(PDF) Human security and the next generation of comprehensive development goals.

The notion of human security provides a fruitful conceptual point of departure for the MDG/SDG discussions on the post-2015 agenda. Insecurity is a universal dimension of the human condition. Human security analysis puts people, not states, at the centre of the stage when assessing actions to enhance security. It appeals to human solidarity, both at the level of humankind and at the level of each individual. For these reasons it can broaden and deepen the post-2015 agenda – by integrating the values and concerns outlined in the Millennium Declaration, the goals and targets of the MDGs and those of preceding and other international development summits with the issues addressed by the climate change and humanitarian conferences and the human rights agenda. The human security approach links well with the emerging discourse that seeks the integration of economic development, social development and environmental protection, and it adds necessary intellectual, existential and ethical depth. It also provides a framework for systematic attention to policy dimensions and to the empowering notion of individual and community-based ‘securitability’. The human security concept, perspective and paradigm can thus function as an organising and exploratory framework for conceptualising development goals for the period beyond 2015. It can combine a broad approach to human development and to policies for human development that are rights-based, priority-centred and genuinely empowering, with an understanding of the complexity of current vulnerabilities. It can provide a more visionary approach in framing ‘development’ objectives and human development, and formulating policy, inspired by a commitment to human rights and social justice. Keywords: Human security, human development, MDGs; securitability, development policy

[#!"$ [#!"$ %&] %&] [#!"$ Table of Contents Articles Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals By Gabriele Koehler, Des Gasper, Sir Richard Jolly, Mara Simane Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex, International Instituteof Social Science in The Hauge, Institute of Development Studies (IDS), and the Cross-Sector Policy Coordination Centre in the Prime Minister's Office in Latvia ................................................................. p.75 Farmers in a Developing Country: An Inquiry into Human Insecurity of the Many By Vu Le Thao Chi Keio University Graduate School of Media and Governance .................................................................. p.94 Human security in the aftermath of March 11th tsunami: different levels of empowerment in provisional shelters in coastal Miyagi By Paulo V.Q. SOUSA, Oscar A. GÓMEZ Tohoku University Graduate School of Environmenal Studies and Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisya University ............................................................................................................................... p.109 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT By Aleksandra Babovic MA International Affairs – Management Public International at Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po Paris) Research student at Kobe University, Graduate School of Law ........................... p.124 0 Journal of Human Security Research. Vol. 1(1). Winter 2012. %&] Journal of Human Security Studies Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.75-93. Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals Gabriele Koehler, Des Gasper, Sir Richard Jolly, Mara Simane1 Abstract The notion of human security provides a fruitful conceptual point of departure for the MDG/SDG discussions on the post-2015 agenda. Insecurity is a universal dimension of the human condition. Human security analysis puts people, not states, at the centre of the stage when assessing actions to enhance security. It appeals to human solidarity, both at the level of humankind and at the level of each individual. For these reasons it can broaden and deepen the post-2015 agenda – by integrating the values and concerns outlined in the Millennium Declaration, the goals and targets of the MDGs and those of preceding and other international development summits with the issues addressed by the climate change and humanitarian conferences and the human rights agenda. The human security approach links well with the emerging discourse that seeks the integration of economic development, social development and environmental protection (United Nations 2012), and it adds necessary intellectual, existential and ethical depth. It also provides a framework for systematic attention to policy dimensions and to the empowering notion of individual and community-based ‘securitability’. The human security concept, perspective and paradigm can thus function as an organising and exploratory framework for conceptualising development goals for the period beyond 2015. It can combine a broad approach to human development and to policies for human development that are rights-based, priority-centred and genuinely empowering, with an understanding of the complexity of current vulnerabilities. It can provide a more visionary approach in framing ‘development’ objectives and human development, and formulating policy, inspired by a commitment to human rights and social justice. Keywords: Human security, human development, MDGs; securitability, development policy 1. Introduction: The MDGs and beyond2 “If economic development is to serve its purpose of increasing the security and welfare of the 1 2 Des Gasper works at the International Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, a graduate school in Erasmus University Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Sir Richard Jolly is Honorary Professor and Research Associate at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Sussex. Gabriele Koehler is a development economist, and is currently a Visiting Fellow in the Vulnerability