn
ISO
ssl «l
Boresight
Override
Narrow
Satisfactory
Linear
1-1/2
Out
System broke
lock , miss i le
went on and
to the right
AIM-9B
HIG-17
HIG M
2000
500
3
2000
Same
0
150
AIH-9B
HlG-17
HIG 0
2000
500
4
2000
Same
0
150
No
Not observed
No
Did not guide*
Ment Into ground
Miss possibly due to target
AIH-9B
HIG-17
HIG P
2000
500
2
2000
Same
0
150
No
Not observed
i^ t. 4 .-.port. ,h,t Jt» 1 c.lUd. •■ out Of ...sn..-. ft -t >-». 1* t»C» » .».«.,♦.- «» "r. t>. .U.r S»..OW.
''closing.
Event III-t52
The P-<5' altitudes during the engagement v&rled from ICO to 8500 feet. The tactics
used by both groups of MIG-173 were to stay In a "wagon whe<^l" b."bit» turning to the left.
Both groups of P4IG3 orbited lou (one near 1000 feet and anot^e^ near 5000 feet) and in the
same location. They operated in pairs or in threes, and when an F-^i elecont rolled In for
a pass, at least one MIC would be at their 6-7 o'clock. The hIG-173 would disengage- by
executing a spllt-S In the vertical and diving for the deck. The enemy aircraft were
extremely agre:..:! ve. There waj also a couple of Kia-173 orbiting very law (100-200 feet-
altitude) nsar the center of the orbit and it was surmised that thest were dl;-ector
airer-aft. The *1ia-17s used afterburner Intermittently throughout the engageoent.
The friendly tactics were to pick an element of MIGs In the orbit and make a high-
speed pass, breaking of a /nlnlmwn range to go high to position for another pass. The speed
Mas kept high.
3
3
i
a
0:|
3
3
3
3
a
31«
Jllrcpaft Involved!
Event 111-253
Three P-tCs and two EB-66s
V5 one unident
Results: StEhtlng
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«'Oi'H/104«02'E
1. fItlHMT NISSIOII AND TACTICAL SITUATION
DateAtnw: 20 May 1967. I6IOH
t1. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
ECK escorts sighted a laree, high swept wing A/C approaching head-on from the
north; the A/C made a wice sMeeplng left turn at approx speed of EB-66 at altitude
of 30,000'; numerous MXG calls were heard.
4-
Event III-25ti
Aircraft Involved: Three P-105s vs seven
MIC- 17s
.Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*'X8'rJ/106°43 'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 20 nay 1967, I63OH
II. DATA SOURCE
. CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight IngreaslnK at 5000'; four :MGs came from the south at flight's
altitude, gently dropping below flight altitude to a 6 o'clock position; MIC-s
were unable to engage due to flight speed; aa flight egressed from target., three
HIG-17S at 3000' were observed closing on flight; XIGa could not execute turn to
engage flight.
I;
Event II 1-255
Aircraft Involved: Four F-l»Cs vs one MIO-?
and one unldent
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"09'N/105'51'E
I. PRIMARY HISSION MO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 20 Kay 1967. 163OH
II. DATA SOURCE
CIHCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
KIOCAP flight, when approx JiO miles short of target, heard MIG call front flight
of Event 170; flight continued cover for ?-i05s on into and out of target area; one
KIC sighted by *3 going away from the strike force; one unVcnown type A/C was
observed, silver in color, marlclngs could not be observed due to distance.
315
Event III>256
Aircraft Involved: Four P-lUSDs »s two KZC-17s
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 2l'^3i'N/lCt;°37*2
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOJ:
Datemme: 20 Kay 1967/about I63CH
BLUE flight (four P-lOSgs) was the lead flight of a force of F-105s striking the
I^^rallroad yards ct Zl'si'N/loe^SS'E. The racCAP was provided by the alrc^ft of
5"'JP"^52. The other strike flights which saw MIGs are described in Events iII-260
ana -«57»
2. MISSION ROUTE
Takhll to target ard return via th^ Culf of Tonkin.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
£=i95£ BLUE 1 BLUE 2 BLUE } BLUE U
4 - CBU-jtis k - CBU-2*s on 6 760 lb bombs 6 - 750 lb beiafes on
centerllne centerllne
1 - AIM9B 2 QRC-160 1 - AIM9B 2 - QHC-I6O
1 - QRClfiO 1 . QRC 160
All aircraft carried 2 - 450 gal external fuel tanks and 23 mm guns. All camouflaged.
MTQ^IT. MIQ 1. 2
Clean
Dull silver color, red stars on wings
Cannon
4. FLIGHT CONOITIOhS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Some low, fair weather cumulus In the area; good visibility.
BLUE 1. 2. 3. ft
Altit:ide : 6,000 feet
Heading; 310°
Fuel Stat^ t 7,000 lbs
Pliidit F ormation ; Line abreast, with 1 and 2 on the right and 3 and 4 on the
left.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Two aircraft, subsequently Identified as MIC-l?s, were detected by BLUE flight
during ingress, when they were about I 1/2 minutes out rrom the target. Bog-^ys
were at 10:30 o'clock, slightly hlgn, about '*-5 miles distance, in a left turn' toward
BLI;E flight. MIG wamlnj?s had been hearJ, but none had teen directed at this flit;ht.
The bogeys were initially thought to be HICs due to their shape and the direction from
Mhleh they came.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight lit afterburners and continued their run on the target. The WTGs fell
behind as BLUE flight accelerated for the pop up, even though they atteroted tc position
for firing.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPKCNT
BLUE flight popped up to about 13,000 or 1«,000 ft, making a right hand roll-In for
an attack heading of abouc 020 , then Jinking oat in a gener£;lly south to east direction.
BLUE flight lost sight of the MIG3 in their maneuvers to stilke the target.
Snortly after coming cff target, BLUE U called that he wa3 being fired upon by a KIG
as he observed tracers hlgn over his left wing. BLUE U applied negative g's, rent
afterburner and successiTully disengaged.
When SLUE flight had eg^essed about five miles further from the target and had
rejoliied in a line abreast Torriaclon with Bf.UE 3 and '■i on the left, iiLUE 1 saw a KIC-17
closing and passliie; behind iTl.r. In a rlirht turn. The y.lC. wa- unable to atrack BLL'I lead --^
and continued over te attack BLUE The XIG approajr.ed 150: feet range at SLUE t's
316
If
J
Event iri-256
5 o'clock poslt-lon as BLUE lead called the MIC»3 position and for the flight to g;o after-
burner, unload and break rlpht. The P-105s accelerated away from the MIC and the range
had Increased ".o 2000 feet before the KIC achieved a firing position. However, the MIC
was not observed to fire and It Is doubtful whether the MIC actually achieved firing
position. The ^ac fell behind a» OLUE flight e(;ressed toward the coant.
Although not definitely ascertained, it waa suspected that the latter two MIO-173
attacking SLUE flight were the same ancs as those making the pass on BLUE flight prior to
Striking th« target.
8. ORONAKCE
BLUE - none.
KIOs - One enemy fired unknown number of rounds of cannon at BLUE it, Ho hits.
9. EQUIPHENT PROBLEMS
None reported.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience ;
Total Hours
BLirE 1 3100
P-105 Hours
250
Combat
Missions
Unknown
Remarks
None
CoajBtrnts
Kne<« that they could outrun tlitr MIC-17s.
11. DATA '0JRCE3
Project Interviews: BLUE 1, 31 Kay 1967.
Messages: 355 TPW Takhll OPREP-3 2013202 May 67, i)OTO-0 II808 May 67.
12. NARRATIVE
See 5* 6, and 7.
ffv
31:
m
Event III-257
Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOSDs vs eigne RZG-17a
Result : No damage
Vicinity of Encounter; 21°26«H/106°20'E
1. PRIHARV HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 20 Hay 1967/about I63OH
Pour F-10i>3 (BLUE flight) were part of a strike force from Takhll attacking the Bae Le
railroad yard. The other strike flights which encountered MIGa were Ch?s« of Events III-256
and III>260. The NISCAP aircraft were those of Event III-252.
8. ORONANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
1Q. AIRCREW CONMENTS
Experience
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
Compenta
20inn
Cannon
3/0
3/0
Total Hours
3300
5100
200 rounds
fired 570 rounds
P-105 Hours
700
260
Coabat Mission:
90 Two previous
air-to-air
engagements .
65 Two prior alr-to«>
air engageaents .
BLUE 1 - the Mia-17's rate of turn is almost unbelievable.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews: BLUE 1, June 1967
Hessages
355 TPW Taithll OPREP-3 201U00Z, May 67, OOTO-0 11812
12. HARRATIVE
On ingress, as BLUE flight approached the "pop-up", eight silver MIC-17s In fingertip
trail formation were sneounterel. BLl.'E flight was headed west and the MIGs were turning
to coae in on BLUE at 6 o'clock. BLUE called the F-t CAP flight and proceeded into the
pop-up, bombed and recovered. At this tlae MIGs were sighted in all quadrants. As the
flight starred to egress, BLUE 1 and 2 In succession passed three MIGs at three separate
times. Each time 3LUE 1 and 2 would fire a burst of 20mm and pass on (vicinity of
21«»26'N/106*20'E}. BLUE 2 fired a total of 570 rounas. The last of these passes by
BLUE 2 waa at 100 feet altitude. There was no known damage done to the HIGs. BLUE flight
accelerated to 600 kta and continued egress.
During the engagement, BLUE 1 saw a single NIG- 17 at low altitude and went down after
hln. Just as he was pulling lead to fire on the MIQ, the KIQ broke very sharp and BLUE 1,
being unable to follow accelerated away.
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
8
318
n
3
-
Event
Aircraft Involved: Four F-UCs vs four or five
MIG-21S*
Results: Two MIG-21s destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: Sl-SS'N/lOS"?! -E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlffie: 20 M.iy 1967/l62*'.H
'rU.I;?.'°o"tt.r«S^;"F-rnU^'. •.;ic:.;tl;ri?JrrAiD klsht (Ev.n. 111-257) -a. ...
tacked by KIO-Zlz.
2. MISSION ROUTE ^ , , . „
BLUE PU.« ....... ■--^/S-^^cS'Jo'ira;™;!^™"-?"' r = °?o"'"""'-
the reverse rcute.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-^C BLUE 1. ?. 3» ^
H - AIM-7E SPAP.!^CV;
l» - AIM-9B SID£«IHDSH
1 - QRC-I6O pod
1 - 600 gal cent«rlln« tank
1 - 370 eal out&card tank
IFP-on-TACAi;-on
MIG-21 C and D (at -WQ werB "D")
Silver
One Mn-21D had CHICCM narklr^s
No external stores
4 FLIGHT COHOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
weather: Tuo-eUr^t^n scattered clouds with tops at 3000 ft. Visibility 20 ml.
BLUE
T i 3 ^
Altitude: 12.000 ft AOL (approx. 15,000 f" MSL)
Hea ding : 137**
Speed: 5'*0 kts
Fuel "State : 9000 lb
Flignt .-orratlon : Pod
5. INITIAL DETECTION
force.
NITIAL Dtlttiiun of t^e strll f
Dur'ne inrress, SLl'E back sa« two KIC-21s attacking the last flight of the strlLe
tSI MinsSere heariln? 010- at 8000 ft altitude.
6. ACTION INITIATED ! |,
BLUE Plight irwiedlately broke off to attack the MIGs. j ^
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHEMT , , n^r^,.- qros ^ * I:
could fire, a call of brea|^ ^":^?fil*?i?-^c "tar-f^d to rejoin the strike force. tl
P f.nr.a., another MIG-21 and began
.1 As BLUE Fll.:ht a^aln started down .hud ^Id.^e ELJ. ^ saw an ^^^^^
an attack. 3LU?. 3 ,v,;b.e=,-:ently f";;';^,.^;^^!. ^f"?:;^ 3 !21D wh obtaining ^ lock on ,|
l^h^n ^^^Jrorf an^^?t^?r?^ild'^e^V^ItUt:;S.%LUE . called 3r:00 fuel due to a
:SShanlca. dirncuuy. .nd Y^^/ ~ ^^^^ 3LUE 1 was success-
I.. BLUE 1 and 2 r.hen p'-c'.:en up a -^^^^^ID and .urnea na destroyed the MIG-no.
fal in a.Mevm, an attack positic. f^^erriLSE ami 2 sal another ••110-21 at 6 o'clock
Tirr^v. .... »nd four w.r. .nr.a;:^.^. or.w re.ber^ validate five, one crew
l:;-:r vaUdat:3*?.;;r;".nd four crew :::e.ber.^Ki^three aircraft.
319
i m
Event IIt-256
ORDNANCE
(No.
flred/Ho. hit)
BLUE 1
BLUE 3
9.
SPARROW
AIN-7E
3/1
SIDEWINDER
AI M-9S
EQUIPHSNT PROBLEMS
BL'IE It had a fuel sj-aten nalfunctlon whl'sh caused the engine no burn ojore fuel than
normal.
BL'JE l'« radar display in t\e backseat had very din presentation. It was difficult
to see the radar return and tho presentation had to be held for several seconds before
the symbols could be seen. In boreslght racde, the scope was so bright no data could be
seen so that lock-ons could not be achieved In boreslght.
10. AlkCREU CONMEKTS
Experience
TOTAL
p.4
COMBAT
HOURS
HOURS
MISSIONS
REMARKS
BLUE 1
Front
3600
230
70
Plew In Thundarblrds - F-86 pilot
Back
500
260
BLUE 3
Front
5000
200
5«
Had fired alssllea In flight test
Back
610
350
CofTLTients
BLin 1 Front - The MIOs were trying to hit the F-1055 from low with a missile
pop-up attack. The MIGs were coming In from a bean position to attempt a hit and
run attack.
The MIC solved BLUE I'a problems by his maneuver.
The wlngnan did a good Job.
BLUE 1 Sack - The winenan (BLUE 2 and U) did an excellent Job of staying with their
element leads. T^.e wlngr.an were irlefed to call the 6 o'clock situation every 15 to 20
sec. BLUE 1 never worried about the 6 o'clock.
Although some of the flights had started to carry guns, BLUE Plight had not yet been
so configured.
BLUZ 1 Front said that due vo his exoerlence in firing SIDEWINDERS, he knew exactly
what he wanted to see for a flrl.ig situation. The one he had this time fitted It exactly
no clouds, clear blue sky, and target golr^ straight away in afterburner.
Due to the failure of the radar set, it was planned to use the SIDEVIIIiDEH.
The wlngnan really made the formation since he was checking the 6 o'clock while
BLUE 1 was attacking. The frequent calls kept SLUE 1 from having to look around.
If fuel was left a'; the end cf a mission, the flights would practice ACT, wlt!i
emphasis on the wlngman's functions. In the element lead, the aircraft coinm-der -«as
flying for an attack. The backseat on the lead aircraft was looking at the rsdar -o
lock on the target. The front seat of the -/ineman was fellow Ing lead and watchln;. to
stay with hlra. The backseat in the wln^man's aircraf; was really performing the visual
search. They were the ones which spotted the MIOs that led to the kills.
BLUE 3 Front - Pelt he could have gotten the last KIO on which he had aenleved a
lock, but he had to leave due to SLUE >*.
If you want MIOs you must go after the-n and Initiate a radar search If you lose
visual contact.
The squadron has a lot of people with long experience and they recognize the value
of the wlngnan working closely with the leader.
n . DATA SOURCE
Pro.1est Interview."
BLUr. 1 Front, 23 June 1?67
BLUE 1 Back, 23 June 1967
BLUE 3 Front, 23 June 1967
320
1
1
3
8
a
3
s
3
id
0
Event III-258
3f>f'T^"w pon^o:: i-'Ci crrKV-^ fastel 670
3'>>Tr.: Xny lOG? Cr;-r:P-3 FA5TEL 17?
360Th".' 2'-JO30OZ Xay l?67 Cr:it:F-3 ^^(^0 00162
Raytheon letter Oil) OU33 22 May 1967
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
DLL"-- '^llnit war one of two «tCCAP escort fllKhts escortlni; the strike force , Ton
Korat. rne strlk..- fore., was In a ^a.-cle foraatl'..'! and the other MIGCAP escort flight
was -ib-i'Jt noo ft hS-htr th^r. -v.:i about In th.> r.ltdle of the strike force. BLUE PllRht
was behln'i the la.it fllrht rV the fr-r-e, j*bout 2000 ft higher than the rest of the
rormnt!on ^r.i trallin? n i:lt.
During mrresa to the tar/et at l62aH. vhen in the vicinity of 21» 35 'N/lQit* 35 ' E .
BLUE Fll.-nt Heard It:-: fllrht c? Event 111-257 call launch lU:ht3 from Lead 12 (a SAM
*lte). Lead 2 (anotner SAM ^ite) was also reported out no ^AMs were observed. ilOTEL was
active, t;lv;.i5 two warnings during ingress and three while the strike force was In the
target area.
When the centerllne tank ^ecap.e empty, it wac Jettisoned and =i-^rtl: after turning
down T^ud R'dr". bL-'E *-llrh!t r.eard tr.e IROt! HAND Pll.;ht (Event III-257) call MICs and
flleht" lnstruction3 called by P-lQSs. The flrct call h-sard from the IRON' "AND put
the .'JiIGs at rhe ^- -O'j*.- ■} c* clock tut BLUE Fllcht v.as unable to gain contact with the
HIGs." Another call inJlcated the ■•lICo were going fror; rignt to left, under BLUE Flight,
so BLUE 3 and A tanked In an atteript to see under theni.
"finally BLUE n backseat jaw two r<1IG-21s (MIG 1 and 2) under the flight, and BLUE 3
picked un a ''iri off to his left (which was to the east). At this time BLUE Plight was at
21°JJ0»N/:05''22'E heading 137" ac 5«0 KTA5 and 12,000 ft ACL. The time was 1625H. MIG 1
and 2 were heading OlO" at 3000 ft AGL and HSO KTAS and were attacking the last flight
of P-1053.
When 3LU^ 3 p'-ked up the MIG (It was felt that this was one of the first two seen)*
he called it and turned left tc start an attack. BLUE 1. who did not see the MIGs at that
time th-n indicated th^t SL'JS 1 and 2 would provide cover. The MIG seen by BLUE 3 was
Identified as a MIO-21 due In cart to its flashing silver color. BLUE 3 started to close
in on the MIG as it turned north and then west. Aithouth tnere hao been two radar con-
tacts 'bm;- 3 went fcor'*5i.-ht and the backseat looked on to one of them. At this tine,
BLUE 3 lost visual contact with the MIG but followed him by using the steering dot on the
radar..
BLUE 3 followed the contact through about 135" of turn and as the ASE circle started
to expand a.nd he was ready to fire Interlocks in, BLUE called for a ,t?2-.7S'31ncSl?.
that there were "lOs at 7 o'clock. At this time, I626H. BLUE fllcnt was at 21<'5VN/105*21
with BLUE 1 and 2 follov/in5 BLUE 3 and U ly about 5C00 ft at their a-7 o'clock hign.
BLU^ Plight after SLUE 3 reauested and received confirmation of the break call,
broke left BLUE 3 broke radir cont.ict during the break. .'lo .MIGa were seen, and th"»
aircraft observed by BLUE U were -eally BLUE 1 and 2. BLUE 1 attempted to call off the
break but, due to the crowded communications channels, the message was not heard.
W^ien seen apaln, the MIGs posed no threat to thj strike force so BLUE Flight turned
to the southeast' to continue to follow the strike fci-oe.
The subsequent actions take place within a 10 mi radius of 21''53 ' N/I05' 2JJ 'E .
Shortlv after rolllns; out with BLUE 1 and 2 still behind, BLUE 3 saw another "10-21-
(MIC 3) off' to the eact, .^oing rather fast. BLUE 3 went to boresight and locked on «1G 3-
The sun rllnts frc^. .'.IG 3's sliver surface had alerted BLUE 3 to the presence of fllO 3
wl.o was atten;:;t'n-; to attack the strike force. When seen, BLUE 3 and MIG 3 were both at
10,000 ft .altitude, with BLUE 3 heading 137* at 5*10 kts. When Initially detected, MIG 3
was at 6 mi range and lock-on was Immediate.
After lock-on, BLUE 3 continued to track MIG 3 visually with only an occasional
reference to the steering dot- ,
BLUE 3 closed sUghtlv on the MIG, and both BLUE 3 and MIG 3 started a left descend-
ing turn. When at about 5-6 t^I range, BLUE 3 fired his first SPARROW with full system
lock interlocks in. BLUE 3 was at 10.000 ft altitude and about O.V Hach. BLUE 3 was
about 20-30^ angle off frorr. MIG 3, puUln;; about 2 "g's". The closing velocity was small.
The missile cime off the aircraft and tucked dcwn and to the left and went ballistic,
passing out of sight.'
>0?REr 21^03502 May 15^7 reptrts a 200 ft miss dlstaroe at the MlG»s a o'clock.
Event: III-258
BLUE 3 continued to turn left with MIG 3. closing slowly, and ?J »
Mlth BLUE 3 8000 rt and about .95 Nach , BLUE 3 fired hla s-jcond oPARROW. The MIG was
It Sboit 800§"rt also -??h the other conditions of firlms «bout Jhe sane as the first
except the interlocks were out. The second SPARROW also went ballistic*
BLUE 3 .nalntalne<i position and Tired his ^^-^^f SPARROW at 2-3 ol range -^^^^ "^JSe^"*
rir>*n^ Bt II?- T .ind MIG ^ wer- at afcout 6000 ft altitude with iJLUfc 3 ac i.i 'J*^';"'- " , .
«ti«n ilr'lar to -he '••artln-Baker seat, and the naln chute had orar.«e and white panels,
action slR.iar to -ne • ^ ' Zh» ar iif 7 h-ir!^<!«»at saw MIC 3 lapact at about
as seen by four nenbers of 3L'JE Flight . BLUE 3 bactseac saw iii.^. j
21*53'N/105*27' 30"E. MIG 3 was a M1G-21C.
Throuehout the encounter BLUE 3 had been In afterburner J"' *;f .nhSiS^SeSSJiS*'*"*
tank. The lock-on to the HIC3 had been nade ag:.lnst a clear sky and a"hou^ the turns
pit mountains In the background, the radar did not break lock J« '^^ot
bounty switch was on linear and the gate was 'ja^'fO"- ^^^Jj^* J^Ii^^^ij^e flrs^
Sas near centered or centered and for the .ast firing the ^ot was centered ^he first
two missiles were not fired out of paraseters and the reason for the lack of guidance is
not knovn. .
After destroying MIG 3, BLUE 3 and U. with BLUE I and 2 still providing J"^"'**
BINGO at 620a lb and ^lOOO lb should have been used to get to the tanker, BLUt, arriveu
with only 300.
At this time tho ^IIG under visual contact, MIQ 5, reversed back to the right in a
«... lf.rJ iJtJtSd^ about 500-1000 ft above BLUE 3. BLUE 3 «as In danger of overshooting
2nd hi B^UE*<» ^0 Sreak of f and egress to the west. BLUE 3 stayed with lilG 5 in his
j;ih5 tSi n SiG 5 a^?eSjU5 ?o dtSSnjEe by using speed. piUZ 3 f^lt that he could
S?I f l?S3 SS ti^ls WIG If he could have stayed.] *'hen «IG 5 !?° ^'^"S*^^ ^
BLlffi 3 broke off and headed west with BLUE 4 te post strike refueling.
Although BLUE 1 and 2 had followed the action and covered BLUE 3 and U, BLUET 1 and 2
broke off from BLUE 3 and H as the latter two egressed for the tanker.
At this time BLUE 2, heading southeast toward Thud Ridge, saw a single "3?"^m?/L-
hl» 10 o'click [thought to be MIG 5] and BLUE 1 and 2 turned into the MIG. This "JG was
SiJrtln« ?o descend fnd turn left into BLUE 1 and 2. BLUE I and 2 turned hard left Into
mS 5 SSd stf!4e5 to descend to gain speed. In the left turn, BLUE I and 2 lost visual
contact with MIO 5 but regained It within 5 sec.
AS soon as BLUE 1 and 2 started to turn Into MIG 5, the MIG "'^^r"^,^^'
the rlKht and lit his afterburner and started a ftUmb. going away. BLUE 1 J, In
iSertSner keot the nose down and gained airspeed. BLUE 1 and 2 then pulled" the nose
i^^JiS^lred ^ne SIdLindER at MIG 5 who was still climbing away against a clear blue sky.
BLUE 1 had selected the SIDEWi:iDER dv: to a malfunction of the radar ^^sP^^y ^" JJ®
backseat which made It difficult for the backseater to find the target for a radar lock.
Sevfrtheless! lmr,edlately previous to firing, the backseat had obtained a radar lock and,
at firing, had a full systen Icck-on.
Th^ MIG had started to climb from about 3000 ft altitude and at firing was at «bout
900n n%mtude. I[a? 1 2as about 6000 ft MSL («.000 ft AGL) at '•JS-SOO KIAS and at I "g"
HIO 5 was dead dhead at zero angle off. At firing, the range was ^^o"* 3500-ftOOO ft with
BLUE 1 closing at about 100 kts. He had a good tone for ahout 5 a«c prior to launch.
The SIDEWINDER went straight out not making large corrections and exploded aft to
the right of the MIG's tall by about 10-15 ft.
Just after the missile detonated, BLUE 1 saw pieces start to cone off of the MIG
wh4,.h -nneared to be part of the stabllator. BLUE 1 had a gcod overtake and pulled up in
fsort'^S? high speed ?oyo ll 10.000 ft altitude and ended up high behind the HIO. which
looked as if it was still flying.
'Note on crevlous paee. . r--~ ...
iNoraal BINGO that day was AfiflflJJa.^ Absolute BINGO that day was 6500 lb.
Event III-258
At this time the nose or MIG 5 pitched up and the MIC snapped over to the right and
*ent Into a flat la=y spin. BLUE 2 backseat saw this MIC pilot eject as the KIG rolled
over the first tine. The pilot had chute with orange panels. BLUE 1 front lost sight
y^j^ of the MIG as It continued In the lazy spiral at ab?ut 1000 ft AGL. BLUE 1 was about
3000 ft at thi3 tine. However, BLUE 1 backseat kept contact with the MIG and saw It im-
pact on the ground at about 22*00 •30"N/105*22'E.
( The strike force was now well clear of the threat area so BLUE I and 2, who were at
BINGO fuel level, started to egreaa. BLUE 1 dropped his outboard tank on the way out to '
1 Improve his fuel conau.riptlcn .
While egresslng at Pl^^e ' M/IOS^OS 'E at about 16»15H heading 270* at 550 !CTAS and
t 12,000 ft AGL, DLUE 2 backrseat saw a single brlRht silver MIG-21 at his 6 o'clock, 5-6 ml
distant and 5000 ft below. The MIC-21 was attemptlr^^ a stern chase but as soon as BLUE 1
I . and 2 maneuvered to get a better view, the MIG broke off with a hard right turn and was
not seen again.
BLUE 1 and 2 continued their efijress when at iSkl H at 20°57 'II/10'»*ti8 'E , heading 265°
at Ift.OOO ft AGL and 550 K.TAS, they observed from Lead 12 a large white colu.T.n of smoke
rise to about 500 ft and then appeared to hang motionless and slowly dissipate. Ho
flame, projectiles, or detonations were observed.
Later at 1651H while at 21''28 *ri/10H''20 • E , heading 210°. cll.T.blng through 20,000 ft
MSL at 450 kta, BLUE 1 and 2 saw another column of smoke from Lead 12, It had the sane
c!)aracteristic3 as the previous smoke sighting. The elements continued to egress without
further Incident.
Event ZII-259
Aircraft Involved: Two F-105s and two F-105Da
V3 three RIG -2 Is
Reaulta: No damage
Vlclnlt, of E-co«n..r: IJoI'lJ^
t
324
I]
]
3
1. PRIMARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Oate/Tlme: 20 May 1967/162 6H ^
Two F-105S ind two P-I050s (BLUE flight) were operatlr^g as the IRON H AMD flight for T
a foSJJeen P-105 strike force from Korat attacking the Klnh No "i^^^J/'J^^^S JJJJ^^.Jf'*'
Tjrs Tareet No 52S6) SLUE flight was from Korat and a flight of P-^s from Danang
JiovU?S| f,IG?AP (Event Flights from the strike force hit the target fro« I63OH
to 1635H and encountered SAMs and AAA but no KIGs. M
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F«10S7 BLUE I. 3
— rx5Hn?
2 CBO-21
20aim cannon
?-105D BLUE 2 3LUE t
— 1 ACR-lff B 500 lb bombs
2 CBU-2^ 20inin cannon
20flim cannon
Tank configuration unknown, but probably two U50 gallon external tanks were carried as
well as a QRC-I60 SCM pod.
8. CRONANCE
CNo. flred/No. hits)
20iBm cannon
BLUE 1 1/0
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLOB 1 • CBU-2'> would not release.
11. DATA SOURCES ■
Hessages ;
388 TPW Korat OPREP-3 2012252 May, 1967 DOI 1779 M
388 TPW Korat OPREP-? 201250Z May, 1967 DOI 1780 ?|
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE flight was at 21°l*O'N/105°30 'E , heading 133°, 550 kts 5000 ft altitude at 1628H .
When silver rlc-Sls were observed approaching the flight from the « °' PJ?"^?"* J
When BLUE flight lost them at 6 o'clock. BLUE flight turned the right and the MIGs then ||
oassed the flight and turned left. Mo firing from the MIGs -..as observed. BLUE flight
Snntinti*d their turn CO the right and then to the left, mailing a complete figure eight
iTr '^ut SSgr Sev a~a?n spr^.n in on a heading of 130° at 550 lets and 4000 ft R
altitude When at 21*35 'N/IOS^SS E at l63fH. BLUE flight observed a silver f«0-21 J
JJtacklng them from the 2 o'clo=k high position. At this time BLUE lead Jettisoned U
?"l5-2" (the ot^er would r.-^t release) and BLUE 2 and 4 Jettisoned 6 HK82 bombs each
ihl val olewhot the flight, and as he passed In front BLUE !: 21
clea.n of external ordnance. BLUE lead turned to the left to follow the MIO and fired 6B
rounds of 20™ with undetermined results. The MIO turned right and cllifibed. and BLUE
flight turned left to heading 310 up Thud Ridge.
a
Q
Q
Q
0
n
u
i
Event riI-260
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-lO^s vs one MIG-17
Results: No datnase
'V' Vicinity of Encounter: 21'»13'N/106«*6 'E
I. PRIHART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 20 May 1967/Approxlniai o ly I63OH
Pour P-lQSs (BLUE FllFhM w«?re p'. of a strike force froa; Takhli attacking the Bac
U raU^arjard. The rulSt of Evekt III-256 and -257 was part of this strike force,
and the flights of Event III-252 were provldlnc MIGCAP.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. fired/No. hit)
Cannon
M(S-I7 1/0
II. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Reports :
355TFW Takhlt 201320Z ftey 67, OPREP-3, DOTO-O.II8O8
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
When at ?1«13 ' M/106»16 'E. BLUE Flight (four P-105s) observed MI0-17s engaging a
fllKhrof ?io P-105S it approiinately 7900 ft. The flight then noticed a single MIG-17
at Bl5e S's I o'clock, low position 3300 ft range, closing and firing on BLUE J. . The
««»hfr rnMMd afterburner ard BLUE 3 and k made a hard right turn, losing the MIG. BLUE
?ug;j JStSfSSd fo SasrSuh no further incident. MIO warnings were heard throughout the
mission but there were none directed at this flight.
325
I
i
if
Event 111-261
Aircraft Involved: Four P-tCs vs oie unldent
Results s SlehtlnB
Vicinity of Encounter: 20»25'N/X0Tn5*E
I. PRIMAUr HISSION MO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlrae: 21 hay 1967, 0853H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Number 1 of escort flight over Gulf of Tonkin observed a llRht colored A/C of
unkno^r^Jpe )"aSn. south at SPP-\;"«"?;4°S°;i JJfSt
to a westerly heading and proceeded Inland, posing no threat to flight.
Event II I- 2 62
Aircraft Involved: Eight P-I05s vs one MIC-17
and two unldents
RaauJCs: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: Sl'OT'N/iOT'SO'E
' 21«15*N/107"00*E
I. PRINARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlffiet 21 Hay 1967. 0S56H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. narrative' DESCRIPTION
Strlke/flak supp flight at altitude 16,000' observed 1 HIC-17 at 13.000'
headlni southwest; MIG passed In front of fllRht from left to right; «cond P-105
m^;? on 3?r"e*rds5ion at 6000', observed two unidentified dark SJijjf.*^^
at Sni altitude at seccnd position shown; unldent flight was in a diving turn
toward 6 o'clock; bogeys were 3-5 ndles away; no attack attempted.
Svent III>263
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-MCs va two unldents
Results; Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 2lO05'M/10«*30'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 May 1967. 090OH
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
P-«C escort flight was at 29,000' when, starting a left tur.i, they spotted two
silver, delta wing A/C; bogeys at 10.000' altitude turned away.
V
4>
Event III-26'l'
Aircraft Invclved: Four F-IO53 vs two unldenta
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Unknown
I. 'RlriARt MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 Kay 15 67, 0905H
II. DATA SOURCe
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. MARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
■ifr^iic^ rinzht at 7000' slKhted two unknown A/C at 6:30 o'clock low approx two
Event lH-265
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-ftCs vs unidentified
Results: damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«56'N/105nO'E
1. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tline: 21 IS^T, l'»20H
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68,
12. ' NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Photo fURht aborted mission ciue ^:IC3 -a SA.s^ fllgt received two rln^ X-band
flight's immediate vicinity; no prior WIG calls received.
Event 111-266
Aircraft Involved: Three P-105s vs two MIC-lTs
Results: Sighting
Vicinity of Ercounter: 21»'<5'N/105»'»3 'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 Kay 1967. I6I6H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-^8.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight saw WGs at 16,000*.
327
Event III-267
Aircraft Involved: ivo P-^tCs va t-o MT.C-17s
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity Of Encounter: 21»10'N/10ft-10'E
I. PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 May 1967/1620H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCFACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12, NARRATIVE OESCRIPTION
ErK escort flight Observed two silver-grey MlOs. «IGs were
lOK position. 2 mills away. After passing flight, KIGs nade a gentle left turn roll-
iroS? and Sived away from flight. Plight did not attempt «nf f« liSJaK'
« having departed 10 minutes before due to engine problems. This left only two alrcrart
covering three EB-66 and Lead felt there ml^t have been a trap to draw protection away.
Event III -268
Aircraft Involved: Three EB-668 wa ono Mlg-?
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«30'N/10*«25'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlnje: 21 May 1967/1031H
^^, DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-1(58.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Plight, for Which the flight of Event III-267 providing S^J^^' "PJ^'J^'JlJ"* *
possible MIG 14 minutes later than the slfhtlng by that fllgnt. Mo hostile intent was
evident .
Event III-269
Aircraft Involved: Pour A-fts vs three unidenti-
fied
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Unknown
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 May 1967/Unknown
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Three bogeys were briefly observed by IRON HAKD Flight.
Event III-270
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-tC* vs three M1G-I7s
Result: No (iamaRe
Vicinity of Encounter: 20» aO'N/IOS-ZO'E
I. PRIMARY MISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlr.e: 22 May 1967/0903H .
BLUE Flirht (four F-uc) wa. aaaisncd «IOCAP for a strlR. against JCS Target 31.00.
tnc ha Uanfi Arr.y liat-racks ar.J Supnly Depot.
"olprcr"" :a«. direct ,0 P"-?"'^" rJ:it"-1,nroriSj''H;«t;"l«" cSil"j7,
20<»58'51"M/10b'f7"*2"=:, outbounu neaulnfr 257" until Clear or rj-Hga,
direct post-strike pefuellns. direct Channel 27.
I I . DATA SOURCES
Messares. Reports :
366 TFW. 0PKEP-3/PIM-ACLE 017, 220U55Z May 67. SECRET.
12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTIOH ^^^^ ^^^^^^^^
BLUE Fllgnt was o«^bound cn a head.n? of 2^7 at ou^ ^^^^ approxinately
20«»30'N/105"20'£ -hen ^» alHtude aad appeared to be attemptini! to keep from
iSlil ;iSt25!"^"rLUrFnght"?id*h:arrs:fe^^«l? ='a?ls for BULISEYE and southeast of
BULLSEYE. No additional infonsatlon provided.
/
Event 111-271
Aircraft Involved: Two RF-lOIa v» two probable
MI0-17S
Result: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: ZO'Sl'W/lOS'ftZ'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 22 May 1967/1 35 IH .
n. DATA SOURCE
Messages. Reports : i»32TRW 2212262 Kay 1967 OPREP-3 TUOC 0^252
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOK
Two RF-lOls (BLUE Plight) were on a mission against the XAC HAI motor pool. The
weather was cl»ar with four nlles visibility. The flight departed ueorn and proceeded
to 2O''35'N/10^''25'E, then to 21' 19 ' H/IOS" 23 ' E , and returned to L'dom at 27,000 feet
altitude. The altitude over the target wis 12,000-1'* ,000 feet.
At 13^7H, whlleen route to the target at 20»57*N/105»32'E, the flleht got a SAM
activity light anJ Lead saw a single SAH. A second SAM was seen at i3^8 as the fi-ght
was heading 090. at a position of 21''00'tl/105'*39'E.
As the missile passed, the flight also received sone 85nm fire. The flight ehanged
altitude to 18,OOC feet and were again fired on by flak. At 1350, when over the target,
heading 180 degrees, a SAM was seen to come from 6 o'clock and detonate at 1 o'clock.
500 feet away.
Two more SAKs were fired when the flight was over the target.
Over the target the flight heard a MIG alert call on guard at 3ULLSEYE. At I151H,
while egressing the target area, heading 320 degrees, two probably MIO-lTs were seen at
8 o'clock. The MIGs were heading south.
At 1352H, when at 20''5l'S/105°''2'E heading 230, BLUE 2, who was ahead of BLUE 1 by
one inile, saw a Si^M. This was followed by another about two minutes later when the flight
was at 2O'''42'iyi05°35'E.
At 1353H SLUE Flight heard a MIC call on guard and then guard channel was Jammed.
BLUE Flight was heading 220-230 degrees and went into afterburner for three minutes to
clear the mountains and then descended to low level to a point southeast of Channel 97.
The flight then returned to Udorn.
Event 111-272
Aircraft Involved: ?our A-tJEs vs two «10-?
and one HIO-17
Results: No dana^e
Vicinity of Encounter: 20'"i8'H/i05''38 'E and
I. PRIKARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 Hay 1967/Berere 1500II
8. ORDNANCE
(Mo. flred/No. hit)
AAM or Rockets
MIG-17 1/0
II. DATA SOURCES
CIMCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68
12. NARRArtVE DESCRIPTION
As a flight of four A-'iEs left the mountains, on Ingress to the target at
20»ti8'N/105°38'E, two MIOs f unidentified type) were seen at 9 o'clock high at a range of
6 »i. These MIGs made no run on the strlife aircr.-ift.
Later, when the flight waa at 21*58 ' NV105°'>3' E. a MlG-17 was seen at II o'clocic high
passing left to right and was observed to fir* an AAM or rockets. The liXQs target was
apparently a strike aircraft on another target.
■4 %.
.*
331 J
1.
Event HI-273
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-lCs vs three
unidentified
Result: Sighting
Vicinity of Encounter: 2O''55'N/lO'J"20'E
PKlNAar HISSICU AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Time: 22 Hay 1967/li|ii5H
11. DATA SOURCE
»32 THW 221228Z May 196? OPREP-3 TUOC 0<t25ll
12. NARRATIVE
20'30^/103no'E^af iS^JJf fierMlt'"*"^ l". '''^^ ^•''^ '^^ proceeded to
soo fMt M^r ?L ^^^^^ proceeded to 21«»20'M/10*«»53«E at
-.1..^^!) target at 1U«5H, when at a position of 20»WN/10ft«»3O'E »nA »n
liiiraJt "^T^f'^f '"rJ' '""^'S' degree,. BLUE Fllgh? observeS a"uJ?d?ntJ??er
S d^gr^:.^'"^^'' ^" " ^ position. 8-lC miles away and oS a heJdlng
turn ?JtI^arI'iF*R?i!ir''"*5^^''!'^^ ^^"^ Plight's 8 o'clocK position It was observed to
turn into BLUE Flight and head for the clcud deck ac J2.000 fpet f/o slmala wbtb
received on the APR 25/26 nor were any MIO warnings hea^d at tMs time?
7 o'cJoci'Sositfof ^aiuE^ri^hi'*'^ " ^ indications from the
6-7 O'clock ai i2S*rin« «iiSJh''''"^""3? '° receive x-band for three nlnutes from
2l«l8»N/10543'E * «Pensth. The time now was H»50H and the flight was at
— ^ ^^^^ 11^^^ aborted, due to weather, and turned to a leadlna C 240 dsnw«s
and went afterburner at 15,000 feet lASL, when two unidentified al?cr2ft Cere nh™3
' ^"'^ closing. A Check witrEthan ChaJue InSIHted Sr
SSjJSSrJJr^aSS^^irJJieTShra^il/^^ '''' ''''''' Pll£i'Ui~'
3
m
it
1
I
1
a
a
a
Ev«nt III-27«»
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs va two MIC-17s
Reaulta: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: ZI-ia-U/lOS-SU'E
1. PRIHARt MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 22 May 1967/1527H
n. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE OCSCRIPTION
orbit at 6000 ft. XiCJa appeared to set up oroit loi-
burners ar.d departed.
Event II 1-275
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-4Cs va two MIC-lTs
Reaul.ts; No damase
Vicinity of Encounter: 2in7'N/105-'»6'E
1. PRIMARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Time: 22 -lay 1567/1527H
n. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. 'narrative DESCRIPTION Flight
MIG CAP on tn.resa observed two sliver MIGs at a high speed I mile to left. Plignt
bro.ce "rS ?o ?nte?«pt out MIGs disappeared Intc naze.
Event III-276
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105a va one HIG-21
and one HIG-7
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Ha Dong
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlme: 22 May 1967/1605H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
one or rught, '?%tS?!Vpoi^"rmy Barraokc. FUsbt »a» not ensajed
,f unknown type in vicinity or targei . n» .
MIG o
by either.
Event I 11 -277
Aircraft Involved: r'our F-*»Cs vs four HIC-21Da
Result: Two MIGs dc-oLrcyed
Vicinity of Enctanter: 20<»5^ 'N/IOS'SO'E
1. PRIHAR? HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 22 May 1967/1C05H
BLUE flight (four P-^JCs) .as one of two MICCAP flights easlgned to escort an P-105
strike force aVainst JCS 31.00 (the Ha Deng Army Barracks and Supply Depot) on the
southwestern outsxlrts cf Hanoi. >
2. MISSION ROUTE
Deoarted Danunc. dirtct to White Anchor extended refueling track, direct Channel
97 dl^crto taJPi? at 20-9' M/105»'«»'E. direct 20«5O'N/105=O3'E. direct White
Anchor post-strlite refueling track, direct Danang.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
p.OC 3LL-C 1, 3
4 - SPARflOW (AIH-7E)
2 - SIDEWIHDEH (Ai:^-9b)
X - 20mn cannon pod
2 - 370 gallon wing tank:.
1 - QRC-160 ECM poQ
Canouflace paint.
P~«C BLUE 2. t
4 - SPARROW (A1M-7E)
4 - SIDEWi:.'DER (AIM-9B)
1 - 600 gallon centerllni tank
1 - 370 gallsn wlr.g tanit
I - QRC-lbO ECK pod
Camouflage paint.
MIG-2X yiG I. 2. 3. t
Sliver with red stars and bars outlined in yellow on both wings,
AAMs
Ko external stores observed.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Cirrus clouds at 22,000 ft AGL, 1/8 coverage.
25 n ml-
BLUE
I
Visibility at flight level.
Altitude ;
Headi ng:
Speed
1 IT
16,000 ft AGL
090*
500 kts
10-11,000 lbs
Fuel State ;
Plight yormation :
Standard four-ship ECH pod formation.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
Encounter 1 - BLUE flight had heard seven MIG calls while inbound co the target.
BLUE lead was searching at 12 o'clock in response to a "Sullseye" (vicinity of Hanoi)
rail when the Aircraft Concnander visually sighted an unidentified aircraft ahead of the
strike force. The pilot subsequently identified two separate aircraft on radar.
En counter 2 - As 6LUE flight was re.Joining on the tail end of the strike forse
after temiinatlnr Encounter 1 above, BLUE lead looked over his left shouMer to check
his fomation and sighted a MIG-21 closing at a Mgh rate of speed "a slight back froc
6 o'clock to the forrration."
6. ACTION INITIATED
En counter 1 - BLUE lead locked on to one of the suspected WIGs and the flight
accelerated ahead of the strike force in A3. SLOE lead lost sltrht of the aircraft after
It sta-ted a left turn and then reversed to the rl?:ht. ELU^ lead continued a radar
steerlnr d-t pursuit In a hard right turn through a cllir.b, djscent, and level flight.
After approxlrately 100° to 120* of turn, 31UE<^ead could noc establish a lead or cutoff
on the radar tarvet (steering dot in far rlghthUnd side of scope) and elected to break
off and return to the =-rike force. This terminated Encount ;r I.
33*
1
a
a
a
a
0
0
3
I..
r
r
if;
Event III-277
Encounter 2 - ULL'E lead Ir^nedlately Initiated a left turn into the MIC-21. As BLUE
lead l-ntered the turn the MIC fired an AAN at the strike force and pullt-d "P Into a
steep cllnb in a slight left turn. BLUE Lead followed the MIC and flrsd a uIDEWIUDEH
as the MIG was entering a *-hlck cirrus cloud layer. .-lIC clircb angle approximately 50 .
7. SITUATIOH OCVELOPNENT
The MIO disappeared Into the clouds with the r.IDEWINDSR tracJclni; towards its tall-
pipe. BLUE lead rolled off sU^ntlv to the rl?ht and continued through the cirrus clouds
to break out on too and found noth^nf; but snokc and debr l:. floatlnc; above the cloud on the
left. (This kill was later conflrned by an F-105 m the strike force who saw
of debris, one aSouc the size of a wln^ or half a fuselage ^^3^1-1"?/"^:^", a''?"^ JJ 'SJ? "
in this area.) Alr.oct Inr.edlately BLi^-E lead sljrhced another Mia-21 at 1 o cjock about
one mile away. BLUK lead turned Into this Kir, and fired the second SiDE.;^flDER. which
failed to Kulde, r>asr,!nr, off to the rlp:ht and behind tne MIC. The MIG entered a hard
left dlvlns: turn followed by violent evasive naneuverlnc from 25.000 ft to 2000 ft. blul
lead closed on the MIG in the descent and be^an flrins: a slnRle 253 round burst of 20min
cannon durinc the nuUout with no aoparent results. BLUE lead did a pull-up and wing
over" to prevent ah overshot and lined uo behind tne MI3 with good overtake for another
attack. The vie had leveled out "in a shallow j^lldlns fllRht slowly novtng ^-^ wlnS?,
turning left and then right." SLUE lead puUed the trigger as the MIC was passing through
1000 ft; however, the gun Ja.Tjned. BLUE Lead slid off to the left and directed BLUE 2 to
take the MIO. However, SLUE 2 did not have a gun and was not In position to initiate
an imnedlate nlsslle attacs. Although no additional action was taken, the MIG continued
down m a gliding turn to Impact the ground and erupted In a big ball of fire. The
flight, havlnis reached BI.'.'GO fuel, egressed the area without further incident.
8. ORDNANCE
(Ho. f3red/No. hits)
SIDEWINDER 20rm
AIM-gB Cannon
BLUE I 2/1 1/1
MIG 1
9. .EOUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Soviet AAH
1/0
Remarks
253 Rounds 20bct (Tracer every
7th Round} .
Total
p-t
Combat
Hours
Hours
nisslons
BLUE 1
Front
5035
139
254
Back
oil
351
115
Coimnents
Remarks
Had previously flown P-59 in SEA combat
prior to P-Hs.
son l»s«rned Is to keep the orersure on the MIGs and do not give up.
thel- Dllots do not have the quality training and experience our
y make' fatal .xlstakes and often fail to exploit their advantages or
as taken a long time to convince peoole that a run Is needed. This
ns»t^3 for those situations where you are ♦^oo close to use missiles
is 'not comcatlble for rada- mls3lles oi- the SIDEWINDER. The noncom-
not very good at beat. With the fixed sight and boreslght problems
it Is a last dlt^h effort that relies on a trene.ndous volume of f*re
Ideally, we need an Internal gun in the F-4.
Blue 1 - A les
It's quite obvious
pilots have and tiie
capabilities. It h
conflp-.uratlon comco
or the environment
putlng gun sight Is
of an external gun,
to spray the target
n . DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : BLUE 1 (Front) - 23 June 67; telecon with BLUE 1 (Front) - 10 July 68.
Kessaras. Penorts ;
nfA-^-c-j rroT ='A<?T'^L 721 OPREP-3 Serial N'lnber 019, 221030Z . May 67, SECRET.
lel-F^r Jpc'o'fASTEL T'^g. OPHFP-3. Serial Numoer P21, 221300S, riay 67. SECRET/MOPORN .
366TFW; DCO 00163. 2506H5Z, Kay 57, SEC.^^ET.
4» >•
335
Event III-277
12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION /
BLUE rilrht was positioned forward and to the rl(i;ht of the leading group of P-lOSs
•* In the strike force. As the force "passed In the vicinity of Hoa Lac heading east," at
Hj, approximately 16,000 ft AOL (500 Jets, 10-11,000 lbs fuel), F.LK'K 1 (Front) "spotted MIGs
out In front of the formation; - Just an airplane way out that was not supposed to be
there." The pilot (DLUH l-Rear) subsequently Idontlfiert two aircraft on radar. BLUE
lead made « borealght lock-on one of the suspected MIGs and the fllp;ht accelerated
ahead of the strike force in AB (All oxte-nal t.mks had been previously jettisoned when
empty because of numerous MIC calls). BL».£ lead lost sl^nt of tne aircraft after It
started a lef*- turn and then reversed to the right. BLUE lead continued a radar steering
dot pursuit In a hard right turn through a elln;b, descent, and level fllg.'it. After
approximately 100° to 130"* of turn, BLUE l. ad could not establish a lead or cutoff on the
radar target {steering dot In far rlghthand jlde of scope) and elected to break off and
return to the strike force.
As BLUE flight, still In AB, was rejoining on the tall end of the strike force, BLUE
lead looked over his left shoulder to cheek his formation sighted a MIG-?1D closinK
at a high rate of speed "a slight back Trom G o'clock lo the forTiatlon." BLUE lead
immediately Initiated a left turn Into the xrG-21. As BLUE lead entered the turn the
MIO ri^ed an AAK at the strike force and pulled up into a steep cllsb in a slight left
turn. BLUE Lead followed the MIG firing a SIDEWII.'DER just as the MIC was entering a thick
cirrus cloud layer. The MIO had at least a 50* cllnb angle. (The missile was visually
launched at apprcxlnately 1 "g" after a good 10 second loud growl tone. BLUE 1 was at
18,000 ft AGL, Mach 0.92; the MIG was at 21,000 ft AGL, 12 o'clock high In steep cllnb,
range 2-3 ml.}' The MIC disappeared Into the cirrus with tht SIDEMIIJDER in pursuit. BLUE
Lead rolled off slightly to the ri^ht and continued through the cirrus clouds to break
out on top and found nothlni^ but sr.oke ar.d debris floating atove the cloud to his left.
(This kill was later confirmed by an F-i05 in the strike force who saw two pieces of
debris, one about the size of a wing or half a fuselage falling from about 20,000 ft in
this area.)
Almost Iranediately BLUE lead sighted another Min-21 at i o'clock about I mile away.
BLUE lead turned into this MIO and fired the second SIDEWIHDE.'l , which failed to guide,
passing off to the right and behind the MIG. (The ralaslle was visually launched wttli ^he
plpper on the MIG after a "medium" growl, 5 second tone. BLL^ 1 was at 21,000 ft AGL in
a 3 "g" turn. The MIG was at 2 o'clock, range approximately I 7:ile.) The MIG entered a
hard left diving turn followed by evasive maneuvering Including "rapid reversals, snapping,
turning, and twisting". During this descent over Hoa Lac Airfield, the "ground erupted
with antiaircraft fire and five SAMs passed through the rorr.ctlon. " Since BLUE lead was
unable to get a radar lock-on to the maneuverlns; '•■IG, he selected the gun and closed on
him in AB at hlph speed. As the MIG began a pull out at about 2000 ft ACL, BLUE lead
"pulled apsroxlr.ately 7 "p:*8" and hosed hln down good with the run" flrinp; a single 253
round burst of 20rjn cannon with no apparent results. BLUE lead did a pull-up and "wing
over" to prevent an overshot and lined up behind the with good overtake "for a.nother
attack. The MIC had leveled out "tn a shallow gliding flight slowly moving his wings,
turning left and then right." BLUE lead pulled the trigger as the MIG was oasrlng through
1000 ft; however, the gun Jamr.ed. BLUE Lead slid off to tf. ; left and and directed BLUE 2
to take the MIG. However, BLUE 2 did not have a gun and was not in position to initiate
an immediate missile attack. BLuE 2 overshot to the right. BLUE Lead started a climbing
left turn in response to several BINGO fuel calls from the f'.lght. The flight was still
drawing heavy flak at thio time. The MIG "continued in his f:lldlng turn and finally
impacted with the groud Just north of the .^ed River and erupted In a big ball of fire."
