Barcode : 99999990080835
Title - Wavell The Viceroys Journal
Author - Moon,Penderel
Language - english
Pages - 564
Publication Year - 1973
Barcode EAN.UCC-13
9'999999"008083
WAV ELL
THE VICEROY'S JOURNAL
77c Viceroy wrttghsjo r ai
WAVELL
THE VICEROY'S
JOURNAL
EDITED BY
PENDEREL MOON
MLSU - CENTRAL LIBRARY
70680CL
LONDON
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
DELHI KARACHI
1973
Oxf&rJ Vnn trstty Press, Ely JJoust, London IViX 4 AH
CLAKOW NE^TOU TORONTO HEUOLKKE WUJ-TNQtTJV
CArcitrwN fBAtJAN Nairobi da* iaulam lluia AMk* a*aia
DELHI AOHlAlT CALCUTTA UADUlI KARACHI LAHORE DACCA
KUALA LL1AU1 SCNGAfORf HOW
ISBN 0 I? 2117^3 8
© The Joint Otmers of she Wavell Papers ig?j
Introducticn, Editorial CortimmtwY* Eptteguc t and Notts
© Penderel Aioon ip/j
All rights reserved No part #f tins publicum may be reproduced
stored tn 4 retrieval system or transmitted, m any form or by any
me<ms t electronic, tnc thamc^ photoropytng recording or ciherwise
without the prt$r permisitm of ike c#pyrjgkt u nets
PrmifJ in C/fdf Bnttm
tht Univm\ty Prett t Oxford
*7 Vipum fhdter
Printer die University
CONTENTS
Introduction xi
1 Appointment as Viceroy (June-October 1943) 1
2 First Months as Viceroy (October-December 1943) 27
3 The Fjght against Famine (January-June 1944) 46
4 Proposal for a Political Move (July-December 1944) 78
5 The First Visit to London (January-June 1945) 109
6 The Simla Conference (June-July 1945) 137
7 End of the War and Second Visit to London 0ul y-Scptcmher
19*5) 159
8 The Edge of a Volcano (September-December 1945) 173
9 The Danger Recedes (January-March 1946) 202
:o The Cabinet Mission Opening Discussions (March-April 1946) 226
Li The Mission's Proposals (May 1946) 255
[2 The Mission's Failure (June 1946) 283
[3 The Interim Government (July-October 1946) 318
[4 The Last Chance of Unity (November-December 1946) 369
15 Dismissal (January-March 1947) 404
16 The Last Three Years (1947-1950) 435
Epdogue Tht Soldier-Viceroy 446
Appen&ces 465
List of Abbreviations 501
Index 503
ILLUSTRATIONS
Frontispiece The Viceroy wn ting his Journal Crown copyright
1 Governors* Conference, November 1943 fi^S P °* 2
2 In a North- West Frontier village 03
3 Famine Relief, Onssa 7^
4 At Bhubaneswar Temple, Onssa 79
5 The Governor-General's Executive Council (22 March 1044) 94
6 Lord Wavell at Alipore with Mr R. Casey, Governor of Bengal
(August 1944) 95
7 Lady Wavell Crown copyright 110
8 A J A Wavell at Dinjan (June 1944) rir
9 Lord Wavell a drawing by Augustus John (1945) 126
10 A page from Lord Wavell s Journal 127
11 At the Simla Conference, 15x45 142
12 Simla Conference group 143
13 Simla Conference Sir Evan Jenkins and Lord Wavell 158
14 Mr Gandhi leaving Viceregal Lodge — 11 July 1945 159
15 [a) Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru 174
(b) Sardar VaUabhbhai Patel
16 Viceroy's House the ballroom 175
17 Lord and Lady Wavell in the Mughal garden at the Viceroy's House 270
18 The Cabinet Mission, June 1946 271
19 Some Congress members of the new Government, 2 September 1945 286
20 The new Government reconstituted to include Muslim League
nominees, 26 October 1946 287
21 Lord Wavell (London, 1946} Photo Karsh cf Ottawa 414
22 Liaquat Ah Khan and Mr Jinnah in London December 1946 415
23 A morning nde 430
24 The Viceroy greets his successor Lord Moimtba tten 431
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Before his untimely death on active service m Ken) a in 1953, Lord
Wavclls only son. Major A J A Wavcll (w ho became Viscount Keren,
M C , and on his father's death the 2nd Earl Wavcll), had taken a year's
leave from the army in order to go through all his father s papers, intend-
ing eventually to arrange for the publication of the Journal With this in
mind he interviewed a number of people who had been closely connected
with Lord Wavcll during his Viceroyalty, and recorded notes of what they
said With the permission of those interviewed I have made use of these
valuable notes
The very considerable labour of preparing typed copies both of the
Journal and of the notes and letters referred to therein and of assembling
all the other relevant papers that had been m Lord WavelTs possession,
was undertaken by his three daughters, Lady Pamela Humphrys, Lady
Felicity Longmore, and Lady Joan Gordon I am indebted to all of them
for this preliminary spadework. 1 am also greatly indebted to Lady Pamela
and Lady Felicity for much essential information and valuable advice and
for the promptness and patience with which they have answered a large
number of questions
My thanks are also due to my sister, Mrs Oakeshott, for reading the
whole typescript and making many helpful suggestions, to Sir Evan
Jenkins and Sir George Abell for answering some specific questions and
for providing useful background information, to Lt -Gen Sir Arthur
Smith and Lt -Gen Sir Reginald Savory for responding to some inquiries
about the Breakdown Plan, and to Professor Mansergh and the staff of
the Historical Section, Lidm Records Office, for tracing and furnishing
copies of two documents that were missing from Lord Waveh 1 s papers
Documents written by Lord Wavell in his official capacity as Viceroy
are Crown Copyright material and are reproduced with the permission
of the Controller of Her Majesty's Stationery Office
Penderel Moon
INTRODUCTION
The three and a half years of Lord Wa\ ell's Viccroyalty from October
1943 to March 1947 was probably the most difficult and momentous
period of office that any Viceroy has had to face The crucial significance
of these ) ears and the great services that Wavell rendered during them to
India and Britain, though recognized to some extent at the tune, ha\ c not
since then received the appreciation that is their due A shadow has been
cast over his Viceroy airy by his summary dismissal from the post and by
the brilliance with which, immediately after his departure. Lord Mount-
batten wound up the British Raj with the full agreement of all parties By
contrast Lord Wavell s unavailing efforts to bring about agreement be-
tween the Congress and the Muslim League can all too casdy appear in
retrospect to have been fumbling and maladroit and his removal from the
scene to have been a necessary preliminary to a final ringing down of the
curtain amid general applause In some recently published books references
to his Vaceroyalry have been disparaging, even contemptuous It has been
said that he was quite unfitted for delicate negotiations, that he was defeat-
ist m outlook, an advocate of what Winston Churchill would have
* properly described as an ignoble and sordid scuttle*, that he was often at
a loss what to do and, by the time of his dismissal, at the end of his re-
sources These judgements are largely based on surmise and have been put
forward without reference to all the relevant documents, many of which
have not been published Lord Wavell *s Journal, along with some of his
own notes and memoranda, should help to correct a number of mis-
conceptions and will lead, perhaps, to a better appraisal ofhis achievements
as Viceroy and his qualities as a man
The main significance of his Viceroyalty lies in the two fateful political
decisions that were, in effect, reached during his tenure of of&ce One of
them, that India should be granted Independence within eighteen months,
was taken at his instance, and largely because of his insistence, and was
annouEced before he left the country The other, that India should be
divided, though it was not actually taken and proclaimed by the British
Government till some weeks after his departure, had in reality been
reached by India's pohncal leaders before he handed over to his successor
INTttODTJCTlON
It was not a decision that he w fllcd, desired, or advocated indeed he
great!) regretted it, but, as he realized and told the Bntish Government
as soon as he armed back in England, partition had become virtually
inescapable it was the necessary sequel to the breakdown of his Jong and
patient endeavours to reconcile within a united India the conflicting aims
of the Congress and the Muslim League By the time of his departure the
embittered protagonist* of these hostile parties had at last agreed at least
on this, that they should go their separate w ays in a divided India The key
memhen of the Congress, who had earlier been adamant m their resistance
to division, were b) now convinced by cxpcnencc in the Intenm Go\ em-
inent that collaboration with the League in go\ eming India was impossible
and that n was best, therefore, to let the Muslims take those parts of the
country that on a population basis the) could indisputably claim, and
form them mto a separate State Meanw hde Jinnah and the Muslim League
had come to accept the position that if they really w anted Pakistan, all they
could get would be the truncated Pakistan that population figures would
gwe them, and they were content to take this rather than to have no
Pakistan at all Thus when Mounthatten became Viceroy, a firm basis
for agreement between the parties already existed He built upon it with
superb confidence, decision, and skill, but it was a much easier task than
to coax the Congress and the League into some form of united India, as
Wav ell and the Bntish Go** emment had tor one and a half } ears rightly,
but vainh , attempted.
Mounthatten also had the advantage of enjoying fuller powers (for
which he had wiscl} stipulated in advance) than w ere ever allowed to
Wa\elL It u said 1 that Nehru was so struck b) the air of authority with
which he spoke that a few days after his armal in India he asked him
'Ila\e \ou b> some miracle got plenipotentiary powers?' "Suppose I
base/ Mounthatten replied, 'what duTcrencc would it make?* To which
Nehru answered *Wby then you will succeed where all others ha^c
faded *
\Va\ ell's fultire, which pa\ed the way for Moumbattcn's success, was
certainly not hi* fault The task that he was set was a well-nigh impossible
one, ahuoit comparable to the hopeless task assigned to him as a military
commander to item the Japanese advance tn South-Last Am, and he w is
hampered throughout b> die indecision and weakness of his masters the
Ermvh Government Nc\ erthclcss he came \ cry near to success, and ic is at
leau art^uUc that if he had been ^%en a freer hand or if thu B*uuh
Government had followed his advice an J acted with the firmness and
Ut\ I L*ltcm, Tie Crrjf D rde (Loudon, p ioi
INTRODUCTION
till
decision that Jic advocated, the transfer of power could have been effected
without the disasters tliat actually accompanied it
The political problem occupied Wa\ ell's mind from the first moment
of his appointment as Viceroy, and during his last two years of office it
came to dominate all else But there w ere many other daunting problems
that he had to cope with. At the very outset he was confronted "with a
famine in Bengal and thereafter, nght to the end, amid all his other cares
he had to meet repeated threats of famine and chrome shortages of food,
cloth, coal, and other essentials As soon as the war ended, there was, as he
had foreseen, a renewal of political agitation and the fomenting of popular
discontent, and this was follow ed b) mutinies, strikes, outbreaks of dis-
order, both anti-government and communal, and the threat of rebellion
and civil war Wa\ ell sought to forestall and counteract this turbulence by
pushing ahead plans for post-war development and by attempting at the
Simla Conference of 1945 to form a Congress-League coalition govern-
ment before the war ended This wise and statesmanlike move, which the
British Government delayed and obstructed, did not succeed m its object,
but in the judgement of the Congress President, Maulana Abul Kalam
Azad, it marked the beginning of a decisive and B.\ ourablc change in
frido-Bntish relations, and it probably helped to keep in check the extrem-
ist wing of the Congress during the ensuing dangerous months
It will be found from WavclTs Journal and the documents mentioned
in it that amid all his difficulties and disappointments he never accepted
defeat and was never for long at a loss what to do, but that, on the con-
trary, he was almost invariably in advance of the British Government in
prompting and proposing courses of action, and that he was always look-
ing ahead and devising ways of meeting contingencies that they had not
begun to think of The pohcy of scuttle that has been attributed to him was
one that he strongly advised should be avoided He foresaw that unless
there was a complete reversal of pohcy and a firm decision was taken to
remain in India for another fifteen to twenty years, British control could
not be effectively maintained for very long He therefore urged the
British Government to fix a date for withdrawal and to make timely
arrangements to beat an orderly retreat, and when he found that they
preferred just to hope for the best and to scuttle if these hopes were not
realized, he pressed his advice upon them with a blunt insistence that was,
no doubt, partly responsible for his dismissal In the end the British
Government agreed to fix a date and took the credit for this *bold and
courageous move* that he had for months been vainly advocating
Indians of all political parties recognized that during his term of office
INTRODUCTION
Wavell worked tirelessly, smccrcl) , and with great ability for the good of
India, for the reconciliation of their internal differences, and for the
peaceful transfer of power to Indian hands He showed himself to be
straightforward, just, energetic, firm, and decisive These were the
qualities that Indians associated with the British at their best, and they
were pleased to fiivd them u\ the Viceroy These qualities are clearly
revealed in the Journal.
The reasons that prompted Wavcll to keep a Journal are explained in
the following short note that he wrote inside the cover of the fin t volume
I have never kept a diary or any record of my hfe other than a small
hook m which T set down m what part of the world T am in each month.
Since this war began and I have become involved in great events I have
regretted that I have tiot kept a note of certain happenings and conversa-
tions Now that I have been appointed Viceroy I think I will try to put
down at the time some note of matters and impressions which may be of
interest from the personal or historical point of view
In accordance with this resolve he kept a regular record of his activities
and impressions throughout his term as Viceroy When he was in Delhi or
in Simla or on a visit to London he made entries in the Journal almost
every day, when he went on tour to different parts of India he usually
wrote up the Journal on his return to headquarters The labour of this
writing after a heavy day s work must have been considerable The portion
of it covering the period of his Viceroyalty fills eleven volumes and runs
to over 2.6 o coo words It is written in his clear regular handwriting with
scarcely an erasure
References in the Journal to personal and family matters are infrequent,
some of them ha\e been omitted There is also comparatively little
reference to world or national affairs, and considering the large part that
he had played as a military commander from 1939 to 1 943, there is not
much comment on the progress tht war 01 on military operations
other than those that directly affected India The great bulk of the entries
in the Journal are concerned with his activities as head of the Government
of India and with the events of his Viceroyalty
Inevitably substantial cuts have had to he made and readers may wish
to know the nature of these cuts Apart from the omission, already
mentioned, of a few of the references to personal matters, some of the
entries regarding the Viceroys routine day-to-day work, and social
aigignnenx mdvdmg same nappy references to members offus starTin
connection with social and sporting events, have been omitted But
INTRODUCTION XV
enough have been retained to give the reader an idea of the wide range of
nutters winch required the Viceroy's personal attention, and to serve as
i reminder of his heavy social obligations Similarly some of the detailed
accounts that Wavell wrote of his tours have been omitted or greatly
curtailed, hut the more interesting or amusing of them have been given
in full or with only slight abbreviation
A number of entries regarding the general problems of the Princely
States have been curtailed, and references to happenings m individual
States that had no serious repercussions in the rest of India e g the
deposition of the Maharaja of Rcwa, ha. e usuallj been omitted altogether.
There is also one whole subject, the treatment of Indians in South Africa,
almost all references to which have been cut out This was a subject that
m the years i 9 43-5 bulked large in the deliberations of Wavell s Executive
Council, but it is quite divorced from the main themes ofhis Viceroyalty
and the Council's debates and decisions on it have not much histoncJ
Significance, for no acnon that India might take against South Africa could
d£ the bovemment of that country _
sympathized wnn tne ™~ - — ^ ^ ^ wWer hc
3SIS S» rf &-3=i-ja SE2:
talk with him
him the strength of Indian
m Apnl 1945 he ^^"^g his Cound from intemperate
Afficuky he was having in '"tr^g ^ diffi-
act.cn He suggested • ^ he refaenccs to ths
cult*, thought that tte ««* °f *em are fag-
subject in the Journal l*efej ^nder-ni a good deal of
mcntory and ^^.Jg^rf best not to detract the reader by
supplementary noting It has seem self-explanatory
obscure references to a side issue, and so, except
=ntry, they have been <^™*££ on m(3lvl duals that nught be
A few of the Journals^ ™ en £ v£ been omltte d, but most of
embarrassing to persons '«^ d ^^ble, have been allowed
such comments, both favourable w ^ r£a ders none
to stand, and despite Ac t nsk ° l ^J £Ml Gan<J ki have been altered
historical interest , Journal a brief record of his inter-
Occasionally Wavell ^~^ t J more often he dictated separate
ews with leading Indian p * m his Journal, sometimes
of such interviews and reterreu
views
notes
B
XVI
iNtstoirtJencw
addmg the words 'copy enclosed* Some of these separate notes have
been reproduced either in full or abbreviated, but, to make for easier
reading, detracts &om some of them have been worked into the text of
the Journal, as though they were part of it
Apart from the omissions that nave been indicated and this incorpora-
tion in the text of portions of the interview notes, 1 the Journal stands as
Wavell wrote it His spelling of Indian names and his punctuation, at
tunes somewhat erratic, have been left unaltered
The early volumes of the Journal are comparatively gay, buoyant, and
light-hearted in tone, but later especially after the Simla Conference, in
July 1945, as the outlook in India became more gloomy and threatening
and the work piled up and the strain and stress grew more intense, there
is less light relief, the Journal is more and more concentrated on the
political scene and towards the end becomes sombre and pessimistic in
tone It is clear that by this time, though Wavell still looked cheerful and
continued to be energetic and, as his letters show, still derived some amuse-
ment from the manoeuvres of the politicians, hg was really very tired it is
probable that unknown to him and to his doctors, his health had already
been undermined by continuous strain and overwork, and he was certainly
depressed by the httle support or constructive help that he got from H M G
The Journal ends on a rather sad, dispirited note
1 la one instance on p 22 a portion of a separate note on a Cabinet meeting has been
inserted in the text of the Journal
Note The letters ICS or I P have been added in footnotes or in the
Index after the names of persons who were members of the Indian Civil
Service or the Indian Police t hut details of honours and tides have not
been given.
1
APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY
fine 24, ip«
It may be of interest if I set down while the events and impressions arc
fresh in my mind the history of my appointment as Viceroy from my
point of vaew — rather a detached one up to the climax
When I came home from ftidia in April,' I had of course no idea
whatever that the post might be offered to me, but I was natural!)
interested to know on whom the choice would fall since I should have to
work with him as C-in-C India The last time I spoke to the Vicero\
[Lord Linlithgow] before I left India he said he liad no idea who his suc-
cessor would be md did not seem inclined to discuss possibilities (we had
been through them at an earlier date before his extension was announced)
J had heard one or rvvo people suggest my name bur they were not
responsible persons and the suggestion merely annoyed me I had seen
enough of the business of the government of India by sitting on the
Executive Council, discussions with the Viceroy and others, to convince
me that I had no inclination or capacity for that sort of work, and t
privately thanked heat en there was no chance of my having to do it, and
made up my mind to refuse any Governorship if one was offered mc after
the war
The PM's greeting to me when I first met him on return home was
far from cordial, and he w as very critical and even unpleasant about the
Arakan 2 operations, though I pointed out to the War Cabinet their
limited scope, that they would never have been undertaken at all if I had
had shipping available foe a direct assault on Akyab and that I had at least
kept the Japanese busy for a whole campaigning season without much
encouragement from home and entirely on my own initiative, while the
Chinese, who according to Snlwell would advance in force on March 1,
1 WavelL as Commander in-Chief India v^as in mid April summoned to England by
the Chiefs of Staff for consultation* along with the Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief
in the India region He reached England on 22 ApnL
* At the end of 1942 the 14th Indian Division advanced wto the Arakan province of
Burma with the object of recapturing the port of Akyab After some initial progress the
advance was held up and although another Division was thrown in a Japanese counter-
stroke compelled the Bnmh-Indian forces to withdraw again to the trontier with some loss
of men equipment 2nd morale
2 APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY
had never moved at all Sulw ell 1 had only informed me that they did not
intend to advance m February This seemed to go down \\ ell with the
War Cabinet, hut the V M did not look pleased This was on April 29
I had dined with the P M the night before (Antony Eden and Admiral
Somerville the only two others)— P M quite pleasant but not much
business talked except that I said I thought we ought to go to Washington
since Striwett and Chennault were there and P M said he did not think
he Tjvould trust me to discuss plans alone with the Amen cans he or Chiefs
of Staff or both should go also I said I was sure someone ought to go, now
that it had been decided that the plan agreed with the Americans in India
in February for Burma could not be earned out in full
During the Tim few days it was decided that tke P M , Chiefs of Staff,
the three Service Commanders from India (Somerville, Peine and
myself) and a large delegation should go to U S A on Queen Mary,
leaving London on the night of May 4 On some day before I left I had
a message that Eden \tould like to see me at the Foreign Office Later
I had a message that Amery would like to sec me at the India OfSice before
I went to the F O When I saw Amery he told me that the P M was
pressing Eden to become Viceroy and that Eden wanted to discuss it with
me Amery urged me to do what I could to persuade Eden to go to India
as he thought he was the best choice I heartily agreed as I like Eden and
thought he would be good to wotk witk. When I went over to the F O ,
Eden told me that he was being pressed by the P M but was in two minds,
because the intention \tas that he should "be recommended to H M to
succeed Winston as P M if anything should happen to W He obviously
feared that the break of fi\ e \ears in his political career might put him out
of running as P M at the same time he was attracted by the idea of being
Viceroy He said P M had agreed to his going as a Commoner as a special
case and not taking a peerage I asked who would succeed mm at the
F O and he said Cranbome Eden wanted to know whether I thought
that anything in the way of great political progress in India was possible
at the present tune I replied that I was doubtful whether the deadlock
could be easily solved during the war his appointment would obviously
arouse great hopes which he might not be able to fulfil, hut I hoped that he
would take the Viceroy alty for which he was so well qualified* He asked
mc a few questions about whether the present pomp and ceremony could
not be greatly reduced. 1 said that I thought it certainly could We talked
* V 'f^l°^y / St2wcU aUS General popularly known as Vinegar Joe He was
UueW-Staff to Chiang Kaj^dt And twsnnamkd U S. and Omne forces in Indu and
24 JUNE I943 3
for about hatf-an-hour and he remained undecided, though I thought he
was inclining to acceptance He said he v ould have to give a reply when
the P M returned from USA
On the Queen Mary on the way to New York, the P M discussed the
Viceroy's successor with me once, and said, rather to my surprise in view
of m) talk with Eden, that he had come to the conclusion that Eden could
not he spared, and that he thought Ohvcr lyttleton would he his choice
This was the last occasion on which he spoke to me about the successor
to the Viceroy till he offered me the post a month later
During the voyage the P M continued his critical attitude of the Arakan
operations, and in a note by him which was widely distributed to most
of the staff of the Mission he used the expressions 'complete failure' and
deep disgrace' in connection with some remarks on them This made me
funous, and I wrote a letter to him to the effect that, if he considered the
operations such a failure and disgraceful, he could remove me from my
cornmand, but that as long as he continued to entrust it to me I would not
have such remarks circulated to junior officers, some of whom were on
my staff It was rather a good letter, but I then decided to sleep on it and
to consult Alan Brooke (CIGS) in the morning He advised against
sending the letter, and said that such remarks were 'common form* with
the P M , that those who worked with him had become hardened to them
and disregarded them, and he asked me not to give the P M any possible
chance to remove me from India So I did not send the letter, but when
I saw the P M alone that day I tackled him about it He professed complete
confidence in me and said he had never intended that his remarks should
have such wide circulation Later, he called in all copies of his note, and
amended the offending paragraph, thereby really calling more attention
to it
He found another subject for criticism in the loyalty of the Indian
Army Amery had sent a paper to the War Cabinet calling attention to
obvious dangers arising from the expansion of the Indian Army It was
the result of some papers I had had sent home as C -m-C We realised the
dangers in India, were keeping a close watch on them, but were not in the
least alarmed and convinced of the general soundness of the Indian Army
The P M T howei er, chose to read into Amery's note the impression that
the Indian Army was liable to rise at any moment, and he accused me of
creaitt^ 2 ysaxk&sst&n hy putting modem weapons m the hands of
sepoys, spoke of 1857, and was really almost childish about it I tried to
re-assure him, both verbally and by a written note, but he has a curious
complex about India and is always loth to hear good of it and apt to
4 APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY
believe the w ont He lias still at heart his ta\alr> subaltern * idea, of India,
just as his military tactics arc inclined to date from the Boer War
He alio raised on the \oyo£c the question of the Eastern Command
He ga\c me two papers one from the Air Minister on the separation of
the air m India from the C -in C 's control the other by Amer) on the
creation of a new Command to control all operations in S E Asia separate
from C -in C India I wrote out my comments on both of these and sent
them to P M 1 pointed out the constitutional difficulties of rm mg a
separate air command in India quite apart from the military disadvantages
and the difficulties of working with the American* if we rmc an. entirely
different set up to theirs 1 strongly ad\ oca ted a Joint Anglo-American
command on the lines of Eisenhow cr s command in North Africa or
MacArthur*s in Australia The PM sent no reply to these papen which
were actually sent to him after i\c got to Washington nor referred to
them in an) way I showed Purse the paper on the Combined Command
and he agreed generally
I did not sec much of the P M in Washington and he was not \ery
cordial when I did At a luncheon at the White House m the President s
study at which there were on!) the PM the President Harry Hopkins
and myself the P M took occasion to make some rather caustic references
both to the Arakan operations and to the Indian Army which annoy ed
me a* the President was being \cry pleasant and had not raised either
topic I ignored the Arakan remarks but defended the Indian Army with
some heat, and the P M said no mote A day oi tw o later he sent the C1GS
a memo asking some questions on the Arakan operations and referring to
them in most scathing terms using the expressions 'discreditable' and dis-
grace nil I sent the CIGS an indignant reply but I don t know how much
of it he passed on to the P M He again said that those who worked closely
w ith hirn became hardened to such minutes and took little notice of them
I wanted to go practically straight back to India from Washington but
the CtGS told me that the P M wanted mc to stay ja England tdl he could
discuss the set up of Command in India with me Hie ?4^I confirmed
this just before we left Washington I could not quite understand why we
did nor raise and discuss the Joint Anglo- American command in Washing-
ton but 1 sensed that there was something working in the P M s mind
which he was not prepared to discuss or mention to me at present Alan
Brooke swore chat he did not know in the least what was in the PM s
head about the Command
So when we left Washington on May 26 I resigned myself to waiting
a week or more in London tall the P M returned froml^orth Africa and
24 June 1943 5
settled up die Command Alan Brooke went to Africa with P M The
P M had said he would discuss the Indian Command on his return The
DOGS and CIGS (on his return) accepted my view s practtcally without
amendment, and later the Chiefs of Sta£ after some discussion pat
forward these views as a C O S paper, recommending a Joint Anglo-
American Command, with a Supreme Commander Without vanity,
I could consider that I "was the obvious choice for Supreme Commander,
hut I was also quite certain that the P M , for some reason did not want
me there I asked Alan Broolcc if he knew how his niind was working
He said he had no idea except that P M had mentioned that he thought
he would like to appoint a good young Corps commander from North
Africa such as Oliver Lecse t to take charge of the operations from India
t warned the CtGS that if operations were removed from C-in-C India,
and placed tinder a comparatively junior commander, the PM could
hardly expect me to re mam as C-in-C India merely to administer the
Indian Army CIGS said there was no question of that, if that happened
Auchinlek would be C-in-C 1
This must have been about June 9 (the P M and CIGS had returned on
June 6) I had no idea what was in the wind or that there was any question
at all of appointing mc Viceroy, and spent a good deal of m> time visiting
military and Air Force establishments in various parts of England when
I was not dealing with matters concerning the Army in India at the Wat
Office or India Office I considered rather vaguely the possibility that
the P M might intend to bring me home to take charge of the Forces for
the invasion of the Continent but thought this improbable as it would
be a waste of my Eastern experience in fact I did not quite see how the
P M could avoid the conclusion that a Joint Command and a Supreme
Commander was the right solution for the East Asian theatre or that I
was rhe obvious choice as a Supreme Commander Bur I thought he might
have broached this to the President at Washington and met objections
owing to the way the Arakan operations had been misrepresented-^
largely by himself— as a complete failure and their importance exag-
gerated I was also quite certain that the Air Force were trying hard behind
the scenes either to get complete independence from the control of a
soldier or to get an Airman appointed as Supreme Commander On the
whole however I felt pretty confident that I should go back to India and
be appointed Supreme Commander if that went through
I asked someone (I think Amery) after I got back from Washington if
' General (later fteld Marshal) Sir Claude Auchmlcck became Commander-in-Chief
India what WavdJ was made Viceroy
6 APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY
it w as true that Eden had definitely decided against the Viecroyalty, and
wis told he was still considering it. Since the P M showed no sign of hfe
as far as 1 % as concerned, 1 went auay for the week-end on Saturday
June 12 I concluded that the P M was still making up his mind about
the question of the higher Command in India and wished he would get
on with it. I intended to go to my sisters m the New Forest fof the week-
end, but Amery had asked me sc\ eral times to go to the house that Lord
Moyne had lent him near Chichester and I had always refused, 50 I
thought I w ould propose myself" for a mght and then motor on to my
sisters and return to London on Tuesday (Monday was Whit-Monday )
Amery asked me to motor him down on Saturday evening The whole
way down he talked Indian politics I took a languid, c\cn somnolent,
interest, I do not much like talking in a car, Amery \% a httle deaf and so
am I and I had made up my mind that \\hate\ e* happened to me I should
not be bothered with Indian politics much more if I as appointed
Supreme Commander in SE Asia, I should he dealing mainly with
operations and someone else n ould be C-in-C India, presumably Auchin-
leck If someone else was made Supreme Commander, C1GS had said
that there was no intention of keeping me on as C-in-C India to run the
lndun Arm) So I am afraid that I did not listen to Amery's monologue on
future appointments to the Viceroy's Council and other marten with the
attention that I might hav e done had I had an) inkling of w hat wisui store
Next morning Sunday, I \\ cm for *n hour or so $ walk with Amery
We again talked mainly of India, but I talked entirely from the military
angle I asked Amery if the Viceroy had yet been chosen he said 'not > et
but i t had reached the semi final uage I did no t ask the names o f the scrui-
fmalut* as he did not sound inclined for discussion (he of course knew the
P M s decision, and w as bang \ cry discreet) Soon after u e got back to the
how the P M 1 Secretary telephoned and asked me to go and dine with
the P M on Monday night, This wis rather tiresome as it made my stay
with my swim a \cr\ short one I had promised to lunch with the I lead-
maitrr of W tnchester on Montbv and had intended to return to my sisters
for Monday nit;ht novt I ihould has c to go straight on to London from
U inches ter 1 1 manned that the P M had come 10 some decision <m the
S E Asian Command and Vi anted to discuss it with me hut thought that
having kept me waiting so long he might now ru\e svaitcdtall Tuesday
I reared on to l\mgv,ood on Sunday afternoon. 1 remember \\ onder-
n £ for 4 moment w hy the P M should send for me at such short notice,
ind the thought JjJ crtm n) ^ A^niery \ attitude to me had
»S*wn a raihrr nofr ptopn-ur\ ihade than before, was it concenable
24 JUNE t?43
that the P M meant to sound me on the matter of the V.cero>aIty? I da-
mped the idea at once and concentrated on putting ; together a few ideas
to delner to the School * Wmchcster next day When 1 got t tittle
Sotnbomc. my sisters said Lord Cranborne had rung ™£
anions I should go over and see him I knew ^uff-Coopc, rs were
there, 1 had offered m, self to Udj Dl ana for lunch on
firm and she had told me they were to be at Cranborne, and had a ked
me to come over there to see them, so 1 imagmed she w as P^£™ b *
for the mvitanon My s,sters and I motored over there after tea Bobbety
CranbomeWectmg tonkas 'Weli.arc^etocongratuUtcyou' Isaid
St. JL for? and he ^J&2E£Z IE
wT ^Z5Z£S3* CrSoL. and 1 1****«>£
^tSi -dJeoL-rf Lady Duna lookc a, : me so
I asked her whether she had anytlung on her nund about m .but »ta«d
no (I have since realised that probably everyone m Ae
myself and my sisters knew that the cho.ee for Vice ™"
Next day I motored to Winchester with my utm. < spoke to the School
anSSwith the Headmaster It was not untd after tea (wh^h I had
in Stxth Chamber m College with Use School J^j^
motormg up to London that Bobbery's grcetmg «mj££
to me and Ireally started thinking about .t It
was unlikely to know about a fresh ^^PP 0 "; iffl
Commandir m S B Asia but might wcU know atom the
a ^ceroy. . fact almost certatnly would For •^^J™^
dnve to London, I really began senous y Ibout
Viceroyalty being offered to me, f*^^^ that I had no
» As I have satd I had made up my ^J^^ refuse any off er rf
taste for the cares of Governorship and that I ^ ^ be
such when my mibmy ^ e ™^ ' ~£ a i t0 me as a war appoint-
rather difficult to refuse the iVwa ^ ^ ^ p M
ment It would mean that noen r Viceroy than as
U deeded that I ^ &
Supreme Commander of S E An « ^^frM protest, and
I had always gone where I was told during t ^ fi ^ ^
had deeded to make none if the P M ™" on the
Command m India to some other nuhury — ^ * ? can A dates
shelf I thought I was possibly as suitable as one o
for the Vrceroyalty I had heard , ~ed Anyway,^ ^ f ^
8 APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY
them If the P M was seriously considering me for the Viceroyalty he
would presumably give me time to think it over as he hacl the others Sol
did not reflect very long or deeply about it all beyond wondering what
my wife would say, she would obviously make an excellent Vice-Reine
I changed into uniform and went to 10 Downing Street at 8 30 p m on
June 14 I was kept waiting about quarter of an hour ;in the basement
where the P M dines during the war I noticed the table was laid for two
only I emplo) ed the waiting time looking at the PM's library w the
sitting room When the P M came in, he went straight to the point He
said something like this (I cannot recall the exact words) I have decided
that you win have to gr* e up your appointment as C-^-C- India, but
when you hear what I have to propose to you I am sur£ you will agree
I propose that yon should be Viceroy How does that stnke you'' I said
that it was a surprise to me, that I was very honoured by his considering
me fit for such a post but that I should have preferred to remain in a
military appointment He made some complimentary femarks, seemed
to assume that I should accept, said that he had obtained His Majesty s
ao^ioval on a sieved document before H M went to Ntfrth Africa as he
wished to make the announcement at once He said Vbu will have to
become a civilian and put off uniform', and after the conversation had
only lasted a few minutes said * We will now go and havtf dinner He was
very pleasant during dinner and talked about India a«d the proposed
set-up of Command etc , as if I had already accepted Towards the end of
dinner, he asked me *May I assume that you accept I said 'Well, I must
at least ask my wife, she has a heavy task to shoulder also* He said
'Certain!) , send a telegram tonight, I will get Pug Ismay over to send it
for you\ and he forthwith rang for his Secretary and told him to get
Ismay over 1 felt I was being rushed Ismay came over ?nd the P M said
goodnight shortly afterwards I wrote out a telegram to Queenie and
gave it to Ismay I had stipulated that she should be flovm home at once,
if! accepted, and the P M said *Of course' Incidentally* he said I should
hav e to take a peerage He also said it would probably be a war appoint-
ment only and that he would make a political appointment after the war,
he indicated three years as the limit of my tenure
My w ife's repl} came two days Utcr, and I then \Y*ote to the P M
formally accepting the post
July 3
Not vcrjf much to record, I\c lunched and dined witK a lot of people,
v, orked z good deal at the India Office, mostly answering letters and seeing
24 JUNE-5 JULY 1943
various people, and have attended one or two Cabinet meetings I had
L . L _ . ,«i_t» -«J k-ih t/\ mike ™ v
a trying aay on junc ^ut" 1 iuw* •» * » — -
first public pronouncement, naturally an important occasion I have »
weakness that I can seldom bring myself to do an) thing til! the last possible
moment Though 1 had fair warning of tlus Press Conference and had
meant to write out my address during the prc% wus v. cekend, 1 did some-
thing else less important, and actually on!> v. rote tt late at night the day
before the Conference It was quite good and went down well, but I
suppose it might have been better if I had done it earlier and given more
timVto it I must tr, to cure this weakness but I kvt done the same thing
all my life and perhaps it is inevitable and it seems to work well on the
whole , ,
On Friday Jul> 3 there was a special Cabmet on Palestine, due to a
pesswusnc report b> the Minister of State on increased *«H«««
tension on the approach of April IP44 when b> the White Paper of 1939
Jewish immigration becomes dependent on Arab sanction I knew Wimton
was a confirmed Zionist, but had never quite realised the lengths to which
he was prepared to go, in speech at any rate, or the strength of the pro-
Jewish feelmg m the Cabmet No^ne seemed prepared to sav anything
at all on the Arab side So at last I spoke up, and said that n<xme ever
seemed to remember the second part of the Balfour Declaration or he
other pledges given to the Arabs I said ^^SlZZlZ
jews, out mat if Arabs anajewa vci* - - , «
out out.de interference I had no doubt Aat the £ . would ™ and that
talked
had done for the Arabs We had done a good deal for the Jews m mtto-
ducing half a muhon into a country whose inhabitants did not ^ J™
The P M said the Arabs had done nothing to he p u> m the war said that
Ibn Sand's friendship had been invaluable and that : hs enmity might have
done us much harm, after all the Jews, as a race. W not he, P ed ™ M
I m Momson (Home Secretary) and Cnpps 1 in the ""T"**?^
spoke of India, about which he really knew little His idea ^ seemed to be
to encourage the masses agamst the classes by factory
education L mechamsat.on of farming on the So^t modeUuthehad
httle idea of the problem, and thought the 'depressed classes ajja
touchable* were merely another name for the poor, and seemed hardiy
. J, Stafford Cnpp* « « «lw ne M—= of Aircraft Product™
10 APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY
to have heard of the caste system I pointed out the differences from Russia
where all at least spoke a common language and had a common religion
(or lack of religion) He is a tuce little man, and I hkc him, but I hope that
the Labour Tarty general I) know more of India
Cnpps also spoke of social legislation to counteract political agitation
He does at least Teabst the duTicultieS of the Indian problem
July p
Meeting with Amery and Mudaliar, 1 to hear M *s views on constitutional
progress
NL said, in effect
Gandhi and Congress will not retract August resolution, 2 though there
is considerable re\ olt inside Congress against G *s negative policy
G rejected the Cnpps offer because he thought Japan %*ould win and
his policy of non-violence was inconsistent with support of war
Best possibilities for Government arc to do something to remove sense
qE Crusxcatioa of noUtical India, and to cctcauxagc tca.cu.on against Gandhi
No possibility during war of such Constitutional change as removing
Viceroy's powers as was suggested during Cnpps* negotiations It would
hand over India to irresponsible oligarchy
M himself is convinced of H.M G 's intentions but India soil lacked
confidence in them "We agreed that some preparatory v^ork on designing
a Constitution for India might be undertaken , and sorrtc body appointed
to consider various forms of Federation (e g Swiss \J S A , Dominion)
This bod\ which should be academic rather than political in composition,
could define Pakistan and consider its effects on defence, finance* com-
munications etc
M then spoke of Jhdiamsation of Council le present crinasm that all
key posts (Home Finance Communications) are held by British He
thought unnecessary to have Council completely Indian provided
principle established that ke\. posts could be held by Indians He thought
there was no diificulty about communal feeling if Indian appointed Home
Member and that Hindus would accept Moslem Honie Member
Lunched with Eubank and then \\ cut to College of Arms about my
title I wanted to be Viscount Wavell of Winchester and the Middle East*
hut Garter King at Arms raised objections to both I pointed out my
family s long connection with Winchester and that 1 was being made a
* Sit A Ramaiwimt MucUlur at this tunc Member for Supply Governor-General *
Executive Council
* The Qmt India resolution that Jed co the rebellion of 1943
5-21 JULY 1943 ii
freeman of the city and he gave way on that, hut after a long discussion
I accepted Cyrcnaica in place of Middle East So I am going to he * Viscount
Wavdl of Cyrcnaica and of Winchester in the County of Southampton'.
J»ty H
Q 1 arrived in England early morning with Felicity 2
July is
Mass for Sikorski at Westminster Cathedral ij hours of usual R C
flummery and ceremonial, (taking on and off a vast bishop's mitre,
lighting and blowing out of candles, processions genuflexions etc) not at
all impressive or very well done, but Polish troops were good, steady,
rigid, tough-looking I would prefer not to be buried by any priest even
of my own rchgion (except for one or two like McKcw or Thorn) and
would like to be put away as simply as possible and with no ceremony or
mourning, nor in a cemetery, if there is an unhallowed hillside somewhere
available If the Abbey were ever suggested, I should like my ashes to be
near Allenby's, but do not feel worthy of either Abbey or Allenby
However, I shan't really be interested in what happens to my vile corpse
July 16
A man called Thompson came to see me Author, professor of economics
in Bengal for many years, historian, fellow of Onei College, good soldier
in last war with 7th Indian division, left-winger friend of Nehru well
acquainted with Gandhi Quite interesting but little knowledge of
political difficulties of government 3
July 3i
Lunched at Buckingham Palace with King and Queen No party, only
Their Majesties and my wife and self, and no ceremony H M complained
about the length of the Viceroy's telegrams and hoped I would keep them
shorter
Joan and Simon - * arrived this evening from India in quite good trim
Lady Wavell
a Wj vdl j second daughter now Lady Felicity Longmore
3 About a year bter Edward Thompson sent some boots to Lord Wavell with the
request that he would pass them on to Nehru who was then, in gaol WavclJ, who as
Commander in Chief had met Nehru once forwarded them to ham. with a private letter
and having learnt from Thompson that poetry w*s one of Nehru s chief interests he en-
closed a copy of his own anthology Other Men s Flowers (London 1044)
* Waveli s third daughter Joan married Captain the Hon S N Astley 7th Hussars in
1943
12
APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY
July 22
Go\ cm men t lunch for mc to meet some Americans Anthoii) Eden took
chair and proposed m> health I asked km the day before what he pro-
posed to sa> and what he wanted mc to say He wrote in effect no politics,
talk about India's past war effort, be pohtc about American assistance, and
pay compliment to Mudahar Then after lunch he got tip and iatd 'F M
V/z\ ell will now talk to > oil about his future policy in India' f I protested
loudly and spoke on his original hues I ha\e no intention of declaring
a policy to anyone at present, and Eden must have known quite well that
I couldn't I might, for all he knew, ha\e embarrassed the Go\crnmcnt b}
setting out a pokey quite at anancc with their aims
Court Circular announced that 'Viscount' Wavctl had had audience
with H M so began to use tide instead of Sir Archibald'
July 24
Lunched with Arthur Wauchope 1 That curious person Hu^h Dow ding*
was there He has now taken up spiritualism and has written a book on it
Has no doubt about there being a future kfe, but seems to have no evi-
dence that such a life is w orth while there is nothing in this life so incredibly
dull as the glimpses of future life that spiritualists produce Hugh Dow ding
said he was never really military in his outlook and that the only reason
he went to Army Class at Winchester was to avoid being taught Greek —
a curious confession for one who has acquired a peerage by militarv (air
force) talent
July 27
Cabinet at 6 p m on Lease-Lend problems maud} It gave P M opportu
ruty to hold forth for nearly an hour and a half with intervals on the
scandal of the iact that we already owed India £0 00 million He hates
India and everything to do with it, and as Anicry said in a note he pushed
across to me knows as much of the Indian problem as George HI did of
the American colonies Winston drew harrowing picture of Bntish
workmen in rags struggling 10 pay rich Indian null-owners, and wanted
to charge India the equivalent of our debt to her for saving her from
Japanese invasion He was in his most intractable form Amery stood up to
him very well and pointed out how it stood from the Indian point of view
1 General Sir Arthur Wauchope High Commissioner Palestine 19 J 1-8 He was one of
Wivelt t closest friends Wavelf succeeded hjm as Colonel of the Black Watch
* Air Chief Marshal Lord Dowding who v> as head of Fighter Command during the
Battle of Britain
22-3 1 JULY 1943 *3
When Winston s firew orks w crc over. Cabinet quictl y agreed to Chancel-
lor's proposals about Lcasc-Lcnd My onl> contribution to discussion was
to point out that India had defended us in the Middle East m the first two
years of the war rather than \\c defend India
July 28
Took rm seat in House of Lords Trenchard and Ice of Fareliam were my
supporters It all ^ ent offqiutc smoothly and was not really a very alarm-
" iwTGiayi Inn with the legal profession The Lord Chancellor
[Simon] was there and Amery and Brendan Bracken Lord Greenwood
Caldecotc (Inskip that was) Winston came m a little lace and was seated
opposite me He was in good form and held forth during and after dmner
on a variety of subjects-post-war democracy, the Battle of Britain,
expected surrender of Italy, financial settlement after last war, necessity
for strong Poland He is a good and interesting talker He left early for
a Cabinet meeting at 10 30 p m , and unfortunately -had a bright idea that
I should attend it, so goodb) e to a quiet evening talk with the Dills which
I had arranged , t . ~
The Cabinet meeting lasted neatly 2$ hours in a hot and stuffy room
It was after midnight before we got to the subject I was mterested in,
operations from India Auchmleck had asked for more to take Akyab than
I ever had and had put off date The outlook for Eastern campaign is
t 1 t 1 i.i „t* n'Uf^A with America and China
July 31, BathffscouTt
Walked with Amery for ih hours in morning We talked of Indian
affairs Amery thought I should build up prestige of present Viceroy s
Council by zood publicity, thought that Russian village system migh be
worth study as model for mdian local government, and said that a nucleus
of the three Supreme Court judges (one of whom is Zafarullah' Khan)
miaht be a suitable nucleus for a fact-finding body for Indian Consticu-
tion He said Halifax and Eden both favoured Bajpai* berng given diplo-
matic status as Indian representative in Washington, but Viceroy was
opposed so matter had been dropped
„ w , j ZafruUa Khan later Foreign Minister of Pakistan
Sir Muiun^ Agent-General for India, Washington After
^^^^^"^"^ Ministry of Vernal A^
A**OtNTMEKT AS VICEfcOY
August J
During another walk with Amery, wc talked of Roman evacuation of
Britain— a propos of eventual British evacuation of India This led to the
Arthurian legend, which Amery thought arose from some Romanised
mad-clad Britons holding the Saxon invaders at bay for a spell, and then
to the legend of Troy We then went on to speak of our failure to mix
with the people of India, Amery thought that intermarriage might have
been no bad thing, and that the ban we put on the Indian Pnnccs marrying
Enghshw omen v* as wrong I said that perhaps it was the marriage customs
of the Hindus and Moslems rather than the colour question that had
prevented intermarriage, and the difference of religion Amtry finished
up on the Lords debate on insemination He has usually an interesting and
up-to-date point of view on any question, and is ah\ ays well-informed,
He is certainly not the obstinate Tory die-hard that Indian, and some
British, papers and politicians are fond of depicting He has usually \ery
liberal views about India
August 4-17
I spent this fortnight in Scotland at St Andrew s and Dalmeny
August 20
Woke up at about jam, with some ideas about possible procedure in
India and feeling wakeful wrote them out Q approved them next
morning but I doubt whether official opinion will or whether my ideas
are really practicable
Tins original, tf somewhat naive note, ti hich is given in full at Appendix I,
was the genesis of the proposal put font ard in September to the Cabinet
Committee <m India, Jor forming a Coalition Government of Congress end
Muslim League leaders The note u as addressed to Mr E M (later Sir Evan)
Jenkins, as Private Secretary to the Viceroy Designate (PSV(D))
Mr Jenkins advised that the chances u ere five to one against the success of sitch
a meeting of Indian political leaders as Lord I Vat ell had suggested, hut was not
opposed to attempting it
Sir Evan Jenkins was an outstanding member of the Indian Cml Service,
who hadUen Chief Commissioner of Delhi 1937-^0, and Secretary, Depart-
ment of Supply ; J 940-3, before being selected to be WavelVs Private Secretary
Went to see Halifax, got nothing particularly fresh from him. He did
not find Gandhi a practical person to deal with when he was Viceroy and
thinks he is probably worse now but he said his experience was that he did
1—5 1 August 1943 15
keep faith o\cr frank conversations *off the record* He hid no grcit
opinion of Nehru He said Ihjpai was doing good work and approved
the idea of his being made Indian Minuter with U S A , to w hich Viceroy
had objected
Artist 23, 1943
Cabinet meeting with 2nd XI present, practically all 1st XI being still in
Canada Proposal to appoint Mountbatten to the S E Asia Command,
with Stihvell as Deputy, and Giftaid 1 as commander of Land Forces was
announced There was some criticism but general feeling was that appoint-
ment should be accepted smcc Chiefs of Staff and Americans approve
PM is still 112 Quebec I hear that Wingatc* has apparently *$old him-
self* well there and his ideas arc to have a good run I expect P M will
now claim him as his disco\ cry and ignore the fact that I have twice used
Wingare m this \y ar for unorthodox campaigns and that but for me he
would probably never luvc been heard of I gather they arc at last realising
the difficulty of communications in Assam and Burma which I have been
trying to impress on P M for nearly two years
August 26
Amery came up from BaihfEcourt and I had half an hour with hun
Viceroy is thinking of mo \ in g Jack Herbert 3 from Bengal, he has appar-
ently had difficulties lately with his Ministry and the food problem etc
I suggested to Amery that if he did he should try to get Lumley+ back to
India to replace him Mountbatten as Supreme Commander was Amery *s
own idea it appears I think it should be good if he has a level headed
C G S to check any wild ideas, I think a little boldness was badly needed
in planning from India I could never get James SomerviHe to back any-
thing that wasn't 100% safe and Rj chard Peirse and the Air always seemed
to me to want a large safety margin I pointed out many times that the
Japanese would never have invaded Malaya or got anywhere if they had
planned on our conservative lines
Augttst $1
Saw Louis Mountbatten and heard about Quebec Conference which
seems to have gone quite well I advised him to take an American as Chief
1 General Sit George GifTard who became Commander in-Chief of ntn Army Group
in South East Asia
a Brigadier (temporary My -Gen ) Orde Wingate- who cotamsndcd toe Chmdits — the
name given to ttoops flown into Burma to operate behind the Japanese lines
j Sir John Herbert Governor of Bengal 1939-43
* Sir Roger Lumlcy later Earl of Scarbrough Governor of Bombay 1937 43
!(S APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY
Administrative Officer, rn spite of anything the QMG might object,
Wheeler 1 would do him quite well, and it will make it easier to get things
from USA
Septemher i
Jack Herbert is ill, appendix: and internal ulcer Viceroy has decided in any
event to replace rum Amery approached Lurnley hut he refused quite
definitely to consider going out again The P M being away, Amery
spoke to Attlee about a successor and put forward some suggestions
Attlee said it must be a Labour man* as the other Governors were Con-
servatives Absurd that Politics should enter mto it at all, we want best
possible man Amery asked Attlee whom he proposed A said he would
think it over
September 6
Hobday now over and I have almost unending lunches dinners, speeches,
discussions and such like functions from now till I go out I have done
hardly anything of what t intended to do in, August I have not read the
books, drafted the speeches, written the articles or thought out the plans
that I purposed to do, I shall be driven as usual to improvise at short
notice
Amery told me Attlee had mentioned Jack Lawson 3 as possibility for
Bengal He was best of that Parliamentary Mission that went to China,
but he is 4>z and I wonder if he is good enough fox Bengal which seems
to he in an awful mess Nothing will be decided, I imagine, till P M
comes back and that may not be for another fortnight
Septemher S
Two strenuous days of functions
Today, after several interviews at India Office lunch with Thirty Club
(Press Management), about 90 people, another speech Amery there and
spoke well about India s future He has the qualities for success, perhaps
in greater measure than Winston — ability, well-arranged and accurate
knowledge* great courage, command of words But he has an unimpres-
sive personality, and 1$ too much of a gentleman for the rough and tumble
of high power politics
Found it impossible to buy a tooth-brush today, even from a very
friendly chemist*
maintenance iemw ta In*Jia, "WiveU t ufcnc* to taken and General 'Whtdcr v?a5 a. great
* uccess * J J Uwion, MP Secretary of State for "War 1945-6
31 AUGUST— 14 SEPTEMBER 1943 17
September 10
A pretty full day, starting with a visit to Lctchworth to see Indian Bcvtn
boys which entailed walking round machinery for a couple of hours and
a short address to Indians Then lunch in City to meet Lord Cat to,
formerly a Calcutta merchant, now financial adviser to the Treasury He
did not seem particularly alarmed by present rise of Indian sterling balance
After lunch, meeting with S of S , Munster 1 Monteath p a Sc Co , about
future policy in India Amery prepared to talk for an hour or so on
Indianisation of Council, powers of Federal Court, etc, and I rather threw
a spanner into works by demanding first of all a clear-cut policy on
constitutional progress, was I or was I not to make an effort to get political
leaders into the Government? After 1 J hours talk general opinion seemed
to he that it was rather tiresome of me to be so direct, but that perhaps we
should make the effort, though it was most unlikely that the Indian leaders
would accept Jenkins, who supported me well is to draft a paper for War
Cabinet
B Gngg* then came to see me over my second volume of Allenby of
which he has asked to sec the proof He was rather perturbed at czittosm
he thought it might cause in Conservative circles I don t think I mind if it
does I am not very much in sympathy with the right- wing Conservative,
and I doubt if Gngg is a very good judge of public opinion
September 14
Discussion again on policy in India Jenkins had drafted a very good
memorandum for Cabinet Committee to consider Amery obviously
is rather for sitting tight and carrying on with present Executive Council,
while making some academic exploration into possible future Constitu-
tions I am sure this will not resolve present deadlock. If the end of the war
finds us with no further progress and another year or two of frustration
in political India, we shall be in a poor position We decided to put the
amended draft up to a Cabinet Sub-Coinmittee on Friday
The draft memorandum was lengthy and underwent several revisions In the
form m wheh it reached the Cabinet Committee on India it recommended
(t) that HMG's immediate aim ofpohcy m India should be the establish-
ment of & Coalition Government of party leaders at the Centre t working
under the existing Constitution and willing to support the war effort,
1 Earl of Mumter Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India 1943 4
* Su David Monteath Under-Secretary of State for India 1941*7
1 Sir Edvrtrd Gngg MP (later Lord Altnngham)
I& APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY
(n) that the method of estabhshmg such a Govanmmt should be by vivitntg
selected political leaders to a meeting to discuss the matter,
{in) than should be left to the Viceroys judgment to decide when to make
a tnoie and issue invitations
September 16
Lunch with the Pilgrims Society, a considerable ordeal Nearly 30a
present and most of them distinguished, 1 have no idea how my speech
got across, I think the matter of it w as reasonable and I did not forget my
w ords, hut 1 have a very great deal to learn ah out the technique of public
speaking I doubt whether I ever shall learn it
September 20
On Friday 17th I had the last of my Press Iunches f with the Foreign Press
representatives I sat between a Russian and a Swede I had got so bored
with speeches that I prepared nothing and trusted to the inspiration of the
moment Actually the Chairman (Russian) gave me a handle by saying in
his introductory speech that if the Indian political problem were solved,
hundreds of thousand's more Indians would join the Army 1 confuted this
nonsense and told them something of the Indian Army Not a very effec-
tive address, but it appeared to interest them.
Then to a Cabinet sub-Committee on my paper about policy in India
Attlec presided and the others were Amery, Halnax, P J Gngg, Sir John
Anderson and Simon Amery and Halifax supported my proposals with-
out much enthusiasm, P J Gngg 1 said that no progress was possible till
Gandhi died, John Anderson 1 and Simon opposed Nothing very con-
clusive came out of the discussion, which ended with an instruction to us
to make some amendments to the note and rc-submit it "What 1 want is
some definite policy, and not to go on making promises to India with no
really sincere intention of trying to fulfil them
September 21
At a reception given by the East India Society, which was one of my
engagements in much too full a day, Amery spoke and said that the
sit* vacua, elephant always tested the strength of 3 hndgc before he crossed
it I said, when I spoke, that *th« sagacious elephant has first to find a
bridge'*
» Sir Junei Gnfg Secretary of State for Wir and Sit John Anderson, Lord President of
the Council, were both ori^uuM Y Home Civil SftreinJa.iwfJj-T««i4i?f mswnnt W-tak
lud KTrtd ki Indu GnjtK n Fimsw* tamper, GovtnwHCkncTil » Executive Council.
IS>)4-0 and Aruimon at Govtrnor of Bengal 1 9} 3-7
14^-7 SEPTEMBER 1943
19
Scpumhcr 23
Another long day Motored down to Winchester for presentation of
freedom~-one speech at presentation of freedom one at lunch The first
prepared the second short and impromptu Directly after lunch hack to
London m time for reception of Empire Societies
September 24
India Office in morning till 12 30 then to Buckingham Palace to be sworn
of the Prjvy Council a slightly complicated ceremony bat a silent one
on the part of the P C Q and I lunched with Kw% and Queen EM
presented her with insignia of Crown of India and self with G CS I and
G C I E and gave us their portraits Wc lunched alone with King and
Queen nothing very much said H.M again referred to undue length of
Viceroy s telegrams and told me to make them shorter
After lunch went to Cabinet meeting on food for India m P M s room
at House of Commons P M spoke scathingly of India s economic in-
efficiency which made it necessary to supply it with food which otherwise
might not be needed 100 000 tons of barley from Iraq had been arranged
and 50 000 tons of wheat from Mediterranean but more could not be
provided without taking it from Egypt and Middle East where reserve
was being accumulated for Greece and Balkans Apparently it 13 more
important to save the Greeks and liberated countries from starvation than
the Indians and there is reluctance cither to provide shipping or to reduce
stocks in this country I pointed out military considerations and that
practically the whole of India outside the rural districts was more or less
engaged on war effort and that it was impossible to differentiate and teed
only those actually fighting or making munitions or working some
particular railways as P M had suggested I left Amery still battling for
more wheat and motored very fast down to Alders hot to inspect Canadian
Black Watch — a fine looking lot Tea with officers and then motored on
to Winchester to stay night with H T Baker the Warden
September 25
Ad Portas ceremony Latin speech by Prefect of Hall and my reply in
Latin Went to service in Winchester Cathedral for Land Girls in Hamp-
shire and read lesson Motored on to Ringwood So ends a pretty strenuous
week,
September 2j
Saw Amery in morning Cabinet on Friday resulted in about 200 000
30 APPOINTMENT AS VlC£3t01f
tons tang allotted far India up to end of year, further supplies being left
for consideration later Amery thought we might get my paper on Indian
policy through Cabinet to extent of getting permission to explore
possibilities, he said Mountbatten had read and approved, my paper
September 29
Started at 10 a m %vith Cabinet Subcommittee on Indian policy to
reconsider my paper as amended Attlee Cnpps, Amery Simon John
Anderson P J Gngg Support for my proposals was very limited other-
wise attitude was negative or opposed. After a good deal of rather de-
sultory discussion I read out my original sketch 1 for a conference of Indian
leaders out of which the paper had developed. It was decided to submit
proposal to Cabinet for instruction to Viceroy to 'explore avenues
Rather a depressing experience I do not believe these men face their fences
honestly, they profess anxiety to give India self-government but will take
no risk to make it possible
TJie Tetontmtnd&tifms made tn the paper for the Cahwrt Committee
Irtdta (see pi?) w ere transformed into a more vague recommendation It was
proposed that the Viceroy-Desionate should he gwen general authority to study
the possibility of attempting to break the present deadlock tn some such way as
he had suggested and to approach the political leaders m India as and when
he considered tt desirable, but that he should consult the War Cahtnet first
September 30
Another long day Lord Lytton* spent half an hour telling me that from
the point of view of the Governor of Bengal it was inconsiderate if the
Viceroy always made his visit to Calcutta about Xmas time and stole the
limelight from the Governor just at the time of all the big social events (he
said Reading was very inconsiderate about this) I don't like limelight or
Calcutta or big social events as far as 1 am concerned the new Governor
can have tWm, He then went on to expound at some length that it was
a good thing for the Viceroy to see the Agents of the States and to hold
conferences of the Governors and keep them in the picture These are
things t should have done in any case as fat as practicable
Then a deputation of three shipping magnates who explained to me the
importance of British shipprng and the necessity to see that no sort of
ducnrmnation was made in India against British shipping I asked them
whether if India should become a Dominion they agreed that she would
1 Appends I a Governor of Bengal 192*^7
27 SEPTEMBER— 5 OCTOBER JO4} 21
have the nght to regulate her coastal shipping as other Dominions such as
Australia have They agreed somewhat reluctantly I fancy their idea of
no discrimination is really special pnulcgcs
Phillips 1 the American then came in charming as ever He says the
President does not propose to send him back to India unless I saj I want
him He was complimentary about my Pilgrim speech and said American
opinion and the President arc very anxious to see another attempt] by
us to solve the dcadfock c\en if it fails Mountbattcn followed him He
and the Chiefs of Staff have been having I gather a very diifiadt time
with the P M over plans for Eastern campaign and the P M has been
trying to play him off against Chiefs of Staff He had seen my paper on
Indian policy and supported it warmly He ^as full of dynamic energy
and optimism as usual I fear he will find some shocks in India He said
P M had a blind spot about India and was most unreasonable and riding
for a fall over it
October 4
After two days shooting at Melton Constable — my last holiday — got
back to London on Monday night
Meeting of the Sub-Committee on India at p m at which we got
a submission to the Cabinet on policy passed in reasonable shape I would
have preferred something more definite but Amery thought we had done
well P J Gngg is at least honest and whole-hearted in his opposition
I wish I could think the others were as honest and wholehearted in support
October $
Gave Lady Oxford (Maigot Asquith) tea at my Club She is still very
intense and intelligent Her chief theme was what a poor Government
Winston had got and how bad his Home policy was I had only met her
once before she is still vital at eighty odd, and nothing to spend her
vitality on Great pathetic restless a woman who has played a great part
and aspired to play a greater Nothing short of being Queen Elizabeth
would really have satisfied her and God help her Essex But I am glad to
have met her She said Winston always wrote his speeches and learnt them
by heart she used to hear him when he stayed with her husband reciting
them JoudJy in his bedroom at any h our on the other hand she remembers
as a g rl Joe Chamberlain (whom she did not like) saying that he used to
practise his speeches in front of a mirror but gave it up because he looked
such a fool
William Philbps American represents vc sa ladu 194s j
32 APPOINTMENT AS VICEROY
October 6
Government farewell dinner to me at Clandges P M very angrj about
the paper on Indian policy (I believe lie almost refused to come to the
dinner) and told me he could not possibly accept it He was how-
ever, quite fairly pleasant at dinner and said nice things about me in
his speech About India he eulogised what the British had done and
said he was unfashionable enough not to believe in the present policy
My speech went down well with some, T think not well with the
Conservatives
October 7
Paper on India seems to have caused some flutter P M t Lord Croft' and
P J Gngg have put in condemnatory notes, the supporters of the India
Sub-Committee are lukewarm and I shall obviously ha\c a rough passage
in the Cabinet this afternoon. Talked to Amery about it, he will sup-
port me
Cabinet at 6 p m. on India worse even than I had expected, not because
of opposition but because of spinelessness lack of interest, opportunism
Amery did his best but talked too long and alWd himself to get tied up
on points of detail by P M PM managed the discussion well from hs
point of view, as he drew each speaker away from principle, onto matters
of detad and waved the bogey of Gandhi at everyone Anderson and
Attlee gave rather lukewarm support Gngg stood pat on his diehard
paper Smu* and others spoke on the thesis <Q ul eta non moW [I said
tha to put the whole constitutional and polmcal business into cold storage
o long as the war Luted, as recommended by Gngg was a perfectly
lo^^
ltd uTI Lnfr^T^ ^ P ° LC ^ b «« 1 that it would
£t^ at * e cnd of the — ' ""J™*
™^t., IT P<*tical progress during the war, we should most
wolh XZ Tfr*™"™' bw 1 P r °P° se to attune
1 PuL^nenUry Undtr-Sccrctary of State f™- ^
Peerage he was Bng^Ws? Hb£r toStJ**** K** tanB to * e
inter-war period J^enry rage-Croft a well known 1-
6-8 OCTOBER 1943 23
new Viceroyalty * « still present ]> Mormon and Bcvin « ere frightened
over the Gandhi bogey and talked vaguely of social progress and cttmg
the poor against the rich. Eden also spoke as if I was proposing to enthrone
Gandh. Sphere about here the P M worked himself up to a nrade
against Congress and all its *orks and then dressed into the danger i of
the Indian Jm> beconung politically nunded and anu-Bntah landed
with the P M promising to draft a d.rect.vc for mc be d ™
tomorrow Something face-saving will be produced
.t 1 .1,-, V.nt with evcrv intention oFbloclang any
respect
progress lhc more 1 see 01 puim^^ - - _ *
Oxford right in considering this a contemptible Cabinet
Hadl^rt discussion with S of S on economic progrra
Winston had cancelled , p « CaW on In<ha and p reposed Uo « me
alone at 3 P m he had produce* U ^^^^t Z
L Seated nght at * . enc •J^J^ttf.T™
not barred Amcry on reading it saia you
ofhotair PM ""-^SKiSp^^W
accused me practically of pUymg »«« body would any approach
come to him ^a andre&amed Somsaying So I should
U Y FOP ^ J I never cZted Simon a supporter he . a man of straw
have expected I ™ Qjl j,,. who l e I am sure I was right to
of legal ability but n <**^ ^ ^ QW ls not honest m „
mse ^^ ero i progress in India and that very few of them have
expressed desire to gr ^ ^ ^ ^
any foresight « Pg*^ hc £ cks l bl00n ^ dnve I think
courageous ana sensioic
ron wthm square brackets taken from a separate note that Wavell recorded
24 APPOINTMENT AS VICfUOY
When I went to sa> goodb>c to the girls who hid done all my typing
work at the India Office, Cite of them said *Do>ou mind if wcgiils gwe
}ou a piece of advice 5 Trust jour own judgement and don't worry too
much about Whitehall',
October 12 (in plane bet\\ ccn Gibraltar and Cairo)
On Sunday evening (loth) there was 3 phone call from 10 Downing
Street to ask me to go and see 5 mutt on Monda) I had an hour with him,
he had come up from Chequers, and had as I had expected, been turned
on by the P M to reinforce lus % lews about India and to counter mine*
He repeated, \erj pleasantly* -ft hat the V M had said to mc rather tav
pleasant!) on Fndaj I exposed m> point of \ icw about looking ahead to
the end of the war, and reminded Smuts that he mould surely be thtf man
to sec the virtue of a generous settlement, such as was made after the
South African war t if possible, and spoke of \\ hat had happened in Egypt
at the end of the last war and Allenby's solution I told him he could
assure the P M that I was not going to act hastily or start negotiations
with Gandhi as soon as I arm cd I think Smuts was speaking on a brief
from the P M rather than from his own con\ actions I Ic came out at the
end wuh \\ hat is really the truth, that the P M is not thinking beyond the
end of the war — about India, or I behe\ e anything else — and is alarmed
lest by jusing the Indian issue 1 should split the Conservative Part) and
Parliament and cause hint trouble He is a great war leader, but otherwise
thinks in terms of politic* not statesmanship Here is the main problem,
to try to do my best for a future settlement of India without embarrassing
our war leader in the present
Looking back on the 3 or 4 months since I was appointed Viccro),
during which I have been through a {oicl^ testing tunc for one quite unused
to public or political life, I think I have come out of it fairlj \\ ell, though
I ha\ e made mistakes and might have used my time better I think I spent
too much time on detail on seeing comparatively unimportant people
and on social engagements and left myself too little time for constructive
thinking Howc\er people like seeing one and being seen, and like having
their letters answered, and I like seeing fresh people And I am lazy
mentally and don t care about thinking until I have to I don't flatter
myself that my speeches were impressive, I know they weren't, but I hope
they left some impression of a reasonably clear and honest mind I re-
member two comments on them which I got second-hand an American
after an address I made m Washington on operations against Japanese and
the Indian army remarked The British always mil tell the truth*— and
8—15 OCTOBER 1943 25
B.11 Astor said of my talk to some M V $ 'We hear quite
» Payment who an speak, and it .s refreshing to hear someone who
has no pretence to be aerator* ^dH.
think,
1 ought to nave raisca mc issue ^ r — ; — ~- , ,
and perhaps been less provocative about «, but one hastodeJ w«h
matters fairly forcibly with the P M or one simply gets browbeaten I am
sure the decision to raise the issue was the right one
We had qmtc a party to sec us off m the afternoon H M -id PM
represented, of Government Amcry, John *^«»- ^ Sim°n
Cranbome (all with wes), Devonshire Selbome, Leathers, Croit.
Munster, Creedy, the Ranganadhans and others
Lord IlWf uas aceompanitl by Uly ll^l2% WaV ' 11
second daughter) and thtfolfm mg members of his personal staff
Sir Evanjenhns Statu*
Major Peter Coats { W) Comptroller
Captain the Earl of Bistort \ ADCs
Captain the Hon Simon Astley]
Other members of his personal staff *ho joined hm m h** «*« he
assumed office were
5 wss**{s=s war*
married to Lord WavelVs eldest daughter,
Pamela)
Captam W Henderson \ ADCs
Captam G Crookshank \
Captam B Fortune )
Randolph Churchill was at Gibralur 0, ^^^t^
Commando at Salerno I always •» «^r- ^ h h most
with and do not see the unpleasant traits he is ^creoi J
people He s.d I went to India with one Vf^™*&°™*%^ j
Viceroys they had to decide whether and when to lock up oan
should find him already locked up
Cairo, October 15 s , TOth Jumto
Wed m Can-o about 3 am 0 "^^ 3 „ j^y on theu" way to
Wilson' at Maadi Found Antony Eden and Pug ; 1 7 ^
Moscow, neither looking forward to it espeoauy
., .„. „ tYl , time conmundewn-Cluef Middle East
■ field M^MIxid Wilson of l*!* at this tune
26
APPOINTMENT A* VICEROY
Mcna one wornmg The\ all seem tn good heart and were pi cued at
m> % isttuig them Cairo has not altered much Nor has Jumbo, he is
jmpmurinble as c\ cr
Talked with Cast\ »' Minuter of State, about food situation tn Middle
East, since it concern* India Case) pcsiimu uc about general \* orld food
situation, tap Australia has had \cr$ bid Jur\«t and has little surplus,
Canada can do no more than suppK USA* and G B deficiencies, and
that Argentine burnt her surplus of z 000 000 torn of w heat as fuel on
railway since she could not t*et coal, of which there also seems to be
a uorld shortai^r
1 R. G Cawy, liter l^rd Cavy, an Auitntun Mmnicr of Stirc m the MaUIc
East tnd M ember of the War Cab met 19 Corcrtiof of hen giJ. 1p{4-6. GoTcrnor-
Greitral of AusinUi, 1963-9
FIRST MONTHS AS VICEROY
Except for one Ann ML early » W* « '' f "f >f ^
had km « JkftMkf */ the Vueroy's Executive Coi«io^im M/ 'W' ™« »
H «JUiy W mer M «t.Mrf« fftf current Indian situation ^^l l of
March i 94 2 then Sir StaflW Cripps flew out to India ^'\« n f r J^
complete, ndependenee at the end ef ik «-r w*r - <°XV£ ttl Z
malno The Congress had resected tins offer mainly because, mm the
Japanese threaten the Me outlook seemed uncertain and became
ie British u ere unu illing to male any ..mediate constm'ona change^
also partly because the offer go, e individual Provinces the riohttoaulo,*
of t£e protected Indian Union and to frame constitutions for tkmsehes Ths
Z s l to Muslim opinion but the ^^T^^
offer on the ground that the demand for Pakvtanhadnot ^JPft™*™
11 Following their rejection of the Cnpps offer the Congress «ad!a',nM m
AmMiW the 'Qh.« IndJ rebellion, thereby seriously disrupting Wave s
p Ss forlh deface of India against Japanese attack In conseqiwue 4
reZlhon all th Congress leaders had been put in gaol aid so ^en Wav^
moment no t'f™; ! 1 ™*^' tvai Uppiy engaged in maL n
political agitation «<f °3"« £ fc $ xm J b \ &,s time to be assured
llZTt £ug% * W£ sole defence against Congress , e
Hindu domination '"^J."?™^ ,„ tke Uague pamte My refrained from
Jinnah and ™£ ^ J c f ess Uaders, they
7! " C ZdjJah permed the Mushm Uague and
a\d P^'^yZ^MmJies xvhlhnow thank partly to the absence
TcZortstl utg^ei in five out of the eleven Provinces, to ec-
of CMS? ™™ * rtqmredfir winning the war
'^StZfofTdT^d blengrLd by the M o India Act of
19 ™JTZ virtually parliamentary selfgovemment Ministers responsible
FIRST MONTHS AS VICEROY
to the Provincial legislatures m accordance with the British parliamentary
system it ere to form the governments of these Provinces Tltf Governors uere
to be w the mam 'constitutional* Gaternors* accepting the advice of then
Ministers, houri er unpalatable if might he to them But fir certain specific
purposes, c g to prevent any grai e menace to the peace of the Prot mcc f to
protect the legitimate interests of minorities, and to safeguard the statutory rights
ofcml sen ants, the Governors u ere empowered, if they thought necessary, to
set aside the adt ice of their Ministers and act m accordance with their individual
judgement Utey uere also authorized in the event of failure of constitutional
machinery to assume to themselves all the pott ers of the Provincial Govern-
ment The Section of the Act uhtch gave them this authority was Section pj,
and it is frequently referred to in the Journal Its first clause ran asfillous
'If at any time tht Governor of a Province n satisfied that a situation has
arisen in uhtch the government of the Province cannot be earned on tn accord-
ance with the provisions cfthxs Act, he may by Proc Jama f tort {a) declare tltat
hts functions shall, to such extent as may be specified in the Proclamation, he
exercised by htm tn his discretion y (b) assume to himself all or any of the potters
vested in or exercisable by any Provincial body or authority *
Ttie need to invoke Section pj had arisen shortly after the outbreak of World
War II when the Congress Ministries holding office in seven 1 of the elei en
Provinces resigned ana no other Ministries could he formed uhich uould
command majorities tn the legislatures In these Section pj Provinces, as they
were called, tht Governors tamed on the government mth the aid of official
ICS Advisers and constitutional goi eminent remained tn abeyance Hoivevcr
tn one of the. Congress Provinces Onssa, stxtn Congress members of the
Assembly changed their allegiance in 1041 and joined the anti-Congtess group
informing a Coalition Ministry, and m May 1943 it proved possible to form
a Muslim League Ministry m the N IPIRP So uhett WaveM became
Viceroy Ministries responsible to the legislatures were in office m stx Pro-
vinces viz Bengal Punjab, Sind, Assam Onssa and N WJ^J 3 1 u hile tn the
remaining five Provinces the Governors uere tnfull control under Section
The names of the Governors in October lasj and also of the Premiers tn
Prot tnces in which Ministries were functioning are given below
Governor Premier
Bengal Sir Thomas Rutherford Sir Nazunnddtn (Mushm League)
ICS {acting)
Punjab Sit Bertrand Glancy> Sir KJW Hyat Tin ana [VmomSt-
IC S Muslim League)
1 A Congress Coalition Mem try in an eighth Province Amite also resigned but it
proved possible to form another Ministry under a Mushm Premier
It
20
1943 y
Governor P«mier
5mJ 5ir Dot,, I C S Sir Chularn Hussam Hidayatultah
{Mtuhm League)
Assam Sir Andtev Clou; Sir M^tnmad SaaMlah {Muslim
ICS League)
Qrtssa Sir Hauthorne Leuis t ^araja cf Parlalmtedi (ant,
ICS Congress)
NWFP Sir George Cunningham. Sardar Auratigzeb Khan (Mushm
ICS
Bombay Strjohn Colt tile Section pj
Madras Sit Arthur Hope
United Str Maurice Hallett,
Provinces ICS
Btkar Sir Frank Mudie* ICS
(acting)
Central Str Hairy Ttvynatn,
Provinces ICS
of war, and thereafttr efforts to do so werejuspended ^ ^
Gam*** and Central Legislature of British
with the protons of an earfier Act ofw, '^ZtfTtouVLJthe
The Golemor-General {Viceroy) and th L^Ld tleT to override h,s
Execute Government The Govemor-GeneraU had poim »
functioned much hUe a Cabinet If there was a difference oj opinion r
of the majority prevailed UoishUae Tliough not un-
The Council Mas not response to the ^™ whcU the
influenced by its views.it « « Mich the
Governor-General considered essential in the mteresa oj
Legislature rejected, couUbe •certified' by ^"f^^""*
amual finance bill had frequently to be passed by «^°" bl M
TU ■Legislature consisted oj two chambers the Leg tslau "<"/. h
Colli i slate. ,n both of which elected members P« J °™ ate *f™/faJ
cZemol^al and his Council, despite the presence °f«™^JXZ
and nominated non^ffeial members, could not ^XTaZ <^it
ge!e\7ly composed of seven members ,n addition to himself, four of them
TIRST MONTHS AS VICEROY
British, including the Comm indent-Chit f and three of them Indian No
munednte change u as tnadt on the outbreak ofu ar t but m i$4* ™d *g* m m
t^2 the Council u as enlarged by the appoint matt of additional Indian
members, and when Wax ell tool office it consisted of fourteen members, of
whom ten u ere Indian and four British The Indians u ere ail nort-ojfiattu
Many of them had pret lousiy hem Ministers in Provincial Governments and
some of them were prominent politicians — one of them had been Congress
Premier of the Central Prot met* — hnl not one of them n as at tins date rtp rf-
sentative of either of the tu o major political parties, the Congress and the
Muslim League Of the four British members one u as the Commandcr-tn-
Chief General Authmktk, i\i o nfre ICS officials, end the fourth. Sir
Edward Benthalh a businessman Tlie Members of the Executive Council are
constantly referred to by name in the fournal TIjosc holding office tn October
igjj are listed hehw
Members of the G trv mi op-General's Exccutn c Council
General (later Field Marshafy Sir CI Hide Auchmleck, Commander-in-Chief
Sir Regtnald Maxu ell, IC S v Home Member
Sir Jeremy Raisman, ICS, Finance Member
Sir Ratnaswamy Mudahau Member for Industry and Civil Supplies
Sir Sultan Ahmed t Member for Information and Broadcasting
Sir Fnoz Khan Noon, Defence Member
Sir Edit ard Benthall, Member for War Transport
Sir Muhammad Ustnan, Member for Posts and Air
Dr B R Ambedhar (representing the Depressed Classes) t Member for Labour
SirJP Srtvastava Member for Food
Sir Jogendra Singh, Member for Education, Health, and Lands
Sir Aztz-ul-Haqite, A f ember for Commerce
Dr N B KJtare (at one time Congress Premier of the Central Provinces) ,
Member for Commonu ealth Relations
Sir Asoka Roy t Law Member
At the time of Lord Wavell's Viceroy alty the population of India was just
over 400 million and was risuig at the rate of 4-3 million a year Nearly 100
million Mere Afitsfims, almost all the rest were Hindus The Sikhs, tii origin
a reformist sect of Htndus, numbered about 6 million and were mainly con-
centrated in the Punjab
More than a fifth of the population were inhabitants of the Princely States
tvhch over $00 in number and scattered over the country, covered ttvo-ffths of
the total area. Tfte great majority <f these were Uitle more than petty estates,
only about 15 of diem u ere. of v.gnifocaxtt area W jMpufo&nt. hut the. Urgz tt t
Hyderabad was about the size of Italy with a population of 16 million
About 80 per cent of India's population hved in villages and u ere dependent,
1043 U
directly or inUrectly t on agriculture Most of them ttcrc entirely illiterate
extremely poor, and comp natively unmtaestcd in politics The tottl annual
revenues of Bnttsh India uerc equivalent to less than teti shillings per head of
population and of this only about tenpena it ere speut on health and educitton*
The Bnttsh had net cr sttpphed more than a small fraction of the officials
required for the administration of this huge country The oieru helming
majority of them liadalu ays been Indians, and after World War I Indians had
been freely admitted to the highest ranis of the services In Wavcll s time there
it as only a tiny handful of British officials serving in India — about 500 m the
Indian Civil Service* about 200 tn thebidian Police , and much smaller numbers
in Medical , Etigmeerm^, Forest, and other Services The Bnttsh 11 ere wholly
dependent on Indian eo-operattonfor the Got eminent of the country
The immediate problem that faced Lord Wat til and his Council uhen he
tool office was economic Though the war was bringing prosperity to the
peasantry, laroc profits to traders and businessmen and fuller employ matt to all
classeSt there 11 as a famine w Benqal For some years before the outbreak of war
India had ceased to be self-sufficient jn foodyrattts, a small exportable surplus
of wheat bem{> more than offset by imports of rice, mainly from Burma The
annual overall deficit* quite small in relation to total consumption, averaged
rather over one million tons Same regions of the country, far instance the
Punjab and Sind, had considerable surpluses* others were more or less self-
sufficient, while others, notably Bombay, Madras, the States of Travancore and
Cochin* and Bengal u ere deficit
With the occupation of Burma by the fapanese imports of rice from that
country were cutoff nor could they readily be made good from elsewhere as the
Japanese now controlled all the rtce-growtno areas of South-East Asia Tfus
was the baste cause of the Bengal famine The overall shortage was relatively
so small that it should have been possible to avoid actual starvation tn any area
But a number of factors combined to aggravate the shortage Owing to full
employment and war-time prosperity targe classes of the population somewhat
increased their consumption of food grains to extend rationing to the whole
rural population was impracticable, it had to he more or less confined to urban
areas, surplus Provinces were reluctant to submit to any rationing at all for the
benefit of deficit areas or to release their surpluses except at high prices
procurement by Government of the surplus grains of innumerable small
cultivators was not easy to organize, and lack of confidence and greed led to
hoarding In spite of these difficulties all the deficit Provinces and States, except
Bengal were able by administrative actton to avert disaster though there was
a good dea t 1 of ahtr&v Ac jEL-w^v 7 &y ritigj&omf «W pr<d\?ty • evrrayn.* J&x&nr
League Ministry and an administration that compared with that of other
Provinces was for a variety of reasons rather weal failed to grapple with the
problem There was a delay in introducing rationing tn Calcutta and tn
arranging for the movement of supplies to deficit rural areas Large numbers of
D 1G»
32 FIRST MONTHS AS VICEftOY
destitutes, mamly old max, uoroen, and children, drifted from the villages into
Calcutta, u here there « as inadequate provision for giving them food and
shelter, and they began to die hie fixes f rem start atton mid disease
IVavelt realized at once that the most energetic action was requited to
retrieve the situation JVtthtn six days of assuming office he personally visited
Bengal and wdaad the Ministry to agree to move the dLStitutes cut of Calcutta
into camps, to accept assistance from the Army for the movement of food pains
to deficit mr at areas, and to bring into operation a rationing scheme for Calcutta
His prompt personal tnten ention made a great impression at the time and
undoubtedly mitigated the disaster, and thereafter his dogged persistence irt
extracting foodgrams from an indifferent British Got eminent t though less
widely known, was largely responsible for preventing its repetition More than
a million people are believed to hai e died m this Bengal famine Wavell was
determined that it should not happen again As the Journal reveals, the threat
of a shortage was a constant anxiety throughout hts term as Viceroy
Another step that he took mthm six days of assumtng office was to call
a conference of Governors, mainly to discitss the food problem and post-ivar
reconstruction Such o, conference had not been held for many years, partly
because, after the introduction of Prot tncial selfigovemmetit in ipyj tt was
thought that a gathering of 'constitutional* Governors might attract criticism
But il ttli nearly half the Provinces under Section pj regimes thts objection had
less force All the Governors welcomed the conference
Tjte Journal contains occasional references to Wavell $ personal staff A hst
of the more important of them at the time that he assumed office has been given
on p 25
October ip Viceroys House, Netv Delhi
Arrived at Karachi on Sunday evening October 17 From now on red
carpet and cere mom il nil I leave India again, I suppose
Lunched at Jodhpur. on way to Delhi yesterday The Maiontji is a nice
little man but has little to say for himself Comparatively quiet arrival at
Delhi but tw 0 guards of honour — one at airfield, one at Viceroy's House
Q and I dined alone with Viceroy and Lady Linlithgow, and after dinner
I talked with him until 1 a m. Following are main points of our conversa-
tion so tar as 1 remember them
Linlithgow does not like Winston but agreed that he was a magnificent
v* ar leader and that our strategy had been good
He was pleased at having recently had arrested one of the principal
Congress agitators stjH at large, Jai Prakesh Naratri 1
1 ** Oc^etw* 'A^iu J av^ 1 &hm tfi. -cXtrrait-vicwi inh. iz ims cure aacuctea to vtfftente
He had a considerable following After Independence he became a sincere believer in Gandhi s
creed of non-violence.
19 October J943 33
He spoke at length of the possibilities of the political situation, at my
request He show ed mc Gandhi's fiml letter to him and his reply He does
not believe any real progress is possible while G lives, and believes \vc
shall have to continue responsibility for India for at least another 30 years
We could not for the peace of the world allow chaos in India He referred
mc to his talk with G and Jtnnah in August 1940 when he tried to induce
them to join a National Government He said the fundamental difficulty
was that they all regarded representation in such a Government as pre-
judging the final constitutional settlement, and therefore would not play
except each on their own terms which were irreconcilable He said the
problem of removing British control bom India was that of getting a
three legged stool (Hindu, Moslem, British) to remain stable with one leg
removed He doubted whether it was advisable to make another effort till
Burma had been reconquered, because of the danger of arousing com-
munal dissension which might affect the Indian Army
He said we must be careful that we did not get into a position when we
could not get out of India because of the chaos it would cause but were
unable to control and administer it if w e remained It was essential to
maintain the morale of the ICS and Police, whose financial future
should be guaranteed whatever happened He thought it might be possible
to make a fresh appeal in say 6 months time before the influence of the
new Viceroy airy was lost, but it would require very careful consideration
and would not be likely to succeed The chief factors of the problem of
Indian political progress were the stupidity of the Indian and the dishonesty
of the British we should not be able to get away with it much longer
He told me tliat before the Cnpps proposals were made the British
Government suggested that the National Defence Council 1 should become
the Constitution-making body and should also assist to run the war
Linlithgow said he would resign rather than accept this, and the Cnpps
proposals followed He said that Cnpps did not play straight over the
question of the Viceroy's veto and Cabinet responsibility and did make
some offer to Congress through the American Louis Johnson z He said
Cnpps was crooked when up against it
Linlithgow s view of Amery was the same as mine, he admired his
qualities but said he was quite unable to get his stuff across in Cabmct>
or I think in Parliament
1 The National Defence Council (N D C) was formed in October 1941 " a consultative
body 011 defence and consisted of thirty person 1 nominated by the Viceroy representative
of both British India and the States
* Colonel Louis Johnson President Roosevelt 5 personal representative in India at the
time of the Cnpps Mission.
34 ST MONTHS AS \ICE*OY
On nubtary situation he thought Mountbatten ('the Boy Champion
he called him) would have some rude shocks to his optimism Linlithgow
does not belie\ e the Chinese mean to fight scnousl) Nor do I
Of the food problem Linlithgow says chief factor morale In July he
expected that deaths in Bengal might be up to i,ooo ooo or I J million,
and that we looked like getting off better than he had thought possible
He advised against further Lidianisauon of the Council, and agreed that
Maxwells 1 health would not stand an extension, and thought that
Twynarn* should be appointed. He said Mudahar was not running straight,
which is disappointing I had hoped he could be trusted
Other matters Linlithgow spoke of we Gandhi s fast and how glucose
was administered as soon as it was obvious that Linlithgow meant to stand
firm and the election of a new Chancellor of the Chamber of Pnnces
Lanlithgow thought Bhopal was hkely to be elected, and acknowledged,
his abihty but said he was sometimes like a mischievous boy with a
catapult
Linlithgow sajd he proposed to stand outside politics for a time when he
got home and try to educate opinion on the Indian tjuestion
I have the greatest admiration for Linlithgow, he is a wise strong man
and ^ cry human really I wish we had had se\ eral days together and that
I had been better prepared for thi5 talk. It is an unsatisfactory take-o\ cr,
this one talk late at night However, one can only really take over a job by
doing it I can't say that L *s exposition of the situation was encouraging
after 7 J years experience his opinion of Indian efficiency and reasonable-
ness is certainly not high.
October 20
Sworn in as Viceroy Ceremony went off all right
October 21
Saw Hutchings* about food he is a good man sensible and resolute and
should help to produce a solution if anyone can He says Snvastava 4 js
doing quite well
Ratsman 5 next, he is good and sound Anxious to know about his
1 Sir Reginald Maxwell, LC ^ Home Member Governor-General s Executive Council,
» Sn tfenry Twytaro ICS, Governor of the Central Province*, 1940-6-
» Sir Robert Hutciungi t C S Secretary to Governmept of India Food Dept 1943-6.
* Sir ) V Snvatava Member for Food, Govtrnor-GaKnl s Executive Council
» Sir Jeremy Rjisman* I C-S*, Ftoancc M*nab*r Governor-General 1 Fjrccuuvc Council.
> 93 9^43 Later Chairman of Llo) 6$ Bank.
I9*2p OCTOBER 1943 35
future whether he is likely to be extended and wants several months
leave home jf he is
Wyhc 1 talked about the main problems of the Princes He agrees with
rnc that the Princes cannot resist reform pressure if w e arc firm their only
card is that the faith of the British Crown is involved in honouring their
treaties
October 22
Masses of paper and interviews all day Saw Somervell head of Supply
Branch U S Army about the w ar m 5 W Pacific and the problem of
developing the capacity of the Assam railways to take increased American
aid to China and to support large scale operations into Burma which the
Americans claim can be done if U S A take over railway and eliminate
Indian inefficiency
1 talked to Maxwell Home Member about the political situation He
agrees w c should make progress if possible and hopes there may be a break
away from Gandhi s leadership I doubt if this is probable
October 2p
Returned from 3 days at Calcutta m the course of which I saw all the
Ministers a number of officials and non-officials went round the streets of
Calcutta by night to see how the destitutes were sleeping and by day to see
them being fed and spent one day in the Contai district of Midnaporc
which is supposed to be one of the areas wont affected by the famine
I found things on the whole much as I had expected from what I had read
and heard — widespread distress and suffering not as gruesome as the
Congress papers would make out but gnm enough to make ofFcial
complacency surprising I don t think anyone really knows the whole
situation or what is going on in some or the outlying areas but obviously
we have got to get to immediate grips or it may get out of hand al
together I saw all the Ministers yesterday evening told them they must
get the destitutes out of Calcutta into camps which should have been
done long ago got them to accept a Major General and staff to help with
the transport of supphes and the assistance of the Army generally I also
urged them to get on with then* rationing schemes and put before them
the proposal to take Calcutta out of the Bengal food problem and feed
it from outside This last proposal seemed to meet with some doubts but
Sir Francs Vfyhe ICS Governor of the Cen ral Provinces 1938 40 Poht tal
Adviser to the Crown Representative 1940-5 Governor of the Uni cd Provinces 1945-7
36 FIRST MONTHS AS VICEROY
I am advised it is the only possible solution that will restore confidence in
the rural areas and bring prices down
Truce pretty hectic and distressing days I wonder if nry intervention
will do any good The Ministry is obviously a very weak one, and the
acting Governor (Rutherford) rather disappointed me — no fire in him
November 3
Three days with National Defence Council just finished They went off
all nght
Hance, the Director General, Indian Medical Service, came to see mc
on Nov 1 I asked him about the drug position in Bengal, he said with
an air of conscious rectitude *I am going down there on Nov 8 to see for
myself* I said 'and why not on Nov 2 or Nov 3 ? * he was somewhat
taken aback and said 'But I have to go to Simla for a meeting of the
Sanatorium Committee' At that I gave him to understand in very clear
terms that sanatonums at Simla could wait but the Bengal famine would
not He would go to the A O C inC at once, I told htm and get the first
possible plane to Calcutta
November 7
A heavy routine week last week, with nothing very special This afternoon
Maync, G O C -rn-C Eastern Command, was brought to me by C-ui-C
about situation in Bengal Army has got down to it well and has already
increased outflow of food grains from Calcutta to rural districts from 90O
to 2,000 tons p u. But Mayne was very depressing about the medical
situation, and says cholera epidemic is most serious Hance, DGIMS,
whom I sent down there 4 or 5 days ago, has apparently done a very good
job of work, but has found a very great deal to be done, as 1 suspected,
Mayne also said that pilfering and misappropriation of foodstufts on way
to population in need is very widespread and Courts arc inflicting only
trifling fines on offenders
November 10
Ordinary routine business forlastzorj clays, except for an emergency
meeting of Council on Nov ember % over a resolution in the Assembly
asking for an Enquiry or Ro^al Commission on the Food question, m
which it looked as if we should have the whole Assembly against us if w e
opposed I was quite clear that it would be disastrous to have any Enquiry
now, and that w e snouldliang an awkward millstone round our neck (and
embarrass H.M G probably) if we gave any undertaking for an enquiry
2p OCTOBIR-I7 NOVJEMBIS IO43 37
in future I had no difficulty with Council over the question of an im-
mediate cnquir) — except Fuoz Khan Noon who delivered one of the
outbursts without thuiluflg which he sometimes gives tongue to— but the
majority, including AurhuiJeck and BenthaU, were for some sort of
pledge on a future enquiry, We. agreed that Food Member should accept
an Enquiry tn principle but refuse to commit Government on form, date
or scope Next day the difficulty was postponed temporarily by the
motion being dropped on consideration of an extra day for food debate
But the demand for an Enquiry will certainly be made in the debate
November 34
Plenty of work but nothing in particular last week But on Saturday
evening Moumbattcn came to tell me about proposed meeting of the
Four Great Ones tn Cairo He then spoke of the future plans of S E A
Command, and indicated, as politely as he could, that the general attitude
of the Indian Government was obstructive, and that India would really
have no difficulty in fulfilling all his fresh demands if she took a more
real is tic attitude to the war I did somcdung to try and dssahusc him of
this idea, and to point out some of India's economic dimcuhies He
mentioned a requirement of eleven large new airfields in the Calcutta area
which the Americans had put forward He asked me for help over a large
increase of supply dropping parachutes to be manufactured in India
Not/ember 17
M B came again on 15th to tell me about the Cairo meeting (Sextant) and
that Chiang Kai-Shek and Madame proposed to pass through India under
American auspices without a word to me or the Government of India,
stopping a night at Agra It seems to me the height of international bad
manners on the part of both Americans and Chinese, but since H.M G has
not seen fit to inform me that a conference is taking place at all, on matters
which vitally concern India, I can hardly complain M B also mentioned
intelligence pointing to the possibility of a Japanese sea-borne raid on
India We also spoke of the parachute demand, he still seems to think that
to double the demand (from 100 000 to 200,000 [per month], the original
demand having been 35 000) is a mere trifle for India, as it only meant
giving up 2% of total cloth I pointed out that 2% of India s population
was 8,000,000 which was quire a large number to go short of clothes
Wingate left today after convalescing here for a week. He a little
reminds me of T E Lawrence hut lacks his sense of humour and wide
knowledge, is more limited but with greater driving power
3$ FIRST MONTHS AS VICEROY
November tS t t$43 (This would have been my father's iooth birthday)
Having had an almost continuous series of interviews with Members and
their Secretaries, I think I have now heard most of their pet schemes, some
\ cry interesting, some practical, some unpractical
Not ember 2t
Finished yesterday a two-day conference with the eleven Governors
1 think it was valuable and that they enjoyed it (no conference of Governors
had neen held since 1930), and it gave me a good chance to size up my
Governors
Arthur Hope (Madras) I found surprisingly good, but I suppose Madras
is comparatively easy Colvule (Bombay) is attractive and sensible but
knows little of India yet, he should be \ ery good* I was confirmed in my
view that Rutherford (acting for Bengal), a good enough administrator
in normal times, is no use now for rough stuff Maurice Hallett (U P ) is
thoroughly sound, wise and courageous, but conservative and perhaps
a bit disillusioned Glancy (Punjab) knows his job but lacks drive I have
not quite sized up Twynam (CP) of whom I had been given so high
a character, he is certainly able Mudie (acting for Bihar) is quiet and
sensible George Cunningham (NWFP) veiy good where he is and
entircl) reliable Lewis (Orissa) willing but not first-class Dow (Sind)
knows his provinces to the finger-tips and has it ■well in hand, he made
more telling and pertinent observations than any of the others, but was
provocative at runes Clow (Assam) reminds me of the remark of a very
celebrated golfer on one of his weaker professional brethren 'a nice little
golfer Sir, a nice little golfer — you know what I mean*
We had a whole day on the Food problem, and half a day on Post-War
reconstruction At the end 1 ga\ e them my general mind on the political
situation, and they ga\ e me theirs Nothing very constructive or encourag-
ing emerged They were all for periodical conferences of Governors, and
1 am sure the meeting has done good
I got Pandit Kunzru' to come and see me since he had been touring
Bengal and expressing himself strongly on the famine He used to be on
m> Defence Committee when I was O-in-C, and I have always liked the
h ttlc man thoughheisanuncom pro mis its g critic and opponent of Go\ em-
inent, he is earnest and sincere He was obviously \cry upset at the condi-
tions in Bengal and also at the lack of civic spint of his countrymen in
Bengal and the inefficiency of the Bengal Government, who are still more
* Pandit H N Ktmzm, a highly respected moderate Nationalist politician.
I# NOVEMBER^! DECEMBER I94J jp
concerned in their politics} rivalries than with the famine (I really believe
there is more anxiet) and sympathy about die Bengal famine in England
than anyw here in India)
iSVi ember 25-30
Visit to Punjab and NWFP M) main object m Punjab w as to get
Ministers to agree to statutory price control of food and rationing They
liked neither, and had committed themselves to their Assembly not to
accept them I made cleat the necessity for both, and that I was determined
to enforce them, and in the en d I think the pn cc was the only real difficulty
1 left a price of Rs 9 4 as maximum for next rabi crop for them to consider
I think Hutchings, the Food Secretary > had rather queered the pitch by
giving the Chief Minister the idea that he would accept the current pnee
(about 10 8) as the maximum (when I got back to Delhi the Food Member,
Snvastava, indicated politely that he thought Rs 9 4 was much too high
and that he hoped to set pnrcs down to 7-8) I doubt if any of these
'experts — Snvastava, Gregory, 1 Raisman or Hutchings — really know
how prices will go or whether statutory price control will work. I hked
Khizar, 2 the Punjab Chief Minister, attractive, straight and courageous,
I should say Rest of the Ministry of no great account, but Chhotu Ram 3
is quite a personality though not very wise, I suspect
I enjoyed visit toNWFP, I have always liked Peshawar since I was
stationed there nearly 40 *ycars ago All they want at present is a really
stout Governor, which they have got at present They are just beginning
to play at politics and I suppose will before long be as political as anyone
December J
A very trying day At Council meeting Braund, Regional [Food] Com-
missioner, gave a very depressing account of the situation in Bengal
administration — apathy, inefficiency and lack of public spirit — in the
matter of food, this only confirms what I already knew or suspected, we
want a new Governor and some new men at top but how to galvanise
the corpse of Bengal administration will be a problem for the best man
Just before lunch Mountbatten came to see me about results of Cairo
conference He w as more tired and depressed than I have seen him He
had had a difficult time at Cairo with P M and with Generalissimo and
they had not got much settled M B said there was htde mention of India
1 S r Theodor Gregory Economic Adviser to the Go vemmtnc of India 1938 46.
a S r Khizar Hyit Khan Tiwana Premier of the Punjab 1943-7
s Sir Chhotu Ram the most prominent Umda member of the Unionist Patty and for
many years a Minister m the Punjab
4Q H£ST MONTHS AS VICEKOY
and her economics and he did not show P M my memorandum on
India's capacity, but he did (rather unwisely, I think) touch on the political
problem and the P M blew up and damned not onl} him but me and all
my v* orks
Otherwise it was paper* paper all the day A. curious old thing called
Sir Eric Teichman 1 dined, he looked as if he was all falling to hits, but had
come from Chungking -via Chinese Turkestan and Russian Turkestan
(some 7000 or Sooo miles), looking at supply route into China He made
one quite good remark* I said * Chinese economy is very rocky, isn't it 7 '
He replied *You don't rock much when you arc sitting on the bottom.'
December 2
Started morning with Counal on Punjab announcement about price-
control and rationing It \v ent quite well and Council supported me on the
9 4 price against the Food Members desire to wait in hope of fixing a
much lower price
December 7
M B dined and u e had a cmema — Casablanca a typical film story of the
sentimental-thriller r> pe The others seemed to like it but I was neither
touched nor thrilled and said so to M J3 afterwards He is a great film fan
and was horrified He apparently has one most nights — *so much easier
and quicker than reading a novel' he urged, 'But I seldom read novels'
I said *But what do } ou read then for relaxanon, from ) our writing it is
obvious that }ou do read sometimes' I replied that I read biographies and
poetry rather than novels 'But dont you like musical films? 1 *I fear I am
not musical "But you don't need to be musical to enjoy musical films,
with just cheerful songs and dancing* He is s nil youthful and I am afraid
rcccw ed the impression that I was a cheerless kill-joy not to like films
Dtcetnber 10
There is too much routine \\ ork, interviews etc to give the Viceroy time
for constructive thinking or the relaxation which is essential to a> lax^ man
like myself Today was an awful da> > interviews, conferences papers
visitors to all meals etc literally from ioam.to lopm, and my only
relaxation was a nde 7 30*8 30 a,m What a life I have been struggling
fox the last 4S hours to find c\ en a short space to compose the speech
I have got to make at Calcutta
' Tr»*r1kd extensively at China and Ccntnl Aia. OngutaBy m the Onjobr ServKe m
Chin}.
1-22 DECEMBER IO43
P S Wc held a parade of the Viceregal Servants the other day, some
1 50 of them w ere there and it represented onlyjust over half They mostly
come from the U P apparently.
December 22
Got hack ) csterday from 10-day tour of Onssa, Assam and Bengal It "was
very strenuous and wc had little or no let-up Onssa is rather an attractive,
friendly, "backward province* full of malaria and other diseases, liable to
flooding, proud of its old history, and of the Onya traditions, but wjrh
little future, unless the contiguous Eastern States, which are reported to be
full of coal and minerals, join up and provide industrial wealth Even so,
I doubt whether the population would hx\c energy enough to take
advantage of it There has been considerable distress in parts which seems
to have been tackled quite well on the whole Lewis, the Governor, is a
pleasant sincere personality, I think he runs his province quite well He
had much to do with Gandhi at one time and has no great opinion of him.
The Chief Minister, the Maharaja of Parlakimedi, has not very high-
powered brains but seems honest He ts at odds with the next biggest
landowner of the province, the Raja of Kalhkote (a member of N D C ),
who was burning to pour into my ear all his rival's iniquities
We went on to Assam and spent three days at ShiHong, probably the
most attractive hill station in India but very out of the way, it takes five
hours in a car to reach a railway or airfield I saw all the Assam Ministers
and chief officials not a very impressive lot, except the chief minister, who
is a shrewd and competent politician, though how he would do m better
company I am not sure Assam is a small province "which seems to rub
along all right but it is not m any way go-ahead* The native Assamese
are lazy and likely to be ousted by more pushing but less attractive
Bengali Moslems The chie£ political problem is the desire of the Moslem
Ministers to increase this immigration into the uncultivated Government
lands under the slogan of 'Grow more food*, but what they are really after
is *grow more Moslems
We flew from Assam to Dacca and spent a night there — an unpleasant
place I thought but I do not like Bengal Dacca District has suffered badly
in the famine and is stiff suffering ranch from disease Little sign of
Government energy or of confidence in Government, but the troops are
running a good show
We arrived in Calcutta on Sunday morning (19th) and went to a
Memorial Service for Jack Herbert
42 FIRST MONTHS AS VICEROY
Spent the afternoon in interviews, and earl) part of the next morning
Then w ent to make my first important public speech as Viceroy at the
Chambers of Commerce As usual, though I had known of the speech for
m o months I had put off writing it till the last moment, and was stul in
labour with it the evening before M) staff had wanted it finished, vetted
by Departments, printed and ready for issue to the Press before I feft
Delhi on the i ith, but I can't do things that wa) , and it seems absurd that
a speech should become public property days before it is delivered 1 think
K wasn't a bad speech* given the conditions m India It has hid on the whole
a good Press, but has naturally disappointed the political elements, who
care little for the economic conditions of the country except as it provides
material to attack the Government
At the cmidasien <f ths speech W<i\ ell said that he had madi. tw Mention 'of
the constitutional or political problems of India not because they dt£ twt
constantly tn my mmd t not because I hai e not the fullest sympathy u it" the
aspirations of India ton ara*s Self Government not because I consider political
progress impossible during the course of the u ar , but because I do not
btht\ t that I ran jiwta ihnr solution any tnsier by talhmq cboni thtmp^t at
presait * The speech u as mainly dt. voted to the problems of food t coal t inflation,
and Post-lVar Reconstruction
In the afternoon visited the 24 Parganas District South of Calcutta —
hospitals, food kitchens, camps for destitutes etc tt looked a hit better
than Dacca but pre try grim The Army is doing a fine show On return
I saw the principal Bengal Ministers and spoke to them pretty straight
about the state of Bengal, the delay in rationing Calcutta etc They said
little, even Suhrawardy 1 I don't think they have any intention really to
get down to things, or the ability to do so if they had the intention And
Rutherford has no longer the will to drive them, and is only thinking of
getting a\\a> on leave Bengal is most depressing, and 1 sent a strong
tele gram to S of S on r eturn , thtry have wasted at least X\\ o critical months
in appointing a Gq\ cm or, and do not seem even now to have any sense of
urgency
On the \\ a^ back to Delhi } cstcrday 1 landed at Asansol and w ent down
a coal-mine, had about 5 miles walk underground Mine was only being
v* orked at half capacity owing to shortage of labour The conditions
abo%c ground m the wa} of housing and amenities were thoroughl) bad
and I do not w onder that mines find it difficult to keep labour
* W £ %«bavwwiifj ^wnriimfcVricftiin Vaguer arfrmximcTooi Vunisnr
liter Chief Minister JJengal Aftet Independence he for * timft Ptwic Mmatef of
Pilot in.
22-29 DECEMBER 1943
43
A \cry hectic tout ami I was glad to get back to Delhi 'Be it cvli so
humble there s no place hkc home 1
Discussed food and coa! problems at Executive Council this morning
Both present urgrnt and difficult problems. The problems ibour coal
include where to procure more labour how to induce mine-owners to
v*ork mines to capacity (some of them arc undoubtedly going slow
because of Excess "Profits Tax) how to pmenr bnbery and dishonesty m
the distribution of the available coal which industries to put on short
rations and many others
D cembcr 23
Since I returned from tour the spate of paper has been unending and I have
had not a moment for constructive thinking for any work outside the
ordinary routine private correspondence or recreation In fact the whole
pace of these first two months of my Viccroyaity has been much too hot
and I sec little prospect of jts slowing down
I had a talk to M B and C -in-C There seem to be six or seven Japanese
divisions in Burma now An attack on Jap positions in the Chin fulls faded
as my attacks on Donbaik and Rathcdaung did last winter M B says no
Japanese entrenched position has yet been taken by assault and that the
Jap position in Mew Guinea and elsewhere m SW Pacific were blasted
out of existence by weight of metal rather than taken by assault 1 wonder
if this is correct it is as regards India though I sull think we should have
succeeded at Donbaik with 6*th Brigade if the attack had been earned oat
as I intended and directed
December 26
Work continued all over Xmas
Food and coal situations continue unsatisfactory and no rain has yet
fallen ui the Punjab Casey s appointment as Governor of Bengal has been
announced but there is no immediate prospect of his arrival and now
Mrs C is seriously ill
December 29
Bernard Ferguwon 1 turned up unexpectedly yesterday evening for a njght
and I had a talk with him about his experiences with 77 Bde in Burma
He says the venture was well worth while and that "Wingate s theories
1 Br gaditr Sir Bernard Fergusson (now Lord Bilknttw) Govsmor-Generai of New
Zealand Served with ihe Wingate cxped t ons mto Burma 1944 5 ADC to
Wawll at Aldershot I93S-7 Avhoi of Beymd the Chutdu>n (London 1945) And of
Wavell Pcrtra t of a Sold cr (London 1961) and other books
44 FIRST MONTHS AS VICEROY
are right, though the troops did not do all that Wingate claimed that they
did He said Wrngate was, and is, extremely difficult— impossible at times
— and he had many tows -with him, but he still believes in his ideas He ms
apprehensive about his forthcoming role, if he had to go in and come out
again as he did not feel we could abandon the Burmans who helped us to
the vengeance of the Japanese a second time
The Executive Council this morning has as its only item the weekly
Food summary, but it was made the occasion by practically every member
present to propose that the Central Government should make itself
responsible entirely, or ux a greater degree, for the food problem in Bengal,
and the majority obviously favoured Section 95 Government They were
all Hindus, except Mohammed Us man, who would not be sorry to see the
fall of a Moslem League Ministry , but I think their chief feeling was that
the Central Government would be held responsible anyhow if things went
wrong in Bengal, so that we might as well take the bull by the horns
1 already had the constitutional problem under examination and the
possibility of having to take over But the S of S seems by his last tele-
gram to have got cold feet over Section 93 Government in Bengal, and
the Governor and his chief officials are at present a weak instrument
I shall probably have to get assistance from the Army It's a misfortune
that they have delayed so long at home over the appointment of Casey
December 31
A long day but mainly routine Interviews all morning a Raja to lunch,
meeting of War Committee on coal in the afternoon A fairly typical
end to 1945
Summary of
It has been a hectic, and surprising, year for me I think an unmerited
share of opprobrium was cast on me for the Arakan operations, which
were quite unsupported by the War Cabinet, misunderstood, and mis-
represented by the P M , partly owing to his pro- American bias (and there
is no doubt that Stdwcll and the A men cans in India did their best to
malign me to Washington — partly to cover their own failure to move the
Chinese), and partly because he has never hked me So that my military
career ended under the shadow of failure
A very curious chain of circumstances then forced on him my appoint-
ment as Viceroy as the only way out of a difficult place, he was pleased to
&vd vt wll iccttvcd, anrV then horrified to find I nad liberal views about
India and was prepared to express them-
29-3^ DECEMBER 1943 *5
I accepted the Viccroyalty in the spirit of a military appoiiitmcnt-
one goes where one is told in time of war without nuking conditions or
aslung questions I think I oui;ht to haic treated it m a political spirit and
found out what the policy to India reall> *as to be and I think I could
ha\e made m> own conditions, for I think Winston was really hard put
to it to find someone Hou c^ cr, here I am and I must do my best, though
i- . . *t i i . ^rr.... , UirA tn the mind ana
frankl) appalled at the prospect
soft to the body.
I certainly do not look forward to 1944 and its proDicim — ,
and inflation problems do not look an> lighter, there seems likely to be
little progress in the war on the Burma front, and 1 see no prospect ot
any advancement in the political field
M* Almo« the last, if not the last, book 1 read in 1 943 was P hoem *>
« • > — «- - mtellectual vmintr officer e*\ e me
by Mr H G Wells, which a rather intellectual yom.g —
He stayed in the house and « Ml of ideas about the *f*"
in this 'var and of the v, orld at large after the war I am afraid I f»«jdm«
of Wells' book sheer nonsense. The trouble with most of these intellectual
is that they have little knowledge of ordinary human nature and no
'r ....._j.jl._„ m n«n Thcv are apt to regard the
expenence of government and admuustraaon i», •» -r- ~ =
mass of human bemgs. not only in their own country, but m aU lands as
sensible people moved by reason instead of ignorant people swayed by
prejudice Ji sentiment Intellectuals fa»e often started a revolution by
their theories, but have never yet m history been able to «™L*£«
« my study goes, and I am pretty sure that the disciples « f ^™""™
cendy equipped and fitted up Rolls-Royce, for which tbe^J
petrol-hunL nature-is lackmg. 1 behe, e the world wd
on m its rattle-trap patched up old Ford which will run WratawonderM
teller of stories Wells was, it « in a way a pity he took to inaccurate history
and unpractical social theories
THE FIGHT
AGAINST FAMINE
January i, i$44
I remember a Latin couplet from my schooldays
Perturbabantttr Cons tantinopoh cam
Innumerabilibus %o Ihctfudimb us 1
I feel the same way as the citizens of Constantinople at the dawn of this
New Year But I am not going to mate any new-year resolutions about
it 1 shall carry on tn my rather haphazard, opportunist, almost Micaw bcr-
hke way t working on certain guiding principles which have b) some
surprising good p) fortune brought me to this high position
January $
The food problem, coal cm« and inflationary threat continue to be our
main anxieties The Food Department and my staff urge mc towards
dismissing the Bengal Ministry as incapable of dealing with the food
question, and going into Section 91 I want to be convinced first that the
Ministry is really incapable, under the firm direction (so I hope) of Casey
when he arrives, to deal with the problem, and secondly that a Section 93
regime could make certain of putting things right I sent my D P S V ,
Abell, down to Calcutta } ester day to put these questions to the Governor
Casey has cabled to saj that he hopes to be in Delhi by the 1 6th
1 ha\e sent a strongly worded telegram to S of S about imports of
food grains, to ask for % definite guarantee of 1 ,000,000 tons during 1944
Nothing \ cry much othcru isc I ha\ e concocted my first letter to H.M
the King, made a short and fatrly hght-heartcd speech ( 4 not long enough or
dull enough for a Viceroy* was P S V *s comment on the draft) to open the
Indian Science Congress, and presented 2 V C s at a parade outside Delhi
Fort — quite an impressive ceremony in a fmc setting with a good crowd
Mountbatten seemed a bit overworked and depressed when I saw him
last- His resources gradually, or not even gradually, being taken away
1 The people of Contfaniuioflli* were hc\ct counties wyuctw* *
r— io January 1944 47
and he sees little prospect of accomplishing much of what he had planned
this winter
Janu try 6
Discussed with Jenkins and Abcll result of Iattcr*s visit to Calcutta, and
approved despatch of telegram to S of S recommending Section 93
administration for Bengal It is against principles to take over from
an Indian Government when they arc in difficulties, they will never learn
to rule themselves if the) art not compelled to face their responsibilities
and difficulties But this Government has been given a good run, and too
much is at stake I think they might have been all right with a Governor
who was prepared to take a stronger line with them two months ago,
when they were thoroughly frightened, but Rutherford has not done so,
cither through weakness of character or ill-health (Thome, 1 who knows
him \\ ell, says he has always been disinclined for firm action) He also
professes scruples over Section 93, he remarked to Abell that the late
Viceroy was mchncd to be too meticulous about the Constitution but that
the present one seemed too prone to disregard it
January p
Cabinet have turned down my proposal to appoint an Indian as Finance
Member 2 I gather from S of S that John Anderson and Winston
torpedoed it Cabinet also obviously very perturbed over my recom-
mendation to go into Section 93 111 Bengal They are considering it on
Tuesday (Jan n) t I also am a bit worried over it hut am sure it is right
In a private telegram to the Secretary of State dated 7 Jan XVdvell said
that he was prepared to await Casey s arrival, if the latter felt that immediate
action would embarrass htm
January 10
I saw Nazimuddin 3 die Bengal Premier and told him J was dissatisfied
with the state of Bengal He said things would be all right if his Ministry
was given a chance and supported against his political enemies I rather like
him and think he is straight but incapable 1 have little opinion of his Food
1 Sit John Thome ICS Secretary to the Governor-General (Public) 1938-44 He
officiated as Home Member of the Executive Council on the retirement of Sir Reginald
Maxwell in X944 sad held the post again m 1943
* To replace Sir Jeremy Raisman who was due to retire Owing to difficulty m selecting
a successor Raisman was g ven a year * extension till April 1945
* Sir Nazimuddm who was later Governor-General (1045 51) and Prune Minister (1951-
3) of Pakistan
4& THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE
Minister Suhraward) , who is also in Delhi and ^ as inclined at first, to be
truculent in an interview with Jenkins
hi the afternoon made a tour of some villages round Delhi to see
medical and veterinary establishments, cattle, schools consolidation
projects (the process of simplifying land tenure) etc I walked through one
village and it seemed fairly clean and prosperous N¥ India is a much
better proposition than Bengal
January 12
I ha\ e decided to alter the method of business At present I spend my
whole mornings in interviews some of which are interesting and valuable
but in many of which time is wasted* since I think that Indian Members
of Council with an interview feel that they must fdl in their whole time,
whether they have any real business or not And the morning is far my
best time for constructive work. So in future I shall see Members only
once a fortnight as a routine interview m die afternoon but shall en
courage them to ask for special appointments in the morning whenever
they have anything of importance to discuss
At Council I raised the question of a Commission of Enquiry into the
Bengal famine Majority were in favour of early enquiry I cabled S of S
accordingly
In afternoon visited Delhi University of which I am Chancellor Sir
Maurice Gwyer 1 is an enthusiast and has done much work on the project —
a group of colleges on the site of the old Viceregal Lodge I think education
is probably the thing we have done worst in India both from our own
point of view and that of the Indians We have allowed a bad system of
advanced education to grow up — unpractical no development of charac-
ter concentration on examinations (which arc often very dishonesdy run)
The Delhi project should be good if ever earned through, and so long
as a good man like Gwyer is in charge
January 13
The War Cabinet has turned down my proposal for Section 91 in Bengal,
they say Case) must be given a chance to press Ministry into adequate
action I do not think they arc capable of taking it or of restoring con-
fid ence and reasonable honesty into the Province I cat led S of S pointing
1 Six Maurice Gwycr Chief Just cc of India and President of the Federal Court 1937-43
Smct the Federal Pin ttfrtie Act of lpjj never brought into opent on, he had Lttlc
judmit work and so devoted hit time to Delhi UniTrrsity of v hich he ww VictsChaiiceUor
from 19JS to 1930
ro-io* jasvauy 1944
49
out that Cabinet lud now twice disregarded my advice and that I hoped
the) would not do so again on the demand for imports
First da) of National Defence Council meeting The discussion on food
showed, I think, that we should have had public opinion very largel)
behind us m taking a strong line in Bengal
farm try t6
The National Defence Council ^cnt off much as usual The food problem
was the one which aroused most interest, and one and all urged strong
action on the Centre
War Cabinet have proposed an unknown, young and apparently, from
die description gi\cn by S of S T tactless and ambitious Canadian as
Finance Member t havuig turned down my recommendation for an Indian
on the plea that they must ha\ e someone really outstanding J cabled a
strong protest.
Wai ell conveyed his 'strong pretest* both in cahks and in a tetter, and said
in the course of them
Cabinet 9 s lack of imagination in dialing with India is sometimes astonishing
Tftey turned down my recommendation for appowttttent of an Indian on plea
that they must appoint man of^aehnou tedged and outstanding qualifications"
Person now proposed is certainly not this Surely yon cannot suppose that
selection of young and almost unknown Canadian, tt hose name does not appear
tn any book of reference and who has no experience of hulia t utll he easy to
defend Your colleagues must stop trying to have everything both tvays Cabinet
should either find me a really outstanding man from V K or reconsider my
recommendation *
Jamna Das Mehta 1 stayed for the National Defence Council meeting
Obviously very flattered Peter went to see him to enquire whether he
was comfortably housed He complained that there had been a rat in Jus
room during the night Peter rose to the occasion 'Ah a rat sir, those are
for our most distinguished guests, the others only get mice'
M B tells following story A propagandist of S C Bose s 2 army on
the Arakan front shouted across the lines We shall be in Delhi in ten
days 1 A sepoy, recently returned from leave, shouted back Not on these
ruddy railways you won't'
* A former member of Congress and ex Mayor of Bombay
* Subhas Chandra Bose an extremist Congress leader from Bengal, escaped front
detention after the outbreak of war and made his way to Germany and thence tn 1943 to
Jaban The Japanese made him Commander in-Chief of an Indian National Army (I N A )
that they formed from such of the Indian prisoner* of war as they could induce to join The
1 N A took part somewhat ingtonously in (ie Japanese operations against Eastern India
in iqj.1 A Subhas Chandra Bose was lulled in an air crash m 1 945
THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE
Jamtary ij
My first visitor this morning was M N Roy, the Soaal Democratic
leader Has been a Bengal terrorist a. worker for Germany Indian repre-
sentatn e of the Comintern expelled from France, imprisoned in India,
and is now trying to form a People's Part} in India to oppose Congress
Has apparently rather got round Home Member who actually suggested
tins stormy petrel as a candidate for a seat on my Executive Council He
impressed me quite favourably, rather more to him than most Indian
politicians, more independence more guts perhaps But I doubt whether
he has much following or is likely to have much
Saw the Service Chiefs — Auchuileck, M B , Peirse I talked to Oin-C
about Finance Membership, he entirely agrees with me that it ought to
be an Indian Peirse agreed with me about the necessity to give Indians
participation in any Empire air crews on imperial routes and saw no reason
why they should not make good
Jatmary jo
Got back last night from a tour of U P , Bombay and Udaipur — strenuous
but interesting
The U P is well tun Maurice Hallctt, m spite of his ta.ther vague
demeanour, is a first-class administrator and a firm one, and gets things
done without fuss or friction or eyewash I went to Gorakhpur (first time
a Viceroy had visited it, they said) and saw the Gurkha headquarters and
recruiting depot an interesting and well-run show, and a big Labour
Depot where labour gangs were recruited for the mines, docks etc The
scheme, which seemed to be working very well is due to an enthusiast,
one Moss, formerly a soldier now in I C S f very fat and like some fat men
full of energy and dn\c
At Lucknow there \\ ere the usual interviews a garden part) , dinner
parties luncheon parties which arc inevitable 1 suppose but do not lead
to much business for one hkc myself who is slow of thought and sparing
of speech- I made the acquaintance of two prominent Liberals and 'elder
statesmen' Sir Tq Bahadur Sapru 1 and Sir Maharaj Singh 1 Both full of
culture and pleasant to meet but to m> mind of little \\ eight as political
leaders I did not talk politics with Sapru, onl) Boy Scouts of which he is
' Bih^Jur Sapni Advocate and Zemmdar (landlord) « one time a member of
the Aii wui i Optii Committee- Law Member of th* Viceroy • Execunvt Council
Pretidcnt ot Indu Liberal Federation
* Rjja S f Mahiraj Singh, an In dun Chrutun and distinguished retired Government
orVul who had been Aptrm General for India in South Africa igj*-5 I l m»dent or the
National Dbenl federation igaj *, and after Independence vu Governor of Bombay
194* 3*
17-30 JANUAHY I944
51
head (I think he was disappointed tlut I did not talk politics, but it seemed
to me u would have been of little value) Maharaj Singh admitted all the
mistakes of the Congress leaders but merel) adjured mc to release them
His wife criticised violently all that we had done or were doing m a talk to
mc after dinner but had again no constructs c solution I met another of
these eld Liberals „ Jayakar, 1 in Bombay and he gave me much the same
impression I feel that the cause of India's political troubles may be our
failure in the past to make more of these liberals and to take them into
our confidence and gnc them responsibility many years ago with the
result that they mnrrasred our sincerity and honest), and the leadership
passed into irresponsible unpractical hands Now they realise the futility
with which they have been led but with the sensitiveness of Indians can
sec nothing but the insult* of their chosen leaders* being m detention and
will not embark on a more practical policy f even if they liad the pow cr to
command a following The only hope now seems to be m getting younger
and more vigorous men to co-operate, I have only seen two possibilities
so fkr — Sir Cbhoru Ram in the Punjab and M N Roy the ex -terrorist —
excluding Khizar the Punjab premier who might be \ery good if he has
the spur to enter all-India politics
Generally the political situation in the U P is J thmk, back to some
years ago, twenty or more Officials and police seemed well on top of
their work, they all said U P would remain perfectly peaceful provided
Gandhi and Working Committee of Congress were kept behind bars
I thought poorly of the Talukdats of Oudh a degenerate lot of absentee
landlords living in the city instead of on their estates and asking Govern-
ment to raise their rents But I may be unfair to them or to some of them
I daresay a collection of our country gentlemen might make a poor
impression on a progressive foreigner
In Lucbiow I saw the rationing scheme which seemed to be working
well and an Indian military hospital quite good I take some credit to
myself for the improvement I made in military hospitals and medical
arrangements in India during the two years I was C-m C They would
have improved anyhow in the natural course of progress but I pushed
them on faster than the Medical people or staff would have done by
themselves
And so to Bombay (January 22 to 27) We started with an hour or so at
the races— a proper Maharaja's day they won I think, 6 of the 8 races
I met the Bombay advisers — Knight Bnstow and Collins and asked
Mr Jayatar i leatfcag lawyer and pokt can from Bombay Judge Federal Court
India, J 93 7-9
52 THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE
Bnstow about the main political prisoners He said Gandhi seemed quite
content to remain where he was* the Working Committee was still under
his influence, they would ne\er co-operate I saw the Food Committee —
Bombay is very proud of the wa) it has handled its food problem — they
insisted on the necessity of imports to form a reserve
The other two days in Bombay included the usual interview s parties,
visits to ration offices I also paid a completely surprise YBtt to the poorer
parts of Bombay, saw a. City Police Station and went round the docks
I saw Brelvi of the Bombay Chronicle, one of the most violent of the
Congress papers, he is not a bad little man he tried to persuade me to allow
Devadas Gandhi 1 to talk politics to his rather when he visited his mother 1
w ho is very ill Sir Francis Low 3 of the Times of India was interesting about
a conversation he had had with Rajagopalachanar* who is getting very
tired of the present situation and wants to start something on his own if
Gandhi won't, and has asked how to approach Jinnah with a view to
Jmnah and Gandhi getting together I doubt whether Jinnah will play
I did not get on \ ery well with 'young Tata with whom I had a short talk
after dinner, a pity as I think he is able and influential about Indian
business, but he seemed to tnc conceited and unhelpful, I expect I didn t
take him the right way
From Bombay we fiew to Bel gaum on 25th, and spent the day looking
into District administration system and saw a Forestry Depot V/e
motored 200 miles to and through the Bijapur District over rather bumpy
and dusty roads on a hottish day 1 was garlanded 4$ tunes, had large
numbers of people presented to me, and altogether was pretty busy from
8 a m., w hen we left Bel gaum till 7 30 p m. when wc got mto a train at
Sholapur Byapur is a historic old city with many fine rums and I should
have hked more time to see it I visited a village a few rrules out who pd*
up a very good reception and entertainment but I think that the talent had
been largely imported m fact I was almost reminded of Catherine the
Great's tour of Russia when Potemkm, her favourite and chief M mister,
had a touring company of artistes complete with effects and scenery, to
represent happy villagers wherever Her Majesty w cnt
Casey had turned up on the 10th (at tucknow) and 1 had an evening
with him he seemed in good heart and not depressed by the somewhat
gloomy picture I painted to him. He said no one m Cabinet except Am cry
supported mv proposal about Sect 1 on 93 in Bengal
' Gandhi * fourth wn
* Mrt Gandhi had elected to iharc bet husband t confinement
» IU1 tof of the Twtft cf InJui 1 931-4?
30 JANUATtY-7 FEBUUAHY 1944
53
I had a telegram from Winston a couple of days ago (first communica-
tion from him since I left UK) thanking mc for a New Year letter I sent
him to congratulate him on Ins rcco\ cry He expressed approval of what
I was doing, said Casey would be most useful to mc, and expressed him-
self optimistically about the new battle on Italian front
February 2
Two long days in office A series of interviews and two big conferences
One on ist with C~in-C and Benthall on Calcutta Port organisation and
military control of Assam railways Americans arc a little difficult in these
mattery if anjthtng is not to their Iikmg, instead of discussing it with
authorities on the spot they are inclined to send a high-power telegram to
Washington demanding action from Chiefs of Staff Calcutta Port is
rather a mess but it is at least partly due to Americans failing to fulfil their
promises about materials, and I don't feci lite dismissing tried officials
simply because th e A men cans d on* t like them 3 ut th c Port certainly wants
reorganisation I said we would get up Elderton, the Port Commissioner,
the man the Americans dislike, to discuss it I accepted the proposal for
military control over railway movement
On 2nd we had a long Council mainly on a proposal to raise railway
fares in the Budget, Members didn*t like it much but accepted it by a small
majority provided the proceeds were earmarked to improve passenger
amenities I think they may go back on it when the Budget proposals as
a whole are discussed on Saturday
Febntary 7
The Council meetings on the Budger on Saturday evening and Sunday
morning went off quite well on the whole I had to begin by reading the
not act on the matter of secrecy since I was informed on unimpeachable
evidence that the result of the meeting on railway fares and the way
individual in embers spoke was known to the Press almost at once Al-
though Indians cannot keep their mouths shut, 1 am not sure that New
Delhi is very much more indiscreet than Whitehall Raisman was very
good* explained his proposes clearly, was patient and tactful m meeting
opposition and conciliatory Miidahar let off fireworks and a lot of not
very well considered opposition to the proposals but quietened down after
Raisman s convincing but quite tactful refutation of his arguments
Snvastava was very concerned about his dividends but on the whole glad
to get off lighter than he expected (he is a very nch man), Ambedkar,
always a bit muddle-headed suggested that we should stop inflation by
54 THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE
the simple process of issuing no more currency, old Jogendra Singh
wanted reconstruction to be financed as Vw ell as the war without increasing
taxation The chief opposition was to the taxes on tea, coffee and betel nut,
because it was realised that they would be unpopular and would he
criticised as taxing the poor man's little luxuries But Raisman justified
broadening the basis of taxation in preparation for post-war reconstruc-
tion, and his proposals went through with only a few minor concessions
Two conferences thi* afternoon one on wages of Indian seamen, a
thorny problem we have discussed before Indian seamen get about £5
a month, Crunesc about £i 5, and British £22 to 0 The liberal man says
*this is racial discrimination, why should men doing the same wort be
paid differently because of the colour of their skins* Actually to pay a
las car at anything approaching even Chinese rates would throw the whole
Indian wage scale out of gear We agreed on 3- moderate increase, since
shipping companies were likely to grant it in any case, or las cars were
Ukely to strike
At other conference we got agreement on new organisations for Calcutta
port and Assam L of C, no mean achievement in view of American
attitude I take some credit to myself for refusing to decide organisations
purely on paper and insisting on getting up Elderton, the Chairman of
Port Commissioners from Calcutta
February p
Flew to Lahtpur, near junction of U P and C P to see Archie John 1 and
2nd Battalion* training there in jungle warfare Talked to them extempore
for about } hour and then had picnic lunch, which we had brought, with
officers
Archie John, C O and officers all say it will be very difficult to maintain
morale unless battalion has a go at the Jap this cold v* eather
Got back to find telegram to say Cabinet seemed to be taking an un-
favourable view of my request for gram imports so sent strongly worded
telegram to S of S and to P M
In the course ofhts telegram IVavell satd
1 Bengal famine was one of the greatest disasters that has hef alien any people
under British rule and damage to our reputation here hoth among Indians and
foreigners in India is incalculable You are better able to judge effect at home and
abroad
1 Major A. J A Wavdl the Black Watch Wavell s only son
* The Bhtk Watch Lord WjivcIL * regiment
7~l6 FEBRUARY 1944
55
Attempt by His Majesty's Got eminent to prox e on the basis of admittedly
defective statistics that u e Can do it tthout the help demanded uould be regarded
f ere by all opinion British and Indian as utterly indefensible Please u am your
colleagues once more that n^id statistical approach is futile and that my i tens
are based on personal discussions u ith all Got emors and visits to seven of the
elet en Prot tttces
*I u am His Majesty s Cot eminent ti \tl\ all seriousness that if they rtfttse
our demands they me rtshno a catastrophe of far greater dmensw?is that}
Bengal famine They must either tntst the opinion of the man they have
appointed to adi tse it an on Indian affairs or replace htm *
Ftbniary 10
Flew to JuUundur and spent chy driving a hundred odd miles round that
part of Punjab to sec work going on in Scwalik hills and Hoshiarpur
district against sod erosion
My Military Secretary tells me I have flown over 1 o 000 miles in the
since landing at Karachi in October* as well as 400 by train and 1000
b) car during tours — total average 3000 miles a month touring
Fehrttary 14
During week-end held investiture in Durbar Hall cleared off arrears of
paper work finished draft of my speech for the Legislature and started
sitting to Simon Elwes for a portrait Had a letter from M N Roy the
Radical Democratic leader whom 1 saw lately practically demanding
seats for himself and some of his party on the Executive Council and
a subsidy my comment to P S V was that I was Viceroy and did not
propose to be vice-Roy Brelvi editor of the Bombay Chronicle has been
making persistent efforts to draw me on the release of the leaders by
a manifesto signed by all the nationalist editors I told them they must wait
for my speech on 17th That speech will please no-one of the politicians
but it is the best I can say in present circumstances I think it has been
passed by S of S at home wjth only textual emendation
F bniary 16
I found some of my colleagues on the Executive Council rather shaken by
my remarks the other day about disclosures to the Press and anxious to
expiain their own clear conscience
Lord Knollys come out on behalf of BO AC adopted the official
BOAC attitude on Indian participation in Empire air route across 2ndia
1 e that Indians m crew would not enjoy confidence of public and would
$6 THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE
prejudice BOAC competition with Dutch air hues I disabused him of
idea that BOAC would get away with an Empire air bne across India in
which Indians had no share
Today, I had to spend a good deal of the day dealing with a telegram
telling me the Cabinet had turned down flat my demand for food imports
in 1944 I concocted a somewhat spirited riposte warning HMG of the
consequences, and got C-m-C and Mountbattcn, whom I called into
conference, to back it It will be interesting to see result
In the course of his 1 spin ted riposte Wavell said that he regarded tt as a
practical certainty that there would be large-scale disaster tn India if imports
u ere refused
Council meeting was fortunately short but meantime boxes and boxes
of papers came in, and I was up till midnight dealing with them
February 17
My address to the Legislature On the whole I think it went as well as
could be expected, though I shall have a bad press with the politicians
Snvastava and Mohammed Us man sent congratulations and Dr Khare
whom I saw in the evening seemed genuinely to hke it
In this speech IVaveJi stressed that India was a natural ami within which the
tu 0 great communities must decide how to hi e together ; as communities differing
in culture or religion had contrived to do elsewhere He reaffirmed the Crtpps
offer, t e full self-government at the end of the war under a constitution formed
by Indians themselves and meanwhile co^opefation trt the Government of
India under the existing constitution He regretted that one important element \
u hich contained 'much ability and htgh~mtndedness', was standing aloof He
it ould ttle *to have the co-operation of this element tn solving the present and
the future problems of India But he saw no reason to release those respottst ble
for the Quit India rebellion until he was convinced that the policy of non-
co-operation and obstruction had been 'withdrawn — not m satt-chth ashes,
that helps no one — but tn recogtittion of a mistaken and unprofitable policy*
Hutchings the Food Secretary came back from Bengal in rather more
optimistic mood He thinks main part of crop 15 still in hands of cultivators
and has not } ct got into hands of speculators Rationing in Calcutta is not
going too badly Crux is to get stocks of food into districts in time He
spent much time with Suhrawardy and found him rather more co-
operative tlnn before He says Casey is a great success but looks a sick man
He thorough!) appro\cd of my telegram home yesterday about food
imports
l6 FEBRUAUY-3 MARCH I944 57
March 3
Returned jesterda) from tour to Madras and CP Madras visit Listed
from February 1 8 to 25 I saw the Collectors of all 23 Districts of Madras
Province and had the usual large numbers of interviews with more or less
prominent persons, so I got a fairly good but hasty impression of the
whole Presidency
Of interviews the most important uas three-quarters of an hour with
Rajagopalachanar He certain!) docs not give the impression of a forcible
character — very few Indiins do— but was pleasant and intelligent He said
he had read my speech and saw in it some desire to make progress He
admitted previous mistakes of Congress and asked what sort of progress
I had in mind as a possibility I said that to speak quite frankly and o/f the
record, what seemed to me required at the moment was a Council of *All
the Talents', of men chosen for their eminence who would be recognised
as representative of the best elements in India who would work out
India's problems under the present Constitution without paying attention
to communal politics but in the interest of India as a whole I said I would
not accept a 'National Government* with so many nominees of Congress
and so many of Muslim League, who took their orders from outside I had
expected R to ask for permission to visit Gandhi, but he said it was no use
his doing so until he had a definite proposal He said G was useless as an
administrator but as a politician was more capable of compromise titan
the Working Committee "We parted on quite good terms and he asked
if he could come and see me in Delhi but I doubt whether he really has
much influence or the leadership to command a following All these
Indian leaders seem to me to want everything handed to them on a plate
and their hands held
I also saw an ex-Congress Minister Subbarayan really more interested
in cricket than politics He admitted that the British were sitting pretty and
could get all the co-operauon they required to end the war, without
making any political move, and it was this knowledge and fear that
British would use it that was causing such frustration and bitterness m
Indian political circles
I had a long day at Coimbatore on February 22 full of surprises and
problems The programme did not at all prepare me for all that was
coming One does not expect to find a naval guard of honour drawn up for
one on an aero dro me several hundred miles fro m the sea Then I had shortly
afterwards to remark on the points of the village stud bull, to grasp the
rationing system of a village to see the village dispensary Imniecuatery
afterwards I had to interview the Collectors of 5 Districts, each much
58 THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE
larger than an English county, and learn in a few minutes some of the
particular problems of each, to receive a deputation of planters representing
rubber, coffee and tea and in ten minutes hear the grievances of the three
widely differing interests, to listen to an impassioned tirade against
Brahmins by an old bearded gentleman with a rather sketchy knowledge
of English, and to deal with one or two telegrams Then a quick change
into \miform to lunch with the Training Centre of the Madras Regiment
(50 officers and some do V C O s to shake hands with and say something
polite to) O n the return journey visit a village and inspect a village temple
— oranges and lemons being handed one by the pnesr, while a drum and two
horns represented the bells of Sl Clements — followed by the explanation
of an irrigation scheme by a nervous and not very lucid engineer
Then an hour s 'rest*, during which P S V produced a box of papers,
after which the programme called simply for a drive through Coinibatore
Actually this involved driving through all the streets of the town lined
apparently by the whole population of C {problem, does one wave one s
hat or one's hand or nothing to a large stolid crowd lining streets to look
at one?) Wc stopped at a rationing centre where the rationing scheme was
explained at some length, at the Town Council where 32 Councillors
were presented, a garland hung round my neck and a speech of welcome
made, at an Agricultural College 'where the Principal would gladly have
talked agriculture for hours, and then, suddenly, at a Refugee Settlement,
of refugees from Malta, Burma and other portions of the British Empire,
where one had a most Io^al reception, and had to inspect Boy Scouts,
a canteen, a living quarter etc and to listen to another speech of welcome
Back to the Collector's bungalow just in time for a small party in which
one had to talk or listen to more planters, another rabid anti-Brahmin, an
ultra-loyahst Indian, a mill-owner, etc Who says that the Viceroy doesn't
earn his salary ?
So on to Nagpur and CP on Feb 25 Much the usual programme
C P seems an attractive Province and getting on all right Twynam has
produced an appreciation of the political situation, which he handed in
just as we left. It suggests leaving Congress to stew in their own juice and
hacking the Muslim League and Rajagopalachanar Hardly practical
politics, I think.
The usual &antic effort since to catch up on papers, hampered by a
number of interviews and a luncheon party and necessity to deal with
food situation While I was, on tour H.M G again refused to send any
imports of food and after discussion with Hurchings, G-in-C, and
Mountbattcn 1 sent off yet another telegram.