and Poverty Reduction team at the Institute of Development Studies, UK. Mara Simane is elaborating the Latvian National Development Plan 2014-2020 section on human security at the Cross-Sector Policy Coordination Centre in the Prime Minister’s Office in Latvia. The authors thank Sergei Zelenev, Asuncion St Clair, Allister McGregor, participants of the 2011 MDGs workshop of the German Development Institute (DIE), and two anonymous referees for comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Alison Norwood for editorial support. All shortcomings remain our own. Gabriele Koehler, Des Gasper, Sir Richard Jolly, Mara Simane great mass of mankind and enabling them to enjoy a fuller, more fruitful life, its benefits must be widely distributed; it must not serve merely to augment the wealth and power of a small section of the population”. (UN Technical Assistance for Economic Development (New York, UN) 1949: 8) 2015 marks the target year of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that were adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2000 along with the Millennium Declaration. Academic and political consultations are underway to review the current MDGs and to elaborate a developmental agenda beyond 2015. This includes MDG performance assessments, progress reviews and conceptual reflections (e.g. Fukuda-Parr 2012). The challenge that world leaders acknowledged in 2000 remains in large part unfinished work. In addition, new challenges have emerged in income-rich countries and in terms of sustainability. In the current environment of macroeconomic and political instability and myriad manifestations of income inequality and socioeconomic exclusion, the six fundamental values highlighted in the Millennium Declaration of 2000 are as important as ever for the future global agenda. These values, endorsed by over 180 governments, are: (i) Freedom, in the sense of being able to live in dignity, freedom from hunger, and freedom from the fear of violence, oppression or injustice, and in the sense of democratic and participatory governance; (ii) equality among individuals and nations and the equal rights and opportunities of women and men; (iii) solidarity to manage global challenges, based on equity and social justice; (iv) tolerance of diversity of belief, culture and language; (v) respect for nature and for sustainable development; and (vi) shared responsibility to manage worldwide economic and social development. (UN DESA 2011: 2 and UN General Assembly 2000) This paper makes a case for extending the MDGs beyond 2015 but significantly reshaping them: to make progress towards goals more explicitly rights-based and participatory, to prioritise economic and social equity and environmental sustainability, to insist on the centrality of employment and decent work, and to move away from the outdated and oversimplified North-South dichotomy. To do this, the paper proposes using the notion of human security, both as a conceptual approach and as a framework for a policy approach that can address and redress the complex risks and vulnerabilities facing countries, communities, households and individuals, boldly and with a social justice vision.3 The paper proceeds by first elaborating the need for a deepening of the MDGs approach; second, explaining how a human security approach can provide an organising framework; and third, itemising the advantages which such an approach can bring to the discussions on a post-2015 agenda. It connects to the emerging discussion on Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), recognising the need for integrating these goals into the MDGs and the post-2015 agenda, but does not essay a full 3 See the UN Intellectual History Project (e.g.: Emmerij et al. 2001; Jolly et al. 2005; Jolly et al. 2009) and Gasper (2011). Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 76 Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals treatment of that theme. 2. The case for strengthening policy frameworks in a post-MDGs approach The preparatory discussions for the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio +20) (UN CSD) proposed a new term with a broader remit: Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs would reflect ‘an integrated and balanced treatment of the three dimensions of sustainable development’ – namely the economic, the social and the environmental. They would thus extend the MDGs, but shift the accent away from the current concentration on ‘social’ factors (United Nations 2012: 16).4 These and similar proposals might be classified as ‘MDGs plus’ approaches, or ‘second generation MDGs’ (Kenny and Sumner 2011). They make the case for extending the MDGs, shifting emphasis, and enhancing them conceptually, but remaining within the existing overall framework that identifies quantifiable indicators and calls on nations to ensure that these are attained. We look instead at proposals that would more fundamentally extend the framework. Relatively few proposals that make the case for extending the MDGs appear to be looking into the actual policy paths needed to support and accelerate progress towards their achievement--let alone to guard against the risks that may disrupt progress along the way. This may be a legacy of the politics surrounding the Millennium Agenda and MDGs adoption, where a common stance was reached precisely by omitting policy discussion, so as to avoid being caught up in the disputes around the (post-)Washington consensus and neoliberalism (Hulme and Fukuda-Parr 2009; Fukuda-Parr 2011). It could also reflect a stress on national government ownership, respect for diverse development paths and fear of offending diverse power-holders. However, one of the reasons the MDGs have advanced only slowly in many countries is precisely because sufficient open and imaginative discussion of specific policy paths has been lacking. We suggest that the international community should now adopt a more outspoken approach to core policy positions that