The flight egressed the area hlthout furth.r incident.
'This range figure is quoted from the OPREP-3. BLUE 1 (Fron-. ) stated that the range was
possibly 3000 ft but no greatur tha.T one mile - well within launch pararceters.
Event I 11-273
Aircraft Invclved: Pour P-105s vs Two MIG-21S
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20»15'N/105'*10'E
^. PRIMARY MISSION AMD TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 22 May 1967/lDOtiH.
Area .
2. MISSION ROUTE ,
» ^ -r.r-^^ AR TK-,iMnd direct to RED ANCHOR pre-strllte refueling, direct Chanrel
97. <il7ellZ.T^.r. cl^ Iro^hISd Pyrrol .'direct cSar.ne! 97. direct RED ANCHOR post-atrl.e
re fuel ins.
3, AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-IO-^F aLUE 1. 3
1 - 650-r:al centerllne tank
2 - CBU-2^5
1 - AGK-Ub
1 - ECM Pod
' 1 - m61 20r«n cannon
P-1Q5D btUE 2. 'I
2 - i450-sal •••in? tanks
6 - MK 82 bcnbs
1 - m61 2 O.Tim cannon
1 - AIM-90 (BLUE 2 only)
1 - ACK-U5 (BLUE >i only)
1 - ECM Pod
r4TG-21 tao 1. 2
Large nose cone (P or F Model)
Silver color
AAMs (suspected ALKALI)
4 FUBHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
weather: 9000 ft scattered to broken with cumulus buildups In the encounter, visibility
5.7 miles. 'gy^E^^^
T 2 5 ^
Altitude ! 6,500-8,000 ft
Heading ! 260°
Speed; ^80-520 KTAS
FuTrState : 10,000-11,000 lbs
PllB;h»- Formation
Unknown four ship, trolling for SAK sites.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
^ 1 nrtiP Piiirnt was on a headlni; of 260" at 6,500-8,000 ft AGL, «80-520
KTAS ^?H?SEf5i^■ln/a^^c 'v2 SArsUe\^^ of Ho^ Binh when BLUE J sighted a
Slc-h an o'clock to 6LUE lead and 2. This MIG was within gun range when first sighted
and had a high rate of overtake.
Encount*>- 2 BLUE Flight was heading 220^ altitude U.GOO ft and was closing on the
fllrhrT f£er a break whin another MIG-21 attacked the flight from a diving 6 o'clock
position. Initial detectlcr. was outside of 5,00n ft range.
6. ACTION INITIATED
Encounter 1. BLUE Flight Initiated a left break Just as the «IG overshot and passe't
in front of the flight In a left cllsblng turn.
Encounter 2 . BLUE Flight broke down and to the left as the MIG fired at least two
AAHs at the flight.
^ PKcP 3 spates WX iiOOQ ft scat tered; however, this pilot report agrees with flight condi-
tions described In the OPREP and the Interview.
Event III-273
-ul- 52:/^"=-" """""
none of the fliK ht saw tnl3 MIC after the initial attack.
8. OSONANCE
(No. flred/Ho. hits)
BLUE 2
MIG 2
SIDEWINDER
AIM-9B
1/0
Cannon
aBo rd8/0
Soviet AAH
2 or 3
Remarks
BLUE 2 stated that
these were ALKALI
missiles.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS ^
BLUE 2 - The m61 20m cannon was apparently -over^reased or something
Sould come out when fired causins an engine compressor staU.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
and large flames
Total
Hours
750
P-]05
Hours
500
Combat
Missions
42
Remarks
Went directly froci pilot training
to F-1058 - USAPE to SEA.
-Unknown-
BLUE 2, mid-June 1967.
BLUE 2
BLUE 1, 3, <»
"-^U. . - T.e «ra-21 "apparently dove t;-J\5™i?:uriir ZUtloHlrlT.^
cumulus buildups so he knew v.-here we were and to us it was oDVious
n. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
H^^saffes , Reports ; j^,,?^ mov 67 OPREP-3 HINNACLE 022. SECRET.
Ill ircS plfTit llli: lllllli MaJ SpREP.^ pinnacle 023. SECRET.
U. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTION for SAM
BLUE Flight had preceded \t l^ll IT
Sites alons the Ingress route In the = ^ ciSsriv--" Hoa Blnh to investigate
?he target area near Kano . f « [J^f ^^^f ^ J^!" !t 6 S"lock'tS BLUE lead and 2. (BLUE
an active SWl Site when oLUE -* called aGL. ^83-520 KTAS.) This NIG was
Plight was heading approximately .60» at 6500-8000 ^- At^W J ^^^^^ ^^^^^^ him to
within gun range when first sighted anj had a ^^^eak.* There was no
overshoot and pass In front of BLUE Flight on ^"^^^ "'^ Flight eased the left turn
indication that the MIG fired ^"^ J^^??;",^^^?'' PJ^us-.top up Ingled off and I could
as the HIO pulled up in front of the rilg"^ 3D up zo us top v
ale a large nose cone which is a D or F Model . . k .
BLUE 1 gave the Jead to BLUE 2 "^o^Jf^^/n-^ri^f ,*-$j3nC^'sfi:it:rS Si'is on the
switched fron conventional f ;°,?J;J^^*?blU^'2 did not ?urn -p the missile tone volume
sight, and conflnjed a |-|«2^.7,f,J|,-if f,' ^/^^^f^^^^ J missile ?on or growl.) This
and subsequently ^^^^^f^J.^^^^rJ" pulling an estlm-t.^d 1 1/2 g's. BLUE 2
MIG-21 continued a cll-^blns V^'^^.^ laxed g's and fired an AIH-9P. At launch the
placed the sight reticle 0" • "iJJ^'^aDnroxl-.ately 150D ft to one mile range. 10 to
MIG was 20 to 50 degrees above the ^orl-on. approxlr^ateiy 5 q^. The SIDE-
12.000 ft ACL, BLUE 2 J, iibo f^^low and to the right. (A satisfactory
llZlnl'^llt ^Sefk^rad^C^en"a=romrU3^:d!^°5^Wh;n\ prefllghted It. liU. .ost of our mis-
alles here, it was well pitted.")
.r— ■ RfiiF pn-h- brcke h ard left and down reversing to the right causing
S""o""rth«?! Soi^v^t'BLurf ««S th« the MIO »a. cut In frcnt of the
time they reacted for a left break.
338
Event III-J78
The HIC started a dive to the left and BLUE 2 "put' the plpper way out In front of hln
and hosed until he flew thrcu^th It. As I did this ~. t^ot lar^e flarries out of the gun and the
conpreacor stalled. It was .just like put'lnu; my r.petid brakes on". This action was
repeated for two additional I'lr'ini; surctG for a total of rounds of 20nm cannon fire.
{BLUE 2 stated tnat the cannon attack was Ineffective since he had fired at an esciraated
range of »i500 ft, "well out of gun ran^e").
At this point, three SAKs were spotted by the flight which broke "hard down and to
the left" dlsent;av:lr.i; from the KIC' As BLUE Lead was JolnlnR on BLUE 2, another MIG-21
"came In behind us and fired either 2 or 3 of those ALKALI missiles. He flreo In about
a 30* dive on us the first tl.rie and, cf course, the missile had very little effect. It Just
went down into the ground. As he pulled up rhe next one went past us ... . We were In
a hard left turn". This KlU-el was not scer< aitaln ifter this brief encounter. SLUE Fllp^ht,
now at ^00 ft AGL, started a cllnb out on a westerly hbsdlnf;. Tlic flight made one last 360**
sweep or the area an;! egressed without further Incident.
»The OPREP states that tnl= '/.Id started a clinblng left turn and fled on a heading of 020®
after the AIM-9B missile launch. :t further stated that 3LUE Fliaht terminated this Ini-
tial eni^a^ement by breaking down and to the Itft at 0S092 and then headed west. It reports
a second MIG en^ac^enent at apcroxi:nately OdllZ, vicinity of 20*50'N/105°05'E with BLUE
Flight "headint; 220°, altltLide ^000 ft. Another r-:ig-21 came on fron 6 o'clock hlp.h. MIG
closed to approximately ^UOO ft anc launched two AAf'iS. BLUE (sic) Flight brok« down to
the left, back to the rl?;hL , ana back to the left. Both AAMs passed behind the flic:ht
as they made their first break to the left. (Since it was not possible to correlate the
interview data with the OPPEP, both data are provided for this portion of the encounter.)
Event III-279
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105a vs t«o MIC-21»
r Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Ha Dong
I. PRIMWV MISSION AWO TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/rine: 22 Kay 1967/161IH
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Stuly 6-68,
12. NAftfMTIVe OESCRtPTION
Ha Dong strUta flight sighted two MIGs In target area but no attempt was nade to
engage.
Event III-2P0
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-I05s vs one HIC-21
Raaults: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Unknown
1. PRIKAtV HISSIOR ARO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlae: 22 Hay 1967/Unknown
n. DATA SOURCE
CIMCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
''st^^rhL^t\'l^tei on. Sliver MIO approach at 6 o'clock position within 1-1/2
•ilea of flight In a harraasment type pass, then pull away.
Event III-281
Aircraft Involved: Four P-lOSs V9 one HIG-17
Results: Slanting only
Vicinity of Encounter:
I. PRIRARY RISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dat«/Tl«es 2* May 1967/after 1715H
II. DATA SOURCE
CIKCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARBATIWE DESCRIPTION
Outbound strike fllRht observed one MIO at low level but no attempt was made to en-
gag?.
Event III-282
Aircraft Involved: Three P-*»Cs V9 cne
unidentified
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21'»55'N/105'»'*0 'E
I. PRIMART MISSION AMD TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlno: 26 May 1967/U858H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
MIG CAP sighted an unllentlfled aircraft, turning from 3-H o'clock low, 6 "IJes dis-
tant. Pll^ttSmeU to investigate but bogey turned north and departed. It -as no threat
to strike force.
Event III -2 8 3
Aircraft Involved: Six P-^Cs vs two unidenti-
fied
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«15'N/106«««0'E
I. PRIHARy MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 30 "'^y i"9o7/l6lOH
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike escort flights sighted two bogeys at 10 o'clock high but unidentified aircraft
were too far away to make positive Identification.
Event Iir-28l»
-4^
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105S " four MIG-17»
Result: No damage
Vicinity rf Encounter: Unknown
1. PRINARy MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 30 May 1967/1516H
Four P-105S (BLUE Flight) were approaching the roll- In point for an attack against,
a SAM site (Lead 52} when they were attacked by four HIG-17s.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
8. ORDNANCE
A section of NIGs fired at BLUE I and 2 in a head-on pass. Ko hits war* scored.
11. DATA SOURCES
Message: 355TFW/OPREP-3/3O1505Z Way 1967
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
During an attack on a SAM site, Lead 52, BLUS Plight was attacked by four MIC-178.
The MIGs attacked rrom the northwest, four o'clock to BLUE Flight which was turning
right at an altitude of '»500 ft and a speed of 150 kts. BLUE 1 (Lead) and 2 continued
the attack on the SAM site while BLUE 3 and H turned into the attacking MICs. BLUE 3
and 0 went through the MIG formation which was spread line abreast with the elenents
approximately 1500 ft apart, 1000 ft AGL. As the MIG elenents split » one el?nent of two
MIGs broke to the rlehc, headed south and was not seen again. The other element (MIG 3
and H) broke left. BLUE 3 and »» Jinked left-right then headed back to Join SLUE 1 and 2.
MIG 3 and 4 engaged BLL;e: 1 and 2 In a head-on pass and fired at a range of approximately
2500 ft while clir.blng Into BLUE 1 as BLJE 1 and 2 were descending toward the MIGs. Mo
hits resulted. - MIG 3 and passed approximately 1200 ft below BLUE 1 and 103 ft below
BLUE 2. As the MIG turned Tor another attack, BLUE 1 and 2 engaged afterburner and
egressed the area, in conpany with BLUE 3 and , without further Incident.
BLUE
Altitude ;
Headlng r
Speed :
1 3 *•
U500 ft
Turning through a southerly heading, in
a turn to the right
540 kts
^1 Event 111-285
Aircraft Involved: Three F-105s vs four NI3-178
«^ Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*10 'N/loe^ftO'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Date/Tlae; jo 1967/1612H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Zngresalng 3trli<e Tllgnt observed four 'MGa In right turn toward flight but flight
continued, losing slgnt of MlOs. :«o ordnance was exchanged.
Event Iir-286
Aircraft Involved: Four F-lO^s va four rtIG-173
Results: Sight in 15 only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«'21'«/106»17'E
I. PRIHART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 30 May 1967/l6l6H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. ' NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight was rolUns on target when No. 2 observed flight of four MIGs approxi-
mately 4 utiles east of Kep, headed west at 2-3000 ft and climbing.
Event III-287
Aircraft Involved: Two P-105a vs four MIC-i7a
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"l6'N/106»li'E
I-
IT 1. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
J^^^ Date/Time: 30 May 1967/16 16H ^
11. DATA SOURCE
(7, CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Numbers 3 and U of strike flight pulled off target. Passing throush 3000 ft they
J * observed four ::iGs -ipprcachin.i; from 5 o'clock In a left sweeping turn but ..IQs overshoot
filght and ;4ur.bers 3 and U continued to egress wltn no further contact.
t tt >
I
Event 111-288 J
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105» v* one KIO-IT
Results: No damage I
Vicinity of Encounter: 2in»l'N/106-20'E "
I. PRIHART HISSIOH WO TACTICAL SlTUATtOR g
Date/Time: 30 Hay 1967/l6l6H ^ •
II. DATA SOURCE _
CIKCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68. ■
into afterburSer and MIO could not maneuver to Intercept. Q
1
Event IIIr289 ^
Aircraft Involved: Pour ?-^Cs vs unidentified .J
Results: Sighting only
vicinity of Encounter: 20-tt5*H/107**5*E m
I. PRIMARY MISSION AHO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 30 May 1967/1635H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
0
1
1
I
9
Event IXI-290
Aircraft Involved: Four P-"'^* J* l\l
and three MIG-Zis
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Kep. Airfield
I. PRIMARY MISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlme: 30 May 1967/1656H
II. DATA SOURCE
CIHCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
alerted flight to Kias on two occasions.
344
0
a
1
Event III-291
Aircraft Involved: Four P-'iCs vs four MIG-17s
Reaulta: One P-'tC lost
Vicinity of Encounter: ai^lT'N/loe^aZ'E
While covering the egress of
1. miMART Mission AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/TlBie: 31 May 1967/1551H
Four P-ftCs {BLUE Flight) were on a MIOCAP mission,
the strike group, four MIG-17 fighters were engaged.
2. MISSION ROUTE
PanAnr and Drocee<led -ilrectly to TAN AUTHOR refueling, thence to points
locat^J^ll lo^r^^^^^^^ 2lO22'»/i06«>l6'E (target). 21«05<N/
107»28'E, 20»07'N/107»ii3'E, TAN AIJCKOR, Danang.
J. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F,,llC 3LL-E 1. 2, 3. "
k SPARROW (AIH-7E)
2 SIDEWIIJCER (Air<-99)
1 SUU-16 2CnvT gun pod . ^. ^ m\
(QRC-160 poda and external fuel tanks Indicated)
MIO-17
Silver color with red stars on the wings
«. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Scattered clouds, good vlslhlllty
BLUE
1 2 2 ii-
10,000-12,000 ft
090"
500 kt
11.000 lb
Pod formation, echelon left
Altitude !
KeadlngT
Speed :
Fuel State ;
Flight Format Ion ;
5. INITIAL DETECTION
A "MIGs In the area" warning was received approximately two minutes before they
were sighted. BLUE l (Lead) sighted the MIOs at 3 o'clock low at 2 miles heading 270
in a right turn. The MIGs were In a trail formation.
6. ACTION INtTIATEO
As the MIOs appeared to be turning to engage the strike force, BLUE 1 announced to his
flight that he was engaging the MIGs and made an lamedlate descending right turn Into the
HIOs.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
observed by any member of BLUE Plight. Before BLUE 3 completed another firing run,
BLUE l called BINGO for the flight. The P-Ua disengaged from the MIOs and departed.
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
BLUE 3
(No. flrcd/No. hits)
SPARROW SIDEWINDER SUU-16
AIM-9B 20mm
AIM-7E
0/0
0/0
0/0
0/0
900/0
300/0
Remarks
Unable to position for a
missile shot.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEHS
BLUE 4 missed a call from BLUE 1 to changed radl;
to coRimunleate Mlth the flight.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
EiPTlenee ;
Event Iir-291
frequency and therefore was unable
Total
Hours
3500
P-it
Hours
200
Combat
Missions
50
BLOE 3
Cowroents on this Encrauntgr: BLUE 3 - "One thing we 1 .:rned Is that we want to try to keep
more zuns an the HIGs. Since then we've worked out a procedure where the lead fires and
t, U number three positions hinself for a firing pass. When the lead
pulls off. nuaber three starts firing. This way they can provide each other top cover and
at the same tine get nore fire pcwer against the enemy."
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ;
Wesaages. Renorts ;
BLUE 3. 22 June 1967
366TPW/OPREP-3/311'*OOZ May 19 67
366TPW/orREP-3/011130l June 1967
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight was providing MIGCAP for a strike against target JCS 3Q.'»3. As the F^kCa.
commenced an attack against the enemy, the MICs went into a tight, in-tvall circle iden-
;i . * Wheel. BLUE 1 and 2 made four firing passes from aporoximacely the
10 o'clock position from the MIGa. BLUE 3 and 4 made one firing pass from the Uoq
o'clock position from the MIGs. The MIOs continued In a tight circle and Increased their
turn rate as the F-UCz fired. BLUE U reached SIKCO fuel and attempted to notify BLUE I.
but because he had missed a frequency change BLUE 1 never heard the call fron BLUE 4.
Eventually BLUE H broke away fron the flight and coranenced egress with 3500 lb of fuel
which was more than adequate to reach the tankers. After Selng vectored to tankers
equipped only with unusable drogue type refueling, BLUE a finally turned toward the
aircraft carriers on YANKEE STATION, and with only 200 lb of fuel remt^inlng, ,nade prepara-
tlona to eject. Both crewmenbers ejected safely and were quickly recovered.
During the MIG encounter accurate 65-™ AA fire was observed. BLUE U also experienced
control diiflcultles just prior to losing sight cf BLUE 3. Because of the high
s
3«6
i
-T^jK* Event III-2y2
Aircraft Involved: Four F-'JCs vs one MIG-17
Result: No lamage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21'>?0'H/106'>35'E
T. PRIRARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 31 May 1967/1610H
BLUE Flight, four P-hCs, was providing MIGCAP Tor JCS target 39.^*3 ■ At the time
Of the encounter the night was outbound from the target area.
2. HISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight departed Danan;; and proceeded to the TAM ANCHOR aerial refueling area
then via direct routes through the following points: 20»07 'N/107*«»3 'E; 21*05'.V107"28*E;
target 21*22 'N/IOd^ld 'E. The return route was the reverse trade.
3. AIRCRAFT COKFIGURATIONS
F'kC BLl'E 1. ?. 3.
4 SPARROW (AIN-7E) One P^tC loaded with 3 AIM-7
BLUE 1. 3
2 SIDEWINDER (AI.'I.QB)
1 Sini-l6 gun (1200 rd 20.'am)
BUJE 2. 1
«l SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B)
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Clear sky, visibility i;r?ater than 15 nlles
BLUE
_i 2 2 SL
Altitude ; 10,000-li< ,000 ft
Heading : 120°
Speed : 500 kt
Plight Formation : Fighting wing
5. INITIAL DETECTION
NIG warnings relative to BULLS EYE had been received between IS^OH and IS53H. One
MIG>I7 was sighted at 1710H In the 5 o'clock position to BLUE Flight.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE Plight broke to the right and observed the MIC to follow the turn.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Flight rolled wings level, zoom climbed for altitude and reversed their turn.
The MIG disengaged, descended and was lost from view.
11. DATA SOURCE
Messages ; 366TFW/OPREP-3/311115Z May 1967 ' ^
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
While providing MICCA? for a strike flight. BLUE Flight sighted a single MIG-17 at
their 5 o'clock position. Frcm their fighting wing formation BLUE Flight broke right.
Observing the MIG to follow the turn, BLUE Fllgi-.t rolled wings level, -^oon climbed and
reversed the turn. As BLUE Flight was naneuverlng to attack, the MIG turned to the
west and disappeared front sight as he descended. BLUE Plight turned outbound arid con-
tinued egress from the area.
Event I I 1-2 9 3
Aircraft Involved: Three F-105a vs two HIG-21S
Results: Vo damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«25'N/106«»JI2'E
I. PRINART MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 31 May 1967/16U8H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Sdff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Flak suppression fllsnt on egress observed two silver MIGs In rleht turn, 3000 ft
below Lead and No. 2. Lead Oroice down to engage but HIOs went into an even tighter rlgnt
turn and passeJ head-on below Lead. No ordnance was exchanged.
Event III-29*
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-1058 »a four MlG-lTs
Results: SlRhtlng only
Vicinity of Encounter: Kep Airfield
I. PRIHARY NISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 31 Kay 1967/1650K
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Pulling off target, strike flight observed two elements of two MlOa .'sach orbiting
Sep Airfield. KIGs were In right hand turn at 2000 ft.
Event III-295
Aircraft Involved: Four P-IOS* »« two HIG-l7s
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Kep Airfield
I. PRIHARY HISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 31 May 1967/1650H
II. DATA SOURCE -
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68. "•«■
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
A3 they were rolling on target, strike flight observed twa HIOs on easterly heading
and approximately 1 mile east of target at 2-3000 ft. MICs were probably one of the
elements sighted by flight of Event III-29't.
I-
S^jfj^ Svent III-296
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s vs six MIG-?
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*14 'N/107'05*E
I. PaiMARt MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 31 May 1967/16 50H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flisnt on e^reas noted four unidentified KlCs at 21" 20 ' tl/ 107° 16' Z and two un-
identified KIGs at 21*1U'"/106'59'H:- The flight was at 12,000 ft and climbing and the
XICs were at iOOO to 3000 ft. Flight was unable to observe markings. MIGs appeared to
[ be camouflaged . The sun angle and clruds precluded positive Identification and the KICs
r
[
it
I
did not maneuver.
Event I I 1-297
Aircraft Involved; Pour F-4Cs vs one MIG-17
(possible)
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Pl'lS'N/loe^lS'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time; 31 May 19b7/1700K
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Escort flight sighted a possible MlG-17 directly below. The MIG was sliver and at
1000 ft. The fllsht was at 2000 ft. No attempt was made to engage. PIRAZ called on
egress that bandit was 5 riiles south and trailing, out flight was unable to sight bandit.
Event III-298
Aircraft Involved: Four F-IO^s vs two KIC-21s
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*20 *N/106*28'E
I. PRIMARY RISStON ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 2 June 1967/0930H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
The strike flight was approached by two silver HICs from 7 o'clock position. The
flight was at 16,000 ft and the MlCa caise up from 7-8000 ft. The flig.it Jettisoned all
ordnance « turned hard lt;ft and then right. The MIGs were not observed again.
319
Event 111-299
Aircraft Involved: Four P-^^s V5 Eieht to Ten MIG-lTa
Result : Three MM kill "probables"
Vicinity of Encounter: 21-'20'N/106«22'E
1 PRIMAM MISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATION
the first F-105 flight.
2. HISSIOH ROUTE ^ ^ nt^^t to the Brown refueling track over
BLUE flight departed 'J^on.f JSJ JJlSf^S^ftSSn !!Sr?S tS 21-05 ' n/107- 28" E,
IS rii:crtr2iiSo^ino^"2?:E:' ilVu^VlVJUUe^ and subsequently egreaaed
over the reverse route.
3. AIRCRAFT COHFIGURATtOHS
P.ao BLUE 1
I; - SPARROW (AIM-7E)
a - FALCON (AIM-ttD)
1 - ALQ-71 pod
1 - 370 gallon wlngtank
1 - 600 gallon centerllne tank
g.UC BLUE 2. 3. A
]) - SPARROW (AIM-7E)
tl - SIDEWINDER (AIM-9B)
1 - ALQ-71 pod
1-370 gallon wlngtank
1 - 600 gallon centerllne tank
MIG 1>10
Unknown.
Weather: 7/8 broken overcast with base at im.uwu
diottds.
BLUE
MIO
T 2 3 ^ ^ ^
8.000 ft 1.000 ft
Altitude : 282» orbit
Heading : 55O KTAS Unknown
Speed : Unknown, protjably Unknown
Fuel State : 10-11,000 lb
Flight Formation
Pod fomatlon.
bound to the target area, when f /J,^" "^^ Ailed out by an P-105 fUght and BLUE 3
E^rs nor?^.^s2s."i-\'S^'
to right. Time was approximately 1529H.
*rr."«""l.. .n. » t.. l.r. .0 ...n ..pa«t«„ ena ».n .o„ rUKt .o
achieve firing position.
no aamase to BLUE FlljM.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. rired/fJo. hits)
Event III-259
BLUE 1
SPARROW
AIH-7E
1/1
FALCOfI
AIM-'^D
2/?
SIDEWINDER
AIM-QB
Remarks
Two AIH-TEs observed guiding.
One A1M-7E went high. Both
AIM-<iDs appeared to track,
one 15 ft nlsu observed.
One
Two appeared to track,
not observed.
Observed for 3-5 seconds and
was guiding.
BLUE 2 . 3/7
BLUE 3 1/7
BLUE U
MIC 1-10 Two of the MI0-17a were observed firing their cannons with no hits.
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 - Two Ai.-i-itDs cooied off (ran out of time) and could not be used. UKP radio
receiver trouble.
BLUE li - Utility hydraulic failure shortly after engagement began.
to. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
BLUE 1
Front
Back
BLUE 2
Front
Back
Total
Hours
1900
519
850
t7l
P-ft
Hours
26S
260
480
187
Combat
Missions
99
105
82
38
Remarks
Previous TAC tours In '-JWII and Korea.
Five previous alr-to-alr engagements,
four confirmed KIG kills In SEA.
First tour out of pilot tralnln?. ICOO
hrs previous RO tine In ADC (P-lOl).
Seven months In theatre. Two SPARRCWa
previously fired In training.
No prevlouf live firings - cany simulator
runs. 2.5 yrs rated, no orevious MIC
encounters.
No previous live firings - many simulator
runs. Two years rated, no previous HIG
encounters.
2700
250
8«
Air Training Command Instructor,
previous MZG encounters.
No
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 1 - Charging SPARROW-type training Is not satisfactory for combat.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews : Aircrew letter - BLUE 3 (Front), 5 July 1968.
Messages J Reports :
OPREP-3 8TFW OO2133OZ June 67, DOI 06OI8. June 67.
OPREP-3 366TFW P021355Z June 67, DCOI 005 June 67.
Supplement 8TFW P0307052 June 67, DI O6O36 June 67.
Aircrew's AIM-7D-E missile performance reports.
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPriON jj^.^^g
« iftc^^y^.!^^*^*^ '^'^l "IShss from Ubon RTAP3 asr l?ned to fly HIGCAP far an
!r ^,?!''^^*/°r*^* TakhU RTAFB. Refuelln;;, strike force rendezvous, and Inrress
was .itfiout Incident until the farce arrived In the vicinity of 21'20'II/106*'Z2 'E " At
this time BLUE Fllf^ht was at 8000 ft, 550 KTAS , on a headlnp; of 282°, In Pod formation
^B?n..^Jw°*^'' sighted by BLUE 3 Oack) at 10 o'clock low {1000 ft AOL) passing
under BLUE Plight In a hard left turn. The OPREP3 do not state definitely, but apparently
S?™ ; z^***!^ headed toward the north and passing from BLUE Flight's left to right,
BLUE 3 (Back) called out the HICa to BLUE Flight.
BLUE Plight, reacting In elements of two aircraft each, pulled up and left to gain
Jnfnc^^ "^*o?,.^^^? ^""^ ^-^^"^ ^^^^^ achieve firing position. Both elecient leaacrs.
i. * ! unable to fire due to the high anple off that the HIGs generated
'"^-^^ ^""^ ^"'^^ ^^^^ PUgnt. Both blue elenents broke up
and hard right. The .-JIGs did not follow the ?-Us as they roomed, but a HIC-i7 was
Observed firing as he passed between BLUE I and 2 at the top of the zooa. The film
thought that this MIG was holdlnis hlch and "pounced" after their first attack. BLUE lead
. urS**,; ^" * '^ov® to attack. BLUE 1 closed on one of
SIX MlG-173, pulled lead and fired one AI>l-i<D, with 50*-60» angle off. BL"E X was at
0.95 Mach (620 KTAS), 1000-1500 ft AGL. about 3 i?'s, 150 kts overtake, =los'e range (exact
range unknown), with a high growl for a tone. The MIG was In a hard left turn The
missile appeared to track but BLUE 1 was fo:ced to break hard left to avoid a head-on
collision with four MIOs ejid to avoid heavy automatic weapon ard 37mra antiaircraft fire
from Kep Airfield. BLUE 1 separated from the MICs and as he turned to reengage, he
observed an aircraft crash Into the ground in a huge fireball about one mile north of Kep.
BLUE 3 and zoomed to 12,000 ft after the first pass and observed the lead element
at-.arw in on their second pass. BLUE 3 then dived down on a second pass but again could
2?^; "ofnc^li'* ""Sf? *"^^f ^^^A ^^''^ angle, airspeed," and pulled off to the
n*J£: ^ ~? °^ ^5"™ ^'^^ t)roke hard left loosing sight
of the HIG-lTs. As BLUE 3 roxled back to the right he observec three KIG-I7s apparently
or7r4"f to land at Kep Airfield. The MIGs were In trail about 1/2 to 1 mile apart!
BLUE 3 rolled Into a shallow dive about 2-3 nlles south of Kep Airfield and headed for
the number two MIG. The riIGs were 1/2 to 1 mile off the end of the southwest runway
(northeast of Kep) and BLUE 3 was 1 to 2 miles south of Kep nearly parallel to the Korth-
tflt Railroad at about 2000 ft and 500 kts when BLUE 3 (Back) called ,. "lock-on." and
BLUE 3 fired one AIM-7E missile.* BLUE 3 was flying an aircraft modified to provide an
"""ch to full system lock on after a boreslght lock on. BLUE 3 observed the
! J a?n^ ^''^i^^w'^ guide," for 3-5 seconds. BLUE 3 was getting heavy ground fire
and BLUE U called that he was experiencing utility hydraulic failure so BLUE 3 broke
right without observing the missile results. (Heavy 85ffJn fire with bursts at 8000 ft
was reported In the Kep area.) BLUE 3 and 4 egressed the area for an efflergency recovery
at Danang. a ^ *
BrT»> V^ltJJ^^'^^^ reengage the MIGs still in a left turn over Kep.
BLUE 1 at 1000 ft AGL. 0.95 Mach (620 KTAS) locked on to a MIC-17 at an estimated 5000 ft
range, auto^track. Inter-locks out, full system, narrow gate and fired three AIM-7E
missiles In ripple at 3500 ft range US" angle off of the MIG's tail while pulling In
2.5 g s. The target was at 1000 ft AGL In a ha.-d left turn, at 0.9 Mach. Again BLUE 1
was forced to break left by additional Mia-173 In a head-on pass and Intense antiaircraft
fire from the Kep area. He did not observe the missile results but did observe that the
first and third missile "tracked beautifully" and the second missile "headed high and for
parts unknown." **
oTire f'^ ^A^'tu^ ^^frM^^r-.^^J'* ^f***" ^^'^ "'^ ^ Single MIG-17 above him in a left turn.
BLUE 2 fired three ArM-9B missiles In rapid succession at 20« angle off. 3500 ft range,
with a good r.rowl. The target aircraft was in an easy left climbing turn at missiles
launch. BLUE 2 was at 0.85 to 0.9 Mach (5^0 to 570 KTAS), 'JOOO ft altitude pulling about
2 g s at launch. Two of the missiles appeared to track. The third missile was not
observed. BLUE 2 did not see the missiles Lit because he broke hard left and down to
rejoin blue i.
•The OPREP-3 reports BLUE 3 fired at 0-9 Mach (500 KTAS). 6000 ft altitude at 1.5 miles
range in a dive, 70«» head-on to the MIG-17 which was headed 2HC^ at 800 ft AGL and 0.9 Mach.
Event III-299
BLUE 1 saw BLUE 2 In a left turn and called hltn to break rlrht for rejoin. GLUE 1
then saw a rMG-17 in rirln-: position on DLUE 2 with cannons t)la2ln;5. BLUE 2 responded
to a '"break" call and evadu-d ths MIG. ULUE 1 turned to ensage the MIG-17, and encountered
an additional fllr.ht of four >!IG-lTs near Kep. One :^lG-i7 made a head-on pass and BLUE I
flrea an AVA-UD. The plpper was on the target. BLUE 1 was at 0.95-1 -0 Mach (620-660
KTAS), 1000-1500 ft altitude, pulling about 3 g's with no recollection of tone. The
missile passed about 15 feet under the MIS, 6ut since the missile does not have a prox-
Inlcy fuze it did not detonate. BLUE Flight observed a second huge fireball at
2l«30'N/106»19'E about this time.
BLUE Plight, at BIS'GO Tuel^ egressed and called the other ?-k flight into the area.
However, BLUE FliRht's MIG encounter Is the only one reported on this date. A third
huge fireball was observeu at 2l«»22'K/106«38*E at 1640H during egress. Official sources
do not list any kills or probables on this date.
353
Event III-300
Aircraft Involved: Eight F-1053 vs two HlC-21s
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«19'S/106«»30'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOK
Date/Time: 2 June 1967/1015H
1!, DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
inbound strike flight of four F-105S observed J'-J^^?' f ^iS'SJ?, ^J't S^SeS
second strike flight which was Just diving on target.
Event III-30I
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-J>C8 vs one MIO-17
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Kep Airfield
I. PRIMARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: 2 June l967/l630a
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
HIG CAP night sighted one MIQ. 7-8 miles due east of *^^f ^JoJ^^N^Ut^o'E beJiSn
also saw P-Us and silver aircraft engaged in aerial battle ''••^''Ji.^? N/106 30 £ between
hnrn «nrf Rooo ft (see Event III-302). liLUE lead observed ar. orange fireball at oomua m
5?S?rS?i?62?6'E iSlIh Appeared to be a large POL explosion or an aircraft striking the
ground.
Event III-302
Aircraft Involved: Two P-I05s vs four MIG-17s
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»l6'M/106»ll'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Tine: 2 June 1967/1$33K
U. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Ken strike flight was proceeding into target ?rca when Lead and Mo. 2 no^f^^^f®"^
,ii««r MICs af-hetr 6 o'clock position, and the XIGs were L-1/2 miles from flight on
si^ Jeilil^g! TSe fllgSt started cli«b to target and the MICs could not keep up.
Event III-303
Aircraft Involved: Four ?-H vs Eight to Ten
MIG-17S
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"'20'H/106»22*E
c
r
L
L;
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 2 June 67/1628K
BLUE flleht was one of two rilRhta of F-tt aircraft (see Event 111-301) aasUned MICCAP
for the ^SSTFW P-105 force. The F-« fllsshtc rendezvoused with the P-105 force
me and accompanied the last F-1C5 flight Into tao t.ari'.et area. The other F-1 flight acco...-
ing and accompan
panled the first P-105 flight.
2. HISSION ROUTE
BLUE flight departed t'bon RTAFB, Thailand, direct to the Brown ref-.ellng track over the
3ulf of Tonkin wUh drop-off at 19 = i.'0 ' N/ 106*22«E. The flight then engaged MIGs and sub-
sequently eRressed over the reverse route.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATION
F-i>D BLUE 1
U - SPARROW (AIH-7E)
ti - FALCON (kVA'HD)
1 - ALQ-71 pod
1 - 370 gallon wlngtank
1 - 600 gallon centerllne tank
F-1C BLUE 2.3.'*
H - SPARROW {AIM-7E)
• H - SIDLWINDER (AIK-9B)
I - ALQ-71 pod
1 - 370 gallon wlngtank
I - 600 gallon centerllne tank
MIG- 17 MTG ItJ'iO
Unknown.
4. 'flight conditions prior to ENCOUNTER
Weather: 7/8 broken overcast with base at 1^,000 ft. About 7 miles visibility below clouds,
BLUE
MIG
Altitude ;
Heading ?
Speed:
Fuel State;
8,000 ft
282"
550 KTAS
Unknown, probably
ICII.OOO lb
I - 10
1,000 ft
Left orbit
Unknown
Unknown
Plight Formation
Pod formation.
5. INITIAL DETECTION
No MIC warning calls were received. 2LUZ flight «^*cortlng the F-105 force in-
bound to the target area, when five or six KIG-17s passed "f^^LU. night .n a hard lef.
turn at about 1300 ft AOL. The MIOs were called out by an F-105 fUaht and ELLE 3 Oackj
at about the same time. Apparently the MIGs were headed North, passing frota lefw to
right. Time was approximately 1523H.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight pulled up and to the left to gain separation and then dove hard right to
achieve firing position.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The MIGs reversed rl^ht end a melee ensued in which BLUE flight fired three 2?,;?.RCW5
(AIM-7E), three SIDEWINDER^ (Aia-9B) and two FALCONS (AIM-i*D). At least two yil^-l.^ fired
their ca.'.>'wr.; it 2LUB flight.
355
I
ORDNANCE
BLOE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
BLUE 1
(No. rired/Mo. hits)
SPARROW
AIM-7E
3/?
PALCOM
AIH-M
SIDEWINDER
AIW-9B
2/1
3/?
1/?
Event III«303
Reaaplca <
Two AIM-7E3 observed «culdlng. One AIM-7E:
went high. Both AIK-tDs appeared to. track,
one 15 ft miss observed. i
Two appeared to track. One not observeil.
Observed for 3-5 seconds and was sulding.
WO I-IO Two of the KI0-17S were observed firing their cannons with no hits.
9. EQUIPKENT PROBLEHS
BLUE 1 - Tfo Alfi-iiOs cooled off Cran out of time) and could not be used,
receiver trouble.
BLOE 4 - Utility hydraulic failure shortly after engagement began.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
Experience
Total
Hours
URP mdlo
P-4
Hours
Combat
Wissions
Remarks
BLUE 1
Front
Back
BLUE 2
Front
Back
BLUE 3
Front
4900 268
519
850
260
480
474 187
2700
250
99
105
82
38
84
Previous TAG tours In WWII and Korea.
Five previous air-to-air engagements,
four confirmed KIO kills in SEA.
First tour out of pilot training. 1000 hrs
previous RO time In ADC (P-lOl). Seven
months in theatre. Two SPARROWs previously
fired in traini.ng. j
Ho previous live firings - many simulator
runs. 2 1/2 years rated, no previous HIG
encounters .
No previous live firings - many simulator
runs. Two years rated* no previous HIG
encounters .
Air Training Co.iunand Instructor,
previous MIG encounters.
No
Comments from Overall Experience
BLUE 1 - Charging SPARROW-type training is not satisfactory for combat.
11. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews ; BLUE 1 (Front) 4 June 1967, Aircrew letter - BLUE 3 (Front),
5 •July 1968.
Mesa age J . Reports:
OPREP - 3 BTFW 0021330Z June 67, DOI O6OI8, June 67.
OPREP-3 366TFW P021355Z June 67, DCOI 005 June 67.
Supplement 8TFW PO307052 June 67, 01 06036 June 67.
Aircrew's AiM-7D/E missile performance reports.
12. NARRATIVE OtSCRlPTION
BLUE flight was one of two F-'* flights from Ubon P.TAFB assigned to fly HIOCAP for an
F-105 strike force from Takhll RTAFB. Refueling, strike force rendezvous, and Ingress
was without incident until the force arrived in the vicinity of 21''20'tJ/106°22'E. At thl
time BLUE fllghr was at 9000 ft, 550 KTAS, on a heading of 282°,
or 6 «IG-17s were sighted by BLUE 3 (Back) at 10 o*'?lock low (lOt
this
in Pod formation when
iOOO ft ACL) passing under
BLUE flight In a hard left turn. TheOPREPs do not state definitely, but apparently 'the
MIGs were headed toward the Morth ana passing from BLUE flight '3 left to right. BLOE 3
(Back) called out the MIGs to BLUE flight.
356
1
a
a
a
1
a
1:
D
Q
a
a
a
3
a
3
Event 111-303
SLUE flight, reacting In eler.ents of two aircraft each, pulled up and left to Rain
Separation and then dove hard right to achieve firlnt; position. Both element leaders
(BLUE 1 and SLU£: 3) were unable to fire cue to the high angle off that the MlSs generated
as they reversed turn to the rl^ht and Into BLUE flight. Both BLUE elements broke up
and hard right. The MIGs did not follow the F-^is as they zootned, but a MI3-17 was observed
firing as he passed between BLUE 1 and 2 at the top of the zoom. The fllj^ht thought that
this ;'IC was holding high and "pounced" after their first attack. BLUE lead then saw the
HIQs In a left turn near Kep anJ dove to attack. BLl'E closed on one of six MIC-lTs, pulled
lead and fired one AIW -''D. with SO^-SC* angle off. BLUE 1 was at 0.95 Mach (620 K7AS),
1000-1500 ft AGL, about 3 £S 150 kts overtake, close range (exact rant^e unknown), with a
high growl for a tone. The WIG was In a hard left turn. The missile appeared to track
but BL'JE 1 was forced to break hard left to avoid a head-on collision with four MIGs and
to avoid heavy autcr.atlc weapon and ilr.n antiaircraft fire from Kep Airfield. BLUE 1
separated from the 'AlQs and as he turned to reengage, he observed an aircraft crash Into
the ground in a hugh fireball about one nl le iJorth of Kep.
BLUE 3 and zoomed to 12,000 ft after the first pass and observed the lead eletrent
stai*t in on their second pass. BLUE 3 then divert down on a second pass but again could
not fire because of "too r.uch angle off, dive an/,le , airspeed", and pulled off to the right.
BLUE 3 ran into a "blanket" of SSiot .\AA fire and broke hard left loosing sight of the
MIQ-17S. As BLUE 3 rolled back to the right he observed three MIG-lTs apparently trying
to land at Kep Airfield. The MIGa were in trail about 1/3 to 1 mile apart. BLUE 3
rolled into a shallow dive about 2-3 miles south of Kep Airfield and headed for the number
two MIG. The MIGs were 1/2 to 1 mile off the end of the Southwest runway (Northeast of
Kep) and BLUE 3 was 1 to 2 miles South of Kep nearly parallel to the Northeast Railroad
at about 2000 ft and 500 kts when BLUE 3 (Back) called, "lock-on", and BLUE 3 fired one
AIM-7E missile.* BLUE 3 was flying an aircra.''t modified to provide an automatic switch to
full system lock on after a boreslght lock on. BLUE 3 observed the SPARROW launch,
"roll and guide", for 3-5 seccnds. 3L'JK 3 was getting heavy ground fire and BLUE 4 called
that he was experiencing utility hydraulic failure so BLUE 3 broke right without observing
the missile results. (Heavy 85mm fire with bursts at 8000 ft was reported in the Kep area.)
BLUE 3 and H egreased the area for an emergency recovery at Danang.
Meanwhile, BLUE 1 and 2 turned to reengage the MIGs still in a left turn over Kep.
BLUE 1 at 1000 ft AGL, 0.95 Mach (620 KTAS) locked on to a MIG-17 at an estimated 5000
ft range, auto-track, interlocks out, full system, narrow gate and fired three AIM-7E
missiles in ripple at 3500 ft range 1*5° angle off of the MIC's tail while pulling 2.5
gs. The target was at 1000 ft AGL in a hard left turn, at 0.9 Mach. Again BLUE lead was
forced to bra -k left by additional :<IG-17s in a head-on pass and Intense antiaircraft fire
from the Kep area. He did not observe the missile results but did observe that the first
and third missile "tracked beautifully" and the second missile "headed high and for parts
unknown" .
BLUE 2 went high on this break and saw a single MIG-17 above him in a left turn. BLUE 2
i'ired three AIK-9B missiles in rapid succession at 20" angle off, 3500 ft range, with a
good growl. The target aircraft was In an easy left climbing turn at missiles launch.
BLUE 2 was at 0.85 to 0.9 Mach (5'<0 to 570 KTAS), »<000 ft altitude pulling about 2 gs at
launch. Two of the missiles appeared to track. The third missile was not observed. BLUE
2 did not see the missiles hit because he broke hard left and down to rejoin SLUE lead.
BLUE I'saw BLUE 2 In a left turn and called him to break right for rejoin. BLUE 1
then saw a .MIC-17 in firing position of BLUE 2 with cannons blazing. BLUE 2 responded to
a "break" call and evaded the KIO. BLyB 1 turned to engage the MIO-17, and encountered an
additional flight of four MIC- 17s near Kep. One MIG-17 made a head-on pass and BLUE lead
fired an AIM-^D. The plpper was on the target. BLUE 1 was at 0.95-1.0 Mach (620-660 KTAS),
1000-1500 ft altitude, pulling about 3 gs with no recollection of tone. The mlaslle passed
about 15 ft under the MIG, but since the missile does not have a proximity fuze It did
not detonate, BLUE flight observed a second huge fireball at 21*'3O'H/106°19'E about this
time.
BLUE flight, at BINCO fuel, egressed and called the other P-^i flight into the area.
However, BLUE flight's MIG encounter is the only one reported on this date. A third huge
fireball was observc-d at 21*22 • :i/ 106" 38' E at I6UOH during egress. Official sources do not
list any kills or probables on this date.
1
The 0Pfi£P-3 reports BLUE 3 fired at O.9 Mach (500 K7AS), 6OOO ft altitude it 1.5 miles
range in a dive, 70" head-on to the HlG-17 which wa: headed 2'tO<» at 800 ft AGL and
0.9 Hach.
357
6^
Event III-30it
Aircraft Involved;
Two F-l^Ds, two P-ilCs va
five MIG-179
Result: Ho damage
Vicinity of Encounter!
21*15'N/106»2O'E
1. PItlHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time 3 June 1967/16'iOH .
BLUE Plight (two F-^iDs and two P-J*Cs) were asslt,ned MTGCAP for a -^akhll force of
?>105a. They acccmpanied one part of the force into the target area and then engaged
five MIC-17S near Kep airfield. Three AIM-7E missiles and one AIM-9B missile were fired
with no results.
2. HISSION ROUTE
buUE Plight departed Ubon RTAFB and proceei^ed directly to the refueling track over
the Giiir of Tonkin. Dronoff was at 19°00 ' M/IOT^ZS ' E. Th*} flight then proceeded north to
21»07'N/107<'38'E. and 21*12 •N/107'*33*E for coast In, west alonf. the north side of the ridge
to 2l«l«t'»/l06»21'E, and then to the target »rea at 21-16 'H/loe^OS'E. The MIO engagement
occurred about 8 miles east of Bae Clang. The flight then egressed east to 21"07'W/
107*33 'E, direct to poatetrlke refueling and return to Ubcu RTAFB.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P.JtP BLUE 1, 3
4 SPARROWS (AIH«7E)
4 FALCOfIS (AIK-40)
1 ALQ-71
1 370-sal. wing tank
1 600-gal. centerllne tank
Camouriaged
Avionics - unknown
P-^C BLUE 2» H
k SPARROWS (AIM-7E)
k SIDEWINDERS (AIM-9B)
1 ALQ-71
1 370-gal. wing tank
1 600-gal-. centerllne tank
Camoiiflaged
Avionics - unknown
HIG-173
Unknown armament
All aircraft silver with red stars on wing and red stabilizer.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather : Cymulus clouds with bases at 8,000-10,000 f*. ar.d tops above 25,000 ft over the
mountains- The valley or flat land area was clear with a slight haze, about 10 miles
visibility.
BLUE
7,000 ft
300*
HIOs
1,000 ft
Left turn
Altitude ;
HeadlngT
5. IftlTIAL DETECTION
MIG warnings were not received prior to the encounter. As BLUE Plight turned away
from the target area at 7,000 ft altitude, BLUE 1 saw five MlG-17s and one MIG-21 In a
flat left turn at 1,000 ft AGL flying In trail formation about 5 miles south of Kep air-
field. The KIG-21 was not part of the formation and was not seen again. Time of the
sighting was about 16^0 local (Hand).
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 and 2 broke Into the KIGa setting up a moderately tight left hand .i.-n around
the MIGs. BLUE 3 and 4 climbed above BLUE I and 2 and waited for an opportunity to
engage. It appeared that the MIC strategy was to continue their turn, but always work-
ing closer to Kep airfield where BLUE Flight would be vulnerable to the heavy enemy ground
fire in that arej»,
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
The HICs maintained their left orbit near Kep. BLUE Fl.'ght remained above them and
started a yo-yo action in a vertical plane pulling up on one side of the circle to attack
a MIG on the other aide of the circle. BLUE Plight stayed o»low 6,000-7,000 ft in their
vertical maneuvering.
358
i
1
I
1
1
8
I
S
•
I
a
i
if
3 i
Event Ill-son
OKOHAKCe
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
10. AIRCRCU COHHENTS
Experience ;
(No.
SPARROW
AIH-7E
2/0
1/0
rired/ilo. hits)
SIOEW:..NDER FALCON
AIM>9B AIM-4D
0/0
1/0
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
( front )
(back)
( front )
(back)
Total
P-H
Combat
Hours
Hours
Missions
RenarKs
2892
210
79
No previous
MIG
encounters
472
175
86
No previous
MIG
encounters
2t76
190
77
No previous
MIG
encounters
1131
175
80
No previous
niG
encounters
n. DATA SOURCES
Kessages:
OPREP-3, 00'i:05Z, June 1967
8TFW DOL 060«1, June 196?
DO^iOlOO, 2 June 1967
2TPW, D1060'*8, June 1967
' Aircrew's AIH-7D/E Missile Perfonnance Reports
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE Plight ftwo P-UDs and two F-UCs) ^as assigned lo fly HIGCAP for a force of P-105
aircraft from TakhU STAFB. BLUE Plight departed Ubon RTAFB, refueled over the Gulf of
?on^In and accompanled one of the F-105 flights Into the target area The ^J^J-'^J^.J^^**!^
t.sctlcs includes attacking Route Package IVA targets by Individual flights with TOTs
separated ? to 5 silnutes.
The fllKht flew north after refueling and coasted in" about 10 miles northeast of
can Pha! tSf roJte! selected to nlninilze flight Mme In areas defended by surface-to-
al? missiles, then continued west to Hortheast Railroad in the vicinity of Kep airfield.
No MIGs were sighted Inbound to the target. But as BLUE ^l^gj^ ?7fovln'''"r?rall
away- from the target to CAP the IRON HA»0 flight, BLU:. 1 saw five ^-^^'l^^ /l^^'^'t''l^J,y^
foSatlon at aboSt 1000 ft AGL. in a flat left hard turn 5 ir.Ues south of Kep airfield
oSrviG!5l also seen with the r^G-Hs but not In formation with them, was not seen again
SSrlnK the'encoC4e^ bLOe Flight was turning through 300° (the direction of turn was
Sot s?a?ed Su^probably to the right or toward the north) at 7C00 ft altitude In J he
;?clnl?5 of 2in5'H/106°20'E at 16<;0H at the tine of the sighting. This ^o"" place the
Jics at 12 o'clock low about 5 miles range. All of the MIGs were silver with red stars
on the wings and a red vertical stabilizer.
BLUE 1 and 2 "broke Intc the MIGs setting up a moderately tight left hand turn around
the M?G3 " IJSe 3 anS H went high above BLUE 1 and 2 and waited for an o«°^^^""y ^« ^^^^^
eneaee. The :;iGs appeared to continue their turn drawing closer to Kep airfield where there
was heavy ground fire.
At the conpletlon of the first shallow diving turn. BLUE Lead obtained a lock-on (at
about 3 ^lles) on the lead MIG, turning through north-ncrthvest at 1000 ft AGL. 0.7 ^a^h
fSso KTAS). BLUE I fired one AIM-7E missile at 5000-6000 f^J-^ne^ /rom the MIG's 9 o clock
ooaltion! BLUE Lead's report Indicates he was at 500 KTAS. 3000 ft altitude In a 1-5 g
dlJlni Jurn with 2000 kts overtake, full system launch with clutter In override a ;.d system
?1 aufo ??acJ. The missile cane off. turned left, "then direct" but P"sed about 500 ft
h.hTnrf the KiG as the -'JIG pulled -nto a hard left turn. The missile was fired at near
m!!;lnl parameters and the'-iof the circle broke X before the mlsslled passed the MIC-
\ second a:M-7E missile was fired at the same MIG, when BLUE Lead ".2500 ft about
S50 KTAS still in the 1.5 g descending turn at 5CO0-600O ft range. B^UE Lead was at the
HIG's 8 o'clock position. This missile also turneti left, "then <J1"««'=' • ^'"J P»"tJ«™.Mv
estlnated 8oS ft behind the MIG. No detonation -ar. observed on either missile. Apparen-ly.
both .tvlssiies were fired before the "break X" occurred.
