F ROM T H E P U L P I T
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“Questions at the Veil”
Philip L. Barlow
In the months after September 11, 2001, essayist and poet Frederick Turner crafted an unpublished tale entitled “The Terrorist
2
Goes to Paradise.”
Told in the first person by the terrorist himself, the story recounts the glories and privileges that greet an operative who
helped f ly a jet into New York’s towering World Trade Center.
Upon his arrival in heaven the terrorist discovers to his pleasure
that, for his heroism, as he presumes, Allah has provided him
with all his fantasies and more: movement without restriction, unencumbered by time; scenes of beauty surpassing mortal ability
to express; seventy-two voluptuous virgins enacting without restraint his every whim; infinite, incomparable food without satiation; a ministering angel attending to his every request and answering every query. It is all . . . heavenly.
Unfortunately, difficulties arise. After the novelty of heaven
wears thin, the terrorist grows restless because he lacks a calling, a
purpose, some way to contribute. He inquires, restlessly, as to
whether he can receive some assignment. His angel forwards the
request, but a disappointing word comes back: he is thanked for
his offer, but told that he has done “quite enough.”
His second problem is the discovery that the afterlife bears an
odor. Our hero comes to notice a distracting, then annoying, then
putrid, over-cooked, and apparently permanent smell that mars
all his pleasures. No matter where he goes—to his virgins, to his
feasts, to the wondrous gardens of paradise—he cannot escape the
stench. Heaven has its virtues, but how do the others bear this?
Eventually he becomes aware of an additional, final, and overwhelming problem. “Finally,” says the paradisiacal terrorist, “to
every other feeling was added a sense of pollution, ultimate pollution, as if for all these months I had [somehow been defiling my-
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self], as if I were utterly filled up and choked and bloated with myself, as if I had made myself pregnant, like a woman, but pregnant
with something foul, inescapable . . . like the smell of the afterworld.”
The smell! That, at least, “I thought I could finally deal with,”
the terrorist continues. “[Seeing me upset], my angel hovered anxiously about me, and when I had recovered my voice I demanded,
weakly, that he banish the smell, at last.” “Oh alas, that I cannot
do, my master,” he said,
For our rule in the kingdom of heaven is that everyone be what they
have chosen to be, and that even redemption by the Savior cannot
enforce a self to be other than what it is—for then it would not be its
own self, and God would have become a Shaitan, and violated the
principle of His being, which is love and freedom. He must go on
loving you for what you are, and that means He cannot rip out your
soul. For you see, the smell is the smell of You. It is not out in the air,
but the inner smell of your own head, of your own self. It is not what
you smell, but what you smell with.
Over the years, I have come to believe that a good portion of
what we smell, what we see, what we hear, and what we sense is, in
actuality, what we smell, see, hear, and sense with. The lens
through which we see phenomena and gauge evidence is comprised not only of our worldview and wit, but also in considerable
measure of our character, attitude, and imagination.
Long before I studied much about religion, epistemology, or
postmodern thought in the formal academy, Lowell Bennion impressed upon me the notion that we live in two worlds: the objective world of external reality and the inner, subjective world of values. In the external world, I am small, scarcely of consequence,
subject to great forces beyond my control. In the inner world of interpretation and values, however, I play a significant role: I have a
measure of choice in what I desire, aspire to, and value. I help
fashion the lens through which I interpret the world.3
This is true even of professional scholars, who intentionally
hone critical epistemologies. As these scholars search out their
paths—their systems of belief and action, including their publications and lives in the academy—they are not merely weighing evidence. They are also choosing and defining subjects, selecting evidence and discerning and assigning significance, which are pro-
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cesses conditioned by who they are, by what they care about, and
by the principles and authorities most persuasive or prestigious to
them.
In this spirit, what follows is self-consciously personal: a meditation on an element of Mormon belief. My words amount to an
act of “theology.” People mean rather different things by “theology”: sometimes they mean an exegesis of scripture; sometimes
they mean a compendium of what living prophets or some
magisterium or council has said. The theological writings of St.