reflect rights, principles and emerging evidence. Cases in point include food security and primary education (see boxes 1 and 2). Box 1. Hunger and food insecurity MDG 1 is about hunger and about income poverty. Currently, an estimated 870 million people live in situations of daily hunger and food insecurity, and micronutrient deficiencies affect around 2 billion people (FAO/IFAD/WFP 2012). Hunger and food insecurity are the most obvious violation of the human security principles of freedom from fear, freedom from want and the right to live in dignity. They reflect a host of inter-related insecurities. These include in the long run the lack of access to land and agricultural resources, or to livelihoods, and the mismatches of food supply and incomes in locations where there is extreme poverty, conflict or a natural disaster. Agricultural lands are increasingly misappropriated through acts of land-grabbing – in turn creating massive personal, economic and political insecurities. In the short run, the 4 This builds on the 2011 UN General Assembly session, where the Secretary-General proposed ‘a new generation of sustainable development goals to pick up where the Millennium Development Goals leave off’ (UN Secretary-General 2011: 3). See also Ministry of External Relations, Colombia (2011). Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 77 Gabriele Koehler, Des Gasper, Sir Richard Jolly, Mara Simane reallocation of land from subsistence to cash crops, or from food crops to biofuels, coupled with intensifying speculation on commodity markets, is causing high food prices and price fluctuations which increase risk and insecurity for small food producers and food consumers alike. In addition, the impact of climate change has intensified disruptions in food supplies. The right to food, first articulated in article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, needs to find its way into national legislation – and policy delivery - in every country, if MDG 1 is to be met. Source: authors Box 2. Education in the MDG discourse MDG 2 is devoted to achieving universal primary school education. The obvious first principle, expressed in most countries’ constitutions, is a right to education. Taking this seriously would imply policy steps such as the abolition of primary school fees, free provision of basic learning materials (and even perhaps also of school uniforms and transportation costs), and a commitment to universal coverage with schools having professional teaching staff as well as adequate, socially inclusive and geographically accessible facilities. MDG 2 would therefore ideally be formulated as a reconfirmation of the guarantee of free and compulsory primary education – in a form that enables high-quality and inclusive learning. Such a basic policy prescription – which had wide acceptance (at least in principle) in the 1960s and 1970s – does not feature sufficiently in the MDG discussions. Instead the focus tends to be on supplementary measures, without any pronouncement on universal access to quality education as a core right and on the concomitant policies. In addition, taking seriously the risks of disruptions to progress towards the goal might require commitments by the country concerned to ensure sufficient budgetary reallocations, and by donors or the Bretton Woods Institutions to provide extra support to a country in the case of force majeure type disruptions. Source: authors Policy prescriptions with regard to the other MDG targets would be more complex, notably those regarding MDG 1 on hunger, poverty, and unemployment. Here, policy prescriptions need to recognise the right of countries to adopt heterodox macro and sectoral strategies (Nayyar 2011: 13) and to adopt bolder policies and practice in such areas as land reform, rural poverty and the reduction of hunger and malnutrition (de Schutter 2010). With respect to employment, experience has shown that recent patterns of economic growth have often been ‘jobless’, failing to create decent jobs in the formal economy and instead increasing precarious work conditions and not redressing inequality and poverty (ILO 2011a; UNRISD 2010). International Labour Organisation (ILO) evidence of this needs to feed into policy recommendations that are part of a social contract and explicitly support and promote active labour market policies such as employment creation and deliberately job-rich macroeconomic strategies, decent work with adherence to the ILO core labour conventions, and lifelong learning supported from public resources. 5 In both these case, 5 Fukuda-Parr for example argues that pro-poor growth strategies need to go beyond social protection measures and Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 78 Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals disruptions along the path towards the goals, from world financial crisis, would again require national and international actions to limit the repercussions on goal achievement. The key point with all these issues is that countries will need to adopt macro and sectoral strategies within which MDG and SDG goals and targets can realistically be pursued. While it is neither appropriate nor possible to set out one single global strategy, policy space must be opened up, empowering individual countries to formulate and adopt strategies that move beyond the conventional and that match their own circumstances (UN DESA 2008; Nayyar 2011; also see Bachelet 2011). The 2010 General Assembly review of the MDGs did explicitly place one policy response on the table. This was the need for social protection schemes and a social protection floor to address poverty and vulnerability (UN General Assembly 2010: 5, 10, 14).6 This is the policy domain where international discussion has become relatively outspoken. The Social Protection Floor Initiative of the UN agencies advocates making social protection coverage universal in the form of a “basic set of essential social rights and transfers, in cash and in kind, to