3-i6 march 1944 59
March 6
Dirl j 1 the millionaire supporter of Congress, came to sec me this morning
Wc had quite an interesting talk on industrial and agricultural develop-
ment of India, He recommended a Member of Council for Development
(dad he sec himself «i that role ? ) He only touched on politics at die end
and admitted the mistakes of Congress but said the problem was mainly
pS) chological and that my predecessor with all his qualities had lacked the
personal touch
Arcluc John was flown in, having been laid up with tick typhus, not
looking well but will soon recover, I hope
March 9
The tide of paper steadily rose against mc on 8th ( on evening of which we
had long Council of 2| hours mainly on the ^c\cd matter of the increase
of railway fares Council always disliked it, knowing it would be un-
popular and having had an adverse vote in the Assembly are now all for
dropping it,
March 10
On March 5 I sent another telegram home emphasising my urgent need
of imports and recording offer by Om*C and MB to gi\ e up part of
their imports of military stores 111 favour of food I said that as this was not
nearly enough I proposed to ask MB to get Americans to do the same
This drew two immediate telegrams from S of S and ? M that on no
account was I to approach Americans until War Cabinet had further
considered matter
March 11
HMG's only reaction so far to my last telegram about food imports
is a proposal that I should export 25 000 tons of rice per month to Ceylon
in return for a similar quantity of wheat and flour several months Eater
I sent back a quick and stuffy one I really think they are crazy at White-
hall or else they never trouble to read one's telegrams
March 16
Back from a short visit to Suid, two days at Karachi a day and a half in
Upper Smd The usual sort of programme There was hardly half an hour
that was not occupied Interviews I find trying — to see a succession of
1 CJ D Birla a highly successful financier and industrialist who contributed lii>etaJJy to
Congress funds and in interviews with successive Viceroys often con ve> ed to them the
Congress thinking on various cutters
60 THE F1CIIT AGAINST FA MIKE
people for ten minutes each and to try and get an> real information out of
them or to raise their morale is not the sort of thing for which a rather
slow-u, orking brain like mine is adapted
Generally speaking, Sind pros pen It is an agneul rural country, with no
food problem, and the only anxiety of the Zemindars is that their opposite
numbers in the Punjab may be making more monc) still out of the high
prices of grain, since the Sind Governor has managed to keep prices down
to a reasonable le\ et Though there is a Ministry, Dov* the Governor
exercises a very strong personal control He knoi* s Sind and all the tricks
and torrupt\ons of his Ministers— v. hich probably arc no \*orsc than
those of English politicians 100 years ago
Meanwhile Government has had thiec defeats in the Assembly on. the
budget, and I -wonder what sort of heart I shall find my Council in
March 18
Saw both M B. and Henry Pownall 1 and talked to them of situation on
Burma frontier It shows the respect they lm e for the Japanese tactics and
fighting that though they ha\ c something like twice the Japanese strength
available on the Chin Hills-Chindwin-Mampur front and have known
for months that the enemy were about to attack, they are both feebng
rather apprehensive of the result, and have taken aircraft off the ferry
route to China to fly into Manipur another division from Arakan The
17th Division is being pulled hack from Tiddim area by Japanese action
against their communications, although in numb en we must be superior
How does the Jap do it' The simple answer is that we have a very ponder-
ous L of C and the Jap has practically none at all, we fight with the idea
of ultimate survival^ the Jap seems to fight with the idea of ultimate death
and contempt for it, when he has done as much harm as possible The
flying in of Wingate's two brigades seems to have been a remarkable
performance after an initial set-back in which there were about 150
casualties from crashed or lost gliders But so far the Jap appears to have
taken no notice of this force in his rear, his independence of communica-
tions is remarkable
M B is prepared to back me up on food problem and agrees that
Americans must be told the situation officially if H.M G will not find
imports
Tfw apprehensions of Mountbatten and PoiwaU were well justified The
Japanese advanced with amazing boldness and skill through wooded and
1 Lt -Gen, Sir Henry Pownall at thu rune Chief nf <^ff m I n*A KAr»*r+,u n*.
■ ■r ell /*EAJTOAl I IQDA&V
I<S-24 MARCH 1944 °"l
almost traclltss mountains to the plakati oflntphai, and by the en I of March
they had aft the road from Imphat to Kohima leading to the railway at
Dtmapur, tiere threatening to heal through at Kohima and to ait the railway
itself and had hemmed mto a narrow area around the town oflmphal the thne
British-Indian divisions that u ere originally holding this front and a fourth that
ti as flown tnasa reinforcement from Arakrn For m my weeks the position u as
critical The large British-Indian force at Imphal had to be sttpphed by air
which, wxth the onset of the monsoon became exceedingly difficult But the
Japanese acre also m difficulties* aft
Kohima an J thpv to break the
stores there with u Inch to support themselves At the end of June casualties
exhaustion, and lack of supplies compelled them to withdraw their famished
forces to Burma— a disastrous defeat for them t as recorded tn thefoumal entry
for 14 August
March 19
A comparatively quiet Sunday I drafted a reply to the letter sent me by
Mr Gandhi, but shall probably not be al owed to send anything so direct
and open I don't, however sec why I should refer home at aU Perhaps
I am unwise to enter mto correspondence with Mr G but I have not
provoked .t, and I must send some answer to his letter, and do not like the
sort of grandmotherly stuff the Home Department produces Pohttcal
t j ^WfTit but the I O Home Department and
India is a very tiresome adolescent dui Lm, r
others still persist in treating it as a naughty child
The nature of this correspondence with Gandhi is explained onp 73
Match 24 , _ .
,,. , , , . i.„„_ from H M G after another Cabinet meeting,
I had another food ^eg™^ 1 d tliclr tlon
they now offer me 2jo oco torn to 9»^i M ^ of whelt
of exporting i$o OOO tons °[^^ announce the of
S of S even makes the ^ being the export of 150 000
+00 000 tons wheat and conceal tor tn *
tons nee I shall fo ° d P r ° bl ™ fot ™ *
not let H M G think they ^ J"*"^ ^ that 1 000 000 is the mim-
250 000 tons when I have told ^ aU *° % c sltuatlon home t0 thcm
mum I think I may have to resign to "™S
They refuse to approach the £% ^ he ^ a WIttv Jpccch
62
THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE
March 2$
Conference with Caroe 1 and Gould 1 on N E frontier problems— all
three of us Old Wykehamists We discussed Gould's visit to Tibet and
possibility of stiffening up Tibetans to resist any Chinese encroachment,
and also pushing up to McMahon hne on northern frontier of A warn
March 28
Last day or two comparatively quiet, usual interviews and papers, but
I ha\e actually naanaged to find a little tunc to v»o*k on the. despatch
I ought to ha\e written as C-in-C last year
Gnfihhs^ M 1L A , vvho has just returned from U K., where he has been
lecturing and talking about India, spoke to me for some tune on the
political situation He found, as I did, that there is a very general wish at
home to grant India self-government at once but no conception of the
difficulties, Muslim League case is hardly known at home, only Gandhi
and the Congress Griffiths' main point in this country was the difficulty of
persuading Indians that we really did mean to give them self-government,
and were honest in our professions He said an unequivocal declaration
by the P M might convince them.
Rowlands 4 is just off home, sent by Supreme Commander to raise
questions of civil supplies for Burma, and Political Warfare 1 briefed him
on food imports and inflation % I think he is sound on these though the
Food Member seems to doubt it
Firoz Khan Noon came to say goodbye before Iea.vmg s for U K.
I briefed him as well as I could He expressed some apprehension that
Khizar might quit politics now his father was dead, and that he was fight-
ing a losing battle against Jinnah and the League for control of the Punjab
Government.
The Budget was defeated by one vote, the Congress leader of the
Assembly, ^Bhulabhai] Desai, turned up to speak after 3 J years absence,
a measure of then- apprehension, I think, of Congress being side tracked.
The C-m-C spoke of the fighting on the Assam border v* here the Japs
seem to be making headway Large numbers of our troops are being
* Sir Ohf Carotf 1 CS , Secretary, External Aflam Dept , 1939-45 Governor North-
W«i Frontier Province, 1946-7
* Stf Basil Gould, LC S , Political Officer m Sik&im ind for Bhutan and Tibet I91S-45
1 Sir Petcival Griffith retired from the I OS in xp}j t went into business in India and
became a member of (he Central Legislature
* Sit Archibald Rowland* a Hotne. Cmt Servant came, out to Lidia m 1943 \* AdviS«
to the Viceroy on War Administration He had previously been m India (1957-9) » Financial
Adviser Military Finance He wai later Finance Member of the Executive Council (I945-* 5 )
5 To be Indian Reptewivtativc it the VTai Obmei
On
2
a
O
a
25-30 March 1944
con centra red in Assam, including I think 2nd Division, this will throw
a very heavy strain on communications
Was told later in the morning that Wingatc was missing from an air
tnp over Burma I heard later that he had almost certainly been killed in
an air crash between Imphal and Silchar
March 2p
Council meeting m evening showed, I think, effcet on members of
Assembly being in session Hindu members, led by Snvastava, attacked
food policy of Bengal Go\eniment I am told that this may be the effect
of lobbying by Hindu members of the Legislature from Bengal some of
whom would go to any lengths, even risk of another famine, to defeat
present Muslim League Government m Bengal
Meanwhile Jinnah*s pressure on the Punjab has obviously shaken
Khizar, and I gather that Jtmtih. regards mc as an enemy of the Muslim
League and is determined to be as much of a nuisance as he can He does
not really represent solid steady Moslem opinion (in fact J himself is
hardly a Muslim) but he can sway opinion, and no one seems to have the
character to oppose him
Khtzar Hyat, like hts predecessor, Str Stlander Hyat-Khan t and many
Muslims of the Umotttst Party — a provincial party, representing agricultural
interests, with Afusltm and Hmdu tttetitbers — teas at heart opposed to the
demand for Pakistan, and he was unwilling to accept Jmnah's directives w
regard to the conduct of the Punjab Government Jtnnah claimed that as the
Muslims, who constituted the majority of the Unionist Party, were also
members of the Muslim League, the Punjab Government was a * League
Government and subject to hts control as President of the League Khtzar
retorted that hts Government u as a coalition government with Hindu and Sikh
members, and not a League Government Kkizar, uith many misgivings,
resisted ftnnah's attempts to dictate to htm and was dismissed from the League
in the middle of 1944 The Muslim members of the Unionist Party were tfien
forced to choose between loyalty to Khizar and the Unionist Party and loyalty
to Jinnah and the League
March 30
Assembly is discussing Baluchistan today, anxious to give it modern
democratic gc^errmterrt ursflstuf afiWjjr^mc oAf Wtfriii 1 ifeadW roiV rtror
Baluchistan I suppose it will have to 'passer par la comme les autres'
some day but it will not be yet The Government proposal I gather is
to have one nominated member from Baluchistan in the Council of State,
D WO P
6* THE flCHT AGAINST f AMINE
the trouble is to find one who can speak and understand English, but it is
urged that this docs not really matter 1
Dickie Mountbatten came to dinner and was in very good form, vital
and amusing M B asked me what I thought about his Hying into Burma
to see the Win gate columns X said I was all for Commanders getting as
far forward as possible, but he had no business to take scnous risks unless
there was really something to be gained — discussion of a change of plan,
estimate on the spot of the state of morale or possibilities of an operation
I also reminded him that if anything happened to him, Joe S til well 1 would
be left in command
March 31
Debate in Council on the vexed question of increase in railways fares
Finance Member proposed i2j% instead of 25% We had bare majority
in Council for this, but majority of Indian members were obviously
against it and to the disgust of the Finance Member I said we would drop
the proposal Firoz Khan Noon sent me a note directly afterwards *The
Persians have a proverb "the how that can bend shoots the arrow a long
way" Y E has shot ^ long aitow tonight* » I think I was wrong really in
letting the original proposal go through
Apn\ 13
Returned yesterday from twelve days in Bihar and Bengal These tours
are interesting but Governors are inclined to fit in rather too much It is
the number of io-minute interviews to a succession of persons which is
killing Some of them are just 'courtesy' visits b} local notables, but some
are officials or non-offiaals who might have a tale to tell if one could
establish real contact, which is beyond me in a short time I may with
experience acquire the knack, or I may manage to alter the system
I had a Council Meeting immediately on return and re-assured Members
on the Bengal situation, or at least persuaded them that interference by the
Centre would not help
April 14}!$
Out riding at 7 a m this morning the dhak tree (name of the forest) was
in full bloom in the jungle on the Ridge and the green parrots w ere in full
bloom on the dhak trees for which they seem to have a great taste It was
a beauofal sight, but betokens the coming of the hot leather
1 He bad b«a ippowtcd Dtpusy Supreme Commander, Somh-East Am m August 1 9+ J
30 MARCH-I7 APRIL IQ44 65
Heard m the evening of an explosion in Bombay Dock, which sounds
a very bad show but have no details yet *
Mountbattcn came to dinner I don't gather from htm or from Henry
Pownall whom I saw this morning that the Assam battle is really going
very well — at least the initiative still seems very definitely with the Japs,
and M B thinks that at best it will take them 5 or 6 weeks to clear the
Japanese out
He told the story of the visit of the Maharaja of Benares to Rampur.
The Mahanya is an ultra-orthodox Hindu and conceives it necessary for
his spiritual health that a cow should be the first object he sees every
morning At Rampur the guest rooms arc on an upper-floor, but Rampur
got a crane from a sugar factory and ngged up a platform on which
a rather astonished cow was elevated every morning to His Highness*
bedroom window.
Mountbattcn was attractive as usual hut he is having a hard passage,
what with the Japs, the P.M and the Americans, and has lost that first fine
careless confidence that caused my predecessor to call him the Boy
Champion
Fire at Bombay has put two docks out of action, lost us a number of
ships and 50,000 tons of food, a bad business but a little better than it
looked at one time
April 16
I got momentarily up-to-date with my work and had time to write a few
letters Even Jenkins ran out of papers and took an afternoon off He sent
me a formal little note 'If Your Excellency approves, I will take the
afternoon off* I wrote on it the informal and undignified comment
'Hooray, hooray, when the cat's away the mice will play** and went off
to the golf links
I wrote a letter to H M the King, and drafted one to Arnery on relations
with the Princes
Apn 1 17
We started a session of the National Defence Council but it only lasted
about I hour because Benthail who should have dealt with two subjects
hhj- rtdi it J?6vrr j z — and Jassaxs I>aj Mekss waf absent X^Af-r fk? Peeved
' Fire had broken out cm a ship lying in Bombay docks loaded with cotton, timber, and
ammunition and caused an explosion in which 500 people were killed, 2 000 injured and
large amounts of shipping food, and stores destroyed
66 THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE
Member came to see me, rather depressed He had teen badly heckled at
Bombay over food imports, and was even more worried by attacks on
him from the Bengal Muslim side, evidently due, as he said, to a leakage
about what had been said m Council on March 29 I tried to comfort him,
this leakage from Council is disturbing but is no new thing Jenkins heard
from India Office that Rowlands faded to make any impression on the
Committee on food imports
Mookerjee, a Calcutta business man and member of the National
Defence Council held forth to me at lunch on the behaviour of American
troops in Calcutta., and implied almost that India was beginning to regard
the British as comparatively civilised
April 1S
National Defence Council went along well The Food Department
actually had quit*: a lot of bouquets thrown at it, in contrast to the heckling
of the last meeting The only grouses were about black market prices,
mainly by Kunzru, but it was apparent that the real trouble is that so many
of the public will pay blackmarket prices if they want something and not
take action to report the offender
April 19
National Defence Councd ended very quietly — rather a dull session, and
absence of Jamna Das Mehta probably meant 2 or 3 hours less talk.
Member for Sind\ being furthest from any operations, was most bellicose
and talked of the high morale in Stnd and us desire to supply recruits — >
it has supplied less than any other Province
April 20
A busy day In the morning sat to Simon £Iwes again, and then a large
number of interviews, ending with Sir Ardeshir Dalai 1 of Tatas, one of the
authors of the io T ooo crorc scheme, 3 which had been debated that after-
noon with members of the Government, the discussion seemed to have
been satisfactory I offered him the post of Member of Council for Re-
construction He said he must ask Tatas and Delhi did not suit his Health*
Finally a Council meeting, only about half numbers and quick decisions
1 t&tx a distinguished career in the Indian Civil Service Sir Ardeshv Dalai "became %
Director of Tatas
* Known as the Bombay Plan*, an ambitious out bee plan Cot economic development
17-25 afsu IP44
67
April 21
A Sikh landowner, Sir Datar Singh, 1 was rather grudgingly alfowcd by
my staff* to sec me this morning, with the intimation that he didn't
amount to much I found him most interesting on the subject of cattle-
breeding, much above the usual run of my *courtesy* visitors, intelligent
and talked clearly and well Young Tata came to lunch When I met him
down at Bombay I found him rather a supercilious and tiresome young
man, but got on with him rather better today Sir Ardeshir Dalai had
spoken to him about the offer I made him yc$tcr6&\ I think Tata was
pleased that the offer had been made but was doubtful whether the firm
could spare htm Snvastava, whom I told about my intention to have
a Development Member last night, is obviously rather upset, he has been
Vice-President of the Reconstruction Committee of Council up till now,
and thinks it a rcBection on him He a very sensitive to criticism. Both I
and P S V have explained to him no reflection on him is intended but
that Reconstruction has become a full time job
April 25
Returned from a short tnp to Bombay to see damage to docks and go
down area caused by recent explosion and fire On the whole Bombay has
come well out of it Damage ina} amount to £50,000,000 or more, we
have lost about 70,000 tons of shipping, 40,000 tons of food and a great
quantity of valuable stores But it might have been very much worse If
position had not been taken in hand efficiently, and if wind had not been
favourable, we might have lost the principal dock, Alexandra Dock, or
the oil tanks might have caught fire or a large part of the dry might have
been burnt Morale is good, and Bombay is feeling rather proud of itself
Civil and military worked in well together Fire brigade and A R P did
well, and all Services co-operated whole-heartedly Rehef of homeless and
sufferers was well organised, and Bombay rather feels that it can *take it*
All the authorities are however concerned on the question of who will
pay for the damage, there is no doubt that safety precautions were broken
for war reasons, and that explosives ought not to have been unloaded
where they were The liability of the Insurance Companies and their
capacity to pay is doubtful Wc got the principle of an Enquiry, with the
Chief Justice of Bombay as President, provisionally agreed, And can
probably announce this almost at once
1 He established 3 reputation as an authority on caztTe^brecding and later both before and
after Independence, held various post* in the Ministry of Agriculture
68 THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE
Got back late in evening to find a message from Governor Punjab to
say that Khizar had decnLd to stand up to Jinnah, and asking lcaii e to
dismiss Shaukat &om the Ministry Shaukat is Sikandei s (the Ute Premier)
son, and has been a great disappointment 1 I told Governor I approved
the dismissal and would support him
April 26
Rowlands came in the afternoon, he had not made much impression in
London on the Cabinet Committee on India food grams — tittle wonder
when he told me the composition that old menace, the Professor (Cher-
well), Leathers, an interested part}, only concerned to hang on to his
shipping, P J Gngg f who is always rruschie\ ous about India t and Llewel-
lyn, the Food Minister, who knows nothing of India, and is concerned to
preserve his food supplies at home Attitude simply is that there is no
shipping and Americans can't be asked to supply some in case they do so
but deduct it from allotment for UK Gngg and Cherweil said the
remedy was to lock up all grain merchants Chiefs of StafFare sympathetic
but can not mo\e War Cabinet. The conclusions arrived at b) the
Committee on Apnl 6, after hearing Rowlands, were that the courses open
were (a) to supply the shipping, (b) to ask the Americans for it, (c) to tell
the Viceroy to supply the Army's needs and let the Indian people starve if
necessary, and that the War Cabinet must decide I wonder what has
happened since then 1 think they would adopt course (c) if the) had any
real hope that the Viceroy would consent to carry it out I expect the
P M is regretting that he ever appointed me
The Caseys arrived, he looks better
April 27
Another Iongish day in office An hour with Snvastava, who was very
worried about personal criticism of himself especially in Bengal I don*t
think he and Casey had had a very successful interview He was also Upset
by my decision to appoint a Reconstruction Member, and thought it
implied failure of himself I got him to talk of hu previous career and
achievements in science business, and politics, and I think this cheered
him up He dislikes democracy and Congress, and adjured me to get rid of
this headcounting business as quite unsuitable for India So it is But Will
authority ever really have the courage to sa} so ? I like Snvasta va, he has
some character and courage and independence, though I think his business
ts always at the top of his nnnd
1 He did lira* *tand by Khazaj m his struggle with J mnah bat jided widi the latter
25 APRIL-S MAY 1944 69
April 2$
Woke up feeling rather rheumatic, and then had a fall ofFniy horse on to
my back, so bn.^ c been rather stiff and lame all day Sat to Simon Elwes,
who is making a good picture, I think, but rather deliberately Then a
very long day in the office Jogcndra Singh came in the morning and gave
most of his favourite hares a run He finally suggested, as he left, that the
Viceroy should sec more of his Council informally and discuss general
questions with them, 1 think this was complimentary and meant to
indicate that they consider mc sympathetic and liberal and that my views
carry some weight I must think it over Bombay reported some concern
about the health of Gandhi whose blood pressure has juddenly dropped t
and I found a little to my surprise that we have no real policy for action
if the old man gets dangerously ill or should hand in his checks
April jo
Abcll came in with a telegram m the evening, giving the text of a very
good letter from P M to President asking for help for India in shipping
for imports of wheat It ought to ring the bell He has put India's needs at
1,000,000 tons This represents a considerable success for my persistency
I had in the morning sent off a letter to the P M on the general state of
India, the first I have written to hun
May 1
A long day m the office Mohammed Usman as usual had nothing to say
ah out his Department but delivered himself of political views that even
a hardened Tory might regard as reactionary — *God never meant India
to be independent* and so forth. Next visitor was Mr Pothan Joseph
(which sounds slightly reminiscent of Egypt in the bad old Biblical days),
the editor of Dawn a cheerful ruffian He has mainly w orked for Congress
papers is now Muslim League and is actually by religion a Christian He
cross-examined me on the difference between civil and military responsi-
bility, and I said there wasn't much difference but that the civilian,
politician or statesman, was always on active service and the soldier only
occasionally I dont think he understood what I meant Then the Finance
Member who is off home shortly Finally a conference on the Bombay
enquiry,, bat everybody had agreed beforehand it did not take lon^
May 8
I got back yesterday from a short tour to Siklam A long days travel on
May 2, left Delhi 6am, landed Hassiniara about noon and then had to
70 THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE
cross a river by elephants t a flood having taken the bridge Then a long
motor drive to Gangtok where wc am\cd at p p m
The only omaal ceremony laid on during my stay was a visit to the
girls school hcing hinlt in memory of the Maharaja s eldest son who was
killed -while serving in the 1 A R The programme called for a simple visit
to the school, hut I found that Gangtok had laid itself out to produce some
ceremony I ^\as met by a guard of wamots m old Bhutanese costume,
gay coloured silks, two swords apiece, shields of rhinoceros hide, old steel
helmets of roundhead pattern, a hand and dancer to lead them Then a
monastery band greeted me, with monks in silk robes, long 12-foot horns,
chanters, conches and other strange instruments, and a display of banners
carrying prayers printed on them There was also the Maharaja's retinue
m the picturesque Lepcha costume, and another hand, and then a modern
police guard, and a parade of bo) -scouts, and the school-girls singing
The actual inspection of the school did not take long as it is only half-built,
and then we sat under a dragon-embroidered shamianah and drank tea
and watched a Lepcha dance (treading out the hanest) and a Tibetan
dance (slow and solemn) and a Nepalese dance (rather ribald) A pictur-
esque and friendly performance
On the morning of May 4. Gandhi interrupted the peace George Abell
brought me a telegram at 2 30 a m to say that the doctors (Roy and the
Bombay surgeon-general Candy) thought very poorly of his health and
that he might die at any moment Bombay Government, Home Depart-
ment and most of the Governors recommended immediate release and
PSV w anted my approval to a telegram to S of S to say that we proposed
to release him 24 hours later Personally, I could not see that we gained
much credit by releasing him at the point of death, and if he was not at
the point of death there was no need of such hurry I did not entirely trust
the medical opinions However, it was difficult to disregard them, and
Thome's opinion a\ as very strongly in favour of release And Jenkins wte
not likely to make a panic proposal, and said that doctors views indicated
that G would not be a factor m active politics again On the other hand,
I should have hked to consult my Council and should certainly liave done
so had I been in Delhi. I talked it over with Abell for about an hour before
cabling consent
1 left Gangtok on May 6th and flew to Sylhet in Assam I spent the ni^ht
at S)lhct and visited tLQ 3rd Indian Division — the headquarters of what
were Win gate s raiding columns, now Lcntaigne s 1 Lentaigne is good
' ^3 -&n Lentaigne succeeded Wuigate in command of the 'Qimdits and after
Independence became Commandant of the In dun Stiff College
may 1044 7*
f think, more orthodox and less highly strung than Win gate, who possibly
was killed at the right moment both for his own fime and the safety of
the division But he was a remarkable man and I am glad that I was
responsible for giving him his chance and encouraging htm My dealings
with him, in three campaigns, were almost entirely official and I never
knew rum well enough as a man to like or dislike him
I had hoped to sec Archie John but he had flown into Burma a week
before Tired of waiting for vacancy in tht, Bfack Watch he had taken one
in the South StafforcU, I beheve the column he has jouied is likely to be
flown out soon, but I expect Archie John will try to stay on with his own
regiment Or some other column I hope his health wilt stand it I saw
Bernard Pergusson, complete with bushy beard whose brigade had just
been flown out He was well, but a little upset by his failure to win his
first pitched battle, at Tndaw against the Jap airfield He had had a hard
time marching down from Lcdo through ike jungle, said it was surely the
only recorded instance of a brigade marching 250 miles in single file
We had a long fly back, nearly 7 hours, as we were in a slow machine,
and did not reach Delhi till nearly 745pm
May 12
May 10 was long day in office and May 11 much longer, work seemed to
he accumulating all the time At Council on May 10 some of my colleagues
were rather upset that I had not consulted them over Gandhi's release
they all agreed that it was the nght thing to do but resented that the credit
of the release should all be given in the Press to the Viceroy and not to the
G of I, they had had the odium of putting him in prison but no kudos for
releasing him* Fortunately I had taken the initiative by explaining to them
what had happened before they raised the point I think they were fairly
happy in the end Arnery unfortunately had said that he left the decision
to Lord WavelT instead of *to the Government of India*
Reports on Gandhi's health seem to show that he is really ill and P S V
seems to think that his memory and headpiece may be affected
Had long talk with Bernard about his Operations in Burma He had
obviously been considerably tired and strained by this second expedition
into Burma and said he had not realised how much the first expedition had
taken out of him He said no one over 40 stood up to it I imagine Bernard
does not spare himself, but the ph} sical effort of carrying at least 50 lbs
continuously in heat and jungle must be great I hope Archie John will
stand up to it
72
THE PICHT AGAINST FAMINE
May 17
I asked Dr Khare yesterday what he thought of Gandhi s health and his
view was he was duping us, or the doctors were, and that he would
recover My own bet is that the old man is still pretty ill Coal labour is
still causing much trouble, odd that the amount of coal %ve can get vanes
inversely with the goodness of the nee Last one was a bumper crop, so the
miners left the mmcs to cultivate their Gelds
May 23
Mainly visitors and interviews and one short Council George Giffard
came to see me on May 20th He has fallen out with MB who is going to
replace him 1 am very sorry, George is a good soldier He says the battle
is going well hut slowly
Thome, Home Member, was very strongly against Gandhis request to
see Governor of Bombay being granted We also discussed the publication
of Gandhi's correspondence, and agreed that if we took the initiative in
publication we should give G due warning of our intention.
May 29/31
Got back today from a short holiday at Nairn Tal with the Halletts to
which I had been much looking forward
We have at last got out the settlement for the Bombay disaster, after
some prolonged negotiations with the Insurance companies It has taken
just a month, since I came back from Bombay
Had a telegram from P M to acknowledge my letter of April 29 It was
friendly and complimentary but finished up with a diatribe against
Gandhi, he is obviously disturbed by the idea that I may start negotiating
with him.
May 31
For the first time since I became Viceroy I was almost short of work this
morning but this afternoon a long telegram from Casey about his Ministry
which he fears may collapse over the Education Bill, His Chief Minister
has not the energy or courage to force a difficult matter through and the
Speaker of the Assembly seems definitely to have sided with the Opposi-
tion Bengal politics are bitter and dirty It looks as if Casey may be forced
into the Section 93 regime which I recommended six months ago
June 1/2
I aon't fed af together happy a&out the Assam and North Burma opera-
tions There is not much progress being made anywhere, especially in the
17 way-7 J UNE 10 44 73
vital task of reopening the Kohima-Imphal road Meanwhile the supply
by air to Imphal and to the 3rd Division columns in North Burma is
causing anxiet)
Inside Burma our raiding columns seem to he getting into difficulties
I hope Archie John is all nght
June 4
The President has turned down flat the PM's request for shipping for
food for India so I sent home >ct another telegram This is disappointing,
after waiting 5 or 6 weeks for a reply I had gathered from a letter I had
from Jack Dill that the request was likely to be favourably considered
June 7
Work has been much less the last few days and there has not been much
of interest Sir Ardcshu Dalai 1 came to sec me yesterday he has very firm
ideas of what he wants and I can foresee some rows ahead with Council
Members some of whose work and staff he will want to appropriate
How ever, I must back him even if it means trouble but I warned him not
to go too fast He seemed sensible about the political situation and India s
needs He said the Bombay damage settlement had been very well
received He thinks Gandhi still a sick man Hydan* talked about the
political situation he said no progress was possible till both Gandhi and
Jinnah were underground first time I have heard an Indian say so but I
expect a good many of the sensible ones think it
A short Council meeting today with few members The Gandhi corre-
spondence did not cause much discussion We decided the best tactics
would be to publish the whole of the political correspondence if G wished
to publish any of it
Gandht m a long argumentative letter tUthe stM stood by the
Quit India resouL Wavell m f writ™ reply W '^f^eaM
the Congress of any deliberate v*A to ad the Japanese lie felt hat they must
have bei aJre tit the Qmf W resold ^f^XtcLZTJLu
01 me u ar and that in his view the greatest comrwtmon wai
1 * „J* c welfare was to abandon the policy oj non-
now make towards Ind a 'J^" correspondence Wavell said that
co-operatwn In the course oj some juwkt w r ?
if on reflection Gandhi had some more constructive policy to offer he would
gladly consider it
■ He had accepted .he p«. of Member of Co^d for Devest offered to hm on
"*Ci&?lSL I C S Secretary 5 " ° f
the Exeoiave Council iS>«-« Gowmor of Assam
74
THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMINE
June io
Came up to Simla jester day It is always a wearisome drive up from
Kaika, and the twists do not suit Her Ex, 1 1 lud a talk with Glancy this
morning* he seemed a bit harassed, he had a very difficult time putting
enough backbone into Khizar and his Ministers to stand up to Jinnah
Although Jinnah is a most unorthodox Moslem (to say the least of it) he
seems to be able to wave the banner of religion and frighten them all to
heel with it We shall have more trouble with J and his private army, the
Moslem National Guards 1 went round some of the houses being used
on the Viceregal Estate for a soldiers* leave camp A very nice lot of men
and they seem happy and appreciative
June 12
Had a telegram this morning to say that Archie John was seriously
wounded, no details His column was last reported south of Mogaung
I am afraid that there is no air stnp available and that evacuation may be
\ ery difficult I am not even sure whether they ha\ e a doctor with those
forward columns
Went to dine with Glancys at Barnes Court On return had more
optimistic new* which showed they were hopeful of gettt&g A J out by
plane at early date
June 13
News this morrung that A J has lost a hand, but is not considered to be m
danger We will go down to Delhi today and fly to Assam tomorrow to
wherever he is
Had a long talk with Khizar, the Punjab Premier, and tned to hearten
him up for his conflict with Jinnah He 15 very apprehensive of V\ o things*
Jinnah*s private army and the maul vis 2 which he says J is bringing in
from outside to preach and sur up communal feeling
Left Simla about ipm. and reached Delhi about 6 p m. Decided to get on
early next morning to Dmjan to which Archie John may be flown out
June 19
Returned this evening from expedition to N E Assam to collect Archie
John We stayed with Gregory, a tea-planter, a nice pen on w ho treated
Viceroys as human beings, and there was no ceremony of any kind, a
1 Lord Wavell referred to Lady Wavetl m hn Journal w Her Ex more m fun than m
ceroraicrefj Hit Tit^vt wrote Wet "Estt&trtty
1 Learned men , an honorific title applied to those believed to be learned in rcl gion and
Muhammad j n
IO-23 JUNE 1944
75
welcome change. It rained almost the whole time, and we had some
trying rather monotonous days of waiting A J was not flown out till
17th, partly owing to weather, mainly owing to his own refusal to be
evacuated till all cases he considered more serious had gone In sptte of an
amputated left hand and slightly damaged nght hand, he seems to have
kept on his legs and carried on helping in the administrative work. He is
in remarkably good shape and heart, considering his injury
I only got a very limited amount of work from Delhi, from a letter
from the S of S, I gather they have definitely refused shipping for food
imports, and will make famous suggestions that we reduce the Indian
Army (as if that would help) or import food instead of military stores f
But the official telegram from the War Cabinet has not yet arrived, and
from a private telegram it looks as if the Chiefs of Staff had seen the
absurdity of the War Cabinet proposals, and were considering means to
find the shipping Meanwhile these discussions have been going on for six
months, with deliberate obstruction on the part of certain members of the
Government Casey is still in trouble over Bengal politics and recognises
the possibility that he may have to go into Section 93 Gandhi has published
his correspondence with me, or rather he gave the Press typed copies and
they insisted on publishing it So we are publishing the whole of the
Gandhi correspondence I don't think it wdj do us an) harm or G any
good it seems to me to show him as verbose, petty-minded, and quite
devoid of any constructive statesmanship, bent only on his own sef£*
justification
June 21
Two fairly quiet days I had a letter from Mr Gandhi asking to see the
Working Committee and to see me I am replying that as our recent
correspondence has shown radically different points of view, I see no value
in our meeting or in his meeting the Working Committee, until he has
something more constructive than Quit India to propose
June 23
Two quiet days So many reports have reached me that a member of my
Conned is disclosing financial information gained in Council to has friends
for busmen purposes that I thought it better to warn him, when t saw him
yesterday that his name was being connected with disclosures He took it
quietly, said it was a great surprise, but did not protest his innocence with
any vehemence
1 This had been considered before See entry for 10 March* p 59
7^ THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMIKE
The India Office or the F O or both are being maddeningly slow over
deciding on giving Bajpai, India's representative in USA, ministerial
status, which I thought was practically decided more than six months ago,
and are also being pedantic about allowing our representative in China
the appellation of 'Honourable Mr*
Simon Elw, es asked for a final sitting 1 as he was unhappy about my
hands He got them to his liking at last He has put a thundercloud behind
my head, I asked whether it was symbolical He said partly technical to
put the left side of my face m shadow and partly symbolical of the storms
that might burst over my Viceroyalry They surely will
June 24
I wired two days ago to S of S to say that I must really have a decision
about food imports and that I must send a personal wire to P M if no
decision was yet reached From reply today it is evident that they are still
fiddling and procrastinating, so I sent the P M a personal appeal, drafted
by Jenkins but pepped up by myself
I had a talk with George Giffard about the Assam war Jap resistance
on the Imphal road collapsed quickly in the end and they got it open
quicker than expected It has been bloody fighting on the E Frontier Our
casualties in some six months in Arakan and Assam approach 25 000,
while the Jap losses are estimated at 3 0 000 to 3 5 coo, with a very high
proportion of killed 7
George is feehng very sore at the American attitude of constant criticism
and deagwum of ,he Bnmh effort We agreed that no other nauon
would take so calmly and good humouredly the Amencan insults and
carry on co-operating with them on friendly terms, and that we were
a very great natton greater than the Amencan, and would remain so
June 26
1 have won another round over food with H.M G A telegram >esterday
pronused to ship another 200 000 tons « the next 3 months and to re-
consider our further needs in August and then agam m Novemher This
telegram crossed my telegram to the P M , whl ch India Office suggested
need not „ ow be dehvercd I wired back that it should be and that I did
™ m -l ratls&ctor y y« Stdl we are gettmg on, I have
OeXe °°° ' mCe AC W " Clbract re S retted *« no thing could
2^-30 JUNE 1044
77
Carton dc Wiart 1 came and spent a night, mainly , I bchc\ c t to tell my
son how well lie had managed without a hand He is a cliarming person
June 2p
A lot of visitors the last few da\ s Henry Pownall came from home,
Mountbattcn and some of his staflffrom Ccj Jon, and Casey from Calcutta,
the latter to discuss the political situation After six months experience of
Bengal politics and administration, he is burning to take over the Province
under Section 03 It is a curious reversal of form Six months ago I advo-
cated a Section 93 Government for Bengal and was turned down by
HMG,I think largely because Casey, who was then At home, wanted to
have a chance of making a success of Ministerial Government When
Casey arrived in India about the middle of January and I saw hun in
Lucknow, I painted hun rather a gloomy but I think realistic picture of
Bengal affairs, but he was full of hope Now he is aghast at the virulence
and corruption of Bengal politics and the ine/Eacncyofthe ad ministration*
and wants to run the Province under Section 93 Six months ago, when
famine and disease were raging in Bengal, wc should have had, I think,
almost the whole of puhbc opinion behind us in taking over the Province*
Now we should be criticised from every quarter I don*t worry much
about public opinion, but we shall never get on in India if we take over
from Indians every time they get into trouble Six months ago the lives
of many hundred thousands of Indians were at stake, and in the hope of
saving them I was prepared to neglect or override constitutional forms
But today there is no immediate prospect of famine in Bengal, and 1 am
trying to get Indians to Jeani to nde the horse before we hand him over
We agreed that Casey should keep his present Ministry in office if possible,
that no alternative Ministry was possible, and that I would prepare the
ground in London for the possibility of Section What a nice fellow
Casey is and a very good and keen administrator
June 30
A lot of files but nothing much in them. The Nationalist papers are making
a great play over my refusal to see Gandhi, and the News Chronicle
correspondent Gelder, is trying to advertise himself by seeking an lnter-
I any intention of seeing Gandhi unless he shows some unmistakable sign
of a great change of heart, which seems unlikely
1 Lt-G«i Sir Adrian Carton de Wiarr, VC, special military representative with
General Chiang Kai-shek 1943^6
PROPOSAL FOR
A POLITICAL MOVE
July 1
A quiet day Since Gandhi w as employing his usual technique of putting
out such portions of correspondence as suited him, I gave orders for the
publication of our recent exchange of letters 1
It has been very hot indeed the last few days and the monsoon seems
late and light so far, I hope it is not going to fail us
July 4
A comparatively quiet time recently Thome tells me our issue of the
Gandhi correspondence has become a best-sellei, and that a furtntr edition
is being called for Congress supporters are obviously very anno) ed that
their plan of publishing such portions of the correspondence as suited them
has been upset by our prompt publication of the whole The} were doing
the same with the last two letters, and the Hindustan Standard had an
angry leader today because I had published them in £ulL
I sent P S V a note yesterday on preparations for the possibility of the war
ending within a. ) car 1 think we must have a plan political and otherwise,
in case there is a sudden collapse of our enemies After all, no one m July
1918 believed for a moment that the war would be over in November
At the moment we seem somewhat stuck in Normandy and I fancy the
flying bombs are being rather more of a menace than we have admitted
However, the Russians seem to be sweeping on fast
Winston sent me a peevish telegram to ask why Gandhi hadn't died yet T
He has never answered my telegram about food
July 11
The correspondence between Jmnah and Rajagopalachanar published
yesterday is cunous so are the various interpretations put on it by the
Pi ess and the various political patties Jinnah is a mass of \anity and no
■ Sec entry for 21 Jutit, p 75
At B! banes var Temple Orssa
I-I7 JULY 1944
79
statesman, but lie 1$ much too nary to accrpt the rather vague proposals
put forward b) R without more definition It u not quite clear how far
Gandhi himself is coinnuttcd to these proposals, hut the Hindustan Times
seems to consider the) have his full approval Wc are undoubtedly in for
a period of political manoeuvring w hich ma} lead to trouble I wonder if
we shall ever ha\c an) chance of a solution till the three intransigent,
obstinate, uncompromising principals are out of the way Gandhi (just on
75)» Jinnah (68), Winston (nearuig 70)
Rajagopalachart put fontard a 'formula 9 which, he $auf t Gandhi was
prepared to recommend to Congress, if Jmnah would accept it Under this
formula *contigttotts districts* in the North-West and East of India in which
Muslims were in ati absolute majority u ere to he demarcated and these u ouU
constitute Pakistan Arrangements it ere to he made by mutual agreement
hettieen Pakistan and the rest of India to safeguard defence and commerce, and
communications, and for other essential purposes Jtnnah replied that he could
not accept the formula on his own responsthihty and it ouJJ have to refer it to
the Mushm League ; u Inch fte would he ready to do, if Gandht would deal with
him direct Later he arranged to meet Gandht hut he denounced the formula as
offering only a maimed, mutilated, moth-eaten Pakistan It Mas the Pakistan
which tn the end he had to accept
Old Jogendra Singh came tn ) esterday in tremendous form, full of
gratitude to me for backing his agricultural schemes and saying it had
given him a new lease of life He's a nice old boy, though woolly-pated
1 read the proceedings of the Donumcm Premiers conference m May
You would hard!) know from them that India existed or had any im-
portance at all Iraq and Persia received more metiuon Curious that
neither Australian nor South African Premiers seem to take any interest
in a country whose future must greatly influence their own problems
July 14
Came up to Simla ) esterday for a fortnight, unless Mr Gandhi should
necessitate my return He is putting forth a series of statements to the
Press and seems determined to raise a political turmoil if he can
July i 7
A fairly quiet tune up here so far On Saturday (15th) 1 saw Sir Chhotu
Ram 1 still rather suspicious of the Government of India and all then* works
but more friendl) I think, and less suspicious than when 1 first met him
1 Sir Chhotu Ram d ed six months later a severe tots to Khxeit and the Unionist Party
Dies c
So PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL MOVE
in the Punjab some six months ago Punjab arc now, I fancy, rather proud
of having 'seen Jinnah off , and more confident of the eventual issue
Her Ex has had a busy time with Red Cross work. She had a Committee
meeting today, morning and afternoon, and seems to have managed it
\ cry cleverly
'The leave camp here m the Viceregal grounds, the idea of Her Ex and
arranged by Peter Coats, seems to be a great success
July jp
Chief business in the last day or so has been drafting telegrams to S of S.
ahout Mr Gandhi's activities There is hkely to be a debate on India m
House of Commons on July 26, and Amery is likely to have a rough
passage, especially in explaining why Gandhi should not he allowed to see
the Working Committee I have tned to give him ammumtion but I am
afraid that nothing he says goes down very well. It would in any event be
difficult to convince a large section of the House that Gandhi s motive is
not really for a settlement hut to secure the release of the Working
Committee as a prelude to further political agitation
I am a bit bothered about the monsoon, it is late and weak so far, I hope
it is going to play the game
Woodhead, 1 President of the Famine Commission, armed One of his
members seems to be running out already I had the arrangements for this
Commission started in January, as a result of a resolution passed in the
Legislature m November, with the idea of getting it started in March 1 It
wdl he lucky i£it (Joes any business before mid-August, I think the delay
this time has been mainly at the Whitehall end , and from my experience
of the last year or so I should say that on the whole Whitehall is slower at
getting anything done and more verbose even than New Delhi
July 22
I t\ as told today of a secret conference on Palestine held in Cairo last May
The subject was the decision by HM G to partition Palestine and the
probable military repercussions I hear that with one exception everyone
there, cavil and military, expressed themseh cs m very strong terms against
the Partition proposal I wonder if die views of the men on the spot will
hate any influence on H.JA G
It will be noticed that, though India has over 00 millions of Moslems,
many of whom feel \ er> strongly about Palestine, H M G did not even
think fit to inform me of this conference
1 Sir John \% oodhtad, I.C S (rctd ) He had ttrved itt Bengit
17-3 1 J utY I0 44
Si
July 25
I have had another letter from Gandhi, to which I replied calling
Mr Gandhi's attention to my statement m m) previous letter that I
was willing to consider a definite and constructive proposal if it were
submitted to me
1 saw a letter from Kirby 1 our Food Controller, who is at home,
describing in pessimistic terms the way in which Indian affairs are treated
in the Cabinet and especially our requests for food imports, and the
complete failure of the India Office to make their weight felt The Com-
mittee on food imports is a packed committee headed by that old fraud
and menace* the Professor, seconded of course by Leathers
July 24
A very busy day for my last in Simla Many visitors, and finally Khizar,
Punjab Premier, who was in much better heart than last tune I saw rum,
and advocated a Centre Party hut did not explain how it was to be formed
I like Kluzar very much but he is not a strong character any more than his
predecessor Sikander Hyat Khan was Odd that these big Punjab landlords
should be so dominated by a down-country lawyer like Jinnah
Jiffy 26
At Council meeting this morning I informed my colleagues of my recent
letter from Gandhi and my reply and discussed G's statements and my
attitude to them Council unanimously supported my attitude, and no
one had a good word to say for Gandhi Council was anxious that S ot S
in speaking to Parliament should make G of I responsible for any refusal
or acceptance of negotiations with Gandhi and not merely the Viceroy
I £our with Bhopal in the morning hstenrng to the grievances of
the Princes Bhopal himself is modern and shrewd but he is only a
Princeling really, and in no position to call the tune for the Princes as
a whole, who are for the most part concerned mainly with mauitaimng
all their privileges, position and prestige untouched, and whose attitude
is inclined to be the British Crown must either continue to protect us or
cease interference with our affairs 1 ,
In the afternoon I W the C-m-C, then Md Usman, then Rowlands,
and finally Mudie, the new Home Member, with a draft reply to Gandhi s
1 W H Kirby A**™, Secretary WofT»dc lomed by the Bnfsh Gcvrmmm.
ii rationing adviser to the Government of India
S2 ^OPOSAL fGtt K POLITICAL MOVE
list letter which I must take time to consider I am quite sure that he is
keeping one objective in mind as his immediate aim, to secure the release
of the Working Committee I doubt if he is really one whit nearer
compromise on his idea of a Congress Raj
In this Utter Gandhi said that as a constructive proposal he it as prepared to
advise the Working Committee that Mass Civil Disobedience as contetnp^ed
by the resolution of August ipjz could not be offered and that Cotigress should
give full co-operation in the war effort, if India it as immediately declared
independent and a Nattonal Government formed responsible to the Cetttral
Assembly, subject to the proviso that military operations should continue under
BnUih control, but without miolvmg any financial burden on India This
proposal, as Gandhi well lne\v 9 was totally unacceptable A similar proposal
had been putfonvard at the time of the Crtpps Mission m ig^2 and had been
rejected
August 2
I have been busy the last day or two in writing a quarterly letter to H M
and in drafting a reply to Mr Gandhi's latest, which has now been cabled
home for approval — rather leluctantly on my part, I dxsbke this reference
to Whitehall on e\ cry detail
August 4
One of my Depart ments told me the other day that I had reduced the
number and length of telegrams by 50% I wish I could think it was true
Snvastava came in this morning, ostensibly to discuss the food problem,
really to talk about politics I like Snvastava, and usually manage to send
him away in quite a cheerful mood, but I think he is harassed at home (his
wife is quite a strong Nationalist) and has a difficult time* smcc he feels
that if anything goes wrong with food he will have to bear the brunt,
and he is very sensitive co criticism
The P M wired mc that the Cabinet was very perturbed that I fad
entered into negotiation with Gandhi, who should be dead — at least
politically — according to the medical reports cabled home I fortunately
remembered his directive of last October, 1 and wired back that I was not
nego bating with G, merely informing him that negotiation on his basis
was impossible, that I had carried out the injunctions of his directive, and
that die only provision of his directive which I had been unable to carry
out was *to dn crt shipping to carry food grains', since HMG w ould
grvt mc nerfner shipping norlooo: grams
' S« p 21 entry for i October
31 JULY-9 AUGUST I944
83
August 9 *
Got back this afternoon from a short tour to Manipur and Assam to see
some of the troop and the recent battlefields I was 'back to the Army
again* for some days, which was pleasant, but it was quite strenuous
I flew to Calcutta on the 5th and stopped a night there Had about 2 or
3 hours talk with Case} He is now \ cry set on Section 03* and regrets that
my recommendation of last January was not accepted
On the 6*th I flew to imphal and did a heavy programme of inspection of
military and R.A F units
I stopped the two nights at Imphal with Gtmson/ he still had not had
his bathroom window repaired (broken in May 1942), his wireless still
gave forth unintelligible sounds, and his cat had had kittens In fact he
was as cheerfully inefficient as ever (When my predecessor, Linlithgow,
stopped there, he always claimed that a cat dropped on his bed from the
ceiling during the night My M S mentioned this story to Gimson> who
said qwtc unconcernedly *I don't think it can have been a cat, quite
probably a rat, though* ')
On the 8th I motored up the Dimapur road and saw representatives of
6ih Brigade and 2nd Division, both of which I formerly commanded
I presented some decorations and made a short speech to them I then went
on to Kohima
I was told that 15 or 20 Nagas would come to meet me at Kohima,
actually 200 to 300 turned up, a picturesque sturdy looking people They
brought gifts of spears and headdresses and woven cloths and chickens and
eggs 1 had brought rum and cigarettes for them but there were a great
many more than wc had expected The Nagas did us extraordinarily well
in the recent fighting
After a picnic lunch I motored on to Dimapur and found another
Iongish programme which was not finished till 7 p m
I had been 12 hours continuously at it and had motored over 150 miles
Rather to my horror I found that 1 was booked to go to an Ensa entertain*
ment after dinner It was not very good and went on till after Upa
During it a bag arrived, so that I had to attend to one or two letters and
telegrams before going to bed
Next morning the 9th, we were booked to take off from the ground
at 6 a m We got back to Delhi at 3 p m
My apprehensions at referring my reply to Gandhi home were luuy
justified I got back a revised draft exactly the same in principle but
intransigent and discourteous m tone It seems to me one of our great
1 Mi C Gimson I C*S , Political Agent in Manipur
U PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL MOVE
mistakes in this country is not to have realised the importance to the Indian
mind of good manners and an appearance at least of consideration I
drafted a cable back, proposing revision of the Cabinet's draft PM will
be furious
IVavelVs draft reply to Gandhi's Utter, after restating the proposals that
Gandhi had made, continued asfollou s
2 Since your letter was written you must have studied the statement
made by Mr Amery in the House of Commons on 28th July, and will
know that this proposal is not acceptable to His Majesty's Government as
a basis for discussion It is very similar to the proposal made by Maulana
JCalam Azad to Sir Stafford Cnpps in April 1942, and His Majesty's
Government s reasons for rejecting it are the same as they were then
3 Although His Majesty's Government cannot accept your present
proposal, and I do not think that we should make progress if we met in
order to discuss it, I must assure you that they are most anxious for a
settlement of the Indian problem The war is now moving last, and unless
we can reach agreement on lines satisfactory to all parties t India can hardly
take her proper place at the Peace Conference, and our plans for post-war
economic and social development will be hampered
4 Ido not wish to prejudge any proposals that may later be made to me,
but if the leaders of the Hindus, Muslims and other important minorities
were willing to co-operate in a transitional government which would be
established and would work within the framework of the present Consti-
tution without modification by convention or otherwise, I believe we
could make progress It is quite clear that until the war is over the responsi-
bility for Defence and Military operations cannot be separated from the
other responsibilities of Government and that until the new Constitution
takes shape His Majesty's Government and the Governor-General must
retain their responsibility over the entire field If the transitional govern-
ment is to succeed there must, 1 think, be agreement before it is formed
between Hindus and Muslims and the other important minorities as to
the general basis of the new constitution and as to the method by which it
should be framed This agreement seems to me a matter primarily for the
Indian leaders I should be glad to help them to achieve it if I thought I
could do anything to help, but I doubt if I can do anything until they have
come closer together than they are now I beg you to remember that
minority problems are not easy They exist in many countries and have
caused much unhappiness and even civil war It is a mistake to say that the
minority problems in India have been created by the British, they are real
and can be solved only by patience and generosity The period after the
war is over for which the transitional government would last would
g-12 AUGUST 1944
85
depend on the speed "with whjdi the new Constitution could be framed
I sec no reason why work on the Constitution should not begin as soon
as the transitional government takes office, and if the parties had arrived
at a genuine agreement as to the method of framing it, I do not think the
period need be very long
5 You and Mr Jrnnah Ime my good wishes for your approaching
discussion
Thts draft reply was friendly in tone and evinced very clearly a desire to
open the door to negotiations^ whereas the Cabinet's draft gave the impression
of a desire to keep it dosed WaveWs draft u as t ttt the Cabinet** view, 'much
too forthcoming mid conciliatory \ and they decided to 'stiffen tts tone Uiey
cttt out, therefore, all friendly and gracious touches, for instance paragraph 5,
and they introduced a new paragraph u Inch by stressing the conditions attaching
to the *offer of unqualified freedom after the cessation cf hostilities \ particularly
the need to safeguard the interests of racial and religious minorities and the
Depressed Classes t seemed to suggest that freedom might he postponed
indefinitely
August 30
A long day of files and visitors with little to show for it
In the evening had a letter from S of S in which he said that the P M
'stormed incoherently for about an hour* over my letter from Gandhi.
I wonder what he wul do when he gets my come back.
I have just read rather an interesting book The Bear of Britain* by a
man called Frankland 1 which gives a realistic and savage version of the
Arthurian legend, much nearer the truth of course than Malory's Knights
I have been trying to find out something about the Roman evacuation of
Britain and the state of the country afterwards, but nothing much seems
to be known
August 11
Patiala came to see me and stayed to lunch.
Out of the long list of subjects which Political Department suggested
H.H. might wish to discuss, only one was raised by him he wanted a war
medal, for which he hadn t qualified, but other more fortunate Princes had T
August 12
My telegram home about Gandhi letter has perturbed the poor S of S
Winston himself seems to have drafted the Cabinet version in a very
1 .Edward Fnokland, Th t Bear of Britain (London, 1944}
86 PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL MOVE
stormy meeting, and now Winston is in Italy S of S wanted me to issue
a short reply of 'nothing doing' I have stuck to my guns and said I am
quite prepared to issue my draft and incur Winston s displeasure I wonder
what they will do now
August 14
I had a long talk with George Gtffard on the wit in Burma He thinks the
Japanese will have a very difficult job to reform their Army and to rein-
force They have practically given up using Rangoon, owing to the threat
of our air force and it is reckoned that they can only bring in a division
a month over the Bangkok railway The} will require at least 75 000
reinfor cements to reform their shattered divisions, they have lost practically
all the artillery of three divisions and almost the whole of their Tank
regiment George hopes to get Kalewa hefore the end of the monsoon
1 wonder what will happen to George himself, it will he a little difficult
for them to remove him after such a great victory, on the other hand there
is little hope of the Americans consenting to serve under him,
August 15
HMG or at least, Ministry of "War Transport is furious at the Bombay
Explosion Enquiry Report and has sent us a very intemperate statement
on it.
The Cabinet refused to play over the Gandhi letter except for one small
amendment, so I have sent then- draft, as it is not a big enough issue for
a head-on collision, which I thmk is hound to come sometime, if the
Cabinet continue their negligent and hostile attitude to the affairs of India
The Secretary of State had urged Wavell not to issue hs own draft and incur
Churchill's displeasure, as this would involve a head-on collision which would
not be justified by a mere difference about wording Wavdl agreed that *thts
occasion ts not one Jot a head-on collision, but he expressed hs dissatisfaction
to the Secretary of State in strong terms
l Ifee] that many of our troubles in India t both administrative and political \
are due to ignorance and prejudice among your colleagues It is discouraging
work to serve an obviously hostile Cabinet, who seem to have no confidence m
my judgement on any matter Tliey have nou turned doum my recommenda-
tions for (a) Indian Finance Minister, (b) Section pj in Bengal at the beginning
of the year, (c) Bajpais status > {d] the form of my reply to Afr Gandhi, and
(c) my requests for food imports ; of which my great perststi nee has produced an
inadequate amount 1
12-22 AUGUST 1944
87
He was also intensely annoyed at the attitude of the Ministry of War Transport
to the findings of the Commission of Enquiry mto the Bombay explosion The
Mtmstry u anted to mate a foolish and Ull-tcmpered attack on the Com-
mission t uhtch had been headed by the Chief Justice of Bombay ti tth a dis-
tinguished Admiral as a member The Ministry* he wrote, *is hardly on a
good iiiftaf in try my to defend a very minor official by impugning we im-
partiality of two very distinguished Goi emmetit officials
His Majesty's Coi eminent must really give up trying to treat the Govern-
ment of India as a naughty and tiresome child whose bottom they can smack
uhenever they feel hie tt *
I am sure that the G-J meeting will rcsuit in a demand Tor the release of
the Working Committee, but I doubt whether n will have any other
result
Following his correspondence with Rajagopalachart, Jmnah announced that
he (tad agreed to meet Gandhi After several postponements they met on
9 September
August 16
Quiet Counai meeting I read out the reply to Gandhi and there was httlc
comment. Firoz Khan Noon signalled his return by a characteristic out-
hurst of eloquence in favour of high prices for food grams to support the
farmers with his usual disregard for accurate facts and the exact issue
under discussion
August 22
The result of the Cabznet's amendment of my reply to Gandhis letter has
been as I warned them The reactions have been virulent and have con-
centrated on the tone of the letter — tf mdV and 'arrogant' it was called —
on the dragging m of the Depressed Classes and the apparent additional
conditions above the Cnpps Offer before a transitional Government was
formed and on the fact that the letter was published immediately on its
receipt by Gandhi — all of which were due to the Cabinet's amendments
and would not have been vulnerable in my original version In fact
Cabinet has desrro) ed at one blow my reputation for fairness and good
temper m my correspondence with Gancflii and" has thus weakened my
usefulness in any eventual dealings with Congress This was probably the
P M s intention It has also increased the likelihood of a Congress-League
coalition against us
88
PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL MOVE
I have just finished reading Dorothy Sayers 'Man Born to be King , 1
very well done and \ ery interesting Curious to think that if Gandhi were
a saint, instead of a very shrewd and rather malignant politician (which is
possibly how the Sanhcdrin thought of Jesus at the tunc), or became
transformed into a saint by history, and if he died on my hands, as he
might well do, if he fasts again. I might go down to the readers of 2000
years hence with the same teputatton as Pontius Pilate, my Cbuncd v» ould
play the part of the Sanhednn, and perhaps one of the Princes could be
cast for Herod
I was amused to sec that since the Americans took over the Assam
Railways, there have been 33 derailments and 6 colhsions, whereas during
the Congress troubles in 1942 all attempts at sabotage caused only <>
derailments
August 31
Governors' conference for last 3 days, which means a pretty hectic time,
since ordinary routine woik does not stop "We discussed food problem,
post-war development, war allowances for civil servants t and the political
situation Perhaps the chief feature of the food discussion was the desire
for central control, both now and after the war In post-war development,
Bombay, Madras and U P are well ahead with their schemes , but I doubt
whether others have done very much
The discussion on the political situation was interesting I made a short
statement of my views, 1 e , that we could quite easdy hold the present
situation till the end of the war if necessary, but that if nothing was done
before the end of the war, we shall find ourselves in a very dangerous
position, and that an opportunity might occur for a move at tlie end of
the European War and should be taken Governors were unanimous in
supporting me in this, though there was some difference on the form
of approach. On the question of progress in 93 Provinces, no one favoured
the summoning of the Legislatures, but Madras was quite anxious to have
non-official advisers , and Bombay and U P did not object Rutherford
even thought he might be able to form a Ministry in Bthar, but he was
woolly about it as usual
Outside the Conference I had talks with all the Governors
Casey agreed rather reluctantly that he must try to keep a Ministry
going in Bengal and forego the delights of Section 03 He told me
Nazimuddin had got back, several followers, one by typical Bengal
■ D L Say en Ttte Afan Bum To Be Ktng {London, 1943)
r
22 AUGUST— 1 5 SEPTEMBER I944 89
These Go\ crnors meetings arc valuable, but have aroused the wrath of
the Congress Press, and the Hindustan Times had a cartoon of me as an
octopus stretching my tentacles (the Governor s head at the end of each
tentacle) all over India Ftroz Khan Noon too, m hit usual slap-dash v. ay,
wrote suggesting I was trenching on Executive Council s work and by-
passing it He was easily pacified
September 7
Mountbatten came up to Simla today, but as he only arrived just before
midday and departed at 5 p m , our talk was rather burned He said P M
v^as as intractable as ever about Indii seemed to regard sending food to
India merely as *appca$ement* of Congress, and it was only the efforts of
the Chiefs of Stafi\ who realised the necessity for feeding India if it was
to be a stable base for operations, wliich produced any food at all My
impression was confirmed that there was really plenty of shipping but that
Leathers would not part, and that the Indian Food Imports Committee
was a packed body P M was quite furious about Gandhi's release and
subsequent activities and in fact quite impossible about India Leo Amery,
who does stand up to him had accused P M of a Hitler like attitude* to
India, and had got a first-class rocket
We discussed welfare and nurses and medical help and all the other
amenities for which India has been asking and lias been dented for years,
now Press and Parliament have turned their eyes East and arc shouting to
high heaven at the scandalous inefficiency of India for not having all these
things They will be sent now t but nothing will ever he said of all that
India has done with the scanty resources allotted to her
September 15
Got back to Delhi from Simla yesterday evenuig I saw Kaisman. the
evening before I left Simla and heard about the Bretton Woods conference
sterling balances problem etc He agreed that the raising of pay and allow-
ances for the troops in the East would have very serious repercussions on
India s finances and that it was monstrous that we had not been consulted
(I had already sent an indignant telegram to S of S )
H M G suddenly intimated that the pay and allowances of British forces
serving in the East were to be increased Despite the fact that under the defence
expenditure settlement the c&st of the increases w&tM tnwnly fill on India and
would almost inevitably involve corresponding increases m the pay of Indian
forces r the Government of India was not consulted— *a typical example of
90 PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL MOVE
HMG's eaiaher treatment of India to winch IVavell was always objecting
The War Department of the Government of India sent a vigorous pretest
One of Wavelh private telegrams of protest to the Secretary of State was
improperly a)\ou ed to come to the notice of ChttrchU atid t as wtll he seen*
raised his wrath
September 26 »
Two (Jays discussions with the Pnnces went quite well Bhopal put his
points clearly and temperately, and the rest hardly spoke at all I said a few
words at trie end about the necessity to {ace changes after the v. ar, and the
idea of a united India They received these remarks in silence and I don t
think that an) one of them like the idea of change
1 had a talk with C-in-C } esterda} , he approved io£}o my proposal to
make a political move, and e\ en said he was prepared to work under an
Indian Defence Minister
September 18
Some time ago I asked Caroe's 'Brains Trust' r to produce a comparison
betw een Indu and China as future Great Powers, eg m material re-
sources, man power, political stability, organization They produced an
interesting paper which I read today The general conclusion was that
there was not much in it, hut that China was tougher and had been
through the fire both of internal revolution and of external invasion, while
India had not and was softer Curiously enough, Dalai, whom I asked this
afternoon what he thought about the future of the two countries, said at
once that he thought India was too soft and w ould have to go through
the fire before she v> as able to be as fit for future power as China
September 21
I got off to S of S j ester day my proposal* for a political mo\ e I have no
idea what the reactions of the P M and EMG will he— wholly un-
favourable, I imagine Its despatch coincided with the arrival of a singu-
larly stupid letter from Gandhi to the P M he had apparently written w
some time back and practically accused us of suppressing the original
1 A small study group, composed mainly ©f Bntiih officios that studied various problem*
I3t«y to confront India m the post war tstotIL
* This proposal was for the formation of a Provisional Government at the Centre repre-
sentative of the mam political parties and for the caUin ? of a small conference of pohtical
leaaorwh Urn object m view The reasons for making such a move well before the end of
the War were very cogently stated and were beer given more briefly m a letter to the Prime
Minuter oared 34 October 1944 vtuch is reproduced on pp 94-9
15-3° SEPTEMBER JO44 91
(l should think his secretary or follow crs had probably not scut it, realis-
ing how sill) it was) 1 1 think it shows that Gandhi's mental powers are
failing, and ic will not improve the prospects of the P M approving any
negotiations
In the afternoon I saw Sir Henry French (Permanent Secretary, Ministry
of Food in U FC) who having toured India for six wcels now realises
that our view of India's food problems and requirements is justified and
that Whitehall s ideas of them art all wrong 1 suppose they will listen to
him, after having refused to hstcn to the Viceroy for 9 months So perhaps
we shall now get our Food import problem settled ofi reasonable lines
September 30
The Gandht-Jmnah talks ended on a note of complete futility I must say
I expected something better I did not expect statesmanship or a practical
solution, but I did think the two would haic got down to something if
only the best way to embarrass the G of I Anything so barren as their
exchange of letters is a deplorable exposure of Indian leadership The tw o
great mountains have met and not even a ridiculous mouse lias emerged
This surely must blast Gandhi* s reputation as a leader Jinnah had an easy
task, he merely had to keep on telhng Gandhi he was talking nonsense,
which was true, and he did so rather rudely, without having to disclose
any of the weaknesses of his own position, or define his Pakistan in any
way I suppose it may increase his prestige with his followers, but it cannot
add to his reputation with reasonable men I wonder what the effect on
H.M G will be, I am afraid it will increase their dislike of any attempt at
a. move
Gandhi offered Jtnttah the maimed* mutilated Pakistan oj the Rajagopalachari
formula* but u tthottt real sincerity or conviction Jmnak rejected the offer and
bluntly toU Gandhi that the itvmon of India was crtly on hts hps and did not
come pom his heart
Moreover Gandhi insisted that any division of India could only take place
after the British had left, ivhtch was \n line with the general Congress aim of
wresting control from the British first and settling with the Muslims , Princes ;
1 Gandhi $ letter was as follows
-D£aj JVanjf -Mini-y^r yojj iff jr^oottfd tp have the desire to crash, the 'naked £9 *v «
you are said to have described I have been long trying to be a faqtr and that naked —
a more difficult task, I therefore regard the expression as A compliment, though unintended
I approach you then as such and ask you to trust and use me for the sake of your people
and mine and through chem those of the world
Your sincere friend M K Gandhi
$2 2HOPOSAL FO* A fOLlTtCAL MOVE
etc afterwards Jtnnah helmed that once the British had gone, the Hindus
would never agree to the division of India and that the Muslims would have to
fight acivd war to get eten a mutilated Pakistan
October 4
Mostly routine business The P M sent me rather an insulting telegram,
because in a private telegram to S of S I had 111 protesting against India
not being consulted on the pay increases, said that Council might take the
view that if the British Government had to bribe the British soldier to
fight ui the East, India should not be saddled ™th the cost Unfortunately
the telegram was seen by the P M who seized the opportunity to get at
me of which he is always glad, and wired what amounted to an accusation
against me of insulting the British soldier I w ired back an explanation , and
added that I thought my record of service might have saved me from his
insinuation 1 am afraid this exchange will not improve his views on India
or the relations between us (October 6 ^Rather to my surprise he cabled
me a pohte acknowledgement )
October 11
For the first time for something like 10 years I have been in bed for 2 or 3
days with a fever I felt rotten on Saturday, had a temperature of over 1 02
and a head — dull on. the tummy I think Was all right by Monday, but
left first two days of N D C to C-in-C and only presided at final session
this morning We discussed food, Snvastava had been well briefed by
Hutching* and was quite good We had got the da} before telegram from
S of S giving us 300 000 tons for last quarter and Srtvastava was able to
announce this After nine months hard struggle I have got 700,000 tons
for India after H.M G had twice said no imports were possible at all (no
mean achievement for India I think)
Had long telegram from S of S urging every possible objection and
difficulty against my proposed political move l all of which I had of course
considered before making it He makes a fatuous counter-proposal which
Linhthgow turned down with a bang nearly three year* ago I thought
they would refuse to face it
Tlte Secretary of Stete suggested that the \attortaI Defence Council should
be utilized for Jtsausm^ the bast? of a future constitution for India and framing
proposals IVaiell replied that this uas quite imptactieahU md uottld lead
rtouhere Gandht and Jitmah held the Leys of the situation and could not he
bypassed
4-30 OCTOBER 1944
93
Octohr 20
For the last week I have been up and downstairs and m and out of bed,
running high temperatures for a short time, having headaches and indi-
gestion, never very bad but enough to make uork <LfTicuIt and life
depressmg I am feeling better today and hope I am all nght I have, how-
ever, cancelled my tours to Baluchistan and NWFP.
We had a Himcult and unfortunate Council meeting on 1 8th over the
application to India of the War Service pay and Japanese campaign pay
which H M G sprang on us without consultation or warning The results
have been disastrous The Oin-C demanded smular benefits for Indian
troops including the indefensible allotment of Japanese campaign pay to
Indian troops serving in India If I had been fit and had more time, I wouid
certainly have stopped this C-in-C said he would not be responsible for
the morale or discipline of the Indian army unless the increases were
granted and all the Indian members of Council naturally supported him
O-in-C also demanded pay rises for Indian Commissioned Officers and
this was also passed He admits privately that Japanese pay inside India is
illogical, and that so also really is the extra pay for I C Os But once the
issue of racial discrimination is raised, it is not possible to restrain Indian
members F M came to me next day and practically threw his hand in
1 have been Viceroy a year today, the hardest year's work 1 have done
In some ways I have done reasonably well, the food problem and getting
some sort of a move on post-war development, 1 have found H M G s
attitude to India negligent, hostile and contemptuous to a degree I had not
anticipated, or I think I might have done more. Still the more one sees of
the political problem and of the Indians, the more one realises that there
are very dark days ahead for India, unless more wisdom and good will
are shown, and 1 think they will have to begin from the top, from
Whitehall
I have made some mistakes I don't think the release of Gandhi was one,
though I always mistrusted the medical opinions on which he was released
I wish I had been firmer with the C-in-C over increases of pay though
1 think most of them have been justified,
Rowlands came in on return from UK. He says the forcible tone of
some of my telegrams has made P M furious and made it difficult for
other members of Cabinet to help, on the other hand if they had not been
forcible PM would have taken no notice General Election is apparently
inevitable in spring, on strictly party lines, and the issue doubtful I have
proposed Rowlands for Finance Member of the Executive Council and
sounded htm this evening
94
PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL MOVE
Octobtr 2$
I have answered S of S objections to my proposal for a political mo\ e,
saying that I fully realised the difficulties and risks but that \vc should never
get on unless \\ c faced them He has now wired proposing that I should
consult Governors, he is obviously m a dither at the idea of having to put
my proposals up to the Cabinet Meantime I have written a letter to the
P M on the occasion of my completing a }car as Viceroy, stating my
view s on India, and liavc taken as text his directive to me of a year ago —
but the P M won't like it
With approval from home I offered Rowlands the job of F M , he asked
for time to consider but did not definitely turn it down
On 24th I presented ^VCsandaGC on quite an impressive parade
just outside Delhi Fort, and yesterday wc had 500 Indian soldier* to tea
(the V Cs and their relatives and the men of the Guards of Honour and
other troops on parade), quite a good party-^Hcc Ex's idea
The letter to the Prune Minister tvith the omission of a few paragraph
mainly about the background of conditions vt India t is reproduced belou*
24th October 1944
My dear Prime Minister,
I have now completed one year in the high and responsible office for
which you did me the great honour of recommending me to His Majesty,
and 1 feel I ihould write and give you some account of my stewardship
and of the views I have formed on the present and future of India
I propose to write entirely freelyand frankly , as 1 know you would
wish I have served you now for over five } ears and we should know one
another reasonably well I know you have often found me a difficult and
troublesome subordinate I have not always found you an easy master to
serve But I think you realise that I have always served loyally — and I may
say with unqualified admiration for your courage and your strategy —
and that I have always told you the truth as I saw it without fear of
consequences I propose to do so now
1 wiL begin by saying that my primary reason for writing is that I feel
very strongly that the future of India is the problem on which the British
Commonwealth and the British reputation will stand or fall in the post-
war period To my mind o ur strategic security, our name in the world for
statesmanship and fairdeahng and much of our economic well-being will
depend on the settlement we make in India Our prestige and prospects m
Burma Malaya, China and the Far Hast generally are entirely subject to
what happens in India If we can secure India as a friendly partner jn the
British Commonwealth our predominant influence in these countries will,
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25 OCTOBER IJ>44 9$
I think, be assured, with a lost and hostile India, \vc arc likely to he reduced
in the East to the position of commercial bag-men
And )et I am bound to say that after a year*s experience in my present
office I feel that the vital problem* of India arc being treated by His
Majesty's Government with neglect, even sometimes mth hostility and
contempt I entirely admit the difficulty of the problems, I know the vital
preoccupations of the European war I agree in the main with what I think
is } our conviction, that in a mistaken view of Indian conditions and in an
entirely misplaced sentimental liberalism we took the wrong turn with
India 25 or 30 } ears ago, but w e cannot put back the clock and must deal
with existing conditions and pledges, and I am clear that our present
attitude as aggravating the mischief
May I give you a few instances of what seem to me a neglectful or
unfriendly attitude to India and her problems
I read the proceedings of the meetings of the Dominion Premiers India,
one of the most vital problems of the Commonwealth, was hardly men-
tioned, either from the strategic or political point of view.
At the last big debate on India in the House of Commons, I am told
that there were hardly ever more thin 40 members present
In spite of the lesson of the Bengal famine, I have had during the last
nine months literally to fight with 31 the words I could command* some-
times almost intemperate, to secure food imports, without which we
should undoubtedly be in the throes of another famine, and probably of
uncontrolled inflation, since without these imports I could hardly have
held food prices from soaring as they did last year
The recent increase of soldiers F pa> , whichhave added some ^50 000 000
to our inflationary position already precarious and a considerable part
of this sum to the Indian tax payer's burden, were introduced without
any consultation of India at all, or even warning, though we could have
suggested means of easing the burden both for the British and Indian tax-
payer, and Indian Members of Council would have felt no resentment if
they had been consulted in advance
The obloquy now being heaped on India for the lack of amenities for
soldiers is mainly due to disregard of repeated requests during the past
three years or more for doqtors, nurses medical comforts and goods of
all kinds
Having got that off my chest I will try to give you a picture of the
Indian problem as I see it
I will take as a text the directive you gave me on October 8th last year,
before I left for India This directive required me, in brief
(1) to secure the defence of India against the Japanese,
(n) to rally all classes to the support of the war effort,
D169 R
96 PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL MOVE
(in) to establish and maintain the best possible standard of living for the
largest number of people ,
(iv) to appease communal differences, and
(v) to make proposals for political advance as occasion warranted, subject
to the demands of (1) and (n) ahove
On the first two tasks given in your directive, I have carried on my
predecessor's work, to meet the development of the campaign The
S E A C has been firmly established, and Moumbatten has expressed his
complete satisfaction at the support in men and material given to the 14th
Army during the recent operations on the Eastern frontier, and in the pre-
parations made for future plans Transportation is perhaps our most serious
single problem, and we also need special help to improve the welfare of
British troops The strain on Indian economy generally is serious, ana
additional hur dens without rehtf in other directions wiU risk a breakdown
The third task in your directive concerned standards of living, and is a
most difficult and complicated problem The Bengal famine of 1943 W3S
a very serious disaster, and disclosed the weaknesses in our food admini-
stration These weaknesses are due partly to an absolute shortage in a
country which is permanently under-nourished, and partly to the human
qualities of fear, selfishness, greed, and provincialism My chief aims in
food administration during the past year have been to restore confidence,
to improve the procurement and distribution of food > to extend rationing,
and to get more food grown It was absolutely essential to secure food
imports on a large scale, and I am afraid I had to be importunate about
this, since my first requests were received with much the same astonished
incredulity as Oliver Twist encountered on a well-known occasion I have
tried to break down provincialism, both by personal visits to all Provinces,
and cascussions with those concerned in food administration, and by
conferences of all the Governors I think I can claim a certain measure of
success, for example, I induced the Punjab to accept both rationing and
price control after their Ministers had publicly announced that in no
circumstances would they do anything of the kind And there is certainly
a great deal more confidence throughout the country than there was a
ear ago, with a very wholesome effect on prices With the help now
erng accorded by His Majesty's Government, wc should be able to hold
the food position, but only just We are 4 and shall remain, on a knife-edge
until normal trade conditions are restored The danger areas are at present
Bengal, parts of Madras, the Travancore and Cochin States, and the
Bombay Decern, at the moment the Travancoie and Cochin States and
tne rAalaW district of Madras form the most urgent problem. The
difficulty, almost impossibility, of persuading the nce-^ating South to eat
25 OCTOBER 1944
97
the hard Northern grains will be well known to you, and you will realise
how it complicate* the problem
Apart from the food problem. I have endeavoured to stimulate planning
for post-war development over the whole administrative field, both in
industry and agriculture, so as to secure a better standard of living for the
Indian people, and I have appointed a special additional Member of
Council to deal with the problem This is an immense task* perhaps
impossible of accomplishment under the present Government o f India.
Success will require either complete autocracy on the Russian model, or
effort and self-denial of a land only possible under imaginative and popu-
lar leadership Indians have not so far shown themselves any keener than
other people on austerity and high taxes But I think 1 can claim that the
Government of India is stimulating ideas in the direction of de\ elopment
as far as possible
The fourth and fifth tasks you gave me together constitute the political
problem I cannot claim to have made any progress with them, but they
are of vital importance The following seem to me to be the essential
factors of the problem —
{1) When we started, 20 or 30 jears ago, on the political reform of
India, we laid down a course from which we cannot now withdraw It
may have been a mistaken course* and it would probably have been better
to nave prescribed economic development first, but I am afraid it is too
late to reverse the policy now And the general policy, of giving India self-
government at an early date, was confirmed not Jong ago in the Cnpps
offer
(n) Nor do I think that in any case we can hold India down by force
Indians are a docile people, and a comparatively small amount of force
ruthlessly used might be sufficient, but it seems to me clear that the British
people will not consent to be associated with a policy of repression, nor
will world opinion approve it, nor will British soldiers wish to stay here
in large numbers after the war to hold the country down There must be
acquiescence in the British connection if we are to continue to keep India
within the Commonwealth
(111) India will never, within any time that we can foresee, be an efficient
country, organised and governed on western hues In her development to
self-government we have got to be prepared to accept a degree of in-
efficiency comparable to that in China, Iraq, or Egypt We must do our
best to maintain the standards of efficiency we have tried to inculcate, but
we cannot continue to resist reform because it will make the administra-
tion less efficient
(iv) The present Government of India cannot continue indefinitely, or
even for Jong Though ultimate responsibility still rests with His Majesty's
oB PROPOSAL fOR A POLITICAL MOVE
Government* His Majesty s Go\ crnmcnt lias no longer the pow cr to take
effective action Wc shall drift increasingly into situations — financial,
economic, or political— for which India herself will be responsible but for
which His Majcst) *s Government will get the discredit We arc already
in the position that Indian Members of Council have a controlling \oice,
and are increasingly aware of their power The British Civil Services, on
which the good government of the country lias up till now depended,
might almost he described as moribund, senior members arc tired and
disheartened, and it will be extremely difficult after the w ar to secure
good recruits
(v) If our aim is to retain India as a willing member of the British
Commonwealth, we must make some imaginative and constructive move
without delay We have every reason to mistrust and dislike Gandhi and
Jinnah, and their follow en But the Congress and the League are the
dominant parties in Hindu and Muslim India, and will remain so They
control the Press, the electoral machine, the money bags, and have the
prestige of established parties E\ en if Gandhi and Jinnah disappeared
tomorrow (and I do not think that Gandhi today would he described by
Insurance companies as a good life) I can see no prospect of our having
moie reasonable people to deal with We have had to negotiate "with
similar rebels before, cg,Dc Valera and Zaghlul
(vi) When we should make any fresh move is a difficult problem. I am
quite clear that it should be made some considerable time before the end
of the Japanese war When the Japanese war ends, we shall have to release
our political prisoners The) will find India unsettled and discontented
Food -will stw be short, demobilisation and the closing down of the war
factories, and o\ ergrown clerical establishments* will throw many people
out of employment They will find a fertile field for agitation, unless we
have previously diverted their energies into some more profitable channel,
1 e , into dealing with the administrative problems of India and into
trying to solve the constitutional problem We cannot move without
taking serious risks, but the most serious risk of all u that India after the
war will become a running sore which will sap the strength of the British
Empire I think it is still possible to keep India within the Commonwealth,
though I do not think it will be easy to do so If we fail to make any effort
now we may hold India down uneasily for some years, but in the end she
will pass into chaos and probably into other hands
(vn) To be effective any move we make must be such as to capture the
Indian imagination If India is not to be ruled by force, it must be ruled by
the heart rather than by the head Our move must be sincere and friendly,
and oui outlook towards India must change accordingly I am prepai&d to
25 OCTOBER I £)44
99
put up proposals for a move, which will involve risks, but which I think
constitute the best chance of making progress
What I have in mind is a provisional political Government, of the type
suggested in the Cripps declaration, within the present constitution,
coupled with an earnest but not necessarily simultaneous attempt to devise
means to reach a constitutional settlement Amcry knows my views, and
I drafted a paper for the Cabinet, which I have asked him to withhold for
the present
But the real essential is a change of spirit, a change which will convince
the average educated Indian that the British Government is sincere in its
intentions and is friendly towards India, It wj]J not be easy to do, there
is very deep-rooted feeling of suspicion to overcome, but certain steps
could be taken which would help to reduce the mistrust and enmity now
generally felt In fact, if we want India as a Dominion after the war, we
must begin treating her much more like a Dominion now If certain
measures, which I would suggest, were taken by His Majesty's Govern-
ment, and I were permitted within a policy approved by His Majesty's
Government to try and convince India of British sympathy, I bcheve it
would he possible to effect a considerable improvement
I shoula like to add that the view that something must be done before
long is not merely my opinion It is the considered opinion of the Com*
mand er-in-Chief, of all eleven Governors of the Provinces of British
India* and of all the senior members of the Services with whom I have
discussed the question I do not think His Majesty's Government can
afford to ignore the entire weight of British official opinion out here
If the Cabinet is opposed in principle to any move during the war, I
think a clear statement to that effect should be made so that we may all
know where we stand But if it is a matter of timing and of method my
advice is entitled to due weight I think the fadurc of the Gandhi-Jinnah
talks has created a favourable moment for a move by His Majesty's
Government
It is easy to condemn any plan for betterment of the Indian situation ort
the ground of nsk or probable failure If we are to make any progress we
must take nsks and be prepared for fadure, but a move made generously
and honestly, even if it faded, would do good
I have, as you know, no axe to grind I did not seek this appointment
or wish it, but since I have been placed in a position of such immense
responsibility for the future of the British Commonwealth which we
jienas- Jji tx> Jirttmd Jto/zlac£_mv views mi front jjfj, o u> 'watbou t jiartuh t^.
favour or affection
Yours sincerely,
WAVELL
[592/9]
100
PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL MOVE
October 29
Simon (Astley) left for home this morning after z \ yean as ADC He is
about the quickest witted and most efficient ADC I have had, and has in
many ways an attracm e personality
I got Maurice Hallett and ColviUe up here to discuss the proposal for
a political move, and sent George Abell to Lahore to consult Glancy
Hallett and Colville entirely support me, Glancy taking a Provincial view,
is afraid that move may affect Punjab Ministry and Unionist Party and
strengthen League
November g
Back to-day from a short tour to the Punjab As usual, a pretty strenuous
performance There were interviews with all the Ministers and some of
the officials, a reception of about 150 or so people, and inspections and
tours
Meanwhile I had to deal with the usual spate of official papers from
Delhi and to keep abreast of the discussions going on between Snvastava,
the Food Member, who had come to Lahore to try to smooth out differ-
ences on food prices etc \\ ith the Punjab Ministers These seem to have
gone fkifly well but there are still some difficult problems Punjab want
parity of nee prices with U P and priority of movement for their surplus
grain and one or two other things
On my way to the plant this morning I paid a surprise visit to the
Lahore Gaol
On return I had a long interview with C-m C On the issue ofjapanese
Campaign pay to Indian troops in India, which the S of S wants re-
considered m council, I found Auchinleck very stubborn I don t mind
the financial effect, but I don't want at this juncture to be turned down by
H.M G on an issue on which we are in the wrong and have not a leg
to stand on logically
\cvetnber 11
A long day with lots of files and a very difficult conference with C-m C
and Finance Member over Japanese campaign pay which lasted for an
hour and a half I got C-in C just a little more accommodating We are
sending telegram to S of S to elucidate certain matters and Oin-C's
final attitude will depend on his reply
No reaction from P M yet about my letter, but S ofS has cabled that
it has arrived, Rowlands has accepted Finance membership provisionally,
asking for certain conditions which are quite acceptable
29 OCTOBER-20 NOVEMBER 1944
1 01
November ij
Lunch paity today included two Ministry of Information officials (Redman
and Bamfbrd) and I tried to impress on them how to get over British
propaganda in India which Bamford admitted the MOI was unable to
do My theme on propaganda to India was this the M of I approach is
to boost British achievements etc , with the implication that India is very
lucky to be able to belong to the British Commonwealth I said that
the approach must be to boost Indian achievements with the implica-
tion that the British Commonwealth is very lucky to have so valuable
a member
November 16
Bulabhai Desai leader of the Congress parry in the Assembly came to
sec me yesterday evening — I had asked to see him Rather an attractive
person with a pleasant voice He was all sweet reasonableness in his
proposals for measures to ease the present situation in fact his ideas seem
to bear a distinct resemblance to the recommendations I have made to
H M G He wanted a National Government under the present constitution
formed of members drawn from the existing legislature — and of course
the release of the Working Committee and replacement of Section 93
Governments
November 20
A moderately quiet weekend but any number of fdes I have to make 4 or
5 speeches shortly — to the Chamber of Princes to the Naval training ship
at Bombay (DufFerin) to the Chamber of Commerce at Calcutta at
Cawnpore and possibly when I visit the Army at ImphaL I am not very
good at speeches 1 hate being hurned over them but seldom finish them
in good tunc
Sapru s proposed Committee announced this morning will be hailed
with dehght by H.M G as an excuse to postpone consideration of my
proposals I have told P S V to draft a wire to S of S to ask that my
proposals may be considered even if they have eventually to be postponed
till Sapru s Committee has reported
At Gandkts prompting the veteran Liberal politician Str Tej Bahadur
Sapru was md teed to set up a Committee of hts Non-Party Conference —
a moribund political body — to study the constitutional problem and attempt
a solution of it Nothing important came of this
102
PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL WOVE
November 26
I think Indian 'political circles 1 have guessed that there is something afoot,
or ought to be G D Birla, Jinnah and Mirza Ismail 1 ha\ e all been around
taking soundings Birla had a long talk with Jenkins, who gave nothing
away It all really amounted to the fact that they are most anxious in all
political partes for H M G to move* and I think prepared to accept some-
thing on the lines of my proposal to KM G I don't think there can have
been a leakage, but it does look as if they knew or guessed something
November 28
The house has been full of Governors* wives and others for WVS and
Red Cross conferences, run by Her Ex. who must he having a frightful
time There has also been a conference of Railway managers, all of whom
came to lunch-
Meanwhile I have been struggling with six speeches which I have to
deliver in the first half of next month, the one to the Chambers of Com-
merce at Calcutta being the important one
The routine work too has been heavy
The P M has acknow ledged receipt of my letter in a telegram which
I am sure indicates his determination to do nothing whatever till the
war is over I shall ob\ lously have to make some very determined move
if India is ro have consideration in the near future
November 30
Snvastava in a discussion with me today told me that after the Congress
success at the polls and assumptions of office in UP in 193 7, the leading
industrialists — all I think Hindu — -got together and decided to finance
Jinnah and the Muslim League and also the Mahasahha, as the extreme
Communal parties to oppose Congress who they feared nnght threaten
then* financial profits I said I considered it a most immoral proceeding
and Snvastava merely said but politics are immoral 1
I have been speech hound for the last 10 days trying to write my
speeches for the forthcoming tour especrall) the Calcutta speech hut am
still practically speech-less
December 3
"Woik has been heavy bat nothing sensational
On the matter of extra pay for Japanese campaign S of S has sent a
series of most confused and illogical telegrams I could make neither head
* 5 rMin3lstna3.DewMi of Mysore i0i6-^t Prime Minister of Jaipur 1942-0 Prime
Minister of H>dcrabad, 1946-7
2,6 NGVEMBEH-6 DECBMBtH I944 IO3
nor tail of them but P S V has managed to interpret their meaning The
result is c\ en more illogical than before and will really satisfy nobody
HJi of Bhopal came to sec me this morning just before a meeting of
the Standing Committee of the Pnnces He expressed himself disappointed
at the answer I had sent to their representations at the September meeting
He came again at 2 }o p m said his Standing Committee meeting had
lasted till 1 20 p m and that they wished to resign I said he must have had
a difficult meeting, that it was tiresome for him to lose his Committee at
this time, and that I must await the receipt of their formal resignation
Later, at dinner time 1 got the formal resignation of the Chancellor,
Pro-Chancellor and whole Standing Committee I wonder what the next
move is
Tlie September meeting with the Princes, which ts briefly referred to in the
journal entry for 16 September, had apparently passed off without any particular
difficulty The Princes uere mamly apprehensive about schemes that were
being put forward for grouping smaller States together for administrative
piaposes or for attaching thent to larger States One sitch 'attadtment scheme*
i« Kathtait ar had beat put into force, despite objections by some of the Rulers
but had later been held by the Courts to be illegal, u hereupon the illegality
was summarily cured by Act of Parliament without the Princes being consulted
Tfiey u ere upset and alarmed by this procedure
A letter was drafted and approved by the Secretary of State, deahtg with
representations that they had made on this and other matters at the September
meeting Though if was conciliatory in tone and said that the Kathtawar
Attachment Scheme would not be repeated, it did not grant the Princes any
special concession Tlieir disappointment at this letter was the pretext for the
resigttattctt of the Standing Committee
December 5
The resignation of the Princes has of course made a sensation It will be
exploited by the Nationalist Press and enemy propaganda and is a tire-
some af&ir, but it is surely a blunder from the Pnnces* point of view and
I dunk they will soon realise it
We had a big party from 7 to 9 p m for the Princes Wyhe tells me he
has good information that the 'crisis 1 was the work of Bhopal and the
Jam Sahib who forced or bluffed the rest of the Standing Committee into
sigxmig
December &
A very long day I had an interview with Bhopal who gave a most dis-
ingenuous account of the resignation of the Standing Committee It is now
104 PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL MOVE
clear that he and the Jam Sahib deliberately engineered the 'crisis*, and
forced the Standing Committee to resign, -without even telling them the
result of his interview with me or of the contents of the Political Depart-
ment's reply to their representations, or anyway giving them time to
digest it 1 discovered that when he saw me at 2 30 p m on December 3,
and professed himself unable to control his Standing Committee, he had
already had in his pocket the resignation document which he had himself
signed and forced the others to sign I told him that I thought the Princes
had made a very serious blunder, and had shown grave discourtesy to the
Crown, and had done themselves no good by bringing their affairs into
public discussion He was obviously ill at case, and professed himself
willing to do anything to retrieve his blunder
I had an hour's talk with Jinnah He showed his attractive side and was
friendly and sensible He professed himself willing to come into any
Provisional Government under the present Constitution, although he
said he could convince me that Pakistan was necessary and desirable He
is certainly in te lb gent
December 16
Got hack from tour this evening A strenuous affair We went to Bombay
on 7th, a long day 6 a m, — 11 p Next morning I went down to the
Docks to see the repairs after the explosion, very well done, and about
midday took off for Hyderabad
We spent December 8-1 j in Hyderabad It was very strenuous but in
some ways easier than I had expected The Nizam, of whose eccentricity
and personal habits I had heard so much, was in some ways an agreeable
surprise We had a long dnve together from the airfield to the Falaknuma
Palace where we were quartered This pretty well exhausted my small
talk, for H E H was not very helpful Then we paid one another State
visits and this involved sitting side by side on ceremonial chairs with our
staffs in long and silent lines on either side and making formal conversa-
tion for io or 15 minutes We managed quite fairly well, but I had to do
practically all the conversation, and it does not come easy to me
Three long days of official engagements followed* and on Tuesday, the
1 2th, the Nizam had a long talk He began with a very fast yorker, as he
said that since all the requests he had to make were in a printed 'yellow
book which he had sent to me, he need not go into them in detail I had
to say that though I was aware generally of H.E H*s hopes, I knew nothing
of a yellow IjooIc {Wyhe of whom I hastily enquired later had also no
idea what H.E R meant but concluded that he referred to a document of
6-1 6 DECEMBER 1944 IO5
several }ears back) However, the Nizam did not press the subject, and
then went on to enquire about the dispute with the Princes and resignation
of the Standing Committee, on which he was obviously well informed
I told him frankly my view of the Princes* action He then went on to ask
about my interview with Jinnah 4nd the general political situation He is
no fool and shrewd in a self-interested The Nawab of Chhatan who
followed rum obviously spoke to a bnef given to him by H E H on the
great merits of Hyderabad's war ciTort and the need to reward them
substantially
There were some rather comic incidents One was H E H and the
champagne Before the visit the Nizam had written to the Resident
expatiating on the high price of champagne and enquiring whether J
expected it to be served to me I told the Resident to relieve H E H's mind
by telling him that 1 thought champagne was out of place in war time
However, on this last mght the major-domo came to me shortly after
dinner began and said the Nizam wished me to dnnk champagne with
him A champagne glass was placed before me, but no champagne
followed and I heard agitated colloquies of the servants with REH on
my left It turned out that the first bottle opened was flat or corked, and it
took some courage to suggest to the Nizam that a second bottle should
be broached This too proved flat and there was consternation Finally
someone was found hardy enough to suggest the opening of a third bottle
and the Nizam regretfully agreed But that too was wrong and champagne
was given up, the Nizam explaining to Her Ex. and myself the high price
the champagne had cost him and the sorrowful v. aste ofhis money (The
major-domo, a European, explained to me later the H E HL had bought
the champagne years ago and had kept it standing upnght with fatal
results )
This visit was rather an o rdeal All sorts of tiresome ques tions o f etique tte
cropped up, and the Nizam rather delighted in being awkward about
them I hate these problems it is difficult to steer between the Scylla of
being pompous and the Charybdis of letting down the dignity of the
office Another problem is the matter of gifts The Nizam sent some round
shortly before we left There was his photograph and a book of his own
poems but there was also a necklace of problematical value for Her Ex
There does not seem any very strict guide about these presents, I was told
that the practice was to accept them and place them in a sort of public
treasure chest, whence they were sold and proceeds used to purchase gifts
which Viceroy had to present
Hyderabad is a freakish place, a curious mixture of modern and
I0 6 PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL MOVE
mediaeval, of progress and of stagnation, under the despotic rule, except
so far as British influence restrains him, of an odd personality But the
Nizam was less odd, more shrewd and less physically debilitated than I
had been led to expect
We got to Calcutta in the early afternoon of* the 13 th Casey seemed to
have fewer problems than usual He has an embarras de nee* at the
moment and would very gladly pact with large quantities if we could
guarantee to replace it in the second half of 1945 I like the Caseys very
much and they are doing a great job of work m Bengal and actually seem
to like Bengalis
Next day r inspected the Calcutta Light Horse before breakfast, and
made my speech to the Chambers of Commerce at it a m. On the 15th
I flew to Imphal and knighted Shm Chnstison Scoones and Stopford
Mountbatten Lcese and Browning were there
On December 16 we flew back to Delhi stopping at Cawnpore on the
way to open the Hallett hospital quite a good budding
December 20
I had a long talk to Wyhe on 18th He says visit to Hyderabad was a
success and that Her Ex in especial created a great impression He per-
suaded me, rather against my own judgement to cancel the visit to Bhopal
My mstmct was to carry it out despite all Bhopal's tiresomeness It loots
as it I might be in for a show-down with the Princes, and I am not quite
sure that I am ready for it
Snvastava was very grateful for my remarks in the Calcutta speech
on the work of the Food Department
December zz
The usual routine for the last few day, The meetmg wtth C-in-C and
*M over the Japanese Campaign Pay went better than I had expected
ranks
tish or Indian
certain line
December 23
importance h
mak
u nT _ , 1 j _ miKc no move about India untd I went
home and advocated «t myself From hu telegram « was obvzous that they
I6-JI DECEMBER IJ>44
T07
would much sooner I didn't hiur) , and lie used the Sipru Committee as
an excuse for delay and suggested that I should wait till that had reported
I think the sooner I go the better But I shall think it over for 2 day or so\
I can't go before the end of January because of the visit to Nepal
December 3 i
A quiet week, one of the quietest I have had since I became Viceroy , but
all the same my trays were never really empty
I have cabled S of S f proposing to go home about January 25 for a
fortnight
So ends 1944 On the whole not a bad year for India I have kept her on
a fairly even keel, and can claim credit for some successes I think it was
quite an achievement to get 1,000,000 tons of food almost, after H.M G
had twice at least declined flatly to send any more And I have had some
progress made with post-war economic development, though not nearly
as much as is required or as I had hoped The machine is desperately sioiv
and cumbrous, and few of the personnel are really first-class I don't know
whether I could have done more to improve the coal situation, I did
realise the need for action at once and tried my best to remedy the defects
in organization and to increase production
I think I did well in getting a quick and generous financial settlement
after the Bombay explosion
On the political side we have made no progress, and I have undoubtedly
disappointed the hopes of political India which were raised by Gandhi s
release
I think his release was correct, though I am still not quite sure that he
would have got out so easily if I had been in Delhi, I should certainly have
insisted on another medical opinion I believe his release has done good on
the whole I am sure 1 have been right not to see him until he could show
some reasonable proposal, and anyway H.M G would never have allowed
it I think I fen e been right to hack up Khi2ar m the Punjab against
Jinnah s attempt to disrupt the Unionist Ministry
I have now at least put a definite proposal to H.M G and have made
them take notice of it 1945 will show whether I can get it across with
them, and if I can, whether I can get it across with the Indians, and in the
unlikely event of these two improbabilities happening, whether I can
make it work and set India on the right road I am afraid that the hopes
are slender, I have less opinion than ever of Indian capacity for leader-
ship and statesmanship and commonsense, nor do I think that I have
a strong enough personality to put through the almost Superhuman task of
IDS PROPOSAL FOR A POLITICAL MOVE
persuading India to be a nation I conceive that my two main objects must
be first to try and persuade Indians that they have it in them to be a great
nation, and secondly to persuade Whitehall of the paramount importance
to British prestige, British security and British prosperity to secure a
sans factory but generous settlement of the Indian problem
The trouble about the first is that there is hardly any sense at all of
nationhood in India or of leadership likely to produce it few of them see
beyond their own personal or sectional interests There is no greatness
about India yet 1 wonder if there ever will be Even the Pnnces have nc
leaders nor dreamers of dreams, they too seem to be thinking only of
personal pomp and prestige or personal gain Has India a great future or
is her great future already behind her ?
In Whitehall there is ignorance and prejudice to overcome, it is curious
how little they seem to know or to care about India and her problems
Official circles still treat India as a naughty child, whereas she has reached
the more tiresome age of adolescence — -I am speaking in regard to Bnnsh
rule — and will leave the parental protecting home of the British Common-
wealth and perhaps go wrong altogether unless gtven a latch-key,
sympathy and a good deal of freedom.
Even if I manage to hold down this job for my full five years, I could
make htde impression on the situation, but the above are the general
principles I should like to work on
Evan Jenkins has been a great mainstay , and I have leaned heavily on
him His extraordinary capacity for \\ ork, clear-headedness and detailed
knowledge have been invaluable, and I could not have got on with-
out him
It is hard to say how we have done on the social side, all right I hope
Her Ex is of course an outstanding success as Vicereine I think the
atmosphere in the Viceroy s House is friendly without loss of dignity, and
the Staff ha\ e done their work well I have heard a good deal of testimony
to the way the AD Cs look after guests But it is hard work and very
easy to make a bad mistake we may have made some already
Someone (was it Dr Johnson') defined golf as the art of directing a
small ball into a hole with instruments singularly ill-adapted to the
purpose It would serve as quite a good description of Indian politics
THE FIRST VISIT TO LONDON
January 3
1945 h^s opened quietly Practically the only discussion in Council today
was on the glut of rice m Bengal and measures necessary to get it turned
over and prevent its deterioration
January 5
Little Menon 1 spoke of an interview he had had with Sapru, who was
apparently of the opinion that I was completely opposed to progress
Menon said he satisfied him that 1 was not, and Sapru said that a move by
H M G would be welcome even if his Committee had not reported
January 7
S of S has wired that War Cabinet will not have time to see nic at home
before March owing to meeting between the Big Three They obviously
want to delay as long as possible the moment when they have to take
a decision about India I suspect they will find other reasons for delay by
March
January n
We had a National Defence Council on the Sth 9th and 10th Rather a
tame affair, even little Jamnadas Mehta had little to say and the proceedings
were rather dull
Council lasted all morning today It looks as if Bengal might have to
export 200000 tons of nee in order to turn over the stocks they have
accumulated, but I am not sure that they will have the nerve to do it Old
Jogendra Singh gave his free-trade hare its usual run, and Aziz-ul-Haque
chased it as usual
January 13
We had another Council meeting yesterday on the status of our High
Commissioner in South Africa.
1 Rao Bahadur V P Menon Reform \ Commissioner 194^, an Indian official of
outstanding abtlity who played a leading role in the final Ttansfcf of Power and in the
subsequent Integration of the States
no
THE TIRST VISIT TO LONDON
Meanwhile PS V was seeing Bulabhai Desai, the Congress Leader
of the Assembl) , who represented that he had the agreement of both
Gandhi and Jinnah to propose a Coalition Government at the Centre, and
Similar Governments m the Provinces under the existing Constitution as
a "war tune measure, in fact his proposals are very near what I have put to
EM G I ha\ e cabled to H M G that I propose to see Dcsai on my return
from tour, and that this approach cannot be disregarded. The) will be
convinced that I ha\ e engineered it, to force their hand, since I ha\ c seen
both Desai and Jinnah recentlv I think it may be an advantage in some
ways that the approach has come from the Indian side But I shall ha\c
some lively passages with H M G
January 19
Got back this evening from fi\ e days camp in Nepal Terai with Maharaja.
The party shot tn clve tigers and six rhino It w as good fun and a vcr)
pleasant change in an attractive part of the country
We w ere very comfortable and the atmosphere w as \ ery friertdi) The
old Maharaja (Joodha) was ver) well and in good form, I liked huru
There was a ceremony (spring festival) on the morning of the iSth, at
which H H, and his tamiiy w ore then- gorgeous headdresses solid with
diamonds, pearls, emeralds and rubies and topped wnh buds of paradise,
and H.H and suite came in after dinner on last e\ ening to make a short
speech and propose my health to which I replied and proposed the
Maharaja's otherwise there were no social contacts and we hved in
separate camps
A huge pile of w ork on return War cabinet \ ery anno) ed at my seeing
Desai tomorrow — I had refused to cancel the appointment made before
1 went on tour — but ga\ e a grudging consent
January 20
I had two important interviews this morning with Khizar and Desai
Khizar was in good heart in spue of Chhotu. Ram's death , he wanted me
against the machinations both of Congress and the League In tact K is
really quite content with things as they are, and has really no great 'wish
to sever the British connection
I had 45 minutes with Desai mairjy asking him questions about his
proposals to ascertain exactly what he had in mind and w hat real support
he had. He was all sweet reasonableness in his answers to my questions
and seemed frank and friendl) but how much backing he really has I
cannot sa) , 1 wired home a summary of my talk and said that 1 must see
Lady Wavell
J A Wavcll at Dwjdtt June 1944
JANUARY Jp45
III
Jinuah if H M G arc prepared to go further with the proposal I doubt
whether they are, hut they may find it a little difficult to say so
Meanwhile I ha\c to cope with a curious (Stafford Cnpps called it
'startling', Amery says) proposal which S of S has evolved and put to
War Cabinet It practically amounts to giving India Dominion status
under present Constitution and present Executive Council It seems to me
quite unworkable, both for constitutional and psychological reasons
S of S has a curious capacity for getting hold of the right stick but
practical!) always the wrong end of it
January 2$
This afternoon I saw Jogendra Singh charming and rather woolly as usual
He is the most attractive character of my Executive Council I think, and
has the right ideas but not a very practical grasp of realities Hydan on the
other hand who was my next visitor is a very practical young man and
I think on the whole more 'English' in his outlook than any official
Indian I have met Ronald Adam A G at the War Office, turned up in
the evening he was as full of gossip as ever and told me of the next
meeting-place of the Big Three and approxunatc date P M will be in a
much less dominating position than at previous conferences both Presi-
dent and Stahn have realised their superior strength- — of their national
power for the time being I mean I wonder if P M , who is the biggest
man of the three will still be able to assert his dominant personality A
great triumph if he can, the oldest man of the three with the weakest hand
to play
January 28
Returned this evening from a weekend at Bikaner The usual sand grouse
shoot small duck shoot and bustard shoot
H.H asked for my help on a few private matters, and then mentioned
the resignation of the Standing Committee, though I think he had not
originally intended to do so I trunk they all realise now that they made a
bad blunder and want to get out of it with as httle loss of face as possible
On return I found the usual mass of files and two important telegrams
from Cabinet on the Desai proposals mainly raising petty and unimagina-
tive objections otTu'etau 1 out they are intmg af fifcer prupcKsf slV tftt same"
January 30
I sent three telegrams to the Cabinet yesterday on the Desai proposals
answering the two they had sent me The first two were drafted by P S V
D 160 1
112
THE FIRST VISIT TO LONDON
and dealt succinctly and effectively with the points they had rawed, the
third was a personal message drafted by myself to the effect that they had
the best chance they have had for a long rime, or were likely to have, to
make a moderate advance in the Indian problem and that they had better
take it at once and not worry too much about dctads or comparisons with
the Cnpps oner, etc
January 31
Council meeting this morning The only subject that aroused much dis-
cussion was Ambedkar's proposal to re-impose the ban on women work-
ing in the mines by a fixed date All members except Snvastava professed
sympathy with the proposal but agreed that in view of the coal situation
and the war we could not impose the ban within any foreseen period
Snvastava said frankly that he thought the women would resent the re-
imposition of the ban, that he saw no reason agamst their working m the
mines if they wanted to, and that he thought they should be allowed to as
long as they liked (At an early stage in the proceedings Snvastava caused
some amusement by complaining that Shankar, the Hindustan Times
cartoonist always drew him with no clothes on except a towel, because
he had once met him in a TnrUI, r
February 17
SaEifc* t 5 eVeWng fr ° m a fiwaghf, tour to Mysore Travancore
JKSrfTT * \ qm V pWlt one 1 Mah«p. courtly
^^^^^^^
The MaharaiTrfT * wtedler " effeeave
«Hc jumor mXI raT 1 ^ °™^<»ved by ha mother,
.0,^1™'^°"^" ^re „ no doubt that Travancore »
effiaency bchTut TT" 5 " 0 P There is no doubt about!*
T Uhen hc 4x» to exert a, or hi* determination to
30 JANUARY-20 FEBRUARY 1945 IIj
get his own wa) How good the State administration really is behind its
impressive facade it is hard to say
On February 1 $ we motored on to Cochin and spent the next two days
there Coclun has a very close affinity to Travancorc, but is more old-
fashioned and less \\ ell advertised The Maharaja is an old gentleman of
nearly So with a ver) limited command of English His prospective suc-
cessor is over 75, and owing to the working of the matriarchal system of
succession— -and I suppose the philoprogcnitivcncss of the Cochin Royal
family — there arc some 200 m the succession line now alive, and little
prospect of a Ruler succeeding much under the age of 70 for any fore-
seeable period ahead Tins natriarcha! method of succession is peculiar to
Travancore and Coclun — and I bche\e the Malabar coast — but no one
seems able to explain its origin — even Frazer*s Golden Bough is silent and
the Encyclopaedia Bntannica vague* but I imagine that it must derive
from a practice of polyandry Its present operation seems to result m the
Maharajas being only figureheads and the power resting with Dcwans —
possibly no bad thing, if they are wisely chosen
Just before I started on tour, S of S sent another long telegram of
Cabinet hesitations, doubts and objections 011 the Desai proposals I cabled
that I would see Jmnah and Desai on return, to which HMG had given
a grudging consent, and then report results, but that I must know earliest
date when H.M G could see me, as a long interval might be fatal
February 20
As usual on my return from a tour 1 have been busy clearing off arrears of
work and getting up to date with events Except for mercy petitions from
murderers of which I must have dealt with at least SO in the last few days,
the accumulations of work were not heavy, but there have been two
Council meetings and the ordinary routine has been quite heavy
The two Council Meetings, yesterday evening and this evening, were
on the Budget proposals A proposal to introduce a Death Duties Bill and
to make a motion for its circulation aroused a good deal of fechng, though
Dalai pointed out that fresh sources of taxation must be found if any social
progress was to be made But feelings were too heated, so I broke off the
meeting and said we would meet again this evening
l^'jfren die Council met this ewenmg » <?nt hkc dbckwrc k. Finance
Member agreed simply to introduce the Bill and to make no motion for
circulation This would avoid opposition in the Assembly, as a mofion to
introduce is never opposed Otherwise the Budget proposals, which were
not in any way drastic, had an easy ride
THE MUST VISIT TO LONDON
February 26
Bhopal his written on behalf of the Princes after their Bombay conference
to request me to hold bye-elections to re-constitute the Chamber I wrote
back and suggested that it would be much simpler if they withdrew their
resignations I don t know how they wdl receive this I flunk the) will prefer
to show the firmness of their front by getting themselves all rc-elcctcd
On the political side 1 found Jinnah was in Bombay and not likely to
conic to Delhi for some time so I got Colville to see him and ask him his
attitude to the Desai proposals He disclaimed all knowledge of Liaquat s 1
talks with Dcsai an obvious falsehood I am sure but said that he was
prepared to consider an offer and \\ ould be ui Delhi on March 6 He is
playing his usual slippery game in tact Meanwhile the Sind Government
seems to be revolting from League control the NWFP Govern ment
likely to fall and the Unionist Ministry in the Punjab consolidating itself
Bhulabhat Desai claimed that tn informal tails with Liaquat Ah Khan tie
latter had agreed to his proposals fir & Congress-League Coalition Goi eminent
at t) e Centre and for stmilar Goverttmnits ni the Provinces Later Ltaquat
dettied tfas m the Assetnhly but told D sat pm atcly that he w<js obliged to
deny it Jot political reasons Jmnah u as heheved to hat e beat annoy ta u tth
lumfar ha\ » g talks with Desai
Ft brttary 28
I had three quarters of an hour with Sapru who came to lunch and he told
me of the progress of his Committee I doubt whether he, really expects
anything approaching a solution from it He ended by saying that it
Indians fail to agree, H M G must impose a solution 1 asked whether he
expected us to force a United India on the Moslems if that was our
solution or Pakistan on the Sikhs ifwe decided to divide India He merely
said that we w ere the men in possession and that it was up to us to find the
way out
Leathers lias declined to find shipping for more than 40 000 tons of
wheat a> month about half whit we need and n looks as if we may soon
he back at the old struggle for food
March 1
Longish Council meeting tins c\ening mainly on the question of the
safeguards in the Constitution to protect British business Everyone is
Na^abiada Luquat Ah khan the A / to lead r eft he Muslin League in the Central
Assembly and Jinnah t No 3 He was later Prune Minister of Pakistan
20* FEBRUARY— TO MARCH I945
agreed they should go, and H M G has promised that they will not he
included in a fresh Constitution It was a question of tactics to he adopted
in an Assembly debate tomorrow v*hich demands immediate action by the
G of I to get the safe-guard Sections removed and for the appointment
of a Committee of the Legislature to examine the question S of S has
warned us that RMG would not agree to remove the Sections until a
new Constitution was made and that any attempt on our part to do so
i\ould be most unpopular and meet \wrh a rebuff, while a Committee
w ould be likely to embarrass both ourscK es and H.M G So our problem
was to show our full agreement with the House but to avoid becoming
committed cither to immediate demand for their repeal or to a Com-
mittee I think we got a fairly satisfactory decision in the end but what
will happen in the actual debate today is a httle doubtful
March j
I presented five V C s to Indian soldiers or their widows this morning*
and we gave tea to about 500 or 600 Indian servicemen who had provided
the guards on the parade, this afternoon How smart and well-turned-out
the Indian soldier always is, compared with the rather casual British.
A Council meeting on Japanese Campaign Pay went well, and we
settled at last this controversial issue Rather surprisingly, the telegram
conveying H.M G *s decision began with three paragraphs of apology
for the way G of I was treated by the original decision being taken with-
out consultation I almost believe I am beginning to put India on the map
of Whitehall
Patiala and Bilaspur were staying for the V C parade, since two of the
recipients came from their States A cunous contrast of all the present
Princes I suppose Patiala looks most hke a Maharaja , and Bilaspur least hke
a Raja 1 rather like Patiala though I would never trust him very far> and
he is in fus rather arrogant way, a magnificent looking man Bdaspur
dresses and looks like an insignificant looking trader or attorney, and has
rather Umh-Heep-hke manners btzt I fkney he is shrewd
March to
Jinnah who was to have seen me on March 7 is sick I am told that he has
a touch of pletinsy and may be hid up for some time Meanwhile I cannot
get a date from H.M G for my visit home, I don't think the P M wants
me at all and will procrastinate as long as possible I don't intend to let
them use Desai and Jinnah as reasons for delay After all, the principle of
Il6 THE FIRST VISIT TO LONDON
my going home for a discussion was accepted long before Desais pro-
posals came up, and it is the mind of H M G that I want to know
rather than the minds of Desai and Jmnah 1 shall send S of S a cable this
\\ eekend
My Government continue to be beaten in the Assembly, and are I think
getting a little rattled Desai and Liaquat are obviously out to show me
that I had better get rid of my Executive Council and gi\e them the
loaves and fishes I am told that Desai has been offering portfolios to his
friends That sort of thing is not the best way to do business with me
I have made up m) mind not to see Desai again before I go home
March SJ
Council this evening on Sargent V Education report Not a vcrj satis-
factory performance, the Communal Spirit being given full play Firoz
Khan Noon having as usual read none of the papers, delivered a most
forcible denunciation of the Report from the point of views of Muslims in
general and tbe Punjab in particular, vt hich be said w ould ne\ er accept the
principles of it He was only momentarily disconcerted when it was
pointed cut to him that the Report was signed by the Punjab Minister of
Education and another Punjab rcprcsentatn e, and that the Punjab
Ga\ eminent as a whole had since then accepted the principles of the
Report Firoz Khan Noon said lie would have to speak to Khizar about
this Ambcdkar of course delivered a harangue in favour of the Depressed
Classes and also of the Criminal Tribes Snvastava was discursively remi-
niscent of his days as Education Minister in the U P , Aziz ul Huque, who
likes talking prattled along for some time on nothing in particular, and
only Dalai really got back to business I had to ask the Member, Jogcndra
Singh, to put up another Summary giving Council some realty definite
points for decision in ordct to get the Education business started But
obviously feeling is going to run high.
\ forth 14
S of S still cannot get date for my visit ft am P M but is going ahead
with arrangements c g the official announcement The proposed word-
ing suggests that it is a sudden decision by II M G I am injuring that it
should be made cleat tliat the suggestion was made by mc six months ago <
otherwise \t witl appeal as if it was due to Desai s move
1 Sir John Sirgtnt DJucat kxuI AJtikt to the OoYrmment of Indu
10-21 MARCH I94.5 117
March
S of S cabled this morning that as Attlce would be busy with the San
Francisco conference they must postpone my visit till June I cabled an
indignant protest but shall not get any change The discourtesy of the
thing annoys me No apolog) » no explanation, just a contemptuous
wzvc of the hmd—'TeU hida to wait ttll it's more convement'
Two Muslim League Governments have been in trouble, Sind and
NWFP In Sind Hidayatullah has managed to emerge soil in charge,
after a most unsavoury exhibition of disloyalty and intrigue by all con-
cerned InNWFP Aurangzeb was defeated, he is less adroit a politician
than Hidayatullah Congress under Dr Khan Sahib has taken office, 1 I
wonder how long that will last
March 17
H.M G came back quickly on my cable and said that juice I felt strongly
on the matter I had better come home at once and that a plane would be
at Karachi ready to take me on the morning of the 2rst
March 20
We are off home this afternoon All rather a rush 1 informed Council
yesterday evening I believe that Desai has made them believe that I am
pledged to him and that I am going to put Congress straight into power
on my return which is certainly the last thing I intend I wonder whether
I shall get any policy at all out of H.M G
Colville arrived about midday to act for me while I am home and I put
him into the picture as far as possible
Catre — March 21
Left Delhi 2pm yesterday and arrived Karachi about 7pm.
Dow was as caustic as usual about Smd Politics and Sindins in general
Hidayatullah the Premier whom 1 think he trusted to a certain extent
double-crossed him and his own colleagues during the recent ens is which
has made Dow even more cynical and disillusioned than usual He said the
Ministry had appointed an anti-corruption officer hut that has chief job
was to keep an eye on the few honest ones and see that they did not give
trouble He spoke of the general weariness of the European side of the
administration and the general subserviency of the Provincial administra-
tion to the Ministers since the Province was so small that the Ministers
1 This was the first Congress Ministry to take office after all of them had resigned in 1939
Il8 TUB FIRST VISIT TO LONDON
could, and did, put their fingers in every pic. Dow is very provincial and
docs not take a wide outlook, but he knows his Sind prett) well
In Cairo Allies tampson (Killeam) at the Embassy seemed tn \ ery good
form and put us up to date with the latest Cairo gossip I asked him about
Palestine and he told me that EMG had proposed partition last August,
very secretly* but that e\ ery one on the spot had objected He agreed that
it v*as scandalous that India with 90 million Muslims should never e\en
have been informed of this proposal
March %3
Arrived Poole 2 30 p m., Atnexy, Linlithgow, and others met us at
Victoria and we went to Dorchester where a suite had been hooked
for us
March 24
Talked with Linlithgow for an hour m the morning He w as as usual very
sensible and practical on Indian affairs but a bit dry and cynical I think
hts trouble in India w as that he is too wedded to efficiency to make allow-
ance for Indian inefficiency, and never grasped that the Indian thinks and
acts a great deal more with his heart than his head He said that he had kept
entirely clear of politics and any expression of views on India since he
came home (except for the address to a Parliamentary body which he sent
me), he thought it was the duty of any c^Viceroy to do this, m justice to
his successor He asked whether I would care to tell him anything of nv)
ideas, and I showed him my Jetter to Winston He approved of it as a
statement of the case but said he thought I was rather too optimistic in my
estimate of the possibilities of making progress He then detailed the
obvious risks and objections, which I had already considered, and finished
b) asking in an indirect way whether I was prepared to go to the lengths
of resignation if the P*M proved intractable, and had I considered the
possible damage to the w ar effort and general position that such action
might cause He s poke ofthcintercstsofbig business in maintainm gsome-
thing like the status quo in India He was friendly as always and I like him 1
In the afternoon I had an hour and a half with Amery I fclc that w c had
*grcat argument about it and about but e\crmore came out by the same
door as in we w cut* ! don't think there was anything fresh that came out
We finished b> an almost heated argument about Palestine, lie upholding
the Zionist point of view, t arguing the interest of the lndnn Muslims m
the problem and the Arab case
21-27 MARCH 1945 119
March 26
Two hours with Cabinet Committee on India this morning Attlcc,
Amexy, Cnpps, John Anderson* Simon, Gngg* R A B 1 Butler, Gilbert
Luthwaitc* as Secretary, Listow cl J in attendance 1 made a statement on
situation in India and outlined my proposals I was then cross-questioned
mainly on personalities and f natters of detail, and on the risks involved
The atmosphere general!) was friendly, no one seemed to have any
alternate e proposals though they stressed the dangers and difficulties of
making any mo\ c After two hours, they decided to think it all over and
hive another meeting at 1030pm tomorrow Simon, who had been
malang a lot of legalistic and constitutional points which had really not
very much bearing on the question at issue took me aside afterwards and
said that he \vas really only trying to be helpful and sympathetic, but was
apprehensive of the risks involved I told him that no one realised them
more than I did but that one could get nowhere without taking risks He
asked about withdrawal of Quit India resolution and I said that Jtonsjdered
that dead but that to try and bury the corpse might revive it He asked
what I proposed to do about a pledge to forward the war and I said I pro-
posed to get a new Council if one was £oimea\ to issue a statement that
they would fully support the war
Finished day by seeing Gielgud's Hamlet, a very fine performance
March 27
Spent the morning at India Office S of S said he thought yesterday's
meeting went very well
We had another meeting of the India Committee at 10 30 p m It got
us httle, if any further after i£ hours discussion What it comes to is that
they none of them like my proposal and see and raise all the obvious
objections But none of them seem to have an alternative Simon as usual
raised lawyer hke and constitutional points of detail, John Anderson spoke
of the responsibility of the House of Commons which my proposals do
not alter and of the sifts of Congress generally t Attlee inveighed against
my proposals as un-democratic, I pointed out that the body I proposed
was certainly more democratic so far as any democracy at all existed in
India than the present Executive Council There was a lot of in determinate
1 Wavcll always wrote R A B Butler (for R A Butler) because he was familiarly
known as Rab Butler
* Sit Gilbert Laithwiite an India Office offcia! who had been Private Secretary to Lord
Lmlithgow when he waj Viceroy
a Earl of Listowel Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for India, 194* 5 Secretary
of State for India 1947
120
THE PIRST VISIT TO LONDON
skirmishing between Cnpps and Attlee and Gngg, and nothing \ery
definite However, wc are perhaps making progress of a sort in allowing
everyone to get the position clear It was finally decided that an) one who
wished should put up an alternative soluaon, and that we would meet
again after Easter I drove R. A B Butler hack to the Dorchester, and he
said that on the whole I was getting on well and having a comparatively
calm passage
March 28
Quiet morning at India Office Went to see H M at Buckingham Palace
at 1 p m. He had, 1 think, been told by P M that I w as casting spanner into
w orks over India but did not press his questions on it very far, and then
Vvent into general conversation. Q and I lunched afterwards with the
King Queen and the younger Princess They all seemed in very good heart,
and they make one feel at home especially the Queen, she takes a great
interest in the Regiment The King told me before lunch that he had
wanted to visit the troops in India this last winter but that the P M had
not wished it.
Went to see Laurence Ohvier's Richard III, a marvellous piece of acting
March 29
After lunch I went to Downing St and had an hour and a quarter with
P M He began by apologising for not seeing me earlier and explained he
had been at the Front and had then had to prepare a funeral oration for
Llo} d George He said he had had no time to consider India hut eulogised
the India Committee as a very strong and representative body who would
advise him. He then said you must have mercy on us*, and proceeded to
state all the problems they had to consider, and the reasons for dela) in
considering India v> hich he thought could be kept on ice He mentioned
probability of early General Election. I said quite firmly that India was
very urgent and very important, that the problems would be just as
difficult in all pam of the v»otId at the end of the war as now, and that
I could see no reason to postpone the issue The P M then launched into
a long jeremiad about India which lasted for about 40 minutes He seems
to favour partition into Pakistan Hindustan, Pnncestan etc , has very old-
fashioned ideas about the problem, and seems to see no ray of hope He
talked as if I was proposing to Quit India*, change the Constitution, and
hand over India Tight away and I had to interrupt him a number of times
He was fhendl) on the whole but 1 thought he seemed depressed and
lacking in fife
27 MARCIT-4 APRIL 1945
T2I
Then I went back to I O and saw Cnpps He said the whole India Com-
mittee were now in favour of makmg some move, except Simon They
were how ever afraid in my proposal that the Executive Council might he
too much swaged by party caucuses John Anderson was putting up a
proposal for an Ad* uory Council elected from the Central and Provincial
legislatures, out of which the Viceroy would select his Executive Council
I said wc should obviously hav e to consider such a proposal Cnpps seemed
to think prospects were considerably brighter than they had been before
t came home
Next I had 45 minutes with Leathers We talked first of the PM's
health, then he spoke of all the shipping and transport dif&cvlcics He said
there was sufficiency of wheat but that transport was lacking to get the
wheat to the ports and from the ports to destination He said India's food
requirements and SE AG's military requirements could not both be met
and that there would have to be a cut in the Eastern shipping I asked where
all the ships were, and the answer seemed to be, mainly in the Pacific,
where 6 to 7 million tons is absorbed m shipping used simply as store-
houses I impressed on him the necessity for 1 000 000 tons of wheat per
annum for India I then asked for more passages to India to enable the
Civil Service to get home for leave before the post-war period He seemed
a little more hopeful about this— after V E Day
I finally mentioned Indian shipping and its post-war aspirations
April 4
Cabinet meeting in the evening Smuts, Forde and Evatt (Australia) Peter
Eraser (the N Z Prime Minister) and Fxroz Khan Noon uere there besides
the ordinary attendants The P M spoke of the difficult and unfriendly
attitude of Russia since the Yalta conference of the mighty military
power of the U S A , and hence the need for Empire unity Bach of the
Dominion representatives then made a httle speech beginning with
Smuts who stressed the possibilities of India as a great Eastern power and
the need to keep her m the Empire Then the P M surprised me by asking
me to say a few words and prefacing it by a eulogy of my military achieve-
ments I spoke shortly about the services of India to the War effort her
importance to the Empire's security and welfare and the need for solving
♦ive. Wtaav ^ofelem f tmz Khan. Noon, Mid, rath^t ^ptoastat^Iy tkyc
everyone in India was united in wishing to remain in the Empire
I then went to dine with Amery and found Atdee there We had about
an hour and a half after dinner on the Indian problem The India Com-
mittee wants to make a move but wants me to arrive on my new Council
122 THE FIRST VISIT TO LONDON
by a complicated method of election 1 pointed out the difficulties — the
tune it would take, the release of all political prisoners which it would
involve as a prehminar) , the danger of getting an entirely unsuitable body
out of which to make a selection the difficulty of arriving at the numbers
to be elected by each Province etc I stressed the advantages of my proposal
as being quicker and giving more scope for private negotiation as against
public discussion in the Press I don't think Attlee was convinced but he
realised the difficulties of his proposal, I think* Amery proposed that I
should have Indian members for Defence (instead of C m C ) and External
Affairs, neither of which appealed to me, and produced one or two other
red herrings
At 5 p m there was a Cabinet Committee on Food for India A new
crisis has arisen in India and v*e want a substantial quantity of wheat at
once The discussion showed what I suspected was the value of Leathers
professed friendliness last week, i e nil He declared himself unable to
find any shipping and seemed indifferent to the possibility of famine in
India The Committee, on the basis of Cherwefi's famous calculations,
simply tried to show that e already had enough food in India, whereas
it turned out that we had in fact for some months past been getting only
half of what we should have had, which again was only halt of our
requirements An unsatisfactory meeting Went straight on to see Gielgud s
Midsummer Night's Dream, a fine performance
Aprils
India Committee this morning at which an extraordinarily woolly
proposal was pot up as the Committee's idea I don't think anyone ever
really believed in it It proposed quite unnecessary constitutional changes
and an absurd Grand Council of India with very nebulous origins and
responsibilities I stated all the objections and in the end we were back
much where we started From their criticisms both of my proposals
and of my draft broadcast it was obvious that some members of the
committee had not read the papers I had put up, or had forgotten them
I suppose these discussions arc essential steps towards progress, but we
seem to me to be going round in a circle
Conference at I O at 6* p m, with Amery Cnpps and all the I O
officials I thought we were only going to talk about technical questions,
l e amendments to the 1935 Act necessitated by my proposals and those
of India Committee, but they re-opened this morning's discussion, so
I stuck vcr> bluntly to my point and refused to budge I am sure these are
the right tactics
4-1 1 APRIL 1945 12J
April 6
Started the morning by sitting to Epstein for a bust He is an odd, untidy,
nthcr aggressi\ c t sclf-optnionatcd little man whom I found attractive and
intelligent His method of working intrigued mc„ I imagined that a
sculptor w ould start with a lump of clay and mould it to shape, but he
starts from nothing and builds up the head outwards, sketching all the
tune, so to speak. Went on to I O S of S seemed to think political talks
were going quite well but was all for compromising on the principle of
some method of election for my council, in order to appease Attlee's
democratic ideas I stuck quite fitrnly by my own ideas and instanced the
precedent of the Cnpps Mission, when no one suggested that the leaders
with whom Cnpps negotiated (nor the Council, if the proposal had been
accepted) should be subject to any form of election I am not going to
budge from my position if 1 can help it
Another food crisis seems to be blowing up in India, and I shall obviously
have to have at Leathers again
Apn I p ^
Even Evan is rather depressed today and thinks we are heading for an
impasse m the discussions with the India Committee, Norhmg ar all
happened about it all day except that Sir John Anderson asked me to come
and see him this afternoon He explained that what bothered him was that
in practice the GG's powers were bound to be curtailed by the existence
of a political Executive Council, and that therefore it would be better to
admit it at once by legislating for less power or by admitting in a statement
in Parliament that the power would be weakened 1 tned to get him to
see that this would make my task more difficult since it would mean
pressure on me, and that until it was certain that I could form a political
Executive Council it would be folly to give away anything He said it
would make it much easier to get a scheme through the Committee if I
agreed to his proposal I left unconvinced but rather unhappy.
A dull Cabinet, but it brought home to me the very different attitude
towards feeding a starving population when the starvation is in Europe
In this case it is Holland which needs food, and ships will of course be
available, quite a different answer to the one we get whenever we ask for
ships to bring ibod to India
April 10-11
No progress at all
Flew over to Germany to Monty's headquarters in a schloss east of
124 THE TIRST VISIT TO LONDON
Osnabnick Had about 5 Hours with Mont) during w hich he talked pretty
continuously
April 12
Nothing much doing in the morning India Committee still preserving a
deep inertia and. silence
Cabinet meeting on War criminals
Had naif an bom with S of S afterwards mostly on some minor points
but I impressed on him that I must be kept informed on Palestine He
seemed to think the discussions with the India Committee were going all
right They met again this evening but did not invite me
April 14
Amery told me that the India Committee had produced a scheme which
he thought not too bad considering all the difficulties He showed it me
later and I think that subject to my being allowed freedom of action on
certain points e g when to release political pnsoners and method of
selecting new Council it may be acceptable
April
Took a walk with Leo in morning and had some general discussion He is
hopeful of proposed solution and thinks it may be the beginning of a
reasonable settlement of Indian afiairs But it is the first step that counts
and that is going to be a very difficult one I think perhaps more difficult
than Leo realises How ever we have got the India Committee a long step
on the road
Apri 1 16
Went to the Treasury with Amery to talk to Sir J Anderson about sterling
balances SisJ A diew the picture of our fmaneial situation Our oversea*
liabilities are £3000 million and may rise to £5000 We owe India £1000
million which may rise to £1 joo Amery entered into a rather lengthy
technical disquisition I simply emphasised the pokncal and psychological
factors in India and asked that India should at least he treated sympa
theticslly as one of the family I said a statement about the balances t e
that we would not repudiate them and an early discussion with Indian
representatives were desirable
Then discussed India Committees draft solution with Jenkins and
II-l6 APRIL 1945 125
Mmon, who thought poorly of it, and went along to S of S who was
discussing complacently minor textual amendments with his officials
I stated my objections, briefly but cogently, and we fixed a meeting for
10 a m tomorrow I then dictated a note stating my views, to be ready
for tomorrow's meeting
The India Committee's ^scheme* or * draft solution, referred to in the Journal
entries of 14 and 16 April, seevis to hate consisted of proposals for modsfyinq
WavelYs plan \n two important respects
1 In order to provide more * democratic* backing for the new Executn e Council
it was proposed that its members should be selected from a panel cltoseti by
the Pr&Mtaal and Central Legislatures
2 Smee the appointment of an Exeatttie Count) 1 representative cf the main
Indian political parties uould make it in practice [though not in constitu-
tional theory) much more difficult for the Goventor-General to override his
Council, if was proposed that this should be plainly recognized and the
fields defined m 11 Inch the Got emor-General could disregard the advice of
his Council
Wavell realized that to both these proposals there u ere considerable objections*
and his reluctance to accept them was confirmed by the advice of Jen funs and
Menon The first proposal 11 ould bring no tangible gain and would lead
immediately to the detttattd (which could hardly he restated) for the release of all
Members of the Legislatures under detention so as to enable them to take part
in choosing the panel It was not desirable at the outset of negotiations, uhtch
might come to nothing, to be forced to make this concession Moreover, it was
likely that persons particularly mil-fitted to be Members of Council, e g
Rajagppalachari, the ex-Premier of Madras, who was temporarily in disfavour,
would not be included in the panel
The objections to the second proposal were even stronger A change in the
Governor-General's powers as contemplated would involve complicated
legtslatton and consequent delay, would at once provoke controversy, as the
Congress would demand that the Governor-Generals powers should be
whittled away altogether, would alarm and alienate the Muslims and other
minorities who looked on the Governor-General s powers as a protection for
themselves, and, once again, would give something away before negotiations
started 77) e desire of politicians m England to advertise the fact that the
appointment of a 'political* Executive Council would in practice wean a
Parliamentary Control \ was due to a fear that Parliament would later complain
that the position had not been properly explained to it From the point of vteu
of Delht the supposed need to protect Parliament from its own impempience
was far outweighed by other considerations
126 THE FIRST VISIT TO LONDON
April J7
Meeting with S of S and officials at 10 a m My note was accepted u ith
little discussion and will go to Committee Jenks later m the afternoon was
gloomy about the whole thing and says I shall have a very rough passage
in the Committee tomorrow, fixed for p 30 a m and a still rouehcr one
in the Cabinet
April 18
Meeting of India Committee, to consider my objections ro the proposed
draft statement Most un&vourable Attlee started attacking me at once,
complaining that I had rejected their whole scheme out of hand John
Anderson complained that I would not admit that I uas making a radical
change in the Constitution Cnpps was absent, Gngg and Simon uere
definitely hostile and Butler very unhelpful Leo Amery supported me
manfully and quite : sUfuU> , and I stuck to my guns, in fact kept on firing
them. An hour and a half of desultory and rather acrimonious^ discussion
got us nowhere, but Amery at the end thought we had not done too
badly I wish I could agree with him, I felt depressed and ruffled
Apnl ip
Evan depressed tha morning and tWks we have failed, but S of S sdll
support their own S ofS properly They are a poor lot anyhow I think.
April 23-25
of n A£ d I V 1 T J Wlth Co ™«. ™* Simon in the chair instead
™ wi°.^ B T £ \ San Fl3DaSC ° controlled dis-
as inevitable, and leadmg gradually m the right direction
ofiKLd^ A TZ- ^ • nd SeIf met > TOth I-thwaite, I O
SfttrTllr '^fT P rOCredcd to P^ace yet another
Jwe See LT?^ ,° n ^ ^ ^ we agreed that
presence S, dL ""T 6 met, but without me, they find my
ST ThenTv ^ ^ * Wme » demons without
HoW ho y il Um °y ed J 1 l I »« Sections to then- work later on
However, I hope Amery and Cnpps stood pat
4
i
Lord Wavell a dra v ng by A g stus John Jp^j
hi
life L jaa-r,,^ cbty rtn/aw , A J
^ pagefiom Lord IVaveWs Journal
17-30 Atfett 1945
I27
April 26
Another fruitless tiresome da}, so far as business went Leo told me the
results of ) cstcrday's meeting Cnpps and John Anderson were absent for
the first hour and he had to face alone the attacks of Simon, Gngg and
Butler, all of whom want to do nothing When the other two arrived,
I gather that the draft statement was more or less approved, except that
the Committee insisted on including Foreign Afl&irs [l e in the subjects to
be handed over to an Indian member] and that John Anderson put in
some phrase about the limitation of the Go\ crnor-Gcneral s powers
Sunon will now apparently draft the report of the Committee and send
it to the Cabinet, 1 think without letting me sec it I am getting tired of
being treated as an Untouchable in the presence of Brahmins, and shall
say so shortly Gngg wants to drag in something about the Indianisation
of the Army, I believe
April 27
Saudi Arabian Minister called in the morning to give me an invitation
from King Ibn Saud to visit him at Rijadh on rny return journey, if
possible I shall try to do so
Lunched with R,A B Buder at the Oriental and had 40 minutes with
him afterwards on my proposals He raised the usual objections , negotia-
tions with Congress, alienation of our friends, wouldn't it be better to do
nothing for a while, etc 1 don't know how far I succeeded in countering
his objections but he said I had stated my case verv clearly
April 29
A quiet rather depressing weekend I feel I have failed to make H.M G
realise the importance and urgency of the Indian problem or the real facts
of the position We have been talking for 5 weeks, in a very disconnected
way The matter could have been settled in a week if they had really taken
it seriously and wanted to Now I think we have missed the bus in any
case The sudden complete collapse of the Germans, and the approaching
rcoccupation of the whole of Burma will make Indian politicians much
less accommodating than a few months ago If I got my own way now,
I feel it would be too late
April 30
Another wasted day so far as India is concerned. The Cabinet is meeting
on India at 10 pm tonight but don't want me I have not even been
P 1*9 £
128
THE FIRST VISIT TO LONDON
allowed to see Simon s report of the India Committee's conclusions I saw
Leo this morning, still opnmisoc What a gallant, loyal, straight little man
he is, but a little detached from realities and more occupied with ideas and
theories than persons and facts
Af ay i
A little routine work in morning Saw S of S in afternoon who told me
they had talked in Cabinet for 2 J hours last night without result,
A Cabinet Committee meeting on food, it was proceeding on the usual
lines of Leathers having no shipping, Cherwell saving that India had plenty
of food if they only managed then" afiairs properly, and everybody sug-
gesting avenues to be explored and stones unturned at considerable
leisure, when I thought it was time to ginger them up So I told them
I had saved them from a famine last year by my importunity of which
they complained, and that they would have one this year if they didn't do
something about it They didn't like this transgression of the usual polite
prolixities and postponements of official debate, but I think it will do no
harm I am tired of Leathers* smooth evasions and false promises
May 2
Spent morning reading Cabinet papers on Palestine In afternoon went to
see H M the King He had obviously been studying the papers of the
India Committee discussions and seemed to consider it settled that my
scheme would go through.
Afay 4
Had a talk with Auchinleck who arrived yesterday Things quiet in India
but the long delay is not improving the prospects of political settlement
He approves the draft now before the Cabinet Food prospects in India
seem to be a httle brighter
May 8 {VE Day)
Saw Leo Amery in afternoon and blew off steam about the way I was
being kept hanging about He counselled patience, said P M was very
busy domg Foreign Secretary (in Eden's absence) in addition to other
business and also occupied with election prospects India Committee had
discussed DalaTs request for revision of Commercial clauses of 193 5 Act, 1
but had not even thought fit to ask views of Viceroy
1 Sec entry for 1 March t>o ija i<
3D WAY J04$ 120
Lmhth^ow dmcd with mc, friendly but rather pessimistic and dis-
illusioned as usual
Today tad interview with Dalai and told him not to get upset and
disheartened because he dtdn't get all he wanted at once — he complained
of an uns} mpatfictic reception by Leo Amcr) Went to House of Lords
to hear announcement of end of European war and to service in Abbey
afterwards
Peace m Europe is very w clcotnc but has come too soon for my plans
m India, or rather H.M G has been so slow that the opportunity has been
missed
May 11
Today 1 discovered die reason of Dalals discontent Without even
informing mc, the India Committee had held a meeting on the proposals
Dalai had brought home and had shot them down at once What extra-
ordinary people they arc 1 One w ould think that with the Viceroy at home
and available they would ha\ e asked his opinion on an important matter
of great political significance which had been approved by the Governor
General in Council instead of contemptuously dismissing it without even
informing him Amery should have refused to accept the decision without
my having been given an opportunity to express a view Instead, he simply
saw Dalai and told him that there was nothing doing, which naturally
upset Dalai I have now put in a note to the Committee giving my views
and asking that they should be gi\ en a hearing What a crew they are for
a perilous voyage T
May 14
On Monday morning a meeting of the India Committee on the safe-
guarding Commercial clauses — my first official contact with or com-
munication from the Committee for exactly three weeks Leathers was
there and Summers of Board of Trade, to reinforce the opposition I
made a statement on the whole problem of India's industrial development
and claimed sympathetic hearing and treatment for the Government of
India's proposals Amery tried to make out that the hampering effect of
the safeguard clauses was hypothetical and that we should wait till a
difficulty actually occurred He was prolix and unconvincing and was shot
down from all sides Cnpps produced his usual conciliatory compromise
draft, suggesting an announcement that while legislation was impossible
HMG would give sympathetic consideration to any special cases Gngg
then made a fiery statement condemning the whole pohc) of Indian
130 TUT FIRST W*IT TO tONPON
industriahration at wrong fulminating a^aimt B:rU A Co and tilhng
of bctrapl of Indian people etc Amcry replied at full len^h and as usual
soon bored most of the Committee he took ncarU 15 minutes to u)
what could ha\c been said more cfTcctne!) m 5 Then John Anderion
practical!) supported Gngs and *aid that die proposal were not in the
interests of the Indian maw and that the Indian aim v* at reill) the
ehnitriatit>nofnntiilibti5inrtiandIln:i\hperu>nnelCrippiipoV:cwns»hIj
on th<* historical and ps) c ho logical aipects pointing out that it was not
for us to tell the Indians what the) wanted liutler mcrel) reiterated what
he has said bef uc that it w ould be much better to settle the Indian problem
as a whole and not piecemeal and to wait for a Constitutional agreement
(Of course it w ould if it w ere possibl* but it is not and HAD Butler
knows it) Leathers then spoke from the point of \ kw of big business and
was of course for maintaining the clauses Summers for the Board of
Trade w as more conciliator) I asked to be allow ed to repK and said that
to be tout;h with India and to continue to treat her as a Colony was a
possible pohc> if ! LM G was prepared to provide the force to support it
and to controvert or ignore public o pun on in this countr) and abroad
but in the long run it % ould be duastroui The alternative was to treat
Indian aspirations with s\ mpath) and good will w c should ha\ c some
shocks considerable loss of efficiency and perhaps tcmporarj damage to
our interests but m the long run w c should gain morall) and matcnall)
But at present w c w crc professing a policy of freedom for India and w
practice opposing cs er) suggestion for a step forward and such a mixture
could only lead to trouble I pointed out that it was futile to talk of
protecting the Indian masses against the policy of mdustna]t2ation (as
Gngg and Anderson had) when impro\emcnt in the standard of living
and social services could onl) be gained b> increased wealth and when
all vocal opinion m India was m fa\our of it In the end the Cnpps formula
was accepted and I suppose I ha\e gained that much at least, I ended by
pointing out that the Committee had completely ignored me for three
week* and that I had now been home for 6\ weeks without an) decision
Simon made a smooth but inoperative reply
A fay 15
Raisman Object of party
show Dalai that wc were sympathetic to his projects Cnpps was good
and persuasive Leo ver) friendly and very prolix and I think Dalai
realised that the atmosphere was not unfriendly
Gave Bevm dinner at the Athenaeum and had a lone talk with htm He
14-24 MAY I94J 131
is quite sympathetic about India* but not I think very knowledgeable, and
promised to help He said he was hcJd tip with his w ark until P M decided
about election Labour Party had told P M they would continue Coalition
Government till end of present Parliament if he wished, but that P M
might decide for parry reasons to have an election at once He said that he
thought Labour would get into office \cry soon and would then hold
poi\er for 20 or 30 ) ears He professed optimism about Labour** attitude,
about agreement with employers, about the standard of living, abolition
of unemployment etc , which many other knowledgeable people do not
share He said that in 5 years of war we had only lost 4| million working
days through strikes and absence — mainly in the mines — against some 28
million in the last war I got him to talk about his early career — he had
been agricultural labourer, page boy, tram conductor, shop assistant and
in other employment before becoming a trade union official I asked him
which of fits professions had interested and amused him most, he grinned
and said 'agitation* I liked Bevin I think he is genuine and quire shrewdy
though not I should say very clever I wonder whether he is straight and
courageous, 1 should think so
May 2)
S of S told me this morning that Government had resigned He was still
however, hopeful of getting a solution next week, though not even
knowing whether he would still be S of S
Food Committee in afternoon Woolton, Lleuelhn, Cherwell, Amery,
Leathers Listowel Atmosphere much more friendly to India than before,
only Leathers, as usual hostile and making heavy weather But when they
talked of 'concessions on both sides* in the arrangement proposed, I had
to point out that all the concession was on India's side, as she was getting
much less than the minimum asked for, and was being asked to supply nee
for Ceylon and groundnuts for this country
May 24
A long day but some movement at last or hope of movement I began the
day by writing to the P M to point out that I had been 8 weeks at home,
that I had had nothmg from India Committee for 4 weeks or from him-
self for 7 weeks and asking for a decision After seeing S of S I toned it
down a bit He said that Antony Eden had sent him a message that the
P M was going to agree to the proposed draft statement in Parliament and
that now the question of dates arose as the statement would have to he
W THE FIRST VISIT TO LONDON
made before Parliament dissolved on June 15 ColvjIJc had wired that
Council expected to be consulted before the announcement was made,
and it w orked out that I should lu\ c to leave England about 1 1 days before
the statement Eden lud suggested June 8 for the statement m Parliament
which meant my leaving almost at once I protested strongly at this, at
being burned off at short notice after being kept waiting for 4 weeks—
especially as Q was ill I arranged to sec Anton) Eden in the c%cmng on
the question of date
1 lud 40 minutes with Dirla in the morning the industrialists' ha\ ing at
last reached England He said the) had had a good journe> and seemed
pleased at the fnendl} reception the) had had from the British business
associations they lud met so fir He then talked politics hard and mentioned
the views of 'the man m the street' I asked to what section of Indians he
applied this term, and n turned out that he really meant the educated
Hindu. He recommended a bits mess Go\ emment and more than hinted
that he w as rcad> to assist mc in forming one or indeed to take part in the
Government 1 said he had better carry on with his valuable industrial
mission He tried to persuade mc that Gandhi was not anti-Bntish and
^cr> ready to compromise, I said I could onl> judge by his actions and
speeches and found this assertion hard to bchc\ c Birla then tried to justify
Gandhi s actions in 1942, and spoke of the bitterness caused by our action
I countered by giving some of the reasons for bitterness and mistrust on
our side, as I had no intention of his getting over on mc that Gandhi was
a saint or statesman I then said both sides would have to try and forget the
past if we were to progress in the future Btrla is able but he obviously
would hke to have a finger m the political p«e, and it would be of the
jack: Horner type He spoke shghtingl) of Nehru whom he obviously
rears as left-wing
I also saw Claude Auchinlcck who starts back for India on Saturday He
told me that Bcaverhrook had asked to see him and that he had found
Brendan Bracken there too Beaverbrook obviously wanted to fmd out
how f ar Aucrunleck was behind me in supporting m> proposals Claude
left him in no doubt about this, and said that Bea^ crbrook seemed to agree
with the idea of a move, but that Brendan Bracken was obwoush hostile
° Ur T th Edcn before He was dining with
the P M and seemed confident that he ^ould accept the India proposals
and he promised to try and postpone statement in Parliament to June 12,
so that I need not leave England before June 1
bJt ^bnd had b«n P h™l «ily * .944
24*28 MAY 1945
133
May z$
No definite decision, but Leo said I should make arrangements on as-
sumption that I should leave on June I
Spent most of the morning trying to draft a broadcast for India on my
return, not very successfully
May 26
No word from P M or Eden or anyone
Went and stood in a queue outside a News Theatre with Pam and
Francis and the feeling was quite familiar after all these weeks of waiting
on Ministers But we did get into the theatre in the end* while I am still
in the queue for a decision on India.