Paul or Irenaeus are different not only in content, but also in
method and character from those of Augustine or the formulators of the Nicene Creed or Rosemary Radford Ruether’s feminist
declarations. In a Mormon context, the formal, metaphysical,
classically inf lected products of Blake Ostler are different in kind
from, say, Truman Madsen’s abbreviated, lyrical, allusive portraits calculated to inspire, or Bruce McConkie’s taxonomy of
proper Mormon belief, or the theological aspects of the “Proclamation on the Family,” or the search for scriptural support of
some ethical position such as we might read in Gene England. If
this essay gets to count as “theology,” this is what theology means
for the next few pages: in my hands, theology is the art and discipline of meaning-making at the nexus of three ideological streams, which
are the revelation and tradition of my Mormon Christian religion, my
personal faith and experience, and my interpretations of the observable
world. By the “observable world” I mean “reality,” far and near, to
the modest extent that I am able to apprehend it by attention to
the findings of science, scholarship, direct observation, and the
commentary of thoughtful fellow travelers. My theme is “Questions at the Veil.”
As a Mormon, I know about claims of revelation. I have been
deeply moved by some of the faith’s canonized prophetic manifestations. In fact, I think I have encountered inspiration directly. I
also do not believe that Mormons have a monopoly on this experience.
It is not lost on me, of course, that Mormonism makes extravagant claims and seems unlikely from certain angles of vision.
Short of divine intervention, I do not know how I would have
come to this movement if looking at it only from the outside,
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though among my friends several of the most sensitive and
thoughtful have somehow done so. Who knows where the hand of
Providence might lead? More commonly, however, modern critical minds outside the fold find the Church’s origins “fantastical,”
beyond the pale, based as they are on the supernatural visions of
a young, obscure, largely ignorant, rural, antebellum American
boy. The story of the movement’s emergence seems rather too
“golden,” like the alleged plates from which Joseph Smith translated the Book of Mormon—before returning them to the angel
who disclosed them. The movement’s history is controversial, and
all too human. Its cosmology seems esoteric, its good-hearted people gullible for marvels and wonders. Its ritual seems secretive, its
God anthropomorphic, its theology heterodox and alien.
Yet the phenomenon persists. Despite its strangeness, perhaps because of its strangeness, the religion thrives, nourishes adherents, serves the world, challenges and is challenged by the
wider culture, and perplexes its most thoughtful observers. It is
nothing if not vital for its engaged community.
If one wishes to understand this curious movement (a pursuit
at which I continue to work), it helps to remember that all claims
that grapple with the contours of reality may seem bizarre when
extracted from their context, when superficially engaged, or
when viewed through the presumptions of another paradigm.
This is so of a Buddhist’s sense of recurrent birth, her highest aspiration to “cease to be”; or a Presbyterian’s commitment to a
mysterious Trinity and to a God enf leshed who walked on water,
died, and came back to life; or an atheist’s faith in a universe explained as fabulous accident. Unlike the early Christian apologist
Tertullian (if we are to construe him literally), I am not a believer
because the object of my faith is absurd (or “impossible,” as may be
a better translation),4 but because the apparent outrageousness of
Mormonism has not dissuaded me from rewarding participation
and further probing. In this respect the Church parallels the universe itself. As geneticist J. B. S. Haldane observed, “The universe
is not only queerer than we suppose, but queerer than we can suppose.”5 And still I find myself a grateful participant in this implausible yet indisputable reality. This paradox holds promise, invites
inquiry, and requires imagination. In the words of Annie Dillard,
“our faithlessness is a cowardice born of our very smallness, a
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massive failure of imagination.” Nature abounds in radicalism,
extremism, selective anarchy. Were we to judge nature strictly by
our common sense, we could scarcely believe the world exists. “If
creation had been left up to me,” writes Dillard, “I’m sure I wouldn’t have had the imagination or courage to do more than shape a
single, reasonably sized atom, smooth as a snowball, and let it go
at that. No claims of any and all revelations could be so far-fetched
as a single giraffe.”6
In the midst of the odd, unfathomable, tragic, and wondrous
reality in which human beings find themselves, we Mormons are
“a peculiar people” in both modern and biblical ways. We are,
first, people, which means it is not hard to discover among us, individually and corporately, shortcomings and foolishness as well as
wisdom and nobility. We are humans in union with and yet distinct from others. Like the ancient Hebrews, we may be wayward
or—like Job’s friends, Christ’s Pharisees, or Mosiah’s Zoramites—
we may be too sure of ourselves, our religious paradigms, and our
righteousness, thereby displeasing God. Yet in our imperfection,
we are a people trying together, by covenant, to respond to the divine, which we believe calls to us. We are a people comprised of
persons, and so we are diverse. In any given Sabbath meeting at
which I find myself, I am surrounded by those I love and with
whom I share much, but who also believe or disbelieve things that
I judge differently. So far, room has been made for me in the Mormon tent. In short, I am—quite happily—an eccentric member of a
peculiar people on a strange planet.