BLUE 2, still in the original orbit, moved laterally In a left ^arnl.ng dive and fired
one AI^-7E and one AIM-9B at a group of four KIG-lTs attempting to evade =j.UE Lead s
mJsslles! T.ne KIGs were at 3000-^.000 500 KTAS PulUn, about ^LUE 2 was
no" off of the MlG's tall at the time ef launcVi. ht fifing ^a'^^-* , , '^"•^^^""l ^o.our'j
ollot's report states "The missile (AIM-7E) was fired In a had condition for a ^PA..RC..
it failed to guide, but conditions were not right in the cockpit, no lock-on and a bad
Event III-301
look angle.* The report also states -there was not enough lead «hen the missile was
fired with Interlocks out." The SPARROW missed.
BLUE 2 then fired a SIDEWINDER (AIH-9B) at 40- anBjj:"" "^^J *b£5eTpui!T5p
The SIDEWINDER did not guide but It was heading toward the HIGa as BLUE Z puii.a up
to rejoin with BLUE Lead.
BINGO fuel was called and BLUE Plight departed the area, returning to UDon.
Event riI-305
Aircraft Involved: Two P-UCs vs two MIG-l?*
Two F.HOs vs one HIG-21
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity cf Encounter: 21*15'N/106*»20 'E
I. PRINART NISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Dat«/Tlne: 3 June 1967/I6IOH
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. MARRATtve DESCRIPTION
CAP flight Sighted tw't MIC-lTs and one KIG-21 orbiting S miles south of Kep Airfield.
Event III>306
Aircraft Involved: Two F-lOSs vs two MIG-17s
Results: sighting only
Vlnlnlty of Encounter: 17*ii9'N/106*12'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 3 June 1967/1651H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. *NAR<tATIVE DESCRIPTION
Armed reconnaissance flight in NVN panhandle delivered ordnance on Lo Cang truck
park. Coming off target, No. 2 observed two MIGs approximately 7 miles KE of target.
One MIC was heading south, turning toward southeast and tne other was heading south. The
MICs' altitude was 2-3000 ft.
Event III -307
Aircraft Involved: Four F-l05s vs two KIG-21s
and 1 HIG-17
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21°19'N/106«l6 E and
_ 21"19'N/106»20'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 3 June 1967/1653H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACJLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPl'ION
StrlKe flight at 10,000 ft observed zvo MIG-Sls at 9 o'clock; 5000 ft altitude KICs
were In pursuit of an F-105; two minutes later at second position, same strike flight
observed one MIC-17 at 7 o'clock, approxioately 2-3 niles away.
Event ItI-308
Aircraft Involved: Three F-105S vs tnree KIG-lTs
heaults: Two «IG-17s destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»17 'N/lOf^SS' E
K PRIMARY HISSION AKO TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlffle: 3 June 1967/1652H.
BLUE Plight was the lead flight of the Korat P-105 force attacking JCS 18.23 (the Bac
Glang BR/Ki«hway bridije) at 21»l6'N/106»ll'E and the ad.Jacent RR yard
force consisted of 16 F-105Db In ECU pod forxatlon and four IRON HAND aircraft. Eight
P-*a ftwB Oa Nang Alrbase accompanied the force into the target area.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Bi;uE Plight departed Korat RTAFB in Thailand, flew directly to the Tan Track refueling
over the Gulf of Tonkin for rendezvous with the tankers and P-JJCs ''rom Da tlang, then pro-
ceeded nortn to SO-OS' N/IOT^-.? ' E, north to Sl-OS'N/lOT^Se-E; each to ^I'U' N/106« J6 ' E;
ani then direct to the roll In point at 21«>13' N/106° 12 ' E (with the target at Zl-ie'N/loe*
13'E). Roll In for attack was to the right with a right pullout and planned egress oy
indlvlifc^l flights over the reverse course.
3. AlBCRAFT CONFIGUMTIOKS
LUE 1. 3
2 - H118, 3000-lb bombs
1 - 650-gal centerllne fuel tank
L * ALQ-71 ECM pod
1 * AIN-9B SIDEWINDER tnlsslla
1029 rds KEI 20mm ejiimunitlon.
P-105D BLUE 2. t
2 - M118, 3000-lb bonbs
1 - 650-gal centerilne futl tank
2 - ALQ-71 ECM pods (1 on each outboard station)
1029 rds HEX 2Cnm amnunitlon.
All P-105S were camouflaged.
MIG-17 WIG 1
Armament -unknown - 2 underwing fuel tanks.
MTC-17 KTG 2. 3
Unknown.
All MTGs were silver with red stars.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
We ather ; Clear over the flatlands with about ten miles visibility.
tbe mountains between the NE Railroad and the Gulf.
Cumulous clouds over
BLUE
2 3 I
5000-6000 ft
095"
600 KTAS
7000-8000 lbs
r
WIG
Altltude:
Heaolng :
Airspeed :
Fuel State :
Plight Formation
In trail attempting to rejoin,
about 500C ft behind lead and BLUE U
500-1000 ft
Approx. 300*
Unknown
Unknown
BLUE 2 was about 1000 ft behind BLUE 1.
was in trail with BLUE I.
BLUE 3 was
5. IIIITIAL DETECTION
KIG warnings were called on guard channel as BLUE Flight was pulling off the target.
The call was "BULLSr:YE-northeast-30-low-330" which placed tht MIGs almost under BLUE Pllaht
flylnn 330° BLUE lead was at 6000 ft headed 095", 600 KTAS, about seven nllea away at
10 o'clock about 500 ft AGL. The MIGs were going from a ciinb to a descent in a shallow
left turn through 300<» . They were In trail formation with about 3000 ft spacing. The last
MIC In trail was almost at BLUE Plight's 12 o'clock position.
6. ACTION' INITIATED
BLUE' Lead called the MIGs and said he was reversing iSo" left. He then entered a
hard left 10** nose down turn (still in afterourner) followed by BLUE 2 and 3 . BLUc U was
looking away from BLUE 3 at the break and cculd not relocate the flight. He egressed with
the second flight off of t.he target.
c
c
c
r
Event III-308
7. SITlATIGfl OEVELOPME.JT
BLUE Fii^-;ht rolled out behind the KIC-17s. Thi- MIG-lTs went into a tlpht left hand
; orbit at about 500 ft AGL. The flights completed one and a half circles when BLUE I fired
a SIIEWINDEK (Ai;''-93) at "IG The MIC attempted unsuccessfully to evade the SIDEWINDER.
; Aft'T the SIDEWINDER danat-.ed the KIG, BLUE 3 closed In firing 20r:n K£I. The HIC was
trailing sroke fron the s:i;SV;iNDEK but exploded in fla-ne apparently from the 20n;in hits.
BLUE Lead then cleared BLUE 2 to after KIC 1, In the ensuing twisting, seissorlnsj
f enfiapement, BLUE 2 flrea three bursts before MIG I was hit, MIG I's left win? blew U3
and KIG 1 crasiiod in flames wlcr. no chute observed. BLUE Lead obtained lead crt KIG 2 and
I fired a SlDcWIIiDER (AIH-QB) which flew Into the ground. BLUE Lead made one more 3^0* turn
and fired a iili;n an;?le off burst of 20irjn at MIG 2, and apparently mlsseo. BLUE 2 and 3
exited the area ahv*ad of BLUE Lead, but tne three .-i. .-craft rejoined after refueling and
1 returned to Korat. The only da.Tiage to the U.S. alruraft was a small hole In BLUE 2's left
intake duct possibly caused oy a particle from HIG 1.
8. ORDNANCE
mo. fired/No. hits}
SIDEWINDER
AIH-93 20mni Reis^rks
BLUE I 1/0 Short burst/0
BLUE 2 ' 450/1 MIO 1 left wing blown up.
BLUE 3 l/l 376/1 AIM-9B hit first, follow-up
;un attack blew up MIG 3.
NIGs ....-Ho known ordnance expended——
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
BLUE 1 - No reticle (no :>xght} on combining glass.
PLUE 2 - Radar would not lock on in air-to-air mode.
BLUE 3 - None.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
j BLUE 2 and 3
Jettison speed for the 650 gal centerll.ie tank Is not compatible vfith combat speed
and naneuverlns, "It Is dangerous to drop t.le 65O (centsrllne fuel tank) unless you unload
j-> the aircraft ( aerodynamic ally ) first".
I BLUE 2
^' Cockpit fog and canopy vapor restricted visibility. I could only see through the
forward windshield.
f * For air-to-ground attack, we need an auto bomb release system with a positive Indlca-
[ tlon to the pilot that the cor.?uter has a solution and will release the bcrobs.
Por air-to-air, suggest a series of fixed ranges on the combining glass. I.e., 500,
1000, 1500, 3000, and about 6000 ft (for hi-alt strafing). These ranges would of course
be lead or g computing constantly.
Keed an additional radio for communication bet-*een flight members. The primary strike
channel la saturated during periods of action when it Is needed most. A direction flndin?
vector strobe toupled to t.he flight frequency would aid flight members In maintaining mutual
support position.
The ease with which the P-105 will gJ supersonic and maintain near supersonic speed
in military power has been a terrific asset against MIGs and reduces time in the hostile
envlrcnment.
BLUE 3
Would Ilk- to have a simpler method of switching from bomb ordnance to missile and
gun firinc capability with a cc-nputing sight. Five switches are currently required.
The capability of firing the IR missile by plaulng the plpper on the enemy aircraft
should be retained.
P
e' ■
I
t
IV
L.
Kes s a^es . ."ecorts :
I V 38e TFW OPiiEP-3 JPCCO FAr.TEL DOT 202^ June 67 0il«J202.
U. DATA SOURCES
Project Interviews :
BLUE 2' - 6 June 1967
BLUE 3-7 June 1967
'This event was reconstructed by BLUE 2.
Event III-303
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
inc^''"^ Flight was the lead fllcht of a force of four strike and one IROM HAMD fiij5hts of
F-1055 launched fron Korac RTAFB, Thailand. The mission was to destroy JCS 18.23, the Bac
Clang RH/HUhway Brla«e at 21*»16 'M/lOi" U 'E and the adjacent railroad yard on the south
aide of the bridge. The four strike ril2;hts penetrated the SAM defenses while Ir.bound to
vne target in a standard "pod" formation. I.e., a Hamond of four flights with four air-
craft per flight.
The force departed Korat and flev, directlv to the Gulf of Tonkin fo*- rendezvous with
****-??"o*" "^^^ force then flew north to 20«a8' rJ/I07''13'E and coasted In
at 21 08*H/107'33'E, The force then flew about 270* to the roll-in point selected about
three miles south of the target, nade a right roll^ln to bonb release and subsequent right
recovery to a heading of 095*. BLUE Plight was the first fliRht on and off target.
The 85 and lOOcun antiaircraft guns opened fire when the P-105 force was about fifteen
nlles short of the roll-in point. Thy force was staggered between 16,000 and 18,000 ft at
that time. Durlnj the dive bonb run, BLUE 2 fired a short burst for flak suppression and
in an effort to obtain photography of the active AAA gun emplacements adjacent to the tar-
get the overrun on the gun ca.-nera fila was set at three 92conds.
BLUE Flight recovered fron the rtlve bomb pass with BLUE 2 about 1500 ft bi^llnd BLUE
Lead and BLUE 3 about a mile behind PLUE Lead. All BLUE Plight -■neiabera were attempting
to close to pod for.-Tiation In afterburner for egress with BLUE 2 reporting a speed of rtach
i.Ol at 5000-6000 ft heading 095**.
Roughly six miles fron the target, SLUE Lead saw three MIC-17s at 10 o'clock low
(less than 1000 ft altlcude) about two nlles ranse. The MICs were In a shallow left climb-
ing turn through 315" and the lead .'••IG was reversing from a cllnb to a dive. The MICs were
spaced about 3000 ft In trail so that the third MIG was almost at BLUE Lead's 12 o'cLack
position.
BLUE Lead called the MIG ' s position and began making a iSO* left turn, BLUE 2
and 3 saw che MICs l.Tmedlately after Lead's call and followed BLUE Lead through a 10« nose-
down, 5 to 6 g turn. BLUE 4 almost collided with the second flight off the target and
lost the rest of BLUE Plight in the turn. He tnen elected to stay with the second flight
and egressed with them.
The HIGs entered a tight left orbit at less than 1000 ft altitude and BLUE Flight was
not able to obtain a firing position on the first turn. As BLUE Lead overshot the MICs
and pulled high, BLUE 3 attempted to achieve a firing pass and as SLUE 3 overshot, SLUE
Lead turned back Into the MICs atteaptlng to fire. BLUE 2 remained about 500 to 600 ft
behind BLUE Lead looking for other MIGs attacking from the rear. During the high g turns
at low altitude, the BLUE Fll^nt members had considerable trouble with cockpit fog and
canopy vapor interfering with their vision.
BLUE Lead and BLUE 2 Jettisoned the 650 gal external fuel tank after the first 360®
of turn. This was accomplished at 550 kts CAS, by obtaining almost zero g prior to
pickling the tanks. BLUE 3 did not Jettison the 650 gal centerline until he was outbound
after the air battle because "It is dangerous to drop the 650 unless you unload the air-
craft." BLUE 3 felt that he had mora speed than the KIC-17s even with the centerline
tank.
After the first 360* turn, the MICs loosened their orbit with MIG 1 in front, MIG 2
to left (Inside the turn) and KIG 3 drifitlng to the outside the turn (down very low
and falling back?. As a result of reducing g to Jettison the centerline fuel tank, BLUE 1
and 2 were outside the raalus of all of the MIOs but with cc.-.c -derably more airspeed. BLUE
Plight was about 2000 ft altitude with 6C0 KCAS between mlnlx-jr.-to-full afterburner power.
BLUE 2 was able to solve the cockpit fog problem at this time ■ turning the cockpit
ventilation system completely off. BLUE 2 cleared the area t ' he rear noting BLUE 3*s
position and no MIGs at 6 o'clock.
Ha.r-fay around the second orbit (headed 270*) BLUE Lead vlrh BLUE 2 In flKhtlns wing
position, turned Into the MIGs and again at'.empted to obtain firing position. But the
HIGs were now spread In a wide V and MIG 3 had crosse-i from th> outside of the turn to
the inside of the turn at very low altitude (about 200 ft) anJ at a slower airspeed than
the other MIGs. Thus as BLUE 1 came thr3uc:h a southwest heading, KIC 3 was at BLUE 2's
10 o'clock low position aocut 300 ft out slowly rocking his wiigs. MG 1 was at BLUE I's
12 o'clock low and MIG 2 was In the process of crossing from l>ft to right, very low
between KIO 1 and BLUE 1. BLUE 2 was at BLUE I's 7 o'clock position about 500 ft back.
Ourl'.g the sane period of time (from a heading of 270" to about 200") BLUE 3, who
was flying the element position unaware ^hat BLUE U was not with him, observed MIQ 3
cross to the Inside and waver moner.tarlly. BLUE 3 had set switches to fire his single
AIM-9B durln? the previous 360° orbit and new decided to fire at MIC 3 -iurin?: KTC 3*s
moment of hesitancy. 5LL-E 3 dived down on MIG 3, put the plpo^r on the HIG's tailpipe
and as MIC 3 "graciously lit his afterburner", fired the SIDEWIiJCER. BLUE 3 assumed
that the AIH-QB IR i eeker was aligned with the plpper and did nor atter-.pt to obtain a
missile tone prior -o flrlns. BLUE 3 estimated 2500 ft ran.:-,», cio.'jure speed of 100 kts
at an altitude of 1 00 ft In a 15* 5') 20" dive, in full afterc^rner and with the 650 gal
centerline tank sti 1 on tne centerline position.
Event IIl-?08
The missile went straight for the MIQ-L7, which '>ntered a shallow left turn. When the
missile was about tfOO ft from HIG 3. MIC 3 broko Into a hard left climbing wln?:over maneuver
as though he suddenly becasje aware that Che mlsrllc wjs tracklnfi him. The KIC turned almost
90" to a heading of ea^t , and had 90° of bank wi»h his nose about 20° above the horizon
when the SIDEWINDER exploded. Exanlnatlon of HLL'E 3'o film Indicates the missile went
aloneslde of the tallploe and from BLUE 2'g aescrlptlon "exploded about a foot or two away
from the tailpipe at the o'clock positon ( fron the rear) and about 2-3 ft forward froii
the end of the tailpipe." The KIG Itr-Tcdlately started to trail a heavy white "vapor"
looking smoke that appeared to come from the bottom of the tailpipe. BLUE 3 continued
closing on the MIG as the .■•!IG rolled over and started down, and with the sight set on
missiles air (g computing for a fixed rantje of 1100-1500 ft) put the plpper "up and right
In front of him and worked It right down through hia", firing 376 rounds at a high angle
off.
BLUE 3 did not observe any cannon hits and l.i.-.t saw the MIG as he rapidly overshot
htm and turned to 090* calling "SLUE 3, I got one.". However, both BLUE 1 and 2 observed
the nUaalle hit, the trailing smoke and the MIG blow up in a ball of fire. BLUE 1 observed
the MIG impact at 21'ie'«/106«21»E at 1653H.
Meanwhile, MIC 1 was at BLUE Lead's 11 o'clock position about a mile range and MIC 2
had crossed to BLUE Lead's 1:30 o'clock position a-, aoout 1/2 nils rantre. MIG 2 appeared
to have slowed down and was at a very low altitude 3LUE 2 called both MICa to BLUE Lead
and BLUE Lead replied, "If you can ?et one, go get lil:n"." BLUE 2 was In position to attack
MIG I and as he tlgntened up the left turn to actacK ;iIG 1, MIG 2 turned left toward BLUE 2.
BLUE Lead subsequently attacked MIC 2.
BLUE 2 Immediately obtained a ^5" angle off shct at MIG I and at about 2000 ft range,
while pulling 5 to 6 e's, placed the plpper in fror.-. of MIG 1 and fired a short burst.
BLUE 2*5 alr-to-alr radar mode was inoperative (previously checked while Inbound to the
target) and he had selected l8 nils fixed bombing depression as a compromise for air-to-
air. However, BLUE 2 did not have enough lead and was unable to track the MIO through the
turn. As BLUE 2 started a hi-speed yo-yo to reduce nls overshoot, «I0 1 reversed into a
hard right turn partially solving SLUE 2's tracklr.g rroblem.
After a few maneuvers, BLUE 2 and MIG 1 were on oarallel flieht paths several hundred
feet apart with BLUE 2 about 500 ft behind MIG I's orthogonal position. As the flight
p;»ths started to converge, MIG 1 again rever:;ed Into a left 60" banked turn with his nose
about 20* above the horizon. This allowed BLUE 2 (still In a hls;h 5 left turn) to momen-
tarily pull lead and again run the plpper through 'AlC, 1. BLUE 2 fired a fairly long burst
at about 1200 ft range, 5 to 6 g':;, and 590 KCAS with no observed hits. It now became
apparent to BLUE 2 that i8 mils was not enoui^h lead under these g conditions.
MIC 1 rolled further left and entered a 120** oanked dive with his nose about 20" below
the horizon. BLUE 2 was now ciosl..g rapidly at about 200 kts overtake speed when MIG I
established a smooth tignt descenaing turn to the left possibly redm.l'"t power to force an
overshoot. BLUE 2, oulllng maximum g (Just short of complete loss of vision) was able to
align the P-105 fuselage with the MIG but unable to pull lead. As a last resort BLUE 2.
by rapid aft stick movement, was able to rctate the "-aCS fuo^lage enough to put the sight
well in front of the MIG and opened fire at a little over 200 ft range forcing the MIO to
fly through the stream of 20.Tm cannon fire. The underside of the MIG ' s left wing exploded
at a point two thirds of t.^.e way between the fuselage and the external underslung fuel
tank. BLUE 2 relaxed back stick pressure as the fire and debris from the 'AIG engulfed the
P-1Q5, and passed about 25 ft below the MIG a.** the MIG rolled inverted and crashed. The
MIG was hit at a range of 210 ft with 55 mlla lead at about uoo-700 ft of altitude. Time
from hit to i.'npact was >t to 5 seconds during which no chute was observed and the MIO did
not roll frcm the Inverted position with impact at 21'l6'N/106'25'E.
Meanwhile, after SLUE 2 passed BLUE Lead, NIG 2 'at BLUE Lead*8 2 o'clock) crossed
back from right to left under BLUE Lead ana behind 3LrE 2. BLUE Lead pulled lead on MIG 2,
and as MIG 2 crossed the "field of view" of BLUE Lead's SIDEWIKDEH (AIM-9a), BLUE Lead
observed good tone and fired. The missile launched out ahead of BLUE Lead and then turned
and headed straight for the ground. BLUE Lead overshot MIG 2 and turned wide. After about
360* of turn, BLUE Lead was again able to cut off MIC 2 and fired a short burst from a high
angle off with no sight display and no apparent damage to the MIC.
BLUE 2 experienced a surging engine and rapid deceleration as a result of passing
through the fire from MIG l. BLUE 3 Joir.ed up with £LU5 and accompanied him toward the
coast but about 30 miles from the coast, BLUE 2's engine began to function normally. BLUE
Lead egressed alone and rejclned 2 and 3 after refueling on separate tankers. The BLUE
Plight aircraft broke off the engagement with about ^*0Q0 lbs of fuel, bingo fuel for unre-
fueled recovery at Da Nang AS, South Vietnam. The only damage to the P-lC5s was that
absorbed by BLUE 2, a windshield partly coated with xolten aluminu^n, some grease blobs on
the fuselage and a one-inch hole Inside the left intake duct.
Event tir-309
Aircraft Invplved: "our P-I05s vs five MIG-17s
and two HZC-2Is
Results: iio damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl^aS'tVlOS^^'E
K PRIHARV Mission AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlne: 5 June I967/1638H
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
IRON HAND flight (BLUE Plight) between 8-9.000 ft had Just fired SHRIKEs at target
and made a left turn when they observed two MI0-17s at 5:30 o'clock high (10,000 ft).
MIGs were In trail with Lead MIC approximately 2000 ft behind IRON HAHD flight and second
MIO 1000 ft behind Lead MIC. The flight lit burner and cor.pleted turn and left MIGs. The
night then Observed an P-<<C flight (probably those of Event III-308) •ngaglns three MIO-lTs
and tvo Hia-21s. BLUS k observed a smoke streak go up toward a RIG-17 and the HIQ ex-
ploded.
Bwnt ZII-310
Aircraft Involved; Pour P-I05s vs six Nia-2l8
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«'I0'B/105**52,'E
I. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 5 June I967/I6O3H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Ingressing strike flight observed one MIO followed shortly by the sighting og five
additional MIGs. The MIGs were at approximately 100" ft and heading west.
event III -3 11
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-lOSs va tbree faG-21
and six HIG-lTs
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"52'S/105*1«»'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tiffle: 5 June 1967/1646H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
During ingress dive down Thud Ridge, strike flight observed three HIG-21S and six
MIG-I73. First signting was two silver MIG-21s a- 9 o'clock and the HIG altitude was
approxliaately 10,000 ft when first sighted. Three minutes later, a single MIG-21 was ob-
served at 7 o'clock at 2-3000 ft in a gentle left turn. Sighting was quickly followed by
sighting of two flights of two camouflaged MIG-I7s. These last MIGs were at approxlcate-
ly 2-3000 ft.
Ev«nt III-n2
•
3*.
13
Aircraft Irvolved: Two P-lCs and two P-4Ds va
seven or elgh^ KIG-17s
Result: One HIC destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«27'H/105'*9'E
1. PRtNARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 5 June 1967/L7ii2H
BLUt Plight, four P-4s, were providing MIOCAP Tor a strllce against JCS target 21.11.
The encounter occurred during the egreas of the strike force. •
2. MISSION ROUTE :
Departed Ubon RTAFB and air refueled at ORANGE ANCHOR before proceeding to TACAN I
Channel 97. Route to the target and back to Channel 97 was via the following points:
21°55'N/10'»''38'E: ai'SS'N/lOS"*? 'E/targct JCS 21.11; Sl^S** 'M/IOS^IZ'E; 21«55'N/10'»''38'E; }
Channel 97, and return to base. ]
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS I
F-ttP BLUE 1 an': 3 ' )
4 PALCON (AIK-Ji) ^
U SPARROW (AIM-7E) \
F'HC BLUE 2 and H
k SIDEWINDER (AIH-9B) \
K SPARROW (AIM-7E) |
4. FLIGHT COnOITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER \
Weather ; Clear In the area of the encounter. BLUE Plight split Into two elements, as *
prebrlefedt Just prior to attacking the HIGs.
I
5. INITIAL DETECTION I
While covering the egress of the strike force, BLUE Flight heard a following flight j
engage MIOs and reversed course to Join tne flight. As the flight was proceeding souch ;
along Thud Hldge, four MIG-ljs were observed engaged with two P-1Cs. Single MIG-L7s
were> observed high at 9 o'clock and at 3 o'clock.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE I (Lead) and 2 went after the MIG at 9 o'clock and BLUE 3 and attacked the
HIQ at 3 o'clock.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT ;
BLUE 1 and 2 gained a firing position on the KIO and launched two AIM-* nlssllea. j
The first missile did not guide and the second was not observed. After repositioning, J
BLUB 1 launched four AIM-7E missiles at an altitude of 500 ft AGC, none of which was •
observed to gvlde. Again the element maneuvered fcr separation and the lead was passed j
to BLUE 2. BLUE 2 acquired a firing position on a single MIG-17 which was about 900 ft J
••" AGL an'l launched two AIM-9B missiles with approximately 15 degrees angle off with the
MIG in a left turn. Both SIDEWINDERS guided and impacted in tail section of the MIO. |
The HIG cortinued .In a steep left turn until impact with the ground. Just prior to j
ftt Inpact the canopy separated frcn the airplane and the pilot ejected. BLUE 1 and 2
departed the area and returned to base. I
In attacking the HIG at 3 o'clock BLUE 3 and U maneuvered Into a firing position at |
approximately 5000 ft in a level left turn. At approximately 3500 ft range with 35* |
angle off SlUE ? launched one AIM-"* which wq!« observed to guide to a 20 ft miss behind I
the MIO. As BLUE 3 and it maneuvered for separation, two more MICs were sighted at i
it/. 9 o'cloi.k low in a shallow left turn. BLUE 3 maneuvered to a position 3000 ft at the j
MIG 6 o'clock with less than 15° angle off and laurc^.ed an AIM-'J . The missile was J
observed to pass within 10 ft behind the MIG. A second AIM-*» was cooled and with a high i
pitched tone BLUE 3 fired the -nisslle which aborted on the launcher. At this time BLUE 3 I
overran the MIG and pulled up to gain separation and altitude. A lone MIG was sighted |
very low (500 ft) and appeared to be returning to base. BLUE 3 and 5 moved below the HIG j
at his 6 o'clock and when the MIC pulled up to cleer a hill, he was silhouetted against the
sky. with a high pitched tone from an AIM-^*, BLUE 3 launched the missile which was observed
to guide to within 10 ft of the MIG's tail pipe.
BLUE 3 and li were at BIKGO fuel so ditparted the area and returned to bast .
367
Event III-312
0. ORDNANCE
BLUE 1
SPARROW
AIM-7E
«/0
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
11. DATA SOURCES
Messages, Reports:
(No. flred/No. hits)
FALCON SIDEWINDER
AIH-1
2/0
4/0
AIM-9B
2/2
Remarks
Launched all AIM-7E3 In boreslght
node with range lock, narrow gate.
One NIG-17 kill.
Near nlSBes.
8TPW/OPREP-3/05132Z June 1967, Raytheon Missile Firing Maiuo of
6 June 1967.
Aircraft Involved: Pour F->iiCs vs four HIG-17i*
Results: One MIG-17 destroyed
Vlclr.lty of Encounter: 2l«»17 'N/105'»50'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION ANC TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 5 June 1967/15*5H
Four F-iiCs, BLUE Flight, were on a KIGCAP mission. Numerous MIO alerts had been
broadcast by ETHAM ALPHA. No SAMs were sighted.
2. MISSION ROUTE
Departed Danang and flight refueled In area WHITE ANCHOR before proceeding to TACAN
Channel 97. Route to the tar«?et was via the following points: 21*»55'N/10«»*83'E,
21»5«»' N/105* 12 'E/TAR ART 1759/5161. Egress was the reverse of the inbound route.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
F-UC BLUE 1 and 3
1 SPARROW (AIM-7E)
2 SIDEWINDER (AIH-9B)
1 SUU-16, 20nun gun (1200 rd)
BLUE 2 and H
4 SPARROW (AIM-7E} BLUE 2 only three AIM-7E
i| SIDEWINDER (AIH-9B)
HIO-17 MIQ I. 2. 3
Silver color with no narklngs observed
MIC H
Fainted red around the edge of the air Intake, on the wing tips and the rear half of
the vertical stabilizer.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Scattered clouds (1/7) with visibility greater than 15 miles*
BLUE
_1 2 3 !i_
Altitude ; 17.000 ft
Heading ; 13S*
5. INITIAL DETECTION
While on a southeasterly heading BLUE Plight sighted four HIOs heading north at an
altitude of 8,000 ft. MZG warnings had been received.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE 1 (Lead) rolled in for a diving SPARROW attack from the MIC's 12 o'clock
position. With the radar in bcresight mode, no range lock-on and Interlocks out. BLUE 1
launched a SPARROW which was observed not. to guide.
7. SITUATION OEVELOPHENT
BLUE 1 Ixunediately pulled up sharply and executed a turn reversal that placed him at
the 6 o'clock position of the MIQ. After firing 202 rounds from the SUU-I6 gun, BLUE 1
observed two explosions which Immediately gutted the aft end of the fuselage of the MXG.
The MIO was observed to crash by all members of BLUE Plight. Before BLUE Plight could
effectively pursue them, the other three HICs departed the area.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. flred/No. hits)
SPARROW SUU-16
AIH-7E 20mw Remarks
BLUE 1 1/0 "Missile wa; fired out of parameters
and functioned properly. Guidance was
hopeless. "
202 rd MIG-17 destroyed.
369
Event I 11-313
10. AIRCRtU CONNENTS
Ejcperlenee ;
BLUC 1
F.'ont
Back
Total
Houra
3«»05
618
2«7
397
Combat
Hlaslons
105
103
Remarks
Previous combat firing on l"* May
1967, two AIM-7E and one AIM-9B.
No hits. In previous tralnln?
In RTU and charglns SPARROW fired
two Ai:*i-7, 9 AlK-9 and 20 simulator
firings.
Training firings of one AIB-T and
4D simulator firings.
11. DATA SOURCES
We88ag«s
iK!:S^J;Ji!!rSI«F^roa5lm W67/DOCO OOXH
12. WARRATUE DESCRIPTION
M >...< - iiiTr« RTUF 1 fLsadl rolled into his attack from the 12 o'clock
i IpJmSS mJssSSe maneuvered with the MIG and attained a 6 o'clock po.ltion froa which
a SPARROW taissiie, ^f,''" ^ e-ur ifi irun The followlnK data were reported for the
Blsslle P"«<1 2500 r« a* J ° bo'eslght. interlocks out and no range lock-on. Evaluation
;nSu8 SSlSd "ss?le laiSched out of envelope and alt.hough the .yateni '
functioned properly guidance was hopeless." (Ref O8080OZ)
Aircraft Involved;
Event III-311
Two P-'JDs and two P-lCa vs
eight to twelve MIG-lTs
Result: One MIG-17 destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»30'N/105'">5*E
\, PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: 5 June 1967/1535H
BLUE Plight (four P-its) was providing HICCAP for an IRON HAND flight In the vicinity
of Thud Ridge.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight departed Ubon and proceeded to ORANGE ANCHOR for refueling
to the target was via the following points: TACAN 97; 21*55'H/10U 38 E, 25 i« "
21«»«»5'N/105'"»2'E; Sl^afi 'N/105°52'E, ALFA day frag NR 125.
3. AIRCRAFT COhF IGURAT IONS
?~iiD BLUE 1. 3
H SPARROU (AXM-7E}
4 PALCOH (AIM-U)
y-dc BLUE 2. n
ft SPARROW (AIM-7E)
4 SIDEWINDER (AIH-9B)
HIO-17
Silver with red star^ on the wings
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather ; Clouds, scattered to clear with visibility greater than seven miles.
BLUE
330"=
Heading :
5. 'INITIAL DETECTION
BL!IE 3 and t first sighted the MIGs in their 5 o'clock position making a firing pass.
6. ACTION INITIATED
During the maneuvering of BLUE 3 and U to defend against Jh? »«*f i"!. JS^'i wJwn
and U became separated. BLUE 1 (Lead) and 2 attacked several HIQs that were in a wagon
wheel forniatlon.
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
While maneuvering independently. BLUE U launched SPARROW as BLUE 3 fired o^
FALCON and one SPARROW. No results were observed. In «*h«J/?f!?f ISSrrov was iaunch^a
. PALCON Mhlch did not guide, and two SPARROW xlSElles. The first SPARRO.1 was iaun^n.a
InswfSinlHi™ range 2he?ea3 the second SPARROW, launched with full system lock-on
against a third MIG. was credited with a kill.
8. ORDNANCE
(Mo. flred/No. hits)
SPARROW FALCON
BLUE
BLUE
BLUE
MIGs
n.
1
3
4
DATA SOURCES
Messages, Reports ;
AIM-7E
2/1
1/0
1/0
AIM-^<
1/0
1/0
Remarks
One MIG-17 kill.
Plrpd guns at BLUE Plight. No hits.
8TFW/OPREP-3/051'<30Z June 1967
Raytheon Missile Performance Report AIW-TD/t
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
After co.pl.tin, a second troll along ^J^^^.^^^^-^^^^^^i^ ^^^.^ TisSaiird t ^.^^^^
^ ^^^^ Troi ^T^^^^l^l :^u:^^Sti^^ had «cved to
371
Event Ill^Slii
the outside of BLUE 3 '^nd hdd started to pull back to the Inside when the firing pass was
made by the MIHs. BLUE 1 called a break and after considerable maneuvering BLUE 3 and U
became separated. BLUE It launched a SPARROW In the boreslKht mode with interlocks In
and range track. At tine of missile launch the MIG was movlnis from the 10 to 13 o'clock
position, TCA 30°, range 3 miles, altitude 7,000 ft, speed approximately 0.9 Mach. SLUE ^
also was at 7,000 ft, speed 0.9 Mac^.. Immediately after laur.ching the missile BLUE
broke right .as another MIG was making a fit-ink^ patis frou, tild 5 o'clock position. Upon
reaching BIMGO fuel state, BLUE 4 egressed the area.
In Che me time, BLUE 3 rolled in on a single MIQ-17 that was in a level right turn.
From a 30* dive and 15* right bank BLUE 3 fired a FALCON. At launch, angle-off was good
but the KIG Increased his rate of turn and BLUE 3 passed over the MIG without observing
the performance of the missile. After cllmbins to gain separation, BLUE 3 rolled In
behind a single MIG at a range of 5 miles but due to the dive angle and sun, the Identi-
fication was delayed. A SPARROW was launched at a range of 2 miles at which tiste the KIG
broke right. Both airplanes were at 2Cas ft with the P-U Indicating 0.9 Mach e.ni the NTO
estimated at 0.8 Mach. TCA was 60**. The flight of the missile was not observed as both
the MIG and the SPARROW were lost from view. BLUE 3 then egressed the area and rejoined
BLUE 4 on the way out.
BLUE 1 and 2 sighted seven or eight MIu-17s In a wagon wheel pattern and
attempted to break up the formation. During the air tatnie BLUE I fired a FALCON which
did not guide. Ar.gle off was 10° with th*» target head-on and level. On ^ second pass a
SPARROW was launched with angle off and target aspect almost identical to the first
pass but was inside stlnlmum range. BLUE 1 observed one MIG high and two others slightly
to his left and acquired a full system lock-on on one of the niGs. With ths steering
dot centered BLUE 1 launched a SPARROW head-on. Target altitude was 6000 ft. D*«tectlon
range was 2-1/2 miles, lock-on at 2 miles, launch at 2 miles, fighter altitude 6000 ft,
speed 0.9 Hach. BLUE 1 heard a call to break right and did not observe the flight of the
missile. However, BLUE 2 observed the missile guiding down toward the MIG. BLUE 2 was
at 500-1000 ft. Within seconds BLUE 2 observed <t lAr^v fireball on the northeast side
of Thud Ridge in the vicinity of 2l°30'N/105"-5'E. The fireball extended along the flight
path of the missile that BLUE 1 had launched and was Identified as the fireball of an
aircraft that had impacted with the ground. The engagement continued until broken off by
the HICs. BLUE I and 2 then egressed the area and while outbound the backseater in BLUE 2
saw a smoking MIC-17 heading southeast with another MIG flying escort.
Event 111-315
Aircraft Involved: One RP-1C va Possible MIO
Result: Radar Contact
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«55*N/lOii''20'E
1. PRIKARf HtSSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time 6 June 1967/0«H2H
11. DATA SOURCES
»32 TRW 052225Z June 67 OPREP-3 TUOC OigS*
12. NARRATIVE
n«. BP UC (BLUE Fllzht) on a weather reconnaissance mission left Udorn ar.d proceeaeo
dlrecflo^SSsTiSmB^irS at So!oOO feet altitude. From there BLUE Flight proceeded
to 2"oO'N/10U»32'E drooping from 20.000 feet to 12.000 feet. From this PO^"' 9^"^
PulSt proceeded to 22<'10'n5iO5^O0'E descending froT 6000 ^^^J,?" 500 f«t jJtUude.
Prci there BLUE Flight proceeded to weather point Alfa at 21»*«2'N/105 «0 E at 500 reec
altitude.
After leaving the weather reconnaissance point, and on egress, ^'•"f.J^if" "*? "
21«>55'N/!55'28'E, heading 219 degrees, at 19.000 feet altitude and a speed of 525 knots.
it ►S*, h*\^e*lved a one -inK x-band TWS rapidly increasing to 3-1/2 rings ana
{ra52unrr?om 3 TcIocTto To- ciofk position. tSi. Ling tooW one minute to complete.
BLUE PliKht went to 500 feet AGL in less than one minute, an<*,.«»r°PP«^. 3 bursts
of •> Chaff bundles. Burst one broke the lock but It came back on tt seconds later. After
bursts 2 and 3, lock-on was never reestablished.
BLUE Flight accelerated to 660 knots on the deck and continued on until he reached
20'»27«N/103'"*2'E.
As BLUE Flight was ingresalng to the weather point Indications were received of
a OCX paint.
The weather was a solid undereast with tops at 10,000 feet, with visibility 10
miles. Mo MIC warnings were received.
Event Iir-316
Aircraft Involved: Four P->1059 vs one KIO-17
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Bac Clang
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: fi juna ig67/15S0H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
mrn °^ "^^''^ ^"^^ di&nz ?R and highway bridge slanted one silver
mo heading west away from the target but tn» HiO posed no Sreat to thi mlsslSS.
Event IIJ-317
Aircraft Involved; One P-105P vs Unidentified
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20*10 •N/105*20'E
I. PRIMARY NISSIJM AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Time: 7 June I967/2137H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
hu^.?S"B °f J"®!! i?*-""^ ^^^^^^ ^ flowing light which appeared to be a MIG after-
SK^Tf ?5 ® o'clock low, approaching and skinning in and out of the tops of a cloud la-^r
nJJfn' 5 miles of the F-105 who tSrned left toward llSgt anS ?t appealed
to pitch up and disappear. Thirty seconds later a strange ELINT signal with the chaJa?
teristlcs of a SCAN Pix was Intercepted for 3 to »l seconds. iSoM?G«ni iiri ?ec2?JIS:
Event I I 1-3 18
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-103s vs one MIC-21
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 20«50*N/105»10«E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 11 June 1967/090OH
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Event ZII-3I9
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-^iCs vs one MZQ-21
Result ; No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21«»22'N/105*10'E
1. PRIMARY HISSIOH AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlne: 10 June I967/1312H
Two RF-HCd (BLUE Plight) were on a mission to Fhu Tho railroad yard.
2. MISSION ROUTE
BLUE Plight departed Udorn and croceeded to 19«15'N/103**15'E at 25,000 feet altitude;
then direct to Channel 97 (20«28«M/lb3*''»3'E) at 30,000 feet; direct to target at 21»2«'?l/
105°lj'i: descending to 500 feet ACL.
8. ORDNANCE
Wo. flred/!lo. hits
AAM
MIG-21 1/0 •
U. OATA SOURCE
Meaaagea. Reports : IJZTRW 100950Z June 67 OPREP-3 TUOC 05162
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
• 9 BLUE Flight was enroute to the target at 21''00'N/105*25'E, at 130HH, a MIG warning
was issued by Red Crown "Bandits, bandits BLXLSEYE orbiting north."
DEEP SEA 22 (AEW aircraft) issued a warning to BLUE Plight call sign when the flight
was at 21*13'N/10'«''57'E at 1308H "Bandits at BULLSEYE plus 20 miles west, medium altitude.
At 1309. when 3LUE Fllsht was at 21=*20' fJ/lC5°08 '"J, Dl-EP SEA ?2 again warned BLUE
Plight by call sign Chat bandits were 5 rrilles south of -heir position and closing.
When at 21*22 •:i/105'*10'E, and 1312H BLUE Flight c/^served a MIG-21 approximately
miles distanc at their 3-3:30 o'clock position. An air-tn-air missile of unknown type
was fired at BL'JE I and at that point X-band strobing was -eeelved of three plus rings
covering a 30 degree sector of the scope with an uncharacv-eristlc dotted line video
pattern of multiple strobes. The missile left a visible black trail and appeared to-
guide accurately toward BLUE 1.
BLUE 1 called a hard left break and deacendet'. What ippeared to be the missile
detonation was observed below BLUE 1 (the flight wj.s at 2j''18'N/105*10'E) . BLUE Flight
pulled out at 1000 feet ACL heading 230 degrees, -ind muzzle flashes were seen at
21*20 'N/105'05*E but no air bursts or tracers were seen.
The MIG was not observed again nor were X-band strobing received again, but warning
calls continued from DEEP SEA 22. "Bandits, bandits 20 miles west." The last call heard
was "Bandits, bandits BULLSEYE plus 50 miles west."
The flight continued outbound at 1000 feet ACL until reaching 21'»05'N/10U«10'E when
a climb to 30,000 feet altitude was initiated.
The weather was clear with visibility unlimited.
%feffl3ir^*lL Event III-320
Aircraft Involved: Ore F-105 va two MIGa
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21*31 * N/ 105' 30 'E
}. PRIMARY MISSION A.tO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 11 June 1967/0909H
11. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. MARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight was at 17,000 ft when two NIG contrails were observed at 25,000 ft by
No. 2 due east of Phuc Yen. MIGs headed toward faght but then turned away.
Event HI-321
Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s vs two Hia-17a
and two MIC-213
Reaulta: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"»ttO'N/105"30 'S
I. PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: n June 1967/0915H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Inbound strike flight observed two silver MIG-17s proceeding UMW alo^f Jhud Rldw at
1000 ft. The flight also observed two shiny MIGs, probably MI0-21s, at Zl^SO'H/lOS'SS'E.
Event III-322
Aircraft Involved: One RF-lOl vs one MI 0-21
Results: Mo damage
Vlciiiity of Encounter: 21'05'N/10ll°06 -E
K PRIHARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tloe: 11 June 1967/09 30K
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
BLUE TREE aircraft at 25,000 ft slg.-.ced a MIG with contrails at 30,000 ft approxi-
mately 5 miles distant. Tne MI^T executed a rl^ht de-scendlng "urn toward the ■ reconnais-
sance al-craft. The reconnalss.-.;je aircraft Jettisoned external fuel tanks, executed a
left divine turn to 100 ft, we..c .iiterourner and exited the area at o20 Knots, x-hana
strobing wL received. Ihe y.:G appeared to paraUel the pnoto aircraft course In descent
bu^ wM n^t oDserved again after 2C«i*5':.VlQ3''eC'E. Numerous a5 warnings were being re-
ceived for 60 miles west to 30 sslles northwest of Hanoi.
Event 111-323
Aircraft Involved: Four P-105s va three uniden-
tified
Results: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'lS^K/lOT'OO'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Oate/Tlme: 11 June 1967/16*5K
II. DATA SOURCE
CXNCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flli;ht at l3,00'J ft observed three silver aircraft In an element of two with
th!rd aircraft following in trail; aircraft approacned flight at 7 o'clock low; aircraft
overshot and flight continued on to varget area.
Event III -3 21
Aircraft Involved: Three P-I05s vs two. NI0-17s
Results; Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21'»lO'N/106'>50 'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AKO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tl.iw; 11 June 1967/l63^H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCFACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. 'NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight observed two MIGs. The HICs were low at 1-2000 ft and performing 5-
tums .
. Event III-325
Aircraft Involved: Two F-lOSs vs two unidenti-
fied
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21"-0«N/107*'28'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 11 June I967/I658H
II. DATA SOURCE
CXNCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Two shiny aircraft were sighted by ei^ressin? IRON HAND flight. The bogeys appeared
to be at 1000 ft and to be dolnj; victory rolls. The aircraft could have been rocking and
the reflection of the sun could have given rolling effect. The type of aircraft was un-
known due to distance.
Event II 1-326
Aircraft InvolveU: Pour P-105s vs on« MIG-21
Results: Sight Ins only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»00'M/lO«i«»50*E
I. PRIHARf HISSIOM AND TACTICAL SITUATIOM
Date/Tlo«: 12 June 1967/i60UH
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff "tudy 6-68.
12. N; MVE OtSCRIPTIOM
StrU. flight sighted silver KI3; «IG -as heading MW and made a left turn Into
clouds and mss not farther observed.
Event Iir-327
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-105s vs seven
MIGb
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: ai«05'»/I06*'>5'E
I. PRINARV NtSSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 13 June I96?/l636H _
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight sighted seven possible MICs heading west at approximately 8000 ft.
Event III-328
Aircraft Involved:
Eight P-lOSs vs ten-
eleven HIC-21S
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity Of Encounter: ^l-^ioij/ioe^so;!
1. PRIMART MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 13 June 1967/1639H
n. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-^8.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Strike flight sighted two sliver MIGs at an altitude of 2O00 ft; flight also obaervftd
flieht of flve-3lx sliver MIGs at an estimated altitude of i-3000 ft; this Hia flight was
trailed bv another flight of three MICs at the same altitude and on the same heading,
approximately 1 die behind the first; second P-105 flight also saw second group of MICs.
i
[
Event 111-329
Aircraft Involved: Two RP-UCa vs one MIO-17
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: ZO^OO •N/106*05'E
J 1. PRIMARY MISSIOI* AND TACTICAL SITUATION
i Date/Tlrae: 16 June 1967/1615H
IK OATA SOURCE
r - CIMCPACPLT Ctaff Study 6.68.
L NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOH
Photo flight Observed MIQ heading 330«; no engagement.
1^
379
I
Event III-330 5
Aircraft Involved: Pour P-I05e v« one H.:o-21 j
Results: Sighting only |
Vicinity of Encounter: 21^50*N/10ii"ti5'E '
t. PRINARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlrae: 18 June 1967/C902H
11. OATA SOURCE
CINCPACPLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOH
l«v.ls MIO tuR»d and htadad northw.t* atp.«r.d to b. fiyinj at tnt-tep
Event III-331
Aircraft Involved: Four F-I05s vs two MIC-Zls
Results: Glr,!itln? only
Vicinity of Encounter: 21'»3'*'H/10?''36 'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION MO TACTICAL SITUATION
Dat«/Tline: 19 June 196 7/09 3 IH
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68,
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
No. 2 of strike flight at 9000 ft observed two silver MlCs parallel "/JlJ^^ JJ^i^f
down Thud Ridge; MiGs were 5 alles aouth at an estimated altitude of 500 ft; MIGs did not
engage and flight lost sight.
Event 111-332
Aircraft Involved: Pour F-ICs vs two unldent
(possible EB-66)
Reaulta: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: Gulf of Tonkin
1, PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 20 June 1967/1635H
n. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-63.
12, NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Flak suppression flight Ingress ing when IIo . 2 observed two silver l^ranf':*
approximately 3 niles distant at 3 o'clock; strangers were at altitude 25,000 ft; Initial
heading 210* » then turned north; possibly tB-fabs.
Event III-333
Aircraft Involved: Four F-105s vs two M1Q-?
Results: Slghtm? only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2i»25"N/10i»«>10'E
I. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 June 1967/0900H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Anna ft flak suDor-ssion flight saw :«Gs at 2-3 o'clock; MICs of unknown type headln?
down tS2 song Jh^y rfver vilLy at no closer than 10 >nlles; flight then lost sight of HIOs,
Event III-33O
Aircraft Involved: One P-105 vs one MIC-?
Results : Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: ai^ZS'H/loa'lO'E
I. PRIMART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATtOK
Oate/Tlme: ^3 June 1967/JC50H
II. DATA SOURCC
CINCPACFLT Sriff Study 6-68.
12. KARRATTVE DESCRIPTION
Kenber of strike flight at 3000 ft when aircraft believed to be MIQ was sighted
heading soutnwest at altitude 12-13,000 ft; suspected MIC lit afterburner and P-i05 lost
sight of aircraft.
Event III-335
Aircraft Involved; ^ow P-105a va one unldent
Results; Uo Canaga
Vicinity of Encounter: 2i«05'M/10«i»50'E
1. PRIMARY MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 23 June 1557/0050K
n. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACRLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. 'nAiIRATIVE DESCRIPTION
IROM HAND flight received momentary x-band signal; F-105» brcke left and signal went
off; at 16502, (22 June), '»5 rnlles south of Yen Bay. flight saw an afterburner light at
their 12 o'clock position, approximately 2 miles ahead In a slight cllnb; light went off
and then ca^ie cack cn, enabling pursuing P-105s to identify swept-back wing features and
to see that the fuselae? was silver-grey In the moonlight; suspest fllG was now heading NW
in slight clizb approxlr.ately 1 mile in front of flight, which turned into suspect Nin
and his afterburner light went cut; shortly thereafter the afterburner was relit, showing
unidentified to be In sllgiit right dive; once again afterburner light went out and flight
lost track of the unidentified.
Event III-336
Aircraft Involved: Three T^^rs vs one Mia-2l,
one unidentified
Results: Sighting only
Vicinity of Encounter: 2 1^40' N/1 04* 15 •£
I. PRIMARY MISSION ANO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 27 June 1967/09 15H
II. DATA SOURCE
CINCPACFLT Staff Study 6-68.
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
Escort flight heard continuous MIG calls from C056Z until 0133Z; ECM aircraft was at
30,000 ft when MIC was sighted at 7 o'clock posltlor. by escorts; MIO was at 30,000 ft
approxlBsately 1 r.llc distant; XIS nadc no attempt to engage and was not further observed;
at approximately 0117Z, flight starting i left turn observed an unidentified silver,
fighter typs; air-raft at rn.^ht'.s. 12 o'clock pcslt <^^^ofi;ey was heading HW up the Hed
hibor; bocey appeared t? b« in a gentle cll»ib aiid •SjHIBHI^i' > was approximately 7-8
miles distant and posed no threat to fli^t. ■
Event II 1-3 37 j
Aircraft involJtH^^W^-''C vs two MIC-l7a
Reault: One P-'iC destroyed
Vicinity of Encounter: Hainan Island
1. PRIHARt NISSION ARO TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/TlB*: 26 June 1967/17 32H
Qm p.»C Perry Plight from Clark APB to Da Nang
2. HISS I OH ROUTE
OMuioim ^
I
3. AIRCRAFT CORF I CURAT IONS
F-«IC BLUE 1 i
~ !■
600-eal eenterllne tank j
HER S outboard.
TETIS Inboard
BLU/IB ba«ga«e rack on left inboard teh. I
4. FLI6HT COR01TI0R5 PPIOR TO EHCOUHTER
Weather : Wind, aloft forecast 25 kt» from 100- at 3y,000 MSL.
BLUE 1
Altitude ; 26,000 ft
Heading ; 210
Speed : Unknown
fueTIState: LO" 0"
Plight Formation ;
H/A
5. INITIAL omCTIOR , . , .
BLUE 1 -as subjected to surprise attack Sy twn HIQ-lTs from hia 6 o'clock position. ,
I
6. ACTION INITIATED |
See Itea \2
7. SITUATION OEVELORHENT
See Itea 12
I
8. ORDNANCE
BLUE I - Kone
MIG-178 - Unknown
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEHS -i inr 'i
Heading Indicators, Primary and Standby In both cockpits were In error and had BLUE :l
north of course.
10. AIRCREM COHHENTS
11. ORTA SOURCES
Heaaages. Reports:
366 TFW OPREP-3 DtIG AS RVN DCOl 809 June 67 261620Z
366 Tp5 OPREP-3 dug A3 RVN DCOl 8l2 June 67 2618^52
CTP-77 SITREP-1 June 67 270902Z
12. fUsht, departed Clark AB and planned tc arrive at Da Nang with 3200
rn^l reserve Sinds enroute^t planned altitude of 39.000 ft KSL /o^ecast to be
^ Lrniv tcG" at 25 kts/ The headinR Indicators (both Primary and Standby) in both
approximately caused the pilot to proceed north of course. BLUE 1 was In
cockpits in r^«S tr^ PhillDDlne ADIZ' until letdown intc what was thought to be the
*Alr Defense Identification Zone
382
Event in-337
CREEN Pll(;ht, returning; fro.'n RP VI strike, ROt AOF tearing on BLUE 1 transmissions and
gave pilot a steer of SiO" for lUo n ni , which proved to be correct. BLUE 1 followed this
steer at 26,000 ft MSL jntll subjected to a surprise attack by two f'.IG-lTs from his 6
o'clock position. Aircraft was hit, flro warnln?; 11,-^hts were illuminated, pilot pulled
throttles to Idle and both engines fctllcd. Pilot extended RAT', Jettisoned external stores*
and continued on course- by controllir.i; aircraft with rudder through a series of dives and
zooms. At 8000 ft both pilots ejected and were picked up 1 1/2 hours later by a navy
helicopter. Position of tailout approxls:ateiv 10 n nl south of Hainan Island. Pilots
did not sustain any injuries.