May 2$
Evan told me he had seen the Intha Committee's report to the Cabinet,
which I had not been allowed to see, Turn bull 1 imagined I had» so gave it
to him Committee were against any move but said that if a move was
decided m) proposal was the best. later m the morning I had a very stuffy
reply to my letter to the V M He said in effect that he had not wanted me
home but that I had insisted on coming and they had done their best for
me He said he would give me Cabinet s decision by the end of the week.
I saw S of S in morning and again in the afternoon, and he said it was all
right, I could make all arrangements to start on Friday So I sent off
telegrams to Colvule and to Mudabar in Washington, giving former the
expected date of return and asking latter to try to get to Delhi by June 15
Saw Dalai in morning, who had been, I think, a little tactless in giving
practically the whole of the White Paper on Indian industrial development
to the FBI and other business associations, and I warned him to go slow
and be as tactful as possible
I continued to make all arrangements to leax e on June r, but am still
entirely without omaal intimation.
In the afremoon Godfrey Nicholson MJP and a man called Richter
came to see me about a proposal to hold an exhibition of Indian art at
Burhngton House in 1947 I said I thought it an excellent idea, but I was
a little perturbed to find that their proposal was to have a purely British
Committee txt am if in this country and sjkJ that Indians must be on the
Committee
During the da\ t got most of the necessary drafts completed for the
1 F F (later Sir Frank) Tum bull, an official of the India, Office, at this time Principal
Private Secre t ary to the Secretary of State
*34 THE FIRST VISIT TO LONDON
return to India, a letter to Go\ crnors, un nations to those concerned, etc
I also got Leo's amendments to my draft broadcast, some of them quite
sensible but ver> \ erbosc and if adopted w ould ha\ e quite spoilt the whole
spirit of the broadcast which was direct and simple Leo never can make
a point and lea\ e n at that, he alw ays o\ er-elaboratcs We also discussed
At some length the release of the Working Committee prior to the
Conference of leaders and frnall) agreed to lea\c the point to be discussed
with m) present Executive Council
May 30
A cntical day The Cabinet met at ir 30 a m, on India, but I was not
invited to be present and had an idle mominq
Liter w ent to I O and saw S of S He said Cabinet in morning had
agreed to m y proposals after onl) 40 minutes discussion, but that P M
had telephoned in die afternoon that his conscience was troubled and
that he wanted the matter reconsidered at a Cabinet at 6 30 p m I said
that P M could not expect me to return to India cmpt) handed, and that
surely it would be unfortunate if from an electioneering point of Aiew
India came into party pontics, which could hardly be avoided if r was
turned down since Atd^e, Cnpps and Bcvin all knew of the proposals
Leo said he could hardly hold office if mj proposals w ere rejected but was
obviously very worried.
Went off to Athenaeum to dine with Eden and hear result of Cabinet.
1 got a message to sa> Anton) E would be late, and waited till about
40 W L t° Amer > M S "P. vcr) worried, and said Cabinet had
gone badly on India, but that tliej had decided to have another at 11 30
am tomorrow at winch I should be called on to state a case Anton>
turned up at 9 p m having been called down to the House about Syria
and Lebanon w hich are in a proper mess He said w c had decided to take
c*cr m Syria We then discussed India at length, and I explained what
l£?5°U A 1 °* 0 ™{ C ™^ some misapprehensions He said that if
what I had told him had been put to Cabinet he thought it would have
gone through, but that Leo had not put the case w ell What had happened
m the morning was that the whole decision had been taken when some-
one a t t h e ^marked that he duin t hke it but that smce the India
member; of rh " ™uld accept, whereupon certain
™"f!3 °/ the Conunittee had said thej had not agreed with the pro-
himsi
pro-
\cry tired and realised it himself
taking Defence Ministry after the
ZS-Jl MAY I94J
'35
A fay 31
I prepared a draft statement for the Cabinet and discussed it with Amery
who approved it Cabinet began u ith a Jong polemical statement by P M
against my proposals He said I should lose a good Council and get a bad
one, there was no democratic foundation, the workers would be victim-
ised by the capitalists, the agriculturalists mined by the money lenders,
the Untouchables would remain untouchable etc etc He then invited
mc to mate a statement I began with the genesis of the proposals, my
Governors conference last August, the views of the C m C Home
Member* Political Adviser eta and why I had pressed to come home now
The P M gave me a good run and did not interrupt There was not a great
deal of discussion it was almost a duologue between the P M and myself
At the end Leo made a long statement on the origin and nature of the
political deadlock — he never can leave well alone No one paid any
attention and the PM interrupted and stopped him. before he had
finished The P M finished with a rather irrelevant dissertation on the
methods of officering the Indian Army He then said he was prepared to
agree to my proposals if the India Committee suitably amended the draft
since it did not completely square with what I proposed to do It was
agreed that the Committee should meet at J 15 PM was quite pleasant
to me, indeed complimentary
The India Committee met at 3 15 Only John Simon Oliver Stanley,
Leo Amery and P J Gngg (Butler came in at the end) Simon produced
two additional paragraphs about the de facto limitation of the Viceroy's
powers which after some considerable amendment were accepted I read
my broadcast which Simon approved P J Gngg sat rather glowering
apart and contributed a hate against Birla on the score of his being given
an official lunch but, as Simon pointed out, this was hardly a matter
which came into the amendment of the draft statement We finished at
430pm Simon gave mc a word of congratulation The amendments
were to come before a Cabinet before or after dinner
The climax of my visit was an extraordinary one At the meeting of the
Cabinet at 10 30 p m the P M made just as forcible an address in favour
of my proposals as he had made in their damnation this morning In
particular he cut out of the draft statement the two paragraphs about the
de facto limitation of the Viceroy's power* on which John Anderson had
insisted and to which I had always objected He made me read my draft
broadcast and approved it entirely with one or two minor exceptions, and
m fact exuded good will towards India and myself at every pore He will
change again but I suppose I can claim in the meantime some sort of
i 3 6
THE FIRST VISIT TO LONDON
personal triumph, 1 think that what really happened was that he saw that
the logic of facts was against him (possibly Beaverbrook reported his
conversation with Auchinleck) and that with the Election looming up he
could not possibly nsk India becoming a party issue, and decided to give
way with good grace What an extraordinary man he is 1 And so at II 3°
pm I got my decision, just twelve hours before my tram was scheduled
to leave Victoria It all ended in an atmosphere of good will and con-
gratulations — only temporary, I fear
June 2 Cairo
Not many to see us off yesterday, thank heaven, but old Lady Simon
turned up and several times called down on me the blessing of St Patrick
and all the saints
6
THE SIMLA CONFERENCE
June 3 and 4 (Visit to Ktttg Ibtt Sand)
A very long but interesting day. Left Embassy at 3 30 a « < =uid &w »
jKldah (about 4 hours), where the M^.er (G raffc ty-Smi « «"j
'one of the King's sons from Ta,f We breakfasted and changed £0 Arab
dress-long pyjama-hkc dlawcrs ' shlIt ' h r ^ ^ whTnd
ontoalantoggroundnearlbjadKaburnpy flyof 3 thours.G Smithand
the Kuigs son«me with us. and the King had
escort us The drive to Rijadh. to a palace a few mdes *e °,her s,d =of it
took nearly 1* hours, though our Arab friends (two more of the Kmg s
ons £td met us) optimistically called it 40 nunutes, an to n, which
hey fortunately persisted next day for the return journey The reason
for thTdLtance away of the landing was not that the ground was uusmt-
SeeLwhTrel^ne could have landed practically anywhere right up ,0
the to,r«self-but that the Kmg did not wist to offend his subjects by
Wgln aeroplane. still suspect as a contrivance of Ebh s or unbebevers,
£2Sh~ 3 P m The Crown Prince met me and we
haSfio niutes formal conversation he was pleasant but look
Si - * - as —it f ™;^ e i
^^SS^ ambitions ■ **> ^
1 , ^ went to pay our first visit to the King
,„ Tnnearance and manner, and is obviously a big man He was
.mpressrve in ^ ^pUments and formal conversation
very fc^^^f^ to our ^idence and I had time for a bath
? f ZTbaX agT to the Palace for the evening meal This was m
dil form of ffa^Arib fashion, sittmg cross-legged on the ground,
Wn T^tc I did not distinguish myself simply cannot s lt cross-legged
tingers, etc 1 ^ ^ ^ food md ^ too
™1X W ic realise that the meal should be eaten at pace, tried
Tit^e corvemuon and kept everyone waitmg at the end After the
Ij8 THE SIMLA CONFERENCE
meal, the King took us inside his private quarters for a few minutes to
show them to us, and we then sat in an open-air hall on the roof and talked
for about an hour The King presented to me a large collection of sons ana
grandsons, I think he has about 30 sons and 30 grandsons in all We talked
a bit about education, and agreed that it was the Turks who had ruined the
original Arab reputation for science and learning, he spoke of the lack of
consumer goods in Arabia, and asked whether I could help from India,
and a few other matters He did not mention the troubles in Syria, of
Palestine, or politics at all At the end I asked him to tell me the story of
his capture of Rijadh some 40 years ago, the fight which was the turning
point of his fortunes He did so and ordered one of his sons when we left
the Palace to show us the scene of the fight While I was undressing for
bed, two of his suite arrived with his gifts — a sword, a dagger, several
suits of Arab clothes, two carpets, a very handsome present My rather
modest return gifts — two old well-hound hand-written copies of the
Koran, a bound copy of 'Allenby in Egypt', 1 and my photograph in a
silver frame — are to go round next morning I hope they will be a success
At frequent intervals throughout the day Arab bitter coffee was served
m tiny cups It is boding hot but the right thing is to drink at once in one
gulp, whereupon a servant at once comes to refill it, the custom seems to
be to dnnk about 3 or 4 cups and when one has had enough to waggle the
cup w hen returning it to the servant
June 6
Wc got to Karachi m the evening of June 4 and stayed the night With the
Dows at Government House
I heard on landing how Desai had been putting about that he had me in
his pocket and that I should at once send for him.
I gave Dow the outline of the plan and he approved He thought his
Premier* Hida^atutkh, \sauld attend the conference and would be reason-
able He was as usual caustic and amusing on politics he said that if
Gandhi Jinnah and Amery made identical announcements the Nationalist
Press ^ould term them respectively a clarion call a crazy outburst, and
imperialistic humbug
I found John Colvillc at Delhi in good heart, and having I think enjoyed
his tune as Viceroy
Met Councd in evening and disclosed the proposals they met with a
very cold reception, and no one except Archie Rowlands fully supported
them, and hardly any Member had a good word to say for them What it
* Vol u (London, 1943) of AJltnby, a Sttijy m Greatness
3-6 JUNE 1945 139
really amounts to is that, as at home, nobody really wants to move at all.
Some suggested elections at once, nearly all proposed the immediate
release of the Working Committee, so as to get the Kudos for it Nobody
had any constructive suggestions Practically all were against any Members
of Council attending the proposed conference A disco uragmg reception
I adjourned imftl this mowing
Before the matting this morning all the Indian Members of Council,
except Mohamed Us man and Roy, got together and produced a written
indictment of the proposals, recommending Dominion status at once
(without the foggiest idea, as it turned out t of what this really involved),
general elections at once, immediate release of political prisoners (only the
Working Committee, they explained later), and that the conference
should be confined to those supporting the war Of the members who had
not signed this document, Benthall was as usual rather prolix and woolly
and stressed all the obvious dangers and difficulties, Mohamed TJsman
said he did not like the proposal but would support H*M G and myself
to the end, Roy wanted an election at once, and Mudie and Rowlands
supported me 1 broke ofFthe meeting until this evening and decided to see
Sir Sultan Ahmed in the afternoon
I saw Rowlands after the meeting He supports mc and thinks my
proposals have a chance of success
I saw Mudie, Rowlands, and Benthall at 3 o pm 1 latter sail a Jade
unconvinced — but ready to support the proposals I then bad a long talk
with Sir Sultan Ahmed on the proposals I asked him whether he did not
agree that any publication of the document he had given me must involve
the resignation of the members who had signed it He agreed instantly and
heartily and said the Members had no intention of publishing it or of
resigning, and would support me in making the proposal though they did
not agree with it About an hour later I found that the Ass<jciated Press
of India had put out a summary of discussions in Council this morning
and of the proposals made by the seven members What an impossible
people to do business with
\ met Council again at 6 0 p m and began by disclosing the leakage
I think most of them were genuinely horrified, and asked that steps should
be taken to stop the API message and to discover the cuJpnt (I thought
F K N looked a httle embarrassed) I then said that, subject to H,M G s
agreement I proposed to continue the plan, and I think Council were
genuinely relieved that someone had taken a decision, and discussions
ended in a friendly spirit, but Ambedkar and Benthall had both to add
a little more wool to an already well-filled Woolsack*
r 4° THE SIMLA CONFERENCE
I was a httle surprised at Council's uncompronusing opposition, though
I had expected difficulties But they liave been subject to intense pressure
while I have been away, and Desat in particular has been i nuisance by
proclaiming that the initiative for a settlement came entirely from him,
that he would be asked to form a Government, etc I suppose I mad<. a
mistake in seeing him at all last January when I had already put forward
my own proposals, but I thought I had better hear what he had to say,
and I was most careful not to commit myself
June 7
A worrying day The Hindu members of Council— Ambedkar, Kliarc,
Snvastava— sent in a written protest against the proposal to ha\ c equal
numbers of Hindus and Muslims on the Council and later Ambedkar
sent m a passionate protest about the representation of the Depressed
Classes, and more than huitcd at resignation
June 8
A long day, perhaps a little more encouraging It looks as if die attitude
of the Executive Councd and their indiscretions had rather liad the effect
ot predisposing Nationalists to tnve them [the proposals] a chance I began
by seeing Ambedkar who required at least two seats tu die new Council
tor the Scheduled Castes and wanted this made clear in the announcement
or the new proposals otherwise he tlireatened that they would boycott
the whole scheme and even hinted vaguely at revolution I told him dicre
was nothing in the proposals to prevent the Scheduled Castes getting two
or e^en three seats on the Council, but that I did not think that H M G
would be prepared to announce an } number to be rescued
Sandwiched m between afternoon visitors came Snvastava After
some talk of his health he began to explain away the document signed by
the seven members and said the demand for Dominion status was only
meant to bring to my notice the importance of the long term issue, and
that the other matte rs^generat elections and release of pnsoners-w ere
points on which there might be two opinions
J\mc 11
Casey arrived dui jifrcrnoon for a short visit He seemed « ell and in qood
heart He >s delighted with the Section 93' administration says it has
the Qj^J*Z?££g^™** a r » uU * , «, JJO r, t y
6-14 June 1945
141
enabled him to make a great difference m a short tunc and is popular with
the people He says I was absolutely right to recommend it at the begin-
ning of 1944 and wishes H M G had accepted it dien He would like to
keep it on till the end of the year and then have elections
He read the Parkamentaty announcement and my broadcast, approved
both and thinks that the move has a good chance of success
Casey wants to go next year, in March for choice, back to Australian
politics
June tz
Nothing very much on the political front All the minorities wire in and
ask for representation
I saw Khare, who tned to persuade me that the Mahasabha had sup-
ported the war effort on the cunous argument that 24 Hindus had got
VCs ( I said that the present leader of the party* Dr Mookcrjee, most
certainly had not supported the war
June is
A comparatively quiet day The Case^s went off in good heart Casey
having had an interview with Aziz ul Huque on the nakedness of Bengal
due to shortage of cloth but having hardly moved him a dhoti, I gathered
Routine Council meeting, with few attendants, most of my colleagues
having decided that as their time may be short they would be foolish to
spend it in working at Delhi in the heat, and that it is wiser to 'recess' in
the hills, and certainly pleasanter
After Council I saw Ambedkar on the matter of Depressed Castes
representation at the Conference on which he was now quite reasonable
June 14
In the evening my broadcast on the political proposals It came through
quite well, I am told Afterwards I had to undergo the ordeal of repeating
the performance or most of it, for an American cinema unit rather a hot
and trying business under the scorching glare of powerful Lghts P S V
meanwhile took a Press Conference and said it went quite well and that
they were not unfriendly
In hs broadcast Waveff said that he propose/ to ttwite lttdwn political
leaders to take counsel with hint with a view to the formation of a new Execu-
tive Cotmcd more representative of organized political opinion and mchidmg
an equal number of Caste Hindus and Mushtns Except for the Viceroy and
142 THE SIMLA COtfrETttNCE
Commander-in-Chief it would be an entirely Indian Council t and fir the fir it
time the 'Home, 'Finance t and 'Foreign Affairs* portfolios u ould le ttt Indian
hands
Hie Council would tt orl u tthtn the frameit orh of the existing Cotislitutwtt t
and one of its mam task uould he to prosecute the uar against Japan to a
successful conclusion, hit its Members, tt hen they thought tt possible, would
also have to consider the means hy u hich agreement could he reached on a new
permanent constitution HMG had not lost sight of the need for such an
agreement and the present proposals n ere intended to male it easier to reach one
Wavell also announced that orders had been g wen for the tmvicdiate release
of the members of the IVorUug Committee of Congress ttho u ere still in
detention
And so is launched a fresh attempt to help India to political freedom,
which I initiated with a note to H M G just 9 months ago I suppose it is
something of an achievement to ha\e got it thus far, but whether it will
crash on Indian intransigence » like the Cnpps and other proposals, remains
to he seen I have certainly got a very difficult time ahead, and I do not
pretend to be a diplomatist
June 16
While the proposals have had <^uite a favourable reception 111 the Press
Gandhi and Jamah are behaving like very temperamental prima donnas
and the latter is publishing his telegrams m the Press before I even receive
them, Gandhi at least had the courtesy to ask whether I agreed to publica-
tion. Jinnah wants me to explain my proposals in detail to him and then
to have Conference postponed for a fortnight while he consults his
Working Committee Gandhi insists on the fiction that he is not a member
of Congress and cannot represent them, he also objects to the term Caste
Hindus and wants me to revise my broadcast to include independence
1 am replying as patiently and courteously as I can but whether I shall ever
get my Conference together, Lord knows Rajagopalochanar is about
the only invitee, except the European representative, who has sent a
cordial and unequivocal acceptance
This is thirtieth anniversary of the fight at Bellewarde, in which I lost
my eye I hope the one eye will continue to last me out it has done so
fairly well up to date
June 18
The Principals Gandhi and Jinnah arc still engaged in manoeuvring for
position and I have sent them both telegrams refusing to be drawn into
$ mla Conference 1945
Above the V tttoy greets Mil k Khizar Hy« Khan Tiwana (Dr Khan Sahib and
Mr Bbuhbha Desa looking on)
Below Master Tari S ngh.
14-21 JUNE 1945 I4J
preliminary discussion and askmg for a definite yes or no Evan comprcs
ft to trying to get mules into a railway truck. It is a depressing business
and doesn't augur very well for the success of the Conference But I doubt
whether it is increasing the reputation of either Gandhi or Jinnah m the
e)cs of any cccept their bigoted followers
June lp ,
Not much moving Gandhi's daily telegram threatened to ban the Con-
ference unless the stipulation of parity between Hindus and Muslims was
removed, but at the same time said the way seemed now open for the
Conference I refused to be drawn and sent a short noncommittal bu
* 1 thinks we snail
not get the Conference assembled
Jittte 20
Bhopal arrived in response to my invitation to discuss solution of Chamber
r .1 TU,. timhnt of a lone talk in the
political proposals
course oi wnicn nc saiu * * -
he would be prepared to advise the Standing Committee to vididrcw
their resignations if 1 could wnte mm a face-saving letter to ay that X was
quite opox to further discussions on certain points There should be no
great difficulty about this n™W
A lull on the political front, pending the Congress meetuig m Bombay
on the 2lst It looks as if they would come up to Simla anyway unless
some last-moment issue arises
June 21
tunc zi * — w ^
The lull on the pokical front continues, pending the Congress Meettng
in Bombay In he mornmg I J^T^ £ ^
situation at whicn Benthall ore w * & «.-~-/ „ r ^^\\ v *]\
runmng out of coal altogedter by the : end of the year,
urtailed I think
rrustic, at least I hope so
a trrZ, .d^^ably his
Advrser « He u wue and steady but possibly a hnle too drasuc with the
PnrZ anyway they don't like being ndden on his rather tight rein and
with his rather sharp spurs
. He ™ g.™ g up ,b» post « 0 become pernor of the Uo*«l Pxovmce,
Dies
144
THE SIMLA CONFERENCE
June 2 J
Came up to Sunk yesterday Had difficult interviews this moming with
Glancy and Khizar who are entirely opposed to the proposals Glanqr has
always been completely provincial and has never taken a very broad view
He says that the Unionist Ministry will not last unless a Unionist Muslim
gets a scat on the Executive Council
Khizar was very upset and sad he had the gravest misapprehensions
over what I was doing He spoke about the loyalty of the Punjab, that
there had alwa) s been a Punjab Muslim in the Executive Council since
1919 and that my approach to Congress and the League was a skp in the
face for all co-operators He said I was handing over power to the enemy,
that my veto was 'dead as mutton', and prophesied chaos and disaster all
round But he had no practical alternative, like the objectors at home, had
no answer to my saying that the difficulty had to be faced some day and
that to do nothing was merely to postpone it I believe that Khizar in his
heart of hearts would really like the British to stay on, for a long time
anyhow His only suggestion was that the present Conference should con-
sider the long-term solution before going to the interim government
On the lighter side, I had a letter this morning from a Parsee at Karachi,
to ask me, now that I have been elected Chancellor of Aberdeen University
(1 have no information that I have), would I recommend for the Nobel
prize for idealistic literature his work entitled 'Can a Prostitute go to
Heaven ^ &
June 24
A long trying day of interviews with Azad," Gandhi and Jinnah Azad
came first m the morning accompanied by Pant (Ex-Premier U P ) as
interpreter (Azad understands Enghsh well but is shy of speaking it)
We had a talk of 1} hours, it would have been much longer, but I broke
it off at lunch time, as the conversation was getting well away from the
Conference It was quite friendly, and notiung original was raised.
Alter lunch I had if hours with Gandhi, the first tune I had met him He
^as rather yague and discursive but on the whole gave his blessing to
the proposals I began by making a short statement on the objects of the
proposals of HMG, the spirit in which they were conceived and the
spirit in which I hoped they would be accepted and worked I emphasised
the necesstty for full support of the war, and that it was essential that
the pohtical parties should put in their very best men, determined to
' Abul Azad at this tunc President of Congress
2} -24 JUNE Ip45 14$
concentrate on the economic and other problems of India, and not merely
to enter the Government in a party spirit
Mr Gandhi then made a long, tortuous and prolix statement, which
dealt with the history of the Congress, British ride in India, British
character, the qualities of a good soldier, and many other more or less
relevant subjects It lasted over half an hour, and ended with a sort of
general blessing on the proposal which he said he had recommended to
the Working Committee
He then went on, referring to some notes, to deal with certain other
points I think this was a list prepared for him as a result of the discussions
by Congress Working Committee The main points were as follows —
(a) That it \\ ould have been much better if I had ordered the release
of all the political prisoners and not merely the Working Committee
(b) That the term *Caste Hindus' should not have been used, as his
great aim was that there should be no question of caste inside Congress,
he would have preferred the term *Non-Scbeduled Hindus*
(c) He then went on to the question of Coalitions in Provinces, obvi-
ously with the idea of trying to establish that the Minorities should be
represented by members of their body belonging to Congress
(d) He referred to the matter of parity, and said he had been under
very severe pressure as regards this, but that he was prepared to accept it
He indicated that it would be open to Congress to put forward the names
of Muslims or Scheduled Castes, and I agreed but said that the principle
of parity between non-Scheduled Hindus and Muslims must be main-
tained
(e) He then digressed into a long story about members of the Indian
Army who had wished to see him but had been compelled, like Nico-
demus, to come to him by night and in mufti 1 said that the one thing
which was disastrous for any Government was if the Army became
political, that the Indian Army had a Commander-in-Chief in whom they
had full trust, that their reputation never stood higher and that I could
assure him that the Indian Army was on the whole a thoroughly con-
tented body He agreed to all these statements
(f) He then started on the question of the Indian States I said that the
Conference dcAc encurely with Bnash /ntfia, aire? tnat / xvzs not prepared
at this stage to enter into a discussion of the Indian States He agreed that
it had nothing to do with the Conference and was not appropriate for
discussion at the moment
THE SIMLA CONFERENCE
I asked Mr Gandhi at the end, whether he proposed to attend the
Conference in person He said that he represented nobody except himself,
and that though he would be prepared to attend the Conference if I
wished, and sit in a comer, he strongly advised me that his presence at
the Conference was undesirable He said that he would hold himself at
my disposal for as long as I wished, but that if I had nothing on which
I had to consult him he would propose to leave Simla tomorrow I said
that I would let him know
The interview was mainly a discursive monologue by Mr Gandhi,
interspersed by numerous digressions, such as a most graphic description
of the death of his Private Secretary, and the relation of his carrying down
the wounded General Woodgatc from Spion Kop in 1899 My general
impression of him was tliat he was friendly for the time being hut
perfectly prepared to go b-ck at any time on anything he had said
A little later I had i£ hours with Jinnah, who is much more direct than
Gandhi but whose manners are fir worse
Mr Jinnah began by saying that whatever happened the Muslims would
he in a minority I pointed out that he assumed, rather gratuitously, that
all the Minorities would vote against the Muslims and that there was at
the back alvi ays the veto of the Vicero> He said that the Minorities c g
Sikh and Scheduled Castes, would be Hindus and would \ote with them
and that the Viceroy would be extremely reluctant to exercise his power
of veto I said that I could not agree with these assumptions He then
proposed that if on an) matter the majority of the Muslims were opposed
to it, it should not go by vote 1 said that this w as quite unacceptable and
was contrary to all principles of Government, I think he realised that this
was rather a forlorn try-on, and said Lttlc more
He then went into the matter of nomination of Members of the
Executive Council and claimed that the Muslim League had the right to
nominate all Muslim Members I said that I could not accept this proposi-
tion Ifc then begin a long history of all the b> ejections of the last two
>ears chiming that the Muslim League candidate had alwa>s been suc-
cessful and that therefore the Muslim League represented the w hole of the
rf. 1 / . lU Kcmed 10 tIimk tlut 1 w * AmJung of nomination
of MmUrm b> the Congress I said that I had also m mind the nomination
by the Umonm Part) of the Punjab of a Muslim Tins led to a long du-
nbe to the effect that the Unionirt Party were traitors to the interests of
the Miriinii and that the fact thai they had been able to run a coalition
Minitrv m the Vmpb for so long was soM> due to the sufferance of
Mr jtnnah. 1 mcrcl> maintained that I would not gi*c a pledge before-
24-26 JUNE 1945 147
hand that all the Muslims on the Executive Council should be nominated
by the Muslim League.
He asked mc whether Mr Gandhi was coming to the Conference. I told
him that Mr Gandhi had said that he represented nobody and had advised
me that it would be better that he should not attend the Conference.
Mr. Jinnah seemed rather upset at this and said it v* as another mck of
Gandhi's, he pretended not to belong to the Congress when it suited his
book f but when necessary appeared as the Dictator of Congress which
e\ cryone knew he was,
Mr Jinnah said at the end that he would have to consult his Working
Committee, but gave no indication that the Muslims would not attend the
Conference, in tact he seemed to assume that they would* but that there
would be ructions inside the Conference I think he is probably having
a difficult nde with his followers It struck me that Mr Jinnah was rather
depressed and not sure of his position
June 25
First day of the Conference On the whole I think it went pretty well,
though Jinnah was a httle difficult I think he Jias the hardest task of any
leader as he has certainly not got the grip on his followers that Congress
has The level of discussion was not high, and I was rather appalled at the
quality round the table Jinnah has a good legal brain, so I think has
Rajagopalachanar Of the rest, perhaps Kher for the Congress and
Saadullah for the League are the best* but they are second class The
remainder are poor stuff, I think If we can build a self-governing India
on this sort of material, we shall have emulated the legendary rope-trick, 1
June 26
On the advice of Evan Jenkins, I put up to Conference 2 today the points
1 These unflattering remark* clearly do not represent WaveLTi considered opinion He
already had considerable regard for Khizar Hyat Khan and later he formed a high opmion of
Liaquat Ah Khan
a tut of Delegates to the Simla Conference
Manlana Abul Kalam Azad, President of Congress
Dr P N Eancrjee Leader of Nationalist Party m the Central Assembly
BhuUbhai Desajt t Leader of the Congress Party in the Central Assembly
M K Gandhi Che did not attend the Conference on the ground that he wu not a member of
Sir Ghulam Hussain Hidyatullah, Premier of Sind
Hodtam Imam, Leader of the Moshm League in the Council of State
M- A Jinnah
Dr Khan Sahib, Premier of NWFP
B G Kher, ex-Premier of Bombay
T 43 THE SIMLA CONFERENCE
for decision under two heads 1 e —A if w e could reach agreement on the
composition of the Council, were the general principles under which it
would work— programme outlined in my broadcast parity of Hindus and
Muslims present constitution etc —acceptable, B if above principles
were acceptable could w e reach agreement on composition of Council
and names to be recommended
This scheme was approved and we reached general agreement on A
The Conference then said they would like time for private consultation
and discussion on B t and we adjourned until tomorrow morning
Atmosphere today was friendly and debate on quite a good level, but B
is of course the real crux of the whole matter Jinnah was in much better
mood today Press reactions on first day s proceedings seem to be good
June 27
lot a fruitful
parties were not going well, and it became obvious this morning that no
pT u S [ eS l htCn ^ Aftcr atout tlu "«-quarters of an hour, during
which there was some skirnuslnng between League and Congress which
almost
■ — ^"^t "Titt, wc agrrea 10 aajoum nil rnaay
morrung to give parties an opportunity of private negotiation
In the afternoon Baldev Singh* came to see me He has two of the
Congress (Kher and Sinha) staying with him He said the Punjab would
be quite satisfied if they had 1 Sikh and 1 Punjabi Mussulman in the
Council
At j 30 p m Jinnah came, after having had tea with Q , and stayed till
Malik KW Hyat Khan Tiwana, Premier of the Punjab
gTkESSSSJ^^ ° f ^ M ^ » Central Assembly
Kh™, S a? thC S 011 ^ 5 P**y m the Council of State
Knwaja Sir Nanmuddin ex Premier of Beneal
Pandit GovjM Ballabh Pant ex Prefer of & Unitcd Pr0vmccs
Maharaja of Paihkimetb e* Prcrmcr of Orma
C Rajagopalaehan ex Premier of Madrai
in Krishna Sinha ex Premier of Bihar
Master Tara Singh, representative of the Sikhs
Secretaries
Sir Evan Jenkins PSV
Ra ° Bahadw V P Menon. Reforms Commm oner
uIScG^ ^ « « * ™ * Master » the
national st Sikhs tnowr? 1 1 All He™ persona grata with the extremist group of
2<S-27 JUNE 1945
149
7 15 P ni I began by telling him that while I appreciated his difficulties*
I had to consider Provinces as well as parties, and was very conscious, as
no doubt he was, of the importance of the Punjab, which was supplying
so large a proportion of the food and of the soldiers of India I, therefore,
considered it essential that there should be a Punjab Muslim in the new
Executive Council, as an deed there always had been for some time past,
and I hoped that he agreed to the necessity for this What I had in mind
was someone who w ould represent the interests of the Punjab but without
strong parry aflfthations, either to the League or to the Unionist Party
Mr Jinnah, who seemed rather worried and ill at case, was a great deal
more prolix and less business-like than usual He went off into a long
description of the 1940 after, of the composition of the Unionist Party in
the Punjab, of his own reception in the Punjab during his journey down
from Kashmir as showing that he really commanded the allegiance of
practically all Muslims in the Punjab, and so on
I finally got him back to business by asking what the result of his
conversations with Pant had been He said they had been completely
negative > that Congress had claimed the nght to nominate two Muslims
out of the Muslim quota to the Council, and that they had got no further
than this
I asked whether they had discussed the strength of the Council I
gathered that they had not done so in any detail He said he wanted a
Council of 14, with 5 Hindus, 5 Muslims, one Sikh, and one Scheduled
Caste 1 He said this was the only Council in which the Muslims would
stand a chance of not being out-voted on every issue. 1 said that he was
assuming that every vote would be taken on communal lines, and that if
this was the spirit with which the Muslim league would enter the Council
the whole purpose of it failed I said that I had now had four years on the
Executive Council, and that I did not recall a single issue which had been
settled on purely communal lines On what sort of issues did he expect
the Muslims to be out-voted' The only thing he mentioned was post-war
industrial development
I finally asked what was his position regarding the nomination of the
Muslim Members to the Council He said that his position was that they
must all be nominated by the League and must all be Leaguers I said that,
as t had told him at our first meeting, this was entirely unacceptable to me,
and asked him bluntly whether he proposed to wreck the whole Con-
ference on this issue After considerable discussion I gathered his position
to be this that the League ckuned the nght to nominate all Muslim
1 The Viceroy and Commander in-Chjef would bring the number up to fourteen-
150 THE SIMLA CONFERENCE
Members to the Council and that they must be Leaguers, but that if I put
it to him that I would not accept this point of view and that out of the
Muslim quota 1 would allow the League only so many and v* ould nomi-
nate the others in) self he would be prepared to put thi* posmon to his
Working Committee
June 2$
While the political parties were consulting, I had a number of interview s
Firoz Khan Noon, who has really very few polipcal principles, now
told me he supported the political move He tries to trim berv* een Jinnah
and Khizar, and is I think trusted by neither
Parlaktmedt put before mc Onssa's problems and claims, but really only
showed animation when I spoke of the exploits of his horse Philanthropist
and discussed its breeding and qualities and his hopes of winning the
King-Emperors and/or Viceroy's Cup His heart is in racing, not pontics
In the afternoon I saw Banerjee "who spoke of Bengal's claims He is an
educationalist and has really little idea of practical politics, but is an earnest
and w cll-meaning person
Next came Jogendra Singh and Sargent on the Education report, dis-
cussion of which I began in Council last March before going home
Colvillc, for some reason did not continue the discussion, as I had intended
and hoped, and nothing more has been done on this important and rather
controversial subject 1 doubt whether 1 shall now get in} present Council
to take any decision and meanwhile work is being held up Jogi was as
charming and woolly a*s ever
So far as I can hear, the discussions between Congress and the League
are not going well and promise little result
June
'When the Conference met this morning, it was obvious that the two
mam parties had failed entirely to agree I, therefore, proposed my own
alternative line of approach, i c that part) leaders should send m panels of
names to mc* and I should try to form an acceptable Council from them.
After some discussion all agreed to do so, except Jinnah and Siva Raj who
said they could not agree to submit a list wtthout consulting their Work-
ing Committees (Siva IUj came to see me aftcru ards and agreed to sub-
mit a list after consulting his Committee) Congress said they must
consult the Working Co mini tree before submittal^ names Jinnah was
\et> difficult and argumentative, trying to corner me on *omc hwjcr*
point and refusing to gi\e a straight answer at last I liad to sa> to him
27 JUNE-I JULY 1945 I 5 t
*I am no dialectician and do not propose to argue, I iiave put you a simple
proposal w hich everyone else seems to understand, arc you or are you not
prepared to submit me 2 list of names'* He then asked for the proposal
in writing, which I had sent to him in the simplest possible terms t am not
sure whether he means to break up the Conference but his attitude seems
to be hardening
We decided to adjourn till July 14 I am not very hopeful of success,
unless there is a change of spirit One of the troubles is that none of the
principal leaders— Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru, Liaquat, Patel — have any
administrative experience, and they do not understand how the machinery
of Government norks m practice t and think entirely on the lines of all
questions being decided by party votes
June 30
I saw two of my Council Ambedkar and Sultan Ahmed, this morning
Both now profess to welcome and support the political move they op-
posed so hotly In fact not one of the 'mutineers* has had the courage to
adhere to his opposition, now that they have seen that the proposal has on
the whole been popular But I am told that they are going about in private,
claiming that they were deceived and ill-used by me and that I never gave
them any inkling that my journey home had any political significance
This although I held a special Council 1 meeting before 1 wen t to inform
them that I was going to discuss the political situation with H M G I feel
some sympathy with them, but they have played their cards badly, and
know it And f don't feel that I have been crooked with them
Ambedkar was bitter against Jinnah and the League, and said that if this
failed he recommended Pakistan. He has the curious theory that after a
few years experience of Pakistan, the Muslims would want to rejoin
Hmdwt&n He then entered on a long diatribe against Congress and their
method of capturing Scheduled Caste seats He made it clear that what*
ever happens he would like to retain his portfolio of Labour, and suggested
that an extra seat in the Council should go to Siva Raj and should be
Education
Sultan Ahmed had not much to say, except to inveigh against Jinnah's
bad manners and the absurdity of his claim to represent ail Muslims
July 1
Walked for about three hours today up in Catchment area, and had a
picnic About the first real exercise I have had since J came to Simla that
1 Sec entry for ao March, p 117
THE SIMLA CONFERENCE
is one of tny chief reasons for disliking the place It was the first time I had
been outside the grounds since I came up, and I found the first mile or so
strif with Pohce and thought that the local authorities had been officious
on my belialf, as they used to he in Delhi, howe\ cr, it was not for me,
I found, but for the arrival of Nehru- N is coming to sec me tomorrow,
Gandhi wrote and asked if I would see him, I meant to an) how
(My son-in-law, Francis, who v> ent to hear the announcement on India
in the House of Commons on June 14, tells me m a letter that there were
never more than about 30 members present, which shows the measure of
mterest taken m the Indian problem at home)
July 2
I had a long talk with Nehru, he rather ranged at large over economics
and history, and it was not easy to get him down to practical politics,
though he was not quite so entirely unpractical as when I saw him three
years ago at the time of the Cnpps ofTer He said Congress v* ould do their
best over the present offer although it was far short of necessities He was
quite friendly and pleasant, except at the end when I warned him that
I could permit no victimization of public servants for action taken during
the disturbances of 1942 He stopped to tea with Q , Archie John and the
staff, and they all liked him
July 4
A rather mixed dinner party this evening mcluded Jogcndra and Lady Singh
(oldjogi was in great form and told Q she had a gracious motherly lace )
July 6
Two comparatively idle days Master Tara Singh came to inform me that
at the insistence of his Committee he had placed his own name at the head
of Such nominees for Council (the other two names are complete duds')
This may be awkward, since Tara Singh would he a poor member of
U>unaJ He also tried to draw me on what my attitude would be if the
for Co^cd gUC d ^ ?Ut f0rWard namCS ° r t0 3CCCpt my ^ ro P os:slt
July p
I had ij hours with jinnah yesterday evening v>hich left us where *c
began He spent practically the whole time trying to get me to agree that
none except hrmse f as head of the Muslim League could nominate the
Muslims on the New Council I refused to accept this, and he finally
i-pjutY!p4J 153
refused to gnc me his list of mmcs, though he left himself 2 loophole at
the end by asking me to write to him, which I have done this morning
He was obviously m a high state of nervous tension, and said to me more
than once, '1 am at the end of my tether , he also said *I ask }ou not to
wreck the League 1 He is obviously in great difficulties, but they arc
largely of his own making by his arrogance and in trans Jgenee He fears
now to be made the scapegoat for the failure of the Conference, and )ct
will not give up anything of his claim to represent all Muslims
The Congress list of 15 names is disappointing, a great proportion of
them are Stooges* for Congress from the minorities, and Azad s covering
letter is aggressive and speaks of 'independence* as the immediate goal
after the defeat of Japan, The lists sent in by Banerjec and Siva Raj arc
unimportant Khizar has been hanging m the wind with his list till he
knew what the M L were doing He is bringing them personally this
afternoon Altogether, the omens for success are unfavourable
Khizar was friendly and seemed more confident and less upset than last
tune I saw him. He asked me the position about the Muslim League and
I told him that Jtnnah had so tar refused to let me nave names He said that
the parties would be foolish in deed to refuse 'an offer so liberal that it made
many of us shudder* He gave me his list of 4 names, the leading one,
Sir Muhammad Usman Khan* Nawab of Kot, a leading Punjab land-
owner, who has been a soldier, may make quite a reasonable member
I then asked him if he had any views about Sikh representation He
obviously knew all about Tara Singh's list, which he described as *Tara
Singh and two dummies* He said Baldev Singh could not be spared from
the Punjab and that Da car Singh though honest and capable, would not
be acceptable to the Sikhs as he belonged to a non-agncultural tribe and
was not an Akah 1 Khizar seemed in good heart, and though he said my
move would probably stir up a lot of trouble I might possibly have been
right to make it He remarked that the P O must he reaping a great
revenue from the Conference, to judge by the number of telegrams he
was receiving
In the evening I got a letter from Jinnah definitely refusing to send in
names I cabled home my provisional selection (including four Muslim
Leaguers) for approval by the Cabinet > and if I get approval shall confront
the leaders with them as a last effort to get agreement I think it is unlikely
Cabinet will back me up and will not haver or delay
* The Akilis were the most powerful Sikh political party representing extreme Sikh
nationalism
154
THE SIMLA CONFERENCE
July n
I fear I have to record the definite failure of the Conference and so of this
fresh effort to make progress in Indian self-Government I had a Cabinet
telegram \csterday evening giving general approval to my Shadow
Council if I could secure its acceptance by leaders I, therefore, saw Jinnah
this morning, gave him the proposed composition of the Council by
parties and communities, the names of the four Muslim Leaguers I had
selected and of the Punjab Muslim with w horn I proposed to make up the
Muslim, quota He refused even to discuss names unless he could be gi\ en
the absolute right to select all Muslims and some guarantee that any
decision which the Muslims opposed in Council could only be passed by
a tft o-thirds majority — in fact a kind of communal veto I said that these
conditions were entirely unacceptable, and the interview ended.
I saw Gandhi an hour Liter He took the news of the breakdown calmly,
but said that H M G would ha\ e to dcade sooner or later to accept either
the Hindu or the Muslim point of view, since they were irreconcilable
So ends my attempt to introduce a fresh impetus and a fresh spirit into
Indian politics 1 am afraid that the result may be an increase in communal
bitterness and agitation in India I wonder what comes next I ha* e asked
all Governors to meet me in Delhi at the beginning of next month to
discuss the situation and the next move
July 12
I saw Khizar this morning and explained the position to him He is
obviously relieved on the whole that the proposals have failed, but he
said I had done my best and vindicated good intentions of H.M G t he
thought the problem was intractable and must be left to destiny and time!
Azad and Pant came in the afternoon and I explained the position to
them They v* ere obviously very disappointed and inclined to he bitter,
they said Congress had made greater sacrifices and gone farther than ever
before to reach agreement, and was one party always to block progress 7
1 had to remind them that the attitude and nustakes of Congress had
blocked progress on more than one occasion
J u k *3
In the afternoon I saw two of the Congress— Dr Khan Sahib 1 and
' jjj? r Kh*» Sahib ihe Control Premier ofNWFP was the brother of Khan Ab<lul
GhlfTir khan, known as the Frontier Gandhi He had close tie* %»th all India Congress
Leaders but wm also on friendly terms with many English officii*
1 1-14 jUtY I945 I55
Rajendra Prjisad' — to make their acquaintance Khan Sahib seems a
pleasant sensible person* rather attracmc Rajcndra Prasad seems quite
ordinary and friendly and not very formidable ot outwardly bitter
The Cabinet, by the way, has been very prompt in answering my cables
and giving appro\ al to the course of action I have recommended, and have
sent mc t\\ o complimentary messages
July 24
The final session of the Conference passed off more easil) and smoothly
than I had expected Azad made quite a temperate statement, Rajago-
palachanar exhorted me to form a Go\ eminent without the League, and
then Jinnah made a long exposition of the League point of \ iew f its claims
to Pakistan and its mistrust of Congress, he seemed at one time to raise his
claim to parity inside the Council with all ether parties combined If he really
meant this, it shows that he had ne\ cr at any time an intention of accept-
ing the offer, and it 11 difficult to see why he came to Simla at alL It is
possible that his attitude hardened during the discussions
So my efforts to bnng better understanding between the parties have
failed and ha\e shown how wide is the gulf Whether I have done more
good or harm by trying, only time will show In the outside world
certainly Congress stock will go even higher and Jinnah* s stock will go
down, I imagine Congress wiU claim to have been all sweet reasonable-
ness But actually their list vvould have given complete domination of the
Council by Congress, and I very much doubt whether they would have
accepted my provisional list I think Jinnah made a tactical blunder in not
bringing the matter to an issue Whether his position with the Muslims
will be strengthened I am not sure, but 1 imagine that it will be Congress
will be encouraged to try and win over Muslims from the League by all
possible methods, and any elections will be bitterly fought
I had a long talk with Nehru after lunch, I put to him that the only hope
for India to make best use of the opportunities before her, and to win self-
government without disruption or civil war was for the Hindus and
Muslims to make friends He was quite friendly and reasonable, the theme
of his discourse was that Congress represented a modem nationalistic
point of view and the League a narrow mediaeval conception, and that
the eventual cleavage when India's freedom was secured would be
between classes rather than communities, between poor and nch, between
1 Dr Rsjendn Prasad, a member of the Congress Working Committee and later President
of India.
r 5<S THE SIMLA CONFERENCE
peasant and landlord, betu ecn labourer and employer Nehru is honest
and sincere but a theonst and doctrinaire rather than a practical polmaan
In his final address to the Conference \ announcing its failure, Wavell said,
I u ish to male it clear that the responsibility for thefnhtre ts mine The warn
idea underlying the Conference uas tmne If it had succeeded, its success ti ould
have been attributed to me t and I cannot place the blame for Us failure on any
of the parties 1 ask the party leaders to accept this t ten , and to do all they can
to ensure that there are no recrtrmnahotis *
Azadjmnah and other speakers all spoke appreciatively of Lord Watclfs
efforts and said that he had done his best Gandht in a letter to him said, 'Hits
time yon hax e talen the blame on your shoulders But the u orU mil think
other u isc India certainly does *
The root cause of the failure uas, of course, JmnaKs intransigence and
obstinacy, but Wat ell recognized that this intransigence 'represents a real fear
on the part of the Muslims including those n ho do not support fmnah, of
Congress domination, u hch they regard as equn alent to a Hindu Raf
July 17
I returned to Dellu &om Simla yesterday Delhi is very sticky but I always
dislike Sunk uhere I can get little exercise and feel shut off It is good to
be able to get on a hone again
I discussed with Rowlands the possible re-construction of Council, he
suggested the resignation of the whole Council to enable me to cet rid of
the unsatisfactory members
July lo
My old mumhi from Peshawar Ahmed Jan treated me to a long harangue
^addressed he said t to Lieut Wavell of 40 years ago not to the Viceroy
^y^^d^^nrng *U politicians and adjuring me to use the b Ig sack
to both Congress and League
As a footnote to the Conference I am told that both Bulahhai Desai
and Uajagopakchamx got properly told offby the Working Committee,
the former because he had not made h* proposals dependent on the
™*°/r ^ ,^°*?S , Commit:ee »k ^ apparently for having
instigated Gandhi to the discussions with Jinnah last autumn
II w'Jr 1 * C ° nfcT T th ™& k « tn failure, may be regarded in some
tZll S f km Cmmt Vxeroyah} The idea of holding
U^^/il? U V"""'' Aw - atld " " « *« dogged persistent
aZroZrZ , "™*™ffHMC Once he hal obtained HMG*s
SKUjutly S ot it off to m eX ceVcnt start m a general atmosphere of goodn ill
H-l£> JULY 1£>45 I57
for h$ imitative had been warmly welcomed m India, and he himself had made
a favourable impression on some of (he Congress leaders, notably en Abut
KalamAzad t who has recorded 1 that he was much strtieh by IVavell s frankness
and smccrtty and hts obvwusly genutne desire to open a new chapter m the
relations betn een Congress and the Government
Nevertheless the Conference failed Although IVavell took responsibility
for its failure, dearly the fault u as not really hts Some critics have* however %
contended that by capitulating without a struggle tojmnalis intransigence and
abruptly bringing the Conference to an end t he needlessly abandoned a great
chance of setting Ittdta on the road to muted self-government 2 This conclusion
implies that tf he had ignored Jumah and continued negotiations with the other
parties t fmnah would have had to give way, since he could not afford to see a
new Council formed without the League, or, alternatively, that if he had still
refused to come in, he would have lost his hold over the Muslims and more
moderate leaders would have come to the fore
These were possibilities, but hardly much more, and tf IVavell was to take
advantage of them, such as they were, he had to be prepared to accept, tf
necessary, a Congress-dommated Council IVould this have been advisable 7
One of his mam objectives in trying to form a new Council was to facilitate a
long-term solution ofIttdta*s constitutional problems by getting Congress and
the League to collaborate m the actual task of governing India If he u cut
ahead without the League, this object we would have to be foregone, indeed
the communal problem u as Itlely to become even more intractable Apart from
thts t the war with fapan u as still in progress and was expected to last at least
one or two years more In the prosecution of the u ar a Congress-dominated
Council was likely to be a grave embarrassment, perhaps even a positive
menace Most of the Congress leaders had only recently been released from
imprisonment on account of the 1942 rebellion and u ere still vieuedutth con-
siderable suspicion IVavell hesitated, therefore, to risk having to form a new
Council without the participation of the League But he did not entirely rule it
out, and on 30 June, realizing that Jmnah was likely to prove intransigent,
he consulted alt the Governors by telegram on the advisability of going ahead
without htm The Governors uere about eaually divided in their views, but
among those who considered that it would be unwise to form anew Council with-
out the League were the Governors of the important Muslim-majority Provinces
of Bengal and the Punjab 3 This tended to confirm WaveWs hesitations
Tliere was another important consideration Churchill, who was still Prtme
Minister and many of hts Ministers had only reluctantly consented to the Simla
Conference ifetttg held of Thep watiM jf/ave he&x mtetgeJ sf & sspslwt J/aJ
- ^Vm Freedom {Bomb^ 1959) P f > 106-7
* SccH V Hodsons Th* Gmat Ui^iJe ^London 1969) p 126 where this criticism is
discussed^ ot j lw t he Governors of the smsU Muslim majoncy Provinces ofSitid and
NWFP both favoured disregarding Jumah,
THE SIMLA CONFERENCE
been a proposal to form a Congress-dominated Carnal unbalanced by the
League IVavell was it ell aware that there tiouldbe small chance ofH MG
agreeing to stick a proposal, tfhe had decided to make tt
In the circumstances there was no way in uhtch he could meet Jumahs
obduracy except by per suasion t and so when he found that Jtnnah would not
yield to persttaston t he was obliged to admit failure and bring the Confrence to
an end As Klitzar put it, he had done his best and vindicated the good in-
tent tons of the British Got cntment He had also won the goodn ill of those
who attended the Conference In the next few difficult montlis when extremist
elements in Congress u ere itching to repeat the 1942 rebellion, this goodwill
seemed to be largely dissipated, but the Congress President, Azad, retained fill
confidence in IVavell and consistently threw such influence as he possessed on
the side of moderation He said later {in a letter to Lord IVavel!) that by calling
the Simla Conference IVavell had rendered India and Great Britain a service
wheh had few parallels m history and that the new possibilities of Indo-
British friendship u ere due to that step
Simla Conference: Sir Evan Jettkim and Lord IVavell
,_. r H F"
Afr Gamffo Ifuwn^ K«r^I Lo^e, jj July 1945
7
END OF THE WAR AND
SECOND VISIT TO LONDON
July 26
So there has been what is called Tor some reason a landslide* in favour of
Labour at the elections It was obvious by this evening that the) w ould have
a majority of about 200 It is too big I bad hoped for something lite
a balance between the two main parties, with a revived Liberal party
holding the scales I am afraid there will be a lot of foolish, inexperienced
and rather wild legislators amongst the 400 odd of Labour However there
were very many stupid and tiresome Tones in the late Conservative
majority I think Labour is likely to take more interest in and be more
sympathetic towards India, hut they will have some weird ideas about it
July 31
My Governors arrived today, all except Hope, whose plane broke down
or was delayed by weather, and I had interviews with some of them
I wrote a letter to Winston a couple of days ago I thanked him for
having entrusted me with such responsibdities and said what a privilege
it had been to serve under so great a man I have never quite known,
though, how he really considered me, sometimes I think more as a liability
than an asset He has certainly, as I know, often said some very biting and
critical things of me though never, so far as I remember, to me I am pretty
sure that when he appointed me Viceroy it was with the intention and
expectation that I should simply keep things quiet in India till the war
was over I should have saved myself a Jot of trouble and should perhaps
have served my own interests best had I done so Then I could have
claimed to go back home at the end of the war, and to leave the political
imbroglio in India to some ambitious politician But I doubt whether
I could have accepted this role, my instincts are for action and not to sit
still over a problem, and my tendencies are progressive I undoubtedly
shook Winston by my proposals, and I think there were times when he
wished he had appointed someone else However, there it is and I must go
on now and do my best for my new masters But how pleasant it would be
if I could look forward to demobilization ar the end of the war
D 1*8 M
160 END OF THE WAR AND SECOND VISIT TO LONDON
I am told that H E H the Nizam's reaction to the British election
results it as how awful, I must now hegin to economise'
Attgitst 2
The Governors Conference went v»cll on the v*hole No one produced
any original ideas as to the solution of the problem but there was almost
unanimity of recommendation as to the next moves Only one Governor
(Colville) advocated by-passing the League and forming a political
Executive Council without it On the other hand only one favoured
reconstruction on an *efBciency' basis , the others all thought I should
carry on with my present Counal with any changes I could make in the
ordinary course, unless and until I could get a tMjhncal Counal All
except Glancy, favoured Elections as soon as possible to the Central
Assembly, and all, again except GLmcy, wanted Provincial elections this
winter, but pracacall) all Governors of Provinces under Section 93
thought elections should precede the formation of Ministries, though they
agreed that should any leader come forward meanwhile who could form
a stable government and gtve satisfactory assurances as regards support of
the war effort it would not he easy to debar him from forming a Ministry ,
and then it would be necessary for the governor to consult him about
elections
No one found much difficulty on the general policy of releasing political
pns oners except the dangerous ones, and lifting the ban on Congress
organisations
I pointed out that elections were probably inevitable hut that they did
not amount to a policy, and might, after some months dislocation of
administration and communal agitation leave us exactly where we were,
if Congress still refused to take office in the Provinces unless a political
Government was formed at the Centre Some Governors were in favour
of bringing Pakistan into the open by means of a Conference, Committee
or Mission— Indian British or International— to determine its advisability
and practicability I said that the difficulty was that Jmnah and the League
would almost certainly boycott any such enquiry unless they were given
some such unacceptable pledge — of the fate of certain Provinces or areas
being determined by the Muslim vote alone — as Jinnah demands
Everyone approved my suggestion of the formation of a Counal^to
be called perhaps the Planning and Development Counal — composed of
the Premiers of Provinces when. Ministerial Govemm^nt has, been
restored in all or the great majority, and some representatives of the States
They also all agreed that the National Defence Council should be
31 JULY-O* AUGUST 1045 l6l
continued nil the end of the war with Japan, but need not meet so
frequently
Wc also discussed in a general way, Food, coal, cloth, resettlement of
soldiers, shortage of personnel* pay of government servants
August 3
My Governors have either left today or leave tomorrow morning They
all profess themselves pleased with the meeting, and I think genuinely,
they get a chance of seeing one another and exchanging views and of
doing a good deal of business with Departments of Government 1 have
had interviews with them all* their Provinces all seem to be running
reasonably well and they had nothing very much to tell me about them
Council meeting in evening, only routine items of Food and Coal, and
Summary At this time of year the Food and Coal prospects can seldom
both be good, if the monsoon is favourable a very large proportion of the
labour in the coalfields goes off to cultivate the land and we lose coal, if
the monsoon is bad we may get more coal but shall lose food
August 6
I know nothing of the new S of S Pethick-Lawrencc, I fear he may have
fixed and old-fashioned ideas derived mainly from Congress contacts
I wonder what the policy of the new Government to India will be, 1 have
no indication at all yet
1 had a discussion this morning with C -ln-C , Home Member and
Finance Member over the treatment of the re-captured F N A The general
policy is all right I think, to detain the 'Blacks' and try the worst of them
by court-martial to discharge the 'Greys*, and to return the 'Whites* to
their units The main point at issue is the financial treatment of the Greys,
when I saw hun some days ago C -ui-C m tended to discharge them with
their pay during the whole time they had been Prisoners of War I told hun that
I really could not stand for our paying men to -fight against us, and that it
was not fair on men who had remained loyal t and that he must think again
He now proposes to pay them gratuity earned by previous service and to
give them the leave on full pay that they would normally be entitled to on
terms are too generous Claude Auchtnleck promised to reconsider
Of some ?o t ooo men of the Indian Army who fell into Japanese hands as
prisoners of u at about 20^000 defected to them and joined the IN A {Indian
National Army) Tins was at first commanded by a Sikh officer, hut he fell out
10*2 END OF THE WAH AND SECOND VrSIT TO LONDON
a>tth the Japanese and the IN A became more or less moribund until the
autumn of 1943 when Subhas Chandra Base [see footnote on p 49) arrived
end took <u er command
Mill tartly the IN A was ofhttk tise to the Japanese, but tt had some
propaganda value Many of the 20 $00 military personnel who pined it did so
primarily to get better treatment^ but some of than were tmbued with genuine
patriotic fen our and were persuaded by Bose to believe that they u ere serving
the cause of Indian freedom
Tlie 'Blacks* were considered to have entered wholeheartedly into the
movement and to be quite unrepentant Tliey numbered over 7,000 Some of
them had been gmlty not only of waging war against the King but also of
appalling brutality to many felhw^pfisoners who remained hyal and refused
to join them Consequently there was very strong feeling against the I-NA
among some of the loyalists TV decision to try a few of the ti orst offenders by
court-martial gave me to a great deal of agitation a few months later
August 7
So the atomic bomb has come, a surprise to me, though I think I have
known or suspected the majoncy of the war secrets I knew vaguely that
they were working at it, hut had no idea it was near going into use The
correspondence there has hem ah out the Travancore mineral salts
(Monasite, etc) is connected with it, I fancy A very dangerous scientific
development, since I doubt whether man has yet the wisdom to use it
wisely It may end war or it may end civilization It is not a weapon that
any thinking man would willingly ha\ e put into the hands of the present-
day world It has shown tt cannot be trusted with a box of matches is it
reasonable to think it can play with a M1IJ5 grenade and not pull the pin
out?
August S
Routine Council this morning nothing much except that the food
situation will deteriorate again unless we get some heavy rains soon
Sir John Woodhcad 13 staying with me, he has written an efficient but dry
rather dull report on the food problem
I had a telegram from Winston thanking me for the letter i wrote him
on rus ceasing to he P M t he seems quite pleased with it
August 11
Habct Nippon, so now for the horrors of peace The first one will be that
1 must write a victory broadcast, 1 suppose
7-19 august 1945
I63
August
The last few days have been spent waiting for the formal surrender of
Japan Wheeler 1 came to sec me on Sunday Americans are always quick
off the mark* and he was already starting to get home the 200,000 Ameri-
cans in India and Burma and the 60,000 in China S E A C arc sending
a commando to Pcnang to take o\cr the port and airfields there, and
a division from Rangoon to Singapore I wonder haw many of our British
and Indian Prisoners of War wc shall recover
In the Departments of the G oil \\ c arc not nearly ready for peace, but
I doubt whether we ever should have been, P S V and I arc trying ro snr
up Departments but it is a hard job
August tS
Nothing much to record I gave my broadcast on the 15th on the defeat
of Japan, not a very good one, but adequate 1 suppose
A telegram from the S of S today, the first real sign of life, indicated
that HMG intend to take the India problem in hand at once and
seriously They agree to elections and the general programme z I put home
after the Governors' Conference, but obviously mczn something further,
and S of S says another telegram will be sent me early next week after
further discussion in Cabinet
August jp
Thanksgiving Service this morning I was sent the choice of three most
inappropriate and rather dreary pieces of scripture to read as the lesson,
so I said I would read the song of Deborah I was told that this would be
most out of keeping with the spirit of the Service but it seemed to me
entirely in keeping with the celebraijon of victory, and I duly read it. It
was a good service, but the Bishop is not a good preacher
Monteath sent Evan Jenkins a private wire indicating that I am likely
to be called home at short notice for consultation.
Basil Gould took leave, he goes home tomorrow after 37! years in
India We went to Surnmer&elds together over 50 years ago and an to
College at Winchester He certainly did well in Sikkirn and the people
up there loved him.
* General Wheeler had become Deputy to Mountbatten in succession to General Stilwell
a This was the programme for elections release of political prisoners lifting the ban on
Congees* organization* etc t agreed to at th& Governors Con (crates
164 END OF THE W\AJE AND SECOND VISIT TO LONDON
August 20
FKN told me that if elections w ere to be held early next ) ear he wished
to leave Council and go hack to Punjab politics He has in fact gone over
to Jinnah and the League and against his cousin Khizar He will be no loss
to Council
Attgttst 22
The present Government certainly moves quicker than its predecessor
They want me to start home the day after tomorrow or as soon after as
pos sible And they anno unced it straight away t also the holding of el ectioro
I had to call a special Council yesterday at very short notice, to let them
know before the public announcement Felicity will go with me and
Men on, and George Abel] will meet me in London
Azad has sent an indignant wire about my ordering elections without
consulting the convenience of Congress, who apparently want more time
to organise, and will also use elections as another lever to try to get their
remaining criminals out of jail
A private telegram from the S of S indicates that they propose to go
back to the Cnpps ofier This won't do, I am sure, it is much less likely
to be accepted by the parties now than before
August 24
Left Delhi at noon.
Dow at Karachi was in his usual rather cynical form. We spoke of the
acquittal of his ex-Ministcr Khuhro, who will now probably become
Premier before long to be suspected of murdering one s enemies or c\ en
to be known to have done it is a quahfication rather than a hindrance in
Smd politics
Dow thinks that some sort of a Consntuent Assembly, or preliminaries
for one is now necessary, but agrees that an inquiry into the question of
Pakistan is probably an essential preliminary
I wonder if the Japanese announcement of Subhas Chandra Bose*s
death in an air-crash is true, I suspect it very much it is just what would be
given out if be meant to go underground My first reaction when I beard
it was to tell P S V to ask S E A C to make most careful enquiries into
the story as soon as thej could If it is true it will be a great relief His
disposal would have presented a most difficult problem
1 am not very much looking forward to this trip I shall find it dif&cult,
I think, to persuade the Labour party of the realities of the Indian situation
20-2? AUGUST 1945 16S
and that they must go slow. However, it will be easier to do it in person
than by exchange of telcgrami
August 26
Arrived London this evening The S. of S met us and I motored with him
to Ctandges He looks old, is pleasant and amiable George Abell tells me
that Cnpps is the only man in the Government who is really in a hurry
o\cr India, and he wants to get back to the Cnpps offer The remainder
of the Government* George thinks, are in no hurry, and the rank and file
of the Labour part) and the country at large take little interest 111 India,
August 27
I had 1 J hours with S of S He outlined the reasons that were impelling
the Labour Government to early action — the pronouncements of Labour
leaders, the end of the war* the fact that the Foreign Ministers of Great
Britain, USA, and Russia are meeting early next month and Be vm would
like to show progress in India, and the fact that Congress seemed to be in
an accommodating mood He said that if progress was to be made, the
alternam es seemed to be the Cnpps offer or a modification of it, or some
new line of approach- He then spoke of the Pakistan issue and the attitude
of the Muslims Finally, he said that while the Constitutional issue was
being settled there would presumably be a time-lag during which the
business of India had to be earned on, and suggested means for forming
a provisional Executive Council from a "Provincial panel
I said the reasons impelling the Government to an early settlement were
understandable, but did not justify action that might throw India into
chaos or turmoil Besides the political issue, we had responsibility to the
minorities other than the Muslims, to the workers vis-i-vis the factory
owners, and to the peasants vis-a-vis the landowners, and for India's post-
war problems, we most not overlook these in the hope of appeasing a few
political leaden I said the spint and objectives of Congress had not really
changed they were in a comparatively reasonable mood at present
because they were anxious to get back into power I did not believe a fresh
Cnpps offer would be acceptable to any of the parties , and 1 thought we
had to face the Pakistan issue and bring its real implications mto the hght
before vre could get any further 1 agreed the time-lag would be consider-
able and might amount to 5 or 6 years I outlined the possibilities of an
Executive Council during this interim period — a political Council if one
could get one* an 'efficiency* Council, or the present Council I reminded
him that he had not e\en mentioned the States but that they were a
166 END OF THE WAR AND SECOND VISIT TO LONDOtf
considerable part of the Indian problem, and warned him of the dangers
that might result, especially in the Punjab, if it were said that the Cnpps
offer would be enforced (he had hinted at this) I spoke of India's social,
economic, and financial problems that had to be faced and must not be
neglected in concentrating on. the political settlement I emphasised the
Indian lack of leadership Some talk followed on Jamah's attitude and
demands and the difficulty of fitting the Punjab with any Pakistan scheme
P L gave me the impression that lie had no wish to be m a hurry himself
but was being pressed by Cabinet and Party
After lunch had another i£ hours with S of S , and the Under Secretary,
Henderson, was present Wfi talked at considerable length of the detention
Ordinances which the Labour Go\ eminent want abolished, the H I rs ,
and J LPs > J of whose crimes and dangerous proclrvtaes they seemed
unaware, of the meeting of Foreign Ministers and India's interest in the
problems they might discuss (Palestine, the future of Italian East Africa,
Persia, Siam), of Bajpai's status, and other matters
In the evening I dined with the P M in the flat in the War Cabinet
buildings, P L was the only other present We talked rather at large on
India and Indian personalities without getting down to anything definite
Dinner was at 7 30 p m and the party broke up at 9 45, Winston would
have had dinner at 9 p m and talked till 2 a m
August 2$
Busy at TO practically the whole day I went to have a talk with S ofS
in morning on assumption, that we had finished with the political situation
for the moment and that he wanted to discuss Governorships and other
matters But I found that his mind was entirely engrossed with producing
some definite scheme for tomorrow's meeting of the India Committee,
and he asked mc to outline a draft announcement to be made, which
would go as far as possible to meet forward opinion in the Cabinet and
would not embarrass mc in India This was a very quick one for which I
was not in the least prepared I thought on the whole I rose to the occasion
rather effectively I outlined the heads of a possible announcement on
general p obey towards a settlement which S ofS said he thought would
do admirably He asked me to produce a draft announcement by 5 p m
I put George Abell Mcnon and Turnbull on to producing a draft, and
went off to give George Ginard lunch
v J \ T i it >panese 'inspired Tifili Chimin were the men of the 1 N A The j
1 « HitltT Inspired Fifth CoVanm were the wry much i mailer number of prisoners of war
11* German hand* who had agreed to collaborate with them
27-31 AUGUST IP45
167
George Abell produced a short and simple draft, which the S of S
approved in substance but then started to try his hand at drafting So we
had another discussion at about 6pm,I didn't like his draft, so we left
it till next morning
August 2$
Final draft was produced at I O this morning, and I got through a certain
amount of miscellaneous work
At India Cabinet Committee in afternoon were P M , Cnpps, Ellen
Wilkinson, Stansgatc {Wedgwood Bcnn that was), Pcthick-Lzwrcncc,
Henderson and Listowel I made a general statement on the present
position and the causes and result of the failure at Simla and said it now
seemed that we must clear the Pakistan issue before we could go any
further I said 1 dtd not think the Cnpps offer would now be accepted by
the parties, and Cnpps said that Biria, Shiva Rao 1 and others had toJd him
that the Hindus w ould accept it % The draft drawn up by S of S and
myself was criticized by P M and Cnpps as reactionary , and it became
evident that Cnpps was, niainly I think for reasons of personal prestige,
set on enforcing the original Cnpps offer, which he said was now H.M G/s
policy About three*quatters of an hour inconclusive talk followed, at the
end of which it was agreed to think again This is a set-back to my hopes
of early return
I sent otT a telegram to Colville, asking htm to consult Hallett, Glancy,
Casey, Hope and Corfield 3 on implications of a renewal of Cnpps offer
August ji
Went to War Office and saw new S of S , Lawson, whom I had known in
1942 when he came to India with the Parliamentary Mission to China
We had about 20 minutes of goodwill, I impressed on him the necessity
for a quick decision on officering the 1 A and put him wise about Hifs and
Jifi problem
Then to F O and had half an hour with Bevin, who I thought was very
sensible about Palestine, about the status of India's representatives at
1 B Shiva Rao a distinguished journalist writing xnamlv for the Madras paper The
H * It would not have been accepted by the Muskm League The Cnpps offer hid given
individual Provinces the right to stand out of an Lidun Union but the Muslim majorities
in the important Provinces of Bengal and the Punjab were so small that the League could
have no assurance that m these two Provinces there would be a vote in favour of standing out
of an Indian Union
j s tt Coarad Cache Id, I C S., -Who had succeeded Sir Tnuias Wyhc as Political Adviser
1(58 END OF THE WAR AND SECOND VISIT TO LONDON
Washington and Chungking, about Indian representation whenever the
Dominions were represented, and other matters He Mas anxious to get
somt aimOTmmrKTft wit about ptogress rai &e fcvdtasv ^oktial utuatton.
before Sept 10, when he meets Foreign Ministers of U S A and Russia
I \\ ent to see the S of S whose drafting I dislike more every tune I see
it We discussed his fresh draft for India Cabinet Committee and agreed
to meet again at 5 15 p m , and then went on to the matter of detenus in
Bengal, S of S feels very strongly about detention of people without
trial, it is of course indefensible in principle, hut almost certainly the only
way to keep law and order m some parts of India
I had an hour with Winston from 4 to 5 p m He was friendly and in
good form, is just off on a. holiday to Italy f to a villa near Lake Como
where he v> ill paint He gave forth his usual jeremiad about India, warned
me that the anchor (himself) was now gone and that I was on a lee shore
with rash pilots, revealed that the only reason he had agreed to my
political move was that the India Committee had all told him it was bound
to fail'
When I got a bit bred of his diatribes on India, I asked him whether he
was going to write the history of the war, he disclaimed any intention of
it, said he was too old and might leave notes to be put into shape after his
lifetime He spoke of the shock of the election, how in one day m 1940
he had been elevated to P M when the enemy was at the gates, and in one
day in 1945 when the war was over had been thrown out
We talked of the strategy of the war, of the fall of Singapore, of the
Greek campaign which he still regarded with disapproval, of Cairo and
tAorasw \n ^nA liitft of -the attwrmt tomb, rt vias iw>t vAL
Potsdam that they knew it was a success Winston said if he had known it
was going to come off and that the Japanese war would be over 50 soon
he would not have had the election nil October, he admitted, however,
that the result would probably have been much the same He was very
fnendly, and 1 think genuinely pleased that I had been to see him. His
final remark as I closed the door of the lift was 'Keep a hit of India*
I had a short session with the S ofS and told him his last draft was the
worst of all and that I couldn t accept it I agreed to produce an alternative
by Monday and that the India Committee should not meet again till
Tuesday
September 3
I seem to ha\ e reached rather a crisis with H M G After seeing the tele-
grams from Colvillc giving the views of Governors — which agreed
31 AUCUST-4 SEPTEMBER 1945 l6 &
generally with my own-early this raommg. I drafted a note for the India
Committee stating the objections to trying to impose a Constitution
Making Body on India without former consultation with Indians, and
took it round to S ofS He was rather shaken, but I told him quite clearly
that I meant to suck to it, and suggested that I should see the P.M I saw
him acain in the afternoon when he had made a rather feeble attempt to
water down my draft announcement, 'in order to make it easier to get it
past the India Committee' I told him that it was perfectly easy to draft
something that would get past the Committee, but that if it promised
something we could not fulfil it would be dtshonest, and ifit was com-
pletely unacceptable to one of the two principal communities it would be
highly dangerous, and that I would not consent to cither
These people hate to be brought up against realities and made tq 6cc
their fences squa^V Buk and Shm md J °* et Con f eSS %T'
gandists are, I know, seeing Cnpps and Attlee, and they are taking all they
"tL^ pretty nearly alt the business of the day, except a certain
number of routine telegrams, but It took quite a time
September 4 „
A very busy and not very profitable day S« R MaxweU - =
from hmi.
of the present electorate
At /p m I had an hour with P M He was quite friendly but did not
convince me about the advisability of imposing a ConstituUon Mahng
Body on India, I don't think I convinced him of the inadvmbihty hut
I left km in no doubt about the dangers At the back of it all he made it
clear without intending to do so, that the Cabinet was diinbng more of
nlacatine opinion in their own party, and in U S A , than of the real good
of India He said in the end that the India Committee would discuss it
amone themselves that afternoon
Then went to dine with Cnpps He tried to persuade me on the same
hncs as the P M , and I was equally firm on the dangers of trying to force
the oace and impose a Constitution Making Body He also revealed in
what he said that at the back of his mind was pledges to the party tail and
fear of their pressure, instigated by Congress propaganda, rather than the
real eood of India I made no secret of my views as to the dangers oi
the course they proposed and the extent to which they were disregarding
the good of the people However, they arc obviously bent on handing over
170 END OF THE "WAR AND SECOND VISIT TO LONDON
India to their Congress friends as soon as possible They will try to get me
to accept some compromise formula of words that the) will interpret
their way I may ha\e to decide whether ro refuse to be a parry to their
plans to Quit India, or to go back and tr) to keep them out of disaster
as much as possible Afterwards Cnpps talked more sensibly on India's
economic problems, and then on the question of Governorships
Septemhcr $
Just before lunch S of S produced }et another draft, and I discussed it
with him for over an hour in the afternoon He is a most chinning old
gentleman but nor a \ ery sJbiful drafts r I thxnk this latest effort maj do
with a few alterations, but it really leaves all the loose aids untied
September 6
Meeting of the Cabinet India Committee went well The latest draft
announcement was passed with only a few textual amendments, it was
agreed that it would be a good tbin^ if I supplemented it with a broadcast,
and the P M w ould also probably broadcast at home I then made a state>
ment, warning H.M G of the rocks ahead and emphasising that a mere
expression of their intentions h<ywe\er good, did not solve the Indian
problem and that there were many aw kward questions to be answered
and decisions to be made before C M B could come into being, much
more before a Constitution could be agreed I outlined some of them—
the composition and procedure of the CMB, the secession issue, the
pledges to the Princes the nghts of minorities It was agreed that there
should be a discussion of these points before I went back.
the announcement which I Vat ell made on behalf of HMG on
ip September after kts return to India, tt as as follows
'As stated m the gracious Speech from the Tlirotie at the Opening of
Parliament Hts Afajestys Government are determined to do their utmost to
promote in conjunction u tth the leaders cf Indian opinion the early realisation
of full self-got cm ment m bidia During my vwt to London they hat e discussed
u trh me the steps to be taken
'An announcement has already been tttade that elections to the Central and
Prot metal Legislatures, so long postponed owing to the tt or, are to be hell
during tlie coming cold weather Tliereafief His Majesty's Government
earnestly hope that ministerial responsibility will be accepted by political
leaders tn all Proi mces
It is the intention of His Majesty s Goi ernment to com ene as soon as
possible a Cotistttution-mahng Body, and as a preliminary step they hat e
4-12 SSPTRMBtH I945
171
attthowcd inc to undertake, immediately after the elections, discussions u uh
representatives of the Lcgislattte Assemblies tn the Provinces, to ascertain
tthether the proposals contained tn the i$4Z declaration are acceptable or
u hether some alternative or modified scheme ts preferable Discussions will also
be undcrtalcrt with the representatives of the Indian States with a view to
ascertaining tn if hat u ay they ean best tale thetr part tn the Constitution-
making Body
*Htj Majesty s Government are proceeding to the consideration of the content
of the treaty u Inch u til reqtttre to be concluded hettveett Great Britain and
India
'During these preparatory stages, the Government of India must he canted
cn t mid urgent economic and social problems mist he dealt with Furthermore*
India has to play her full part tn u orUng out the netv World Order His
Majesty's Government have therefore Jiirther authorised me t as soon as the
results of the Provincial elections are published, to tale steps to bring into being
an Rxeaitit e Comal which u ill have the support of the mam Indian parties *
September J J
The Secretary of the India Society, Richter, came to sec mc about the
proposed exhibition of Indian. Art at Burlington House and I found that
a J most nothing had been done since I was home last So I wrote a note to
theS ofS
The Cabinet Committee discussed all the difficulties m front of us a
httic languidly, since they were not immediate Cnpps was always ready
with a form of words, but even he realises that words, however skilfully
chosen, will not solve fundamental differences Still the atmosphere was
fnendK > different to the India Committee ofthe hst Government, who
were however, more alive to the practical difficulties Compared with
last tunc, I have had to raise my right foot — die one on the accelerator
pedal — and put down my left foot — the brake pedal one — gently but
firmly
September 12
The usual lasr day hustle included a meeting with the Secretary of State
on Commercial safeguards and discrimination against British firms and
several other matters — a mixed bag
Sirtvell the gunner whom 1 left in command on Java in February 1043
came to see me He has been a Jap prisoner ever since He seemed in very
good heart as he was when I handed him over that very forlorn hope He
told me the stor) of his adventures When the Japs landed Sitwell was
ordered by Ter Poor ten to surrender The Japs beat him up really
171 END OF THE WAR AND SECOND VISIT TO LONDON
thoroughly at the start to try and get from him where the Australian I
Corps was, he told me he was left on the floor for ten days with his hands
tied behind his back for stx days without food Afterwards they (the
officers) were subjected to a policy of degradation in front of their men — ■
a policy which did not pay from the Japanese point of new; as it otAy
aroused the fury and indignation of the men. He said the morale of our
men was much better thant hat of the Dutch and Americans Sitvteli
impresses mc by his vitality and couragc > as he did when 1 put him in
command
September 14 (Cairo)
Usual party to see mc offycsttiday Arrived Cairo about 8pm and went
to Paget — our old house on Gezrra
The Casey s turned up for dinner and I had half an hour with him He
was furious over the release of Sarat Bose, 1 apparently it was done without
consulting him He wants to leave Bengal in January, rather to my dis-
appointment he had no very defimte ideas about a successor
September 16
Back to Delhi by lunch time Evan Jenkins had as usual prepared a suc-
cint and illuminating note on all the principal developments in my absence
So ends another stage or incident of my Viceroyalty I think it was
worthwhde to go home and make contact with the new Government
I appear to have for the moment the confidence of H M G and of people
generally, and hope I have introduced some sense of realities into the
people to whom 1 have talked on the Indian situation
It has been faitly grilling work and I am a little weary
1 Left wing Congress leader from Bengal brother of Subhas Chandra Bose
THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
Lord Wavell had predicted that the citd of the war would be a testing tme tn
India, and he was right The left-wing extremists in Congress, many of whom
had recently been released fromtatU it w netting to launch afresh 'Quit India
rebellion, and during the next few months this seemed to be the intention of the
Congress leaders t judging by the violence of their public utterances Gandhi
tt as said to favour moderation, but Gandhi's influence teas on the decline
The first trials of members of the IN* A began tn November and aroused
great excitement, fomented by the Congress leaders,some of whom were thinking
of employ mg INJi officers and men as the spearhead of a rebellion The
triab were a source of great anxiety to the Government of India On the
Army's insistence and against the advice of the Home Member > they it ere
umvtsely held m the Red Fort at Delhi m the fullest glare of publicity, and m
retrospect tc rs clear thai the policy, adapted later \ of only sending for trial those
agamst u horn charges of brutality could be proved should have been folia wed
from the outset, but tt is difficult to see how these trials could have been avoided
altogether
Another source of atjxiety at this twit was the possible need to use Indian
troops agamst the hidonesmns If the impression was created that the Indian
Army was being used to restore ' colonialism 1 , this would intensify political
trouble tn India and might excite disaffection m the Army itself
However, by the end of the year the worst dangers were over The important
Congress leader t Vallabhbhat Patel, seems to have come round to the view that
Independence could he gamed quite soon by peaceful means and that tt would be
foolish to stir up trouble and create disorder m the country He therefore began
to throw the weight of his great influence in favour of keeping the peace
September 20
Council meetings on last two days On the evening of 1 8th I held a special
meeting to communicate the result of my discussions at home and to read
the proposed announcement of HMG In contrast to the last occasion
'when I came back, the proposals had a very good reception, and the
comments of members were sensible and friendly
After dinner I made my broadcast of H M G *s announcement, and then
had to do it all over again in front of an American film unit, whose
machine kept breaking down with the result that I was kept about 40
174 THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
minutes in front of those blazing lights I remarked to the American in
charge that I did not wonder that fdm stars became temperamental, he
merely replied *You are lucky, you haven* t got any make-up on
September 21
According to the Japs at Singapore, S C Bose definitely is dead, but I shall
be sceptical till further confirmation
I told Caroc. and Tnvcdi about their Governorships 1 and they seemed
pleased Mudie has accepted Go\ crnorship of Sind.
September 22
Ceremonial parade this morning when Wheeler presented Legion of
Merit to C.-m-C and myself We had a number of Americans to lunch
later on* Parade went well and I think Wheeler was very pleased, he has
been a great co-operator with the British and genuine!) liked by everyone
I saw two correspondents this morning — Moraes of the Times of India,
who tried to draw me on my political intentions and drew a blink, and
Holbum of the Times Sultan Ahmed also came and expressed a wish to
resign from Council and take up a post as Muslim Adviser to the Chamber
of Princes
September 2$
Back this morning from a. fairly strenuous 4 days at Dehra Dun I saw the
2 Gurkha Training Depot and battalions of and and 9th Gurkhas back
from P o W camps in Malaya 9th Gurkha battalion put up an impressive
performance by turning out on parade very smart for inspection in spite
of being a very sick and debilitated lot of men Both battalions had
brought back more men and in rather better shape than I expected, both
were exceedingly bitter about the LN A from whose hands they had
had worse treatment than from the Japs
September
A pretty busy day Saturday was succeeded by a very *Green-box\ Sunday,
and I got no week-end rest at all Bengal is getting very worried about
food, and it looks as if we might have a situation comparable with 1943,
unless wc are careful
l x n ^ irwr * w ho bad been foreign Secretary was appointed Governor of
thcNWFP and Sir Chandu tal Tnvedi 1 C S , who had been Secretary War Depart-
ment was appointed Governor of Onssa
Viceroy s House the ballroom
20 SEPTEMBER-4 OCTOBER IQ45
175
October 1
I began with an hour with Lawson, the S of S for War, who arrived last
night I tackled him over passages home for the large ntimhcrs of civilians,
Service and commercial, who liave been abroad for 7 or 8 yean He was,
perhaps naturally, impressed with the necessit) of clearing the block of
soldiers waiting to go to the U K. where trade is suffering from lack
of labour
I then had two of the Diwans of big States — Ramaswami Aiyar of
Tra vancore and the Nawab of Char ran from Hyderabad The former
talked of his plan for Regional grouping, of the necessity to form an
Interim National Go\ crnmcnt, of proposals to bring the Princes into
consultation over industrial and economic questions, of Pakistan and how
to elucidate it He has clear and sound ideas of what should be done but no
intention, as he showed a } ear or two ago, of descending into the dust and
strife of the arena himself
The Nawab of Chattari with a bad cold was even less audible and
intelhgmle than he usually js to me He was charged by his formidable
and importunate master to suggest that H.M G should enter into a
separate treaty with Hyderabad as an independent State and give her an
outlet to the sea by permitting or heiping her to buy Marmagoa from the
Portuguese, also that H E H should be given a resounding title and be
released from all restrictions as a reward for his services in the war I was
not encouraging about either proposal
Then I had a talk with Archie Rowlands for an hour on the reorganisa-
tion of the Finance Branch, the decimalization of the coinage, India's
ratification of the Bretton Woods agreement, and several other matters
Next an hour with C -in-C on various matters He wants a big Victory
parade and military week in Februar) , which seems a bit late, and the
Africans, East and West, removed from India as soon as possible —
especially the West Africans
Finally, a big dinner party of 70 or so, hrgely Princes
October 4
The 19th and final session of the NDC, which has been in existence for
just four years, ended today It has been, I think a useful body, but it has
sometimes been rather a wearisome one We discussed a number of matters
and then at the end an officer P O W from Ma/aya, Major Bahadur Singh
of the Hyderabad Regiment spoke of his experiences and sang a hymn of
hate against the 1 N A His obvious sincerity and the obvious sufferings he
had been through made a considerable impression It was a good session
d ice N
176 THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
and ended with farewell complimentary remarks by myself, the Jam Sahib,
and Sir C Jehangir 1
We had two biggish parties, an At Home on the evening of the 2nd for
Lawson to meet the N D C and a farewell dinner tonight for the N D C
Peter Goats departed -yesterday morning with Lawson, he has been
with me for nearly six years, as ADC, P S and Comptroller 1 shall nuss
his stimulating company and quick wit
Outside the N P C there haa been plenty of paperwork and a number
of interviews I had a long session with Corfield on the difficult problem of
war rewards for the Princes, on which it will be "\ cry difficult to satisfy
them It looks as if we should have to agree to Mirza Ismail going to
Hyderabad to replace Chat tan — a \ain untrustworthy but clever man
for m honest but stupid owe
Dalai saw me today, full of difficulties and complaints of the slow
functioning of other Departments, says he can get no decision on Agri-
cultural policy. Educational policy, policy to deal with unemployment
(roads, etc) I hold no brief for my Members in charge of these Depart-
ments, they are maddeningly slow, but Dalai is rather soft and faint-
hearted and cannot stand up to difficulties or criticism I tried to hearten
him a little He said he had seen Gandhi and Vallabhai Patel in Bombay
Gandhi had now no objection to promotion of heavy industries, though
he itnl wished for cloth to be produced by village industry Vallabhai
Patel was \ery bitter about the dissolution of the Assemblies by Governors
and claimed that Congress should have been given the chance to form
Ministries, though he said they would not have done so I suppose wliat
they wanted was to be asked to form Ministries. %o that they could have
refused or demanded conditions I am told that there is a considerable
struggle going on inside Congress between the advocates of co-operation
(on Congress terms) and violence Vallabhai Patel of course advocates the
latter
October 6
A considerable number of interviews Sir Cowasjce Jehangir talked on
the political situation He had been talking to jrnnah and was possibly
sounding mc on Jinnah's behalf He said communal feeling was w orse
tlian ever and adjured mc to form a Central Government before the
elections with parity bctw ecn Moslem League and Congress 1 said that we
were a little tired of making efforts at solution and finding them rejected
* A prominent P*t«e t who represented die City of Bombay m the Central Legtsbtive
Assembly 1950-47
4-*7 OCTOBER 1945
and that Jinnah had said at Simla that nothing less than Mtrhm «.
with all other parties at the Centre would satisfy him, and that j tV-Tv I
he was pla-y ing his cards badly C J said there were dissensions m Ccr \Z
and that Gandhi was losing his influence, and that the immoderate v«l
gaining ground
I talked to Mudic about law and order during the ejections, abou yt-A
Rutherford had been rather panicky, and told him to impress ortevm- *
that to appease the Congress at the expense of loyalists was not my no*
October 17
Got back this evening from a visit to Kashmir and Rawalpindi TV
to Kashmir was comparatively peaceful, my only official duties wn »■ \\
opening of an (unfinished) hospital and interviews with Minuter* ~
social occasions were many Wc had three shoots and a round of goff a
Gulmarg
The hospital was a very complete ptecc of camouflage, it was unfmii^/1
and would not take patients for many months, but a complete staff of
doctors, nurses, orderlies, etc, had been assembled, the finished ward*
were complete with beds, blankets, flowers, and every detail, instrument*
X-ray apparatus, operating tables and so on had been installed m tfi'ir
proper places, the dispensaries had an entire stock of medicines; even th*
offices were full of stationer), ash-trays, etc, as if m use Next day I
suppose it was all moved back to the other hospitals from which it )\^A
been taken I made a short speech and the ceremony did not take Ions
I liked H H , he is shrewd, has quite a sense of humour, and is liberal-
minded — for an Indian Pnnce He means well by his State and subjects
and docs not seem to be very extravagant— except on his wife's jewellery'
But he is energetic only by fits and starts and will not really put hi ml
self out
I quite fell for the Maharani who js attractive and has ohviousl j a good
deal of character Her jewels must be seen to be bebeved, she wore a frcih
set every day we were there
The new Prime Minister, Kak, a Kashmir Pundit with a British wife, i»
clever, plausible, and quite useless in a crisis, I should say He has been the
power behind the throne for some time and is said to have ousted tbe last
two or three P M *s by his intrigues Kashmir is likely to be the seat of
political trouble before long, there are two factions, both Muslim (80%
of the population is Muslim), one of which supports and is supported by
the Congress, the other Muslim League Nehru, Azad and Jinnah have all
visited the State lately and have agitated
I7& THE EDGE Of A VOLCANO
We had four days of official engagements m Rawalpindi, military and
otherwise
I had longish talks with Glancy and Khizar, both \\ ere very anxious
that H.MG should announce a definite policy about Pakistan, t e what
they really meant by permission to secede from the Indian Union which
was promised in the Cnpps offer FKN and Juuiah are firing in strong
accusations, both to the S of S and myself, that Glancy and Khizar are
using officials to support the Unionist party and to influence the elections
October ip
A long day of green boxes, interviews and a Council meeting The
Council meeting was the long-postponed one on Education It was less
difficult than I expected though I don't think it really gets us anywhere
The Indian tendency to think with the heart rather than the head was
evident All the Indian members disregarded Finance Member's warning
that the full scheme was quite impossible to finance, and practically all
insisted that it was the really backward classes that must get the most
attention and money, although it is quite obvious that India's real need at
present is technicians and leaders * and that half-educated sweepers and
bhistis and wild men of the hills can contribute little or nothing to the
removal of India's poverty Sargent was very good, cleat and conciliatory,
and we arrived at some sort of general approval of the report Curiously
enough, lt ^as Ambedkac alone of the Indians who advocated that money
should be spent on leaden, technicians and businessmen rather than on the
most backward
October 2$
Normal day of papers and interview s Depress ing reports continue to
come m fcom Provinces of the intemperate attitude of Congress, their
attempts to intimidate the Services by threats of revenge when they come
into power, and so on, Nehru, in particular, seems quite unable to ie-
s train himself and perhaps imprisonment has quite upset his balance which
was never his strong point. Thome 1 agrees that I should see him and w am
turn about his speeches
Council meeting this morning was a longish one There was an en-
couraging telegram from S of S about Food imports , and apparently on
the strength of tt, Jogi gave his de-control hare a canter round the track
but could find no one to chase it Wc decided to restore the ban on u omen
working underground in mines on February 1946, on the summar),
1 He hid fuccccdcd Stf Frencii Mudic u Home Member
17 OCTOBER-3 NOVEMBER 1945 179
Members of Council voiced their apprehensions on the law and order
situation, and arc obviously getting a httic rattled
October 26
Dr Khan Sahib, Congress Premier ofNWFP. lunched yesterday He
is pleasant but not perhaps a very strong cliaracter Hatchings, who has
lately returned from leave home, said that the atmosphere in the Food
Ministry at home was quite changed and now much more friendly to
India
Ocioher 31
1 had C -m-C and Thome in and told them to be prepared for trouble
and possibly for a fresh struggle with Congress as in August, 1942, in view
of the obvious intention of Congress leaders to stir up a mass struggle
George Cunningham arrived in the evening and I had some talk with
him about the Frontier Province
Next day a conference with the C -m-C % George Cunningham and
Olaf Caroe on the Frontier problem, The C -m-C committee on Frontier
defence had been divided on the issue of disarming the tribes The majority
had held, quite rightly I think, that disarmament could only come by
economic penetration and improved social conditions, obviously a matter
of tune The President, Tuker 1 and the R. A V member recommended a
policy of immediate disarmament as an essential. The C -m-C insisted
on disarmament as the key Cunningham and Caroe supported the
majority opinion. After a good deal of time the C -ln-C promised to
produce a plan for the substitution of Armed police for troops ni Wazin-
stan and the Khyber So the old see-saw of frontier policy goes on, much
as it has gone on for the last roo > ears, without getting any nearer to a
permanent solution
November 2
Wild speeches by Nehru and Patel threatening a mass movement after
the elections unless they get all they want (1 e Quit India), continue, and
Smith, 2 the D I B , was gloomy yesterday
P S V saw Holbum of the Times today and put him into the picture
he had just come hack from Burma and said that serious trouble was
brewing there
1 tt -Gen Sir Francis Tuker G O O-in-C Eastern Command India
* Sir Norman Smith, I P Inspector-General of Police Bombay 1942-4, Director Intel-
ligence Bureau, Go vernment of India 194 5-4
ISO THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
Had a farewell lunch party for Sultan Ahmed today, who has resigned
from Council to take up a job with the Princes
Noi ember 3
I had an hour with Nehru this morning I told him that no Government
could continue to tolerate indefinitely incitement to violence or threats to
its officials and that the future of India must depend oti some compromise
between Hindu and Muslim.
He replied that Congress could make no terms whatever with the
Muslim. League under us present leadership and policy, that it was a
reactionary body with entirely unacceptable ideas with which there could
be no settlement
He practically admitted that he was preaching violence and said that he
did not see how violence could be avoided if legitimate aims could not
be attained otherwise
I left him in no doubt that the Government were bound to take the
necessary measures to prevent violence I don't think it tviII do any good
Though his attitude was quiet and friendly throughout and I cannot help
liking him he seems to me to Have reached the state of mind of a fanatic
and is quite incapable of considering any views that do not coincide with
his own, I think he knows he is heading for trouble but feels he can rouse
the country sufficiently to make it difficult for us to suppress it The
situation gets to look more ugly every day and the tone of the Nationalist
Press more virulent We shall before long be faced with the issue of
another violent suppression of Congress, with weaker and rather de-
moralised forces perhaps if their intimidation of officials and police
continues unchecked and they succeed in dividing the I A over the I N A
trials or of capitulation to them
Ivor Jehu 1 came to dinner and I had an hour with him afterwards He
is alw ays interesting He is very worried over the policy of his paper t the
Times of India 1 c what line to take about the Congress He agrees that
the policy of Congress is now almost openly violence He thinks they will
take office after the elections get nd of the British officials paralyse the
administration and start a mass movement I J has had talks with Valla -
bhai Pat el whom he regards as the strong man of Congress and sajs they
are determined to get tid of British power altogether in a )ear or two
He wanted to know what line Go\cmmcnt proposed to take with Con-
gress He agrees with me that our propaganda and publicity over the
1 ! S Jehu at tha time actirrg-cJjtor of the Ti nti *fltd<i.
2-5 NOVEMBER IQ45 l8l
LN A* was fatally slow and lnefTectn c, and that wc have given Congress
a w capon which they ha\ c been not slow to use, and very unscrupulously
Novemhcr j
A long, rather depressing day Old Mohamcd Usman at his interview
today was really upset at the prospect of the British leaving Indta, the
dear old boy is a real die-hard Imperialist and quite contemptuous of the
ability of his own country men to rule He said wc were losing all our
friends, that no one in India ever worshipped the setting sun, only the
rising one, and that was now Congress He deplored the general tide of
world politics, which perhaps made our attitude inevitable
1 had a long talk in the evening with Alan Brooke (now Alan Alan-
brookc) who arrived this afternoon I showed Alan the note I proposed
to send HMG on the Indian situation, he agreed that I ought to send
a warning but had no idea where the troops would come from if we
wanted them
Tlie note sent to HMG, is given below
We are now faced in India with a situation of great difficulty and
danger, m which I require support and guidance from His Majesty's
Government
2 Since the session of the All India Congress Committee (2ist~23rd
September) the Congress leaders everywhere, hut particularly Valhhhai
Patel in Bombay and Nehru and Pant in the United Provinces, have been
making statements and speeches which can only be intended to provoke
or pave the way for mass disorder They began by taking the credit of the
1942 disturbances, asserting that the British could be turned out of India
within a very short time, denying the possibility of a compromise with
the Muslim League, glorifying the I N A „ and threatening the officials
who took part in the suppression of the 1942 disturbances with trial and
punishment as war criminals' From these general attempts to excite
racial and communal hatred t they have now passed to a disclosure of their
programme, which is, briefly, to contest the elections, to serve an ulti-
matum onHMG, and, in default of its acceptance, to organise a mass
movement on the 1942 lines but on a much larger scale
3 The Congress, as a body, would almost certainly deny, m spite of
the speeches ofmembers of the Working Committee, that violence is any
part oftneir orHciaf creed" .But citner tncre is a secret poficy wnicn memoes
use of violence, or the more extreme leaders ate out of control Gandhi's
influence is believed to be an (he side of moderation but he has said and
done practically nothing for weeks, and his friends are believed to be
THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
seriously worried about his health Whether he will attempt later to
control the extremist Congress leaders I do not know f but if, as I suspect,
they axe takmg their line from the rank and file of the party, he may be
unwilling or unable to do so
4 At any rate there is nothing secret about the intentions of Nehru and
Patel, and as they are, after Gandhi, by far the most influential of the
Confess leaders the others are takmg then: line from them In a recent
speech at Bombay, Patel said that 'Congress was not going to sit quiet
after the elections and wait on the convenience and pleasure of the British
Government The Congress would demand an immediate and final
solution If such a solution was not forthcoming sure as day follows
night there would follow another struggle When the time for action
comes and the time for action may come soon, we must be able to act as
one man Nehru said a day earlier that 'revolution is inevitable'
5 In order to make sure that there was no misunderstanding I saw
Nehru on 3rd November, and pointed out to him the danger of the course
he and other leaders were advocating He made it clear that he thought
violence inevitable and shortly after our interview delivered an inflam-
^^tfr ° t C mml W 1 belicve that thc Congress are counting
on the I N A as the spear head of their revolt, they would suborn the
Indian Army if they could, and they hope that their threats will impair the
lo} alcy and efficiency of the Police They have been encouraged by events
in French Indo-China and Indonesia which they are watching carefully,
MeftJe ^ Y PCnd Up ° a Wh3t tIlere 311(3 ^ ST™ and
6 The object of the rising the Congress leaders have in mind would be
the expulsion of the British Whatever the leaders themselves might say
pubhely, there would be organised attacks on the railways and public
buildings, treasuries would be looted and records destroyed lA fact
Congressmen would attempt to paralyse the admmistrauon as they did
m 19+2, they would also attack and possibly murder any officials, British
and Indian, on whom they could lay their hands In a recent speech Nehru
S^t^^^"** ***** 4** United
f™. n. r «* J 7 "J paralyse me administration
-^S^y 1 2 1942 ke " amed and *«««n«I five British officials who
restored order there
. W J ^ M ? < Ae Congress leaders w.11 attempt
for- / t ^ l to JT il elect,ons " e completed unless even*
suA tZ 1 d ° Ubt ' f ^ are ™** "tested in the elecnons as
d«^m£ " lm P°«=>« «o them is the opportunity afforded by the
ttoS^L?*?** * c P"ty and they are alreadj tafan?
full advantage of th,s opportun,ty The tone of the nationalist Press has
$ NOVEMBER 1$4$
perhaps never been worse, and there js no doubt about the growth of
Hindu enthusiasm for the Congress It is probable that there may be
communal disorder on a large scale before the Provincial elections, and it
is possible that in Provinces such as the U P. and Bihar, antt-Govemment
disorders may begin before the Congress leaders intend.
8. I must accordingly, with the utmost gravity, warn HMG to be
prepared for a serious attempt by the Congress, probably next spring, but
quite possibly earlier, to subvert by force the present administration in
India Half measures will be of no use an dealmg- with a movement of this
kind, and the choice will he between capitulating to Congress and accept-
ing their demands — whatever they may be — and using all out resources
to suppress the movement
9 The mam Congress demand would, I suppose, be the grant of
immediate independence to India under a Government selected by the
Congress High Command This has been the aim of Congress pohcy for
years, and it is clear that nothing short of it would satisfy Nehru and Patel
I do not imagine that His Majesty's Government wift wish to yield to
force or threats of force, nor can we lightly divest ourselves of our
obligations to the minorities I assume therefore that there will be no
question of the acceptance of a Congress ultimatum
10 If this assumption is correct, we must be prepared to suppress the
movement, and to suppress it tJm time with great thoroughness I am
aware of the extreme difficulty of this course, it would involve the use of
a considerable force of British troops, probably the declaration of martial
law over parts of the country, the detention of a large number of persons
without trial or trial by special courts, and the suppression for an indefinite
period of the Congress Party All this would he most unsatisfactory, hut
the alternative is to hand India over to a single parry-~adnuttedly the
strongest and best organised m the country, but consisting mainly of caste
Hindus and experienced in nothing but agitation If we handed over
British India, it would be impossible tor us to fulfil our obligations to the
States, the rulers of which have loyally supported us
1 1 We should be justified in moving against the Congress now, on the
information already available The Party is not yet fully re-organised and
its immediate suppression would be relatively easy Moreover, immediate
action would rally those Indians who have hitherto supported us, and
would put heart into the Services The British members of the ICS and
I P sxr shpantfd and discontented, the Indian members of these services
are uneasy about the future and under strong political and social pressure,
while the Indian subordinates on whom the administration so largely
depends are naturally reluctant to make enemies of the future masters of
India
184
THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
12 But I do not recommend immediate action, unless it is forced on us
before the elections by actual disorder To abandon our programme now
would be to invite criticism all over the world* and to stimulate the general
doubt* about our good faith I am afraid thatwe must wait for the present,
and prepare to act quickly as soon as we are compelled to do so The
dangers of inaction arc grave, since the capacity of the administration in
rural districts to stand up to serious disturbances is large!) a matter of
morale, and service morale \% now had m many districts and 1$ being
steadily undermined
13 1 am convinced that His Majesty's Government should at some
very early date make it clear (i) that they are aware of the gravity of the
Indian situation, (n) that they do not intend to permit the use offeree by
an) political party and will suppress disturbances by every means, (111) that
they will support against political attack ofJiciats who have done their
duty, and (iv) that they will provide me with the resources I require to
keep the peace A statement on these lines might bring some of the less
hysterical Congressmen down to earth* and would certainly put heart
into the Services It is in fact essential, in my view and it is just possible
that it might bring Congress to its senses and prevent the violent mo vement
which I apprehend
6-11-1945
No vernier 8
Conned meeting yesterday lasted under half an hour The members
present unanimously approved keeping Ordinance III (Arrest without
trial) ui force till September 1946, instead of withdrawing it next month
as had been proposed, and made some gloomy comments on the lav* and
order situation
S of S cabled that Archie Nye 1 was being offered Madras, if I approved
I agTced
V P Mcnon optimistic as usual said tlut he thought Nehru had
quietened down a bit since his interview with me, 1 can see little sign of
it Azad sent what was, I think, meant to be a conciliatory reply to m>
last letter to him
Not ember 75
Back this evening from U P It was the dullest tour I have done, tinng
depressing and hot
1 U -Gen Sir A rchibaU Nyc,V ict^Oucf ofl m p*ml General Stiff i 04 1 -6 Go vemor of
Midrw 1546-8, H gh 0>mm »ioncf for the U K *n fadj* 1948-52
8-2 1 NOVEMBER I 945 l8$
On return I held a short Council meeting on some matters in connection
with the Assembly* and started on the wear) business of catching up on
the work which always seems to accumulate, however many green boxes
one deals with on tour
Gandhi wrote a male\ olent letter to V S V , admitting that Nehru's
speeches were 'hot 1 but putting forward the curious argument that if the
British really meant to grant freedom to India it did not matter how hot
they were, if the British were not in earnest they ought to be hotter, and
that 'forgive and forget* could not be held to apply to our action in
suppressing the 19+2 rebellion He is a malignant old man.
November 17
Evan Jenkins went off yesterday, 1 1 shall fceJ his Joss greatly He had an
extraordinarily clear and quick brain, and was a sympathetic personality
in spite of his rather detached outlook.
Archie Rowlands discussed his visits to the Provinces and the big
schemes of expenditure they would need to prevent heavy unemployment
He said G D Bula was alarmed at the virulence of Congress speeches
November 21
I returned from a few days in Gwahor which I hoped were going to be
restful but turned out to be exhausting
Tuesday was supposed to be given up to a tiger shoot It didn't turn out
the least as I had expected There was one short beat and no tiger and that
was all the shooting The beat for tiger was about 20 miles away While
we were collecting at the rendezvous two male elephants started a fight
while being loaded up and delated proceedings for nearly an hour, and
the noise probably disturbed the tiger, anyway he was not in the beat
which was down a narrow ravine Then we motored another 20 miles for
lunch after which we motored on another 40 miles to Shirpun to visit
the tombs ofHH's ancestors There was something rather incongruous
about this we were ali in shooting cJotlies, it was quite unexpected and
some of the items were unusual, for example there was outside a fine
marble tomb a small cheap bath-mat with the word welcome*, and a
sentry with fixed bayonet stood and presented arms while we inspected
a shnne to Rama and Hanuman (the monkey god) The tomb of H H *s
father was a fine one with inlaid marble after the fashion of the Taj Mahal,
and silver doors At Jus grandmother s tomb there was a figure of the old
3 He vr&s proceeding oa leave preparatory to taking over as Gcrtrnot of the Punjab
George Abell took, his place
186 THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
lady, which was, H a informed us, treated as living, and washed and fed.
The immense gulf between the Hindu rehgton and mentality and ours,
and the Moslem, is the real core of all our troubles in India, and this visit
in a w ay brought it home to me After it, we motored to a lake and rushed
about in American speed-boats and were then oifered an enormous tea,
A weary drive home of 70 to 80 miles ended a curious day
I like the Maharaja, but he has ne\ er quite grown up A long minority,
with a dommeenng mother, has given him an inferiority complex and
a suspicion of interference or advice But he Has the right ideas, no vices,
and a very attractive Mahararu
Not ember 22
Long Council meeting in the morning 10 3 c-i p m. Food member gave
quite an encouraging report from Bengal but coal had had a bad week
Rowland s plan for decimalisation of coinage went through with
instructions to keep the term W and to avoid cent' The rest of the
morning was taken up by discussion of 5 bills which Amhedkar wishes to
mtroduce 111 next session-a Working Hours in Factories bill, a Minimum
wages bill, a n Amendment to increase the Compensation for injuries,
a bill to compe employers to post up conditions of employment in all
ketones, and a hill for the recognition of Trade Unions Ambedkar had
not quite thought them all out, but on the whole got a good deal of his
programme through, a Bit mangled
I had over an hour with C -in-C on political situation and internal
1 « A mals ' the P ro P° sal the Victory Week
mDelhi should becancdled (C-in-C and I agreed that it should not), and
one or two other matters
Novemher 2j
• about a fortnight
relegram last nighi
5er this morning:
J S ™ T ^ ?' 1 shouM sec and ask for his
visit of tho ' t ^ d make a sta ^ment when the
„ n t IZ l7 J? elegaGOn B ced, re^arTirming their
and making clear their attirude toward* ^KnX '1 *u ^
protect
21-24 NOVEMBER IO45 jfty
discouraged (b) and (c) which I am sure would do no good Later I got
a sensible letter from S of S which he Jiad written after seeing my paper
Of my visitors, Kharegat 1 was as dry as c\ cr, but rather more interesting
than usual, about locusts, afforestation* etc , he knows lus stuff but is a pure
pen-pusher, I am surc t and will never get results Hutchmgs was hopeful
about the food situation after his visit to Bengal but gloomy about the
political outlook, and pointed out that interruption of communications
on anything like the August 1945 scale nught mcati famine
Noi ember 24
\ have gi\ en up hoping for any rebef at w cek-ends I have been struggling
to draft a speech fbr Calcutta, bat have hardly had a clear five minutes
George Abell brought in some papers and expressed his concern about the
I N A trials, then Snvastava asked specially for an interview and came in
with one of his periodical attacks of cold feet, over the I N A trials again
suggesting that I should caff them off He was foffowecf by B N Rau*
about the Madras-Onssa boundary dispute and the work he is doing on
the preparation of a draft treaty between Britain and India Then came
the C -m-C , also about the I N A trials, on which he is putting up
a modified policy, he is now definitely worried about them and the
possible eflcct of them and Indonesia on the loyalty of the Indian Army
He has sent m the appreciation which H M G asked for as the result of
my reports on the political situation — quite a good one but not very
comforting
The trial of IN A officers afforded Congress leaders a splendid opportunity
of arousing papular feeUng against the Government which they 11 ere not slow
to exploit They set up a strong defence committee under Bhulabhai Desat
which included Nehru and the veteran Liberal Leader* Str Tej Bahadur Sapru
Not to be outdone m patriotism the Muslim League also associated itself with
the dejence of the accused
The trial of the first batch of officers, a Hindu , a Mitshm, and a Sikh, who
ticre accused of waging war agatttst the King and of murder or abetment of
murder* opened at the Red Fort, Delhi, tn November It was the signal for
widespread demonstrations which m Calcutta led to serious noting Over thirty
people were killed \ several hundred injured t and a large number of cars and
police vehicles destroyed or damaged
1 Sir Pheroze KJutcgat, ICS, Secretary to the Government of India Department of
Agriculture
* Sit B N Rau, ICS* Puisne Judge of the High Court Calcutta, 1938-4+ on special
duty with the Government of India 1945 Constitutional AcJviser to the Constituent
Assembly of India in 1946 Permanent Representative of India t^ the U N 1949
THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
A very good end illuminating Utter that Sir George Cunningham, Governor
of the NWFJ> t ii rote to Lord Wavcll at this time on the subject ofthelNA
trial is reproduced below
~ r . ^ „ Peshawar, November 27th, 1945
Dear Lord Wavcll,
I am going somewhat outside my proper sphere in writing to Your
Excellency about the I N A trial, but the matter is one on which I have
been trying to gauge opinion of all sorts and I have now come to a
dennite conclusion It is that the C -in~C should at once announce that,
as Indian opinion is opposed to the trial of these persons, he wipes the
whole thing out and takes no further proceedings against anyone No one
can do it but the C -in-C , of his own volition and on his own responsi-
bility Done by anyone else, even by the King, it will not have the same
efiect— particularly on the Army
Some Army Officers of great experience with whom I have discussed
the matter— Dick O Connor was one— have sa,d that leniency at this
stage would have a disastrous effect on the Army I do not believe that
that is true Some Indian officers and soldiers, whose relations or close
ftiends have suffered under the I N A leaders, are no doubt minting for
tneir blood But I am certain that they are comparatively few and that
their resentment at any clemency shown now would not affect Army
discipline as a whole Most Indian soldiers who have said to me 'Hang the
lot nave, m my opinion, said so because they thought it was what I
wanted to hear and this applies to comment by Indians on most occasions
i tic thing is daxly becoming more and morepnrely Indian versus British,
VI 1*1 lll ^ 0 ! cd ***** versus Bntish-cum-welMisposed
Indians I think that every day that passes now brings over more and more
weU^sposed Indians into the ann-British camp and, whatever the ouc-
3 4 T ™ Y ^ "a-Bwah bias will persist in each man's
a^d at o£e ™ Y ^ "* 15 by 3 clea * ^ 1 W sajd '
I dislike saying this intensely It is tantamount to surrendering to threats,
bade* 3^,"^ for * m ° ment worst of the I N A
Satb ^ g I 'hot out of hand Congressmen-Dr Khan
Ranir ^ ^""^^ md t0 me If *2& been shot in
Sl W rc > ^eryone would have been pleased' But that
tedmg has gone and cannot now be revived
^LnS S ffu 10 1 W ln ^ia But I am
> ULU me bcst ™g to do is to cut our losses
Yours sincerely ,
G Cunningham
27-aj NOVEMBER I945 189
Lord IVavcll rephed
The Viceroy's House, New Delhi
November 30th, 1945
My Dear Cunningham^
Man) thanks for your letter No 27 1 of 27th November about the I N A
trials It was good of y on to mite, and I was glad to have y our vjcw It 1$
about as difficult a case as one could want But w c have, after considering
aJI opinions in the last few days, decided on a policy, and a communique
will be issued before you gee this letter No future trials will take place
except where there are allegations of gross brutality against the accused
"We have advisedly said nothing about the present cases, bur it is intended
that these will continue Council considered the policy and approved this
morning We shall no doubt continue to suffer from distorted publicity,
but 1 think in the long run it will be recognized that we have given the
accused a fair trial and that though we have gone to the very limit of
clemency, we have not entirely forgotten the 40,000 out of 6o f ooo of the
Indian Army who were loyal to their allegiance and refused to give way
to pressure and jom the enemy
2 I hope you will not think that I have failed to appreciate the strength
of the arguments y ou put forward I do appreciate it, but I think the policy
on which we have decided is the right one
Yours sincerely,
Wavell
Not ember 25
After lunch the Casey s turned up, and I had a long talk with him about the
Calcutta nots. It was his first experience of civil disorder and he was
obviously surpnsed but not at all shaken He said the police staff-work
was thoroughly bad, a good deal of the firing unnecessary t and most of
the Bengal officials useless The crowd was quite hysterical and he could
get no sense out of any of them* though he went down to them personally
without molestation The tactics o£ attacking transport and putting up
road-blocks proved difficult to deal with Casey wanted the troops to act
as additional police, armed with truncheons, and I pointed out the diffi-
culties and dangers of this Later in the day he had a talk with C -in-C
and with Smith of the D 1 B Latter explained to him Bombay police
methods of dealuig with crowds and nots, and Casey decided at once to
send one of his police officers to Bombay to study them
Casey said he was going to ask for some more of Bengal officers back
from the Centre, I doubt whether we can afford to let them go On rhe
general political situation* 1 showed ham my paper of November 6 to the
l 9° THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
S of S and he said it was a masterly statement He spoke of Burrows,'
whom he had met, said he was a good stout-hearted man, but he thought
&M m un. Ji^tjiui ui jus omciais tor tne
iirst six months
November 2j
A comparatively quiet day, except for the general current of* uneasiness
about the I N A trial* which practically all my visitors express or Wy
I am sure it would be disastrous to stop the present trials as I am being
urged to do, and I am not much in love with the C-in-C 's idea of
putting out a fresh commumque I think the harm is done now and that
wc should stick to our guns
November 28
A frightful day, after a pretty solid 10 hours or so at the desk I had barely
kept abreast of routine « ork and had to leave impomnttlungs mil undone
That .s the worst of this job, one so seldom has time at all to think out the
next move, or even to give one's mind a rest
J£Zf "f Th ? rest of *e was spent with papers,
™ I I fi n t?™ *? ^ Im S aaon -Board I went to bed with
comphshed nothing useful at all &
November 2$
^ JenkWS ^ WtCrVleW ™ A tl« S of S , he had
certainly painted the picture in dark colours
proved ZtTl CkUdC ™ ^ I N A tnals He had
dXd a com^„ P 1 u V**?* ^ °f brutality and had
S anfaX ^ T H f nath " GTOr S e AbeU «™ anyone else liked
muroque council and try to improve the Press Com-
finl andl «„W T C ^ther she had a
daX^S ^ N °' 1 VC med & 8 htfi % ^ b« I'v= only got
^rgeant Major, Gretudi<r
tjovrmot of Bettwl Tft,*c-,
2$ NOVEMBtR-6 DECEMBER I94J tpl
Not ember 30
The Council meeting on IN A trials went quite well, I saw C -m-C
before the meeting and wc got a communique drafted, and Council
accepted the policy and the communique* with little alteration suggested
to latter
Tuq out of the Jirst three IN A officers put on trtal were acquitted of
all charges except that of waging u ar against the Ktng Some months later
Lord Wavell admitted that 'ttti'ds undoubtedly a serious blunder to place on
trtal first men against whom no brutaltty could he proved*
December 4
We got back just before lunch from three days in Bahawalpur Quite a
pleasant trip but rather mobde, we never slept more than one night in the
same place, and one place a train ( and we did a lot of motoring over
not very good roads
The usual job m catching up with papers this afternoon, but no inter-
views Casey rang up about his talks with Gandhi, he is seeing him again
tonight He thinks one of G 's main objects is to try and ascertain how far
Congress will be allowed to go in incitement during the elections without
the arrest of the leaders Casey claims to have private information that
Nehru and Patel are determined on violence in 1945.
December $
1 had an interesting letter from Evan Jenkins on a visit to Chequers, at
which he was attacked by Atdee, Morrison and Jowitt on the inefficiency
of the Indian Government They obviously know httle about India, do
not care very much, but are very worried and have no real idea what
to do
December 6
Dalai lias sent an his resignation, I have been expecting it for some tune
He has httlc stamina, physical and moral, and is not the man to take the
knocks of politics, especially in an unpopular administration Nor J think
has he got on well with his colleagues, in fact he said when I saw him that
only my support had enabled him to get on at all, that the others were
jealous, especially Mudahar, who had wanted the job himself D sug-
gested M should now be gi\ en it D wants to tune his resignation so that
he will not have to face the Assembly at the end of January
DKtS O
192
THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
Decembtr 15
Returned this evening from a tour to Calcutta, Assam and Bihar On
Monday I deh\ ercd my address to the Associated Chambers of Commerce,
which has somehow come to he the Viceroy's annual review of the econo-
mic and political position in India, I don't think it is a good convention
that such an address should be delivered to a commercial and British
audience, and I tlunk I shall try to find some other occasion I am not a
great admirer of the British business man in Calcutta I think the speech
was not a bad one in die prevailing conditions, the Nationalist Press is
rude about it of course but not so rude as might be expected, and secret
information is to the effect that it made some impression
In the course of this speech Lord IVavell appealed for moderation and a
stneere effort to reach agreement 'The British Government and the Brtttsh
people*, he said, 1 honestly and sincerely 11 ish the Indian people to have thetr
political freedom and a Government or Governments, of thetr ottm choice
But it ts not a simple problem > it cannot and ml! not be solved by repeating
a passi 1 order formula "Quit India* u ill not act as the magic* Sesame ' uh ich
opened AhBaba's ca ve It cannot and u til not be solved hyvio lence There
are various parties t who must somehow or other reach a measure of agree-
ment amongst themseh es — Congress, the largest political party in India, the
minorities, of whom the Muslims are the most numerous and most important,
the Rulers of the Indian States and the British Government Tfie objective of
all ts the same— the freedom and welfare of India I do not believe an agreed
solution between the parties ts impossible, Ida not believe ituouldeven be very
d iffia tit given goodwill, commonsense and patience on all sides I do appeal
most solemnly and earnestly at this critical moment of Indian history for good-
lull on the part of all leaders It ts a tune when every man in any position
of responsibility must determine to do all in his pott er to bring about a just and
lasting solution of India's problem without plunging this great land into conflict *
After that I interviewed a deputation of the European Associanon
They voiced their apprehensions of the present political situation, and of
the safety of isolated Europeans especially in Bihar They also deplored
the departure of Casey and change of Governors at this critical moment
I told them that it was quite impossible to put a police guard on every
European s house which they seemed to expert, and that the change of
Governors had to take place some tune and that no one could tell quite
when the ens is would come
They uere followed by Gandhi— with whom r had 40 minutes I de-
plored the recent speeches of Congress leaders and said that the preaching
of violence could only lead to violence especially with the inflammable
15 J>£crMBE* IP3
material in India, of young students and goondhas (the Indian equi-
valent of hooligans), and that fomentation of racial and communal
hatred would not produce the atmosphere tn which a solution could be
produced m next gear's discussions He admitted the violence of Congress
speeches and indicated that he was trying to get the tone lowered I said
that an agreement of some kind between Hindu and Muslim was necessary,
even if it was an agreement to part He said he had always tried for a settle*
ment but was frustrated by the British policy of divide and rule. I said this
was nonsense, we tried our best to bring them together, that the increase
in communal fechng was mainly due to the action of Congress Ministries
in W 7-39 which had made Muslims feel they would not get a square
deal from Congress and had caused the rise of the Muslim League and the
idea of Pakistan He defended the Congress Ministries at some length, and
said all Governors had admitted their fairness I said there was no doubt
about the psychological effect on the Muslims, whatever the facts may
have been, and he admitted this I then said that the British were ac^
customed to abuse and misrepresentation from Indian. Nationalists, but
that there was a limit, and that it seemed hardly wise to antagonise us at
this moment when we were trying our best to bring about a settlement,
and that India after getting her freedom would want Britain's co-operation
in defence and in commercial development 1 added that if any disorder
resulted from the hatred now being stirred up, it would of course be my
duty to suppress it, and I should do so by all means tn my power He
assented to this, and then said that India needed no help from Britain in
trade or defence She would develop her trade in her own way, and her
defence would be the moral force of non-violence, which would eventu*
ally conquer the world and bring about universal peace I said I did not
think cither of us would live to see this desirable issue, and that the
immediate point was to prevent violence in India during the next year or
so We left it at that He was quite friendly though woolly, and seemed
in good health He then went off to see Arthur Smith, 1 who found him
querulous, malicious and quite unimpressive, so he told me at the airfield
next morning He told Arthur that he had no trust at all m the British, that
they always broke their word, that I had broken mine at Simla (he based
this on the grounds that I had said I meant to make the Conference suc-
ceed, if possible, and then had not done so and went back to the Mutiny ,
etc He has not engaged 2nd never htJJ
Casey seemed m quite good heart He told me of his talks wirh Gandhi,
1 Lt -Got Sir Arthur Smith GOC -in-C , Eastern Command, India 194 SH5. Chief of
General Stiff, India, 1946
I94 THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
Nthiu and Pate! He did not think much of Nehru and judged him a \% eak
character He said Patel was a proper 'tough* and the real driving force
behind Congress* aggrcssi\ c policy
I went on to Assam on the nth, to see the northern frontier and the
tnbes there Wc landed at Tezpur about midday and motored to Chard uar
inhere I h\ cd in the Political Officer** bungalow Next morning wc \\ cnt
out to the Barcilh River for a picnic, seeing an elephant camp on the wa)
with several recently captured wild elephants In the afternoon there was
a parade of the Tribesmen of the Balipara Frontier Tract, a picturesque
and rather attractive looking lot who did ceremonial dances and some
national sports, an interesting performance
Next day e flew east over the Himalayan foothills and tribal country ,
and then up the Lohit valley , through some magnificent mountain gorges
over Walong, a frontier post at the N E corner of India on the borders of
China and Tibet
I had a long talk on the N E frontier and the future of the tnbes with
Mills the Governor's adviser for tribal areas, and Godfrey one of the
Frontier Political Officers, both sensible people, who knew and liked the
tribes They wanted a policy for frontier organisation, a road policy, and
information about the possibility of continuing to supply the frond er
potts by m The drop last month was on the whole successful, but I gather
the R A F thought it risky It is difficult to sec any good future for these
simple unsophisncated, probably quite happy, wild men, one cannot stay
the advance of civilization or pretend that tt brings unmixed blessing, and
what will happen when Indians take over is not pleasant to contemplate,
few of them are likely to have our sympathy with wild men and wild life
Mills and Godfrey both thought the policy of advance to the MacMahon
line correct
I went to Bihar on the 14th We flew for an hour and a half to see the
depredations caused by the erratic behaviour of the Kosi nver which
has moved some 30 or 40 miles in the last 15 y ears or so, destroying large
areas of fertile land Then I went and looked at a Medical School and two
hospitals attended a Garden Parry given by the Maharaja of Dharbanga, 1
with whom we were staying, had an hour of interviews, and finished up
with a ten-course dinner at Dharbanga s palace, follow ed by an exhibition
of dancing It was a long day I had caught a cold m Calcutta and it was
now at its worst
This morning I motored 40 or 50 miles (terribly dusty roads) to see
some of the Kosi river floods at close quarters We went out hi a boat to
1 An ejrceedmgly wealthy iaadowncr net a Rulitfg Pnnce.
15-20 DtCBM5£R 1$4$
a flooded village, and got a good impression of the damage done The
\i\hgcts politely assured mc that their troubles would now be over smce
I had come and taken the matter in hand, a very voluble, intelligent and
candid gentleman, who was the local Congress leader, explatncd the
position to mc in an extraordinary mixture of Hindustani and English,
and said that plenty of people had been to look at the floods but no one
had done anything, he hoped I would really get something done
DccemhcT jp
Arrears of work for several days and the house full of visitors
I finished a note on the political situation and a possible way of dealing
with it I also went into the question of getting a survey, by air and on the
ground, of the Kosi nver where it leaves the hills in Nepal, and also a
survey of levels m the flood area I am not quite clear why nothing has
been done before Reports and recommendations have been made but
have been pigeon holed and jgn or ed
Today, quite an impressive parade outside the Red Fort, at which I
presented a number of V C s The Chief Commissioner of Delhi had
begged me not to hold it, as he feared a demonstration in favour of the
1 N A I absolutely refused to pay any regard to his protests There was
a large and orderly crowd a very good parade and no demonstration of
any kind
In the afternoon we had a soldier's party at V H for the men on the
parade, and there were about a thousand
One way and another — parades parties, green boxes, red carpet —
Her Ex and I earned our keep today
December 20
I am feeling definitely overworked I have been at it all day and have not
even kept abreast of the routine stuff, let alone several important things
I have to do — appreciation for Cabinet speech for Engineers at Calcutta,
letter to the Kmg — and private correspondence
Council meeting was fortunately short Both Food and Coal positions
are deteriorating rapidly We decided to adhere for India to the Bretton
Woods agreement which has to be done by 31st December if India is to
obtain the advantages and prestige of original membership This means
breaking our pledge to consult the Assembly first, for which we shall be
heavily criticised, but if we don't do it, they will criticise us for not securing
India a place
196 THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
I gave Council an account of my meeting \\ ith Gandhi, and Md Usman
made characteristic comments
My last interview today was with Dr Khan Sahib, Congress Premier
of the NWFP,whomI like and find sensible though not perhaps a very
good administrator We spoke of economic penetration of the Tribal
area He agrees with me that any pohc) of forcible disarmament of the
Tribes would be folly
December 22
The last two days have been a steady struggle against files, with the files
gaining ground I have been trying to complete two jobs, a political
appreciation for the Cabinet and a speech for the Engineering Institution
which I have to give at Calcutta next week. I am also due to wnte a
periodical letter to the King but have not had time even to begin it And
pn\ ate correspondence continues to accumulate
Lord Wat ell sent the 'political appreciation for the Cabinet* to the Secre-
taiy of State on 27 December along tilth a programme for political action
Appreciation of political situation
I. Our immediate objectives for 1946 are
(a) to secure a reasonably efficient Executive Council with representa-
tives of the principal panics on a proportional basis, which will
carr} on the government of India during the interim period,
(b) to form a Constitution Making Body which will produce a work-
able and acceptable constitution,
(c) to bring about Governments in the Provinces, on a Coalition basis
as far as possible
7 The fJpcf facton we have to take into consideration are the aims and
policies of the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Ruling Princes We
have also responsibilities to the numerous minorities, and a general
responsibility to ensure that India is not thrown into chaos and civil smfe
betore, during or immediately after our hand-over of p
3 The objective of Congress, the principal political party, is un-
doubtedly to seize power for their organization, i e the Caste Hindus,
and to destroy Bnttsh influence m India as soon as possible They will go
to any lengths to achieve this if the) feel strong enough, and will use
violence if necessary
Congress commands the support of practically all Caste Hindus, and of
certain other elements in Indu wluch tend to follow their rismc fortunes
lncy have the support of nearly the whole of the Press, they have the
lower
20-22 DECEMBER IO45
197
best organised — in fact the only well organized — political machine, and
they command almost unlimited financial support Almost all educated
Hindus, and especially the student class, are their enthusiastic followers,
and they can always raise mob passion and mob Support, and do not
hesitate to use the worst and most violent elements *n the population for
their purposes
Indian business magnates, although strongly pro-Congress, are anxious
for a solution without conflict and disorder
Most of the big landowners dislike and fear Congress and would like to
support Government, but few of them can probably now be relied on to
give active aid. They have never organized opposition to Congress with
any success, and are on the whole rather a poor lot
There is generally speaking no organized opposition to Congress
amongst Hindus in British India (except possibly m the Punjab) and
nothing to put in its place if we suppress it Neither the Communist Party
nor M N Roy's Social Democrats have any influence The Scheduled
Castes are divided and many of them support Congress The only real
opposition to Congress comes from the minorities, of which the Muslim
League is of course the principal but represents entirely sectional interests
and not all-India The League, though strongly anti-Congress is not
prcKgovemment or pro-British, and would support us only to the extent
of remaining neutral in a conflict between Government and Congress
Pakistan will remain inflexibly the League policy, so long as Jinnah
controls it, though many ofhis supporters, perhaps the majority of those
who really think, realise the difficulties and disadvantages of Pakistan,
4 At present the Government can probably count on the support of the
Officials, Police and Army, in a conflict with Congress, though there
might be some defections amongst the junior official:! and perhaps junior
pohce officers It would certainly not be wise to try the Indian Army too
highly in the suppression of their own people As time goes on, the loyalty
of Indian officials, the Indian Army and the police might become prob-
lematical A large number of British officials will probably take the first
opportunity to retire
5 The attitude of the Princes is on the whole that they would like to be
nd of the British if it were not for their fear of Congress They would
certainly for the most part, support us m a show-dawn with Congress
The Pnnces are not organized and do not normally show a common
front The Chamber of Pnnces is by no means representative
6 The general conclusions I make on this part of the appreciation are
(a) That Congress commands the support of practically the whole of
articulate Hindu opinion, and could Undoubtedly bring about a
very serious revolt against British rule,
ipS THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
(b) That we could still probably suppress such a revolt, after 3 consider-
able amount of bloodshed,
(c) That if we do have to suppress Congress we have nothing to put in
its place, and should be driven to an almost entirely official rule, for
which the necessary numbers of efficient officials do not exist
In other words, we shall he placed m a quite untenable position, unless
we find a solution, and we must do so by some means or other Our chief
problem is to find some bridge between Hindu and Muslim
Probable course of events
7 The present Congress policy seems to be to avoid conflict at any rate
until the elections are over, while taking full advantage of the licence they
arc being allowed during the elections, to increase their influence and
prestige, to stir up racial hatred against the British and communal feeling
against the Muslim League, and to complete their organization for a mass
movement, unless their demands are satisfied after the elections They will
go as far as they feel they safely can without provoking a premature (rro*u
their pomt of view) conflict with Government Meanwhile they will do
their best to weaken Government by intimidating officials and all non-
ofEaal supporters of Government, and by endeavouring to suborn the
Indian Army
8 After the elections, which wiU undoubtedly show overwhelnmig
success for Congress, they will, unless we take the initiative* present their
demands in some form or another, with the threat t>f a mass movement if
not fulfilled These demands may include
(a) Immediate establishment of a Central Executive, on which Con-
gress repfesentanon will be proportionate to their success in the
elections >
(b) Abolition of the Governor-General's power of veto, or a convention
that it wdl not he used,
(c) Formation of a C M B on which Congress representation will he
proportionate to their success m the elections, and a pledge from
HMG that the decisions of this body will be accepted without
further discussion or amendment,
(d) Possibly a refusal to take office or cooperate m any way, unless
Indian troops are withdrawn from Indonesia and/or all I N A men
released,
9 What we have to decide now is
(a) The method by which v^e arc to attempt the formation of a new
Executive Council, by a conference as at Simla, or by direct
ZZ DECEMBER 1945
199
invitation by the Governor-General to certain individuals to assume
office, or by an) other method,
(b) How far wc arc prepared to go to secure Congress cooperation in
a Central Executive, the two crucial issues tvjJJ be
(t) to what extent wc are prepared to ovcr-ndc or b)-pass Jinnah
and the Muslim League,
(11) whether wc will consent to any restriction of the Governor-
Generals po\%er of veto ,
(The above are inter-related to the extent that any weakening of the
Govemor-Generars veto will increase the reluctance of the Muslim
League to cooperate)
(c) Hot\ e arc to form the Conference on the C M B
The ' programme of political action that Lor J Wavell suggested was
designed to forestall Congress demands and enable htm to setze the initiative
He said that he wished to attempt to firm a new Central Executive as early as
possible, 1 e ton ards the end of February, for by then the results of the elections
m the Punjab 11 ould be known and these uvula* show the meastwe of success
that the Muslim League had u on He proposed to avoid a conference on the
lines of the Simla Conference and simply to see the Presidents of the Congress
and the Muslim League and to ask them to let htm have panels of names from
which he uottld choose the Congress and Muslim League members of the
Executive Council He n ould, tf necessary, make it clear to them that if any
party refused to co-operate he u ould go ahead and form an Executne Council
u ithout them
If the Punjab elections went tt ell for the Muslim League, he intended to
assure Jinnah, (a) that the Muslims would have parity with the Hindus other
than Scheduled Castes in the Executive Council, (bj that the Muslim seats
Mould be filled by Muslim Leaguers, (c) that the Muslim League could have
tiLootitof the four hey portfolios, viz War, External Affairs, Home, Finance
He envisaged a Council of fourteen composed as follows Jive Hindus other
than Scheduled Castes, five Muslims, tu 0 Scheduled Castes, one Sikh, one
Indian Christian
As soon as the new Executive Council was formed, he proposed to put before
them suggestions for holding a Preliminary Conference to reach decisions about
setting up a Constitution Mahmg Body He furnished detailed papers drawn
up by V P Menon and Sir B N Rati, regarding the composition of this
Ccttferettcc and its agenda
Lord U avell also sent to the Secretary of State on 27 December an important
Memorandum showing how he proposed to proceed in regard to the Pakistan
issue If at any stage, the Muslims brought about a deadlock by their inflexible
demand for Pakistan, he would tell Jinnah that tf they persisted tn this attitude,
200
THE EDGE OF A VOLCANO
HMG would have to take a decision themselves and then decision would he
based on the pr maple that large non-Muslim populations could not be included
jn Pakistan against their tttll Tins u mild mean that Western Bengal including
Calcutta and at least tu o-ffths of the Pttnjab would have to he excluded from
Pakistan and ftnnah would be left, mhs own words, with only *the husV
Lord Wavell thought that if Jmnah was confronted with this prospect, there
was at least a chance that he would set to work to secttre the best possible terms
for ihe Mnshms within a united India
HMG acknowledged these proposals, but did not comment on them tn
detail, for the decision, taken infamiary, to send to India a Cabinet Mission
caused them to be set aside It will be found, however, that in dealing with
finnah the Cabinet Mission more or less adopted the line that Lord Wai ell
suggested, offering him only a truncated Pakistan as an alternative to some
form of all-India Union, and that Jttinah, faced with ths bleak prospect,
opted, to begin with, for a loose union
December 23
Cleared up arrears and had. one visitor, Pandit Kunzru, an old friend or
enemy— earnest, sincere, austere, rather tiresome sometimes He is going
to Malaya as an unofficial delegation, to enquire into the difficulties of
Indians there under arrest or at liberty He spoke at some length on the
political situation, and stated the problem with admirable lucidity, but
had no solution to offer
December jo (in Calcutta)
I had two long talks with Casey, on the lessons of the Calcutta nots, the
use of troops in civil disturbances, tear gas, Austral lan politics, etc He has
enjoyed his two years in Bengal, but leaves with a liking for the Bengali
but a very poor opinion of him as a politician or citizen
A scnous food cms seems to be developing again as H M G is going
back on all its promises about imports, and the situation in Bombay and
Madras is worsening I thought that Food was going to be one of the few
tlnngs in India I should not have to worry about m the next six months
So ends 1945, a bus) and eventful year for me The important periods
were of course m) visit home in the early pan of the year and long struggle
for penmsston to make an attempt to end the Indian deadlock, and then
my fcnlurc at Simla to do so Then came two rather unexpected develop-
ments, tbc Labour success in the Election and the sudden ending of the
war vmh Japan, both of which had of course considerable effect on my
problems out here
23-30 DECEMBER 1945
201
I am sure that 1 was right to try for a solution, and 1 think it was some-
thing of mi achievement to have got it past Winston's Government I have
wondered many times whether I could have avoided the Simla failure, by
a different handling of Jinnah or by b) -passing him when he was ohstmite.
I doubt it.
The end of the war brought on my difficult penod sooner than 1 had
expected t but a Labour Government has on the whole made things easier,
since rather more attention is paid to India and the outlook is rather more
sympathetic.
And so to 1946, to which I am not very much looking forward I tFunk
we may have passed the first crisis, an immediate outbreak of violence or
such a threat of it as v> ould have necessitated a fresh conflict with Con-
gress But all the difficult and dangerous factors still remain, and I shall
consider myself \ cry fortunate if I am writing with any cause for satis-
faction at the end of I94G.
THE DANGER RECEDES
I am not very much looking forward to 1946, and shall be surpnsed and
\ery pleased if we get through without serious trouble But I believe
everyone wants a solution, and every one really expects RM G to produce
it, and that works down to me, I suppose, and I very much doubt whether
my brain-pow er or personality are equal to it I shall just have to keep on
trying, but I shall, as I say, he very pleased and surpnsed if it comes out
right.
