Rodney Harvill's Reviews > Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway

So, why does the subtitle claim to be the untold story of the battle of Midway? It is written from the Japanese perspective and includes some of the most extensive details I have ever seen in a World War II naval history. While earlier books on Midway incorporate the account of Commander Fuchida Mitsuo, the authors note that it was long ago debunked in Japan and use other Japanese sources, including official records, that tell a quite different story. If anything, this book is a bit of a myth-buster, taking aim at the following fact-claims that the authors consider to be myths:

1. The Americans triumphed against overwhelming odds at the battle of Midway.
2. The Aleutians Operation was designed to be a diversion to lure the American fleet out of Pearl Harbor.
3. Admiral Yamamoto withheld important intelligence from Admiral Nagumo, leaving the operational commander of the carrier strike force in the dark about the American fleet opposing him.
4. Had the Japanese implemented a two-phase reconnaissance search, they would have located the American fleet in time to win the battle.
5. The late launch of cruiser Tone’s No. 4 scout plane kept Nagumo from locating the American fleet in time.
6. If Admiral Nagumo hadn’t decided to rearm his aircraft with land-attack weapons, he would have been able to attack the American carriers as soon as they were discovered.
7. The lone attack by VT-8, resulting in the destruction of the entire squadron, caused the Japanese combat air patrol (CAP) fighters to be at sea level when the American dive bombers arrived overhead, thereby allowing them to attack unmolested by fighters.
8. Japan’s elite carrier aviators were all but wiped out in the battle.

Because many of these points have been considered common knowledge, the burden of proof was on the authors, and they went into impressive levels of detail: Japanese carrier doctrine, including rearming and aircraft spotting procedures, Japanese carrier construction, damage control doctrine, detailed timelines, etc. A detail-oriented engineer and Navy veteran (USS Theodore Roosevelt, CVN-71), I was in my element reading this book.

Before I discuss the myths, I will discuss the different air wings of the American and Japanese carriers. An American carrier had four squadrons:

• Fighter (VF), equipped with Wildcats
• Bomber (VB), equipped for Dauntlesses for dive bombing
• Scout (VS), equipped with Dauntlesses that could bomb a target of opportunity
• Torpedo (VT), equipped with Devastators

For the battle of Midway, the scouting function was primarily performed by PBYs from Midway.

A Japanese carrier had a similar distribution of aircraft:

• Type 0 carrier fighter (Zero)
• Type 97 carrier attack aircraft (Kate) that could carry torpedoes or bombs. Bombs and torpedoes utilized different cradles. So, shifting between bombs and torpedoes required both an ordinance and a cradle change-out.
• Type 99 carrier bomber (Val) for dive bombing

The Japanese primarily used seaplanes carried by their cruisers for scouting, although they were supplemented by type 97 and 99 aircraft from the carriers.

Before I discuss the myths, I also consider it appropriate to list a rough timeline of the battle, with some overlap between some events:

• The Japanese Navy settle on a plan to attack and overrun Midway atoll, luring American carriers out of Pearl Harbor so they can be engaged by heavy surface units and destroyed, providing the decisive victory considered necessary to force the U.S. to the negotiating table. An invasion of the western Aleutian Islands is added to the already complicated plan.
• American cryptographers intercept Japanese communications regarding the battle plan and conclude that Midway was the target of a large Japanese operation.
• The Japanese fleet sorties from the inland sea anchorage at Hashirajima.
• A badly damaged Yorktown returns from the Battle of the Coral Sea. It is given an intense three-day stint in a drydock to get it battle-ready.
• Task Force 16, centered around Enterprise and Hornet and commanded by Admiral Spruance, sorties from Pearl Harbor.
• Task Force 17, centered around Yorktown and commanded by Admiral Fletcher, sorties from Pearl Harbor a day later.
• The carriers Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu, in the Midway strike force launch an attack on Midway consisting of half their air wing strength. The other half of their air wing are armed for naval attack to account for the possibility that the American carriers have already sortied.
• Having taken heavy casualties, the Midway attack unit radioes for a second strike on Midway to further soften it up for the scheduled amphibious assault.
• Admiral Nagumo, in command of the Midway strike force, orders the planes in the hangars to be rearmed for land attack.
• A scout plane reports the presence of American naval forces in the area. Later reports will indicate the presence of carriers.
• Admiral Nagumo orders the rearming for land attack to be stopped and the planes to be once more armed for naval attack.
• Multiple waves of aircraft from Midway attack the strike force.
• VT-8 from Hornet attacks alone and is all but wiped out.
• VT-6 from Enterprise attacks alone and suffers heavy casualties.
• The Midway attack unit lands. Its aircraft are moved down to the hangers.
• While VF-6 fighters engage CAP fighters, VB-6 and VS-6 from Enterprise attack and mortally wound Akagi and Kaga. At the same time, escorted by VF-3 fighters, VB-3 from Yorktown attacks and mortally wounds Soryu, and VT-3, also from Yorktown, attacks Hiryu but fails to get any hits.
• Hiryu launches a strike against Yorktown, with dive bombers scoring hits on its flight deck.
• Yorktown puts out the fires and repairs the damage, restoring its flight deck to operational status.
• Hiryu launches another strike that hits Yorktown again, this time with two torpedoes that cripple the carrier. Because of its repairs from the earlier attack, the Japanese think they have hit a second carrier.
• An attack by American carrier aircraft mortally wounds Hiryu.
• Over the next few hours, Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu are scuttled.
• During the night, Nagumo and Yamamoto attempt to maneuver their forces to engage the American carriers on the surface. The American commanders maneuvered their carriers to avoid this.
• Finally, Yamamoto decided to terminate the operation and retreat back to Japan. By the time it was notified to turn back, a cruiser group was within fifty miles of Midway. As the cruiser group was retreating, it encountered an American sub on the surface. While it was turning to avoid the sub, two cruisers collided.
• The crippled cruisers were located by American scouts and attacked. Although they both suffered similar damage from the air attacks, only one sank. The survivor had made better damage control choices.
• While Yorktown was being towed back to Pearl Harbor, a Japanese sub torpedoed it and a destroyer alongside, sinking both.

Regarding myth 1, the Japanese assumed that they would have to lure the American fleet out of Pearl Harbor and came up with a complicated plan that positioned different elements of the Japanese fleet too far apart to be mutually supporting. On June 4, three American carriers engaged the four Japanese fleet carriers of the Midway strike force. Because the American carriers had larger air wings than their Japanese counterparts, they were fairly evenly matched. The light carriers of the Japanese main body might have the equivalent of a single fleet carrier’s air wing, but they were too far away to assist the strike force. Furthermore, the American carriers were supplemented by land-based aircraft from Midway’s airstrip. While the Japanese commanders desired to engage the Americans in a surface engagement, the Americans didn’t want this and consistently positioned their fleet to avoid this.

Regarding myth 2, Japan had feared air attack from the American territories closest to the home islands, the Aleutian Islands. When Admiral Yamamoto planned the Midway operation, the Aleutian Island operation was part of the price tag for approval of his plan. If the Aleutians Operation were intended as a diversion to draw the American carriers out of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese would have had to attack Dutch Harbor a few days earlier than they did. As it turned out, the diversion of carrier resources to the Aleutian Islands left the Japanese with fewer carrier resources near Midway.

Regarding myth 3, because Admiral Nagumo received the same intelligence transmittals as Admiral Yamamoto, there was no need for Admiral Yamamoto’s staff to relay intelligence reports to Admiral Nagumo. Other failures left them both in the dark. There had been a plan for seaplanes to overfly Pearl Harbor and identify the American fleet elements there. Given that the seaplanes didn’t have adequate range for this, a submarine was assigned to refuel it at French Frigate Shoals. Because an American destroyer and seaplane tender were present there when the submarine arrived, this operation was called off. Furthermore, other submarines were assigned for cordon duty around Midway. They were a day late getting underway and were not on station until after the American carriers had sortied out of Pearl Harbor and were already in position to fend off an attack on Midway. Had the submarines arrived on schedule, they might have spotted the American carriers and given Admiral Nagumo the early warning he needed.