[;
n
'Paia Air Turbine
383
' 7
11 r
ii
I
t
[;
Svent IIl-3'iO
Aircraft Involved: Four A-^s vs five HIC-21S
Results: No daraape
Vicinity Of Encounter: SO"*;? •N/106*21'E
I. PRIHARY NISSIOS AND TACTICAL SITUATIOH
Dace/T.'ne; 11 July 1967/0838H
Two elerents of A-^a part of a strike force frcni the Consellation were attacking a
target in the Kal '3uone area. The strike group consisted of A-63 and an F-4 flak sup-
pression fllcht.
8. OAONANCE
(No. fired/::o. hit)
AAM or Rocket Remarks
MIG-21 1/0 Fired at A-*5
II. DATA SOURCES
Hessaggs. Rtcort?. :
CTO 77. U 110100 Julv 67 GPREP-3 PINN 003
CTC n.k 110110 July 67 OPREF-3
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTIOM
At oa33H, as the Consellation strike ^roup approached the target at position
20*55' 35'*:.'/13£»2O'10''E ^nd ir. iltltude of 12,000 ft on a heading of 358"*, the F-U TABCAP/
flak suppression and strike aircraft conrenced their attack followed by eTements of A-6s
and A-I5.
Two elements of A-Us glchted a total of five NIG-Zls. The HICs were on a heading of
090* at 17,000 ft altitude and 3-5 "1 froa the strike group. The MIGs were called, but
at this tli.;e trie r-iis and the rvst of the strike grcup were coimlttod to their attacks.
The MiGs approached over the strike group at the same time the group entered Into
the Im-Tttdlite target area. As flak started from the target area, three of the HIC-21s
engaged afterturr.er , rained altitude, and were not coserved thereafter. Two of the MIG-Sls
were observ^ed t? ccrr.ence a shallow dive toward the strike group and one fired a missile
or rocket. The exact "lyre was undetermined due to the strike group's concentration on
the target. The smoi^e or vapor trail from the weapon was seen momentarily as the on}y
Indication that a weapon had been fired. No strike aircraft were damaged, and the target
of the MI'1 attack was unknown.
Immediately after completion of their ordnance delivery runs the F-^s pulled up,
climblnE nortnwest , to enijaee the MIGs. Although the ?-fis remained In the vicinity of
the tarret to cover the egress of the A-U and A-6 aircraft and continued to search for
MIGs, they were unable to make either radar or visual contact with the MICa .
The weather was scattered clouds at 16,000 ft with visibility unlinited.
The best estimate of the flight crews is that the MIGs approached from the west at
about 18,000 ft and flew over the strike group. The ones that attacked the group egressed
on a right cllmolng turn to the west.
385
r
I
Event jill-jHI
Aircraft Involved: Pou:* F-Bs/pne A-UE vs two :'»IG-21s
Result : No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 19"n'H/l05'25'E
1. PRINART MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
D«te/Tljne: 17 July 1967/0900H
BLUE Flight {four F8s) on a TARCAP niSBlon aPQ GREEN Plight (one A«E) on RESCAP tnisslon
Mer« involved in this event.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-8 BLUE 1. ?. 2. H
Ait-
Unknown
QREEN I
ZUNI rockets and 20 n ml
mc»2ia I. 2
8.
AAN - quantity unknown
ORDNANCE
BLUE 1, 2. 3,
GREEN 1
MIC-2I9
ZUWI Rocketa
8/0
20 n ml
30/0
Soviet AAH
1/0
Remarks
HIG3
11. DATA SOURCES
Messages. Reports :
CTG 77.8 OPREP-U July 1967 1708202
12. NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
At ogoOH, SL'JE Pli5:.t sighted two MIG-Sl aircraft while on a TARCAP nlssion.
vere approachlns BLUE Flight and flak suppression aircraft from the south at approximately
6000 ft when BLUE Pil^tit assumed chase. MIGs made a hard left nose low turn to north.
BLUE Plight could not close and dropped off MIGs. HIGis then turned back and headed toward
strike ijroup. BLUE Pll
GREEN Plight (one AttE]
crossing in front of al.v-^*- .^-^ , - uxr- ;u e.
air type nlssile at BLUE Flight in front of him. GREEN one maneuvered to the MIG ,^3 6
O'clock position, 8000 ft altitude, 3/'* mile behind and fired 8 ZUNI rockets and 30 rounds
of 20iiim. MIQ-21 pulled away from engasement and departed to the north.
; close and dropped off MIGs. HICs then turned oacK ana nesoep i-owbi-b
'light resu.T.ed chase and MIGs again turned north and dlsappeai;ed.
:) flying RESCAP flak suppression for SAR e 'fort sighted MIG-?!
al.-craft vicinity 19*'»7'N/105°25'E at ITOO^gZ. Saw MIG flreHalrTtOr
1
k ■ ■
X
'i.
386
A
m
ii|J!^IHiUWJlJA.4W»
Event III-3I2
Aircraft Involved: Four A-^iEs vs four MIC-21s
Kesult: Kc dar.r-.ge
Vicinity of Encounter: 20»30'rV105*55'E
PRIMARY HISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tlr.e; 18 July ICoT/lf-CZ!!
The A-!iE were part of a f-^roe of 1^* A-Es and 7-85 attackln;; the Dlen Xa storage area,
tip. fIr'"i/N'J. hits
AAM
1/0
8. OROMANCE
MIG-21
n. DATA SOURCES
y.es3ar«» s. Re?:rt3 ; CTC 77.5 l8l30CZ July 67 OPPEP-5/005
- ' C70 77.8 1B1202Z July £7 OPREP-I
12. NARRATIVE CESCRIPTION
Two elenents of the strike force encountered KIG3 as follows:
Two A-f*'^ flak supprestir,n alrrrafl, with a TOT cf If^Oa. «ere at that tine In the
vlcmuy 0° ^c°31' S-N/lC^'^^'Ol'-E when one of rhe pilots saw three KIC-218 300°
liSieiie rillih?: The XlOs'^ere at lU.OOO feet altitude h-.ading 220 degrees. The MICs
were quickly lost from view.
b> ■'wo lr.OU HA:ID al-craft In the vicinity of JO'Sg'N/lOSO^VE, heading OJil
s [r-aT^l^a'^^t-^-lnb-'^r;-:?;'^ f r^c'eror AAM f.c. lO.OQQ feet altitude. 7000
feet'^anie! The :ontinued to cllT.b to 13.000 feet and heading north.
337
ii
I I
i \
1 .
! 1
Event III-3«3
Aircraft InvlJ^e>'^^Sur P-«Ds va elgl:t KIG-IU
Result: No damage
Vicinity of Encounter: 21»19'M/105»53'E
1. PRIMARY HISSIOri AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/?lre: I? July 1967/16522 w i- r».
-our ''-uo, (3Lt- nUht) -ere on an ar:.ed reconnaissance mission against the ha Gla
transht^Jent ?oln?V. 29»19' 25"N/105-53'00-E In Route Package /la.
2. MISSION ROUTE , .
BLUE flight «aa fro™ Ubon and probably Ingreaaed and eeressed overland.
3. AIRCRAFT CONriCURATlON
' " J : S!tiriiH-;pro...l, c.m.d «, »nfl^r.tlon l«,.rd p,l.«. Vcm PC)
(no AIM-i»D carried)
HTC~17
Karklngs unobserved
Cannon
5. irilTtAL OETECTtON,
BLUE fU?ht ctaerved ?<IC» near Phuc Yen while Inbound to target.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight continued on to tha target arriving at 1615H.
While egressin, .h. IJ^f J.^rwe^f "af.'ui\Srra^?%'iieTf
?S3-Rl5^:;^^r?«^ ^7^^ P-t:?" '^^r ^JaSi^r-e^I-. -ey bro.e left and then
rSengagea'the Miaa.-t.is tine wU. ^^^^^^J^;;^ ^ , ,
BLUE 1 achieved a lock ar.d flrei two at a ran:,e oi^ to . ,3^^^^
One nuaile did not ^u.ce. prctabiy due ^^/^J^^.^'J^^^^l^^d^on p^ss; ind BLUE Flight
-guided t)eautirully.:; So.e ..UG3 turn^ and ^-^ted a^.ea ^^^P^^^'^^^
was reentering Pnuc :en f.ak (ierenses. rar ' . , u -t- « of
BLUE 2 fl-ed one AIM-? after a boreslght acquisition wltn .ock-on at a range or
3 n «?^"^BLUE'lead°SroIce loft to avoid flak and head-on pas^ of -IG-l.s
BLUE I and 2 egressed up Thud Pidge and out. Action too. place between I65O «d
1658. MIC marklnss not visible.
8. ORDNANCE
{Ho. fIred/No. hits)
SPARROW
Xiy.^lZ CAHNOM Remarks
One missile failed to guide, probably due to
mot-cr malfunction.
Yes Fired unknown number of tines
^, „_ - ,/n one missiie laiuru
BLUE 1 2/0 aaifunctlon.
BLUE 2 1/0
MIGa
a EQUIPMENT PROSLEMS ^ ^ ^
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
BLUE lead ccr^ente. that MIQs dem=nstrated a hl?h r.eacur. of aggrw^
th-y could have t.eli lock for a few more seconds on the xast .Ir.ng, .ney wo
credited with two more Kills.
11. DATA SOURCES
;«esaap-es, Penorts :
U32 TFrf OPFEP-U 19320OZ. 19 July 67, DUOC 07057
MEXO OLD 0600 - f^aytheon - Missile Cystens Div.. Oxnard. Calif. 2^ July 67
CP^SV BOX SCORE
338
4ir
I
1.
i:
[
[
1"
12. HARRATIVE DESCRIPTION
TMe narrative la contr.lned l^.'-^ens 5. 6. and 7 above,
firing ptirar.eteps for the three Ai:-.-7h actemp.s.
Event 111-3^3
The table below gtves the
BLUE 2
Left Front
P.lr;t!t Front
t Ppcnt
1
2
1
Radar *'3dio
•-ore3l.:ht
P. a d T r
Auto
Auto
Auto
Holarl la: ion
L:n
'Jlr 1
Jlr 1
•■"133 He ".c-i-i
Mr
::ar
:;ar
Ir.'.trr.-iTZzr kiz'.t-jie
Alrsr:e-d
2000'
• r'ack 1
00-
•■lack 1
TOT Altitude
Airspeed
6000 '
3C00'
jOOC
AS?9Ct
9C Do:; and
turr.in?
10 iegrees c
•f tail
Detectlan oarve
i n Rl
lb n mi
18 r. nl
t n nl
le n .7.1
13 n ml
Judy
PCX
-Irlns r.ar.-e
3 n r,l
i n r.i
6 r\ cl
Hiss
. •
Had to creaX
off due zo
1 other '•■.103
r-ad to bre&A
off due to
oth«(r 'A'Sjii
Xotor
Malfunction
I
I
L
if-
1..
389
Event Ill-jt*
Aircraft Involved: Four P-'*Cs v» one
Result: No damage
Vicinity or Encounter Zl^lZ'M/loy'lT'E
1. PRINART NISSIOM AMD TACTICAL SITU.»TIOR
Date/Time; 20 July 1967/1652H
Pour F-*»Cs on an armed reconnaissance mission against the Hung railroad yard at
2I»33*20"N/106»29''»0'*E.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
P-UC BLJE 1. 2. 3> ft
SPARROW AIM-7 - quantity for flight unknown
BLUE flight had a total of 13 M-117 bonbs at 3 CE«-2*is.
4. FLIGHT CONDITIONS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather: Unknown
BLUE
1
Altitude: 15 #000 ft
Head ins : 120«»
Speed : Unknown
Fuel State : Unknown
Plight Fomasion : Strike formation
5. INITIAL DETECTION
After hlttlne the target, and while egresslng, received warnings from HOTEL' about
MlQa In the area. SLUE fil,5ht sighted a single lon?-nosed, delta wing, silver aircraft
at altitude 2000 ft, heading 050", 500 kts. approximately 1652 local time.
6. ACTION INITIATED
BLUE flight pursued the HIG to 21»21'N/IC7*«»8'E
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE 1 (le'\d) rired an AIM-7 at the MIO fron 2 n ml out, 10* dive, altitude 8000 ft,
heading 05<» , lock-on Indicated (full system) at time of firing, but missile did not appear
to guide. BLUE flight broke off attack due to proximity to CHICOM border. MIO believed
to have proceeded across Into CHICOil airspace « BLUE lead carried a blister camera on
board and expended 200 feet of flln.
8. ORDNANCE
(No. flred/No. hits)
SPARROW
AIM~7 Remarks
BLUE 1 1/0 Missile failed to guide
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS '
BLUE 1 - SPARROW missile failed to guide.
10. AIRCREW COMMENTS
None
11. DATA SOURCES
Mess ages. Reports ; OPREP 2011502 Jul 67 from 366 tTV
■ Danang AB RVN
>See Item 12.
2dIA Intelligence summary lists the MIQ as firing one AAM. Mo other source Indicates
this firing.
Event III-3*!*
12. MRRATtVe OESCRIPTtON
See ttens 5, 6, 7.
PLIGHT reports the followiriE: calls from HOTEL.
Red for CGI at 0810Z Tit PSN at 21" 16 ■ tl/107*01 'E)
Yellow for CCU at OS'iOZ (fir PS» at 21*17 'N/lOT^Ott 'E)
Bandits NW It 06253
SU 25 N^ed at 0333Z
NW 25 at 083^2
South at 0S3:!s
S HO heading 090° at O838:
HOTEL radio sounded garbled
c
[
[
I.
r
i
391
Event ri:-3'»5
Aircraft Involved:
Result
One A-IC and four P-8Cs va
eight MIG-17D3
Three MICs destroyed, two MIC s damaged
and one probable kill. Two F-8Cs
damaged.
Vicinity of Encounter:
Hanoi
20 miles northwest of
1. PRtHARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Time: 21 July 1967/1519H to 16I»6H
Stride mission on the Ta Xa fuel -"rage depot JO ^^/.^/-.lint slJn"""''
p.8Ca were on TARCAP and one P-8E was escorting the A--C iru« n*i.*u wi-aa
8. ORONAMCE
(No. fired/Ho, hits)
AIH-gP 20inm ZUNI
Unk/1
Onk/1
Unk/0
Onk/l
Unk/3
6/unic
Remarks
Carried AIH-9D. No data. Unobsenred.
Hit. Probable kill.
Kill.
Kill. '
Three hits. One kill.
BLUE 1
BLUE 2
BLUE 3
BLUE It
P«8E
11. DATA SOURCES
Messages: OPREP-5/021 2116U7Z. July 1967 from CTO
12. NARRATIVE OESCRIPTION
While en route to the target, a force of at least Jjf J{ PS'^^^^Jru^"?!."?.? ^.ngaged
attac!!^d the TARCA? and IHOH HAND PC^plng up ^^J/' .^f dfrfct
the MIG-17S m a dog fight and shot ^S^^.I^I^n'dowSed by canron fire and another
hit from a SIDEWINDER missile. 0"* "^«;;:/"o^^''^!Ser MIG waf^Jtacked with a SIDE-
MS destroyed oy ZUNI rockets ^nd 20mm -J;*; to detonate. Uter a parachute
iiS'luhtS! "ihe'ifo^SirnsteS f.'\\To\:Al jru!"Two ot.er .IGs were damaged in the
"""'^iwrnror'TARCAP were damaged Jy/^nnon fire One F-8 was hit ^Je right ^
aileron and the ether -^^^J^ff^/"" iy3'2„^;:emei "Sk.ta and cannon,
F-8 was able to outturn the MIG-17 m tnis engagcm.ui..
392
ii
I.
Event III-3'>6
Alrcra^^B^^^^ Two F-'tCs vs two NIG-'31s
Result: ^^^K^ killed (probable)
Vicinity of Encounter: Zl'OT'N/lOS'lT'E
PftlNARV MISSION AND TACTICAL SITUATION
Date/Tine: 27 July 1967/1600H
Two P-oc aircraft (BLUE Plight) on an escort nisslon approximately 35 miles west of
Hanoi. BLUE 1 and 2 had air aborts. BLUE 3 and 4 were involved in this encounter.
3. AIRCRAFT CONFIGURATIONS
p.»C BLUE ?. «
AIN.7
AIH.9
MIC-ais
Dark silver color with no vir<.ble markings.
4. FLIGHT CONOITIOKS PRIOR TO ENCOUNTER
Weather; Unknown
BLUE 3. 1
17,000 ft
325'
460 KTAS
Unknown
Altitude ;
HeadlngT
Speed :
• Puel State ;
5. INITIAL DETECTION
The two MIG-21S were first called as bogeys at 10 o'clock by the flight that was
being escorted.
6. ACTION INITIATED
SLUE Plight engaged the two MIG-21S almost Imaedlately .
7. SITUATION DEVELOPMENT
BLUE Plight first sighted the two HIG-213 (dark silver with no visible markings)
pass from left to rlisht across nose of ELwE Flight aparoxiraately 1/^ miles distant In a
descending rignt turn. SLUE Plight followed In pursuit. BLUE 3 ha'' one NIG centered at
3000 ft distance. The MIG lit afterburner Just prior to missile ler.nch. The SIDEVrtNOER
tracked strai-^ht ahead until r.otor burnout, then turned right dlrecvly after the HIO-21.
The SIDEVIt.'DEH was last ::een In full guided flight approxlnately 200 ft directly aft of
the HIC-21, but no detonation was observed. One MIG-21 started Into a left descending
turn. (At this time the second MIG continued straight ahead and was not pursued.) BLUE 3
and ^ continued a left turn In pursuit of first MIC, and at altitude 9000 ft, heading 090°,
25 degree dive, 150 kts overtake with interlocks in and full systems lock-on, BLUE 3
fired one AIK-7 from 1-1/4 ml out, 10 degree aspect angle 20 degree angle-off. The
missile left the launcher with b.<.as, and appeared to track Immediately. The MIG-21 was
in a moderate descending left turn, headed for the undercast at altitude 6OOO ft. The
missile was last seen tracking 2000 ft behind the HIQ-21 In a lazy pursuit curve. This
was classed as a' probable kill.
BLUE 3 Initially tried to fire but the dot was out of the ASE circle; when the dot
was brought into the circle tlie missile launched.
ORDNANCE
BLUE 3
BLUE 4
(No, flred/No. hits)
SPARROW SIDEWINDER
AIH-7 AIM-9
l/Kprob) 1/0
0/0 0/0
Remarks
Probable kill with SPARROW
9. EQUIPMENT PROBLEMS
None stated for BLUE 3 and 4.
BLUE 1 and 2 aborted early in mission.
11. DATA SOURCES
Messa<:fe3. neciorts : OPREP-4368
2712502 from 366TPrf Danang AB RVM
393
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^X^SHG RLFOIIT 116 ^' .
A I R • T O - A f E .N C u> I J N T E R S / N
SOUTHEAST ASIA (U)
a.
o
V 0 i -J rn c I V : :kv?A y 5 c 5
April 1 968
I n c ! i; li i .T
"Urauthorizeii Dt»cloauro Siibj«c! 10
D D C
I ;.•'! a-t^ '.'itt
jEXCLlJDZD FRCK Tii2 GD3
nvsvk>'> hv ■ j.j: a'» I '"i?. !t; vi: ;;^:-* y 1-:; a;.' V :.j;iivi:. AKiJSw":^:,. v.-
"EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL DECUSSinCATIOM ... - — ^
SCHEDULE." PRESCRIBED BY E. 0. 11652 '
mnm m i
m
nc
hrill
□
ionuieaiiM
IT
DttnniiiN/iiiMiiiLin mo
tat Milt MirtTSwiP
0
THi: documsnr contoim j^irrcfio^cffscJlnj tho nafiofwl dtfenjo
snrcri^i in ciV>^n3nneik{e^Jn •jneiifnorizfld
0
the hc^Tzf cr!.j^yjjL:=.-v^pro*N^Acpovc refer
" inferirat ioii zor*alr.c:c r.;;r-ii.
■ "— ■ ■ — "nC>'i ' .- viO '■-
C4 t£Si.-MfS *Ty*".
**>lATIONAL S£:c.U..frY .... JRMATOJT
"Vaaulhotiied DUclosiuta Subject Id
[sSCIiiMSS FROM tili: GD3 |
1 |M *WP
' j I T ' ' *!" ^> 1 ' ' ' . ■ H '*l«' I
(Thb page h
CCHrtDl'
orncE or thc pirfctor of Df-rrNsc RrscARCH and CNciNECRmc
WEAPONS SYSTEMS LVALUAHOM GROUP
WASHINGTON. U C 2C305
D DC i
OCT 24 I9f75
MdM U ILLU
D
21 May 1968
MEHORANDUK FOR THE CirAInMAIf , JOINT CIIIEF3 OF STAFF
SUBJECT: Alr-to-Air Encounters In Southeast Asia (U)
(U) The abstract of WSEG Report Wo. 116/ "Air-to-Alr
Encounters In Southeast Acia - Volume IV: Analyses," is con-
tained in Section I telcv/. Additio.nal coiTLT.ents on the study
are contained in Scctlcr. II.
I. ABSTRACT
(U) Title fxr.d Date of Report : "Air-to-Air Encounters in South-
east Asia - VoluHie IV: Analyses," WSEG Report No, 116,
April 19w3.
(U) Conducted by : WSEG
(U)
For : DDRiE
Kcla2£2_l2.' I^^ontiricatlon of research ani ctsve J-Oprxnt
prooie:ns Trom analyses of air-to-air combat ii^ Southeast
Asia.
(C) Si :n:r.ai\v of I'tethcdolc^y it^A Dizcu5?,ior. : Extensive detailed
in forma c ion was gacr.ered from SiA cor.bat aircrew dtbriefin.:s
by specially trained r.llitary and civilian toa;-s to :'^upple-
ment* the inf orrrial? on contained in the jombat repcrtint"
systems. The collected data, coverins the period April i9o5
to Auf;ust 1967, v.'ere organized in outline and narrative for-
mat and also encoded fcr computer use. Two independent
analyses of the data were performed: a quantitative^ analyi:ij;
of the various T^hasss of each en^arorr-ent and a qualitative
analysis of each event as a whole. The quantitative anal-
ysis examined the separate phases of combat, first by quanti-
fying the Darar.-?ters and then by analyzing each of the
separate chasos, bct'n individually and collectively, in all
of the documented events. Resul'-5 of the qualitativa
analysis identifiod the factors affecting the outcome of
the air battles and fron these factors areas requiring
research and development effort were identified,
(C) Principal Firviinrs_: The study indicates that concerted
research ai;a dSv\rlocrem: effort tcwavd effectlnff, improve-
ment^jn the foiiowing areas would eniiance the effectiveness
of U.S. cP'?r?.!;iorj in air-to-air coirbat:
fihto page Wj
n-OC CONTROL
-t
\
i
Enemy position and direction information,
Lonc-rance positive identification.
Weapon versatility and reliability.
Target dlscririiaatlon acalnst ground return.
Aircraft rearward visibility.
Man/nachlne compatibility.
II. COMMENTS
(U) This study is responsive to a request fron the Office
of Director of Defense Research and Engineering (ODlRSE) for
an analysis of air-to-air encasements directed toward identify-
ing those areas cortlnent to research and develor^.ent for air-
craft weapons systems of the 1970-1975 time period. Basic
authority for the study is contained In 28 May 1965
and DJSM-16Q2-66 , 6 December 1966. JCS concurrence in this
DDRiE study Is recoEniced in J3M-1929-66, 2 December 1966..
(U) This study should prove useful in:
• Providing data on SEA air-to-air combat events
which hcrotofcre have not been available from
other sources.
• The identification of research and development goals
for improving current v:eapons systems as v/ell as the
design of future aircraft v/eapons systems.
• Other studies or follov/-on efforts in suggesting
data collection and analytical methodclosy for
similar operational analyses.
• Providing coTjnanders and aircrew personnel a source
of information on the achievements and the mistakes
of U.S. pilots in air-to-air combat in SEA.
• The development of tactics as a consolidation of
experiences in air-to-air combat.
(U) It should be noted that the data collected for this
study, although v:g11 taoulated and presented, are primarily
based on observations 2nd estirr.ares nade by individuals under
the stress of ccrr.bat and thus subject co the frailties of
human memory. The lnterviev;s frcn which the data were gleaned
were conducted at varying tln:es follov/ing the actual combat;
some immediately following the action and others as much as
one year later.
(S) In addition to those areas identified in the stijdy
0
a
a
fl
n
0
a
a
a
i
for research and development investigatxcn, another area -
countermeanures to defeat or de^^rade eiieiiy weapons and v/eapon
systems - appears to .Indicated by the Increased employment
effectiveness of enerty air-to-air weaponr> subsequent to the
data cut-off date of 1 Auj,ust igC?. In the short five-nonth
period from 1 August 1967^0 3 January 3.968 , the U.S. lost two
aircraft to enetriy air-to-air gunfire and 12 aircraft to enemy
air-to-air ruinjiles. During this period neither side intro-
duced nev/ Dircraft and/or v/earcns or appreciably chang:od its
sortie ratea. Ther>e recent losses to air-to-air missiles alone
account for 40 percent of the total U.5. . SEA alr-tc-air losses
and 70 percent of the total losses to air-to-air missiles.
(S) Two other research anu developir.ent problem areas,
while identified in the report, were not stressed. These are
voice comnunications and aircraft performance, which also appear
to warrant serious investigation for future weapons systems,
(U) It should be noted that ths conclusions reached in
this study v/ere based solely on data gathered during a specific
time period and from the United environment of SEA. Therefore,
the indicated areas for research and development effort which
have been identified are not necessarily all-inclusive for all
environments .
(U) The effort in this project was directed toward the
identification of problem areas v/ith research and development
implications. This objective appears to have been met; hov;ever,
a continuation of the data collection effort is desirable in
order for there to be a data base fcr such further analyses as.
may be desired. It is recommended thac this f 'motion be accom-
plished by the Services , with channels provided for the ex-
change of information. The follGv;-on data collection effort
would, hopefully, be consistent v;ith d^ta collected for this
study both in content and quality in order x;o assure ccm.mon
data for the tctal period. " V/SSG is prepared to cooperate fully
with the Services in casslnr; c:i the skills, techniques, data
foi'mats and instructions developed in acquiring the data used
in this study.
(U) Volume I cf this report, "Accont of P-^ and F-8 Events
Prior to 1 '-larch 1967 (U)," v;as distributed in October I967.
Volumes II and III, covering air-to-air encasements through
1 August 1967, will be forwarded upon completion, on or about
15 August 1968.
Vice Aomirai, U3N
Dj rector
J
3 ■ ■
B
f -
a
a"
ia
la
DFORN
i8
REPORTjR-l23'»^f-^^ :
TO-AIR ENCOUNTERS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA.^)
Volume "C^"^ Analyses CnA\(c^
April 1968 ^
This report ho^ been prepared by the Systemi Evotuot.on D.vmon of
the Imtitulefor Oefcr.se Analyses i"f"P«""!f ^.^^^'^'^V^^!,* l!"!!
tvcluotion Group Talk Order 50-OAHCI5 67 C 00I2-H04A doted
6 December 1966. ^"Y^j T"^"^ ^- C ! ^ C ^ A 7 - Ol ' J
tn the work under this Task Order, the Institute na$ beert oi»:$ted by
.mililcr/ personnel assigned by WSEG.
"AATIOHAI^ SECURIZX UVORUAXIOB" '
'Unauthorized Disclosure Subjeot .to^Crlaloel "
Sanctions* ^ V ) / _ ' ^ ' ' 1-^ t ST' ' ^-
"EXCLUDED FROM GENThAL ULCLAiSJilHCAIlUN ^ ^
SCHEDULL" PRESCRIBED BY L 0. 11652 - •
INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES
SYSTEMS EVALUATION DIVISION
400 Army-Navy Drive. Arlington. Virginia 22202
OCT 24 1979
D
IDA Log No. HQ 68-8621
NOFOIIN
FOREWORD
(C) At the request of the Director of Defense Research
and Engineering, the Systems Evaluation Division of the Institute
for Defense Analyses in conjunction with the Weapons Systems
Evaluation Group has undertaken a study of air-to-air encounters
in Southeast Asia. The effort, called Project RED BARON, sought
to obtain and analyze data, primarily to assist in the selection
of suitable research and development programs for future high-
performance fighter aircraft, and also to provide a much-needed
source of basic data for use by the military services and the
scientific community.
(C) Project RED 3AR0N Is reporting its findings in four
volumes. Volu.iie I (IDA Hepcrt R-123; V.'oEG Report ll6) documents
air-to-air encounters in SEA involving and P-8 aircraft
prior to 1 March 1967. Volume II will document those encounters
involving P-105 aircraft for the same period. Volume III will
give the data for all air-to-air events in the period from
1 March 1967 to 1 August 1967. These three volumes constitute
the collection of basic data.
(C) Volume IV presents the results of the analyses which
were performed on the data base. The extensive effort exerted
by the RED BARON Project in obtaining and organizing a detailed
and reliable data base involved hundreds of people and many man-
years of vjork. Those people v/ho assisted primarily in the data
collection effort are listed in the Foreword of Volume I, and
their assistance is here, again, gratefully acknowledged.
(U) The Project also v;i::Jie3 to think Mrs. Antoinette
Hudson and Mrs. Elizabeth Bash.-iin, who assisted in many clerical
and administrative areas since the beginning of the Project.
The special art and reproduction problems for the project were
ably handled by Walter Hamilton, Robert German, and the staff
of the Publications Department, and Edgar Boling of the Editorial,
Staff.
(U) In addition, the Project wishes to express its appre-
ciation to the many members of IDA/WSEQ support staff who re-
sponded to the unusually heavy work load resulting from the
massive interview data.
(U) Appreciation is also expressed for the assistance and
guidance provided by T. L. Johnson, Captain, USN, and his
replacement , William Russell, Captain, USN, and Phil H. Van
Sickle, Colonel, USAF, of ODDR&E Tactical Warfare Programs.
(U) The analytical effort rested principally on those
members of IDA and w35G who constitute the .RED BAROM Project
staff, and on those consulting specialists from outside the
ID*\/Vi3EG organization who contributed to the analyses.
(U) The members of the RED BARON Project are as follows:
SED Members
John S. Attinello,
Project Leader
Douglas N. Beatty,
Asst. Project Leader
John W; Rubino
Earl A. Thomas
Charles W. Gardner
Velma M. Archer
WSEG Members
John W. Walden, Cdr., USN,
Primary Military Project Member
Richard C. Stewart, Capt., USU
Floyd A. Prlesen, Cdr., USN
Philip Brooks, Col., USAF
Ralph L. Kuster, Ma J., USAF
M. J. Agnew, Lt.Col., USAF
Charles R. Shaw, Col., USA
(U) Other assistance in the analyses, as consultants to
the Qualitative Analysis Panels, is gratefully acknowledged:
Dr. Sidney Alexander, Advanced Research Projects Agency
Mr. V/illiam C. Barnum, Aeroneutronic Division, Philco-Pord
UElCLASSinZD
Mr. Richard C. Beall, USAP Syc terns Command, Aeronautical
Systems Division
Mr. Harold Dradshaw, Naval Air Systems CoTjnand
Mr. A. DeGray, Jr., Naval Air Systems Command
Mr. L, Franceschi, Raytheon Corporation
Mr. Herbert Goda, IDA/STD
Dr. A. Hyatt, Morth A.-nerican Corporation
Mr. William H. Laudel, HcDonnell-Douglas
Mr. James McCarthy. USAF Systems Coironand. Aeronautical
Systems Division
Mr. Paul Okamoto, IDA/SED
Mr. James A. Perkins, McDonnell-Douglas
Mr. John Transue, IDA/SED
Dr. Robert D. Turner, IDA/STD
Mr. C. C. Welssman. Office of the Chief of Haval Operations
Mr, Frank Wyche, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation
Lt.Col. David Young, USAF, WSEG
(U) The Project also wishes to thank those who reviewed
the final draft of Volume IV and contributed their comments and
suggestions: a
Mr. George E. James, IDA/SED, representing Dr. All 3.
Cambll. IDA. Vice President for Research
Mr. Peter G. Freck, IDA/SED
Mr. Herbert Goda, IDA/STD
Mr. Terrell Greene, The RAND Corporation
Mr. Bruce Powers, Center for Naval Analyses.
(U) Although volume IV represents the combined effort ol
the entire Project staff, and all members contributed in some
measure to all sections, there were principal authors for each
of the major areas considered. Those authors names are indi-
cated m the Contents with the sections for which they had
primary responsibility.
(U) The project wi.hes to hereby acknowledge those. air-
crewmen Who as interviewees for the data base, so generously
Ut:ClASS'i:';!ID
v
UNCLASSiFIED
contributed their time and Interest and insight, without which
the analysis would have been severely restricted.
vl
UIJCLASSiriED
CONTINTS
... 1
I. SUI-TMARY AIID COIICLUSIOIIS
Project otaff ^
II DACKGROIJMD AND STUDY APPROACii
J.S. Attir.ello, J.V/. Rubino, D.M. Beatty
Character of the Air-to-Air Uar in Southeast Acia — • ^7
19
Study Approach * * ' 25
III. -QUAHTITATIVE AliALYSIS
... 27
Acquisition and Identification
F.A. Friesen
Attack Pl-aso
K.A. .Thomas
Firins Phase, DanaG© Phase
C.W. Gardner, D.M. Beatty
Termination Phase
.D.H. Beatty, J.V;. V/alden ^ ^
IV, QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
J.V/. Waldon, u.H. Beatty
Background and Scope
Methodology
Findings
V. INTEGRATION OP ANALYSES
Project Staff .121
Introduction ^^14
Attack Phase * . . 125
Acquisition r'hase \ 126
Firing Phase, Damage Phase
Termination
vii
UHCLASSiFIED
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A - The North Vietnamese Air Defense
Environment ..«••> 13,p>
All heodlngs in this document are UNCLASSIFIED,
vill
J.W. Rub: r»o
APPENDIX B - Aircraft and Ordnance
D.N. Be; .ty
APPENDIX ; - The Data Definition and Collection Program . 169
J.W, Wa-den ' . '
APPENDIX D - Short-Range Weapon Employment Opportunities - 1;9^1
A.L. Kuster
S
^1 ^fl
i
I. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
SUMMARY
(S) The results of the Project RED BARON analyses must
be viewed In light of the Southeast Asia environment In which
U.S. fighters operated. This ene.T^y environment has evolved in-
to a sophisticated, integrated air defense syotcm consistins of
MIGs, surface-to-air missiles, and intensive AAA, employed
simultaneously with effective enemy early warning and GCI. One
of the sicnificant constraints in employing U.S. fighter weapons
systems has been the requirement for positive, visual identifi-
cation before firing. Air-to-air encounters in this environ-
ment are characterized by close-in combat, high-g maneuvering,
and visual cues.
(S) The major findings of this report are based on data
collected to 1 August 1967 Other findings may reflect more
recent data, as noted in the text, but these subsequent data
(principally missile firing results) are from sources outside
the major data collection effort. The analysis of air-to-air
encounters is based on detailed reconstructions by the Project.
These reconstructions were made primarily from data which the
Project obtained by interviewing air-combat participants.
The methodology and procedures devised for these aircrew
Interviews are discussed in Appendix C.
(S) As a result of mutually supporting, independent
analyses undertaken by the Project, R?<6 problems v;ere identified.
The Project carefully avoided suggesting specific solutions,
so as not to prejudice the definition of the problem areas. The
following problem area? are determined to be most significant
and deserving of maxir.um P.iLD attention.
LOCATION MO DIRECTION INFORMATION
(S) Thi. problem tn^or'aUoron^fhe^loolJifin
"f flLht'path^f alrfrfrt'operatlne ?n the vicinity.
?{;?s informauon shoild be su'pplen.ented "eans for
establishing positive identification of these aircratt.
(S) Studv of the acquisition and identification proc«-ss
I^'se! {Section III-A) revealed ^hat these important
initial chases of air battles took place at short rangts
(median ran|e of all acquisitions examined was 2 rjlles).
iSd were dU tribute d anong all quadrants around the U.S
tJrcraft. In^approxmately 25 percent of the encounters,
the enemy was able to position himself In ^^e rear
Wdrant of the U.S. aircraft before detection. These
-quaarant oi i. aircraft at a disadvantage in
occurrences put the U.S. axrcra. o a -vaslve
(•hat- little or no time was available to taice evasive
■ aoUon before be?ns fired upon. The frequency of rear-
oSad^nt aoquisltlSns indicated that visual search methods,
?u?ren? A? radars, and MIG warning "chniques were inade-
quate to prevent surprise attacks upon U.S. aircraft.
(S) Study of the attack phase (Section III-B) in11="«'*
thkt the enemy's ability to achieve a Position to fire
on U S. aircraft was alnost entirely dependent upon the
abiliti to attain the rear-quadrant position before de-
tection conversely, whenever the U.S. aircraft acquired
thf ene^y a??craft bkore the attack maneuver was com-
pleted! U.S. aircraft negated the ^■aneuverJiPor£.e.nt
fhP tine The requirement for real-TIme Inforraation
on l^l posiiio; of the enemy aircraft is apparent from these
two results.
• (S) Positive identification was required ^^^^E A due to
the presence of U.S. and third-country aircraft in the
combat area. This requirement makes it Iniportant for the
■ • aghter to-have the capability to identify targets at
ranges commensurate with his ability to acquire them.
WEAPONS RELIABILITY
l/s) Weapons reliability was identified as a sienificant
problem by the oualitative analysis (Section 1\) and was
Substantiated by detailed catec^orization of malfunctions
in the studv of the firing phase (oecv^ion lii-o;.
should be n'oted, however, that the missile syste^.s
employed in S:.A were not designed for use in close-in, dog-
fight encounters characterized by high-g maneuvers.
\t J ? firing phase studies (Section III-C) were based
on firing atter.pts" since In the real world of aeria3
combat, the perforniance of the weapon for each "trigf-o-
squeeze' is the most meanin.-ful criterion for success.
The missile hlt-to-firlng-attempt ratio (as ccnputed on
a moving average, and for ail types of missiles combined)
had steadily decreased from a value of 25 percent in
April. 1965 to 12 f)ercGnt In January 1968, In addition
to overall missile systems performance, the analysis exa-r-
Ined each missile system in detail. The SIDEWIIiDER (AIT-I-
9B and AIM-9D) failure rates were decreasinfi:. whll^» the
SPARROW (AIM- 7^) failure rates, though Wr' than during
the early phases of the war, were not decreasing.
(S) With reference to gun systems (Section III-C), the
results indicate that the failure rate has decreased from
21 percent to 10 percent.
WEAPONS VERSATILITY
^^^c-^?^"^^®^ °^ acquisition, attack, and firing phases
of ScA air battles indicate needed ImDrovemeniss in the versa
tillty of current air-to-air weapons.' The qualitative
analysis (Section IV) identified the need for weapons usable
within ranges shorter than the minimum range of the cu^re'-t
missiles (Section III-C and Aopendix 3). The studies of
•r.EA acquisitions -(Section IIi-A) substantiated this reau^re-
ment for short-range capabilities. In addition to the'
short-range proble.-rid, expansion of current weaoon envelopes
is required to offset the envelope shrinkage and distortion
which results from low-altitude air battles against a
highly maneuvering target (Section III-C). In the'combat
environment the mechanical time delays required for
properly aiming and firing current weaoons are frequently
unacceptable, a.nc have highlighted the' need for quick
response weapons. The boreslght mode of firing the Ai:'-7
a aegraded technique for "snapshot" capability, has been *
unsuccessful in combat (Section Ill-C). In 65 attempts to
fire In the boreslght mode, only one hit resulted.
is) With reference to guns, the results indicate approxi-
mately the same level of performance as missiles in terms
of kills per firing attempt. For the period of the RED
BARON study, gun system overall kill effectiveness pe^
attempt was 14 percent, compared to 17 percent for the
missiles .
TARGET DISCRIMINATION AGAINST GROUND RETURN
fS) Although airborne intercept (AI) radar has in some
cases been asset to U.S. fighters (Section W). In
llhll cases It was Inadequate for use against the low-
flylne targets which have characterised "Jf ^ °f
battles in SEA. WIO approach tactics have «Plo"«<»
^rrent AI -<^ar limitations by use the^.VN^CCI^^^
, lt?flsluLrwere":;rutl'Ld at relatively short ranges
'^median of 2 miles. Section III-A).
(S) Ground clutter not only hampers the AI radar in
reduce the probabilities for success (Section III-C).
AIRCRAFT REARWARD VISIBILITY
e^SasUed t:ne imoortance and dangers of /«^7<l"^??^^':^
Xcks and stressed the need
to the rear of the U.S. fighter alrc.ai-. Restr.ciea
visibility contributed to the inadvertent loss of
contact with the enemy causing termination of the
engageinent (Section III-D).
HAN-MACHINE COMPATIBILITY
(S) The qualitative analysis (Section IV) "ef-tined the
^lilop'ng\s r.an-.achine co.p^ pro. ens ^dis-
'alrcra°f? by 'oL^ ^"Utthlng'procecuras; the possibility
for pilot error in armins. aiming. lirlng or Jettisoning
of weaoons- and the training i-eqairenents of the presen.
S S SeaSoA systems. Son* man-machine v..eaknosses «ere
acc^n^ed bv the character of the SEA air «ar, c:uch as the
reaulrenent for the pilot to maintain visual ""tact i.ith
?he enemy «hile performing the switching procedure.
(S) studies of the firing phace (Section III-C) sub-
stantiate tV<: qualitative analyr.is findines. For example,
the proper i ;ilization of the c<J'>« j-C^*^ was severely
hampered by the multiple switch procedure; therefore
restric^ntr needed capability.
/
CONCLUSIONS^
(S) This study of air-to-air encounters in Southeast
Asia identifif.d a number of assets and problem areas
relating to future fighter aircra-^'t weapons systems.
JeSi^ Th£ following problem areas were determined to be
the most sif.aificant and deserving of serious H/(d attention:
>1'mPR0V:0 l^OCATION AMD o'iRECTIOM INFORMATION •
.•^MPRO^fED WEAPON RELIABILITY*
(J'" ',^ncr':ased weapon VERSATILITYJ
/^MPROVEO TARGET 01 SCRI MINAT ToN AGAINST GROUND RETURN^
/ ^MPr^OVED AIRCRAFT REARWARD VISIBILlTYy .'^
i INCREASED MAN-MACHINE COMPATIBILITY,
J^gff^ "-Developing specific solutions to th^ese problem areas
will require detailed investigation of all corkributing opera-
tional factors and applicable technologies, in conjunction
with an evaluation of related on-going R^D programs.
11. BACKGROUND AND STUDY APPROACH
(C) The purpose of Project RED BARON v/as to collect
detailed data to analyze air-to-air encounters in Southeast
Asia and to Identify research and development required for
future fighter aircraft xveapons systems. All air-to-air en-
counters through July I967 were analyzed in this study.
(C) The original task order requested analysis of air-
to-air events from the first known event in April 1965 through
1 March 1967. A significant increase in the intensity of the
air-to-air war during April and May of 1967 prompted an ex-
tension of the time period covered by the study to 1 August
1967.
•(C) Since information relative to all aspects of enemy
encounters was desired (including disengagements and inability
to engage) the study included all contacts with bogies not
identified as friendly even if they were only sightings and in-
volved no maneuvers. Furthermore, this study was limited
primarily to encounters involving high-performance U.S. air-
craft. A total of approximately 400 events have been identified
and the results of F-3 and F-105 encounters (approximately
350) are analyzed in this volume. Approximately 85 percent of
the encounters were with USAF forces. The data also include one
P-100 encounter.
• A. CHARACTER OF THE AIR-TO-AIR WAR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
(C) Essentially all of the air-to-air encounters con-
sidered in this study involved MIG-17 or MIG-21 aircraft viith
the exception of tv;o instances when Colt- type (AN-2) aircraft
c
D
were Intercepted in night engagements. In general, the en-
counters took place over North Vietnam although a few were in g
the vicinity of Hainan Island.
•(C) The nature of the war placed operational constraints g
on U.S. pilots involved in the air-to-air encounters; in most
cases their missions were defensive. Generally, fighter air-
craft (P-^ls and P-85) were assigned to escort a strike force U
or other support aircraft thus limiting opportunities to pursue
the enemy. Since the primary mission of the fighter was to jj
protect the strike force, the enemy would be engaged only if
the mission was threatened. The primary mission of P-105 air- g
craft was generally a strike mission and their primary objec-
tive was to deliver ordnance on target. Thus, they were in- H
structed not to engage unless directly threatened. There was
a few instances when U.S. fighter aircraft were employed in MIG -p
sweeps and only then did they assume an initially offensive role. U
(C) A further constraint on operations was the requirement n
for positive identification. This required visual confirnatlon U
of the target since numerous nonhostile aircraft (both U.S. —
and neutral country) might be operating In proximity. Thus, [j
i-^r-to-air battles except for a few isolated Instances depended
on visual cues. The requirement for positive identification y
before firing required a close approach which tn some cases
forced the U.S. fighter to pass entirely through the missile jjj
launch envelope in order to make the identification. Thus,
the element of surprise was lost as well as exploitation of the
advantages offsred particularly by the longer range all-aspect
missiles.
(S) The North Vietnamese air defense environment had a
D
Significant effect on U.S. air-to-air operations. It was -
characterized by the fact that (1) U.S. aircraft operated U
in a hostile GCI cnvironme.nt , (2) surface-to-air missiles were
used for the first time in a war, and (3) ^he opposing enemy .[j
D
fighter force was relatively small compared to number of U.S.
aircraft Involved. This differed sharply from the Korean
conflict wherein both the U.S. and enemy forces had GCI capa-
bility and approximately equal numbers of fighter aircraft in
the combat area.
The North Vietnamest Air Defense System
(C) There have been a number of recent studies^ coverL.g
various aspects of the air war In North Vietnam (NVH) and.
these have included a detailed examination of the air defense
environment. A brief summary of this environment Is included to
describe the conditions under which the air-to-air fighters
operated. A more detailed description is given in Appendix. A.
(S) The NVN Air Defense System had developed r-^rom a
rudimentary system in 1964 to a relatively complex, up-to-date,
and formidable system in 1967. The weapons employed as part
of the air defense system can be classified into three major
groups: (1) grcund-cascd guns, (2) surface-to-air missiles,
and (3) fighter aircraft.
(SNF) The AAA environment encountered in NVII has been
extremely dense, particularly in portions of Route Packages
V and VI. By the end of July 1967, more than 5600 37mm/57mm
guns and 1700 85rrun/10Crr.m guns were deployed in North Vietnam.
This has had a significant impact on choice of tactics for
strike aircraft which, in turn. Influenced the altitudes of
the protecting fighter force. The antiaircraft artillery
capability was further supplemented by surface-to-air missiles.
^(U) a. JC3 Air Operations Study Group — Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Factors Affect: inn- Combat Air Qperatlor.s and Aircraft Losses in
So utheast A.-rla (o), i.ovember 19o6, TOP SKCKKT/NQFOHN .
b. Night Song Study Group — Joint Chiefs of Staff, Might
Sonp; Report (U), Volumes I and II » 30 March 1967, TOP SECRET/
NOFOHM .
c. V/SEG/IDA Study — Analysis of Combat Aircraft Losse:^ in
Southeast Asia (0), IjA Report H-l^Q, l/SEG Report 12b, dated
April 196H.
NOFORN
9
NOFORN
(SNP) The SA-2 was initially used In combat In July 1965.
Since that time there has been a steady buildup of prepared
sites to a level of 235 sites by the end of July 1967. It
shoulvd be noted that these are not occupied sites but that
■approximately 25 SAM battalions move between these sites on a
scheduled (but nonpredlc table) basis. The heaviest concen-
tration of these sites has been in the Hanoi-Haiphong Area,
but strategic location of sites near the DMZ and in Route
Package V have also been employed by the Morth Vietnamese to
protect these areas.
(SNF) The enemy fighter inventory consisting of various
versions of the MIG-17 and MIG-21 has remained relatively con-
stant during the past two years at a level of approximately
50-60 MIG-17S ani 15-20 MIG-21s. As previously mentioned, this
is in sharp contrast to the Korean War when the North Koreans
had a force of approximately 500 MIG-15 fightors. Since the
beginning of 1967, a large part of the MIG-17 inventory has
been stationed outside of North Vietnam, Similarly, 50-60
percent of- the MIG-21 force has been moved out of North Vietnam
since September 1967. These moves appear to be related to
U.S. strike forces bonibing North Vietnair.ese airfields. As will
be discussed in the MIG tactics section, there has been an
observed change in North Vietnamese control procedures in that
fewer aircraft are up at any one time but are controlled in a
more selective manner and appear to attack only when they
think they have an advantage. As a result, they have been
more effective. A description of enemy aircraft and ordnance
Is given in Appendix B.
(S) The GCI system employed to control MIG aircraft
is a manual system. However, control procedures have been
achieving a reasonable degree of sophistication as evidenced by
the simultaneous employment of AAA, SAMs and t4IGs in an
integrated fashion. This represents a significant change
from the early days of the air war when presence of MIGs would
10
Indicate an absence 'of SAMs and vice-versa. The effectiveness
of the GCI system Is evidenced by the fact that t4IG Inter-
ceptors contact U.S. aircraft during cloudy as well as clear
' weather and approach in a manner Indicative of radar-initiated
Intercept,
(S) The radar order-of-battle (ROB) in North Vietnam
consists of a diversified surveillance net and fire control
radars. As of early August 1967, more than ^00 sets have
been Identified .1n North Vietnam Including over 200 early-
warning CiCI radars, 17b AAA fire control radars, and approxi-
mately 25 FAHSOMG-B missile control radars.^ The radar
deployment both in terms of numbers of equipments and the wide
frequency diversity is particularly impressive. While ECW
has been extensively employed by the U.S. to degrade the
effectiveness of the North Vietnamese surveillance net and
weapon control radars, the jamming effort has not been able
to deny the combined radar net the capability of maintaining
an accurate track of .penetrating flisl^-ts. Thus, succ.ess-fu'l
QCI operations are at this time well within, the "capability of
the North Vietnamese air defense ^system.
MIG Tactics
(S) In general MIGs rely on GCI to position them close
to the target before the pilot takes over the Intercept. ^
Firing is usually accomplished visually although it is possi-
ble for some MIG-21 aircraft to fire without visual reference.
Soviet training manuals indicate that they favor a two-ship
element with the wingman flying about 5000 ft to the rear and
50 degrees off the leader's wing. Three types of intercepts*
are practiced, pursuit curve, parallel course attack, and lead
cut-off attack.
MU) Source: Defense Intelligence Agency, 9 August 1967.
2(U) 8th Tactical Fighter V/lng, Tactical Doctrine , DCO-67-S-
01070, 1 March 1967, SECRL:t.
(S) The pursuit curve is used with a track crossing
angle of 30 degrees and a closing velocity of 100 knots. In
a typical GCl approach profile the MIG-21 fighter Is vectored
at about a 30 degree angle from the rear of the target so
that visual detection may take place through the glass or. the
side of the canopy as the fighter approaches the target at
a closing rate of about 50 to 100 knots.
(S) The narallel course attack is a displacement to
the side of the target and on the opposite heading, and at the
proper time the OCI controller turns the KIO into the target
for a tall attack. According to the Soviets, if an Intercept
la attempted by a MIG-21 on a counter heading, that is. a head-
on engagement, visual detection is nearly impossible due to
forward visibility restrictions.
(S) The lead cut-off attack Is similar to rejoining
aircraft Into the formation by leading and cutting off to the
inside of the aircraft under attack.
(S)- The MIO has pritaarily been committed to low and
medium altitude attacks against U.S. strike forces. However,
attacks have been made against EB-66 aircraft at 30,000 feet
(particularly by the MIG-21). The hostile GCI environment
within which U.S. aircraft are forced to operate gives the
MIG the definite advantage and places stringent demands on
visual scan.
(S) When attacking a maneuvering target the Soviets first
recommend use of the IH missile. ^ They train their crews to
overlead the target and reduce g loading to permissible launch
parameters. If a missile attack cannot be accomplished cannon
may be used although only 60 rounds of ammunition are carried.
A normal pursuit curve is used when attacking a maneuvering
inn Ho 388th Tactical Fighter Wing, Combat Tactics and Tech-
niques; DOA-67-033il, 22 August 1967, SrXHET.
tareet. A desired firing ranee for cannon is under 2000 feet,
howevsr. firlne can be expected as far out as 3300 feet.
(S) The maneaverlng advantage of the Mia-21 relative
to the F-105 is exploited by defensive tactics against the
P_105. If normal acceleration can first gain the tCG separa-
tion, this Will be followed by a vector to a position advantage.
Further, a climbins hi5h-g turn is reccmended if a speed
surplus exists. Alternatively . it can be a diving high-g
turn for a low position. This high-g turn is considered by
the Soviets to be the BIC-21's best defense against the mis-
slles or guns of the P-105.