New Year 1946
January 2
1 opened the year > esterday with discussions on two important problems—
with Hutdnngs on Food and the C -in-C on I N A trial sentences
Hatchings was not as perturbed at the food situation as I had expected,
he hoped we should be all right till end of March-with UP the im-
mediate danger— provided ue had some ram shortly in the Punjab and
managed to get nee out of Nepal The shortage was fortunately worst in
our best-administered Provinces— Bombay and Madras
The C -m-C told me of the sentences in the first I N A trials 1 and his
proposals to commute them
Today's Counal meeting went quite smoothly There was an almost
unanimous decision for the Go^ eminent to remain at Delhi for the summer
and not go to Simla
January 5
I had over an hour with Jinnah in the mormng He was rather less difficult
m nunner than at Simla but just as uncompromising m substance
The Parhamcntary Delegation* turned up many hours late, and rather
tired, havuig been delayed four hours at Bahrein by a damaged float On
first impressions qu,tc a pleasant body with little knowledge of India but
anxious to learn **
1^ 2? wtCLT&r 1 "?" for ■* Md ta md
tcnoj of^poTu,?™ ^ J>P»«c Gc™I Auchinl«k «n.,t«d the «n-
p rTOpMX '° mA ° u ' » M-««»y Ddcg, non had bem m ,d e « Mmrnber «
NEW YEAR— 12 JANUARY I946* 20$
Tlte following U$t of Members of the Delegation was inserted in the Journal
Professor R. Richards (Leader of the Delegation), M P. (lab)
Mr. R. Soreitsen, M.P. (Lab)
Mrs. Muriel H. Nichot, M P. (Lab)
Mr. A. G. Bottomky, M.P. (Lab)
Major W&odrow Wyatt, MP. (Lab)
Mr. Godfrey Nicholson, M.P. (Cotis)
Brigadier A R. \V. Low, C.B.E., D.SO t MP. (Com)
Mr Hopkin Morris, M P. (Lib)
The Earl of Munster
Tlie Lord Chorky of Kendal
January 6
A dinner party for the Delegation to meet Executive Council went quite
well, I think. I think the Delegation had had rather a critical reception by
some of the Press at a conference in the evening, and seem to have acquitted
themselves quite w ell.
January 7
I spent an hour and a half m the morning, giving the Delegation a short
talk on how the Government of India functioned and on the economic
problems, and answering their questions* This went quite well
Then Aid Usmsn delivered his usual hoituly on the folly of the British
in leaving India, and Roy the Law Member, who had been away sick for
some months without anyone noticing it very much, told me all about
his illness
In the evening we had a mixed hag party for the Delegation It went
quite ™ ell I talked to the local Muslim League leader; who thought 1 was
one of the Delegation and was rather shocked when I told him I was the
Viceroy, I think the personnel of the Delegation is on the vthole very \\ ell
chosen for goodwill purposes
January 12
Bade this evening from a short tour to Ahmedabad, Bombay and Poona.
Qua re interesting but strenuous Ahmedabad, a big industrial centre, a
great Congtess stronghold and an interesting city from the old and the
modem point of view, had not been visited by a Viceroy for 17 or 1 8
years I saw some of the old buildings in the morning.
20 4 THE DANCER RECEDES
I was garlanded at a Hindu temple near the Bhadra fort, by the Jews of
Ahmedabad, by the calico printers, and by the Dyers This garlanding
habit is much practised in Bombay Presidency, and is tiresome, an
Englishman feels a fool and looks a fool, when a very large garland of wet
fioTA ers is hung round his neck and a large tight bouquet of flowers
pressed into his hand and a platoon of photographers crowd round to
take photographs It is a little difficult to decide at what stage one is en-
titled to remove the garland which is usuall) dripping down one s neck
and soaking one s collar, and hand the bouquet to an ADC I have
decided that as soon as the photographers have recorded the event, the
garlander is quite satisfied and the garlandee can remove the garland
January 16
I had the usual interviews and a Council in the morning which went quite
smoothly
I then had an hour or so, first with Dickie M B and then with him and
C -m-C , chiefly on the danger of trouble m Burma in which Indian
troops might be involved I do not share Dickie's enthusiasm for Aung
San the Burmese leader, first of an army of Burmans for the Japs and
against us, next for us and against the Japs and now of a political party
1 doubt it I should place much trust in the gentleman, but victory seems to
make us acquainted with some strange bedfellows
January 17
Toe first day of the Chamber of Princes, ent.rely formal for the most part,
accept tor certain passages in my opening speech, warning the small
States that they must by amalgamate or otherw.se, form themselves
into unities capable of running a reasonable admimstraaon Bhopal came
to me after the day s Sess 10 n, and said he was m difficulties with the smaller
states, to whom his election as Chancellor was chiefly due, they opposed
any form of amalgamate or reform and Bhopal, .vhile professmg to be
entirely out of sympathy with them said he would have to represent their
wrw He said that some of them were threatening to merge with British
W lf t they , had » "° sc *» impendence »d B suggested that Nehru
SnfTfc ^ ^ ' number ° f '"S^inces, ^eluding
Bhopal himself, have been m touch with Congresfas to the terms they
might expect m a Congress-ruled India) Bhopal s ways are tortuous, he
-L . "*>"«y 01 r «'gnatron, but I imagine that he docs not want to
repeat his mistake of last year
I2-r<? JANUARV 1940*
205
January 1$
Session of Chamber of Princes concluded quietly to day, I trunk the tone
was perhaps more realistic than usual, the Pnnccs have realised that they
must move i\Jth the times
January jp
I saw Vallabhai Patel for the first time this morning Not an attractive
personality and uncompromising but more of a man than most of the
Indian politicians I ha\ c met I began with some talk about Ahmedabad
where he hves, w hich I had lately visited — its buildings, its industries and
history We then had some talk of the scarcity of rain m that part of India
and of the food situation generally We passed on presently to the political
situation, and the need for a settlement between Hindu and Mushm. Patel
at once began with allegations that the British were supporting Mr Jinnah
and the Muslim League, that Jinnah had been allowed to wreck the Simla
Conference, that his manners to Azad had been intolerable and so on He
then went on to make a grievance of the Provincial Legislatures being
dissolved before Congress minntnes could take office* and alleged that
this had been done at the instance of Jinnah I combated this and said that
Congress had had ample time and opportunity to make up then* minds if
they wanted to form Provincial ministries after Simla, and to approach-
Governors, but that they had shown no sign of doing so t m fact I thought
that one prominent Congress leader had sajd that they had no intention of
forming ministries before the elections I told him that at the Governors*
Conference which I had held after Simla, it had been agreed that if any
approach had been made to Governors for the formation of ministries they
would be accepted t it was only after there was no sign of any intention of
the political leaders to come forward that Legislatures were dissolved, as a
matter of administrative convenience in view of the approaching elections
Patel seemed to be determined to make a grievance of this and an instance
of British support of the Muslims, but did not speak with any great bitter-
ness about it
He said that he did not sec how there was ever going to be a settlement
between Hindu and Muslim while the British were in India, and that die
British should clear out and leave Indians to settle matters themselves
I said h^ j-caJJy could not expect us to leave India to chaos and civil war„
and that there must be some sort of settlement I did not introduce the
issue of Pakistan, as the tone of his approach did not seem to favour it,
and merely said that it was my business to see that law and order was
206 THE DANGER RECEDES
maintained until some new form of Government was settled He agreed
with this
He was polite, and certainly quite as friendly as I expected, but obviously
uncompromistn g
January 24
A penod of comparative quiet was succeeded by a real blizzard of work,
a whole number of awkward problems seeming to arise at once
Counal meeting in the evening lasted nearly two hours, of which i\
houn were on food The complete failure of the rams in the South has
created a famine position m parts of Madras, Bombay and Mysore, and
the lack of winter rains in the north has entirely dried up procurement in
Punjab and Sind Also nee is not coming out of Siam quick enough or m
sufficient quantity, how far this is due toHMG insisting on 1,500,000
tons being supplied free as reparations is uncertain, but it will undoubtedly
be the subject of bitter criticism here There will be a debate in the
Assembly next weeL
Meanwhile a telegram came in from HMGto say that they propose
to send a delegation of three Ministers to negotiate a settlement of the
Indian problem, to arrive middle of February I wonder if this is a wise
move, they arc under an illusion if they think a w cck or two of discussion
is going to he sufficient From my own point of view, it relieves mc of
some of the immediate load of responsibility, I suppose, but may increase
it in the end, as I suspect that I may be left with all the loose and awkward
ends to tie up, and perhaps to implement a policy with which I do not
agree it depends a great deal whom they send I am afraid that I would
not wholly trust Cnpps as a negotiator
I also saw Smith, DIB His information is that Congress is m militant
mood and out gunning for the Muslims, confident that they can down
them He thinks they are prepared to take office in the Provinces without
waiting for the Centre,' and will then secure control of Government
sen ants and make action against Congress impossible, b> dismissal or
persenmon of any officials not amenable to their ideas A dangerous
po hey for us, and also I dunk for themselves in the long run
I saw Liaquat Ah Khan in the evening, he u rather an attractive person,
much pleasantcr and easier to talk with than jtnnah. His general theme was
that Hindus and Muslims would ne,er agree and that the British would
imposed a solution we should Imc to stop in Ind.a to enforce it, and he
' Tht* confined by Axad d^g hn mtcmcw W th lord W*vcU on ^J^ry
19-18 JANUARY I946 207
said that in an) event wc should have to stop for many years yet, and that
the Muslims n crc not at all anxious that we should go, India could not
stand alone and would only get some \\ one master
January 25
Another \ ery full da> I saw H) dan and asked him to take over Planning
and Development Department from Dalai as Mudaliar, having been
elected President of an important Committee ofUNO, was not likely
to be available for some months at any rare H) dan was delighted
After )uneh I had ij hours with Azad and Asaf Ah 1 the latter acting as
interpreter I entirely refused to accept their thesis that Congress was
entirely right m all it satd and did I think these Congress leaders live as
little tin gods m their immediate entourage and never hear criticism and
are entirely autocratic, so tliat a little plain speaking does no harm
In the course of this meeting, at which a number of subjects, eg the release
of detenus u ere discussed, Azad informed Lord IVavclt that after the elections
the Congress would form governments iti all Provinces in which they had
a majority and would not expect anew Executive Council at the Centre to be
formed till after tins Lord Wavell told him that he was discussing with HMG
the hest way of forming agoodBxecuUx e Council to carry on the administration
while constittttwti^maktng was in progress Azad suggested that the Premiers
of all the eleven Provinces should be asked to nominate two persons and that out
of this panel of twenty-two the Viceroy should select the Executive Council
In reply to an inquiry whether the Viceroy would have complete freedom of
choice in making hts selection Azad said that tt u outd be a matter J or negotiation
January 26
I hear Congress do not mean to attend the Assembly when I speak on
Monday
I spoke to A J *s soldiers on India a difficult thing to deal with one of
the world s most complicated problems in 40 minutes
January 2$
T3us morning I addressed the Assembly Congress did nor attend and
apparently considered it rather a concession that the President 3 did
Then we had a Council on Food found ourselves at least a million tans
short, dc-aded to send a deputation to London and to Washington if
necessary and to take certain other measures
1 A Congress Muslim from Delhi arid, member of the Congress Working Committee
1 The President ic Speaker who had just been elected was * Q^gressmin
D 169 F
2 °S THE DANCER RfCEDES
Jjtm iry 2$
Sargent spoke ro mc about the Iong-dcla)cd letrer to die Provinces on
Education policy I took this up m March 1944 jiat before I uem home
did not finish discussion in Council, CoK illc v, ould not rouch it w hifc he
was acting for mc, when I came back the Simla conference occupied my
whole attention for a month or so, then I could never get a quorum of
my Council sufficiently large to deal with it till October, we passed the
policy in October, and since then Finance branch has held up issue of the
policy by a dispute on the financial implications Such is the difficulty of
getting anything important settled and issued m this countrv
Fchmary
1
A quiet day I saw an Amcncan correspondent, Jones of the New York
Times and suggested that Americans might show their sympathy for the
bidian war effort and India's aspirations for freedom by allocating more
tood He didn t seem to realise that there had been an Indian war effort
but seemed to think the matter of food shortage was worth a message
WaSjoa* aCCCPtCd t0 1Cad ^ W d< * Utatl0n to 1011(3011 wd
eJ^^J^^^TT f 1 ?™f^ Con & c * pohtiaans seem
r 3S Cn ? e| y »»d by demanding pressure on the Muskm
lJ^T 3 iTu , SmA *° P r0ducc SUI P lui « I *** » busmess-hkc
SfuS^ ^? !ccm5 'obedealmg with the problem as cffiaently
and cheerfully » possible, and a very gloomy one from Glancy. W ho s
obviously a tired and depressed man *
W f * rC i UtneJ ' 1 ^ " ho * *«« before dinner, they
fo W, kIT C ° mpIe J XltI " ^ P^^ties as anyone else No one seems
™dX ^ lmprC5Sed Jmmh ' 01 rather «W * to be impressed
to 1 bM P^^'r » U think that the Paktstan issue has
ConlLs W J ^7 " g °° d T*" ° f ^ " e ^'°°cd W th
SS„U Moms «» Bottomley seem
Lm ^ a n t % M " N,Ch ° L 1 W n0t scen Wyatt yet. I am seeing
mem au again tomorrow evening ' &
sZXf JmZ "J" J W tefe & Ct 0" >t* <°>™ °f wets, but
29 JANUARY-H FEBRUARY 1946 209
February 9
Back this afternoon from short visit to Bangalore to see the drought
affected areas of Madras and Mysore Three strenuous and rather depress-
ing days The drought is quite unprecedented, and the seriousness could
not be known till the end of the ) car as rains even in December would
partially at least have saved the situation
On Thursday 7th I did a tour of the Madras areas We flew to Arkonam
and had a meeting on the airfield there with the Collectors of North
Arcot, Chmgleput, Nellore Chittor, Anantpur f Salem, who told me
their talcs of shortage Then I motored for about two hours round some
of the adjacent affected areas with Dixon, Madras Commissioner of Civil
Supplies, ex-Diwan of Cochm, a good man and the Collector of N
Arcor, Ahmed Ah, who obvious I y knew his District extreme] y well and
was efficient
We then flew ontoTanjore, lunched with the Collector, and had another
Conference with the Collectors of Tnchmopol) , Tanjore, South Arcot
and Ramncd, and the English Diwan of Pudukkottai State and the Rajah
Yesterday, February 8, I flew for an hour over North Mysore, to see the
dryness of the land The tanks on which irrigation depends m this part of
the world seemed even drier than m Madras on the previous day H.H
excused himself from coming on this rour as the air did nor suit him, hut
accompanied me on a 200-mile drive round the same area, almost, which
we began after a quick breakfast with the RAF The drought was even
more evident and more complete than in Madras, and it did not seem that
the administration was as adequate, in one area the inhabitants claimed to
be subsisting on 4. to 5 oz a day, though it was quite obvious from then*
appearance that they had not done so for long
We got back at 4 p m, t and at 5 p m I held a Food conference which
lasted nearly two hours One of the chief matters discussed was an all-
India cut of the grain ration to 12 oz On the whole the Conference went
well
February 11
I had decided after the Bangalore trip to try and enlist the co-operation
of the principal parties m the food problem or at any rate keep them off
agitation about it. So I asked Gandhi and Jinnah to come and see me
Gandhi^professsd to be too unwell to travel so George went offto Nagpur
early this morning to see him at Wardha He heard by telephone that G
seemed to be in a most unaccommodating mood Ho^v ever, George must
have been diplomatic and persuasive, for he came back this evening with
210
THE DANGER RECEDES
quite a satisfactory reply, although G had at first appeared to demand an
immediate change of government at the centre Congress has its knife into
J P Snvastava for some reason George said G *$ secretary, Pyarelal, and
A mm Kaur 1 who was there, were helpful
I had ahout 45 minutes w ith Jinnah in the e\ emng He was quite
reasonable and sensible about the food situation, but then started a violent
attack on the I N A policy, m fact gave me a summary of the speech he
had just delivered m the Assembl) I don't know whether he had any real
hope in his mind that I would stop all the I N A trials in return for his
attitude about food, when I made it quite clear that the two subjects had
nothing to do with each other, he promised to play, though he kept up
his usual dramatic manner and ended with an indictment of Congress
In the afternoon I had a walk round the garden and cup of tea with
Burrows the new Governor of Bengal who had just arrived, an attractive
person, steady, sensible, straight with a slow West Country speech He
will do well, I thirilr .
After Jinnah, I finished the evening with Thome who spoke chiefly of
the immediate request of the Assam Ministry for the release of all political
prisoners This will of course be the first request of all Congress Ministries
—as it was in 1937— and will not be easy to resist
February 12
Benthall talked to mc of the prospects of a railway stnke, hitherto we have
always been able to rely on the Anglo-Indian element, but in view of the
approaching constitutional change they are unlikely to court unpopularity
m India by standing out from the rest I asked B to consider how an
emergency food service could be run if there were a strike He said the
r m °T C jt Assem % had been less hostile than expected over the
I N A debate and Mason* had put the Government case well Tones* also
mentioned the possibility of a general striker-Posts and Telegraphs this
time and said the Assembly Committee on the Bretton Woods agreement
had been quite unable so far to reach any conclusion Spence* discussed
the muauon that would arise when Ordinances became invalid in Sep-
tember and the best way to replace the essential ones by legislanon
time <mc of Gandhi j entounw AW i^JT'T 6 "^" !"*™ uinsiun i:mm r» »
Government of TndiZ g A&f * Indt P cndencc ^ became Health Minister in the
if India.
s beocury Govt of India Legislative Department, iwj 47
11-14 FEBRUARY I946
211
Finally, an hour or so with the C ~jn-C t who had two important
problems a reply to a telegram from the C T G S about the possibility
of sending more British troops to India — there are none available except
by taking them from elsewhere* and the organization of divisions in
India, he wants to pull out the British dement and organize it into purely
British groups I told him I should want time to think o\ er both these
problems Meanwhile news came m of fresh noting in Calcutta on a large
and violent scale, again \\ tth the idea of getting 1 N A men released
apparently
S ofS has told me of the Ministers to come out Cnpps Alexander and
himself I am afraid that Cnpps will be the operative element, and I think
he is sold to the Congress point of view, and I don t think he is quite
straight in his methods I wonder what these three Magi will achieve
I cannot so far get from H*M G any definite pohc)
Febn/ary 13
Dickie Mountbatten was my first visitor He proposed to hand over
Mala) a Singapore and Borneo to civil government on April 1
Then came Brailsford the aged left-wing journalist, a round-faced
benevolent-looking gre} -haired old man who brought in his compara-
tively young wife, dressed m a sort of semi-Tyrol ese costume He had
nothing \ er^ special to say or ask, while her mam contribution was a sug-
gestion that if we built enough small fishing boats we could feed the
people — the miracle of the loaves and fishes came irreverently to my mind,
and \ wondered whether she cast Gandhi or myself for the principal role
Council m the evening was almost entirely on the proposed reduction
in the food ration My colleagues were rather slow and woolly over it
but recognized its inevitability in the end
Rioting in Calcutta continues and seems to be serious
February
I had an hour with Glancy who looked better but is a nred and depressed
man He thinks Muslim League may get 60 out of the 87 Mushm scats,
but will not have a clear majority Congress will have 45 to 50 seats
J&hizzr / who hai .won _nvn 5^ats and is standnyibr a tiur4- Jt jeeras.an xidd
electoral law that allows this) is apparently toying with the idea of a
Unionist- Congress coalition but Glancy thinks it u ould be unwise
1 told him of H-M G *s intention to send out 3 Ministers and of our
212
THE DANGER RECEDES
proposed breakdown plan, 1 which he thought reasonable u one had to
concede Pakistan in any form
I then had a long talk with W) lie 2 on much the same lines as with
Glancy One of his chief troubles will he a demand from a Congress
Ministry for an enquiry onto the suppression of the disturbances and
punishment of the officials they have already named Wylie says the
suppression really was drastic and that some indefensible tilings were
done, but wc must protect our officials He does not think any sort of
Pakistan should be conceded, that there must be some sort of Federation
Calcutta seems to ha\e quietened down and the Burrows go oft to-
morrow I think they will do it well anyway they go m a calm and
confident spirit and will have a good try
February 16
In the afternoon I had over an hour with Asaf Alt, acting for Azad who
is ill at Calcutta I spoke to him about the food situation and asked for
cOr-a^emiQtL of the Congress nart^ He, made, a tentative s,ott o€s.uggestion
for a change in my Executive Council as a necessity, but I think without
any real hope He then went off into a long diatribe about the way the
food situation had been mismanaged m the but 7 or 8 years* how many
thousands of acres had been allowed to he waste, which Congress would
certainly have brought under cultivation etc etc He then criticised the
publicity which had been given to the scarcity and pointed out how
publicity created panic and led to stocks, going underground and such
platitudes I interrupted him on this and told him he was wasting time,
did he really think Government could succeed in concealing the fact that
the monsoon had failed, or that gram-dealers and other interested persons
did not know the exact state of affairs, and reminded htm that his own
party had criticised Government m the food debate fcf not disclosing the
full facts earlier I showed him the text of the broadcast on Food I was to
make that evening vihich dealt with most of the points he was raising, and
asked him if he had any suggestions He merely asked that I should alter
one or two words I had said that any attempt to make party capital out of
the food situation would be Toll) and wickedness*, and he asked me to cut
out the 'wickedness' Asaf was quite friendly, but is a poor sort of creature,
without much ability or character but a very exaggerated idea of his own
talents How ever, I think Congress are bound to play* after GandVs lead,
though it will not stop them taking party advantage if they sec a chance
• U a veil is here referring to his plan for dealing with a deadlt>ck over the Pakistan issue
expired on f p 199-200 j At thw time Go vcroof of. the United Provinces
14-lS FEBRUARY I946 21}
By the way, I referred at the end to a speech of Nehru, which implied an
attempt to suborn the Army, and said diat there could be no greater folty
than to introduce politics into the Army on the eve of a settlement
Rather to my surprise he agreed at once
I broadcast m the evening not very effective]) I am a&jfd I Jack the
fire or conviction for public speaking
(The one light touch in the election campaign so far has been a petition
fiom the Santals in Bihar, of which the Governor has sent me a copy
They objected to the date fixed 'Surely Y E is aware* they said in effect
'that about this date is the great tribal holiday and that we are all drunk
for a week and unable to attend to any business *)
The Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and to the Provincial
Assemblies had to be spread cut over the colducather of 1943-6 In the Central
Assembly the Muslim League won all the Muslim seats and the Congress
most of the other seats In the Provincial elections the Congress won the
great majority of the non-Muslim seats and the League a majority of the
Muslim seats except m the N WJ* P
February }8
I wrote a private letter to the S of S to warn him that I did not propose
to be treated as a lay figure in the forthcoming negotiations
Personal and Confidential The Viceroy's House
New Delhi
17th February 1946
My dear P e thick-Lawrence,
I feel that I should let you know that I am hecommg a httle concerned
as to what is m the minds of H M 's Ministers on the method of conducting
the forthcoming negotiations While it is claimed and announced that the
Viceroy will be an equal party in the discussions, I have been given no
information whatever, since I sent home proposals early m January, 1 of
how the mind of the Cabinet is working, and the latest telegrams about
accommodation seem to give the impression that the Ministers wish to
conduct the negotiations at some distance from the Viceroy's House, in
order to ensure informal contacts* What does this realiy mean is the
Mission expecting people to come to them hke Nicodemus* 1 1 can assure
yon that wherever they are, everyone who comes to see them will he
noted by the Press and parties If the idea is to give the impression that
the negotiations are not being influenced by the Viceroy or his advisers,
why announce that he ts one of the negotiators 7
We can probably find a suitable house or houses outside the Viceregal
x These were the proposals dispatched from Delhi on 27 December see pp 1 96-200
214 THE DANGER RECEDES
Estate, but it will be some distance av* a) (one of the Princes' Houses might
be most suitable), one or two miles, so that if the intention really is to
negonate in close consultation Tvith the Viceroy , it ^ ill obviously be most
inconvenient, especially in hot weather
I may be quite unjustified in my suspicions that there is an intention,
not on y our part I am sure, to treat the Viceroy as a lay figure, and to keep
him more or less outside the discussions, as was done at the time of the
Cnpps offer If so, I should like to know
Incidentally , I may say that knowledge of the Mission has been fairly
general knowledge, to the Press at least and other well-informed people
in Delhi, by advices from London, for some time past, though I am not
allowed to inform my Go\ ernocs till tomorrow
I have thought it right to let y on know this privately If it is the wish of
HMG that I should be responsible for implementing m India any settle-
ment to be negotiated, I must really and genuinely be consulted
Yours sincerely,
Wavell
2 1st February 1946
My dear Wavell,
I am in receipt of your confidential letter of 17th ins t, and hasten to
send )oua personal reply
I am indeed sorry that my delay in giving you any detail with regard to
our projected personal plans and to our own discussions here on tacnes of
negotiation should have led you to think that we have any intention of
acting separately from y ourself
I can assure you that that is not the ease It is the firm intention of my
colleagues and myself that the negotiations shall be undertaken by y on and
ourselves acting together as a team. But it has been felt that that should
not preclude some personal contacts which will be more easily made
outside Viceregal Lodge, perhaps at private dinner parties
As to our tactical approach to the actual problem we are devoting the
coming week-end at Chequers to a full discussion of the fundamental
issues involved and I hope to be able very shortly afterwards to give you
a full account of our reactions to them and to your own plan
My difficulty has been that until we have had a proper time to deliberate
away from the incessant interruption of other business it has not been
possible for me to get any coordination of views which it would be profit-
able to communicate to y on or even to danf\ my own mind
I hope this cxplananon and reassurance will allay the suspicions t\ hich
I can quite appreciate y ou may not unreasonably ha\e entertained but
nhich are in fact quite without foundahon
Sincerely yours,
P ctmck-Lawr ence
18-21 FEBRUARY 1946
215
February 19
A da^ of alarms but not excursions f saw Porter r all for capitulation to
the I N A t Bewoor 2 about a postal strike > Carr 3 the A O C -in-C, about
R I A F mutiny t Griffin* and Conran-Smith 5 about a railway strike, and
finally the C -m-C , most gloomy of all, about the R*l N mutiny at
Bombay and the I NT A trials, though he talked about sticking to our
principles he was really hoping hard that I would give a lead to recom-
mend toHMG surrender to public opinion and total abandonment of
I N A trials I refused to play and said we should stick it out What
a cheerful day — prospect or reality of three mutinies and two strikes '
Ho\\e\er I got in 18 holes of golf with Pompey Howard in between and
played well
February 20
I had an hour with Rutherford who was fairly re-assunng about the law
and order position in Bihar* though he said everyone expected a serious
outbreak sooner or later
Council went quietl) The C -in-C gave an account of the mutiny of
the RIN at Bombay and Council was clear that it should be dealt with
firmly and the ringleaders severely punished
February zt
The Aga Khan came and talked of the necessity for Pakistan and the
impossibility of Hindus and Muslims agreeing he sajd Jimiah was willing
to concede Amritsar, Ambala etc, in the N W , and the Hindu districts of
Bengal and Assam but not Calcutta
Smith DIB had no special intelligence everyone seemed to agree that
an explosion might come at an) moment but no one could see immediate
signs
Then C m-C came in just before lunch with serious news of the R I N
mutinies at Bombay and Karachi Fire seems to have been opened on the
troops who were confining the mutineers to barracks According to
C in-C there was some suggestion of parley hut he and I entirely agreed
that there could be no question of parley and that nothing else than un-
conditional surrender would be accepted
1 A £ Porter ICS Secretary, Govt of India Home Department 1945-7
a Sir Gurunath Bewoor LC &. Secretary Govt of Indn Posts and Air Department
1942-6 a Air Marshal Sir Roderick Carr A O C m-C India 1946
* S r Arthur Griffin, Chief Commissioner of Railways India >pj4-6
s Sir Eric Cortran-SmitK ICS Secretary Govt of India Wj r Transport Department
216 THE DANCER RECEDES
Later R I N mutiny at Bombay is apparently in hand no news from
Karachi
A hunger strike by some ratings of the Signal School tn Bombay on grounds
oj t?iade<ptate pay and racial discrimination touched off a mutiny by ether
ratings who took possession of their ships and threatened to open fire on the
military guards Ratings at Karachi followed their example Sympathetic
strikes and demonstrations u ere organized tn the city of Bombay and serious
disturbances ensued tn u Inch about 200 people were killed The mutiny had
been jomented by political abators, hut the Congress leaders had not en-
couraged it and u ere alarmed by the disorders Vallabhbhai Patel personally
intervened to induce the ratings to surrender
There was also unrest at this time tn the R IJl F and m some of the
technical units of the Indian Army
Ftbntary 23
Came back tlus evening from Patiala, to which I had gone yesterda).
meaning to return on Monday But events in Bombay and Karachi and
the obvious flap' ,n Whitehall determined me to get back to Delhi, as
had fctffcd * e two principal functions at Patiala
I opened a Soldiers Club, attended an Agncultural and Industrial Show,
ot the usual type, and presented a colour to the Traming Battalion-^ very
good ceremonial parade, including the unusual feature of a State elephant
banging on the Granth Sahib (Sikh bible), to which HH and I presented
flowers, which ^ ere after* aids hung on the colours
1 like HH of Patiala, I dunk he ts really keen on making a good show of
his State, and that ,« mterests are hi, principal concern m life at present
February 2$
I had a long talk with Thome m the morning He « anxious to see all the
*» TO r> PPed ' ^ * iaUtS thc ifficu]t y of *»g « He complams
S^EiES" Ad not keep Homc Department in
^SSShif," w WKh w - d Asaf AL ™ ey were
to tfttf the Cmw „ W U „ ,„ t0 '
A™Uh,i7"?K', Pr " pntS p f "<•'»•<>" governments m thc Proves
t^Tio tt tt 3 "' by " " k »« "fJ"'""!' » perm,, thc
Zl-2*f FEBRUARY Ipjftf
217
February 26
The Raja of Khalhkote, 1 whom I nominated to the Assembly to his great
delight, came to sec me I spoke somewhat strongly to him about his
proposed absence during part of thcB udget debate, to perform the *thread
ceremony* for his son, he said the ceremony was most important the date
auspicious, and the guests mvitcd, and assured me that he would only be
away during the debate, he would be back in time to vote T
Next came the Editor of the Amiita Bazar Patnka whose paper is about
the most ^ indent and poisonous of all the Indian papers m English with
any circulation He is the new President of the Editors Association He
was quite pleasant to talk with He began by asking my assistance to
secure more newsprint and some additional machinery for his paper So
that you may have greater scope to abuse my Government and the
British, I suppose,* I enquired This aspect did not seem to have occurred
to him I then took him to task for the unbndled intemperance of the
Press in the last six months, which had naturally resulted in out-breaks
such as at Bombay, and w arned him strongly of the harm being done to
India's future He merely said *we felt so frustrated after the Simla
Conference ' He then asked for guidance on die food question
February 2j
A comparatively quiet day hut somehow rather a depressing one It
becomes increasingly obvious that the students and mobs are out of hand
and that the so-called political 'leaders', who are really only polmcal
agitators, cannot control the passions they have aroused by six months
unbndled incitement during the election period They have often con-
demned 'police rule*, but it ts at any rate better than student rule or mob
rule as they are beginning to find out
Council agreed this evening to the establishment of an Advisory Food
Committee
Our chief item was the measures proposed by P & T Department to
stop a threatened strike Nobody liked them much, though everyone
recognised that the P & T people had some grievances but the Department
put up a good case and they were passed in the end with a warning that
they would probably lead to pressure from the Railways for similar
concessions Ambedkar whose sudden rather unaccountable reactions
sometimes take himself by surprise just as much as his colleagues held an
unexpected one-man indignation meeting over the proposals proclaiming
1 A nch landowner from Onssa not a Ruling Prince sec p 41
2lS
THE DANCER RECEDES
with, vehemence that the Labour Department had never been consulted
As the proposal before Council had apparently been drawn up by the
Labour Commissioner and backed by the Labour Member himself, it was
a little difficult to accept his contention that he had not been consulted,
nor could I understand his explanation of the apparent mconsistenc)
I have given up expecting logic from Ambedkar, when something
touches off his touchiness His W wolf mentality is engendered by
much brooding on the wrongs of the Depressed Classes, I imagine In his
way he is quite a fine character
A long telegram came from S of S about then* plans for conducting the
negotiations, it seems really to amount to having no plans but hoping to
collect some out here by a long series of talks
March 1
I toolc over Colonelcy of The Black Watch today
Another very busy day with never a moment's pause to allow of any
constructtve thinking, private business or recreation
In the evening I presided at a meeting of the Coordination Committee
of Council which Benthall had asked for urgently to consider Council s
decision on the threatened P & T strike in relation to the railways Hie
Committee upheld Council's decision and decided that the threat of a
railway strike must be dealt with as a separate issue
Af arc h 4
I spent all Sundav morning answering S of S telegrams about the
delegation s plans and directive I suggested that they must have some
more define ,dcas about Pakistan their objective and their time-table
Aan they appeared to have or had disclosed to me I pointed out that
^™ T* I n0t ? nly Ind,a but * c Empire, since it
might lead to a confha with Muslims, that they had not mentioned m
heir telegrams a Consntution Making Body, but had talked of W
segment so that I was left in doubt whether a C M B still Wed part
than prolonged discussions followed by a recets to Simla to
fork derwT i ° r M « **T «™ to some
fauly definite conclus.om and do not wish to disclose them to mc
Gruesome bos* fir agreement beUi ecu Congress aJthcMushm Lea/te that
27 FEBRUARY— 7 MARCH IO4G 2Ip
t( otttti male this pissibh Btyond tins it is doubtful u hethcr at this stage they
had any very dtfimte ideas U avctl u as no doubt, somen hat put out by the
fact that JIM G hail put aside, almost 11 ithotit comment all the plans that he
had sent than on 27 December
One of my visitors was Dc\ adas Gandhi who was out\\ ardly all s\\ ect
reasonableness he nude a rather vague suggestion of International
arbitration if Hindu and Muslim failed to aqree and said u would give us
*moral support I pointed out that wc should still be left with the job of
enforcing a decision with which perhaps we did not agree and that we
were getting rather tired of holding international babies
I asked w hether he would like Russia taking a hand m deciding the fate
of Tndia as she would certainly want to do if an International body was
formed He professed great anxiet) not to break the British connection
and to remain tn the Empire
March 5
Comparatively quiet da) Porter of the Home Department was rather
depressing It is quite true that the situation must be depressing as seen
from the angle of the average District officer and wc are of course
running big risks But I do not believe that further concession to agitation
by dropping all the I N A trials as Porter advocates is the right answer
March $
Liaquat All Khan who was due to see me on the Food Advisory Council
was too busy with politics at Lahore lam afraid that the Punjab like Smd
will have an uneasy and mutable Ministry
Council in the evening went quite smoothly We usually have long and
difficult Councils when the Assembly is sitting and all members are
present but Mudahar is away and Rowlands Jogendra Singh and
Snvastava are sick, so wc are fewer than normal Council decided practi-
cally unanimously to give notice to South Africa of the termination of
the Trade agreement in retaliation for their Bill against the acquisition of
land by Indians I have managed to keep this m abeyance for about tvt o
years but with the war over it is essential to make this concession to
Indian feelings It is not likely to do any good at all to India or to Indians
m South Africa but it has become a matter of national prestige to the
Indians
March 7
There was a Co-ordination Committee of Council on control of capital
220 THE DANGER RECEDES
issues, on which I understand little, but I suppose it helps to get decisions
if I preside
In the afternoon was the Victory Parade, a really magnificent show by
a t, cry fine lot of men and well organized. The only failure was the fl>-
past by the R A F which was \er> poor It was a bit wearing for me, as
I had to stand at attention for li hours and at the salute nearly all the time
It is a measure of the unutterable folly of the politicians that they
decided to boycott the parade of the men who have saved India and have
given her greater prestige abroad than ever before, and to mate their
follow ers to demonstrate against it The result was that the mobs cot out
1 I lAlki m-hJ L. .. _. iT. ■ I ■ -V -r 1 1 mm * .*
* — ■ >- ui^u<uii» xl win recoil on cne neaui
ot the polrtical leaders some day that they have chosen to exalt and glorify
we few thoiisandi of traitors of the INA who were mostly the cowards
Aem t0 ne8leCt ^ ma S nificeilt mcn who realJ y fou g ht for
In the evening there was an indifferent firework display
March 8
Interview all day and finally Liaquat Alx Khan came to see me He readily
agreed on behalf of the League to the proposed Food Advisory Counal,
and then spoke for some time of the disappointment of the League at not
being asked to form a Ministry in the Punjab and of the partiality of the
Governor I merely said I was sure that the Governor had done his best
m a difficult position I then spoke to hm very straight about the previous
day s events in Delh, I said I had seen the most magnificent parade and
the finest lot of men m my « years service as a soldier, and had come
away teehng very proud of my connection with the Indian Army— to
, ™ v ^ teen hooted and dended by their compatnots,
and that a mob mated to demonstrate against the parade by the political
u "?? W . md bumt and Iooted "» Delhi, ,t made me
l<X mi of Inia's future that her
™ / T" s r h l mCredlWe fo!1 >. ^hich could only injure her
2„V f wth Nations, to whom she was at the
i P ptaLns /° r 1 d " 1 *» ««« my words Liaquat took ,t
well and attempted no defence He is a gentleman and likeable
JSnt! TL ~A A r n Tr ,tS ' " h ° MpKnmd, been m *je*
lk f Uape tte u J9 seats (he n largest J g U party, H
7-10 MARCH
221
did not command an absolute majority and was unable to arrange an alliance
with any of the other parties Khzar was, therefore, allowed to take office as
the leader of a Umomst-Congress-ALalt Stkh coalition and Muslims found
themselves under what was virtually a non-Muslim Government in a Muslim-
majority Province. This caused mtettse resentment
Mushm League tmmstertes could he formed only tn Bengal and Stnd
Elsewhere, apart from the Punjab, Congress ministries were tnstalUd.
March to
I had an hour with Azad and Asaf Ah this morning I began by speaking
about the proposed Food Committee, telling the Maulana the proposed
composition and asking whether he had any suggestions, and saying that
I should be very glad to receive nominations from the Congress Party He
said he agreed generally with the idea of the Food Committee and the
numbers, there would be a meeting of the Congress Working Committee
at Bombay on March the rzth, and he would put the proposals before
them and let mc have suggestions and nominations He said that his idea
was that the Committee would he a committee of people who had the
ability to advise the Government on food matters, and that it should not
be a question of parry representation hut of individual qualifications
I said that the reason why I had suggested a certain number of nominations
for the Congress party and the Muslim League was that tt was important
to secure the general support of the main political parties for such steps as
it would be necessary for the Government to take He said he would let
me have the views of the Working Committee by the 14th
T then went on to say that since he was meeting the Working Com-
mittee, I hoped that he would represent to them the necessity for the
greatest possible moderation during the present penod I said that I was
still very disturbed at the tone of some of the political speeches, and
instanced particularly those of Smha 1 and Nehru Recent events have
shown the folly of inciting people to violence, and 1 hoped that he would
impress on the Working Committee m the strongest possible way the
necessity for moderation m tone He professed to agree entirely with what
I sajd and asked whether I had noticed the moderation of tone since the
meeting of the Working Committee at Calcutta I said that while the
tone of the speeches made showed a shght moderation affer the Calcutta
meeting, there were still a number of very violent things being said by
a great many people, and that it was only in the last week or two that the
political leaders had shown any real sign of responsibility and desire to
refrain from any incitement, and some of them had snll not lowered their
* Sn Krishna Smha, Congress Ptcnuer of Bihar
222
THE DANGER RECEDES
tone I instanced particularly Sinha s recent speeches in Bihar Azad said
that it was his desire to maintain a calm atmosphere and that he hoped
things would be kept quiet
I spoke to them very straight about the anti-Victory demonstrations on
Thursday and they listened in silence Azad said that while Congress had
been unable to approve of the Victory celebrations, they had issued
instructions that people should not stage demonstrations against them
and it had been other elements which had caused the trouble He fully
realised the danger of undermining the morale of the armed forces I said
that I was glad to hear it, but that the whole tone of the press which sup-
ported Congress had been to belittle the achievements of the Indian Army
and the part they had played in saving India from invasion, and that
there had been no sign at all that the political parties took the least pnde in
the exploits of their magnificent soldiers Azad said there was no offiaal
Congress Press and that he was not responsible for what the papers said
I replied that if the pohtical leaden had taken the hne of giving the armed
forces credit for what they had done, the press would certainly have
followed them.
I went on to point out the harm that had ahead) been done to the
morale and discipline of the army by the Congress attitude in the I N A
trials, m which I said they made heroes of people who, for the majority,
formed the worst and not the best elements in the Indian Army I hoped
that they would not continue to condone or praise indiscipline m the
armed forces, they would certainly regret it subsequently if the) did
Azad then spoke of the situation m the Punjab, which he admitted was
most difficult, he said that he had been quite prepared to form a coalition
Government with the Muslim League, but that the Muslim League would
not agree He did not strike me as being very confident of the stability of
the Present Government, but said that there was no better alternative
I finished by referring to Nehru s visit to Malaya and said that there had
been considerable opposition to the visit, but that I had told the Supreme
Allied Commander that I was sure Nehru would honourably observe the
understanding on which he was allowed to go to Malaya ic that he
would not indulge in political agitanon or speeches against the existing
administration I was not likely to be able to see Nehru before he went, so
I hoped that Azad would impress this on Nehru. He said that he would
do so
The general tone of the interview was friendly, and I think the) arc
really an xious to preserve the peace, and realise that it is essential to
moderate tbe tone But I doubt they are really able to do it
10-12 MARCH 1946 223
In the afternoon \vc had a party for the soldiers who had come to Delhi
for Victory Week, it w cnt quite well
March 12
I /tad a visit to the Ddhi Waterworks arranged tor 7 15 a m 6ut before
going there I visited the Town Hall which was burnt out in last Thursday's
riots, all the municipal tax records being destroyed amongst other things ,
presumably a Commwust attempt to make Government impossible
The Nawab of Bhopal was my first visitor of the morning I told him
about the food situation and the proposed Committee and H H promised
full support to any measures taken by the Government and outlined what
was already being done in the States He said he would discuss the question
of nominations to the Food Advisory Committee with Political Adviser
The interview took a rather w ider scope than I had expected when H H
asked about arrangements for the Cabinet Muusters to see representatives
of the States and for my advice on what the Princes should do in the forth-
coming negotiations I said that if he really wanted considered advice I
should want time to think it over but that the aim of His Majesty's
Government was a uni ted and self-goi OTing India, with a constitution
arrived at by Indians remaining within the British Commonwealth as
a willing partner In such an arrangement the Princes would obviously
have a place but some re-grouping, such as small States joining a larger
one, or of other States into Unions, would have to be considered It was
His Majesty's Government's desire that the Princes should find their
rightful place within an Indian Union and they would give them every
assistance to do so They had announced that they would not transfer
Paramountry to an Indian Government wathout the consent of the Ruler
H H asked that nothing should be done or said by His Majesty's Govern-
ment which would weaken the power of the Princes to negotiate with
a new Indian government I said that we had impressed this on His Majesty's
Government
In the afternoon a rather surprising interview xnthjinnah I have never
known him in such a reasonable mood, he seemed an entirely different
man to his normal rather aggressive self He was very courteous, listened
to argument and seemed much more human and likeable than in any
previous contacts with him
Tltey discussed the Advisory Food Committee Jumah sat d that it would not
help and suggested that Gandhi should he asked to come to Delhi and *stt m
close conference with him, for as long as was necessary , fa advise the Govern-'
meut on the matter of food He said that he thought that this was the only
d im q
2^4 THE DANGER RECEDES
effective way of dealing it ith the threatened calamity, both Congress and
League organizations would be available all over the country to help the
implementation of Goi emment's measures, and the country would feel that the
problem really was being tackled and that the leaders were behind it He said,
'The responsibility it til of course remain yours and the Government's, hit the
moral responsibility mil be ours * He agreed that the Nawab of Bhopal should
sit with them to represent the States Lord IVatell said that he would put the
proposition to Gandhi
They also discussed the IN A Jmnah listened attentively to what Lord
IVavellhad to say and at the end said that he filly appreciated his point of view,
but that the INJL business u as poisoning relations to such an extent that they
must try to find a u ay out Lord Wavell suggested that he should have a talk
about it u ith Str Arthur Smith, Chief of the General Staff
March iS
Back this morning after a tour to Jaipur and Alwar
Before I left Delhi on the I2tli I had commissioned P S V to go to
Bombay and put Jinnah's proposition to Gandhi The Working Com-
mittee had already turned down the proposal, made by Azad to me, that
Congress should participate in a Food Advisory Committee Gandhi
turned down Jinnah's proposal, on his usual convenient plea that he is not
a member of Congress and cannot represent it George flew to Jaipur on
the evening of the 14th to tell me of the result So the political leaders will
not forego any item of party advantage even in face of famine I don t
think I could have done more to persuade them*
On the morning of the 17th, [at Alwar] just as I was about to get up and
go riding, came the news of my son-in-law Simons death in an accident
at Quetta We motored to Palam [Delhi airport] 100 miles, as soon as v* e
could get ready and flew to Quctta, for the funeral We stopped a night in
the Residency and flew hack this morning
I spent all the rest of the day getting square with arrears of work, and
in the _ evening had another interview with JinnaH on the food situation
He asked me why I could not carry on without Congress cooperation
I said that I was afraid that this might make matters worse, and that I could
do nothing more at present He v>ent on for some time in the strain of his
entire disinterestedness and desire to place the matter of food entirely
abmc ail party or personal consideration I got rather ored of this after
a bit and said I entirety appreciate your attitude Mr Jinnah, may I ask
whether you would be prepared to sit in the Committee if the Congress
were to nominate Azad as their representative?' He then began explaining
that though he had nothing personal against Azad, he was only a mere
I8-2I MARCH 1946
225
puppet of Congress, and so on and so forth » that it was not a fair proposi-
tion to put to him I said that I had merely put it since he had adopted the
attitude that no considerations of any kind would prevent his cooperation
I then asked whether he would be prepared to sit in a Committee with
Patel as the Congress representative , he said that he would agree to this,
but said that Congress would never agree
March igj20
Ivor Jehu, who had come up from Bombay on business for the Times of
India, had seen Jinnah and had found him, as I had, much more reasonable
than before He agreed with my proposition that if we oifercd the leaders
all they asked — Congress, complete independence, Jinnah, some form of
Pakistan — they would be likely to ask us for help from the consequences.
He said that the Congress leaders knew that in view of their age this was
their last chance, if they did not reach a settlement, leadership of a mass
movement would pass into younger, more violent hands He also told me
that they were finding the I N A and their demands for money an in-
tolerable burden
Arthur Smith told me of recent talks he had had with Jinnah J had
covered much the same ground on the I N A trials as he had with me and
had practically the same answers It is always refreshing to talk with
Arthur, he has such a courageous outlook and such a nice sense of humour
March 2t
The DIB's secret and open intelligence pointed to everyone wanting
a settlement except the extremists to control having rather got out of the
hands of the Congress leaders, to their great alarm, to the obvious fact that
we were living on the edge of a volcano but that on the whole morale
seemed steadier than some months ago, and that Congress could raise
much more trouble than the Muslim League if dissatisfied
10
THE CABINET MISSION:
OPENING DISCUSSIONS
The Journal entries fir the next three months are mattily det o ted to the Cabinet
Mtsswn A short summary ofet cuts may assist the reader to fillon the thread
of the bno, complicated negotiations of tt htch the Journal gives Lord Waters
account
Tiie tasi of the Mission tt as to seek agreement it tth Indian traders on the
principles and procedure to be follou ed ttt framing a ncu' constitution fir an
independent India Ituasalsoent isaged that simultaneously, the lleeroy, in
consultation u ith the Mission, u outd open negotiations u tth the tu o principal
political parties, the Congress and the Muslim League, for the firmahen of
a ncu 'Interim* Government tt htch u ould hold office ululc the constitution u as
being framed and u ould include no British member except the Viceroy himself
Since the proclaimed objectn es of Congress and the League u ere did-
'^Tm^f Q F p0S!te * M* sston * of bringing them to an agreement uas
a djfieult mdetd a seemingly impossible one The Congress u anted a united
India, the League it anted India to be divided and the Mushm-majonty
Protmces of the North-East and the North-ll est firmed into a completely
independent and soterctgn State of Pakistan But the Mission btlieted, not
incorrectly as it proi ed, that the League might accept something less than com-
plete independence fir Paltstan, and tt was tn this belief that they tvent to u orl
After tuo ttccis of discussion uhch ted twuhere, the Mission toldjmnah
that ij he insisted on a filly severest Pakistan, it uould hate to be of the
truncated variety, excluding most of Assam and half of Bengal and the Punjab
since tt uould be impossible to include in an independent Muslim State large
areas tn u htch Hmdtts were m a majority A truncated Pakistan did not appeal
tojmnah But the Mission put to htm as an alternate c a proposal for a three-
tiered ccnsUtution- r Provmees Groups or sub-federations of Provinces, and a
Union— under winch the Groups of Provinces that he claimed fir Pakistan
u ould have a large measure of autonomy and u ould he joined u ith the rest of
India m a Union confined to the control of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and
Commimicattom To su cetcu this proposal it n as indicated that m the all-
India Union the Hmdu-majortty and the MusUm-majority Groups of
Provinces might have equal representation and that there mioht be provision
fir a Province to fiat e the right to secede from the Union after a period of years
H ith considerable reluctance Jmnah and the Congress ti ere induced to accept
MARCH 1946
227
thts proposal (often termed by Wax ell the 'breahdon n award') as a possible
basts for negotiation and to agree to send representatives to Simla to dtscttss it
Tlte Mission moi edout of the heat ofDelht to the eooltUmate of SimU at the
begmmtig of May and the second stage of their « ork began
Hie negotiations at Simla soon brole down, and since the parties could not
be brought to an agreement ; the Mission decided to elaborate and perfect its
proposals for a three-tiered constitutional structure t to add thereto proposals for
constttntjcn-mahtig machinery whereby all the details could he worked out, and
to issue the whole as a ktnd of an ard in the hope that both parties would accept
it Tins they did m a Statement published on 16 May {Appendix II) im-
mediately after their return from Simla to Delhi TVjij Statement tvas, on the
nhoJe, tiell reeenej throughout the country, Gandhi himself remarking that
the Mission had produced the best document that was possible tn the circum-
stances But neither the Congress nor the League showed much inclination to
accept rf, and a farther short Statement was issttedon 2$ May (Appertdtx V) t
clarifying certain points in answer to questions that they had raised
Both these Statements made references to the 'Interim* Government that it
u as intended to form Waved had opened negotiations about it with Nehru and
fvttiah tMe sttll tn Simla and continued them on his return to Delhi TJiey
dragged on until the middle of June As with the long-term constitutional
problem* no agreement could be reached between the Congress and the League,
and so tn this matter also IVavell and the Mission at last decided to make their
own proposals and hope that they would be accepted Accordingly tn a State-
ment dated 1$ June [Appendix VI) tt was announced that the Viceroy had
issued invitations to fourteen persons [whose names were given) to serve as
members of the Interim Goi ernment Paragraph S of this Statement seemed to
imply that if either the Congress or the League rejected these proposals, the
Viceroy would go ahead without them This gave rise to a good deal of con-
troversy later
The Muslim League had decided on 6 June to accept the Statement of 1$
May, and it was believed to be fairly certain that they would also in due course
accept the proposals for an Interim Government But the Congress continued to
hesitate and to haggle At last on ifi June tt was reported that their Working
Committee had decided to accept at any rate the proposals for an 'Interim'
Government Hopes rose high, but were dashed by the last-mtnttte intervention
of Gartdht, u ho insisted that a Nationalist (Congress) Mushm must be included
as a member of the Interim Government IVavell and the Mission had avoided
the inclusion of a Nationalist Muslim as they knew Jrom the experience of the
Simla Conference that tt tvottld be dtttte unacceptable to Jmttah They took
a gamble — which very nearly came off— that the Congress would reconcile
themselves to thts
Congress while conveying on 24 June thctr rejection of the proposals for an
Interim Government, intimated at last their acceptance of the Statement of
228 THE CABINET MISSION. OPENING DISCUSSIONS
16 May Something, therefore, seemed to be sah aged from the wreck of the
Missions hopes But the Congress's acceptance was qualified and disingenuous
— worse m Wavtlts opinion than an outright rejection So though the Mission
on their departure for the U.K, on 2g June appeared to have achieved a partial
success, tn actual fact their two months* tt orl u as largely in ruins and Congress
of id the League were uo nearer agreement than at the time of their arrival
Moreover, when they left,Jmnah was tn a very angry mood As soon as he
knew that Congress had rejected the proposals for an Interim Government, he
had got the League to accept them, beheving that tn accordance imth Paragraph
8 of the Statement of t6 June, the Viceroy u ould proceed to form a Government
without the Congress but u tth the League The Viceroy and the Mission,
however, put a different interpretation on Paragraph $, and decided that a
Caretaker Government of officials should he installed pending fresh negotiations
for the formation of a government representative of the political parties that had
accepted the Statement of 16 Mayjtnnah was bitterly disappointed and resentftl
Wavell had told the Secretary of State that he did not intend to be a lay
Jig}tre tn these negotiations, and it will be seen from his Journal that he played
a leading role in them throughout and not merely tn those relating to the Interim
Government, for which he a as primarily responsible He and Crtpps were, tn
Jact, the two chief protagonists on the British side with Pethtck-Lawrenee
generally follou ttig Cnpps's lead and Alexander that of Wavell Ue Journal
reveals that there were at times fairly serious differences of opinion within the
Mission and also brings out rather forcibly the inadequacy of Pethicl^Laurence.
Tlie three members of the Cabinet it ere able to dex*ote all their time and
thought to the negotiations Wax ell had to sustain m addition the whole burden
oj he I iceroy s day-to-day « ork It was an enormous load. Even Cnpps, who
u Hen he lejt Delhi was not on very cordial terms with Wavell and did not
trouble to say goodbye to him, later paid a tribute tn Parliament to 'the amazing
j%Vj gh thrce montks °f Dc}ht hot thts
double burden
Wavell was also constantly thinking ahead Qmte early m the negotiations
he pointed out to his colleagues that they must be ready with a plan to put into
P "?Z tf f, € C °?* reSS " n i tkc LwfrM to agree or tf either or both
rejected theMvsion s proposals He himself dreiv up a Breakdown Plan to meet
ZJ~A >* 2 i d t& C ? mmtt f/ *™*™ to it ^ u hen the Mission
seenied to be on the point of success, he reminded them that et at if the Congress
3t f U * Ue ? Mcd mta ™ ^enm Got eniment and a Constituent
teembly there were many pufalls ahead, and that circumstances might arise
Lt„uT pd the V°£ 11 hack ™ Breakdown Plan, unless something
nlue ^ B ™ U °™ hich sex era! writers have
^^5* mm€d ^ Vas t0 * a ™'™< ^eme during the rest of his time
24-JJ MARCH 194*5 229
March ?4 .. ,
The three Magi' haw arrived They are pleasant and friendly but I am
st.ll doubtful whether they have got any definite plan m their heads
March 2$ ,
Meetmg in the morning with the Delation on the ™
Press conference which ,s colourless and quite all right But Aey also
produced at the meetmg proposed answers to certain most mipomnt
supplementary questions wbeh were bound to be put. and which panted
coLVno?! hope they w>U not make a practice o [ £
between themselves and then confronting mc with .t at short nonce Mine
is not a quick-working brain ,„„.»,, rvlwation
Council meenng in the evening, preparatory to meettng ^el^non
tomorrow BenthTll made a statement giving the pd™ Council
as voiced at a private meetmg they had had y« tCT ^ «™«
new in it it emphasised the need for a fresh popular Government that .
waTe»lal"Lch a settlement, since the
A *W «n nromress could be made without facing the Faitistan
Pahstan but thought that the Mushms
defeatist but agreed with the general statement made by Benthall
^iz ul Huuuf but rather diflusely and not very lnodly
£Zt 2oiLd a lighter touch by dedanng that he would leave
jsjiarc mu » Government took over he then
Site an I Son m wthe suggested a r^tnbuaon of fafe
made qmte an ora«on^ Mahrattas into one and strongly
rsSr^Siirought » * u« ^
insisted tftattne : «i & to Provincial Governments should
Roy put sclect m ? neW
submit a P^X™ must get , settlement, we must reeogn.se the
was bnef and ^ejhctf ™ S ^ ^ ^ ^
League as repr«emm^ ^ ^ ^ nQw
prmciple of Palas^ ^ ^ he ^ Qnce
ftTo do HvdTw^ pract.ca.ly alone in saymg that he would not
S to m pn-pk but would invite Mr Jinnah to define i.
2}0 THE CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
March 26
I had an hour or so with the Cabinet Ministers this morning Satisfactory
on the uhole H M G realise the weakness of our position and the
necessity for a settlement, and they seem to e sensible views on the
Pakistan issue For some reason they seemed to think that the Muslim
League had joined hands w ith the Communists They saw their task as to
get an interim Government into office and a Constitutional Making Body
or Bodies into being They expected the process of Constitution making
to take a year 1 expressed doubts of the possibility of keeping a Council
together for that time on the easting set-up, and suggested that something
must be done to give the transitional Government a greater feeling of
po^cr and independence- had the abolition of the India Office been
considered for instance'
S of S brought out the stock I O arguments against it, that it uould
only be camouflage ^hich would deceive no one, etc, but Cnpps to my
surprise put forward the possibility of a solution on Amery s hncs-the
Viceroy s independence of the I O This was thought a b.t too radical, but
I insisted that the control of the I O over e.ery detail of Indian admini-
stration and of finance should be removed or lessened It was agreed that
thf* Secretaries 1J 1
At Council's meeting with the Delegation in the evoung they all said
much the same as the evening before
March 27
The dW>n with the Delegate dui mormng began with S of S
™ mg the best mean, of approadung the Pabstan ISSU e in the duouons
w«h Provmcial Prefers by d.rect or mirect means I sa.d that the
Delegation need hardly W orry about dm, the BSUC would crop up qwcfcly
enough m whatever means they approached the Prerruer* I suited
Tt u i' * meCtm S each d.scuss.on at which »c
m«, afd d«J ^ /eneral character of the men ^ ^ere to
iZ u ™ rT ° f appr ° ach - llso ** Secretary nughc
PakwttTi i4, n j . cma J scajnt ) r purposes or to guarantee
J™ C A the ;«««««. to cable « to C-,n-C for h»
comments Fmally, wc d. SCU5SC d Ac adv.sab.hty of rekasmg Ja. Prakash
26-$D MARCH IO46 2$l
Naram, on which S of S is keen t said we ought to consult the governor
of the Province (Bihar) to which J P N belongs
Only routine items for Co una J, but the Congress Press (Tribune and
National Call) made it dear that there had been a complete Jcalcagc of last
night's meeting with the Delegation, and Home Member was instructed
to try and trace it
March 28
A full da} of 14 hours practically continuous work All the Governors
armed this morning Three hours m the morning with the Delegation,
mainly on States problems, the chief issues being how to dispose of
Paramo untcy — hand it over by consent, bury it, transfer it to the new
Government of British India' — and the effect on the States of the draft
aide-memoire on British troops m mdia Cnpps* proposal was apparently
that the States should regain 'independence*, when we gave up para~
moiwircy — a proposal ivhich rather shocked the S of S The aide-memoire
Seemed to bristle w nh so many difficulties that I questioned the wisdom of
issuing it, or indeed of giving out anything on paper, if we could avoid n%
this view was I think generally accepted in the end We also discussed the
representation of the States on the Consntution Making Body or Bodies,
and how they were to he divided if there were two
Then I had a short talk with Glancy about Punjab politics and a wheat
levy after which the American Press Association insisted on coming ui to
take photographs of me at work
After lunch 2^ hours meeting of the Governors with the Delegation
Nothing very fresh was said but the views of the Governors were quite
interesting After half an hours interval I had nearly another two hours
on a Food Conference with the Governors, rather a waste of time
Mtrch z§
Delegation had two hours with Governors in the morning The main
subject was the use of the Governors* powers v«~a-vis popular Ministries
and anticipated difficulties On the whole Governors seemed reasonably
happy
March 30
Two hours with Delegation m morning, almost entirely on the question
of the S of S *s control and GG's powers of veto My plea was that while
I recognised the necessity for S of S control in the interim period I hoped
2$2 THE CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
that it would not be exercised in quite such a heavy-handed manner
Crjpps was inclined to suggest some whittling down of the G G 's powers,
and I think that he may be dangerous over this None of them much liked
my Big Stick note (see below) and Cnpps said it was quite unthinkable to
exercise sanctions against India, and would never be accepted by the
present Parliament I retorted that if British li\es were lost or property
destroyed on any substantial scale, the British people on all previous form
would see to it that something fairly tough was done about it, Parliament
or no Parliament
Note fir the Cabinet Delegation
There is a point which I should like to bring before the Delegation,
before the beginning of the talks with political leaders
We are going into these negotianons with an extremely difficult hand
to play, owing to the necessity to avoid the mass movement or revolution
in India which it is in the power of the Congress to start, and which we are
not certain that we can control It is obvious that Congress will use the
threat of such a movement to secure as much as possible of their demands,
even unreasonable ones
We have one high trump in our hand, the Big Stick We can in the last
resort make things prattically impossible for India by various kinds of
sanctions, of which the principal would be a blockade We could cut off
India from all supplies of oil, kerosine, and imports of all lands We could
also exact reparattons for any damage done to British property or loss of
British life, by impounding sterling balances to such amount as we con-
sidered effective
Obviously the last dung we want to do is to make a threat of this kind,
but there may possibly come a moment when it will become our last
resource and I think we should consider the implication
I should like to discuss this with the rest of the Delegation
W
April 1
The opening day of our discussions with the Indian leaders I shall not
note them fully here, as there will be an official record, only my general
impressions ' ' &
We began with Dr Khan Sahib from N W F P , who >s an attractive
personality but very definitely woolly in his ideas He had obviously not
really thought out the problems of Pakistan and refused to consider its
possibility Nor had he cons.dered what Hindu domination at the Centre
might entail He talked in &ct entirely from the Pxovinaal angle, as if the
30 MARCJt-2 APJR1L 1946 2JJ
Pathans were a separate nation living m Pathanistan He contributed little
of value
In the afternoon we had ftardoloi, the Congress Premier of Assam, a
more forcible and quicker intelligence than the Khan Sahib, but not a very
pleasant personality He put out the general Congress thesis on a settlement
— transfer of power at once, Jmnah must not be allowed to stand m the
way. Centre should be formed from a panel chosen by Provincial
Assemblies, etc He then launched into a history of Assam, trying to make
out it had been a great independent Jcingdorn before the British came,
1 had to point out gently that the British had rescued it from Burmese rule
He said Assam was badly treated by the Centre, who took all the profits
on Assam's oil and tea, denounced the Muslim theory that there were
many large tracts of uncultivated land to be colonised, and claimed that
all the hill tribes wished to belong to the Province and be administered
directly by them He said Assam would be quite prepared to hand over
Sylhet to Eastern Bengal
I spent the evening clearing up the routtnc wort Cnpps I believe went
sliimmuig with Gandhi
April 2
10 to nam. Chancellor Ch of Princes HH Nawab of Bhopal
1 r to 12 noon Leaders of Opposition (NWFP Abdul Qaiyum,
Assam Sir Mohd Saadullah)
12 to T2 30 p rn leader of Opposition, Punjab Nawab Iftikhar
Hussajn, Khan of Mamdor
is 30 to 1 p m Leader of Opposition Sind G M Sayed.
230pm Delegation visit Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru (4 Hardinge
Avenue)
4 to 5 p m Nawab of Bhopal, Maharaja of Gwahor, Maharaja of
Patiala, Maharaja of Bikaner, Jam Saheb of
Nawanagar
5 30 to 730pm Tea with Standing Committee of All-India News-
paper Editors Conference (Imperial Hotel)
The Chancellor made quite a good impression he was clear and sensible
As I had warned the Delegation when we discussed the question of the
States, he wanted very considerable modifications of paramountcy 1
1 Paramountcy was the term used of the relationship of the British Crown as suzerain to
the Pnnccfy States of India. On India s attainment of independence this relationship would
necessarily come to an end, and the Cabinet Mission with the approval of H.M-G stated
plainly that Paramountcy could neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to
234 THE CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
during the interim period, including the right to require a Committee of
Enquiry on all matters of dispute, or rather Court of Arbitration
The two Muslim League leaders from Assam and NWFP were not
very convincing Saadullah was obviously very tired after five days tra\el,
and not at his best He laboured derails about the number and affiliations of
hill tribes (m direct contrast to what Bardoloi bad told us), to prove that
Muslims were really in a majority m Assam* and was not very clear on the
main issue — Pabstan Abdul Qaryum was a rather unpleasant looking
tough, only converted from Congress to Muslim League a few months
ago Like Dr Khan Sahib he was convinced that the Provincial admini-
stration could manage the tribes much better than the Political Depart-
ment, and advocated aNWFP made up with the addition of the Tnbal
territories and a part of Baluchistan, which he professed to believe could
stand on its own and defend itself
The Nawab of Mamdot was a pleasant looking } oung gentleman but
almost entirely dumb, and S of S did most of the talking Mr Sayed of
Sind on the other hand held forth in an almost uninterrupted monologue
His record shows him a quite unscrupulous politician but he is certainly
intelligent and has a sense of humour, I should say (he reminds me a little
of the Sind Premier who was murdered some years ago, Allah Bakhsh)
His main theme was that none of the economic problems of India were
TecciYmg attention owing to the concentration on party politics — or
polemics
So ended the morning The S of S is not a very good negotiator or
questioner, he is inclined to be sloppy and long-winded and makes little
speeches instead of asking questions Cnpps is of course an expert and
incisive cross-examiner, but for some reason he makes lengthy notes all
through an interview, which must distract his attention, at least it would
mine, it seems pointless when a Secretary is doing it already Alexander
docs not speak much, 1 think he takes it m but his knowledge of Indian
affairs is scanty
S of S told me he had had a letter from Gandhi after the interview he
had with him yesterday, making three immediate demands
Release of all detenus
Abohnon of salt tax
Di s missal o f A mbedkar
a. new Government of Ind a. In practice however the transfer to a new authority of the
powers and resource* of the Government of India— and these included control of the rail-
way* the major pom, and the armed forces — was bound automatically to put that new
authority in a position to establish its Piranfiountcy pu4*u the States
2-3 aphil 1946 235
That comes of all dm slopping good-will A over the place It docs*
realk pay. and will make things ^ cry difficult later
InthYaftcrnoonwcwent toseeoldTcj B^S»P*^^«J
he was ,00 ,11 to come He looked frail He talked jfcutode. ; «.th hc*r
ofw^dom of an Elder Statesman which he fanc.es himself to be, I have
al\va\ s thought him rather an old fraud
Then « c had an hour wtth the Princes' Standmg Cornmittce-BhopaK
JaSb Patula, Bikanc, Gwahor Bhopal at the ^£ ™g
'session had left a long string of searching
did not expect to be answered without some long interval Rathe ■ w my
horror S SfS proceeded to answer them, m a long d.ffuse monologue,
v™hx and P woolly, I thought, and he gave away much which
not haL done at thts stage-he - P^ PV The
Prmces with dm charming manners made a igood mp«»on
tfgetTwayU. ^ left me rest of the Delega-
non to face the Editors
S of S Lke of Gandhi demands which I said were moment but he
a ota spoitc f . piakash Narain
was st. 1 hankermg a Ae -to ^.^.cd than on the other
Maulana Asad ^ ^^fre^ently walked up and down the room
^ ^^2^ 5 ofS beg^an as usual by giving
rw^pXce-iU hLs and practically asbng Congress to
^He^ttka^- without ma^g a httle speech about it and
He cannot ask a qu« toush/ wlth every point He is a charmmg
present^ h>s ^ ^ ^ ^ J h Hmdll po!ltlalns
old gentleman but no M« ^ ^ ^ m B10n
However, ^P ^X Federation, m which there were two
Azad pm out ^*^ f ™ ^ uom , He also admitted the
nght of a ^ ^ lf there were a .Won, Muslims domi-
H f r^Tl^d hJL m Pakistan would be "ahem', which Cnpps
^ , ^^dTcXTmp^We I am sure Azad only meant it as a debating
sud ™i BB **?*££_ mnt i l whom he showed great an.mos.ty-
point l g 1 ^. J, 3 n made some iatQe r foohsh remark about separate
SSSTt prodded the Congress cla,m mat the Centre should be
236 THE CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
chosen by Provincial nomination vt hich would obviously give Congress
a nine to two majority o\ er the League but conceded that there might be
'adj ustments*
I thought the interview with Gandhi, naked except for a dhoti and
looking remarkably health), was rather a deplorable affair S of S began
with his usual sloppy benevolence to this malevolent old politician who
for all his sanctimonious talk has, I am sure very little softness in his
composition He began with the demand for the abolition of the salt tax,
which he led up to by a lot of rather hypocritical sob-stuff (In the five
yean I have been in the Government of India I have never heard from
an) one but Gandhi a suggestion that the salt tax was really oppressive,
and it brings in 9 crorcs but G wants it removed as a sop to his vanity
because he ™ ent to prison o\ er it 15 years ago )' He rambled on m his
usual rather vague way approaching the Pakistan issue by the way of his
drunken son who had become Muslim for a while in the hope that it
would cure him of drink spoke of his efforts to meet Jinnah by Rajago-
palachanar s formula and his Bombay talks and finished with the meant-
to-be plausible proposal that Jinnah should be asked to form a Ministry—
the catch being that he would be subject to the Hindu majority in the
Central Assembly (I had heard this idea put forward before) As usual
G refused to be pinned down to details The interview closed by a little
speech of S of S expressing penitence* for Britain s misdeeds in the
past 1
I was frankly horrified at the deference shown to Gandhi when he
expressed a wish for a glass of water the Secretary was sent to fetch it
himself instead of sending for a chaprassi and when it didn't Come at
once Cnpps hustled off himself to see about it Besides being undignified
I am sure this son of thing does not pay and will leave an unenviable
legacy for the Viceroy and officials G is a remarkable old man, certainly
and the most formidable of three opponents who have detached portions
of the British Empire in recent > can Zaghlul and de Valcra being the
other two But he is a very tough politician and not a saint
Almost immediately afterwards I had to go to a Committee of Council
on the price of cotton Immediately afterwards came a meeting of Council
Finally a small party for the Political Residents who are holding a
conference
hid* *L » md^l^ *** b4Ck ? * c the British Ifcj vns so
ugnc tnar no individual was consc ous of it as a h» r A m r.,* ^. ,i~i.< c k™. m» .
j-j AfRJL I94<> 337
The Delegation began the morning b) dcading not to go to Simla, which.
some of diem had been rather hankering after Then we had three hours
of Jinnah, of which at least two were, to iny mind, entirely wasted 1
should have started at once on the boundaries of Pakistan but die Me-
gation gave J his head and he talked for one hour on die history of India
Oargcl> fanciful) and the cultural d.fTerences between Htndu and Mushm
also! somewhat fanciful) Then S of S made a speech lasting racdy
IS nunutcs and ending m one qucsnon xvhich could have been asked .m
15 seconds O^^b^f^^V^^^f^^f^^
possible contents of a suppositious treaty ^^^n ^S^t
and Hindustan, with analogies and compansons of U N O which jidn
seem to get us much further, and Jinnah stonewalled oh
some nofvery fist or skilful bowling After about i\ _ hours I&™"*J
to know Jinnah's ideas about the boundar.es o Pakistan ^ w 5 had
a more Jtcresrmg half-hour though we got no dung much out oQ
Talk with Hutchrngs about Food and with the C -m-C about I N A
trials, Jubbulpore mutinies and vanous other matters
Then back to Conference Dungarpur and Bilaspur did well for the
httle Princes, the former read out a long statement advocating federal
SSr States, wble Bilaspur made an
survival value of small Smes^speculiy his own Dungarpur then asked
some pertinent questions about the future
c ^ t Tars Sineh brought two others, who did most of
Tu^r^^7^J S . calculations of figures to show
tttreiere —^^ZSEZZ SEtZ
1 Sdlv Cgh £J2* the same in a more pohshed manner and ^
,rr,n CC The division of the Punjab was quite simple the Sikhs
S U wTreS die Rawalpindi and Mooltan divisions and some
should We , «ceP untied to a large share of the
ACTc^ ^and everything else, whatever form of India was set
£ All thTdid not get us much further except to emphasise the difficulty
r -t. K.Vh nrofelem in any form of Pakistan.
AtbeSarTtarted quiedy on the da.ms of the Scheduled Castes and
238 THE CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
gradually worked himself up into a really spirited denunciation of the
wrongs they suffered I sympathise with A , but I am afraid that the uplift
of his people w ill not easily be brought about, whatever the provisions of
the Constitution
I saw Thome after lunch, mainly because S of S worries me daily about
the release of Jai Prakasb Narain I told Thorne to telegraph the Governors
of Bihar and UP about it, I expect we shall have to let him go and there
are so many blackguards being let out now that I suppose one more v* on't
make much difference, except that he is an intelligent blackguard
Then came a cheerful Baluchistan Sardar, whom I nominated to the
Council of State some time ago It was decided that Baluchistan must have
a representative and he was put forward as one of the verj few presentable
Baluchis it was urged that his almost complete lack of knowledge of
English would not matter much, as he could be trusted to vote with
Government on every subject' He looked a good type of country gentle-
man, and talked voluble Hindustani at me quite regardless of my telling
him I had forgotten all my Hindustani I gathered that his theme was that
Baluchistan had equal contempt for Congress and the League, and wanted
to be left alone
Khizar was our final interview m the Delegation He made a very good
impression and was frank and sensible It was obvious that he had no
belief in Pakistan, and said in effect, as he had to me at Simla, that the
British had no business to go till they could hand over to something much
better than Congress
I had half an hour with Bourne,* who goes off to Assam tomorrow,
and was then able to get down to the days routine papers at about 7pm
Apn 1 6
Five Congress Premiers this mormng-Kher, Pant, Sinha, Shukla and
Mahatab They are not a very inspiring or inspired lot and not very certain
oi themselves really behind their facade of being the great tribunes of the
Indian people I like Kher, who is I think genuine and honest with a sense
of humour Pant is also honest and well-meaning but not I should say
very capable Sinha is the least pleasant, rather an aggressive agitator type,
Shukla probably the least capable, of. not very capable lot, Mahatab also
is not impressive They all of course put forward the Congress demand-
immed.atc transfer of power at the Centre on the basis of each Provincial
5-8 APRIL 1946
Premier nominating one, not necessarily from his own Province, a
Congress High Command list in fact, and then let them make the Constitu-
ent Assembly and the Constitution They mostly wanted a strong Centre,
on the understanding of course that it was a Centre dominated by Con-
gress, and expressed the usual righteous lndignanon at any suggestion that
Congress had ever gi\ en the Muslims the slightest ground for suspicion
of unfair treatment, in fact the} had given them far more in every way
than they were entitled to ha\ c
S of S made his usual little speech of how they had come out to transfer
power as soon as possible, our politicians are die only people who nave
given away points, and they have guen them away with both hands,
while Gandhi and Congress, so far from giving away anything have in-
creased their demands, and Jinnah has not conceded an acre of Pakistan
Mahatab's chief subject was the necessity for the States contiguous to
Onssa to be handed o\ er to the Province They all professed to believe
that food and cloth would at once become plentiful all over India, once
they got control They were, how ever, quite friendly
April $
After 3 comparanvely 3 met Sunday, the Delegation mixture as before.
I raised the general question of the continuous appeasement of Congress
and leading them to suppose that they could get what the) wanted by
demanding it 1 pointed out that it was not fair on the people who would
be left behind — the Governors, the Services, the Police, the troops — and
would probably have to be tough at some time to keep law and order,
that concessions should be made all the time, and that Gandhi and Co
should be led to think that they owned India already Alexander I think
agreed with me, S of S and Cnpps were rather silent
Suhrawardy of Bengal was our first visitor I have always regarded him
as one of the most inefficient conceited and crooked politicians in India,
which is saving a good deal He made a very bad impression on the
Delegation- He put forward all the stock arguments about Pakistan, and
was allowed by the Delegation to argue about small technical points, of
citizenship, etc , instead of keeping him to broad principles When I did
tackle him on the defence of Eastern Pakistan, it was obvious that he had
never given it a moment's thought, and he tried to ride ofFon generalities
that no country could defend itself alone nowadays, and so on. He then
indulged himself with a hymn of hate against Hindus, claiming tint the
greater broad nun dedn ess of Muslims made them much better admini-
strators he w cnt on to claim that Bengal had been deliberately starved
240
THE CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
out by the other Provinces in 1943 » and that this proved that there was no
unity m India
He was succeeded by four leaders of Muslim League oppositions in
Bombay, UP, CP, and Madras They too were not very impressive
They claimed that Pakistan would help the Mushm minorities in Hindu
Provinces, but after an immense amount of verbiage — mainly from
Bombay (Chundngar) with U P (Chaudn Khahq-uzzam) a close runner
up — could adduce no real argument, except vague phrases such as balance
of power, prestige, psychological effect, but a good deal of hate against
Hindus Madras (Md Ismail) and C P {Syed Abdur Rauf Shah) echoed
the same sentiments very volubly, whenever they got a look-in or rather
speak-in, and the session had very little of value in it
The Nawab of Chhatan came to see mc after lunch, his chief object
being to reiterate his Exalted master's desire to be relieved of all restrictions
on his powers
Later came the Premier of Onssa, Mahatab, to plead in rather a simple
and engaging manner, for benefits for his poor Province — a grant-in-aid
ofs crores for development and education was the chief item, for which
he seemed almost to expect mc to write him out a cheque on the spot He
spoke of food smuggling, of the aborigines and their education, of his
desue to send officers to be trained at the Centre and one or tw o other
matters I rather liked him.
Tuesday April 9
I had three-quarters of an hour with S ofS before the interviews What
I had said yesterday about the salt-tax and Congress appeasement had
obviously gone home, and he made a long exculpatory statement I
pointed out in reply the position of Governors, the Services, the Police and
isolated Europeans, our responsibility for law and order, and the danger
of leading Congress to suppose they could get anything they asked for
I admitted that our position was weak and that we were conducting a
retreat, that the first military rule in making a withdrawal was to show as
much strength as possible, and that the weaker one was, the more impor-
tant it was to keep up a strong appearance, we seemed to be ad\ erasing our
weakness unnecessarily Gandhi had great power still, but he was at heart
an implacable enemy of Great Britain and would take advantage of every
concession and be encouraged to ask for more S of 5 ended with his
daily request for the release of Jai Prakash Narain and I said I was not
going to do so v> ithout consulting the Governors concerned
We then interview cd the three best-known Dm ans of States Chhatan
8-9 APRIL I946 24t
of Hyderabad* C P Ramaswami Ai)ar of Travancore, and Mirza Izmail
of Jaipur Chhatan brought Walter Monckton 1 and an official from
Hyderabad, he said nothing unexpected and voiced Hyderabad's desire to
maintain an independent position and relations with the British crown t
to reco\er Bcrar, 3 and to obtain a port He wanted some special body to
deal t,\ ith economic arrangements between the States and Centre in the
Interim period
C P delivered quite a brilliant lecture on the Indian problem in about
40 minutes, nothing very new, but all very lucidly set forth He said that
the States should not insist much on existing treaties, that the exercise of
paramountcy would require revision for the interim penod and there
should be a body of advisers to the Viceroy appointed by the States, that
the States should group themseN es mto viable units (if the standard was
a population of 1,000,000 and one crore of revenue there v*ou!d be about
20 to 2$ such units, with a standard of 3,000,000 population and two
crores of revenue, there would be about 10) t they should have some form
of popular government but with a non-removable Executive He then
spoke of the Communist dinger to India, of the defence of India, and of
the Constituent Assembly He is of course a strong upholder of a united
India He spoke well and made a good impression He is one of the
cleverest men in India, of course
Mirza Ismail showed up very poorly in contrast He has no fixed
principles, except to look after Mirza Ismail, and faces all ways He put
forward a quite impossible scheme for forming a Central Executive (2
representatives of Congress out of 8) and Constituent Assembly {5
Congress out of 27) and showed no grasp of realities at all
In the afternoon Gandhi came to see me about the salt tax. He professed
to be coming purely as a friend of Britain, so that the British would get
the credit of removing this unjust tax, before the National Government
came into power and did so The old humbug, 1 wonder whether he
suspects that a National Government would do nothing of the sort and
that the British are easier to bounce I refused naturally, to commit myself
in any way, and merely said I would look mto the matter (He had sent
A miit Kaur to see Q and try to influence her in helping bounce me) He
then asked for the release of Jai Prakash Narain, whose wife is apparently
one of his followers f adopted daughter*, he called her) I did not commit
1 Sir Walter Monckton (later Viscount Monckton of Brenchley) was legal adviser to the
Nizam of Hyderabad,
a Bcrar was a tract of country that had once formed part of the Nizam, j dommjons but
its administration had bctm taken over by (he British in 1 S jj as part of a financial settlement,
and in 1902 it v»ax leased in perpetuity to the Government of India
242
Tlir CABINET MfSSfON OPENING DISCUSSIONS
myself, though I expect wc shall hav c to release him shortl) Gandhi then
started on the I N A and I told him exact lv what the I N A were— the
w eaklings and cowards of those captured in Malaya— and w hat folly it
had been for Congress to make heroes of such men and to neglect those
who had remained true in spite of starvation, ill-treatment and torture
When wc parted I gav c him a w arninq; that the threat of mass movement
by Congress was a dangerous weapon there were still a great many
thousand British soldiers in India, who did not subscribe to his doctrine
of non-violence, and might be vcr) \iolent if British lives or property
suffered He took this with a grin, and was very fncndlv throughout
Cnpps has produced a scheme w ith altcmatn cs A and B A is a grouping
into three blocks — the Hindu Prov mces, the Muslim Provinces and the
States, with a Federal Centre on which all three blocks u ill be equally re-
presented, B is a truncated Pakistan We are going to discuss it tomorrow 1
April 10
Wc discussed Cnpps' paper and our future tactics in trying to bring about
a settlement After 2^ hours quite useful discussion, wc d ended provision-
ally to see Jinnah early next week and put the two alternatives in Cnpps f
paper to him, and to sec Congress and make it clear to them that para-
mountry would not be handed ov cr to them, and that any Interim Gov em-
mem would be on the present Constitution, and also to obtain their views
on the Constitution Making Body It was agreed that the original dis-
cussions on the composition of the Interim Government should be between
Congress and myself not the whole Delcganon
It was also decided to put out a Press note to state that we w ere getting
on with the job, and to draft a telegram to the Cabinet stating Cnpps*
alternatives I wanted to sec C -in C and ask him about the possible
effect of the proposals on the I A , but he was laid up so I sent P S V to
see him. He agreed generally with the line we w ere taking
Saw Maharaj Singh and the Indian Chnstians in the afternoon who
produced nothing new, and then had a longish meeting of Council Wc
decided to release Jai Prakash Naratn which will make the S of S happy
and encourage Gandhi to ask for more
April ii
We began the morning with a Delegation discussion on the telegram
home and Press statement I had complained that at previous meetings
drafts were placed in front of me at the opening of the meeting which
™ p™4T S VC " m 1 * omcwhlt form m the brief for interview with
9-1 1 APKU Ip4<5 243
I had had no time to consider, and requested that I should have plenty of
time to consider the drafts before the meeting The Press statement was
produced at the meeting itself
Our interviews in the morning were a pure waste of time Two mem-
bers of the Indian Federation of Labour — a cheerful looking old girl called
Mamben Kara > and Karnik the Secretary, a httle clerk type anxious to
please, were interviewed for no other reason, I imagine, than that the
representatives of a Labour Government could say that they had seen the
representatives of Indian labour The total membership of the Federation
is, at the Secretary's optimistic estimate, about 400,000, and they have no
political influence They proposed that the Central Executive should be
handed o\er to them, or at least that their programme of social reform
should be enforced on it, and that immediate fresh elections should he
held on the basis of adult franchise They did not expect this to be taken
seriously, did not take it seriously themselves, nor did anyone else The
S ot S delivered a httle lecture on adult franchise and we parted with
mutual smiles
Mrs Kama Mehta, President of the All-India Women's conference^
about 25 000 members, said that the sooner the British gave India mde*
pendencc and cleared out, the better, but she said it quite politely The
S of S , as a protagontst of Women's rights was interested, and another
half-hour or so was wasted
Then came Jayalcar, who delivered an hour's speech for the prosecution
of the Muslim League* precisely as a lawyer speaking to a brief It was well
delivered, laboured the obvious, contained nothing new, and ended with
a recommendation of the scheme of the Sapru Conumttce, and for the
removal of separate electorates He never paused for the whole hour, and
the S of S closed his eyes to hear better I thought it a sorry exhibition of
the partisan spirit by one who likes to be considered an elder statesman
of India, there was no atom of compromise m it ot recognition that the
other side had a case Jayakar really provided as good an argument for
Jmnah's attitude as I have heard
Finally came K S Roy 1 from Bengal, 2 typical heavy widespread
Bengali, with an expansive jowl He had httle to say except that Bengal
should be increased by adding to it the districts of Manbhum and Sing-
bhum from Bihar, and Sylhet, Cachar and Goalpara from Assam ' Pakistan
was n onsen se, of course
Cnpps told me this morning that the younger members of both Con-
gress and Muslim league had got together and brought a joint scheme to
1 Leader of the Congress in the Bengal Legislature
244 THE CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
Cnpps m great secrecy, which he thought might produce a solution
acceptable to both sides I don't like this kind of secret negotiation, but
I can't do an) thing about it
April 12
Sarat Chandra Bosc was the first visitor A stupid man, with an egg-
shaped head, he put forward the usual Congress propaganda, no Pakistan,
strong Centre, and the Muslims will come to heel all right
Griffiths, leader of the European Group was good, and talked \ery
sensibly for o^er an hour He said nothing very original but put the
general situation and the European case clearly and well
Hossain Imam, League leader in the Council of State, was more French
in appearance and gesture than any Indian I have met previously, he had
a little imperial on his chin and moustaches a la Napoleon III and gesticu-
lated like a Frenchman He merely repeated Muslim League Propaganda,
and was a striking example of the precept that you can't argue with a state
of mind
Last came Kunzru, clear and logical and moderate, but with nothing
fresh to say (I should be quite glad to haVe Kunzru in the Executive, as
Foreign Minister or War Member, but I am afraid Congress would think
him too moderate )
Aprtl 13
A comparatively quiet day We met in the morning to consider the brief
for Jinnah on Tuesday Then I had a Committee of Council on food, we
decided to try and persuade Congress High Command to instruct the
new Ministries not to take independent action about prices for the
present, I said I would get into touch with them
In the evening the First Lord came to dinner, and then sat down at the
piano and placed and sang for a couple of hours, he has an endless
repertoire
April 15
A quiet Sunday, and I managed to cope with some arrears of private
business I sent to Washington a personal message to the President, asking
for an assurance that the promised supplies of food for India w ere not
being reduced
JA&rgt afciarak <wr&&ad Cziks of the iasc iorfnignt nave got us \ er) far,
in fact from my pomt of view rhey have mostly been waste of time The
Congress and League briefs have been repeated by a variety of persons —
1 1 — 1 5 APBlt 1946 245
cleverly or stupidly, dearly or obscurely, with conviction or without
conviction, often at great length, very seldom succinctly Congress has
not abated one mrle of its 'democratic claims as a majority, Jinnah has not
conceded an acre of Pakistan No Hindu has satd a word to suggest that
the Muslims have a case, no Muslim has admitted the possibility of fair
treatment hy a Hindu. The Pnnccs ancf their diwans have been by tar the
most businesslike, the most sensible and the most luad On the surface
the omens are not good, but there lias been a great deal of talk gomg on
behind the scenes, and Cnpps and his minions (W)att and Short) 1 have
been working hard, to what eflrct J have no idea, but Cnpps seems
satisfied And we ha\c got a paper by Cnpps which gives a basis for
negotiation Perhaps it will turn out all right, but I do not trunk that any
settlement wc get will be a good one or a lasting one
We saw the representatives of the Zamindars this morning — Darbhanga,
Parlakimcdi, Burdwan, Vmanagram, and Nawab Sir Muhammad Yusuf
They began by stating that they had selected Darbhanga to be their
spokesman, but he hardly got m half-a-dozen sentences m the whole hour
the interview lasted Yusuf, whom I had met in Lucknow last December,
would not stop talking, and Vmanagram was nearly as bad At one time
all except Darbhanga the spokesman were spcakmg together And they
had nothing to say, except that they had always been loyal to the British
and now wanted protection, or at any rate plenty of representation on the
CMB
After they had gone, we had an hour*s rather rambling discussion on
the line to take with J inn ah tomorrow and with Azad on Wednesday
lit the brief for the interview with Jtnttah if was stated that the JitU claim for
Pakistan had no chance of acceptance But that progress might he possible tn one
of the fallowing two Ways
(1) Agreement might perhaps be reached on a separate sovereign State of
Pakistan consisting of Smd> the N\VFP,the Muslim majority districts
of the Pttrtjab, except perhaps GttrJaspur, the Muslim majority areas of
Bengal, and the Sylhet district of Assam Whether there would be any
chance of agreement on Calcutta hang a free port was doubtful Its
inclusion m Pakistan coitU not he justified on any principle of self-
determination
(2) Tlie most promising alternative wcttld be for the Congress and the League
1 Major "Woodrow Wyatt MP, who had been » member of the Parliamentary
Delegation and Major J Met- (BiUy) Short a retired officer of the Indian Army who
had a great knowledge of the Sikhs and -was in close touch with their leaders Cnppi had
brought them out with him from England u assistants
246 THE CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
to try to evolve an agreed scheme for an Indian Union If the League
accepted a Union Centre to control only essential subjects {say, as a
minimum Defence, Foreign Affairs t and Communications) it might be
possible to include tn one Federation the whole of the Provttices of Sitid*
Baluchistan > N IV F P , tlx Ptmj&h, and Bengal {plus perhaps Sylhet),
white the Hindu Provinces would form another Federation In sttch a
Union the Mushm arid Hindu Federations might hai e equal representation
IVai ell sometimes refers to this alternative as the 3-tter solution
April 16
Before the interview vnth Jmnah we had 20 mmutcs Press photography,
sitting round a tabic and very obviously not talking business, I thought
I dislike this modem craze for publiat)
The critical interview with Jinmh went about as badly as it could * 1
thought I told the S of S before it started that I thought he ought to be
tough with his approach to jinnah and nuke him see clearly that what was
bemg put to him was the best offer he could possibly hope for S of S
snubbed me and said he was convinced that the \ eh et glove was essential
He began with ten minutes rambling platitudes would-be sympathetic
stuff) about the welfare of the world , 'advancement of India's interests'*
etc > which had not the slightest effect on Jinnah, who listened without
any sign of interest till S of S got down to the brief paper and the
alternative solutions suggested Then J started taking notes Onte he had
grasped the two offers he merel) repeated all his old arguments, main-
tained that any form of Union or unity was impossible in India, and re-
iterated his claim to all 6 Provinces and complete sovereignty At the end
of nearr) two hours we had made no progress \vhatc\er Obviously J 's
intention is to drive us into an award and to hope wc shall remain in India
to enforce it At the end he said that if Congress admitted the principle of
Pakistan he was prepared to discuss its boundaries No ad\ance at all in
fact I said nothing during the whole discussion except to ask Jinnah
when he was holding forth about 'unit) 1 , what sort of unity he expected
in his Pakistan I expect it is pure conceit on m) part but I believe I could
have got Jinnah to mo> c further or at least could have put him firml) up
against the altemam es and left him under no illusions that he could expect
a better offer But that w ould have been too direct and brutal for these
pohnaans Cnpps was rather hankering after goini; off to sec Jinnah and
getting him to himself this evening I don't think he approves of S of S s
methods or of mine but hoped that a lawycr-to-lawyer approach would
be successful
15-17 APRIL 1946 247
In the afternoon I saw Patcl oti the food question He was quite friendly t
promised full co-operation, said he would sec that Pant came into hne,
ana that a meeting of Premiers or reference to Azad was unnecessary
April ij
We had a morning meeting of the Delegation, to discuss the method of
conducting the interview with Azad Wc also had some talk on the
Punjab v, heat levy, the possible content of a treaty with India, and the
proposed arrest of Aung San in Burma I did not much like the proposed
brief for Azad, so I dictated after the meeting a suggested brief This
was later accepted by the S of S but failed m the end to keep him on
the lines
Jn this brief tt u as proposed that Azad should be told that certain suggestions
hud been put to Juvtah for bridging the gap betn em the League and t)te
Coiigress, but that until his reaction to them was known, the Delegation would
prefer to say ttothmg further about them
There were, however, other Matters to Be discussed with Azad, eg the
future of the Indian States — hs u as to be told that there u wild be no transfer
of Paramountey, and the formation of an Interim Got eminent — tt was to be
made clear that this tiottld have to function under the existing Constitution
The talk with Azad went badly, according to my ideas S of S read otit
brief I had suggested without embellishment and I hoped he would stick
to tt Azad asked result of talk with Jinnah and was told we could say
nothing at present On the States, he said nothing on the Paramountcy
issue, but proposed that the Political Adviser should be an Indian
Then Azad began on the powers of the Executive Council in the interim
period and said they rmrsr be 'plenary 1 and that there must be no control
by Viceroy or India Office Now things began to go all wrong from my
point of view We had agreed in (5iir preliminary conferences that we must
stand firm on the question of maintaining the existing constitution during
the interim period, but the S of S instead of saying so definitely em-
barked on his responsibility for the ICS as a reason — the worst possible
example, he then went rambling 011 about the files at the India Office ( T )
and the difficulty that would arise if they were not available [ |) He was
deplorably woolly, said that all could be arranged with goodwill and
used the phrase 'it takes time even to arrange terms of surrender for a
beaten force* The result was a long inconclusive argument which ended
by S of S leaving Azad to think that the matter T-vas open to discussion
248 THE CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
and that we should probably give wa> We then talked for a while on
Federal and Union Centres and the constitutional variations possible—
Cnpps and Azad I then had a talk with Azad myself about the Punjab
wheat levy He was prepared to help but obviously didn't like the idea of
bringing too much pressure on the Punjab Government and risking its
break-up
From here I went straight to Council, and found them discussing this
matter of the levy V S V had had another message from the Governor to
say that he was sure that the Ministry would break up if we forced them
to a levy, and the Council decided we could not do it
I finished a long day by writing a note to the S of S to say that we
must stand firm on the constitution m the interim period
April IS
Began with a meeting with Cabinet Delegation Cnpps reported that his
talk with Jinnah last night had been completely abortive J had refused to
budge one inch in the direction of a common Centre, and had indicated
that HMG would have to make an award which would of course be
abused by all parties hut might possibly be accepted Cnpps had since
seen Gandhi and told him that J was immoveable G had said it was no
use he was sure, his meeting J t agreed that J would not meet Azad, but
told him that he might perhaps meet Nehru, though he was sure that it
would lead to no result Cnpps and the other Ministers thought that there
ought to be a meeting between Jinnah and Nehru, not with any hope of
agreement but purely for publicity value, to show that we had done our
best to secuie agreement I was rather doubtful of a meeting on such terms
and thought it would do no good, but raised no objections if the others
thought it necessary I said that if Gandhr had been informed of the
position* which would soon become public property, the Princes should
be informed and that I thought I should see fihopal and tell him of the
progress* or rather lack of progress, of the talks S of S objected, but
Cnpps and Alexander backed me S of S then went on to the Ihtenm
Government he did not mention my note to him, but had obviously been
disturbed by it and tried to make out that he had been firm on the principle
of the Constitution with Azad yesterday I stated my views again very
clearly and definitely, and said I did not think wc should argue about it,
merely stand firm Alexander backed me and Cnpps did up to a point but
would 1 think, give way to Congress if they threatened a breakdown* m
fact I should never be surprised to learn that he had already promised
Congress some satisfaction on this point, as he did in the 1942 negotiations
17-32 APUIL 1946 249
After a good deal more talk, the following rough time table was agreed
Delegation returns from Kashmir 1 morning April 24, we will have a
meeting that afternoon, Nehru will meet Jmnah on April 25 for a 'Break-
down* talk, it will then take us about 4 days to draw up our auard and
another 4 da\s to obtain HMG's approval, we shall then sec the leaders
of Congress, Muslim League and Princes about May 2 and present them
with the Plan
Cnpps produced at the table an outline of a proposed aw ard, the others
haa e read it f I thtnk, hut I have not had time ) et
So cud: the Delegation's second round with political India, with no
more progress made than in the first It is clear that we shall have to make
an award and Cnpps* paper is quite a good basis for an award I and my
staff will have to turn it over in the next few days and so no doubt will the
Delegation Whether when they come back we shall be able to produce
anything acceptable is problematical So far all the gifts of these Magi —
the frankincense of goodwill the myrrh of honeyed words, the gofd of
promises — have produced little Indian politicians are not babes even if
they do wear something like swaddling clothes
April 21
The most peaceful week-end X have had for a long time with the Delega-
tion ofFand the faster holiday on
The C -m~C came to see me in the evening He thinks that Cnpps*
paper is a good basis for a settlement, or at least as good as wc are likely
to contrive He says Asaf All expects to be War Member God forbid,
I have the lowest opinion of his character and abilities We discussed
Frontier policy in connection with the forthcoming Peshawar Conference,
on which he was sensible, in tenia] security — there is now a pfen 'Mad-
house* and another 'Bedlam* which allow for the LA becoming unreliable
or hostile, and some other minor matters
Today I received an invitation to go home for the Victory parade on
June 8 I think it is unlikely that I shall be able to get away but I should
like to be there
Aprtl 22
Busy days again after a brief respite
Master Tara Singh came and poured all the sorrows and apprehensions
of the Sikhs once more out of the back of his throat through his thick grey
' The Delegation paid * vis't to Kishtiur simply in order to havt a rest and get away from
the extreme heat of DeB"
2$0 THE CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
beard into my ear where it arrived a bit muffled but 1 bad heard it all so
man} times before that I could pretty \\ ell have said his piece myself The
Sikhs arc naturally anxious at the possibilities of Pakistan or the division
of the Punjab or e\ en more of the Indian Army on which they are so
dependent But they are too scattered all over the Punjab to form a
compact homeland of their own
Hutchnigs told me of the Singapore Food Conference Siam is full of
nee but owing to the delays and muddling? ofHMG over the treaty
and terms and pnee nothing has come out yet Hoover 1 arrives here
tomorrow and we must convince him of our plight On stocks at present
available or in sight our whole system will break down in June or July
Hatchings is not quite convinced that wc should not have insisted on
a \evy m the Punjab but I am sure it would not have succeeded
Then Thome Menon and George Abell discussed with me Cnpps
draft Subject to elucidation of certain points we thought it made the best
of a very difficult business and none of us could suggest anything better
though Thome does not think it will be accepted by either party
Meanwhile to work on the Honours list always a tiresome and rather
depressing business
April 2 j
Bhopal came at 12 30 and stopped to lunch He was obviously quite well
informed of what had been taking place he had flown Nehru back from
Bhopal this morning He said that the Princes would do their best to help
in a solution and would support one which appeared reasonable Nehru
had indicated to him that they would wish to put an Indian Politician in
charge of the Political Department but he had told Nehru quite definitely
that the Princes would not accept this If the political parties were as
practical as the Princes we should get along much better
Meanwhile the Hoover Mission turned up 7 or 8 of them After lunch
they had a conference with the Food officials which I gather went quite
well and then I had a talk with Hoover He is not a forthcoming type
and I think I can understand his failure as President apart fiam his bad
luck in being in office at the time of the great slump But he is obviously
a fine character and a very capable man He likened himself to the retired
family doctor called back for consultation but six months too late I
thought n would be a good thing for him to see the party leaders and
Gandhi and Nehru arc coming to see him tomorrow Jinnah refused but
1 Ex Pres dent of the USA Chum an of Pres dent Truman s Famine En er^ency
Committee
22-25 APRIL I94 6 251
said that .f Hoover came down to h.s office, he might fit ... a few minutes
forhmbemecn other engagements' Manners "^^J^"^
suit, but .t is surpnsmg that he should antagon.se an .mportant Amer,can
in this way.
Hotver left for Bombay, after see.ng Gandh. and Nehru, he d,d not seem
particularly interested in either of them and is
Ut.« He seemed to dunk Ind,a had done all she &od»d
L he could help us He will hear plenty more about our needs
Bombay and Bangalore
- m 1
:d from Kashmir
I then had neatly two nourswiu."- — y,-— ... &
The reason for the new suggests of a solution which Y^^Iedlxo
Kashmir was that Cnpps had heard from Neh™ befor Mfcy kft tha tm
Congress ™^o^ by
of ba proposal which he left ™> u ^ ho!c ^ n ^ orn er
some Muskm ^^ ^^Z sure that he both gets led down
private negotiation of Cnpps, and am of
ie garden padi and ^fiiteto, and still will
negotiate and am quite sure we
do. .f we make a plan and stick to ■ But to P£P^ them down and
put the* suggestions to ^one.de o the other. ^
:tkng - --• •• Kashm,
decided that C«K»*W~ ^ ft wc sh r ou ld teU h, m officially at a
le Jwe Ration that we could do no more for him
meeting with the w tioic lk t Muslims that we could
and should have .0 WB**£ £ ^ goodw) U and pussy-footmg
get from Congress Thejact is *«a ^ ^ ^ ^
£5£ ^t^ sX and more deLmmed from the first
^ ir«l business which reached me this morning was a telegraphic
The first °ffi^u« n ^ rf ^ palKtme Cq „„ The
summary ot the a r ^ of ^ bemg ac _
^^Xw^rZ ouTpohcy and prestige all over the Middle East
cepted, . which wtL I ruin P r to w , ost Ae J courlge
the Congress Jt was
_ L^i™
jpped ana ics c
>uld probably
wrunt It ermwged a complicated system of voting which
truncated Punjab similar to what was ultimately agreed to
2$Z THE CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
to support our own point of view The results here will be bad and will
harden the Muslims in favour of Pakistan A bad business
Nearly two hours this morning with the Cabinet Delegation Cnpps
found Jinnah most unrecepuve, he said he had said all that he had to say
and now it was up to us to take our decision Finally he agreed to put
the new proposal to his Working Committee, if the Congress accepted it
I stated my objections both to this form of negotiation and to the proposal
itself, which would mean about two months delay and would increase
communal tension But I agreed eventually that since Jinnah had given
provisional, very provisional, acceptance, it must now be put to Congress,
and it was agreed that Cnpps should do so at once We then had a longish
discussion on whether and how wc should make an award, what we
should do if it was refused and how we should meet a complete break-
down. We then discussed Cnpps' pre-Kashmir paper and how far we
could modify it The fact is that the Delegation's methods of appeasement
and negotiation have completely Guled My blunter and more direct
proposals could anyway have had no worse fate
Shortly before lunch Cnpps rang me up to say that Nehru had turned
down the new proposal flat So that's that The sands are running out and
we are no nearer a solution I drafted a new pre-amble to the draft of
an award which Cnpps is preparing, and we shall meet tomorrow to
consider it 1
Aprtl 26
T T VfW* "> mommg Cnpps had seen J«nnah agam.
and sa.d he had got him to agree provmonally to the '3-Uer' Constitute
as a basis ofnegotiat.cn if Congress would We deeded, myself rather
reluctantly that Cnpps should put tins proposition to Congress, he «as
seeing Arad before lunch and Gandhi in the evening We then discussed
vanous types of Comntuent Assemblies and Constitutions Th.s was
Azad
Nehru had h*
l, r j _ , , . _ «cau in nimca out later mat
.0 ht t dd C T C m lnd told ™ that Bilaspur has reported
vesttlv A me V m | L 0f ?f Standm S Committee of the Chamber
A T TCnX X Bh ° pal ^ told *»» thlt " ™uld help me. and
that I had sa.d so, ,f they recommended the appo.ntment of an Indian as
25-28 APRIL 1946 253
Political Adviser m the interim period t Really the tortuous ways of Bhopal
arc beyond me
In the afternoon another meeting with the Delegation. Azad had pro-
posed to Cnpps a meeting of 4 from Congress, 4 from the Muslim League
to meet Delegation and negotiate on the 3 -tier solution — our break-
down aw ard in fact— but not in Delhi, as he could stand the heat no longer
We agreed that Cnpps miqjit try this on Jmnah I said that if Jinnah did
not accept the negotiation idea wc should stop all this to-mg and fro-mg
by Cnpps, and get down to an award Alexander approved I think, but
theS ofS did not
April 2 j
Another discussion with Delegation this morning Cnpps had had another
talk with Juinah w ho had at first taken up the odd attitude that everything
he had said previously had been his personal opinion and not necessarily
that of the League He had eventually agreed to put to the Muslim League
the 3 -tier proposal as a basis for negotiation We accordingly drafted a
letter to be sent to Azad and Jinnah, asking them to delegate four persons
each to meet the Cabinet Delegation at Simla for negotiations on a 3-tier
basis Cnpps was anxious to show the draft letter to Azad before it was
sent, but I re-acted firmly, and said I thought we had had enough of this
private negotiation I have a suspicion that Cnpps does not put quite the
same proposition to Azad and to Jmnah, or at least he pets it in such a way
that each thinks he is getting a different proposal, more favourable to
himself, and I think it is time that we got things on a paper and official
basis rather than on an oral and unofficial one We then discussed the
formation of the Interim Government for a while, the S of S being
against any nego nation till we had a settlement of the main issue, I
insisting that we should not waste time, Cnpps and Alexander supported
me
We agreed that we must carry on with drafting our breakdown award,
and S of S informed us, rather to my consternation, that he was drafting
the whole document personally from previous experience I consider him
a weak, woolly and wordy drafter However, we shall see
April 28
A short meeting in the morning with the Delegation to consider Azad's
answer, which rather tends to confirm my suspicion that Cnpps has been
saying slightly different things to different people We had no difficulty in
replying to Azad
354 ™E CABINET MISSION OPENING DISCUSSIONS
Azad, m wplywg to the mvttatum to send negotiators to Simla* had objected
to the three-tier proposal on the ground that it was wrong to form Groups of
Provinces on a religion* &r communal basis and to weaken the Union by the
creation of sub-federations In reply the Delegation informed him that accept-
ance of the invitation uottld not be taken to imply fitll approval of the proposah
that had been put forward They u ere a possible basis for a settlement u hen
Congress and the League u ere being invited to dsscuss
In the evening S of S draft began to come in — woolly, except where
he has followed Cnpps 1 draft or nunc
April 2p
Two drafting meetings with the Delegation, morning and afternoon
We rather tore to pieces S of S draft, dismissed the operative part as much
too vague, and agreed to discuss a. new draft of Cnpps tomorrow S
sat mostly in rather pained silence
Meanwhile both parties have accepted the invitation, to meet at Simla,
though both maintain then* position and are still poles and poles apart, and
have both interpreted the basis quite differently Still it is something of
a success for the Delegation to nave got them to meet. It would be quite
unwarranted vanity on my pan tq reflect that I got them to Simla in a
\\ eek last year, and it has taken the Delegation more man four weeks
There was some trouble over the original letter to Azad, who apparently
showed a lack of frankness with his Working Committee and did not
show it to them, and then wanted a different letter sent which he could
show them I don t quite know how or whether it got straightened out,
Congress arc by no means a. united body.
We decided to let the Princes and Governors know how matters were
going
April 30
Two and a half hours -with the Delegation this morning on the draft of
the breakdown award and various constitutional devices and formulae
"We have got a very long way to go yet
t had a short meeting of Council m the evening to acquaint them with
the progress of negotiations They were naturally concerned chiefly with
their own futurc t arid when they were likely to be replaced by a new
Government, and what notice ticy would get Then 1 had a talk with
C -m-C about new I N A tnah and a letter that he had received from
Nehru about them
11
THE MISSION'S PROPOSALS
We came up to Simla ycstcrdaj and had a quiet afternoon Jmnah is not
coming up til! Saturday, so wc cannot have the first conference till
Sunday This a typical of JmnaVs manners, he cr.gmally sa.d he would
not come till Sunday, and the Delegation had to ask him to hasten fan
arrival But it is a good thing that he did not come up at once, we have
a lot to do still before we are ready for the Conference, as our meeting
this evening showed Alexander .s not well, and was not at « S _ofS and
Cnpps seemed to me to be set on avoiding all the awkward fences and
proceedmg on lines of mdcfinite Ascussion, I said that we really mus get
down to business, have a definite agenda and face our fences at last I am
sure that both parties really want us to do something definite and make
a decision, and are Med of all this endless discussion
Nehru sa;d as much when I saw him today mainly about some INA
trial, about which the C -m-C had asked mc to
considered mat tnc n^^^ * * 1
becoming more clear-cut and definite they were getting vaguer and more
nebulous All the facts and the attitudes of the parties concerned had been
known long ago, nothing fresh had come out, and time was bemg wasted
I to ldh,mthattheINAca S e S ,aboutwbchhenadwnttentotheC -in-C ,
would be dropped but asked him not to make public that he had written
wouia ne g> ^ in fl„ence him He promised not to do so
I aL saTthat I thought it was an act of folly on the part of the pohfcal
Dartres to have glorified the INA men, who were for the most part the
weakbngs and softhngs of the pnsoners of war and had joined to obtain
barter tLtment or to avo.d hardship H* real heroes were the 4J.coo
meTwho had remained staunch, in spite of starvation ^treatment, and
Srmre 15 000 of them had penshed as a result of this, wh. k the canines
of X lNi had been relatively small and they had done little real fighting
Nehru listened qune quietly and said he realised that some of the INA
men had not joined from the best of motives and were not the best type
of men but he had met many of them who were of a good type
He was very friendly and is undoubtedly an attractive character
256
THE MISSION'S PROPOSALS
May j
Conference on procedure at first meeting with CongTess and league
S of S wanted to address it on long and woolly lines, and Cnpps tried to
find some non-controversial, even if irrelevant issue on which friendly
relations might he established I insisted, perhaps a little brusquely, that
we must really get down to business
After lunch the Delegation gave general approval to my proposed
method of trying to form a new Council
Wavell proposed to see the Congress representatives first and to inform them
that the new Council {Interim Government) would he entirely Indian, except
for the Viceroy, and would function under the existing Constitution He had
in view a Council of twelve consisting of five Congress [including one Scheduled
Caste) t five Muslim League^ one Sthh, and one Anglo-Indian or non-League
Muslim
Bhopal wants to come up with some representatives of the States and
sit m at the discussions We agreed that he should come up but that we
could not let him sit in at the discussions at present
May 4
Three long meetings of the Delegation We began in the morning by
passing my draft as a basis for the S of S opening speech, it is short and
business like but I am sure the S of S will expand it into something dis-
cursive and rather nebulous We then seemed to have finished, and the
three Cabinet Ministers were prepared to break up ( but I insisted on
getting down to the details of how we were going to issue our *award\
if we have to mate it as we almost certainly shall Cnpps was all for still
trying to haggle with the Parties over it, but I said very firmly that the
whole essence of an award was that it was something we meant to stick
to, and that it would be quite fatal to begin the whole process of bargain-
ing over agam Alexander backed me, the S of S agreed a little reluctantly,
and Cnpps most reluctantly (I suspect he will give his Congress friends
advance notice all the same) Then I raised the mechanics of the move
timing, publicity at home and abroad announcement in House of
Commons, broadcasts, printing, etc Just as well that I did, they hadn't
thought of it at all, and it will be a most complicated business, and none
too much time to arrange it I secured that we should send Governors at
once an outline of the proposed award and get their re-actions as soon as
possible Wc also agreed to consult the C.-in-C We decided to return to
Delhi before issuing the award, I said this was essential from my point of
3-5 may 1946 257
view Provisionally we thought we might return to Delhi on the 13th and
issue ike award on the r Jth or ftfth I think the Delegation was a httle
sobered to realise how much had to he done in the way of staff work
before they could get out the plan
After the rest of the Delegation had gone, the S of S suggested that
I might require some additional staf£ also that CorfSeld had not impressed
them as Political Adviser I suspected the hand of Cnpps in this and said
so S of S admitted that Cnpps had criticised Corficld as re-actionary,
apparently because he had, quite naturally and rightly* refused to discuss
behind the back of the Princes the amalgamation of the Onssa States with
Onssa Province with Mahatab, the Premier of Onssa, whom Cnpps had
sent to him I suspect the idea of extra staff* is his too His activities in the
wings are too often mischievous I wish he uould confine himself to
drafting which he does admirably 1 wonder whether some of his Congress
friends have complained that the I C S influence me too much
In the afternoon we discussed the award which Cnpps had drawn up
with Rau and Men on It is ingenious and probably about the best we can
do but there are some obvious snags After two hours on it we broke off
to let Cnpps draft it in a revised form to be telegraphed to the Cabinet
which we would discuss after dinner After another two hours beginning
at 10 p m we ran aground about midnight over the question of a final
arbitration Court > to decide matters on which there was not the requisite
two-thirds majority m the final Consrrruent Assembly No one could see
how to get afloat again and we were all tired, so we decided to sleep on it
May J
My 63rd birthday, is it auspicious or not that we begin the critical negotia-
tions on it ? We have not made too bad a beginning rather better than
1 expected Jinnah began by refusing to shake hands with Azad, who was
obviously annoyed Then we settled the hours of sitting 11 30-r 30, 4-6
Azad began by asking was the basis of the discussions the independence
of India, and was re-assured Azad and Jinnah then asked that their letters
of acceptance, in which they laid down their respective reservations,
should be read This was done We then decided to start on the composi-
tion of the Union, instead of on the Groups as we had proposed, since
Congress wanted it so, and Jinnah agreed. The first point of controversy
arose over the financial powers oFthe Union Centre, Congress wishing it
to have powers of direct taxation and to be self-supporting, while Jinnah
advocated that it should be given a lump sum and should have to go to
the Groups if it wanted any more Jinnah's method was obviously an
2$Z THE MISSION'S PROPOSALS
unpractical one and he did not argue very convincingly on it We then
went on to the question of a Central Legislature, again Congress of course
wanted one and Jmnah did not, but his arguments were even weaker and
more unconvincing He was certainly not at his best We broke oft the
morning session here The Delegation was I think a little unduly opti-
mistic at the result, but it certainly might have been much worse
We held a short meeting before the afternoon session, as I wanted to
get our tactics clear When the Conference met, S of S tried to comer
Jinnah on the matter of a Legislature and to make him admit that there
must be one at the Centre J stonewalled obstinately but produced no
good arguments We therefore went on to the composition of a Central
Legislature on the assumption that there was one, and eventually got J
to admit that parity of representatives from the two British India groups
would be 'the least objectionable' We then spent some time discussing the
manner m which the States might join a Union Legislature Finally it
seemed to be generally agreed — at least J did not dissent — that a Central
Judiciary w ould he necessary That ended the session
In the evening I had a talk with C -m-C He approves of our 'award
scheme, and thinks it will not upset the Army m any way We discussed
the question of getting the award understood by the Army so that it would
not be stampeded by a hostile Press
May 6
A long discouraging day Wc had two hours discussion m the Delegation
9 30-11 30, before the Session, mainly about the timing of publicity Just
before the session began we had a letter from Azad to say in uncompro-
mising terms that Congress entirely disapproved of all that had taken place
the day before and that the only issue was the immediate independence of
India and the w ithdrawal of the British
At the Conference Azad did not raise this, though he had brought
copies of the letter and was obviously prepared to do so We did not refer
to it We discussed the Group organisation, which of course Congress
condemned and Jinnah supported J was better and clearer than on the
day before Wc finally got down to an announcement by J that he would
accept the Union Centre if Congress would accept Groups Nehru said
something very near acceptance of J *s proposition, and Patcl's face of cold
angry disappnn al was a study The session ended here They face us as
follows from left to right Ghaffar Khan 1 large, rugged* bearded.
■ Khan Abdul Chaffir Khan brother of Dr Khan Sahib the most prominent Congr«*
leader in the NWFP popularly known u the Frontier Gandhi
5-6 MAY 1946 259
obviously hostile, silent, m rough Khadi which he wraps over his head at
times, a stupid but obstinate man Patcl, also in Khach, but wearing it
more like 3 Roman toga and with rather a Roman face, powerful, cJexer,
uncompromising, vety seldom spcakmg but listening with obvious dis-
appro\ al then Azad, looking rather worried occasionally getting up and
standing behind his chair , then Nehru \\ ho does aJJ the fa Hang for Con-
gress, able and clear in statement and reasonable, except for occasional
bursts about the struggle for freedom and the rights of India On the
League side, there is Liaquar, solid, pleasant, speaking vnl) occasionally*
to echo Jinnah, but quiet and reasonable Jinnah himself, dapper m Euro*
pcau clothes which Liatjuat also wean Ismail Khan small with rather a
monkey face but may he clever, he occasionally interjects a remark and
Nishtar, bigsnsh, dark, may be quite capable, silent
Wc had an hour with the Delegation after lunch first the C~in-C came
in and gave us his picture, reassuring on the whole about the stare of the
Army, and then a short discussion on how to handle the afternoon
Conference, on the Constitution Making Machinery
This went much as expected, but Jinnah did agree to a single CMB
meeting as one to begin with and then splitting mto groups The final
incident of the session was the discussion of a point which Jinnah had
raised at the end of yesterday s session after I had left the room,, whether
there would be any provision for the revision of the Constitution after a
fixed penod of years It had not been discussed then and was raised now
At one moment Jinnah seemed to claim the right of a Group to secede
after 5 yean, and Patel exclaimed triumphantly there we have it now,
what he has been after all the time' We finally got it down to an agree-
ment that there would be some provision, arranged by the CM £ , for
the possibility of revising the Constitution, either at fixed periods or by
the desire of a certain proportion But the damage had been done in Patel s
mmd, and he had been given a handle for his contention that the League
are not really in earnest about entering a Urn on and mean to get out as
soon as possible
Immediately after the conference I had a talk with Azad and Nehru
over the possibility of a railway strike about which he had written to me
I told him it was easy enough to buy off the railwaymen temporarily but
would leave a legacy of great embarrassment for % new Government
We had decided earfy in the afternoon that it woufd &e a good thing
to see Ga ndhi ar once and enhst his support for the proposed solution
as Cnpps was confident he could do For some reason the Delegation
wished him to be asked merely to sec the Viceroy, and they would drop
2O0 THE MISSION'S PROPOSALS
in later, which ts all rather m a line with their methods of indirect approach
It was G *s day of silence which he could not break till 750pm He came
at 7 30 p m and I spoke a monologue for 15 minutes or so, telling him
generally how things were going Then the Delegation came m, just as his
silence was up, and the S of S and Cnpps started their explanations and
blandishments The result was a shock to them G , who had been living
with Ghafiar Khan and Patcl, the two malcontents, had adopted entirely
their point of view, said the proposed solution was 'worse than Pakistan ,
and he could not recommend it to Congress, we must either adopt
entirely the Congress point of view, if we thought it just* or Jumah s
point of view if we thought it juster, but there was no half-way house G
seemed quite unmoved at the prospect of civil war, I trunk he had adopted
Patel's thesis that if we are firm the Muslims will not fight Though
Cnpps and S of S kept at G for an hour, till 9pm they quite failed
to move him
So to a waiting dinner party
May 7
Spent most of day on draft* — 10-12 in morning, 2 30-4 30 and 6-7 m
afternoon — a wearisome business, as it was mostl) technical matter on
Constitutional arrangements At 12 I saw Oin-C and told him how far
we had got he thought that what we were doing was on right lines and
would be accepted by the Army
At 7 p m I had over an hour and a half with jiruiah to see how fat
I could get him towards agreement on the proposals we intended to put
to the Parties tomorrow It was riot very far He was friendly but showed
his deep and utter mistrust of Congress and all their works He is con-
vinced of their intention to split the Muslims and secure Hindu domina-
tion and instanced their bringing two Muslims, Azad and GhafFar Khan,
to the Conference I put to him very strongly the results of a failure to
secure agreement especially the sphttmg of the Indian. Army and the
probable partition of the Punjab He said finally that we must do what
we think just and fair but must not press him too hard He ended with
thanks for stopping the I N A trials but a plea for the release of those
convicted
Meanwhile Cnpps had been seeing Gandhi, and came down triumphant
to say that he had secured G *s full approval of our outline proposals, and
that G had suggested that wc send them with a letter to both Parties and
postpone our meeting for 24 hours ThisS ofS proposes to do I went to
bed unhappy all the same I sympathise with the Muslims rather than
6-8 MAY 10 46
Z6l
with Congress, and I atn not convinced that our document js qmtc fair to
them. Also I had a message just before going to bed that Menon and Rau
had said the proposals were unworkable Also I do not quite trust Cnpps
and wholly mistrust Gandhi, and would back the latter every time to
outsmart C , clever man though C is I am not at all persuaded that C had
led G up to the altar, I believe it is more likely that G has led C down
the garden path
May $ (I have 45 years service today)
Such a day I began atpam. with Azad and Nehru on the Interim Execu-
tive Council (they want to call it something else, the National Govern-
ment> I said 1 had not the slightest objection, if so doing did not invalidate
its proceedings) Rather to my surprise they did not raise the issue of the
Viceroy's veto t but said that the Government ought to be responsible
to the Assembly I said that it was impossible to make it so by act of law t
but that there was nothing whatever to prevent them resigning if they
were defeated m the Assembly on a major isstie They then raised the
question of nonumted members, Is^:d that the oiSaal nominated mem-
bers were supposed to vote with the Government, or could be directed
by the Government to abstain 60m voting This seemed rather a new
idea to them I told them that the non-official norm nations were usually
discussed by the G-G with Governors who would naturally consult their
Ministers We then discussed portfolios the composiuon and the method
of arriving at a list of names quite amicably On the whoh this talk went
reasonably well
At 11 ajji. I saw Vallabhai Patel He was to begin with uncompro-
misingly hostile to any settlement except on the basis of complete Hindu
supremacy, and said that they were bound to have it out with the Muslims
sooner or later, and that it was better to have a conflict now and get it
over I pointed out to hmi as strongly as I could what the results would be
of plunging India into chaos at this time and that surely it was a bankrupt
policy to precipitate civil war when it might be averted by commonsense
I have no idea whether I shook him at all (Cnpps told me later that his
information was that V P was a bit shaken) but he was quite polite and
friendly But his nature is fesast and he is always likely to be on the side
of direct action and if necessary violence
At 12 I saw CorfieJd and discussed the Princes representation which is
going to be a complicated business He sa) s Bhopal has lost the confidence
of the smaller States— and 1 don t think he ever had that of the larger ones
like Hyderabad and Kashmir
2 °2 THE MISSION'S PROPOSALS
After lunch I saw Bhopal who seemed worried, and gave him a copy
of the draft agreement we have put to the parties
At 6 p m more drafting We have got into a muddle over method of
representation in the Constituent Assembly by election from Provincial
Assemblies The natural method of proportional representation of parties
does not work owing to the weightage* which the Communal award of
the 1935 Act gives to minorities
Just before dinner, Cnpps rccei\ ed a letter from Gandhi saj mg m effect
that the draft proposals for settlement, of which Cnpps had claimed that
he accepted every word last night, were unacceptable m several respects,
while S of S received a letter from Jinnah to the effect that he never had
agreed to anything which was m the document and could not agree to it
These letters are no surprise at all to me, it simply means that the political
leaders are runnmg true to form and arc quite incapable of statesmanship
of any kind We held a meeting in Cnpps 4 room after dinner, and decided
that Cnpps should see Azad and that I should see Jinnah tomorrow morn-
ing and see whether we can move them at all But we shall not Sunla
Conference history will repeat itself
May $
A critical day with a dramatic denouement We began by passing an
answer from S ofS to Jinnah Then there was an almost heated argument
between S ofS and myself over the method of electing representatives
to the Constituent Assembly, so as to get over the injustice to the Muslims
in their majority Provinces owing to the weightage to minorities in the
Communal award The S of S was all for accepting the weightage,
arguing that anything else uould antagonise Congress, I argued strongly
diat the popubtion basis must be taken mto account as the fairest and,
1 contended the most democratic method (it is not often that I introduce
democracy as an argument') Alexander supported me but S ofS ^as
unconvinced uiitil Cnpps came m from seeing Azad and supported me
He said Azad had ra IS ed strong objecnons to certain features of the pro-
KTh ? PCC '£ y t0 ^ at Ccntrc and to pnMfctcnnincd Groups,
but had not been unreasonable
do™™™ T bhopal turned up w.th a formidable Jookmg tjpcwnttcii
document from *hich he asked questions sens.bly and to the point The
t*m entitled to on * nU m2Sf iSL/tJ, mmot ? tlcs rfun they would hjve
8-10 MAY I946 263
Princes arc naturally anxious that wc arc committing them by ow negotia-
tions without fully consulting them, and there is much force in their
contention Wc did what we could to reassure htm
At 12 I had three-quarters of an hour with Jinnah He has been much
more reasonable, easier to taffc with, and more fikcaMe m the interviews
I ha\ e had n ith him lately He was quite helpful over several points we
discussed— grouping of Provinces, meeting of Constituent Assembly, etc
At 3 p m the Delegation met again to hear my report on the talks with
Jinnah and to decide on our tactics at the Conference this evening Since
these seemed rather indeterminate and woolly, I offered to dictate a brief,
and did so in about 10 minutes, a quick bit of work and not a bad one
The Delegation appro ved it, practically without alteration
In this brief the pot tits of agreement and of disagreement between Congrtss
and the League m regard to the draft proposals u ere listed and ir was suggested
that the Secretary of State should put these before the parties and then propose
that the points of disagreement should be discussed u ith each party in turn with
a viet 1* to seeing haw they could he resolved
At the Conference at S p rn , S of S spoke on my draft, giving the
points of agreement but not of disagreement After a short discussion
Nehru mad^ the proposal on behalf of Congress that Congress and League
Delegations should meet with an umpire to settle points of difference,
whose decision would be accepted as final Jnmah replied that he would
be pleased to meet any Htndtt representatives of Congress There was
a pregnant silence for a minute or so, and then Nehru suggested that he
and Jinnah should meet there and then and see whether they could decide
on an umpire 1 We adjourned for 40 minutes and most of us strolled about
the lawns to the obvious curiosity of some Press men while N and J
talked When they came back, they merely proposed that the Conference
should adjourn for 4$ hours, tiU 3 p rn Saturday whrie they had further
talks This was agreed
I had a talk with Evan jenkms and he stopped to dinner He was in good
heart but said the Punjab was in an inflammable state and he could get
little work out of his Ministers
So the Conference has a death-bed reprieve but is still on the danger-hst
Xlay 10
Spent a good deal of the day (10-12 30, 6-7 J drafting our breakdown
award ft is curious xvhat a Jot of snags there are in making out these
' The effical record ia>s thatjinnah agreed only to sit with Nehru and consjder whether
this proposal could be accepted and if w>, ■who the umpire should he
264 THE MISSION S PROPOSALS
constitutional proposals especially when one has to steer between the
Sqlla of Congress and Charybdis of Jinnah We are not nearly ready yet
Cnpps, who cannot keep his finger out of the pi e» had heard from Nehru
that the talks with Jumak were not hopeful, as J absolutely refused to meet
any Congress Mushm Tiresome of J but Congress have been very pro-
\ocative Ki bringing up heie two Muslims out of four, when they are
almost entirely a Hindu organization
May 11
A really dreadful day from my point of view, since I think it has gone far
to destroy most of what wc have accomplished up here I may be wrong
and unduly depressed but I ha\ e had to sit and watch what seemed to me
a deplorable exhibition of failure to face facts on the part of the S of S
and I think partisanship on the part of Cnpps
We began with an hour or so*s drafting, the main point bemg the
numbers to be summoned to the Constituent Assembl) We decided
eventually to 'double the number we had first thought of *, which will
make the total up to about 400 an unwieldy number but it apparently
enables us to avoid certain anomalies We have now practically speaking
completed the revise of our Statement Meanwhile Cnpps who is in close
correspondence wuh Nehru hears that the negotiations between huu and
Jinnah are unlikely to be successful We agreed unanimously that at the
afternoon s meeteng wc would stnetly confine the discussion to the
question of an umpire and on no account allow all the old questions to be
raised again Cripps was particularly sttong on this
Meanwhile I had a peevish letter from Gandhi about the salt rax the
propaganda he has put out about the imminent abolition of the tax has
naturally upset all the salt trade so that a salt famine is likel) , and Finance
Member says it can onV) be averted by a communique which Gandhi
describes as 'discreditable* I arranged to see the old man at 7 p m
Just before the j p m Conference Cnpps produced a letter from Nehru
to the effect that Jmnah had run out and claimed with some emphasis that
we mutf definitely pin the responsibility on Jmnah* 1 1 countered this
strongl) and said that it would be entirely disastrous to any hope of settle-
ment to do so and S of S and Alexander agreed, to the obvious dis-
appointment of Cnpps
The Conference itself was a disastrous affair The first quarter of an hour
snowca tnat tnc attempt to decide on an umpire or arbitrator hid faded
' J iniuh mamtairwd, apparently correctly that he had not agreed to the appointment of
an umpire but only to conudtf thu propoul.
10-13 MAY 1946 z6S
and that Jtnnah had gone back to his original standpoint that he would do
nothing unless the division of India was recognised. Nehru said that it had
been proposed that the arbitrator should be Indian but not Hindu, Muslim
or Sikh, and that international arbitration had also been in his mmd We
ought to ha\ e broken off the Conference here, as wc had agreed that the
arbitration issue was the only one w e would consider. But the S of S and
Cnpps would keep on—Ctipps, I think, because he wanted to pin the
onus for failure on to Jmnah, S of S because he has a sorr of pathetic idea
that if he keeps on talking vague and benevolent generalities long enough
it is bound to get him somewhere* and he is constitutionally unable to be
brief and keep to the point The result was quite disastrous All die old
ground was gone over again with increasing divergence of opinion and
acerbity, every inch of ground gained m the first two days was lost, and
I am afraid that our own proposed Statement was hopelessly prejudiced
by the two sides being driven into extreme positions I tried hard to stop
it, hut S of S would not listen, and we went on till nearly 6pm, though
the Conference had been dead at 3 30 F m Even then they would not
recognise it, and did the wont thing possible, by asking Jinnah to put his
demands on paper, which means that he is bound to put them in extreme
form, and will then have to stick to them We meet again at 5 p m.
tomorrow* to bury the corpse
After the conference, I expressed myself strongly to the Cabinet
Mission on what had happened, and told S of S and Cnpps that 1 con-
sidered that they had seriously prejudiced the chances of our own solution
being accepted and had made the situation much worse and lost all the
ground we had gamed Alexander told me afterwards that he had already
said the same thing to them
At 7 p m Gandhi came to see me about his wretched salt tax I told him
that if a complex administrative process was suddenly r evened after it had
lasted for hundreds of years, without proper preparation, chaos was bound
to result and consequent suffering to the poor But nothing would
persuade him that it could not all be done with the stroke of a pen He
was quite friendly, and contributed some extremely woolly ideas on how
to solve the food crisis
What a day, I am afraid it has sunk the hopes of settlement
May 12
We spent a good deal of the day (p jo~n 30, 3 jo-j pm) completing
our Statement It will not be an impressive document from the point of
view of presentation, there have been too many hands at it and ic is too
266 THE MISSION'S PROPOSALS
much of a patchwork. But it docs contain, I believe, a reasonable way for
India to make a Constitution if it had not been for yesterday's disastrous
meeting, or if we had got it out earlier and not come up to Simla at all,
1 believe it would have had a good chance of success Now I behe\e that
the chances of acceptance are slight
From 1130am toipm I saw Patiala, C P Ramaswami Aryar, and
Cotfield Patula was chiefly concerned with the Sikhs He said that they
were hopelessly disunited (Akah group, Congress group, Communists)
and had no leader or outstanding personality, and usually came to him m
a difficulty They were holding a meeting on the 14th, to decide, I gather*
whether they would break awa) from the Coalition Government m the
Punjab It is probably undesirable for HH to play with Sikh politics, but
he thought they would inevitably consult him, I could only say that I
thought the Sikhs, if they played then cards well, could exercise an influ-
ence in the Punjab far beyond their numbers But they do not usually pla>
well and are too fond of cheating (this I did not say to H H )
C P was his usual suave, self-confident omniscient self We talked
about the States* negotiating Committee He deplored how many of the
Pnnces were still living in a fool s paradise, and how few really got down
to business Otherwise they might be the balancing power in India
\ discussed with Cornel d amendments on behalf of the Princes to the
draft Statement, the amendments he puts forward are all sensible and
reasonable
After lunch the Delegation saw Bhopal about the draft Statement we
only showed him the one paragraph which referred to the States, and gave
him. the Aide-Memo\te about paramountry prepared some time ago He
seemed satisfied but worried
The letters from Jinnah and Nehru came in during the day As I knew
would be bound to happen both sides had stated extreme views and were
further apart than 2 days ago
At6o ni meeting of the Conference, it was obvious in ten minute* that
life was extinct and that no amount of the artificial respiration attempted
by S of S and Cripps v.ould be of any use, but we took over another
hour to compose the obituary notice Jtnnah said at once that the disagree-
ment with Congress was fundamental and could not be resolved, while
Nehru said that Congress had gone as far as possible and could not go
further J then said that Muslim League had gone a long way, while
Congress had not moved
It w as obvious that there was nothing more to be done and we should
have ended there by saving that we were putting out a Statement on
12-13 MAY I946 ^ 267
Thursday and asking both sides to hold tJicir hands till then, and that those
wretched letters which S of S and Crtpps had forced jinnah and Nehru
to write should not be published* at any rate till after our Statement If this
had been done clearly and directly, all would have been well But S of 5
is constitutionally jucapabJc of bang bne£ direct or decisive The result
was a long and uncdif) ing wrangle over the publication of the letters,
Jinnah wishing to publish, Congress quite willing not to do so (As an ex-
ample of the unwillingness of S of S to say anything direct, he satd that
we were contemplating* the issue of a Statement, knowing full well that
the Statement was written and the date serried, as I imagine inost of those
present knew) (A statement by Nehru seemed to me to indicate that he
had already a fairly intimate knowledge of the contents of the Statement,
he mentioned representation on a population basis of one per million)
Eventually it was agreed that publication should be withheld till the end
of the week, hut we became committed to eventual publication which
I think unfortunate The discussion became almost heated at one time,
with Jinnah saying that the whole Hindu Press would be mobilized to put
him in the wrong
So ends the second Simla Conference with much the same fate as the
first I was always very doubtful about it, 1 have nc\er attached the same
importance as the Mission to Congress and the League reaching agree-
ment, as I was pretty sure that they never would I still think we would
have done better to put our plan out at a much earlier stage However
this is a political show and my soldier's judgement and direct methods seem
crude and clumsy to them, though I still think I was nghf The Con-
ference I think did good up to that fatal meeting of the 1 ith, in my view
Again, perhaps I am wrong Also I think Cnpps' continued and daily
contacts with the Congress camp arc all wrong
The S of S told me rather to my horror that he was seeing Nehru
tomorrow morning, J am afraid that he is going to try to get him to agree
to concessions about the Executive Council which he failed to extract
from me, and that the S of S may be weak.
May j j
I saw Nehru and Jinnah this morning A note of these discussions is enclosed
The talk with Nehru u as confined to administrative matters such as the
proposal of some Provincial Governments to enlist IN A tneii m the Police
In the talk u tth Jitmah, « ho 'looked tired and i/f , Lord Wavell outlmed to
him his proposals for a isen Exectttive Council {Interim Goiernnsent), vtz
a Council of twelve (five from the Muslim Zjeagtie, five from Congress,
263
THE MISSION'S PROPOSALS
including a Scheduled Caste representative^ one SiUt, and one other) He said
that he did not hwu u J ether HM G uould accept this, hit if they dtd, he
thought * the Mushm League uould be nell advised to accept so favourable
a proportion He also expressed the hope that Jttmah u ottld reflect cdrefitlly
before refusing to sit u ith a Congress Muslim because as there uasa Congress
Ministry of Muslims m the NIVFP it might be diffaih to resist Congress
on this point
Jmnah listened carefully but madt little comment He seemed inclined to
agree it ith me that the Defence Member should be neither a Hindu nor a Muslim
He said that u hether or not the Muslim League came into the Interim
Government would depend on » hether our Statemetit seemed likely to offer
a solution of the long-term issue His fear it as that the Congress plan u as to get
control of the Central Got eminent* to shell e the fitndamental long term tssue t
and concentrate on getting control tn the Prot tnces He conld not come into the
Government wihss it u as on a basis of a long-term settlement satisfactory to
htm being tn aetv
I think this ts the nearest I have et ergot Mr Jitmah ton aids accepting the
p mibiltty of entering an Interim Government He did not commit himself tn
any u ay t but he did not ad pt an entirely unreasonable and non passutmts
attitude as has so often been his practice in the past 1
Just before lunch ue had three-quarters of an hour on the final draft
Statement and publicity arrangements After lunch I saw Short about the
Sikhs and Evan Jcnkim about the Punjab Both thought Baldev Sinch the
best bet as a Sikh for Council
Evan Jenbns seemed to think the Punjab could be kept in order Khizar
thought the offer of the Cabmet Mission *ould merely add to the
consmutional wreckage already lying around India We talked for an
hour on the situation in general He seemed to think the Punjab would
produce a reasonable amount of surplus food hy the methods he was
putting mto force and it was no use forcing matters by an Ordinance or
Direction by the Centre
Just before dinner I had at the S ofS He had as I suspected, been very
woouy with Nehru over the Execute Council and was woolly now
Mold him I could not remain responsible for India unless I had something
May 14
1*7/1 ** ^ (8 3 ° a ra " IO a "0 ^ *e Executive Council
but did no more I f rar than discourage the hopes the S of S had obvi-
ously given him ) esterday ,h« we * ould give in on the parity B sue and
1 3 — I S MAY I946 269
nuke a convention depriving the Vicero) of his powers and handing over
supreme control to the Interim Go\ crnmcnt I am sure we should have
been all right on both these questions if w c had been firm and definite
from the start, but the S of S *s vagueness and Crtpps' continuous courting,
flattery and appeasement of Confess ha\e led them to behe\e they can
get what they want Nehru talked of Vital forces' at w ork in the country
which must be taken into account, I said it was the business of a Govern-
ment to control and direct Vital forces' and 'mass sentiment* and 'funda-
mental issues* (which were the sort of phrases he used) and not to follow
them blind!) , they v ere usually ignorant and often misleading I told him
my father's favourite story of a French mob rushing on to some foolish-
ness which was obviously wrong, and a spectator stopping a man who
was following the mob and asking him why he did so his reply was
'mais ll faut que je les suive, je sins Uur cheF I don'r know whether
1 moved Nehru at all but I made it quite clear that I was quite definite and
not proposing to compromise
We went down the hill after an early lunch and got back to Delhi at
6 p m I saw C-in-C for a few minutes, he wanted to know the publicity
arrangements
Alexander and George Abell dined with me in my study and we talked
till 11 30 p m , partly about the course of action if the Parties reject our
Statement and partly reminiscence about Winston, etc A is first class
company and very sensible, I wish he had been leading the Delegation.
May 15
A long Indian day Delegation met at 9 30 a tn, to consider final publicity
arrangements What with Wireless, broadcasting. Press requirements, the
House of Commons, the time factor in three countries (India, U K,
U S A ) all requiring to be considered and satisfied, and a slip-up hkcly to
bring down the wrath of Press m any one of three countries, or of House
of Commons, or of E B C or A I R , it is a complicated business, WfoJe
we were snll considering it, the Cabinet's proposed amendments came m
They were obviously dictated by apprehension of what Winston and the
Opposition might say, and tried to re-iterate the possibiliry of independ-
ence within the British Commonwealth, the necessity for common defence
measures the benefits Co India from British rulc—atf calculated to arouse
suspicion of British intentions w hich the Delegation had been $0 careful to
*lky Cnpp* a*d even the S of S became qz lie fcfl^ ^
even began to talk of resignation Finally, I was dep utc d t0 a icph
to the P M , which went over the teleprinter at about 1 p ra and we sat*> J
Lord and Lady Wavell in the Mi ghal garden at the Viceroys
270 THE MISSION'S PROPOSALS
waited for an answ er till about 2 pm when 1 got hungry and went to
lunch At 3 p m they called me back— to say that P M had said that he
would answer before 4pm. They were still feeling rather bellicose and
inclined to send the P M an ultimatum, but quite glad to he advised that
it was unnecessar) and injudicious So I walked back again, and heard
about 4 pm* that the P M had given the all-clear
At 5 p m I saw that pleasant old gentleman the Nawab of Chhatarj,
who said that Simla was not all loss — we had narrowed the issue between
Congress and the League, got Pakistan defined at last, and proved H.M G s
sincerity, made his usual request (or rather his master's) for Berar and
a pott, and asked that if British troops ^ere removed from Secunderabad
they should not be replaced by Indian
At 6 p m. another meeting with the Delegation We spent some time
over the publication of the Simla letters — ►which Congress and M L want
to issue on Friday 1 reaffirmed my new on the disastrous effect this might
have, and w e agreed to try and defer it a few days Then we considered
the reply to a rather plaintive telegram from the P M over our refusal of
the Cabinet amendments Finally I dropped or threw a large b nek in the
pool of their complacency by demanding a discussion on the action to be
taken if one or both parties turned down our proposals Cnpps said in
effect 'scuttle' , but I demonstrated that this was just as bad a policy as
repression, and — the important thing from their point of view — likely to
be fatal to the Labour Party We then had a very useful hour on the gum
realities and awkward alternatives if our proposals w ere turned down
They had never considered them and I had to be brusque and challenging
to make them face them, I tried to stiffen them to be firm with Congress
over our Statement and to make it clear that if they turned it down they
would not get a better offer S of S was a little pained and shocked at my
attitude but I am sure it did good
Finally Francis Low came to dine and I showed him the Statement
He thought that though rather clumsy it was quite a good proposal and
might be acceptable as a long- term policy, hut Congress was reall\ inter-
ested in the short-term policy, the Interim Go\ eminent 1 explained to
him my views on this at some length. He has some influence with Con-
gress and will be helpful, I think.