One entry into this peculiar people’s sense of the human place
in our bewildering universe is through the concept of “the veil.”
In Latter-day Saint parlance the veil refers to a barrier of memory
and consciousness that separates humans from a wider reality.
That reality is “eternity.” This eternity precedes or outf lanks our
birth and the creation of our universe (“preexistence”). It is that
into which we shall enter upon death (“afterlife”). Eternity is an
enduring realm where God and all who are not in time, or our order of time, dwell (“the other side”). The veil, as the intangible
barrier between the temporal and the eternal, is the bounds of
our awareness.
Like all language, these terms comprise models that, even
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when apt, point to what likely are vastly more complex and capacious actualities. Even our best conceptions resemble two-dimensional maps symbolizing multi-dimensional reality: white lies that
tell the truth of the landscape.7 They are highly impressionistic
paintings that as a whole gesture toward something large. Viewed
up close, however, the individual strokes may be crude, even errant and contradictory. Joseph Smith’s strokes are often crude indeedlike those in a Van Gogh painting.8 Granting my assumption
that external reality entails dimensions unsuspected by human
thought, I like the Mormon metaphor of “veil” to describe something of the present human circumstance.
A veil is “something” rather than “nothing,” suggesting a barrier but also a reality beyond itself. It is not a window through
which one casually discerns the transcendent “out there.” Nor is it
an impenetrable “wall.” A veil may be thick and gauzy, and in this
opaque form it may indeed be mistaken for a wall and have something in common with notions of thinkers and artists over the centuries who lament the vacuum of knowledge characterizing the
human condition. This sense of “unknowability” inclines some to
a resigned indifference to wider horizons for their actions, creating a class of the religiously tone-deaf. In more passionate souls,
existential unknowing coupled with a sense of the incongruity of
reality can drive one to bifurcation, as with Voltaire: “To believe in
God is impossible; not to believe in Him is absurd.”9
But on some occasions a veil is thinner, obscurely translucent.
We have inklings of something beyond what empiricism allows.
Perhaps the Mormon notion of the permeable veil that shrouds
human minds has limited connection with Wordsworth’s “intimations of immortality”—intimations which have thrived across diverse cultures, over millennia.10 In several short parables, the
ever-enigmatic Franz Kafka wrote of a haunting awareness of a
message, a presence, a judgment, a something he found unshakable
but maddeningly indiscernible because it is too peripheral to our
predominant senses.11 Mormon sensibility understands that the
veil may even be parted: at death, in ritual, by revelation.
I like the veil for more than its utility as a descriptive image for
our mortal relation to a wider reality. I embrace it as a present and
potentially useful fact. Unlike some of my fellow believers, I do
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not think of it as merely an obstacle to be punctured by revelation.
I construe it, rather, as a phenomenon with a purpose, or to
which I can assign a purpose: a pithy psychological or metaphysical “something” with which I am in creative and useful tension,
like the friction I minimize when lubricating my car, but on which
I depend when steering it.
Insufficient regard for the veil can be problematic, even dangerous. We Mormons often are blithe about our revelations.
While I prize curiosity, imagination, and the written and unwritten inspiration that points to eternal aspirations and horizons
and sometimes helps me pick my way through thickets, I do not
believe in encouraging adult naïveté, Freudian projection, superstition, or fanaticism—under the sovereign notion that “more
faith is always good.” Suicidal and homicidal terrorists, as I suggested earlier, are also possessed by extraordinary faith. For
Christians, the scriptural mandate is that we be “wise as serpents
and harmless as doves,” not harmless as doves and just as dumb.12
Nor do I believe in spending much time elaborating the unknown. Every time I hear confident and comforting explanations
of “the way things are,” I am apt to think, “This doesn’t go far toward explaining crocodiles, f lesh-eating bacteria, babies born
with two heads, or the tsunami that just obliterated more than
250,000 people over yonder.” Nor does it account for the conf licting inspirations that various people sometimes profess. My impression is that, informed and animated by a thoughtful faith in a
wider horizon, the veil should funnel the bulk of our attention to
the here and now—on the time, people, problems, and opportunities of this day, at this moment. Despite the grace offering
glimpses of eternal purposes, my life unfolds in tremendous,
all-but-complete ignorance of our mysterious universe. The merest dabble into quantum physics, black holes, dark matter and energy, interstellar wormholes, or the Higgs-Boson reminds me of
that fact. There is no proving God to others. Ultimate reality is
not something I know; it is something in which I put my trust.