(S) Another tactic encountered during the middle part
of 1967 was the so-called "wagon wheel" employed by MIG-17
aircraft.' During this period larger flights of aircraft (per-
' haps 8 to 10 in number) were common. The tactic was utilized
When these flights encountered U.S. aircraft and ^"-^-^J
descent to low altitude and the setting up of a wide circular
pattern. Because the HIGs were spread out around the circum-
ference It was difficult for U.S. aircraft (e.g.. the to
make an attack on any single MIG without coming under attack
from a trailing MIG. In addition, the low altitude used
precluded the F-4 fron. obtaining either a radar lock due to the
proximity of the ground, or a good IR source due to «>ackground
IR radiation. Thus, the combination of low altitude ana highly
maneuvering targets negated effective launch of U.S. missiles.
ZiU tt F-^ wa.- continually able to reposition for attack under
these Situations by yo-yoing in and out of the wagon wheel, in-
sufficient time was available to permit an attack. Ofoen a
single HIG-17 was seen in the area, and it was hypothesized
by U.S. pilots that this was a l^ad or director aircraft.
l(U) See Volume III of this report.
(S) Experience has shown' that the r4IGs do not engage
unless they think they have an advantage (i.e., they chose when
and where to engage). They have been observc-d to rur. rather
than engage the P-^IC, .however, they are generally airborne
any time strike fighters are in the area. Jus^. because MIGs
are airborne is no assurance that the enemy will or will not
use SAM and AAA defenses simultaneously. If the MIG force is
outnumbered they may be ordered to disengage. When they
disengage U.S. aircraft must be alert for concentrated AAA and
SAM defense.
(S) There has been increasing evidence of changes In
MIG fighter tactics since August 1967 which have resulted In
increased U.S. losses. i During the period of the study the
North Vietnamese Air Force attempted a high volume. of inter-
cepts and indulged in dogflghting in the congested air space
within the 30-mile circle around Hanoi. This complicated "
their intercept problems and GCI control training. The more
recent success. level appears to be largely a result of fewer
MIGs being handled at any one tirr.e by controllers of increased
skill level. This change in operating procedure represents a
critical element of NVN air defense capability. The combina-
tion of increased skill level of the controllers and their
control of fewer aircraft is one of the major factors which
have made the hit-and-run tactic of MIG-21s on P-lOSs as
successful as they have been in the latter months of 1967.
Typically, a high speed (usually supersonic) deLcending pass
is made against trailing or isolated U.3. flights and when the
MIG-21S make visual acquisition and reach missile range they
have both the speed and position advantage. In addition
they are also positioned for sa fe high speed withdrawal.
^U) Sources:
a. Hq. PACAP, TACS.VAL 5u lie tin . Movember I967, SECRET
b. Hq. PACAF, TAClriVAL ?;ulletin . December 1967, SECRET*
c^.™^^^ '^-Q^3^Z liov, 1967; PADA? Bulletin No. Hq ,
d. CIMCPACAF r^sg: 050.32i<Z Jan. I968; PADAP Bulletin No. 53
(S) To react to this attack, U.S. aircraft had to jettison
air-to-ground ordnance and accelerate. Therefore, it was diffi-
cult to obtain overtake speed within the available fuel limits
to succecsfully launch missiles. r4IGCAP aircraft had frequently
driven off these intercept attempts but the improved NVH GCI
procedures have been successful in avoiding U.S. CAP aircraft.
Dy late Decemb^?r and early January 1968 the enemy GCI control-
lers were able to use mixed forces of MIG-17s and r4IG-21s and
coordinate their attacks from opposite directions and from low
as v;ell as high altitudes end at greater distances from Hanoi
than before. Multiple MIG approaches and their decoying ef-
fects have attempted to degrade CAP flight protection of the
entire force throughout their mission. However, it appears
that on some major raids U.S. CAP positioning has been success-
ful in preventing an attempt by MIGs to engage.
QTaracter of Air-to-Air Encounters
^ (C) In attempting to characterize air-to-air combat
It is apparent that there is no "typical" alr-to-alr encounter.
Too great a number of variations exist in the parameters de-
scribing encounters to permit a single description. However,
there are some factors common to the air-to-air encounters in
SEA which can be used to characterize them, including:
• Visual contact .
• High-g maneuvering.
• Close-in combat.
• Rapid situation change.
• Generally subsonic speeds.
These characteristics contributed significantly to the air-to-
air" battle which may be likened to the classical dogfight.
(C) As previously indicated, air-to-air battles were
generally dependent on visual cues. It r.ay be 'noted that
visual contact vias critical and when broken, usually, it .
either was not regained, or permitted the enemy to gain an
attack position. The combat was controlled by the pilot's
assessment of his adversary's actions. Visual cues were the
best and frequently the only method of providing this infor-
mation from initial Identification through the assessment of
the results of ordnance expenditure.
(C) The most successful method to defeat an opponent's
attack was to present a highly maneuvering target. This v»as
necessary to defeat both the enemy fighter's gun and missile
attacks and to avoid enemy ground defenses (AAA and SAM). In
addition to defeating enemy attacks, maneuvering was necessary
to keep the enemy in sight and to gain attack position,
(C) Because of the necessity of maintaining visual contact
the ranges between combatants remained short, ^s a result, the
encounters occurred in limited air space. Further, since the
air battles were characterized by close-in, high-g maneuvering,
situations developed and terminated within extremely short time
periods, usually a matter of seconds. Because of the limited
separation, head-on attacks were rare.
(C) Speeds during combat varied but in general they were
in the high subsonic range with occasional bursts tc supersonic
speed (up to about Mach 1.3). These bursts occurred during
short periods of acceleration or at the end of a i:'ve. The
fact that sustained supersonic speeds were uncommon was due to
two major factors: (1) The action started at the subsonic speed
of the escorted aircraft or cruise speed while in CAP orbit,
and acceleration to high speeds was frequently irnpossible because
of insufficient time and subsequent maneuvering; and (2) The
battles were fought at altitudes which did not permit airframe
operation at the high Mach numbers.
Results
(S) The confirme" ombat results of air-to-air encounters
Table II-l (S). CONFIRMED COMBAT RESULTS OF AIR-TO-AIR
ENCOUNTERS IN SEA (U)
3 APRIL 1965 TO 1 AUGUST 1967
Confirmed U.S. Kills
HIG-17
MIG-21
Other
; Total
by F-4B
3
0
1*
4
by F-4C/D
23
21
0
44
by F-8
n
1
0
12
by F-105.
23
0
0
23
by other
3
0
0
3
Total
63
22
1
86
Confirmed U.S. Losses
by MIG-17
by MIG-21
Total
F-4B
1
0
1
F-4C/0
4
0
4
F-8
3
0
3
F-IOS
4
5
9
Total
12
5
17
Othen^
4
TOTAL U.S. LOSSES
^AN-2 \,
^^2 killsx by A-1 ; 1 kill by A-4.
*^0ne A-1 !\ A-4, RC-47, KA-3B.
in SEA rro|n April 1965 to 1 August 1967 and 3 January I96B are
presented Tables II-l and II-2, respectively.^ In addition
to the confirmed kills shovjn, as of 1 August 1967, there were
10 probable MIG kills by U.S. aircraft. While U.S. losses
to enemy, aircraft represent only a small fraction of total
U.S. losses over NVY] (21 losses out of 635 combat losses as
of 1 August 1967), their significance is far greater than indi-
cated by the percentage of attrition shown. It must be re-
membered that the results of encounters represent a war with a
small enemy fighter aircraft force coupled with heavy ground
defenses.
'(U) Table II-2 has been included since the investigation of a
fev/ sel-^cte-i orUnriTiCc e:-:ro:i:;: nure^ extended to the H January
inCS --late. A majority oT uho analyses cover the time ceriod
of Table Il-i (to 1- Auruzt Ivtiy).
Table II-2 (S). CONFIRMED COMBAT RESULTS OF AIR-TO-AIR
ENCOUNTERS IN SEA (U)
3 APRIL 1965 THROUGH 3 JANUARY 1968
Confirmed U.S. Kills
MIG-17
MIG-21
Other
Total
by F-4B
by F-4C/D
by F-8
by F-105.
by other
Total
4
31
12
28
3
78
3
25
I
0
0
29
8
56
13
28
3
108
Confirmed U.S. Losses
by MIG-17
by MI6-21
Total
F-4B
F-4C/D
F-8
F-105
Total
Other^
2
6
3
5
16
0
5
0
14
19
2
11
3
19
35
_4
TOTAL U.S. LOSSES
:
39
"AN-2
^2 kills by A-1; 1 kill by A-4.
^One A-1, A-4, RC-47, KA-3B.
(S) While the data provide an interesting summary of air-
to-air action over MVN, great care must be taken when inter-
preting the results, particularly since the tables prrvide only
a cumulative summary as of a given date. However, the losses
and kills are spread over long time periods and are not
homogenous with time. For example, the first two F-105 losses
were by ^aG-173, and following a no- loss period of 1^1 months,
were followed by two more F-105 losses spread over a f-mor. i
period. Conversely, the F-105 losses to MIG-21s all occurred
after these losses and the majority since July 1957. No reli-
able time trends could be developed from the above data since
sample sizes during most time intervals were too small to
develop statistically sisnificant results.
B. STUDY APPROACH
Introduction
(C) The complexity of real-world air-to-air combat is
the result of the sequential decision processes of two or more
pilots and the resulting series of interacting maneuvers
of the hiph performance aire aft involved. Additional complex-
ities result from the employment or attempted employment
of the sophisticated avlonic and weapon systems in the often
rapidly changing offensive and defensive roles of the combatants.
To examine the fighter aircraft, avionics and iveapons systems
employed in the SEA air-to-air battles, detailed information
was necessary for every phase of combat. The complex inter-
dependence of the fighter systems and subsystems would
necessitate the recording of special information in consider-
able detail before meaningful analyses could be attempted.
(C) Investigations of all known SEA air-to-air combat
data sources revealed the inadequacy of the official reporting
media for supplying data with oufriciently detailed Information
to permit meaningful analyses of systems perfonnance. This
finding had also been substantiated for aircrafv loss and
damage and related studies conducted by IDA/WScG. Quantitative
data from instrumented aircraft were unavailable during the
study period, although it should be noted that a small per-
centage of strike aircraft operating in SEA, are now equipped
with recorders 1 for structural analysis data. Thus, the only
technique available for retrieving the necessary detailed
data was by means of in-depth' interviews of the air-to-air
engagement participant:-.. A detailed discussion of the Data
Definition and Collection Program utilized for this study is
presented in Appendix C.
^(U) TJjese record the rollowing parameters: velocity. "c*"s"
and .-.Ititude. * b ^ ,
Data Collection
(U) Implementation of aircrew interviews was complicated
by lack of sufficient information for identifying the partici-
pants of previous air battles and the lack of tools and tech-
niques for conducting comprehensive and meaningful Interviews.
Considerable "detective work" was necessary to identify the air-
to-air encounters and the participants since this Information
was often not reported In official message traffic. Appropriate
tools and techniques for conducting comprehensive interviews
were developed by the project staff with the aid of psychologists
and technical personnel from government, industry and the mill-
tary services who helped formulate the technical and operational
questions needed for the interviews. Special, large scale
(1:123>000) maps of North Vietnam with transluscent overlays
were used during the interviews to record the geometry of the
engagement. Including flight paths of both U.S. and enemy air-
craft. It was found that the landmarks identified on the maps
frequently aided the interviewee in reconstructing the engagement.
Data Reduction
(U) The information obtained from the interviews along with
with data from the official reporting channels was then utilized
by the project staff to reconstruct the events in detail.
This made It possible to resolve conflicts in the data by using
those data elements consistent with a logical development of
the event.
(U) General Interest in the collected data expressed by
the Services, airframe and missile contractors as well as
stuc^y and analysis institutions influenced the decision to
publish the reconstructed events separate from the analysis.
Each event was identified only by a nurrber and aircrew or
official call signs v/ere not used. Anonymity of the interviewees
was assured during the Interviews to permit greatest possible
freedom of comment and criticism. The data for F-^ and P-8
events through I March 196 7 have been published as Volume I
of this report, and the remalnlnf; data will be published In
Volumes II and III.
^ (U) To Insure that the large data base could be effl-
•^lently utilized, an automated Event Index wa s developed. The
Index contained data sufficient to categorize each event and
to permit rapid Identification of specific events for analyses.
Analysis
(U) The data oollc>cted v/ere analyzed using two Independent
approaches: a quantitative analysis which examined the air-
to-air engagements by separate phases, quantified the key param-
eters influencing each phase, and analyzed these across the
spectrum of all events; and a qualitative analysis which examined
each event as an entity. Thus, the qualitative analysis ex-
amined the Interaction betvreen the defined combat phases as
well as other nonquantlfiable factors, for example, enemy
mistakes .
(C) The quantitative analysis examined the Identifiable
phases of alr-to-alr combat. The flow chart in Figure II-l
Indicates their relationship to each other. The engagement
always begins at the acqu isiti on and identification phases.
Since no knowledge was available concerning these first phases
from the enemy's point of view, only U.S. actions can be re-
corded. The following phases, hov/ever, may be described as
either U.S. or enemy actions and include challenge, attack,
position to fire, firing, damage and separation phase. In any
given alr-to-alr engagement the action flow may recycle to either
U.S. action or enemy action or to any other phase until finally
one or both combatants terminate the engagement.
(U) The phas-:3 as listed above are defined as follows:
» Acquisition. The radar or visual detection of an aircraft
(or evidence thereof, i.e., contrail).
SIARTj
START •<
VISUAL ^ O
U.S.
ENEMY
I
U.S.
MANEUVW
'■"^ TOWARD
tNtMY
U.S.
ATTACK
BYPASS
ACHIEVt
VM
POsniON
NONI
NON-
PATAi
INIMY
KILUO
U.S. AtXCRAPT ACTION FlOW^
ENEMY AIRCRAFT ACTION. FLOW,
/
ENEMY
ACHIEVE
FIRE
rosnioN
MANCUVIR
TOWAKD
U.S.
-*>
EN£M>
AIIACK
FIRE
RECYCLE
t
U.S.
INITIATE
1
+
lOtMINATION
I
.1 _
^ TERMINATION
LOST
CONTACT
i
U.S.
LOST
U.S.
DAMACEO
I
I
I
M
.4.
I
I
I
'4
I
I
ENEMY
INITIATE
/
FIGURE IM (S). Encounter Flow Chart (U)
c3> 0'Ci3»-€jS> ci> o -o o a> C2» c:^ o i22> o o
• Identification , The definite determination of identity of
the aircraft acquired,
• Challenre . The portion of the engatjement where one
participant takes the first aggressive action that can
be discerned by his opponent.
9 Attack . The phase of maneuvering to achieve tactical
advantage.
♦ Position to Fire . The period of maneuver necessary to
place the opponent in the firing envelope of the
weapon to be used.
• Fire . The period of ordnance expenditure (for U.S. air-
craft this included attempts at ordnance expenditure).
» Damage . The results of the firing phase. Damage
was classified as none, damage, or kill and further
classified as possible, probable, or confirmed,
• Separation . The termination phase of an engagement which
ends in loss of contact.
(U) The concurrent but Independent qualitative analysis
phase was conducted for each event as an entity. This approach
was used so that many important factors, not readily quantifiable,
would not be overlooked. The analyses were conducted by. panels
of experts in the field of aircraft, avionics, and alr-to-alr
weapons design (missiles) together with a qualified fighter
pilot. The panel moderator, who was a member of the project
staff, guided the efforts of the panel. For each event, all
factors in the engagement v/hlch Influenced the final outcome
were studied and identified. After the panel reached agreement
on the relevant factors, the research and development impli-
cations represented by the factors were identified. In some
aa&es these Implications were identified as assets of the
current weapons system, rather than RiD problems. These were
also documented in order that the desirable characteristics
of current weapons systems be incorporated or improved in
future weapon systems design. This precaution was taken to
prevent "designing out" of new systems those characteristics
proven advantageous in combat.
(U) The frequency of occurrence of the R&D problems is not
UKCLAS
necessarily a measure of Importance as related to success In
air-to-alr con*at. To aid In establishing the significance of
R4D problems Identified by the qualitative analysis, the re-
sult, of the independent quantitative analyses were
Thlre the results of the quantitative and qualUat ve analyses
were mutually corroborative, strong emphasis was given to the
R&D problem so Identified. Those R4D problems not supported
by the detailed analyses of each phase were then considered
separately and given less emphasis.
Definitions ..4..„„-i_
(„) TO establish a consistent nomenclature for categori-
zation of the data, several definitions were developed. The,
are presented here and are used throughout the analysis:
.Aa^ is a ^--lP,^;;??,?^,%f run?t nl'lZ Purpo^es^"
rf-^doruSenfarior Te^eil'Lllll, involves the action
Of one flight. . . v,^ .v,
V ^ ^- n 1-1 ne continuous sequence during whlcn
>An_ encounter a ^t;'^'^ he-omes aware of one or
i[t"least one ^^^^"^1^. ^^^^^f ' ^d^atlL^ts to maintain
more possible Vnem! The encounter
encounters.
.An en'a<rer.ent is an encounter which IncJ^fs Jggresslve
maneuvl^tng by at least one of the participants.
.A sightiSE 18 an encounter without aggressive maneuvering
on' the part of any participant.
111. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
(C) The RED BARON Project was formulated as a two-phase
prosram because of the uncertainties in obtaining suitable
data for effective analyses of the SEA air battles. The first
phase focused major effort on the data collection and event
reconstructions. Only after assessment of the quality, char-
acter, and extent of the data v/as the analysis methodology
finalized. The quantitative analysis was developed with an
appreciation of the data limitations.
(C) The purpose of the quantitative analysis was to in-
vestigate some of the many factors (speed, altitude, direction,
weapons, etc.), in an air-to-air engagement In order to pin-
point any RStD problems discovered from the analysis. The
phases of an engagement have been grouped as follows:
• Acquisition and identification,
• • Challenge, and position to fire,
• Plre and resulting damage,
• Termination, and separation.
This grouping was used because these phases were sufficiently
interrelated to make the analysis more meaningful than by
treating each phase independently.
Section III-A
ACQUISITION AND IDENTIFICATION PHASE
A. SUMMARY
(S) Da'ua froia approximately 350 events In the alr-to-alr
war in SEA have been analyzed to determine the significance of
some of the parameters of acquisition and Identification. To
be properly understood, these data must be viewed with respect
to the environment over North Vietnam. SAI^s, AAA and GCI had
great effect on the results. To summarize the- findings:
• Acquisitions v;ere primarily visual for the F-^,
exclusively visual for P-8 and F-105 encounters.
• Statistical tests of the data failed to identify
either dominant or recessive quadrants in v/hich the
enemy \-:az acquired. For the size of the data sam-
ple, the frequency of acquisition, statistically
speaking, was essentially the same for each quadrant.
• Acquisition range v/as two miles or less in 50 per-
cent of the cases.
• Due to the short ranges of acquisition, identifica-
tion was accomplished simultaneously v/ith acquisi-
tion in tv/c-thirds of the encounters.
B. OBJECTIVES
(C) This investigation sought to analyze the data on ac-
quisition and identification in order to:
• Determine if any pattern exists in the distribution
of acquisition bearings and ranges,
• Deterrr^ine the relatlve'frequency of visual versus
radar acquisitions,
C. BACKGROUND AflD SCOPE
(S) Acquisition and identlf icatich data were obtained from
several sources, including message combat reports, extensive
personal Interviews, and letter reports from participants in
the events included in the study. Interview data were vali-
dated by comparison with reports made immediately after the
events, and by comparison with interviews of other participants
in the sane event. Of the ^413 events documented in Volumes I, !
II, and III of the RED BARON Report, approximately 35 percent
involved 5 percent F~8 and ^5 percent F-105 aircraft with;
the remaining from miscellaneous other aircraft types. The
quantitative analysis is based on those events which contained |
data on acquisition ranges and/or bearings, I.e., about two-
thirds of the total events. Acquisitions were considered as i
radar or visual solely from the pilots* viev/points, disregard-
ing the assistance of external radar vectors, which" occurred 1
In only a few events. Acquisitions which were not later posi-
tively identified as enemy could not be included in the anal- ;
ysis because the number reported officially was so small, com-
pared to those 'which were mentioned in pilot interviews. It
was felt that erroneous conclusions about the frequency of un-
identified acquisitions would be dravm.
(U) Definitions that are pertinent to air-to-air encoun-
ters are provided for clarity;
• Acquisition ; An acquisition was a radar or visual
detection of any enemy aircraft or unit, or some
evidence thereof, such as a contrail, that led to
a positive identification of the enemy. An acqulsl- '
tion occurred each tir.e a friendly tactical unit
detected a different enemy tactical unit. Identifl- :
cation may have occurred simultaneously or at a la-
ter time, without breaking contact with the enemy.
All acquisitions with data that Included clock posi- :
tion* and/or range v/ere considered in this analysis. [
'(U) Clock position - a method used to reorosent the bearing
■of a target from an aircraft by visualizing a clock face in !
the horizontal plane of the aircraft with the sighting- air-
craft at the center and the hour positions 30 degrees apart.
Twelve o'clock is directly ahead of the aircraft, six o*'clocic •
directly astern and 3 .and 9 o'clock on the right and left
sides, respectively.
• Initial Acaul:3tlon : For the purposes of this anal-
ysis, the initial acquiuition was the first acquisi-
tion in an -event by any member of the flight.
• Subse quent Acquisition : Those acquisitions that
occurrea after the initial acquisition in an event
are referred to as subsequent acquistionE.
(U) Initial acquisitions were analyzed separately, as
they represented the initial conditions v/hich precipitated the
ensuing combat in each event. The subsequent acquisitions
were then included for further analysis. In an air battle,
subsequent acquisitions — those which occurred after the ini-
tial acquisition and frequently while the U.S. aircraft was
maneuvering in an engagement — precipitated other engagements
not associated with initial acquisitions. T\'/o situations rep-
resentative of subsequent acquisitions were:
• Losing contact with the initially acquired enemy
aircraft and after a short time acquiring another,
or
• While maintaining contact with an acquired aircraft
* in one location, another v;as acquired in a different
location.
0. RESULTS
(U) The parameters of acquisition are related to enemy
'capability and intent. The adversary who first acquires his
enemy has an advantage of time to initiate an attack. The
range of acquisition is important because it will equate to
time for the crew to prepare for combat and space to maneuver.
Range of acquisition is also Important to the crew under at-
tack as it equates to time and maneuvering room to thwart the
attack, levcrse the advantage, or' escape.
(S) Full use of the airborne intercept (AI) radar was
greatly restricted by the environment in v/hich the events c'
curred. A continuing need to visually search the area for
surface-to-air missiles, antiaircraft fire, and enemy aircraft
outside the radar beam, ..greatly reducel the time available for
monitoring the AI radar scope. Additionally, heavy ground .
clutter when operating at the lower altitudes over land made ,
the detection' of targets extremely difficult. The fact that |
pilots were constrained to a visual ID before firing partially
offset any advantage to be gained by longer range radar ac- r
qulsitlons. Random radar contacts observed but not identified
were not included in the analysis because they could have been
friendly and thus failed to meet the criteria for an acquis!^;
tion. A few cases of U.S. aircraft investigating unidentified
aircraft which proved to be friendly were reported, but most |
of these instances were not reported. Since these data were
not available from any source, they could not be considered: ik
the analysis, but the cost of these futile intercepts in terms
of time and fuel consumption must have been considerable.
(S) Ha7.e often restricted visibility, particularly at.
the lower altitudes, and hampered visual acquisition. As al-r
ready stated, the necessity of visual search for MIGs, SAMs, |:
and AAA demanded constant crew attention. The restricted air-
craft field of view caused by airframe masking v^as partially j
offset by support of other members of the flight and aircraft
maneuvering. The silver, metallic color of the enemy airplanes
assisted in identification, especially in the early period of
the war. Enemy use of camouflaged aircraft became sifeuif cant
later in the period of this analysis (see Appendix B). :
F-4, F-8 Aircrew Acquisitions
(S) The acquisition data for high-performance fighter
aircraft have been separated from that of aircraft primarily^
engaged in the 'strike role. Most of the F-U and F-8 encounters
occurred when the aircraft were assigned missions of MIGCAP. •
ESCORT, and RESCAP while P-105 encouftters occurred while on
strike missions. ^
(S) Data from F-h and F-8 acquisitions between 1 Aprilj
1965 and 1 August 1967 v.ere analyzed. Figure III-Al represents
XII
3-IS-68-15
FIGURE lll-Al (S). F-4, F-8 Initial Radcr Acquisitions,
1 April 1 965 to 1 August 1 967 (U )
14 initial radar acquisitions within ttie + 60 degree sector, of
the radars 10 of the 14 were at twelve o'clock or directly
ahead of the fighter. Figure III-A2 is similar except that lu
shows initial visual acquisitions which occurred at every clock
position around the U.S. aircraft. It is interesting to com-
pare these with the sightlnGS of the Korean War reported In
31
XII
3-18-68-16
FIGURE HI-A2 (S). F-4, F-8 Initial Visual Acquisitions,
1 April 1965 to 1 August 1967 (U)
Project CHORE^ and shown in Figure III-A3. Over 90 percent of
those acquisitions were in the forvvrard hemisphere and all were
visual (the F-86 was not equipped with AI radar). The dif-
ferences in the figures reflect the vast difference's in the
^(U) Institute for Air V/eapons Research, F-fi6 Versus MIG-13> A
Dir^est Gf the Sriorinr, on the Ar.vilpic af the Korean Air V.'ar ,
University of Chicago, May 13, 19b^ Formerly ProlJect CHORE,
COHFIDHIJTIAL. !
32
VI
3-18-^-17
FIGURE tll-A3 (C). Clock PosiMon of MIG-15 from F-86 (U)
parameters of the two wars. U.S. pilots in Korea launched di-
rectly for MIG Alley to seek out and destroy MIGs. Allied and
Communist air forces used GCI radar. Altitudes at acquisition
were generally 30,000 to ^10, ODD -feet, and ground fire was not
a factor. By contrast, in SEA MIG aircraft were vectored for
intercept by a very efficient" GCI system while U.S. pilots had
to rely primarily on visual acquisition. Also, U.S. fighter
missions analysed in this study were .T.alnly defensive and were
®
FORWARD QUADRANT
UFT
REAR @
FIGHTER CENTERED COORDINATES
INDIVIDUAL ACQUISITIONS 3Y
CLOCK POSITION AND RANGE
0TOTAL ACQUISITIONS BY QUADRANT
VISUAL
RADAR
e
RIGHT
TOTAL
EVENTS
58
3-18-68-18
FIGURE 1II-A4 (S). F-4, F-8 Initial Acquisitions Versus Rcnge by Event,
1 April 1965 to 1 August 1967 (U)
flown in a sophisticated MIc;. SAM and AAA environment where
altitude was chosen as a compromise between the various hazards
The. MIC force encountered in SEA was substantially smaller than
that encountered in Korea (pp 8-10).
(S) Figure III-Al is a plot of Initial P-^, P-8 acquisi-
tions by clock position and range in 58 cases, both visual and
radar. All radar acquisitions were made by F-^t aircraft. The
P-8 radar v/as normally in standby because of the magnitude of
ground clutter at the low altitudes flown, and the necessity
in thp single-place aircraft for a continuous visual lookout.
The sample is smaller than that shown in Figure III-A3 because
for some acquisitions only the clock position was reported.
Radar acquisitions were all beyond 10 miles and visual acquisi-
tions "l^ss than 10 miles (except for several detections of
contrails at 20 miles and over).
(S) Figure riI-A5 displays the distribution by clock
position of a total of 121 initial and subsequent acqulsitionc
by- F-4 anH F-8 aircraft. A chi-squaro test shcv;ed that no
quadrant had a statistically greater percentage of acquisitions
than any other quadrant for the size of the sample.
(S) Figure III-A6 illustrates both initial acquisitions
and subsequent acquis itiuns which followed initial radar ac-
quisitions. Note in particular that once an enemy v;as ini-
tially acquired visually there were no subsequent radar acqulsl
tions (Figure III-A7). Radar lock-ons during maneuver to fire
are not acquisitions. Note also the random cluster of acquisi-
tions Inside ^1 miles of range for both figures.
(S) P-^, F-8 initial acquisitions for which range data
were available are plotted in Figure III-8. The median range
Is approximately 3 miles. For all acquisitions, initial and
subsequent, the median range is about 2 miles. Since most
acquisitions were visual and ranees were usually estimated
35
3-18-68-19 |f
FIGURE III-A5 (S). F-4, F-8 Visual Acquisitions by Encounter
1 April 1 965 to 1 August 1 967 (U ) j
■ . ■ • [
without the aid of radar, the initial acquisitions have been
plotted by range increments in Figure III-A9. The greatest:
number, 15 visual acquisitions, were in ths 0 to 1 mile range
increment. Compare this with Figure III-AIO, a similar graijh
for the Korean War, The graph of P-86 sightings versus range
Increments reveals zero detections inside tv:o miles and the |
greatest number of acquisitions were between ^ and 10 mllesi
FIGURE III-A6 (S), F-4, F-3 Acquisitions Versus Range Commencing with Initial
R-'dor Acquisition, 1 April 1965 Through 1 August 1967 (U)
37
FIGURE III-A7 (S). F-8 Acquisitions Versus Range Commencing with Initial
Visual Acquisition, 1 April 1965 Through \ August 1967 (U)
12
10
z
o
i 8
o
—I
< 6
Z
lb
o
s ^
I
I
tOHM VISUAL
<vsimm. RADAR
I
(TOTAtSS)-
21
1^1
11
\ I
12
0
12 16 20 24 26
RANGE OF INITIAL ACQUISITION (mil«i)
32
36
40
FIGURE III-A8 (S). F-4, F-8 Initial Acquisitions Versus Ra.ige,
I April 1965 to I August 1967 (U)
(S) These data show clearly that in about 50 percent of
the cases U.S. fighter pilots v/ere not aware of the enemy air-
craft until they had closed to within two miles, and the enemy
fighters appeared at all bearings around the U.S. aircraft.
.F-105 Acquisitions
(S) Air Force F-105 aircraft were employed in an air-to-
ground role as their primary mission in Southeast Asia, and
were subject to MIG attacks. Figure III- All depicts the ranges
and bearings of 135 acquisitions made by P-105 pilots. These
have been plotted on an expanded scale due to the concentration
of data points at short ranges. The extent of the shaded areas
represents the relative frequency of sichtings in each quad-
rant. Like acquisitions -ads by and P-8, those by P-105s
were close in and at all clock positions. The median range of
KOREAN V/AS
15
Z
o
o
o
C 5
I
z
UOAR
O VISUAl
0-1 1-2 2m 4-10
RANCI INCREMENTS (mi>n)
10 &
OVER
FIGURE III-A9 (S). F-4, F-8 Initial
Acquisitions Versus Range
1 April l'/65 to 1 August 1967 (U)
30
3 .
o
z ro
*liHlilw»« for Air
Weapon* RtMfdch,
F'36 Vtrjut MIG-
15, A Oigeit of th«
* Briefing oo tVt
Analjriii of ih«
Korcon Air War,
U'tivtMity of
Chicag'), Ma^ 19,
- Formerly
Proi*rl CHORE,
CONfiOCNTIAU
39
0-1 I -2 2-4 4-10
RANGE INCREMENTS (ihIIm)
I0&
OVER
FIGURE lil-AIO(C). Extreme Ranges
Between F-86 and MIG-15
76 Sighting Reports (U)
initial acquisition was about two miles, the same as for P-^l
and P-8 aircraft.
Decoys
(S) An investigation of possible enemy tactics was made
to determine whether they could have been using decoy aircraft
to draw the attention of U.S. pilots to the forward quadrant
to mask an almost simultaneous attack from the rear. An anal-
ysis of 78 F-^, P-8 events between 1 April 1965 and 1 March
1967 failed to confirm this tactic. Evidence strongly indi-
cated that there was a simultaneous vectoring of multiple MIG
aircraft on a single flight of U.S. aircraft with each enemy
intent on conduct Ing an attack. Events 26, 37, and 39 of
Volume I are examples which illustrate this tactic.
'13
FOKWMO QUAOKANT
(38^
ltfT(3<>
TOTAL I3S
EVENTS
(n) total acquisitions aVCUAORANT
INITIAL
ACQUISITION
•
TOTAL ACQUISITION
BY QUADRANT
@*IGHT
FIGURE I a -A 11 (S). Ranges and Bearings of F-105 IniHal Acquisitions (U)
Identi f Icatlon
(S) Identification range was available for almost every
event in which acquisition data were available. The identifi-
cation range was the same as acquisition range in about two-
thirds of the encounters. In other words, at the close ranges
of detection, identification occurred simultaneously. A cor-
relation between long-range identification and the ultimate
success of an engagement was soug.'it, but from the sparse data
available wherein long-range identification took place, no
correlation could be found.
(S) Identification means included color (MICs were usu-
ally a distinctive silver metallic color, occasionally camou-
flaged), silhouette, and the sighting of missiles or bullets
being fired by an aircraft. In at least two cases the color
of contrails v/as used to Identify MIGs. In many cases, how-
ever, the specific means of identification was not or could
not be recalled by the pilot and thus an inadequate sample was
available .for analysis.
(S) The full value of a long-range identification capa-
bility could not be fully discerned from the quantitative re-
sults of the air-to-air engagements, U.S, aircrews encountered
several difficulties that were either caused or aggravated by
lack of a long-range identification capability. First, there
was no complete record of false alarms in the SEA area. Pilots
Intercepted -bogies only to find they were friendlles and these
were not reported via official channels, although these false
alarms were mentioned in pilot interviews conducted by the RED
BARON team. Thus, these events could not be analyzed due to
the inadequacy of data but the time and fuel wasted by these
unnecessary diversions must have been* considerable. When the
identification proved the bogey to be hostile, the uncertainty
in the initial phase of the pass created new probli ns, i.e.,
speed may have been too great to jettison some external stores,
handicapping the acceleration, maneuverability and weapons
Choice available to the U.S. aircraft. In some cases it was
necessary for the U.S. aircraft to pass entirely throuch is
weapons envelope to .a.e visual identification at a -"Sejoo
close to employ Its weapons. This placed a require:nent on he
U.S. aircraft to achieve separation (sometimes by deceleration)
With all the difficulties and dangers Involved J ^J^^J
ver A dlscu3Slon of the effect of short range identification
on the success of an alr-to-alr encounter is discussed fron. a
qualitative approach In Section IV.
Section tll-8
ATTACK PHASE
A. SUMMARY
l^y^) The not critical air-MO-air requirement was to
achieve a position to fire first.
h (S) The importance of firing first can be seen in that
for the 209 encounters studied, i n only four ease s did an^air^
craft attacked firs t by another aircraft rianage to destroy the
attacking aircraft. It is of some interest that in all four
5r^hese encounters it was the U.S. aircraft that accomplished
the conversion.
(S) U.S. P-^l and F-8 aircraft were successful in achiev-
ing a position to fire first approximately 95 perce nt of the
(/time v;hen the enemy aircraft was detected befor e passing to the
rear quadrant .
(S) The enemy was able to attain a position in the rear
quadrant before detection in approximately 25 percent of the
encounters analyzed.
(S) V/hen the enemy attained a rear quadrant position
^ before detection , the enemy fired first approximately 90 per-
cent of the time.
^ (S) The success rate of U.S. first firing pass was 27
percent.
(S) The enemy success rate for first firing pass was 13
percent .
B. OBJECTIVE
(C) The primary objective of -his section ::as to deterr.iine
whether the relative position 'of the combatants when aerial
combat began* had a significant effect upon the outcome,
C. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE
Background
(C) Proper Interpretation of the numerical results de-
tailed in this section requires an understanding of the envi-
ronment In which the events occurred. During the time period
covered by this analysis the enemy had a capability to main-
tain an essentially continuous track of the location and alti-
tude of U.S. aircraft from ground stations. This capability
was used to conduct ground controlled intercepts (GCI).
(C) The U.S. aircrews, essentially unaided, were tasked
with:
• Detecting the presence of other aircraft.
•Making visual Identification of the other aircraft.
• Maneuvering to attack hostile aircraft while avoid-
ing attack upon themselyes or the aircraft they
were protecting.
Scope
(U) This section analyzes the results of P-8 and F-^l
aircraft against enemy jet aircraft from April 1965 to 1 Au-
gust 1967.
(S) With few exceptions almost all these encounters began
^(U) More explicitly, the relative positions of the two comba-
tants are recorded at the point in time when the U.S. aircraft
detected the enemy aircraft. In many encounters the enemy
aircraft (with the aid of GCI) were av.-are of the position of
the U.S. aircraft and had already started their approach and
attack maneuver undetected. In some events the first Indi-
cations of enemy aircraft v/as enemy ^ fire. Therefore, it is
obvious that the relative positions* of the combatants at the
point. in time when the enemy initiated the engasement, though
unknown, was different than the recorded position. This is
an important distinction when interprotinr? the results that
follow.
kG
when the aircraft were flying CAP and escort missions. This
differs In many respects from F-105 encounters most of which
were initiated at various stages of a strike mission. On these
missions the P-105s were instructed not to react to the pres-
ence of MIGs unless under imminent threat.
D. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS^
Measures of Success
(S) Fnemy kills ftr.d U.S, losses vrere examined as a poten-
tial measure of success for the attack phase. However » this
measure is the compound result of achieving a position to em-
ploy weapons and the effectiveness of the weapons employed.
The results of weapons fire for both participants were variable
and uncorrelatcd to initial combat conditions. This measure
had to be discarded since weapon performance effectively ob-
scured any determination of the effect of initial conditions on
the outcome of the maneuver-to-fire phase of the attack.
.(S) Examination of the results (see Figure III-Bl) re-
vealed that 75 percent, of MIG kills by U.S. F-^ and F-8 air-
craft occurred on the first attack. Furthermore, seven out of
eight U.S. losses occurred on the enemy's first firing pass,
rrhis result implied that achieving a position to attack (fire)
first was probably the most reasonable measure of success for
the maneuver phase of the attack.
Data Base
(S) The events described in Volumes I and III were exam-
ined to identify all encounters v/here there was an apparent
attempt by one or both particpants to engage the other aircraft.
Examination revealed that approximately one out of four encoun-
ters terminated or aborted without either partlcpant discharg-
ing weapons. The reasons for enemy-initiated termination were
not always discernible. V/here the U.S. aircraft initiated the
disengasement it v;as primarily for reasons unrelated to the
r^UMBER OF
FIWNC
ENGAGEMENTS
gQ9
3-18-68-8
U.S. FIRED
FIRST
154 (75%)
ENEMY FIRED
FIRST
55 (25%)
U.S. KILLS ON
FIRST FIRING PASS
41 (27%)
U.S. MISSES ON j
FIRST FIRING PASSJ^
113(73%) I
r
U.S. LOSSES ON
FIRST FIRING PASS
7(13%)
U.S. KILLS ON
SUBSEQUENT
FIRING PASS
15
G ENEMY MISSES On]
-HFiRST FIRING PASS-**
48{87«;'o) j
U.S. LOSSES ON
SUBSEQUENT
FIRING PASS
1 ■
FIGURE ni-Bl (5). Results of Engagements in Attack Phase Analysis (U)
potential outcome, e.g.. returning to escort position rather
than continuing to chase a KIG element that had turned away,
etc.. (see Section III-D) . Any attempt to evaluate the poten-
tial'outcome of these encounters would be pure conjecture and
they were consequently not Included in the subsequent analy-
ses. The encounters Included (1) the U.S. aircraft attempted
to fire its weapons, and (2) the enemy aircraft was observed
to fire its weapons. It is recognized that there probably
vere instances where the enemy achieved a firing position and
even fired its weapons without" being obse -ed. This might give
a slight upward bias to the ratio of U.S. enemy firing
attempts.
(S) Initially this sample of engagements was restricted
to include only those engagements for which the following in-
formation was available at acquisition:
.^'U.S. aircraft type
^-Hostile aircraft type
^^^^cquisition range
^•''Acquisition clock position
^Hostile altitude
^✓^^Friendly relative altitude
^^Tlme of day
Stage of war
Method of acquisition and identification.
(S) This selection was based primarily on availatLillty of
data. Other equally or more important factors such as cross-
in g angles , attitude., sun positio n, m aneuver sequence , etc.,
were not available on all engagements with the desired accura--
cy. One hundred and nineteen engagements met the above cri-
teria and were analyzed to determine which of the prior se-
lected factors, if any, influenced the outcome. It was deter-
mined that on this subset of encounters, four faetoi^ip
correlated with_5Jie results in a complex wa y — en emy airc raft
type ^ "qu^dnant, re lative altitud e, and a cquisition rang e.
f^(The latter two factors, while statistically significant, had
/ a small effect upon results compared to quadrant). No signi-
ficant statistical difference was noted between the results
(achieved by the different U.S. aircraft types, when adjusted
for relative starting position. No significant difference
could be detected among the three nonrear quadrants. Accord-
ingly, the data base v;as reexamined to identify all engagements
that could be categorized with respect to the following factors
^U.S. aircraft type
•^ostile aircraft type
J,Ac,uisltion range { ff "
<^^cqulsltion quadrant
Relative altitude
Rear quadrant
All others
0 + 2000 feet = coaltitude
Altitude difference >2000
feet « unequal altitude
Numerical Results
(C) The results of the 209 engagements for each of the
factors listed In the data base are presented in Figure III-B2
and Figure III-B3, and Table IIl-Bl and Table III-B2.
Interpretation of Numerical Results
Acquisition in Other Than Rear Quadrants
(S) The performance of U.S. aircraft, combined with the
skill and tactics employed by U.S. aircrews versus the enemy
aircraft/crew combinations, resulted in a 111/8 advantage
against the Mia-17 and 36/1 advantage against the MIG-21. This
result indicates that under the prevt?illng conditiony, t imel y
f position information of the enemy c\i:-;raft was the single most
significant requirement to enable U.ii. aircrews to achieve a
position to fire first.
(S) However, reference to Figure III-Bl indicates that
only iil of 15^ or 27 percent of U.S. first attacks resulted
a MIG kill, improvement in U.S. weapons or weapon de-
livery capability would result in an appreciable number of MIG
kills for these acquisition conditlom>.
Acquisition in Rear Quadrant
(S) The implications of the observed results, when the
enemy is detected in the rear quadrant, are more serious and
more complex. There are three numerical ratios to be examined:
The relative frequency of attaining a first firing
( position when the enemy is not detected until posi-
tioned in the rear quadrant.
The effectiveness cf the ener.y's weapon system in
/ utilizing the first firing opportunity.
COALTITUDE
(±2000 n )
3-1B-68-9
UNEQUAL ALTITUDE
OIFFCRENCE(>2000FT)
2 N Ml RANGE
FIGURE III-B2 (S). Ratio of U.S. to MIG-17 First Firings for Different
Acquisition Ccnditions (U)
COALTITUDt
(±2000 FT)
U.S.; 8
MIG: 0
3-I8-6B-10
2 N Ml RANGE
UNEQUAL ALTITUDE
DIFFERENCE ( > 20C0 H )
U.S.: 13
MIG: 1
FIGURE 11I-B3 (S). Ratio of U.S. to MIG-21 First Firings for Different
Acquisition Conditions (U)
T.hle 111-81 (S) RATIO OF U.S. AIRCRAFT/MIG-17 FIRST ATTACKS
■ AS A FUNCTION OF INITIAL POSITION AT ACQUISITION (U)
••tlo *
BltiO
ftitio
f-t.
'NI6-I7
Teui U.
Ouidrint
Other
Outdnntt
B««r
Ou4dr«iit
Ciiidrtnt
Other
Ou^irmti
Re<r
Cutdrjnt
other
CoiUttHdc
♦ 1000
ClOi*
<2 n at
OUUot
>2 • mi
'0
°'„
Ooo^w* 1
Alt. 01 r.
»t00Q ft
Clot*
>2 n at
''.
lOTAL
"'s
'J
4-Z9-48-3
• The relative frequency of rear acquisitions to
all acquisitions.
^(U) The third item includes the results of Section III-A,
but will be discussed herein, .. -^i
(S) -The enemy, when not detected until he positioned
himself in the rear quadrant, usually succeeded in making the
first attack. The enemy success ratio in attaining a position
to fire first under these circumstances was 37/2 for the MIG-
17 and 9/5 for the MIG-21. The possibility of significantly
affecting this result appears negligible. The short ranges of
detection in this quadrant indicate that the MIG was within a
few seconds of a- firing position and in several cases he was
already firing. The previous statements are made in relation
to the enemy's current weapons capability. If and when the
enemy increases the range of his weapon system to ? to li miles,
there would be no time interval at all for evasion before the
attack.
(S) The second item relating to the effectiveness of the
enemy's attack has two aspects. First, the success ratio of
the enemy's first attack was approximately 13 percent. Tacti(
or equipment that would degrade this limited effectiveness or
CoaUi tude
+ 2000 ft
Unequal
Alt. Dif.
>2000 ft
CI ose
<7. n ml
Distant
>2 n ml
Close
<2 n mi
Distant
>2 n mi
TOTAL
Total U.S.3/MIG-21
Rear Quadrant
v;
other
Quadrants
8
13/ *
36
•This result includes one - J.^^^-^,,,,*"
against the MIG-21 are for the F-4C ai reran.
at least counterbalance the enemy's attempts to Increase the
effectiveness of his firing attempts could reduce or prevent
an increase in U.S. losses.
.(S) The slsnlflcanoe of rear acquisition Is apparent,
in 25 percent of the encounters the enemy managed to position
in the rear quadrant before detection. In most events this
was not a chance phenomenon but appeared to be the result of
ground controlled Intercepts. A study of Intercept patterns
indicates that many enemy aircraft must have passed through
other quadrants where they were at least theoretically visible
but went undetected. The short range of most of the acquisi-
tions indicated In the previous section of this report make it
quite clear that, under prevailing operating conditions, a MIG
can pass through the detection ran^e of 3 to 10 miles with
som. positive orcbabllity (higher than desired) and then turn
into the roar quadrant for hi= attack run undetected. Since,
(S) However, there is a more alarming aspect to the data.
The frequency of encounters in which the enemy has successfully
attained the rear-quadrant position undetected is probably be-
low the potential achievable for forces with a GCI capability
acainst penetrating aircraft dependent on visual detection.
If it may be presumed that the enemy wore still in the early
part of his learning curve, then an increase in the relative
frequency of this type of attack could be expected which would
seriously reduce the observed U.S. superiority unless timely
and adequate countermeasures are introduced. The seriousness
of this is illustrated in Figure III-B^I and Figure III-B5.
For example, reference is made to Figure III-B5 for the MIG-21.
Point (A) indicates the ratio of U.S. (F-VF-8) to MIG-21 kills
over the study period. If more effective utilization of GCI
permitted the enemy to position in the rear quadrant before
detection, in one-half the encounters the kill ratio would
change to that shown in Point (D), other things being equal.
AlRo z roint not to be reelected Is that an increase in enemy
weapon delivery capability to equal the U.S. capability would
further reduce this ratio to Point (E) .
E. CONCLUSIONS
(S) U.S. aircraft attained a position to fire first on
the enemy aircraft in 95 percent of the engagements when the
enemy aircraft did not attain a close-in, rear quadrant posi-
tion before detection.
(S) Unaided visual search and existing AI radar were un-
able to prevent enemy aircraft from an unobserved approach to
the rear quadrant of the U.S. aircraft in 25 percent of the
engagements.
(S) Real-time position and direction information of
enemy aircraft would reduce the frequency of undetected rear
quadrant attacks.
(S) If the undetected rear quadrant attacks could have
been prevented, the U.S. to ene», success ratio would have
been significantly higher.
' (S) The relative advantage of U.S. to enemy air-to-air
weapons in these encounters was approximately two to one A
large nu-nber of the U.S. attacks that did not succeed can be
a«rlhuted to the low reliability of some U.S. weapons and the
limitations of these weapons In a Mo..-1n , Z ^^^^,
vlrorment. (These latter points are more explicitly set
in the* following section.)
Section lll-C
FIRING PHASE, DAMAGE PHASE
A. SUMMARY
(S) Each of the air-to-air engagements of the period
April 1965 to 1 August 1967 was examined to determine the spe-
cific' results of the ordnance expended. Additional material
for the period August 196? to 3 January I968 Is included where
applicable. All results were examined on a firing attempt
basis where an attempt is defined as a trigger squeeze,
(S) The following conclu?ions were reached.
• The AIH-9D (SIDEV/INDER) has ' shovm a signifi-
cantly better target-hit performance than any
other r.issile system.
• The boreslght mode of firing the Air4-7D and
AIM-7E (SPARROW) was not successful in the
dogfight conditions of the present air war.
• SIDEV/INDER (AIM-9B, Air4-9D) failure rates are
decreasing while SPARROW (AIM-7E) failure rates
are not decreasing.
• The data do not provide a measurable difference
in the effectiveness of Navy and Air Force use
of the AIM-7 and AIH-9B missiles.
• In view of the high percentage of missiles
fired out-of-envelope, the pilots need either
more training, an improved on-board indication
of the envelope, and/or a larger margin of
error as provided by a larger envelope.
• The hit-to-f Iring attempt ratio v:hen combined
for all missiles reached a value of 12 percent
(as of 3 January 1968} and was in a downward
trend.
• Missiles and i;uns showed essentially the same
effectiveness in terms of kills per firing
attempt.
"0 25 30 75 100
PERCENT OF ACQUISITIONS IN REAR QUADRANT
FIGURE III-B4 (S). Estimoted Kill Ratio
for Different Levels of Enemy
Copability -MIG-17 (U)
0 23 50 75 ICO
PERCENT OF ACQUISITIONS IN REAR QUADRANT
3-18-AB-12
FIGURE 111-65 (S). Estimated Kill Ratio
for Different Levels of Enemy
Copobility -MIG-21 (U)
when the MIG Is detected prior to this' turn, U.S. elements
have demonstrated a high degree of success in the ensuing en-
counter, it is obvious that if a real-time position and direc-
tion information on the enemy elements were made available to
the U.S. aircrev:s, other things being; equal, the enemy MIGs
would seldom attain a favorable combat position.
B. OBJECTIVE
(C) The objective of this section was to categorize the
results of air-to-air ordnance firing attempts and to deter-
mine those significant categories and trends of interest to
the R&D community.
C. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE
(C) The following sources of data were available to Pro-
ject RED BARON:
• Aircrew interviews
• OPREPS^
• PMSAEG forms 2
• USAP missile firing reports (since May 1967)
• USAF supplementary OPREPS (since May 1967).
All available data were screened to identify all attempts to
expend ordnance. The more valuable sources of data were the
aircrew interviews, the USAF missile firin? reports, and the
USAF supplementary OPREPS : In general, the data available
from OPREPS were not sufflclontly detailed to determine firing
parameters. In addition, the OPREPS do not list all missile
firing attempts.
(C) All of the data sources listed above were based on
the aircrew's description of the ordnance expenditure. Since
no other sensors recorded these data, it follows that although
specific quantities are derived from the reports, they are
subject to some inexactness. These limitations have been rec-
ognized and have been taken into account when defining the re-
sults categories and when computing the various ratios and
trends which follow. It is not felt tnat the inherent inexact,
ness in any way negates any of the conclusions.
^(U) Joint Chiefs of Staff Operational Reporting System.
^(U) Fleet Missile System Analysis and aluatlon Group.
(C) This section identifies and discusses the var^lous ^
categories of results in terms of all attempts by the p-ilot to
expend rrdnance; that is, each trigger squeeze is a flr|ing at- ;
tempt. The analysis covers a discussion of the total ^^tempts
to expend ordnance in order to identify results relatedjj to all ^;
elements of the weapon system (I.e., pilot, aircraft, and mis-
sile). In general, discussion is made relative to total fir- j
Ing attempts and the analysis has not addressed mlssll^) single- j
shot kill probability or reliability ger se. Slngle-shjot kill {
probability is a predictive measure (as opposed to a past de- |
scriptlve measure) which , has limited use in light of the ob-
jectives of this study. Therefore, the percentages pre;sented j
in this section are not estimates of kill probability, i In 1
addition, no overall estimate of the reliability has b^en made ^
since the total number of missiles carried in all sortl|es and J
the malfunctions found during pref light testing were no.t col- j
lected as part of the data. For example, a gun's flrlrig his- , J
tory prioi: to tiie air-to-air engageinenu is unknown and j it may i|
have been used in an air-to-ground mode. Thus, reliability as j
expressed by rounds between failures could not be assessed. j
In the case of missiles, the data analyzed represent only those
missiles which were attempted to be fired.
Definition of Results Categories i;
(C) An assessment of the air-to-air ordnance expenditures
has been made and the results categorized. In several; respects
the categories included here differ from those of a rai^ge test.'
This is because it was not possible to determine why a missile,
failed to guide or why a radar broke lock. On the other hand,
many range test firings are (justifiably) considered "no test,"
Out-of-Envelope firings, for example. In this study the re-
sults of each trigger squeeze have been placed in one of the
r
following 17 categories: |
• Failed to Leave Aircraft : Results were recorded
in thi3 category v;nsn a firing attempt was made
59
( ■
60
r ■
but the missile did not leave the aircraft. (This
includes AIM-^^D ar.d AIM-9 No Motor Ignitions). Many
of the reporting media overlook this category when
making their standard reports. Included in this sub-
division were tv;o firing attempts which failed be-
cause the multiple ejection rack (MER) could not be
Jettisoned to complete the enabling circuit on the
forward missiles.