May 16
D-Day for the Delegation's Statement* We began by tw o hours rather
inconcltisn e discussion on a paper by George Abell about the action to be
1 Appendix IL
Lord and Lady Wavell in the Afughal garden at the Viceroys House
1 5-1 <S MAY 1946
271
taken in the event of a deadlock and a mass movement by Congress.
C-in-C aws called m, but beyond deciding that neither repression nor
scuttle were practicable policies we did not get vcr) far
The rest of the morning I was trying to write a broadcast which always
bothers me and which, as usual, I had left till too late The result was
universally condemned by my staff, mainly on the ground that it contained
one or two reminders of difficulties ahead and did not foster the illusion
that independence was just round the next corner My reaction was that
there has been quite enough, and more than enough, appeasement and
pandering of Congress and that it was time realities were faced I was
reminded of Kiphng*s couplet
*No doubt but ye are the People — your throne is above the Kings
Whoso speaks in your presence must say acceptable things *
At 4 30 p m. Alexander and I saw Bhopal He had little to say on the
Statement
Then came the Sikhs (Baldcv Singh and Master Tara Singh) Baldev
said little and I believe was relieved on the whole, but Tara Smgh launched
mto a declamatory jeremiad on the wrongs and oppressions of the Sikhs
and their need for an area completely their own, which ts impossible
Finally, Azad and Nehru from Congress Azad said little and seemed
reasonably satisfied, or else was content to witlihold judgement Nehru
seemed to me worried and nervous and therefore a little inclined to be
aggressive He concentrated mainly on the States, said the provisions
about them were vague, was dissatisfied with the idea of the Rulers
appointing the representatives or even the negotiating Committee, and
obviously has it in mmd to get rid of Princely rule as soon as possible
I warned him against too hasty attempts at democratization He also said
the document was not definite enough on independence I pointed out that
it was the whole keynote of the Statement and was mentioned in the first
paragraph and in the last But it turned out that what Nehru was thinking
about was immediate independence, in the Interim period, in fact he
disclosed almost nakedly the real Congress objective — immediate control
of the Centre* so that they can deal with Muslims and Princes and then
make at leisure a Constitution to suit themselves I warned him again that
made He passed over the joining of Assam to Bengal without much
comment, accepting the explananon that geographical reasons made it
necessary Finally they said they would send Congress views m writing
in a couple of days Then that business of the publicanon of those wretched
EUC9 T
272 THE MISSION^ PHOFOSALS
letters from Simla came up Azad and Nehru said they would be agreeable
to postponement if Jinnah agreed
Meanwhile S of S and Cnpps had been seeing Gandhi and the Muslim
League They reported it had gone fairly well, but I have a strong suspicion
that Gandhi was offered more incense of appeasement The Simla Delega-
tion, less Jamah, represented the League and apparently took it senously
and quietly They asked whether Bengal and Assam would be able to
join the N W Group if they wished, and whether there would be an)
power to secede from the Union
Then at 7 p m, to a rather hostile Council, who had just read the State-
ment Ambedkar was grimly dissatisfied that the Scheduled Castes had
not received better treatment, Azizul Huque voiced the personal griev-
ances of Members at not know ing the date of their demise % old Md
Usman sang a hymn of hate against the Punjab for not delivering grain to
his starving Province, and Rowlands was brusquely negative to Benthall
over possible means to avert a railway strike Not a pleasant Council, but
nothing to what I am likely to have with a new Council
Afay 17
Revised broadcast and wrote a warning to S of S to be firm and definite
about maintaining the present Constitution in the Interim period at the
Press conference they are attending
Broadcast went not too badly* 1 think*
May 18
Hutchings came to see me before Council meeting, and we discussed the
food situation generally, especially as regards Punjab procurement.
In Council on food we decided to send a letter to the Punjab pressing
them to take certain measures, but it is really more to save face than m
hope of practical results We then discussed the latest estimate, which
seems to show we may hold out till September anyway if all goes well and
that a cut in the ration may not be necessary
Delegation had met at 12 noon, they had had several hours with Gandhi,
they always think — or Cnpps does — that they swing the old man, person-
all) I believe it is the other way about, and that if only they were firmer
and more definite we should have less trouble I delivered myself of a small
but vigorous oration on the danger of letting Congress have their own
way and on their objectives in the Interim period, 1 e to obtain control
of the Centre rather than constitution-making I wondered at the time
I<S-I p MAY 1946
whether 1 had been a Iutlc aggressive, but Tunibull told George afterwards
that 1 was perfectly right to uarn them
May 19
Jinnah sent a message late last night that he hoped to call his League
general body about the middle of June, arid could take no decision till
then t and why %^crc uc tn such a hurr) ' So we arranged for Liaquat to
come and sec Delegation at 11 am Li squat 1 came and said it was im-
possible for the League to meet an) earlier as by its Constitution members
had to have a fortnight's notice Cnpps and S of S argued at length that
such constitutional rules could and must be broken m an emergency and
that they could not possibly wait for a month Liaquat after 'being silent
to a brief* for some time agreed to telephone Jinnah and press him
Cnpps then told me very briefly the result of about seven hours talk
with Gandhi, whose main points had been (a) whether the procedure of
the Constituent Assembly could be modified without the consent of the
two main parties, (b) that paramountcy should be terminated at once,
(c)the position of the NWFP and Assam, (d) whether Europeans in
Bengal would join Constituent Assembly, (e) removal or anyway non-
use of British Troops in Interim period, (f) parity in Executive Council,
(g) representation of Baluchistan in Constituent Assembly Cnpps claimed
to have satisfied him on every point without giving away anything, but
I have strong doubts, and kept on emphasising the need to be firm and
definite I elicited from Cnpps that he did think the Govemor-Generars
powers could be limited by convention, and I am quite sure that he has
encouraged Congress in this belief We decided that I should go on with
the negotiations for Interim Go\ ernment
Liaquat came again at 5 15 p m after a talk to Jinnah on the telephone,
and said that J was calling the Working Committee of the League for
June 3 and 4. and the Council for June 5, and begged not to be hutned as it
would take time to persuade his people to aceept the proposals The
Delegation had to agree rather reluctantly They then produced a letter
from Gandhi the first of the Congress efforts to wreck the Groups of
Provinces This is what the Delegation has let itself m for by not standing
ftim *S£Ti& iaSatcvt tm trai Strfienrezfi. , iWj Wft Vrati Vrtyori 'WVtYi
Gandhi, and this is the result, the clever attempt of an able and unscrupu-
lous politician to torpedo the whole plan I told the Delegation in plain
language that we were sunk if we qualified the Statement or argued about
1 Jinnah was ill at this time
2?4 the mission's PROPOSALS
it on lawyers* points, our only chance was to stand firm, and refuse to
argue But they won't do it, I fear
In hts letter Gandhi referred to Paragraph JJ of the Statement whtcfi
prw\ded t inter aha,_/or Pro vmces firming Groups wtth their own executives
and legislatures^ and inquired whether those who welcomed the Statement
hat disliked Grouping could honestly seek to educate the country and the
Constituent Assembly against the provisions fir Grouping, and, if the answer
was *yes J , whether it u r ottld not follow that the Frontier and Assam delegates
would be free to abstain from joining the Sections of the Assembly to which
they were arbitrarily assigned
Wat ell noted m the margin ' The answer must be a very definite and decided
No .
May 20
A really dramatic morning Delegation met at p 30 a m to consider the
reply to Gandhi's letter. Cnpps produced a long argumentative reply,
Alexander a shorter but also giving reasons, I recommended two brief
paragraphs returning a negative answer on both points raised by Gandhi
I kept warning them against Gandhi and of the danger of being drawn
into argument with him and how he would twist your words and that the
only chance was to be firm and definite 1 drew rather a heated reply from
Cripps while S of S looked at me rather sadly, thinking obviously
what a rough "Wimpish soldier 1 Avas, and how unjust my suspicions of
Gandhi Just then he was handed a further letter from Gandhi and read it
out I have never seen three men taken more aback by this revelation of G
in his true colours Cripps and S of S were shaken to the core, while
Alexander's reactions were pure John Bull at his most patriotic and in-
sular After sitting for a while — Cripps quite ahun 1 , S of S sadly dis-
illusioned, Alexander boiling with indignation and myself refraining
with a little difficulty from saying *I told you so , we agreed to think it
over and meet again at 3 p m If it were not so tragic and dangerous, it
would also have been amusing to see the sudden change in the three men
In thts second letter {Appendix Itt) Gandhx discutsed at tame length the
other points that he had raised in talks with Cripps and the Secretary of State
and on which Cripps claimed to have satisfied him It was very clear that
Gandhi was far from satisfied The Secretary of State said that thts tetter greatly
misrepresented u hat had passed m their interview with htm and he was now
coflvmcf a* that nobody should see Gandhi apart from other members of the
Delegation and without a note being taken Alexander said that Gmtdhi clearly
19-22 MAY I946 275
did not it ant a setttemettt on the basts of the Statement and that hts tetter
grossly misrepresented the Deleg it tons position
I then saw Bcnthall about Europeans joining the Constituent Assembly,
and the railn ay strike, which he hopes to avert by negotiation He was
followed by Ambcdkar about his proposal to raise the percentage for
Depressed Classes in government service
From 3-4 30 p m. wc discussed the reply to Gandhi, and while we were
doing so a letter from Azad armed containing the official Congress reply
and raising most of G 's points We sent a fairly stiff reply to Gandhi and
decided to sleep on Azad*s letter
Then I had i£ hours with Nehru about the Interim Government He
kept on about the necessity for immediate independence and the im-
possibility of parity, and I kept steadily on our determination (nunc really)
not to gi\ e way on these issues I don t know whether I made any effect,
I did m the end get him down to reluctant discussion of names He kept
talking of *vital forces' and I insisted on jobs to be done and men to do
them.
Then to a party for Provincial Premiers and Development Ministers
who \\ ere holding a Conference Finally I had the S of S to dine and
tried to bolster him into firmness about Azad s letter, and then suggested
that a holiday would do the Delegation good
May 21
Delegation met 10 a m.-i2 noon and did not get very much further with
the reply to Congress letter, none of us much like the others' drafts, and
Cripps, our chief drafter, is in hospital, with dysentery We decided to
think it over and meet again tomorrow
May 22
We had two hours with Delegation 10-12 on the draft reply to Azad,
and with some difficulty arrived at a new draft to be retyped and discussed
again after lunch- We met again at 2 30 p m and in about 40 minutes or
so passed a final draft — a small mouse after all these mountainous labours
of drafting but one which I hope the Congress cat may find it difficult to
get its claws into
A crucial passage tn this tetter was the following *YIt«# are aware of the
reasons for the grouping of the Provinces, and this ts an essential feature of
the scheme which can only he modified by agreement between the two parties *
S of S then raised the question of our action in case the offer was not
27(5 THE MISSION'S PROPOSALS
accepted and tilings went badly I gave an impromptu appreciation which
was quite well received but which I shall now have to reduce to writing
This morning just after lunch I saw Mahtab, Premier of Onssa about
his proposed conference with the Onssa States He is a reasonable and
rather attractive person who is on the Working Committee and he told
me that Congress had decided to accept the Scheme
Council went off quietly, this Council is practically moribund now,
and I think m a mood to pass almost anything
May 2$
Azad and Nehru for ii hours over Interim Government I put a list of
names to them to which they did not offer very much comment but said
they would write to me after consulting Working Committee They kept
on again about the Independence question i e that the new Government
should be virtually a sovereign government, answerable only to the Central
Assembly — 'the will of the Indian people* — and I kept steadily stone-
walling They were quite friendly
Corfleld came later m the morning to show me a letter from Bhopal
expressing his wish to abdicate at an early dare in favour of his daughter
I w onder what that old fox: has m mind I don't think he has cold feet or
is tiring of ruling he is an ambitious man
At 4 p m we had i} hours in the Delegation over the draft provisions
for elections to the Constituent Assembly The S of S was making very
heavy weather o\ er it all and the First Lord was also rolling and pitching
a hit S of S is very worried over the European vote in Bengal which is
an awkward problem I rather suspect that he and Cnpps committed
themselves to Gandhi rather further than they admit
In Section C {Bengali Assam) of the projected Constituent Assembly the
numbers were going to he very evenly balanced {$6 Muslims and 34 non-
Muslims), and therefore the voting of the few Europeans might be crucial The
Muslim League tt anted the Europeans to vote so as to ensure their majority ttt
this Section Tlie Congress objected to Europeans taking any part both on
principle and bumse it u ouliS dummsh their chances of preventing a Muslim
League majority Tlie Europeans were quite willing to refrain from voting,
fatt were afraid that if they disclosed their intentions too soon tt tmght dis-
courage the Muslim League from accepting the proposals
Burrows Governor 01 Bengal arrived to stay, in good and refreshing
form He says he gets on well with Suhrawardy who is straight with
him — after tiding it on once 01 twice and realising that B was not to be
23-25 MAY ! 94 6
277
bounced, I gather — but that he would not trust htm as far as across the
street He thinks S is determined to remain in office, *at least till he can
re-coup the election expenses* t and will press Jinnah hard to accept the
offer He believes it will he fatal for Europeans* interests if they elect
themselves to the Constituent Assembly and says he has advised them to
that effect and that they agree
May 24
1 J hours in morning with Delegation and Burrows, B explained the
general reactions to the Statement in Bengal, which w ere on the whole
favourable He thinks that whatever happens the Hindus wilf control
Bengal within a few years of a new Constitution coming into being We
then discussed at some length the position of the Europeans and Burrows
repeated what he had said to me last night There is little doubt m my
mind that the S of S and Cnpps really committed themselves pretty
deeply over this matter of the Europeans in their talks with Gandhi —
those fatal 7 hours
Letter from Azad in evening enclosing Congress Resolution on lines
of his previous letter not very helpful
In their Resolution of 24 May, the Congress Working Committee stalled,
saying that 'm the absence of a full picture 9 theyu ere unable at this stage to give
a final opinion on the Delegations proposals They reiterated the objections
that they (and Gandhi) hdd previously raised to these proposals, in particular
they claimed that, according to their interpretation of the Delegation's State-
ment, it was not obligatory on a Province to enter the Section m which tt had
been placed (They had been expressly told that their interpretation u as
incorrect and that Group ino was an essential feature of the scheme )
They also said that the Interim Government (which they termed the
Provisional National Government) must function as a cabinet responsible to
the Central Legislature and must be in fact, if not tn law, virtually independent
They said that the status, powers, and composition of this Provisional Govern-
ment a ould have to he defined to ettable than to come to a dtctston on the
Delegations proposals
May 25
Spent nearly all day drafting — by myself an appreciation 1 for the Delega-
tion w ith the Delegation a statement* m amvi er to the Congress statement
1 This important and fare ghted appreciat on of the s tuation that was likely to anse if the
Delegation s proposals failed and of the general policy to be adopted m that event is given
with some abbreviat on in Appendix tV
* This statement is given in full ai Appendix V Paragraph 8 and Paragraphs io-ii were
of considerable importance
278 THE MISSION'S PROPOSALS
— concise, clear and firm, I hope, but it will not please Congress Tw o
more letters from Azad in the c\ cmng and one from Nehru — I fancy they
aie quite in a fuss and jam too, trying to counter the left wmg— Jzi
Prakash Narain & Co — and a very peevish Gandhi I gather
These letters were mainly concerned with the Congress demand that the
Interim Government shoitU have the status m fact, if not tn Uu>, of a truly
national government and function like a Dominion Cabinet
May 26
S of S came and woffled for an hour, about nothing special* mainly the
Interim Government and powers of G-G Then I had over an hour with
Nehru, to reply to his letter It went much as visual, and was quite friendly
but I don't know whether cither of us persuades the other much, though
we get on quite well The more I see of Nehru, the better I like him.
Otherwise a. quiet day Cnpps is still in hospital Alexander has gone off
to Trincomalee to see the Fleer, the Congress Working Committee has
broken up, Jinnah is still in Simla
In the evening a dinner of my Council, to say farewell to Rowlands and
Thorn e Short speeches by sen; Benthall, Rowlands and Thome
The following ' Note for talk with Pandit Nehru* indicates what IVai ell
said to htm
I regret all our talks seem to have led to nothing apparently except
a feeling of frustration and disappointment on your part Our oudook is
of course bound to be different quite apart from the question of race and
traditions, I look at the immediate future of India from the practical point
of view, while you seem to be entirely sentimental My whole lite has
been devoted to keeping law and order and peace as far as possible, your
outlook is that of a revolutionary
I must also say that I feel depressed and disappointed in the conversa-
tions, disappointed at what seems to me a complete lack of reality m the
Congress attitude To be quite frank, they seem to me to be thinking much
more of party pohncs and party advantage, than of the good of India as a
whole
Congress are practically asking us to hand over India to a single party,
a parry which is deeply distrusted by all Muslims, by Rulers of States and
quite a proportion of their people, and by quite a number of other people
m India
We are asked to guarantee complete independence to a Government
under the control of this party, before we know whether it and the
2$-2% MAY I946
279
Muslims can work together, and while its objective in the States seems to
be to cause agitation against the Rulers
We arc hound to have some suspicion that the objective of Congress is
to secure control of the centre, entirely eliminate British influence, and
then deal with the Muslims and States with a high hand We are asked to
guarantee independence and to hand over complete control to a Govern-
ment responsible to a Central Legislature which has a Hindu majority
Such a policy seems to us hound to lead to a complete refusal of the
Muslims to co-operate, to break up the Indian Army on which the defence
of India depends and to cause chaos in India which may lead to another
World war We feel wc are bound to sec that there is a good prospect of
order and peace in India before wc hand over control completely
Our attitude is not, as you seem to suspect, prompted by a desire to
retain power for powers sake, but to give India the best possible chance
of success as an independent nation We are giving you a chance of a
United India, and I think it may be the last chance, and arc prepared to
give every possible help to you to obtain n But we are not prepared
simply to abdicate to one political party
If you are unable to see the difference between the proposed new
Council and the old one, I am afraid that I cannot help you, it seems to me
to be an entirely different thing And I can assure you that H.M.G will
treat a coalition Government working for the good of India as a whole,
with a very light hand But it docs seem to us that the only possible chance
of getting such a Government is that it really should be a Coalition Govern-
ment in which the Muslims will feel that they are not at the mercy of a
Hindu majority This will undoubtedly entail concession to the Muslims
in the matter of numbers
As regards the States, I do not propose to defend the Rulers as a
whole or the present system as a whole But to carry on agitation against
the Rulers at this juncture seems to me an extremely foolish procedure
Any Government is bound to react against agitation against itself And
we surely do not want disorderly revolution in the States at the present
moment It can only harden the whole attitude of the Princes
May 2$
Benthall came in at 10 a m about the Railway strike threat The railway-
man are &penmg their mouths very wade We decided to get Nehru and
Liaquat who were in Delhi, and discuss the matter with them. This was
done at 4 p m they did not commit themselves but seemed to realise the
unreasonableness of the men s demands and the danger of giving way to
them.
2%0
the mission's proposals
Claude Auchinleck came m the evening, and said that he agreed entirely
with my appreciation [Appendix IV] and would have the measures
necessary to implement it examined
May 2p
A long meeting of Council m the morning, three hours Food, coal,
demobilization, control of minerals, lend-lease agreement "with USA
nil took a certain amount of time, hut were not very controversial then
came the very difficult question of the threatened railway strike I was
sure we must face it and refuse to he blackmailed any further , hut some of
Council were rather timid and woolly In the end we got only a fairly
satisfactory solution to offer some compensation in the lower grades and
a ver^ limited adjudication if they refuse it
Old Md Us man came to say good-b} e after Council, he is departing
to Madras, to await the formation of a new Government He has been
a lo\al old thing and entirely disapproves of the new order
May 30
In the afternoon I had a short session with the S of S over the draft letter
to Azad about the Interim Government and the protests of the Sikhs S of
5 wanted to reply to A2ad by inviting him and Nehru to come and discuss
the whole matter again, but I refused resolutely to propose it I have
a feeling however, that S of S will, sooner or later, have such a talk and
wit commit himself to something vague and woolly We decided that
nothing much could be done for the Sikhs except to try and persuade
theiru
A letter was settt by the Viceroy to Azad on 30 May and is of importance
as it was the basts on which the Congress subsequently entered the Interim
Government It ts reproduced below
1 have received your letter of 25th May on the Interim Government
2 We have discussed this matter on several occasions and I recognise
the importance that you and your party attach to a satisfactory definition
of the powers of the Interim Government and appreciate your reasons for
asking for such a definition My difficulty is that the most liberal mtennons
may be almost unrecognisable when they have to be expressed in a formal
document
3 I am quite clear that I did not state to ) on that the Interim Govern-
Cons Utu rional position is entirely different I said that I uas sure that His
2$Z
THE MISSION'S PROPOSALS
So end two months of negotiation without an) decision Perhaps ^e
shall get one in June, and very much good work has been done by the
Delegation, but 1 shall riot alter my view that a more firm and definite
lmc and less pandering to the Congress, would ha\c produced quicker
and better results*
I am disappointed to miss the Victory Parade in London but it is
impossible to get aw a) I am feeling stale and o\ cr-w orked, not sleeping
\crj well, and waking up depressed and worried I think the strain of
sc%en )cirs heavy responsibility without i proper rest is beginning to tell
on me. How c\ cr t I expect I shall manage to carry on, though w ithout
much enthusiasm for the work, Indian politics and Indian politicians arc
dnhcartening to deal with, and w c British seem to hat e lost faith in our-
seh cs and the courage to go \ cni at present But w c ha\ c staitsJ to do that
often enough before tn out history, and rcco\ ctcd. And I ha\e seen too
many dark and apparent!) hopeless situations turn out all right since 1039
to lose hope oxer this one.
12
THE MISSION'S FAILURE
June t
Wj lie and Twynam, from UP an d C P came for week-end I saw them
at 4 p iil, and at 4,45 the S of S and Alexander came and we talked nil
nearly 7 p m Afterwards, S of S wanted to know about the railway
strike and also talked about the Intcnm Gov crnmcnt I am convinced that
he and Cnpps have in some way committed themselves to Congress over
this, and that is why wc are having all this trouble
June 2 {Sunday)
I talked to Wyhc and Twynam in the morning Wyhe was \ cry certain
that any withdraw al from India would be disastrous and tliat wc could
deal with a revolt. But like every one else he had no idea of where we went
from there, after repression, unless we were prepared to govern on die
old terms for another 10 or 15 years He was womed about the large
number of Europeans who would he isolated at Nairn Tal in case of
trouble He hoped that the food problem would be all nght and did not
take as gloomy a view as J P [Snvastava] did the other day, hut said that
the complete inefficiency of his Government was a hampering factor His
Home Member Kidwai was a thoroughly had man
Twynam had not a great deal to say about the C P hut all his 1 C S
people would retire as soon as possible, he thought and were anxious
about compensation terms
At 11 45 a m the Delegation came, and wc spent nearly two hours
on the draft telegram to the P M , without reaching any final decision
except that practically all the courses open to us in the event of a break-
down were disastrous and unworkable We decided to think it over till
tomorrow
I wrote a note to P S V on a possible breakdown plan
This note t somewhat abbreviated, is reproduced below
I have been thinking agam over the problem of our action if the present
proposals break down, hut have not managed to arrive at anything much
more definite It is very difficult to choose a line of action, until one is able
to see how the crisis is brought about
THE MISSION'S FAILURE
2 If the breakdown comes through the refusal of the Muslim League
to take part m the Interim Government or Constituent Assembl) , or if
they make impossible conditions. Congress will undoubtedly expect us
to go ahead without them If we do not fulfil their expectations, they
will accuse us of bad faith, and I should expect a crisis to arise almost
at once
1 think that all wc could do would be to call the leader* together and
make one last effort to get them to sec reason We should inform the
Muslim League that we must go ahead with handing over independence
to India, in spite of their intransigence, and that while wc do not intend to
assist Congress to enforce Hindu domination, wc have no intention at all
of assisting the Muslim League to a complete Pakistan We should remind
Congress of their repeated assertions that they will allow independence
to those parts of the country winch desire it t and that uc propose to
maintain the present position m the Muslim-majority provinces until we
can consider further The other Provinces (and I suppose these must include
the N W F P and Assam) will be summoned to the Constituent Assembly,
and will proceed to devise their Provincial constitutions, and any groups
they may wish to form, but not at present a Union Government
The choice for the Interim Central Government would be between a
purely official Government, and a Government of Congress with Muslims
represented by officials or non-League Muslims
I do not think that this arrangement would satisfy anyone, but it might
possibly gain us a little time for further consideration
3 If the Congress refuse, while the Muslim League agree, it will mean
that the Congress left-wing has gained the upper hand. In this event,
we should obviously have to allow Muslims to go on with their own
constitution-making in Groups 3 and C, I think we should have to stick
to our grouping, and if N W F P or Assam refuse to send representatives
to the Group Constitution-making-bodies carry on without them
In the rest of India, wc should invite the Provincial Assemblies to elect
representatives to a Constituent Assembly for the Hindustan Provinces,
to decide on the Provincial constitutions and any grouping they wished
The plan would m fact be to try and carry on with the Constitution for
the Provinces and Groups, leaving the Centre in abeyance
I think the Central Government would have to be an official one, I do
not think it will be feasible to have Muslim League leaders on it with no
Congee** representatives
I should not expect this glan to succeed, there would be widespread
communal outbreaks all over India — in the Muslim provinces as well as
m the Hindustan provinces, I think, and it would become increasingly
difficult to maintain law and order
2-3 JUNE I946
285
4 In die end, wc are really faced with the same alternatives — rep res s ion
or withdrawal If it is decided that repression is not a practical proposition,
w e arc left with the various alternatives of withdrawal a complete and
immediate withdrawal from all India , which is unthinkable, withdrawal
by a certain date, which is I think equally impracticable, and a partial
withdrawal, to northern India
There is m tact no alternative, which is m any way satisfactory, to
ob taming agreement, and wc must exercise every possible resource at our
command to do so But lack of resolution is the most fatal possible thing,
and we must make up our minds what our pohcy is to be
5 What then arc wc to say to HMG, and what policy arc we to
decide on* I think that something 011 the lines of the present draft
telegram will do f but the telegram should lead up to the conclusion that
if repression is ruled out and complete withdrawal equally so, a partial
withdrawal to the Muslim-majority Provinces of North-Wcst and North-
East India is the only practicable course w c can see, but that it is not a good
one and must be avoided if possible
6 I have been unable to think of anything better than the above so far
Will you come down and discuss it with me after golf has cleared our
minds, I hope 7
A telegram substantially on these lutes u as sent to the Cabinet on j June
It was proposed, tn the watt of a break with Congress, to gtve t in effect
independence to Southern and Central India and to maintain the existing
position m North-West and North-East India This 11 as what Wavcll
had recommended in Paragraph 11-12 of his appreciation dated 30 May
(Appendix IV)
June 3
I saw Jinnah at 10 a m , he seemed to be in good heart He said he could
not give me names for the Interim Government until after he had seen
his Council, but I got the impression that the M L would probably come
in He asked about the correspondence with Azad which had been reported
in the Press, and I showed him a copy of my last letter to Azad 1 He made
no comment, except to discourse on the way Congress always continued
to haggle and ask for concessions He then went on to complain that the
Muslims had nor been given parity m the Union Legislature, and stressed
the very great concession he had made in agreeing to a Union at alU
with a disquisition on the Canadian Constitution He then asked what we
1 The letter dated jo May, see p 2&0
236
THE MISSION^ fAILURE
should do if the M L came m and Congress refused I had anticipated this
query and had consulted S of S through P S V. I told him that the M L,
would certainly not suffer by its readiness to w ork the Delegation scheme,
and that the intention was to go ahead with the scheme aj far as possible
with any party who would work for it He asked for something more
specific before he met his Working Committee at 6 p m, and I said 1 could
do nothing more without consulting the Delegation He said the nutter
was of \ cry great importance and asked me to do so Wc then Iiad some
further talk about the Sikhs and Patliam, and he left after an hour (By the
way t Ian Scott 1 told me out riding this morning that Bhopal had told his
doctor that the reason he was preparing to abdicate was that he might
become Defence Minister in die Interim Government T )
At II am. wc had over two hours again on the draft telegram to the
P Jkl, on action in the e\ cnt of a breakdown, it seems to get longer and
woollier the more wc work on it. I got permission to give Jinnah a verbal
assurance that we would work with the ML if they accepted and Con-
gress refused, so summoned him. again for 4 p m After lunch I dictated
a form of assurance to Jinnah. In this I told him that though the Delegation
could not give him a written assurance of what its action would be in the
event of the breakdown of the present negotiations, I could give him, on
behalf of the Delegation, my personal assurance that we did not propose
to make any discrimination in the treatment of cither party, and that we
should go ahead with the plan laid down in our statement so far as circum-
stances permit, if cither party accepts, but we hoped that both would
I asked him not to make this assurance public* hue simply to say to his
Working Committee, if necessary, that he was satisfied on this point
The Delegation approved the assurance and also produced one from
Cnpps which amounted practically to the same thing f showed them to
Jinnah at 4 p m. and he seemed satisfied. He then asked me one or two
<quesnons of detail would it be obligatory on the Chairman of the
Constituent Assembly to accept the opinion of the Federal Court — on
which 1 read him Spens T * opinion, could provincial Assemblies nominate
anyone outside the Province for the Constituent Assembly r to which I
said } es, and was there any objection to members of the Interim Govern-
ment being also members of the C A — Avhich was one I had not thought
o£ He then went on to the election of a representative from Baluchistan,
1 Ian (later Sir Tan) Scott ICS, had succeeded George Abell as Deputy Private Secre-
tary to the Viceroy
a Sir Patrick Spens who had succeeded Sir Maurice Gwyer a Chief Justice of India in
1943 gave the opinion that acceptance of the Federal Court i advice shouLi be obligatory
on the Chairman of the Constituent Assembly
7
.4-
4
a
E
3
3
-1
*0
Is
5*
3 JUNE I946
287
about which apparently unimportant matter both parties seem very
concerned
Prom 4 30-6 30 p ni* \\c continued on that telegram to the P M t and
finally got it drafted. I fancy its contents will be a severe shock to die
Cabinet. Then the S of S started again — with the support of Cnpps who
was present— on the matter of a further assurance to the Congress over the
powers of the Interim Government, He wanted to discuss the whole
matter again with Nehru and Azad I deprecated this to the point of
pro\ oking an outburst from S of S t and said that on no account would I
be a parry to any further unilateral concession to Congress, if there was to
be any convention or statement it must be joindy accepted by Congress
and M L Wc had quite an unpleasant ten minutes , but I entirely refused
to give way The fact is, I am quite sure, that Cnpps or S of S or both
have committed themselves to Congress to secure some statement, S of S
admitted to having written a letter to Nehru while up at Simla It has
I think, been die banc of the Mission that it has been unable to keep away
from continual personal contacts with Congress, and so have been unable
to remain really impartial S of S still goes for a walk w ith Agatha
Harrison' nearly every morning, I believe Alexander hacked me He
dined alone with me afterwards and said that Cnpps was quite capable
of making out at home, if the scheme failed, that it was because he,
Alexander, had backed the Viceroy in being intransigent I like Alexander
\ ery much, he is intelligent, honest and amusing, he has rather a surprising
knowledge of poetry
In a letter to the Secretary of State dated 2 June Wavell had strongly
deprecated unilateral concessions to Congress m regard to the pouers of the
Interim Government for the reasons given m the following passage *It seetns
to me that there ts a tendency to overlook the fact that the proposed Interim
Government will be a coalition, and that these demands for conventions and
eoticesswtts come at present from one party only If we receive a combined
readiest from both political parties with regard to the powers of the Governor-
General or to the responsibility to the Central Legislature t we should obviously
have to consider it very carefiilly, but these concessions to one party are merely
likely to have the result of deterring the other party from joining tlie Interim
Government 9 Tlie fact ts that Juinah and the Muslim League did not want
the Governor-General s powers to be whittled away as they looked on these
powers as affording some protection against Congress dictation
1 Miss Agatha Him son was a fhend of C F Andrews (a missionary and associate of
Gandhi in South Africa and later in India) and through htm had met Gandhi when he
visited Loudon in x 93 1 for the Round Table Conference She was Secretary of a small group
of Quakers known as the India Conciliation Group
D left u
288
THE MISSION'S FAILURE
June _j
Council this moniiiighad only four manbcxs Sn\astava Kltaie, k*.vzx&
Huquc, Hytlaii We decided tku Food should not be a weekly item any
longer J P S who had been, to the U P was suddenly optimistic again
and rather loquacious
June 6
The Muslim League has accepted by a large majority Now the real battle
begins and the great question is whether the Delegation will stand up to
Congress or not* Parity in the Interim Government may be the main
issue I am afraid that Cnpps and P L, arc so much committed that they
will be unable or unwilling to he firm with Congress
We saw the SuMis this afternoon Tara Singh and Baldev Singh On the
whole I think it went fairly \\ ell We told them that agitation and disturb-
ances could only be harmful to their cause and would not be tolerated and
tried to persuade them that if they kept calm and used their influence they
would be able to secure their position in the Punjab The trouble is that
the Sikhs have never forgotten that they once owned the Punjab that they
have been rather spoilt in the past that they ha\ e no political sense and
an exaggerated idea of their own abilities and importance
June 7
S of S came in for a talk about noon He reverted to the suggestion that
Maurice Gwyer 1 might he of assistance to me as an expert on Constitu-
tional Law He also recommended to me Ghosh, 3 whom he described as
Gandhis Mercury (he is an official in Tatas I believe) He said that he
understood that my letter to Azad had been well received hut that Birla
(I think probably at Patel s request) had been attacking on the parity issue
I said Vt e must stand firm on this
At 7 p m I had an hour with Jinnah on the Interim Government Not
very successful He said the League would only come in on the 5 5 2
formula on which he claimed I had given him an assurance I said that
I had not, though it was die formula to w Inch I was still working * He
wanted the Defence Portfolio for himself and Foreign AHairs and
Planning for two of his followers
1 Sir Mauncc Gwjer hiving ceased to be Chef Justice stayed on tn Delhi as V ct-
Chaaccllor of Delhi University
* Sudhir Ghosh, ? ftcngjli ^bo aj a student at Cambridge had been in touch with the
Qiuken India Conciliation Group and later wa* associated with the Friend* Ambulance
Ucui m fiisune rdicf ork ui BetLgaL Author of the h<xk Gtiadh i i Emu&sr/ (London 19&7>
J See record of talk with Jinoah on pp 67-8
5-X I JUNE I946
289
June JO
Azad 2nd Nehru came to sec the Delegation at 12 noon And raised two
issues the \otc of the Europeans m Bengal and tht parity issue The
Delegation did not give way on cither, though the Cabinet Ministers do
not really bchc\ c in pant) , and Congress 1$ pla) nig on this Nehru struck
me as a little unbalanced in some of his statements
It is obviously more a matter of prestige now than an) thing else, and
it looks rather like touch and go Nehru said they could not possibl)
accept parity, but he said it rather with the air of the dealer who hopes for
a slightly better bid.
I started to ha\ c a note drafted for the Delegation to take home
IVavell began drafting tins note at a moment uhen hopes ran high that the
Delegation, due to leai e for home before the end of the month* might witness
an Interim Government in being before thetr departure and a Constituent
Assembly summoned He u arnedthem that even if tins much had been achieved
the Indian problem tt ouldstill by no means be solved Both the Interim Govern-
ment and the Constituent Assembly u ould be difficult to hold together and
Congress and Muslim League uould undoubtedly continue to pursue the
conflicting aims they had never abandoned In addition, there u as a strong
element m Congress that u as hkety to raise agitation in the States and in that
case the Rulers might decline to alter into a Federation HMG must therefore
have 4 policy prepared to meet a possible early breakdown and not wait until
a crisis arose He laid great stress on the weakness of the existing government
machine*, the dwindling number of British officers in the ICS aitd the likeli-
hood of divided loyalties m the Indian Army and Police He also stressed that
the Indian Interim Government u ould hai e to be handled with the greatest
tact and forbearance It would undoubtedly be proiocattve and tiresome tn
a great many of its acts and resolutions, and a great deal would have to be put
up with that H \IG might neither approve nor consider wise
He suggested that, if possible, HMG should come to an understanding
with the Opposition to take India out of party politics, any it ay for the next
six months
June 11
At 10 am the Delegation came and we talked for an hour and a half
PL 1 was all for seeing Gandhi Alexander was bitterly opposed and ^ent
so far as to threaten to go straight home if P L insisted Alexander is
1 He hid been informed by 3VU« Itamson. and Sudtur Ghosh, that Gandhi wn likely to
throw his whole weight against parity and that the only hope of preventing this was to see
Gandhi
20 O THE MISSION'S FAILURE
completely mistrustful now of G and all bis ways Cnpps suggested an
interview between myself, Jinn ah and Nehru None of the Cabinet
Ministers are prepared to face a breakdown over the parity issue and were
inclined to press Hie on it I threw out the suggestion of a Cabinet on the
British principle, with other Ministers not members of the Cabinet as
a possible solution Cnpps was rather in favour of it
We finally decided that I should see jinnah and Nehru and try to
arrange a Government, while P L went off* determined to see Gandhi and
A V A stopped behind to tell me how much he disliked the idea While
we wete talking, George Abell came in with a message that G realty
wanted to see me, and A V A at once said he had no objection to this
G turned up rather suddenly and unexpectedly at about 12 35 p m. ana
I had about 40 minutes with him He said he was thoroughly anxious for
a settlement and agreed that a coalition was necessary He said that parity
was of no account nor whether the members belonged to the Congress or
the League, provided they vvere the best men available, I suggested that
perhaps the best course would be for me to sec Jmnah and Nehru together
and to endeavour to amve at an agreed composition for the Interim
Government with thern He agreed that the meeting should be between
Jinnah and Nehru since he realized the difficulty of Azad meeting Jinnah
He advised me to pm them down to make a Government and not allow
them to leave the room until they had done so
It is always difficult to fathom how his mind is working, but he w as
quite friendly throughout and gave the impression that he would advise
the Congress to come to terms and not to allow a breakdown on the
parity issue
At a Delegation Meeting at 6 p m, v*e decided that Cnpps should see
Jinnah tonight to persuade him to meet Nehru and myself on the Interim
Government
Jane 12
A really hatd— and very critical day k began with a meeting of the
Delegation at 9 30 a m to deade on measures to break the deadlock It was
agreed that I should write to Nehru and Jinnah and ask them to meet me
in the evening to try and settle the Interim Government Cnpps had
spent several hours with Jinnah Jast xughr aad jajd that he JbaJ agreed &?
this I was also asked to see Vallabhai Patel
I then had a Council meeting of which the main item was an attempt to
settle the threatened P and T strike
After lunch I saw Vallabhai Patel
11-12 JUNE I946
I begin by saying that I had asked to sec him because I knew that
acceptance of the Delegation's Statement and participation in the Interim
Government by the Congress were hanging in the balance, and that my
information was that he \\ as opposed to acceptance I said that 1 did not
consider him a man who was likely to be persuaded of anything against
his will, but that I should like to put before him something about the
consequences tlut might follow rejection I then spoke to him on the
same lines as I had to Gandhi the day before of the problems facing India
which required above all things a period of calm and constructive work
For Congress and the League to combine cflccmcly in this work was the
best way of removing the possibility of division and Pakistan, much
rather than political manoeuvres or threats of civil war
Patel said that I was quite correct in say ing that he was opposed to the
acceptance of the Statement, but so was the whole of the Wording
Committee, there was no-one in favour of it. 1 said that I thought there
must be more moderation in Congress than that He said that Gandhi had
put forward all the arguments for acceptance, but had failed to convince
the Working Comnuttec, and Patel himself was all packed up ready to go
to Bombay today when he had been asked to stop It w as quite impossible
for them to accept the matter of parity
We then had a discussion on the parity issue, I said that I entirely
appreciated the Congress point of view but we had not adopted the parity
solution m the Constituent Assembly or in the Union Legislature and
there was no reason for fcanng it as a precedent He replied that it was
being taken as a precedent even in villages and on municipal committees
and so forth.
He then went on to say that Jinnah would only use his position in the
Interim Government for purely communal and disruptive purposes and
to break up India I said that I was quite certain that that would not be
Jinnalis attitude and that he could trust me to see that any attempt by
Jinnah or either party to make the Interim Government a battle ground of
communal polities instead of an instrument for administering India would
be prevented. 1 Patel was not at all convinced, but said finally that if
Jinnah and Nehru met and could agree on a list of names for the Govern-
ment, he would be prepared to accept it He said that it would be better
if they sat alone, with no-one else.
He was quite friendly, although as bitterly hostile as usual to Jinnah and
the League, and said finally that if Nehru and Jinnah could settle it, it
might be all right
■ la the event Wavell was not really *bl* to prevent dus
292 THE MISSION'S FAILURE
1 then had a talk with Mcnon He docs not like the idea of an Inner and
Outer Cabinet— no more do I— and thinks that I should press Jmnah to
agree on 5 j . 3 with the Scheduled Caste outside the Congress quota
At 3 40 p m , when I was due to sec Nehru and Jmnah at 4 p nx,
Cnpps came in and told me that Jinnah would not come, he had written
a kttcr earlier to say that he did not feel he could meet Nehru, unless the
parity basis was conceded, and Cnpps had gone to try and persuade him.
Saw Nehru at 4 p m. and had if hours with him He was attractive and
interesting as usual, and \\c got as fee as a list of names foe Council He
produced a list of is names $ Congress (all Hindus)* 4 Muslim League,
one non-League Muslim, one non-Congress Hindu, one Congress
Scheduled Caste, one Lid 1 an Christian, one Sikh, one Congress woman
I said that this hst would be quite unacceptable to Mr Jinnah, and I did
not sec how 1 could put it across to him I promised to keep his hst of
names entirely to m) self since, as he said, he was in a difficult position as he
was not President of the Congress and Azad ought to have been m his
place He told me that they had had a letter ready to send me } ester dUy v
more or less turning down the w hole proposal^ I gather % but Gandhi had
inters ened and it had not been sent I asked him to see that no letters were
sent to me for a day or two, while I saw how w e could settle this business*
June 13
Delegation at 9 30 a.m when Ave discussed the Interim Government and
the European \ote At u 30am,! saw Jmnah and he agreed to accept (or
rather to recommend to his Working Committee) 553 with the Sched-
uled Caste who w ould be a Congress nominee as one of the three He also
gave me some names for the Go\ eminent if the League came in After
a short talk with the Delegation, I saw Nehru again at 3 30 pm I ga\e
him a suggested list, with 5 Congress Hindus, 5 Muslim League, 1 Sched-
uled Caste (Congress), 1 Sikh, 1 Indian Christian He seemed depressed,
w orked himself up to one outburst about Jmnalis refusal to meet Azad and
described Jinnah as a wrecker He promised to put the proposal to the
Working Committee but without much hope of success
After he had left, the Delegation assembled and were anxious that I
should seePatel and try to enlist his support I was a little doubtful about
it but agreed. He came at 7 55pm, quite uncompromisingly hostile and
vce^j ^rraksid U£ talked \s>Vabk> %\-v&!avtt. W^wt^ vc> i,scf at^iomem *iws
sung a continuous hymn of hate against Jinnah and the League He said
the Working Committee had nor taken five minutes to turn down the
proposal I had given Nehru, and said that no Government formed by
12-14 JUNE I946
293
die Viceroy would be acceptable It looks as if he had wrecked the whole
proposal
Sudliir Ghosh, by the way, who is so lauded by the S of S , canic to sec
mc in the morning with a letter from Gandhi He did not impress mc as
sincere at all and I should place no trust in htm His claims to have told G
that he was wrong and to have corrected the errors caused by the worship
of G *s entourage are, I believe mainly a device to create confidence with
the Mission, and I should doubt if they were genuine Cnpps told mc
later that Lady C distrusted him at once, and women arc often better
judges of character than men — so long as their affections arc not involved
Extract from Gandhis tetter to the Viceroy dated 13 June 'You arc a great
soldier — a daring soldier Dare to do the right Yon must make your choice
of one horse or the other So far as I can see you will never succeed m nding
two at the same time Choose the names submitted either by Congress or the
League For God s sale do not male an incompatible mixture and tit trying
to do so produce a fearful explosion Anyu ay fx your time-hmtt and tell us
alt to leave when that tune ts over
I hope I have made my meaning clear *
June 14
Another of those sort of days of winch I am getting very weary We had
a Delegation meeting at 10 a m. on a Statement which it is proposed to
put out if the negotiations fail, giving an Interim Government of 14 5
Congress 5 League, 4 Minorities We had a good deal of discussion on the
14th Member and also on the 5th Congressman (to avoid Sarat Chandra
Bose) We also discussed again the problem of the Europeans
St 1 ice Congress were expected to reject the proposals for a Council of thirteen
(5 5 3) wtd were demanding fifteen it was decided in the projected Statement
about the Interim Government to raise the number to fourteen (5 .5 4) hy the
addition of either a Par see an Anglo-Indtan, a non-Congress Hindu, or a non-
League Muslim In the end a Pat see , Str N P Engineer was selected
At noon I had an hour with Azad and Nehru all the old ground was
gone over again without much result I had made a very stupid error
yesterday in including Rajkumari Amnt Kaur 1 (again to avoid Bose)
thinking she was a Hindu while Nehru had apparently made an error in
his representation of my proposals to the Working Committee They
went away finally saying they would recommend the proposal to the
Working Committee without much hope
1 She was an Indian Christian (Congress) sec footnote on p 210
29+
THE MlSSION*S FAILURE
June 15
Azad s letter received last night practically amounted to turning down
both the Statement of May 16th and the Interim Government Delegation
met at 9 30 a m. for a couple of hours and put the final touches on the new
Statement about the Interim Government to be issued tomorrow — the
European question intervening it frequent intervals
Wc met again in the afternoon, registered the fact that the Europeans
had made a statement which might or might not solve that part of the
problem and appro\ed a reply to Azad.
The Europeans satd that they would iwt nominate any person for election to
tht Constituent Assembly and ucutd w>t vote for a European to sit m if
June 1$
Delegation meetmg at 9 30 a m Cnpps, as a result of talk with Rajagopal-
achanar, who is the blue-eyed boy of the moment with S of S and Cnpps,
tried to induce me to substitute the name of B N Ran for Engineer in the
Interim Council list, so as to give an extra Hindu. I refused to agree and
was hacked up by Alexander (who was ill) and Croft, 1 and after some
discussion S of S accepted my view that it would he a break of 61th with
Jinnah. "We then drafted a letter to go to Azad and Jinnah with a copy of
the new Statement 2 S of S and Cnpps then went off to get into a huddle
with Rajagopalachanar again S of S came back at 1 15 p m. to seek my
agreement to his seeing Gandhi again on the advice of Rajagopalachanar,
before the Congress Working Committee met on the new offer I agreed
that it could da no harm.
And so the Delegation's final (?) attempt to induce the children to play
together is launched I think the chances are 50-50 of its acceptance,
perhaps All this huckstering and bargaining by Congress has shown their
complete inability to take a broad or statesmanlike view Jinnah has shown
up well in comparison
June 17
Delegation at 930 am. S ofS and Cnpps in close touch with Congress
camp xi usual via Agatha Harnson Sudhir Ghosh and Co S of S had
seen Gandhi and Cnpps was seeing Azad so I had a message sent to
Jmnah to say that all these interviews did not mean further concessions and
that the Cabinet Ministers or myself would be very pleased to sec him if
1 Sir Wilkim Croft Deputy Under-Secretary of State for India 1941-7 on the sUfTof the
Cabinet Mission 3 See Appendix VL
I s-i8 JUNE 1946
295
he wished. Congress arc apparently objecting to the inclusion of Nishtar
and the exclusion of Bosc*
Then a comparatively qutet time till the c\ cning t w hen I had an intcr-
\icw with CL-m-C 011 ft I N court-martials, which wc deaded must be
postponed till the new Ministry takes office, Indian troops abroad, and
some other matters
Then a Council meeting on an attempted settlement of the Railway
Strike
June 18
A discouraging day, a little rchc\ ed by talk with Monty, who is refresh-
ingly vital, self-confident and shrewdly egotistical
Delegation met at 10 a. m S of S reported conversations with J inn ah
and Azad Jinnah was anxious about portfolios and wanted a guarantee
that the Muslims should have Defence even if Jinnah didn't come in He
also wanted a guarantee on the major communal issues, that they would
not be decided against a Muslim majority vote Azad grumbled about
the nomination of Nishtar from die NWFP, wanted Bosc instead
of Mahtab and talked about the possible inclusion of Zakir HussainJ
Gandhi was reported m a bad mood, he still remains really the evil genius
of the Congress that stupid old man Abdul Ghaffar Khan is being brought
down from the N W F P (by train, as his doctors are against his flying)
on the Nishtar business, and it is alleged that I purposely indicated June 26
as the target date for the formation of the Interim Government so as to
saddle them with the responsibility for the railway strike due to begin on
June 27 1
I saw Azad and Nehru at 12 30 p m. There was htde new in what they
had to say and after blowuig off some steam on the new Statement it all
came down to three points the substitution of Sarat Bose for Mahtab which
I agreed to after some discussion, their wish to include a non-League
Muslim, possibly Zakir Hussain This I pointed out would raise great
difficulties but I said I would consider it, whether Abdul Ghaffar Khan
would object to Nishtar T said I could not accept his exclusion and they
did not press this point
Nehru is going off to Kashmir for the defence of Sheikh Abdulla 2
1 Dr Zakir Husiain a pro-Congress Muslim and keen educationalist President of India,
1967-9
3 Sheifch AftduAa reader of tic Kasfimir National Cooler race a pro-Congress political
party close friend of Nehru became Premier of Kashmir on its accession to India but was
imprisoned by the Govt of India in 1953 He had been arrested at this time m connection
with an agitation that he was leading against the State Government and \iai m gaol aw aj ting
trial
296 THE MISSION'S FAILURE
I told hun I thought this was most unwise and not the period when he
should absent himself from Delhi
Monty turned up before lunch and I had an hour*s talk with him after
lunch and another after dinner He was in great form. He is an example
of a happy man m that he has always known exactly what he wanted, has
had complete self-confidence in his ability to get it, and had no outside
distractions and no raise modesty or self-consciousness
In between my talks with Monty I saw H}dan — another man with
complete self-confidence and lack of modesty — who wanted to know
about his future He was quite content to take four months leave and wait
He thought Congress would come in, said the Mission had done well and
was respected for its sincerity
I also had a difficult and not \ery pleasant interview with Jinnah. The
more I see of these Indian politicians, the more I despair of India I began
by telling him about my interview with Azad and Nehru this morning
He accepted the substitution of Bos e for Mahtab but said that Zakir
Hussaw, whom he characterised as a Quisling would be utterly and en-
tirely unacceptable He then objected to my including Naztmuddiri in the
Government, as he wished to propose him to the Nizam as Premier, and
we had a long discussion about this I said I should be sorry to lose
Nazimuddin
He wanted a guarantee about major communal issues not being decided
against a vote of the majority of Muslims I said I thought that there
would be in practice no difficulty about the major communal issues, he
agreed that the Viceroy would have to be the judge of what was a major
communal issue On portfolios he did not really seem to know his own
mind and had not decided whether to come in himself or not We
discussed some names
He said that the Working Committee \\ ere meeting tonight and would
write to me, but indicated that he thought \\ e were being very w eaV with
Congress and giving way to them on every point, and that he himself
was being ground down* beyond endurance I am afraid it was not a \ ery
successful interview Jinnah gave me the impression of being rather
depressed and tired and of feeling that he had been rather let down
After this interview Jinnah wrote to the Viceroy to say that the substitution
of Dr Zakir Hnssain would he totally unacceptable, and that the Muslim
League u ottU never accept the nomination of any Muslim other than a Muslim
Leaguer Jinnah s rigid insistence on this point dating right back to the Simla
Conference t reqinres a few n ords of explanation as prima facie tt would seem
unreasonable that he should object to the inclusion of an extra Muslim m the
l8-I9 JUNE J946
297
Got eminent, which ts u hat the substitution of Dr Zakir Hussain for a
Congress Hwdu would have meant His objection stemmed from his belief that
the Muslims* only hope of resisting Hwdu dominance tt as to put up an un-
broken and united front* and that if any countenance u as given to Nationalist
Muslims it horn he regarded as Congress stooges t this nould simply further the
Hindu (Cvtigrcss) aim of dtx iding the Muslims In Sind, u here the Muslims
uere m a clear majority, the Hindus, by exploiting Muslim divisions had
for sci erat years during the u ar established u hat tt as virtually a Congress
Government More recently in the Punjab, by combining with the rump of the
Unionist Party, they had successfully kept the Muslim League out ofpou cr m
this important Muslim-majority Province In Municipal Committees in West
Punjab inhere they uere m a minority, they had by similar skilful tactics
habitually obtained for themselves control of affairs Jinnah thought that if
Muslims u ere allotted to attain high office as Congress (Hindu) nominees, then
the Congress by subtle flattery or other more material inducements u ould win
more Muslims to their side and fatally divide the Muslim ranks
These reasons for Jtnnafts intransigence were well understood by Wavell,
but they 11 ire not easy to explain or defend m public, and at a later stage, when
the Mission had gone home, he decided that it uas impossible any longer to
accept Jimiah's veto of a Nationalist Muslim
fune jp
Delegation met 10 am as usual The information (from Ghosh and
Rajagopalachanai) was to the effect that the Congress Working Com-
mittee had decided, against the advice of Gandhi not to put forward a
Nationalist Muslim for the Interim Government and were going to accept
subject to Abdul Ghaffar Khan raising no objection to Nishtar Things
looked hopeful therefore though the Muslim League was known to be
asking for assurances Vallabhai was reported to have opposed Gandhi on
the Nationalist Muslim issue Nehru has gone off to Kashmir in spite of
much advice not to do so and will quite likely run into trouble
Later I had a long letter from Jinnah 1 complaining of the concessions
to Congress and asking for assurances and guarantees that there would be
no more much in the tone of his interview with mc yesterday Inciden-
tally Jinnah saw Monty yesterday and said that no Interim Government
would last
A V Alexander dined with Monty and myself m very good form
talked of his early life of his service in the first World War of the Co
operatives and other matters On the Indian situation he was all for firm
handling equally so with the Jews 111 Palestine
1 This letter dated 19 June waj subsequently published by Jinnah »t a cruc al moment and
gave rise to a good deal of ill feeling
20S
THE MISSION'S FAIlURE
Jutte 20
The situation seems to have gone all haywire again, thanks to Gandhi
We met at 10 a m and began to discuss my draft reply to Jinnah S of S
was all for being \ague and indefinite, hut I refused absolutely to give
Jmnah a teply capable of misinterpretation later and insisted that \vc must
be quite definite Cnpps and Alexander backed me Then Woodrow
Wvatt appeared with a message as a result of an interview with Rajagopal-
achanar He said that RajagopaUchanar had told* him that Congress had
gone back on yesterday's decision, on the instance of Gandhi, and were
going to insist on the removal of Engineer s name, since he was an
'omctalV and the placing of Azad in the Government (they would
apparently suggest Dalai instead of Engineer) I said at once that both
conditions were utterly unacceptable and that putting Azad forward was
simply a manoeuvre to ensure Jinnah's refusal and thus put the onus of
a breakdown on him The Nishtar objection was gone apparently, since
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, brought down at such trouble from Peshaw ar, had
apparently said that the idea of participating in such a Gov emment was non-
sense anyhow, so ^hat did it matter who was in it. We all agreed, I am
glad to say, that there could be no question cither of leaving out Engineer
or including Azad or any other Congress Muslim Cnpps was anxious to
see Azad and then if necessary Gandhi before the meeting of the Congress
Working Committee in the afternoon Alexander protested loudly against
an) one of the Mission ever seeing Gandhi again I agreed with him, but
S of S ruled that it could do no harm if Azad himself suggested it
After lunch I had another talk with Monty, he seemed to have had
satisfactory discussions with the C-in-C He was amusing about his inter-
view "with Azad, he had asked him how soon he could get all the British
troops out of India and the British officers out of the Indian Army f as he
wanted them elsewhere, and Azad had said that they could not be spared
for a long time
The S of S turned up next, to tell me of Cnpps* interviews with Azad
and Gandhi They had been quite fruitless, Azad was worn out and obvi-
ously bullied by Gandhi, Gandhi, with whom Cnpps had spent an hour
and a half) had been in his most tiresome mood, had expatiated on all the
old themes and was obviously working for a Congress controlled Central
Government which I warned the Mission from the start was his objective,
Meanw hile Nehru has got himself arrested in Kashmir z
1 SurN P Engineer wis not an o5k:iL but he hcLi at the time *□ ofScui position, viz. the
post of AdvtJcate-Osneral to the locum Army
1 The Kashmir Government had binned Nehru s entry into the State; and when he
20-21 June I94<S zgg
June 2t
The usual meeting at 10 a in after a quiet beginning dc\ eloped almost into
a major communal issue on the question of what to do if the Congress
refused It was agreed that Jinnah should be asked to cooperate in a
Go\ eminent* Cnpps was set on J being actually asked to form a Govern-
ment, in the obvious hope that he would fail or refuse, in winch event he
insisted that we should go back to Congress and ask them to form one
c\en though they had refused the offer Tlus of course would give Con-
gress exactly what they arc working and hoping for, and would be
manifestly unfair to the Muslim League Cnpps showed his Congress bias
strongly, and said that he would resign if this was not done After over
two hours talk it was left at that Cnpps threatens resignation freely,
I think this is the third or fourdi time he has spoken of it I wonder how
far he means it
In their telegram to the Cabinet dated 3 June the Delegation had proposed
that tf the League accepted the proposals fir a Constituent Assembly and an
Interim Government t bttt the Congress rejected them, then a Government
should be formed of League representatives and representatives of the Minorities
with seats reserved for Congress but held temporarily by non-Congress Hindus
or officials The Viceroy, the Secretary of State, and Mr Alexander considered
that this was how they should now proceed, on the assumption that the Con-
gress u ere going to reject the proposals, rather than on the lines proposed by
Cnpps, and they all three agreed that to ask the Congress to form a Government
would not be an acceptable solution
Ambedkar lunched, he is off to Bombay tomorrow, another of my
Council gone He was quiet and depressed, obviously thinks his side has
been let down by m> self and the Delegation His party was of course
thoroughly defeated at the polls, whether the strange system of selection
is fair or not I don't know I do not know enough about the wrongs and
disabilities of the Scheduled Castes to feel really sympathetic or sentimental
about them, but I do know that they are not capable of supplying, for a
very long time to come at any rate, the men of character, education and
ability of whom India is so sorely in need I should not feel inclined to
hamper the progress of India by special measures for them at this stage,
though they must be given their chance to develop gradually Ambedkar
is sincere, keenest and courageous, hut he is not au at Tractive personality
persisted in crossing the frontier he was arrested and detained in a Rest Home Abul Kabm
Azad got through to him on the telephone and persuaded him to agree to leave the State
and Lord Wavell sent an aeroplane to fetch htm back
300 THE MISSION'S FAILURE
Maun cc Gw^cr armed an J we talked for some tunc after dinner He
was \cr\ critical of Gandhi and the Congress 13c docs not think that I
dull need additional advice on Constitutional matters, and I am sure that
he w ouJd be quite misplaced on my staff
June 22
Met Delegation at 1 1 a ni. ov cr a suggestion by George Abell to write a
letter to Azad to inform him that wc could not agree to a Nationalist
Muslim m the Go\ eminent Wc had some fireworks at first since Cnpps
produced an alternative draft which would probabl) ha\ c sent J inn ah in
off the deep end (L wish 1 had a political pool with two shallow ends) t as it
suggested some further appeasement of Congress, but m the end wc got
a short and reasonable draft though I am sure it will do no good, and by
all accounts rcj'Xtion hy Congress is inevitable They \\nll of course put
it down to J inn ah s intractability ai;ain Wc then discussed our future
course of action The Mission decided to go off home on Thursday or
Friday so as to hi\ c time for full consideration with the Cabinet before
Attlcc goes off to Australia on July 29 Meantime I try to form a Gov crn^
mcnt w ith Jinnah i participation or failing that an official Caretaker
Government. S of S asked wistfully for the inclusion of a woman if
possible
June 23
Last minute efforts to a % art a breakdown Delegation met 950 a m.-T2
S of S reported his interviews of yesterday and this morning Barherhc
had gone to Gandhi s praters with Agatha Hamson I suppose — a most
unnecessary and undignified excursion to my mind, but I think it happens
often, and had talked with Gandhi Sarojim Naidu* and Patel, all quite
assured on breakdown Patcl had gone right back to Simla in 1945 w ith
incorrect ideas of what had happened there He said, surprisingly, that
Congress had accepted the long-term policy of the May 16 Statement. 2
Quite a number of Congress want to accept Interim Government, but
their Working Committee as a whole is quite incapable of making a
corporate decision We discussed Rajagopalachanar*s advice to sec Gandhi
and Azad only Cnpps fkv anting it and then Alexander said vcr> scnsiblv
that if there were to be any more interviews die Delegation as a whole
should see the four leading members of Congress with the principal object
of removing any misunderstandings on our pledge* to Jmnafi and what
1 Member of Congmi WoTlung Committee |>oetes*
* It ft ould seem that Patcl had Already decided m hji owji mind that Cotagrrsi had better
accept the Statement of 16 May and kiatw that they would da s«k
21-24 JUNE 1946
301
1 had said at various times, of 'which misleading versions were apparently
being gv\ cn This was agreed, and we then spent some time discussing the
line to be taken, turning up old correspondence w itli the Parties, records
of interview s, etc The interview was fixed for 2 p in.
The interview lasted 2-3 20 p m Azad, Nehru, Patcl, Rajcndra Prasad
came S of S opened with an agreed statement to the effect that had
never accepted Jinnali s claims to represent all Muslims, but m this
particular instance asked Congress not to press for a Nationalist Muslim
Discussion then proceeded on the old lines, that it was a matter of principle,
that Jinnah had no right to question Congress nominations or to block
progress etc S of S and Cnpps answered quite well We then got on to
the question of deciding major communal issues in Council, how Zakir
Hussain's name had come to be mentioned, the position of the Viceroy —
Nehru claimed that it was for the Parties to form the Government in
consultation with the Viceroy I satd diat was not the position at all the
Viceroy formed the Government in consultation with the Parties, and
the objective was a united India and so forth At this point the S of S
lapsed into woollincss, and made several of his long-winded appeasement
speeches, about the imminent transfer of power, the unreasonableness of
Jinnah — and the implied reasonableness of Congress, etc I felt I wanted
a large piece of green baize, a knobkerry or some other extinguisher He
is cunous sometimes he makes quite concise, sensible, even statesmanlike
contributions and then he suddenly seems to turn into a gushing babbler
unable to control his tongue and quite incapable of stopping He will not
leave well alone Apart from, this, I think the interview was worthwhile
I do not think it will change their decision, they said so in fact, but they
were friendly, and some misunderstandings were cleared up
June 24
Delegation met at 10 a m S of S described the comings and goings of
the evening and night before and this mormng Amnt Kaur had turned
up at 9 p m. as an emissary from Gandhi, very excited she said that G
had gone completely off the deep end, as she herself had obviously done,
over a paragraph in the instructions to Governors about elections to the
Constituent Assembly S of S says he lost his temper with her Others
who turned up to see various members of the Mission at intervals during
the evening were Sudhir Ghosh, Patel and Hajagopalachanar, and the
scene must have been rather like a French farce, as some of the visitors had
come unbeknownst to each other and had to be interviewed in separate
rooms, sitting or bed. At 6 a m or 7 a m this morning Patel and Gandhi
302 THE MISSION** FAILURE
appeared (G *s day of silence made discussions somewhat protracted) ana
talked on many matters One of the latest ideas is apparently to put the
Constituent Assembly on a legal basis, by Act of Parliament S of S
committed us to seeing G again itSpm. his announcement of this lea
to a strong denouncement by Alexander of Congress and all its manoeuvres
of the past weeks We then turned to a discussion of otir next meeting
with Jinnah, which will obviously be ait awkward one S of S is inclined
now to place the blame for failure on J *s intransigence, Avhich neither
Alexander nor myself thought fair Cnpps now says that Congress while
turning down the Interim Go\ eminent will accept the May 16 Statement,
the one thing which he assured me } esterday and the day before that they
would never do, and which places us in a more awkward position with
Jinnah. 1 am afraid that I would not put it past Cnpps to ha\ e suggested to
Congress in one of his many talks that they w ould put themselves in a
better tactical position if they did so
Tlte record of the meeting of the Delegation at ic a m on 24 June sJwiis
tliat the various emissaries who liad seen members of the Delegation on the
previous evening had given them clearly to understand that Patel now u anted
tlie Congress to accept the Statement of 16 May, and tluxt when Gandhi and
Patel appeared at 6 00 a m + the Secretary of State had pointed out to them that
if tlte Congress accepted the Statement ofi6 May they u ould put themselves on
tlte level with the Muslim League in respect of the Interim Got eminent
Mr Alexander expressed himself strongly on Congress manoeuvres He said
that tlmr acceptance of the May Statement would not he genuine, but a paper
acceptance tn order to get an Interim Government tn which they would have
control 'He had come out to India quite unbiased and m the early stages had
been somewhat exasperated with Air Jmnah s attitude But he was bound to
say that the behaviour of the Congress m the last six weeks seemed to htm the
most deplorable exhibition that he had witnessed m his political career *
When the rest of the Mission had gone the S of S came back again to
the question of Maurice Gwyer, and I asked him bluntly what was behind
it all* was it being suggested to him by Congress that I had nothing but
official adv ice He denied this and said his desire was merely to help mc t
as I should have no-one to lean on for pohncal advice after the Mission
had gone' I said that 1 had had to rely on my own judgment for a long
time before the Mission came but that if H^M G or the P M would
piefcr to xep\ace xne Viy someone with more political experience that
would be quite all right by me.
During the afternoon I had a letter from Azad to convey the Congress
refusal to take part in the Interim Go\ crnmcnL
21 JUNE I946
303
TJic jutcrvjciv with Gandhi \\ aj t I thought, 3 deplorable aifoir, Gzn&u
was at his worst, )cc tKc Mission was out to do everything possible to
conciliate him He began with the complaint that candidates for the
Constituent Assembly \\ ere bemg compelled to sign a document which
meant their acceptance of die principle of grouping Provinces in Sections
for the determination of their constitution He w as given what seemed to
me a dishonest assurance that tlus was not so, and when I said that the
grouping was an essential part of the scheme* S of S asked me not to
press the point
IVavdt was much disquieted by the tack of frankness to Gandhi on this
matter He u rote an important and telling note for the Delegation on the
subject {Appendix VII) atid f as unit be seen, raised the matter at a meeting at
12 noon on 2jjutie, btit without getting much satisfaction Subsequent events
shou ed that his apprehensions u ere fully justified
G then went on to the European question, 011 which propitiatory
statements were agam made to him He next said that since negotiations
for the Interim Government had faded all correspondence about it
including all assurances given to Jinnah, should be put on the scrap-heap
Just what the Congress want of course. He then wished the Constituent
Assembly to be given legal status by Act of Parliament — this is a new
Congress stunt S of S burst into one of his long statements on the faith
of the British Government being a greater safeguard than an Act of
Parliament, etc, while Alexander contributed his favourite reference to the
rights of Minorities and a treaty The interview ended with Patel, who
had hitherto sat silent, regarding Gandhi with some contemptuous
tolerance, it seemed to me, bringing up the Europeans in Bengal again,
but he did not press il The meeting broke up with an air of heartiness
on the part of the Mission towards G which I did certainly not share I
have much more respect for Patel
Sometime to-day I dictated a note to the Mission on the deplorable mess
we had got into
Congress manoeuvres have now put us into a very difficult position, both
with Mr Jinnah and as to the formation of an Interim Government.
Relying on a letter from Congress that the acceptance of the Statement
of May 1 6th and the Interim. Government hung together > and an assurance
that there was no possibility of the Congress rejecting an Interim Govern-
ment and accepting the Statement of May i6 f we have cornrtutted our-
selves, in paragraph 3 of the Statement of June 16, to forming an Interim
Government with anyone who had accepted the Statement of May 16
304
THE MISSION'S FAILURE
This paragraph was put in, perhaps rashly, because we felt that Mr Jinnah,
who had already accepted the Statement of May 16, should not he put at
a disadvantage with, the Congress, who had not, and m furtherance of our
pledge that w e would go ahead as far as possible with any one who accepted
the Statement of May 16
"We are now precluded from trying to form an Interim Government
with die participation of the Muslim League, hut without that of the
Congress, and Congress will claim that in any fresh attempt all the original
bases and the assurances given to Mr Jinnah have disappeared We have
in fact teen out-manoeuvred by the Congress, and this ability of Congress
to twist words and phrases and to take advantage of any shp in wording
is what Mr Jinnah has all along feared, and has been the reason for his
difficult attitude The success of the Congress, which he will feel has been
mainly due to their continuous contacts with the Mission, especially since
the Statement of June 16, will increase his distrust, both of the Congress
and of the Mission, and of the Viceroy
In these conditions, I feel that it would be quite useless to try and press
Mr Jinnah to make the concession of accepting a Congress Muslim, and
indeed I doubt whether Congress would now be prepared to come in if
that concession were made They would see their advantage, and would
press it by demanding some further concession The atmosphere far any
sort of compromise is now, I think, more unfavourable than at any other
tune. Tempers are /rayed, the Mushm league ft el that they have been
betrayed, and the Congress feel that they have gained an advantage of
which they will not be slow to make capital
Tbc alternatives for an Interim Government therefore appear to be
(a) To ask Mr Jinnah to form a Go\ eminent I do not see how this
could possibly be done, suice both sides have now accepted the May 16
Statement, unless we decided that the Congress's is a dishonest one, as it in
fact is, and refuse to regard it as an acceptance
(b) To capitulate entirely to the Congress and ask them to form a
Government, seeking the cooperation of the Mushm League on such
terms as they judge right It does not seem to me that this would be fair or
honest to the Muslim League, and I could not accept it,
(c) To form a Caretaker Government of officials, to carry on fbr a short
period while the Mission goes home for consultation, and everybody has
a rest and recovers from the strain and heat aroused by the recent discus-
sions and negotiations
The solution depends on whether the Delegation propose to regard the
Congress acceptance of the Statement of May 16 as genuine, in spite of
their expressed intention to evade at least one of its essential provisions
24^5 JUNE J 940* 305
If the DclcgaUon do not accept it, then Mr Jmnah can be asked to pit tic w
pate in a Govern ment as already agreed
If the Delegation proposes to accept the Congress acceptance of the
Statement, I think that the only possible solution is a temporary Caretaker
Government of officials It may not hold the situation tor long, perhaps
for not more than a few \\ ccks, perhaps hardly that, but we have been
manoeuvred into a position when it seems to be the only chance However
long it lasts, and whatever decision H M G gives as to their general policy,
I am quite certain that our last chance 01 getting a genuine Coalition
Government for India has gone, for a very long time at any rate
June 2$
The worst day yet, I think Congress has accepted the Statement of May
i6, though with reservations on its interpretation They did not intend to
do so, having always said they would not accept the long-term policy
unless they accepted the short-term one, Interim Government. Now
Cnpps, having a&sutcd me categorically that Congress would never accept
the Statement of May 16, instigated Congress to do so by pointing out the
tactical advantage they would gain as regards the Interim Government
So did the Secretary of State When I tackled him on this, he defended it
on the grounds that to get the Congress into the Constituent Assembly
was such a gam that he considered it justified It has left me m an impossible
position vis-a-vis Jinnah
We had a meeting with Delegation from 12-1 30 p m I challenged the
assurance given to Gandhi last night on the matter of the undertaking
to be signed by a Candidate for the Constituent Assembly as not quite
honest, but these politicians can always out-talk me, and I had to with-
draw We then discussed the Congress letter of acceptance which is really
a dishonest acceptance, but is so cleverly orded that it had to be regarded
as an acceptance
In thetr letter the Congress referred to their Resolution of 24 May (see
p 277) m which they had pointed out what tn thetr opinion were the dejects in
the proposals and had also given their interpretation of the provisions of the
statement 111 regard to Grouping, and continued * While adhering to our views,
we accept your proposals and are prepared to work them with a view to achieve
our objective *
Delegation met 3 30 p m.-5 p m., to discuss brief for interview with
Jinnah S of S showed his bias against Jinnah and wished to accuse him of
having wrecked negotiations by giving out his letter of June 1Q 1 for
1 Set footnote on p 297
3o6 thb mission's failure
publication 1 protested against this, saying that it was no use treating
Jinnah in this way, and all agreed, but it did not m the event stop S of S
doing so at the interview
The interview wichjumah ($ 30-8 p rru) was a. deplorable one It began
with J questioning the genuineness of the Congress acceptance of May 16
This resulted, quite unnecessarily, in a long argument about J *s acceptance
and the reservations 1 he had made A htth later S of S , 111 spite of his
agreeing not to raise the subject, attacked J vehemently on the publica-
tion of his letter to me of June 19th and declared it to be the cause of the
breakdown There followed a long unseemly wrangle, and by the Drue
w c got down to real business, what to do next, J was in a thoroughly evil
mood, accused us of bad faith and of giving way to Congress, and con-
sidered that he should be given the opportunity of entering the Govern-
ment He finally left, asking me to write to him what we proposed to do
Wc spent about £ of an hour drafting a letter to J which I signed and
sent off about 10 p m A sorry business, and I think wc deserve some at
least of J 's strictures, though J himself has not placed his cards too w ell
June 26
Delegation met at 9 30 a m, and Congress (Azad, Nehru* Pate I, Prasad)
at 9 45 a in, S of S was apologetic about the way he had handled the
interview with Jtnnah the evesung before, but all the same v. a& for keeping
off anything which might annoy the Congress 1 insisted that wc should
make it clear to Congress that wc did not accept their interpretation of the
Grouping business
The inters icw went qiftte smoothly Congress have a different technique
to Jinnah, though more dcadlj in die long run They agreed to the pro-
posed interval, as they w odd naturally do Wc had a little disc us sj 011 on
the publication oflcttcrs Finally Nehru complauied diat Governors were
thwarting Ministers ut the Provinces and ought to give up all theie special
responsibilities etc- and d<? nothing except what their Ministers told thcro-
1 said Governors were doing their best to work with Ministers, but were
bound to fulfil their duties under the existing Constitution
After Congress lud gone, wc agreed that Alexander should sec Jumah
and try to remo\ c some of last night** unfortunate impression, dealt w uh
* la *C4rrptuig the Sutemcat of 16 Mjy the Muiiwn Ltagu* hul cktUmJ tfut 'the atutn-
m&x. of the ftcal of % t&mfktt vavcttn^a \ JkxOMi. \ull ttnumi the uaakmVik foal of xUc
MtiUum of tndu *itk> tint « »i» \» iJinig to cooperate with ihr proposed coaiCKiitko*
mAsng ra&iucrF rf» tHt hope Out it Would uUmmcljr mult m {he tftiilj)}uT*nt of
cooiptrtt tavern £n I Aiit#a The Lci^tw? alto rnfr\cJ the i^ht lo rrvi»c «» polity aiiJ
itt*u»i* « any ii»*rt duiing ih* pn gtti* iA iU coci>iituLK*»-mAiitg body
2$-27 JVUE 1946 307
#
die paper on Minorities and Cnpps* opinion 011 the grouping question,
decided that \vc should have to go through all the correspondence and
decide what should be published, and that a Statement of proposed
action should be put out tomorrow The Mission decided to go on
Saturday
Afterwards I had a talk with Alexander* and told hun that I should
normally ask to be rchc\cd of my appointment after what had happened,
that I thought I had been placed m an impossible position with die M L ,
and that Cnpps had not been quite straight, but that I did not want to
embarrass H M G He diought I ought to stay
At 7 p m, wc drafted a short Statement on the proposed action, to be
issued tonight, and heard Alexanders account of his interview with
Jinnah, which had lasted i£ hours J was naturally and justifiably sore,
but A V A had done somcdung to calm him down On the matter of a
Congress or even non-League Muslim J had spoken for over 20 minutes
and had been absolutely and entirely adamant
In thctr short Statement the Cabinet Mission and Viceroy expressed satis-
faction that Coitsttttttwn-nialtng can now proceed with the consent of the tu 0
major parties and the States* They regretted that tt had not so far proved
possible to form an Interim Coalition Government, but said that after a short
interval^ durtttg which elections to the Constituent Assembly woula take place ;
afresh effort to do so ti ould be made m atcordante with Paragraph $ of the
Statement of 16 futic Meanwhile a temporary Caretaker Government of
officials 11 ould be set up
fune zj
A comparatively short meeting of the Delegation this morning in which
we approved replies to Azad and Jinnah and discussed the publication of
correspondence during the negotiations
In the afternoon I saw Patel in \iew of a report that Nehru was off to
Kashmir again
I asked him to use his influence to prevent Nehru going as his visit
would be most inopportune and could only do harm It was surely better
I said to negotiate with the Princes through their Negotiating Committee
than to bring pressure to bear on m dividual States Patel agreed with me
and said he and Azad had done their best to dissuade Nehru from going
When I said that I had also tried to dissuade Nehru he said I should have
done so more forcibly 1 1 said I thought this would only be likely to rouse
a spirit of opposition in N
JOS THE MISSION^ FAILURE
On the forthcoming A I C C meeting he told me Nehru would take
over the Presidency I then told him how disappointed I was that the recent
negotiations had failed to secure a coalition government I hoped Congress
would come into any fresh negotiations in a constructive spirit and that
they ^ould not try to raise their price and make negotiations with the
League difficult He was non-committal, but said that he had no quarrel
with Mr Jmnah, and that communal feeling in the country at large would
he stilled now that the long term policy had been accepted
The conversation lasted for about half an hour He was friendly and
sensible.
la the evening Nehru came He talked much of Kashmir and occasion-
ally got wound up about the Princes Then I had a dinner party, farewell
for the Mission at which everybody was rather subdued, except Alex-
ander who was prepared to go on playing the piano and singing till early
morning
June 2$
Delegation met from io-ir 15 a m on the publication of the correspon-
dence which has passed during the Mission s negotiations It was a waste of
time so far as I was concerned. I said that I was prepared to abide by the
dictum *quod scnpsi, senpsi*, and was prepared for any letters of mine to
be published But the Mission, with an anxious eye on Parliament, debated
the matter at some length. They were however forced to the conclusion
that everything would come out sooner or later and only made a reserva-
tion on the correspondence with Gandhi, about some of which some of
them have, I think, a slightly uneasy conscience
Later in the day I received a letter from Jmnah, accusing the Mission
and myself of bad faith, m not at once forming a Government with him
Jitmak had understood Paragraph 8 of the Statement of 16 June (Appendix
VI) to mean that if the Congress refused to join an Interim Government
composed as proposed in that Statement while the League agreed to do so, then
the Viceroy would go ahead and form the Government as proposed, but with"
out the Congnss representatives This nas a possible, perhaps even the
natural interpretation of the meaning of Paragraph S Tfie Miss ton and the
Viceroy interpreted if differently Tfiey cotisidered that since both parties had
now acceptei the Suteroem of 16 May Paragraph % requiK^ thai fresh efforts
should be made de novo to form an Interim Government Jmnah said that this
interpretation had been dishonestly concocted by the legalistic talents of the
Cabinet Mission
27-30 JUNE 1946
309
June 2g
I finished offs note for the Cabinet on the present position, so as to make
it quite clear that the outlook was still unsettled and stormy
Tins note was an expanded and shghtty revised version of the note he had
started drafting on jo June, seep 2Sg
At 11 a m. S of S came to say goodb^ c He read my note and said he
thought it nu glit be pessimistic Wc had some talk on the past negotiations
but nothing new was said He thought Rajagopalachanar the biggest man
in Indian politics, Nehru likeable but not courageous politically He
wanted me to give special facilities for Sudhir Ghosh to go home I said
I saw no reason to expedite a Congress agent and that S G was rather a
snake in the grass Wc parted on quite friendly but not cordial terms I did
not see Cnpps
Jmnah wrote again and I sent him a bncf reply The Mission departed,
it looked at one time as if the weather might delay them, I will try to
summarise my general comments on their work tomorrow
Jtttte jo
Came up to Simla for a little change and rest, and to think out the next
move
With remarkable res thence IVavell on 28 June wrote a note for consideration
by the PSV on a possible new method oj forming a Coalition Government t
and in Simla he discussed the matter with Sir Evan Jenkins
A Retrospect Summary of Cabinet Missions Work
(March-June 1946)
While the events of this period are fairly fresh in my mind I want to
set down my general impressions of what took place and the reasons for
failure I am doing so without any reference to documents, and mean
simply to give my personal view There will inevitably be a great deal of
publicity and much controversy over this Mission, and I want to write
before all this starts
Firsdy, the personnel of the Mission The S of S , old P L , is a senti-
mental pacifist with a strain of rather pugnacious obstinacy if crossed and
I think a good deal of self-satisfaction and some vanity He is more
genuinely non-violent* than Gandhi, with him it really is a creed while
I believe that for G non violence is a political weapon far more than
a creed The approach of the S ofS to these tough crafty Hindu politicians
310 THE MISSION S FAILURE
-tfas often too abject, I thought, but he undoubtedly convinced them of
Jus genuineness and honest) of purpose He could make a very sensible
little speech or pronouncement, but too often lapsed during interviews
and discussions into an apparently uncontrollable cascade of words,
delivered at a tremendous pace, often not very well thought out and
always largely repetitive and redundant He was a very bad draftsman of
a document, wordy and indefinite
Cnpps was much the ablest of the part) , with an extremely acute legal
intellect, \ery quick to seize on a point, very persuasive, convinced of his
ability to make Tboth black and white appear a neutral and acceptable grey,
a clever draftsman and very good at finding a compromise solution to any
problem. But he is an ambitious man and was quite determined not to
come away empty handed this time, and this made him over-keen and
not too scrupulous My predecessor told me, a propos of the Cnpps
Mission of 1942 that C was *not quite straight under pressure', and he \* as
right
Alexander w as straight, sensible and honest, the very best type of British
Labour, the best we breed- At the beginning he knew nothing of India and
the ways of Indian polincians, and sat back At the aid he really had a surer
and more realistic grasp of the situation than cither of the other two He
had a tendency to appeal to the strict letter of his instructions or of any
document and obviously liked to have definite 'sailing orders* on which
to base his opinions and actions
Of the officials Croft was rather disappointing and did not exercise
much influence He was rather too narrow and old-fashioned m his views,
I do not think the S of S set much store by his advice, and his unquestioned
ability was rather wasted Turnbull was a \ery good secretary and pro-
duced good summaries of dtscussions etc Joyce 1 on publicity was I think
no more than adequate, he never seemed to have any special ideas for
guiding the Press but he may have been working behind the scenes And
I doubt whether the most skilled of snake-charmers could do much with
the cobras and karaits of the Indian Press
I think the unofficial excrescences were unfortunate I do not approve*
of course, of the polincal praence of using hunting jackals to nose out
scraps of informanon behind the backs of the principals, to a negotiation
I was rather shocked at it m 194.5 when I was at home and found that
certain members of the India Committee approached members of my
Executive Council w ho were at home and e\ en members of my staff in »
order to try and ascertain from them whether they agreed with views
I had expressed, (I first struck this attitude of mind when Hore-Behsha
hecanac Was Misuses, asvA -oft mceung for ihc first time — I ^was a,
divisional commander — endeavoured to get me to criticise the views of
* A H.Jp>cev Adviser od PubLat j Iddi* Oifioc
A RETROSPECT
3U
the A G and give him my own, and seemed rather surprised when I
refused to do so )
But far more unfortunate than these was die presence of Agatha
Harrison and Horace Alexander, 1 who lived in the Congress Camp, were
completely sold to Gandhi, and saw the S ofS almost daily No wonder
that Jinnah and the Muslim League distrusted these unofficial connections
with the Congress, I ondcr whether I should have been more vigorous
about it
Phase I was the discussions of the -Mission with myself at die end of
March I was worried by the lack of positive approach to their task on the
part of the Mission, they seemed to be purely opportunist and content to
wait on the discussions rather than direct them, though I sensed from the
first that Cnpps would take and encourage die Congress point of view
(I knew that he had been m private correspondence with Nehru about the
objectives before the Mission came out — a proceeding which I should not
call strictly honest, though to a politician it seems quite normal) My
suggestions for a firm line and possible threat of a big stick were received
with shocked disapproval by the S of S It hecame clear to mc during this
Phase that the Mission had no real plan (though Cnpps may have had
a private plan) and that they would not therefore take charge of discus-
sions and direct them, but would simply wait on events and were likely
to be influenced by the loudest tongue I was discouraged by the S of S
Jack of Common wealth* hack bone
Phase II — the discussions with selected persons or groups — was, in my
view, an almost complete waste of time All the stale old Party slogans
and dogmas were delivered m different forms, there was no sign of
constructive statesmanship or compromise, no Hindu admitted that a
Muslim could possibly liave a grievance or any reason for mistrusting the
'democratic' predominance of the Congress, no Muslim would admit any
possibility of justice or fairness from Hindu hands The only people who
put their case m some spirit of moderation and realism were the Princes,
one or two of their Diwans, and Griffiths on behalf of the Europeans
I thought the Mission handled the interviews in a thoroughly un-
businesslike manner, as was perhaps inevitable since they had no plan
Those interviewed were allowed to deliver long harangues, instead of
being kept to the pomt since the Mission, without a definite scheme,
hardly knew where the point lay The S of S was incapable often of
asking a simple question without delivering an almost interminable little
■ H G Alexander a lecturer at B nrnngham was like Agatha Harrison a member of the
Quitets India Conciliation Group Along with Sudhir Ghosh and a group of young
British pacifists of the Friends Ambulance Unit he had been engaged on famine rthef work
in Bengal in 1 942-3 He 5a\ v himself as an intermediary between Gandhi and the world of
British officialdom in succession to C F Andrews
312 THE MISSION'S TAILURE
speech, and every interviewer had to be assured* almost abjectly, of our
desire to part with power and 'Quit India' Cnpps often got involved in
lengthy legal discussions on details of constitutional questions which
seemed to mc waste of tunc at dus sta^e Alexander Was still a little 'at sea*
and did not make much contribution The Indian politicians showed up
as a sorry lot.
I was frankly shocked at the deference shown to Gandhi by Cnpps and
S of S The second round of these discussions, with the leaders of the
Congress and Muslim League, was equally fruitless, and to my military
mind equally mishandled owing to a lack of a definite plan It was obvious
that v*e should have to lead ourselves, and at least to make a plan, which
should have been done at the beginning
PAoif IiTwas the period before and after the Mission's recess ui Kashmir
and ended with the decision for the Simla meetings I felt at this umc that
the discussions had shown that there was no hope of reaching agreement
between the Patties, and that we should have to take a decision I thought
the Mission made rather heavy work of doing so, and that it was absurd
to say that we must never speak of an award , only of recommendations
and suggestions We had the germ of a good and workable compromise
in the 3 -tier scheme, and my personal view was that had we boldly set it
out, and had an alternative breakdown scheme definitely planned and
approved by H.M.G , if the Congress hesitated, we should have had a good
chance of its being accepted, and need not have been afraid to call it an
award I thought the manoeuvres by which the two parties \s ere induced
to go to Simla v* ere not very dignified and a little disingenuous I suppose
it was a success in a way for the Mission, but from the point of view of
a military observer it meant that we had shirked giving a decision and
surrendered the initiative
Phase IV I thought that the chief value of Simla was not the negotiations
themselves, I did not think they ever had a hope of success* but the time
it gave us to draw up the Statement of May 1 6 I doubt whether we should
ever have arrived at as good a Statement down in Delhi The discussions
went on too long, they should have been broken off at once when Jmnah
and Nehru reported that they had been unable to agree on an arbitrator
We went backwards after that, and the request to both Parties to put their
claims on paper v*as, I thought and still think, a stupid blunder, and the
long wrangle about the publication of documents was quite unnecessary
and avoidable That the negotiations should still have gone near to success
in spite of them is I think a testimony to the anxiety of everjone for a
sett\emeirt
Phase V May 16 Statement was a good one, E and O H We made a
mistake over the Europeans we gave the Congress lawyers a loophole
K RETROSPECT 313
for misinterpretation — quite wilful on their part, of course — between
paragraphs 15(4) and 19(5), and perhaps wc might have done something
more to satisfy the Sikhs Possibly too the condemnation of Pakistan was
rather too sweeping But on the whole it was a great tribute to the
Constitutional ingenuity of Cnpps and Rau
Could we have kept the initiative after its issue, and forced a reply
within a limited period' Only I tlunk if wc had really had a definite plan
of action from the first The long period of argument, quibbling, huckster-
ing and hesitation by Congress was deplorable, and I think it ought
somehow to have been prevented The Mission's continuous touch with
Congress during this period and the pathetic anxiety they showed to
persuade them to accept was to my mind all wrong It was, I tlunk, both
undignified and unprofitable, and I am not sure that it was always quite
honest
Phase VI The negotiations for an Interim Government were going on
concurrently with Phases IV and V I am not very proud of the way I con-
ducted these, though I am not sure that I could have done any better
I was hampered by tw o things, that it was impossible to keep the Interim
Government separate from acceptance or rejecnon of the long term
policy, and that I never quite knew what was going on behind the scenes
I think perhaps I was wrong to begin with the 5 5 2 formula, also not to
press Jinnah more strongly about a Congress Muslim from the very start
Still it is difHcult to deal with people who continually change their ground,
who give you to understand that only one point requires to be settled, and
as soon as they get some satisfaction or concession on that, raise another,
and so on Thus the Congress first concentrated on the powers of the
Government, then made an issue of parity, and finally of the Congress
Muslim Still I feel that I should somehow have been cleverer about it,
and a little firmer with Jinnah
I think the Statement of June 16 was on the right lines but perhaps
Engineer was a mistake If Anthony 1 had been suitable it would have been
better to have included an Anglo-Indian But the really unfortunate mistake
was Paragraph 8, which was meant to help Jinnah and has caused him such
irritation and enabled him to accuse us of bad faith I wonder if Cnpps
foresaw from the first the way that would or might, work out At any
rate it was, I think, definitely sharp practice on his part, after having
several times assured me, when I raised the point, that there was no
possible chance of Congress accepting the May 16 Statement, unless they
came into the Interim Government to point out to the Congress as I am
sure he did, the tactical advantage they would gain by accepting the : May
i<5 Statement, even with reservations, and thus preventing Paragraph 8 ot
■ Anthony President in-Cmef of the Anglo-Indian Awcum and a member of
the Central Legislative Assembly
314
THE MISSION^ FAILURE
June 16 being operated in JinnahV favour And the S of S did so too
They played too keen a game* at die snost charitable view. Cnpps even
said, with some satisfaction, that it was Paragraph 8 which had brought
about Congress acceptance of May 16 Statement
Whether Gandhi** final spanner could have been kept out of the woiks,
if Jinnah had not published his letter, and whether Jmnah could have been
restrained from publishing his letter, if we had kept in touch with the
Muslim League as some of die Mission did with Congress, it will never
be possible to say, but I do blame myself for not having had some line to
Jinnah to re-assure him a little t
Anyway, the third attempt which 1 have seen, and in which I have taken
some part — a very minor role in the Cnpps offer, the leading part ui 194 S»
and a large but unsatisfactory role tn this Cabinet Delegation business —
has ended in failure, and perhaps a worse failure than ever before What
were the mam causes'
As I have indicated, I think at the root of die failure lay the fact that
H M G and the Delegation never had any definite basic plan, and so
could never keep the initiative They negotiated as supplicants asking for
favours, rather than as masters granting them And we are still masters of
India, even if a little precariously We showed ourselves much too eager
to make a bargain, almost at the pnee of honour and peace I still believe
that a firmer, more masculine attitude would not only have been more
befitting a great people, but would have paid a better dividend
It was quite wrong for the Mission to have had such constant contacts
with the Congress camp and especially with Gandhi They put exag-
gerated faith and belief in him and showed him absurd deference Sudhir
Ghosh Gandhi's emissary f *s I bekevc a snake in the grass, and I would
certainly never have trusted him. Even Rajagopalachariar would I am
sure let them down if it suited his took or that of the Congress, and was
throughout a propagandist of the Congress case
Gandhi ran true to form and was the real wrecker His one idea for 40
years has been to overthrow British rule and influence and to establish
a Hindu raj, and he is as unscrupulous as he is persistent He has brought
to a tine art the technique of vagueness and of never making a statement
which 15 not somehow so qualified or worded, that he cannot be pinned
down to anything definite His practice of mixing prayers with politics,
or rather of making prayers a medium of political propaganda, is all a
part of the make-up He is an exceedingly shrewd, obstinate, donuneenng,
double-tongued, smglc-tnmded politician, and there lslmle true samtliness
in him.
1 One of Cripps * a&si stents Woodiow Wyait was on good terms with Juuuh and not
unsympathetic to the Muslim League Wavcll might have made more use of him it a line to
Jirtnab, but d d not feci complete confidence ui him He regretted that he &d not keep in
closer touch with Juuuh through members of im own UiSL
A RETROSPECT 315
With v cry few exceptions, the Congress Working Committee arc not
an impressive lot, while there is a good deal of cleverness there ts no
statesmanship amongst them Azad came out well, he is honest, moderate
and a gentleman, but not a strong character Nehru is sincere, well-
educated and personally courageous, but lacks balance and political
courage Patcl is more like a leader than any of them, and might become
the easiest to do business with I liked Mahtab of Onssa, earnest but
inexperienced
Jinnah over-called his hand 111 the end, and was too uncompromising on
the non-League Muslim issue, but he ts straight compared with Congress,
and docs not constantly shift his ground, as they do, though he too drives
a hard bargain
Such is the judgment of one trained as a soldier on some very well
incentioned but in the end a little sordid, political manoeuvres I somehow
feel that I ought to have been able to keep them on firmer and straighter
lines, but it would have been difficult And I was in agreement with most
of what they did, it was their dilatory, too conciliatory, rather tortuous
methods which I thought wrong, and 1 do not think I could have changed
them.
I am depressed at the future prospect Congress have been encouraged
and will set their claims higher than ever The suspicion and cbshkc of
Jwnah for the Congress have been enhanced, and to them is added, I fear,
a mistrust of £LM G f and perhaps of myself Further negotiations will not
be easy
(July 1 1946)
I picked up Alice through the Looking Glass one evening shortly before
the end of the Mission and wrote the parody below I put it down here
hut doubt whether it is really worth preserving
JABBER-WEEKS
(from Phlawrencc through the Indian Ink)
Twas gnllig and the Congrcehtes
Did harge and shobble in the swope
All Jmsy were the Pakstanites,
And the spruft Sikhs outstrope
Beware the Gandhiji, my son,
The sat) agraha, the bogy fast,
Beware the Djinnant, and shun
The frustnous scheduled caste
3i<5 THE MISSION'S FAILURE
He took his cnppsian pen in hand.
Long time m diafosh mood he wrote,
And fashioned as his lethal brand
A cab J missionary note
And as he mused with pointed phrase,
The Gandhiji, on wrecking bent,
Came toppling down the bhangi wa>s,
And wo&ed as he went.
Ek do, Ek do, and blow on blow
The pointed phrase went slicker snack ,
And, with the dhoti, Ghosh and goat, he
Came chubdating hack
And hast thou &woozled Gandhyi *
Come to my arms, my hhmpish hoy 1
Hoo-ruddj-ray T O Labour Day,
Vfe shakkjiktd \s\ his ysy
Twas grdlig, and the Congreehtes
Did haige and shohble m the swope,
All }uisy were the Pakstamtes,
And the spruft Sikhs outs trope
Tt's very interesung\ said Phlawrence a little wearily, *but it's rather
hard to understand*
'So is nearly everything m this country*, answered Hobson-Jobson-
* Shall I explain some of the difficult words for you
*Ycs t please\ said Phlawrence
'Well, gnlhg is in the hot-u eather at Delhi, when everyone's brains are
grilled hefore 2pm and don t get ungnllcd till 2 a m Congreehtes are
animals rather lie conger eels t very slippery, they can wriggle out 01
anything they d on* t like Harge is a portmanteau word, it means to haggle
and argue, to shobble is to shift and wobhle, a swope is a place open to
sweepers Pakstamtcs are rather fierce noisy animals, all green* they live
round mosques and can't bear Congreehtes Spruft means spruce and
puffed up t outstropc means that they went round shouting out thar they
weren't being fairly treated and would take direct action about it*
Tnat seems a lot fbr one word to mean', said Phlawrence.
*Thc Sikhs Aon t quite know what it docs mean \ et*, said Hobson-
Jobson
A RETROSPECT
3*7
anyway, the Gandhiji seems to have been swoozlcd, whatever
that means', said Phlawrcncc, *and I expect that was a good thing*
'But he wasn't 1 , said Hobsou-Jobson, 'they found out afterwards that
he had swoozlcd everyone else*.
*Thank you very much for your explanation 1 , said Phlawrcncc after
a pause, 'but I am afraid it is all still very difficult'
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
July 4 (StmU)
Some comparatively peaceful days since I came up here. O a the 2nd B \an
Jenkins came in for a talk, he is looking very well and in good heart, less
need as a Go\ cniof to o\ cr\\ ork himself, I expect. He said the Sikhs were
very excited, were talking wildly* had 110 leadership and might do some-
thing stupid We talked of Nehru's visit to Kashmir, of possible means to
resume negotiations for an Interim Government — which he thought mote
important than the Constituent Assembly, of the Services, about food
procurement, which is going much better in the Punjab, and about the
possibility of a Governors* Conference
This morning I had the first meeting of the Caretaker Official Council
It will certainly be easier to do business with, but this morning there was
practically nothing to do Hutchings made a statement about Food, and
seemed to think we should pull through all right with luck. Bengal is now
the danger point.
Members of the Caretaker Cent tat
Field Marshal Str Claude Atichttilecki Conimander-m-Ch\ef y War
Str Eric Coates, 1C S , Pittance
Sir Eric Cowdn-Smrtft, ICS, War Transport* Railways, Potts, and A\r
Str Albar Hydan, IC S f labour. Information and Arts, Health
Sir Robert Hutch tngs, ICS, Food aid Agriculture
Str Arthur tVaugfh ICS, Home and Supply
Sir Gutttnath Bewoor, ICS, Commerce and Commonwealth Relations
Str George S pence, ICS, Law and Education
]u\y3
Nothing but routine papers from Delhi the last few days t and not too
many of them. I have written a periodical letter to the King, describing
the negotiations with the Cabinet Mission. P S V thought it good, Q
thought poorly of it.
H M King George VI, m handing tins tetter to his Private Secretary,
Str AUu Lascclles, sjii *And 4 (fctmicJ good letier it »s ' Sir Alan said rti*Ji
4-1 1 JULY I946 319
if 11 as all tins and more — *a state and historical document of the first import-
ance * Although tt duplicates to some extent the summing up of the Cabinet
Mission given m the Journal, it is such a good letter that with Htr Majesty s
gracious permission it ts reproduced with only slight amissions as Appendtx
Vllt The portion omitted contains brief comments on some individual Rulers
fitly 10
Council had only two items, the release of cx-encmy technicians to
remain in India for jobs instead of deportation, and die date of the next
meeting of the Legislature Conran-Smith made a statement about the
strike of postmen, due to start tomorrow, which it is proposed to fight,
and will be a half-hearted affair, it is hoped
July 11
Wyhc, Dow 1 and Twynani arrived yesterday, and I had a two-hours
conference with them this mo nun g and two hours 111 the afternoon In
the morning we discussed the protection of the Services against victimiza-
tion for the 1942 disturbances It was agreed that the question of an enquuy
into 1942 would undoubtedly depend on the attitude of the Congress
High Command, that the Services must be protected from such an Enquiry
even at die risk of a showdown with Congress, but that individual cases
brought against officers would have to be dealt with in accordance widi
the law
All agreed that compensation terms for the Services should be published
as soon as possible that officers should be allowed to go on these terms if
they wished, and that the S of S Services would have m any event to be
wound up within a very limited penod It was decided that, if the S of S
agreed Governors should approach their Ministries and ascertain whether
they wished to keep on the existing S of S officers
In the afternoon after a short discussion on the I N A I gave Governors
an outline of the breakdown plan I had put to EMG and their reaction
The Governors had not much comment, they were all agreed on the
necessity for H.M G to have a definite policy they thought they could
at present suppress a Congress movement, except in Bihar but none of
them could answer the question of where we went from there
Governors had no special problems otherwise Evan Jenkins was rather
shocked st the deeenazzcion. of the zdrwmffrztcoti ut die Punjab tn the hst
10 yean he said it was now definitely an oriental standard He was
apprehensive of communal trouble especially from the Sikhs
1 Now Governor of Bihar Mudie had taken his place as Governor of SintL
D lab Y
J20
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
July 12
All the Governors except Dow left early this morning I Had an hour's talk
with Dow He has a cynical contempt for Bihar and its politicians hut is
holding his own with them, 1 think. He thinks his police unreliable
I believe even Congress think poorly of their supporters in Bihar, it has
always been a difficult Piovmce
July 16
Left Simla yesterday and called ui on H.H. of Patiala at Chad ou the way
down 1 had an hour's talk to him about possible grouping of Sikh States
and the prohlems of the Sikhs generally He was sensible hut nothing new
came out of it.
S of S sent a \cry woolly reply to the telegram I sent from Simla about
the Services, after my discussions with the Governors to the effect that it
'raised serious issues, 'would require earnest consideration by EMG,
etc Even worse, just as I had approved a final draft of letters to Nehru and
Jmnah, reopening negotiations for an Interim Government 1 had a letter
from S of S saying that HMG were about to send me instructions about
the Interim Government 1 almost decided to send my letters and turn
a blind eye to his* but eventually cabled home text of letters and said I
should send them unless I received orders to the contrary
H Af G agreed to the issue of these letters and the one addressed to Nehru
was gnat to htn when he saw Lord Wavell on 22 July
The principal item in Counal was a review of all the plans for the five
year period ahead put forward by the Centre and Provinces with an
estimate of their cost This produced a very interesting discussion > and
the general result n as that the financial resources could probably be pro-
vided, but that it ^ as most unlikely that the necessary material resources —
steel, bricks, machinery coal cement, etc — w ould be available, or the
skilled personnel required so that an attempt to carry out the whole
programme would merely result m competition for the limited material
and a rise in prices, so that we should get no more done than our resources
in material permitted but that the cost might be 50% or more higher It
was agreed that an estimate of our material resources was necessary before
a realistic programme could be drawn up and priorities deaded The dis-
cussion was a good one and it is certainly easier to get business done
cxpediuously in an official Counal
12-22 JlHY 1946 321
July f$
S of S telegraphed instructing mc to give that little snake Sudhir Ghosh
a priority passage which I had refused, and I sent back a telegram accept-
ing his directions but registering a very strong protest, these unofficial
political lines arc all w rong and do a lot of harm,
I had a string of interviews in the afternoon Conran-Srrutii spoke of the
Post and Telegraph adjudication and wanted it approved by Council at
once, so as to get it out speedily
Wc had an emergency Council meeting at 7 30 p m* and accepted the
Post and Telegraph adjudication, v»ith some misgiving at the probable
effect on Railways and other Government Departments, who are likely
also to demand to share in the hand-out
July 22
Today, I had a fairly busy morning with papers, and an afternoon of
m tcrvicws
Smith, DIB, gave a most gloomy forecast of the law and order
situation, said he considered the country npc for sen o us trouble, thought
that the Constituent Assembly would be made the instrument for a coup
d'etat by Congress, which would declare the C A to be a sovereign body
and set it up as a parallel Government I wonder how far his judgement
is sound
Then 40 minutes with Nehru 1 discussed among other things the
question of the Services and the demand for a general enquiry m the U P ,
Bihar and C P into the 1942 disturbances Nehru was very reasonable
about this, said that he did not wish any general enquiry, and that his
advice was against it Public feeling was, however, strong, especially
against certain individuals, would it be possible to retire these individuals ?
I satd that if he would advise Premiers against any general enquiry,
Governors would be prepared to discuss with them individual cases where
there was well substantiated evidence that the bounds of duty had been
exceeded m any way Nehru was very quiet and sensible about this, and
I hope that he may succeed in preventing any general enquiries
By handing him at the end of the interview a letter with proposals for
an Intenm Government, which have also been sent to Jnmah, I began
a fresh attempt to form a coalition of the two main Parties But I am very
far from being sanguine of success
Meanwhile the Postal Strike worsens, the Sind Government is very
rocky, the Sikhs are still sullen or worse, the Governor of the NWFP
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
and die Political Department want to start a *wai with the Mahsuds 1 our
efforts to get nee out of Java seem doomed to failure, and Juinah is fulmi-
nating against the Nizam s appointment of Mirza Ismail as his Premier
Such is a selection from my daily cares
July 23
A comparam ely quiet morning till 12 30 p m when Weightman 2 came
about the proposal to take action against the Shahi Khel section of the
Mahsuds who recently Udnapped Donald, the Political Agent, In order to
rescue Donald we advanced no 000 Rs to the Mahsudjirga 3 which they
paid o\ er to the Shabi Khel to deliver up Donald We now propose to
demand from the Shabi Khel the return of the no coo Rs plus 250 nfles
plus hostages The ethics of this procedure seem to me doubtful but it is
apparently in accordance with frontier procedure and code if the Shabi
Khel do not comply, as they almost certainly will not, it is intended to
proscribe a certain area and after due warning to destroy villages by
bombing Now I am rather doubtful of our ability to do this Our re-
sources avadable are three squadrons of Spitfires flown by Indian pilots
To expect an Indian pilot to fly low enough in a Spitfire in a narrow valley
among those hills to hit the target is unduly optimistic I sent for Carr the
A O C -w-C who confirmed my misgivings about the likelihood of the
action being effective He said that the Spitfires in these hills were an
untried weapon with doubtful pilots We agreed to get the A O C down
to discuss the question
Weightman was very insistent that it would be ratal not to take im-
mediate action but I am sure that to take ineffective action will be worse,
and I decided to get down Olaf Caroc and discuss matters with him and
C-in C
After lunch came Coatcs and Conran-Smith about the P and T strike
and it was decided that we must fight their impossible demands
Just before dinner I got Nehru s reply to my proposal about the Interim
Government It practically amounted to an ultimatum, almost a declara-
tion of war by Congress The Viceroy was to be a complete cipher in the
Government, merely a figurehead and the appointment of the Minority
representatives would not be for him to have any say in etc etc I wired
the answer home and said I would comment on this ultimatum* to-
morrow I had not anticipated that the show-down, vvtfh. Coxigccit would
come quite so soon
1 One of the wildest tube* of the NWFP
* Su Hugh Weight mm ICS Secretary External Affair* Deportment 1946-7
> Council of ckien.
22-27 JULY I 94 ( '
July 24
At Council this morning Conrau*Smith made a statement on the P and
T strike, there seemed to be a great many fingers m the pic now, with
Jinnah, Patcl, Nehru and perhaps Gandhi offering adv ice to the strikers or
Government. It is perfectly clear that \\c must stand pat
After lunch I had a conference on the proposed air proscription of the
Shabi Khel Carr had got down Long, the A O C t from the N W F P
He seemed good and sensible and after hearing his views on the effort
involved, the probable effect, and the skill and morale of the IU A F
pilots, I decided to give approval to the proposed action, without waiting
to sec Caroc
I sent a telegram to S of S about Nehru's letter, George Abell and
Mcnon, as usual watered down my draft a little I shall get a washy
procrastinating reply from fLM G f 1 am sure that they will not really
face the issue
7; 1 tins telegram XVavell said that he proposed to see Nehru on tlte 29th and
that if tt became dear that Congress u ouU not participate in the Interim
Got ernment except on condition that absolute power 11 as handed over to them
and the Governor^General s special powers abrogated he would speak to
htm m very clear terms A l would say that HM G have the fullest intention
of handing over power to Indians and wish a untied India But they do not
rtcagtusc Congress as representing all India and have no intention of handing
over potter to Congress alone While they are prepared to consider any
modifications in the u orktng of the Interim Government which are desired by
both tnatn parties H MG will not accept unilateral demands by Congress
In regard to the Constitttent Assembly he proposed to tell htm that tf
Congress did not intend to work the Statement of 16 May sincerely on the lines
laid down therein, HMG must reconsider the whole position
He also pointed out that tf as seemed posstble t Congress decided to chal-
lenge H MG >theitH MG must make up their minds whether to abdicate or
to accept the challenge He himself had no doubt that the challenge must be
accepted
July 25
Comparatively quiet day No reaction yet from. tLM G on any of my
recent telegrams The P and T strike continues
July 27
I had a long and rather pussy -foot telegram from S of S in reply to
mine about Nehru's letter, they are obviously in alarm lest 1 should say
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
something uncompromising to Nehru I sent a reply* George drafted it
this time and I hotted it up
Wavell in his reply said that he had no destre or intention to break with
Congress if this could be avoided, but that he had wanted assurances that
H.MG umtd stand fam on iito essential matters, (t) that the Interim
Government would function under the existing constitution, (it) that the
procedure for comtitutioiir-niaktng laid down in the Statement of j6 May would
be adhered to He u as glad to note that HMG were prepared to stand firm
on (i), but perturbed that their answer on[u) was rather indefinite He repeated
hxs request that H M G u ould decide their policy w the, event of a direct
challenge by Congress
The whole situation was, hou ever, just about to be radically altered by the
Muslim League's withdrawal of their acceptance of the Statement of 16 May,
as recorded tn the last paragraph of the next Journal entry for 2$ July
July 2p
I had a telegram from HMG outlining their Palestine policy, and asking
for my comments I thought their proposals- quite disastrous and said
so in very plain language The effect in India at this juncture will he
deplorable
This morning Z had a letter from the P M 4 pressing on me again
Maurice Gwyer as Political Adviser He has obviously been told that
I receive nothing but official ICS advice and that my political judge-
ment is therefore unsound, 1 e not sufficiently pro-Congress I think my
judgement is better than H.M G 's and shall say so, and tell him that if
HMG don't like tf their duty is to find another Viceroy, as I will not be
a figure-head
So the Muslim League has run out, thanks to the Mission living in the
pocket of Congress while out here, the dishonesty of Cnpps t my stupidity
and weakness in not spotting his dishonesty earlier and standing up to it,
and the irresponsibility of Nehru m making the statements he has since
the Mission left. I do not feci guilty about paragraph 8, I have always
thought our interpretation correct but 1 do feel guilty of not seeing
through Cnpps' manoeuvres and refusing to be a party to Congress*
insincere acceptance of the statement of May 16 and the dishonesty of
Cnpps and P L in instigating Congress to make such an acceptance It
was the one important point throughout the negotiations on which
Alexander refused to support me, and 1 rather weakly gave way
On zg July the Council of the Muslim League at a meeting in Bombay
resolved to u nhdraw its acceptance of the Cabinet Missions proposals set forth
27-31 JULY 1946
m the Statement of 16 May and to resort to 'Direct Action* to achieve Pakistan
The League was moved to do this mainly by a number of rash statements made
by Kehnt He publicly declared that the Congress had agreed only to go into the
Constituent Assembly and to nothnw else, and that, in his opinion there would
probably be tio Grouping (to which the League attached the greatest tmpor-
tance) % and that it hat the Cabinet Mission thought or intended did not enter
into the matter at all
Jinnalx had all along maintained that the Congress's acceptance of the Cabinet
Mission s proposals u as not getuarte Nehru* sscatemcttts confirmed htm and the
League in this view It was quite clear t they declared, that Congress had not
really accepted the proposals at all
The League Council also complained of the 'fantastic and dishonest con-
struction that the Viceroy and Cabinet Mission had put upon Paragraph S of
the Statctnent of 16 June
The last sentence of the above Journal entry and a passage m a subsequent
telegram to the Secretary of State dated 31 August show tftat IVavcftwas under
the vnpresston that he had strongly opposed treating the Congress*$ acceptance
of the Statement of 16 May as genuine He had certainly expressed the opinion
that it was mstiucre and that an acceptance which they meant to break was
worse than a refusal But both the Journal and the Cabinet Mission records
indicate that he agreed with the Members of the Mission that because of its
clever wording it had to be treated as a genuine acceptance He did, however,
urge that the Congress should he firmly told that the procedure laid down for
the Constituent Assembly m the Cabinet Missions proposals could only be
altered by a majority of both communities t and if was on this point that
Alexander did not support htm and he gave way
July 3i
Yesterday morning I had one and a quarter Lours with Nehru, I got tie
impression that he had been rather shaken by the Muslim resolution and
realised that it was partly at least due to his hasty and intemperate state-
ments I don't think that his recent visit to Kashmir was a success Anyway
he seemed very subdued I said to him that Congress now had a chance of
showing real statesmanship and of giving the Muslim League assurances
that would bring them into the Constituent Assembly Nehru said that he
did not quite see what assurances could be given to them they certainly
could not be given assurance of Pakistan I replied that the principal
grievance of the League was that the statements of Congress leaders made
them beiieve that it was not in tended to give the Group system, on the
basis of which they had agreed to join a fair chance I referred specially
to the Congress reservations m their acceptance of the Statement of May
16th* Nehru said that the Muslim League had also made reservations I
3^6 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
pointed out that these were long-term reservations, on a possible Pakistan
a number of y ears aKcad, whereas the Congress reservations were short-
term ones an<l affected the immediate issue
On the matter of the formation of an Interim Government, I said that
1 was still most anxious to form one as soon as possible, but that H M G
was quite clear that it was impossible to go beyond the assurances given
m the letter of May 30th to Azad 1 and there would be no question of an
'independent' Gov crnmcnt, whether the Muslim League took part 111 it
ot not, Nehru made bo comment on this
Tuler dined, on lus way home for 5 months lea\ c He is an attractive
personality On something that cropped up during dinner, I asked him
and Charles Gairdncr, 1 if they were grven another chance of life and
offered the choice of three qualities to hi\e in that h£e — one moral, one
physical, one artistic — what they would choose I think we all three chose
courage as the moral quality, Tuker and Charles chose good health as the
physical quality, fTuker has suffered much from ill-health)* I chose
vitality or (if vitality was considered a moral and not a physical quality)
horsemanship, for art I chose an understanding of music which I have
never had, Tuker w anted to be a master of the violin and Charles G to
draw and patnt well
S of S telegraphed for an immediate appreciation of the situation
caused by the Muslim League withdrawal which has obviously greatly
perturbed them, and I sent a reply
Wax ell replied that the Leaguers resolution u cttld certainly increase com-*
ttiunat tension u hveh u as already acute, andtlmt the general situation u as most
unsatisfactory There u as widespread labour trouble, encouraged by the left-
wing of Congress uhich believed m revolution Hie right-wing u anted to
<ccure pou cr by cottstitutiottal tneans^ but u ere Leeptttg revolution tu resctt e ttt
case constitutional means failed 'Nchnt,* he u rote t u as probably elected
President because he has the best chance of keeping a foot m each camp, though
ha\ tng no balance he will usually be on one kg and net er on the same one for
loiiq
Tlie most HT^crtl need tsfor a Central Government with popular support
If Congress u ill tale responsibility they mil realise that firm control of unruly
eh merits is necessary and they may put doun the Communists t and try to
control their ou n ffjt-u tug
V disltie intensely the idea of having an Interim Got eminent dominated by
one party hit i jea that I must try to get Congress in as soon as possible x
1 Sec p -to
1 Ck-neti! Su C lurid Ciiidncz Prime Minister * Spccul Ktprc*cutato c in llic far Eiit,
1943 4 Governor of TjjnvuiU, ij>6j -8
31 JULY-3 AUGUST IQ46 327
It u as not hoxtexer, possible, he said, to go beyond the assurances given to
Azad m the letter of 30 May and if the Congress u ould not conic in on these
terms, the Carctalcr Gotcrnmcnt it ould hai e to got cm firmly even at the risk
of a dash with {eft u tug elements
He proposed that places should be leptfor the Muslim League in the Interim
Government in the hope that they uot dd come in later and that these shout i
cither he left vacant or filled temporarily by non League Muslims
He thought that he u ould have to go ahead and summon the Constituent
Assembly as already arranged, though without the League CoustUuhcn-
waking for the Muslim majority Provinces would obviously be a farce
At gust 1
Business began for what will probably be a \cry disturbed month with
a wire from S of S suggesting that 1 should send for Jinnah at once a] id
try to induce him to join a Coalition Government I replied that 1 thought
very poorly of this idea which would look like panic \\ ould only increase
J s intransigence and lead to no result I would propose to leave Jinnah
alone for the moment
My afternoon began with Yeatts 1 who begins an interview by taking
out his watch and laying it in front of him he then chatters uninterruptedly
till the scheduled time is over then replaces lus watch says regretfully
My tunc is up and takes his leave His subjects today were disposal of
surplus stores the Hindustan Factory railway coach the Sindri fertiliser
factory and the price of raw cotton
Kharegat docs not actually use a watch but he times himself over the
course pretty accurately and keeps up a steady flow of measured and
precise statement usually of delays and difficulties rather than of ac-
complishment
Conran Smith was quick and businesslike P and T strike seems likely
to be off and Railway men apparently satisfied with their terms but
Calcutta Port is on strike
Augt st 2
A comparatively quiet day
Menon deprecated my proposal to keep the C-in-C as War Member
if I formed a Government from Congress since he thought it would give
a handle to the Left Wing of which Nehru is very alarmetL Menon him
self also thinks that Communism is a real danger in India He advised that
' M W W M Yeatts ICS Secretary to the Government of India Industr es Depart
mem
328 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
I should write to Gandhi to inform him of the negotiations for an Interim
Government
S of S telegraphed HMG's approval to my proposals for formation
of an Interim Go\ eminent I a\so had a reply &om jmnah to my ongmal
letter, not perhaps as uncompromising as it might have been
August 3
I had an interview in the morning, with Reid of the Daily Telegraph.
Rud whom I had not met before seemed quite intelligent and good bat
has not been long in India, He had recently had an interview with Jinnah,
and had some interesting impressions He is sure that J wants a settlement
and thinks that J lumself does not believe in Pakistan Contrary to the
general impression ht does not think that J dominates his Working Com-
mittee but that it dominates him, Nishtar impresses him as one of the
strongest characters on it We had a long discussion on j *s interpretation
of Clause 8 (which Reid shared) and his accusation of bad faith I said that
1 had never had any doubts on the interpretation of Clause 3, once it was
agreed that the Congress acceptance of the Statement of May 1 6 was
to be regarded as genuine > it was on this point that I had my doubts
From what Reid said, it was obvious that Jinnah knew all about Cnpps
interviews with Gandhi and Patel and the way m which Congress accep-
tance of the May 16 Statement was obtained It was obvious also that
the disastrous interview of June 20 had completely upset Jinnah who
complained that he had been * bulbed' Reid also mentioned an interview
with Gandhi, at which Reid had said something to him about, *Vour
relations with those other celebrities, the Mission and the Viceroy* Reid
said that Gandhi turned on him and said with great malevolence and
venom 'They are not celebrities'
I decided to consult Council tomorrow on the negotiations to form an
Interim Government the latest proposal is to put the onus on Congress
to approach the Muslim League
August 4
I held an informal Council meeting and explained to them my proposals
for trying to form an Interim Government The members present —
Waugh, Spence, Conran-Smith, Bewoor, Coates — approved unani-
mously So I telegraphed for S of S approval So begins yet another
attempt to induce these irresponsible Indian politicians to show some sense
and responsibility I have no great hopes of success
\
2-8 AUGUST I946
329
Of j 5 August Wat ell received information from mi unimpeachable source*
about the attitude of Valkhhhhm Patel n Inch led him to think that after all
there u as quite a chance of success His informant told hint that if Congress
ttere asLcd to form an Interim Goicrnment Patcl would insist that tltey should
agree to do so and that they should not hrcak over the issue of the status of the
Interim Government He eomtdered that they should accept as the basts the
letter to Azad of 30 May mid he u as prepared to resign from the Working
Committee if Ins view was not accepted He u as convinced that the Congress
must enter the Got eminent to prei cnt chaos spreading m the country
August 6
S of S cabled approving my proposed approach to Nehru I don't like it t
but I think it is the only possible mo\ c I ha\ c a bad hour or two every
morning now, when I wake early and think otcr chc general state of India
and the lack of a definite policy by H.M G and the virtual certainty of
serious trouble, and the way all constructiv c \\ ork I have been able to do
in the last 2£ y cars seems likely to be wasted However after a nde and
breakfast I cheer up again 1 want a rest badly but sec no prospect of
getting one
August 8
A busy day with conference of five Governors whom I have summoned
for consultation Burrows (Bengal) Wyhc (U P ) Jenkins (Punjab),
Mudic (Sind), Caroc [NWFP)
At the morning session I gave some account of the Mission s negotia-
tions, and explained the present situation and proposals The Governors of
these largely Muslim Provinces naturally did not like the idea of a Ministry
at the Centre or the possibility of a Constituent Assembly which the
Muslim League did not attend, and anticipated that there might be scnous
repercussions But neither in Bengal nor Smd did the Ministries wish to
go out of office and it was obvious that the League had at present no
organised plan for direct action Caroe was the most worried, about the
Tribes Caroe himself has never yet really reconciled himself to the idea
of our leaving India Generally the Governors thought that they could
hold the situation and were not able to contribute very much towards the
solution of the present problems Burrows was as solid, imperturbable,
and quietly humorous as ever, he is really 3. complete Conservative in fats
ideas and thinks the Grenadier Guards the finest body ever collected
Evan Jenkins had come in fro m tour says the villages arc all as friendly as
ever and not much interested in politics Shortages of cloth kcrosine, and
sugar arc their worries
3^0 TJIE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
On the whole I think the conference was worth while, though nothing
very concrete came out of it No one likes the present or prospective
situation, but no one has any new ideas for dealing with it
August to
Dictated a note in the morning on the breakdown plan, copy enclosed
[below]
Note for PS V
i I think the outcome of the present political situation may very well
be that Congress will not reach any agreement with the Muslim League,
either on the Interim Government or the Constituent Assembly* and that
they may put forward proposals for an Interim Government which I shall
fcei unable to accept If we m this way reach a deadlock, I imagine that
it is quite probable that H M G will summon me home for consultation
I want to be prepared with a definite plan in as much detail as possible
z As I said m ray last telegram home, I can see no better breakdown
solution than the one I put forward in paragraphs 1 i to 14 of my Apprecia-
tion of last May, 1 e that we should hand over, after a stated period, the
Congress majority Provinces to Congress, but maintain the present
consntution and our own con trol mNW and N E India If this is the
best plan, and 1 can think of no better, we must have it worked out 01
as great detail as possible I think this should be done as soon as possible,
and sccredy, by a small body I suggest that this body should consist of
the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Coatcs, Spence, Waugh, and yourselfj
working under my directions What I want to get clear is whether the
plan is practicable and what steps should be taken to put it into effect, if
the necessity aroes
3 If fcLM G were persuaded to adopt the plan, which could, I think,
only be done in consultation with the leaders of the Opposition, and
probably of the Dominions, they would have to make an announcement
something to this effect
(A) His Majesty's Government sent out a Cabinet Mission to
endeavour to produce by agreement between the main parties a solution
for a free and united India As a result of those negotiations and the
subsequent developments it is clear to H.M G that it is at present
impossible to reach any solunon to which the two main parties will
agree* and H>M. G hsis to take a fresh decision
(B) tLM G cannot consent to hand over India under conditions
which are likely to produce civil war and disturbance The chief
obstacles to agreement he in the north-western and north-eastern areas
8-10 AUGUST I946 33I
of India where the mam Muslim populations arc These are also the
areas of greatest importance for the defence of India's frontiers The
situation 111 the southern and central portions of India is less complex,
since the population is more homogeneous
(C) H.M G have therefore decided to withdraw all British officials
and troops within six (*) months from the following Provinces of
British India Bombay, Madras, Orissa, C P , Bihar, U P , and will
hand over control of these Provmccs to the Congress Working Com-
mittee
(D) The present constitution and control will be maintained in the
followmg Provinces N W F P , Punjab, Smd, Bengal, Assam, the
Chief Commissioner s Province of Delhi, and the Agency of British
Baluchistan » until some permanent solution for an Indian Union can be
reached The British will assist these two groups of Provinces in the
N W and N E to reach agreement on a constitution and to arrive at
terms with the remainder of India They will then withdraw completely
from India
(E) The boundaries between the Provinces handed over to Congress,
which may be referred to as Hindustan, and the Provinces remaining
under British control, may be adjusted if necessary, by mutual agree-
ment
(F) H M G will undertake responsibility for the defence of N W
and K E India, and will by agreement, assist Hindustan in external
defence if desired.
(G) The exercise of paramountcy over the States which he within
the boundaries of Hindustan will be relinquished by the Crown from
the date when British control of the provmccs of Hindustan is handed
over Paramo unccy vail continue with those States which he within
the boundaries of N-W and N-E India still rcmauiing under British
control Those States which he between Hindustan and the proposed
areas under British control will be free to adhere either to Hindustan
or to the British controlled area
(H) During the period before control is handed over, H.M G shall
make it clear that they will maintain law and order throughout India
by all means at their disposal, and will not tolerate any revolutionary
action
4 The above is of course the merest skeleton, and there is a whole host
of problems which would have to be solved In the next paragraphs I
outline a few of them There are many others which will naturally occur
5 The Amy One solution would be for the Bnnsh at Delhi to retain
control for the defence of the whole of India This would avoid splitting
332 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
up the Army and would keep the door open for a subsequent Union of
India and common defence arrangements It would undoubtedly be the
best arrangement, if Congress could be persuaded to accept it I think it
is quite conceivable that the Army might also accept it, but there would
have to be some readjustments and redistribution of troops, and officers
and men should probably have an option to resign. The C -ln-C will have
to advise on this
6 Foreign Affairs The same applies here as to the Army; 1 e it would be
much better to keep these under Central control if possible
7 Communications Again these should be centrally controlled if
possible It would always be open to Congress, if they felt bloody-minded,
to make the maintenance of communications practically impossible, but
if the Brmsh Government w ere really firm, it could retort by cutting off
external communications to Hindustan
8 What form should the Central Government at Delhi take ? It might
have to be purely British, which would not be satisfactory, or it might be
possible to negotiate some ad hoc Government to deal with agreed Central
subjects until some permanent arrangement could be made
9 Other difficulties would be currency, finance, customs, etc t and
there ate doubtless many others
10 I believe myself that this scheme would work, provided H.A1G
was quite firm on it, and was prepared to cany it out with a high hand if
necessary For this reason I have suggested that the consent of the Op-
position and the Dominions should he obtained t and that Congress should
be presented with a plan which had the full backing of the Bnnsh Empire
I think it is possible that knowledge of such a plan might be sufficient to
induce a reasonable mood m the poliucal parties
The plan would of course not be possible m race of determined op-
position by the Muslim League but 1 do not dunk it is likely that this
the dLT 011, in ^ Mmhm UagUe Would P tesuiniLtl y ^Icome
11 Please think this over and discuss it with me as soon as possible
August 11
Tlierc were plenty of green boxes mostly routine wort I was amused by
Dow s note on the attitude of Um^rsity students towards examinations
mn^T u' y ^ UDaUe by bnber ? or theft, to obtain copies of the
papers before the exanunations, a ^ cry large proportion tail They consider
this most unjust and have put forward the foUowmg argument ^
10-12 AUGUST 1946
333
wants marc educated men, therefore examinations must be made much
easier * QED
I had a special meeting of Council at 6 30 p m whidi lasted for nearly
two hours
Wc decided to grant certain reliefs to all grades of Government sen ants
111 conformity with the concessions recently granted to P and T and
Railw a) s, m order to forestall a possible strike
August 12
Nothing during the week-aid except a telegraphed letter from Nehru,
agreeing to make proposals for an Interim Government I cabled a draft
reply to S of S who agreed to it at once
The Naw ah of Chhatan came to sec me about the position of the
'loyalists who had always helped the Bntish, were wc really going so
soon and lea\mg them at the mercy of Congress, who had always been
antt-Bntish, and now we had got at odds with the Muslim League too
and what were our friends to do? Did I advise them to surrender their
tides, as they were being pressed to do by Juinah? Couldn t we stop
another 10 } ears or so anyway, the Labour Go\ eminent was surely going
much too fast in handing over India These interviews, of which I had
already had a number and shall doubtless have many more, are rather
trying and very painful Some of the so-called 'friends* of the Bntish have
done nothnig more really than support us because we kept order and
enabled them to draw their rents from the land in ease and safety > few of
them have been good land-lords or looked after their tenants, and not one
of them hardly has had the pohtica} courage to come out into the open and
oppose Congress I have not a great deal of sympathy for them. But some
hke the Nawab are really genuine and arc great gentlemen, and I am sorry
for them. I always feel it is better to he honest and to say that we are going
to hand over power, that it is right that wc should do so and leave Indians
to govern themselves, that while the Congress is not a body one would
have chosen as the representatives of the great mass of the Indian people,
it is the body that the Indian people have chosen for themselves and we
have to do business with the men of their choice The Nawab agreed to
all this, and I gave him such comfort as I could by saying that the experi-
ence of history was that people became much more moderate when they
got power and became responsible and did not do nearly all the violent
things that they threatened. I said I saw no reason why they should give
up well-earned honours at Mr Jmnah's bidding but that was for them
to decide I explained to him frankly and fully what happened about
334 tilt INTERIM GOVERNMENT
paragraph 8 of the June i<5 Statement ami that Jinnah was not justified
in his accusations
August 16
Rather a depressing sort of da> Jmnah and Nehru have failed to agree
about the Interim Government, Nehru has hcM a Press Conference and
as usual has nude some stupid remarks, and there has been some * jolcnt
noting in Calcutta
August j 7
In the afternoon I saw Nehru about the formation of an Interim Govern-
ment He said he had had a long and quite amicable discussion with Jinnah,
but ihat it did not lead to any result* He had made him an offer of 5 scats
m an Interim Gm emment of 14 and told him that any names proposed
by the League would be accepted by Congress Jumali had complained
that under the proposed arrangement n would be open to Congress to
nominate a non-League Muslim. Nehru had replied that he did not sec
how the League could object if it came out of the Congress quota
Nehru told mc that his idea was to propose the names of 6 Congress
nominee* and 3 Minority representatives, and to fill the 5 Muslim, seats
with neutral Muslims I suggested the possibility of leaving them open for
a time for acceptance by the Muslim League, but he said that he did not
like this idea, as it would give the Government the appearance of insta-
bility
I asked him w hat his view s w ere about the summoning of the Constitu-
ent Assembly and he said he thought it should be summoned for about the
middle of September
The conversation lasted for an hour and a quarter and I suppose was
reasonably satisfactory, hut I am sutc his 'neutral* Muslims won't v^orL
He was very friendly and reasonable* but looted rather worn and tired.
He told me that he was \ cry much upset by his car having knocked down
and killed a child a little w hile back.
Mcamvhile in Calcutta the noting continues on the most violent lines
On 16 August, urfach the Muslim League had decided to celebrate as * Direct
Action Day attd tphidt the Mushm League Government of Bengal unwisely
declared a public holiday there was an appalhng outbreak oj communal riotmg
in Calcutta that lasted several days According to official estimates 5 000 people
uere killed and 15*000 injured
12-19 AUGUST I946
335
August iS
Calcutta is as bad as ever and die death-toll mounts steadily Sarat Chandra
Bose rang up in the afternoon with a message of protest to me that the
police Were favouring die Muslims against the Hindus, whereas die
Governor tells me the casualties arc higher amongst the Muslims Anyway
it is a dio roughly bad business
1 saw Nehru again in the evening and told him that I thought I should
sccjnuiah and make a last appeal to him to join die Interim Government
I put forward the argument tliat it was just possible that Jinnah might feel
more inclined to accept 111 view of the latest happenings, that a very grave
responsibility would lie on us if we had not made every effort to secure
his co-opera tt on Nehru was opposed to it and said it would be useless,
but said he would put it to his Sub-Committee and wntc to me I stressed
particularly the danger of the Army breaking up He produced a terrible
list of Muslim names for the Government which I can certainly not accept
Nehru informed IVavell on ip August that his colleagues were also opposed
to making a fresh approach to Jmnah, and Wavell himself concluded, ttt view
of a statement by Jmnah published on the 19th, that it would he useless to said
August ig
I sent S of S a telegram grving the probable composition of the Govern-
ment which Congress would propose and saying that I did not think we
should accept five Muslims P S V and Mcnon do not approve and think
that we should not break with Congress over the Muslim, issue
I saw C-in-C who told me that diere were already four British bat-
talions in Calcutta and one more arriving and two Indian battalions in
and two more arriving also a British Armoured Car squadron I wonder
what the situation would have been like if British troops had left India
as Congress demanded I sent a telephone message to Burrows later in the
morning to ask if he would like me to go down but he replied that it
might embarrass him at the moment The situation seems to be more in
hand
I had an hour in the afternoon with Azad about the Calcutta riots and
the Interim Government He criticized the Bengal Ministry severely, and
said that although they had apprehended trouble they had not taken
sufficient precautions also they had been too late in enforcing a total
curfew and the troops had not been called out soon enough
z
336 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
As regards the Interim Government he said that it would be inad\isable
for mc to approach Jmnah direct but would it be possible by indirect
contact to give Jinnah some reassurance and persuade him to come in ?
I said that I would consider the matter, but that in the present mood of the
League it might be difficult to give them sufficient assurances
Azad is an attractive character and ica% a much truer representative of
the Muslims than Jinnah He was obviously very worried at the possible
fate of the Muslims in such places as Cawnpore and Lucknow
Smith, DIB, said that according to hi* ^formation about the Congress
Working Committee at Wardha, 1 Gandhi and Rajagopalachanar had
drafted the resolution which % as intended to appease the League, agamst
opposition by Nehru and Patel, that Gandhi had rebuked N and P for
the tactlessness of some of their recent utterances, but that he had agreed,
m spite of his creed of non-violence, that force should be used against
Muslims if they resisted a Congress Government— a typical piece of
Gandhi an hypocrisy Smith said that in the Punjab Muslim feeling against
Congress was growing, but that the Sikhs seemed to be tying up with
Congress* and that the hot-heads amongst them were speaking of the
'it-conquest of the Punjab* Smith told me that he was disposal g of
certain dangerous C I D records, m anticipation of a Ministry coming into
office
August 20
Ian Scott, usually cheerful and optimistic, was very depressing in a talk
I had with him out ndmg this morning. Both he and George now seem
to be convinced that our only course is to get out of India as soon as
possible and leave hex to her {ate, which will be civil war
At 5 o p m, I had an hour with the Committee 2 on my breakdown
plan. They had produced a report almost entirely onPSV's instigation,
I think, which did not approve my plan and produced an alternative with
which I entirely disagreed* I turned them back again to my way of think-
ing, with the support of the Army representatives, Arthur Smith and
Savory.
1 la an attempt to repair the harm done by Nehru * irresponsible statements about the
Constituent Assembly the Congress Working Committee met at Wardha on 8 August and
passed i resolution to the effect that they accepted the Cabinet Mission s constitutional
scheme in its entirety But they added that in their view provincial autonomy is a basic
p revision and cadi province has the right to decide v. hrthri to jowi * group or T*ot This
addi t ion, in effect nullified their acceptance cf the scheme in itt entirety and the resolution
did not Satisfy the League.
* "Wavcllhad suggested the formation of this Committee in Paragraph a of hu note to the
Private Secretary to the Viceroy on p no
ig-zz august 1946
337
Just before dinner I received a letter from Nehru with his list for a
Government His Muslim names arc terrible Fazlul Huq, the most
notorious crook m Bengal, Asaf Ah, whom I think contemptible,
Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Ah Zaliccr, a Sluah, and one name not yet
given I cannot stomach Fazlul Huq, and shall tell him so, and the others
will be passengers
August 21
Congress proposal of Fazlul Huq as a member reminds me of a time when
Mohamcd Said (Mine Sirry's father) was forming a Ministry and
proposed a notoriously corrupt politician To Allenby's remonstrances he
replied 'C'esr un hommc absolument sans pnncipcs, il nous sera tres utile'
A short meeting of Council tins morning, perhaps the last of my
official Council How much easier and quicker and more effective it has
been to do business with them. I shudder at the idea of dealing with a
Political Council
August 22
I saw Nehru for an hour this morning I said that I could recommend to
H.M G the six Congress names he had given me, viz Patcl, Rajcndra
Prasad, Rajagopalachanar, Bosc, Jagjvan Ram and Nehru himsel£ I also
agreed to the three Mmonty representatives Baldcv Singh (Sikh),
Matthat (Christian), and Bhabha (Parsee)
We then turned to the Muslim representatives I said that surely Fazlul
Huq would let the side down badly, and that I advised Congress strongly
not to include him. After a little discussion Nehru agreed to withdraw his
name
I again suggested the possibility of leaving the Muslim seats vacant, but
Nehru said the Congress were not willing to agree to this I then said that
I was prepared to recommend Sir Shafaat Ahmad Khan, Saycd All Zaheer
and Asaf Ah The other two Muslim names -were left over for the present.
Azad had decided not to come in
Nehru then pressed for a Council of 15 and the inclusion of Antony as
Anglo-Indian representative I said I should be very reluctant to increase
the size of the Council, since I thought it would increase the suspicions
of the Muslim League and make their joining more difficult I would con-
sider the matter of the Anglo-Indian representative, but I did not think I
could agree to the increase of the Council to 15
338 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Wc had some discussion about portfolios He said he thought that as
War Member the Sildi representative might be suitable, that he himself
would like to have External Affairs and that for Finance the choice seemed
to he between Rajagopalachariar and Matthai
When ^ e had completed out business, Nehru seemed reluctant to go
and we had a general talk about methods of physical exercises in the
mormng t sport m India, and one or two other topics He was quiet and
friendly I think that the prospect of* responsibility has rather sobered
Congress
1 had a few words with Arthur Smith who agreed that Baldev Smgh
was in the circumstances the best bet as War Minister
1 was sad to see a letter from the Mawab of Chhatan, renouncing his
titles, I am sure he didn't really wish to, any more than H.H. of Bhopal
really wishes to abdicate and become a private Muslim Leaguer, as he has
proposed to me 1 think both actions are part of a campaign of nerves
instigated by Jinnah
August 2J
An interview with Nehru and preparation for a broadcast for tomorrow
evening took up most of my time Nehru looked tired and depressed he
is not looking forward to the responsibilities of office any more, I think,
than I am to running the new Government I told him that I had decided
that the numbers of the Government must be restricted to 14, so a place
could not be found for Antony We agreed that the names of the members
of the new Government should be announced tomorrow and that they
should be sworn in on September 2nd*
August 24
After dinner 1 got news that Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan, a Muslim member
of the new Government, had been murdered m Simla An ominous start
(Actually he had not been lolled I heard later, only damaged )
August 26
I got back tonight from 24 hectic hours in Calcutta I left early yesterday
morning, got to Calcutta about 130 pm. and at once went on a two-hour
tour of the scenes of the recent rioting The cuy had been pretty well
cleared up by this time and except for some bumt-out shops and houses
there was not a great deal of evidence of recent occurrences I spoke to
some of the troops and thanked them everyone agrees that they did
magnificent work.
22-Z6 AUGUST I946
J39
After a few minutes for a wash and change — Calcutta was as sticky as
usual — I started a scries of 3 J hours of interviews, 4 o to 7 30 p ra. I saw
first the Commissioner of Police, Hardwick. who gave mc his account of
what took place
The chief points to my mind were Suhrwardy s continual presence in
the Control room on die first day with many M League friends and his
obvious communal bias, that die victims were afmost entirely goondas
and people of die poorest class, that there were no attacks on the Police «
and diat any hesitation of die Police to open fire or take firm action was
pardy due to the political criticism directed against them after the riots
of last February and No\ ember Hardwick has only held this job for a
few months, and seems perhaps to lack a little in toughness as well as in
experience
I then saw Buchcr, 1 acting Army Commander, and Sixsmith, acting
Area Commander, both good and sensible men who had done very welJ.