provide a minimum income and livelihood security for all” as well as the ”supply of an essential level of goods and social services such as health, water and sanitation, education, food, housing, life and asset-saving information that are accessible for all” (ILO 2011b). These are to be guaranteed by government and financed from tax revenues. The social protection floor is mentioned explicitly in the 2012 document preparatory to the Rio +20 Conference (United Nations 2012: 13), and was adopted by the International Labour Conference as Recommendation 202 concerning national floors of social protection in June 2012 (ILO 2012). This could open the way for the new SDGs to have more policy content in other areas as well. 3. The changing world and the case for moving beyond the North-South distinction The world has changed considerably since the Millennium Summit and the adoption of the MDGs. An increasing number of developing and emerging countries have achieved high gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates for the past decade (and in some important cases for considerably longer), and have markedly increased both their GDP per capita and their Human Development Index (HDI) ranking. Examples include non-OECD members of the G20 such as Brazil, China and India and other countries including in Africa as well as Asia and Latin America. The global balance of economic and political power has shifted as a result of this process. Of special importance for the MDG/SDG discussion is that these new economic and political powers – such as Brazil, China, India, South Africa – have been developing significant approaches to poverty reduction and alleviation, notably programmes in public works employment, social protection, access to food and nutrition and the right to information (see, e.g. Hanlon et al. 2010). Their programmes acknowledge the pervasive challenges of poverty and exclusion, accept government responsibility for policy action, are tax-financed, government-led and sometimes rights-led as well as having major potential for genuinely empowering participation (Koehler 2011b). Another change in the global economic geography is the opening of new options for financing 6 give more attention to macroeconomic and labour market policies (Fukuda-Parr 2011: 3). Also see Bachelet (2011). It also mentioned enhancing fiscal space and strengthening the tax base, and the need for access to land (UN General Assembly 2010: 27, 14). Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 79 Gabriele Koehler, Des Gasper, Sir Richard Jolly, Mara Simane public expenditures. Many developing countries now have the potential to generate the fiscal resources to finance the socioeconomic spending necessary to alleviate poverty and some have become new donors to poorer countries (Ortiz et al. 2011). At the same time, new and large private foundations have been unlocking new sources (and procedures) of funding. There is even a discernible shift in the ideology of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), including towards supporting social protection for vulnerable groups. In a nutshell, politically and financially, fiscal space enabling the financing of socially progressive policies has become larger in what has been called the global South, at least for the more successful countries. At the same time, many of the larger OECD economies are in economic disarray, with sharp declines in GDP growth, high levels of unemployment and increasing casualisation of work. The recession of 2008/2009 was very serious, 2011 involved slow growth and there is a high chance that recession may recur in 2012/13 (ILO 2011c). Unemployment and associated economic and social distress and child poverty have risen in many countries, along with other forms of poverty, including among older sections of the population.7 As a result, poverty, vulnerability and exclusions are growing in “the North” (e.g. Standing 2011). Both OECD and emerging countries show rapidly increasing income inequality. Top incomes have been growing rapidly, especially in the US and UK, China and India, with incomes of the top 1% being substantively higher than in France, Germany and Japan. Significant numbers of countries show a Gini coefficient higher than 40 on a 0-100 scale.8 China, it may be noted, now has a higher Gini coefficient than the USA. In addition, a myriad of other intersecting and reinforcing social inequalities influence access to and the benefits from health, education, nutrition, sanitation and other factors fundamental for human wellbeing (Kabeer 2010; Jolly 2011; Te Lintelo 2011). The range of these problems is blurring the established North-South or developed-developing country distinction. While one would not want to conflate the absolute poverty experienced by large numbers of people in low-income countries with the relative poverty experienced in some dimensions by most of the people classified as being in poverty in OECD countries, the conventional distinction between developed and developing countries is, arguably, becoming misleading. Poor people in OECD countries experience absolute poverty in various important dimensions of access, meaning and sometimes even of health. Historically, systems of public health and social security emerged in present-day rich countries in recognition of the insecurities that could affect the majority of their populations. There was recognition also of the great waste in terms of human potential, and thus of potential benefit for all of addressing these insecurities, and the risks and costs in terms of human conflict that can result if socio-economic insecurities are not countered. Similar recognitions for both national and international levels underpinned the design of the United Nations system from the 1940s, after the human disasters experienced during 1930–1945. The same insights apply with increasing force to the intensely interconnected and volatile global systems of the twenty-first century, and not just for individual countries or poor countries. Because the MDG discourse has been directed toward solving challenges in the ‘global South”, it missed an opportunity to reflect the challenges of the global webs of causation of poverty, conflict, 7 8 Perhaps partly in response, the ‘Sarkozy Commission’ on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (Stiglitz et al. 2009) identified more human development indicators, along with other moves away from economic growth as the all-sufficient indicator and indeed solution. For the Gini measure, the closer to 100 (which is the maximum score possible), the higher the degree of inequality. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 80 Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals disease, migration and climate change that also affect the North, where inequities are emerging with increasing intensity. The MDGs and their extension or successor need to be (re)conceived within a global perspective: as global development goals and mainstreamed to address vulnerable populations, no matter where they are geographically located. Box 3. Human security and securitability in Latvia Latvia, a middle-income country and member of the European Union, has been working with the concept of human security on several levels, in academic research and policy planning, since the pioneering Latvia Human Development Report 2003 (UNDP Latvia 2003). It has currently adopted the concept of securitability as one of three priorities informing discussions of the National Development Plan 2014–2020. Securitability is defined as “The ability to avoid insecure situations and to retain a sense of security when such situations do occur, as well as the ability to re-establish security and sense of security when these have been compromised” (LAPAS 2011). Securitability is strengthened by:- enabling attachments in early childhood by ensuring a nurturing family environment; increasing individuals’ opportunities to improve competencies via formal and non-formal education; promoting healthy lifestyle choices; supporting decent work; and enabling opportunities to cooperate with others to strengthen societal trust through engagement in political processes. The holistic, people-centred approach does not hold the answer to all perceived human security threats, but it empowers people to remove barriers to their and their communities’ development, and to cooperate with all levels of government to guarantee key services mandated by the relevant public authorities. Securitability also requires government support to promote empowerment. Source: authors 4. The case for ‘human security’ as a conceptual framework for the MDGs Over the last decade or two, the idea of human security has developed as an important associate to the already prominent and widely articulated global development languages of human rights and human development. It can help to focus and motivate the required work of updating, continuing and deepening the MDGs agenda. Human security thinking combines  a core intellectual frame concerning interconnectedness and human vulnerability;  values centred on basic human rights;  agendas for action, to build the capacity to avoid, respond to or cope with risks and threats;  awareness of the increasing cross-sectoral nature of government policies; and Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 81 Gabriele Koehler, Des Gasper, Sir Richard Jolly, Mara Simane  an established multi-sector presence in many UN agencies, NGOs and universities, as well as a ready compatibility with the work of many other justice and rights-oriented agencies, in fields of social security, employment, public health, environment and peace. The rounds of discussion on human security in the UN General Assembly in 2008, 2010 and 2012 have made clear the considerable and growing support for the ideas of human security, provided that they are separated from the approach adopted under the banner of ‘the responsibility to protect’ and thus not used to justify armed intervention in the affairs of other countries. The UN Secretary General now has a Special Adviser on Human Security who has been consulting and preparing recommendations to consolidate the connection of human security thinking and the debate on the post-2015 agenda. In a human security approach, the primary object of security is not states and their military forces, but all people, and by implication the human species. The UN’s advisory Commission on Human Security, chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, described human security as meaning security of ‘the vital core’ of people’s lives (Commission for Human Security 2003). The values that are to be secured thus include not only survival and physical integrity but also other core human values, including the ‘freedom to live in dignity’. 9 The concept of human security was made operational by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the 1994 Human Development Report. It specified seven typical priority areas of security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal physical security, security of community life and political security. This represents only a partial checklist of areas of security/insecurity and possible threats, to which financial insecurity was added in 1999. It is reductionist and not itself the definition of human security, which concerns security of those elements in persons’ lives that have a reasoned high priority: ‘core human values’ (Hampson et al. 2002). Areas of priority attention in human security will be partly place- and time-specific, as revealed in National Human Development Reports that have investigated human security in particular countries, as well as in much related work (e.g.: UNDP Latvia 2003; UNDP 2004; Gasper 2005, 2010; Jolly and Basu Ray 2006, 2007; UNESCO 2008; Leichenko and O’Brien 2008; UNDP RBAS 2009; O’Brien et al. 2010; UN Secretary-General 2010; Gasper and Gomez 2011). Human security thus shifts the focus and enlarges it far beyond the