No Motor Ignition (AIM-7) : Applicable to AIM-7 mis-
siles which were successfully ejected from the air-
craft but were not observed in powered flight. Even
H though ejected, this category is considered as a pre-
il ; launch failure.
j." • flesults Unobserved : Results recorded here came from
\\ two sources:
^\ Unobserved by crew, except when superseded by
I' other sources.
iJI ; Insufficient data available to permit reason-
able assignment to any other category.
The latter source accounts for only a small number
if - * of firing attempts. The major cause was that the
:! crew lost sight of the launched missile due to
fj clouds or U.S. aircraft maneuvers.
i! • - Desperation : Those missiles deliberately fired out
; ■ of parameters for tactical reasons are categorized
_ -as fired in desperation. Inclusion in this category
[ j required a pressing need to put the enemy on the
• 1 defensive or to attempt to cause him to break off
I , his attack on another aircraft.
• Personnel Error : Personnel errors are limited to
those firing attempts in which a missile was
launched in spite of ind:' cations present that the
missile could not function. For example:
Firing an AIM-7 with the radar in search;
that is, with the antenna sv/eeping
Target aspect switch in head-on mode when
attacking from the target's rear.
Overriding circuit breaker to fire missile
past centerline stores.
• System Failures ; For missile systems, this category
• is comprised of rare occurrences v/hich did not fit
f * in any other place. They are: no ready light, ord-
nance rack malfunction, radar malfunction, and me-
chanical failure. In the tables which follow, the
first tv/o groups are included in Failure to I;eave
Aircraft while the others are li5~ed specifically.
>
listed sepa-
discussion
Out-of-
Por gun systems. System Failures cover all occur-
rences which prevented the firing of thefguns.
Out Maneuvered: A missile was "out maneuvered" if
there was a sTrong indication that the t^arget had
exe^^uted a violent evasive maneuver after the "Jfssiie
had left the aircraft. It was also necejssary that
the missile had been launched within parameters and
had begun to guide on the target. !
Out-o f-r.nvelcce ; Where applicable, an estimate of
the kinematic launch envelope was made gased on the
weapon type, the firing parameters of Jhe attacking
aircraft, and the maneuver undertaken by the target.
This cGUiilea v/ii;h thQ .^i^^^ar limit:, of tae missile
determined if the missile could physically guide to
an intercept. Not included in this category are
those missiles which could be judged to | have been
fired inside the minimum range of the missile.
Xnsid« Mini mum Ra nge: Those out-of-envelope firing
attempts wnicn v;ere clearly within the minimum range
defined by the safety and arming ^-^^^^^^^^^^-^-^^^^^^
tions were categorized here. These are]
rately in the tables but in all further
they have been included in the category
Envelope ,
Ra dars Broke Lock After T.aunch (AIM-7) . • All Instances
of break-lo'ck are groupec here. The re 'as on s for
break-lock were seldom available, !■
Illumination Interrupt (AlM-7) . Aircraft tactical
maneuvers to avoid enemy attack may pull the radar
antenna off the target with the resulting loss of
guidance information for the missile.
I Failure to Guide ; Those missiles which: failed to
guide properly (including catastrophic [failures )
were summarized here. It should be observed tha^"
In the case of the AIM-7 the failure to guide could
be caused by a misaligned radar as i^rell as by a
failure in the missile's guidance system. The data
base contains seven engagements in which two or more
AIM-7 missiles were fired by a specific aircraft and
for which the only result was failure to guiae. The
limits of the launch envelope (e.g., gilmbal angle
limits on the AIM-9B) may cause some ambiguity as
Out-of-Envelope firing resembles failure to guide.
However, such results were listed as Out-of-Envelope .
9 Boresif rht Mode M iss (AIH-7) : This category is re-
stricted to fWr-.-ls fired in the boresight mode; that
is, with the radar antenna fixed and aligned with
the centerline of the aircraft. In order for the
and Missile Out Maneuvered. Therefore, the estimates for Des-
peration, Missile Out Maneuvered, and Minimum Range must be
considered lower bounds; the combination of Minimum Range and
Out of Envelope is aloo a lower bound (Out of Envelope may con-
tain some Minimum Ranges). While no general rule can be im-
plied, in many cases results were categorized as Failure to
Guide when the original data would not Justify placement In
the above categories. However, if there were serious doubt,
the result was listed as Unobserved.
(S) V/hile enemy countermeasures could have caused re-
sults v;hlch appear like False Detonations or Failure to Guide,
there Is no evidence which Indicates the employment of ECM
against the radar missiles or flares against the IR missiles.
D. RESULTS
(S) This section Is subdivided Into three parts: Sum-
mary of Firlnrr Attempts, Gun Firing Attempts, and Missile Fir-
ing Attempts. The gun subsection Is subdivided by aircraft
type v;hlle the missile subsection Is subdivided by missile
type and by major categories:
Summary of Fir-'ng Attempts
(S) A su.T.niary of the results of expenditures is given in
Table III-Cl v/hich gives the total confirmed kills made by each
f ighter/target/v;eapon com.bination. Enemy missile firings are
not Identified by missile type due to the difficulty of Identi-
fication. These results are presented for the time period
April 1965 to 1 August 1967 and also through 3 January 1968, a
period for which some additional ordnance expenditure data
were avallabZe. (These additional data are limited In most
respects but jo contain all the kills.)
(S) Table III-Cl excludes the following categories of
aircraft kills:
Table III-C1 (S). RESULTS OF ORDNANCE EXPENDITURES
CONFIRMED KILLS BY AIRCRAFT ORDHAHCE ONLY (U)
April 1965-1
August 1967
Aoril 1965-3 January 1968
MIG-17
HIG-ZI
MIG-17
MIG-21
Enemy Kills By:
1
F-8
Gun
3
0
0
AIH-9
8
9
1
F-48
1
AlH-7
2
0
3
AIH-9
1
0
1
2
F-4C/F-40
Ann
3
1
5
2
AlM-7
5
9
7
9
1 n
AIH«9
in
13
1 0
AIH-4 (F*4D
0
0
3
0
Only)
F-105
Gun
c u
0
25
0
AlH-9
3
0
3
0
HIG-17
MI6-21
MIG-17
MIG-21
Guns
Hlsslles
Guns
Mi ssl 1 es
U.S. Losses:'
ft
F-8
3
0
3
0
F-4B
1
0
2
0
F-4C/0
4
0
5
5
F-105
4
5
4
12
The MIG-17S have acmevea zero kims wnn a mi»aii^. 7"''r
have achieved zero kills with a gun system. Neither MIG.has achieved a
km with a rocket system.
o Enemy loss resulting from enemy pilot error rather
than missile hits.
• Probable enemy aircraft losses (11 MIG-lTs and 2
MIG-21S through 3 January 1968).
It Is of interest that although the MIG-1? was equipped at
times with missiles, all of its kills were achieved by the gun
system. Also, the MIG-21 has only achieved kills with missile
ordnance even though it frequently attacked with guns while
Table IIl-CZ (S). GUN-FIRING ATTEMPTS
APRIL 1965 TO 1 AUGUST 1967 (U)
Aircraft:
F-105
F-105
F-3
F-4C
F-4C
1
F-lOO •
Target:
HlG-1 7
MIG-17
HlG-17
MlG-21
HIG-17
Totals
F 1 ring
Attempts
134
14
25
13
1
3
190
System Fai 1 ures
Ordnance Power
Fa i 1 u re
1
1
1
no Hinniiin i l i nii
1
1
2
Swi tcho 1 ogy
1
1
4
Gun Jam
Q
o
•»
1
1
12
Over Gassing
3
3
Hal functi ons
1
2
Z
c
3
Total
13
. 5
7
2
27
Mi sses
76
8
11
8
2
105
Hits
28
Damage
24
1
3 •
1
Probable Kill
1
1
3
Confir^ned Kill
20
3
3
1
27
• Total Hits
45 '
1
7
3
1
1
58
4.U-68-I
flying without missile ordnance. In addition, although both
the MIG-17 and the MIG-21 have fired rockets, no hits have
been recorded.
Gun Firing Attempts
(S) A total of 190 gun firing attempts .was analyzed. A
summary of the data collected is shown In Table III-C2. For
all gun systems, 31 percent of the attempts resulted in hits.
Given a hit, a kill occurred 47 percent of the time. Con-
sidering confirmed kills only, the gun system's overall ef-
fectiveness per attempt is 14 percent compared to an overall
effectiveness of 17 percent for missiles.
is) The combined gun firing effectiveness is plotted in
rigure III-Cl. A movinp; average, plotted at the midpoint of
0
3-26^7
i^i/U \0fW66 l/t)3/67
3/01/67
4/19,^7 "4/28/67
5/12/47
3/19/67 5/52/67
20
40
60
SO 100
FIRING ATTEMPTS
120
140
160
FIGURE Ili-Cl (S). Trends for All Gun-Firing Attempts (U)
t80
53. attempts, was computed for the firing altitude and the
three categories of results: Hits, Misses, and Failures.
Enemy aircraft kills are also shown in this figure. The kill
trend rises from 10 percent to 20 percent following the hit-
trend line, but then quickly levels off at a reduced value of
15 percent. This value Is close to the overall average of
kills per attempt for all gun systems.
(S) It can be seen that the number of P-i05 attempts is
much greater than the other gun attempts. In addition, the
i
3
3
0
0
0
•i
^#
0
installations of the various e;un systems are different between
aircraft. For these reasons the various aircraft will be dis-
cussed separately*
F-105 Gun-Firing Attempts
(S) There were 1^18 F-105 gun-firing attempts from April
1965 to 1 August 1967, as shown in Table III-C2. Of these,
90 percent of the attempts and all but one hit were against
MIG-17 aircraft. Table :iI-C3 compares the F-105 frequency of
Table in.C3 (S). COMPARISON OF F-105 EXPOSURE AND GUN-
FIRING ATTEMPTS . APRIL 1965 to 1 AUGUST 1967 (U)
Frequency of
Exposure
Frequency of Gun-
Firing Attempts
MI6-17
125
134
HIG-21
77
14
TOTAL COUNT
202
Events
148
Attempts
exposure to the frequency of gun-firing attempts against MIG
aircraft. Exposure is measured in terms of the number of
events in which F-105s encountered MIG aircraft, \fliile 38
percent of the F-105 events Involved MIG-21S, only 9 percent
of the gun- firing attempts were against MIG.213. The gun- fir-
ing attempts occur significantly less frequently than the ex-
posures. The same result is evident for F-105 missile-firing
attempts over the period December 1966 to 1 August 1967.^
(S) There are several reasorts which account for this
discrepancy. The main reason is the performance differences
between the F-105 and MIG-17 contrasted to those between the
F-105 and MIG-21. While the F-105 cannot out turn either
\u) Frior December 19=6 a fissile was seldom carried.
After December 1966 some F-105s of each flight regularly
carried the AIi-i-9ci.
67
aircraft, the acceleration and high speed capability relative
to the MIG-17 permit disengagement at will. Against the MIG-
21 the P-105 has higher maximum speed at sea level but has
inferior acceleration. Because of these performance differ-
ences, an F-105 pilot will generally choose to evade a MIG-21.
(S) A related reason for the variation in exposure and
firing attempts is tactics. The MIG-17 can exploit only
AltIL \9ii - I AUGUST IM7
14 FIRING AHEMPrS
SIGHT INFOKMATION SIGHT INFOftMATtON FOK KILLS
FIGURE III-C2 (S). F-105 Gun-Firing Attompts Summary (U)
N
limited tactics,* due to the performance deficiency relative
to the F-105. The MIG-21, on the other hand, has had more
tactical latitude to negate F-105 attacks, including evasion
when necessary. Finally, the mission of the P-105 aircraft
was not to attack other aircraft unless seriously threatened
by attack. Therefore, engagements with other fighters were
normally avoided.
(S) The F-105 firing attempts can be summarized as 31
percent hits, 12 percent failures, and 57 percent misses as
shown, in Figure III-C2, The probability of a kill given a
hit is 0.^6. The largest source of failure was gun Jams. In
most cases the cause of a Jam could not be ascertained.
(S) Effective gun utilization requires the use of a -
gun sight. However, in many engagements the sight was set for
air-to-ground use and either there was no image on the combin-
ing glass or the sight picture v/as fixed plpper (usually de-
pressed for bombing) . Sufficient information to permit a de-
terinina*;ion of the sight states v/as available for 33 of the
1^48 firing attempts. Of these 83, ^1 attempts were made with-
out the aid of a computing air-to-air sight; that is, with no
image or depressed pipper only. The remaining ^2 attempts
were made with the pipper depressed as a function of aircraft
g-loading for a fixed range. The range presented depended on
the mode selected and could vary from 8OO to 1^400 feet. Vari-
able ranging is available if a radar lock-on is achieved.
However, no radar lock-ons were obtained because of the very
rapid nature of the combat and the several seconds of settling
time required after achieving a radar lock. In addition, some
target acquisitions were made inside minimum lock-on range
(2200 feet).
(S) The F-105 was credited with 20 confirmed gun kills,
two of which were made head-on. One-half of t!ie kills (10)
*(U) See Tactics Section, II-A.
were made despite the absence of computed sight Information.
Only fixed-range information was available for eight of the
remaining ten kills. No information regarding sight status
was available for the other two kills. A summary of the F-103
sight information is presented in Figure III-C2.
(S) This ineffective use of the P-103 gun sight Is In-
dicative of man-machine incompatibility. The sight could not
be exploited to its full capability (radar ranging); moreover
if radar ranging lock-ons were attempted but not achieved « no
sight picture would be available. In addition, even If lock-
on had been achieved, several seconds of settling time would
be required for the computations to be made. In half the cases
no computing sight was available. The failure to achieve even
fixed-range computations was influenced by the swltchology in-
volved. Therefore, despite the fact tftat guns could be fired
Immediately by simply squeezing the trigger, the lack of accu-
rate sight information to the pilot reduced the gun capability
in the snapshot role.
(S) Figure III-C3 displays the F-105 gun-firing results
for the period of the study, plotted as a 51 point moving aver-
age. The altitude at firing has remalnded relatively constant
in the 3000- to 7000-foot band. The percentage of failures
shows a steady decrease. The percentage of hits shows a steady
increase until December I966 at which time a level of 45 per-
cent was reached. After December a decline is noted which lev-
eled off at about 20 percent in the final 2 months of the study.
Other Gun-Firing Attempts
(S) The other £un-flring attempts listed In Table III-C2
represent a much smaller sample than that of the F-105. The
F-lOO was involved in only one event' (3 firing attempts) and
Navy aircraft had much less exposure to MIGs. The P-Uc alr^
craft carried external gun pods as air-to-air armament only
since May 1967.
7/10/65 10/05/66 12^0/66 1/21/67
3-26-68-6
4/1 9/67
4/28/67 5/12/67
20 40 60 BO
FIRING ATTEMPTS
100
120
FIGURE III-C3 (S). Trends for F-105 Gun-Firing AHempt$ (S)
5/22/67
140
(S) The F-8 Mk 12 gun .-system was plagued by many dif-
ficulties, particularly early in the war. This accounts for
the relatively higher percent of attempts resulting in failure.
Al:?o, the P-8 gun sight computed inaccurate lead if the fight-
ers v;ere pulling more than 3 ;7«
Missile-Firing Attempts I
(S) The results of all the mlssile-flring attempts for
the study period are presented in Table III-CH. Table III-P5
is a further categorization of the missile failures. Tables
III-C6 and III-C7 are an extension of the missile-firing re;-
suits and the failure classifications for the period Augustj:
1967 to 3 January 1968. The information contained in Tables
III-C6 and IIX-C7 is based on supplemental data, not invoivjing
aircrew interviews, and consequently is much less detailed j
than those of the remainder of the report. Note that Hits are
the only known information for the AIM-9B and AIM-9D. In the
case of the AIM-^D, the information is a little more complete
but not as detailed as that in Tables III-CU and III-C5. The
data for the AIM-7E were obtained from forms completed by the
pilots and permit an adequate characterization of results.
Even in the case of the AIM-7, however, it is not known that
all launch failures are included, and for this reason the num-
ber of attempts represent a lower bound. j
(S) Table III-C8 presents the results of the 65 boreslght
Table III-C4 (S). SUMMARY MISSILE-FIRING ATTEMPTS BY ORDNANCE,
AIRCRAFT. AND TARGET - APRIL 1965 TO 1 AUGUST 1967 (U) |
A»r<r*ft:
Mr(M«*t trrcr
faU* 1ar|t(
0«itaaM««tr«
P*ttlM*ch ralUr*
mil
0«t- I
(HtalBo* laat*)*
Nit
(DrakafeU Mil)*
10
I
I
1
1
t
! 4
(1)
(91
'1 1
1!
!0
2; I u
(<1
18
!1)
n
10 1 1
(f, (2;
li
Tata It
II
IT
t
4
It
41
70
I
ii
(&1>
Table 1II-C5 (S). MISSILE SYSTEM FAILURES
APRIL 1965 to 1 AUGUST 1967 (U)
• ;9
All*.
«•
"IC l«'i«t:
f » 4C
II
f > 4I
W
f .
;i
»>. j IJ
17
*
( 1
f -48
f .
4C
:i
ICS
2\
\J
F-B
1 » j"Fr
it
1
1
t !
;
1
t
i
u
i
?
1 i
1
i
1 1
2
t
*
1
4
>
II
;
1
»• i«n
t
i
*
1
«
i
1
1
•
HtttM* fatlatti
I
i
)
n
« 1 <
:^
1
0
3
»
5
0
<
a
0
III
10
17
u
44
It
1
1 1 1
1
t
18 1 1
i
1
14»
Table ni-C6 (S). ADDITIONAL MISSILE-FIRING RESULTS
•AUGUST 1967 THROUGH 3 JANUARY 1968 (U)
tin
■40
UN
-«t
am
■10
•(rcrtft:
40
f .
«l
f-40
r-it
f.40
f-8
f -4t
Nit larftt;
17 •
11
IT
: n
1?
. 21
17
it
17
17 '.
21
Tault
•
S
i
1 7
1
I)
40
»
«
«
1
7
to
114
I
1
1 Z
>
4
1
«
2
t
1
»
1
I
i 5
T
\
1 1
t
I
Jtircritt l*nfH««r
t
«
i
1
tv
failUime* f«tlur»
1
i )
i
Out-Ot-t Aiit*»»*
(Km t*n)t>
RtSt
J
(I)
I
1
i .
1
()>
! ,;>
2
IS
<1)
4
mt
(rros rtll)
lino
'
(11
1
(1)
■ ft)
1 2
! (>>
, n»
1
(U
(1)
.
(2)
li
(?)
tn
(10)
!
1
I
*( I IMKItn tuit ftUt irclultf in pr««i«'i t3t4t.
Table III-C7 (S). ADDITIONAL MISSILE SYSTEM FAILURES
AUGUST 1967 THROUGH 3 JANUARY 1968 (U)
llrcrtft:
■tS Tir««t:
f.49
»«t«««tl«... i« Kttl
••M*<«M RMt Ftr«M
T*itt C««l«rt«
rirlii AttMftI >
*rtUiir« Oala Mt avallwlt for U
I
>
t
1
f
Table III-C8 (S). AIM-7D AND AIM-7E BORESIGHT MODE
FIRING ATTEMPTS (U)
0«tt:
1 «ar «»•
1 *«« «l
1 •««
1 Jaa M
1 Apr tl-l Jaa (|
Tatal
NIB Tarftt:
r
II
II
i "
i;
1 n
OatMratiaa
laaack raltara
■• Natar Ifattlaa
1
1
t
1
1
)
t
>
1
t
%
t
1
1
«
Ottoxttion
li<«r Irak* tact
3
t 0)*
1
J ■
}
1
t
■oMflfHt RaO Hlti
I«*tlo9* • Str>tr«l
iMvtlept - Nln laaft
rUta T«r««t
1
t
1
1
t
1
* (41
I ii)
to
19
1
1
«
t
13
10
mat trrar
1
1
M1«a<attlaa lalcrrnit
Nit (Rflll
1
»
1
{
(2)
(1)
1
i
1
t
Tatal
IT
12
it
l«
It
i«
-Taa laMtlflt *lr1«»i altk li»;t Loci.
7^1
0
0
0
9
B
Q
0
0
C
0
6
0
firings made over the period 1 April 1965 through 3 January
1968. While the same limitations mentioned above also apply
to this post-July data, a chi-squaro test of the pre-July and
post-July sa.-nples did not detect a significant difference in
the tv/o sets of data.
(S) Tables III-C^^, C5, C6, C7, and C8 can be used to
develop many statistics and while care must be exercised when
comparing a heterogenous sample space such as this one, it is
oftci'i u^oiuj. to Ct^C'Cfk tl^o pC'i' roi'niwiiiU^' of a wpc-cific rr.issile
against the aggregate performance as well as against the spe-
cific computations of o*'.her missile types. Table III-C9 is
supplied to fulfill this function. Notice that the table is
divided into two ^^arts. On the left are the percentages of
hits for the period April 1965 through 3 January 1968 while
on the right are the percentages for the major categories for
the period ending July 1967. Prom this presentation It can
be seen that the AIM-9D had the highest ratio of hits, the
AIM-9B had the lowest percentage of failures, and the AIM-7D
had the lowest ratio of out-of-envelope firing attempts. Of .
Table III-C9 (S). MISSILE COMPARISONS (S)
«»r<l W«l to
] J4Au<r" I9SS
April IMS
Nttllll
f«t«l ftri«)
■tttajtl far
til itrcftft
*«retat
or !t«t«
— 1
ftf Hit!
f«r<*nl
Oht «f
tll»tlOP«
Olii*r
Tal«> Firing
*tt*a«t( for
III Alrcrirt
ti
\i
0
{0
SO
0
10
U
it
%t
•i
)
14
2*
e.Jt
HI**
U
11
II
2)
111
ft.ti
UO
II
tl
tt
14
t»
1M
e.»
SO
40
«-
20
n
20
10
o.;f
««0
II
23
23
240
■A
(trrjrir.) t^«t ai'.fllt.
AettpltKCt U.tl: t«t hf»»lK*it\ II ttt*9tt4 tf IRt ca">«tt4 srsfatBilttr tk4t t^f >««plc COaid kM kttA 4r«M
CMelvitoit: Itth prj-.iti)!*^ *• irt*t<'' . 'f'rttnrt, f^t K/ret^e%-1 it «cc«p:«d f«r t*ca vMti
tn«t It, no aiMfr.-.ci' ttt.^-c. tir-.ri;t t/r»l.
the missiles currently in the inventory, the missile with the
smallest percentage out-of-envelope is the AIM-7E closely fol-
lowed by the AIM-9D.. The air war in SEA has fluctuated through
periods of no activity to periods of Intense activity. This
variation can be observed by the changing slope of the cumula-
tive total of firing attempts shown in Figure III-C4.
(S) A. test of the hypothesis that there was no measur-
able difference in performance between aircraft carrying a
given missile resulted in the probability values also given
in Table III-C9. The Yates-corrected chi-square procedures
were used because of the large variation in the expected value
3S0
300
250
200
I 190
100
50
A M J J A S O N 0 J
1965 *
FMAMJJA SONOJFMAMJ J A
IM6 • »W»
3-7-68- I
FIGURE III-C4 (S). Cumulative Total of Missile Firing Attempts
April 1 965 to Augujt 1 967 (U )
Table III-CIO (S). COMPARISON OF MISSILE RESULTS
AND TARGET TVPES (U)
er«M«<t:
kin- rt
ktn-n
• IN
-to
RIC T«r««t >!••:
tr
;i
ri
If
71
U
;i
rirlMf Ittcapti
Nttt
FalUrtt
Pr«»4ftUUy
It
0
1
■
0
It
«
II
0.0
«•
t
i
«
lot
It
11
it
0.
1*
w
11
II
11
1}
i
«
0.
1
0
0
;s
■■■ ■ — ■
U S J»Mrj 11(1
Hill
■
u
1
0.
>
0
lOJ
0.
It
II
11
lOi
II
0.
u
u
l(
0.
ti
1
10
HypttHtllC *9r t lOCCWic tNtrt 1« •<» BtAlyrtel* «iff»r*<ict >" yfrf or^txc* »tti>»t<i ti'Stt (^»t.
HwHtur* l*itl: l^t n/tot-.tt'i >i ic(t»(c4 if '.ti« ;»'^>iiti'< trattoiMtf ck*: t*« »«••>« cojl* kr>* 4r*aH
ff9«i « i«t no-: •« •it soul tlt'iKtv M ^naur 0.9*.
CMCU*I*II: (id prgsitttUf H frdltr tU' J. 31, T-irtfort tn« itfpothfili It «Ct«>t«< f»r t«C« •tlliU t^flt;
th«t U, *• «trftrtnc« kctmiii lirftt t|p«.
••M4M
of Individual cells. The level of rejection was placed at 5
percent. On the basis of these tests (the lowest probability
was 0.28) the hypothesis was accepted that there Is no differ-
ence* in aircraft types and throughout this report the missile
carrier is suppressed in favor of the missile system itself.
(S) A similar computation was made on the variation of
missile results with target type. Table III-CIO presents these
data for the missiles currently in the inventory. The table
is subdivided into the two periods, April 1965 to 1 August I967
on top and April I965 to 3 January 1968 on the bottom. The
hypothesis tested was that missiles worked ■ equally well on
both targets and the level of rejection was placed at 5 per-
cent. Based on this criteria, the hypothesis could not be re-
jected. The relative low probability for the AIM-7E during
the early period is a direct result of the high ratio of MIG-
21 kills. This tendency was reversed in the last six months
so that the probability that there is no difference between the
targets is increased when considering the entire period (April
1965 through 3 January 1968).
3
lESItLIS
UNOSSERVCD
10%
AIM 70
APtlL IMA - I AUCUST 1947
AtM7E
Ami 1965- I AUGUST \W
2»
RESULTS UNO6SIRVI0
16%
DCSFCitATION
OUT-Of-Eh*VtLOPI
3%
PUT-OF-£NyElOI«
11%!
,MlsailAN£OUS
3%
19
MISSILE SYSTEM FAIIUXES
MISSILE SYSTEM FAILURES
S6%
MB,F*4C 9, f-dC 99, F-40 IT,
79 FIKING ATTEMPTS 127 FIXING AITEMMS
I2.5.^*96
FIGURE III-C5 (S). AIM-7 Summary (U)
AIM 70 AIM 7E
ARIL IKS - ATXIL I96A AKIL l«»5 - 1 AUGUST IV«7
FIGURE 11I-C6 (S). AlM-7 Missile System Failures (U)
78
AIH-7 SPARROW
(S) The AIM-7D was employed in SEA from April 1965
through April 1966. The AIM-7E replaced the AIM-7D in April
1966 and has been used since that time. The summary of AIM-7
results is shov/n in Figure III-C5, while Figure III-C6 further
subdivides the missile system failures. Note that the frac-
tion of attempts fired out-of-envelope Is small and that the
fraction of prelaunch failures of the AXH-7D has been reduced.
When corsid?r?r.s the pcstlauneh rnrults of the Airf-7S, the
environment should be examined. Figure III-C7 combines a
time-based histogram of AIM-7D and AIM-7E firing attempts
(subdivided Into illts. Missile System Failures, and other re-
sults) with a target maneuvering, non-maneuvering dichotomy
APRIL IMS -I AUGUST l%7
30
^ 40-
J
1 30-
S 20-
10-
POST LAUNCH MISSILE SYSTEM FAILUXcS
O TARGET JMANEUVERING
• TARGET NOT MANEUVERtr4C
AIM-7E ALTITUDE
"**■" 4 MONTH MOVING AVERAGE
^ ^ AIM-.7D ALTITUDE
L£AST SQUARES FIT
8 }■
<
6
T
M A
3-25-68-9
HIT
MISSILE SYSTEM FAILURE
OTHER
1 — I — r 1 I — I — n — r
MJJA SOND
IMS
I
F M A M J J
5 O N 0
AIM-/D •
1966
— AIM-7E
F M A M J J A
1967
FIGURE II1-C7 (S). Hislor/ of AIM-7 Firing Affcmpts (U)
superimposed on the target-
altitude profile. The solid
line on the left shows a least-
squares fit for the four groups
of altitudes for the Air4-9D,
while the dotted line on the
right Is a four-month moving
average of AIM-7E altitudes.
It should be remembered that
the SPARROW, like the SIDEWINDER
and the FALCON, was designed for
use against high-flying, non-
maneuvering targets. This was
not the combat environment dur-
ing 1966 and the first half of
1967.
(S) Figure III-C8 presents
results of the 65 boresight mode firings of Table III-C8 for
the period 1 April 196^ through 3 January I968. It should be
noted that the only hit was one of ten boresight-mode firing
attempts made -ri^h range lock. Firing in the boresight mode
in the dogfight environment of SEA was not successful.
FALCON
(S) The AIM-4D was introduced into the theater during
the last three months of the data collection phase. Of the
first ten missiles fired the results were one prelaunch fail-
ure, one post launch failure, eight fired out-of-envelope, and
zero hits. The preliminary data received on the firings be-
tween 1 August 1967 and 3 January 1968 indicated that the
AIM-4D has achieved three hits in 13 additional firing at-
tempts assuming all firing attempts have been reported. The
overall hit/f Iring-attempt ratio is a maximum of 13 percent
(similar to the AIM-7 but less than the AlH-9).
Ani!L l%S • 3 JANUASY \96B
65 FIRING ATTEMPTS
10 ATTEMPTS V.'ITH RANGE LOCK
•RANGE LOCK ATTEMPTS 3.7-68-14
FIGURE III-C8 (S). AlM-7 Boresight
Firing Summary (U)
AIM-9> SIDEWINDER
(S) The summary of the AIM-9B results Is shown In Fig-
ure III-C9. The observed percentage of hits for the AIM-9B
Is higher than that of the AIM-7 but less than one-half that
of the AIM-9D. Percentage of failures Is significantly less
t;ian the AIM~7 and comparable to the AIM-9D, The percentage
fired out-of-envelope is over twice as high as for either
the AIM-7 or the AIM-9D. Figure III-CIO presents a more de-
tailed description oi' the AlM-^b post- and prelauncij failures.
Similar detailed information for the AIM-9D is shown in Fig-
ure III-Cll and Figure III-C12, Note that the much smaller
percentage fired out-of-envelope and the much higher percentage
of hits.
(S) If the preliminary data of August 1967 through
January 1968 are included, the AIM-9D hit/f i : ing-attempt ratio
is redi?ced to ^0 percent,
' APRIL l%5 - I AUGUST 1967 AMHL }965 - I AUG 1967
ISO FIRING ATTEMPTS
3-7&-66-I0
FIGURE III-C9 (S). AIM-9B Summory (U)
5
FIGURE lll-ClO (S). AIM-9B Missile
System Failures (U)
APRIL IMS - I AUCUST l«67
AWL IMS - 1 AUGUST l«67
30 FIRING AHEMPTS
fOST-lAOKO*
ttFiUNGAnEMnS
FIGURE III-C12 (S). AIM-9D Mrssile
System Failure (U)
FIGURE lll-Cll (S). AIM-90
Sununory (U)
Out of Envelope
(S) Figure III-C13 presents a comparison of the per-
centage of missiles fired by each a ire raft -ordnance combina-
tion together with the number fired out of envelope for each
category. Chi-square tests of these comparisons indicate that
the combinations are heterogenous at the 5-sigma level and
therefore there is near-zero probability that this set could
have been dravm from a homogenous random sample.
(S) A detailed. examination of the data identified those
combinations which contributed to the heterogenous results.
This process indicated that the AIH-TE/F-^IC had relatively
the least out-of-envelope firings 'and the AIM-UD/F-i»D and the
AIM-9B/F-^;c had relatively the most out-of-envelope firings.
(S) V/hen a coniparison is made of the percentage of
out-of-envelope firings with altitudes, there is a statistical
82
Area 1963 • I AUGUST (96;
40
<
Z 30
Ml
20
[" jn PERCENTAGE OF 346 F WING ATI CmPTS
\ ■-. \ PERCENTAGE OF 78 0UT-0F-EN7fL0?£ FIRINGS
m
LARGE OiFFE((CNC£ DENOTES AlliCfiAFT -O90NANCE
COMBINATION or INT&IES1
10
I
F-:D
AIM
40
Jl
F-4( F<«C
AIM
7D
4-13-
XL
F-48
F-4C F-40
AIM
7E
f.A^ F-4C. F-135 F-103
AM
9S
F<8 F-4B
90
3-7-68-3
AIRCRAFT -ORDNANCE COMftlNATICNS
FIGURE III-C13 (S). Comparison of Aircroff-Ordnance Combinations for
Percentage Fired Out of Envelope (U)
Inverse correlation between the two; that Is, as the altitude
decreases, the percentage "of out-of-envelope firings Increases,
as depicted in Figure III-Cl^.
(S) There are a variety of contributing causes to the
out-of-envelope phenomenon; among these are missile type, air-
craft g»3, target g*s, and altitude at time of firing. Al-
through less obvious, the effect of altitude on out-of-envelope
fir-ngs becomes (Apparent by a cor.parison of envelopes at
n
83
40
30
20
10
I I I I I I I I I
4 AAONTH MOvrNC AVERAGE
'V7
7
40
30 s
i
s
20 J
O
3
t:
.oS
AMJ JASONDJ FMAMJJASONDJFMAMJ J. A
\96S I 1966 1967
3-26-M-13
FIGURE in-C14 (S). Comparison of Altitude ond Out-of-Envelope Ratio (U)
different altitudes. As altitude decreases, the envelope
shrinks rapidly, predominately as a result of increased aero-
dynamic drag. The capability of the target to distort the en-
velope also increases as altitude decreases. Representative
envelopes are shown in Appendis B.
Hits
(S) The desired result of a missile firing attempt is a
target hit. In this sense all results in the other categories
(with the possible exception of desperation firing) must be
considered a nonsuccess. Figure III-C15 shows the percentage
of firing attempts together with the percentage of hits for
each aircraft-ordnance combination (data through 3 January
1968). Again the combinations are heterogenous (at the 2.6-
algma level). The AIM-9D hit ratio was significantly higher
than that of the other missile types. No significant differ-
ence could be detected among the remaining missile types.
(Note that the zero hits of the AIM-9B/F-^IB do not negate
this conclusion because the sample size is small).
AraiL 1965-3 JANUARY 1968
i 1 PERCENT AGE Of 460 FIRING ATTEMPTS
PERCENTAGE OF 82 MISSILE HITS
LAKGE DIFFERENCE DENOTES A«CltAFT>OKDNANC^
COMflCNATION OF INItXtST
m
F-4D
AIM
O
3-7-68-4
F-48 F-4C
AIM
70
F-4B
AIM
71
f-8 F-4ft
F-4C F-105
AIM
9B
F-a F-JB
AIM
90
AIXCRAH -ORDNANCE COMBINATIONS
FIGURE ill-C15 (S). Comparison of Aircraft-Ordnance Combinations
for Percentage of Missile Hits (U)
Hisslle System Failures Trend Analysiu
(S) It was recognized early in the analysis phase that
any cumulative results such as those of Figure III-C16 may
distort evaluation of a missile system if most of the failures
occurred early in the war. A method to test a hypothesis that
the failures v/ere decreasing was by means of trend analysis.
The specific procedure selected was the method of moving
averages .
(S) It was found that the choice of a base was not
critical. For the Individual mif^sile^;, a summing base of
approximately one-third the r.uKt'.*r of flrlnrs sr.othered the
to
ss
so
46
Ama I96S • I AUGUST 1967
r I KERCENTACE OF 346 FJRING ATTEMPTS
PttCCNlACe OF 122 MISSILE SYSTEM i AILUKES
LARGE DIFFfcKENCE DENOTES'
AIRCRAFT -OSONANCE
COMUNATION OF INTEREST
3S
20
15
10
Jh.
I
n
EL
u.
mi
n
F-4D
AIM
40
F-4a F-4C
AtM
7D
F-4B
AIM
7£
F-40
F-8
F>4B
AIM
9B
F-]05 . F<IOO
F-8
F-4B
AIM
90
AIRCRAFT -ORDNANCE COMBINATIONS
3>7-6t{-2
FIGURE in-C16 (S). Compcrison of Aircraft-Ordnance Comb inaf ions for
Percentoge of Missile S/stem Failures (U )
minor variations v;hlle leaving the major trend visible. It
should be noted that the abscissa for most of the plots is
firing attempts rather than calendar -days. This scale was
selected because the rate of fire varied over such a wide
range that any grouping by week or month distorted the trends.
Those trends which are plotted as a function of time were com-
puted using firing attempt.*: and then plotted by date.
Co
4/23/66 I2/t9/66 l/6,'67 V9/67 5/20/67 8/13/67 10/54/67 )2/lV67
I I I 1 I I 1 1
0 25 50 75 100 I2S 150 17S
FIRING AITCMPTS
).7-68-ll
FIGURE II1-C17 (S). AiM-7ETnnd Analysis (U)
(S) The moving average plots for the AIM-7E are shewn
in Figure III-C17. The failure rate can be seen to be holding
at a 60 percent value until mid-May 1967. The low point was
reached In August and has been gradually rising until the
final of ^9 percent failures is obtained. Unfortunately, the
decrease In failures did not result in a corresponding in-
crease in hits as the hit trend remained fairly constant at
10 percent throughout the entire time period. It should be
reemphaslzed that these percentages do not reflect kill prob-
ability or missile reliability.
(S) Figure III-CI8 presents the trend plots for the AIM-
9B. Note the decreasing failure r^te. The hit percentage is
returning near its original value of 28 percent after reaching
a low of 10 percent. The out-of-envelope percentage increased
3-7-68-t2
FIRING ATTEMPTS
FIGURE m-C18 (S). AIM-9B Trend Anoiysis (U)
to IS
FIGURE I1I-C19 (S).
AIM-9D Trend Anolysis (U^
as the altitude decj'eased as
discussed in the out-ol'-enve-
lope subsection*
(S) The number of AIM-9D
firing attempts is too small
(30 for the time peilod of the
study) to justify any detailed
trend analysis. However, Fig-
ure III-C19 indicates that the
trend of each curve appears to
be favorable: hits up, fail-
ures and out-of-envelope per-
centages down. An analysis of
the AIK-^lD was not considered
becap.se of the small number of
firing attempts and the incomplete-
ness of the post-August 196? data.
A'nalysi.s of Overall Trends
(S) One measure of effectiveness for the air-to-air war
is the composite hit-to-f Iring-attempt ratio. A 51 point mov-
ing average plot of th^s measure is shown in Figure III-C20.
S 40
iw
o
<
2
Mi
-
cu
ATI
LO
VE
F
MPT
s
n
RING A7TE
1 1 ,'l
TO
OF
HIT
S
1
fl?INC ATTE V.'nS *
1
1
-1 1
!
/
1
\
l>
J"
"X
"A
1
_._
1 — '
1
A'
-\
t
t
1 1 i ! 1
i
i
1
_J
II
400
<
350 O
3
250 1
200
ISO
iO
0
1«6S
1W6
1967
1968
FIGURE ill-C20 (S). Hit Trend Analysis (U)
The moving average Is plotted at the date of the midpoint.
The cumulative total of all micsllc firing attempts Is In-
cluded for comparison. (Note that the specific combination
of missiles expended in any specific period is not Indicated.)
The general trend Is a series of plateaus of decreasing value
and reaching 12 percent in April 1957. The ratio increases
to 22 percent in June, A low point of 6 percent was attained
in October, The final value for percentage of Hits (repre-
senting data as of 3 January 1968) can be seen to be 12 per-
cent in a downv/ard trend.
(S) The moving average of altitude at which missiles
were fired Is presented in Figure III-C21. While the early
air battles were at high altitudes since mld-1966 the altitudes
have been lower and followed a more seasonal trend (lower In
the summer than In the winter). Figure III-C22 shows the mov-
ing ^average of altitude for the MIG-17 and the MIG-21-. ; The
cumulative- total for each target Is also Included. Of Inter-
est is .the, fact chat the altitudes at which MI0-17s were en-
gaged Is significantly lower than those of the MIG-21s. Table
FIGURE lll-C2^ (S). Altitude Trend Analysis (U)
90
Table in-Cn (S). COMPARISON OF ORDNANCE EXPENDITURE
ALTITUDES, APRIL 1965 - 3 JANUARY 1968 (U)
HIG-21
MIG-17
No.
Mean
Altitude
K Feet
Standard
Devi ation
K Feet
No.
Mean
Alti tude
K Feet
Standard
De V i ati on
K Feet
ProbabUUy
Missi les
Only
134
16.4
9.3
208
7.3
9.1
0
Guns
Only
7
9.3
8.3
56
4.4
3.0
0.09
Hypothesis: There is no measurable difference in altitude of ordnance ex-
penditure against the MIG-17 or the MIG-21
Procedure: Student's t Test.
Acceptance The hypothesis is accepted if the computed probability that
L«ve1 : the sample could have baen drawn frmm a set of homogenous
elements is greater than 0.05.
Conclusion: The probability that missile system firing altitudes are the
same for each target fs less than 0.05. Therefore, the hypo-
. thesis is rejected for missiles. That is, theie Is a differ-
ence in target altitude (MIG-21S higher than HIG-I7s). How-
ever, the computed probability for gun systems is 0.09.
•Therefore, the hypothesis is accepted. That is, there is no
difference in target altitudes for the gun systems firing
attempts.
of Investigation Is based on factoring the hit * probability
into its conditional probabil itle.s . The factors chosen are:
• A. Probability of successful launch given a launch
attempt *
• B. Probability missile fired in envelope given a
successful launch.
• C. Probability missile will track to the target
given it was launched in envelope.
• D. Probability of target hit given the missile
tracked the target.
(S) The product A*B«C'D is the hit probability given a
launch attempt. Table III-C12 provides the specific defini-
tions for these probabilities alon;^ with the basic data and
the resulting Individual probabilities. The disposition of
Desperation, Unobserved, and Personnel Error results should
bo noted. Desperation attempts were included in the denominator
«0
1
»
49
!
»
1
10
ALTI
10
«
1 1 1 1 1
4«l MIC-I7FI(ING ATTtMm
SI rOtNl MOVING AVfrAOC
nrtllB At ki-ICMifil
1
MIC
M
Mni ano cum
AtllMPTS
rtiiui
1
1
Alll
n
r
1 — i Ul.
. —1
1
— 1.
a
.J
1 —
[ ,--f
1 t 1 1 1
l_l — 1_1 .1 1 1 1 1 1 . 1 t t i 1 . I : , 1
1 ! J
:
5j?53::}ics|rj5|p5|:igoa|r|5|
—
MIC
-21
r-
AL
IITUD
t
J-
i
"Li
*^
CU.VJLAIIVC TCTAi.
! 1 rrH
. . i
"* i
1
SOD
400 <
300
200
too a
I I i I .I 1 i 1 ; ■ t i. :. i i i ! j ' I ■ * ■ ■
. FIGURE IIK22 (S). Altitude of Firing Attempts b/ Target Type (U)
III-Cll summarizes the altitude information for missiles and
for guns. The hypothesis that the altitudes for the MI0-»17
and the MIG-21 are the same may be accepted for gun-firing
attempts but must be rejected for mlssile-f irlng attempts
(MIG-17S lower than MIG-21s).
Hit Probability Components
• (S) Up to this point, tiie missile-firing results have
been considered as a c*.cscriptton of past performance on the
basis of three major categories: hits, missile failures,
and missiles fii-ed out-of-envelope. "A second method of
91
of factor B as they were not fired in envelope . Unobserved
attempts were Included In factor A since they were launched
successfully, but were discarded from the other factors.
Personnel Error results were not Included In any of the
factors .
(S) These four factors (A,B,C,D) and their' product
(A-B-C-D) were plotted as a moving average for the AIM-7E,
AIM-9B, and AIM-9D as shown in Figures III-C23, and*
C-25.
(S) The curves for the AIM-7E indicate that the early
prelaunch failure problems have been solved: the probability
of launching in envelope has climbed back up from a low of
0.6 to above 0.9; and the probability of a missile tracking
(given a successful launch in envelope) increased toward the
later periods fronj a low of 0.2 to a value of 0.5, The big-
gest single contributor to the latter factor was Failure to
Guide.
(S) -Except for two peaks which reached above 0.8, the
probability of a hit (given a successful track) has been going
down steadily from an early value of 0.6 to a value of 0.3 in
January I968. The first of these peaks (at ^5 Firing Attempts)
occurred during Operation hOLO. The second peak occurs In
late May, early June 1967. No other corresponding cause-ef-
fect relationship was observed. The major single contributor
to the Hit factor was the False Detonation category. While
the seven False Detonations represent only 5.5 percent of the
127 AIM-7E firm- attempts, this contributor is given great
leverage due to the small number of missiles which success-
fully tracked the target.
(S) The precombat estimates of these factors by OPTEV-
PORi are given in Table III-CI3. These values may be compared
(U) Operational Tsst and Evaluation Force, Norfolk. Virginia.
Q
0
a
Q
0
0
Q
(1
0
0
Q
Q
0
a
1
Tible in-C12 (S).' HIT PROBABILITY COMPONEHTS
Table Ul M^^l )^^^ _ ^ AUGUST 1 967 (U)
Result
AIM-4D
\
«»
S,
R
10
'll
'li
'13
'14
F«nure to Launch
Desoeratlon
Out of Envelope
FaMure to Guide
False Target
Boreslght Mode Hiss
Hech«n1c8l Failure
Radar Broke Lock
Out Maneuvered
Fuze Failure
False Detonation
Hit
Unobserved
Personnel Error
TOTAL
AIM-70
AIH-7E
12
1
1
7
10
20
2
14
27
9
1
7
3
7
15
?1
1
AIM-9B AIK-90
7
14
SI
9
29
127
8
3
4
33
17
1
150
14
4
30
Factor/Description
A Probability of successful launch given a launch attempt
2? ^^
0.90
0.59
0.84
0.95
0.93
Probability nissile fired in envelope given a successful launch
12
•B . -l^i 0.11 0.86 0.81 0.48 0.83
i-2 ^
Probability missile will track target given it was launched In envelope
12
C •
i?9^1
0.42
0.36
0.80
0.75
D Probability of a hit given the missile tracked target
0 •
1^12
NA
i-9
Product A-B.C-0
1.00
0.21
0.60
0.15
0.69
0.25
0.93
0.54
Mi|>i|liJi*>ii'i.
60
FIRING AITCMPIS
FIGURE III-C24 (S). Trends of AIM-9B Probability Factors (U)
0
96
n
J
FIGURE III
-C23 (S). Trends of AIM-7E Probabiliiy Factors (U) |
95
j
/ '11/
APRIL 1965 TO I AUGUST 1967
n POINT MOVING AVERAGE
PLOTTED AT MID POINT
30FJRING ATTEMPTS
PROBABILITY OP
A. LAUNCH
S. EN'/ELOPE
C. TRACK
^.o.. D. KIT
i.... Aaco
6/12/46 6/12/66 6/21/66 4/^4/67 5/19/67 5/19/67
„l \ I I I I
0
3.28-68-5
10
15 20
FIRING ATTEMPTS
25
30
35
FIGURE IH-C25 (S). Trends of AIM-9D Probability Foctors (U)
97
Table III-C13 (S). COMPARISON OF PRECOI'.BAT ESTIHATES
Table lu i-u \ i^^^^ ^^^^^^ p^^^ (yj
■ ■((titrtil U«me» »• •"••UM
ft. »r»ktktlttr
iM(Mi(«t trtck
O.I« I O.tl
O.I* I Oil
o.j> : O.J*
I
o.u : 0.12
o.ss
o.u
0.»J
0.0«
o.M I o.n
set ' »*• ' t'*"*"
0.«9 o.«J
O.ll
o.ir
o.zt
! 1.90
o.ni '00
a.6< o.«J I o.;»
! I
O.St • O.OJ
»|W fO ^
so; ' 74: ' lOCi 1 Cil'-»t*'
! 1.00 .1.00 o.»
i
o.to o.»i 1 t.oa i »-00
O.S)
0.20
o.?» : o.«
0.71 I O.M
0.11
with the missile firms attempts corresponding to 50. 75. and
100 percent of the sample size.' It can be seen that the big-
gest discrepancy betaeen precombat and postcombat results Is
In the Hit factor. :
(S) Figure III-C2M shows these probability trends for
AIM.9B. comparison with Table III-C12 Shows that the Launch.
Track, and Hit probabilities are adequate. However, as dls- ■
cussed previously, the Out-of-Envelope firings are negating ^
the effectiveness of this system. I
(S) The AIH-9D curves of Figure III-C25 show that early :
difficulties have been overcome. The last values actually
surpass the precombat estimates by OPTEVFOR. It will be of ;
interest to observe the next 30 firing attempts to see if
these favorable trends continue.
'(U) For example there -re IS^^^^^^ attempts.^ With a^51
?!irprr:cnf l^^^^^t^^^ ^^ ... ^ percent point occur,
at 121 and the 50 percent point is at 73-
I:
il
E. CONCLUSIONS
(S) The' analysis as pre:;ented in th(* preceding sections
has indicated the follovrlnr: conclusions:
• With the cxreption of the .MM-9D (3IDEV/IKDF.R) which
v/as sir.niricantly tetter, all missiles and missile-
alrcrarc conbinalions shov;od essentially the sane
level of tarcet-hit pof romance.
• The lack of success of the Ai:"-? (SPARROW) when
fired in the bores lr:ht mode (1 hit jn 6? att',:j.'npts )
Indicates, that *".his mode v/ai; not successful In the
dogfiglit conditions of the present air war.
• Failure rates for the various missiles are quite
erratic and each trend nust be analyzer^ separately:
The AIM-7D (SPARROW) has been phased out.
The AIM-7E (SPARROW) held a 60 percent pic.teau
from April 1965 to June I967 and then dropped
to ^0 percent in th.e suniner of 19^7 . Addi-
tional data collected on the from August
1VG7 to 3 January 1963 Indicate the failure
rate has increased to acproxina::ely 50 percent.
The Ai:'-9B (SIDEWINDER) trend has decreased to
about 10 percent .
The AIM-9D (SIDLV;iriDER) trend has decreased to
about 15 percent .
Thus, SIDi::wi:iDER failure ral:es are decreasing while
SPARROW failure rates, though better than during
the early phases, are not decreasing.
• Missile performance (as measured by a chi-square
comparison of Hits, Missile System Failures, and
Out-of-Hnvelcpe firing atten\pts) is similar for
each aircraft type. Thus, the results of the ord-
nance firing attempts did not provide a measurable
difference in the effectiveness betv/een Navy and
Air Force use of the AlM-7 and AIM-9B missiles.
• The correlation of Out-of-Envelope firing attempts
with altitude (the percentage increases as altitude
decrear;es) coupled v/ith the high percentage in this
catef^ory for both the AIM-4D and the AIM-9B indi-
cates that either:
The pilots need more training to knov/ v;hen they
are v/ithin the envelope;
The pilots need an improved on-board indication
of v/hen they are within envelope; and/or
The pilots need a lar^e weapon envelope
to provide more latitude in launch
paraneters.
The bit-to-firlns attemof. ratio when combined for
all missiles reached a value of 12 percent (as of
3 January I968) and was downward trend. Ihls
ratio, as computed on a 'jl attempt movins average,
has varied between a high of 25 percent (at the
start of the war) and a low of 6 percent.
Although employed under varying conditions o^'^^ar--
eet typo and altitude, :ni33iles as one set and guns
considered as a second sc. showed essentially the
san.'i effectiveness .'n terms of kllls-per-f irlng
att .'mpt .
100
0
0
0
G
Q
Q
Q
0
0
Section lll-D
TERMINATION PHASE
a
Q
Q
0
f! (S) The analysis of the termination phase has indicated
that the major causes were less of contact, fuel limits, and
amission require::ients. While termination due to expenditure of
all available ordnance occurred only 7 percent of the time,
P-8 aircraft which terminated due to lack of ordnance did so
U relatively more frequently than the F-^ .
[I B. OBJECTIVE
(U) This portion of the analysis souj|;ht to determine
n the reasons which caused termination of air-to-air combat.
A. SUMMARY
C. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE
(S) Current doctrine dictates that the tactical unit^
maintain integrity. Therefore, when an individual aircraft of
the unit must terminate, it is standing operating procedure
for the others to accorr.pany. Under the exigencies of combat,
however, tactical unit integrity frequently v;as not maintained,
For this reason the analysis sought first to identify those
tactical units cperatlns independently during any event.
(S) As discussed in previous sections, the actions of
any one event can be conposed of multiple encounters. For
this analysis, however, only the last encounter of any inde-
pendent tactical unit or aircraft was considered to be of
interest. The data base used were all F-^l and P-S events over
^(U) The tactical unit may consist of a flight (4 aircraft),
or an element (2 aircr-jft).
V
101
the time period April 1965 to August 1967- For each of the
•encounters Identified In the events, a reason for termination
was specified. No a priori categorization of reasons was; made;
however, the results can be summarized by the following::;
• Fuel: Fuel limits were specified as a f^ason for
^^ination for those units which were contact
with the enemy but could not P^^^'f "^^.^e
the engagement because of low fuel state. Ihe
normal operational procedure is to refuel USAb ^
strike and CAP aircraft inbound tc the target.
5sAF aircraft are also refueled outbound, unless
the distance from the strike to the recovery base
is such that more fuel is required to reach a [
tanker than recover. Due to the distances, USN air
craft are not refueled on a regular basis, '-netner
or not ^efSelins was planned, the fuel levels estab-
lished for mission termination "^^^^^f
turn to some friendly base was possible without re
fueling. In a majority of terminations due tO: fuel
the normal levels were observed. .