They described events to me and the action of the troops So far as I could
sec, their judgement and action had been correct and they had used the
troops at the right tune and in the right way Buchcr said the Indian troops,
including Transport Companies (one manned by Mahsuds of the Shabi
Khel whom we are now bombing) behaved very well indeed He also
said there was complete harmony between Civil and Military authorities
during the disturbances He commented on the completely communal
attitude of the Chief Minister, Suhrwardy, when he had driven round
with him on the 18th
Then came the Chief Secretary, Walker, and his assistant, Martin
They agreed on the Communal bias of Suhrwardy, and said he had made
continual allegations against the Chief Commissioner and his police
Walker said that S was very worried but might be truculent when I saw
him He thought that Calcutta might get through the Id 2 without fresh
disturbances unless Jinnah declared a jehad 3
After having a few words with Ranking the new Area Commander,
I had half an hour or so with the Governor He outlined the position m the
Assembly, where the Government was really dependent on the European
vote and could be turned out but there was no alternative Ministry and
a Section 9 J administration was not possible He said that Suhrwardy had
forfeited everyone's confidence and suggested the possibility of a Coalition
Ministry under Aziz ul Huque I told him that I had no great opinion of
A ul H *s ability though he would be a pleas an ter personality than S
1 General Sir Roy Buchcr who after Independence became Commander-in-Chief Indian
Army 1948^9 3 A Muslim festival ■> A war against infidels
340 THB INTERIM GOVERNMENT
I then had three quarters of aa hour \\ itli Suhrvvardy He was polite ana
not at all aggressive and took in a subdued way a homdy I dch* crcd to Kim
on Jus duties as Premier of Bengal He suggested that the Chief Justice,
Spcns* should head an enquiry into die disturbances
On the general political situation I said that I had done my utmost to
secure a fair deal for the Muslims, but that I was quite unable to support
Jinnah over the question of a Nationalist Muslim, and that I thought a
Nationalist Musbm in place of a Hindu should be a source of strength to
Jinnah rather than otherwise
After dinner I had another hour with the Governor, who spoke of some
of his troubles. Communists and Strikes, Sarat Bose and the INA, the
danger of a really big flare-up at the Id with Hindus and Muslims* with
Muslims the aggressors, the small numbers and low morale of the Calcutta
Police, to whom he was giving a pep talk next day, and the dangers of
famine Burrows strikes me as being v> orned but still unperturbed
And so bed, after an 1 8 hour day with no relaxation
This morning I went out for an hour, to visit two Relief Centres a
Muslim one at the Lady Brabourne College and a Hindu one at the Asu-
tosh College These Centres, and there are very many others, brought
home to one the misery caused by this communal frenzy > at each centre
there were over 1,000 men, women and children, often injured, who had
irt many cases Lost their relatives, their homes and possessions At each
place of course a large and voluble crowd of workers and others followed
me round pointing out the results of the evil handiwork of the 'other
party 1
Then I went back to Government House, arid had a series of interviews
with Hindus, Europeans and Muslims Among the latter was Nazimuddin
who made a statement on communal lines about the riots He then spoke
about the question of Grouping and its interpretation, and said that if it
was quite clear that a Province could not opt out of a Group till after the
Group discussions he thought that it might have a considerable effect on
League policy T had a final interview with the Governor, and then after
a quick lunch flew back to Delhi I found that Archie John and the new
Governor of Burma, Ranee, 1 had arrived that morning 1 dined with them
Ranee seems very sensible and capable A j in good form.
I finished the evening with two very depressing telephone intercepts,
showing Pate\ m very truculent mood and in tou<:h through Ghosh with
Cripps and P L (Apropos of the Shabi Khel mentioned above, they know
that their homes axe being bombed they said to their officers *That is all
1 MijXkn Sn Hubert Ranee GovtttMw of Burma 1946-S
26-27 AUGUST I946
341
right, our people have been naughty and arc being justly punished but
what arc you going to do to these Hindus of Calcutta for all the murders
they have committed A pertinent comment )
According to V P Menon a definite change in Lord WavelYs attitude and
policy was noUceahte after his return from Calcutta He had become convinced
that unless some agreement u as effected soon betu ecn the Congress and the
League, the fcarfid Calcutta disorders u ottld be repeated in other parts of India
He was also itwh stnul by 11 hat Nazimnddm liad fold lam about the attitude
of the League touards participation tti the Constituent Assembly These
factors account for his abortive attempt (rccordtd m the next entry) to induce
Nehru and Gandhi to male a statement about the Constituent Assembly that
tvould really satisfy the League
August 27
I determined to make an attempt to induce the Congress to state clearly
their intentions about Grouping in the Constituent Assembly* since this
was obviously one of mam obstacles to co-operation by the League I
therefore asked Gandhi and Nehru to come and see me in the evening
Later, at 5 o p in. I had a meeting with the Committee on the break-
down plan At the end I think we arrived at the outline of quite a reasonable
plan t which will now be put into shape to go home
The meeting with Gandhi and Nehru was not a great success. The old
man was in a legalistic and malevolent mood, and Nehru was full of liatc
against the League I told them that I thought the only chance of a peaceful
transfer of power in India was if the Congress made a categorical statement
that they would accept the position that the Provinces must remain in their
Sections as intended by the Mission* until after the first elections under the
new Constitution 1 said that I could not undertake the responsibility of
calling together the Constituent Assembly until this point was settled
I handed them the draft of a statement which I asked them to make
Gandhi went off into long lcgahsnc arguments about the interpretation
of the Mission's statement I &Aid that I was a. plain man and not a lawyer
and that I knew perfectly well what the Mission meant and that com-
pulsory Grouping was the whole crux of the Plan
The argument went on for some time, and Nehru got very heated
Gandhi said that if a blood bath was necessary, it would come about in
spite of non-violence 1 1 szid that I was very siiocfccd to hear such words
1 Lord Wavcll always used to uy that on thjj occasion Gandhi thumped the tatJe aad
said* If Ind a wants het blood bath she shall have it *
343 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
from him In the cud they took away the formula, but I do not think there
is much hope of their accepting it
August 28
A very quick Council Meeting, presumably the last of the Caretaker
Council which had lasted tv\ o months
During die morning I received an abusive and vindictive letter from
Gandhi, which he asked should be telegraphed home Evidently my rebuke
to bun on his blood-bath* remark had gone home It confirmed the view
I have always held of G , that his professions of non-violence and sainth-
ncss are political weapons against the British rather than natural attributes
It looked like a declaration of \var> and I wondered whether L really had
held the last meeting of my Caretaker Council However, I received later
a letter from Nehru about nominations to the Peace Conference and
UNO Assembly, which seemed to show that Congress still intended to
come into the Government.
Gandhts letter was asfolloivs
28 th August, 1946
Dear Friend,
1 wnte this as a fhend and after deep thought
Several times last evening yon repeated that you were a 'plain man and
a soldier and that \ ou did not know the law We arc all plain men though
we may not all be soldiers and even though some of us may know the law
It is our purpose, I take it, to devise methods to prev ent a repetition of the
tecent terrible happenings m Calcutta The question before us is how best
to do it
Your language last evening was minatory As representative of the
King you cannot afford to be a military man only, nor to ignore the law,
much less the law of your own making You should be assisted» if neces-
sary, by a legal mind enjoying your full confidence You threatened not
to convene the Constituent Assembly if the formula vou placed before
Pandit Nehru and me was not acted upon by the Congress If such be
really the case, then you should not have made the announcement vou
did on 1 2th August But having made it you should recall the action and
form another ministry enjoying v our full confidence If British arms are
kept here for internal peace and order your Interim Government would be
reduced to a tarce The Congress cannot afford to impose its will on
witting elements m India through the use of British arms Nor can the
Congress be expected to bend itself and adopt what it considers a wrong
course because of the brutal exhibition recently witnessed in Bengal Such
27~3 1 AUGUST 104G
343
submissions would itself icad to an encouragement and repetition of such
tragedies The vindictive spirit on cither side would go deeper, biding for
an opportumty to exhibit itself more fiercely and more disgracefully when
occasion occurs And all this will be chiefly due to the continued presence
in India of a foreign power strong and proud of its arms
I say this neither as a Hindu nor as a Muslim, I write only as an Indian
Insofar as I am aw are, the Congress claims to know both the Hindu and
Mushm mind more than ) ou or any Britisher can do Unless, therefore,
\ou can wholly trust the Congress Government which you have an*
nounccd, > ou should reconsider your decision, as I have already suggested
You vnli please convey the whole of this letter to the British Cabinet
I am, yours sincerely,
Sd/-M K. Gandhi
Just before going to bed, I received a letter from Nehru, but as it might
ha\ c spoilt my sleep I left it unread
August 2p
Nehru s letter might have been worse, and it seems clear that the Congress
will come into the Government all right, whatever I say about the
Constituent Asscmbb I answered it and said it was not a matter of legal
interpretation but of practical politics I had an almost panic-stricken
telegram from the S of S askjng mc to do nothing rash vwth Congress
Nehru m his letter conveyed the reftisal of the Working Committee to make
an unambiguous statement about Grouping stick as Wat ell had requested He
said that the Congress had accepted the Cabinet Missions scheme m tt$
entirety but *they interpreted it so as to resolve the inconsistences contained in
if They hold that Provincial Autonomy ts a basic provision and each
Province has the right to decide tvliether to form or join a Group or not'
Questions of interpretation could be referred to the Federal Court
I had a talk with Spcns about the possibility of the Federal Court being
called on to interpret the Statement of May 16 and also about the Calcutta
Enquiry He was sensible and helpful
August 31
I had another rather panic stricken cable from S of S , asking me on no
account to do ot say anything that might occasion a break with Congress
I sent back a telegram that I realty should have sent long ago 1 have been
slow to realise (a) that the real crux lies in the Grouping in the Constituent
Assembly, (b) that Congress have never really meant to play over this
344 THE INTERIM CO VEHNMENT
(c) that Cnpps and Co had no intention of insisting on thur (die Mission's)
plan being carried out I hope that I shall not be too late to sec tins put
right
In this telegram Wavell told the Secretary of State that the Interim Govern-
ment timid tale office on 2 September, hut that he did not thml a single-party
Government conld control India for long u ithout serious trouble arising
Tttc compulsory Grouping of Provinces m the Constituent Assembly for
framing both Group and Provincial constitutions was the crux of the matter 'for
unless the Muslim League were assured that thts essential provision u aula be
adhered to, tt would be difficult to persuade them to enter the Constituent
Assembly or to participate m the Interim Government
Wavell felt that after NehrtCs wild statements in Bombay and the Leagues
withdrawal from their acceptance of the Statement of 16 May he ought to have
acted at ottce to get a clear decision on the Grouping question He thought such
a decision uas essential before the Constituent Assembly was summoned—
indeed, without tt, 'the most essential part of the Missions uorlt on the long-
term plan remains undone The keystone of the arch is missing 9
Dinner at night to say gooc
made quite a good little speech
September 1
In the monuiig I dealt with the final draft of the Breakdown Plan
The Breakdoun Plan was sent to the Secretary of State on 7 September
It was based on the proposals contained in the Note for PS V* dated 10
August, but some very important changes had beat introduced
1 The initial withdrawal of control was now to be only from the four
southern Provinces of Madras, Bombay, Central Provinces, andOnssa and not
also jrom Bihar and the United Provinces as Lord XVavell had originally
envisaged (Retention of control m these two Congress (Hindu majority)
Pynces was considered advisable both from tlie point of view of communi-
cations and abo to avoid tlie impression that control was being retained only in
Muslim-majority Provinces so as to facilitate the creation of Pakistan )
Hydan
The vutial withdrau al of control from southern India was to be follou ed
by complete withdrau al from the whole of India by 31 March 104$
3 This plan was not merely to be put into operation if a sudden crisis arose,
out was to be announced and acted upon, u hatever happened, not later than
ji March 194? rr
M^rding to the Secretary of State this plan for the complete winding up
iT*% 1 Ra J^m eighteen months Wavell requested that the orders of
0 » if at a very early date and suggested that the Opposition
31 AUGUST-I SEPTEMBER I946 345
and the Dominions should be consulted He explained that unless HMG
u ere prepared to mate a radical change of policy and announce thctr decision
to remain ut India for another fifteen to tucnty years — which would im-
mediately alter the 11 hole position and rally support to their side — it would not
he possible to exercise effective control over the whole of India for more than
about eighteen month, and that therefore a programme of orderly u itftdrawal
must be announced and acted upon very soon He hoped that such an announce-
ment might hat e the additional advantage of administering a sex ere shock and
so induce the political leaders in India to adopt a saner outlook, but this it as not
the primary reason for putting foru ard this plan
The first shock that u as administered was to II M G WaicITs proposals
greatly perturbed them, and they concluded that they could not justify to
Parliament so drastic a policy and that on this ground alone his plan was
impossible They said that if withdraw al from India became unavoidable, then
u ithdrawal should take place from India as an hole as quickly as possible and
without a long period oj notice, and that there should be a military plan for the
protection and evacttation of European personnel — mute a different matter
from what Wavell had tit mind, though such an emergency plan for the pro-
tection of Europeans in the et eut of an anti-European outbreak existed and had
existed for years
Wax ell uas not, houever, to be put off and, as will be seen* continued to
press his BreaUou tt Plan upon HMG f finally putting the whole position to
tmm very plainly in a note which he delivered to them on his arrival m
England early in December, see pp 386-9
In the afternoon I had an hour with Nehru aver the Interim Govern-
ment We settled the distribution of portfolios and a number of other
nutters I told him that I would liave to appoint a Vice-President to act
Vthtn I was absent, I gathered he would expect to be nominated himself
He also intended, apparently, to act as Leader in the Assembly I mentioned
the matter of interviews with Members and told him that I intended to
discontinue the practice of Secretaries having access to the Viceroy, but
that I wished to continue seeing all Members at regular intervals He
agreed
I asked him, at the end, whether the Congress ban on accepting hospi-
tality in the Viceroy's House was going to be raised, as 1 should like to be
able to invite my Ministers He said that he would consult the Committee
and let me know, but that he himself anyway would have no difficulty in
to dine on Tuesday night, and he agreed
Nehru was quiet and friendly throughout and seemed anxious to make
no difficulties A J went off to Simla
34<5 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
September 2
Arthur Smith came to see me in the morning and we discussed various
matters Then I swore in seven members of my new Government. Nehru
added a soft *Jai Hind* at the end of his oaths, but no one made any
difficulty I said a few words, and Nehru made a few quite conciliatory
remarks. I believe there was quite a considerable crowd round about the
Secretariat On the whole, the inauguration of this new Government went
all right, but I shall have some very tricky bowling to deal with m the near
future
September j
No disturbance reported so far, except in Bombay 1
Spens, Chief Justice, came down from Simla about the enquiry into the
Calcutta Riots, and I saw him this morning He was sensible and practical
Otherwise a quiet day I sent a letter to Nehru to impress on him that I
and not he was responsible for the vacant portfolios I dealt with papers,
and read a couple of very depressing reports on the communal tension
from the Governors of the Punjab and U P
Nehru and his sister Mrs Pandit dined in the evening She is an attractive
pen on
September 4
The first Council meeting of the new Government went quite smoothly,
and so far my Ministers arc all sweet reasonableness But I do not trust
them a yard
Septanbcrs
Vallabhai Patel came to dinner He said he had broken all rules in doing
so but was very friendly and appeared to be in a mood to talk At the end
of dinner I said to him that in my opinion it was far more in the interests
of Congress to get the League into the Constituent Assembly and Central
Govcnunent than it was for the League to come in, tt seemed to me in fact
to be absolutely vital for the Congress, if they wished a united India and
a peaceful transfer of power, and that it was well worth their while to go
a long way to reassure the League The first step was to reassure them on
the matter of Grouping in the Constituent Assembly I said I did not sec
how it could injure the Congress to carry out the intentions of the
Mission s plan
Xo\ht ^^^S^ bccWbancc* <™ g to a dvt™ Muslan return*
10 lisumpuon of office bv a Conf-ret f^^mm^t
i-7 SEPTEMBER 19+6
347
Patel did not dissent from what I said, in fact he seemed to indicate
agreement, but said that Jmnah \\ as an impossible personality with whom
to negotiate. If there as someone else in the Muslim League with whom
they could talk, he thought that matters could be arranged.
On the matter of Grouping, lie seemed to admit the meeting in Sections,
but thought that each Province should \ otc as a Province I said that this
was entirely contrary to the intentions of the Mission, and would defeat
its object In neither 'B* nor *C Sections had the Muslims more than a
narrow majority and this would make it impossible for them to do any-
thing unreasonable Patel said he had no great fears about Section *B\ but
it was different in Section 'C* where Assam might he overwhelmed I said
that the MusLm majority was too narrow for there to be any chance of
anything being done which would make the position of Assam impossible
We left it at that I do not know whether what I said made any im-
pression, but he was very reasonable and sensible in his arguments and is
certainly the most impressive of the Congress leaders and has the best
balance I asked how he was getting on with the D I B , he said, 'Quite all
right, they have destroyed all the compromising papers T I said, 4 Ycs, 1 told
them to make sure of that/ and he laughed.
September 6
1 sent a telegram to the SofS, saying that I hoped that the Press reports
that he would be relieved by Cnpps were not true and that if he did go 1
hoped that Alexander would succeed him
September 7
I sent a letter to Nehru asking to see a copy of his broadcast before he
delivered it My starT were rather pussy-foot about this and thought I
ought not to raise the issue, but I insisted N sent a copy at once, there
was nothing really objectionable in it
A long telegram from S of S about the Constituent Assembly, it was
so fall of references that I could not disentangle xt r bur it gave me the
general impression of being both dishonest and cowardly
Towards the end of this long, ramhltng telegram the Secretary of State said,
'We ate still not clear whether your view is that we mnst stand for our own
interpretation of Statement of May 16th if necessary to the point at which
Congress r^stgu frcm Interim Government and presumably from Provincial
Governments aho' Wavell rejihed firmly 'In my view that Statement of
May 16th ts worthless if we have not the honesty and courage to stick to if, and
X would rather lose the co-operation of the Congress at the Centre and m the
348 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
Provinces than go aluad u tth consUtnUon-tnalmg on a one-party hosts ana in
& u <jy u htcti the Afisstoii net a tateitdtd t am quite dear it e must grasp this
nettle now and if tie do it resolutely India may respond to our lead 1
Rajcndra Prasad dmcd, he was almost embarrassingly deferential and
quite fnendly I rubbed into him the importance from the Congress point
of \ icw of getting m the Muslim League He said, rather surprisingly,
apropos of his projected tour hi the south 'I suppose the Constituent
Assembly will not meet before the middle of October
Scptanbi r 8 {Sunday)
The only event to record is an interview with Suhrawardy, the Premier of
Bengal, who had gone to Bombay to sec Jinnah, and was on his way back
to Calcutta He had obviously drawn a complete blank with Jumah, who
had refused to allow him to establish a coalition ministry in Bengal* unless
there was a satisfactory coalition at the Centre Perhaps lie trusts Suhra-
wardy as httle as 1 do The Nationalist Muslim issue was raised of course,
and I said that I could not support Jinnah on that point Suhrawardy was
obviously very w orncd 1 dislike him and distrust him intensely I ha\ e
always thought him a dishonest and self-seeking careerist with no prin-
ciples I think Jinnah is worried too, but he seems as intransigent as ever
September p
A long unsatisfactory day I despair of ever being able to make these
Indian politicians see sense or lessen the tension betv* een the communities
Nehru's quite fairly conciliatory reference to Grouping m his broadcast
has merely drawn one of the most violent and bitter articles that Dawn
has ever produced And Nehru himself this evening was as communal as
I have ever seen him.
Next was the Nawab of Chhatari, anxious to help if possible in resolving
the relations between Congress and Muslim League, and full of the
dangers of civil war or of another world war He thought if it was made
clear that tLNLG meant to insist on their plan for the C A the League
might be able to come in, but he admits the difficulties of dealing with
Jinnah whose arrogant manners he considers atrocious He emphasised the
dangers of delay He left with deep professions of loyalty to the British
and of sadness that we w ere leaving India
Septetnber iq
Mrs Sarojini Naidu dined and we had a long talk on politics and of the
necessity of getting jumah and the M L ui and the difficulties of Jinnah S
7-1 3 SEPTEMBER I94 6
349
character Mrs N. spoke of jamah rather as of Lucifer, a fallen angel, one
»ho had once promised to be a great leader of Indian freedom, but who
had cast himself out of the Congress hca\ai
September 11 c
The Cabinet Mccimg quite businesslike and sensible I swore » four
NWstcrs-Rajagopalad.ariar, Mattha., Sir Shafaat Ahmed Khan and
Bhabha The first nvo will obviously be a considerable addmon to the
debating and administrative strength
After the meeting I saw Nehru and told him that I proposed u> ask
Jinnah. to come and see me and make another effort to get him .mo the
C A. and if possible the Interim Government 1 told him that I thought
Jmnah would ask for certain assurance, with regard to the work . o *e
Constituent Assembly, espeaally the right of Sections to <^
procedure He demurred to this, and said that Congress was bound by
assurances given to the Provinces, . e Assam. (I am told. ho» ever, tku N
.as not reJly spcakmg to Congress bncf, and that the Congress* pre-
pared to concedeXpomt) N «sob%«^yreW»«^«^
Ac League at th» stage, he wants to consobdatc Congress powc r » Mta
Central Government and the Constituent Assembly before ^cahng wuh
the League He tned to minimise the danger of
sa,d thafthe Police could easily suppress it. I firmly ^^"^^
idea In the end. he sa.d Mfyou want to see jinnah,
I hope that the moderate members of Congress will be '
but I expect that Gandh, wdl throw a spanner mto *c : works » Ac ad
N then%poke Smd and the alleged parity of the Governor for a
%vhde, after which he turned to the nuouiry of bombing the Shab, Khel,
and wanted to discuss it at a Cabinet meeting v t trl _ at lather
(Fortunately I heard a few hours later that the Shab. Khel-or rather
the Mahsud jirga on their behalf-had proposed terms which had been
accepted)
personahnes of Gandhi and Jmnah will agam prove insuperable obstacles
September 13
headlines that Nehru
in toe Nationalist tress uus uiy"uu S
has stopped brutal British bombing in Wazinstan, while a leader in Dawn
}$0 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
headed, 'Hands off the Pathan' implies that the first fruits of a Hindu
Government have been the bombing of Muslims 1 Actually the bombing
of Shabi Khel villages started more than a month ago, before the present
Government came mto power, and stopped just as Nehru made his
protest, because the Shabi Khel had given in Such is the accuracy of the
Press m this country
In the afternoon I had nearly an hour with Rajagopalachanar In regard
to die Constituent Assembly he said that Nehru was in a difficulty because
of pledges he had given publicly to his supporters, and he therefore wished
the decision about procedure in Sections, etc imposed by the findings of
some legal authority 1 e the Federal Court, even though he had rto doubt
the decision w, ould be in favour of the Mission's interpretation I said I saw
the point Wc left it at that
We then v*ent mto the question of the Interim Government. I got the
impression that there is a strong party in the Congress, led by Nehru and
probably supported by Gandhi, to prevent the Muslim League from
coming in ( if possible, though they dare not say so openly and have to
profess eagerness to get the League in
My final interview was with Jagjrwan Ram, 1 the Labour Member, and
I was rather pleasantly surprised. He had not made a great tmprcssion at
first sight, he looked uncouth and unintelligent But this afternoon he
seemed to know his job and to be sensible on all the subjects we discussed,
re-settlement of soldiers, labour unrest, the general position of the Sched-
uled Castes, the political situation
September 16
A crowded and difficult day I saw C-in-C at 10 o a m He thinks that if
Jinnah comes in and Government is reconstructed it will he better to stick
to Baldev Singh now than to make a change
Then a quick Cabinet Meeting Nehru raised the question of a date
for the meeting of the Legislature and wanted October 28 and that the
first meeting of the Constituent Assembly should he postponed to first
week of December, probably December 9
After the meeting I had a talk with Nehru. He said his general pro-
gramme for C A was to get a constitution m about 8 months— original
meeting in December lor a fortnight, two months lot Committee work,
another general meeting submission of proposals to Provinces for
1 Jigjiwan Ram, a member of a Scheduled Caste contmucd after Independence
uninterruptedly as a Minister of the Government of India- In 1972 he was Minister of
Defence
U-l8 SEPTEMBER l<)$6
351
approval^ and then filial appro\ al next autumn Obviously very optimistic
I told him of the impending appointment of U JC Hfgli Commissioner,
and said tlut 1 did not propose to make my usual Calcutta speech to the
Associated Chambers of Commerce, which lie agreed was not a suitable
forum* I told him the gcticraJ lines on wlueh I proposed to approach
JuinaK He obviously disappro\ cd of my doing so at all
I saw Patel at a routine interview an hour or so later He had not a
great deal to say about Jus Department but got off a good deal of com-
munal hatred I warned him \ cry clearly of the dangers and consequences
of civil war and of my determination to get the League in if possible He
took it quite mildly, but looked gnm-
At 5 30 p m. ij hours with Jmnah. It went on the whole better than
I had expected, and Jinnah was less aggressive and aggrieved than I had
expected and easier to talk with But it was all no more than preliminary
sparring Jinnah's *no hope* at the end of it all was, 1 think, just a con-
\ rational way of ending the round before going to the comer to his
seconds
September 17
A comparam ely quiet day
I had 40 minutes with Matthai, 1 probably the most capable and intel-
ligent of my Ministers He thinks India s financial position has greatly
deteriorated, and that there is serious danger of inflation He is being
pressed about the salt tax* but says, as I alwa) s told Gandhi that it cannot
be removed by a stroke of the pen, as Gandhi imagines
September 18
Cabinet in morning dealt quite sensibly with problem of Burma nee pnee
and other matters but towards the end the matter of Indian troops in
Indonesia and Burma cropped up and Nehru became very eloquent and
almost aggressive rather to the embarrassment of some of his colleagues
I think.
I saw Nehru after the Cabinet and told him of my talk with Jinnah He
had to say that he welcomed a coalition but he obviously didnt. He
challenged, sny contention that die Constituent Assembly must he sum-
moned by me but I stood firm on this
Dr JohnM^tthii an Indian ChnstLiii Pres dent of the Tariff Board, 1931 4 Director
General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistic* 1935 40 He was at first Finance Minister
in the Interim Government but later had to give place to Liaquat Ah Khan He wa* Finance
hkmszct again 1
352 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
September 20
Day began with a. Cabinet Meeting on trade controls, at which also food
policy was discussed. Nehru looked a bit glum and hostile, I thought
Next Sultan Ahmed came in to report a talk he had had with Jinnah,
which almost makes it look as if a Settlement was in sight
After lunch, Sarat Chandra Bose was my first visitor He discussed the
affairs of his Department with sense and with marked deference, all a part
of the present Congress set-up to convince me what good boys they are
I was cynically amused to notice that his first reaction to a threatened
strike of the Delhi electnciry workers had been to make a plan for troops
to be flown to Delhi to take over essential services and to summon certain
British technicians He then tned to put across Hindu propaganda on the
origin of the Calcutta riots, but I cut him short at once by saying that it
was for the judicial enquiry to determine responsibility On the general
political situation he brought up the 'divide and rule' insinuation I said
shortly that we %v ere trying now to *umte and quit*, and that 1 was quite
determined to get a coalition
September 25
Cabinet meeting this morning lasted i\ hours and dealt with a number of
subjects Atmosphere was quite friendly and business-like
After Council I saw Nehru and explained to him the lines on which
I proposed to speak to Jinnah, and said that I was not trying to get the
Muslim League m as a *King*s party* with the object of holding the balance
of power but would like the Cabinet to work as a team.
Then in the evening the critical interview with Jinn ah- It went as well
as I could have expected, Jinnah was in quite a reasonable mood and is,
I should say, really anxious to reach a settlement if it can be done without
loss of piesnge But now will come the really critical business, getting
Congress to welcome Jinnah in and make the way easy for him I mistrust
the influence of Gandhi and Patel
September 26
Spent most of morning considering tactics for interview with Nehru this
afternoon Hearing that Gandhi was leaving Delhi tomorrow, I had asked
if he would like to come and see me, and he had chosen 40pm, just after
Nehru I soon discovered that the old man had no intention whatever of
leaving Delhi so long as any political negotiations are in progress
I saw Nehru from 3 o to 4-0 p m., and Gandhi from 40t050pm.N0
progress, quite obviously they do not want Jinnah and the League in, and
20-2$ SEPTEMBER 1946
353
Gandhi at tlic end exposed Congress policy of domination more nakedly
than ever before The more I sec of that old nun, the more I regard him
as an unscrupulous old hypocrite, he would shrink from no violence and
blood-letting to achieve his cuds, though he uouJd naturalJy prefer to do
so by chicanery and a false show of mildness and friendship
George Abcll told me later that Baldcv Singh gave htm an account of
Nehru's report to his colleagues after his interview with me According to
Baldcv, they really arc anxious for a settlement but are not going to make
it too easy for Jimiah for fear tliat he will raise his price
September 27
I saw Nehru again at 12 o'clock but did not make much progress He
said that Congress must put m a Nationalist Muslim I asked him whom
they proposed to put m and whom to omit He said Asa f All , vice Rajendra
Prasad, but on cross-examination I found that this was not a recent decision
but one that they had considered sonic time ago I told him to go and
consider it again
In the afternoon I saw Rajagopalachanar He said Congress would have
to insist on Asaf Ah, but I think that this was partly *war of nerves' He
said he thought it would take 18 months at least to make a constitution
Gandhi, typically, wrote mc a letter giving his own account of our
interview, and asking me to agree I refused to be drawn into accepting
a written record of a private discussion, beyond correcting an entirely
false statement which he had put into my mouth
According to Gandhu Wavcli had said that Ins 'kanwgs acre towards the
Muslim League*
September 28
La the evening I saw Jinnah again We did not make much progress but
Jinmh quite friendly and obviously wants to come in I said that I could
hold out no great hope of Congress yielding on the Nationalist Muslim
issue and I had always told him that 1 could not support him to the end
on this issue I got the impression that he might in the end concede the
Nationalist Muslim point rather than bring about a breakdown
It js weary work negotiating with these people, it takes weeks or
months to make any progress on a pouit which ordinary reasonable men
would settle in an hour or so How they will ever make a constitution at
this rate I cannot imagine
354
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
October i
Made a note on line to take in bringing the present negotiations to a head.
Bhopai came at 11.30 a m He has apparently heen trying to act as
unofficial negotiator, and has seen Gandhi, J inn ah and Azad, but has
obviously made no progress at all He did not say much and seemed a
little depressed
October 2
Cabinet meeting took an hour, there was nothing controversial, but there
are a lot of lawyers in this Cabinet and some rather technical points in the
Bribery and Corruption Bill were argued at great length by Rajagopal-
athamr, who 13 always a bit garrulous, and Asaf Ah. These two arc at
present the chief talkers in the Cabinet
At 12 0 noon 1 had the vital meeting with Jinnah; he said nothing at all
on the Nationalist Muslim issue and did not attempt to argue it, but he
said that if he was to have any chance of success with his Working
Committee he must have some success to show on the other points he had
raised c g the safeguard about being outvoted on major communal issues,
the Vice-Presidency of the Council, and the question of Minorities The
matter of the Vice-Presidency was obviously the one to which he attached
importance, from, the psychological point of view. His argument was that
with Nehru holding the office of Vice-President the Congress were in
a superior position and that made the Muslim League inferior in status
1 get the impression that Jinnah wants to come m, if his prestige can be
upheld It was agreed that he should send me a note setting out the points
which we had discussed and asking for a decision on them.
October 3
In the evening I got Jinnah*s promised letter, with the points on which he
wants a decision before he meets his Working Committee on the 7th,
1 don't think they should present arty really serious difficulty Wc may
be within sight of a settlement, though 1 shall not believe it till I actually
swear the League in
October 4
Spent some of moimtig pispatmg fox mictvicvf -■?nxh Nehru this aftcmoort
and drafting replies to Jinnah's points The Vice-Presidency 15 the most
difficult one. I decided to try the rotational proposal on Nehru but without
much expectation that he will agree, and I don't think it is worth while
to force it on Congress
1-9 OCTOBER 1946
355
Rather to my surprise he accepted all my tephes to Jinnah except about
the Vice-Presidency, without asking to consult his colleagues So I sent
my letter tojttmsh aricf a copy of che replies to las pomts co Nehru This
was rather better than I expected, George had prophesied a good deal
more difficulty and objections, and was certain that Nehru would wish to
consult his colleagues before agreeing N mentioned his proposed visit
to the Frontier, and I said that if we have a coalition by then he might
consider taking a Muslim colleague with him 'to show a united front'
He said he would consider it, but v. ithout any enthusiasm, a$ was natural
So the prospects of a coalition arc still ah vc bur, as I said in my cable to
S of S reporting progress, the issue rests on the knees of some very
strange gods
October S (Q *s birthday)
Nehru was to have come in the afternoon, but there was some misunder-
standing and he did not turn up Negotiations between him and J inn ah
are going on and there seems optimism about
George had an interview with Sudhir Ghosh who has come back from
England with a very swollen head According to him, he had seen the
P M and S of S frequently, had been sent to Pans at Government ex-
pense and to Switzerland ft> see Cnpps, and had been consulted by the
Times on all their leaden about India, and they had undertaken to remove
anything of which he did not approve' He told George that he was mis-
trusted and unpopular 1 1 always took a poor view of S G
October p
Cabmet meeting after which I saw Nehru for a short time and asked him
how the negotiations were going He said that a good deal had been agreed
but there were still some points outstanding They had agreed that the
arrangement of Vice-President should stand as at present but that the
Vice-President need not be the Leader of the Assembly They seemed also
to have reached some sort of an agreement on the matter of major com-
munal issues They had not discussed portfolios nor the long-term issue
I said that the points outstanding must be very small Nehru said Yes
but seemingly small things sometimes become very big * which is of
course quite true with these people Nehru looked rather tired and
depressed I thought, and was not very forthcoming
Ohf Caroe was very womed about Nehru's proposed visit to the
Frontier Tribes I gave him what cornfbrt I could and said that I hoped
that a Coalition would he in existence before he went, and that 2 could not
356 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
well stop turn* He w as chiefly concerned because Abdul Ghaffar Khan w as
going to accompany Nehru
I saw Caroe again in the even ng after his mtcrv icw with Nehru He
had quite failed to shake N in his intention to make the visit but their
discussion seems to have been amicable
October 10
I cannot mute make out what is gomg on in these politic*! negotiations
but I am quite sure that Bhopal is being tortuous and evasive as usual
Sir B N Rail came round this morning with a message from Bhopal that
there was only one point outstanding that I should agree to consult the
whole Cabinet over the appointment of a Minority representative and
not the leaders of the two mains as \ had said, t refused to budge except to
add that I hoped the leaden would by agreement recommend someone
acceptable to the whole Cabinet I am pretty sure that Bhopal was lying
when he said that this was the only point outstanding and that it was a
try-on by him and Gandhi to get me to accept the principle of the Cabinet
and not myself nominating members
October 1 1
B ho pal asked George to see him and confessed that his attempt at negotia-
tions had completely broken down So far as I can make out these so-
called ncgQttti\oo& hvtz \\\ tffcet practically amounted to an itttmpt by
Gandhi and the Congress to secure Muslim League compliance in an
arrangement to eliminate the Governor-General s influence in the Cabinet
and reduce him to a figure-head The method appears to have been to
offer Jinnah certain concessions provided that he agreed that the G G
should never be allow ed to interfere with the decisions of the Cabinet
The effort made yesterday to induce me to agree that the decis on on
Minority representatives should be made oy Cabinet as a whole was just
part of the plot and was not the last outstanding point as I was told that
B hop a I had promised. Now I shall have to get back to Jinnah again
Bhopal s intervention has not improved matters
October iz
Spent most of morning ou a reply to S of S comments on my Breakdown
Plan and produced a fauly stiff reply which was approved by George and
later by C-in C J afco began to draft a letter to the Kmg
Bhopal came in for a short time before lunch and told me about the
recent negotiations that Gandhi had drafted a formula accepted by
jinnaht conceding that the Muslim League represented the overwhelming
p-13 OCTOBER I946
357
majority of Muslims, but Nehru and die Working Committee had refused
to agree A rider to the formula, that the Cabinet should work as a team
and should agree never to permit interference by the Govcnior-Geriend,
was not accepted by Jinnah Bhopal said tliat Congress had conceded
Leadership of the Assembly to Jinnah in return for Nchrus continuance in
the Vice-Presidency There had apparently been some sort of agreement
on the matter of major communal issues The question of appointment of
Minorities had remained unsolved, but I have never attached great im-
portance to this Bhopal was leavuig by train this evening, but evidently
would have liked to have been pressed to stay I did not encourage him.
After lunch I saw C^in-C, who agreed with my draft reply to S of S
on the Breakdown Plan He told me the Cabinet was pressing for the
release of all I N A men He confirmed that he would prefer to keep
Baldcv Singh as War Member radicr than have Jinnah when the Cabinet
was reformed
At 5 30 p m, came the crucial interview with Juinah Obviously the
League have made up their mind to come tn t obviously also there will be
trouble inside the Cabinet, since Nehru and Jinnah have failed to agree.
1 am not sure yet how fast a one Jinnah's surprise ball about the inclusion
of a Scheduled Caste m his quota is George suggested that he might
intend to put in Ambedkar '
Well, ™ ell, I suppose that is something of an achievement to have got
so far, but I stdl see plenty of stiff fences ahead
October 13
Shortly before lunch I received a letter from Jinnah It was a typical ac-
ceptance by an Indian politician, in that the first two paragraphs set forth
the reasons why he could not possibly accept the basis and arrangements
of the present Interim Government, the final paragraph said that the League
had decided to come in I therefore wrote to him and to Nehru asking for
their lists of names
Later m the evening Jinnah asked to come and see me, and I saw him
and Liaquat at 7 o p m The subject about which they had come was the
nomination of a non-Muslmi Scheduled Caste Member in the Muslim
League quota Obviously what was m their minds was that if Congress
did not nomina te a Na ti onalis t M usLm th ey woul d refrain from uid u din g
a non-Mushm Scheduled Caste Member t told them that whatever the
Congress did, it would be a mistake on their part to include a non-Mushm
It would mean that the two parties entered the Coahtjon Government in
a mood of antagonism
3jS THE 1NTLRIM GOVERNMENT
I then said I hoped they understood that the presence of the Muslim
League m the Interim Government would be conditional on their re-
consideration of the Bombay Resolution and acceptance of the Statement
of May 16th Jumah said tint he realised this, but that it v. ould be necessary
to secure certain guarantees from the Congress, and that the Council of
the league would ha\ e to be called together 1 said this should be done as
soon as possible
Now I shall ha\ c a difficult and unpleasant time with Nehru and the
Congress, and I think it may be impossible to a\oid a showdown and
perhaps a breakdown I am tired of dealing with these impossible people,
and of knowing at the same time that I shall get only weak-kneed support
from home
During his interview with Nehru the next day* 14 Octoher, JVaveli shou ed
him Jmnalis tetter of 13 October which %e read with some apparent amuse-
ment* The Utter was as follows
The Working Committee of the All-India Muslim League have
considered the whole matter fully and I am now authorised to state that
ikey do not approve of ilie basis and scheme of settmg Tap the Internal
Government, which has been decided by you, presumably with the
authonty of His Majesty's Government
Therefore, the Committee do not, and cannot agree with your decision
already taken, nor with the arrangements you have already made
We consider and maintain that the imposition of this decision is
contrary to the Declaration of August 8th, 1940, but since, according to
your decision we have a right to nominate five members of the Executive
Council on behalf of the Muslim League, my Committee have, for various
reasons, come to the conclusion that in the interests of Mussulmans and
other communities it will be fatal to leave the entire field of administration
of the Central Government in the hands of the Congress Besides, you
may be forced to have in your Interim Government Muslims who do not
command the respect and confidence of Muslim India which would lead
to very venous consequences, and, lastly, for other very weighty grounds
and reasons, which arc obvious and need not be mentioned, we have
decided to nominate five on behalf of the Muslim League in terms of
your broadcast dated August 24th, 1946, and your two letters to mc,
dated 4th October, 1946, and 12th October, 1946, respectively, embodying
clarifications and assurances
October 14
I felt rather depressed early this morning as I anticipated rather an
unpleasant struggle with Congress over the entry of the Muslim League,
13-15 OCTOBER I946
359
especially as Nehru had written asking for Jinnah's names, so tint he might
submit them to the Cabinet! I sent a message Asking him to come and sec
me t and prepared to be tough, if necessary.
The interview with Nehru \v cut rather better than I had expected And
ValUbhai Patel, whom I saw after lunch, was almost cftitsnc m his
acceptance of die Coalition I wonder how far the old villain was sincere,
not \ cry far I thmk.
Qctohtr 15
Although I have at last succeeded in amiouncing a Coalition Cabmct T I
feel no elation over it, rather depression o\cr the difficulties still ahead
I "wonder whether I can induce them to work together
Jinnalis list of names came in late last night, just as I was going to bed
Since I did not wish to be kept awake by pondering on them I only
looked at them sufficiently to see that Jinn ah had not included himself and
had included a Scheduled Caste When I studied it in detail it was rather
a disappointing list Liaquat Ah Khan and Nishtar were certainties, but
Chundngar from Bombay and Ghazanfar Ah Khan from the Punjab
are poor substitutes for Ismail Khan and Nazimuddin I suppose J was
bound to put in someone from Punjab I believe the Scheduled Caste,
Jogendra Nath Mandal, 1 is not too bad
I saw Nehru just before the Cabinet and gave him Jmnali f s list confi-
dentially He promised me his list by the evening He made little comment
on J *s names, did not object to the Scheduled Caste, but said it was not
the best list that the League could produce N was obviously reluctant to
discuss portfolios before he left for the N W F P f but I told him that the
League must have one of the four 'Jcey* portfolios previously held by
Europeans — Finance, Defence, External Affairs* Home, and also one of
the two portfolios Commerce or Industries and Supplies
The Cabinet meeting passed off satisfactorily The two principal sub-
jects were the price of sugar and the reorganisation of the Salt Industry
and the removal of the Tax on Salt for which Gandhi had hecn pressing
for so long
Nehru sent 111 his names 111 the evening Of the three Muslims, Congress
are keeping only Asaf All, and are dropping one Hindu, Sarat Chandra
Bose I had rather they kept Ah Zahecr than Asaf Ah t but Bose is the
Huidu I had rather see go N showed no disposition to meet the League
over portfolios, we shall have a struggle about this
1 Jogendra Nath Mandal had been included in Mr Suhiiwardy * Muslim League ministry
ia BengaJ^-the onjy non Muslim in that ministry
360 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
My chief difficulty today, however, was to get S of S to obtain the
King's approval to Jinnah's list, which I had cabled early in the morning
He obviously mistrusted me and feared Congress, and wanted Nehrus
approval to Jamah's names cadier than, mine 1 I only got approval just
before dinner
Meanwhile ^ery serious troubles seem to have broken out in Eastern
Bengal with much killing of isolated Hindu communities by Muslim
terrorists A very inauspicious beginning to the new Government, I am
afraid.
October 16
I had an hour with Jinnah this morning He said with great emphasis that
the spint in which the Government at the Centre was conducted would
aU depend on whether Congress would get over the idea of the Muslim
League coming m as subordinates in a Government run by Nehru, We
had some discussion on the long-term issue and he said that there must be
some agreement that the terms of the Statement of May i<5th, as empha-
sised in the Statement of May 25 th, would be observed by the Congress
Bosc and Shafaat Ahmed came to lunch and All Zaheer came \n afterwards
Then I had a talk with Patcl mainly about events in Eastern Bengal He
started on rather a truculent note but was quite good-humoured Nehru,
Bose and Patel all very msistent about the riots in E Bengal, but more for
political reasons* I think, than with any real sympathy for the victims
Bucher thinks the killings have been exaggerated and that the matter is in
hand, but I doubt if they really know in Calcutta what is going on
October 20
Returned from a four-day visit to Bombay, which had as its objects to
learn at first hand of the communal troubles in the City, and to collect
Pam and my tw o grand-sons who were arming from home in S S Andes,
a liner normally on the South American run
I flew down on the 17th, armed about 2 o p rrL, and met the Ministers
during the afternoon and evening
On the morning of the 18th I did a tour of the parts of the city most
affected by the disturbances I had a surprisingly cordial reception from
both Hindus and Muskms J visited j hospital azK? ssw some of the victims
(last time I had been at this hospital it had been after the 1944 explosion)
I had a talk w ith Wilson, head of the Police, about the unhclpfulncss of
the public and the instigation of some of the political people, notably
the Mahasabha Since September 1, when this trouble started there have
IS~22 OCTOBER 19^6
been nearly 1,500 casualties, of which more than 360 ha\ e been fatal, about
equally divided between Hindus and Muslims 0\cr d.ooo arrests have
been nude, more than half Hindus There arc certain quarters into winch
no Muslim can go without escort, and vice versa A deplorable state of
affairs, but not easy to remedy
During the day I had two long talks with Archie N\c, mainly about the
Breakdown Plan, on which he contributed some useful comments He
said all w as going \\ ell in Madras and his relations with his Ministers were
cordial He thought the Province would just get through the food crisis
October 21
I came back from Bombay feeling rather depressed, at the little progress
v*c ha\c made m settling the Indian problem, the great amount that
remains to be done, the acutcness of the communal tension and the bitter-
ness of feeling, the lack m the leaders of any sense of urgency or of any
foresight, none seems able to look be) ond the immediate party advantage
I believe Azad is in many wa)s the best of them all
In the evening I had a talk with Patel He blew off steam about Ghazan-
far All's speech and about Eastern Bengal, and delivered a general hymn
of hate against the Muslim League, but was reasonably friendly He was as
anxious as we are to get a decision from S of 5 about winding-up of
S of S Services and terms of compensation for them. He said that he had
advised Nehru not to make this N W Frontier tnp
October 22
A wearing day I saw Jimiah in the mornmg, but it was not a very satis-
factory interview, these people always go back to the same old arguments,
and never seem to me to mo\ e forward at au I have the impression that
Jinnah is not so much 111 control of the Muslims as he was, that his preach-
ing of Pakistan and Direct Action, \\ hich he meant mote as political
bargain counters than realities, has gone to the heads of the younger and
more hot-headed, who want to translate them into action
After lunch I saw Nehru, looking worn and tired after his Frontier
experiences He appeared to be less difficult about portfolios than I
expected, but I daresay he will be difficult again tomorrow after he has
seen Patel
I finished the day with a bad migraine
Disregarding the advice of Ahil Kalam Azad and &t}ter$, Nehm had
insisted on paying a visit totkeNWFP On his arrival at Peshawar there
362 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
uas a hostile demonstration organized by the Muslim League In tribal
territory he 11 as also gn at a hostile reception, the Afndis refused to meet him
at all at J at Landx Kotal and at the Mainland Pass stottes it ere throu n at him
and hts party and they uerc extricated with difficulty Some of the Congress
Ministers vj the NJVFP unjustly blamed the heal officials for these
demonstrations The effect of the tour was to u cttlcn the Congress in the
N IV F P and to strengthen the League
October 23
A really bad day As I anticipated, Nehru had changed his tone after
seeing his colleagues and wrote nic a long letter ■which contained every
possible reason for keeping the League out of the Government, unless they
were prepared to crawl in apologetically
Cabinet meeting considered Gurkhas oil-seeds control jute control and
appointments of non Indians Nehru silent and sulky, Asaf Ah and
Rajagopalachan loquacious as usual
I saw Nehru after Council, and told him that the portfolios w ere for me
to distribute, that the Muslim League must ha\c their fair share, and that
I hoped Congress w ere not going to wreck, the only hope of peace for
India He listened but was not helpful and as usual accused Jinnah and the
League.
Then 1 saw jumah, who brought Liaquat, and tned to persuade them
not to insist on Home or Defence portfolios but Jinnah was in one of his
worst and most communal moods as bitter against Nehru as N had been
against him These people make me tared and discouraged
So I WTOtc to Nehru to say that the League must have one of the
principal portfolios but I am afraid that we are in for a show-down
I warned S of S to this effect
October 24
The Coalition Government is still alive at the end of the day but only
just and it required something like artificial respiration this c\cning It
certainly docs not look like outliving the cradle at present
The morning began with a long letter from Nehru saying that Congress
were unable to gjve up the External AfEuct Defence at Hams patt&Uas
and containing the usual tirade about the Bengal disturbances the
speeches of the Muslim League leaders their non-acceptance of the May 16
Statement etc but offering the Fmancc portfolio if the League must ha\ e
one of the major ones and suggesting that it w ould be better if the League
23*24 OCTOBER 1 946 363
simply took the five vacant portfolios till the Legislative Assembly was
o\ er, and then reconsidering the matter later I replied pressing for the
Home portfolio Nehru wrote just before lunch to say that Congress
would resign from the Go\ eminent sooner than agree to this, but that he
would confirm this after consulting his colleagues He confirmed it m the
evening
I then sent for Jinnah at 7 30 p nx t informed him of the position and
asked whether the League would accept the Finance portfolio J w as not
in a very accommodating mood, and accused Congress of mutilatmg on
the radio his statement about the NoaUiah disturbances, but he agreed to
the Fmancc and Commerce portfolios with three others, with the usual
proviso that it was subject to the decision of his Working Committee I
then sent for Nehru at 9 30 p m and told hun that the League would
accept Fmancc, and asked him to let me know what alternate e portfolio
he proposed for Matthai Nehru, who looked very tired and worn,
accepted this quietly, and said he would let me know after consulting his
colleagues I had rather expected he might persist in resignation and from
previous experience shall not be in the least surprised if he comes back
tomorrow with some new objection or proposal I would not put it past
Jinnah either to raise fresh difficulties Neither party has the least trust in the
other, and I am sure that Gandhi in the background is doing his best to
wreck any hope of agreement.
During the afternoon, by the way, the Congress sent round Asaf Ali-
en the pretext of his coming for his routine interview, half an hour late
on what was obviously a reconnaissance of my position After a little talk
about his Department (proposal to construct locomotives in India} which
was simply camouflage he began by saying that he had proposed to
retire from the Cabinet and let Azad take his place but that the present
time was not auspicious After some talk about Jinnah and his previous
friendship with him, which he said was broken in 1938, he launched out
on the matter of portfolios and put out at me the same propaganda as had
been in Nehru's letter This was typical Congress technique a would-be
confidential and friendly approach to try and put mc in a receptive mood
and then the proposition that Congress wanted to get across I think I can
recognise ic readily now and am not easily deceived.
It is all very wearing, and for almost the first time m my life I am really
beginning to feel the strain badly — not sleeping properly and letting these
wretched people worry me However some courage and a sense of
humour usually returns with the morning nde and carries me through
the day
364
THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
October 2$
After another day of excursions and alarms \vc have settled the dimcult
portfolio business Nehru as usual opened the boiling wjth a fast one He
wrote that Mat thai was taking the Industries and Supplies portfolio from
Rajagopalachan, who would take Education, but that Bhabha would go
to Works, Mmes and Power, Now I told him last night that I was prepared
to allot WMP w Alatthai if he wanted it but that otherwise I was com-
mitted to giving it to the League So I sent George down to sec Nchm and
tell him that Bhabha should take Posts and Air or Health, No result So
I saw Nehru myself, again without result, except that he said he w ould put
it to his colleagues No result again. So I sent Ian Scott down to sec Jiniiah
and offer him the other portfolios — Finance, Commerce, Posts & Air,
Health, Legislative Rather to my surprise Jinnah raised little protest, was
friendly, accepted, and sent me a message of thanks
So I have at last got a Coalition Government safely m office. But I am
m no way inclined to optimism over the future, and do not feel m the
least like 'celebrating the event*, though I hope I may sleep better tonight.
The new Government will be sv^orn in tomorrow under ominous
auspices — the riots tsi E Bengal, restlessness in Bombay and Calcutta, the
resentment of Congress at having to take m the League without acknow-
ledgment of Nchm s> position as self-appomted Premier, the deep mistrust
betw een the Party leaders I shall ha\ c to be a very much better diplo-
matist and leader than I judge myself to be to make the Government work.
The correspondence over the distribution of portfolios shows the
dimculty of settling matters between the two Parties, who cannot meet
each other without immediate divergence That an agreement has been
reached at all is I suppose something of an achievement
October 26
My apprehension that matters would not go smoothly for long received
an immediate justification this morning While I was waiting to go to the
Cabinet to swear m the League members, George brought down a
strongly-worded note from Patel, demanding that the Bengal situation
should be discussed in the Cabinet this morning, and that the Centre
should at once take over control of the disaffected areas from the Bengal
Government It was an immediate wrecking attempt before the new
Government had even begun 1 sent word at once that t refused to allow
such discussion which was not witiun the competence of the Cabinet,
unless I sought their advice which I had no intention of doing at present
I said that the meeting would be confined to swearing in the new members
2$-2$ OCTOBER IO46
It had been the intention to discuss the Adjournment motions m the
Aucmbly, hut since a number of them dealt with Bengal it would
obviously nave been dangerous, so 011 the grounds that I had only just
seen the motions I said that I would discuss them with the leaders after the
Cabinet and call another meeting later if necessary
The new members were sworn in Ghazanfar All, the only one I had
not met, looks a rather irresponsible sort of buccaneer, I hope he will
settle down I made a short speech to them.
Aftcr the Cabinet I discussed the adjournment motions with Nehru and
Liaquat and disposed of them satisfactorily, I hope Then 1 had half an
hour with Nehru, Patcl and Rajagopalachan o\ er Patel s note I explained
my view of the legal position R. attempted to controvert it but I refused
to be drawn into a legal argument, and he had really no grounds for his
argument and knew it Then I said that quite apart from the legal point
of view, it would be futile from die pracncal point of view to attempt to
interfere from the Centre with the Government of Bengal it would
merely promote fresh conflict Both Nehru and Patel got a JmJe heated
they are obviously under strong pressure from their supporters and there
was at one time even a hint of resignation But in the end we parted
amicably So that I was able for the first time this week to play a round of
golf in the ev enmg
Chips 1 and Peter Coats arrived
October 2?
I spent the morning trying to get an appeal to end communal strife issued
by the Party Leaders Ian Scott went round to Nehru and Liaquat first of
all, the difficulty here was that while both agreed with the appeal Nehru
would not sign alongside Liaquat which would admit him to some sort of
equality in the Cabinet, and suggested that cither all members of the
Cabinet should sign it, or that it should be issued over the names of my-
self Gandhi and J inn ah But Gandhi took refuge m his usual subterfuge
that he was not even a member of Congress and Jinnah would have
nothing to do with anything signed by Gandhi, and so the proposal once
again foundered on the rock of party jealousy and smallrrundedness
October 2$
A comparatively quiet day
I drafted a very short broadcast appealing for communal peace which
1 Sir Henry CLaimon, MP
l66 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
I delivered in the c\cmng It would have been better jf my proposal of
yesterday had succeeded, but my own appeal can at least do no harm
October 2$
First day of Assembly session seems to ha\ c passed off satisfactorily Nehru
and Liacmar sat side by side on the Go\ eminent benches though I believe
they did not exchange a word
I saw Patcl atiooam He "was fairly friendly and reasonable, but pulled
the usual fast one out of the bag at the end by producing a telegram from
Pant to Congress asking permission to resign over the Measures case
Sir Pfiifip Measures, Inspector-General of Police in the United Provinces,
learnt that the Congress Home Minister uas corresponding direct with pottce
officers instead of through him as Head of the Department, whereupon, without
any reference to the Home Minister or to the Chief Minister, he issued a
circular pointing out that such correspondence uas irregular the Home
Minister, of course t was offended, and although Measures apologized, he
gathered from Pandit Pant, the Chief Mwtster, that he had lost their confidence
He therefore tendered his resignation ; and the Ministers u anted to accept it But
the Governor t Sir Francis IVylte, feeling that Measures tt as being forced out
for a minor error of judgment^ considered tltat w discharge of hts special
responsibility fir the protection of the Services he should overrule his Ministers
and refuse to accent Measures' $ resignat ton Pandit Pant and the V P Ministry
tlien threatened to resign , and Nehru threatened that the Congress Members of
the Interim Government urwfi do likewise The matter dragged on for some
days with recurrent threats of resignation Ultimately on instructions from
the Secretary of State the Governor gave way and Measures was allowed to
proceed on leave preparatory to retirement
I saw Liaquat and spoke to him of the necessity for the Muslim League
to accept the Statement of May 16 forthwith He referred me to jmnah
Liaquat seems a sensible Ie*cl headed person.
After lunch 1 had half an hour with Rajagopalachan talking about
Education on which his views seem sound. But he ga\e me the impression
of being depressed over the general situation There is no doubt that
Congress are bitterly disappointed over the entry of the Muslim League
into the Government which checks their attempt to seize power
Another of those sort of days 1 had an interview fixed with Nehru for
iooam but he apparently had a nervous breakdown and sent word
that he could not come I had Jinnah at iz o noon for one hour and ten
28-30 OCTOBER I946
367
minutes at his most Jnmah-ish, on the question of Jits calling his Council
to accept the Statement of May 16th It was completely unsatisfactory
Ji 1 111 ah went over all the old arguments to the effect that the Congress
acceptance of the Statement of May 16th was not a genuine one and should
nc\cr have been accepted as such. His main theme was that he could not
possibly get his Council to accept the Statcmcut of May 16th unless
Congress accepted the literal interpretation of die Mission's plan His
attitude was that *if HMG will not take a firm Jme and protect us, then
leave us to our fate*
It looks as if another long disputation was 111 sight
In the evening I had the first meeting of the new Cabinet. The chief
item was the proposal for a Consultative Committee with the States
Rajagopalachan was as usual very discursive and seemed to regard the
Committee as a step towards a Federal Cabinet Luquat made on the whole
the most sensible contribution
In the evening Nehru sent from his sicL-bcd a rather plaintive indict-
ment of the Governor of the U P , the Muslim League and myself, and
threatened resignations all round. War of nerves, I think
Summary
These four months, from the departure of the Mission to the s wearing in
of a Coalition Government, have been in many respects the most gruelling
of my life so far They arc comparable to the four months from March to
June in 1 94 1 in the strain to which I was subjected, but then at least I was
dealing in a medium to which I was trained, the conduct of war, and with
people whom I could trust These political negotiations are entirely foreign
to my military training, and there seems no firm ground m political
matters and no one whom one can trust
The fatal weakness of the Mission in their abject attitude to Congress,
and the duplicity of Cnpps, left behind a legacy which it was beyond my
power to counter-act Congress realised that H.M G was afraid of them
and would never really stand up to them — an impression which was
increased by the treatment accorded to that little rat Sudhir Ghosh, while
Jinnah and the League considered that they had been 'sold down the river
and were deeply suspicious I have paid a heavy price for not being firmer
in the last stages of the Mission and allowing myself to be double-crossed
by Cnpps I don't beieve mat 6y fus code he tnougnt fte was cvouig any-
thing dishonest he was merely being cle\er But I am quite sure that
cleverness does not pay with these people they can be deeper and more
visa a h
368 THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT
dishonest staB Vallabhai Pattl himself once remarked to me that they
ne\er knew where they were with Cnpps, he said different things to
<U0exent people. While Mrs Suojim Naidu said to one of my staff We
think very poorly of Sudhir Ghosh, but if he is the sort of person the
Cabinet Mission Like \ou cannot blame us for using him*
I am \ cry doubtful whether this Coalition will w ork, too much time
has been wasted and things are moving too fast The Congress is not
interested in making a Constitution under British auspices, only m con-
solidating then* power The Mission gave away the weakness of our
position, and our bluff has been called Our tune in India is limited and our
power to control events almost gone. We ha\ e only presage and previous
momentum to trade on and they will not last long My task now is to
secure the safest and most dignified withdraw al possible.
I am sorry for the Muslims, they have more honesty, courage and
dignity than the Hindus, but cannot stand up to the power of the rupee
and the superior education and chicanery of the Congress Up to a point
Jinnah pla) ed his cards well, but I think he has been too unyielding
14
THE LAST CHANCE
OF UNITY
November 3
Got back today from a short visit to Calcutta and Bast Bengal I left Delhi
on the morning of October 31, and got to Calcutta m early afternoon
Driving from the airfield at Dumdum, I found Calcutta streets dirty and
deserted, and the city looking more squalid even than usual Buses and
taxis were on strike, most of the shops closed and barred and the streets
half blocked with refuse which had not been cleared for days It seems that
no transport will run without escort
I had a scries of interviews in the afternoon about the disturbances in
East Bengal They did little more than confirm my general impressions
about the course of events and the bitterness of communal feeling The
Governor was calm and imperturbable but said in his slow fashion 'I
reahsed that I was taking on an extremely difficult job, I did not realise
that I was taking on a practically impossible one f
Next day, we flew over the area of the disturbances for an hour or so
and got a fairly good idea of the country and of the amount of damage
done Then we landed at Dacca, lunched with the Commissioner (HoJJand)
and had a scries of interviews I had a telegram from PS V that all Congress
Ministries and Congress members at Centre were threatening resignation
over Measures case After tea we drove to Narayangunge and embarked
on a river steamer for Chandpur
We disembarked at Chandpur on the morning of the 2nd More
inter views and an inspection of some refugee camps
Meanwhile, I had a telegram that Nehru, Liaquat, Patel, and Nishtar
were flying together to Calcutta, which was welcome news
We re-embarked about midday and steamed up river back to Dacca
and thence by plane to Calcutta where we arrived about 5 30 p m,
I had a little talk with the Governor before dinner and again after dinner,
and at 7 o p m saw Nehru and Co I gave them my impressions of East
Bengal and cordially welcomed their initiative in coming down together
They had nothing much to say about their mission, but seemed on quite
y]Q THE LAST CHANCE Of UNITY
friendly terms with one another I warned them against giving any
countenance to Bose's proposed strike
In my talks with Burrows he told me of the apparent hopelessness of
arriving at a coalition at present (Roy, the Congress leader of the opposi-
tion, demands parity of seats with the Muslims except for the Chief
Minister), of the danger of Bosc*s projected hartal, 1 which the Govern-
ment will fight with all its resources, and of a difficulty about reinforce-
ments for the Armed Police — Suhrwardy wants to enlist $00 Punjabi
Muslims I told him. about my Breakdown Plan t with which he agreed,
and said that he must know what plan he is carrying out He said T can-
not carry Bengal for more than another 12 months, because after that it
will not be there for me to carry ' He remarked tliat when he took on the
job he thought he had one good asset, the Police Force, but found that it
was now unreliable
I left Calcutta this morning and touched down for 40 minutes at Bihta
airfield near Patna and saw the Chief Minister Sinha, some of his staff,
the I G Police and the Sub-Area Commander Sinha was definitely
rattled, and it looks to me as if the troubles m Bihar were going to be
worse than those m B Bengal The Premier of course wants more troops
and aeroplanes
A large Mtnher of Hindu refugees from East Bengal had made their way to
Bihar, and then talis of woe excited Hindus of Bihar to murderous attacks on
thetr Muslim neighbours which quite echpsed m scale and savagery the slaughter
tn East Bengal
The more I see of Bengal the more I dishke the country, the people,
the climate Most of Bengal is a swamp most of the time, the people are
cowardly yet capable of terrorism and cruel ty> the educated men are
clever but tn a soft superficial way, the climate is sticky and enervating
A deplorable part of the world.
Burrows remarked that it was costing more in casualties to hand over
Bengal than it did to conquer it The loss of life in the Calcutta riots was
far greater than at the battle of Plassey
November 4
One of those sort of days again I puzzled over the problem of the League
and. the. Gomrjuoiexit Assembly anji^wtote 1 tvote about, ut k vi rad to raJLse
how the well-framed plan of the Mission has been ruined by the initial
duplicity of Cnpps and the failure to take a strong line in upholding our
1 Hartal the dosing of shops as a political gesture*
3-4 NOVEMBER I946
371
intention I hold myself to blame for tins, but it is difficult to take a strong
line with jellyfish
The note u as addressed to P S V and is given below
1 am rather puzzled and worried about the matter of getting the Muslim
League into the Constituent Assembly Time is getting on, and wc cannot
delay sending out invitations much longer, if the C A is to meet on
December oth
2 There arc three parties to this impasse the Muslim League (or rather
Air Jmnah), the Congress, and HIM G
It seems impossible at the moment for me to move Jinnah m the matter,
he professes that he could never get acceptance by the Council without
further assurances, and is not willing to try It is difficult to get ar exactly
what assurance Mr Jinnah wants, but I think if it were definitely stated
that the Sections will draft the Provincial Constitutions, this would
satisfy him
I do not sec any possibility of persuading the Congress to give such an
assurance, they are bound by frequent statements they have made, and
always refer to their letter of acceptance to the Mission, which the Mission
so wrongly accepted They arc apparently prepared to agree that the
question of whether the Sections mate the Constitution for the Provinces
or the Provinces make their own, should be referred to the Federal Court
but this Jinnah will not accept There is therefore an impasse also in this
direction
There remains H.M G , who are to my mind absolutely committed
to the League point of view, both by their statement of May 16th and by
the assurance which Cnpps and the Secretary of State gave to the Muslim
League in the interview on May 16 ( HMG are, however, ui my view,
both cowardly and dishonest in this matter, and have so far refused to
issue an unequivocal statement Their attitude is that they dare not do
anything which may upset Congress Tiere is therefore also an impasse in
this direction
3 The question is how to proceed whether to try and work on Jumah,
on the Congress, or on HMG Wc might perhaps get B N Rau to
approach Jinnah, or try to induce the Muslim League Members of
Government to influence him I do not feel there is much hope in approach
mg the Congress But if H M G could only he persuaded to issue a clear
and authoritative statement, I think that might satisfy Jinnah I propose to
send a telegram to tLM G to the effect that Jinnah is reluctant to call his
Council until a definite assurance has been given him on this pomt and
1 The assurance v as givcu dur i g the meeting of Muslim League representatives with
Cnpps and Pethick Lawrence briefly referred to in the Journal entry for 36 May see p 272
372 THE LAST CHANCE OP UNITY
that I consider that HMG, who arc fully committed m honour on this
issue, should make a statement to the effect that it was and sail is an integral
part of the scheme for the Constituent Assembly that a Section should
make the Constitution for the Provinces inside that Section, and that a
Province cannot withdraw from the Section (or Group if formed) until
a htcr stage as laid down m the Statement.
4, The whole question is. really academic, since the Constituent
Assembly cannot work except by agreement, but unless we can get the
Constituent Assembly together at an early date* the whole situation is
bound to deteriorate, and there is a serious danger of the Government
splitting up, since I shall have to bring pressure on Jinnah to calf his
Council or wididraw from the Government » 1/1946
At 10 30 a til I had a rather dutuihmg interview with the C-ia-C He
goes too far in my view in subservience to his Minister, and has gt\ en the
impression that he is quite prepared for the immediate withdrawal of all
British troops, which will be very embarrassing for mc He left behind a
note which he handed to Baldcv in which he had spoken hypothetical!/ of
any British troops remaining in India after January 1, 1947 I have always
maintained the attitude that British troops will not leave India until after
the new Consutution is made I wrote C-in-C a strongly worded letter
We also discussed the N \V Frontier, he is disturbed at the effect of
Nehru s visit, does not think much of the Political Service* which he thinks
has been going downhill for the last twenty )cars and has completely
failed to change with the times
At 3 1 5 p m. I saw Vallabhai Patel and Liaquat Ah Khan on their return
from Vatna They were sensible and seemed still on friendly terms, and
impressed with the seriousness of the situation This getting together of
Congress and the League, if it continues and bears fruit is the most hopeful
feature of the political situation for a long tune
Afterwards 1 saw Jogcndra Nath Mandal the Scheduled Caste repre-
sentative of the Muslim League, a smooth sort of Bengali t not very
impressive
November 6
The situation m Bihar seems quite out of hand It is of course the result of
the violent communal propaganda on both sides and of the lowering of
the authority and morale of the services and Police by the Ministry The
question is when and how one can stop it As I have warned EMG on
many occasions we have now the responsibility without the power.
4-9 NOVEMBER I946
373
whereas the Indian Provincial Ministries have the power but little or no
sense of responsibility
I discussed with Wcightinan this morning Nehru's tour and his foolish
and unrealistic note about it Wcightman said that Congress are 'gunning
for* Olaf Caxoc and will have him out if they can W says he can seldom
get hold of Nehru, who is trying to do too much and is likely to have a
nervous breakdown He said that Cnpps was in correspondence with
Nehru and had written to him about Krishna Men on 1
The Muslim League members of my cabinet came to me about Bihar
just before the Cabinet Nishtar had returned that afternoon and they were
all full of accusations against the Provincial Ministry and Congress t and
wanted marm] Jaw, Muslim and British troops, and a visit to Bihar by
myself I decided that it might be a good tiling if I went down tomorrow
Cabinet meeting went off quite successfully m spite of the tension We
dealt with proposals for encouraging small savings, establishment of a
Price fixing Committee, formation of a new Central ICS and I P to
replace S of S Services, rules for the admission of foreigners into India,
instructions to India's UNO Delegation about trying to secure a seat for
India on the Security Council, and demobilisation Then Asaf All made a
statement about insecurity on the railways and wanted to establish a special
armed force for protection of passengers and property — another symptom
of the breakdown of law and order
After Cabinet I had a few words with Patel and Liaquat about the Press
and with the C-in-C about the Bihar situation
Mandal the Scheduled Caste representative of the League, was sworn in
Ghazanfar All will be a rather noisy and tiresome member of Cabinet, I fear
Novemher 9
Returned from a couple of rather harrowing days ui Bihar where there
has been an outbreak of savagery and bestiality even worse than the
Calcutta killings and more terrible than the Noakhah riots for which they
were a revenge The victims are all Muslims
I went off on the 7th and got to Patna after lunch I had a series of inter-
views with that gangster the Premier Suiha, with Bowstcad Secretary to
Government and Creed the I G Police with the military commanders
Bucher Ekin and Russell, with Nehru and Prasad who have been doing
their best to check the troubles and chim to be influencing a return to
1 V K Krishna Menon a Congress, propagandist in the U K and a close friend of Nehru
After Independence he became High Commissioner for India in the. UJC and was later
Defence Minister
J74 THE LAST CHANCE OF UNITY
sanity, and then w ltli three indignant and accusatory Muslim* The first of
these Nauman, a central MLA, seemed to mc a most unpleasant little
man, it was only at the end of the interview that I realised he had some
personal cause for his bitterness, as his property liad been destro)ed and
relations Jailed Mr Hussein Imam, the local Mushm League leader was
in a high state of mdignation, demanding strong action, machine-gunning
of crowds from the air, dismissal of the Go\ ernment, etc The third was
Md, Yunus* a rather sad little man in European clothes with long bushy
hair sticking out of his cars His theme was the same but he was more
restrained than the other two The trouble is that there is httle or nothing
now that I can do to influence events I cannot turn out the Government
and run a Section 93 Administration Machine-gunning from the air is
not a weapon one would willingly use, though the Muslims point out,
rather embarrassingly, that we did not hesitate to use it in 1942
Yesterday I wasted my morning in a 3 -hour flight over the affected
area, one could see little or nothing of the damage done, c\ en at a few
hundred feet, and to all appearances the countryside was normal aud
peaceful I took Nishtar with mc, to whom 1 had given a lift ni my plane
from Delhi I then w ent round the Patna Hospital a poor old-fashioned
hospital and looked at not victims
In the afternoon I spent an hour looking at refugee camps m buildings
in Patna a depressing sight After that I had some more interviews
Before I went off this morning I had the Premier up to see me, an dtold
him that his Government has disgraced and discredited Bihar that it was
criminal folly to allow Noakhah Day to be celebrated, and that the course
of action of his Government in insisting on the release of criminals, m
persecuting Government servants and lowering the morale of the Police,
and m fading to control the Press had led directly to the present tragedy
I told him that he must give c\ ery support to the troops and police in
restoring order, must stop the campaign of hatred in the Press, must see
that offenders and instigators were punished and must rehabilitate the
sufferers He took quite a considerable rocket meekly, but it will have httle
effect, and he left with a w ould be propitiatory grin
The communal trouble seems to have spread to U P 1 as feared
November 10
Commemoration service in morning Duty lunch party, went to finals
of Delhi Tennis tournament for an hour and finished the day with an
1 Hindu pjgnms it the annual religious fair at Gannukteswar set upon Muslims and
killed about i ooo of them Reports of these disturbances were Curly succesifully suppressed.
9-1 1 NOVEMBER IO4G
375
interview with Nehru and Liaquat, which went sockijy I spoke of
remedies for the present situation control of the Press, coalition ministries
ui the Provinces, and proper support o£ officials and pohec They listened
calmly till I came to the matter of Provincial coalitions, when Nehru
suddenly blew up as he so often docs He denied the existence of a Coali-
tion at die Centre because the Muslim League members refused to
recognise him as *dc facto' Premier and attend his tea-party Cabinets 1
I reminded lum of the Constitution, and he promptly offered his resigna-
tion, tliree tunes in five minutes (M had a very rough passage from some
elements in Bihar, the ruffianly gangster side of Congress which had
expected tjie Interim Government to be a Hindu raj which would sup-
press the Muslim League, He is obviously over wrought and not far off
a nervous breakdown) After some talk on wcll-wom lines, he calmed
down a little Liaquat remained \cry quiet and self-possessed, said the
Muslim League members were quite prepared to co-operate in the Cabinet
but not to recogmse Nehru as head of it, and to discuss conditions in the
Provinces if it applied to all In the end ^ e discussed the question of the
Honours list calmly and amicably But I shall quite likely get one of Nehrus
letters tomorrow, and possibly resignation The aim of Congress has
always been clear to obtain power by eliminating the influence of
Governor-General and Governors A show-down is not far o4 and I can
still get no definite policy from fLM G I can bnng about a crisis, indeed
I shall find it difficult to avoid doing so, but ] cannot solve it
November u
I meditated a little on the Breakdown Plan m the morning and wrote a
note regarding some of the details of it on the assumption that EMG
agreed to the general pnnciple
Ghazanfar All Khan came in the afternoon and talked quite sensibly,
for die irresponsible politician I believe him to be
We had a Cabinet meeting on the Air agreement with USA which
w cnt quite smoothly, and I think arrived at a logical and sensible decision
I had a violent headache and much bleeding of the nose during the
evening, which Harold* attributed to over work and want of a holiday
1 "When the Interim Government was first formed, Nehru arranged for all the Members
to meet informally for discussion among themselves usually m hit room over a cup of tea,
before the fotmal meetings at which the Viceroy presided- The object was to establish the
conviention that the Viceroy was only a constitutional f gur*s-he*d. After the Muslim League
representatives joined the Government Liaquat and his colleagues firmly declined to attend
Nehru s tea party Cabinets or to lend any countenance to his attempt! to make himself
instead of the Viceroy, the real head of the Government
s Lt^oL H "Williamson, t M,S , Surgeon to the Viceroy
376 THE 1AST CHANCE OP UNITY
He is quite right, but I don't think it is possible for mc to leave my post at
present I cannot take a proper holiday in India, as papers are bound to
follow me about, and the responsibility for what happens And I do not
want to go to England in the winter
November 12
Matthai was my only visitor in the morning, as Jagjivan Ram was ill We
hid a general talk at which. I tried to put across my views about the neces-
sity for coalitions in the Provinces as well as in the Centre and the abso-
lutely vital need to make the present coalition at the Centre work. He said
that if we could keep it together for the next month or two it might turn
out all right
In the afternoon I had three-quarters of an hour with Rajagopalachan
We dealt with the lack of any historic sense m India and the reasons for it.
We came back inevitably to present-day politics at the end, and he held
me responsible for all the recent disorders in India because I had not taken
stronger action at the time of the Calcutta nots and dismissed the Bengal
Ministry I said that I wondered whether his views would have been the
same if the Bihar nots had been the first to break out, and pointed out the
difficulties of strong action with limited resources Congress have of
course been criticised by their supporters for not using the Bengal troubles
to suppress the Muslim League, and they are not accustomed to criticism,
so are naturally shifting the blame to Burrows and myself
In the evening I had an hour with Patel on various matters control of
Press, private armies, the Assam evictions, and of course the recent
disturbances On the whole, 1 get on well with Patel, we speak our minds
to each other without reservation, and he has more balance than Nehru
though he is even more communal and anti-Muslim in his outlook. He
finished up by saying that coalitions would never work, at the Centre or
in the Provinces and I said that I was going to keep on at them and would
make them work,
November 13
Cabinet meeting in the evening went quite smoothly and the more of
these we can get through on similar terms the better chance of the show
settling down Both Nehru and Li aqua t speak sensibly Rajagopalachan
is loquacious — so is Nishtar — and Ghazanfar rather in dined at present to
be an enfant terrible, the remainder are mainly silent
II-I9 NOVEMBER I946
377
November ig
Returned just before luiich from a tour to NW Frontier I got to
Peshawar soon after nud-day on the 14th, After lunch J had an hour of
interviews, then a garden party and then the Khan Sahib and finally a
dinner party
It is evident that Caroc and the Khan Sahib arc at odds, and Caroc is very
much on edge, so too is the Khan Sahib He is a pleasant well-meaning
person, without the necessary force of character or wisdom to run a
Province, and he and the Governor are cnnrcly different types who arc
not likely to get on well together
On November the 15 f motored to Landi Kotal and saw a jirga of the
Afhdis Their representation was to the effect that if we were going we
should hand them back the Khyber Pass, that they had no intention of
being ruJcd by Hindus and resented Nehru 1 s visit, and that anything in the
way of a little extra cash would be very acceptable I told them in ertcct
to be good boys and that no one would interfere with their freedom and
that they would have every opportunity to state then case to any future
Government of India and make their own terms The jirga was dignified
and impressive
After lunch we new to Wana, where I saw a jirga of the Ahmadzai
Wazirs They were not so impressive as the Afhdis and were more
communal and less dignified in their outlook. I said to them much the
same as I had said to the Afndis I then had a series of interviews with
the local commanders and officials, went to a dnnk party and dined in the
Wana Brigade Mess
On Sunday the 17th, we motored by Nowshcra Dargai the
Malakand pass to Chakdarra, at the junction of the Dir and Swat
Valleys Here we had tea with the Nawab of Dir, a severe but competent
looking person, who obviously does not believe in progress or change
for his people, but apparently rales well Then we went on to Saidtt
the Capital of Swat The Wall met us at the border of his State a nice
friendly old man The Swat Valley is a lovely one and the people seem
reasonably prosperous The State is progressive in its policy in contrast
with Dir
At the Malakand Pass t looked at the scene of the assault on Nehru and
his party The political agent, Mahbub Ah, whose conduct has been called
in question, had met us at Daxgaj While J think it u most unlikely that he
instigated or was privy to the attack, it was inexcusable that he should
have gone on down the hill as he did and not seen the party safely past
what was obviously a danger point
373 THE LAST CHANCE Of UNITY
Next morning, the iSth, we had a chikore shoot at Swat, quite good
fun but there were not many birds
After lunch we motored back to Peshawar, about So odd miles, in
a little over three hours I came back to the atmosphere of political crisis,
as P S V had telegraphed the text of letters from Nehni and Jinnah, the
former expressing great surprise that I had not already issued imitations
for the Constituent Assembly, the latter protesting strongly against my
doing so It was an issue I knew w ould arise before long
I left this morning after breakfast It is always pleasant to visit the
N W F P f but it is not in a happy state at present, Caroc is highly strung
and takes tilings too hardly and seriously Nehru's visit has shaken the
officials badly The N W F P has been until lately out of the hurl) -burly
of Indian politics, and has run itself rather in the old fashioned way The
latest Congress Ministry and Nehru's visit has given them all a severe jolt
and they aic discouraged and resentful But it had to come, and may
possibly do good in the long run Nehru, to judge by his last letter to
Caroc, which I saw on return here, seems to ha\ e realised that the Frontier
and the Tribes had better be left alone for the present
I had long interview s with Jinnah and Nehru this afternoon an d c\ ening I
was not looking forward to either of them I suppose they w ent as well as
could be expected, J gi\ cs me the impression of deliberately riding for a fall
His whole theme was that a settlement between the two communities
was quite impossible, and he went back to the history of Akbar and
Aurangzeb to pro\c it He said that it was no use the Muslim League
coming into the Constituent Assembly, that the Muslims were being
ground down, and that we could not help He thought we should gi\C
them their own bit of country, let it be as small as we liked but it must
be their own, and they would live on one meal a da)
I told Nehru that it did not seem likely tint the JVluslim League \\ ould
attend the Constituent Assembly if called now On the other hand we
could not put it off ^definitely and if he advised me that he considered it
should be called, I would issue invitations at once Nehru said that if the
Assembly were postponed now there was no con\cnient date all April
by which time everybody would ha\e lost interest in it. He therefore
recommended that invitations should be issued at once, I said that I would
ha\e them issued- We then talked about se\eral other matters including
various diplomatic appointments He said that he had Asaf All in mind for
the Embassy at Washington ([ refrained from comment)
Nehru was quiet and quite friendly throughout and remained at the
shallow end of the pool
Ip-20 NOVEMBER I946
379
hovcmbcr 29
A \ cry busy harassing day \\ uhout a moment's let up I dealt with the
usual accumulation of business* which is normal after a tour, had a number
of interviews, a cabinet meeting and quite a house-party for dinner
Khizar, the Punjab Premier, was my first visitor If all Indian politicians
w ere as sensible and attractive as he is t life would be much easier He did
not talk much about all-India politics, said I knew his views, that the
British ought not to leave, m fact he did not see how they could leave, that
Pakistan was nonsense and any idea about exchange of populations mad-
ness > that he did not sec how the Constituent Assembly w ould work, but
that if I felt I should call it that was my business, that Jinnahs pohcy was all
wrong, and that the Punjab vtould get on perfectly well by Jtself jf only
it was left alone He had only two matters he really w anted to speak about
that entry to the Indian War Academy should not simply be by competi-
tion, as it would then be filled by babus, and that I should not have taken
away hi% Bnnsh Chief Justice, as the standard was bound to deteriorate
I told hun he must speak to the C-m-C about the Academy, he said he
was going to take him to task most severely, also the Defence Member
who was bound to be sympathetic since Sikhs were so stupid that they
would never get in by competition Khizar w as in very good form. He
said the Punjab would be prepared to keep all their British officials on the
same terms as the present S of S Services
Khizar was followed by a Muslim deputation which had visited Bihar
Nazimuddin, Firoz Khan Noon and the Nawab of Mamdot The last-
named remained silent throughout and F K.N was comparatively sub-
dued and said little, Nazimuddin was the spokesman and carried a good
deal of conviction He estimated the refugees as 70 ooo-So 000 in towns
and camps and as many more sail in the villages but unable to move
without protection and short of food They alleged that Hindus, with the
complicity of government were destroying bodies and evidence They
emphasised the brutalities and atrocities committed They spoke of the
size of the problem the need for warm clothing and proper rations, the
urgency of rescuing Muslims from the villages where they were marooned,
the rescue of women who had been abducted, the harvesting of crops, the
question of resettlement All this was the responsibility of H,M G and
myself who were still charged with the protection of Minorities, the Bihar
Ministry would do nothing There should be a judicial enquiry, they
accused particularly the Finance Minister of the Government and the
Deputy Commissioner, Patna They said Nehru had done his best but had
been mobbed at one of his later interviews
3 8i THE LAST CHANCE OF UNITY
tt onU said them Ins const hed i icu s after discussion u tth JotLnu u horn he
haiaslcd to fly dotut to Delhi from Lahore
It is clear that I cannot bring the parties together The original clcav age
was deep enough, but the failure of the Minion, m winch t ucaUy
acquiesced to meet the Congress challenge last June and the subsequent
lack of firmness and honesty on the part of 1J M G has made the League
what one can only describe as mulish and bloody-minded
I spent the afternoon drafting a telegram to II M G and putting the
position to them, and decided to get Evan Jenkins down for an hour or
two tomorrow and put the position to him
NotunhtT24 (Sunday)
While I was continuing my draft toHMG.a telegram came from S ofS
proposing that 1 should go home with two representatives of the Congress
and two of die Muslim League for a discussion at home
Evan Jenkins arrived about mid^dav and left again soon after 30pm.
He did not think a statement by H M G tliat would satisfy the League
would be of any use now. as Congress w ould not accept it He uas doubt-
ful of the value of a visit home but thought it worth trying He said
Khizar s impressions of lus visit to Delhi were that die two communities
were determined to fight it out and that Congress feel that they have
H M G in their pocket I showed him the Breakdown plan and he agreed
with it He agreed vv ith me that a Sikh should be added to the party inv ited
home He thought that he could hold the Punjab tf his Ministers did not
interfere too much. I completed the telegram to EM G and wc talked a
bit about other Punjab matters shortage of wheat imuiticicnt cloth and
sugar the services Khizar s wish for more Bntish troops
So begins yet another effort I am doubtful whether Congress will accept
the invitation to U K. They w ill certamly be angry with mc and attnbutc
it to my machinations m favour of die League
During an interview before dinner my visitor said very slowly and
oWy while I was discussing some point I am not surest I should
mention dm matte at the moment Sir andlamsurc vouvvillforgrveme
it I interrupt at an ^appropriate moment, but there has been a mouse
running about your table for the last five minutes ■
November 25
A comparatively quiet day but plenty of g rcen boxes as usual and one or
tW ° m0rC 0f Nchru s I"™ 1 "** «d aggressive letters A cabinet meetmg
2J-27 KOVEMDUR 194^ 383
m the evening on Telecommunications which wait all nght Nishtar
knew his bncf and was sensible Thai there looked like bang a communal
row over Ian Scott's report on Bihar winch 1 had circulated, so I cut short
the mcctinc before it could develop
Mrs Sarojim Naidu dined, she is always good value (One of her wise-
J - * * 1 * man knew how much
us to keep him m poverty ')
T™« of In^ia li« mibhshcd what I naturally
accusations
November 26 c
ftM G 's answer to my telegram came in the fonn of an umofloa _ for
two representatives of Congress, nvo of Muslim Leagu e and ^one Sikh o
fly home at once for Ascussions m Won I got hold of Nehru at about
J 30 a he was as I expected not at all cmhusiastic but sa,d he : would
consult his colleagues and let me know m the cvemng L>aquat thought ,
a very good .dea but had of course to consult jumah and flew offto Karachi
to do so Uter on m the afternoon I saw Baldev, who was quae prepared
eras'
frankly
Earlier on 1 had seen ratci wuu -~~~ 7 -
control of the Press means the suppress^ of Dawn prohibition of pm ate
armies, the dispersal of the Muslim Guards, and rehabilitation that of E
Bengal only, although of course he professes complete
In the evening came the Congress reply to H.MG s invitation, a
refusal as I had expected
November 27
Cabinet Meeting m the morning went off quite amicably, although there
were one or two contentious subjects Nehru s proposal - -<1 K_ P
Menon' to Moscow and Krishna Mencn to other European "piuk w,
naturally likely to be unpalatable to the Muslims, smce Knshna Menon «
i ._ J « J^Mndist Nehru was conciliatory and although
.zanfar
rMisMarandtrnazanianwicuuu." — j-- — - , - , . .
proposal to negotiate an agreement for Australian wheat caused lade
trouble If only the leaders were as reasonable outside Cab.net as inside «
After lunch I saw Corfield. He showed me a ^letter from Bhopal in
which for the third time in the last few months he wuhed to resign the
Chancellorship, abdicate, and 'fight to the death for the Mushm cause
■ K P S Men™. LC.S Agcat-Gmcnl for India and U t „ Amba*a^r » Chma, W3-*.
Ambassador to U S S.R 19S2-61
384 TIIE tAST CHANCE OF UNITY
He wrote very bitterly about the abandonment by H.M G of both the
Princes and the Muslims The trouble about Bhopal is that he tries to
stand in with ever) one at once— his brother Princes, Congress, League,
H.M G , myself is not really straight with an) one and is trusted by no one
I spoke to Corfield about the Breakdown Plan and gave him an outline
He agreed that it was the only course
Baldev Singh followed the Congress lead of refusing H.M G *s invita-
tion and took the opportunity to condemn the Muslim League and all its
works
In the evening a large parry of the members of two conferences
Railway Board and Irrigation Branch, about 2 jo people, mostly Indians
Chips a little horrified, not at all his sort of party, no lovely Maharanis or
high-born gentlemen Asa f Ah took occasion to whisper his 'willingness'
to be nominated as Ambassador to Washington
Liaquat came back from Karachi and saw me in the evening and said
that he and Jinnah would come to London I agreed to start on Saturday
instead of on Friday
November 2$
As I rather expected £LM G came back with a personal appeal by the
P M, to Nehru. Congress considered it all day and in the evening N sent
a letter recounting all the objections but saying that he would go if the
P M made a special point of it. Baldev will I expect come too So we shall
have a parry in London after all though I think H.M G will be dis-
illusioned if they think they will get any solution or induce the Muslim
League to come into the Constituent Assembly But Cnpps may contrive
to put jinnah m the wrong
The Colvxlles arrived just before lunch-
In the afternoon little Menon poured out to me what practically
amounted to a brief for Congress I think George has trusted too much to
Menon for advice he is a good little man and honest but he is really
bound in the end to turn to the Congress side and I think he has for some
tune past been too much the mouthpiece of Vallabhai Patel
November 29
I wanted a quiet day to get my things packed and hand over I didn't get
it. I spent a good deal of the morning with Colvule explaining the
Breakdown Plan to him. He was distressed by it but like everyone else
can produce no alternative I also had to deal with the S of S latest reply
27 NOVEMBER— I DECEMBER I946
385
to my letter on the Breakdown Plan of October 23 It was, as usual, a
deplorable bit of woolly and wisliful flunking, but did admit at last the
necessity for a plan of some kind, and I hurriedly drafted a letter to the
Om-C to tell htm to get on with planning
Nehru and Baldev have dcaded to comc t rather unwillingly and
ungraciously. Nehru sent me three letters on other subjects, Liaquat also
wrote me two or three, Patcl at least one, and what with answering them
and an unending stream of green boxes I never had a moment's peace
After dinner, just as I was going to finish packing and tidying, George
came m with the news that Jumah had now run out' What an impossible
set of people they are 1 1 sent Ian Scott off to sec Liaquat, and by midnight
he returned to say that we had got this far, that Liaquat had agreed to
come with us to Karachi tomorrow to see Jinn ah and try to persuade him
to come I rather expected that the news of J 's decision would mean that
Nehru and Baldev would run out, but apparently they still mean to come
I got to bed about 1 o a itl, with the comment of Shakespeare's Bastard,
Falconbndge, running m my head *Mad world f mad Kings, mad
composition 1
November $0
Left Delhi in a York at 9 o am Omens rather more favourable this
morning Liaquat came, obviously dressed for Europe, Jinnali has had
a telegram from Attlee which should satisfy him, though it may well have
the opposite effect on Nehru, and jmnah has made no public announce*
meat about a refusal to go
Got to Karachi about 12 30 p m and found a good guard of Honour of
my Regiment. Governor reported all quiet in Sind After lunch Jinnah
came to see me and announced that he and Liaquat would go His refusal
seems really to have been what Her Ex would call *a bit of pretty Fanny/
perhaps he thought that as Nehru had had a personal appeal from the
PM t it behoved his dignity to have one too
I saw the 2nd Bn, 1 on parade in the afternoon, quite a good-looking lot
of officers and men, but at least 50% English, a very different type from
the short, stocky men we used to have
December 1
We left Karachi at 7 0 a m, Nehru, Jinnah, Baldev and several Secretaries
Jinnah rather late A crowd, organised by the League, I suppose, was
gathered outside to shout * Pakistan Zindabad*
1 Black Watch,
386 THE LAST CHANCE OF UNITY
Twelve hours flying to Cairo, with one hour at Basra These York
Madhm.es axe terribly noisy
December 2
Left Cairo 4 30 a m., Jiniiah late again Arrived Malta about 9 30 a m,
local time, on three engines My usual experience of these breakdowns
confirmed, 1 e RAF (or in this case BOAC) said repairs would be
effected m 40 minutes, and admitted an hour or two later that the plane
would not go at all Another plane was summoned We left Malta about
10am on December 3 and arrived London 90am
Ai 11 00 a m on 3 December Wavellsaw thePM, the Secretary of State,
and A V Alexander and handed over to them the follow tug note in when
he analysed the situation and suggested various possible courses of action
Skwl-ierm Issue
1 The Cabinet Mission Plan was as good as could have been framed m
the circumstances and could have been put through with firmness, but
neither the Mission nor HMG adhered to their original intentions with
sufficient directness of purpose In particular the Mission gave Jinnah
pledges on May 16, which they have not honoured
Congress has been reasonably honest in that they never meant to
carry out the plan as the Mission intended, unless they were forced to,
and said so
League also have been reasonably honest and would have attempted to
carry out Mission's Plan had HMG stuck to it firmly
2 Present situation is that Congress feel that H M G dare not break with
them unless they do something quite outrageous Their aim is power and
to get nd of British influence as soon as possible, after which they think
*hcy caxv <JsaX ^f\tK bcyd\ Muslims 3tvd Ptintts, liie foimtT by tnbery,
blackmail, propaganda, and if necessary force the latter by snrring up
their people against them, as well as the other methods above
They will continue a gradual process of sapping and infiltration against
the British, the Muslims, and the Princes by van o us insidious methods for
as, long and so far as they are allowed, until they consider themselves strong
enough to take more direct measures, such as an open revolt against
British rule
Congress are not really interested in the Constituent Assembly as
conceived by the Mission, except as a means of getting nd of the British,
and gaming more prestige and power for themselves Though the sensible
and moderate ones realise that they cannot get a united India without
Muslim goodwill, or at least acquiescence, the Congress will not seriously
1-2 DECEMBER 1946
3*7
negotiate with the Muslim League so long as they feel they can get what
they want by pressure onHMG
3 The Muslims arc thoroughly alarmed and many of the leaders arc
getting desperate They trusted to the British to give them a fair deal and
feel that owing to the weakness and duplicity of H M G they arc not
getting it
They will not come into the Constituent Assembly unless they get
a very definite pledge that it will be worked in the way they were
promised and that H M G will not recognise the results otherwise
4 The S ikhs have been ncgotiann g with b oth Congress and the League,
but as the result of recent events have come down on the side of Congress,
because they feel that Congress arc the stronger and that H M G dare
not oppose them
5 There are stresses inside Congress, League and the Sikhs
Congress has a powerful Left Wing led by such as Jai Prakash Narain
and Mrs Asaf All, with no constructive programme but capable of
stirnng up the worst elements of the country and doing a great deal of
destruction and mischief They are already preaching that a revolt against
the British will be necessary The Right Wing, which used the Left Wing
to create unrest and discredit the old Govern men r, cannot now control it
Nehru is the unstable hnk between Right and Left
Gandht feds that his life work of driving the British from India is
almost accomplished, and he knows that his political weapon of non-
violence* — it was always really a weapon more than a gospel — is out of
date It was a weapon for the use of the weak against the strong and now
that the strong have become weak, more direct weapons will be used,
which he cannot control
Gandhi will remain in the background, will continue to deplore
violence, bur wall do nothing ro check it, since he knows he cannot
6 The Muslim League leaders raised the cries of Pakistan and Islam in
danger originally to enhance their prestige and power and thus their
bargaining values as a political party They have now so inflamed their
ignorant and impressionable followers with the idea of Pakistan as a new
Prophet's Paradise on earth and as their only means of protection against
Hindu domination, that it will be very difficult to satisfy them with
anything else I think Jinnah is honest in saying that he had great difficulty
in putting across the Mission Plan with his party, though he was probably
wise enough to recognise it as a reasonable compromise worth trying at
least for a period
Hence his anger when he found that the Mission had double-crossed
him, as he considered He probably meant to use his Council meeting at
3^8 The LAST CHANCE OF UNITY
Bombay as a lever to force H.M G to announce their adherence to the
promises on which he had accepted the scheme, and found his hand
forced by his extremists mto entire repudiation
7 The internal stresses of the Sikhs arc of a different land, a struggle
for power between various sections But the Sikhs as a whole will back
tJfw parry which they feel to be the strongest parry and can give them mosL
This used to be the British, they now behe\c it to be the Congress
8 On the short-term issue, i c persuading the Muslim League to enter
the Constituent Assembly, I am confident that H M G can only succeed
bv Statins oniff* nnMilv in J „ Jt . l i i l 1 . „
firmly
ithin
~ " «^ ul ij woup ana provincial Constitutions witmn tne
Sections, and that they will not recognise a Constitution arrived at other-
wise I am sure that the League will come in on no other terms, and that
no rurther arguments, formulas, legal sophistries or pleadings will have
any effect r r s>
The Congress of course would be furious, hut I am not sure that they
are ready >et for an open breach with HMG Such a breach is howler
a possibility, and we can only face it if we have a definite pohcy and a
Breakdown Plan This leads us to the long-term issue
Part n
Tke Long-Term Plan
9 Unless dunng the present discussions we can get back to acceptance
2 T? n§tCSS , L^SPc of original plan of the Mission as intended by
f VTT a w n0t 35 J nt£nded h y Congress, H MG must accept the
tact that the Mission Plan is dead They must also accept the fact that we
nave only a very limited period and a very limited power to substitute
tresn arrangements
Mi^Llplan^ 11 ^ 1116 COUrSCS ° pen t0 H M G » ° n k JurC ° f ^
^n rt 7^ rCHMtabLsl l OWa auth °nty and rule India for a further
penod I This course they have already ruled out as politically impossible
sort nf P?r^ mpt tD J ne 8°^ te a settlement This could only be some
It T' * 0uld at ° nce bnn S ^ ™° connect with Congress.
forTome «S °™ rcmamm S in » ** «P the Partition, it might be
I do not think that this is a practicable pohcy
it Ls whTn 'I ^ Ma J° n ^ ?^ to ^quiesce in all
£ne to £1 nA g ^ ^ch will remain to us for a little
Se W SCCUrC ' £anuu We for ^ Mmonaes, the States
2-J DECEMBER I$4<5
3S9
I do not think this an honourable or a wise policy, it will end British
rule in India in discredit and eventually ra an ignominious scuttle or
dismissal by Congress There is no statesmanship or generosity m Congress
D To announce that, having failed to bring about a settlement, we
propose to withdraw from India in our own method and m our own tunc,
and with due regard to our own interests, and that wc will regard any
attempt to interfere with our programme as an act of war winch we will
meet with all the resources at our command But we should of course do
our best to secure agreement while we remained, and in any event to hand
over to established authorities, c g Provincial Governments
This is in effect the Breakdown Plan, but it is intended for use not
merely when widespread disorder has broken out, but for use in the event
of a political breakdown and before disorder has broken out The existence
of this plan will also enable us to take a firm line with Congress, since we
have a reasonable alternative on which to fall back, and may thus enable
us to avert a political breakdown
II I recognise HMG's political difficulties but Parliament must soon
be informed of the realities of the Indian situation I do not consider it is
fair to leave Parliament, on whom the ultimate responsibility rests, to
believe that the present situation can continue indefinitely nor to His
Majesty's servants in India to allow matters to drift on without a definite
policy
12 I therefore recommend HMG to make the fullest use of the present
discussions to try and restore the Mission plan to its original basts as
intended by the Mission If it fails in this^ it must choose one of the courses
outlined in para 10 above But it must be quite definite in its choice
Neither I nor the Governors nor any responsible officials can act with any
confidence or decision unless we know, quite clearly, what policy HMG
proposes to follow
It will also, I feel, be impossible to carry out the present negotiations
with any hope of success, unless HMG have made up their mind whether
or not they are prepared to stand up to the Congress
December 5
Since arrival in London I have hardly had one moment to make an entry
It has been one continued rush of conferences or official engagements
Immediately after a homed Lath and breakfast went to ra, Downing
Street, and had conference with PM,S of S , Alexander
I handed over to them the note I had already written There was a
general discussion on it.
390 1AST CHANCE OF UNITY
The P M then went into the difficulty of putting the Breakdown Plan
into operation, since legislation in Parliament would be necessary before
the announcement There was some discussion on the Breakdown Plan t
which showed that the Ministers were at least beginning to realise the
necessity of having such a plan
Later I went to sec the King, who seemed in good form and well posted
on the Indian problem. The PM was there for the first ten minutes of my
audience and I then had about 20 minutes with the King alone. He was
very complimentary about my letters to him and said they gave him a
better idea of affairs in India than anything else
Ended with an official dinner to Jinnah and Liaquat at Lancaster House
Alexander, Samuel, R.A B Butler, Addison, Listowcl, Eden and some
Secretaries I found Addison' sensible about the Indian problem and
inclined to accept my views on what should be done. R A B Butler said
the Opposition had been very forbearing in not pressing Gov eminent on
thelndjan question, but that Winston was anxious to make it a party issue
On the 4 th I had conferences all morning and most of the afternoon At
930 a m there was a meeting with the P M and the members of the
Cabinet Mission at which the P M reported the result of his talks with
Nehru and Baldev Singh, and the Secretary of State Ins with Jinnah on the
previous day Both had found them quite obdurate and had made no
progress The line they took mlly bore out my note to the P M and
Ministers of which I gave a copy to Cnpps t who had not been present on
the previous day He read it, and, rather to my surprise, sa,d that he agreed
with the general analysis in it
A discussion of nearly two hours with Nehru did not get us much
further Nehru charged the Muslim League with seeking to obtain its ends
by violence, and went on to complain that the League was never prepared
to cooperate in the Interim Government (which of course means; to him,
submission to the Congress point of view) A remark by myself on the
constitutional position led to one of his sudden outbursts, he said that he
would put everything to the vote in Cabinet and make my position
t ^ mpkmC<1 that thc W™* ^ the Muslim L£gue to
join the Interim Government had been made over his head.
tio^jT T l ° n t0 ° f the fc™* °f Provincial constitu-
tions within Scrfinnt m^i — 1 * . . .
dmit
f^rrtt f-u n , u ingress a omit mat iections could
torm thc Provincial consututiom thac was a long duel between him and
mLwcVLt^ri9 4 f 3 !^ eW0Ugh (Dr AddjitHl ) Secrctvy of State for Com.
5 DECEMBER I<M<5
Cnpps on the legal niceties in the interpretation of the May 16 Statement,
it got us nowhere At one time Nehru made the declaration about Con-
gress that \\e arc a revolutionary party
The only constructive part of this long discussion came 111 a suggestion
by the Secretary of State towards the end that the question of procedure
inside the Sections should be raised at the first meeting of the Constituent
Assembly and referred to the Federal Court, Nehru agreed that this might
be possible
When we saw Jmnah and Liaquat, Juinah was asked whether the League
would come into the Constituent Assembly, if on a reference to the
Federal Court f the decision was favourable to the League or if Congress
were brought to accept the Mission's and the League s interpretation of the
Statement of May 16 J inn ah would not commit himself except that he
would be prepared to call fas Council and explain the position to them.
He argued that there was no chance of agreement between the two parties
and that whatever happened Congress m the Constituent Assembly
would succeed m whittling down the Cabinet scheme, that H M G
would eventually be raced with a fait accompli and would not have the
courage to act against it
Ljaqiwt asked pertinently w hat HMG vtould do tEthe decision of the
Federal Court were unfavourable and pointed out what an awkward
position they would be in Both Cnpps and the Secretary of State were
evasive on this point Liaquat also put very plainly the real point from the
Muslim League point of view that LLM G have not had the courage to
stand up to Congress over the interpretation of their own scheme so what
guarantee had the League that HMG would reject an unsatisfactory
Constitution The attempts by Cnpps to deal with this were rather dis-
ingenuous
It became quite obvious that we were going to make no progress in
reconciling Congress and League All the efforts of P M S of S and
Cnpps to find formulas tor agreement or to persuade the leaden that their
differences could be reconciled were completely fruitless and they had to
admit entire failure Two lines of a poem of Browning s came into my
head as appropriate
Now enough of your chicane of prudent pauses
Sage provisos sub intents and saving clauses
I remembered too that the poem begins ominously
Let them fight it out, fnends tilings have gone too far
392 THE LAST CHANCE OF UNITY
Another official dinner at Lancaster House, for Nehru and Baidev,
much the same party
Another long day to-day (5th) We began with a meeting 9 0 to no
a m, at JO Downing Street Cnpps reported that he had sat up till 1 o a.m
with Nehru, a proceeding which I mistrust N apparently proposed a
reference by C A to Federal Court on main points at issue with League
Decision should be reached early January and meeting of Sections should
be deferred till then I emphasised importance of terms of reference if this
were done Question of acceptance by £LM G if against their view was
then raised After the discussion had proceeded some while, I had to put
in a reminder of the realities of the situation and the need for a Breakdown
Plan Then for the last hour or so we had a really valuable discussion on the
Breakdown Plan P M emphasised the Parliamentary difficulties and
world opinion, and Alexander was anxious about the effect on the Muslim
w orld if we withdrew from India The possibility of a reference toUNO
was raised. I stuck to my points, and in the end no one had really shaken
my Plan and P M seemed prepared to accept it m principle. Cnpps as
usual had some simple sounding modification which I suspect of being
a disguised attempt to alter it to his way of thinking But on the whole I
felt I had got H.M G down to face realities at last.
I went to lunch at Buckingham Palace
The next item was a Conference at 10 Downing Street to discuss a
Statement to be issued on the results of the visit of Indian leaders, the
principal item in which was the matter of reference to the Federal Court
of the clauses under dispute between Congress and League It was a
colourless statement, and I was by this time rather too discouraged to take
much interest. There was some general discussion on the Breakdown Plan
and Alexander came out strongly for taking a firm line
December 6
The final day of these Conferences and a very heavy one. "We began at
Downing Street at 10 1 5 a m, on the draft statement Encouraged by the
PM'j attitude I questioned the whole tone of it as being much too timid
and too much on the Congress side In the discussion which followed we
lined up in the old way — Cnpps and S of S for complete acceptance of
the Congress \ tew and fear of offending them, Alexander and self for
justice to the Muslims The P M rather came out on our side, and the
statement was put back for re^drafhng
At n 15 the Mission met jinn ah and Liaquat, and we talked for an hour,
the last I s minutes being only because the S of S would go on talking
$-6 DECEMBER I946
393
when there was obviously nothing more to be said The niam point was
whether the League would come into the C A t if the Congress accepted
H M G *s interpretation of" the disputed clauses J as usua/ woufcf not com-
mit himself He then said that there must he a body to prevent die C A
making other flagrant b readies of the Mm ion plan, and there was con-
siderable talk on whether the Federal Court was not the most obvious and
appropriate body Jinnah showed some signs of his usual tactics of possibly
making some concession at the fbial moment
I lunched with Halifax, who cross-examined me closely, speaking
obviously to the Conservative bncf; on recent happenings in hidta and
the general situation
Nehru cameat23opm M and wc went over much old ground He
spoke with the usual complete self-nghteousncss of the Congress, implied
that any recognition that H M G had the right to interpret their own
Mission's statement would be a concession to the violence and threats of
force of the League (') completely disregarding Bihar of course and
himself used his usual vague threats of outside forces beyond the control of
Congress But he seemed to raise no objection to the Federal Court acting
as arbiter to the Constituent Assembly and interpreting the Statement,
and was reasonable about the intentions of Congress at the first meeting
of the C A — places would be left for the League in the Committees, etc
The interview ended with an appeal by Alexander to prevent civil war
Then back to Downing Street, where we spent two hours mainly on
re-draftmg the Statement to be made on the outcome of the vi&it It was,
as usual a complicated process and the result a mixture of three draft:
by Cnpps Alexander and m) self It might have been worse
In this Statement of 6 December HM G said that the Cabinet Mission had
throughout held the view that decisions of Sections, in the absence of agreement
to the contrary, should be taken hy simple majority vote of representatives in
the Sections This had been accepted by the Muslim League hut not hy the
Congress
HMG had taken legal advice which confirmed that the Statement of 16
May meant what the Cabinet Mission had always said was their intention
This part of the Statement as so interpreted should therefore he accepted hy alt
parties in the Constituent Assembly
If in spite of this reaffirmation of the intention of the Cabinet Mission, the
Constituent Assembly shottU desire that this fundamental point he referred
fir tfie decision of the Federal* Court, such reference s Acuta* 6e made at a very
early date
Tttehope was expressed that if as was likely, other questions of interpretation
394
THE LAST CHANCE OF UNITY
of the Statement of 16 May arose, the Muslim League would agree to accept
the decision of the Federal Court as Congress had already agreed to do
At 6 o p iru came the final act, when Nehru, Jinnah, Liaquat and Baldcv
came m The P M spoke quite well, concisely and clearly and on the
right lines (He begins to impress me as likely to be a notable P M )
The others listened quietly but Nehru scribbled it all down At the end
Jinnah seemed quite prepared to accept the Statement, so long as it was
recognised that the League would be no party to any reference of the
disputed clauses to the Federal Court. Nehru spoke at considerable length
He said that this statement was an addition to the Statement of May 16
and created an entirely new situation, which the Congress would have to
consider very closely He elaborated the Congress position on the usual
hnes He ended on a more co-operativ e note, and said that he did not take
a dismal view of the present or future But co-operation must be real and
not an armistice m preparation for future conflict.* He complained, with
obvious reference to myself, that Congress had not had a fiee hand (1 e
been allowed complete power at once) ThePM replied briefly to N and
refuted his argument that the new Statement was an addition it was
merely the maintenance of the view HLM G had always held. He also
denied that there had been any outside pressure Baldev then said that the
Statement would worsen the position of the Sikhs and would be quite
unacceptable to them, the reaction would be serious though he w ould do
his best to persuade them to be reasonable. Liaquat endorsed Jinnah. The
P M then called on each of the Mission and myself for a few kind words 1
So ends this phase of the long-drawn-out drama of negotiations with
India, On the whole a better curtain than seemed likely at one time Bat
the next Act will probably show all the Parties going right back to their
original positions
December p
I had 40 minutes with the S of S about future procedure He agreed that
the whole policy must be settled before I went back, and that it might be
difficult to get it all done this w cek I impressed on him the necessity to
A l C .T^* Up ° f ^ Scmccs - wI »ch he seemed reluctant to
do On the Breakdown Plan he said that he did not see how the Central
Government would work, especially as regards Finance, collection of
Revenue etc I said that it was obviously impossible to say in detail what
would happen but if we got our plan settled m principle it would be then
possible to work out the method and arrangements, die Plan was intended
6-1 6 DECEMBER 1 946
395
as an alternative to chaos and avil war, a great many things might be
untidy and not work well, but if there was civil war they w ould not work
tidily cither, m fact they would not work at all
December 1 1
I worked m the I O m the morning
A meeting at 10 Downing Street lasted two hours and discussed the
Breakdown Plan in rather a desultory way Those present were PM.S of
S , Cnpps, Alexander, Addison, Ellen Wilkinson, Listowcl, Henderson
It was on the whole useful, I think, in educating some of the Cabinet.
Addison for example had no idea that the Sikhs lived in the Punjab, and
Ellen Wilkinson had no idea that wc only had some joo British officials
Addison's reaction to the Plan was typical, he was shocked at the idea of
withdrawing from India but had no idea of any alternative plan
December 12
Worked at I O m the morning Went to Peers Gallery after lunch to hear
debate on India Heard end of Cnpps* speech and Winston's, latter in
qtiitc good form but no real fireworks
Dined with Monty who was in his usual form and talked continuously,
about the situations in Burma, Palestine, and Greece, about the Army at
home, various other military topics
December 16
Did a little shopping in the morning of 14th and a little work, on two
notes for the Cabinet with reference to the Breakdown Plan, and then
motored down to the Rodneys 1 at Penshurst, giving Julian* a lift down
I found Leo already there, and sighed, though I am very fond of Leo,
because I knew he would want to talk a lot about India and I wanted to
forget about India for the week-end
On Sunday morning I went for a walk with Leo, he is very slow and
now has to pause often for breath — sad when he has been such a wonderful
walker and climber He still talks of going back to the House of Commons,
but I am sure that the Conservatives must keep any seats available for
younger men His views on India are not up to date with the pace things
have been gomg, and are still tinged with Imperialism, but he has plenty
of common sense about it all
1 Cape the Hon and Mrs Simon Rodney Mis Rodney wii a sister of Mrs Amery
* Julian Amery son of Leopold Am cry
396
THE LAST CHANCE OF UNITY
Linlithgow came to lunch with me at the Club and talked India, he ^as
going down to speak in the Lords He had apparently come to much the
same conclusion as I had, 1 e that unless \\ e were prepared to change our
policy and hold on to India for a number of years w e had to clear out at
an early date, his chief point was that w e ought to run no nsk of India
becoming a second Palestine for us on a larger scale
December ij
Meeting at 10 Downing Street 10 o am. to 12 o noon P M , India
Cabinet Committee, and Dalton We discussed Breakdown Plan and S of
S Services We got to no decisions on former but made some progress
The) were concerned more with j ustification to Parliament and with
Constitutional procedure than with more practical considerations of the
actual withdrawal
P L began by commenting on Lords* Debate, mentioning especially
Linlithgow's speech. My plan was then attacked on the basts of handing
over power to Provinces without guarantees for Minorities, etc After
about \\ hours rather desultory discussion, nothing was decided about
date or form of announcement, but the plan of withdrawal by two stages
beginning with South India seemed to be more or less accepted Alexander
intervened with a pessimistic forecast but had no alternative to propose
Addison kept harping on Parliamentary difficulties
We then turned to the question of the Services with reference to Patel s
note It was at least decided that H M.G would stick to the principle of
compensation, and that the U S of S , Henderson ' should go to India to
discuss the question
Dtcanbtr lS
Did a certain amount of work ac the I O and saw a few friends Ko
further meeting until tomorrow, I wish they uould get on faster
I gave Alan Moorchcad* lunch and put him nght on a passage in his
book on Monty v. hich had aroused controversy, he had represented me as
opposing the expedition to Greece and Eden as having deceived me as to
the possibilities of Turkey coming into the v.ar I told him neither vsas
correct.
i94i^ rthUrHCndCTWn MP Piflumo,tir V UnJ «^««y «f Swe for Indued Bunni.
• Aim M Moorchwd, Aurtrdun joum^t War Conopocknt, wntcr
1 6-20 DECEMBER I946
397
Dccemhcr jo
Work at I O in tnonvmg, preparing bncf tor this cv cning's meeting
Saw the S of S after lunch, and impressed on him the necessity for me
to get a decision and definite policy to-day or tomorrow, and emphasised
the amount of time 1 had been kept hanging about. He spoke of their other
cares, especially Burma, about which he is very worried
I then went over to sec Alexander and spoke to him on the lines that
I must get a decision, that I realised his dislike of the plan, but that if no
one had a better plan to propose I thought they should support it, He was
pleasant and sensible as usual, but is really imperialistic m his outlook and
hates the whole idea of handing over India
The meeting at Downing Street which followed, 50 to 715pm, was
disastrous There v, ere the PM, Cnpps, Alexander, S of S , Ellen
Wilkinson, Dal ton and Listowcl Two hours desultory discussion resulted
in no progress at all f with the P M now definitely hostile to the Break-
down Plan They are all frightened of anything which imolvcs Parlia-
mentary legislation, and therefore tned to make out that the Plan was
either unnecessary or misguided It was all very disheartening, once again
they have run out. Dal ton's main contribution was an attack on S of S
and myself for allowing women and children to continue coming to India,
but we repulsed this It was decided to meet again at 9 15 a m tomorrow
and that I should first see the P M at 9 o a m.
December 20
I saw the P M at 9 o a m and told him that I thought I had been very
discourteously treated It was a fortnight since the discussions with the
Indian leaders and in that time there had been only three conferences held
To enable Nehru to get back for the Constituent Assembly, three or four
meetings a day had been held for three days, but the Viceroy was kept
hanging about without any consideration for his convenience P Af made
a rather lame excuse I then said I could not go back without some definite
policy P M said he thought he could accept my Breakdown Plan in
principle, but ddated on the difficulties of handing over the Centre
especially the I A
At 9 30 a m the India Committee assembled less Cnpps who had gone
off to meet his wire P M stated that he thought he could accept my plan
m principle if it was put in a duSerent form, not requiring Parliamentary
legislation, but stressed the difficulties about the Centre and the I A Things
seemed to be going reasonably well, when the S of S raised the point that
398 THE LAST CHANCE OF UNITY
legislation \\ ould be required about the Services Tins led to an hour s
indeterminate talk at which all the objections against the Plan were raised
again and always came back to the rock of Parliamentary legislation, the
idea of which always seems to send them into a panic At 10 45 a m. the
P M left to make a. Statement on Burma ui the House, with nothing what-
ever settled We then had a good deal of talk about another meeting
Everyone seemed to be breaking away for Xmas, but I said quite firmly
that I must see the P M again anyway and that we must get something
decided It was eventually agreed that we should try to get another meet-
ing for this afternoon with the Lord Chancellor to give an opinion on legal
questions
At 3 30 p m. we had another two hours with the Cabinet Coinnuttee,
plus Lord Chancellor 1 and Dalton Lord Chancellor gave an emphatic view
that nothing could be done without legislation, but later agteed that it
would be possible to proceed by a resolution, with legislation later, and
that even if the House of Lords rejected the Resolution we ctfuld still
proceed xW Co?smiorfr passed it This seemed to samty everybody s
difficulties, and we ended with a draft Resolution produced by Cnpps,
which I was assured would give me what I wanted, and \\ ould apparently
satisfy Parliament It was agreed t o submit this to the Cabinet after Xmas
I asked the P M whe&er he wished me to remain for this He said he
would rather I returned to India I then asked for a reply to a letter I wrote
him after the first meeting this morning He said the decision of the
meeting just held covered it, but I pressed for a reply which he promised.
1 then said good-b>e, he was not at all gracious, I am not sure that he has
it m him to be so, or he docsn t like me, probably the latter
I wonder whether I am wise to go back I think I have got most of what
I wanted, if they do not reverse their decisions when I am gone I do not
trust Cnpps But there is a lot to do at the odier end, and I want to get
back to Q and the family
I was impressed by the Lord Chancellor, he seemed knowledgeable,
sensible and decided The India Committee as 3 whole do not greatly
impress me S of S carries no weight, Henderson is futile so is Listowcl,
\ thmk, Ellen Wilkinson docs not really understand it all, and Alexander
docs not hkc it Cnpps is of course the directing brain, and I repeat that
I do not trust Cnpps
Tfie PJlf *j ungracious manner is explained by the fact that two days ear Iter
he had asked Lord Mountbattai to tale over as Viceroy He must, therefore,
hai e felt some embarrassment m tailing to IVai elt and been guiltily conscious
1 Viscount Jowett
20-24 December 1946 390
o/d tack of candour ton ards him The letter to u htch Wavdl asledfor a reply
a as as follows
My dear Prime Minister,
If I am to return to India on Sunday to undertake the very serious
responsibilities there, with no settled policy after nearly three weeks at
nomd I feci I should have your personal assurance on certain points, 1 c
(a) ThatHJMG docs recognise that wc must make arrangements with
a view to the transfer of power in India not later than March 31, 1948
(b) That you accept in principle my general plan of withdrawal by
stages, subject to farther examination in the next few weeks, here and in
India
(c) That any legislation found necessary will be placed before Parha*
ment at the beginning of next Session, and that I should be summoned
home, if necessary, to discuss the final plan to be submitted
(d) That you agree to the need for making a very early announcement
about the winding up of the Secretary of State's Services
I propose to leave my Private Secretary at home for the present to
represent my point of view m the discussions here
Yours sincerely,
Waveil
December 24
Got back to Delhi yesterday evetung in time for dinner after a very good
journey in the PM s plane
On Saturday morning 21st, I cleared up at the office, then lunched with
A* V Alexander at the R.A.C and went with him to see Che/sea play
football, he is a director He is an enthusiastic football fan, shouting 'foul/
*piay the game/ 'don't mess about,* etc as loudly as any one
I had a message that Bevm would like to sec me at Alexander's Flat at
the Admiralty I had about i£ hours there. Bevm hke everyone else hates
the idea of our leaving India, but like everyone else has no alternative to
suggest. He was pessimistic about our position generally, said that every-
one was kicking us around, in Palestine, Egypt, Sudan, India and that our
international prestige was very low He said that the USA were very
worried about India I pointed out how they had encouraged Congress
and pilioned us as imperialists, and could hardly expect us to face another
Palestine in India because it suited their commercial interests that we
should remain I told Bevm the realities of the Indian situation or rather
Alexander did and I confirmed He seemed to accept the picture Both he
and Alexander are in reality imperialists and dislike any idea of leaving
India I then finished packing and got to bed about 12 45 a m.
13160 £> <J
^OO THE LAST CUANCE OF UNITY
I had decided to lca\c George Afeell behind to watch my interests with
the Cabinet.
I Had a long talk to Colvillc this jnoniing about the Plan Like everyone
else he hates the idea of our leaving India, but agam like ever) one else can
see tio alternative. He suggested that the date should be put back to Jan I,
1949, or later, if the Indian parties w anted it, and says that he thinks there
is a growing sense of responsibility m Congress CoKdlc is sensible and
pleasant, and has obviously got on v ell with the Indians
Spent rest of day clearing up and sorting out and picking up the general
thread, as usual after an absence
December 2/
After a. quiet Boxing Day I got into political harness again with two
interviews with Ministers and one with the G G S
The C G S produced an appreciation of the Breakdown Plan from the
point of view of military administration It *l UItc useless since it
advocated withdrawing from the north first arid took no account of
political situation Claude Auchinleck is not really very helpful over this
sort of planning, and 1 feel I shall have to do most of it myself
Bhabha gave me the impression of being fed up with politics His
business friends in Bombay had obviously given him a roasting, and he
talked of their feeling of insecurity and the lack of stability in the Govern-'
ment He asked me w hether I thought the present Government efficient
I said that six months ago I could have told him pretty well how all
Departments of Government ia ere working since I saw Secretaries as well
as Ministers, but that now, since I saw only Ministers and they either did
not know what was going on m their Departments, or did not confide in
me, I could not say so readily But that since Ministers spent most of their
time on politics rather than administration and let political considerations
override those of administrative efficiency I should be much surprised if
administration had not much deteriorated. He said that he agreed. He 15
certainly out of place and not big enough for his job, and 1 clunk he would
like to get back to business
Chundngar talked about cotton business interests had obviously got
hold of him, and he was proposing the export of more cotton and the
raising of prices He then went on 10 propose Nazimuddm as High Com-
missioner m London — this is obviously a League riposte to the appoint-
ment b£ Ksai Jili to'SWasxangion He aiso proposed to reverse a decision
of Nehru that the In than delegation to the International Trade Conference
should not attend the preliminary meeting of the British Empire delegates
24"3I DECEMBER I946
401
He said that Jinnah was waiting for the decision of the Congress A I C C
on January 5 before deciding whether to call his Council and recommend
attendance at the Constituent Assembly
Dtccmbcr 39
My only official visitor was Nishtar, who had recently returned from the
N W F P He tried to make out that the recent raid of tribesmen on the
Hazara frontier should be excused and not punished, or only very lightly,
on the grounds apparently that the victims were only Hindus, that the
news of the Bihar massacres had excited the tribes and that 'boys will be
boys* I merely said that the Tribes must be kept in order and that I
approved the measures being taken
Francis Wylie arrived in the evening and I put to him an outline of the
Breakdown Plan and the recent discussions m London He obviously did
not like it, and said that the U P would not really run without our help,
but could see no good alternative He said he would think it over and give
me his views tomorrow
December 31 , 1946
Wylie did not produce any new ideas on the Breakdown Plan this morn-
ing He agreed that we must have a plan, that we must set a limit to our
remaining m India, and that March 31st, 1948 was, if anything rather
beyond the date at which our control could have any effect though he
thought that our influence might still be valuable His chief concern was
with the technique of the announcement, would it not be possible to
inform Nehru and Jinnah well m advance, at least 48 bouts of any an-
nouncement in Parliament and try to persuade them to agree to coalition
governments in all Provinces and to some common line of action I said
that I realised the advantage of cushioning the shock of a sudden announce-
ment in Parliament by preliminary warning > the trouble was that neither
Nehru nor Jinnah was capable of committing his Party to anything even
if his own mind were made up, without consulting his colleagues, and
that inevitably meant loss of secrecy, and it would be fatal if Parliament
heard the news from India before they had been consulted He agreed He
was pessimistic about the future of India, said that the Congress leaders
were quite incapable of running the country, and knew that they were
not really equal to the job, and that there was a complete lack of harmony
and discipline in the Congress FLgh Command, Patel with Birla's backing
was trying to break Nehru, and that they were all frightened of the left
wing
THE LAST CHANCE OP UNITY
Baldev Singh did not turn up, he had apparently simply forgotten his
appointment, an increasingly bad habit with my present Ministers
So ends 1946, the most gruelling year I have ever had, and I think in
some ways the most unhappy
I ha\e been at full strain pretty *ftell all the year, preparation for the
Cabinet Mission,"the shock of Simon's death, the three months of the
Mission, the threat of famine in Southern India and the struggle to avert
it, the efforts to bring the parties together after the Mission, and the dis-
couraging experience of the complete lack of any statesmanship, toleration
or generosity amongst the Indian leaders, the riots and massacres m
Calcutta, Bombay, East Bengal, Bihar, U P # the. visit home and the task
of trying to put my views across to a reluctant and not very realistic lot of
Ministers They have left their mark and I feel depressed
The Cabinet Mission was really our last chance to bring about a settle-
ment in India, a temporary one which would have enabled us to leave
India with peace and dignity I have commented on its proceedings in
a previous portion of this journal I think it might have succeeded, had its
attitude been Jess apologetic, and had Cnpps and P-L not been so com-
pletely in the Congress camp and had remained more neutral
The result has been that I have had to deal for the rest of the year with
an arrogant Congress, convinced that it had H.M G in its pocket, a sus-
picious and resentful Muslim League feeling that it had been betrayed,
and resentful Princes, who thought that H M G should keep all their old
privileges and way of life without change It has not been easy
Meanwhile the administration has declined, and the machuie in the
Centre is hardly working at all now, my ministers are too busy with
politics And while the British are still legally and morally responsible for
what happens in India we have lost nearly all power to control events ,
we are simply running on the momentum of our previous prestige The
loyalty of the Police is doubtful in some of the Provinces, they are tinged
with communahsm fortunately the Indian Army seems unaffected so tar,
but it can hardly remain so indefinitely, if communal tension continues
The British ICS is disheartened and looking over its shoulder The
delay in settling terms of compensation, date for winding up and future
prospects has had an advene eiFect I wonder whether I could have done
more to prevent this if I had been more sympathetic, t have been inclined
to feel that the ICS has been in some ways rather too highly privileged
I have now committed myself and very nearly committed H.M G to
a plan of announcing a definite date of termination of our control of India
and of withdrawing on a definite plan I think I am right, and that this is
31 DECEMBER 1946 403
the only way to avoid a worse disaster But I have not that convinced
certainty of rn> wisdom that Monty has for instance and have not really
got my heart in it. It has been my fate for the last $ or 6 } ears to hav e to
conduct withdrawals and to mitigate defeats, and I have had no real
opportunity of a success This is inevitably depressing Continual hard
work, and almost continual failure No rest, no succesf
Personally too I have had rather an unhappy year While I have not had
a day's real illness, 1 have nev er reallv been 100% fit The mam trouble has
been that 1 have been sleeping badly, waking up too early, to be availed
by doubts fears and problems, official and private.
It is a great strain on a small man to do a job which is too big for him,
if he feels it too big Health and vitality suffer
I am afraid that 1947 may be even more difficult, and more of a strain
1
DISMISSAL
January t
My first interview of the } ear, with Nehru, was not very satisfactory
Congress arc obviously \ cry annoyed at H M G standing up to them at
last in the statement of December 6 They had obviously been Jed to
belies e by their contacts with Cnpps and P L, that they never \\ ould do so
The pity is that H.M G did not do so long ago as I repeatedly urged them
to Nehru was polite but his chagrin was obvious
At one poult he worked himself up into a denunciation of H.M G and
sajd that he would sooner India was divided into a hundred parts than that
they should m any way abandon their puna pies and gi\e in to the
Muslim League The whole attitude of the Muslim League, he said was
based on their knowledge that RMG would support them to the end
I merely said that the Muslim League took entirely the opposite view and
thought that RMG had given unqualified support to Congress
In the evening came a telegram from George Abcll to report that the
Cabinet had failed to come to a decision ^ estcrday and had decided to hold
another meeting in a week's time but that the reception of the proposals
was less unxa\ourab)e than expected
Ian sajs his Committee on the Breakdown Plan met for 7 hours today*
I wonder what they ha\c produced
January 2
I had an hour with Rajcndra Prasad After disposing of the business of his
Food Department — he agreed that India was free for the moment of the
famine threat, though he wanted Turkish wheat urgently— wc discussed
at tome length the political situation with special reference to RM G s
statement of December 6 the meeting of the A I C C on January 5 and
die position of As*ant 1 tried 10 tonuncc him that it was numfesdy to the
interest of Congress to accept liM G s statement and try to get the
Muslim League in and that Assam $ fears were groundless Rajcndra
Prasad ts scmiblc and moderate and would, I think be all for a reasonable
settlement but lie has not \cr) much force of character
1-4 JANUARY 1947
405
January 3
Un jour ties mouvemente (is that reasonable French') Cabinet meeting
was very communal and incline d to be stormy It lasted 10 30 a tru-i p m
We discussed Press Ordinance, which was directed mainly against Dawn,
and seemed unnecessarily drastic An ordinance to possess ourselves of
some jute required to pay for grain from the Argentine, had a compara-
tively easy passage But the matter of the Salt tax, the repeal of which
Iiaquat as Finance Member wished to defer tiR the whole Budget was
considered, led to a sudden outburst by Nehru against Liaquat and the
whole Finance Department I prevented it developing too tar, and some
of N 's colleagues tried to spread oil on the troubled waters, but it is not
a good augury for future relations, and I wonder how much longer the
present Cabinet will bold together
* January 4
Very busy day for a Saturday I began with a Cabinet meeting — 9-10 30
a itl — to try and finish yesterday's business "We dealt with the extension
of the right of premature retirement to the S of S Services at the Centre,
and with a threateifbd strike in the Government Presses I think we reached
reasonable decisions in the end, but the discussions in Cabinet tend to
proceed more and more on communal lines
After Cabinet I bad a talk with Matthai about the most level-headed
of all my Ministers He did not see much daylight ahead, agreed that the
Congress was very short-sighted in its policy, hut said that the chief
trouble was personal antagonisms — Nehru versus Liaquat, Patel versus
Nehru, Gandhi versus Jinnah* He had no good solution for the present
situation said that Great Britain and India were very closely tied by
commercial interest, but that a stable and united India was necessary for
this interest to operate, and that he did not sec how this could be evolved
Bntter f the Times Correspondent, was my next visitor, a sensible and
competent observer He took a gloomy view of the political situation,
thought that the Congress completely lacked any spirit of compromise or
generosity, and that their internal dissensions were acute He said that
there was still mistrust of our intentions, that the Services ^\crc completely
disgruntled and only anxious to go, and that to fix a definite date for our
departure v. as probably the best thing w c could do
I then saw the Khan of Kalat, a stout middle-aged old-fashioned gentle-
man, who impressed on me hi* dishke of change, Jus Io)aJry to the British,
and that Baluchistan had no real connection \\ ith India
406 DISMISSAL
Arthur Henderson and his party, to negotiate a settlement of compensa-
tion for the I C S , arrived before lunch, and i had a talk with him in the
evening I doubt whether he will get much change out of PatcL
January 6
I saw C-in-C this morning Chief subjects of discussion were the proposal
put forward that I N A con\ icts should be released, this \\ e agreed must
be resisted, the release of a large number of junior British officers from the
I A and their replacement by Indian officers which seems inevitable but
Vfill obviously v,eakcu the I A and tend to make it more susceptible to
communal influence, the visit of Aung San, and Defence Member's
proposal to bring before the Cabinet a recommendation that all British
troops should he withdrawn as soon as shipping could be made available,
Oin-C had not been consulted on this
A.T C C seem to have passed a resolution accepting fLMJG F s statement
of December 6", hut as usual with many reservations, and I rather doubt
whether it will be enough to bring in the Muslim League
The A ICC white agreeing *to advise action m accordance with the
interpretation of the British Government in regard to the procedure to be
followed itf the Sections \ could not refrain from adding the following reserve
tions
*lt must he clearly Milder stood, however, that this must not involve any
compulsion of a province and that the rights of the StWis in the Punjab should
not he jeopardized
4 In the event of any attempt at such compulsion, a provmce of part of a
province has the right to tale suclt action as may he deemed necessary m order
to give effect to the wishes of the people concerned '
January 7
1 busied myself with consideration of the Breakdown Plan most of the
forenoon, and then had 1 { hours with Liaquat Ah Khan We had a good
deal of discussion about his estimate of the Budget deficit and other
financial matters I then spoke to him about the Congress Resolution,
accepting £LM G s statement of December 6th and said I very much
hoped the Muslim League would now call their Council and come into
the Constituent Assembly He said that it was not a true acceptance by
Congress and that they did not really mean to be honest about it, and that
we ought to restore our authority and rule India for a further period of
>ears, until the parties agreed. I pointed out that \ie could not break our
4-8 JANUARY 194 7 407
pledges to give India self-government at an early date. He said that it
'would be very wrong to leave India to chaos in this way, but that if we
were going to do it we should 'leave fair chaos for both parties*, and not
remain to establish, the Hindus in power
In the afternoon I saw Rajagopalachan As usual, he knew nothing very
much about the work of hu Education Department, but was interesting
about affairs in general He admitted that it might have been better had
the Congress acceptance of the Statement of December 6 been quite
unequivocal, but stressed their difficulties with their followers, and said
that it was only Nehru's personal efforts which had secured acceptance at
all. We discussed Assam's attitude, which he agreed was unnecessarily
apprehensive and unrealistic. Finally he mentioned Burma and said
rather surprisingly that Burma's political leaders suggested gang leaders to
him rather than statesmen — this was in reference to Aung San's visit — and
that it was a pity that Burma had ever been separated from India
Later 1 saw C-m-C about two proposals by Defence Member — one
about withdrawal of British troops, the other about release of I N A
convicts Congress are apparently alarmed at Sarat Chandra Bose's
assuming leadership of the I N A under the mantle of his deceased
brother, and think they can appease him by release of the I N A convicts
(sentenced for murder or cruelty) and restoration of their pay to all of
them. The next step would be of course to demand their reinstatement in
the Army I said I should resist any demand for concession to I N A
January &
Cabinet this morning lasted 2 J hours It was quite amicable and sensible
on the whole The first item was the Report on the R I N Mutiny, which
was accepted with some discussion The next item on the Coal Report
went through peacefully, though Nehru raised the matter of thorium and
uranium in Travancore, which might, I thought, have provoked some
awkwardness Proposals for the protection of coated abrasives whatever
they are, and hurricane lanterns, a peculiarly Indian product presented
no difficulty Liaquat then embarked on a statement in reply to some
remarks by Nehru at a previous Cabinet meeting I was apprehensn c that
this might provoke a communal not, bvtaH went w cU Liaqctat's statement
was moderate and sensible, and he and Nehru almost, but not quite,
purred at one another
After lunch I had 45 minutes with Suhrwardy, the Bengal Premier
whom I dislike He was sulky, shifty and unattracti\ c as usual After a little
talk on the Damodar Valley project, which was the ostensible reason for
aq$ dismissal
liis visit to Delhi, he embarked on his normal hymn of hate against the
Hindus, with reference to Bihar, Calcutta and East Bengal had of course
been gentlemanly differences of opinion, in his view, compared with the
Hindu retaliation in Bihar He complained that we were strengthening the
hands of the Hindus against the Muslims, and drew a most gloomy
picture of Bengal after our departure, with Darjeehng annexed by Nepal
or Sitlam etc I gave him my usual line, that Hindus and Muslims had got
to live together in India on some terms and that the sooner they got
together to settle them, the better, etc S endedby admitting that H. M G 's
statement of December 6 was fair, and that he would recommend to
Jinnah that the League should enter the CA Jmnah was calling his
Working Committee at Karachi for January 10
George Abell telegraphed to say that the Cabinet at home has gone
back completely and refuses to have anything to do with the Breakdown
Plan, so he is returning at once 1 thought they well might run out after
I had left, they seem quite unable to face an awkward decision
January p
A very busy and rather tiresome day It began with Baldev Singh coming
at 10 30 am, about the IN A He said that Sarat Chandra Bose was
holding an 1 N A meeting m Calcutta on Jan 23 , and that a Resolution
would he moved in the Assembly early in February demanding the release
of all I N A prisoners under sentence — there are about 10 or a dozen, all
convicted of murder or cruelty — , the payment of I N A men of their
pay for the tune that they were fighting us, and that this was certain to be
followed by a demand for their remsutement in the Army I naturally
reacted very strongly and told him that such action would make it im-
possible for British officers to continue to serve and would destroy the
I A He promised to put this to the political leaden, but did not seem very
hopeful that they would agree as they seemed anxious to appease the
INA I then wrote to C-in-C, to see whether he v*as prepared to stand
firm, and arranged to discuss it with him this evening
After lunch I saw V P Menon, who has become rather the mouthpiece
of Vallabhai Patel I fancy He said he thought the League ought to go into
C A , but was not hopeful of an agreed Constitution being evolved He
said that Congress leaders were Josmg popularity and that there were
serious internal troubles in Congress and great fear of the Left Witig> and
that the danger of labour difficulties was acute Patel is very annoyed at
Nehru for making the appointment of Asaf Ah without consulting his
8-12 JANUARY 1947 409
colleagues Mcnon also said that Gandhi had proposed a most mischievous
resolution about HMG's statement of December 6 t but that Patel had
opposed him strongly and was unpopular with G at present.
Menon was very perturbed at the decline of the Administration —
Ministers too busy with politics to pay much attention to their Depart-
ments, he outlined the chief dangers as Food distribution breaking down*
lack of Textiles, Labour troubles, and slowness of the Development plan.
I think he was echoing Patel Finally, he described an interview with Aung
San, which had shown that young tough's complete ignorance of financial,
constitutional and economic questions
At 6 30 p m. I saw Oin-C about the I N A problem. He told me that,
after consultation with his senior officers he was determined to stand, up
to the point of resignation, on the first issue, the release of the prisoners
We shall have a first-class row with Congress, I expect, but I think we
snail get away with it
January 10
My sister Molly 1 arm ed this morning, and General Tvker and George
Abell The latter returned very disappointed with the P M and Members
of H.M G and the way they had gone bade on their promises He said
that he was really horrified at their lack of realism and of honesty I read
later on some papers he brought back, he had kept his end, or rather my
end, up very well hut apparently to no purpose I have not had one word
from the S of S about the result of the Cabinet meetings on India, but
he has telegraphed that an important letter from the P M is on its way to
me I must wait for that
I saw Chundngar in the afternoon He said Jinn ah was a sick man, and
the meeting of the Working Committee not till January 29
Sunjjy t 12 January
Tuker came m to see me before his departure from Calcutta. I like him,
he has many more interests than soldiering, in fact his defect as a soldier
is probably the same as mine, that soldiering rather bores him and books
and history and art interest him more We discussed the general situation,
he eulogized the I C S and their w ork, spoke of the break-up of the
Congress, of the decline of Hinduism, and of the dangers in front of India
Nehru, Raj ago pall chin and Baldcv Singh came to lunch.
* Mia I~ At Wtvdl
408 DISMISSAL
his visit to Delhi, he embarked on his noimal hymn of hate against the
Hindus, with reference to Bihar, Calcutta and East Bengal had of course
been gentlemanly differences of opinion, ui his view, compared with the
Hindu retaliation ui Bihar He complained that we were strengthening the
hand* of the Hindus against the Muslims, and drew a most gloomy
picture of Bengal after our departure, with Darjeeliog annexed by Nepal
or Sutkim etc I gave him my usual line, that Hindus and Muslims had got
to live together in India on some terms and that the sooner they got
together to settle them, the better, etc S ended by admitting that HMG's
statement of December 6 w as fair, and that he would recommend to
Jinnah that the League should enter the C A Jmnah was calling his
"Working Committee at Karachi for January 19
George Abell telegraphed to say that the Cabinet at home has gone
back completely and refuses to have anything to do with the Breakdown
Plan, so he is returning at once I thought they vv ell might run out after
I had left, they seem quite unable to face an awkward decision
January p
A very busy and rather tiresome day It began wtth Baldev Singh coming
at 10 30 a ui. about the I N A He said that Satat Chandra Bose was
holding an I N A meeting m Calcutta on Jan 23 , and that a Resolution
would be moved in the Assembly early m February demanding the release
of all IN A. prison eis under sentence — there are about 10 or a dozen, all
conMCttd of murder or cruelty — , the payment of I N A men of their
pay for the time that they were fighting us, and that this Has certain to be
followed by a demand for their reinstatement in the Army I naturally
reacted \cry strongly and told him that such action would make it im-
possible for Brmsh officers to continue to serve and would destroy the
I A He promised to put this to the political leaden, but did not seem very
hopeful that they would agree, as they seemed anxious to appease the
I N A I then wrote to C-in-C, to see whether he m as prepared to stand
firm, and arranged to discuss it with him this cning
After lunch I saw V P Menon, a\ ho has become rather the mouthpiece
of Valbbhn i'atel, I fancy He said he thought the League ought to go into
C A » but \\ as not hopeful of an agreed Constitution being evolved He
sj)J that Congress leaden were losing popularity and that there were
wrrcwis wrtenwA vrwiUtA wi Congress and great fear of ihc Left NVmg, and
that the danger of labour difficulties wis acute Patcl is very annoyed at
Nehru for nuking the appointment of Asaf Ah without consulting his
8-12 JANUARY 1947 409
colleagues Menon also said that Gandhi had proposed a most mischievous
resolution about H.M G 's statement of December 6, but that Patel had
opposed him strongly and was unpopular with G at present
Menon was very perturbed at the decline of the Administration —
Ministers too busy with pohtjes to pay much attention to their Depart-
ments, he outlined the chief dangers as Food distribution breaking down,
lack of Textiles, Labour troubles, and slowness of the Development plan
I think he was echoing Patcl Finally, he described an interview with Aung
San, which had shown that young tough's complete ignorance of financial,
constitutional and economic questions
At 6 30 p m. I saw O-in-C about the I N A problem- He told me that,
after consultation with his senior officers, he was determined to stand, up
to the point of resignation on the first issue, the release of the prisoners
We shall have a first-class row with Congress, J expect, but I think we
shall get away with it.