conventional approaches to human development. Human security analysis covers a wide scope of areas considered as contributory factors and possible countermeasures to insecurity.10 A number of important features 9 Much earlier, in a speech to the US Congress in 1941 arguing for US entry into the world war, US President Roosevelt outlined four essential human freedoms, the last two of which have been used in normative international development debates ever since. ‘The first is freedom of speech and expression – everywhere in the world. The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own way – everywhere in the world. The third is freedom from want – which, translated into world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants – everywhere in the world. The fourth is freedom from fear – which, translated into world terms, means a worldwide reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor – anywhere in the world’ (Franklin Roosevelt’s Annual Address to Congress – The ‘Four Freedoms’). It is worth underlining that ‘freedom from want’ here means fulfilment of needs of subsistence, not fulfilment of every desire. 10 For the Commission for Africa: ‘Human security becomes an all-encompassing condition in which individual citizens live in freedom, peace and safety and participate fully in the process of governance. They enjoy the Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 82 Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals are: " An explicit concern for the wellbeing of fellow humans. This is shared by the sister humanist perspectives of human rights, human needs, and human development (Gasper 2007). Human security thinking contains an insistence on fulfilling basic rights – which typically are derived from basic needs – for every person (see e.g. Owen 2005). # The focus on threats to basic human values directs attention to the everyday realities of life, and the things that people value and the diverse but interconnected threats to these values, actual and/or felt. Human security analysis involves a rich, realistic picture of being human. The risks and insecurities are partly case- and person-specific, and partly subjective, so human security analysis requires listening to people’s ‘voices’, their fears and perceptions, including both the ‘voices of the poor’ and of the rich (Narayan et al. 2000; Burgess et al. 2007). $ Attention to the lives of real persons reveals the intersections and combinations of diverse forces in the lives of individuals and groups, and the various causes and varied difficulties that arise as stress factors and vulnerabilities interact. For example, poorer groups are more exposed to environmental threats because of the locations where they live. They suffer greater harm when hit, because besides their greater exposure they have less resources to use in protection; and they may be less resilient, again because they have fewer resources – economic, social, cultural and political – with which to recover. Micro-level study of the impacts of disasters (for example, Hurricane Katrina) and of ongoing climate change reveals this ‘triple whammy’ (see e.g. UNDP 2007; Leichenko and O’Brien 2008). % The focus in human security analysis on people underlines both human vulnerability and capability. A human security policy approach seeks to manage and moderate vulnerability. This complements the great stress on capability that is found in human development thinking. Human security thinking includes capability too, as we see in the concept of ‘securitability’ articulated in the Latvia Human Development Report 2003 and subsequent work; it stresses empowerment as well as protection. & Attention to the intersections that occur in each person’s life is part of ‘joined-up thinking’ that is aware of potential interconnections, including interconnections between threats, and between what are in conventional research and bureaucracies seen as different spheres of study or responsibility. Human security thinking looks at links between the economy, protection of fundamental rights, have access to resources and the basic necessities of life, including health and education, and inhabit an environment that is not injurious to their health and wellbeing’ (Commission for Africa 2005: 392). Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 83 Gabriele Koehler, Des Gasper, Sir Richard Jolly, Mara Simane distribution, environment, health, as well as conflict. Economic trends can greatly increase the chances of conflict, via mechanisms that have regrettably largely lain outside of the fields of attention of businesspeople, conventional academic economists and economic policymakers (Collier et al. 2003; Picciotto 2005; Picciotto et al. 2007). The resulting conflicts then have implications for distribution and health, as well as for economy, crime and further conflict; the distributional changes may in turn impact on environment; and so on. Further, these interconnections sometimes involve flashpoints or tipping points, stress levels beyond which the negative effects sharply escalate. Beneath certain levels of malnutrition, for example, young children can suffer irreversible mental deficits; and some types of stress or abuse may produce irreversible emotional harm. ' Wider attention to contributory factors and their interconnections increases our awareness of vulnerability and fragility, but also of opportunities and resilience. The numerous national Human Development Reports that have taken a human security approach have produced novel insights and suggestions along these lines (see the reviews in Jolly and Basu Ray 2006, 2007). Besides the promotion of analytical integration, human security thinking does ‘boundary work’ in other respects. First, consideration of the sources of and threats to human security helps to bring together the different organisational worlds of socioeconomic development, human rights, humanitarian relief, conflict resolution and national security (Uvin 2004). This was