In Mormon understanding, the veil is necessary to our stage
of progression as beings. While we search, listen, and pray for
comfort and direction beyond our sphere, the veil—the necessary
epistemic distance from this “beyond”—affords us a freedom for
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independent action not otherwise possible were we literally and
readily able to see God smiling or frowning at each move. The
freedom independently to discern and choose between good and
evil (morality) and good and bad (quality) is at the core of our
purpose.
Although Mormon thought instructs that we are in but one
stage of a broader evolution, we are invited through mortal experience to discover, forge, claim, and realize—to make real—our
identity and character. In LDS belief the potential of that character for degradation or exaltation is scarcely bounded, and it yields
a unique construction of two dimensions of Christ and his atonement: “The potential evil of human beings is of such a depth that
the Son of God died in the f lesh to confront it; the potential good
of human beings is of such a height that the Son of God lived in
the f lesh to reveal it.”13 On the latter point, distinctively emphasized in Mormonism, the gift of knowledge offered is something
in the spirit of Disney’s The Lion King (from a scene which my
young daughter years ago forced me to memorize), in which the
deceased King Mufasa speaks from the beyond to his exiled, befuddled, uncoronated, but coming-of-age son: “Simba, you are
more than you have become.”
Be-veiled as we are—in our confusion and unknowing, our curiosity and vulnerability, our passions, agonies, delights, yearning, choosing, and striving—we humans ask questions. We are
hard-wired to do so: our existential circumstances and our natures
require it. Unless this impulse is unnaturally driven from us, we
are intrinsically interrogative beings. And therein lies a tale: Our
native curiosity is itself a clue to our intended response to the experience of being human on this earth.
This curiosity can be distorted. I recall taking my one-year-old
nephew, David, out for walks in the forest that lay behind our family home in Utah. Together we delighted at implausible wonders:
the November air, crisp as an apple; red ants and black ants resolving some dispute, thereby revealing an appalling lack of multi-cultural sensitivity that was no doubt the result of ethnic prejudice;
three distinct trees somehow grown together as one; blue-brown
beetles visually as formidable, up close, as any dinosaur. As we
walked, we named things. I would say “robin” or “lily” or “dirt”
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and David would approximate the sound. I cheered and hugged;
David was reinforced. He learned language.
But in time I noticed a change. The focal point of his attention, with my Skinnerian assistance, subtly shifted: from the bird
or the f light of the bird, to his own ability to attach conventional
sounds to the bird—to name it. Now, acquiring language still
seems to me a good idea, but in the process of becoming himself
in this way, David diluted—distorted—another part of himself: his
unfiltered sense of relation with the world. Over time, and in his
case, I am happy to say, temporarily, he learned less about curiosity and experiencing the universe and more about getting A’s in
school. A similar disease can beset us in the academy, as we compete and perform, and the disease can affect the sorts of projects
we take on, even how we spend our careers.
Despite these dangers of distortion, we are, again, natively interrogative beings. We ask questions of life, of the cosmos. We ask
questions of the God we believe in, the God we rail against, or the
God we do not believe in because we see other people’s superstitions, or because God seems inaccessible, or because of the
world’s hurt, and our own.
Our questions to this God form themselves variously. Among
the most common is “Why me?”—a protest posing as query.
Among them also are “Why, God, don’t you show yourself ?” And
“What does life mean?” “Where do I fit?” “Who am I?” And
“What will become of me?”
Many of the most poignant questions present themselves classically in the Bible and other Mormon scriptures. Fueling our
awareness of injustice, the scriptures ask, “Why do the wicked
prosper?” In excruciating (literally: crucifying) times, it may come
to “Why hast thou forsaken me?” As a cluster, the questions represent the human search for God or meaning or ultimacy or relief.
Sometimes they signify despair; sometimes, human outrage at the
human condition.
Such questions are understandable, legitimate, perhaps even
necessary for a season. Pursued relentlessly and with vehemence,
however, they can cripple our radar. We may rage until we lose
hearing. We may forget our station. Our purchase will not be
sweet illumination, but only gall.