Regarding myth 4, the two-phase reconnaissance search pattern wasn’t incorporated into Japanese naval doctrine until 1943. Such a search would have involved more aircraft. For Admiral Nagumo, this would have meant utilizing some of his dive bombers as search planes, reducing the strength of his strike waves. Such a search pattern would have gone against contemporary Japanese carrier doctrine that called for hammer blows of overwhelming force. This criticism of Admiral Nagumo comes from Fuchida, who should have known better. That said, the authors consider the search plan inadequate, even for a single-phase plan. There were too few search planes aloft to adequately cover that much ocean, but, as noted earlier, more search planes in the air would have meant fewer dive bombers in the attack waves.

Regarding myth 5, had Tone’s No. 4 seaplane launched on time, its search pattern wouldn’t have overflown the American carriers in time for Admiral Nagumo to launch a strike that would take them out before they could launch their own strike against his carriers. The flight plan of cruiser Chikuma’s No. 1 seaplane would have overflown one of the American carrier task forces in time for Nagumo to attack it before it could launch its own attack. Either this plane flew off-course or it was flying through cloud cover when it overflew the American carriers. Regardless, it missed them.

Regarding myth 6, the authors go into a high level of detail regarding arming, spotting and launching procedures on Japanese carriers. Most of the re-arming and refueling took place in the hangers. The strike on Midway involved about half the planes of the Japanese carriers in the strike force. The other half were armed and ready for a strike on American naval assets, if any were discovered by the scout planes. When the Midway strike group radioed ahead that a second strike would be required on Midway, Admiral Nagumo, not yet having learned about the American carriers in the area, ordered the planes in the hanger to be rearmed for land attack. In the middle of this effort, scout planes started reporting American naval assets in the area. Eventually, they reported the presence of carriers. At this point, Admiral Nagumo ordered the planes to be rearmed with anti-ship weaponry. This did constitute a delay in his ability to attack the American carriers. However, during this time, Nagumo’s carriers were under near-constant air attack from Midway and later from early arriving elements of the American carrier air wings. He was too busy dodging air attacks and launching and recovering CAP fighters to spot his strike wing on deck, warm it up and launch it. As a result, there was a period of time in which the aircraft would have been ready and waiting in the hangars. Remember, World War II carriers had straight flight decks and could do only one thing at a time.

I remember repeating myth 7 in the last year or two and now stand corrected. When Hornet launched its own strike on the Japanese carriers, a misunderstanding of where the carriers should be sent the air wing in a wrong direction. VT-8’s commander thought he knew where the Japanese carriers were and, in violation of orders, led his torpedo planes away from the rest of the air wing. He was right, but his squadron of slow Devastators (In this battle, the slow speed of the Devastators was more devastating to their own aircrews than to the Japanese carriers.) found itself attacking the Japanese carriers without fighter escort. As a result, they were wiped out, with only one man of the thirty-man squadron surviving. Who want’s such a sacrifice to be in vain? It has been long argued that the torpedo planes drew the CAP fighters down to sea level, allowing the dive bombers to attack unmolested by fighters and deliver the fatal blows on the Japanese carriers. The authors point out that the failed attack by VT-8 was followed up by a separate failed attack by VT-6. Finally, the dive bombers of VB-6 and VS-6 just happened to attack the carriers Akagi and Kaga at the same time that the Yorktown attack group (VF-3, VB-3 and VT-3) came on the scene, with VB-3 successfully attacking the carrier Soryu and VT-3 unsuccessfully attacking the carrier Hiryu. The CAP fighters in the air were overwhelmed by simultaneous attacks from different directions and distracted by the surprise implementation by the outnumbered VF-3 fighters (Wildcats) of a new air combat tactic to neutralize the superior speed and maneuverability of the Zero (the fighter used by the Japanese Navy).

Regarding myth 8, with their planes in the hangars, the Japanese aviators not in CAP fighters were in their ready rooms when Akagi, Kaga and Soryu were mortally wounded. While some of them certainly perished on their ships or in the water after abandoning ship, most of them survived. On the other hand, Hiryu’s air wing, which twice attacked Yorktown, suffered exceedingly heavy casualties on account of CAP fighters and anti-aircraft fire. It was the subsequent Solomon Islands campaign that gutted Japan’s corps of elite naval aviators.

Personally, I think that the authors did an outstanding job of defending their thesis. As noted above, I absolutely loved the level of detail in the book.