January to
My suter Molly 1 arnved this morning, and General Tuk-er 2nd George
Abell The latter returned very disappointed with the P M and Members
of H.M G and the way they had gone back on their promises He said
that he was really horrified at their lack of realism and of honesty I read
later on some papers he brought back, he had kept his end, or rather my
end, up very well but apparently to no purpose I have not had one word
from the S of S about the result of the Cabinet meetings on India, but
he has telegraphed that an important letter from the P M is on its way to
me I must wait for that
I saw Chundngar in the afternoon He saidjtnnah was a sick man, and
the meeting of the Working Committee not till January 29
Sunday t 12 January
Tuket came in to see me before his departure from Calcutta T like him,
he has many more interests than soldiering, in fact his defect as a soldier
is probably the same as mine, that soldiering rather bores him and books
and history and art interest him more We discussed the general situation,
he eulogized the I C S and their \\ ork, spoke of the break-up of the
Congress, of the dechne of Hinduism, and of the dingers m front ofhidiz.
Nehru, IUjagopalachan and Baldcv Singh came to lunch.
1 Mm L. M. Wivcll
410 DISMISSAL
The luncheon party went off quite well Nehru was friendly and talked
freely, he is sometimes apt to be reserved and on the offensive-defensive,
as at Buckingham Palace 1 The gardens had hecn opened to the pubhc and
w e *ft alked in them afterwards, I think N may have rather suspected it had
been specially arranged to impress him, hut it was in fact part of our
normal winter programme
I had a letter from the P M , telling me that the Cabinet had rejected
my plans The letter w as cold, ungracious and indefinite, the letter of" 3
small man It proposed that I should go home in the near future tor
further discussions, hut I cannot see any value in doing so and shall reply
to that effect It is possible that the idea is to get me home and force my
resignation*
January tj
I agreed with the Om-C to produce a directive on v» hich a combined
civil md military staff would prepare a plan for a breakdown
Nehru was due for an interview but did not turn up, an increasingly
common habit on the part of my Ministers
January 14
A long day in the office with a number of interviews I began with
Jagjivan Ram the Labour member He talked of labour troubles strikes
and threatened strikes at Karachi Coimbatore Cawnpore and elsewhere,
and ascribed them largely to Communist agitation
Nehru was next, and apologised for his absence yesterday, and was
quite friendly We talked of foreign affairs, of Travancore minerals and
other matters
Baldevhad not much to say, I told him that H.M G would not consent
to the removal of British troops till a new constitution had been made, so
that it was no use bringing his proposal to do so before Cabinet, as I should
only have to overrule my colleagues if they passed it He said that he and
the Congress members quite understood this but he implied that they
w anted to clear themselves with their followers
1 worked on a planning directive for the Breakdown Plan, and drafted
an answer to the PM which I thought was mild hut which George
apparently considers too drastic
1 Wivtll had gathered that Nchm givt \bs$ impression Vfbtn ht tn« invited to Eudung
turn Pilactf during his vi*it to U K> in December
I 2-1 9 JANUARY I947 411
Wednesday i$th January
At his interview Patcl began by compUmmg o£ hLM G*s decision of
December 6 as unfair to Congress, I said that it was not unfair at all, it was
merely that H M G were saying what they meant, and that the only
criticism could be that they ought to have done it months before He
agreed with this last part He then spoke at some length (a propos of my
question whether Jai Prakash Narain was still a member of the Congress
Working Committee) about the danger of die Communists* I got the
impression he would luce to declare the Party illegal, he said that many
>oung but misguided men of family and education were behind the
movement
The Oin-C agreed to the terms and to the composition of the Planning
Committee on Withdrawal
He told me that he had lunched with Nehru and Baldev and had dis-
cussed the I N A question He said that N was quite friendly but that
neither convinced the other
Maulana Azad was moderate and sensible, and will 1 hope be a good
influence m the Cabinet 1 We discussed the general political situation
I said that I hoped that Nehru*s resolution on a Republic would not be
pressed in the C A on January 20, and Azad said that it might perhaps
be postponed but he could give no guarantee He deplored the lack of
social contact between the political leaders, and said that communal feeling
was running so high that Muslim League would not meet Congress
Cabinet meeting lasted two hours 6-8 p m- The Report on Planning
was discussed in quite a reasonable spirit.
January ijj
Got back this evening from a short shooting trip to the Dehra Dun jungles
This was ongmzlly to have been in December, but had been postponed on
account of my visit to UK I began it lnauspiaously by slipping m the
aircraft when I was walking to the exit at Saharanpur — the floor as steel
uncovered by a mat and I forgot I had nails in my shoes — and landing a
terrific crack on my back* I thought I should be unable to do much, I felt
so shaken and bruised but I went on into the jungle and found I was able
to move better than t had expected Jim Corbett, the man who wrote
Maneaters of Kumaon, 2 was running the shoot with Yakub Khan 1 and
1 He had taken the place of Asaf All.
* Jim Corbet t Man-Eattrs of Kumaon 1946
J Captain Sshihzz&i Atolid. Yakub Khan* Adjutant to the Bodyguard He kter beamc 2
Li c u tenant-Gcner ai m the Pakistan Army and Pakistan Ambassador in Pans
412 DISMISSAL
some of the Body guard His talk on tjgers aiidjunglc life is of extraordinary
interest^ and 1 wish I could have had more of it He has rather pessimistic
views on the future of tig«s, he puts the present tiger population of India
at 3000-4000 (I was rather surprised at the smaUness of this estimate) and
thinks that in many parts of India tigers will become almost extinct in the
next 10 or is >ears> his chief reason is that 'Indian politicians are no
sportsmen and tigm have no votes, while the nght to a gun licence w ill go
with a \otc*
January 20
Most of my day was taken up over an impending crisis about the LN A
which has been on the bonzon for some time Baldev Singh put up a
summary for Cabinet recommending release of all LN A men, convicted
for brutality or murder, and restoration of pay for the period during
which they were serving our enemies Pie wanted it taken in Cabinet at
once, in order that these concessions might be announced before January
23, when 5arat Chandra Bose is holding a meeting at Calcutta to assume
the mantle of his brother as leader of the I N A
I saw C-in-C at 10 30 a m. and found he was still firm, on the nutter,
he said he was determined to resign sooner than acquiesce in the proposals
about the I N A
So I wrote a note on Baldev s summary for Cabinet and told George
to draft a telegram to S of S to warn him of the approaching crisis I
believe myself that if we all stand firm — H M G t C-in-C, myself— my
Cabinet will nop force the issue and the) may even be encouraged to
stand up to the Left Wing— J P Narain and Bose.
Ghazanfar Ah was my visitor m the afternoon. He is the wont repre-
sentative of the League m the Cabinet (except Manual)— intensely com-
munal and rather stupid. He seemed completely hazy about Pakistan and
its implications, and admitted that he did not understand the economy of
it 1 find him rather a trial, inside and outside the Cabinet
Arthur Henderson dined, he is off tomorrow, having made 110 progress
at all in his Mission but having perhaps learnt a bttle about India
January Zi
Ian Scott had some political gossip out riding this morning Menon who
is now very much m Patel's pocket, claims to have seen a letter from
Gandhi to Patel> abusing him £bu supporting acceptance of tLM G *s
statement of December 6, which G had wished to reject I have always
19-22 JANUARY IQ47
413
regarded G. as our most inveterate, malignant and rather hypocritical
enemy, hn also had a story of an interview between Sultan Ahmed and
Nehru, m winch S A. had intimated that the passing of N/s Republic
Resolution 1:1 the C.A. might nuke it difficult for the Princes to negotiate
According to the story, N. had blown up into one of his outbursts and
said he did not care a damn for die Princes, to \\ Inch S A. had replied that
the Princes did not care a damn for hurt
I spent some of the morning over a telegram to the S of S. to warn him
of the LN A. crisis.
Azad came after lunch, He had one or two small matters on his Depart*
mcnt; then spoke of the relations between the communities and advocated
improvement m social contacts between the Members of the Cabinet. He
is in favour of Coalition Go\ emments m all Provinces, but says that it is
no use to approach die subject unless the atmosphere at the Centre
improves. I asked him about Nclirus Republic Resolution and he dunks
it will be passed, though he sees the danger of doing so, and has advised
against it, I gather.
Bather Arthur Henderson had come to say goodbye. He had break-
fasted with Nchru f who was very worried, he said, over the possibility of
serious labour troubles and apprehended a railway and coal strike. N.
made the usual complaint of non-co operation on the part of the League
members of die Cabinet Henderson said he would recommend to Cabinet
that the sooner the S of S. Services were wound up the better
Three-hour meeting of Cabinet 4-7 p m. The matter of a Press Ordi-
nance for the Commissioners Provinces, 1 c , Delhi for all practical pur-
poses, took nearly ij hours, though it had been twice before Cabinet
already. The Muslim League is convinced that it is simply a device of
Patel's to muzzle Dawn, and they may have some reason for apprehension
I think, however, that the stand they have made may protect them to
some extent.
The rest of the proceedings were less controversial, though the com-
munal element obtruded itself The League members do not show up
well m Cabinet discussions, except Liaquat, who always talks good sense
Chundngar is slow and dull, Nishtar loquacious and not very clever,
Ghazanfar always communal and pugnacious Congress can always make
dialectical rings round them and appear reasonable and moderate.
January 22
I had a talk with Benthall, who has been co-opted into the Breakdown
Plan Committee to represent the European Community X put the position
1J4 DISMISSAL
before him frankly and plainly* he was obviously rather shaken at the
idea that we might withdraw so soon, but had no alternative plan
After lunch I had three Sikhs — Hamam Singh, Kartar Singh and Ujjal
Singh — who talked for 45 minutes about their requirements for safeguards
in die Constitution without making it very clear to me what they did
want, and 1 am not sure that they were really clear 'themselves But they
were friendly and only wanted sympathetic noises from me really, I think*
Cabinet, 6-715 ptn t went quite well The difficult jtem was the
demand for withdrawal of British troops but they obviously never really
expected it to be accepted, and seemed quite satisfied Ghaxanfar*s item
of the export of Rhesus monkeys to South Africa proved quite a good
comic interlude.
Thursday, 23rd January
Interview with Khizar who, if his heart was really m it, would be the best
leader of the Muslims in India, but he docs not like politics and would
prefer to be out of it all
Mandal who succeeded him is the poorest Member I have ever had in
the Government, and 1 find great difficulty in understanding his English.
I had a telegram from S of S to say that EMG would support me
over the Lt4 A question* which was tjmte a. pleasant sutpme I aUo hid
a telegram suggesting that I should go home again for dtscussions, which
seems quite unnecessary
I discussed with C-in-C at 6 p m the line to take at the conference
which has been arranged tomorrow with Nehru, Liaquat and Baldev on
the I N A question
January 24
A busy but interesting morning At 10 a m. I had a discussion of the
LN A business with Nehru, Liaauat, Baldev and C-in-C On the whole
it went better than 1 had expect e A The discussion was conducted m quite
a friendly spirit and was argued without heat of any kind but what the
eventual outcome Will be it is hard to say
January 27
For once in a way I had a comparatively peaceful Sunday yesterday,
though the action taken in the Punjab against Muslim Guards seems to
have raised a storm.
V
Lord IVavell, London t 1946
LaqatAl Khan and Mr ] n a! n Lender, Dm nber , 9i 6
22-30 JANUARY 1947 4*5
On 24 January the Punjab Government, alarmed at the collection of arms
by quasi-military organizations, operating under the direction of political
parties t passed an order declaring the Muslim National Guards and the
Rashtrtya Swayam Sen alt Santfi — a militant Hindu organization — unlawful
bodies The Muslim League leaders in the Punjab seized the opportunity to stir
up agitation There were demonstrations by Muslim mobs and after a few days
the Punjab Government rescinded its order Tins did not, however, prove to be
the aid of the matter
This morning I hid an hour with the C-in-C on the reports of the Joint
Planning Committee on our withdrawal from India, and various smaller
matters The Committee has recommended a phased withdrawal of
authority instead of the phased geographical withdrawal which I origi-
nally recommended toHMG, ic a withdrawal first of the S of S
Services, or rather their transfer to die Central and Provincial Govern-
ments and then at a later date of British troops t thus leaving the Governor-
General and Governors in position with no means of enforcing their
orders I don't much like it f nor does C-m-C
Then came Liaquat with whom I had a long talk Liaquat is always
sensible and well-balanced but is firmly determined that cooperation with
Congress is not possible
Nishtar did not turn up for his interview in the afternoon
Cabinet meeting in the evening (6-7 jo pm) was quite a surprise
I expected a long contentious sitting and much communatism, as there was
plenty of material for display of feeling But all the items went off in a
peaceful and almost friendly atmosphere. Ghazanfar All was absent, and
I suppose the League must have passed the word round to hold their fire
January 20
Comparatively quiet monimg Dickie Mountbattcn telegraphed that
Archie John had been given a belated Military Cross Mike Calvert told
me some months ago that the ongrnal recommendation had gone astray
and that he was putting it in again but I did not think there was much
chance of it at this late stage
Thursday, 30th January
Day began with Hutchings who is just off to London on food matters
We are all tight for nee for the moment but very short of wheat On the-
general situation, H said he thought there was a section of Congress, and
Gandhi himself, who did not really want a peaceful hand over but to
claim that they had ejected the British by force perliaps there is something
in this
4l6
DISMISSAL
January 31
C-in C and three Army Commanders— Lockhart, Tukcr and Mcsscrvy —
came to lunch and I gave them a sketch of the political situation
February j
The Muslim League Resolution seems to shut the door completely on
their participation 111 the Constituent Assembly and creates a difficult and
perhaps an ugly situation I decided to send for Nehru and discuss it w ith
him this evening
By a Resolution passed on 31 January the Working Committee of the
Muslim League denied not to call the Council of the League to reconsider its
withdrawal of its acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan It declared that the
AICC by its reservations had conferred a fight of veto wtthm a Section *on
a Province and — what is more absurd — on a part of a Province t as welt as on
the Sikhs in the Punjab', and that these reservations completely nullified the
* so-called "acceptance" by the Congress of H M G*5 December Statement*
TJie Working Committee called on the British Government to declare tltat
the Cabinet Mission Plan had failed because the Congress had not really
accepted if, nor had the Stklts nor the Scheduled Castes
1 saw Vallabhai Patel who was more silent and restrained than usual,
and ohviously did not wish to discuss the political situation, though I gave
him an opening We spoke of the Bihar Government s reluctance to
reserve places in the Provincial service for ex-Service men, on which
Patel promised to help and a number of other matters He was friendly
and sensible
In the evening I saw Nehru for half an hour I said that the League
resolution created a very djfHcult situation, both for the Constituent
Assembly and the Central Government There was of course no question
ofHMG going back on their policy or dissolving the C A * hut it was
obvious that the C A without the League and possibly without the States
could not make an acceptable constitution for the whole of India As to
the Central Government, the Congress was in a position to force the
resignation of the Muslim League members but they would be well
advised to consider the matter very carefully., since, the Muslim Lcaejie in
active opposition might make the administration of the country even
more difficult than now The crisis had come at an unfortunate time, just
as the Budget session of the Assembly was beginning Nehru was subdued
and obviously realised the seriousness of the posidon He said that the C A
would go on but obviously could not force a constitution on unwilling
31 JANUARY-6 rEBftUARV 1947
417
provinces He hoped that the States, or at least a proportion of them,
would join the C A As to the Cabinet, the matter would require serious
consideration Apart from the fact tliat the League had not joined the C A.,
the policy of die Party, unless the Bombay decision last July were with-
drawn, was aircct action, 1 e, active opposition to the Government of
which they at present formed part He would consult his colleagues and
give me his views
In the evening 1 got one of the S of S panic-stricken cables, deploring
any initiative on my part in seeing Nehru Too late, anyhow, and it would
not have influenced me, I think* even if u had come earlier
February 4
Harold Macmillan has been staying and I had a talk with him this morning
before his departure for Calcutta He had seen most of the Indian political
leaders (he dined with Nehru last night) and had formed a fairly shrewd
appreciation of them He found Ncliru charming but nervy and said that
he \\ ould not stand the racket of great events He recognised in Patel much
greater qualities of leadership, and compared him to Bevm as against
Nehru for Herbert Morrison He thought Liaguat easier to talk with than
any Hindu, but could get little out of him beyond the usual party line
except that he apparently thought that HMG ought to make a new-
start altogether
Just after lunch I had a letter from the P M by special messenger, dis-
missing me from my post at a month's notice Not very courteously done
Azad told me he had settled the teachers* strike at Delhi and then at
once embarked on politics He thought that the League rank and file wish
to come 111, and that H*M G should bring pressure on the Muslim League
to reconsider the Karachi decision
February 5
Quiet day, which I spent in composing a reply toPM s letter 1 with the
assistance of Q andPSV
February 6
As I had expected I had a letter this morning signed by all the Congress
members of my Cabinet demanding the resignation of the Muslim League
members I wired it to H.M G , it crossed a telegram from S of S asking
me to *gam time* if the Congress did put forward such a demand- But they
1 See Appendix IX for Attlee 1 letter and Wavell % reply
418 DISMISSAL
-will not be able to pm off a decision for long, and I do not see quite now
the Congress demand can be resisted
V P Menon, whom. 1 saw this afternoon, usually so optimistic, was
gloomy about the position and thinks that the partition of India is now
incv itablc He says the League reckon on this,, and expect to capture the
Punjab Go\ eminent soon
February 8
Cabinet meeting again went quite smoothly The main item was the
strength of the post-war Indian Army It became clear that India could
afford not much more than half the annual amount that Defence Depart-
ment had originally asked for At the end of an hour s discussion I under-
took to draw up a draft directive to the Defence Department to make
plans for a smaller Arm> We then considered the formal statement of the
Budget figures, showing a deficit of 60 to 80 crores Finally we passed the
draft Ait Agreement with the Dutch.
This morning 1 drew up the draft dirccm e for the Defence Department
and later discussed it with the C-m-C \Vc also spoke of the proposal to
release the I N A convicts on w hich he still remains firm, and plans for an
emergency withdrawal of Europeans. I told him of the PH's letter and
my removal, since he was off on a week 1 * tour and I did not want him to
learn of u by a Press announcement, he seemed very upset.
I had a telegram from H.M G m the evening, with reference to the
Congress request for the removal of the League members from the
Government As usual, it was indefinite, but H-M G apparently con-
template making an early statement about the termination of our rule.
On 9 February I Vavcll informed tlie Secretary of State that in hs judgement
neitfier side u anted an open breach arid tftat both of tliem ti ere hoping for some
ijwve fom H M G that v enlist thtm out of then difficulties He therefore
strongly advised that a final attempt should be modi to bring all parties into the
Constituent Assembly before taking the decisive step of announcing a date for
the uttkdrau al of British autlwnty On it February he telegraphed tht draft
ef a ttrtement u hizh he ilwught, tj made by JLM G , u ould offer a chance,
though vahaps a slender efit 9 of getting the League into the Constituent
Assembly WatelVs advue uas not accepted.
February si
I had nearly an hour with Nehru I threw a fly over hnn on the matter of
trying to get the League into the Consntumt Assembly and keeping them
in the government, but he dul not rue He seemed subdued.
6-13 FEBRUARY 1947
419
Later Baldev came His chief point was on the release of the I N A
convicts The Resolution comes up in the Assembly on the iSth and he
wanted the matter taken in Cabinet I said I should have to over-rule the
Cabinet, if they decided on release, and he said he would consult his
colleagues He then discussed the political situation and said that Jinn ah
did not want a settlement. He had had discussions with him in London but
had got nowhere, and Jinnah offered no assurances to the Sikhs even if
they supported Pakistan
February 12
Saw Liaquat on the Budget proposals The new taxes proposed are a
Business Profits Tax (the peace tune equivalent of the E P T ) estimated
to produce 30 crores, increase of one anna in Corporation tax to produce
4 crores, some changes of super-tax to produce 2 jrd crores a Dividend
tax, yield uncertain but not large, Capital Gains Tax (equivalent to a tax
on Unearned Increment) to produce 3 J crores
He proposes a high-powered tribunal to deal with tax evasion
I arranged that the Budget proposals should be discussed with Nehru
and Matthai early next week.
Cabinet meeting m evening went smoothly On the first item, Pro-
tection of the Leather Industry, Chun dn gar was argumentative, there
was a moment of light relief when he argued that hides were thicker m
the Punjab than elsewhere*
February 15
In the afternoon I had a talk with Matthai, who is always sensible and
interesting He deplored the leadership both of Gandhi and of Jinnah, but
like all other moderates in India seemed to accept them as inev itable evils,
whose influence could not be opposed
In the evening I saw Nazimuddin about the Punjab situation, at the
request of Evan Jenkins m a telegram* N was moderate and quuc willing
for compromise, if the Punjab Government would make concessions over
political meetings and processions I like honest fat little Nazimuddin and
^ ish Jinnah had put him m the Government* He told me something of the
Karachi meeting, I think he may have been for joining the C A himself
A longish telegram from the P M , to say that they propose to make an
announcement next week on India and include the change of Viceroy,
and that Dickie Mountbattcn had been appointed. An unexpected appoint-
ment but a clever one from their point of view, and Dickie's personality
may perhaps accomplish what I have failed to do
420
DISMISSAL
Fehntary J-f
Of my visitors, the first w ere two representatives of a big British business
firm, and left on me the impression that British business-men in India
have not moved with the times, their chief plea was that they should still
have, after the transfer of power, their own settlements, their own clubs
and should in fact keep themselves to themselves
After lunch I saw Jagjivan Ram, who was comparatively optimistic on
the Labour troubles, but pessimistic on the political situation He said that
a fresh effort by H.M G was required, and that the departure of the
League from the Interim Government was no solution (why then did he
sign the Congress letter demanding it ? These Indians have no pohocaj
courage)
Big dinner party in evening m Banqueting Hall, the list I shall hold
there,
Fehntary 15
Nazimuddin asked to see me again about the Punjab situation He merely
said that he had been in commum cation with Juinah, that a settlement
might be possible if the Punjab Government withdrew the ban on political
meetings and processions, and that he was going to Lahore tonight He
also complained of a provocative statement by Tara Singh-
Late in the evening J P S V (John Christie) 1 came back from Bengal
with a long appreciation from Burrows B did not knowH.M G proposed
to make an immediate statement giving a final date for transfer of power,
but was very strongly opposed to any such statement at present and drew
a gloomy picture of its effect on Bengal He recommended, as I have done,
a last effort to get the League into the C A and the winding up of the
S of S Services as the immediate steps required I telegraphed the gist of
Burrows appreciation to S of S P S V will go to Lahore tomorrow to see
Jenks and get his reactions to the issue of a statement 1 do not think it will
be favourable
Fehntary 16 (Sunday)
George Abell came back from Lahore with a note from Jenkins even more
damning than that of Burrows I then sent for Oui-C, showed him
H.M G s statement, and the notes of Burrows and Jenkins I also told him
the name of my successor He was considerably shaken at EM G 's action
1 W H J ChnsttC ICS Joint Private Secretary to the Vjccto> 1947 He had been
Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy in Lord Linlithgow * time
14-19 FEBRUARY 1947
February t?
] sent a telegram toil M G urging incrn to postpone their main announce-
ment, and merely to announce on Thursday my replacement, their _vicws
on the differences between Congress and League, making a last effort to
bring them togcdicr into the C A (diough I do not think it will succeed),
and if possible some decision about the Sen ices 1 said that 1 thought it
was out) fair on my successor to let htm hx\ c a week or two to study the
situation before die final date was announced, and on mc tliat I should not
c die responsibility m m> final w ceU of oiTice of carr) out a policy
winch I thought nut-judqed and dl-nmcd
1 saw C-in-C again, at Ins normal mtcn ic w , and he produced a gloomy
view of the results of the announcement die gist of which I cabled home
Patcl was pleasant, and we discussed a \ancty of nutters die slowness
of RM G in dealing with die question of the Services, the situation in
the Punjab, Pakistan, he was quite prepared to let die Muslims have the
Western Punjab, and Smd and NWFP if d 1C y wished to join, and
Eastern Bengal, the question of language on die A 1 die enquiries into
the Calcutta and Bihar riots he agreed widi me that these enquiries were
too late and too long and diat any enquir> should be immediate and short.
In the c\cntng I discussed the Budget proposals with Ltaquat, Nehru
and Matthai, all wait well, die meeting was amicable and the proposals
were accepted.
February 1$
One of my visitors was Hutching* just back from London who had had
interviews with S of S and P M He regarded P-L as completely useless
and dithering, and could get no sense or decision out of him over shipping
or the Services The whole atutudc of die Cabinet to India was condi-
tioned, as I found last December, not by any consideration of what was
good or expedient in India but by what they could put across in Parlia-
ment Also dicy were thinking not about India but about coal electricity
and Palestine
February Jp
HMG telegraphed adhering to their announcement, and also sent a long
telegram of self-justification and accusation of myself as inconsistent, to
which I think I can make an effective reply
HMG accused IVaveU of inconsistency because, having strongly pressed
when m London that a final date should be announced for the transfer of power,
422 DISMISSAL
he had later transmitted r epoiis from Burrows and Jenkins opposing siuh
a course and predicting calamitous consequences m Bengal mid the Punjab* and
had himself urged that the anrunmentent of the date should be postponed
It does not appear that Wavell ever sent his * effective* teply Probably he
would have pointed out that mfom ardmg the reports of Burrows and Jenkins
he had expressed the view that they were unduly pessimistic, that he had only
asked for a temporary postponement of the announcement m order to make cue
final effort to bnng the Congress and the League together m the Constituent
Assembly and that from the point of view of staving off a crisis there nas no
longer any immediate hurry to make the announcement,, since ttettlter party
really wanted to precipitate a break, and finally that, m hts vtew t before
making the announcement, HMG should have some definite plan for
demtttmg power by the due date and that they had rejected hs Breakdown Plan t
but had not put Joruard any other
I spent the afternoon working on papers Cabinet meeting in the
evening lasted 2j hours, but was very friendly There was one very
contentious item, the amalgamation of the External AfEurs and Common-
wealth Relations Departments, and the transfer of the High Commissioner
in London from the Commerce to the External Affairs Department, but
I managed to skate round the really contentions pan — very skilfully,
George Abcll said The other items — tariffs on bic) cles and woodscrews,
regulation of dentists, note by Nehru on Scientific Manpower, Land
Requisition went almost hilariously They are curious people, these
Indians
Late in the evening I was told that there had been leakage in London
and the Press obviously had had the text of the Statement and the name of
my successor
Tlwrsday, 20th Fthruiry
Felicity's wedding 1 went ^ell and smoothly, thanks to Q *s weeks of hard
work and the efficiency of the staff
In the c\cmng I had short interviews with Nehru and Liaquat and
liindcd theni FLM G \ Statement Liaquat seemed to be genuinely sorry
Out I w as going, and Nehru was polite
The Statement announced that ituas H UG *f definite intention to effect
the transfer ofpau er to responsible Indian hands by a date not later than June
I) fey itai Qtfte no Gttthonties had heat e$tao\isiieh under a. new Constitu-
tion u orixd cut by a fully rcprcstntatwe Constituent Assembly itt accordance
' Txhcny Uj\rU numed Ciptiin I iter Loogcnorr, MC ion of Air Chief Manful
S r Arthur Loagmorv G CD DSO
i$-26 rcbRUARY 1947
423
u ith the Cabmet Mission Plaj^ H*M G u onld have to consider to uhom the
pou en of the Central Government should be handed oicr t uhcther as a whale
to some fomt of Central Government for Brttish India or in some areas to the
existing Proi utctal Got entmatts, or trt such other u ays as might seem most
reasonable and m the best interests of the Indian people
As regards the Indian States, the statement that had been made by the
Cabinet a\ fission that H MG's poners and obligations under paratnountey
uould not be handed 01 er to any Government of British Indta t u as reiterated
It was also announced that the u ar-twie appointment of Lord Waicll as
Viceroy u as being terminated and that Lord Mountbatten u as being appointed
m his place
February 21
A longuh da) I saw W) he in the morning and ColvtUc in the afternoon
The first reaction of both to H MG's Statement had been to offer that
resignations but I told them that they should carry on, and they agreed,
though Colvillc apparently proposes to write to the S of S and offer his
resignation if requited
Bhabha and Chundngar had nothing much to say, I never linger over
an interview with these rather dull personalities, and it never develops
into a general talk on affairs or ethics or literature as with Rajagopalachan
or Azad or Nehru or Liaquat
In the evening I had about an hour each with Nehru and Liaquat They
were both friendly, both 1 think quite impressed by the Statement Nehru
described it as a courageous document which would have far-reaching
eifects, but he went on to speak of its lack of definition on many points
As regards the Muslim League members remaining in the Central
Government he said that the Congress would not press for an immediate
answer to their request that they should go, but that the issue would have
to be faced in the near future
Liaquat said that the Statement wanted * ery careful consideration, but
was not hopeful of any Hindu-Muslim rapprochement
February 23
I had quite a cordial telegram from the P M in reply to one I had sent
deprecating any party controversy over my removal I have had nice
letters from Rajagopalachan, Azad and Nehru about my work
February 26
Baldev Singh had no knowledge of Sikh reactions to H.M G 's Statement
since he had been away* but said that the nft between Sikhs and Muslim
424 DISMISSAL
League was wider than ever He was perturbed at the idea of all British
officers leaving LA tna year's tune He said nothing about the I N A
resolution, I am told that it has been postponed till April, I thought we
should get away with it if we stood firm
Cabinet meeting this evening One would certainly never imagine
from the atmosphere of friendly discussion that each side was demanding
the withdrawal of the other, nor that they were likely to initiate a
civil war
February 27
Rajendra Prasad thought it was blowing up for another food crisis, and
unfortunately at the same time our control over the Provinces and the
Provinces* control over procurement and distribution is weakening,
o\v ing to the general preference for politics over administration
In the afternoon I had three-quarters of an hour with Dr Matthat,
practically all on the general political situation and Indian mentah ty He
docs not thmk that the Muslim League will come in, mainly because of
Juuiah's personality and of the Congress arrogance in I9}7~3<>» which
persuaded the Muslims that they would never get a fair deal He said that
the Hindu did not naturally lack generosity* but that the Congress was
swaged by the 'Gujctati mentality* of the leaders, ic that of a trader
driving % hard bargain
Fc hm&ry 2%
From an exchange of telegrams with London I learn that Mountbattcn
ma) arrive ut Delhi on March 22 and that I shall leave next day M-B has
also \\ ircd that he will keep on the whole of the Personal Staff at any rate
for the next three months
Wc had a Cabmct meeting at 10 30 a m to hear the Budget proposals
Thty went down quite well Rajagopalachart was rather talkatne, but
otherwise there was not much question George says the Budget is a clever
onc T m that it dmes a wedge between Congress and their rich merchant
supporters, hkc B\rla, while Congress cannot object to its provisions, but
1 doubt hcthcr Liaouat had any deliberate intention of doing this, I think
he took the advice of Jus officials, uhich I think was sound
I saw Ltaquat for a few minutes after the meeting, about the date for
M-B s arnv al He said the League would certainly not ha\ c taken a decision
by then, that Jtnnah uas a sick man and would not be in Delhi before the
uuddle of the month at the latest.
26 FEBRUARY— 5 MARCH IO47
425
After lunch I talked \\ itli Jagji\ an Ram, w hom I like and dunk die most
sensible of the Scheduled Castes I ha\ c met. He said that RM G *s
Statement threw the S C. to the mercy of the Majority Communities,
that they would miss British protection and British justice and would
ha>c preferred that wq should remain for another 10 )cars or so, but
admitted the difficulties
March $
Law son and Griffiths of die European Association came to sec me They
>>\ ere friendly and complimentary, and did not seem unduly apprehensive
about the safety of Europeans or the prospects of British business Griffiths
was clear that the decision to fix a diiimtc date was die right one
I spoke to Patel on die Punjab situation and asked hrni to use his influ-
ence to stop the proposed anti-Pakistan demonstrations on March 11
He promised to help
Nehru, Patcl and Bhabha have sent in minutes, dissenting from the
record of die Cabinet meeting at which Liaquat explained his taxation
proposals The record sajs the proposals were appro* cd* These minutes
now say that their writers do not agree that they were approved Poltroons,
especially Nehru 1 They now find that the Budget is not popular with their
big business supporters and are trying to rat or hedge, I drafted a stitf
reply, but perhaps P S V- will tone it down
I saw Liaquat just before lunch, and told him of the objections, not
naming the objectors He claimed, not unnaturally , that it would be an
impossible position if the Budget were held to be the responsibility of the
Finance Member alone and not of the whole Cabinet. Liaquat is going off
to Dehra Dun for a rest 1 asked him when the League Working Committee
would meet, and he said he had no idea, he thought that perhaps the
debate in the House of Commons would elucidate the position a little
more I tned to impress on him a sense of urgency
After the evening Cabinet meeting, which went well enough, I got
P S V who had just returned from Lahore to explain to Liaquat the
seriousness of the situation and to suggest his intervention with the Punjab
Muslim League Lia (mat's attitude was inclined to be* what could one
expect after such a darnlool Statement by EMG, but he will do his
best to help, I think.
AUhevgh ihePwyjih Gove/jwent had rcsmxdfd its &rJer jjga.wsi the Mushm
National Guards, the Muslim League continued their agitation and for over
a month defied with impunity a government han on meetings and processions
Eventually & compromise was reached, the League leaders tn the Punjab agreeing
426 DISMISSAL
to end the agitation if all those u ho had been arrested were released and the
ban on mectitm tva$ withdrawn The impotence cf the Punjab Government ttt
face of a Muslim League challenge was thus starkly revealed an J on J March
Khtzar suhiuttcd his Cabinet 9 * resignation*
The League's agitation had so inflamed communal feeling tliat the mere
rumour that the League would now form a Ministry — it proved, m fact t unable
to do so and the Cot entor took charge under Section gj — evoked demonstrations
by Hindus at id SiUts, and these at once touched off violent communal noting in
Lahore, Atnntsar, Rawalpindi, and ether smaller towns T/ic disturbances
spread to rural areas and there were heavy casualties
March 6
I saw Baldcv Singh in the morning about the Punjab situation He would
be prepared to go to Lahore if Governor wanted htiti* but says that there
can be no coalition between the Sikhs and the Muslim League He harked
back to the days of the Moguls and the old feuds between Sikhs and
Muslims I am afraid that communal is m is rampant in the Punjab
Jenkins docs not want me to go there at present He says that Mamdot
cannot form a stable ministry > and advocates keeping in Section 93 for the
present
March $
Yesterday was a quiet day, with no interviews for a wonder This morning
1 held my last Investiture (about 300 to be decorated) and dubbed my last
knight There were a lot of the Household receiving awards appropriately
enough, Archie John, Peter Longmotc, David Walker my Surgeon
Taylor, Blake my Tour Superintendent
Maulana Azad came to see me before lunch. Wc discussed the Punjab
situation, the failure of the Bihar Ministry over rehabilitation, a new
approach by Congress to the League Azad is always for moderation but
lam doubtful how much influence he exercises
March 10
After a quiet Sunday I had a fairly busy day I saw C-ui-C, who was rather
depressed about the Indian Army
I then said goodbye to J P Snvastava he always had rather more
character and guts than most of my Executive Council, though I fancy
his business methods may have been shrewd tather than scrupulous
Then I saw Nehru who was quite friendly He agreed that the Cabinet
Mission Plan was the best solution if it could be earned through, and that
the only real alternative was the partition of the Punjab and Bengal He
6-13 MARCH 1047
427
was quite sober and realistic in what he said, but lii J not scan really
hopeful of a settlement with the League Wlicn I said that I hoped jny
successor would succeed where 1 had foiled, in bringing the two Parties
together, lie said that failures and successes were only relative and that
some failures w crc greater than successes
March 11
Mainly a military day I presented five George Crosses, all posthumous
except Durrani, at a parade near the Memorial Arch It went off quite
Well Then I was photographed with the Bod) guard. Wc had a dinner
party in the evening and went to a Military Dance Festival at the Stadium*
good but rather too long
March 12
Council (I beg its pardon, Cabinet) went quite smoothly and in a friendly
atmosphere
Meanwhile things go badly in the Punjab
March ij
Hutchings came to say goodbye He was gloomy about the Food situation,
as there seems to be a world shortage, and the harvests in India do not
promise too well, as die wheat in Central India has been ruined by rust
We had a long general talk He docs not think that many of the Services
will stop in India after June 194S He agrees with many of the better men in
the Services that the compensation claim is wrong but that Government
should find employment for the Indian Services He says that m England
all the employees on Railways etc arc asking for compensation on being
nationalised We discussed Indian mentality and character, Hindu and
Muslim and the future of India Hutchings is one of the ablest ICS men
I have had under me
After lunch Evan Jenkins who had been to Rohtak, came in He was as
calm and clear as usual, but took a serious view of the Punjab situation
The cities are more or less under control but the trouble in rural areas is
spreading and is of course more difficult to check. He has no idea, of what
casualties yet are, but there may be a total of 1000 kdled in the whole
Province The trouble m getting any settlement is that both the Congress
and Muslim League are controlled from outside, from Delhi and Bom-
bay, while the Sikhs, who are in a position to negotiate on the spot, are
disunited and poorly Jed, Master Tara Singh is stupid and emotional The
local Muslim League leaders are poor Mamdot is hopelessly stupid and
42S DISMISSAL
£1102 Khaii Noon is ttustcd by no-one and cute no ice. Khizar's resignation
was prompted largely by die Statement of February 20
Evan wants an extra brigade of troops from the south. He is rather
afraid of the trouble taking an anti-European turn, and thinks tt possible
that we may be forced to evacuate the Punjab before the rest of India —
just the reverse of what my plan proposed I told him of Nehru's proposal
to visit the Punjab, ^ hich he did not like hut said could not be pre\ ented
Baldev's visit had done more harm than good*
At 3 30 p m. Nehru came in and we had about 40 minutes talk N
began by recnmuiation against the methods of the Muslim League, Evan
pointed out that they had used exactly the technique practised by the
Congress ui their agitations of ig2i and 1930 He also said that the trouble
at Amntsar had been started by non-Muslims Nehru showed signs of
working up for one of his outbursts hut the unruiBed calm and in-
controvertible statements of Evan kept him in check. No conclusion was
reached, but N gave the programme of his visit He said nothing about
going to Peshawar, and I hoped he had abandoned this idea, hut I gathered
htti m the evening that he still might go there
In the evening furrows arrived, he had come up to say goodbye a
little reproachful that I had not gone to Calcutta He was gloomy about
prospects in Bengal, did not think that there was much hope of its holding
together, unless he could get a Coalition Ministry in the next six months,
and he saw little chance of that He said that Suhrwardy was a very
fngjitened man, that he was almost the only Indian politician he knew
capable of taking a long view, but that he was a cad and untrustworthy
Burrows liked what he had seen of Liaquat We had some discussion of
all-India politics and agreed that the personalities of Gandhi and Jinnah
had been the determining factors in preventing a solution of the Indian
problem. He was \cry relieved that G hid left Bengal 1 it had taken 20
of his best police to protect him and he was sarcastic over an American
correspondent's article headed Gandhi walks alone* r
Burrows is a really sterling character, the best type of Englishman we
breed, and I think he was genuinely sorry at my departure
March 14
I sent a message to Nehru asking him not to go to Peshawar and he agreed
though protesungly 1 think this will relieve Olaf Caroc^s mind.
1 Aftct the outbreak of commuftii ntswig in Eart Bengal Gandhi bad undertaken an
cjctCTLiJVC tour on foot through the affected Aru in the hope of reconciling the two com—
13-17 march 1947 429
March 15
The President of the Council of State Hossain Imam, came ostensibly to
say goodb) c, but occupied 1 5 minutes by a hy nut of lute against Congress,
especially on die score of lack of generosity to Muslims, this is of course
true and is where Congress ha\ c shown such short-sightedness, they could
ha\c appeased the Muslims without really giving away anything essential
for the good of India or their cause, but they ha\ c the mentality of the
small lawyer who will hold on to the smallest point of his argument and
of the binia who will not give up one anna of his bargain
Spcns, Chief Justice* came to say goodbye and we had a Jong talL He
says that the Calcutta Enquiry will show that there was Hindu incitement
and a sudden and concerted attack without provocation on the Muslims
m the north of Calcutta, that the Ministry will come out of n all right,
that tlicrt was delay m bringing in the military owing to faulty infbnna^
Don, and tliat Buchcr and the military w ere magnificent w hen called in
March ij
Claude Auchinlcck came for his last official interview He certainly regrets
the change He says he can get no decisions from Baldcv Singh who is
always away on political tours and anyway is afraid to give decisions by
himself
Then came Patel Wc discussed die appointment of a DID vice Smith,
Patel wants to put in an Indian ICS man on the grounds that there is no
Indian policeman good enough (actually there is a good Muslim but Patel
will not have him and he will not serve under Patel) I said that it would
be bad for police morale if the plum appointment in the I P went to an
outsider P took the usual communal line about the Punjab and accused
the ofEcjah and police, who are mainly Muslim, of bias He had written
to me advocating martial law, but I explained to him the disadvantages
We then got on to the Budget against which he declaimed very hotly, it
has obviously got Bula and Big Business*, with whom P works closely,
very much on the raw, and they are using every means to get it amended
P wants the whole Budget taken again in Cabinet I said we must wait
now for the Select Committee & report Patel was very friendly at the
finish and we have always dealt on frank terms and have respected one
another He is entirely communal and has no sense of compromise or
generosity towards Moslems, but he is more of a man than most of these
Hindu politicians
The vanguard of Mountbatten s large staff turned up
430
DISMISSAL
March 18
I fell behind all the time today ami never got abreast of the work There
was a continual succession of files and visitors
I had a long talk \\ ith Liaquat mainly about the Budget He said that
it would have been perfectly easy for Nehru to come and sec him if the
Congress wished to propose any modifications in the Budget The fact
-was that Big Business, headed b> Birla and Dalmia, had got at the Con-
gress High Command, and that instead of coming to him direct they had
intrigued behind his back in the Select Committee Actually he had now
carried his proposals through the Select Comnuttec with some modifica-
tions of the Business Profits Ta*.
I have always liked Liaquat and thought him full of common sense, but
he has no use for Hindus Still if he had been in Jinnah*s place I think we
could have got a solution,
Azad spent most of his interview after lunch about the records of the
Political Depattmenk Congress have an idea, that we are destroy ing all
inconvenient or compromising flies about the States and our relations
with them, and want to try and. ha\ c a finger m the matter I lent htm.
Arthur's 1 book on his pilgrimage to Mecca, and he said that it was a \ery
fait and accurate account and that Arthur had gained a great insight into
the manners and customs of the Arabs (Azad \v as born in Mecca and spent
many years there )
In the cvemng 1 saw Matthai, the ablest and most impartial of my
Mnmttrs Wc talked mainl} of the Budget, I think he really approves the
proposals and realises the difficulties Congress is m if they back Birla and
Co but he had to put acx oss the party hne of modification of the proposals
On the question of Bnnsh withdrawal he was gloomy on the future
prospects ot India but said our real mistakes began 4.0 ) cars ago f especially
with Curzon's bureaucratic centralizanon and worship of efficiency,
instead of putting mdians gradually into the saddle and accepting a lower
standard of efficiency
March ip
I had one of Nehru s rather intemperate letters on my request to him not
to go to Peshawar, it ended with a demand for the resignation of the
Governor I sent a soothing reply and said nothing about his demand with
regard to the Governor
* Major A J B Wavell MX FRGS a cousui of Lord Wavcll. went to Mecca and
Medina in 1908 and wfote A Modern Pi\gf\m m Mecca (London 191 2) He wa* killed in East
e Viceroy greets his s tcussor Lord Mouuthatten
18-23 MARCH 1947
431
Cabinet meeting m the cv cinng began with the I N A* case, I saved
discussion on it by sayuig tint I assumed that Cabinet supported the
demand for the release of the prisoners, and when they assented I an-
nounced my intention to o\ cr-rulc my Cabinet for the first time in my
Viccroyalty, at what will probably be my last Cabinet meeting. Only
Mandal tried to start an argument on the merits of the case, and I stopped
him. Nehru said that my decision would have serious consequences but
on the whole they took it quite well- After that we got through quite a lot
of business.
March 20
A day of iarewells and packing. Two Nepalcsc gcneraJi came to give me
a farewell message from die Maharaja of Nepal
Then Mandal gave mc a half-hour discourse on the disabilities of the
Scheduled Castes, their regret that the Bntish arc going and their fears for
the future It was all on the usual lines, but Mandal spoke with obvious
sincerity and showed up better than at previous interviews when I have
found hun tiresome. I think part of his trouble is that his command of
English is poor* And he is not clever.
Little V P. Mcnon came in the afternoon He has always been an
admirer of mine, I think, and regrets my going 1 Always an optimist, he
thinks the budget dispute will be settled by Liaquat giving way He gets
this from Patel, I expect*
In the evening a farewell party tor the Stiff, about 300, I don't think
I have ever properly realised the size of the Vice-regal household. Then
Mavlankar, President of the Legislative Assembly, and his wife came in
to say goodbye, quite a gesture I think from a very confirmed Congress-
man
Finally a farewell dinner-party to the Cabinet, which went quite well
Nehru was quite genial and talkative, he is apt sometimes to be silent and
aloof at these gatherings I gathered from Liaquat that compromise on the
Budget is possible*
March 22
My last day A good turn-out for the last morning ride from Hauz Khas,
12 of the Personal Stal£ Fchaty and the Policemen
Ismay, Mieville and some of M-B's staff turned up for lunch and I had
about an hour with Pug Ismay and Mieville after lunch They do not
1 V P Mcnon was a great adirurtr of Lord Wavell and always stressed what a 'good man
he was,
D 160 f f
432 DISMISSAL
seem really to know very much about it or to luvc any \cry ntw or
definite policy
Then came die ceremonial arrnal of the M-Ils, die Bod) guard in full
dress looked well and he was \ay pfcascd with them.
I talked with Dickie M-B from about 4.30 p m, to 7 p m. He began by
telling mc that the P M liad sent for him and asked lum to take on ihejob
other bcfoic ot at the tunc I left England last December So that Attlec *
assurances at that time and subsequent letters w ere completely insincere.
He said that Attlec had been quite mo\ cd by my telegram assuring him
that I had no intention to make trouble for the Go\ crnmcnt and w as w ell
disposed
He then talked of the 1 N A , having in mind apparently to reduce the
sentences of those serving sentences for brutality as 'part of a political
gesture' He also proposed to write to Gandhi and jmnah to ask them to
come and sec him, one more Viceroy, I suppose, who hopes to reconcile
these intractable personalities He seems to ha\c succeeded 111 getting
compensation for the Services, thanks partly, I think, to ni> cables to him
not to come out Without settling this.
He also talked of his hope of getting India to accept some form of
Dominion status.
At 7 1,5 p m. 1 saw Liaauat about the Budget crisis He was prepared to
consider the compromise I suggested, 1 but only to prevent my successor
from the embarrassment of a contentious Cabinet meeting at once, and
provided Congress agreed to support all other Budget proposals, other-*
wise he would right out the battle m the Assembly and J am on a strong
wicket , as I think he is We parted on \ crj friendly terms 1 like Liaquat
and have a high opinion of him.
We dined alone with the Mountbattens After dinner Pug Ismay,
Micvule and George Abell came in and wc talked politics for about an
hour and a hal£
March 27 (Clandges Hotel)
The departure ceremony from Delhi on 23rd went ofFall right. The M-Bs
contrary to precedent came to the airfield to see us of£ w hich was rnendly
On arriving at Karachi, I paid a short visit to the 2nd Bn., (Black Watch)
and we then flew on and got to Habbanry eh at 11 30 p m. and staged at
the A O C *s house Next day w e flew on to Rome, arriving about 4pm.
local tune Next day (25 th) we spent most of the morning at the Vatican,
1 Liaqmt accepted a reduction of the raw of the proposed Busmesj Profit* Tax from
20 per cent to 16J per cent He had original]/ proposed 1$ per cent in the Budget
22-28 MARCH JG47
433
mainly in the Smme Chapel, and took off at 1 1 45 a in Wc got to North™
holt at about 4 p m P-L, A V Alexander met me from the Government,
Cnpps sent the excuse of pressing business At Jo) ce's pressing request I
said a. few innocuous words to the Press, very haltingly We then went off
to Clandges where the Government had booked us a suite for 10 days
The only thing I have to record from the India angle in the next few
days is a talk with one of my staff He said that there had been a leak from
PS V's office, that George AbelKs Indian stenographer, whom he trusted
absolutely though I had once or twice questioned the advisability of
trusting any Indian with really secret stuff, had been passmg copies of
George's letters out to Congress, that Nehru had brought some home and
showed them to Cnpps as evidence that my staff was at heart biased
against Congress, and that this was largely responsible for my dismissal
Now if there is any truth m this, it does show an amazing mentality on
the part of the Cabinet Ministers concerned Instead of warning- P S V
or myself of the leakage, and, if they considered that the letters which
were produced showed disloyalty to EMG's policy on the part of
P S V or myself, confronting us with them and asking for an explanation,
they allow the leakage of secret correspondence to go on — or at least fail
to warn us — and make arrangements to replace me more or less at Nehru T s
bidding Politics is a dishonest business , R A B Buder said to me in
1943* It certainly does change the ethical code of men who would, I
suppose regard themselves normally as men of honesty and principle
I am glad that i have finished with politics 1
March 28
I went round to Downing Street this morning by request to meet the
India Committee — P M , Cnpps, Alexander, P-L, Listowcl, Addison
They questioned me for about 40 minutes m a rather routine and per-
functory fashion, as if they knew all the answers already Towards the
end the S of S said Is there any general advice you can give us on how
to proceed ? ' t said that I had given them advice and that they had not Jiked
it, that they had presumably given my successor full instructions, and that
anything that I w as likely to say could hardly have any influence For what
it was worth, however, I could only recommend them to make a last
1 It is in disputable that there was a leak from the P S V *t office not only of Sir George
Abcll ■ letten but also of top secret document* and that this came to the notice of Cabinet
Ministers in the U K They did not diidosc the leak to Laid WavtU but as a remit of the
knowledge of it Bnttsh stenographers were employed to handle secret correspondence what
Mount batten became Viceroy There is no reason to suppose that the leak was responsible
for Waveli * dumi&sal
434 DISMISSAL
effort to bring the Parties together, and if that railed, as it seemed likely
to do, to start on derailed arrangements for the partition of India, so as to
a.\oid confusion when we leave, and in the hope that there may he some
last-minute arrangement about Defence etc Shortly afterwards the P M.
said: 1 Well, thank you, that is all, I think'; and bowed me out without one
single word of thanks or commcadaaon- He is a singularly Ungracious
person* I had no desire for an insincere little speech and was glad to be
spared it, but it was not a good exhibition of manners*
March ji
I think I had better close this record of my time in India at this point. I had
a talk on India with Bohbery Cranborne today, and he said that it was
a great pity that H.M G had not taken my advice and consulted the
Opposition on Indian affairs The Lords had always found it almost im-
possible to extract information about India from P-L, who was vague
or evasive in his replies. This was one of the reasons why they had intended
to press the debate in the Lords to a division. It was the speech of Halifax
that had led them to re-consider the decision.
R. A. B. Butler said that my final broadcast had created great im-
pression, and was simple and dignified.
I dined with Monty, who talked mainly about forthcoming Conference,
Spearhead.
I am not going to attempt any summary here of my Viceroyalty. My
last letter to the Kmg was something in the nature of that. Whether I shall
ever ha\e the time or inclination to go through all these journals again
and comment on them, I am rather doubtfuL I think I have always been
honest in the entries and have tned to represent accurately the events,
discussions and impressions of the time Perhaps they may be of interest
to my family, ot to some future historian many ^cars hence. It has been
interesting to write them down though rather a burden at times.
THE LAST THREE YEARS
Wavell lived for rather more than three years after his return to England
Though he received many honours—he was made Constable cf the Tower,
Lord Lieutenant of London, and Chancellor of Aberdeen University — and was
appointed the London Vice-Chairman of the South African diamond Company
ofde Beers and was much m demand as a lecturer, lie was not very happy and
felt that he was spending Ins time ttnprqfitahly If his health had not deteriorated,
he would probably have settled down to some serious writing He left hy his
bedside tn hospital chapter headings for his memoirs and was planning to write
a detective story during convalescence
When he left India in March 1947 he for a while gave up keeping his
Journal, but tn August he decided to start it again and continued making entries
at irregular intervals till March to.$Q Tiiottgh he still had a good many public
and official engagements, he no longer field high office and so not many of
the entries are of historical interest, hut a few have been selected for inclusion
tn this volume that have a bearing on Indian affairs or that chronicle his last,
and ultimately successful, battle with H MG over the grant of proportionate
pensions to British members of the lou er grades of the Indian services or that
give a good picture of his interests and activities during these closing years
He restarted the Journal on the day of Indian Independence
August Jj, taw (Indian Independence Day)
I gave up keeping a journal when I got back from India in March But it
may be worth while to continue it on a reduced scale, and I wilt briefly
summarise the 4 or 5 months since I came home
The Duke of Gloucester (acting for the King in S Africa) and Queen
Mary saw me on Apni 2 and questioned me generally on Indian affairs,
but there was nothing of any moment in these interviews
Then I wait up to St Andrews for a month St Andrews University
gave mc an honorary degree at the same time as they made George
Cunningham Rector
During June 1 took my scat in the House of Lords as an Earl I took
honorary degrees: at Cambridge and Oxford and attended meetings and
receptions of various bodies and societies Nearly all these involved
malum; speeches, which is not a thing I do easily or wdL
436 THE 1AST THREE YEARS
All this time I was trying to find something to do, sJ^ce until this was
more or less settled it was not much use to look senouiiy ">r a home
Listowel, now S of S for India, asked mc to com* and see him on
July ii, and we had an hour's general talk on the situation 1£1 India He
said that it was only my visit home at the end of 1946 tl* at had driven the
Government into a policy and sa\ ed the situation by preventing drift
I said I thought I had perhaps been a bit too rude and uncompromising,
and had annoyed Ministers He said that this was so, but that nothing
else would have made them do anything definite
Q and Joan and 1 went up to Scotland on July 15th &r the Highland
Brigade Gathering and Ball at Edinburgh, a Royal GanJcn Party at Holy-
roodhouse, and the presentation by the City of Perth of i» freedom to The
Black Watch and to myself We had a fine day for th£ "Perth ceremony,
at which the Queen was present, and all w ent w ell
Next I went to Germany to see the 1st Battalion Watch) Just
before 1 started off I had an offer of an appointment >vith de Beers, the
big diamond concern in South Africa After seeing 5"* Ernest Oppen-
heimer, the head of de Beers and practically of the diatnoid concerns of
the world, I gather, I agreed to take the appointment
I Sew over to Germany on the afternoon of August 5 and spent the
night near the Minden Gap It was near here that the famous disaster to
Y&rro's legions had halted for ever the spread of Roman civilisation to
Eastern Europe
Next day 1 flew to Dmsberg and carried out a strenuous programme
with the 1st Bn then on to Luneberg and finally Berlin, where I had not
been since 1936
October 14
Q's strenuous flat or house-hunting has not been very successful and we
are still homeless, but arc in negotiation for a flat in Kingston House,
Kmghtsbndge, not very attractive but possible
I saw Evan Jenkins and on the 1 ith had a long talk with Ismay» home
for a short visit on Indian affairs He put the Punjab tragedy down to the
failure of the Indian Army in the Border Force to take action against their
own community and the organisation by the Sikhs vho had obviously
made great preparations Nehru and Liaquat did their best and the former
especially showed great personal courage and considerable statesmanship
October 31 (International Sportsmen* Club)
On October 21 I carried the Sword of State at the Opening of Parliament,
15 AUGUST-20 NOVEMBER Ip47
437
Andrew Cunningham earned the Crown and Portal the Cap of
Maintenance
I went ofF the same night to St. Andrews where I gave the Walker
Trust lecture on Leadership on the evening of the 22nd I had a very good
and attentive audience
On the 24th I went on to Aberdeen and next day was my installation
as Chancellor It went well and my rather Itght-hearted address on games
and athletics was very well received As was inevitable, I suppose, the
Press seized on my somewhat controversial remarks about waste of time
at cricket and in football pools and gave them full publicity, while they
entirely ignored for the most part my much more important speech at
St Andrews
November 20 (Royal wedding)
Today we had seats in the Abbey for the wedding which went well The
King had ordained that Field Marshals should carry their batons even if
they were only in Service dress, and wear two stars of orders Perhaps the
only time 1 shall carry my baton
I had about an hour this evening with Dickie Mountbatten He was as
voluble as ever and full of confidence and personality, but had evidently
had a gruelling time He paid a great tribute to George Abel! and his staff
He said my stock stood high m India and that all the political leaders
respected my integrity He has very much gone over to the Congress side,
as was I suppose inevitable in his position, says Jinnali has become an
impossible mcgaloiuauiac, and that Nehru has shown himself a really
great man He thinks Liaquat the only man on the Muslim side who has
shown sense and some statesmanship, which about tallies with my judge-
ment But Liaquat is a sick man and may collapse, which Wilt leave
Pakistan barren indeed The bitterness of feeling between Hindu and
Muslim is worse than ever before and neither side trusts or believes the
other about anything
On Dominion status, Dickie thinks that both wish to retain connection
With the Commonwealth but India will Imc to do some sort of face-'
saving in view of the declared resolution to become an independent
Republic I said I thought it would be highly dangerous to have Pakistan
in die Commonwealth, and India out of it M B said he entirely agreed
but that the Service chiefs ac home seemed to him to be playing with the
idea of making a base of Pakistan and letting India go, if she wished. I said
1 thought such a policy would be suicidal.
438 THE LAST THREE YEARS
We had some talk of his Despatch and my criticisms of it, in the course
of which he warned me again as he had done at Delhi that Winston was
no fnend of nunc and had never been loyal to me
November 30
On the 27th I took an honorary degree at London University, a good
ceremony But it Drought me a great disappointment I mentioned to the
Vice Chancellor at dinner that, haying already four Degrees in Law, 1 had
nearly asked for a D Lite when London University ofFcred me another
Degree in Law He said I do wish you had, and I do wish we had thought
of it for ourselves* I had not liked to ask for it, hut I might have had it — •
and had it alongside Maseflcld.
December 1
The UNO decision on the partition of Palestine is a sad business — not
so much the decision itself though that I am sure is bad as the method of
reaching it It has heen decided not on its merits hut by a process of dis-
honest and discreditable lobbying among the smaller powers It is disgrace
ful that a vital question like this should be decided by the venal votes of
such countries as Haiti Liberia Paraguay The Times reports that partition
could have been carried m no other city than New York where Jewish
influence \s so strong
December 7
The flat in Kingston House is finally taken but we are neither of us at all
enthusiastic about it We shall be cramped nt tt and we don't really like
London hut anyw ay it is some place of our own at last I have been made
Constable of the Tower when Philip Chetwode vacates next March
Decemher ji (SeJham House)
The second load of furniture came into the fiat on the 23rd, and on Xmas
Eve we motored down here where we have spent a very quiet week
indeed.
So ends 1947— * thoroughly bad year I think on the whole I am well
out of India though I hated the way they chucked me out and should
have Ukcd to see the thing through, I have been rootless and unhappy ever
since I came home unable to settle down to anything or to make a plan
taking things as they come accepting invitations to lecture to dinners,
and to functions of all kinds without really wanting to do any of them,
20 NOVEMBER 1947^3 FEBRUARY IO48 439
undecided where to live or what to do There seems to be no prospect of
getting down to some writing which might I think interest me I can only
hope that some of the things I have done in my various responsibilities
have been of some use to someone
And I have lost my best rnend, Arthur Wauchope, and have not felt
really well all the year. However, the family on the whole are flourishing,
and Archie John will he home soon
1948
January zp (In plane between London and Tripoli)
The last four days have been a terrible rush, just before departure for
S Africa, Amongst other engagements Q and I lunched at the House of
Lords, and I then asked a question about the unprotected European civil
servants, whose case I am trying to get reconsidered.
Last mgbt I never went to bed at all, what with packing, tidying up,
finishing off my outstanding correspondence and talking w ith Archie
John
February 1st (Forest House, Federation Road, Johannesburg)
The journey out was uneventful and dull We got to Johannesburg about
7 P m I was greeted with the news of Gandhi's assassination an unexpected
end for a very remarkable man I never accepted him as having much of
the samt in fus composition but he was an extremely astute politician
"Whether he did more harm or good for India it w ould be hard to say, but
Indians will ha\e no doubt, and he certainly hastened the departure of the
British, which was his life's aim But he wrecked the plan of the Cabinet
Mission which might possibly have seemed a united India and saved all
the massacres 1 do not believe that he rcalJy worked for an understanding
with the Muslims, when his influence might have secured it He was
always the lawyer and the bama who would dnve a hard bargain and
then find some legal quibble to deprive his opponent of what he had
seemed to gain I always thought he had more of malevolence than
benevolence in him* but who am I to judge, and how can an English-
man estimate a Hindu' Our standards arc poles apart, and by Hindu
standards Gandhi may have been a saint T by any standards he was a very
remarkable man
I have had two crowded daxs here.
February 3 (Blue Mountains, Beach Road, Muiscnbcrg)
I flew down ) ester day from Johannesburg, about 3 hours Sir Ernest
440 THE t AST THREE YEARS
Oppcnheimct and Lady O met mc and brought me out here, a house they
ha\ c built by the sea.
I motored in. to Capetown this morning and saw Smuts and Ho&ncj cr.
Smuts looks as }oung in mind and body for his age as ever Wc talked of
the state of Europe and he then cnt on to ipeak of the problems of
Indians mSA. and his hopes of arranging a round-table conference, but
said that the Indians themsck es \\ etc divided into a moderate and extreme
element
February J5 (Kijnberlcy)
I left Capetown on the 12th with the Oppcnheimcrs
Every one in S Afnca talks with apprehension about the Indian problem
and the Nam e problem. The sanctions put on by India hav c hit S A badly
as regards jute, which is badly wanted for bagging the grain crop, and
Smuts is now anxious for a Round Table Conference, to which I tried to
get him to agree before the sanctions, when I was Viccro)
Smuts and his supporters, or most of them, w ould also like a liberal
policy as regards the natives But how c\ en the most liberal policy is going
to secure the permanent domination of a mere handful, comparatively
speaking, of white men in a country of predominantly black men, who
are becoming conscious of their numerical advantage and of the happen-
ings m Asia, no-one can quite foresee
IVavell remained m Smith Africa until the end of February, carrying out
a full programme in connection with the business of de Beers, vtsttttto mines and
factories, attending meetings and meeting many of tfie staff and offictab of the
company
On 2g February lie flew to "Rhodesia where )ie attended a variety of functions
at Salisbury and Bulawayo and met many old friends After another short visit
to Johannesburg he relumed lu>me ott€ March
March 15
I found it had taken poor Q all the $ weeks I was away to get permits for
decorating the flat, so the painters were only just beginning She had,
however, got more hookshehes up There was an enormous mass of
correspondence waiting for me
March $1
Worked away at the case for House of Lords on April 7 John Colville
(Cl\, desmuir) and Scarbrough and femay will speak in support of me,
I think.
3 FEBRUARV-30 JUNE I94S
441
April jo (Kingston House)
Not much to record except the debate in the House of Lords on pensions
for British officials outside the Secretary of State Services This has heen
taking up a good deal of my time since last November when I saw Mount-
batten and found that his representations had had no effect I wrote to
Cnpps and got nothing but a blank refusal, then tried Noel-Baker and
got a polite but non-committal reply* then asked a question in the House
of Lords and got an official sort of answer In the motion for papers which
I moved on the 7th I was supported by Linlithgow, Clydesmuir, Scar-
brough and Ismay Listowcl replied for the Government and put up
a poonsh case. I think we may get something done m the end.
May 31
One official activity during this month was to ask a question in the House
of Lords on the imcovenanted Civil Servants so as to keep the ball rolling
I got an unsatisfactory reply from Listowcl, so wrote him a letter asking
bun whether the Government did propose to do anything for these men
in the end or not, and saying that I must adopt more forthright methods
unless I got a satisfactory reply
June 30
During June I did a good deal of Regimental work, and was very busy
with my campaign on behalf of the uncovenanted Services m India This
culminated in a high-power Delegation to the Minister, Noel-Baker,
probably the highest-powered Delegation which a Cabuiet Minister
has ever received 4 ex-Viceroys -Halifax, Linlithgow, Mountbatten
and self, 7 ex-Govemors of Provinces-Scarbrough, Burrows. Jenkins,
Twynam, Caroe, Hallett, Lewis, Auchinleck, Ismay, Stanley Reed
Bmerson (Railways) John Colville (Clydesmuir), John Anderson and
Amery would also have been with us but for unavoidable engagements,
and Wyke if I had had his letter in time Though we got nothing definite
out of N-Baker, I think that he was impressed and that we shall succeed
in time Our mam opponents arc Patel in fcidia, and the Chancellor of the
Exchequer' at home The idea now is that Mountbatten and I should have
a meeting with the Finance Ministers of India and Pakistan, who are in
London for the discussion of the sterling balances
Archie John went off to the School of Army Education at Castle
Buchanan I don't like his becoming so taken up with Education, but it
"Tbs
442 THE LAST THREE YEARS
seems to be ^hat he likes He has teen with us for quite a long time —
always good tempered and charming, thoroughly efficient, and lamentably
untidy
July $
Noel-Baker sent a message to ask if I would come and sec him, but on
ringing bim up 1 found that Cnpps would not be there and that he merely
wished to explain to me the difficulties in persuading the Indians to pay
proportionate pensions to the jion-S of S Services I told him that what-
ever the Indians did or did not do, the men w ere our men and H.M G s
responsibility I had a message later that he would try to arrange a meeting
with Cnpps next week.
July 21
Another hectic ten days or so I went off on the 9th to Germany to \i$tt
the Regiment. I think the battalion is in good shape and the National
Service men se^m a good lot Today w e lunched at House of Lords with
Mountbattens The Duke of Edinburgh and he were being introduced
into H- of L After the introduction ceremony I went off to see Noel-
Baker in his room at the H. of C On the w ay I met Winston in a passage
and lud a talk he was \ery aflable N-B admitted that we had Tvon our
case over the nan S of S Services and that something was bound to be
done for them. The strength of our Deputation had convinced even
Stafford Cnpps
Octobers
I spent September in Scotland, shooting, stalking and placing golf at
Sl Andrews The news of Jinnah*s death canie while I was at St. Andrews
I never hked Jinitah, but had a certain reluctant admiration for hum and
his uncompromising attitude He certainly had much justification for his
mistrust of Congress and their leaders
At 1 uriom dates during October IVavell had several long talks on India with
Indian and other persottahttes The talks u ere interspersed wilt many other
activities — hts work for de Beers % regimetUal affairs* lectures either given or
attended, golf and shooting when time permuted, aid atisxtto Denmark
Octoher 16
I had haI£-an-hour s talk with J P Snvastava at the Athenaeum on
Wednesday, and with Nye nest day I had nearly an hour on the affairs of
30 JUNE-3 I OCTOBER I94S
443
India He tells mc they had something very like a serious famine 111 Madras
last winter but suppressed the news, had wc been still m charge it would
have had headlines He thinks that relations between India and Pakistan
nught become reasonably good and things settle down if the Kashmir
dispute were out of the way
October 31
I had dinner with Liaquat last Sunday at Clandges, no-one else there
except Rahnntoola, the High Commissioner, who hardly spoke L held
forth almost continuously for 3 hours, he is 111 good form, looking well
and very fnendly He told mc ofJm discourse to the Premiers Conference,
advocating much closer relations, now that the Dominions were not all
of the same race, and of a long audience with the King, whom he found
\\ ell-informed and fnendly We spoke of Kashmir, which he said was the
only bar now to better relations with India, discussions with Nehru had
led nowhere and Pakistan would never agree to Kashmir's accession to
India L was obviously bitter about Mountbattcn, though he said little
He told me the circumstances o£]mnah*s sudden death We then discussed
some personalities Nazimuddin, Bhopal, of whom he asked mc my
opinion which I gave him frankly, Gha^anfar Ah, who had blotted his
copybook as a Minister by too much jobbery and had been sent as Pak-
istan's representative in Iraq, Firoz Khan Noon, whom he obviously
regarded as a lightweight, Gracey, Mudie and Dundas, with all of whom
he seemed happ^, and some others He described his own Cabinet as not
brilliant but honest, and said, quite truly I believe, that Pakistan had faith
in itself and would get along all right
I asked him about proportionate pensions for the non S of S Services,
and he said it had never been mentioned to him while he was over, but
that Pakistan was quite ready to do the right thing by their British
personnel
On Monday I had tea with Nehru, also in his room at Clandges He
was less forthcoming than Liaquat* less friendly though quite pleasant,
and less buoyant He looked in fact rather worn, but said he was well,
and ascribed it to his practice of standing on his head for a few minutes
every morning Nehru seems to rne to be afflicted with something like
an inferiority complex when he comes to England, I felt the same when
he came over at the end of 1946 I think it requires an applauding crowd
or a hostile reception to stimulate Nehru and he gets neither m London
He spoke on a variety of subjects — Kashmir, Hyderabad, inflation,
shortage of food, personalities — but none very widely or deeply He said
444 THE tAST THUEB YEARS
he thought inflation the mam danger to India, at present and admitted that
they had made a great mistake in taking offcontrols a year ago (I was told
elsewhere that Gandhi was responsible for this), and had had now to
reimposc them It was interesting to find that he was disillusioned ahout
Russia and that the Indian, representative, his sister, had no more freedom
of movement or action than the other foreign representatives I asked him
about proportionate pensions, and he told me that it had been settled
'according to Mountbattens formula', but either did not know or would
not disclose details
That evening I saw Noel-Baker at an evening party of Pakistan, ana
tackled him about the settlement It was fairly obvious* though he pre-
tended ignorance, that the concession was not retrospective and did not
include any compensation I warned him that that would not satisfy us
1 must look into this
StttJwtary of 1948
I suppose 1948 has been a better year than 1047 in that we have got some-
where of our own to live But I dislike a flat and wish we lived out of
London Life is so difficult nowadays, however, that I daresay we should
find ourselves worse offm the country I have too much to do in London
to live a long way out, and Q has always hated the idea of the country
within 20 or jo miles of London So I suppose we shall have to carry on
as we are
I have had an aimless, purposeless, unprofitable year, and have settled
down to nothing I spend most of my time m dealing with matters of little
importance, answering a large correspondence, refusing or accepting
invitations, and so on I spend much time on Regimental affairs but am
not sure that the Regiment would not get 00 just as well by itself Except
for the visit to S Atnca, de Beers has taken up very little of my time
I have succeeded in getting something for the non-Secretary of State
Services m India, which has meant quite a bit of work. I, who am no
speaker have spoken far too often m public, over 30 times this year Even
when the material is good, my delivery is I know unattractive and I would
be much better not to do it,
I wish I could find some real object, such as a book to write, and I wish
I lived by a golf course and could get more opportunity to play
During ig^ WavelTs activities were much the same ds in 19 48 He gave
a itttmbtr of lectures and addresses on military and literary topics, made ui-
numerable speeclies at dmtiers and otiier junctions^ it cnt to Canada, m No vembcr
Tilt tAST TIIRtt YTARS
445
to sec the Black IVotch of Can tda t i title I the Iliad U etch in Gumjny, and
placed a good deal ofg^lflh *Ua brought to a successful conclusion his long
strucgle uuh If M G to yet pulsions fr British memkrs of the suborduM
Indian scri ices n uh tcirospcctn c effut from y August In his Journal
he briefly words that he mo i e J a resolution on the sithect m the 1 torse of U rJs
en 6 July and *haJ a rather unexpected success* Tiic Time* catitc out « ah
a lender next day en 1 Tardy Justice* and the Daily Telegraph commented
Urd Wat ell has u on many battles, but twnc so lon^ drait n out as that u on
in the Upper House ) ester Ja} For sS niantlts he has jcuqht for pension rights
for certain of the lou er gradts of the Indian sett ices Time after time he has
raised the matter on the poor u it It ntt dcasit c result
It seemed yesterday as ij he uas ^oirig to eany his campaign into the
dn tsion lobbies He had formidable support Lord Addison must hate Jilt
tenet cd that he uas not called on to contest the case He announced the
acquiescence of the Get emment amid cheers *
Tftroughout tins ) ear I Vat ell ft It increasingly urtu cll t hat oit consulting a
doctor he uas told that there uas nothing urotig with htm and that he uas
remaiiabty heahhy, and fie stood up to the trips to Germany and Canada,
which uere rather taxing, letter titan he expected In an entry dated jj
December summing up ip^p, he complained, *\{y digestion hasgn en me a tot
of bother and my gotj is as bad aseter I hai e done no u riting u orth u hie *
Tltc last entry that IVavctl made in hts Journal u as dated 15 March ipjt)
and briefly described the 1 tsit of President Auric! of France whom as Lord
Lieutenant of London he had to meet on arrival In April he fell til and under-
ueut an operation He seemed to male a good rccoi cry and uas beginning to
thmk of punts for his com alesccuce, what he had a relapse and died on 24 May
Ttiere uas a State fmeral, and an offer u as made of burml m \ Vesitmtistcr
Abbty near Allettby's graved hut in view of his family* s long connection with
iVmchester special permission 11 as sought* and granted, for him to be buried in
the chantry cloister of Winchester College of which as a boy he had been a
scholar
1 Seep, li nuiy for 15 July
EPILOGUE
THE SOLDIER-VICEROY
The selection of Waveil for appointment as Viceroy was* as he himself
realized, a left-handed compliment His own preference would have been
for some high military command that \\ ould have given him the chance
of redeeming previous defeats by winning victories over the Japanese
He rightly saw himself as the obvious choice for the post of Supreme
Commander, South-East Asia* But Churchill did not want to gn e him
this command, nor were the Americans keen that he should get it Earlier
they had held a high opinion of him, but during the 'Trident* conference,
in Washington in May 1943. the advice that he gave created a bad im-
pression He pointed out— quite correctly, as it proved — that it would be
impossible to launch from India a successful offenme against the Japanese
without far greater resources than were likely to he available in the near
future This appraisal of the situation was unwelcome, and both the
Americans and Churchill preferred to ascribe to Wavell undue pessimism
than to recognize the unpalatable facts Not for the first time nor for the
last, he was unjustly held to be a defeatist.
His reputation was, however, still high in military circles in Bn tarn and
in the country at large Hie memory of his great victories over the
Italians that had lightened the gloom of the winter of 1940-1, had not yet
faded, and many Englishmen still regarded him as their test general To
keep him on as Commander-in-Chief, India, with mainly administrative
duties and to entrust to another Commander the active direction of
operations against the Japanese was out of the question If someone else
was to be appointed Supreme Commander, then a way had to be found
for the honourable removal of Wavdl 60111 the military scene. His
appointment as Governor-General of Australia was mooted, hut a better
means of e* ading his claims to high military command was aHbrded by
the vacancy in the post of Viceroy No other suitable candidate was
readily a\ ailablc and WavclTs recent experience in India gave him some
special qualifications for the post So m the middle of war Britain's best
general was told to put on civilian clothes and become a proconsul
Ax Wavell teumked ui his jautuil, ChuscWll isAesvd&d bissv simply tt*
keep things quiet in India till the war ended. No move or initiative on his
EFiLOCUH
447
part towards solving the political problems was txpcutd or dcurcd He
was to be 4 stop-gap Viceroy who m the political CM would jmt maintain
the status ipij But Wavcll was hardly the nun ea*t for such 3 role, and tt it
souicwlut surprising that Churchill did not rcali/c [hit. It is (rue tiuc a: the
tunc when he chow: him to be Viceroy he !ud not read hit biography of
AllcJib) and was unaware of hu rather progressive views as disclosed m
tlut book* Thar rev elation a few w cck* later came to Churchill as a great
shock and caused him so much annoyance tlut he almost refused to attend
the Cabinet*! dinner to Wavcll on the eve of Ins departure for India But
aside from these liberal sentiments of w Inch Churchill w as at first ignorant,
it u difficult to understand how he could have unarmed tlut such jji
intelligent and remarkable nun as Wa\cll who, moreover, lud beai a
dose w itncss of Allcnby's handling of political problems m Egy pt after
World War I, would be emit ait passively to contemplate the Indian
scene and nuke no endeavour to find answer* to the challenging political
problems tlut it presented
Wa\ell of his ovvn volition addressed himself to these problems from
the very start, later when the war was over, he could not escape them and
they engrossed most of his time and thoughts, robbing him of much of
has enjoyment of his administrate c w ork as Viceroy Though die heavy
burden of routine was often \\ czruomc, he found 2 great deal of die
administrative work intensely interesting and would have liked to luxe
been able to giv e more undiv ided attention to it, Ev cn as it was, the energy
and enterprise that he show cd m die discharge of this part of Ins duties was
remarkable He did more touring of die Prov mccs and States of India and
saw a w ider cross-section of die people than any of lus predecessor*
During his first six months of office he w cm to all the clcv en Pro* mccs of
British India (to Bengal three tunes), spending not less dun a week m
cadi of them and visiting v dbges, agnail rural stations, mines, factoncs,
and odicr establishments besides grantmg a great nuny interviews
On one * isit to Madras lie saw all the Collectors (Heads of District) of
the Province — probably an unprecedented performance Tins extensive
tourmc; was nude possible by the increased facilities for air travel, of
which full adv antage had not previously been taken, but to which Wav ell,
from his experience as a military commander, was well accustomed.
The Journal gives a good idea of one of his mam administrative achicv c-
nicnts — his prompt and firm handling of the Bengal famine and the
success of his dogged and determined efforts to prevent its repetition
Another considerable achievement, touched on occasionally in the
Journal but not particularly emphasized, was the progress nude at Ins
44»
EPILOGUE
instance in the preparation of plans for post-war economic development.
This was a subject in which he took a great deal of interest. He fav oured
projects that would advance the material prosperity of the people rather
than grandiose plans for extending education Full bellies, he said, must
come before full rrnnds Largely as a result of his prompting and prodding,
by 1046 the Provincial Go* ernments, man} of the Indian States, and the
various Ministries and Departments of the Central Government had put
together quite an imposing array of development projects and pro-
grammes, and these, after some dela> owing to the dislocation earned by
Partition, were utilized by both India and Pakistan, indeed they became
the mam substance of India's first Rvc-Year Plan — small in scale, no
doubt, compared with w hat was to follow, but perhaps the most successful
of all the Plans
The extent of Lord WavelTs personal \nitmi\ e as Viceroy was not
fully appreciated outside the narrow circles of New Delhi He was
popularly thought of as a fine old soldier who, being deficient himself in
knowledge and understanding of the work of Viceroy, was content to be
steered along by Sir Evan Jenkins (renowned for his abibty) and other
highly competent cml serv ants Wa\ ell himself testifies that he leaned
quite heavily on Jenkins during his first two ) cars of office, and he was in
the habit of consulting Governors and other highly placed officials But
he was a man of far too outstanding intellect ability, and character to be
guided on! v by the opinions of others Hav ing listened to advice, he
formed his own judgements and took his own decisions Throughout his
tenure of office he was a vigorous and effective Viceroy who did not let
the grass grow under his feci, did not shirk awkward fences, and worked
exceedingly hard He said that he had never worked longer hours in all
his life not even when he was Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. It is
remarkable how manv letters, notes, and memoranda he undertook to
draft himself instead of only touching up the drafts of others As will be
seen fironi some of the examples printed m this volume, he was a good
draftsman and could sum up a situation and make his recommendations
with great cbnrv and logical force — sometimes with too much force and
his drafts had to be watered down* b> his staff No w ondcr he complained
of Pcthick-LawTence s vv ordj and v\ oolly drafting and grew impatient
with the diffuse and futile rigmaroles that flow cd from his pen *
Among the notes that Wavell himself drafted was one for a talk that
he gave to Army Comrnaiidcrs ax the end of January 1947 1 This note
outlines the political strategy that he had followed since his appointment
* Much of tlui note wai bier incorporated tn ha lextcr to H.M. ihc Kicg
EPILOGUE
449
as Viceroy, and provides a useful review of die political side of his work.
The first principle* he said, that he established in his mind was the vital
necessity to the British Commonwealth (and to the whole world) of a
united, stable, and friend J y India The obvious difficulty was that unity
and stability seemed only possible if the Bntish retained control, but if
they did so, they were most unlikely to secure the friendliness at any rate
of the educated part of the population Moreover he was convinced that at
the end of the war it would not be possible to induce the Bntish people to
make the effort that would be required to retain control of India against
the wishes of a large part of its people
He examined carefully whether it would be possible to make the more
moderate elements m the country f who had supported the Bntish during
the war, the basis for a stabie and friendly India Such elements would hav e
included the moderate political leaders who during the \*ar had served m
the Executive Council and National Defence Council, the Pnnccs, the
landowners, and many of the industrial and commercial magnates who
wanted a peaceful transfer of power and a continuation of the Bntish
connection He very soon perceived that this would not be feasible Few
if any people would have the courage boldly to stand out against the
leaders of Indian nationalism as represented^ antagonistically, by die
Congress and the Muslim League, unless they \\ ere assured that the British
would continue their rule indefinitely, and no such assurance could be
gi\ en
He therefore came to two conclusions first that the attempt must be
made to build up a stable and friendly India in conjunction with the
existing leaders of Indian nationalism, particularly the Congress leaders
however unpromising this line of action might appear to be, and secondly
that a start in this direction must be made well before the end of the war,
since an Exccutw c Council dominated by the political leaders would be
much easier to handle while the war still provided valid excuse for fairly
close control by the Viceroy
These conclusions, which he convened to Churchi 11 in Ins letter to hnn
of 24 October 1944* were the basis of tlic Simla Conference 111 the summer
of 1945 The Conference ended m failure and was followed immediately
by two radicr unexpected events, die collapse of Japanese resistance at least
a } car car her dun had been foreseen, and die complete \ tctory of die
Labout i'ajct^ u\ the General Elections la the U KL.
A fresh start had to be nude, and as a preliminary, General Elections
were held throughout India The results confirmed that Jinnali lud
greatly strengdicncd his position and now lud die backing of nearly all
450
EPILOGUE
the Muslims Before these results were fully known, Wavell drew up
proposals for making a second attempt to form a Congress-League
Coalition Government and also for starting constitutional discussions and
for tackling decisiv cly the Pakistan issue, lfjinnah pressed it The decision
to send out the Cabinet Mission caused these proposals to be put aside,
and there follow cd the Mission's interminable discussions which m the end
left the Congress and the League even more embittered and exasperated
than they were at the beginning and achieved no real agreement of any
kind But the Mission had the mcnt of producing what appeared to be
a workable constitutional plan that both the Congress and the League
could be induced to accept, "Wavell considered that real success might have
been achieved, if this plan had been put forward firmly as the award of
the Power m possession rather than merely suggested as a basis for dis-
cussion But the Mission, reflecting presumably the wishes of the British
Government, v*erc unwilling to take the stronger line that he recom-
mended
Wa\ ell felt that the Missions plan wa& Britain s last throw in India and
that there must be some agreed strategy in case it failed It would be fatal,
he argued, for the British to hang on to responsibility when they were
rapidly losing the pow er of exercising it, and to run the nsk of becoming
involved in a civil war or in anti-European troubles and of being eventu-
ally forced to scuttle out lgnomnuously The strategy he therefore ad-*
vocatcd, if the Mission's plan was not accepted by the parties or failed in
its working out, was \oluntanly to relinquish control m India by st3gcs,
handing over m the first mstance the southern part of the country T where
the communal problem was not acute, and remaining m the northern part
for a further limited period only He put forward this Breakdown Plan 1
while the Mission was still in Delhi but he could not persuade the British
Government to make up their mind about it Later, in September 1946,
when it had become obvious that the Mission's constitutional plan had
a \ery poor chance of success, he pressed his Breakdown Plan on the
British Government again giving now a precise time schedule — with-
drawal was to be announced and to begin early in 1947 and was to be
completed by 31 March 1948 Again the British Government stalled
In December 1946 he went to England and personally put before the
Government the absolute necessity for a definite pohev of some kind He
suggested four possible courses of action (including his own Breakdown
Plan) if at bv this tunc seemed almost certain no progress could be made
with the Mission s plan After many hours of conference he failed to get
the Government to commit themselves to any definite course It turned
tPHOGVli
out in the end that the only firm decision the) ha J reached was to dismiss
rum from the office of Viccro)
It ts *cr> clear from this rcucw that throughout his Viccroplry
Wa\cll Iiad x firm grasp of the political situation and wclI-concci\cd,
logical plans for dealing with it But unfortunate!) he never had a free
hand He \\ai couumnlly obstructed vid thwarted, ftnt by Churchill $
prcdomuuml) Tory Co\ eminent and then hy tlic Labour Co\ crnmcnt
of Mr Attlcc Consequently he was rarcl) able to ukc at the appropriate
time the steps that he saw to be required It is remarkable tint despite all
the hindrances put in his way b) succcs&n c British Go\ eminent* and their
failure to support hnn at critical moments he came as near as he did to
achiev ing the almost impossible task of bringing Independence to India
m a maimer satisfactory to all parties Without these hindrances he might
w ell lu\ c been successful
The founders of British pow er in India, Ch\ c. Warren I ladings, and
Wdlcslc)t would nc\cr have achieved what they did if m those dap the
Home Authorities had been ahlc to exercise the same close control o\ er
them as the) could o\cr Wa\ell in the twentieth century They would
ha\ c liked to exercise such control but the slowness of communications
between India and England two hundred )cars ago precluded them from
doing so and enabled, and at times compelled, the men on the spot to
act on their own responsibility as the) thought best The Directors and
the Board of Control might later complain that they lud disregarded
instructions, and might criticize, censure, and disgrace them. Warren
Hastings was impeached, Wellcslcy was recalled But what they lud done
Could not be undone
In our own day the British. Go\ crnmcnt were all too slow to realize that
in carry ing out the difficult and delicate task of relinquishing pow cr in India
they must trust the man on the spot, give him ample authority and when
necessary, support, and if they did not trust his judgement, must replace
him, Attlcc*s Government did not fully trust Wavcll and did not fully sup-
port him, and when at last, belatedly, they decided to replace him, all chance
of transferring power in India without disaster had vanished His successor
Wisely insisted that more ample authority should be granted to him
This disharmony between Wavcll and two successive Governments m
the UK w as frustrahng for him personally and calamitous for India It
made partition with all its disasters inevitable WJiat were die reasons for
this disharmony *
Wa\ ell s differences with Churchill s Government are easily compre
hensiblc They were not his fault. Promises had been made to India of
452 EPILOGUE
Independence* but Churchill's Government as a whole did not sincerely
intend to try to fulfil them and habitually disregarded India's needs and
aspirations* "blocking even small concessions to Indian sentiment that
Wavell proposed He soon discovered that the Cabinet was not "honest in
its expressed desire to make progress* The outgoing Viceroy, Lord
Linlithgow, also observed that a chief factor in the problem of Indian
political progress was 'the dishonesty of the British* These judgements of
two Viceroy s go a long way to justify the deep Indian suspicion of British
intentions Amery, who was at any rate honest in his intentions, put the
position very plainly m a letter to Wa\ dl of August 1944
You and I both genuinely mean to implement the Government's
pledges, if they can be implemented, and at any rate to make quite clear
that "w e are sincerely doing our best to promote a solution The Prime
Minister passionately hopes that any solution involving the fulfilment of
our pledges can still somehow or other be prevented, and with that in
view naturally makes difficulties at every stage In between come the
Cabinet, most of whom agree with us in their hearts, and would do so
even more if it became a question of stating a policy in public But when
in the Cabinet room a particular question crops up t they are overborne
by the Pnme Minister's vehemence and are glad to find an escape from
open disagreement with him by accepting arguments agautst a particular
matter brought up, whether it be an Indian Finance Member, Bajpai's
status, or the terms of an answer to Gandhi We have just to be patient and
carry on as best we can,
Wavell T*as both patient and persistent, and ultimately extracted from
ChurchuTs Government permission to make a political move, but only
after eight months* delay, with the result that when the move, 1 e the
Simla Conference, faded there was no time for him to try again before
the war came to an end.
m retrospect it seems doubtful whether m Ins dealings with ChurdulVs
Go^ eminent Wavell could have done much better than he did, but he
probabl) nude a mistake in raising w ith the Cabinet at the very beginning,
before he had even got out to India the question of a political mo\c He
himself wanted to make such a move, not, indeed immediately but well
before the war ended Would this be acceptable to his masters, the British
Government 3 His instinct as a soldrcr was to put the question and seek
a directive and it was natural that his Pmatc Secretary, Sir £ van Jenkins,
framed as a civi? servant snoufd encourage rum to do so But pofmcaJfy it
was unwise and Amcry, the politician, should lu\c headed him off it
He should have told him that the Cabinet did not want to be bothered
EPILOGUE
453
with India and would only be irked by any suggestion of a political move,
and that he should first get furnseff well into the saddle as Viceroy and
then, after six to nine months, come forward with his proposals which he,
Amery, would fully support and which the Cabinet, at that stage, would
find it difficult to reject.
This sort of advice was given by Mr R. A (Lord) Butler In an interest-
ing talk with Sir Evan Jenkins at the Cabmct's Farewell Dinner to Lord
Wavell, he expressed the view that Wavell was wrong in trying to get
guidance from the Cabinet, that in politics there can he no long-term
planning or 'grand strategy 1 , that the political art is necessarily empirical
and ui a sense dishonest, and that Wavell's right course was to go to India
without settled ideas, m the knowledge that the Cabinet v. ould in fact try
to act on any recommendation he might make 1 This was sound advice,
but it came too late The matter had already gone to Cabinet and aroused
Churchill's wrath
The ill e fleets of this mistake were at most marginal It may have
enhanced Churchilfs prejudice against Wavell and against India and
contributed slightly to his reluctance eighteen months later to agree to the
proposals for the Simla Conference, but it did not appreciably influence
the course of events
Wavell's differences with Attlee's Labour Government were more
complex, more damaging in their effects, and require more detailed
analysis Atdee, while in Churchill s Cabinet, had never been very helpful
to Wavell over India and, as records now reveal, had tended to be critical
of him, bewailing the fact that he was not a politician Wavell was unaware
of this criticism and readily overlooked Attlec's previous failure to give
him firm support- He welcomed the more sympathetic attitude towards
India's problems that, with the advent of the Labour Government,
immediately became apparent in Whitehall, and his relations with the
new Cabinet Ministers were at first quite happy But ab initio the Labour
Government, particularly their chief India expert, Sir Stafford Cnpps,
were far too deeply committed to the Congress point of view and far too
prone to give ear to Congress propaganda This was the real source of the
disharmony that developed All along Cnpps was in contact with Nehru
either directly or indirectly through Congress agents and propagandists
in the U K , notably Krishna Menon, whose m formation and advice
Cnpps seemed in course of time to prefer to that of Wa veil himself This
excessive readiness to rely on what was said by Congress became evident
as early as Wavell s visit to England in August-September 1945 The
1 From. i. note recorded by Sir Evan Jenluns at the tunc
4j4 EPILOGUE
Labour Government, under Cnpps** guidance, wanted to renew and
enforce the Cnpps offer of 1942, having been informed that this would
be acceptable to Congress They overlooked the fact that it w ould be
totally unacceptable to the Muslim League
During the Cabinet Mission this bus in favour of Congress was ill
concealed. The results were unfortunate By the time the Mission left,
Jmnah and the League* aware that Congress were now, by 1 strange
paradox, the favourites of the British Government, had become suspicious
and resentful, while sonic of the Congress leaders, feeling that they had
Cnpps and the British Government in their pocket and that Wavell was
the one obstacle to their ha\ ing everything their own way, started a subtle,
insidious propaganda, readily sw allowed by Cnpps, that Wavell was in
the hands of 1 C S , and so, by implication, of ana-Con gress, advisers This
led to Attlee's not very tactful suggestion that Wavell needed Sir Maurice
Gw> er as a political adviser Sir Maurice, who had the highest opinion of
Wavell, ridiculed the suggestion, and it seems that Cnpps arid Attlce had
forgotten that among Wav ell's close advisers was V P Menon, the
Reforms Commissioner, a Hindu official who had risen from the tanks
and who, though a most lo) al and admirable civil sen ant, could not be
accused of being anti-Congress*
Wav ell consistently tried to remain impartial and to hold the balance
evenly betw cen the Congress and the League He wanted to deal fairly,
but firmly and decisively* with both parties He w as at one with Congress
in desiring that power should be transferred to a united India He never
favoured Pakistan , and was as anxious as Congress and the British Govern-
ment to avoid the partition of the country "When he went to England tn
December 1946, partition was one of the four possible courses that he
proposed to the British Government, but he did not recommend it Only
when he came home for good at the end of March 1947 did he say that if
a final effort to bnng the parties together faded, arrangements, ihauld he
put m hand for partition
But Pakistan was, in his judgement, an issue that had to be faced. The
demand for it was not just bluff which could easily be called as Nehru
and many of the other Congress leaders hked to imagine As late as
January 1946 Nehru was writing to Cnpps that if the British Gov ernment
made it clear that it would in no way encourage Pakistan, then agitation
for it would rapidly collapse and that the Muslim League leadership were
iBrapahfe of any foraj of direct actios or of lasagitifig any r^aJ trotib)r f
though there might he pett\ not* in some cities 1 This was a complete
1 Letter from Nehru to Cnpp* dated 27 January 1946,
EPILOGUE
455
misreading of the situation, which Wavcll could not accept But he did
intend to grasp the Pakistan ncctlc firmly, and he proposed to do so by
tilling J u mah that if he persisted m the demand for Pakistan* all he could
get w Quid be a 'truncated* Pakistan w ith only half of Bengal and half
of the Punjab The Cabinet Mission agreed to take this line, w hereupon* as
Wa\cll had hoped, J inn all opted for the loose Indian Union adumbrated
in the Missions Plan
It was, however, essential to be read) also to take a firm line with
Congress, and o\er dm \Va\ell was complctJ) let down by the British
Go\cmmcnt His proposal for dealing with Congress** in trans tgcncL was
his Breakdown Plan It served two purposes* since it was likcl> to result
in the division of India* it w as a lc\ cr against Congress, if the) withheld
acceptance, or genuine acceptance, of the Mission plan or otherwise
threatened trouble , and it prepared the way for an orderly withdrawal
of British control The existence of tins Breakdown Plan would enable a
firm line to be taken with Congress* smcc in die c\ cnt of a breach with
them there would be a reasonable alternative on which to fall back
Without its acceptance in principle dicrc could only be weakness and
indecision Wa\ ill Wanted to be able to speak to the Congress leaders, if
they were obdurate* ui die following tenra
We liavc done our best to bring about a settlement and have given you
what we think to be in the circumstances the best and fairest constitutional
plan Since you refuse genuinely to accept it, we propose now to begin
withdrawal of our control from India in accordance with a planned
programme of our own and with due regard for our own interests We
shall first relinquish control m the south of India* wc shall retain control
m the northern Provinces for a limited period* and so long as wc do so*
wc shall continue to try to secure agreement for a united India* bur wc
shall not allow failure to reach agreement or anything else to interfere
with our programme for withdrawal from the whole of India within
a short period of time
If a firm attitude like this had been taken, it is probable that the Con-
gress leaders would have been more reasonable and that all the months of
haggling* amid growing ill will, over the interpretation of the Mission's
plan would have been avoided But the British Government s excessive
deference towards Congress pre\ enced them taking Wa veil's advice and
led them into fatal weakness and procrastination — besides antagonizing
the League They were afraid of anything being said or done that might
offend Congress When Wai ell wanted to point our to Gandhi thar the
interpretation he sought to put on the Mission's plan was inadmissible* he
456 EPILOGUE
was asked by PethicL-LawrcnCe not to press the point When later he
tned to get the British Government to state categorically that the Con-
gress's interpretation of the Mission s plan \vas wrong and that the work
of the Constituent Assembly could not go forw ard until they accepted the
correct interpretation, he was rebuffed The British Government would
not risk a break with Congress, although this cowardice reduced them to
virtual impotence and made them ridiculous in the eyes of the League, for
if the British Government would not sack up for their own interpretation
of their own plan, what would they stick up for ?
Li retrospect, it seems fairly clear that the hold, forthright, masculine
approach that Wav ell wished to adopt towards both parties would have
paid greater dividends than the coaxing and wheedling of Congress and,
at times dishonest cringing that Cnpps favoured, and that if the British
Gov ernmcnt had given Wavell a freer hand and stood four-square behind
him, there w ould have been a better chance of shepherding both the Con-
gress and the League into a Constituent Assembly Whether they w ould
ever have produced an agreed and workable Constitution 1$ another matter,
hut at least a fully representative sovereign body would have been brought
into existence to which the British could have faitly handed over control
The difference of approach of Wavell and the British Go\ eminent
became apparent at the time of the Cabinet Mission It ga\ e rise to some
stormy scenes, and near the end Wavell contemplated resignation The
difference continued after the Mission had gone home The Government
feared that Wavell might precipitate a breach with Congress, and they
were irked by his pressure on them to be honest about the Mission's plan
and by his growing insistence on his own Breakdown Plan Wav ell felt
frustrated by the Government's vacillation and by their unwillingness to
follow the course that he advised or to put forward any alternative
Meanwhile, it seems 1 Congress emissaries in England fed Cabinet
Ministers with Congress propaganda which was not alw ays favovirable to
Wavell Even after Jinnah's call for Direct Action and the Calcutta
killings Nehru sail nursed the illusion that the Muslim League w ere on
the run and could cause no serious trouble — though in fact the country
was heading for civil war He was therefore annoyed with Wavell for
boosting their morale by bringing them into the Interim Government,
especially without any cast-iron guarantee that they would enter the
Constituent Assembly Their entry, however, depended on Nehru and
the British Government rather than on Wavell and neither Nehru nor
1 See for instance Durpa Du From Gtrzott to Nekni and After (London. 1969) p 2 J 4,
and Sudhir Ghosh, Goufti s Emmery (London, 1967) pp 2.0-2 and
EPILOGUE
4$7
the British Government would make their entry possible, the former by
accepting without qualification the Mission's plan, the latter by confirm-
ing unambiguously the League's interpretation of it.
Matters came to a head in December 194.6 during Wave/is visit to
London The British Government were at last induced to make an un-
ambiguous statement about the Mission's plan, and his own Breakdown
Plan now became the main bone of contention The dogged, uncompro-
mising manner m which he demanded that it should be accepted and a
date announced for the ending of British rule in India put the British
Government m a quandary They shrank from facing Parliament with
a proposal to lca\ e India by a fixed date widiout any assurance of the
peaceful transfer of pow cr to an established authority, and some Ministers,
eg Bcvm and Alexander , began to feel a John Bull-ish unwillingness to
Jet the Indian empire shp from their grasp But the Government could put
forward no alternative to Wavcll's proposals, and they did not have the
courage to tell him that they ^ould look for another Viceroy who might
think up something better After many days of discussion the India
Committee of Cabinet seemed at last more or less to agree to the Break-
down Plan and to the fixing of 31 March 1948 as the date for final British
withdrawal, and Attlee assured Wavell that he had got all that he wanted.
But after he had returned to India, they went back on their decisions
What followed was a striking rednctto ad absurdutn of His Majesty's
Government They had rejected Wa veil's demand for the fixing of a date
and had decided to dismiss him from the post of Viceroy, only to find that
his proposed successor made exactly the same demand and would not
agree to take office unless it was granted So Attlee and his Government
capitulated* and soon were quite happy to take credit for a decision that
had in fact been forced upon them
Some of those who were close to these events have felt uncertain whether
it was conflicts of policy or conflicts of personality that were mainly
responsible for Wa veil's dismissal It seems clear that both played a
considerable part Though there was no disagreement over the basic
objective of policy namely to transfer power, if possible, to a united
India, there were, as has been shown , grave divergences over the methods
to he adopted in handling Congress and over the steps to be taken to
liquidate British rule, if no agreement between Congress and the League
could be reached These divergences were aggravated by certain aspects
of Wa\ell s personality He was too forthright, blunt, and uncompromis-
ing to deal successfully with British politicians He disliked and despised
their 'polite prolixities* and had no aptitude for employing them himself
458 EFILOGTJB
His mind may have been, as lie said, slow-moving— with the result that
he was better on paper than m debate or at the conference table — but it
was clear and powerful and went straight to the heart of a milter. He was
impatient of the quibbles, petty objections, and sometimes dishonest
evasions of lawyers and politicians, and both in correspondence and in
debate was apt to treat them brusquely He himself in his Journal wonders
whether during the Cabinet Mission he had not ou occasion been too
rough with Cnpps and Pcthick-Lawrence, and he told Lord Listowel that
he thought he had been too rude and uncompromising m his discussions
with Cabinet Ministers in December 19+6, and had annoyed them
Listowel confirmed that this was so Cabinet Ministers found him dis-
concerting Sometimes at meetings, having discharged a heavy broadside,
he -would relapse into gnm silence, -unwilling or unable to reply to the
sniping of objectors on points of detail if someone made a fatuous sug-
gestion, instead of flattering the speaker by saying that it was a wonderful
idea, though it might perhaps on examination be found to present certain
difficulties, he would ignore it altogether and remain silent The Ministers
complained that he was too inflexible, whereas he would have considered
that he was merely being straight with them His roughness with them
certainly contributed to his removal from the scene, though Listowel may
well have been right in saying that nothing else would have made them
do anything definite
To all this was added the personal antipathy that developed between
Wavell and Cnpps Having both heen at school at Winchester, they
should ha\ c imbibed similar traditions, but there was a natural disharmony
between the straightforward soldier and the rather slippery lawyer and
politician, and hy the end of the long, testing Cabinet Mission negotiations
their relations were far from cordial Wavell distrusted Cnpps In his
Journal he conceded that Cnpps had done nothing dishonourable by his
own standards, but they were the standards of a politician, not Wavell's
standards It is probable that if the report that Cnpps was going to take
Pethick-Lawrence's place as Secretary of State had proved true, Wavell
would have tendered his resignation, and Cnpps would have been glad
to see him go When, towards the close of the Cabinet Mission, he was
known to be thinking of resignation, Cnpps was not at all sorry and
already had Lord Mountbatten in mind as his possible successor 1 In the
ensuing months, as the situation in India deteriorated and Wavell kept
hamm^cvtig <aa his Breakdown Elm, Cnp^s, Vfho duA&cd it, ira&t have
1 He mentioned this possibility in a conversation with Major Short and the present editor
m New Ddhi at the end of jvmt 19+6
EPILOGUE
459
felt more and more convinced tJiar if only Wavell could be displaced,
Mountbatten with Ins charm and nimble w it w ould be able to find some
more acceptable solution
Wa\cll more than once told Pc thick-La wren cc that if he and the
Cabinet distrusted his judgement and were disinclined to accept his
advice > they should replace lum. They did not take lum up on this at the
time At the beginning of August 1946, in the course of a letter to Attlee,
he pointedly remarked that if they wished to have a politician rather than
a soldier as Viceroy and to end hts wartime appointment, he would of
course accept their decision without question Attlee in replying made
no reference at all to tins matter* so Wavell w rote to him again, saying
that he assumed from his silence that they wished him to continue Attlec
did not reply
This was the position when Wavell was summoned home in December
Attlce's obvious disinclination to state positively that he wished him to
remain at his post suggests that, prompted perhaps by Cnpps, he was
already thinking of making a change, and it seems clear that during
the wearisome meetings in London m December, when Wavell insisted
uncompromisingly on Ins Breakdown Plan, Attlee, Cnpps, and other
leading members of the Cabinet became as much fed up with him as he
was with them, and they concluded, not perhaps altogether mcorrectiv
that he was tired and stale and that a fresh e) e and mind was needed for
the intractable problems of India He had borne very heavy burdens for
too long and met with little but defeat and disappointment As he wrote
in his Journal, * Continual hard work, and almost continual failure No
rest, no success This is inevitably depressing *
In all the arcumstances, especially the lack of confidence and the frayed
relations that had come to exist between him and the Cabinet, the decision
to replace him was not wrong He himself, though he was greatly dis-
appointed at not being allowed to complete lus task, would not have
denied this a younger man and a fresher mind, he said were needed It
was the manner of his dismissal that really hurt him It came to kirn as
a shock to discover that Attlee had approached Mountbatten to take over
the Viceroy alty on 18 December 1946 while he was still in England, yet
had not had the courage or courtesy to say anything about it to hi m, and
that the correspondence that thereafter for over six weeks Attlee and
Petinck-Lawrence had kept up w ith him was entirely insincere The only
comment ui the Journal on the abrupt termination of his services was *not
very courteously done*, but this terse understatement concealed intense
indignation at the way in which he had been treated
460 HPILOGUE
The dismissal of a great public servant like Lord Waveli was a diificult
opcianon but, having deaded that it was necessary, Attlce's Government
should have gone out of their way to make his departure as easy fox him
as possible Instead of arranging everything behind his back and then
suddenly confronting him with dismissal at short notice, they should ha\ c
conveyed to him at an early stage what they had in mind and endeavoured
in consultation with him to ease him out of ofHce with the minimum
injury to his feelings and the maximum of honour and glory and public
expressions of gratitude for his great services He v. ould certainly have
smoothed their path by tendering his resignation. But, apart from the
conferment on him of an Earldom and a perfunctory reference to his
having discharged the office of Viceroy with a high sense of duty, the
Labour Government left all these things undone and some years later
Attlee unjustly labelled him an advocate of scuttle and a defeatist A truer
description of him would be that given by Horace of Ulysses, *adversis
rerum immersabilis undis* 1
By the canons of behaviour that ordinarily govern human relations the
Attlee Government's treatment of Waveli was lamentable But politicians
are a race apart and a law unto themselves, as he wrote in his Journal,
politics change the ethical codes of men who would normally regard
themselves as men of honesty and principle The final episode of the leak
from the P S V *s office, of which Ctipps became awate but which he did
not disclose to him, was only a straw but it was the last one After this,
well might he exclaim '1 am glad I have finished with politics 1
Cnpps is said to have remarked 'The trouble about Waveli is that he is
no politician — a remark that , Wa\cll regarded as rather a good testimonial
for honesty The cnucism reflected a belief among British Ministers that
as they found him difficult to understand and to get on with, the same
must be true of Indian politicians This judgement based on their own
experience, was not entirely correct His lack of the arts and graces re-
quired for charming British politicians into harmony with his views and
his avoidance of all tricks of ambiguity and evasion Vtcnt along with
qualities of character that were of more importance m his dealings with
Indian than with British politicians As Viceroy, he had to be the impartial
arbiter bcrvv cen the competing claims of the Congress the Muslim League,
the Untouchables, the Princes and other sections of Indian society He
was not an equal negotiating with colleagues but an outside authority
standing above them, and in this role his absolute integrity was an
1 Never overwhelmed by the tides of misfortune Long after Waveli j death Sir Evan
Jcolum pointed out that this quotation fitted hid most aptly
EPILOGUE 461
invaluable asset. They knew for certain that Jijs Yea was Yea and his Nay
was Nay and that he would not try to mislead them with half-truths and
false promises Some of the Congress leaders would have hked him to be
more pliant to their wishes, but they all felt respect and some of them also
affection for him. There was by no means such a lack of understanding
and intimacy bctvv ecn him and Indian political leaders as some members
of At dec's Government imagined.
It is, however, true that it would have been an advantage if his integrity
had been combined with more of the superabundant charm of Ins suc-
cessor His reticence* taciturnity, and occasional gnmncss of manner were
certainly handicaps He could talk freely widi those who were congenial
to him, but was apt to rcmaui silent with others The European members
of the Assembly, who used to have interviews with the Viceroy from tunc
to time, found that whereas Linlithgow would have long chats with them
and give them a survey of the war, Wav ell, having listened to what they
had to say, replied, *I sec*, and the interview aided without any talk or
discussion The Journal entry for 21 February 1947 reveals his willingness
to talk with some, but not with others He never lingered, he wrote,
over interviews with rather dull personalities like Bhabha and Chundngar,
whereas interviews with Rajagopalachari Azad, Nclini, or Luquat might
develop into general talk on affairs, ethics, or literature
Nevertheless Wav ell's relations widi most of the leading Congress and
League politicians w ere fnendly He disliked Jinnah, but got on tolcrabl)
vvell widi hmi, completely ignoring his deliberate bad maimers He also
disliked Gandhi and wholly distrusted luni, but there was no unpleasant-
ness between them till die interview on 27 August 1946* when Gandhi is
alleged to ha\ c thumped the table and afterwards accused Wavcll of being
minatory Wavcll once wrote diat he put die composition of Gandhi's
character as 70 per cent extremely astute politician, 1 5 per cent saint, and
15 per cent charlatan Most people would consider dur GandJu had more
of the saint 111 him dun Wavcll allowed and dut he was not 'malevolent*
or 'malignant*, as Wav ell often described him, 1 Its acuons w ere some-
times unpredictable and productive of calamitous consequences, but dicy
w ere not prompted bv male* olciicc In judging, or perhaps one should
say mtsjudgtnj Gandhi, Wav ill was strongly influenced b\ his recollection
dut ui 1942, when he as Conmundcr-in-Clucf was trying to secure India
agauut Japanese m\ ation. Gandhi had let loose the 'Quit India* rebellion
which for some weeks paralysed communications widi the Eastern front.
Wavcll am ceded later dut Gandiu had not deliberately intended dus at
a tub in die back, but dm u what m effect it was. Wavcll was never able
4£l EPILOGUE
to nd Bus mind of the memory of it and it coloured his judgement Gandhi s
capacity for mischief, unintended though it might be, was w ell illustrated
towards the close of the CaiWet Mission If it had not been for his last-
numitc intervention* the Congress would fia\c accepted the Mission's
proposals for an Interim Government and, with a Congress-League
Coalition Government installed m office at the beginning of July, the
communal outbreaks of the next few months w ould neier ha\e occurred.
Even Cnpps and Pethick>Lawrcnce by the tune they left India had begun
to share some of Wa.vtU's mistrust of Gandhi
Of the other Indian political leaders, Wavell had a high opinion of
Liaquat and a considerable liking for him which was reciprocated* He also
liked Nehru, though, he had differences with him and sometimes found
him lacking mjudgement. Nehru undoubtedly preferred Mountbatten to
Wavell, hut he stated publicly that he had a high regard for the latter and
was in many ways sorrj to part with him. It was Nehru, too, who made
the consoling remark to hun that some failures were greater than suc-
cesses Wa\eH and VaUabhbhai Patcl respected each other and m matters
of business got on well together, as Patcl w as eminently practical and
a realist
A number of the lesser Congress figures had warm feelings of regard
for "Wa\ell, but the two who best appreciated his services to India and his
efforts to hold the scales evenly between the Congress and the League w ere
Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Rajagopalachart They were better judges
of his fairness than the communally minded Patel the unbalanced Nehru,
ot the fax from impartial British Labour Government Rajagopalachan
in a charming farewell letter ending * Yours affectionately', paid a high
tribute to the justice, firmness, patience, and ability with which he had
worked for m honourable settlement and said that it was a misfortune
to ail of them that he was leaving Azad wrote him a long letter of apprecia-
tion one sentence from which has been quoted earlier He said that he
had been deepfy impressed by Lord WaveU s sincerity right from the
time of the Simla Conference, and that he felt his departure as the loss of
a personal friend who had done immense service to India
WaveD s mention in his Journal that his official interview s with Azad
Nehru and others sometimes de\ eloped into talks on ethics and literature
is a reminder that he was a very well-read man with a wide knowledge of
history and literature and a special interest in poetry, long passages of
which he knew by heait Despite his notorious silences and occasionally
rather gnm manner, he was normally of a gay and cheerful disposition,
and in congenial compam could be talkamc and amusing He had a fund
EPILOGUE
463
of good stones and was an excellent raconteur He liked rhymes and
jingles and enjoyed writing parodies and doggerel and inventing light-
hearted mnemonics To remind himself of the order of precedence of the
five biggest Princely States in India, he corned 'Hot Kippers Make Good
Breakfast' (Hyderabad, Kashmir, Mysore, Gwahor, Baroda), and for the
Mogul Emperors, 'Best Horses And Jockeys Seen Ascot* (Babar, Huma-
yun, Akbar, Jahangir, Shah Jahan, Aurangzeb) An example of his parody
is given in the Journal at the close of the Cabinet Mission, written after
twelve gruelling weeks of heat and stram
This was the hghter side of a remarkable man who, whatever future
verdicts history may pass on him as Military Commander and as Viceroy,
must always be ranked as a leading and heroic figure on the British side
m the period of World War II hi all the high posts that he filled he in-
variably had to battle against heavy odds with quite inadequate resources
and without steady, firm support from the British Government Yet he
remained undaunted, and m both military and civil capacities displayed in
a high degree, boldness, energy, and enterprise and— in adversity-
courage, patience, and resolution During his time as Viceroy it was he,
not the British Government, who supplied the driving power behind
successive efforts to break the deadlock between the Congress and the
League, and it was he who saved India from a repetition of the Bengal
famine
Wavell was the only soldier to hold the office of Viceroy alter the
Crown took over control of India from the East India Company in 185 S,
and he was also one of the few Viceroys to be drawn not from the
aristocracy, but from an upper-middle-^ass farruly-thc class of society
that was the mainstay of the British Raj and was largely responsible tor its
character He typified the best qualities of tins class and the best qualities
of the Rat Fart and foremost was his deep sense of public duty arid public
service, next Ins straightforwardness and complete integrity and next his
energy and capacity for hard worL But he also possessed some rarer
qualities to which the younger of Nehru's two sisters, Krishna Nehru
Huthecstng. has drawn attention He was a good Viceroy, she has written, 1
and besides being conscientious was 'understanding and humane In his
possession of these qualities Lord Wavcll was in die tradition of the
greatest line of British administrators 111 India, Warren Hastings, Munro,
Malcolm, Sleeman, and Henry Lawrence, all of * horn respected the
people over whom they ruled, sympathized with their feeling?, and tried
to understand them
etirui p ltd (LB Publishing
ith
EPItOGUE
If Wa veil had had a. little luck or even if he had been allowed to finish
his task, he would have been acclaimed a great Viceroy, not merely a good
one As it is, ui the long roll of Viceroys and Governors-General his name
will stand high, afld though he may not be ranked with the greatest of
them, WeUesley, Dalhousie and Curzon, from each of whom he differed
widely in character and achievement, he will he held in honour by Indians
and Pakistanis no less than by his own countrymen
Wavcll was very fond of some words of Sir Walter Scott Without
courage there cannot be truth and without truth there can be no other
virtue * Those who knew him best would say that these words were the
motto of his life and belie\ e that history will adjudge him a great and a
good man — the greatest and noblest man that it has been my fortune to
encounter *, one of them has written" The reader of this Journal will be
able to form his own estimate
APPENDICES
page
I Lord WavelTs Note to the P S V (D ), 20 August 19+3 467
II The Cabinet Missions Statement of 16 May 1946 471
III Gandhi's Letter of 20 May 1946 to the Secretary of State 481
IV Lord WavelTs Appreciation of Possibilities in India, May 1946 483
V The Cabinet Missions Statement of 25 May 1946 487
VI The Cabinet Mission s Statement of 16 June 1946 489
VII Lord WavelTs Note for the Cabinet Mission, 25 June 1946 491
VHI Lord Wavell s Letter to H.M the King, 8 July 1946 493
IX Mr A tdee's Letter of 31 January 1947 497
and Lord Wa veil's reply, 5 February 1947
APPENDIX I
Lord WaveWs Note to the Private Secretary to the Viceroy
Designate, 20 August xgtf
l have been turning over in my mind how I should approach this question of
finding a solution of the Indian problem if I discarded all normal methods and
trusted entirely to my own common sense (such, as it is) and my previous
experience and training As a result 1 have evolved the following scenario, on
which I invite your opinion It will probably appear to you fantastical, im-
possible or inadvisable , you will certainly consider it unorthodox, as it is
I collect by summons, invitation or other means, with the greatest potable
secrecy the following ten individuals to the Viceroy's House
Gandhi
Nehru
Jinnah
Ambedkar
HajagopaJachauar
*Savarkar (Mahasabha)
Jam Sahib
Mudalur
Zafrullah Khan
Representative of big business ( ? Birla or head of Tatas)
(* I am a little doubtful about these two )
I proceed to address them somewhat as follows
I have collected you here, gentlemen, to debate the problem of India's future
and to advise me on the solution of the present deadlock I regard ) ou as a
representative selection of India's political and older leaders as near as I can
assemble within the compass of a body small enough to deal with really im
portant questions, i c a body approximately the sue of the British War Cabinet
or the present Executive Counaf It is my experience that any body larger than
this is too unwieldy to arrive at a decision I behevc that a vital decision in
nutters of government — and I am asking >ou to make a vital decision for India
— can be armed at only by a few selected men of wisdom and good will, not
by counting votes. Your selection is purely my personal one, as is the idea of
this conference t am the man primarily responsible in this country for us
go% eminent at present and for finding a means of improving that government
4*53 APPENDIX I
I will outline to you briefly die reasons that have guided me m summoning this
conference and in my choice of you to form it
I have no axe to grind, I have no political career to make, I have little know-
ledge of politics, I am here to do my duty to His Majesty the King Emperor wha
has honoured me by this appoint mcnt, to carry out the pledges of His Majesty *
Government of self-government for India, and to do my best for the Indian
people, for uhose welfare Great Britain has been responsible for nearly two
hundred }ears I have been trained in a profession where it is necessary to take
sonic action in a crisis, and where one has to take big risks, I have perhaps inore
experience of practical government in crises than most soldiers, in Egypt and
Palestine and now here I am quite clear that any government that is prepared
to govern, whether it is autocracy, democracy or any other, is better for a
country than no government or than a government too weak to carry otft its
deacons We ha\e a government in India at present chat is prepared to govern
and able to do so and until some better government, that is equally prepared
and able to govern, can be formed, I do not propose to be any party to abro-
gating that government, w hich 1 consider to be dealing with India's needs in
a workmanlike and efficient manner in the present difficult conditions
I can give you a. definite pledge that His Majesty's Government is prepared to
give self-government to India as early as possible, and that this is the earnest
wish of the people of Great Britain and of the British Empire I may also add
that I have* for some reason* a. certain prestige in Great Britain and the confi-
dence of a large proportion of the people and that any solution of the Indian
problem which I recommend will receive earnest consideration
There are only t\t o qualifications to His Majesty's Government's offer of
self-government, and they are, I admits most important ones The successful
ending of the war, in which we have nude such sacrifices and overcome such
odds, with much aid from India, must be an overriding consideration , and
secondly, we must be satisfied that we ate handing over India to a governrnent
that can govern and enforce its decisions to the same extent as the present
government The whole British people, and mdeed the opinion of the United
Nations, are behind these reservations Wc do not intend simply to abrogate
government and leave India to chaos, and we do intend to defeat the Japanese
menace as completely as we are now doing the German.
I will nt)w give you brief reasons for youx selection by me and what I hope
you will do The present deadlock in Indian politics is caused by the inability of
Indian leaders to reach an agreed solution (though there are a number of inde-
pendent solutions by various parties) and by their rejection of any solution
proposed by His Majesty's Government^ while at the same time there i* a
demand that the British Government shotdd take the initiative to find a solution
This conference represents my personal initiative to help Indian leader* to
find a solution As I have said* I do not believe in any Jarge body taking a
decision but I do hope that ) ou p whom X ha\ e chosen as the best representatives
t^* i^vtl*4» |i*A) jil i< ti lt Ut *>rJtl V*C |*l^'l|*t *ilHC Urfff
nj*c»m**r£ i< * fit**.
.Uf JJj^ Laic e*> Lr^y jxs '-jJ ft&miry., Kd
Ululf u the M*uv I iU* t*< oj<vi t!^ cut ti>mua< t!ww t,-»
1%-* «t Afty Jk-L:nsr> tithe LvLt.i j n ilf 1*1 i*v:*rtni nLt»i*x.Jp
JvJ a ! i*H n *a <u4 taiii-ff. to fr^rrwm,. At i^irvuj). UvLmi
Ki*Lut> ini 0* t-:noif i ^ tail* t An
odw^il 1 j ouoa. tut I luxe fcLUJ nu^sly IxxiLiv * i Ui mou cijvrt£*u:ir
is itc Wat C*Uivt ti Citt*t lUiu \ t \* i IiujaU* 1 ^ ftTKRi Unii-ii
axUju^i4 tn-tli*, k lm % i!to /jtiUU* Mun his lilt 5iT It Mudttur,
wcirife ofjid 1 ijnjl) ^tu« jp * pL^'uUtjoti tn U^i tiuulitt^ ^o-^IicjJ uot I J man
ucjvnJ gf?J(J> ttn her mJatuui Jciti^ututr. i«J t tlutik tt tt n^hf wut )au
iKiVmU lu\c ioiiicf.ine n*U> C4i tf^A for I^U^ri in*urknu
Siklit, the M^I^Iniuui in J the ttmuh ta InJii I Ulic^c ihit to inrirAte )our
nuittbcii ^milJ nuke a rtlution u^re Jilficu]( t aji4 tlui I c±ti trutt >ou to
fcraeiubcr ihiciit fttaiji.
I Ifj\e )oli to dcMtc )our u\"kn pUKcxlme an J met hod* of dcluun^ the
problem c.f Inihi't future i^J *J%tung mc on it An/ iimMncx I or my *t4tf
on fcivt )oa u at )uur kxvuc Wc ^Ul pruviJc any Secretariat, tn>oks of
ttfaence or 10 forth, f am afa a > 1 a\ jihMe if )ou to tjuoutm t»e or
refer to mc 1 mutt, howocr, tiukc it a condition that I hoi J )ou *in purdah'
for the pcnoJ of your dchlctitioas* I &c/ tint the imxat of my experiment
will be itnpoiublc i( die inilucnce of out m tic opinion, political follou tn an J the
I'm* » mtroJuccJ. J h*>j>c >ou wi)J co«^l to jrrrpr «»y conations of thit
470 APPENDIX I
conference, I e no contact with outside opinion until you have reached" a
decision, and that you will meanwhile enjoy the hospitality of my house.
t hope you will not merely put forward political slogans such as 'Quit India',
'Immediate declaration of Pakistan* w 'Release at once of ail political prisoners*.
These are incidental to your recommendations As I have said, we are ready to
hand over India to self-government as soon as practicable, if Pakistan, or some
similar device, is essential for the welfare of India and can be made a practical
solution, you will tell me so, 1 can assure you that I have no desire to hold
anyone in prison for a day longer than is necessary for the security of the State
The Cnpps* proposals still hold good and may sen, e as the basis of your
discussions I have had prepared for you, should you desire them» notes on other
systems of government, such as the Swiss Federal System, the American System
and others, which may possibly be appropriate to India's problems
1 do not expect from you, nor is it possible for you to produce, a detailed
solution or Consuruoon for India What I want is a practical programme to give
India self-government as soon as possible after the conclusion of hostilities, and
to secure m the meantime the best government to carry the war to a successful
conclusion, to deal with the many and urgent day-to-day problems of India,
and to prepare for self-government after the war If you fail to produce for me
any practical programme, I shall cany on with the present methods and present
government, which I may remind you is mainly Indian and do our best for the
progress of India m the many matters in which progress is possible without
a pobtical solution.
Gentlemen, the step I have taken in summoning you here is the best 1 can
devise to help India after much thought A heavy responsibility lies on you and
on me for the future welfare security and happiness of India, which is the end
at *hich we are all aiming May I in conclusion remind you that no pohncal
progress has ever been made without the spirit of compromise.
Abo\ e is of course only a very crude outline of \i hat is in my mind. Is any
such procedure a possibdity ? I have always been in military matters an upholder
of unorthodox methods when orthodox methods have failed, as I think they
h*\ e in India, Before I go any further, or submit my ideas to the Secretary of
State or anyone* I ihould Ukc your comments
I naturally should not propose to take such action immediately on arrival
in India, but to have it in mind after I had taken soundings
ioth August, j 94 3
APPENDIX II
Statement by the Cabinet Delegation and His Excellency
the Viceroy
l On March i jth last just before the despatch of the Cabinet Delegation to
India Mr Attlcc, the British Prime Minister, used these ■words
My colleagues are going to India with the intention of using their utniost
endeavours to help her to attain her freedom as speedily and fully as possible
What form of Government is to replace the present regime is for India to
decide, but our desire is to help her to set up forthwith the machinery for
making that decision.*
1 nope that India and her people may elect to remain within the British
Commonwealth I am certain that they Will find great advantages in doing so *
But if she docs so elect, it must be by her own free will The Bnnsh Com-
monwealth and Empire is not bound together by chains of external compulsion
It is a free association of free peoples If, on the other hand, she elects for mde-
pendcnce t in our view she has a right to do so It will be for us to help to make
the transition as smooth and easy as possible *
2 Charged in these historic words w© — the Otbuice Ministers and the
Viceroy — have done our utmost to assist the two main pohncal parties to
reach agreement upon the fundamental issue of the unity or division of India
After prolonged discussions m New Delhi we succeeded in bringing the
Congress and the Muslim League together in Conference at Simla There was
a full exchange of views and both parties were prepared to make considerable
concessions in order to try and reach a settlement but it ultimately proved im-
possible to close the remainder of the gap between the parties and so no agree*
ment could be concluded Since no agreement has been reached we feel that it is
our duty to put forward what we consider are the best arrangements possible
to ensure a speedy setting up of the new constitution This statement is made
with the full approval of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom
made whereby Indians may decide the future constitution of India and an
Interim Government may be set up at once to carry on the administration of
472
APPENDIX II
British ln<3ia until such tune as a new Constitution can be brought into bang
We have endeavoured to be just to the smaller as well as to the larger sections
of the people and to recommend' a solution which will lead to a practicable
way of governing the India of the future and will give a sound basis for defence
and a good opportunity for progress in the social political and economic field
4 It is not intended in this statement to review the voluminous evidence
that has been submitted to the Mission but it is right that we should state that
it has shown an almost universal desire outside the supporters of the Muslim
League for the unity of India
5 This considerat on did not however deter us from examining closely
and impartially the possibility of a partition of India since we were greatly
impressed by the very genuine and acute anxiety of the Muslims lest they
should find themselves subjected to a perpetual Hindu majority rule.
This feeling has become so strong and vndespicad amongst the Muslims that
it cannot be allayed by mere paper safeguards if there is to be internal peace in
India it must be secured by measures which will assure to the Muslims a control
in all matters vital ta theic culture rehg on and economic or other interests
6 Wc therefore examined in the first instance the question of a separate and
fully independent sovereign State of Pakistan as claimed by the Muslim League
Such a Pakistan would comprise two areas one in the north west cons stmg
of the Provmcw of the Punj ah S nd North West Frontier and British Balu-
chistan the other in the north-east consisting of the Provinces of Bengal and
Assam The League were prepared to consider adjustment of boundaries at a
later stage but insisted that the principle of Pakistan should first be acknov*
ledged The argument for a separate State of Pakistan was based, first upon the
right of the Muslim majority to deade their method of Government according
to their wishes and secondly upon the necessity to include substantial areas in
which Muslims are in a minority in order to make Pakistan adminis trati vely
and economically workable
The sire of the uon Muslim, minorities in a Pakistan comprising the whale of
the six Provinces enumerated above would be very considerable as the following
figures* show
Muslim Non Muslim
North Westtrn Area
Punjab ifi*3i? 2+2 12 201 577
North West Front cr Province 2 788 797 249 270
Sind 3 208 jzj r 326 683
Br Biludustin 438 930 62 701
22 <Sj3 294 13 840 231
6i 07% 3793%
* AU pppulittan figure* in this sta cinent arc from the most recent census tjken m 1941
APPENDIX H
473
Muslim Non Muslim
North Eastern Area
Bengal 33 005 43+ 27,301,091
Assam 3 442 479 6,703,254
36 447*913 34 Q$3 345
ii 69% +S 31%
The Muslim minorities in the remainder of British India number some 20
million dispersed amongst a total population of rSS million
These figures show that the setting up of a separate sovereign State of Pakistan
on the luies claimed by the Muslim League, would not solve the communal
minority problem, nor can we see any justification for including within a
sovereign Pakistan those districts of the Punjab and of Bengal and Assam in
which the population is predominantly non-Muslun .Every argument that can
be used in favour of Pakistan, can equally m our view be used in favour of the
exclusion of the non-Muslim areas from Pakistan This point would particularly
affect the position of the Sikhs
7 We therefore considered whether a smaller sovereign Pakistan confined
to the Muslim majority areas alone might be a possible basis of compromise
Such a Pakistan is regarded by the Muslim League as quite impracucable because
it would entail the exclusion from Pakistan of (a) the whole of the Ambala and
Jullundur Divisions in the Punjab, (&) the whole of Assam except the district of
Sylher, and (c) a large part of Western Bengal including Calcutta, m which aty
the Muslims form 23 6% of the population, We ourselves are also convinced
war &n y solution which mvoh es & radical partition of the Punjab and Benga),
as this would do, would be contrary to the wishes and interests of a very large
proportion of the inhabitants of these Provinces Bengal and the Punjab each
has its own common language and a long history and tradition Moreover, any
division of the Punjab would of necessity divide the Sikhs leaving substantial
bodies of Sikhs on both sides of the boundary We have therefore been forced
to the conclusion that neither a larger nor a smaller sovereign State of Pakistan
Would provide an acceptable solution for the communal problem
8 Apart from the great force of the foregoing arguments there are weighty
administrative, economic and military considerations The whole of the trans-
portation and postal and telegraph systems of India have been established on the
basis of a united India To disintegrate them would gravely injure both parts of
India The case for a united defence is even stronger The Indian armed forces
have heezi built up as a whole for the defence of India as a whole, 2nd to break
them m two would indict a deadly blow on the long traditions and high degree
of efficiency of the Indian Army and would entail the gra vesr dangers. The
Indian Navy and Indian Air Force w ould become much less effective The two
sections of the suggested Pakistan contain the two most vulnerable frontiers in
India and for a successful defence in depth the area of Pakistan would be
insufficient,
474 APPENDIX II
9 A further consideration of importance is the greater difficulty which the
Indian States would find in associating themselves with a divided British India
10 Finally there is the geographical fact that the two halves of the proposed
Pakistan State are separated by some seven hundred miles and the communica-
tions between them both in war and peace w ould be dependent on the goodwill
of Hindustan
1 1 We are therefore unable to advise th£ British Government that the power
which at present resides in British han<4s should be handed over to two entirely
separate sovereign States
12 This decision does not however blind us to the very real Muslim appre-
hensions that then* culture and polio cal and social hfe might become submerged
in a purely unitary India, in which the Hindus with their greatly superior
numbers must be a dominating element To meet this the Congress have put
forward a scheme under which Provinces wovdd have full autonomy subject
only to a minimum of Central subjects, such as Foreign Affairs, Defence and
Communications
Under this scheme Provinces, if they wished to take part m economic and
administrative planning on a large scale, could cede to the Centre optional
subjects in addition to the compulsory ones mentioned above
13 Such a scheme would, in our view, present considerable constitutional
disadvantages and anomalies It would be very difficult to work a Central
Executive and Legislature in w hich some Ministers, w ho dealt with Compulsory
subjects, were responsible to the whole of India while other Ministers, who dealt
with Optional subjects* would be responsible only to those Provinces which
had elected to act together in respect of such subjects This difficulty would be
accentuated in the Central Legislature, where it would be necessary to exclude
certain mcmhers horn speaking and voting T\hcn subjects with which thctr
Provinces w ere not concerned were under discussion
Apart from the difficulty of working such a scheme, we do not consider that
it would be fair to deny to other Provinces, which did not desire to take the
optional subjects at the Centre, the right to form themselves mto 1 group for
a similar purpose This w ould indeed be no more than the exercise of their autono-
mous powers in a particular way
14 Before putting forward our recommendation wc turn to deal with the
relationship of the Indian States to Brmsh India Ic is quite dear that with
the ittunmcnt of independence by British India, whether inside or outside thtf
Bnosh Commoner calth+ the relationship which his hitherto exited htm ecu
the IXuUn of the States nvd the Unush Cicwiv mtU no \ongti W possible
Paramountry can neither b« retained by the British Crown nor transferred to
the new Government Thij fact hi* been fuJJy recognised by those whom wc
ULtcrv«.v*ed from ihe Stat«. They hive « the same time assured us that the
APPENDIX II
475
States arc ready and willing to co-operate in the new development oflndia The
prease form which their cooperation will take must be a nutter for negotiation
during the building up of the new constitutional structure, and it by no means
follows that it will be identical for all the States We have not therefore dealt
with the States in the same detail as the Provinces of Bnnsh India in the para-
graphs which follow
15 We now indicate the nature of a solution w hich in our view would be
just to the essential claims of all parties, and u ould at the same time be most
liLeJy to bring about a stable and practicable form of constitution for AlUndja
We recommend that the constitution should take the following basic form
(i) There should he a Union of India , embracing both British India and
the States, which should deal with the following subjects Foreign
Affairs, Defence, and Communj cations, and should have the powers
necessary to raise the finances required for the above subjects
{2) The Union should have an Executive and a Legislature constituted
from British Indian and States representatives Any question raising
a major communal issue in the Legislature should require for its
decision a majority of the representatives present and voting of each
of the mo major commumdesas uell asa majority of all the members
present and voting
(3) All subjects other than the Union subjects and all residuary powers
should vest in the Province*
(4) The States will retain all subjects and powers other than those ceded
to the Union.
(5) Provinces should be free to form Groups with executives and legisla-
tures;, and each Group could determine the Provincial subjects to be
taken in common.
(6) The constitutions of the Union and of the Groups should contain a
provision whereby any Province could, by a majority vote of its
Legislative Assembly, call for a reconsideration of the terms of the
constitution after an initial penod of 10 years and at 10 yearly
intervals thereafter
16 It is not our object to lay out the details of a consotunoa on the above
lines, but to set in motion the machinery whereby a constitution can be settled
by IndianJ for Indians
It has been necessary how ever for us to mate this recommendation as to the
broad basis of the future constitution because it became clear to us in the course
of our negotiations that not until that had been done was there any hope of
getting the two major communities to join in the setting up of the constitup on-
making machinery
476 APPENDIX II
17 We now indicate the constitution-making machinery which wc propose
should be brought into being forthwith in order to enable a new constitution
to be worked out-
18 la forming any Assembly to decide a new Constitutional structure the
first problem is to obtain as fcroad-ba*ed and accurate a representation of the
uhole population as is possible The most satisfactory method obviously would
be by election based on adult franchise, but any attempt to introduce such a step
now would lead to a wholly unacceptable delay in the formulation of the new
Constitution* The only practicable alternative is to utilize the recently elected
Provincial legislative Assernbhes as the electing bodies There are, however,
two factors in their composition which make this difficult First, the numerical
strengths of the Provincial Legislative Assemblies do not bear the same pro-
portion to the total population in each Province Thus, Assam with a population,
of 10 millions has a Legislative Assembly of 108 members, while Bengal, with
a population six times as large, has an Assembly of only 250 Secondly, owing
to the wcightage gr* en to minorities by the Communal Award, the strengths
of the several communities m each Provincial Legislative Assembly are not m
proportion to their numbers in. the Province Thus the number of seats reserved
for Muslims in the Bengal Legislative Assembly is only 48% of the total,
although they form 55% of the Provincial population. After a most careful
consideration of the various methods by which these inequalities might be
corrected, we have come to the conclusion that the fairest and most practicable
plan would be —
(a) to allot to each Province a total number of seats proportional to its
population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million, as the nearest
substitute for representation by adult suffrage
(B) to divide this provincial allocation of scats between the main com-
munities in each Province in proportion to their population
(c) to provide that the representatives allotted to each community in a
Province shall be elected by the members of that community m its
Legislative Assembly
We think that for these purposes it is sufficient to recognise only three mam
communities in. India General, Muslim, and Sikh, the 'GeneraT community
including all persons who are not Muslims or Sikhs, As the smaller minorities
would, upon the population basis, have little or no representation, since they
would lose the -weightage which assures them scats in the Provincial Legislatures,
Vie have made the arrangements set out in paragraph 20 below to give them a
full representation \ipon all matters of special interest to the minorities.
19 (0 We therefore propose that there shall be elected by each Provincial
Legislative Assembly the following numbeis of representatives, each part of the
APPENDIX JJ
477
Legislature (General, Muslim or Sikh) electing its owo representatives by the
method of proportional representation wjrh the single transferable vote
Tahle of Representation
Section A
General
Muslim
Total
Ma dm
45
4
Bombay
*9
2
21
United Provinces
47
S
55
Bihar
3i
5
36
Central Province*
16
I
17
Orissi
9
0
9
Total
16?
2o
1S7
t-
Section B
Province General
Punjab 8
North-West Frontier Province o
Suid 1
Total "9
Section C
Province General Muiltm
Bengal 27 33
Asiim 7 j
Total 3+ 36"
Total for British India
Maximum for Indian States
Total
Note In order to represent the Chief Commissioners' Provinces there will be
added to Section A the Member representing Delhi in the Central Legislative
Assembly, the Member representing Ajaxer-Mcrwzrz m the Centra} Legislative
Assembly, and a. representative to be elected by the Coorg Lcgislatn e Council
To Section Ii will be added a representative of British Baluchistan.
(11) It is the intention that the States should be gi\ en in the final Constituent
Assembly appropriate representation which would not, on the bail* of the
calculations adopted for British India, exceed oj, but the method of selection
will have to be determined by consultation. The States u ould in the preliminary
stage be represented by a Negotiating Committee
(jiiJ The rcprcsentan\cs thus chosen shall meet at New Delhi as soon as
possible.
Uv) A preliminary meeting will be held at which the general order of
business will be decided, a Ch a ir man and other Officers elected, and an Advisory
Muslim Sikh Total
16
4
28
3
0
3
3
0
4
22
~7
35
Total
60
93
38?
47& APPENDIX II
Committee (see paragraph 20 below) on the rights of citizens, minorities, and
tribal and excluded areas set up Thereafter the provincial representatives will
divide up into the three sections shown under A, B, and C p in the Table of
Representation in sub-paragraph {>) of this paragraph.
M These sections shall proceed to settle the Provincial Constitutions for the
Provinces included in each section, and shall also decide whether any Group
Constitution shall be set up for those Provinces and, if so, with what provincial
subjects the Group should deal Provinces shall ha% e the power to opt out of the
Groups in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (put) below
(ci) The representatives of the Sections and the Indian States shall reassemble
for the purpose of settling the Union Constitution
(vti) In the Union Constituent Assembly resolutions varying the provisions
of paragraph 1 5 above or raising any major communal issue shall require a
majority of the representatives present and voting of each of the two major
communities
The Chairman of the Assembly shall decide which (if arty) of the resolutions
raise major communal issues and shall, if so requested by a majority of the
representatives of either of the major communities, consult the Federal Court
before giving his decision.
{vtu) As soon as the new constitutional arrangements have come into
operation, it shall be open to any Province to elect to come out of any Group Ui
which it has been placed. Such a decision shall be taken by the new legislature
of the Province after the first general election under the new constitution.
20 The Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens, minorities, and tribal
and excluded areas should contain full representation of the interests affected,
and their function will be to report to the Union Constituent Assembly upon
the list of Fundamental Rights, the clauses for the protection of minorities, and
a scheme for the administration of the tnbal and excluded areas, and to advise
whether these nghts should be incorporated in the Provincial, Group, or Union
constitution.