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It helps me at times to shift my perspective: Our interrogation of
God may be fruitfully inverted. Through this means, the questions
may be read not as the human search for God, but as God’s search
for humanity.14 Here, the answers to the questions we ask of God,
through the veil, come back, through the same medium, as counter-questions—queries put to our souls by God. Latter-day Saints
know sacred queries in their temple ritual, but the queries that
haunt, or ought to haunt, the human soul are widely accessible.
Developing an ear for these soul-queries alters our ordinary
epistemological preoccupations and our existentially natural but
sometimes self-centered questions. It puts us, rather than God, in
the dock. Absorbing questions rather than inexorably posing
them may, at times, be a more promising avenue of inquiry.
Such questions have their archetypes in scripture. Some
might be put to us as a people: “Have you become of one heart
and one mind, with no poor among you?”15 Others, on which I focus here, come to me as an individual. God asks, “Adam, where
art thou?” as if to say, “Man, Woman, where do you stand? What
ground do you inhabit? What have you been about? What hast
thou done?”16 Or, more explicitly, He might ask us to ponder,
“What manner of men—of women—ought ye to be?”17
We have Christ’s inquiry of Peter, posed also to us: “Lovest thou
me?” And to the disciple’s perhaps too-ready answer, the question
recurs and recurs, implying an underlying question: “Really?”18
Alma the Younger in effect expounds upon Christ’s query to
Peter by asking, “Can ye look up, having the image of God
engraven upon your countenances?”19
While we march to our carrels and jobs and to our churches
and sports arenas, perhaps oblivious to the wounded and bereft
around us, Christ may ask, “Have I been so long with you, and yet
thou hast not known me?”20
To our questions-become-accusations against the Divine, in
the midst of our pain, comes the divine question to Everyman,
embodied in Job: “Who is this who speaks with words devoid of
knowledge?”21
To our moral or situational quandaries, perhaps the best question is not “What would Jesus do?” (a rather sentimental and unscriptural presumption), but rather, as Dostoyevsky transposed
the query, “What will you do, with only His image before you?”22
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On a stormy sea, the Lord asks, “Why are ye fearful, O ye of little faith?”23
Under a heavy weight, before a dreaded task, a cup we would
have pass from us, comes Mordecai’s godly challenge to Queen
Esther, whose life and people are in peril: “Who knows but that
you have come to your . . . position for such a time as this?”24
When in our preoccupations we seek more to be comforted
than to comfort, seek compassion only from, and not toward,
God, we are asked, “Could you not watch with me one hour?”25
It may be that “Christ the Word,” as the Gospel of John casts
him and as the Greek logos connotes, is indeed the “word”—that is,
the “reason,” the “mind,” the “logic” and “expression” of God.
But it may also be that Christ is, at last, God’s interrogative syntax,
enf leshed: “Whom do men say that I am?” “Whom do you say?”
And implicitly: “So what?”26 I value my life in the Church. I value
also the life of the mind and the academy. In some ways my religious practice and professional efforts are independent spheres.
But who I am (and how I answer questions put to me by scripture)
naturally conditions how I construe and go about all my tasks.
My personal though Mormon-infused ruminations have it
that we are interrogatory beings, that God is a loving but question-asking God, and that the veil through which we and God
question one another is an interrogatory medium. Life itself is intrinsically interrogative; and like Wordsworth, I embrace rather
than lament the veil that makes it so, even as I am grateful for intimations and prophetic glimpses beyond it.27
To whatever religion we subscribe the limits of our knowing,
and the human ability and instinct to ponder those limits, implies
an ultimate Question that lurks behind all else. Although it may
be submerged, the Question is never extinguished, not in any day
or moment. Even for those who hold to no God, even to those in
the direst circumstances, and even to those who cannot hear or articulate the inquiry, it abides: Life itself asks of us a Question from
which there is no escape. Viktor Frankl discovered that the question need not be extinguished, short of death, even in the vise of
Hitler’s concentration camps.28 But for me, the ultimate author
of the Question that life poses is the Author of creation. Our inescapable reply, the way that we reply, the quality and content of our
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reply, is that which creates meaning—and forges the caliber of our
souls. We become the answer to life’s query.
Life, then, is a question, posed by God, through a veil.
How shall we respond?29
Notes
1. Preliminary versions of the ideas that follow were presented as lectures at the annual meeting of the Society for Mormon Philosophy and
Theology on September 21, 2012, at Utah State University and at the biennial “Faith and Knowledge” Conference on February 22, 2013, at the
Wesley Theological Seminary in Washington, D.C. Thanks to Terryl
Givens for a thoughtful response to an initial hearing and to Cory M.