• Ordnance E xpended : The category includes those
termination^ caused by lack of usable ordnance.
o Loss of Contact : Inclusions in this category are
. the result or tw o major situations J^^l^^
cessful completion of an attack, no .urther ta^-^s
were contacted and a Judgment was made to f^tire
the termination was included, ^he other situations
are those encounters during whicn the U.S. xorces
unintentionally lost contact with the enemy force.
Due to the imprecise knowledge of enemy acw.ions,
it is not possible to ascertain how many of the
latter cases could be attributed to a successful
enemy disengagement.
• TacticalDlsadvanta^e: If the U.S. fighters decided
to disengage due co i'avorable enemy position, and
contact was broken in the process, the termination
waS categorized as the result of tactical disadvantage.
• Battle Damaee: If damage to the friendly aircraft
caused the cermination it is included in this cate-
Kory. Inclusion occurred if a U.S. fighter was
forced to break off action., even though the source
of damage was flak or SAMs . i
• Enemv r^ofg r^c^ or Sanctuary : If contact was broken
because^he enemy v;enL iii^o China or a restricted
zone, the termination is included in this category.
Also included are those cases where contact was
broken due to the presence of flak or SAM
concentrations .
• Mlr,r.lon: If the encounter with enemy aircraft
was terminated clue zo ovorrldlncs mission require-
menta, it was categcri"cd as mission. An example
of this termination is the determination not to
pursue enemy aircraft who pose no immediate threat
to an escorted aircraft.
0. RrSllLTS
C'j) Since any one event was usually comprised of the
actio'.s of several tactical units which couid terminate sepa-
rately, at different times, or for different reasons, these
tacMcal units form the basis of the count of terminations.
No*..- that this is on a slightly different basis from the en-
cct.nter or event count used in other parts of the analysis.
To bo consistent, these could be called the terminal encounter
.'ount. Table IIX-Dl presents the catehorlzation of all l60
Identified F-^i and ?-8 terninations for the time period April
196t; to August 19C7. Not included in this total were the 8
confirmed U.S. losses during this period.
Table III-Dl (S). REASONS FOR TERMINATION
F-4 AND F-8 TO 1 AUGUST 1967 (U)
Reason
Number
Percent
Fuel
Ordnance Expended
Lost Contact
Tactical Disadvantage
Battle Damage
Enemy Defense or Sanctuary
Missi on
37
11
51
11
15
10
25
23
7
32
7
9
6
16
160
(S) The highest frequency of terminations were in the
group coni'prislng loss of contact with the. enemy and no more
targets, v/hlch represented 32 percent of the cases. Both of
these catecorlos imply the need to know eneny location in
order to reestablish contact; that is, some sort of enemy
position and direction information as well as better vislbi:-.-
ity from the cockpit. In several cases contact was lost when
radar return was obscured by ground clutter. In other canes »
visual contact v/as lost due to poor visibility (e.g., haz;).
(S) The second major catej^cry for termination v;as fuil
limits. Most of these terminations resulted from the obse:-
vatlon of normal fuel levels and in only 8 of the 37 cases
would the aircraft have been lost without refueling. The
ability of U.S. aircraft to disengage successfully permitted
termination when nor::ial fuel levels were reached. There was
no difference betv/een F-'* and P-.8 relative' frequency of termi-
nations In this category.
(S) . The third most frequent reason for termination was
mission requirements. In general, there are no R&D Implica-
tions In this item. There Is no evidence that equipment
deficiencies v/ero the basis of the mission requirements that
required the escort to terminate,
(S) An Item which occurred with small frequency but with
potential rt&D Implications is the lack of useful ordnance.
This circumstance occurred 11 times. Almost half of the cases
(5 of the 11) were F-8 aircraft, which carried only tv/o mis-
siles and had 6 seconds of gun-firing time. The poor reliabil-
ity of the Mk 12 cannon system over the period of the study
also contributed to the unavailability of ordnance on the F-3,
since gun failures were frequent (28 percent of firing at-
tempts) in air-to-air combat. In the remaining 5 cases the
P-^ aircraft were loaded with only a partial missile comple-
ment (usually due to operational considerations, such as
landlnc weight for night carrier operations or bombs in store
locations otherwise occupied by miosilcs. In only one case
■did an aircraft armed with 8 missiles expend all ordnance dur-
ing air-to-air conibat.
(S) There, was a significant difference between the F-U
and F-8 relative frequency of terminations due to ordnance
expenditure, with the F-8 terminating more frequently. This
would indicate that two missiles «nrt a f?».l lure-prone gun sys-
tem are insufficient armaments for the type of combat experi-
enced in SEA. In the other categories of terminations the
relative frequency is about the same for both F-M and F-8
aircraft.
E. CONCLUSIONS
(S) The successful termination when fuel limits were
reached was evidence of U.S. ability to disengage at will.
•(S) The relatively higher frequency of F-8 terminations
due to ordnance expenditure indicate.:^ -hat two mJosiles and
a failure prone gun system are not sufficient for the type of
combat experienced.
IV. QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
A. BACKGROUriD AND SCOPE
(U) In this study It was appropriate to go beyond the
usual quantitative methods of analysis. Important considera-
tions were:
• The air combat process offered a particular type of
complexity with its great number of variables, and the
interdependence and interaction of all elements of a
fighter weapon system,
• The data for reconstruction of encounters were in many
ways quite subjective in nature. Since thei*e v;as no
real-time recording of flight data, it was necessary to
exploit the human ability to sense, analyze, and recall
the details of an encounter.
« Many do poet* of air cciabat si;aply do uot lend themselves
'to quantifica-ion, e.g., the development of the pilot's
rationale for the actions he took over a period of time,
or some of the maneuvers which took place: "I went into
a high speed yo-yo."
(U) It was determined that these considerations could be
most effectively dealt with, in the light of RED BARON- purposes
and in addition to quantitative analyses, through a qualitative
approach by persons intimately familiar with the various aspects
of the fighter weapon system and its employment.
(C) Six qualitative analysis panels were formed to assess
the various air-to-air encounters. The panels were composed
of experienced individuals both from within the IDA/WSEG
organization and elsewhere, representing the major subsystems
of the fighter weapon system.^ liach panel consisted of an
Ku) For purposes of analysis the fighter weapon system is con-
sidered to be composed oT the follov;ing four subsystem: the
airframe, propulsion, and controls; avionics; weapons and fire
control; the iiurrian bein*-; (pilot and crew).
aeronautical engineer with fighter design background; persons
with design and development experience in avionics and in ^
air-to-air weapons, and an experienced flghtor pilot. Addl-
tlonally. a member of the RED BARON Project acted as moderator ^
for each panel.
(C) The objective of a panel was to consider each air-
to-alr encounter assigned to it and to identify the factors.
I.e.. systems, subsystems, and environment . etc., which H
contrlbuced to coiaplete success, partial success, or failure In
the U.S. fighter weapon system. From the factors Identified. «
the panel was then to outline the R4D Implications for future U
weapons systems. Q
B. METHODOLOGY «
(C) The 78 events in the period from April 1965 to [j
IMarch 1967 documented in Volume I of this report were assigned
to the panels, each group being assigned events representing |j
equivalent cross-sections of complexity, outcor.e, and
chronology. Panel deliberations were limited to the Volume I Q
events since these were the only ones sufficiently recon-
structed to permit qualitative analysis. Q
(C) The qualitative analysis panels were given the
following guidelines: Q
• The outcor.e of the events in air-to-air engagement can
Se%onsidered as a spectrum of P--^^^^f/j^,^f' ^^|?,3e3
success and failure. For the purposes of these analyses,
succesi occu.^s when an enemy aircraft is =-'Stroyed and
the U.S. fighter is undamaged and returns safely to base.
The oth^r eltrerr.e is failure, in which a friendly air-
c^ift is downed by enerr.y air action .Ul outcomes which
are neither success nor failure are designated "o^"
success. It should be noted that in any one event there
may be multiple outcoir.es.
•For each event the panel should attempt to answer, in
terms of the R&D implications, the following basic p
questions: tJ
(1) In those insta:^cec v/here success v.-as achieved, which
, ■ ^ ^ were the key elerr.ents :.hich contributed to success? g
(2) Where success was not achieved, to which factors
may nonsuccoss be attributed? Also, sugeest
the possibilities which may have resulted in
success .
(3) In cases 1 or 2, where failure was narrowly averted,
which were the key elements In averting failure?
•The results cf the above findings will serve to highlight
problem areas, as well as the strengths and desirable
qualities of the v/eapons systems,
•In asseaslnc an encounter the panel should avoid com-
pound speculations. While certain suppositions are
clearly necessai-y , * supposi tion based on suppusltion
should be avoided, e.g., "if this had been the case,
then that would have occurred."
•The panels should recognize that the collection of
assessments from each of the panels, for all the events
considered, v;ill be examined by the Project for
patterns of findings, and degrees of significance to
air-to-air combat.
C. FINDINGS
. (C) Each "panel produced a report on each event it con-
sidered in which it identified the factors affecting the outcomes
of the event and the R&D implications of each factor in the v/ay
of assets or problem areas.
Assets
(C) The significance of identifying assets was to
emphasize the characteristics of the current weapons systems
that should not be designed out of the future v/eapons systems.
The items identified as assets were those considered to have
significantly and favorably contributed to the outcome of the •
events studied. The assets have been grouped by the two pri-
mary aircraft types considered by the panels: The P-i» (as
shown in Table IV-1), and the P-8, since there is a clear
distinction between the assets attributable to each.
^(U) To consider something; that did not happen (i.e., nonsuc-
cess) and make stater.encs about clear" requires supposition.
Table IV-1 (S). F-4 ASSETS (U)
APRIL tSm- MARCH IW7
;>«f;FOflMANCC
(A I KAOAjt ,
10 15
EVENTS
20
25
SPCCD AND ACCELERATION
TURNING ABIUTV
ClIMt RATE
MANEUVERABILITY
OeStRVATION TO WAR
ASSISTANCE TO PILOT
FLEXIBILITY
SELECTIVnY
LONG RANGE CAPABILITY
PERFORMANCE
ACQUISITION
9S EVENTS
».26^I7
F-4 Aircraft
(S) There were 58 P-^ events considered by the panels.
Of these, the performance of the F-^ was Identified as an
asset In 23 events. Performance was divided into subfactors
such as speed and acceleration, turning, and vertical climb
ability. Of these, the most significant factor to emerge •
was that of speed and acceleration, which permitted successful
separation and disengagement at the discretion of the pilot.
(S) The other Items of performance relate to maneuver-
ability and require some elaboration. In the SEA environment
they were employed to:
•Defeat AAA fire.
•Evade SAMs.
•Negate enemy aircraft gun attacks.
110
- - 1 J
•butmaneuver enemy alr-to-alr missiles,
•Keep a maneuvering target within weapon launch envelopes.
The maneuverability of the aircraft (and Its weapons | must be
such that it can be converted Into some tactical adv^tage which
can be exploited. Howover. this advantage need not Jxlst under
all conditions.- For example, althoueh unable to out turn the
MIG-17. the climb capability of the P-i| relative to the Min-17
permitted vertical maneuvering to reposition for reatltack.
While the P-K had a slight excess power advantage at ilow alti-
tude (below 15,000 ft) relative to the MIG-21. it was! Insufriclent
to be tactically exploited and the combat resulted in; a stale-
mate With neither aircraft capable of achieving an advantage.
The conditions which permitted the P-H to attain a taklcal
advantage (or stalemate) were devised in part on the basis of
the energy maneuverability concept, and have in general proved
successful when executed correctly. This depends on Jilot skill
which some lacked due to peacetime restrictions on ali combat
nancuverin^.
(S) While performance aspects, such as velocity land accel-
eration, were recognized as contributing to the succesl. per-
formance must be utilized and controlled to be an assei. The
control which can be successfully employed depends in Urt on
such items as aircraft handling qualities, aircraft stkbility
control forces, and inertlal coupling, if these Itemsi are poor
the pilot must exert extra attention to flying the aircraft and'
must limit the perforaance to those conditions for whl4h good
control can be exercised. j
(S) Although in collecting the data no special ei-fort was
made by the interview teams to discuss the pros and cohs of 'one-
and two-seater fighters, in 15 cases the assistance to the pilot
provided by the backseater was a contributing factor tj the out-
come of the engagement. This assistance was over and Love that
of operating the radar. The advantages attributed to t!he
111
backseater primarily concerned his ability to provide addi-
tional visual surveillance. There were Instances of his malcing
the initial visual identification, and of his assistance to
the pilot by keeping him advised of the tactical situation
during combat.
(S) The advantages of the weapons systems accrued from
their flexibility and selectivity (in terms of IR or radar mis-
sile selection and the inherent characteristics of each), and
the long-range capability of the AIM-7. These desirable weapons
systems qualities were prevalent in 12 of the 58 F-^ cases con-
sidered.
(S) In addition to the long-range capability of the
weapons, the long-range and all-weather AI radar capability in
the F-^ had a favorable effect on the outcome in 7 cases.
F»8 Aircraft
There were eight P-8 events considered by the panels.
The F-8 had much less exposure to enemy aircraft during the
time period of the study as evidenced by the small number of
events, and only encountered the MIG-21 once. In four of the
eight cases, performance (mainly the turning and high-speed
capability) was considered to be a major factor exerting a
favorable effect on outcom.s of the engagements.
R&D Problems
(S) The panels considered 66 events where there were
sufficient data to identify factors affecting the outcomes
of the event. R&D problems were then derived from considera-
tion of these factors. These R&D problems have been combined
into general areas and are listed in Table IV-2 with the number
of events in v.'hich they occurred. Whereas in the case of
assets it was meaningful to distinguish between the type
of aircraft being referred tc, with regard to problem areas 3,t
v;as more desirable to generalize. The problems were carefully
Identified In terms which did not indicate specific solutions
but rather indicated areas for further R&D consideration. Ulti-
mate solutions depend on considering the problem in its many
ramifications and interactions with other requirements, vxhich
was outside the scope of the study. The relative importance
ascribed to the problems here depended on the context of conbat
in SEA, but of course, ultimate solutions rest in the overall
needs of the U.S. defense posture.
Tabic IV-2 (S). R&O PHOSLEMS IDENTIFIED
F-4/F-8 EVENTS APRIL 1965 TO MARCH 1967 (U)
NO. EVENTS
A.
ENEMY POSIT tON AND OIREaiON INFORMATION
39
».
WEAPON VERSATILITY *
37
1. SHORT KANGE WEAPON (20)
2. EXPAND PERFORMANCE ENVELOPE <t7)
3. RAPID RESPONSE WEAPON (U)
C,
LONG RANGE POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION
23
D.
WEAPON RELIAftlllTY
19
E.
VOICE COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS
IS
F.
AIRCRAR REARWARD v:SIDILITY
17
G.
A.I. RADAR CAPABILITY
IS
H.
AIRCRAFT DECELERATION CAPABILITY
13
1.
MAN-MACHINE COMPATIBILITY
t3
J.
AIRCRAH TURNING CAPABILITY
11
EXTERNAL STORES PR03LEMS
9
L.
ENEMY DEFENSES (iMM)
7
M.
INTRAFLIGHT POSITION INFOR/MTtON
7
*The three tubcotagflfict overlap.
3-18-66-I4
(S) It must be emphasized in considering the R&D problems
listed, that the frequency of occurrence of a given problem
per se is not a measure of its importance relative to other
problems and is not an indication of the relative significance
of that problem In any given event. For exan.p-o. voi
01 mat „T,,hnitv occurred with equal
cations problems and weapon reliability .
frequency . but the importance of weapon -/^-""'y '; ^
come. of the battle would normally be greater than that
communl c at 1 ons .
Enemy Pn ^ition and nirection InformatjoO.
^^f;^;;^;^;;;^;^^ need for real-tlme
infor ion on the presence, position, and °
Lt Of enemy aircraft In the vicinity. The P-^^^ '"^^
the general problem from certain specific problems hiehUgh ea
„ t data, an of which directly affected the outcome of the
events. The need for effective early warning was evident
oi: cases early warning was not available - a . - "
actual combat. -"---^ ^^^^^rLr t ^ a eo^
Warnings which indicated inlGs xn .he area, K^n ^
H hulls-eve KIG-call technique) did
MTP ^nii technique, and the DUiis-ey«
o Tr i^^*^^ -^-"-^"^ information needed by the Intercept
10 o .aue i..edlate tactical decisions. The comba =on-
^ - ^^«^<^/s An arrivlnK undetectea
Hit ions in which the enemy succeeded in arriving
lithe r ar quadrant clearly pointed out the need forwarnlng.
i" certa" events, the first Indication of ene.y presence was
e^er acer fire missile smo.e trail, or a wins^an in distress
lonally. the;e were cases where success -j;-;^---
because visual contact with the ene.y was lost and ne.er
regained.
Wpaoon Ve rs a ti 1 i ty ^, ^
'^^^^^;rZ:^o.. frequent RiD problem Identified as a
facto n the outcome of events v:as weapon versatility This
a .or includes such specific problems as the need for a
rort-i..e weapon, the requirement for an expansion of .he
;rrforman:e of current weapons In terms of a larger envelope
Tga : r-neuverm. targets, and a rapid response weapon.
(S) In relation to the rapidity or combat action, the
time required to alra and to activate current weapons is too
long. (2 ^.o 3 second settlinc time for gun sights; approxi-.
matcly M seconds required by the computer between lock-on
and trig&ar-soueeze for the AIM-7; approximately 1 second
was required for launch of the AIM-9B). This situation led t|he
panels to identify the need for a rapid response weapon with -
minimum of aiming and activating; involved.
(S) The n*»«.l for a r.hort-rfsnre weapon vras indicated by
the highly maneuvering and close-in combat typical in SEA.
The enemy appears to have exploited the sanctuary inside the
minimum limits of the U.S. missile system, on the order of a
half Mile. The current weapons ^^ere not designed to oppose a
highly maneuvering target, and therefore the missile envelopes
shrink rapidly as targei; "g" increases. In fact, at low
altltudc^s, against a hicn-S rr.aneuvering target (well within
the capability of the er.emy aircraft) the launch envelopes
of ourr-nt U.J^. !T?.1?siles are so distorted that frequently
it has proven ir:?ossibie for U.S. fighters to achieve prope^
firing pararieters.
(S) In order to explore more fully the short-range weapon
requirement, a separate analysis of all the short-range we?.^;on
employment opportunities was undertaken by the Project, members.
The Project examined 29 events where the F-i| (no gun) partici-
pated in day. visual engagements, and considered the charac|er-
istics of the M-61 Catling Gun. It was determined "that there
were 15 events when at least one additional enemy aircraft
could have been taken under fire if the F-4 had had a short-range
weapon with no larger envelope than that of the M~6l; that ip.
in 15 of 29 events the eneny aincraft was within the firingf
envelope of the M-61 Catling Gun for sufficient time for its
employment. This is not intended to endorse the gun as an air-
to-air weapon. Also, it is noted that the geometry of the \
situations which can^.e iibout ^os undoubtedly influenced by t'hs
fact that the F-^ did not have a gun and there Is no guarantee
that a gun-carrying F-^ would have experienced the same
geometry (see Appendix D).
Long-Range Positive Identification of the Enemy
(S) The need for long-rapge positive identification of the
enemy was the third most frequenL problem identified by the
panels. It was noted that the ability to identify bogeys was
Incommensurate with the ability to acquire. In some cases,
the requirement for positive identification forced the U.S.
fighter to' pass entirely through his missile envelope i order
to make the identification. Frequently, the requirement to
maneuver to Identify restricted the tactics available for
attack. In the case of a flight of four aircraft, when the
■first element made the identification, the second element faced
an alerted enemy, and also a delay until the first element had
cleared the area.
(S) No complete record of identification passes exists for
SEA; however, the problems which result from false alarms can
be important. If the fighter jettisons tanks to maice an iden-
tification run, and the bogey proves friendly, fuel has been
needlessly lost and time on station has been reduced. If
external fuel tanks are not jettisoned, there is a risk of
being unable to jettison at high speed, and therefore combat
is entered in a high-drag condition, and ordnance cannot be
expended from certain stations .
Weapon System Reliability
(S) The panel identified R&D problems as those of
weapon reliability when the failure of the weapon system to
perform had a significant effect on the outcome of the
engagement. The detailed analysis of the exhibited weapon
performance is presented in Section IIT-C.
(S) The qualitative analysis panels studied gun performance
only In the case of the P-8, where there were numerousj gun-
firing opportunities v/hich could not be exploited due jto fail-
ure of the Eun system. Missile failures, applicable tp both
the P-^l and F-8, occurred in the pre- and post launch modes,
and with sufficient frequency to influence the outcotneji of the
eventn. In some cases, failure of the missile permittjed the
enemy to escape undamaged.
i
Communication Problems |
(S) Several types of voice communication probleris were
noted. Major problems were inter- and intra-f light communica-
tion breakdown dae to crowded channels. Onboard communication
equipment failure was relatively infrequent. Very few cases
were noted of breakdown in communication between front?; and back
scat in the F-^. At some times in combat as many as 56 aircraft
were operating on the same primary attack frequency. During
periods of high combat activity saturation of a channel pre-
cluded the x^light leader's capability of calling his flight
to a different frequency. I
Aircraft Rearward Visibility
(S) The rearward visibility in the aircraft was identified
as an important RiD problem. In 17 events considered; the
lack of rear visibility affected the outcome in an unfavorable
manner. The enemy «s weapon systems and tactics favor ; a rear-
quadrant attack, an occurrence which emphasizes the need for
improved rearward visibility. This problem is highlighted
by the detailed discussion in Section III-C.
AI Radar Problems j
(S) The R&D problems with the AI radar were concerned
with its two basic functions — its use in acquisition, and its
use in fire control. The AI radar problem noted in i!ts
acquisition role is its inability to discriminate targets at
lower altitudes because cf ground clutter, and its inability
to search a wide area. This latter problem Is espjcially
critical In an environment where there is no friendly GCI. The
predominant problem with AI radar in the fire control role was,
again; the Inability to discriminate against ground clutter In
the low altitudes and the Inability to operate in look-down
situations. The secondary problems In the fire control role
included: the Inability to maintain continuous tracking of
acquired targets, and the inability of the radar to perform
area search while maintaining lock-on.
Aircraft Deceleration Capability
(S) An inadequate aircraft deceleration capability was
noted in some 13 events. This problem io related to the
weapons capability since It is necessary that range be opened
to permit missile launch- within envelope, and_therefor.e_ alrr. .
craft deceleration may also be considered a weapons system
problem.
Han-Hachine Compatibility
(S) The man-machine compatibility problem area was
identified in 13 events. This problem had its basis in several
factors which affected the outcome of the events. Often the
pilot's attention was distracted from the enemy by the other
duties which had to be performed such as keeping visual contact
with SAM, AAA, and/or a radar presentation. Instances were
also identified where the lack of crew training in air combat
maneuvering and tactics affected the outcome. In some cases,
the lack of training hampered effective communication between
frontseat and backseat crew members ir> the
(S) A meaningful facet of the man-machine compatibility
problem concerned the armament. Particularly in the case of
the IR missile, little or no information is available to the
pilot for the assessment of proper missile launch parameters.
This was also true to a lesser extent for the radar missile.
since the mechanliied launch zones do not take into account tar-
get mar»cuvers . In addition, the pilot has no indications from
the weapon system to permit accurate assessment, prior to
•launch, of the target onto which the missile is locked. Prob-
lems of this nature were Identified several times by the panels,
(S) Another contributing factor to man-machine compati-
bility problems v;as the switchology necessary to set up weapons
and Jettison ordnance. Although not investigated by the panels >
the Project recognized from its investigations that the P-105
armament system was also characterized by this problem. The
seat restraint harness was identified in two events as re-
stricting the pilot's movement within the cockpit.
Aircraft Turning Capabilities
(S) Some aspects of aircraft performance v/ere identified
as assets in that they .permitted tacti os .that.-.as£i.sJted
positioning to fire. Deficiency in turn capability, however,
was a factor af.fecting the outcome of 11 events. This
occurred despite other aircraft performance capabilities
which could have permitted tactical advantage (e.g., F-4
climb vs . MIG-17) • These other capabilities could not be em-
ployed due to other aspects of the combat situation (e.g., SAM,
weather). The turning capability of the including the
pilot's ability to control the aircraft In a turn, was de-
ficient against the MIG-17 aircraft. Although the could
turn with the MIG-21 below approximately 15,000 feet, there
was no evidence that this performance was adequate for the F-4
to attain position to fire on the MIG-21.
External Stores Problems
(S) The R&D problems categorized as "external stores" were
identified in 9 events and could be classed in two categories.
The first was a reliability problem evidenced by malfunctions
In the tank jettison system v/hich precluded tank release. The
s
second category relates to thos. aircraft which accelerated to
combat speed on bOGoy slshtlngs, and thereby exceeded the [}
speed at which stores (primarily the ceaterllne external fuel
tanK) could be Jettisoned. The extra drag of the external y
store affected the performance of the P-l to the extent that
the inadvertent tank retention was considered a factor . g
affecting the outco,«e of the 9 events. Another factor was the
inability of the P-t to expend the forward two AIM-7s. as a ft
result of the centerline store failure to Jettison. U
B
Enemy Defenses
(S) The RiD problem categorized as enemy defenses was
associated with the limitations placed on U.S. fighter operation Q
in a SAM environment. Some battles were terminated prematurely
when enemy aircraft entered areas protected by SAMs, causing R
U S aircraft to break off. It was noted that SAMs place
constraints on U.S. fighters which could not be readily measured ^
by the panels in that the altitudes of the CA? and escort U
missions were influenced by the SAM environment.
Intraflight Position Information
(S) The final item which became evident in 7 events was y
intraflieht position information. The factors which emphasized
this problem arose when friendly aircraft did not attack due to
imprecise knowledge of the position of other flight members.
Two of the events in which this occurred were at night and came
about although there was positive, friendly GCI. In one
daylight event, lack of position information resulted in a mid-
air collision. This problem is. of course, related to, but
goes beyond, that of cockpit visibility.
6
120
s
0 1
U
^ S
V. INTEGRATION OF ANALYSES
A. INTRODUCTION
(C) Two independent analyses of the collected data were
performed as part of the KED BARON study; a quantitative analy-
sis of the various phases of each engagement and a qualitative
analysis of individual engagements as a whole. While the
events were subdivided into various conbat phases and selected
parameters quantified, there were many aspects of importance
that did not lend themselves to this approach. To insure
that these factors be considered fully, each event was studied
in its entirety. The relationship of the analyses can be
described as a matrix in which one dlr.enslon represents the
various phases of each event and the second dimension repre-
sents the individual events. This is Illustrated in Table V-1.
Table V-1 (S). INTEGRATION OF QUANTITATIVE AND
QUALITATIVE ANALYSES (U)
Event
1
: Event i
: 2 i
Event
3
Event
N
Acquisition
snd
Identi f ication
•
: Acquisition
: and
J Identification
Acquisition
and
Identification
Acquisition
and
Identf fication
1 Attack
I Attack
Attack
Attache J
Firlng/Oatnage
1 Firing/Damage
«
F1 ring/Damage
Fi ft ng/Damage
Termination
; Termination
Termination
Termination
legend
I Quanti tati ve Analysis
1 QuaHtatfve Analysis
J.3l.4>i-I
jggPP^^t 121
(C) The Qualitative Analysis Panels examined each event
separately as an entity identifying the factors which influenced
the outcome of each event. From a composite of these factors
the research and development implications were determined.
Those factors that affected the outcome favorably were classi-
fied as "Assets" and those that exposed system deficiencies
were identified as "R&D Problems." Although the qualitative
analysis identified factors with research and development
Implications for each event, their overall relative importance
could not be determined directly because these factors varied
In importance from event to event.
(C) The quantitative analyses examined the air-to-air
events by separate phases of combat actions, quantifying the
key parameters and analyzing them across the spectrum of all
events. Thus, the expected frequency of various combat situa-
tions could be determined, permitting an evaluation of U.S.
weapons system effectiveness in reacting under these conditions.
However, this approach has several Inherent limitations:
•It cannot take into account those factors not readily
quantifiable.
•It does not provide perspective for the interaction
of the various phases of individual events.
•It does not identify directly the research and develop-
ment implications.
(C) This quantitative approach may be likened to a sub-
optimizing process whereby a segment of the process is viewed
in detail but in Isolation and v/ithoiit considering the relation
to the whole and interaction with other segments. While this
can be a powerful analytical tool, it is important to recognize
that erroneous conclusions may be reached, unless great care
Is exercised to consider the effects within the overall context
of the problem.
(U) The results of the two approaches complemented each
other and both vxere utilized to arrive at ^he study conclusions.
1
3
3
rt
3
0
n
Ui
CO
>-
<
o
o
o:
CM
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HVS
IV
Jiff 9)1
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papuffdx3
uodtan
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uo 1 4 ; ^Od
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123
(S) The interrelation between the two Independent analyses
methods employed can best be visualized as a matrix which is
presented in Table V~2. The R&D problems Identified through the
Qualitative Analysis Panel deliberations of each air-to-air event
and discussed in detail in Section IV, are listed as one dimen-
sion. The significant findings of the quantitative analysis
efforts, which examined specific phases of combat for all events ,
are listed as the other dimension. Whenever quantitative analy-
sis results supported the panel findings directly a "D" appears
In the table In the appropria'-e row and column. An "I" appears
,ln the table wherever a quantitative analysis result supports an
R&D problem through inference. Table 7-2 may also be employed
as an index to Identify sections of the report which present
relative and supporting data concerning a given R&D area or com-
bat phase. The following discussion summarizes the reasons for
the entries in the matrix.
B. ATTACK PHASE
(S) ' The analysis of the attack phase demonstrated that
enemy success in achieving a position to fire was almost entirely
dependent upon the ability to maneuver into a rear quadrant
attacking position uefore detection . Conversely, whenever U.S.
aircrews acquired the enemy aircraft before the attack maneuver
was completed, U.S. aircraft negated the maneuver 95 percent of
the time. The require.ment for real time information on the posi-
tion of enemy aircraft is apparent from these two -results.
(S) In the events analyzed the U.S. aircraft were primarily
on CAP or escort missions. On this type of mission the primary
aircrew function is to search for enemy aircraft. Despite the
search, enemy aircraft attained a position in the rear quadrant
before detection in approximately one-fourth of the encounters.
This indicates that the unaided eyeball is an Inadequate mechan-
ism for detection of enemy aircraft in a hostile GCX environment.
At low altitudes, haze conditions over North Vietnam often limit
visual capability.
(S) The AI radar was Inadequate ]*or supplementing
visual search because of its limited field of view and degraded
performance due to ground return (as discussed in Section IV) .
(S) The relative frequency of rear-quadrant attacks
emphasizes the R&D problem area of rearward visibility.
In close-in, dog-fight situations, a fighter is hampered by a
blind spot in his field of view.
(S) The number of very short-range and short-duration
acquisitions under combat conditions in SEA indicates that
there were opportunities to employ a short-range, snap-shot
weapon system, had one been available.
(S) The analysis of the attack phase indicated the
advantage of attaining a position to fire first. As the
weapons envelope increases, the probability of attaining a
position to fire first increases.
(S) The analysis of the attack phase revealed that
only 27 percent of U.S. first attacks \;ere successful. This
result combined with the results of the firing analysis indicate
that unreliability of the weapon systems v/as one of the major
contributors to the number of unsuccessful attacks.
C. ACQUISITION PHASE
(S) Acquisitions of enemy aircraft during the period of
the study were primarily visual at close range, and in all
quadrants. A method of determining enemy position and direc-
tion information at longer ranges would have enabled greater
preparedness for aerial combat. At these short ranges « two-
thirds of the identifications occurred simultaneously with
acquisition. The data suggest that a rioderate increase in
acquisition ranges v/ould result in irproved ID ranges within
limits of visibility and human vision. Further increase in *
acquisition and IL range will require supplementary sensor
equipn-.ent.
125
(S) The need for improved rearviard visibility is indi-
cated by the several instances recorded in the data where
pilots first became aware of MIGs by observing enemy fire
from the rear. Although the structure in present fighter
aircraft restricts rearward visibility, by employing special
formations and maneuvering, the pilots in SEA have achieved
25 percent of their acquisitions in the rear quadrant.
(S) When acquisitions resulted in combat, the parameters
of acquisition again supported RiD problem areas identified by
the qualitative analysis. The short range at acquisition
-(median of two miles) caused external stores problems, such as
difficulty in jettisoning of external tanks at high speed
and Inability to fire certain ordnance with external stores
aboard. In addition, the short-range visual acquisitions at
■ all bearings around the fighter aircraft (and with resultant
short-range identification) frequently precluded firing of
missiles on the first pass at the enemy. This supports the R&D
requirement for an improved weapon, which may include a short-
range weapon, or an expanded weapon envelope of present weapons,
or a snap-shot weapon requiring almost no warmup or preparation
time .
0. FIRING PHASE, DAMAGE PHASE
(U) Because of the many differences in the two firing
modes, gun systems will be discussed independently of missile
systems .
Gun System Results
(S) The results of the analysis of gun firing attempts
directly confirm three problem areas isolated by the panels
and indirectly support two additional problems.
Wea porv Reliability . (S) The F-8 v. as the only gun-
carrying aircraft considered oy the paiiels. Twenty-eight per,-
cent of these gun- firing atte-pts resulted in a weapon failure.
126
For comparison, the value for the P-105s was percent. While
the failure ratio is not a direct measure of reliability. It
directly supported need for improved reliability of gun systems
in general and the Mk 12 in particular.
Snapshot Weapon . (S) Those aircraft with gun systems
had a weapon which responded almost instantaneously to the
squeeze of the trigger, a snapshot weapon. However, even
this fast response system required several seconds for the prop-
er use of a computing sight. In this environment, even two
seconds is often too long to wait. The alternative was to fire
in a noncomputing mode which required the pilot to estimate
lead.
Han-Hachine . (S) The gun system results give direct
evidence of the efects of man-machine incompatibilities which
exist in the current v/eapon systems. While the panels con-
sidered only the ?-i^/F-8 events, the F-105 events also revealed
similar problems. The case in point concerns the F-105 gun«
sight which required av/kward switching from the air-to-ground
to the air-to-air mode for proper usage of the gunslght.
Short-Ranqe Weapons . (S) The gun firing results do not
directly support the short-range weapon R&D problem since the
problem area was not present as such when guns were carried.
However, an estimate of the potential use of a short-range
weapon may be interpreted from these results.
Expanded lieapon Envelope . (S) The need for an expanded
envelope applies more directly to missile systems. However,
it was noted that the F-8 gunslg^ht computed an Incorrect lead
angle when the aircraft pulled more than 3 g*s, thus reducing
the effective envelope of the Mk 12 system.
Missile System Resu1 ts
(S) The results oi* the analysis of missile firing
attempts directly co:irir:r. eight problom areas isolated by the
panels. These areas are:
127
wea pon Reliability . (S) While the ratio of missile system
failures to firing attempts Is not a direct measure of system
reliability, this ratio does support the panel's conclusion that
there is a need for an increase in ordnance reliability.
Expanded Weapon Envelope . (S) While an expanded envelope .
includes an increased maximum range, its primary implication is
a reduced minimum range and a broader angular coverage. An
appreciation for the effect on missile performance by an incr-ase
in weapon envelope may be obtained by comparing the re:iults for
the AIM-9B'and the AIM-9D (SIDEWINDER). Other modifications were
made but the major change was the increase in missile envelope.
(See Appendix B for typical envelope geometries.) While no
direct cause and effect relationship can be proven, the data
■strongly suggest that the AIw-9D success is due to its larger
envelope.
Short-Ranqe Weapon, Decelerati on Capability. (S) Five per-
cent of the missile attempts were fired at less than minimum
range. While the inclusion of an additional short-range weapon
or an improved deceleration capability would not eliminate this
problem relative to present missiles. It would provide the pilot
with an alternative to the present fire/don't fire dichotomy.
. Snapshot Weapon . (S) The lead time required when firing
missiles varies from the two or three seconds required for the
SIDEWINDER to the six to eight seconds required for the SPARROW.
One reason for using the SPARROW boresight firing mode was the
fact that it eliminated the time required to obtain a radar
lock-on.
Al Radar . (S) The missile firing results reflect the
need for an improved air intercept radar. First, in several
instances a degraded mode was selected over full system mode
because ground return precluded radar lock-on. Sixty-five
firing attempts in this degraded mode (boresight) resulted in*
I
:J
J
n
one hit. Second. 17 percent of the AIM-TE missilss, successfully
fired within envelope, broke lock. |
Han-Machine . (S) The missile firing phase provides, j^everal
man-machine problem areas which are enumerated in the data.
.Personnel errors, such as firing an AIM-7 with the Jgdar
in search, or switches in the head-on mode when firing
f?om ?he targ:et'3 rear, as well as the out-of-envelc^pe
firings revell the need for improved training or simplified
switchclogy. I
• The percentage of r.issiles fired out-of-envelope indicates
a need for additional training and/or an improved in-
envelope indicator.^
•The degree of variation allowed is much less in the^J^ore-
sight mode of firing since the radar does "Ot have juto-
matic tracking and must be- aimed '"o^i'^e^^^^ «rf Ihe
Aircraft maneuvers pull the radar illumination off Jhe.
tarBefwit^the resulting loss of AIM-7 guidance information.
External Stores . (S) In a few events, an AIM-7 missile
could not be launched because of the interference of external
stores. These cases are included in Launch Failures cat|gory.
E. TERMINATION
(U) An examination of the termination phase of thef air-to-
air engagement indicated support for the following R&D p,roblems
identified through the qualitative analyses. I
(S) The most frequent reason for termination — losing
contact with the enemy (32 percent) - supports the neecj; to know
'(U) Although the AIM-7 weapon system indicates ralniraum ,and maxi-
mum rir5nE%anees. the "v""'^-*-°?^»YR-\^^"L are uCnehed'
i-ar.3.««- In c^eneral. v;nen tne IR missiles are launcnea.
n^enveloof i^fcrSafion is'availatle except as estimated by the
n?io? The AI'1.9 system dees no-, indicate proper firirig con-
dlt^oAs except for the tone which signifies that the J^sslle
ha^^ocked on tc so:ne tar.^et and provides no ranre dat|. The
vtl svstem l^n indicate r.axlmurr. and ninimum ranges fo^ the
AT" ATM-^D i'-' the rauar is locked on the target Cwhich is
norusuallf the^a;er:>o^^^ a^ain only for a nominal 1 g
(nonmanc-uverins) target.
1^9
vS,.-.
enemy position and direction information. The termination
occurred because U.S. aircrews were unable to regain contact,
due in part also to lack of visibility and radar search
capability.
(S) The second. most frequent reason for termination —
fuel limits (23 percent) — was caused in part by the necessity
/ of U.S. aircraft to use fuel to make an identification of
friendly aircraft. Therefore, a need for longer range Identifl-
catlcn is indirectly supported by this result.
(S) Two categories of termination which occurred with
small frequency support other of the R&D problems. One case of
termination due to lack of usable ordnance was caused by the
failure of external stores to Jettison. Those terminations due
to SAM defensei directly support the need to extend the capability
for operating in a SAM environment.
Appendix A !
i
I
NORTH VIETNAMESE AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMET^T
NOFORN
THE NORTH V!ETNAAAESE AIR DEFENSE ENVIRONMENT
(C) There have been a number of recent studies* covering
various aspects of the air war in north Vietnam (IJVN) and these
have included a detailed examination of the air defense envi-
ronment. A brief summary of this environment is included to
describe the conditions under which the air-to-air fighters
operated.
(SNP) The NVN air defense system has developed from a rudi-
mentary system in 196^1 to a relatively complex, up-to-date, and
formidable system in 1967. The weapons employed as part of the
air defense system can be classified into three major groups;
(1) ground-based guns, (2) surface-to-air missiles, and (3)
fighter aircraft.
(S) Ground-based guns in NVN range from small arms and
automatic weapons to antiaircraft artillery (AAA) consisting of
light AAA (37mm and 57mm guns) and medium AAA (85mm and 100mm
guns).' Considering the effective range and altitude coverage
capabilities of these weapons, only the light and medium AAA
weapons offer a serious threat to fighter aircraft on CAP mis-
sions. Pertinent characteristics of ground guns are shown in
Table A-1.
^(U) a JCS Air Ooerations Study Group — Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Pa c t o r" A f ''e c t ^' ^'-^ Cc^.bat A.lr Operations and Aircraft Losses in
Southeast AslT lU), ;:ove:aoez> iSbb, TO? 3ECRET/^0r-'0R« .
b. Nir^ht song Study Group - ^cin^ Chiefs of itaf.,
So np;'Study Report (U), Volumes I and II, 30 March 1967. TOP
^^^''^c'^visFG/IDA Studv — Anilvsis oV Combat Aircraft Losses in
So utheast ^Asla (U), IDA Hcoort fi-l^.O, WSiiG Kcport 12d, dacea
April l9bST
r
NOFORN
Table A-1 ($). SUMMARY OF GROUND GUN CHARACTERISTICS* (U)
Weapon
Estimated Maximum
Effective AAA
Range'J (feet)
Practical Rate of
Fire (Rounds per
Minute per Gun)
'I2.7inm heavy
machine gun
3,300
80
14.5mm heavy
machine gun
4,600
150
37mm gun
5.600
13,100^
19.700O
80
57mm aun
{S-60)
70
85mm gun
27,500
15-20
100mm gun
39,000
15
*Data obtained from DIA publication ST-CS-07-2-67- 1 NT . Anti-
Aircraft Gun Sys tems - Eurasian Communist Countries (ur,
TMay 196), SECRET/NOFORii.
^As defined by DIA.
^On-carr1age fire control.
^Off-carriage fire control*
<S) It should be noted that the estimated maximum effec-
tive range shown in Table A-1 is not the absolute maximum dis-
tance the projectile can travel but represents the range within
which the trajectory of the projectile can be predicted with
sufficient certainty to have an appreciable kill probability,
as estimated by DIA.
(SNP) The AAA environment encountered in NVN has been
extremely dense, particularly in portions of Route Package V
and In Route Packages VIA and VI3. Figure A-1 shows the major
areas of concentration of AAA weapons in NVN as of October 196?
The buildup of light and medium AAA guns in NVN Is shown In
Figure A-2. By the end of July 1967, there were over 56OO
134
NOFOUN
TOTAL
37/57mm
85/IOOmfn
ON D|J FMAMJ JA S0ND|J F M A M J J A
1965
1966
1967
3-24-68-9
FIGURE A2 ( 5NF ) . Estimated North Vietnamese Antioircraft Artiller/ Strength
37mra/57mm 'and over 1700 SSmm/lOOnua guns deployed in rJVN. This
great concentration of guns has been largely responsible for
fixing strike force penetration altitudes above 15,000 feet
(particularly during 196? after extensive deployment of on-board
ECM to defeat SAMs), thus influencing the altitudes of the
fighters which are to protect this strike force.
. (S) A major component of the NVN air defense system is rep-
resented by SAI^ls. The SAM system used in NVN is the SA-2 con-
trolled by the PANSONG B radar. A typical active missile site
consists of one PANSONG radar controlling six missile launchers.
Each site is normally assigned 12 missiles; 6 are kept on launch-
ers and 6 are held in reserve on transporters in a nearby hold
area. An acquisition radar is normally stationed near the outer
perimeter of the site and furnishes early warning data.
(S) The capability of the SA-2 system complements those x>f
the various AAA guns. For the altitude banis of interest (1,000-
30,000 feet) the minimum range
for engagement Is approximately
5 n ml and extends out to ap-
proximately 17 n mi. This com-
plements the 100mm gun which
has an estimated maximum effec-
tive range of 39,500 feet (ap-
proximately 6.5 n mi).
(SWF) The SA-2 was initially
used in combat in July 1965.
Since that time, the number of
prepared sites has steadily in-
creased to a level of 235 at the
end of July, as shown in Figure
A-3. These sites are not all
occupied; in fact, he approxi-
mately 25 SAM battalions* move
between these sites on a sched-
uled* (but nonpredictaols ) basis.
In late 1967, there has been a
tendency to concentrate these in the Hanoi-Haiphong area.
Typically 16 to l8 of the 20 most active sites in a given month
have been located within 20 miles of Hanoi. In addition, some
SAM sites have been strategically located near the DMZ and
Route Package V. The concentration and location of SAM sites
has played a definite part in restricting the tactics that were
employed by fighter pilots during MIG encounters.
(SNF) The enemy fighter inventory, consisting of various
versions of the MIG-17 and KIG-21, has remained relatively con-
stant during the past two years, as shown in Figure A-^. Since
early 1967, v;hen Morth Vietnamese airfields were first bombed,
a large part of the MIG-17 inventory has been stationed out of
Alt JULY Oa I JAN *W JUIY 0C1 I JAN Af« JUIV
Vawai •M-HiMOHMtooiMiv
FIGURE A3 (SNF)._ Prepared
SAM Sites in NVN (U)
^(U) One battalion occupies one site.
NOFOKN
137
3-18-68-6
FIGURE A4(SNF). Ml G Order of Bottle (U)
Similarly 50 to 60 percent of the MIQ-21 t--'«
the country. 3lnoe September 1967. A8 dla-
has been moved out of the ooun y
NVN GCI procedure has been observe ^^^^
given in Appendix B. - ■
«T «r 1-he air defense system.
138
of AAA, SAMs, and MIGs In an Integrated fashion. This repre-
sents a significant change from the early days of the air war
when presence of MIGs v/ould indicate an absence of SAMs and
vice versa. U.S. aircraft are faced with SAr4 and AAA defenses
as soon as they penetrate the coast line from the east or cross
the Red River from the west, indicating coordination between
radar surveillance and weapon system selection and command.
Furthermore, MIG interceptors contact U.S. aircraft during
cloudy as well as clear weather and approach in a manner Indic-
ative of radar-initiated Intercept.
(S) The Radar Order of Battle (ROB) in NVN consists of a
diversified surveillance-radar net and weapon-control radars.
The surveillance net is employed for early warning, tracking,
and the control of interceptor aircraft. The weapon control
radars control the operation of AAA and SAM batteries. As of
early August 1967, over ^00 radar sets have been identified^ In
NVN Including over 200 early warning/GCI radars, 175 AAA fire
control raddrs, and approximately 25 PANSONG B missile control
radars. The early warning coverage and EV//GCI radar locations
are shown in. Figure A-5. Locations^ of AAA and missile fire
control radars are shown in Figures A-6 and A-7. The figures
point out the heavy concentration of weapon-control radars in
the Hanoi-Haiphong target complex. The radar deployment. In
terms of number of equipments and wide frequency diversity, is
particularly impressive.
(S) In a concurrent IDA/WSEG study, ^ the U.S. electronic
countermeasures (ECM) effort in N\'N has been analyzed. ECM is
extensively employed by the U.S. to degrade the effectiveness
of the NVN radar surveillance net and weapon control radars.
^(U) Source: Defense Intelligence Agency, 26 July 1967.
^(U) These are locations on a particular date (9 August 1967)
and vary with time.
\u) Op.cit.
1^0
FIGURE A5 (S). Rcdar inventor/ North Viotnom (U)
u
0
0
e
0 ;
G i
0
0:
S:J
O'
0
0, j
0
n I
0-
NOFORN
ECH operations i. NVN are of two types: standoff Jamming and
self-protectlHG Ja:-.ins. Standoff Jam.alne, using special-
purpose aircraft (e.c. EB-66. EA-3B. and EA-IP) in orbits out-
Side of the hleh threat zone, is directed at the air
environment and is intended to protect penetrating U.S. forces
by denying the ener.y efficient use of his radar sensors. Self-
protective jan..mlng. on the other hand, is carried on board the
penetrator and is designed to protect the penctrator against
the terminal defenses, i.e.. the SAI* and radar controlled AAA.
(5) It was concluded in the referenced study that although
jamming can prevent successful tracking of flights
radars, the combined radar net is generally capable of maintain
• ing an accurate trac. of penetrating fli^.ts. Thus successful
GCI operations are well within the capability of the NVN air
defense system, as evidenced by typical MIG approach profiles.
These profiles are described in the MIG tactics section.
(SNP) Typical NW reaction' to th. U.S. standoff Jamming
eff rt was to concentrate radar activities in bands not Jammed
at a particular time; also they frequently changed frequencies
In order to evade the Jamming. An effective ECCM employed by
HVN was the activation of two BAR LOCK radars, one near Ha p hong
With early warning coverage well out over '^J j;^"
/ and one in the western part of Route Package V with EW/GCI
Toterage at least 90 n mi Into Laos. This effectively covered
refueung tracks and Yankee Station. This action may have
reflected an NVN evaluation of:
« r^T>PP•^se Ions-range early warning and
• Tu^v^nilnce Lrability ?° t:-ir air defense system.
. The effectiveness of Ea-66 standoff Jamming against
the lower frequency raoars,
, *-i,„> Invulnerability of the high-powered
• ritlbet^TAR'SocHIdar to^ide-lobe Jamming.
li
a
Q
Q
0
Q
Q
8
0
0
Q
8
B
0
0
.,.n>lo. ««• BAH LOCK/BIO 0»» typ« «' ■■•■'=>■ " ••"•••>"' "
.p,™xl.»t.l, 8 h~r= » M=o~ op.mion.l Ti.r -o.-
i„, on .It,. Th. t™cl.-».m.d »«CE rMu-, "M«» W
„ . e» tlU.r, b. lut in »,«P.tlO« 1» .W" 1» -l"""-
-^t rmmtries , Vol. II, DIA
hu\ RoHar. f ^t>.^^k^^;. ) --^-..>-o q-t iin Corrjiup. i 3 1 Countries, '.o
ilLllTm. ST-HB:ot,:ol-6o June 196.. SECRbT.
Its
UNGLASS:ri£D
Appendix B
AIRCRAFT AND ORDNANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
(U) The purpose of this appendix Is to describe the varl
ous air-to-air weapons used during the study period. The
description of ordnance types is not meant to be exhaustive;
however, those operating characteristics which are pertinent t
the analysis are briefly covered. The general characteristics
of the aircraft types most commonly involved in air-to-air
combat are also given.
II. GUN SYSTEMS
(U) The characteristics of the various gun systems
employed in the air-to-air battles in Southeast Asia are pre-
sented 3n Table B-1, for both U.S. and enemy.
(S) The weight shown for each gun is the- individual weapon
weight and is not that of the total installation. 3y a compari-
son of the firing rate and the number of rounds carried, it is
evident that the F-^l gun systems have potentially twice the fir-
ing time as that of enemy gun systems,
■ (S) The M-61, when employed in the P-^*C and F-UD aircraft,
Is carried externally in a pod. This installation is called the
SUU-16/A or SUU-23, with the major difference being that the
SUU-23 pod uses internal aircraft power instead of a ram air
turbine. The maximum effective range for all of the guns is
about 3000 feet.
(S) For proper aiming of the gun systems, particularly at
the longer ranges (>1000 feet) a signt is necessary to direct
Table B-1 (S). GUN SYSTEM (U)
Cun Systen
Gun
Weight
lbs
Muzzle
Velocity
Ft/Sec
Firing
Rate
Rounds
per
Hinute
Installation
Aircraft
Type
Kk-12
zona
101
3200
1000
F-8
F-105
N-61
20ra
2(0
3200
6000
F-4C
F>4D
23nn
B3
2250
800
HIG-17
37ffln
232
22S0
400
HIG-17
HR«30
30ma
1S1
3200
700
H1G-2K
Nunber
of Guns
Rounds
per 'Gun
100
1029
II
1200
I!
1200
I.
80
|l
40
80
Mhe MI6*17 cirrles both guns stnuUaneously.
the aimpoint In order to compensate for the bullet flight p^th.
However, several seconds (2-3) are necessary for the sight com-
putations to be conducted and smooth tracking of the target lis
required for this time period. The gun firing delay Is short,
however. The response time of the SUU-16 pod, from trigger,
pull until the first round has left the barrel is 0.2 second.
Within 0.^ second the gun has achieved full firing rate.
(S) The F~^C was initially armed with the M-6l cannon
air-to-air use in May 1967, installed externally as the SUU;jjl6/A
gun pod. However, a lead-computing sight was not available
for target tracking. The F-^ID, when armed with the M-61,
utilizes the SUU-23 pod and Is equipped with a computing sight.
(S) All F-8s are armed with the Mk-12 cannon system and
all F-105 aircraft carry an Internally mounted M-61 cannon.!
Both aircraft have a computing sight. The F-8 sight, however,
computes insufficient lead over 3s.
for
150
I.
III. AIR -TO-AIR MISSILES
(S) The major characteristics of the missile ordnance
that has teen employe, in S.A are siven in Tahle ^-^^ -
sue Side vieus are shown to the same scale. Some additional
pertinent characteristics of each missile type are discussed
below.
A. SPARROW AIM-7D AND E
(S) T^e AIM-7 SPARROW was the only 0.5. radar guided mls-
.iie s!d. and it existed in two ma,or variants and
AIM-TE. both Of Which were carried by the ^-^^'^l'';'' 'J^;
v,as the earlier variant used until ear y 6'
Which "it was retired from conbat use. The major difference
be ween the D and E model, was that the AIM-7D could only be
f!red at targets for which the closing velocity was greater than
t e bo:t 150 .nots). while that of the AIM-7E is minus
300 Knots (i.e.. opening). In addition, the AI.WD generally
had less maximum ran.^e than the AIM-7E.