21 His Excellency the Viceroy will forthwith request the Provincial Legisla-
tures to proceed with the election of their representatives and the States to sec
up a Negotiating Committee It is hoped that the process of constitution-making
can proceed as rapidly as the complexities of the task permit so that the mtenm
period may be as short as possible
22 It will be necessary to negotiate a Treaty between the Union. Constituent
Assembly and the United Kingdom to provide for certain matters arising out of
the transfer of pcra er
2 J While the constitution- making proceeds, the administration of India has
to be earned on We attach the greatest importance therefore to the setting up
APPENDIX II
479
at once of an Interim Government having the support of the major political
parties It is essential during the interim period that there should be the maximum
of co-operation in carrying through the difficult tasks that face the Government
of India Besides the heavy task of day-to-*day administration, there is the grave
danger of famine to be countered t there arc decisions to be taken m many
matters of post-war development which will have a far-reaching effect on
India's future % and there are important international conferences in which India
has to be represented For all these purposes a Government having popular
support is necessary The Viceroy has already started discussions to this end, and
hopes soon to form an Interim Government in which all the portfolios, including
that of War Member, will be held by Indian leaders having the full confidence
of the people The British Government, recognising the significance of the
changes in the Government of India, will give the fullest measure of co-
operation to the Government so formed in the accomplishment of its tasks of
administration and in bringing about as rapid and smooth a transition as
possible
24 To the leaders and people of India who now have the opportunity or
complete independence we would finally say this We and oat Government
and countrymen hoped that it would be possible for the Indian people them-
selves to agree upon, the method of framing the new constrtuijoa tinder which
they will hve Despite the labours which we have shared with the Indian
Parties, and the exercise of much pa Hence and goodwill by a J J, thxs ha* not been
possible We therefore now lay before you proposals which, after listening to all
sides and after much earnest thought, we trust will enable you to attain your
independence iti the shortest time and with the least danger of internal disturb-
ance and conflict These proposals may not, of course, completely satisfy all
parties, but you will recognise with us that at this supreme moment in Indian
history statesmanship demands mutual accommodation*
We ask you to consider the alternative to acceptance of these proposals After
all the efforts which we and tbe In than Parties have made together for agreement,
we must state that in our view there is small hope of peaceful settlement by
agreement of the Indian Parties alone Tlie alternative would therefore be a
grave danger of violence chaos, and even civil war The result and duration of
such a disturbance cannot be foreseen, but it is certain that it would be a terrible
disaster for many millions of men, women and children. This is a possibility
which must be regarded with equal abhorrence by the Indian people, our own
countrymen, and the world as a whole
We therefore lay these proposals before you in the profound hope that they
will be accepted and operated by you in the spirit of accommodation and
goodwill in which they are offered We appeal to all who have the future good
of India at heart to extend their vision beyond their own community or interest
to the interests of the whole four hundred millions of the Indian people
D lft* 1 1
4$o
APPENDIX II
We hope that the new independent India may choose to be a member of the
British Commonwealth We hope in any event that you will remain m dose
and friendly association with oui people But these are matters for your o\va
free choice Whatever that choice may be wc look forward with you to your
ever increasing prosperity among die great nations of the v, orld, and to a future
even more glorious than ) our past
New Delhi, 16th May
APPENDIX III
Gandhi's Utter to the Stcnury of Shite
VittxuU Mandir,
[tailing Iload,
New Delhi
May :oih 1946
Dear Lord,
At ihc matter* uc di tamed ) ester di) morning an J tlie Jay before were %cry
important in J jUccicJ and vtilt atlcct my attitude an J corresponding action*
I think it worth while to reduce a summary to writing You can correct rnc if
there 11 misunderstanding This may c\cn help )ou, uhcrc\er ncccisajy
I may a J J that I hat c conveyed to the Working Committee of the Congress,
the purport, to tttc bctt of m> abiht), of our talk*.
With tint preface 1 proceed to give the summar)
1 You were good enough to asturc me tlut )ou will ice to 11 that European
members of Pro\ moat Assemblies, neither- \ oted at the election* of delegates
to the Constituent Assembly nor expected to be elected by the elector* of non
Muihm delegates
2 Ejection of the possible 03 delegate* on behalf of the State* u ou IJ be
determined by the Navwbulub of Dhopal and Pundit Jaw aha rial Nehru In the
absence of an agreed solution, there should be no election of delegates on behalf
of the States, the function of Too king after the interest* of the Prince* and their
people devolving upon the Advisory Committee referred to in clause 20 of
the State Paper
3 In view of the fact that there 1* no machinery in British Baluchistan
analogous to the Provincial Assemblies, it should be treated as the special concern
of the Constituent Assembly , and should be included in the function of the
Advisory Committee Meanwhile it should be the duty of the Interim National
Government to set up machinery to b nog Baluchistan on a par with the other
provinces.
4 I ventured to suggest that Paramountcy should cease even while Indepen-
dence is at v. ork in fact, though not in law, till the Constituent Assembly has
finished its labours and devised a constitution Sir Stafford saw danger in acting
upon my suggesuon. I hold the opposite view Acceptance of my proposal
would vivify the people of the State* as if by a stroke of the pen And the Interim
Government would be a boon to the Prince* who, though the creation of the
A&2 APPENDIX 111
paramount Pov,et and dependent on it for the continuance of their existence*
stsll chafed wider its heavy band The immediate end of Pararaountcy would
test the sincerity alike of the Princes and the paramount Power
But if this Indian feeling did not find an echo in jour hearts, I personally
would be satisfied with Sir Stafford** view that Pax amount cy which had been
admittedly used to protect the Princes against their people in the shape of
suppressing their liberty and progress, should for the time continue for the
protection and progress of the people If the people of the States arc backward, it
is not because they are different in kind from the people of the direct British
parts of India but because they ha\e been groaning under a double yoke I
endorsed also the suggestion that Paramountcy should be exercised in consulta-
tion with the National Government
5 I have written to ) ou on my difficulty on grouping* I need say nothing
more on the subject, pending reply to. it.
6 Whilst I appreciate \ our and Sir Stafford's frankness, I would put on record
my conviction that Independence in fact would be a farce, if the British Troops
arc in India even for peace and order within, or danger from without The
condition of India after the labours of the Constituent Assembly are over wdl
in this respect be no better than now If the position about the Troops persists,
Independence next month' is either insincere or a thoughtless cry Acceptance
of 'Quit India* by the British is unconditional, whether the Constituent Assembly
succeeds or fails in bunging out a constitution. A drastic revision of the attitude
is a necessity in e\ ery case.
Finally, it can in no way be contended that in the face of the Troops there
would be natural behaviour in the Constituent Assembly
7 As to the Interim Government, the more I think and observe, the more
certain w my fcehng that a proper National Government responsible in fact, if
not in law, to the elected members of the Central Legislative Assembly should
precede the summons for the election of members of die Constituent Assembly
Only then, and not before, can a true picture of coming events be presented
The food crisis demands immediate formation of a strong, capable and homo-
geneous National Government Without it, deep and universal corruption can-
not end, without it the psv etiological effect will not be produced in spite of the
landing on Indian shores of expected gram from outside Every day's delay in
forming such a go\cmincm is agony to the famished millions of India There
can be therefore no question of parity, whether the Gov eminent is allow cd to be
formed by the Congress or the Mudirn League, The best and incorruptible men
or wotnen from India arc wanted for die purpose. I was therefore gbd to find
that the Viceroy was ahtady moving m the matter as quickly at possible
Yours sincerely
id M K Gandhi
To The Rt Hon ble lord Peihick-Lawrcuce
APPENDIX IV
Lord WaveWs Appreciation of Possibilities in India,
May 1946
1 The Cabinet Delegation have asked for an appreciation of the situation
likely to atise if our present proposals fad, and for a general policy for India in
that event
2 The general political situation in the country may be briefly described as
follows The principal party, the Congress, which has long been a purely
revolutionary movement, devoted almost entirely to agitation suddenly sees
power within its grasp, and is not quite able to believe it yet The leaders are stili
mistrustful of our intention, and believe that we may take away from them
what is offered and start another period of repression if we do not like what
they do They are therefore determined to grasp all the power they can as
quickly as possible, and to tty to make it impossible for us to take it back It is
as if a starving prisoner was suddenly offered unlimited quantities of food by
his gaoler, his ui&tmct is to seize it all at once and to guard agayist its being
taken away again, also to eat as much and as quickly as possible, an action
which is bound to have all effects on his health.
The real objective of the Congress certainly of the Left Wing extremists, is
not, at the present, so much to make a constitution, as to obtain control and
power at the Centre Their plan is to delay the formation of a constitution until
they have obtained control at the Centre, have succeeded in getting British
troops and British influence removed from the country, and have gained over
the Indian Army and the Indian Police forces as their instrument They then
intend to deal with the Muslims and the Princes at their leisure, and to make
a constitution that accords with their ideas They will not swerve from this
objective Whether the moderate element in the Congress can control them, or
wishes to, is uncertain
3 The Muslim League is deeply suspicious of Congress under its present
leadership, and more particularly of Mr Gandhi I think the Muslim League
would be prepared to work with the moderate Congress element, if it could get
nd of its extreme Left and of Mr Gandhi s influence The former is only likely
to be removed by a violent conflict the fatter only by the normal process of a
non-violent old age. So long as the Left wing of Congress continue to exercise
influence, and Mr Gandhi throws his authority unaccountably to one side or
484 APPENDIX IV
the other, it is going to be almost impossible to obtain Mushm-Hindu co-
operation
4 Of the minorities, the Silths are the most important from the point of view
of this appreciation, since they occupy a key position in the Punjab and can be
dangerously violent They are much divided in both politics and in space t and
their reactions are never easily discernible They are an important element in the
Indian Army
5 The great mass of the Indian people desire to go ahout their affairs peace-
ably* few of them have any real feeling against the British, whom they have
looked upon as protectors for many > ears, they do not realise what is happening,
or what disorder or misfortune* threaten the country if law and order break
down They are, however, ignorant, and easily and suddenly swayed to violent
passion and action, and there is, in every large town and in many country
districts, a dangerous element who are accustomed to live and profit by violence
and are ready tools in the hands of any agitator Hatred against the British could
soon and easily he roused r and there would then be considerable danger to
isolated British officials, planters, etc
6 The Rulers of States are perplexed and anxious, they realise that their
former protectors^ the British* are going* that they will be subject to the agitation
of Congress, and that the end of their autocracy and easy living is in sight"
In any conflict or disturbances, the States "would m all probability remain
generally friendly to the British
7 It is impossible to tell how or when trouble is hkely to come It may take
the form of very serious communal noting* owing to the Congress and the
Muslim League bang quite unable to come to terms The chief areas would
probably be the Punjab, the U P and Bengal Rioting m the Punjab would he
hkely to take the most severe form* smce the peoples of the Punjab axe more
naturally violent than elsewhere in India It w ould also be senous in the U P and
Bihar, and these tw 0 Provinces, which might be termed the *Mutmy' Provinces,
where the trouble was greatest both m 1S57 and 1942, are probably more anti-
Bnush than any others, with the CP * good third, Communal noting in
Bengal would take place mainly in the large cities, e g Calcutta and Dacca,
smce in the countryside the two communities are generally separated
Or trouble may take the form of a mass movement against British authority,
either hy Hindus or Muslims, or by both
A widespread mass movement, sponsored by the whole force of the Congress,
would be hkely soon to rake a violent form, even if nominally begun on non-
violent lines and it would probably be beyond our resources to suppress it* at
least without very considerable reinforcements of Bnush troops ,
* * *****
10 If it were the firm policy of His Majesty's Government that, in the event
of the main patties failing to agree and cither or both launching a movement
APPENDIX IV 485
against the authority of the existing British rule, n should be suppressed, I
should he prepared to attempt this, and believe it would have a chance of suc-
ceeding, if His Majesty's Government would support me with all forces they
could make available and give me a free hand to take all measures necessary to
restore order, e g , the proclamation of Martial-law and the use of all force at my
disposal It \\ ould be essential for His Majesty's Government to maic a clear
statement of this policy and of its determination to enforce it
I assume, however, that in the state of public opinion, at home and abroad,
His Majesty s Government would not wish to adopt such a policy
A policy of immediate withdrawal of our authority, influence and power
from India, unconditionally, w ould to my nnnd be disastrous and even more
fatal to the traditions and morale of our people and to our position in the world
than a policy of repression I could not consent to carry out such a policy
It remains to examine whether any middle course between 'repression* and
scuttle can be found, if we arc unable to persuade the Indians to agree to a
peaceful settlement of their Constitution
II We must at all cows avoid becoming embroiled with both Hindu and
Muslim at once Nor do I think that wc can possibly accept the position of
assisnng the Hindus, that is the Congress, to force that will on the Muslims,
that would be fatal to out whole position in the Muslim world, and would be
an injustice
The alternative is that, if wc are forced into an extreme posmon, we should
hand over the Hindu Provinces, by agreement and as peaceably as possible, to
Hindu rule, withdrawing our troops, officials and nationals m an orderly
manner, and should at the same time support the Muslim Provinces of India
against Hindu domniaiion and assist them, to work out their own constitution
If such were our general policy, we should make it quite clear to the Congress
at the appropriate tune that this would be our policy and that it would result in
the division of India This might compel them to come to terms with the
Muslim League
12 There are obvious difficulties and dangers in such a policy It is possible
that the Muslims might dechne our assi stature, though I rhml it is unlikely, it
would mean the division of the Indian Army, and our military position in the
N W and N E of bidia would be weak, as a permanency, as the Commander-
in-Chief has pointed out The actual military operation of withdrawal from
Hindustan into Pakistan would be difficult and possibly dangerous
Further, we should have the Urge minorities, Hindus and Sikhs t to deal with
in the Muslim Provinces, and we should have had to abandon our responsibility
to minorities, and our own interests, in Hindustan.
Nevertheless, I can see no better policy available, and if it were earned out
firmly, I think it would succeed
13 It is not suggested that this arrangement should be a permanency, and
486 APPJENDIX IV
that *e should maintain indefinitely what would amount to a 'Northern
Ireland' in India We should endeavour to bring about a Union of India on the
best terms possible , and then withdraw altogether
14. The formation of an Interim, Government » hkely to be the crux of the
whole problerrt-
If both the mam names come in, and really try to work the government, all
may go well
I think we may dismiss the contingency of the Muslim League agreeing to
participate in the Interim Government, whilf the Congress declines, since I can-
not conceive that a Government formed without Congress agreement could
exercise authority in the Hindu Provinces
The difficult situation will arise if the Congress agrees to take part in an
Interim Government while the Muslim League declines It will he very difficult
to refuse to form a Government with Congress members and again to allow
Jinnah to hold up all progress At the same orac to give control of all-India to
a Government in which Muslims refused to take part would be very dangerous
It would be likely to lead to grave disorders in the Punj ab and Bengal, and would
be injurious to our whole position in the Muslim world. I could probably get
a number of non-Congress non~League Muslims to join the Government, but
with the League standing out the writ of such a Government would probably
not run in the Punjab or Bengal, and there would be serious disorders
It might be possible to form a Government temporarily, with non-League
Mnshms taking the seats reserved for the Mush in League, in the hope that this
might induce the League to break away from Jinnah's control, or make Jinnah
reconsider his refusal
If this fads, a possible solution might be to allow the Hindus to form a Hindu-
stan Government for all the Congress Provinces, and the League to form one for
the Muslim Provinces, while the Centre was a purely official Government,
carrying on as a Union Government, until the two Hindustan and Pakistan
Governments could agree on terms of Union or Separation
The dangers of such a solution are obvious, but it might be possible to work
out a temporary arrangement on such lines,
f 5 Even supposing that we succeed in forming a Coalition Interim Govern-
ment and (that) the Constituent Assembly (is) formed* our troubles vnll by no
means be over There is also sure to be in an Interim Government controlled by
the Congress a continuous attempt to sap Bnnsh authority in every possible way
A real Coalition Government might avoid this, as the Muslims and other
Minorities ^ould not wish British influence to be lessened or removed It is,
however, bkely that it will be difficult to hold together either the Interim
Government or the Assembly All we can do then 1% I think, to fall back on the
policy outlined in paragraphs 11-13
"W, 30-5-46
APPENDIX V
Statement issued by the Cabinet Mission in New Delhi
on 25 May 1946
The Delegation have considered the statement of the President of the Muslim
League dated 22nd May and the resolution dated 24th May of the Working
Committee of the Congress.
2. The position is that since the Indian lcadets after prolonged discussion
failed to amve at an agreement the Delegation put forward their recommenda-
nons as the nearest approach to reconciling the views of the two main parties.
The scheme stands as a whole and can only succeed if it is accepted and worked
in a spirit of co-opcradon
3 The Delegation wish also to refer briefly to a few points that have been
raised in the statement and resolution.
4 The authority and the functions of the Constituent Assembly and the
procedure wbch it is intended to follow are clear from the Cabinet Delegation s
statement. Once the Constituent Assembly is formed and working on this basis
there is no intention of interfering with its discrenon or questioning us decisions
When the Constituent Assembly has completed its labours His Majesty s
Government will recommend to Parliament such action as may be necessary for
the cession of sovereignty to the Indian people, subject only to two matters
which are mentioned in the statement and which, we believe, are not contro-
versial, namely adequate provision for the protection of the minorities (para-
graph 20 of the statement) and willingness to conclude a treaty with His
Majesty's Government to cover matters arising out of the transfer of power
(paragraph 22 of the statement)
5 It is a consequence of the system of election that a few Europeans can
be elected to the Constituent Assembly Whether the nght so given will be
exercised is a matter for them to decide
6 The representative of Baluchistan will be elected in a joint meeting of the
Shahi Jirga and the non-ofHaal members of the Quetta municipality
In Coorg the whole Legislative Council will have the nght to vote but the
official members will receive instructions not to take part in the election.
488 APPENDIX V
8 The interpretation put by the Congress resolution on paragraph is of die
statement, to the effect that the Province* can in the first instance make the
choice whether or not to belong to the Section ui which they arc placed, docs
not accord with the Delegations intentions The reasons for the grouping of
the Provinces are well known and this is an essential feature of the scheme and
can only be modified by agreement between the parties. The right to opt out of
the groups after the constitution making has been completed will be exercised
by the people themselves, since at the first election under the new provincial
Constitution this question of opting out will obviously be a major issue and all
those entitled to vote under the new franchise will be able to take their share in
a truly democratic decision
9 The question of how the States representatives should he appointed to the
Constituent Assembly is clearly one which must be discussed with the States
It is not a matter for decision by the Delegation,
10 It is agt eed that the Interim Government wiU hav e a new basis That basis
is that all portfolios including that of the War Member will be held by Indians
and that the members will be selected in consultation with the Indian political
parties These are very significant changes in the Government of India and a long
step towards independence HMG will recognise the effect of these changes,
will attach the fullest weight to them and will gi\ e to the Indian Government
the greatest possible freedom in the exercise of the day-to-day administration of
India
n h% i&ie Congros statement recognises, the present Constitution must
continue during the interim period and the Interim Government cannot, there-
fore, be made legally responsible to the Central Legislature There is, however,
nothing to prevent the members of the Government, individually or by com-
mon consent, from resigning if they fail to pass an important measure through
the Legislature or if a vote of non-confidence is passed against them.
12 There is* of course^ no mtennoa of retaining British troops m India,
against the wish of an independent India under the new Constitution, but during
the imcnm period, vfhich u is hoped will be short, the Bnnsh Parliament has
under the present Constitution the ultimate responsibility for the security of
India and it is necessary, therefore that British troops should remain
APPENDIX VI
Statement by Cabinet Delegation and His Excellency
(he Viceroy \ 16 June ig^6
l* His Excellency the Viccroy t in consultation with the members of the Cabinet
Mission, has for some time been exploring the possibilities of forming a coalition
Government drawn from the mo major parties and certain of the nun on ties
The discussions have revealed the difficulties which exist for such a Government
2 The Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission appreciate these difficulties and the
efforts which the tw o pirtics have made to meet them. They consider however
that no useful purpose can be served by further prolonging these discussions- It is
indeed urgently necessary that a strong and representative Interim Government
should be set up to conduct the very heavy and important business that has to be
earned through
3 The Viceroy is therefore jssmng invitations to the foIJoTvmg to serve as
members of the Interim Government on the basis that the constirutton*making
^wiU proceed in accordance with the Statement of May 16 tit
Sardar Baldev Singh John Matthai
Sir N P Engineer Nawab Mohammed Ismail Khan
Mr Jagi 1 van Ram Khwaja Sir Nazimuddin
Pandit Tawaharlal Nehru Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar
Mr M A Jinnah Mr C Rajagopalachan
Nawabzada Liaquat Ah Khan Dr Rajendra Prasad
Mr H K Mabtab Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
If any of those invited is unable for personal reasons to accept, the Viceroy
will, after consultation, invite some other person in his place
4 The Viceroy will arrange the distribution of portfolios in consultation with
the leaders of rhe tntf major para cs,
5 The above composition of the Interim Government is in no way to be
taken as a precedent for the solution of any other communal quesnon It is an
expedient put forward to solve the present difficulty only, and to obtain the best
available coalition Government,
6 The Viceroy and the Cabinet Mission, believe that Indians of ali com-
munines desire to arrive at a speedy settlement of this matter so that the process
490 APPENDIX Vt
of constitution-making can go forward and that the Government of India may
be earned on as efficiently as possible in die meantime
7 They therefore hope that all parties especially the two major patties will
accept this proposal so as to overcome the present obstacles, and will co-operate
for the successful carrying on of the Interim Government Should this proposal
he accepted the Viceroy will aim at inaugurating the new Government about
the 26 th June
8 In the event of the two major parties or cither of them proving unwilling
to join in the setting up of a coalition Government on the above lines* it is the
intention of the Viceroy to proceed with the formation of an Interim Govern-
ment which will be as representative as possible of those willing to accept the
Statement of May 16th.
9 The Viceroy is also directing the Governors of the Provinces to summon
the Provincial Legislative Assemblies forthwith to proceed with the elections
necessary for the setting up of the constitution-making machinery as put forward
in the Statement of May 16th
APPENDIX VII
Lord WavelVs Note for Cabinet Mission, 25 June ig$
1. I feel that I must know exactly how wc stand mth regard to the question of
Grouping, i c paragraph 19 (v) of our Statement of May the ifith
z 1 understood from last mght*s interview that Mr Gandhi , on the telegram
from Assam, ratted objections that representatives elected to the Constituent
Assembly w ere being asked to commit themselves to acceptance of paragraph
19 before becoming eligible for election, to the Constituent Assembly He was
apparently given reassurances on this point, and this is the subject of headlines
in today's Press I attempted to have it made clear that acceptance of paragraph
19 (v) of our Statement was an essential part of the Delegation scheme, but was
asked by the Secretary of State not to press the point,
3 In our instructions to Governors, which were passed by the Dcleganon
(though I btheve Sir Stafford Cnpps was not present), we made it perfectly
dear that acceptance of paragraph 19 was a condition of cljgibdity for election
to the Constituent Assembly, and Uid down that a candidate was required to
sign a declaration to this effect
fa the form issued by the Bengal Government, it appears that this provision
did not appear, and that all the candidate was asked to do was to sign a declara-
tion that he vi as elected with a view to forming a Constitution I do not know
why the Bengal Government substituted this for our instructions, but there is
surely no guarantee that other Governments have done, or will do the same,
and it is impossible to get over the fact that our instructions to Governors have
hid down that section 19 must he accepted m full It seems to me therefore that
the reassurance apparently given to Mr Gandhi last night may subsequently
lead to an accusation of bad faith on our pan, since it is obviously impossible
that our instructions ro Governors should remain 3 secret, and 1 behe\ e thar they
have in fact been already published
f am very concerned about this, smce if my understanding is correct, I con*
Sider that there has either been a reversal t>f policy which has not been agreed,
or that the assurance given to Mr Gandhi is not entirely an honest one
4 I also wish to he quite clear as ro our policy with regard to section 19 (v)
J uodtffSiaajd from the Press roday that Congress may arcept the StsteBxnt of
May the itfth, provided chat they are allowed to interpret the provisions of the
Statement in their own way, 1 e that Provinces may elect to opt out of the
492
APPENDIX VII
sections in which they h^ e hecn placed ktfert those sections have heen formed
and have decided upon the matter of grouping I take it that this cannot be
regarded as an acceptance of the Statement of May the i6th, and that the
Delegation, will say so clearly
5 The Cabinet Mission will remember that I raised the point of what would
happen in the event of Congress attempting to obtain a legal decision in favour
of theit own. interpretation of out Statement of May itfth- My pouit was that
the Statement is not a legal document and that its interpretation must depend
on the intentions of those who framed it 1 therefore suggested to Sit Stafford
Cnpps that the Cabinet Mission, before leaving India, should draw up a paper
staring clearly what the intentions of those who framed the document were in
this respect , so that I could produce it as evidence of our intentions if the docu-
ment w ere challenged in court, or elsewhere
\ do not mine understand the paper which has been drawn up by Sir Stafford
Cnpps , but I gather from it that he considers that the document may be chal-
lenged legally, and that its interpretation is open to question, and he proposes
that a tribunal should be set tip by the Constituent Assembly to interpret the
document As a Layman I do not understand this, and I cannot accept that our
clear intenuons should be open to interpretation by another body
W, 25-6-46
APPENDIX VIII
Lord Wavell's Letter toHM the King, 8 July 1946*
Viceregal Lodge
Simla
July 8th, 1946
Your Majesty,
1 last wrote just before the arrival of the Cabinet Mission In this letter I will
give some account, from my personal point of view, of the jfj- months of
negotiations which have taken place, and of their results I shall write quite
frankly* as I conceive is my duty to Your Majesty, and shall not conceal such
differences of view as there were between some members of the Mission and
myself
2 I will begin by saying that I do not think any men could have worked more
wholeheartedly and with greater patience and good temper than did the
Mission It is not really questionable which is the more trying to the temper and
patience, the climate of Delhi in the hot weather, or the quibbling*, hagghngs,
tergiversations, and small-mindedness of Indian political lea ders, especial/ y of the
Congress — the latter have it by a distance, but to have suffered the combination
of the two over a long period without loss of courtesy or hope was a fine
tribute to the Mission
3 Their achievements were also very considerable They certainly convinced
Indian opinion, except perhaps the most extreme, that we really do intend to
give India her freedom as soon as possible, they persuaded the Congress and
Muslim League leaders to meet at Simla, they produced an admirable compro-
mise plan in the Statement of May 16th, and succeeded, after some almost
interminabJe haggling on rhe part of Congress, m getting it accepted by the two
mam Parties — though both had, I aiu afraid, more than mental reservanons in
their acceptance
4 The failure to secure an Interim Government was perhaps more my fault
than theirs, since I conducted most of the negouations to this end They came
near success, I think But at the last moment Gandhi, whose conduct, as always,
was quite unpredictable, threw a spanner in the work* at the Congress end, and
Jmnah chose that moment to give to the Press an intemperate letter he had
written to me about the attitude of Congress, before I had ever received it
And Nehru at the same critical juncture went off on a quite unnecessary and
1 Reprinted, with slight omusioni, by graciou* permission of H.M* the Queen
494 APPENDIX VIII
provocative expedition to Kashmir, mainly for reasons of personal prestige and
vanity Such ate the irrtsporoibuitics of *hc leaden with whom wc hive hod
to deal
j Any differences, of view that I ha J with the Mission were on the methods
of reaching our ends, not on the ma* themselves, on which \\t were ;n full
agreement, Wc arc bound to fulfil our pleJgei to give India her freedom as soon
as possible— and we have neither die power nor, 1 think, the will to remain in
control of India for more than on extremely limited period, w jthout a complete
reversal of policy, we must try to leave India united, and we must secure the
co-operation of the Congress which represents the great majority of Indian
political opinion, vJutever our views on the post record of that Parrj
Wc are ui fact conducting a retreat, and ui very difficult arcutrutanccs. Now
my military instincts when retreating — and I am afraid I have had to make a
number of retreats— tell mc to show a* bold a front as possible and to try to
simulate reserves of strength, so as to prevent being pressed too close J y I thought
the Mission was too prone to parade the weakness of our position, and did not
make enough of our strength — India is not vet able to stand without us and I feel
that this should have been brought home more clcarlj to her rather irresponsible
leaders, also what the consequences of attack on the Unnsh in India would be
likely to be. I considered that the Mission should hav c taken and kept the initia-
tive more * and should not have been so dependent on the shifts and changes of
a set of inexperienced, short-sighted and sometimes malevolent politicians. After
all, ire soil in charge of India, and are giving a boon father than asking one
Further, I thought it was a mistake that the Mission should have had, outside the
oficul discussions, such a continuous and dose touch with one of the tw o main
Parties, the Congress this naturally aroused the deep suspicion of the Muslim
League, and was probably a cause of that letter of jamah's which contributed to
the breakdown on the Interim Government.
1 may be quite wrong in all this Military ideas and methods may not he
applicable to political ncgotwnons, and perhaps the rather more summary
methods I should have preferred would have failed completely
Finallj , I can never entirely nd my mind of the recollection that in i<?-p, at
almost the most cnucal period of the war for India, when I ^vas endeavouring
as Commander-in--Chicf to secure India with very inadequate resources against
Japanese invasion, the supporters of Congress made 4 deh berate effort to paral yse
my communications to the Eastern Front by widespread sabotage and noting
6 I will not trouble Your Majesty with any details of the various phases of the
protracted negotiations but I think that ) ou may be interested in some estimate
of the performance of the principal Indian personalities concerned, and in on
appreciation of where we stand now
Gandhi ran entirely true to form his influence is soil great his line of thought
and action at any given moment and on any particular issue is as unpredictable
APPENDIX VIII
495
as ever, he never makes a pronouncement that is not so qualified and so vaguely
worded that it cannot be interpreted in whatever sense best suits hini at a later
stage, but how ever double-tongued he may be, he is quite single-minded on the
one objective from which he has never swerved in the last 40 ) ears, the elimina-
tion of the hated British influence from India My distrust of this shrewd,
male volenti old politician was deep before the Conference started, it is deeper
than ever now One of the Mission also came to distrust him at an early date,
and I think all did at the end Incidentally, he looks much tougher and in better
health than since I first knew him And I was persuaded that he was at death's
door when I released him over t\\ o ) ears ago Curiously enough, I lately found
an appreciation of the Indian situation sent to me by a friend in India ten years
ago, he wrote that everyone was agreed that Gandhi could not live more than
six months'
I have much sympathy with Jinnah, who is straighter, more positive and
more sincere than most of the Congress leaders, but he overcallcd his hand in
the end, and thereby, I think, missed the opportunity of having a more favour-
able share in an Interim Government than he is likely to get again He was
naturally disappointed, and indulged m an unjustified outburst against the good
faith of the Mission and myself He is a curious character, a lonely, unhappy,
arbitrary, self-centred man fighting with much resolution what I fear is a losing
battle
Azad, the Congress President, did well He is a gentleman and stood for good
sense and moderation as far as he was able, m spite of poor health and a naturally
weak character But tip agamst Gandhi he was as a rabbit faced by a stoat
Congress, most unwisely brought up to the Simla Conference two Muslims
out of their four representatives Azad their President naturally had to come,
but the presence of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, from the North- West Frontier Pro-
vince, whose intelligence and grasp of .English are both limited, was regarded by
Jinnah as a gratuitous and deliberate provocation.
I have seen much of Nehru and cannot help liking him He is sincere, intel-
ligent, and personally courageous But he is unbalanced — witness his ploy in
Kashmir — and also lacks the political courage to stand up to Gandhi when he
knows he is wrong
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel is the recognised 'tough* of the Congress Working
Committee, and by far the most forcible character amongst them I have a good
deal more respect for him than for most of the Congress leaders, and he ts
probably the only one of them capable of standing up to Gandhi If he takes the
line of constitutional progress, he may be valuable, if he goes to the Left, he
will be formidable
Tu£ test of the Congress Working Committee arc poor stuffy except that
possibly one of the younger ones* Mahatab, Premier of Onssa, who is earnest
and likeable, niay in time become a capable administrator
P I4B
496* APPENDIX VIII
8 Of the immediate future in India it « diflicvit l& ^ nte much ctdvfic-
dence I am left with one rather sickly infant, the Constituent Assembly, which
I shall find much difficulty in nursing through its childhood, and oat stubborn
babe, the Interim Government, which I am expected to resuscitate by some
means The Sikhs, v*ho have always more conceit than political sense, are
threatening to make trouble Jai Prakash Narain and the Congress left wing Will
certainly do so if they see a chance, the Service*, on w ham the good government
of India depends, are tired and discouraged, the lo)alty of the Police and Indian
Army in face of a really serious challenge to British rule is problematical, and
the Congress are convinced that immediate pow cr is theirs for the asking This
has always been their real objective* and they will concentrate on it rather than
on consntunon-makirtg, that is in their c>es a sequel to the seizure of power,
not a preliminary The Congress is, however, by no means a united body and
a considerable proportion are in favour of constitutional progress rather than
violence We may be able to secure an orderly withdrawal from our rule over
India without a rebellion or civil war but it is hkely to be a close-run thing And
no-one can feel much confidence in the ability of the Indians who will take over
from us to make a strong or prosperous new India Still, if \\ c play our hand
well* they are hkely to continue to lean on British help, and may maintain some
connection with the Commonwealth, hut these three months close contact with
Indian politicians have certainly not enhanced anyone's opinion of their political
'wisdom or foresight. We shall know more of their immediate policy after the
meeting of the All-India Congress Comimttee at Bombay this week
Monty, who spent a. few da^s vmh mc last month, had rather an amusing
interview with A2ad He pretended to be anxious for the immediate return to
the U K. of all British troops in India* and the withdrawal of all British officer*
from the Indian Army Officially these arc two of the most insistent demands
of Congress, but Azad, quite taken aback, said that neither British troops nor
British officers could be spared for some time to come
9 Outside politics, 1 have httle to tell Your Majesty It looks as if we may
just scrape through 1946 without famine, though Bengal is now causing some
anxiety, and the threatened railway strike has been averted for the time being —
at a cosl
I am taking a fortnight's comparative rest in Simla before descending again
into the sticky and unpleasant heat of Delhi and of political discussion.
I have the honour to be,
Your Majesty's humble and devoted servant,
Wa\ell.
APPENDIX IX
Mr. Attke*s Letter of 31 January igtf and
Lord Wavell's Reply
private an d person a l 3 1 st January t 1 947
My dear Viceroy,
I have ) our letter of the 19th in reply to mine of the 8th. It is clear from w hat
) ou say with regard to Gov eminent policy that there is a wide divergence of
view as to the course which should be followed during the interim period t had
hoped that it would have been possible for you to ha\c returned here during
January to discuss the situation which has an sen.
I am very conscious of the heavy burden which )oti hate earned and of the
great service! which ) ou have rendered during this difficult penod I know that
) ou undertook this task from a high sense of duty
You were, t understand, informed that ) our appointment was a war appoint-
ment and that while the usual term for a Viceroy is five vcars, this might not
apply I think that three ) cars was mentioned. This has now expired I know, of
course, that prior to ) our appointment as Viceroy >ou had had the heavy strain
of high commands in war and, a* you say in your letter, j ou have had no rest
1 appreciate that )ou desire a month or two's leav c at home
But the Indian problem is entering on a new phase, which w ill be very exact-
ing and may be prolonged The next few months arc of great importance
In view of ail these circumstances and of the fart that it is specially necessary
that the Viceroy should be in full agreement with die policy of I lis Majesty's
Government, I think that )ou may agree that the time fus come to make a
change m the Viceroy ah}
I recall that \ou expressed y our readiness to retire m the event of disagreement
on policy and this w ould seem to me to be the appropriate course to follow
An announcement should be made with as little delav as possible in order to
allow nme for the appointment of ) our successor and for him to take over at
the end of February or early in March The normal announcement about > our
successor would be prefaced with the SLatement 'field- Marsha I the Viscount
Was ell who accepted the V«xro)iIt) as a war appointment is now retiring
1 have not looked into dctads, but if as a result jou arc denied +ay leave of
absence w hich ) ou w ould normally In v c had, ) ou may be sure that > ou will not
surfer Unarm i!I>
49& APPENDIX IX
I should like to submit your name to His Majesty for the dignity of an
Earldom in recognition of the self sacrificing and loyal service which yon have
displa>ed in your long and distinguished areer in India both to the Indian
people and to this Country and the Commonwealth
Yours sincerely f
C R, Attlee
jth February, 1947
My dear Prime Munstcr,
I have received youi Imtr of January 31, \tt which }OU inform me of your
intention to advue his Majesty to terminate my appointment as Viceroy m a few
weeks tune
As yon say, my appointment was a war one and no fixed term of office was
given me I thinlc > ou ire in error about a term of three yean having been
mentioned but the point is immaterial, since the three year term passed several
months ago without your giving any indication of wishing to make a change.
You are causing mc to be removed because of what you term a wide diverg-
ence of policy The divergence, as I see it, is between my wanting a definite
policy for the Interim period and HMG refusing to give nie one I will not
at this time enter into further argument on this
I do not of course question your decision to nuke a change I have no desire
except to serve the State to the best of my abdity, obviously I cannot continue
to do so if I have not the confidence of the Government m power
I think, however, that I am entitled to observe that so summary a dismissal
of His Majesty's representative in India is hardly m keeping with the dignity of
the appointment It has been usual to give a rennng Viceroy six months 1 notice
of his replacement I may recall to you that I wrote to you six months ago, at
the beginning of Augntt last, suggesting that yon might now wish to replace the
soldier by a pohucian, but that you gave no indication of any desire to make
a change Whether my conduct of my office since then has deserved dismiss I
at a few weeks* nonce is for others to j udgc
You can hardly have fa Jed to appreciate the inconvenience and expense
which you are causing to me and to the whole of my large personal staif by
directing mc to Iea\ e at such short nonce t and I hope that J shall be given at least
nil the second week m March, to avoid the indignity, as well as the inconveni-
ence of a scuttle I note what you say about my enatlement to leave I too have
not looked into detads on this matter, but will do to and will communicate with
the Secretary of State I hope that the expense and dislocation unexpectedly
caused to my personal staff ^ ill be recognised and considered
1 Churchill lot J Wavcll that he wuhed to be free to make another appointment after
three yean* tf that ihould be necessary but that he hoped u woulj not be Apart from this t
no exceptional limn placed on hii tenure as Yjceroy Normally th* post wa* held for
fi\e years
APPENDIX IX
499
It is desirable for official and personal reasons to know the name of my succes-
sor, who has presumably been selected, as early as possible You wiiJ of course
give mc advance notice of date and terms of announcement
I thank you for what you say about my services, and wiH gladly accept your
proposal to submit my name for the dignity of an Earldom
Yours sincerely,
Wavcll
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AG
AICC
AIR.
AJ
A O C -lti-C
A V A
CA
CGS
CIGS
C-in-C
CMB
COS
CP
DCIGS
DGJMS.
DIB
DPS V
EPT
FBI
FKN
FM.
FO
G
GCIE
GCSI
G of I
HMG
IA.
I A F
ICS
IMS
I N A
f O
I?
J
JPS
AdjutatnvGeneral
AH India Congress Committee
All India Radio
Major A J A, Wavell
Air Officer Cornmanding-in-Chief
A V Alexander
Constituent Assembly
Chief of General Staff"
Chief of Imperial General Staff
Co mmander-ux-Clucf
Constitution-making Body
Chiefs of Staff
(Central Provinces
Congress Party
Deputy Chief of Imperial General Staff
Director General, Indian Aledical Service
Director Intelligence Bureau
Deputy Private Secretary to the Viceroy
Excess Profits Tax
Federation of British Industries
Firoz Khan Noon
Finance Member
Foreign Office
Gandhi
Grand Cross of the Indian Empire
Gratid Cross of the Star of India
Government of India
His Majesty's Government
fidian Army
adjan Aix Force
ndian Civil Service
adian Medical Scrt ice
ndtan National Army
ndia Office
tidrai VoUce
Jinnah
J P Smastua
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
L of C Lines of Communication
M B Mountbattcn
M L. Muslim League
ML A Member of the Legislative Assembly
M O I Ministry of Information
M S Military Secretary
N D C National Defence Council
N W F P North-West Frontier Province
P andT Post and Telegraph Department
P L Petlnck-Lawrcnce
P M Prime Minister
P O Post Office
P S V Private Secretary to the Viceroy
Q Queeme (Lady \Sfoveli)
QMG Quarter Master General
R 1 A F Royal Indian Air Force
RJ N Ro> al Indian Navy
S E.A C South East Aiia Command
S ofS Secretary of State for India
S ofS Services Secretary of State's Services
U P United Provinces
WVS Women's Voluntary Service
INDEX
Hie official designation P eg C -m-C, has been added in square brackets a/ter the names of
those persons w ho are sometimes referred to in the text by designation instead of by name
WavcU has been abbreviated to W
Abdul Ghatfar Khan, sec Ghaffar Khan
Abdulla, Shaikh. 395
Abdul QaijTim Kh*n t 233, 234
Abdur Rauf Shah* Maulana Sycd, 240
Abcll, Sir George (I C S ) [P S V ]
In London dunng W \ second visit, 164-7
succeeds Jenkins as P S V , 185 il
uneasy about I N A tmb, 187
visits Gandhi about food problem, 209-10,
224
drafts paper on action in case of dead-
lock, *7r
watm down rekgram to H M G . J 2 3
member of Co mini tree to consider Break-
down Plan^ 330
thinks British must le*ve Indu, 336
left in London to represent W r 399t 400
reports to "W from London* 404+ 408
homfied at RM G 'i lack of honesty, 409
his letters pissed to Congress, 4 3 j
Other references to 25, 46, 47, 69, 70,
ioq, 190, *so, 26g t 273, 290, 3*5, 3M>
335- iSh ZSS* 3$$* 357* 3^4, 384, 410,
412, 417, 430, 422, 424, 43*, 437
Aberdeen University! 144
Abul Kalam Asad, sec Azad
Adam* General Sir Roruid, ixx
Addison, Viscount, 3 90, 395, 396, 433, 44i
Africans 175
Afhdis, 3 (52, 377
Aga Khan, 215
Agra, 37
Ahmad (Ahmed) Khan, Sir Shafa'at, 337p
338, 34^ 360
Ahmadiai Wazirs, 377
Ahinedabad, 203, 204, 205
Ahmed f Ahmad) Ah, Collector of North
Arcot, 209
Ahmed Jan, tnunshi, 156
Ahmed, at Sultan Ahmed
A.I It (All fndii Radio), 269, 421
Aiy«, Sit C P Rimasv/wiUv 17 5 , 141*
Ajmcr-Merw^ra, 477
Atalu, 148 n % l53t 266
Akbar, 378, 463
Akyab, i n, t 13
Alanbfookt, jet Brooke
Aldcrshot* 19
Alexander, A V (later Earl Alexander of
Hdlsborough)
usually agrees Vrtth W ( 228, 239, 248,
353, 256, 264* 26$ t 287, 294- 392
W 's opuuon o£ 269* 2&7 r 3 10
indignant with Gandhi, 274
threaten* to go home, 2B9
distrusts Gandhi, 290, 29ft
denounces Congress's manoeuvres, 302
tnes to mollify ]mnjh Y
thinks W ought not to resign, 307
prepared to play the piano till early
morning, 308
in favour of a firm line, 392
dislikes idea of handing over India, 397*
399- 457
a football fan, 399
Other references to 211, 229 n , 234, 244*
255* 37li 281 p 283, 290, 297,
299- 300, 303- 306, 312, 3*4> 325, 347i
386t 389, 39** 393- 393, 39*. 398, 433
Alexander, Horace, 311
Altiii Bzksk* Prctcner of Stnd* murdered
14 May 1943* *34
Alknby, Field Marshal Viscount, 11, 24,
337* 44S* 447
AUcnby tn Egypt, if* 138, 447
Alwar, 224
Ambala, 215
AmbedW,r?r B R
attitude towards W 1 * political move,
139, ho, I4it I5K
t hi"ki after short experience of Pakistan
Muslims would want to rejoin
Hindustan, 1 ji, 229
hi* unaccountable reactions, 217-18
damis^tl demanded by Gandh;, 254
expound* to Cabinet Mission, vrtotvgt of
Scheduled Castes* 237-8
W T * Yiew of, 299
INDEX
Ambedkaf Dr B R. {» 0
Other references to 30 53 * 12
j8d 57^ 275 357 407 4<*9
Amen cam
take over Assam Railways 35 83
dislike Calcutta Port Omni ss oner
behaviour of American troops in India 66
constant cnt asm by 76
always quick off the mark 163
influence on Palestine policy 251
not keen to hive W *s Supreme Com
mender South £ast Asia, 446
Other references to 2 4, 12 13 37 39 di
65 86 171
Amery Julian 395
Amery L C M S Secretary of State for
India 1940--5 [S of S ]
asks"W to penuadeEdsn to be Viceroy 2
on Churchill s ignorance of Indian prob-
lem 12
Linlithgow s opinion of 33
support* proposal f« Sect on £3 jnBcrigiL
urges "W not to mou Churchill s dis-
pleasure S6
accuses ChutchilL Hitlet-Lke att tuds
sugges 1 NDC should discus Con
s tut on for India^ 92
makes Sapru Committee excuse for
delaying political move 106-7
proposes g vrng India Domin 00 Status
under existing Court tution 1 1 1
produce? red herrings 122
supports W manfully T26
W s comments on 128 395
proluc about commercial safeguards
129-30
explain* Churttull s art tnde to Indian
poke cal progress 452
Other references to 3 4 5 6 13 15
18-23 *S $1 6$ 71 *o 04 9? roo
11S H9 m 131 133 S
138 44r 452-3
jijjtr &Bdzar Patnita 217
AmntKaur Rajkum^n 2%o 241 293 301
Amntsar 213 426 428
Anantpur 209
Anderson, Sir John (later Lord Wavcrlcy)
Chancellor of the Exchequer 1943 5
opposes * paper on Indian policy 1 8
20
torpedoes proposal for In dim Finance
MtmbeT 47
corned at prospect of curtailment of
GavcrtKiivGciitiil * powers 123 126
US
discusses sterling balance* 11+
Other references to 2i 25 119 121 127
130 W
Andrews theRevd C F 2S70
Anthony (Antony) Frank 313 337 33 s
Arabs 9 137 8 4 JO
Arakan Arakan operat oris i 3 4* 5 44
49 60 61 7^5
Arcot North and South 209
Argentine 26 403
Arkonam 209
AwfAh
acts as interpreter for Azad, 207 ii6 221
^35
3 opinion of 312 49 337
as Member of Interim Government 337
353 354, 359 362 363 373
appointment as Ambassador to U S A
37a 3S4 400 40a
Other reference to 41 tn
Asaf Ab Mrs. 387
Asamol 42
AsokaRoy Sr Set Roy
Asqu th Margot Conn es* of Oxford and
Asquith, it S3
Assam
V/ s opinion of 41
W s tours in 41 83 ipa 194
fighting on bo tders of <5z 63 72 7<5
placed with Bengal ui Sea on C by
Cabinet Mjssion 271 274 276 347
g ven assurances by Congress 349
groundless fears of 404 407
Other references to 15 28 19 215
233 243 245 272 273 2S4* 331 473
477 491
Assam railways 35 53 54, 88
Associated Chambers of Commerce 4-
10 j 102 io6 r92 351
Astley Captain the Hon S N irn 25
loo 224 402
Astor V scount 25
Attlee C R (later Earl) {? M ]
vrxitfs Labour man a) Governor
Bengal 16
g vet lukewarm support to W s Indian
pobcy 20 22
calk W i political pcopoub undemo-
cratic, 119
rcaddy swallows Congress propaganda,
169
presses W to take Gwyer political
adviser 324
personally requests Nehru and Jinnah to
come to Loudon 18^. 38 £
emphasizes Parliamentary dj faculties of
Breakdown Plan 390 392
prepared to accept Breakdown Flan in
pnac pie 391 397
INDEX
505
ungracious to wax As \V>, 39&-9
a*lt* Mountbattcn to beconie Viceroy*
39$, 4)2
goes back oa bi promise*, 409
juggcitj W should come home for Jtf-
fusions, 4 14
dismisses W , 417
send* W cordial telegram, 433
nt>cr very help AJ fa W , 43 J
silent about W 1 powiblc replacement! 459
Other reference! to 18, U7, i-o P 121,
Mi t 134* J66 p 167, r9f i 2tfft 27C W 2Sl*
28 286, 2S7, 300, 302, 3 KG, 389,
394, 395, 39*, 4*0, 4*9, 4^1- 433. 434,
4 Si, 457, *&r- 47f
Auchinleck, Field Marshal Sir Claude
[C-iih-C ]
succeed* W ai C-to-C India* jn
agrees Finance Member should be Indian*
bzeks W ^ denumi for food imports, $6*
sa
offers to give up import* of military
approve* W f * proposal for political
move, 9<> p 128* 132
demandi Japanese campaign pay for
Indian troops, 93, ioo,
discusses treatment of I N A . 161
^<?mcd about IN A tnalf, 2S7. pro-
poses new policy for them 190, J9 1
modifies sentence* m first I N A tmls*202
gloomy About R*LN mut/ny and I N A
trials, 215
approves Cnpps T * paper a* basis for
*tttlem«it a 242, 249
receives letter from Nehru about LN A
toil*, 254, 25s
resist* release of IN A ,357, +o<^9, 4",
412,414- 4i8
approves Cabinet Mission s proposed
award, 25^ 260
ready for immediate withdrawal of
British troops, 372
upset at W ** dismissal, 41 8
opposed to H-MG's statement ter-
minating British rule* 420-1
depressed about Indian Army* 426
last official interview TMth W , 429
Other references to 6, ij p 30, 37* 53,
8i, 136. 175. *79i i* e . l8 9* 204,
21 t, 237, 256, 27l t 280, aSr, 29U
298, 318, 332, 335, 35<S. 357,
373* 379- 4°°i 4io. 4*5* 4*6, 44*
Aung San, io+ P 247* 4^- 407, 4&9
XurangEcb Khan, ^aifca Mf^tSkta^it ^2>t
117
Aurangzseb, Alog^l emperor, }?$* 4&J
Aunol, V , President of the French Repub-
lic, 445
Austria, J J, 26, 300,446
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam
ha* long talks with W t 144, 2Qj t Zl6 t
221-2
impressed by W \ frankness and sincerity,
157
prajjM W for Simh Confcrtncc t ijS
sends W indignant wire, 164
interview i with Cabinet Mission, 235,
24?S
meeting* uith Cabinet Mission in Simlap
257-9
dixcuue* Interim Government Midi W T
26 1, 276* 293- 295
1* sent tetter on pov, en of Interim Govern-
merit* iSo t zSs* 28 S
worn out and bulbed by Gandhi, 29 8
W* opinion of B 315, 3 fi i, 495
aaxjom W should reassure Jimuh* 336
decides not to join Interim Government,
337
advises Ndira igimst trip toNWFP t
361
joins Cabinet (Interim Government), 4"
favours Coalition Go\ ermncnts m Pro
vmccs t 4r3
think* HMG should bring further
pressure on League* 417
alway s for moderation, 426
last interview with W , 430
feJr krcnly W *a departiirr, 4<S2
Other reference* to xni s 84, 14711-1 133*
15^ 177* 184, 205, 2i2 P 224, 245* 232,
iSh 254, 262, 271, 272, 275, 277, 278,
287, 2S9, 290, 292, 294* 296, 300, 30 1 a
3<x5> 307- 326, 327, 339, jj5i 354. 3*3p
423, 461
Azi^ul-Haquc (Huque), Sir \V \ opinion
of P 339
Other references to 30, 109* n6, r4i^
229, 272, 288
Bahadur Singh, Major, 175
Bahawalpurp 19 1
Bajpai t Sir Giqa Shankar (ICS), 13, 15
76, 166, 452
Baker, H T, 19
Baldev Singh, Sardar (Defence Member)
Minister in the Punjab, 148, 153
meeting* with Cabinet Mission, 237, 27 i F
238
becomes Defence Member, 337> 33 8, 3 %o t
357
attitude during discussions mUK, 390,
394
$o6
INDEX
Baldev Sii ght Sardar {to t )
propose* withdrawal t>f Bm A troops
\o6 4io
recommends release of I N A men 407
408 4U 412 4M 419
report* S UwMuii nnftwdenuig 4*3
afraid to g * c dens ans hinuelt 4*9
Other reference* to 6* J5J 37^ 4^
409 426 428 4S9
Balfour D<xtintioa 9
Bahpan Front cr Tract 194
Balkan* 19
Balba tS2
Baluchiitaa
denre: to £We democracy to 61
rcpte*cntat on in CA 273 286 477
4Sr 4*7
Other references to 93 234 23 S 246
3JI 405 47*
Baovfoid E* St J 10 1
Bangalore 205 25 r
Bauncqce Dr P N 147 » J 50 153
Bardolo Gopnuth 233
Basra, 3 86
ficv«tt\3fiwt Lend* \yt
Belgium 52
Benares Maharaja of 65
Bengal
W jYtttsto 32 35 41 42 6i ,447
W v diilik* c£ 41 no
European vote in 273 276 277 289 303
partition of foreseen, 426 42S
W predicts communal disorder* a 484*
4S6
Other references to 1516 S ji J4,
3d 38 35 48 49 106*141 ISO 167 n
190 200 215 221 245 246 271 *72
329 331 342 420 426 45s 47j 477
496
Bengal, Ea^t
co nun una! disorders a 360 361 362
364* 3tf 5 369 370 402 408 J28 n
\V 5 visit to 369
Bengal Wes em 200
Bengal famine food problems
one njdlioii bebev^d to have died in 32
more anxiety about in England than in
liidi* 39
ComuHSaiGo of Enquiry jnto 36-7 4S 80
danger of repetition of 54 5
Other references to xni 31 35 36 44,
56 95 96 109 174* 186 187 239
inn 447 463
Bengal Covtrnment 38 6} 364, 3Sr 491
BenthaU Sir Edward
fears railways will run out of coal 143
and threat of railway strike aro 28
272 275 ^79 281
shaken by Breakdown Vlin 413
Other Ttfcrcttcc* w 30 17 53 65 139
z 9 27ft
Berar 241 270
Berlin 436
Bevm Ernest
sympathct c about India 130-r
W * opinion of 131
wants to shovr progrctt in India 16J
diiLkes idea of leading India, 399 457
Other references to 23 134,167
BmnBoys 17
Bcwoor St Gunmath (LCS) iij 31*
3 S
Bhabha C II.
Member of Interim Government 337 349
fed up with politic; 400
W doc* not prolong mtcrv ew* with, 423
461
Q bci references to 364, jSo ±JS
Bhopat, Na vab of
L nh hgow s cpin on of 34
engineers res gnat on of Standing Com
nmtctf 103 4
Ulkj of res grung as ChanceKor 204, 38 J
tortuous ways of 204 253 356
meeting* with Cabinet Mis on £23 233
235 262 266 271
cypresses v^h to abd*cite 276 33 s
333
tries to art as negotiator between Con-
gress and League J5+* 35&
trusted by no one 3H
Other reference to fc* $o 106,224,248
2$6 61 337 443 43r
Bhulabhai (Bulabhai) Desai see De*ai
Bihar
W s V15 ts to tf4* 193 194* 374
a difficult PtGvtncc 319 3 Q 4*4
communal disorders m 370 3?a-<5 379-
8 383 401 402 408 421
Other references to 29 34 n 88 183
313 343 319 3" 33r 33* 344. 393
477
Bihar Government
reluctant to reserve posts for ex Service
men 416
fill* over rehabihtat on 426
Bjapur 52
Bkaner irl
Bikaner Maharaja o£ ill 233
Blapra Hijiof 3.15 237 25*
Bizh G D
his opinion of Linhthgow 59
has Jong talk "W th Jenkins, 102
Gngg s animadver on* again t 130 135
talks politics with W 132
IN
W *< opm-on of, 131
alarmed at virolcttcc of Congress speeches,
IBS
irl.cxt by Liaquat's Budget, 4-4> 4-9* 4 30
Other references to I67 P iGq w iSS, 401,
467* 4<*9
Black Watch, 54 n ,71, *i8, 3*5, 43a, 436,
445
Illakc, Mr Wake, Tour Superintendent*
Bombay City
W T s wsitsto, 5t-2, 67* icUt *0Ji 3^>
RIN mutiny at, 216, 217
communal not 1 in, 346, 360, 36 1 1 3^+ t 4^1
Bombay Pro\ mco
AV "i tour* in, $1+ 203^4
food shortage in P 9*p 206
Other references to 29. 3 it S8 P 3Ji* 344*
477
Bombay Explosion, 65 P 67, 72 1 B6-7* 104,
IQ7
Border (Boundary) Force, 43<S
Borneo, 2 1 1
Bose, Sarat Chandra
released from j ad, 172
interviewed by Cabinet Misiion, 244
Member of Interim Go\ernmait l 337
dropped from, 339
tnes to assume leadership of I N A t 340,
407p 408, 41a
Other references to 293 1 295, 2$6 M 33J P
5J2i Jtfo. 370
Bose. Subhas Chandra
iiiide C -m-C of I N A , 49 n P 162
hllcd m atr-crash, 164, 174
Other reference to 172 n
Bottomlcy, A G t 203* 208
Bourne, Sir Frederick (I C S j s 23S
Bowstead, John (ICS), 373
Bracken, Brendan (Viscount), 13*
Bradford. H N f 211
Braund p Sir Hcnr>, Judge of the High
Court a Allahabad, Regional Food Com-
missioner 1943^4* 39
Breakdown Plan
W write* preliminary note on ( 2S3-S
proposals for sent to H M.G not accepted,
228, 285
outline given to Governors, 319
Committee set up to work out details of,
final draft of sent to S of S y 344-5
correspondence with S of S on a
3*5-6
BiurciW5 agrees w lth, 370
Jenkins agree* with, 382
EX 507
Coh die, W) hc P Ifcnchaii an produce no
alternative, 384. 401- 413-U
ducuurcint in London on t 389* J9°> 392,
J ( J4i SV7
rejected by HMC t 4&S, 410
Other references to J36, J*** 375*
400. 40*1, 450, 455 P 458, 459
Brelvip Sjcd AbduUa, 52, 53, 23s
UrwKw, $tr Charlci (ICS), jr-j
11 n t ish Go\ cnunem [HMO] fare 0 !&
uudrt Cabinet)
mdetisjou and weakness o£ xii, 455
wrongly claim* credit for fixing date for
British withdrawal, xiu p 457
lack of support from depresses W t xvt
earned by W of risk of catastrophe, 55
makes inadequate offer of food, 61
a nut* to inform W about Palestine, 80,
118
otiuti to comult Indt* about ra/j^ig pay of
British military force* in, 89-90
atti E\ide to India negligent and contemp-
tuous flj, 95
grudgingly consents to W seeing Jinnah
and Dcsaj, 113
unwilling to modify commercial safe-
guards, 115
reluctant ly assent st a W s visit to England,
117
ignores W *s proposals for political action,
goes back on promises about food im-
ports, 200
mxiQui to preserve unity of ln<h*> 2iS t
223
declined to accept Wj Breakdown Plan,
2Z8 t J45, 4S<f
dcasion on Paramountcy, 23 3 n
advised by W to have Breakdo^Ti Plan,
aS5, 2Sq
latki definite policy* 329^ 375* 4* 2 i 45°
493
lacks firmness over Constituent Assembly p
37r, 3811 38fi, 3S9
unwilling to take firm line with Con-
gress, 3<S7p 381 2* 38<S,456
Muslims alarmed by w eakness of, 3 87
urged to choose definite policy, 3 89
makes Statement of 6 December* 393-4,
406 p 407* 4<>9i 4"* 411
supports W over I N A * 414
slow m deciding about Services, 421
accuses W of mconsiitencyp 42 1
announces W *% dismissal and date for
transier of power, 42.2-3
Other reference* to m, io B 17 * 32 33, 36 a
37* 8 1 n B 82^ 87, 9** 9*-io^» 107*
tio p 129, 140-2, 144, 156, is&, 163.
INDEX
Dfitish Governn ent {r& f )
170-3 175 I7S 181 IS J i%4
230 248 50 269 270 279 25>r 302
303 jo* 307 3" 314 3ij 319 3^0
323 iU 3^ 3^3 330-2 348 379
3S0 3*4* 3*8 392 39^ 399 tf>* 4<H
409 413 415 J S 420 434 435 44*
445 450 45i 454 4S7 47* 474 47?
485 437 4S8
Brittcr ELY Bkkcr^y 40 5
Brooke F dd Marshal Sir Alan (Viscount
Alanbrooke) 3 4 5 181
Browning Lt -General S r Frederick, jo6
Bnchcr General S r Roy 333 373 4 9
BaUwi)o 440
Burd* in Maharajadhiraja of 245
Burma in 2 15 31 33 35 4} 45 58
61 EG 94, 127 163 179 204 247 351
395 J97 393 407
Burrows Sir Frederick
appointed Governor of 13 engal 190 210
talks with W and Cab net M ss on
imperturbable 329 34° 3^9
worried hy disorders in Calcu u J 39^4°
agrees -with Breakdown PUn 370
opposes immediate statement on transfer
of power 420 422
gloomy about prospects m Bengal, 4*8
Other reference* to 312 329 376 441
Butler R A (Utef L fe Peer)
unhelpful over W s pol t £al move 126
127
vmhtipfial iboui the Safeguarding Com
me rail clauses 130
on dishonesty of politics 453 453
O her references to up 120 135 390
434
Cabinet War Cabinet Cabinet Meetings
strong pro-Jew sli feeing in 9
n ectrng on food for India, rg
spmeles&ne s and opportunism on Indian
problem 22
tu*t honest about Indu 13 451
turns dowtf proposal to appoint Ind an
Finance Member 47
turru down proposal for Sect on g3 in
Bengal 48
proposes unknown Canadian a s Finance
Men ber 49
turns do vji ^Sf 3 request for food m
ports 5+. 56
mditfcreat to Indii 4 needs %\
pmiuWi stMv Tie^ox ating w tiiGandhi
S2
it ffcni W * draft letter to Gandhi S5
S7
refuses to make pol t cal n ove until W
personally advocates it id6
fr as no time to see W 109
OTio^edatW seeing Jihubbhai Desai no
takes more notice of starving people in
Europe than India 123
Accepts W s proposals for a polit cat
move 133 5
iCpbe* promptly to W" S cables about
S mla Conference 155
disturbed by W s note on Ind an situation
1S6
ignores W s poht ca3 proposals 2 1 3
frst draft of Breakdown Plan sent to
285 2S7
ignorance of Cabinet Members 393
rejects Breakdown Plan 408
pays no heed to good of India 42 1
frayed relat ons with W 459
Other references to 1 2 17 20 44 59
6S 75 ?G 94 99 HI 121 1^4 1^7
128 153 166 J96 357 ^9 370 299
300 309 198 404 +5*-3 45<1 4*7
Cabinet Committee on India
considers W s papet about pokey m
India 17 18 20-2
considers W s proposals for political
move 1 19-22
produces altcmat ve proposals 124-6
considers W s objections to them 126-7
meets without W 126
docs not show its report to Cabinet
123 133
rejects proposal* about Commercial
Safeguards 128 jo
lukcyvumJy lecommejids W s poliut-at
move J33 4
as ures Churchill that political move
bound to ful 16 S
W not greatly impressed by 39S
goes back on pro n scs 4 57
Other references to 12 J iji 167 169—
71 310 396 433
Cabinet Committee on Food for India r2i
128 13*
Cabinet (of Indian Interim Govern n ent)
meetings of 346 35* 355 3S9
3*2
presses for release of I N A men J 57
Cabinet (of Congress League Coalition
Govcrnn cm)
ncgot at ons about its mode of working
356-7
League men bcrs sworn in 364 5
first meeting of 367
meetings of go stuoothly 373 175 376*
jSo 3S2 383 407 411 414* 415 418
419 4«
INDEX
509
communal feci ng shown m 40$ 4 1 J
resignation of League members called
for 417
friendly ducus* on in 412 424 427
cons dcrs Budget proposals 414
mmutcf of dissent 425
W s bit meeting with 431
Other references 10 350 41* 423
Cablet Mjhtou {Ob wet Dclcgit on)
decision to send 200 zo6
correspondence about 213 14
us Work 2 6-309 jfjjttti/ri
W $ summary of 309^15 3 1&— 19 493^6
111 the pocket of Cougrcst 3 4 32* 367 8
3*2 454
ga\ c the last chance of settlement 402
W 1 tribute to 493
statements issued by Appendix If V VI
Other reference! to 3 9 330 33611 341
343 386 387 3&S 390 391 393 +23
455 4*6 45* 4^ 46j
Cabmct Miss on Plan
luiTLmary of 2 6-8
failure of HJii G to stand by 370 3 86-8
interpretation oC 393
the best and last chance of settlement
4^6 450 455
details of Appcndtx U
Other references to 346 416 42 430
457
Obinccs tea-party 375
Cadur 243
Cairo 24-6 80 ii3 168 172 386
Cairo Conference 37 39
Calcutta
and Bengal famine 31 2 36
W svuUto, 35 4i * 106 19* 33S 41
369-70
noting 111 187 189 200 211 212 334
335 34r 34* 35* 3^4 373 376 40Z
456 4«4
enquiry into not s 340 343 346 +" 4^9
Other reference* to 20 37 40 46 47 56
ioj 102, 1B7 ai5 351 408
428
Calcutta Port 53 54 3 2 7
Caldecote Viscount 13
Calvert Lt -Col J M 415
Cambridge 435
Canada, 15 *<5 444 445
Candj' Major-General R H 70
Cape Town, 440
Caxmker Government (Council)
proposal to form 300 304 5
members of 3 11 *
meetings o£ 3^9 3*o 3^1 3*3 3^8 333
337 342
Oti cr references to *28 307 319 327
H4
C2roc SirOlaf(fCS)
attends conferences on Tront cr prob-
lems 62 1 9
hi* drains Truit 90
appointed Governor of N W F P 174
not reconciled to transfer of power 329
worked by Nehru j vj*ts to frontier
355-6 3-8 4 S
Congress gunning for 373 43 0
at odds u th khan Sal ib 377
\V t conin ent* on 378
Other reference! to 322 323 441
Carr Air Marshal Sir Roderick, 21 5 322 323
Carton dc Wiart Lt -General S r Adrian 77
Casey R G (Life I cer)
pessimist c about world food * tuatioa 26
appo nted Governor of Bengal, 43 44
not depressed by gloomy picture of
Ucngal
hjj good m Of k hi Deng*} 56 106
wants to run Bengal under Section 93 77
83
reluctantly trie* to keep a Ministry going
S8
I kes Bengali* 106 200
del ghtcd w th Section 93 administration
140-1
experience of Calcutta nots 189 200
his v ews of Nehru and Pate! 194
Ofcftcr ncrf renex** ca <ftf 4T SS
7a 75 167 172 191 19a 193
Catherine the Great 52
Carto Lord* 1 7
Cawnpore 101 106 336 410
Central Provinces (CP) W vis ts 57-8
Other references to 29 30 54 240 283
321 331 344 477 4S4
Ceylon 59 *3i
Chail 320
Chaidarra 377
Chamberlain Joseph, 2 r
Chandpur 369
Chum on Sir Henry (Chips) 36311 384
Chennault General C L (US) 2
Chenvell Lord (F A Lindemann Profes-
sor of Experimental Philosophy Ox
ford) Paymaster-Genera J 1942 5
wants to lock up all grain merchants 68
fatuous calculations of 122
Other references to Sj 128 rjr
Chetwodc Field Marshal Lord, 43 S
Chhatari (Chattan) Nawab of
request* reward for N zam s war serv ccs
105 175
asks for Berar and a port for N zam 24r
270
510
INDEX
Chhatan (Chattari), Nawah of (cottL)
deplores departure of British, 33 3
renounces lais titles* 3 3*
Other reference* to 176, 34 5
Chhotu Ihm, Svr t 39. 51, 7*.
Chiang Kai-shek, Generabssimo, 211 1 37i
Chiang Kai-shek, Madame, 37
China, Chinese
failure of Chinese forces to mo\c* t f 44
tougher than Indii, 90
Other references to 13, 37, 40, 54* 97-
163. 194* 333 n -
Chindwiti 4 10
Chin hills, 43 § 60
Chittor, 209
ChotUy^ Lord* 203
Chnsmon, General Sir Phihp* iv6
Chimin W H J, (I CS ) t 420
Chundngar p I* I
League nomine* in Coalition Cabinet, 3 59
says Jinitih is a jack man, 409
Other references to 540, 400, 419
Chungking^ 4°-* 1^8
Churchill, Randolph, 23, 27
Churchill, Sir Winston [PJvl ]
critical of Arakan operations, I, 3. 4* 44
doubts lo} aJry Indun Array, J* <f* *3
docs not want W as Supreme Com-
nunder, s t 446
of&rt W post cf Viceroy, &
denounces scrndal of the sterling
baUnc», 12^1 J
criticizes ladsi'j economic inefficiency, 19
angry at W P s pjpe* 00 India. i2 p 447* +53
wave* bogey of Gandhi at everi one 4 22-3
horrified it W p i liberal views on India,
44-4+7
torpedoes proposal to appoint Indian
Finance Member 47
expresses approval of what W tv*s douig*
S3
asks President for help in shipping \wheat
to India* 69
send* &icndiy ttltttam to VJ , 72
aski w hy Gandhi hiiJn # t died. 78
perturbed at negotiations wuh Gandhi, 81
stonxu incoherently, S j
furtoui at Gandhi 1 retcase, £9
sends W rather losulting cefceran^ 91
furious at forcible tone of W j telegrams
W
W »endi Jong letter ro p 94
does not want W 10 vuut En^UnJU lis,
ti6
favours Partition of India, i^o
eulogizes W military achievements, 121
wanted W simply to keep thing* quiet
in b.dia > 159
asks W to keep a bit of lndia P 16S
attitude towards Indian political progress
452
Other references to x* t 2* 6 P 7* 9i J5p 16*
21 9 23-5, 3*. 30* 4»f +5* <5& f 73. 76*
79- S4, 86, pa, pi, io0. 102, ill*
iji, 132- 137* 159* i6*t l66 > *or, 269*
390, 39J- 43*- +4*. U9+ 45 1 + 493 n
Cli\t, Robert, 4S^
Clow, Sir Andrew (I C SJ. 29, 38
Coal, +3, 4S. in, H3> 16 tS6 ? 19 j ¥ 280,
4Q7p 4IJ
Coaces, SirEnc 0 C S ) p 332, 32$, 330
Coats, Major Peter* *5, 4^ 8o > <7*. 3*5
Cochin
shortage of food til, 3I» 9^
W p s visit to, it2 13
Other reference to 209
Cochin, Maharaja of* 113
Gawibatjw^ yt* S6* 4™
Colhns, Sir Godfrey (I CS ), jl
Cotville, Sir John (Lord Ct>desmuirJ
W *s opinion of. 3 8
supports W *s pohtical ntovc p loo
acts for W B U7 f 138, i67, 384
idv&citcs by- passing ic^fi^A
Can suggest no alternative to Breakdown
Plan, 384, 400
Other TefeToiccs to 19, 114 131, 133,
f5o, io8 ¥ 423, 44^ B 441
CoTiynnemil CUu^n of 1915 Art^ ha ^S*
r2S t 130* 171
Communist PiTty of Indja, Communists,
197- 2 3Q* 340- 4«
Congresjp [ndiaa National
unwilling to rrtract 'Quit ladja B reso-
lution, 10
urns o^ 9*> iSJtt iQfi, iifi* 17 1 > *7ii
J75i 386, 483*4^
takes office m N WF P 1 117
attitude at Simla Conference, 149-5$
dissension* wichin, \76-j t 401 1 496
extremists wish to launtb fresh rebellion,
J73- 178-Sl
co\tutt oti LN A to spearhead Tcbclhou t
<73i i*i
unwilling to make terms vnth Muslim
League, tfe-i
widnpread support for p 1 96-^7
Princes in touch wtih^ 304
prepared to take orfl^c m Provinces, 2^6-7
appeasement of hy Cabinet Wjjsion, 1J9»
-40 H8
INDEX
511
negotiation* with Cabinet Mission, 244-
rejects proposal* for Interna Go\ em-
inent, 29 8-3 02
accepts Mission** Plan With jescrvations*
305
demands supreme power^ 322-3, 496
mate? reservations about Grouping, 341-
3, 34&-7, 349, 39G»4<A 4l<S- 49 W
feels m a strong position* 386-9* 402 p 49^
demands resignatwn of teague Members
416-18, 4^°* 4*3
secret letters passed to t 433
propaganda agamse VF , 454
Other reference* to xu, xm, 23, i7,
33, 57* 58* 6^ 102, 143, 145, 160, 163,
184, 19 t, 193, 198, 199, 205, ^o3, 210^
12, 2lG> 222, 424* ^S* * 2 7t 228, ^*6,
^P, *43* 3x9-21, 324^8, 330, 332-8,
345. 348 P 35*. 352-4, 35G-6o, 3^-
363, 366-8, 371-3, 376, 381^4, 391-4*
400, 404, 409, 4"* 4 I 5- 4^it +24,
4^7-30. 43** 437, 44^, 45^, 454-7, 46o f
4<k, 463* 471* 48a p 484-6, 4*3, 493^5
Congress, All India Congress Committee
(A LCC ) accept* statement of 6
December with reservations, 406* 416
Other reference* to 181,308,401,404,496
Congress leaders
use LN A, trials to foment popular feel-
ing 173* 187
make speeches to provoke mas* disorder,
1S1
alarmed by RXN mutiny, 216
find I N A demands fo* money burden-
some, 22 J
Other references to 27, 192, 207, 449,
454*4S5.4*li 495
Congress Ministries
jnNWFP,H7^ 268,378
complaint that Governor* thwart, 306
threaten resignation, 366, 369
Other references to 28, 193* "0, 2«,
378
Congress Working Committee
Gandhi* desir* to secure release o£
75, 80, Ea
release of, 8? t iGii U4* !39i
members of preach violence, 181
and Cabinet Mission* 227, 25 1 ■ 254* 276-
B, 281 p 291-4* 297* *08, 300
W* opinion of, 31 5
refuses to makfc unambiguous statement
about Grouping. 343
Other references to SU 5*- 37* US, ISO,
221, 329* 33 1 ! JS7. 4*it 487
Conran Smith. Str £ne (LC-S ), 215, Jl 8*
319, 31*, 322 P 323, 327- 3*8
Constituent Assembly (CJL)
Cabinet Melon's proposals for, 2$j f 26z 3
263, 264, 476-8 487-8* 491
Gandhi** questions about, 273, 274
Europeans* participation in, 275-7, 294
Jinnah*s questions about, 286
Gandhi's objections to, 301, 303, 3 05
tactions to t 307
W *s doubts about convening, 323, 342,
343
Nehn**s rash statements about, 325, 33 fin
League 1 * reluctance to take part in 327,
3^9. 33t>, 34*, 344* 34^ 370-*, 384*
387, 3SS, 406, 40«, 4*6, 4tS
summoning of; 334* 348. 3Si, 37*
Other references to i6±> 241, 284, 2891
29 1* ^99* 302, 3iS p 321, 3+9 P 350, 379,
380, 38^ 391, 392* 393- 397, 401, 41 U
416, 419. 4i2, 4*3* 45*, 481-2, 486. 492
Constitution Mating Body (C-MJ3 }
objection to forcing on India, 169, 170
W *s proposals for, 199
Other references to 186, 196, ig8 p 218,
230* 231,242. 259, 3060.
Coorg ( 477, 487
Corbett,E J ? 4ll
Coifidd, Sir Conrad 0 C S )
criticized by Cnpps, 257
agrees with Breakdown Flan, 3 84
Other references to 167, 176, 252, 261,
zG6 f 276, 383
Council* Viceroy s Council, ste Executive
Council
Council of State, 29, &3 238
Cranborrie t Viscount (later 5th Marquess
of Salisbury) , 2, 7, *J. 2 5- 434
Creed* C J (LP}, 3 73
Creedy, Sir Herbert* 25
Cnpps, Sir Stafford
suggests social legislation to counteract
poht;cal agitation, 9-10
Lmhtbgow * comments on, 33
effect* a compromise over Commercial
Safeguards, 129-30
wants to get back to Cnpps CHfer, itfj, 167
swallow* Congress propaganda, 1 69
not trusted by W t 2o6 p 398, 458
accepts Congress point of view, an, 311,
392* 402
proposes States should regain indepen-
dence* 231
on limiting Goveruor-Gcnttal t powers,
^3*, 373, *S7
suggest! alternative for a settlement,
^45t i*9t ^50. 252
drawt up an award, aji P 257
confident of Gandhi s approval of award,
259-62
INDEX
Cnpps, Sir Stafford [cont )
anxious to make Jinnah responsible for
failure! 264-5
contacts with and courting of Congress,
267. 269, 27*, 294* 313, 3iO t 373* 4^4,
45 h 45<*
talks of resignation, 269. 299
shocked by letter from Gandhi 274
instigates Congress to accept 16 May
Statement, 305. 313, 354
TV *s opinion of* 3 10
unwilling to stand firm on Mission - *
plan, 344, 370* 3SG
alleged duplicity of P 367* 1^8, 370
agrees with W *s analy^Si 390
repbes disingenuously to Liaquat, 391
conduct over leakage from PSY's
office. 433* 460
Other reftrenctt to 20, 25* 27, "l*
122, rj4. 171* 228,229 11^230,232,233,
234. 235, 2J9. 243, 245, 246, 24S, ^51,
252-7, 366, 270p i75-8t 2S6 P 2 88, 29O1
29 * f 29}, 29ft, 300* 301, 307 * y>9> 3*3*
314* 328, 347* 355* 384- 392, 393t 395-
397, 441, 443, 4S+* 45** 4<S0 1 4Blt 4^2 P
491- 492
CnppSr L*dy t 293, 38a
Cripps Musion, 33 n T 82, 123
Cnpps OtfeTi proposals* to, 27^ 33^ 56* 87,
97, "2 B 142, i j2, 164-6, 178, 4S4, 47o
Croft^Iord^ 22*25
Croft, Sir WiHiaui, 294, iio
Ctookshank* Captain G s 25
Cunningham P Admiral of the Beet, Vis-
count* 437
Cunningham Sir George (ICS) writes
to Wavell on I MA trial* 1SS-9
Other references to, 29, 38, 179
Dacca, 41, 42- 3<5SK 484
Datly Ttlegrjph f Tlie, 445
Dalai, Sir Ardeshir [ICS rctd,)
becomes Member of Council for Re-
constructions 66 p 67
considers India too soft, go
retki revision of Commercial clauses, 12&-
3o
full complaint e, ijfi
tesigtw t 191
Other reference* to 7 l y 11 r 16+ 1 3 J t 207*
29S
Dalmcny, 14
Dalmia, Seth Rani Knshna fe 430
Dalton, Hugh, Chancellor of the Ex-
cheguer ip45-7r 396* 3$?, 39B
Djjnodar Valley Project, 407
Dargai 377
DarjeeIing P 408
Datar Singh, Sir, 67, 153
Dawn (Muslim League newspaper), 691
34S, 349- 3*3* 40J, 4^3
De Beers. 435, 436, 4+o, 44^ 444
Dehr* Dun P 174, 41U 425
Pelhi
W glad to be back in, 43
IN A trial held ad 187
Victory Parade in, i86 p 220 p 223
decision to remain for the summer m t 302
disturbances in, 220
Delhi Province
W tour* villages in p 43
Cabinet Mission's provision for« 477
Other references to 331*4^3
Delhi University, 4S
Denmark, 442
Depressed Classes
Cabmet di*gs m reference to, 85, 87
championed by Arabcdkar, 30, 11 6, 140,
HI ( 218, 27s
Other references to p P 3 Si
Desai. Bhvdabhai {Bulabhai)
make* political proposal*. I or, 1 10
claiEU Liiquat's support for proposals, 1 i4
offers portfobos to friends^ 116
chains to have "W in his pocket, U7t IJ*
attends Simla Conference, 147 n
leads defence of LN A officers, rS7
Other references to 62, in, 113, I rj.
140* 156
De Valera, Eamon, President of Ireland
from igjp, 98, 236
Devonshire, Duke of p 25
Dharbanga, Maharaja of, 194, 24 J
Dill p Field Marshal Sir Johfl a 1 3, 73
DimapuTp fir, Bj
Dmjan, 74
Dir, Nawab of B 377
Dixon, A F W {ICS), 209
Donald, J O S , 322
Donbadc, 43
Dow, Sir Hugh (ICS)
Governor of Sind, 2% 3 8 t 60
caustic about Smd pontics, 117, 164
approves W '1 political move, 138
becomes Governor of Bihar, 319, 320
Other reference to 331
Dowdtfig a Air Chief Marshal Lord, li
DuflP-Coopet^ Lady Duna^ 7
Dinsbufg, 43<S
Duradum t 169
Dundas, Sir Ambrose {I OS } B Governor
NWFP I94&-9.443
IhnxgirpuTr .Mahafawat- -2J?
Durrnu, Captain, Bahawalpur State Forces,
427
Dutch, 172,41s
INDEX
Eastern States 41
East Ind a Soc ety j 8
Eden Sir Anthony (Earl of Avon)
and the Viceroyalty 2 3 <i 7
and W s pohtical move 1 3 1 4
Other references to 12 13 23 25 128
390 396
Edinburgh 436
Edinburgh HRH the Duke of 442
Egypt 19 24 69 97 399 447
E senhower General D wight D (US) 4
Ekrn Major General R G 373
Elderton Sir Thomas 53 54
Elect ons
m England 93 120 131 13^ 159 449
in India 160 iGjn 164 170 171 182
183 191 198 199 213 449
to the Const tuent Assembly 307 490
Elibank Lord, 10
Elwes S mon 55 66 69 76
Emerson R, B Chief Coinm oner of
Railways 1946 441
Einp ie Sonet es 19
Engineer S r N P 293 294 4^9
Ep&tem Jacob 123
European A&soaat on 192 425
Euston Earl of 25
Evatt R V 121
Esceut vie Council
W as C m-C a Member of 1 27
Indianisat on of 10 17 34
compos t on of 29-30
favours Sect on 93 m Bengal 44
proceed ngs of g ven to the Press 53 66
75 139 33i
dislikes proposed increase of railway fares
53 59 64
on release of Gandhi 70-1
on Japanese campa gn pay 92 93 n 5
strong feeling in about Educat on report
116 150 178
d scussions about 1 poh cal Council
119 123 125 135
rece ves coldly W s pol t cal proposals
League s claim to nominate all Musi m
Members of 146 147 149
welcon es W s annom cc Tiem of 19
September 173
apprehens ve about law and order 179 164
decdes it I N nutiny must be iinnly
dealt with 21s
on Post and Railway strikes 217 i3 290
meeting w th Cabinet Miss on 229-30
decides not to force a wheat levy on
Punjab 24*
powers of 247 267
Dlfl* L 1
par ty in 273
Other references to jcv 6 36 40 43
4S 60 73 81 89 109 tii 112 117
132 141 157 162 164 171 185 190
195 202 203 207 211 212 219 236
254 272 276 278 280 310 449 467
FazMHuq 337
Federal Court 17 286 343 350 371 39r 4
478
Fergusson Bngad er S r Bernard (Lord
Ballantrae) 43 71
F roz (Ferofc) Khan Noon sec Noon
Food Adv ory Councl (Commttee)
216 217 219-21 223 224
Foreign Oif ce 76 167
Fortune Captain B 25
FranJdand E P 85
Fraser Peter 12 1
Forde F M Deputy Pr me Minister of
Australia 1941-6 121
French S r Henry 91
Gairdner General Sir Charles 326
Gandhi Devadas 52 219 235
Gandhi Mohandas karamchand
W sop mon of xv 146 185 236 240
309 314 3 53 3 87 412 439 4«l 2
469 494 5
unwilling to retract Qu t India resolu
t on 10
Halifax opinion of 14
progress mposs ble while abve 1 3 73
Cab met alarmed by 22—3
more ready to compromise than Work
mg Comm ttee 57
correspondence wdi W 61 73 75 78
81 7
illness and release of 69 70 71 73 93
107
writes letter to Churchill* 9C^i
prompts Sapru to set up Committee 101
part mS inla Conference 142-7 154 156
first mterv cw w th W 144
favours modcrat on 173 181 193
agrees to help over food 209 210 2 12
rejects Jumah s proposal about food
223 4
insists on inclm on of Nat onahst Musi in
in Inter m Government 227 297 298
493
urges aboht on of salt tax 234 236 241
264 26 S 359
mtery cw woiJb Cab net Muss on 2j5
vacillates over Miss on s proposal s 2 $9-
62 291
letter from startles M ss on 2 73 J
Appendix HI
index
Gandhi Mohandas Karamchand (co j/ }
objects to Grouping 274, 277 303 $0$
491
talks with Mission about Interim Govern
ment zSSH>o 294
sends letter to W 293
tries to appease League 3 jfi
declines to make clear statement about
Grouping 34 1 2
sends offense c letter to W 342 J
does jaot % ant League 111 Interim Govern
ment 350 352-3 363
sends W record of their interview 353
negotiations with Bhopal about Interim
Government 354^ 356
tvadei s giung appeal agaiotf communal
strife, 365
tout* East Bengal, <z8
assassination of 439
vieu * 011 paramountey 4 Si 2
Other references to n 24 2 j 27 J 3
35 4i 5 1 5* <fr 72 77 80 98 IJ2
13S i5i 175, lS(S 2JJ 235
245 248 250 255 272 ^78 292 295
yvi 3^ yi} yft ^ 354
3S3 405 4P9 415 419 432 444, 45*
455 4*7 469 48J
Gandhi Mrs 52 n
Garmukteswir 374 n
Gelder Stuart 77
George VT King of £ngJan<i
complains oF length of Viceroy 1 tele-
grams it 19
wanted to visit troops in Indvi 120
complimentary about W slitters 318 390
W s last letter to 434,448*1-
Gennany Germans 123 r27 436 442 445
GhaifcrKhan Khan Abdul
description of 258 259
consulted about Nishtir 295 297 298
Other rtfbitntc* lo 260 356 495
Gfuzanfar Ah Khan
League nominee iu Coalition Govern
mem 359
W s comments on 365 373 375 376
4« 4i3
Other references to 36r 380 383 414,
415 443
Ghosh, Sudhir
Gandhi * Mercury 288
W t opinion of 293 309 3*+* 355 3*7
granted pr onty pasjjgd 321
gets a swollen head 353
poorly thought of by Congress 368
Other reference* to 289 n> 294 297
301 jitti 34* 4S*n
Ghoth* Tushar Kantt Editor iinr id fid?4r
Piitrkdt 217 235
G braltar 24, 25
Gielgud, Sir John 119 123
Griford General Sir George 1 j 72 76 %6
166
Gm>so*C (ICS) B3
Clancy Sir JBeiTraiid (ICS)
takes a. provincial view iqo 144
opposes formation* of Conned without
League 157
anxious for definite policy about Pakistan
I7S
tired and depressed 208 21 1
think* Unjomst-Congress Coibtion un
wise 211
Other references to 28 3* 74 160 167
ioB 220 2J1
Gloucester HRH the Duke of 435
Goal para 243
Godfrey IL W (I P } 194
Gorakhpor 50
Gould, Sir Basd (ICS ) 62 163
Government of India Act 1935 27 29
43n 128
Governors Conferences of 32 38 £8-9
Gracey General Sir Dougbs Commander
m-Chief Pakistan io^S-S 1 443
Gntffcty Smith. Sir Lawrence 137
Greece Greeks 19 395 39^
Greenwood, Viscount 13
Gregory F G 74
Gregory SirTTieodore 39
Griffin Sr Arthur 215
GnSuhs PtTCivai (ICS K td) 62
244 311 4^5
Gngg Sir Edward (Lord Alttingtum) 17
Gngg Sir P J
opposed to political move m India r8
20-2
wants to lock up grain merchants 63
bosirie to W s proposals 126 127
fulminates against Bub, 1*9-30 135
Other references to 119 120
Groups Grouping
Cbngresi object* to 254* 3j8 305
Congress attempts to wreck, ^73 274
3*S 34)
an csseiit al feature of Cabmct Miss on
Plan 277 344 488
mtctpcetii on 306 340 347 571 3S1
3S8 490 491
Cabinet Mission proposals regarding 475
478 4S8
Othtfr referenced to 357 363 27J 284*
303 307 341 J4<5 J48 4$l
Gulmaxg 177
Gnrdiapur 24s
Gurklus 50 174, Jfi2
INDEX
515
Gwahor, 1S5, 463
Gwahor. Maharaja o£ 185, 1S6, 233, 235
Gwyer, Sir Maunce
as Vice-Chancellor, Delhi University, 48
suggested as political adviser toW , 2SB,
302, 324, 454
critical of Congress* 30a
Other reference to 286 n
Haiti, 438
Halifax, Earl of (as Lord Irwin 'Viceroy'
1926-31)
favoured diplomatic statu* for £ajpai,
13, IS
opinion of Gandhi, 14
opinion of Nehru, 15
Other references to i8 a 393, 434, 441
Hallett, Sit Maunce (LC S )
W *s opinion of, 38* 50
approves W *s political move. 100
Other references to 29, 72, 106, 1671 44 1
Hance, Lt -General Sir J B „ 36
Hansa Mchta, Mn , 243
Hardwjck, D IL (I P ), 339
Harnani Singh, Sardar, lawyer and politi-
cian, 414
Harrison* Miss Agatha 4 287* 289 n*, 294* 30O p
3U
Hassirnara* 69
Hastings, Warren, 451, 463
Hazara, 40 r
Hendetson, Arthur P 166, 167. 395, 396, 398*
406, 4I2 ( 413
Henderson, Captain W t 25
Herbert, Sir John, i$ t 16, 41
Hidayatullah, Sir Ghulam Hussain, 29, 117.
138, r47
FLM,G iftf British Government
Hindu, Tfec, i67n
Hindustan Standard* 78
Hindustan Times, 79, 89, 112
Hodson, H V . xun
Hofmeycr. J 440
HoIbum P James P 174, 179
Holland, 123
Holland, R W (LOS ), 369
Hoover, Herbert, 250*1
Hope, Sir Arthur, 29. 3*. *S9i * 6 7
Hopkins, Harry, 4
Hore-Belisha, 310
Hoihiarpiir, 55
Hossain Imini! Member of the Council of
State, I47n+- 2 44*
Howard, Lt--Gencral Sir Geoffrey (Tom-
pty p )f 2 *$
Humphr>f,A F W ( FtaacuV** UJ*li*
Humphry*. Pamela ( Pam B ), 25, 133,
3&>
Hussein Imam, Muslim League leader in
Bihar, 374
Hutchings, Sir Robert
W opinion of, 34, 427
poor opinion of Pethick-Lawrence, 42 1
Other references to 39, 56, 58, 92, 179,
r87, 202, 237, 250, 272, ji8, 415
Hutheesmg, Krishna Nehru, 463
Hj dan, Sir Akbar (LC S )
W ? s opinion of, m, 296
talcs over Planning and Development,
207
opposed to Pakistan, 229
Other references to 73* 2S8, 3lS P 344
Hyderabad, 30* *oi-*6 f *75* *7 6 * 2 4*w
44L 463
Hyderabad* Nizam of, io+~6i i<So,24T n 1 322
Ibn Siud, King, 9, r27, 137-8
Imphal, 6r, 63, 73, 83i ioi, 106
Indaw* 71
India Committee of Cabinet, sec Cabinet
Committee on India
India Office
W works at, j, 8, 16, 19* U9»
l« t 395p 397
typists at, 24
treats India as naughty child, 61
fails to make its weight felt* 8 r
Official* of p 122, 12 j, 126
control by, 230
files at , 247
Other reference to 76
Indian Army
Churchill's unfavourable view of, 3. 4, 23
officering of, 135. 1( *7
Gandhi discusses with W , 145
in relation to I N*A , 161, 180, iS8. 222
possibility of disaffection in, 173* 1*7.
197, 229 B 249
Congress** desire to suborn, 182, 198
unrest in technical units of, 216
W proud of his connection with, 220
Congress policy hkely to break up. 279
danger of divided loyalties in* 289, 402
proposals for in Breakdown Plan* 3 J 1-2
failure in the Border (Boundary) Force,
436
Other references to 33,75,100.242,258,
397* 4o6» 408, 41S* 4*4* 4^. 47J, 4&J-
484
Indian Christian (s), joa t l$9i 2IOn , 242,
29^ *93 n
Indian Civil Service, ji. 33* 183, 147* 157»
283* a»9. Ji4* 37jt 402, 406, 409,
Indian Federation of Labour. 243
Indian National Army (1 N A )
formation of, 16 [-2
J! 6
Indian National Array (I N A ) (w L)
poss ble spearhead for Congress rebellion
loyal troops b ttcr resentment agnnst
174* 175 i&S
glorification of 181 220 222 255
Congress finds its demands for money a
burden 225
W s \o v opin on of 2+3 255
pressure for release of I N A men 3 57
406 407 40& 4" 4i* W *H 41*
419 424,431
Other references to 49 ^ 166 n. 160
195 19S 224, 67 281 319 340 43*
LNA trials
offer Congress opportun ty of rousing
popular fe^hng 1 87
Snvastava suggests they be called off 187
uneasiness about them 1S7 190
Cunningham wntcs about them iSS-g
change of policy regarding 189 190 131
outcottie of tint trial* 191 202
desire that they be dropped 210 215 216
noting at Calcutta provoked by 211
Other references to 171 1S6 "9 225
237 25+, ass 260
Indian Police Jr 33 183 373 429
Indian Science Congress 46
Indian States a« Pnucely States
Indian Union* 226 246 254,257 *58 2S5
331 475 4S6
Indo-China 1B2
Indones a, Indonesians 173 182 187 19S 35*
Interim Government
to fimct on under existing Const tut on
M2 247 280 5*3
negot ar on* for 261 267 268 575 276
2B5 288 290-3 3^3 313 318 328
479 493
Congress desire supreme power for 269
277 278 323 3 3 26 4S2
Congress rtjm proposals for 294, 302-5
4«
Congress asked to form 329
Congress mak£ proposal for 333 334
take* office 344-6
W gets Jinnah to join 3+9 357 S
Congress desire to exclude League 34P
350
Cabinet Mission s statements regarding
488 4B9-90
Other references to xii 226-8 253 270
283 284, 286 287 394. 295 293
300 304* 305 307 3o£ 33o 335 347
471 4&r 482 48S 493
Iraq r9 79 97 441
rsnuilKhan Nawab Muhammad 759 359
489
INDEX
Ismay General Sir H (Lord) 8 25 431
432 436 440 441
Jagjivan Ram
Member of Interim Government J 37
381 410 420
W s opinion of ISO 425
Other references to 37* 489
Jii Fralush Narain
arrest of 32
release of *jO-t 235 38 240
242
leader of Congress Left Wing 278 387
411 412
Jaipur 224^ 241
Jam Sahib set Nawnagar
Japan, Japanese
operat ons against I 24, 43 4 6°-2 65
76 86
and the IN A- 49« itfi J<k
surrender of 163
Other tefercnees to 10 15 27 31 95
153 157 i 6 * 17* 2 174*204 44<S
Japanese Campa gtt Pay 89-90 93 100
102 106 115
Java, 322
Jayakar MR 51 243
jehangir S r Cowa jec 176-7
Jehu I S 180 225
Jenkins Sir Evan (ICS) [PSV]
not opposed to W s jdcas for procedure
m India 14
drafts memorandum for Cabinet Com
mittee 17
h s qual t es approbated by W 108 185
W leaned heavily oa 108 44-5
thinks W s proposals will be rejected
123 126
cfejeas to rnodifkat ons of pro-
posals 124 5
says India Office officials are against W s
proposals 12&
advises on procedure for Simla Con
ferenee 147 8
attacked by Labour Leaders on inef
ficiency of Government of India, 191
called from Lahore for consultat 011 382
agrees wth Breakdown Plan 3 82
opposed to early announcement about
ending Bntish rule, 420 422
takes serious v ew of Punjab disturbances
427 428
his unruffled calm checks Nehru 428
his tal£ with IL A Butler 453
Other references to 25 47 48 65 66
7Q 71 ?6 tot in 143 H&ti 163
172 179 2tf3 268 309 3*S 3^9 329
4x9 426 436 44^ 452
INDEX
517
Jews, 9, 2Q4i 297
Jiddah, 137
Jmnah, M A
his view of *Qmt India* rebellion, 27
able to wave banner of religion, 74
denounces Rajagopalachan's formula* 79
meeting with Gandhi, 87, 91-2
expresses willingness to enter Provisional
Government, 104
annoyed at Liaquafs talks with Ehula-
bhai Desai, 114
interview with W before Simla Con*
fcrence, 146-7
claims League should nominate all Mus-
lim Members, 149^50, 296, 297, 301
at Simla Conference. 1 50-8
complains of officials helping Unionist
Party t 178
remains quite uncompromising* 202, 239,
24 5 i 3*7
Parliamentary Delegation impressed by
his intrasigence, 20S
attacks IN A policy. 210
unusually courteous and reasonably 223-5
his interview with Cabinet Mission, 237
negotiations with Cabinet Mission* 242,
244-9i 251-6$, 272, 273, 303-7
declines to see Hoover, 250
refuses to meet Congress Muslim P 264
negotiations for Interim Government *
283-92, 195-300
his annoyance with and distrust of Cabinet
Mission, 306, 308, 3ir, 387- 454
W p i view o£ 315, 368, 442, 461
asserts Congress's acceptance of 16 May
Statement not genuine, 325* 3^7* 371-3
compared to Lucifer, 548-5?
agrees to League joining Government*
351-^4
temperamental about visit to London,
negative attitude m London p 390-3
offered no assurances to Sikhs 1 419
a sick man, 409, 434
Other references to xu, 33- 53* fe> 6 1*
68, 81, Sj, roip io2, 10s, 107* riOp nr,
U3f US* h<5t 138* 142, 143. 144* M«p
l6o a 164* l66 t i7<St I77i iSe, i97 P 199,
201, 205, Z06 t 209* 215. 2l6 t 226-8,
235i 277, 278. 30>4. 3", 313, 314*
320-3, 327* 328- 333, 334 339. 340*
347, 350i 3^5i 379- 3^0, 4*4* 405. 4o8 p
420. 4*8 P 430 P 4J1» 437* 443* 449» 45<>,
45 5i 45<S t 467* 469, 486, 48 9
JodhpuTp Maharaja of B 32
Jogrodra Singh, Sir
gives favourite hares a run, 69 P 109, 178
W/* liking for, 79, ui
Other references to 30, 34t nGt i5o f 152*
219
Johannesburgp 43 9f 44°
Johnson, Colonel Louis (U S J, 33
Jones, Sit Cyril (I C S ), 210
JoneSp Correspondent of Nov York Tunc*! 208
Joseph, Pothan* 69
Jo witt, Viscount (later Earf), 191, 398
Joyce, A H t 310, 433
Jtibbulpore, 237
Jullundur, 55
Kak, R C , 177
Kalat, Khan ofp 405
Kalewa, 86
Kalka, 74
Khalhkote (Kaliikote), Raja of, 4*1 217
Kara, Miss Mawben p 243
Karachi
W *s visit top 59
R-LN mutiny at, 216
Other references to 32,117, 138, 3 83-5- 4 10
Karnik, President, All India Coal Miner*
Union, 243
Kartar Singh, Gyam, Akah Sikh, 4*4
Kashmir
W *s visit to B 177
Cabinet Mission** visit to p 249* 3 12
Nehru's visits to, 295* 297* 298, 307-
3iS, 325
Other references to 251. a6r p 3 08, 443* 4* J
Kashmir p Maharaja of, 177
Kathiawar P 103
Khahq-uz-zaman, Chaudhrj, 240
Khan Sahib, Dr
takes office as Premier, NWFP, 117
W *s opinion of, 1 54- J* *79, I9&> 235, J77
interview with Cabmet Mission t 232^2
at odds with Caroe, 377
Other references to iS8 P 234
Kliare B Dr N B, J0 f 56, 140, 141, 229, 2SS
Kharegat, Sir Pheroze (LC S )■ 187. 327
Kher, B G # 147. 14S
Khizar Hyat Khan Tiwanap see Tiwana
Khuhro, Muhammad Ayub Khan, 164
Khybct Pass, 179- 377
Kidwai, FUfi Ahmad, 283
Kirby, WHJi
Knightp Sir Henry (I C S ). 51
Knightsbndgc, 436
Knollysp Viscount. 55
Kohima. 6rp 83
Kosi river, 194* 195
Kn*hn* Mcnon. V K t 37J, jSi, 4SS
Kunzru, Pandit H N , 3 8, 66, 200, 244
Labour Government
reasons for earJy action m India* 165
518
INDEX
Labour Government (cant )
more jyntpathet c to India* 20 1
W s difference) with, 453 4
Other reference* to 166 20S 243 33 J
451 460 463
Uhour Faity to iji LS9 ±49
Lahore 100 219 426
Laithwate Sr Gilbert 119 126
Lahtpw 5+
Lampson Sir Miles (Lord KiUcam) u*
LandiKotal 161 377
Lasarllc* Sir Alan 31*
Lawrence S r Henry 4*3
Lawrence T E 37
LiWSOQ C P 4*5
Lawson J J 16 167 175 176
League sec Mu\bm League
Leather* V scount Minister of War Trans-
port 1 94 1 5 d scussc* shortage of shij>-
pingwihW 121
Other references to 25 68 81 114 122
130 131
Lebanon 134
Ledo 71
Lee of Fareham Viscount 13
Leese Lt -General S r GUver 5 106
Legislat ve Assembly a ts for Enquiry nto
food quest on 36-7
Other references to 29 60 mi 113 114
115 i85 191 *9J 207 210 213 261
276 3*5 3*3
Legislat ve As einblies Provincial 171 176
213 2&4^ 47* 48i 490
Legislature^}
W addresses 56
elect am to 170 **3
Other references to 29 r2j 277 279
291 350 475 B 488
Lentil gne Major-General W D A 70
Lc chworth 17
Lewis Sir Hawthorne (I C S } 29 38 41 441
Liaquat (Liaqat) Ah Khan* Nawabzada
denies agreement w h Desai s proposals
ii+
W s comments on 206 220 259 366
J67 372 375 40743 430 43* 443
SAembet of Cotigrrav-Leagne Coabt on
Government 359
states terms for acceptance of long-term
plan $9i
agrees to go to London 383 5
pu 5 Cnpps awkward que* ons 391
his Budget proposals 405 406 419 455
*3o-2
conside % cooperat on w h Congress mi
f o ble 4 5
react on to statement of 6 December 422
Other reference* to 116 14711 14* «
ISI 219 273 *79 351 357 3^ 3*5
369 373 375 376 ilO 390 39* 394*
414 4r7 4*4 4*8 436 461 462 4*9
Lbcm, 438
Linlithgow Marque* J of
opin on of Churchill 32
opin on of Cnpps and Amcry 33
v ew* on Indian s tuatioa 33 4 +5*
on Gandhj * fast 34
W % h gh opin on of 34
lacking in personal touch*
asksW fbe 1 prepared to res gn riB
O her references to 1 16 8j 9^ H9n
129 420 n 441 461
Little Somborne 7
Listow^l* Earl of confirm* W s bluntntfs
annojcd Ministers 436 438
Other references to rrp I3r 167 390
395 197 398 433 441
Llewellyn Lord Minister of Food 1943 5
65 iji
Lloyd. George David, 120
LotLbart General Sir Rob Commander ra
Chief hid an Army 1947 416
London *w 267 19 21 164, 3.65 170
207 282 3 S3 384 386 38P 435 444
London Univers ty 438
Long Air V ct Marshal F T \tf 323
Longmore Captain (Major) Peter 4 2 <*
Longmore Lady Pel c ty iee Felicity
Low Sir Francis 52 270
Low Sir Tohy (A H W) 303
Luctnow 50 51 336
Lmnlcy Sir Roger (Earl of Scarbrough)
15 16 440 441
Luneburg 436
Lyttelton Obvcr {V scount ChandosJ 3
Lytton Earl of 20
Maadi 25
MacArthur General Dougbj (US) 4
McKew the Revd J hL Army Chaplain
1 1
MacMahon Line 194
MacimUan Harold, 417
Madras Province
W $ tours in 17 209 447
shortage of food in 96 200 202 206
209
Other references to 2g 31 SS 184, 240
280 331 344 361 477
Maharaj Smgh* Raja Sir 50 jr 242
Mahasahha AlUndia. Hindiv ±02 14X 220
360
Mahbub Ah Khan Shailth 377
Mahratta* 2^9
Mahsudi, 322, 339, 349
Mahttb (Mahatab), Hare Krishna W f s
opmion of, 238, 276, 315
Other reference* to ii$ t £ia t 257- 295,
489
Malabar district,, 96
Malakand Pass, 362, 377
MiUjA, 15, 94, 175,200,311, 222, 242
Malcolm, Sir John, 463
Malta, j8, jS6
Mamdfit, Nawab of, 233, 2341 379* 426,
427
Mandal, Jogcndra Nath W *i opinion of,
37i-4",4H* 431
Other references to, 359, 373
Manbhuni distnet, 243
Manipur, 6o p 83
Maxmagoaj 17s
Martin, O M (LC S ), 339
Mary; Queen, 435
Mascfitld. John, 438
Mason, Philip (LC S ), 210
Matthai, Dr John W*s opinion of, 35 r p
405, 419, 430
Other reference? to 337, Jj8* J49, Jfij,
364. 37*- 424* 489
MavJajifcar, Ganesh Vasetleo, 431
Maxwell, Sir Reginald (I C S ), 30, 34 t 35,
61* 169
Mayn«, General SjrMosley, 36
Measures, Sir Philip (I P ), 366, 369
Mecca, 430
Met rut, 380
Mehu Jamna Das, 49* 65, 66, 109
Melton Constable, 21
Mena, 26
MenoD, K P S (ICS), 383
Menon, V P
dislikes India Committee** proposals p 125
prepares papers regarding Constitutional
conference 199
helps Crtpps drzw up jmrd, 257
notices change m W *s attitude, 341
W V comzcexitj ob- 3S4
becomes mouthpiece of Patcl, 384* 408 p
41 2
thinks partition inevitable, 418
an admirer of W , 431
Other references to 109, 126, 148 n >
164, i66 p 184, 2S0 B 261, 292, 323, 327,
j 3 $ f 409,454
Messervy, General Sir Frank, Commander-
in-Chief Pakistan Army, 1947-
Middle East,, 13, 19* 26
MjJuaporCp 35
Mievilie p Sir Enc, Private Secretary to the
Viceroy 1931-*- 431* 43*
MdlsJ P (I CSX 194
EX 519
Mindcn Gap, 436
Minorities, 85* I41 t I45t I4<Si i$5t *7<>i
183, 19*, 30 Jt Jo?* 3*2, 354- 35^ 357.
379- 3 So- J9CI, 47*, 485, 4fid h 4S9
Mjrzi Ismail, Sir p 102, 17&* 241, 322
Mogaung, 74
Mohamcd Said, Prime Minister of Egypt,
l9'9i 337
Monckion, Sir "Walter (later Viscount), 241
Montgomer> B Field Marshal Viscount,
123-4, 296-8* 395, 403> 434- 49*
Mookcrjcc, Sir Bircndra P 66
Mookcrjcc* Dr Sh)ama Prasad, 141
Mooltan* 237
Moorthead T Alan M , 396
Moracs, F R , 174
Moms, R. Hopkin, 203, 208
Mornson, Herbert, 9, 231 t9i* 4^7
Moscow, 3 j, 16S
Moss, Sir Eri£ (I C S ), so
Motibl, G S , I4*a
Mouiubattcn, Admiral of the Fleet Lord
Lotus (Earl)
enjoyed fuller powers than W P *w
approved W *s policy paper on India, 20,
21
depressed after Cairo meeting, 39
a film fan, 40
deprived of resources, 4<>-7
apprehensive of the result of Japanese
attack, 60
reports Churchill intractable about India,
appointment as Viceroy, 398, 419* 4^3-
459
talk wjjh W in Delhi, 432
talk with W m England, 437-8
Other references to xi, 15, 34* 37- 49*
SOt 56, 58- 5% 64* <5S, 72-
2041 211, 4^5- 4^4p 433n> 44^i 443*
4JS- 4S9
Moyne, Lord, 6
M^diLjJt Szr A RimtewzmY views on
constitutional progress, 10
Other references to p 12, 30, 34, 53, r33 a
i9r, 207- ^I9t 4*7* 469
Mudie, Sir Frank (ICS) (HomeMemberJ,
29* 38*8r p 139- i6l t 173* 174- 177* 178 n ,
329. 443
MuhajRjnad lsnziih 240
Munrop Sir Thomas, 413
Minister, Earl of 17. 2 j f 203
Muslmi League
claims right to nominate all Muslim
members of Council, 146, 149, rso
un willing to accept Cnpps offer, 1
520
INDEX
Musbra League ( u it }
joins in defence of LN A off ccrs 187
\V s approvals of 196-9 3fi^S
unable to form Ministry W Punjab 22a-
ncgotiat oni tv tli Cabinet Misa on 2 6-8
230 236 243 245 7 249 253-^ ^59
6j 266-8 2-0 2 2 273 2 6 Sr
312 3*4
W 1 proposed handling of m case of
breakdown 284-6
want* tiA diminution of G -G- 1 po cc*,
287
accepts Cib net Mis* <*n Pun* 306 tu
negot tftjon* for Interim Government
distrusts Cabinet Mm oft * contacts with
Congress 311
withiinwi acceptance of Cabinet Miss on
Plan* 324 7
V/ 1 effort* to bring mta Intcrun Govern-
ment 341 344, 350-6
decide* to join Interim Government
357 & 360
itfuggle for portfolios 3<iJ-4
uriwalLng to jom Constituent Aiscmbl>
366 371 37* 3^1 3 39* 4 406 +0*
416 417
feels let down 40 404
causes ag til on m 1 unjab 425-6 4*8
Other reference* to xi xu »u 37 30
jS tf2 63 9 ioi no UB rj2 7
160 1 6 177 180 181 193 -05 08
2u 216 224 f *J5 239 9' 3 £-3o
332 334, 336 3<5i 3* 37 373 37<
3 <J 3&4* 390 413 +- 1 4 4-7 4+9
450 4S6 457 460^3 4 1 3
Mmhm League Ministries 83 4*+ 6j
117 14^ 22i 334, jjs
MuiUm League Working Conim ee 14*
147 tjo 252 273 W ^92 j6 3:8 334,
358 405 409 4ltf +2*
MuiL u League Council* u hdrau *
accept -u ce of Cabu ei M11 ion I Un,
324
rrtol Trt t Dtrcrt Act on 315
Other reference* to }$l }$7 38 401
4 6
Mu Um Natutful Guards 4 J&J 44.
4U 4J<
Mutum, x u 2 j jfw It I N Mu my
Mitre ]E2 09 463
M w>rr Mai if ap 1 A
Niklu, Mh Si tn Dcv p°c c*s M
ber f C_ fci^nru \t of (-on c
3^ J4*~v 3** 3*3
NauU Tal 7 2 S3
Narayangunge 369
NttMulCdlt 23 j
Nit onal Defence Courted (NDC]
proposed 2s Const ttftJon making body
33 9*
meetings of 3<5 49 *5 109 I7S
Other refcreneej to 160 1 6 449
Nat onalist (Congress) Muslim (s)
Jiniuh s objection to 227 268 297
Congress iniuts on including 397 8 300
301 353
Jmnah *restgpedto 3S4 JS7
Other reference* to 3°4*JI3 54° 348
Nimnin Wuhiramad 374
Na^2n2gir J*m Sih b of
tmgmtcn xt$ gna on of Standing Com
imttcc 103 4
mtct> ewift thCabmelMiii on 233 35
467 469
Nizunuddtn Sir
W i opinion of 47 4 T 9
on League s entry into the Const tucnt
Assembl 340-1
on Bihir duprden 379
Other reference* to 2& 14811 9*
359 400 4 a 443 4S9
Nehru Pandit JiwahirUl
his long talk* with W 152 155 278-9
W s vicwi and oomracntj on 152 135
180 255 278 292 3tJ 4*1 4*2
495
nakes wild speeches l 8 179 181 221
\*amcd by w 180 1S2
andlNA 187 54 2jj 4I1 414* 43*
Cwy i poor opm on of 19*
\ii 1 to Malawi 222
in negotoi oos for Interim Government
227 6t 6^9 27j-^5 2SS-9] 29S
301
succeeds Audi* Con gm* Pres dent 252
30S 326
m negotutiuns w h Cabii et J^Lii on at
Simla* 258-9 26J 7 J 12
reunion to Cabinet Musion f au^rd^ 271
gets arrested in K^jiirn r 97 299
docs not pins for ^uquiry into 1942 dit-
fur bant es 321
Han s to reduce Viceroy to f gurchejd
32 J2J J8r
nuLes aTopatis LIci a ctntnt* about Coo
s liiicnt Assembl) 324 5 344
form j h ituu Government 333 i 3J7
33^ J4J 34*
f buked by Gandhi 3J&
unwillin^ to naLe tlejr HJlcn on about
Grouping 341 jj3 34^ J So
IN
docs not unit League to join Intern"
Government, 349-J3* 362
negotiates Jinnait, 3SS-7
insists on visiting NWFP, J55* 3S* 5 *
361- 362.372, 373, 377* 378
not helpful o^ cr distribution ofpottfohos,
J59i 3^4
threaten* resignation o\cr Measures* c*$c 9
}66* 367
tn« to check disorder in Bihar, 373, 375*
379
sudden outburst* of, 37S1 39&* 4<>4p 4^**
428
reluctantly agree* to go to London, 383-5
hi* put in London discussions, 390-4
vacillates over Ljiquoi** Budget pro-
pouls, 42 1, 425, 430
reaction to Statement of 20 February, 422*
423, 426-7
agrees not to pay second visittoN WFPi
418, 430
*£csW in London, 443-4
hi* underestimate of Muslim League, 454i
456
Other references to xu t ir, ij, 132* I77t
l*3t 1 84* 1 86, 191, 2D4t 213- 287, 30*-
307, 3t>8, 3ii t 318, 320, 327. 32S>, 347.
348, 3S8 P 3^5- 3*9, 37^ 3*0. 382, 383,
397* <oo, 401, 407, 408* 4*9* 4to f 41^
r8 p 42ip 43«p 437. 4*7, 4*9i 4*1- 489
Neilore, ^09
Nepal, 107, no. 202, 408
Nepal, Maharaja of, no, 431
New Forest P 6
New Guinea, 43
News Ckromck, 77
New York, 2, 438
NichoL Mrs Munet 303. 20 S
Nicholson, Sir Godfrey, 133, 203
Nishtar, Sardar Abdnr Rab
description of t 2 $9* 4*3
Congress objection to T 295 , 297-8
Member of Congress-League Coalition
Government, 359 # 369
Other references to 328, 373. 374- 383i
40ip 415- 4*9
Noakhali, 363, 373
Noel-Baker, P J , Secretary of Stare for
Commonwealth Relations 1947^5°* 44 1 *
442. 444
Noon, Sir Firoz Khan
thoughtless outburst* o£ 37j 87* iifi
nor trusted, 150, 428
goes over to Jinuah, 164
Other reference* to 30, 62, 64, 89- i 2 r>
139 178*379-443 t ^
North-West Frontier Province (N WFP)
W a * Visit to a 39. 377^9
EX 521
Nehru'* visit to P 359. 361-2, 372
Other reference* to zS t 49, 93, 114* 117,
rTFi 2J4* A4$i 2461 i£3, 27J P i£J, Jjr,
40l f 421
Nowihcra* 377
N)c, Lt -General Sir Archibald. 184, 361,
44^3
O'Connor. General Sir Richard, 18S
Olivier, Sir Lawrence (Lord), 120
OppcnhcuncTp Sir Ernest p. 43 6, 440
Onsia
W p * tour of, 41
proposal to merge contiguous States with,
239- *57* 176
Other references to 28, 29, 150, 240, 33
344- 477
Ojnabruck, 124
Oudh, Talukdirs of, 51
Oxford, 435
Oxford, Lady, see Asquith
Fibstan, 437- 443
Pikurtan, concept of, demand for
truncated version of f »u 79* 9i-*» '99-
200,226, 242,245,45s
need to face, 164, 165* 167, 178, 206,
2l8 p 229,454
League 1 ! firm adherence to, 197- *99i
20S
discussion of boundaries, 237p 246
Cabinet Mission's condemnation of*
472-4
Other references to 10, ^7* 6i f 104, 114,
i$U 175, I93i 205, 212, 2XS> 230, 234,
239, 240p 243, 246, 270* 284, 2pr p 313.
325, 326, 328, 344P 3&l t 379* 387* 42i*
470
Palam, 224
Palestine
Cabinet djscus5Jon on f j>
secret conference on, 80
proposal to partition, 1 1 8
W desires to be kept informed on p n8 (
124
UNO 1 * decision on, 438
Other reference* to iaB p 138* 166, 167,
182,297, 324, 395, 396, 399*421
Palestine Commission, 251
Pandit, Mr* Vyaj alakshmi, 346
Pant, Pandit Govind Ballabh, 144, I4S11,
I49t 154, 18 r, 238, 247, 366
Paraguay, 43 S
Pajamountcy t 223, 23 i f 2J3 n , 24 247,
266, 273, 33T, 423, 474- 48r-2
Parlalumcdi, Maharaja of, 29, 41, 148 n .
150, 245
Parliamentary Delegation, 1S6, 202-3, 208
522
INDEX
Pate! Sardar Vallabhbhu (ValUbhai)
in favour of violence 176 ipr
mBammatory speeches of 179 181
determined to aid British rule 1S0 1S2
strong man of Congress 180 194
helps to keep the peace 173 216
J to nmcnti on 05 3*5 347 37^
W sfrst interview with 205-6
co-operative on food quest on 247
att tude* during Cabmct Miss on 2 5 8-6 r
2S8 190-2 300 jot ioj
opposes Gandhi on Nat on^is t Muslim
issue *97
asks Ndini not to visit Kashm r 307
convinced that Congress must form h\
tenm Government 3 9
rebuked by Gandhi 336
in touch w th Cnpps 340
driamei G rouptng with W
eiftuively accepts Coalit on Government
359
truculent over East Bengal noU 360 361
364
cr ticism of Cr pps 368
communal att tude of 376 3 El 383
rivalry w tlx Nehru 401 405
annoyed with Nehru over Asaf Ah s ap-
pointment 40S
opposes Gandhi over 6 December State-
ment 409 412
speaks of Communist danger 41 1
agreeable to truncated Pakistan 421
Other references to 151 225 306 323
328 33^ 351 35* 3*5 $66 369 372
373 33* 3S5 39<S 408 409 4i r
413 4J* 417 429 431 441 462 489
Patiala 216
Patiala Maharaja of 85 115 2J6 233 235
266 320
Pathans 233 286 350
Patna 370 372 371 4. 379
Perse Air Chief Marshal Sr Richard
Commander in Chief South East Asia
Command 1945^4 2. 4 \ 5 50
Penang 163
Penhurst 395
Persia 79 166
Perth 436
Peshawar 39 298 361 377 37* 4*8 430
Pethick Lawrence Lord [S of S j
W s first mprcss ons of 163
a poor draftsman* 16S 170 254^310 448
expresses penitence for Britain s misdeeds
236
incapable of bicv ty 337 246 247 265
267 301 363 392
djuly requests release of Jfai Frakash
Nara n 240
talks of resignation 269
shaken by letter from Gandhi 27+
unwdUng to be firm, with Congress 288
suggests Gwycr as adviser to W 288
302
asks not to press point about Group-
ing 303 491
W s opinion of 3&9~*o
directs pnor ty passage be given Sudhir
Ghosh, 3^1
perturbed by Mushm Leagues with-
drawal 326 3^7
in touch with Patel through Stidhtr
Ghosh 340
sends pan c-stntken telegram* 343 4 1 ?
rductant to stand by Cabinet Mitt on
Plan 347
scads woolly communication about
Breakdown Plan 184 5
evades Liaquat * awkward quest on* 391
accepts Congress point of v cw 39 402
can es no weight 39a
Hutchings s opinion of 421
Other references to 161 16 J 164 7r
1 £6 1S7 211 213 214,218 228 229 n
231 234f^35 ^39 242 243 247 248
*53 2 55 257-80 pa** m ^gj ^57 303
pass 309 3" 3*2 314, J 0 3*3
324 328 329 333 335 344 355 356
360 j6i jE6 3B9 394-7
4i2-r4 4*7 433 434 455 45& 459
Philips William US Fore gn Service ^r
P lgnms Soc ety rS 21
Pillai K Shajikar 1x2
Plassey 370
Poland Poles it 13
Polit cal Adviser 143 167 n 223 247
^53 ^57
Pol t cal Department 85 104 25a 322 430
Polit cal ScrV ce 372
Poole irtt
Poona ^03
Portal Marshal of the Royal Air Force
Viaconnt 437
Porter A E- <I C S ) 215 219
Portuguese 175
Post Wat Reconstruct on and Develop-
ment 33 4Z 54 66 67 S3 97 107
160 44S
Potemkin 53
Potsdam 168
Pownall Lt -General S r Henry 60 6 j 77
Press
Council proceedings known to 53 55
139 *U
Governors meetings arouse wrath of B9
INDEX
favour able to W spol teal move 142 14 S
virulent tone of 1 80 182 217
crit cal rcccpt on of 1 arl aincnury Dcle-
gat on 203
inaccuracy of jjo
Bihar Government s failure to control
J 74
Other reference* to 9 1 8 42 75 S 103
122 13s 139 H 1 192 194 21] 214
222 z 9 231 242 246 25s 63 267
269 172 285 310 j 3 4 373 37J 37*
383 422 437 469 491
PrcwOrd lance 405 413
Princely (Ind an) States
Acts regarding 9 30
Congress des re to ra se ag tat o 1 in 2$$
Cabinet Aliiijom proposals Cor 474 J
477 4S8
Gandhi s views on 4S1 2
Ofhrr reference* to xv 31 103 14 S
160 ifis 171 183 192 223 233 241
247 256 258 271 279 38S 417 447
448
Pnnecs (Indian)
hesitate to enter Federal on 29
grevancesof Sr 103
discuss ons w th 90
general att tude of 197 2Qj
m touch with Congress 204
Congress desire to deal brusquely with
271 278 279
Other references to 14^ 35 65 91 105
108 173 180 196 223 24S 149
254* 257 2fii 266 271 307 308 386
402 413 460 482
Princes Chamber of 34* idi 114 i+3
194 197 204* 205
Standing Comm tt<x of
res gnat ons from 103 S I"
w thdrawal of res gnat ons 1 43
meeting th Cabinet Mis on 235
Other reference to 252
Pudukkotta 209
Punjab
po ton of Sikhs in 30 266 288 336 473
W svutJ to 39 55 *°°
Jinnahj interference jn 63 80 149
loyalty of 144
lack of ra n in 202 206
League s eiccttfrai sac^es* m 220^2
proposed wheat levy n 247 a 48 250
disturbances in 4*4 *5 4 19 4*5 8
Other references to 28 3r US rtftf
167 n 197 199 £D0 219 245-^
263 26S 272 297 318 319 331 379
421 455 473 473 477 4«4 486
Punjab Government 100 116 24S 415
418 419 420 425 426
1 yarc La4 Na>ar 210
Quebec Quebec Conference 15
Quctu Z24 4S7
Qu t Ind 4 rebellion resolution ion 27
5* 73 75 "9 1S7 8 173 185 192
[Uh mtoola Hab b Ibrahim: 443
IU sman Sir Jcrc ny (ICS) [Finance
Member] 30 34 39 4711 53 54 89
100 113 130
Rajagopabtharj (Rajagopalachar ar) C
W s comments on 57 147 314 37*5 469
first meeting w th W 57
proposes fonnuU to Jinnah, 7S-9
urges W to form Government wit! out
League ffj
reprimanded by Congress Working
Committee 156
in touch with Cab^er Mis* on 2^4 297
-.98 3Cjo 301
Pet hick Lawrence a h gh opinion of 309
draft* Rcsolut on to appease League 33<S
Menbcr of Interim Government 337
338 349 354, 3«2 364 367
speaks of Nehru s pledges about Con
stituent Assembly 3 50
thinks Btujna s poi ileal leaders gangsters
407
h s high regard for W 462
Other referei ccj to 52 58 87 9 1 ^5
14811 353 365 366 409 423 4i4
461 4G7 489
Rajendra Prasad Dr r55 3 01 3 0 * 5 337
348 353 380 424 489
Ramncd (Rajnnad) 2p9
Rampur 65
Ranee Major-General Sir Hubert 340
RatigjnadhM (Rui7g2n2dh3n} S r Samuel
Indian High Comnnss ontr in London 25
Rangoon 86 163 iSS
Ranking Major-General R PL 339
Rashtnya Swayam Sewak Sangh 415
Rathedaung 43
Rau S r 13 N (r C S ) 187 199 257 261
294,313 356 371
Rawalpmd 177 237 426
Reading Marquess of 20
Redman H V 101
Reed Sir Slinky Ed ror lie Truss
Ida 1907 23 4+1
Reid Colin 328
Rewa Maharaja of Jtv
Rhodes a 440
RIAF mutiny 215 216
Richards Professor R, 203 208
Richardson S r Henry 14S11
Richter F J P 133 171
INDEX
524
Ringwood 6 19
R*IN mutiny court mart als 21 S 216
28 r 295 407
Ibjadh, 127
Rodneys Captain the Hon and Mr*
Simon 395
Rohtak, 427
Rome 432
Roosevelt Fres dent Frankhn D 4 J 21
3jn 69 73 "I
Rowlands Sit Archibald (Finance Mem
bef]
accept * pos t of Finance Member 1 00
supports W * pol tied move 138 139
Other references to 62 63 81 93 94t
156 idi 175 1S3 1E6 219 272
278
Roy SirAsolta 30 i$9 203 229
Roy DrB C 70
Roy K- S 3+3 370
Ray M N 50 ii 55 197
Ru* ell, Lt -General Sir Dudley 373
Russia Russians 10 78 121 16s 168 219
4+4
Rurherford Sir Thomas (LC S ) 2S 36
38 47 177 2*5
Saadulla Sir Muhammad* 29 147 I48 n
^33 234
S^hal^npiJT 411
Saidtf 377
St Andrews 14 435 437 442
Sakra 209
Salt Laws Salt Tax 236 24.0 +r 264 265
359 405
Samuel, V Kiount 190
San Francisco Conference 117 126
Sant^ls 213
Sapm, Sir Tej Bahadur 50 ior 109 114
1B7 233 335
Sapru Committee ior 107 114^243
Sargent Sir John ij6 150 178 208
Savarkar Dr V D 4 s 7 4^9
Savory Lt -General Sir Reginald 336
Sayed (Seyud) G M 233 234
Sayers Dorothy L 87
Scaibrottgtu see Lundey
Scheduled Castes uo 145 146 15 r 197
199 329 237 272 92 299 330 359 416
4-55 43i
Scoones General Sir Geoffrey 106
Sco land 442
Sen t Sir Ian (ICS) 286 336 364, 365
380 381 3S3 38 j 404,412 413
Secretary of State for India (S of S J
see A may and Pet fuck lawrence
Sea ong3 (Government of bidia Act 1935)
expUnat on of z8
proposed application of in Bengal 44
4<5-8 52 72 77 83
appl ed jn Bengal 140
applied in Punjab 426
Other references to SS 101 339 374
Sccunderabad 270
Selborne Earl of 25
Services 31 178 1S4 ^40 3^8 319 J3I
366 388 394* 427
Services Secretary of States 319 373 379
j9fi 398 399 405 4r3 4*o 4^r 43*
Servces uncovenanted 435 439 441 5
Sewahkblls 55
ShabiKhei 3" 3 2 3 339 340 349-50
Shantar cartooni t see P llai
Shauiat Hyat Khan 63
Shdlong 41
Shiva Rao B 167 169
Slnrpun i8j
Sholapnr 52
Short Major} Met 245 268 458 n
Shulda Pandit R. S 148 n 238
S am 166 206 2j<>
SkanderH)at Khan Sir 63 68 ftl
Sikhs
popular on of 30
represent at Yes of meet Cabinet Miss on
237 27r 88
apprehend ons of 249 230
licttag unity and leadership 366 318
38S 427
expected to eaus^ trouble 318 319 32r
336 4S4
side with Congress 336 387 388
Other references to ir4, 146 1480 153
t99 12* 2^8 2&6 313 379 194
395 40 6 4*3 4^ 43^ 4<*9 473 47(5
4»J
S kkim 69-70 163 40S
Sikkim Maharaja of 70
Sikotski General W 11
Sdchar 63
Simla xiv 36 74 89 143 156 302 218
227 253 254 266 27S 287 3^9 313
Simla Conference
anno uRcem.cn t of, 141 2
proceedings of 144 56
reflections on 1 54-6 01
Other references to xu 193 199 200
205 208 217 227 262 296 300 449
452 453 462
Sin on Viscount
W 1 v cw oC 23
opposed to pot ticit move 12X 126 T17
Other references to 13 18 20 25 ir9
*30 ns
Simon Lady 136
INDEX
Sind W *j visit to p 5SH50
Other rcfuences to 28. 31 1 66 f 206, 208*
arp, iu> 245, Z4<S ^97, 3*9. 33 U 349.
38s, -pi* 47^477
Sind Government, ii4 f 117, 321
Singapore, 163 1 168, i?4i 21 r, 250
Singbhum district, 243
Smha* Sn Krishna
violent speeches of, 221, i23
W B s comment* on, 23 B P 373
rcbuied by W t 374
Other references to 148, 148 n , 370
Sirry* Mme, wife of Sirry Pasha* Pnme
Minister, Egypt, 1940* 337
SicweU, Major-General H D W p 17 1-2
SivaRajp Rao Bahadur, 14S n P 150, 13 if i$3
Sixsmith, Majar-Gctieul K G t 339
Slecman, Sir William* 463
Sluit, Fieid Marshal Sir William P rotf
Smith, Lt -General Sir Arthur [C G S ],
193* 224^ 225, 336, 338, 346* 400
Smith, Sir Norman (IP) [DTD], 179,
i8g t 206+ zxSr Z2$ t 32 r, jj6, 429
Smuts, Field Marshal J C , xv ( 22* 24*
I2t, 440
Somervell, General R* B (US), 35
SomemUe, Admiral of the Fleet Sir James,
Commander*m*Chicf s Eastern Fleet
194^4, ^ is
Sorensen, R W (later Lord), 203
South Abica t xvi 24, icq, lip. 435*436* 439,
440
Spente, Sir Gcotge (1 C S ), 2io P 3 28 i
Spens, Sir Patrick, 286, 340, j+j* 4^9
Snvastava T Sir J P [Food Member]
W \ comments on p 53* G8* 426
upset at appointment of Reconstruction
Member* 67, 68
dislike of Congress and democracy, 68
want* I N A tnals called off* 187
Congress have knife into, 210
Other references to 30, 39, 5 6* 62 p 63 P
<Ss— 6, 92, ioo, ro2 P U2 T utf, 140,
X86, 208 2i9 P 229, 283, 288, 44*
Stalin, J , in
Stansgate, Viscount , 167
Stanley, Colonel Oliver, Secretary of Sutc
for Colonies 1 942-5 P 135
Sterling balances. i2 a 17* 89, 12*
Stilwdl, Lt -General Joseph W (U S ) p I,
IJi 4* ^4* ifiJ^
StopfortL General Sir Montagu, 106
Subbarayan fl Dt, 57
Sudan, 399
Suhriwardy (Suhrwardy), £L S
meets Cabinet Mission, 239
W p s opmion of, 239* 348* 407
Burro w* ¥ s relations with, 276, 277
and Calcutta nots, 339* 340
Other references Co 42* 4S- 5<Si J 59 11 * 370
Sultan Ahmed, Sir
vacillates over W *s political move, 139,
151
resignanon from Council 174, rSo
Other references to 30i35 2 *4U
Summerfields, 163
Summers, G S (later Sir Spencer) Secretary P
Department of Overseas Tradc P *S4S*
129, 130
Swat, Wall of P 377
S>lhet P 23 3. 243* 245, 246, 473
Syria, 134* 13S* r«2
Taif, 137
Tanjorc, 209
Tara Singh p Master, 14& n, 152, 153, -2J7i
249p 271,288, 420, 4*7
Tata, J R 0,5***7
Taylor. Lt -CoL A , 426
Teichman, Sir End 40
Tezpur P 194
Thorn* the Revd J , Army Chaplain, n
Thompson, Edward, 11
Thome, Sir John (ICS)
ra favour of Gandhi*s release, 70
want* LN*A trial* dropped, 216
Other references to 47. 72, 178, 179* *io t
22p^ 2j8, 2jo, 278
Tibet, 62, 194
Tiddim. 60
Times, Tlx, 174- 179, 355. 405. 438, 44S
Times cflnd\Q> The, 174* 180, 2zj, 3S3
Tiwana p Sir Khizar Hyat Khan
Wa veils comments on, 39- Sip Sl t 379*
414
resists Jinnah, 63, G 8, 74- 107
doe* not wish to sever British connection,
1 10, 23 8
upset by W p s political move, 14*
at Simla Conference, 148 n p 153* 154
heads Coalition Government, 220-1
meets Cabinet Mission, 23 8
resigns, 426, 42 S
Other references to 28, 62 1 790 . H7t
l$S t 164* an* 3S2
Travancore
shortage of food m p 3i» 96
Wa veil's tour in, 112-13
Other references to 162,, 175, 241, 407,
4*o
Tnvancore, Maharaja of. 1 T2
Tren chard* Marshal of the Royal Air Force,
Viscounty 13
Trj&u« p 231
Tnchmopoly, 209
INDEX
$26
*Tndent conference 446
Tmcomake
Tnvcdi S r Chandu Lai (LC S ) i?4
Tuker Lt -General Sir Francs 179 J 26
409 416
Turkey 39<S
TurnbuU Sir Frank 133 273 3™
Twynam Sr Henry (ICS) 29 34 J* 53
2&3 119 44*
Udaipur JO
TJjjal Singh Sardar Sib landowner arid
pol t c an 414
Un omst Party
character of 63
denounced byjfmnali, 146
Other references to 790 100 14? J 7*
297
Unionist Ministry i8 107 U4ti44 s 45n
United Nat ons UNO 207 220 237
342 373 392 438 +<>8
Un red Provinces (U P )
apprehens on of disorder in 18J 4S4
communal disorders m J 74 402
Oihet (defenses to 19 4c 54*68 143 ft
181 202 240 283 88 121 311 34+
3^6 477
USA S J ij l^i 1G5 iGB 280 375
399
Usman Sir Muhammad reactionary poh
t cal v ews o^ 69 1S1 203 zz$ 2B0
Other references to 30 44 56 Si 139
196 272
Usman Khan Muhammad Nawab of Kot
153
Varro 43 6
Vizianagtam Maharajkumar S r V jaya 2+5
Walker Major D Comptroller to the
V ceroy 1 94 6^7 426
Walter R L (ICS) 339
Walong 194
Watu 377
War Board T43
War Cabinet ee Cabinet
War Offce 167
Wardha 209 336
Washing on * 4 5 24, 168 207 208 244
Wan hope General Sir Arthur 12 439
Waugh Sir Arthur (IC S ) jia 330
Wavell Major A J A (second Earl)
Ardiiejohn 54, 59 71 73 S 152 207
J4o 345 41S 426 439 44i
Wavell* Major A J B 430
Wavell A P F eld Marshal Earl
reasons for keeping a Journal, xiV
his opin on of Gandhi xv 7 5 193 3**-
IS Hi 2 3SJ 439 4*1 * 494 S
goes to Washington w th Churchill 2 4
chosen as Viceroy 7 S
attend* Cab^ 1 " meetings 9 H 1 2 *J
19 22 1
apprcciat on of India 1 war cJlbrt 13 1 9
12 r 208
frames proposal* for Cabinet Commuctcc
on IndLa 14, I? 18
hjs v Cwsof A mc ry * quaht cs 16 128 395
given d rcct ve by Churdwll 23
arrives Delhi J*
encrget c act o** against famine 32 Jj-^
talk with Lull thgow 33 4
high opinion of Linlithgow 34
holds Governors confcrtnCc 38
n ate* first important speech as Viceroy 4*
proposal fof Indian Finance Member
rejected 47 49 SO
proposal for Sect on 93 m Bengal rejected
47 43 52 77 83
54-6 58 59 76
addresses Legislature 56
meditate* re* gnat on over itfitfil of
food imptJft* 61
corresponds" with Gandhi 6x 73 7 J
appoints Dalai Member for Reconstruo
t on 66 67 73
wr tes to ChU^hill 69 94-9
distrusts medical opm ons on Gandhi 70
93 J 07
agrees to Gandhi s release 70
drafts letter to Gandhi 82 S4 85
accepts Cabtf 1 ^ * rev sed draft but c*
presses di satisfact on 86-7
holds Governors conference 88-9
makes proposals for poht cal move 90
94 i°7
surprised at H-M G s hostile attitude to
India 93 95
hi* forcible telegrams infuriate Churchill
meetings w tb Bhulabhai Dcsai 101 no
views on Be t propaganda in India* 10 1
reflect an* on Indti s lack of nationhood
loS
puA^es Indian Army 115 11c 2zz
dies to England 117 1 8
discu ses polit «1 move w h Linlithgow
meetings with Cabinet Committee on
India 1 9 12 j 126 129-30
has in erviCYf Yfith Churchill 120
attends Cabinet met tings 121 123 r24
^ Ls Church U for a d^ci on 131
lus propusik accepted by Cabmet
INDEX
5*7
told reception by Conned
broadcasts on political pro posals 141 -
first interview v,ith Gandl 1 144-6
interview 1 %uh J innah 148 50
his long ulk with Nehru 152
his comments on Nehru, 152 i~8 tBo
315 3*5 338 3*1, 375 3*6 J93 4**
443 46- 475
accept & rciponsibiht} for failure of Simla
Conference 156
his frankness and sincerity Appreciated by
Azad 157 464
wr tcs to ChutchiU on his ceasing to be
PM 159
holds Governors conference 1 SSMJi
discusses treatment of LN A 161
summoned home by Labour Govern-
ment 164
discussions with Labour Minister* 165 70
first impressions of Pet hick Lawrence
165 170
dishkc* Fethitk Lawrence * drafting 167
168 170 zsi 4* 310
meets Churchill 16S
warns Labour Government of iLmgci*
169- 70
broadcasts HMG s announcement
170- 1 173
warns Nehni against incitement to
violence iEg
warns Hjvl G of danger of Congress
rebellion jSi-4
speaks to Gandhi about incitement to
violence 192 3
writes political apprtxiat on for Cabinet
195 2QO
proposes offenng Jinnah truncated Pakis-
tan 200
first interview wirb PateJ, 205-6
doubts about proposed Cabinet Mission
206 an 213 214*218-219
objects to Cabinet Mission s appeasement
of Congress 239 240
low opinion of LN A 242 255
urges Pet luck Lawrence to be tough with
Jmnah, 246
insists on retaining G -G s powers in
Interim penod i?* 280 i8 7 3*3 i 2 4*
writes appreciation for Cabinet Mis* on
277 Appendix IV
disquieted at lack of f rmness about
Grouping 303 344* 347 37* Ap-
pemibc 5^
contemplates res gnation 307 45^
hu summary of Cabinet Miss onu ork,
his opin on of Jmnah 315 4+* 461 495
resumes negotiations for Interim Govern-
ment 3*8 3" 3« 4
co rmicnts on Muslim League s with-
drawal 3*4 3^7
summoni five Governors for consults
tion 3 9
forms Interim Government wtfhCongn**
only 3-9 33S 334 335 33? 343-6
v ts ts Calcutt a aft cr riots 3 3 8-40
att tudc changed by Calcutta nots 34 r
unsuccessful interview with Gandhi and
Nthru 3* 1 3
negotiates for Coalition Government
3*9-5?
achieves Coalition Government 359^4
beg us to feel the strain 3^3 375 4°3
tncs to coax League into Constituent
Assembly 366-7 3 Si 2
see* disturbed areas of East Bengal, 3^9
sees disturbed areas of Bihar 373 4
puts forward Breakdown Plan 2 S3
33Q-2 344 5 389 45* 455
goes to London for discuss oris 385-6
discuss ons in London w th Nehni and
Jinttah JS*>-4
discuss ons in London on Breakdown
Plan 390 39^ 395-9
informed of Cabinet s rejection of Break
down Plan 408 410
receives letter of dismissal 417 Appendix
IX
overrules his Cabinet regarding LN A.
431
talk with Mountbatten 43 2
recommends part tion of India 434*454
last talks with Liaquat and Nehru, 443 4
dtifcrences * ith H M-G 45 1 "9
impartiality 454
fhendly relat ons with Indian leaders
461 2
Wavell Eugenie Countess Q 8 11 14
25 74 So 94 102 105 106 108 120
rj2 14s 152 igs 241 318 355 jSj
398 417 i 22 436 439 440 444
Wavell, B&hc ty (Lady Felicity Longmore)
ir 2$ 164, 412 43i
Wavell, Joan (Lady Joan Gordon) 11 436
Wavell MissL M 409
Waiinstan 179 349
We gbtman Sir Hugh (ICS) jj2 J7J
Wells RG 4J
Wellesley Riclurd Marquess 451 46+
Westminster Abbey 11 445
Wheeler .Major-General Raymond A
(US) 16 163 174
Whitehall compared with New Delhi 53 So
Other references to 24 gr 93 108 433
INDEX
5^5
Wilkinson Ellen C B Minuter of Education
19+3-7* ^7, 395. 397* 393
Wson, Field Marshal Lord, 35-6
Wilson, J C (LP^sfio
Winchester 6 S 7# io-ii P 19
Winchester College, 6, 7t 445t *S8
"Wixigatc. Major-General Ordt, 1 j, 37, 43,
6o p 63,
Woodgate, General, 1 46
Woodhead, Sir John (ICS rctd ) p 16*
Woolton, Lordp 13 1 4
Wyatt^Woodrow^oj* 208* i45* 298* 314
Wylic l Sir Francis (ICS)
opposed to Pakistan, an
action in McasuieV c»t, JtrfS
sc« no altcrnat 1 vc t o BreaLJo mi I'lan r 40 1
Other reference* to f 35# 104* it^5,
H3- iS3 f 3*9, 3*9> +23, 441
Yakub Khan, Captain (Lt -General)
Muhammad, 411
Yalta Conference, 1Z1
Yeatts, M- W W M (I C S ) P 327
Yunus, Muhammad, Bihar pohtician f 374
Yu$uf, Nawab Sir Muhammad, 245
Zafrullah (Zafirullab) Khan, Sir Muham-
mad, 13, 467, 469
Zaghlul Pasha* Saad Great Britain's prin-
cipal opponent in Egypt 19*9^2$, 98, 236
Zaheer, S j ed Al*, 337* 359*
Zafcn Hustoin, Dt , 295 1 ^96-7*