Nani for research, critique, and editorial assistance.
2. Unpublished, copy in my possession.
3. Lowell L. Bennion, The Things that Matter Most (Salt Lake City: Bookcraft, 1978), 19–22.
4. Tertullian, De Carne Christi Liber: Treatise on the Incarnation, trans.
by Ernest Evans (London: S. P. C. K., 1956), 18–19, section xviii, lines
23–26. The popularized statement referenced here, “redo quia absurdum
(“I believe because it is absurd”), simplifies yet neuters what Tertullian
may have intended. The phrase in the Latin, “crucifixus est Dei Filius, non
pudet, quia pudendum est; et mortuus est Dei Filius, prorsus credibile est, quia
ineptum est; et sepultus resurrexit, certum est, quia impossibile,” more accurately translates to “The Son of God died; it is immediately credible—because it is silly. He was buried, and rose again; it is certain—because it is
impossible.” Terryl Givens drew my attention to what may be error in the
common translation that has come down through the centuries.
5. J. B. S. Haldane, Possible Worlds, and Other Papers, Essay Reprint Series (Freeport, N. Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), 286.
6. Annie Dillard, Pilgrim at Tinker Creek, 1st Perennial Classics Edition, Perennial Classics (New York: HarperPerennial, 1998), 146.
7. Mark Monmonier and H. J. de Blij, How to Lie with Maps, 2d. ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 1.
8. Philip L. Barlow, Mormons and the Bible: The Place of Latter-day
Saints in American Religion, updated edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), xxiii.
9. While widely attributed to Voltaire, there seems to be no publication bearing the philosopher’s name in which this statement appears as
recorded. Nonetheless, its pervasive usage in modern literature suggests
some degree of authenticity in origin.
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215
10. Terryl Givens, When Souls Had Wings: Pre-Mortal Existence in
Western Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
11. Franz Kaf ka, The Basic Kafka, 159–60, provides an example.
More broadly, one can discern in Kaf ka’s “The Castle,” “The Trial,”
“The Burrow,” and elsewhere a persistent struggle not merely with his illness, his pathologies, his cloudy relations with his father and with
women, his Jewishness, and his entanglement as an employee of the
modern bureaucratic state. One can discern beyond all this the grappling of a tortured prophet of “the modern mind” that “knows two
things at once: that there is no God, and that there must be God.” This
God, for Kaf ka, need not be personal, to be sure. See Roberto Calasso’s
brilliant interpretation of Kaf ka: K. (New York: Vintage Books, 2006).
12. Matthew 10:16.
13. Philip L. Barlow, “Unorthodox Orthodoxy: The Idea of Deification in Christian History.” Sunstone, September–October 1983, 18.
14. Abraham Joshua Heschel, God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism (New York: Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1955).
15. Moses 7:18; Deuteronomy 15:4.
16. Genesis 3:9.
17. 3 Nephi 27:27; see also Lynn G. Robbins, “What Manner of Men
and Women Ought Ye to Be?” Ensign, May 2011, 103–5.
18. John 21:17.
19. Alma 5:14.
20. John 14:9.
21. Job 38:2.
22. Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov: A Novel in Four
Parts and an Epilogue, translated by Constance Garnett (New York:
Macmillan, 1922), 269.
23. Matthew 8:26.
24. Esther 4:14.
25. Matthew 26:40.
26. Mark 8:27.
27. William Woodsworth, “Ode: Intimations of Immortality” in The
Oxford Book of English Verse, edited by Christopher B. Ricks (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1999), 349–55.
28. Viktor E. Frankl, Man’s Search for Meaning (Boston: Beacon Press,
2006), 108–9.
29. Philosopher Dennis Rasmussen, through rather a different path,
asks a related question at the beginning of The Lord’s Question: A Call to
Come unto Him (Provo: Keter Foundation, 1985), 4. While the seeds of
my own thought were planted long ago by an encounter with the work of
Viktor Frankl, Rasmussen and I share interests. His book poses a series
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of questions asked by an all-knowing God to fallible man. If an omniscient and omnipotent deity asks a question to which he already knows
the answer, wonders Rasmussen, what response does man actually have?
Is the question posed by God more accurately considered a question
posed by ourselves, since God knows better than we what the answer
ought to be?