(S) Because it experienced a much greater number of combat
firings, than the AIH-7D. the remaining discussion "J"
fined to the AIH-7E. Since the AIM-7 employs a semiactive guld-
sy t the target must bo illuminated by the -dar antenna
Tf the attac.in. aircraft until missile intercep . ^° -^"^^^
radar illumination the aircraft must be pointed o within 0
IL target If the missile is fired when the. radar is in the
ore— (antenna caged> to the aircraft centerline) then
the llunch aircraft must be pointed exactly at the target.
\u) AliEneci and fixed
Table B2 (S). MISSILE ORDNANCE (U)
nANfOIlM
CUIt>ANC(
lYK
WtlGHF
CM
WAKHEAO
WIICHT
(UOIUS OF tool
FUZE
I-
MM-7D SPA.WOW
SEMI-AOIVC
RADAR
402
AS l> ROD/MR
ROX AND
CONTACT
MM-7E SfMKOW
SEMI -ACTIVE
4M
71 lIROO/aSfT
1
KOXAND
CONTACT
i
AIM-«ft SIOEWINOER
■ ^
IR
164
2SUtLAST
FRAG
nOXAND
COMPACT
AlM-90 SIOEWINOW
t*
lU
2SlltOe/17PT
1
PROX AND
CONTAO
AIM-40 FALCON
»
134
7uiusr
CONTACT
O^N>V
ATOU aa: (USSS)
B >
IR
140
HASf FIAO
FVOX AND
CONTACT
AUCAU AAI (USttt
^'^^^ K>
^
tCAM IIMR
IBO
U.U
FROX AND
CONTACT
(S) The AIM-7E has the following sequence of ever degrad-
ing modes of operation.
• (1) The first Is full system lock where botii range
and angle tracUinc of the target are provided to the
missile as well as closing velocity. In this case,
if interlocks are "In" the missile cannot be fired
unless the launch paranieters satisfy computed firing
envelop3s.
•(2) This mode is the same as Mo. 1 except Interlocks
are "out;" that is, the missile may be fired at any
time, even though the system docs not indicate that
the proper Ir.unch conditions have been satisfied
(launch within computed paraTietcrs and aim-dot within
allowable steering error circle).
(S) In all remaining modes, the system operates as If the
Interlocks were "out."
(S) Modes 3, *l and 5 are categorized as boreslght firings.
In these, the radar antenna Is caged to the centerllne of the
aircraft and Illumination to the target is provided by the pilot
sighting on the target with a fixed pipper. The radar antenna
is then pointed at the target.
• (3) A system lock may be achieved under boresight con-
ditions so that while angle track is not being pro- .
vided (the antenna remains caged) closing velocity and
range can be fed to the missile.
• (^) Boresight firing can be accomplished with the
target aspect switch (when it is Installed). In this
type of firing, although the missile does not receive
the true closing velocity and range information, the
target aspect sv/itch permits a false closing velocity
to be fed to the missile and the missile speed gate
will then search for the target return over a narrow
band about the input closing velocity.
•(5) Boresight launch with missile speed gate in wide
sweep. . This means that .the missile speed gate is
sweeping over the entire spectrum of possible target
return. This was the most frequent mode of boresight
firing during the study period.
• <6) Launch of the missile v/hile the radar in the
search mode. In this situation, 'the missile is
launched v;hiie the radar is in its normal search
pattern; that is, sweeping back and forth. This Is
Is purely a ballistic rocket.
(S) While boresisht firings were not successful, the use
of the radar antenna caged in boresight to achieve acquisition .
and lock was extremely useful in combat. With the antenna caged
in boresight. the target return appeared on the scope in a pye-
dlctable manner- (particularly in a maneuvering environment) , :
therefore enhancing acquisition.
(S) In some of the late model P-Hs automatic switching,
has been provided to go from boresight to full system, and in
this situation, upon achieving a locK onto the target the ^
radar locked in the boresight mode, the system will automatically
switch to a full track. On the F-1 models covered during the
period of the RED BARON study, this automatic feature was no^t
available and a switch had to be activated by the backseater^ In
order to go from the boresight lock on to a full system sltna-
tion; that is. go from either modes 3. «• or 5 to either 1 or 2.
Frequently, during this operation, the system would break lock.
(S) AH air-to-air combat Is predicated on actions an^
reactions which are dependent on the enemy actions. In a maneu-
vering situation the only method of determining enemy actions
was visual. This is true for the employment of all weapons
under discussion and the crew of the launching aircraft Is 1^
likely to experience considerable difficulty keerlng the target
in sight during hard maneuvering close-in combat. This is
specifically mentioned in the case of the AIH-7 to emphasize
that although there can be radar Inputs, visual contact muS;t
still be maintained. Also, if the radar gimbal angles were
exceeded, visual contact was necessary for reacquisitlon.
(S) A problem experienced by the AIM-7 is that the AN/APA-
157 computer only gives the proper firing solution for targets
under nominal 1 s niz^l. Therefore, against maneuvering
targets, the computed launch envelopes are not an accurate
AIM 7E SPARROV/
TARGET VELOCITY, MACH 0.9
UUNCH VELOCITY, MACH 0.9
ALTITUDE, SEA LEVEL
3g TAftCn 7 US N TO LEFT
3-20-68-2
TARGET CENTERED
COORDINATES
FIGURE Bl (S). AIM 7E Missile Lounch Envelope (U)
indication of whether or not the aircraft has achieved satis-
factory launch conditions. Figure B-1 gives an AIM-7E launch
envelope* The envelope is shown in target centered coordinates
and Is for a cospeed attack at sea level against a target
T—
(U) Tne ]aunch envelopoc shov.n are the kinematic launch bound-
aries and ar.sume that the nissile has been launched under
specified Initial conditions (vclocit;;, altitude, rancre and
bearing from the tarj;et). The boundary so defined represents
those conditions wherein an Interccct is possible. Joint USU/
USAF ?ro.:o'^t for Invo.icl ^gt j or. of ^tm- - ^ yip3 j i es A ^-n TTvit
Mane^rvorinv: Tarr et. rinii Heport 0/V n'i, , COMO PTEVrXK ' 39 30-0/^'-
^9 Ser 00101, 1 Au^^ust 1966, ZliCR-iT.
turnlnc at 3 g. The area represented gives the permissible
azimuth-range combination for launching the missile.
.(S) The minimum range for the AIM-7E Is a complex inter-
action of the time to arm and the satisfaction of certain guid-
ance inputs. The AIM-7 missile is the only one which does not
have a lock before launch. The missile speed gate must be locked
on the target for at least two seconds before the fuze is enabled
lock can occur about one second after launch. Therefore, about
three seconds are required after launch for proper fuze activa-
tion. A better consideration of the minimum range would be the
total time from system lock on (when the attack display appears
on the scope) until the missile Is completely armed. About four
seconds are required after the attack presentation appears before
all information has been fed to the missile. Trigger squeeze
before that time has elapsed can mean that the missile will not
achieve proper guidance. Prom the time that the trigger is
squeezed, about 1.25 seconds elapses before the missile leaves
the aircraft. Therefore, from attack presentation to missile
launch can take as much as five seconds. This delay, of course.
Is not normally included in the launch envelope presentation.
However, since the times involved are relatively long at nominal
closing velocities, the minimum range can be significantly
altered by the Inclusion of these time delays. These delays
were excessive for some of the situations which developed in
the air-to-air ctmbat in Southeast Asia.
(S) When fired in the boresight mode, the required four
second time delay between lock and trigger squeeze is not present
(since no lock is achieved). However, in this mode the missile
speed g.ite searches for the target return over the entfre range
of closing velocities. Therefore, the missile requires a longer
time in which to achieve a lock. Because of the additional time
it takes to search for the target, and the fact that due to the
frequency of ground return, the missile will frequently lock on
to this instead of the target return, the boresight mode firings
have severe limitations. '
B. SIDEWINDER AIM-9B
(S) The AIM-9B is an Infrared (IR) homing missile. It
was used by the USAP on the F-^IC aircraf t in addition to the
AIM-7 armament. Until December I966 it was sporadically carried
on F-105 aircraft. After that date, It v/as standard practice to
carry some in each flight. The USN uses AIM-9B on both the F-AB
and P-8 aircraft.
(S) This infrared missile uses a simple aiming system and
is sighted by the pilot throuGh a fixed pipper. There is some
latitude of aiming error since the field of view of this missile
is 2.5° and the seeker is caged to the missile centerline. Due
to the pointing requirement, the launch aircraft must fly a
pursuit course at firing. This, coupled with an IR seeker,
requires a stern quarter attack. V/hen locked on to the teu?get,
an audio tone is received by the pilot. The tone, however, is
not indicative of the missile launch envelope.
(S) The missile leaves the launch rails about one second
after- trigger squeeze and the" trigger must remain depressed
throughout this entire time.
(S) Due to the size of the launch envelope (restricted in
part by the 25* half angle gimbal limit of the seeker) severe
launch restrictions are present against maneuvering targets.
Because the launch envelope for the AIN-9B is roughly a cone
extending from the tail of the target, the envelope swings to
the outside of the target's turn as it maneuvers. If the target
maneuvers strenuously, the launch envelope may disappear com-
pletely. It should be noted that in aerial combat to be on the
outside of a turn is unfavorable to the attacker.
(S) A launch envelope for the AIM-9B against a 3 g target
is shown in Figure B-2.^ The minimum range is due to the safety
*(U) NAVAIRSYSCOM, "Air-Launched Missile Bulletin 32, Attach-
ment 1," 7 October 1?C6, 3ECHET.
FIGURE B2 (S). AIM 9B Missile Lounch Envelope (U)
and arm, and the proximity fuze does not arm until motor burn
out (two seconds after launch). The seeker of the AIM-9B detects
IR radiation in the 1.8-2.7 micron oand and therefore can
receive unwanted IR radiation from the clouds and ground.
C. SIDEWINDER AIM-9D
i.
(S) The AIM-9D is a much different missile than the AIM-9B,
although they both use IR homing for guidance. The AIR-9D has
a greatly enlarged launch envelope and performance capability,
as well as a different v/arhead. The IR seeker is cooled fori
added sensitivity, and senses IR radiation in the 2.7-3.7
micron band. The gimbal limits of the seeker have been in- i -
creased to 40 degrees. '
hjii^}^
FIGURE B3 (S). AIM 9D Missile Launch Envelope (U)
(S) The launch sequence is similar to the AIM-9B vjith an
audio tone indicative of the missile lock onto a target. Due
to the sensitivity of the seeker, hov;ever, there is some launch
capability from all aspects of the target if the target is emit-
ting sufficient IR radiation.
(S) An approximate launch envelope against a 3 g target
is shovm in Figure While a considerable head-on inter-
cept capability is shown, this assumes a suitable IR source,
which may not be available' against some types of targets.
\u) ::OTS, "AIM-'lD/AIM-93 Cc.r.p arisen Kc-port," August 196^1,
(S) The AIM-9D Is only used by the USN and Is carried on
both F-i*B and F-8 aircraft.
D.. FALCON AIM-4D
(S) The AIM-ilD was introduced into the theater with the
arrival of F-^D aircraft in June 1967. Although it is an fR
homing missile, its operation is more complex than that ofi the
SIDEWINDER.
(S) The optimum launch situation is in conjunction with a
radar lock on the target. In this case the missile IR see|cer
is slaved to^ the AI radar (unlike that of the SIDEWINDER which
is caged in boresight), and the missile can then be fired f*lth
lead as computed by the fire control system. In general, jthe
rapidly changing combat situation precludes this mode of '
operation.
(S) Firing with lead but without radar lock can be a,ccom-
plished by uncaging the missile IR seeker and allowing It to
track the target. This mode of firing requires locking on! to
the target with the missile seeker caged, and then verifying
lock on by a change of audio tone as the trigger is squeezed.
Once the lock is verified, the seeker can be uncaged and lead
pulled as estimated by the pilot. Even this mode had limited
utility in the SEA combat environment experienced over the: period
of .the study. i
(S) The missile can also be fired much like the SIDE-
WINDER, with the seeker caged on the aircraft on a pure pursuit
course-. However, since the missile is not fired with lead, the
performance envelope shrinks .
(S) Figure B-H^ shows launch envelopes for the AIM-ilD both
with and without lead against a maneuvering target. The larger
*(U) Unpublished oerformance curve from Analytic Services,; Inc.,
June 1967, SECRET.
160
FIGURE B4 (S). AIM 4D Missile Lcunch Envelope (U)
envelope is for firing vfith proper lead while the smaller two
areas at the nose and tail of the target represent the launch
envelope when the missile is fired with minimum lead. The mis-
sile arms when motor burn out occurs after 1.^1 second of flight.
Also, full guidance does not occur until that time. The AIM-^D
has no proxip.ity fuze and therefore must hit the target to
detonate the warhead.
(S) The IR seeker of the AIM-^D is cooled and is sensitive
in the 3.8-5,M micron band. The seeker has a field of view of
6. 5. degrees and gii^-bal limits of kB degrees.
(G) The AIM-'ID suffers from an operational restriction
due to the limited amount of coolant available to any missile.
The coolant flow Is continuous and, once activated, cannot be
stopped. The AIM-^ID requires three seconds to be brought Ito
ready state from total quiesence. It then can be fired In, an
additional one second, during a succeeding two-minute Interval.
Once the two-minute period Is exceeded, the missile is I
effectively dead.
IV. ENEMV MISSILES
(S) MIG aircraft have been observed firing missiles,
unguided rockets and guns. Doth MIG-17 and MIG-21 aircraft
have fired missiles although it was not possible to determine
the missile type in all cases. Air-to-air rockets, carried in
external pods, have been fired by both MIG-17 and MIG-21
' aircraft.
(S) The enemy missile types observed over the period of
the study were:
•AA-1 ALKALAI - radar beam rider
•AA-2 ATOLL - IR homing
(S) The AA-1 ALKALAI launch envelope is shown in Figure
The launch envelope of the AA-2 ATOLL is similar to that
of -the AIM-9B since the ATOLL is a direct copy of that missile.
V. AIRCRAFT
is) The major aircraft types involved in SEA air-to-air
combat are shown in Figures B-6 and B-7. The .drawings are to
scale. There are several variants of each type, but their
external configurations are almost identical. The most obvious
external difference is that displayed between the various FISH-
BED C (or E) and FISHBED D since the latter is equipped with a
large centerbody in the intake, housing AI radar, v/hich enlarges
the fuselage nose.
^(U) USAP Foreign Technology Division, "FRESCO (r.:iG-17) Weaoons
System," FTD-CS-09-5-67 . 13 July I967. SKCRET. ^^eapons
FIGURE B5 (S). ALKALAl Missile Lgunch Envelope (U)
(U) The figures also show the following characteristics:
•Maximum gross weight (pounds)
• Normal air-to-air ordnance carried (less frequently
carried, additions in parentheses)
• Maximum Mach at altitude
• Maximuin velocity at sea level (knots)
•Ratio of maximum sea level static thrust to combat
weight (T/W)
• Ratio of combat weight to wing area (W/S)
(S) The P-i* exists In three major variants, the F-^IB, used
by the USN, and the F-^IC and D used by the USAP. The P-^IB has a
slightly different radar and the backseat, unlike that of; the
P-IC and D, is not configured with flight controls.
U.S. F-I05D
GROSS WEIGHT AIR TO AIR
ORDNANCE
29675
NVN MIG-21
FISHBED
16300
NVN MIG-17
FRESCO
3-26-68-19
1 SIDEWINDER
1029 ROUNDS
4 AIM-9
4 AlM-7
(SUU-16 POD, 1200 ROUNDS)
2 AIM-9
400 ROUNDS
2 ATOU
. 123 ROUNDS
200 ROUNDS
(2 ATOLL)
FIGURE B6 (S). Aircraft Characteristics (U )
U.S. F-105D
MAXMACHATALT COMBAT
MAX SL VELOCITY
2.1/no
U.S. F-4
2.15/710
U.S. F-8
1.7/651
.745 92.5
7,
.79 81
/
urn- —
.69 69
NVN
MIG-21 .
2.0/595
NVN
MlG-17
FRESCO
.97/574
.88 58
.64 44
3*26-68-20
FIGURE B7 (S). Aircraft Characteristics (U)
(S) The majority of F-105 aircraft involved with MIGs
were the P-105D. The other variant vxas the two-seat P-105P>
configured to locate SAM sites.
(S) During the early period of the war (1965), USAF F-M
aircraft were painted with light grey tops and white bottoms.
The F-105 aircraft were silver. By 1966, however, all USAF
fighters were camouflaged with tan and two shades of green
on upper surfaces and white underneath. Except for a few air-
craft which were camouflaged for only a short period of time,
all USN aircraft exhibited the standard grey color on upper
surfaces and white underneath.
(S) MIG-17 aircraft were initially either silver or a
dull grey except for a few Isolated contacts which were painted
odd colors. Later in the war the MI0-17s were encountered with
camouflage paint schemes. The MIG-21S, except for a few rare
cases, have been silver, either natural or painted.
I, INTRODUCTION
(U) This appendix is Included:
•To afford perspective as to the precision, limitations,
and usefulness of the data used in the project; and
•To document the somev;hat unique experience of the RED
BAROM Project, for its value to ether projects in the
future .
(U) The appendix contains a description of the rationale
and nethodology used in defining and acquiring the needed data
and t-rxnlains, in detail, the data collection techniques, v/hich
involved primarily the interviev/ing of air combat participants.
II. BACKGROUND - GOALS AND LIMITATIONS
(C) In nursuit of the basic task, which v/as to "analyze
air-to-air encounters...," the goal formulated for the data
definition/collection effort was to obtain sufficient data to
en.ible reconrir. ruction of the encounters in appropriate detail
with maximum, accuracy and completeness.
(C) The scope and detail of the necessafy data were not
simoly defined, for they had to meet the needs of the R&D
community, and yet recognl::e the limitations of the available
data. The rrir.ary limitation had to do, of course, v;ith hum.^n
ability to ."ensc and recall. There v/ere no real-time recording
devices in U.;".. aircraft, and therefore, v;ith fev; exceptions
(such as taped comnuni cations and photographs), all data had
to be recalled by participants and observers.
(C) There was also the question of adequacy for project
use of the data reported from Southeast Asia via the standard
reporting system. By September 1966, when the RED BARON Pro-
ject was organized, ' ;EG/IDA had accumulated some significant
experience with regard to the SEA air war and its R&D aspects.
Field Representatives, both military and civilian, had been
carrying out detailed R&D-oriented studies in the combat the-
ater for more than a year. They had dealt at length with
all levels of command from CINCPAC down to the smallest oper-
ating unit* Various study documents on :he air war had been
published and other studies were being conducted.* Important
points which stood out in these documents and which were- clear
in the minds of the Field Representatives had to do with the
Inadequacy for R&D purposes of combat data being reported
through the standard reporting systems. Indeed, data Inadequacy
provided the need for existence of Field Representatives.
(C) Most of the combat reporting systems, and appropri-
ately so, were' operationally rather than R&D oriented and did
not have the detail or completeness needed by the R&D community.
The few R&D-dlrected reports were generally incomplete, and
there were alv;ays events which, due to the press of the
situation in the combat theater, v;ere never reported at all,
or were reported inaccurately. The tremendous reporting burden
already imposed upon the operating forces and the existing
orientation of reporting personnel precluded meaningful emphasis
on the initiation of reports of real value to the R&D scientists.
^(U) Published v/ere: V/5EG Keport 90, Prelinlni.'ry Analysis of Com-
bat Air Qperatlc ns in Southeast Asia (U) , TOP SHCHiT, Nov.
1965 ; V.'Sii Q Heport lOi, Heculret.'cnus of Dv'fcp.se R&D Agencies
for Data fron Ccr tii^z Air Oper at: icns ir _S o u ^heast Asia ( U) ,
SECRET, Aug. i9£fc, '■■.'SiiG He-rof:; 103 > Int:erdicr ion of the Ko
Chi M mh Tr^.:i (U) SECRET riOFORH, Auf^. 19co; numerous and
various staiT s":v.dies a£soclat<?d with l-hese reports. In prep-
aration was viSZQ Keport 109, Analysis of Combat Air Losse ^^
in Southea st Aoia (U}, SECRET, Feb. i9oY, and related Staff
Studi'.-o nctatly 153, 13^, and 135.
Hi. APPROACH
Data Definition
(U) To determine what constituted a meaningful reconstruc-
tion of an air-to-air encounter, the project conducted extensive
study and v/ide liaison v/ith that part of the R&D community
concerned with components of the fighter v;eapons, including
commercial contractors and government laboratories. Appropri-
ate major contractors were invited to WSEG/IDA to brief the Pro-
ject on their current and future activities as- well as on their
Droblems In obtaining combat data for their studies. Also,
visits v;ere made by the Project members to various government
and contractors' installations. The government and government-
associated R&D installations visited included MADC, Johnsvllle;
NOL, Corona; N'CTS, China Lake; RAND Corporation; APL, The Johns
Hopkins University.
(U) Various military commands were visited In the process
of defining data needs and to further the Project's education
in air-to-air combat, including in the continental United
States - Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, USAF Air Staff
Naval Air Systems Command; USAF Systems Command; COMNAVAIRPAC ;
COMFAIRI-IIRAMAR; USAF Tactical Fighter V/eapons Center, Nellls
Air Force Base.
(U) From this data-definition program evolved a detailed
list of data needs of the R5D community which the Project wanted
to fill in reconstructing an air.-to-air encounter. These data
items are reproduced as Table C-1. It should be emphasized that
they did not form the basis for a questionnaire or any such
rigid device for data collection. The Items v;ere, rather, a
checklist for the ccr.p]otC!iess of the data.
Table C-1 (U). GUIDELINE FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF AN
AIR-TO-AIR ENCOUNTER (U)
OVERALL HISSXOH
1. Location and Identification of support aircraft, surface
craft.
it Loeatlcn and id<»nttflcatlon of other nlsslon aircraft.
3. Arr.iiRPnt carried.
*, External store ccnriguratlon, Including tanks, pylons.
5. Number of rounds of machine- gun arr^unltlon.
6. Nlsslon plan, purpose, route.
7. ECK equlpssnt on tsird (er.erglsed) .
8. Checkouts perfarred en w««pona ayscerra and equipment
prior to take-off with reaulta.
■9. Take-off tlr-.-.
10. Tines of planned events.
11. Canouflage on aircraft.
PRIOR TO ENGACE>2:.T
, 1. Veather, enroute and on ..tat ion.
2* Equlpnent malfuneticns prior to cnfaj:enent.
' 3* Readiness eonditlcn of weapons systers (warn-up, etc.).
1. Deviations fror. r.ls^lon plan. Reasons for deviation.
5< Inbound refuellr.g.
6. Radar scale and search pattern.
7. Coir.T.unlcatlon frcsi/to ot:i«r aircraft or surface craft. '
8. Aircraft flight condition (aitltu<ie, ^:ach» maneuvers,
attitudes , etc. ).
9. Active avionics equipsent used (e.g., radar, TACAN, etc. I.
IMITIATION OF EKGACZl'^llT
(Detection, Th.-eat Evaluation and identification}
1. Wanner of enEageT.ent initiation. Including which crew
Denber trade first «l?:n^lns;,
2. Location of er:?airen^^?r.t , and point In r;ls8lon.
3. Nurier of er.er.y loentlfled Initially and their forr.atlon.
k. Position of eacn frier.dly aircraft ai tine of detection.
9. Relative position af each enemy aircraft vlth respect zo
U.S. aircraft iiarret ar?le, elevation, et5.).
6. Apparent ground concrcl of eneiry and signs indicating.
7. Course, altitude, speed a.nd range of eac.^ contact.
8. Initial plan of action and why undertaken.
9. Fuel state.
10. Artr.a.Tent load.
11. Jettison of stores.
12. Other aircraft directed under the plan.
13' Ranse of Initial zar.x.ict, and aids used, (radar or visual}.
Range scale of rsiar.
1<I. Range of initial Uentlflcatlon.
15* Any IFF assistance In Ident If Icatlcr .
16. Assistance fron surface forces, support aircraft throughout
engagcT.ent.
Initial ra^ar contact (slghtinf at rAxlmua range of equipment
or at sor.e shorter range),
18. Method of positive identification, recognition problens. and'
eaeouflage.
19. Rules of er.gager.ent (e.g., ID requirements) and any effect
on tactics.
20. Enersy detection of U.S. aircraft, and range of detection,
21. Keasure used to estlrate relative speed or absolute speed
of tarj:et (radar, :r other).
22. Coir,-.unl cat. lens a.-.-r.? pilot, HIO, ar.d ether aircraft.
23' Attention of ta':>:s-a?er (looking outside, at scope).
2'!. Electronic wamlr.r,
25' Effect or early vimlng on engagenent.
26. En<»rjy tactics.
27. KIC wanilnc;, if received, and fror. wh.OB.
28. Descrlpilor of er.or.y aircraft type(s):
Kodcl (e.g., y.-.i'.rT?. £).
Exterr.al sto:'" ;onrifl;uraticn.
Amapent, r.lsslles, (nuT.cer, type, losatlcn, alr^to-alr
rocket p'.ds). L;c3tl:n cn
A ii-u »M^9t Description of vehicle <Biarielng3, configuration).
«"ii-«a-/i 1 1 01 7) Afterburner operation.
0
Q
i7.
17^
0
Q
Q
0
D
0
Q
C
0
D
0,
ii
0
Table C-1 (U). (Continued)
KANEUVEK TO FIRE WEAPONS
1. TlBw, place, and ranRc or lock-on (continuous and Interrupted)
2, Declslcn to attack or not to attack.
3> Support provide by other air or aurfaee sources*
4. Plan an<: Inter.ted taetlss.
5. Effect of weather cn 'actlca.
6. Eneny tattle and r.ar.euvers .
7. Uae of r.'Jtual support p^slil^" of winRsan.
8. Relative pos'tien, sic:/ ?oc!e bearing of eneisy aircraft
and r.elN3d cf d-terr.lrln^ dlstancea f.-aiar, visual).
9. Changes in aircraft store condition (itores» tank,
configuration] .
10. Description of cineuvers for each aircraft.
11. Haeh nurber ( Indicated) atteicpted and held.
12. "C" :^-vils t.llcl J^rlr.? r.:_-:i:uv.TS . criiililo poner
liriltstlor.3) r-jritlcn cf -.-r.ciiver. (S-jf feting) .
13. Altitudes during the ra.'.L-uvera .
14. Use of afterturner. (Juration, adequacy of AB eodulatlon
control) .
15. Firing by ener.y (type and hits).
1$. Chances in r:3ne'jvering (e.g., nole in tall).
17. Backse^ter z^slscance.
18. Effect on cnscy of no SCI control.
19. Attenpta to ret Into flrlns envelope.
EXPEMDIT'JRE OP ORDHAHCE
1. First flrlnfi (U.S, or enerry).
2. Ordnance expended {U.3. e:;e:^y>, range, attitude, target angle
"b"3, TiT.euver Involved at tiza of flrlns, weapon closest point of approach.
3. Firing cnvelcpe (reaay llc^t on nisslle, position in
envelope) .
1. Airspeed (ln;ilC3ted .Vic^:) and position of each aircraft.
5. freflrlr.s :J:eci<9 corviete.
6. Duration if trigger i-^v-,
7. Counterre\.v,;r9S used f^y ener.y anrf u.3.> against firing.
8. Cessation ;f rirlng, pian of flrln?.
9. Direction of the attack (ty vhom).
10. Coanunlcatlcn arottg oa^^cseater, pilot, and other aircraft,
and eorxiunleaclon procler.s.
11. Hits on enery (where? w«5h what?).
12. Gun al-lr.g (Cli gunsli^c give proper lead?)
13- Visual loss of target d'-irins £un act up.
lU. Weapons perforr.ance (Did w-acon zulds? - Vaa there a look-on?
How long befcre flrln? was lock-on obtained? Old weather
degrade anv weapon sys^er.7).
15. SID£WIN:^P. tone at firing.
16. Duration of .-un burst,
17. Equlprent or weapons nalfunctlons .
IB. Action* of eneir.y aircraft after hit/fire, what color,
s'^oke. cxpioslonz. pieces ieavine aircraft, pilot eject,
■ damaee ir.echanisr!? ) .
19 > Conflrraticn of kill.
TERMINATICtJ OF EN'CAGir^ENT
(Egress and postfllg-nt inspection}
1. Termination of enragerent (ef.*r.y, friendly).
2. Reason for t'>rr.lr.a^lcn : dl!»n;-:iscr.ent) .
3. Initial nisslcn 2c:o-.pil:r.r.Ent .
4. Fuel state at cn-i of enparercnt.
5. Location at end of engagement.
6. Location of oth^r airaraft in the area.
7. Aircraft conrir.:ratlcn a: end (weaptr.s regaining, store).
8. Nur.ber of raunds left,
9. Heider.tlflcatlon of flight.
10, PostrilG->t :heck3 perforr^d, and status of systet&s.
-66-2\ (2 or 2)
Data Collection
(C) The very detailed information which the Project
wished to collect and the shortcomings of the standard report-
ing systems, necessitated some unique data collection effort.
In addition to all possible documentation on air-to-air encoun-
ters j It was determined that the primary source of data for
the Project would be those individuals themselves Involved in
alr-to-alr events. The Project determined to actively Inter-
view those participants and obtain firsthand accounts by which
to reconstruct the mission in detail.
(C) The Data Collection Program then involved several
interrelated procedures:
•Identification of air-to-air encounters and the
'participants.
•Continuing definition of specific data needs and
resolution of needs with the limitations in acquiring
data.
•Collection of appropriate documentary Information on
Southeast Asia air-to-air encounters.
•Development of optimum interview techniques.
•Location of participants and arrangements for inter-
vlev/lng them.
These operations were not necessarily sequential and they were
continued throughout the Data Collection Phase.
(C) Encounters v;ere identified through a search of exist-
ing documentation, various formally and informally maintained
"box scores" and other files, and early information was gained
from the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the USA?
Air Staff. Additional basic documentation came from the USAP
Tactical Fighter V/eapons Center, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACA?, CQM-
NAVAIHPAC, and the Commander, 7th Air Force. It was quickly
determined that the various "box scores" did not agree. This
was attributed to a variance in definition of what constituted
an air-to-air encounter/engagement and possibly administrative,
or communications failures within the commands.
•I
ID
fQ
Q
0
Q
0
0
n
0
(C) Additionally, early in the f*tudy, the CNO and the
Chief of Staff, USAF, were advised of Project RED BARON and
reque:^Ued to provide reference to appropriate documentation.
\ p' "Numerous replies v;ere received from various offices v/ithin the
1^ Services. Gradually, sources of documented information were
I increased until they Included: standard reporting system
li (Oi'REPs, COACT, Mavy 3^80-^ Reports, Guided Missile Perfor-
mance Reoorts); various reoorts of associated studies made by
|}( OEG representatives and other analytical groups; letters from
* aircrev;men v/ho could not be Interviewed; various records kept
t n at all levels of command; gun-camera films, tapes of communl-
1 cations made by aircrewmen; and miscellaneous message traffic
among military commands.
(C) Identification of participants was a particular prob-
lem since there was no existing mechanism for providing this
information. V/ith relatively few exceptions, names of partic-
i. - ipants v^ere not included in standard reports. However, names
I y were e;radually acquired through infornial communications with
USN and USAF aircrewmen and, as the interviev; program proceeded,
other persona were identified by the intervlev/ecs .
(U) There were potential problems involved with the inter-
view program. The problem.s were related to such considerations
as the human ability to recall stressful Incidents and the
effect of elapsed time between the event and the attempt to
recount it. . Also large numbers of people throughout the world
had to be interviewed, great quantities of interview data had
to be reduced, and time and manpower had to be considered.
■ (U) Considerable time and effort were devoted to develop-
ing interviev/ techniques. At an early point in the Project
IDA psychologists, H. V/. Sinaiko and VJ. Richard Kite, were
called in as consultants. They continued to work with the
P -^ject through the phase of development of interview proce-
dures. An interview program was designed which would allow
177
MiHdriiMiliiiUiiiMdyiiHi
■ )t
the greatest number of interviews, while maximizing the quality,
depth, and scope of Information obtained from each interviey.
(U) The basic interview concept stressed unhurried j;
informality, anonymity of the interviewee, a chronological
approach to the entire flight in question (not just the air-
to-air encounter period of it), and use of visual aids (maps,
sketches, airplane models) to reconstruct events. i
(U) A systematic prograri was developed to interview a ■.
maximum number of participants in the combat theater and
throughout. CONUS and Europe. Since there was little chance
"to control' the elapsed time between event and interview, the
elapsed time varied from a few days to more than one year.
' (U) The efficiency of the interview effort was approached
in various ways. Several levels of encounter were deflned|
according to complexity and intensity,^ and the basic inter-
view procedure was somewhat expanded or abbreviated according
to the level of encounter and the knowledge of the interviewee.
Data formats were devised which attempted to facilitate th^
recording' (and subsequent reduction) of information while i
stimulating the memory of the interviewee. ^
(U) In a]l, ten persons were trained as interviewers.;.
Because of the specialized techniques developed for and by the
Project and the type of data desired, considerable effort 'was
required in training proficient debrief ers. At the start,
various test interviews were conducted, their results evalu-
ated, and Improvements made before a large scale program was
undertaken. Minor changes in procedure were made through(^ut
the program.
(U) Although the Project wanted to interview a maximum
number of aircrewmen, the overriding aim was coverage of the
^(U) Sirhtin^ only (visual or radar); either side taking hostile
or evafive action; expenditure of ordn..nce by either side; .
loss or danage by either side.
largest number of the more meaningful class of encounters.
Consequently, where a choice had to be made as to whom to
interview, breadth of coverage and type of encounter were the
primary considerations. For comprehensiveness, attempts were
also made to interview all participants of each encounter.
Where it was possible to ooraraunlcate with a participant but not
practical or possible to interview him, he was contacted by
mail.
UilClASSiFiED
IV. THE INTERVIEW PROCEDURE
(U) Although small changes evolved and flexibility was
Introduced to accommodate individual situations, the basic
interview procedure remained largely constant after the early
test cases. The interviews sought to reconstruct the events
in as much detail and as accurately as possible, and to in-
clude the items of information formulated by the Project (as
presented in Table C-1), This, listing was used as a guide for
discussion, not as a rigid set of requirements or as a ques-
tionnaire from v/hich specific questions should be asked. Early
experience and study by the Project had shoiifn that the inter-
rogation should allow the subject to tell his story as he
lived it, and for the interviewer to occasionally interject
questions of interest.
(U) An important aim of the interviews was to identify
why certain aspects of the events occurred in the manner de-
scribed. It was felt that the most value in identifying R&D
lessons learned lay in answering the why questions. If the
reconstruction provided good answers to the items in Table C-1
the reasons why many parts of the event occurred as they did
should be identified.
(■J) Ideally, the interviewee was given advance notice and
a general idea of what would be discussed. The interview team
consisted of two persons, one a military aircrev/man with a
significant amount of flying experience and the other a mili-
tary officer or civilian. The team would meet with one crew-
man at a time in a closed room, with minimum distraction, and
with what was intended to be more than ample time allotted for
UIICLAS£i?iE9
181
UUCinSSiFlED
the meeting. The team attempted to create an air of relaxed
Informality,
(Uj The interview that followed was permitted to vary
somewhat in detail depending on the complexity of the encoun-
ter and knowledge of the interviewee, but the basis procedure
was always used. This consisted of some explanation to the
aircrewman, a narrative account of the event by the aircrew-
man, a detailed sketch of flight paths with accompanying notes,
a final review of the whole encounter and a period in which
the aircrewman was encouraged to comment in general on the
event and related subjects.
* (U) The interviewee was given an explanation of the study,
how it came about, what It hoped to accomplish, and what his
role was to be. To encourage frank and honest answers, it was
emphasized that the interviewee's name would not appear in
print and that, in general, attempts would be made to preserve
his anonymity. The complete interview procedure was explained
in detail.
(U) The aircrewman was then asked to give his background
and an uninterrupted narrative of the encounter in question. .
He was asked to start from planning for the mission and to
discuss all aspects of the flight through its return to base.
He was given examples of the kind of detail desired. Early
in the project it became standard practice for the interviewers
to use a tape recorder for the narrative phase with the Inter-
-viewee's consent, of course, and his understanding that he
could eraso anything he Isht-d from the tape. He was assured
that the tape was used only to gain complete, accurate infor-
mation from the meeting and that its use was limited to the
project. ;-.
(U) Following the aircrewman' s narrative of the entire
mission, the event was again reconstructed with careful at-
tempts to record all situations and circumstances in very great
detail.
182
UI^CLASSinED
(U) In this detailed phase, depending on the intensity
and complexity of the encounter, some type of sketch of the
action was made. The detailed sketch covered not only the
air-to-air encounter itself, but also ingress and egress. For
the sketch, a transparent papor overlay was placed on a large
scale map^ and the paths of the various aircraft known to have
been present were traced relative to known geographical points,
to the best of the interviewees* knowledge or estimation. This
v;as done f»s ?. plan view. The third dimension to the picture
was introduced by means of a keyed time -sequence versus alti-
tude plot at the top of the overlay. A copy of this overlay
is shown as Figure C-1. The horizontal and vertical lines re-
present a 5 mile square on a 1:125,000 scale — the scale of
the charts used.
(U) The use of the map as a background in attempting to
retrace flight paths was intended to stimulate the aircrewman»s
recall. The introduction of geographical references, including
terrain features sought to reduce some of the abstraction
Involved in reproducing flight paths. Although controlled
experiments were not conducted, aircrewman reaction to the
interview techniques suggests that real benefits were gained
by the use of the map background.
(U) Early in the study it became clear that the air-to-air
combatant rarely had an accurate concept of the time duration
of events or phases of the combat. He was better able to re-
call the sequence of events. Therefore, time was reconstructed
m terms of a time sequence. This procedure allowed the inter-
viewer to "stop the action" at a point where something signi-
ficant was occurring and try to elicit a detailed account of
the scene at that instant — tho location and altitude of
each participant, status of ;;he interviewee's aircraft in the
way of speed, g's, fuel state, avionics modes; action by the
^U) Soeclal reorir.tc, of JOC(k) charts were made to a 1:125,000
scale by the U..:. ::avy Hydrc-rarhic orflce.
1S3
UNCLASSIFIED
era ''^^
M, Z_
tv«n*
|ntarwi<« Oof*
tNTtgVIW NOTES
r.-i
CO
CO
FIGURE C2(U).
1
individual and his reasons therefor; communications which took
place; enemy actions; etc. After such a stop the description
would continue until the next significant event occurred at
which point the action would again be stopped. These stops
correspond to the "T" (of "Time") marks in events and pictures.
While one team member worked with the aircrewman in making the
Sketch, the other kept notes on a specially designed note pad,
a sample page of which is presented in Figure C-2.
(U) Upon completion of this step-by-step, detailed recon-
struction the interviewers asked specific questions from the
checklist about points which had not been covered.
(U) Finally, the interviewee was encouraged to comment
on the whole range of considerations which might be of interest
to the study — comments derived from his experience in the
specific encounter as well as from his overall experience.
The Interviews lasted from a few minutes to several hours,
depending on the significance and complexity of the encounter
and on the knowledge of the interviewee.
186
V. GENERAL COMAAENTS ON DATA
(C) The Project identified ill3 air-to-air events that
occurred prior to 1 August 1967. Participants in 227 of these
events were interviewed, with a total of ^18 interviews con-
ducted.^ In addition, 37 written accounts of events were re-
ceived. In general, priority in conducting Interviews was
given to the more complex encounters. Events for which no
interviews were conducted were usually sightings only, with no
R&D significance.
(U) The 37 written accounts, referred to above, were
letters from aircrev/men who could not readily be interviewed
and who v;ere contacted by mail. These letters contributed
very little to the information on any given event and in some
cases introduced confusion. In general , this was an unsuc-
cessful technique for gathering data,
(C) The most Important question that can be asked about
the RED BARON data has to do with validity, i.e., how close
do the final event reconstructions used for analysis compare
with what actually happened? There is nothing approximating
laboratory control or measurement about the SEA air war and,
therefore, njjj. precise answer to this question can ever be
given. There are some meaningful things to be said on the
subject, however:
•Real-time recorded information was at a minimum
(there wera a few communications tapes and films).
(U) If an individual was interviewed in connection with two or
more different encounters, this would be considered as two or
more interviews.
Practically all basic- data depended upon the human
ability to sense, analyze and recount.
•This fact was recognized from the beginning as of
primary imoortance to the project and all activities -
data definition, collection, analysis — were formu-
lated with it in mind; that is, data requirements
were continually refined in attempts to define what
was reasonably achievable; the interview techniques
and their taeo-by-step , systematic, detailed approach
with words and sketches were carefully devised to
give the aircrewraan maximum assistance in analyzing
and recalling what actually occurred and to introduce
checks on the validity of the alrcrev:man ' s recounting.
The final reconstruction of each encounter, by uti-
lizing and comparing all of the sources of data,
again was devised so as to enhance completeness and
validity in reaching some determination and logical
explanation of what really happened.
•With regard to analyzing the data, only after com-
pletion of the collection and event reconstruction
phases v:ere decisions made as to vjhat could consti-
tute a meaningful analysis of this kind of material.
•There were indications during the interview program
that the techniques used did in fact achieve certain
success in enhancing the alrcrevraan ' s analysis and
recalling of his encounter. It v;as not unusual, in
the middle of creating a step-by-step sketch of an
encounter, for an aircrewman to exhibit certain
surprise and state that only now could he understand
what really occurred. Prior to this exercise he had
had misconceotions about or paps in his understanding
of what had taken place, or things could not have
happened as he stated in his post-flight debriefing.
•Many of the interviev/s took place weeks or months
after the encounter and there is question about how
the time lapse betv/een encounter and interview
influences the aircrev/nan's ability to recount things
as he actually sensed and analyzed them. Intuitively,
it. might seem that the best information would be
obtained by minimizing this lapse. However, there
are illustrations v/hich counter this. In an early
stage of its activities, the Project was advised
by its psychologist consultants of the remarkable
human ability to recall the details of stressful
events and not lose recall over. time. Comparisons
by the Project of information obtr^ined from aircrew-
men immediately after an air-to-air encounter and
some weeks or months later, as well as comparison
of OPREP reports with Interview d£.ta substantiate.
m general, this human ability. The checks on
validity which came about throuch the interview and
final reconstruction techniques substantiate to
some degree the consistency and accuracy of this
recall over time. Additionally, there are opinions
from alrcrov.T.cn who have participated in air-to-air
engagements which say that Immediately following
the occurrence- their thoughts were quite jumbled and
it took them days or weeks to understand and analyze
what had occurred in this fast moving, complex situ-
ation. In summary, then, the Project cannot prove
or disprove any precise statement about the effect oi
elapsed tine on the validity of recall. On t>fljnce,
th-rc sec:r.3 to be little to substantiate the intuitive
notion that recall is a function of time lapse. Dates
of events and interviews have been published with the
data. There is a place for additional psychological
study in this area.
(C) The precedure of conducting some 1*00 interviews and
the reduction of the Interview material to reconstructions ^of
the encounters was extremely laborious and time consuming.
In any follow-on investigation of this type, the effort could
and should be reduced — not by the sacrifice of detail or com.-
pleteness but. rather, by more efficient formatting of the
material as it comes out in the interview. It is not complete-
ly clear how this might be done without loss of the unhurried,
informality of the interview; however, the optimum procedure
probably makes a lltt;le more use of forms by the Interviewer.
The effort cculd also have been greatly reduced had there been
considerable recording equipment in our aircraft. In the
absence of 5uch equipment (and to some degree even with the
existence of it) there is no substitute for the technique
whereby the analyst, with a clear idea of the subject matter
he wants, has a face-to-face meeting with the air battle
participant. Only in this way can detailed, clear, complete,
authentic information be recorded. Data retrieved from forms
^(U) .\c'--oviinately 15 wan-months were devoted to conducting
interv^ewo'.* Volume I represents approximately 50 man-months
of work following the completion of data collection.
I
I. INTRODUCTION
(U) The purpose of thiv analysis Is to explore more com-
pletely the extent of the shc.rt-range weapon requirement iden-
tified by the ?SD BAHC:: Qualitative Analysis Panels (see
Section IV). The analysis qu-intlfies the number of events
where a short-range v:eapon enployment opportunity existed for
an aircraft v;hlch carried onJy air-to-air missiles. This pro-
cedure was based on an cxper' onced fighter pilot's judgment in
analyzinp; the information published in the RED BAROM Report.
11. SCOPE
.(S) The data for this cinalysis were extracted from the F-*}
events which occurred between April 1965 and 1 March 1967 as
published in Volume I. The F-^l was not equipped with a short-
range weapon until the SUU-16 gun pod vras utilized for air-to-
air armament in ^lay 1967. Sh..rt range, for this analysis, is
identified as leas than mini:..um missile range, i.e., 2000 to
3000 ft range. The characteristics of the 20mm, M-61 Catling
Gun, were chosen to identify :he short-range envelope. The
characteristics of this existing weapon were selected Instead
of a hypothetical weapon. This should not be construed as a
recommendation for any specific type of short-range weapon.
(S) The three necessary conditicns for an event to be
Included in this analysis were:
• The U.S. aircraft Involvd was an F-^.
• The event contained a vi..ual sight ing of the eneny aircr-aft.
• There vras a reasonable opportunity for U.S., enemy, or
both opponent aircraft fire crcnance during the event.
111. DISCUSSION
(S) Investisation of the data published in Volume I Iden-
tified 29 events which fulfilled the above requirerae|hts . These
29 events can be subdivided into five categories of related
air-to-air missile succesc. The total number of eve^hts per-
taining to each category is also listed. j|
• (1) Four events occurred where a short-range weapon
opportunity v.-as available, but there yere no air-
to-air missile firing attempts and no; enemy air-
craft were destroyed.
• (2) Five events occurred where a short-raiige v/eapon
opportunity v;as available, but althou^gh there
were air-to-air missile firing at temtjjts in each
event, no enemy aircraft -rfere destrOiij!ed.
• (3) Six events occurred v/here a short-range v/eapon
oppcrtur:ity ^vas avciilable against ensiny aircraft
other than those destroyed by air-to-air missiles.
' ' - ■ ■ 11
i'. • (4) Eight events occurred v;here a short-range weapon
opportunity was available against an |;ene!ny air-
craft which was destroyed by >n air-to-air
missile. {
• (5) Six events occurred where HO short-range weapon
opportunity v;as available. Air-to-air missile
firing attempts v/ere made in each event and de-
stroyed eneny aircraft in three of th'ese six
events . •
(S) The 15 events listed in categories (1), (2), and (3)
Identify at least one additional enemy aircraft in each event
which could have beer* placed under U.S. fire. Thus; the enemy
aircraft benefited frcm the short-range sanctuary in front of
the F-^f in approximately half of the day-visual eveijts.
(S) These short-range weapon employment opportunities
occurred in spite of the flight tactics which were designed
to achieve missile firing position. It is not possible 'to
speculate whether fewer or less short-range firing opportuni-
ties would have occurred If the F-t had been equipped with a
short-range weapon during this study period since the enemy
would have avoided this short-range area and the F-t tactics
would have been modified to exploit the additional weapons
system capability. The interplay between offense and defense
makes the net effect of adding short-range weapon uncertain
since each tactical ploy has Its tactical answer. However,
If the only effect Is to force the enemy to open range to
avoid the short-range envelope, the ene.^ becomes vulnerable
to the longer range missile attack.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
(S) Enemy aircraft have had a sanctuary of approximately
one-half mile in front of an F-^ fighter, which carried only
AIM-7E and Air':-9B misailes. The enemy benefited from this
sanctuary in half of the events studied,
V, DATA
(U) The 29 events used in the short-range weapon study
are listed below. Each event is identified v/ith the Volume I
event number. Where applicable, a time sequence mark (example:
T-6).ls also listed following the event number. This time mark
refers to the location of the passage in Volume I which led to
the identification of the short-range firing opportunities.
(S) Event 2 (T-i3). Eight AIM-7 and two AIM-9 missiles
were fired with one probable MIG-17 kill by an AIM-7. Short-
range weapon employment opportunities were available following
the high-closure rate missile attacks.
(S) Event 6 (T-11, T-5, T-9). Eight AIhj-9s were fired
and destroyed two MIG-17s. Both attacking aircraft closed to
short range as their respective missiles destroyed the enemy
aircraft.
(S) Event 9 (T-6). One AIK-7 fired for a probable kill.
The U.S. aircraft then closed and passed a second enemy air-
craft from six 6 'clock but inside of minimum missile firing
range .
(S) Event 12 (aircraft com!?andc: 's coni-nent ) . The A/C
stated, "A gun would have been useful on the first ID pass
because the intercept ended in good position for a gun attack,
but Insufficient time remained to maneuver for a missile launch
before the MIGs disappeared into the clouds."
(S) Event l8 (T-3A). A close-in maneuvering engagement
occurred with no missile firing opportunities. U.S. aircraft
forced overshoots but the enemy aircraft stayed well inside
of minimum missile firing range.
(S) Svent 22 (T-6) . Six missile firing attempts were
made. Four AIM-9 missiles scored a probable kill against one
MIG-21. The short-range weapon employment position vms avail-
able to press the attack.
(S) Event 23 (T-5 4 T-10) . Two MIO-17 aircraft v/ere de-
stroyed, one by each type missile. P-^l pilots were In a cir-
cling battle where a cannon would have been a better weapon
against the highly maneuvering targets.
(S) .Event 26 (T-11) . Four AIM-9 missiles were fired. One
HIG-21 pilot ejected when a missile passed close to his air-
craft. One of the U.S. aircraft closed to 500 ft behind a
second MlG-21 not destroyed in this engager.ent.
. (S) Event 27 (T-8), Two AIM-9 missiles were fired in des-
peration to divert a MIG attacking another flight member. Both
nlssiles missed. The cannon would have provided a weapon for
a follow-up attack with proper discrimination between the U.S.
aircraft under attack and the attacking MIG.
- (S) Event 28 (T-2 narrative). Three AIM-9 missiles were
fired with one kill. A second MIG pilot crashed into the
ground while maneuvering to avoid one of the missiles. There
was an established closure rate on both of these »MIG aircraft
for a follow-up short-range vieapon employment opportunity if
necessary.
(S) Event 32 (T-^l). Two Air-l-g missiles were fired, re-
lyyn— p— IP— i in . I II' II r. iii 'M M- i iTT'" i » it m;y . ?
sultiHG in one MIG kill. A second U.S. aircraft inadvertantly
maneuvered to less than minimum missile firing ran^e behind
an enemy fighter not" destroyed in this en-acement.
(S) Event 37 (T-l^A plus snapshots of T-9A, T-6B, and
T~^IC). Two AIM-7 missiles were fired but missed their target
while one AIM-9 downed a MIG-17. There was a good gun tracking
position available for a long burst from a head-on firing pass
against an enemy aircraft not destroyed in this event.
(S) bivent 39 (T-1 and Five AIM-9 missiles were
fired destroying two MIG-21s. Two U.S. aircraft closed rapidly
through the radar missile envelope to less than minimum missile
firing ran^e. Both HIG aircraft would have come under fire
from a cannon sooner than from the missiles.
(S) Event 45 (T-9A, T-U. T-7B). Six missiles were fired
in a maneuvering dogfight. Good short-range weapon employment
opportunities vrere available against additional enemy aircraft.
(S) Event 'l6 (T-2 and T-3). ?our AIM-7 and six AlM-9
missiles were fired in this engagement with no hits. Four of
the six AIM-9 missiles were fired inside of minimum missile
firing range.
(S) Event (T-2). The U.S. wingman sighted a MIG-21
at his four o'clock position, 800 feet out, firing at his lead.
A right turn would have given the wingman an immediate short-
range weapon employment opportunity.
(S) Event 56 (Narrative). A MIG-Sl was in an escort for-
mation for thirty seconds. As Num.ber Three attempted to open
range, the MIG turned away and departed. Mumber Three returned
to escort formation. A ca.nnon would have provided a weapon
for imiacdiate attack without opening range.
(S) Event 57 (T-10). Six missiles were fired, two AIM-
7s and four AIM-93, with no hits. Friendly lead at one time
was 500 feet behind a nonrn:neuverins MIG-17 atteniptin^ to
open range for miss lie attack.
199
(S) Event 60 (T-6. 6A). Two MIG-21 aircraft were de-
stroyed, one .y each ..IssUc type. The Short-range weapon
e-nployment opportunity preceded a missile firing opportunity.
• (s) Event 68b (T-5 narrative plus a snapshot at T-5).
Six missiles were fired. One AIM-9 destroyed a MIG-21. A
good head-on flrlne; opportunity was available.
(S) Event 68c (T-13). Sixteen missiles were fired. The
12 AIK-7 missiles fired resulted in three Vao-Zl aircraft
destroyed. One pilot had a choice either to continue for a
short-range attack or to open range for a missile attack.
(S) Event 71 <T-11). Seven missiles were fired. Four
AIM-7 SPARROW missiles resulted in two ffiG-21s destroyed.
There was an excellent opportunity to employ short-range
weapons against an additional enemy aircraft not destroyed by
a missile.
(S) Event 78 (T-H). Six U.S. missiles were fired, three
radar and three IR. Both U.S. elements had MIG-17s at their
6 o'clock and were using "S" r,.aeuvers to clear each other s
tall. There were high angle-off shots available against rela-
tlvely nonnianeuverlns targets.
(C) -The events that conta.lned no short-range firing op-
portunity were Events 5, 24, 25, 29. and 68a.
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