recently reconfirmed in a UN General Assembly September 2012 resolution on human security, which defined human security as an approach to identifying and addressing “widespread and cross-cutting challenges to…survival, livelihood and dignity”. It included in the notion and approach of human security: “the right of people to live in freedom and dignity; a call for people-centred, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented responses that strengthened the protection and empowerment of all people and all communities; and recognition of the interlinkages between peace, development and human rights, and [between] civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.” (DPI 2012). Second, human security discourse similarly synthesises ideas from the partner ‘human discourses’ of human needs, human rights and human development (Gasper 2007). It better grounds human rights and human development work in attention to the nature of being and wellbeing; focuses them on high priorities; highlights interdependence more than does human rights language, and increases attention to risks, vulnerability and fragility; and it carefully explores human subjectivity – meaning how people perceive and feel, and what they cherish or fear – which increases its explanatory force, vividness and motivating potential. Human security analysis recognises emotions and perceptions, identifies surprising conjunctures, and can give a sense of real lives and persons. The language of ‘security’ itself touches emotions, which is both a source of strength and of danger (Gasper and Truong 2010). While the ‘human security’ label aims to re-orient security discourse, it carries risks of being taken over by the psychic insecurities and fears of the rich and the military instincts of those with large arsenals and Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 84 Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals the habit of using them. However, those fears and habits exist already and have long had ways of expressing themselves without requiring ‘human security’ language in order to do so. The difference made by this language is likely to be in the opposite direction, in gradually helping to promote interpersonal and global sensitivity and solidarity in situations of risk and setback. . Human security thinking looks at diverse, situation-specific, interacting threats and how they affect the lives of ordinary people, especially the most vulnerable. It promotes empathy, the ability to imagine how others live and feel, and the perception of an intensively interconnected shared world in which humanity forms a ‘community of fate’. It thus favours the changes that are needed for global sustainability, in respect of how people perceive shared vulnerabilities, shared interests and shared humanity (Earth Charter; Gasper 2009). Narrower versions of the concept of human security (in terms of the range of core values included) do not block such changes, but are less conducive than the broader versions. This said, human security analysis is still met with doubts and debate, especially among some political scientists and international relations professionals operating in the field of international conflict. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong Khong (2006) for instance, accept the focus of human security on the human referent but balk at the idea of including an almost limitless range of threats. Unless the term is restricted to insecurities which arise from deliberate acts of violence, they fear that the door will be opened too wide. This critique was written several years ago and since then review of many national studies as well as debates in the UN General Assembly have shown that broader approaches are both operational and can meet with political interest and, increasingly, with government support (see e.g. Jolly and BasuRay 2007). 5. Human security analysis as an integrating policy framework The MDG targets can be seen as one step to making a human security agenda operational. At the same time, one of several critiques of the 2000–2002 MDG agenda is, as we saw earlier, that it shied away from actual policy design – by failing to make recommendations on how governments would need to go about achieving the various targets and goals. 11 Recent research and discussions on inequalities and social justice (Kabeer 2010; Jolly 2011; Te Lintelo 2011) can serve to update human security oriented policy. The proposals underline the need for specifically addressing income and social inequalities and their intersections, if the MDGs are to be met. The proposals also elaborate a set of required policy interventions which are in tune with a human security policy framework. They can deepen the MDGs (Fukuda-Parr 2011) and inform the emerging SDGs. The proposals for government policies (Kabeer 2010; Jolly 2011; Te Lintelo 2011) include: …adopting legislation against discrimination and for affirmative action [for] strengthening the resource base of the poor, adopting policies for growth with redistribution and improving outreach, quality and cultural relevance of basic social services... Consideration should also be given to adopting group-based solutions to address problems that are collective (particular to specific groups of society rather than only to individuals), and to striking the right balance between universal policies on equality and tailored ones that address groups within the poor that have been systematically excluded. (Jolly 2011: 14) 11 The UN DESA publication on national development strategies (UN DESA 2008) is a significant contribution to defining policies and endorsing space for heterodox policy making. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 85 Gabriele Koehler, Des Gasper, Sir Richard Jolly, Mara Simane Agencies supporting equity policies should not be shy in calling for and promoting macroeconomic strategies of redistribution with growth (Jolly 2011: 14). And with respect to tax reform there is an explicit call for progressive taxation (ibid.: 10; Te Lintelo 2011: 6). Policies addressing income inequality and social exclusion need to be joined up with policies on decent work and employment, which are central for incomes as well as for dignity (e.g. UN Secretary-General 2005; UNRISD 2010; ILO 2011c; Fukuda-Parr 2011; Nayyar 2011; Bachelet 2011; Raworth 2012). Systematic attention to the factors that support or hinder individuals in increasing their securitability (Simane 2011) will complement the policy interventions needed to address income inequalities, social exclusion and employment – including by strategies at the level of individuals, groups and communities.12 Such a holistic approach will both consolidate the human security approach and provide the policy dimension that is needed in MDG/SDG discourse. 6. The value added of a human security approach to the post-MDGs agenda The human security approach can be creatively used for integrating, invigorating and extending the MDGs. In doing so, it can add value to the post-2015 agenda in the following areas (Commission on Human Security 2003; Koehler 2011a; Gasper 2010): " It focuses on freedom from fear, freedom from want, and freedom to live in dignity, and thus combines human rights dimensions and the notions of human dignity and choice. # It captures all the current MDG areas – food and nutrition, employment, income poverty, education, child and maternal health, HIV-Aids and similar challenges, gender equality and the environment. But the human security concept casts these presently demarcated and separated components of the MDG agenda in a more interconnected and systematic fashion, including by organising them as economic security/employment security (decent work and income), political security, cultural and psychological security, and environmental security. $ It emphasises ‘joined-up thinking’ that displays connections across and between development areas and policy domains (Jolly and Basu Ray 2006; Leichenko and O’Brien 2008). It integrates the impacts, in terms of political and personal security, of violence and conflict, as well as of ecological destruction and climate change. % It includes the impact of income and wealth inequalities and social exclusion and can thus address poverty and exclusion in a more integrated, multidimensional fashion (Commission on Human Security 2003: 76), thereby corresponding to the more sophisticated discourse that has emerged on poverty and its many dimensions. & It acknowledges the importance of good governance as part of an enabling environment 12 The 2010 Human Security Report of the UN for example examines the application of the concept in these areas: the global financial and economic crises, food insecurity and price volatility, the spread of infectious diseases, climate change, and the prevention of violent conflict. See UN Secretary-General (2010). Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 86 Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals (Commission on Human Security 2003: 4). ' It examines objective situations as well as subjective perceptions, both of which matter for human development, equity and wellbeing, social inclusion and social cohesion (see, e.g., UNDP Latvia 2003). Sensitivity to subjective aspects is central to thinking about human development from the vantage point of people, as opposed to states, and informing and enabling participatory decision-making and creating social contracts between citizens and governments. By acknowledging that subjective barriers to development are often just as challenging and painful as objective ones, it relates well to the idea of multidimensional human development (Alkire and Foster 2010) and to the concept of ‘three-dimensional human wellbeing’ (McGregor and Sumner 2009) which covers objective, subjective and relational dimensions of the human condition. This is an additional conceptual strength. ( It can therefore be used as a point of departure for participation. Participation is the necessary starting point for developing policy approaches which are holistic and empowering, both of which features are conditions for ‘securitability’. Securitability, as coined in the Latvian national report on human security, embraces the ability of individuals and communities to avoid insecure situations, to retain a sense of security when such situations do occur and to re-establish security and a sense of security when these have been compromised, regardless of the type of threat (UNDP Latvia 2003; Simane 2011).13 ) Human security thinking embodies a strong emphasis on environmental sustainability, and on the integration of climate change adaptation concerns in development strategies. * The challenge of human security is universal. It transcends the North-South distinction since human security matters everywhere and since it highlights our worldwide interconnection (UNDP Latvia 2003; Burgess et al. 2007; UNESCO 2008). "! The human security approach has been applied in analyses of priorities for international governance (see for example High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 2004; UN Secretary-General 2005 and 2010). The approach directs attention to processes to support securitability for individuals and communities at risk, across different systems of security providers. When considering a post-2015 MDG agenda and vision, these international dimensions of human security require exploration.14 In this sense, human security thinking will open new perspectives for the objectives, instruments and management of the international system. Nevertheless, as emphasised in the 2010 Secretary-General’s Report on Human Security: “Human security is based 13 Many discourses are using a related concept: resilience. See for example Raworth (2012) and Melamed (2012). The Rio+20 preparatory document refers to resilience in connection with disaster mitigation and responses to climate change (United Nations 2012: paras 25, 72, 107). Whereas resilience means ability to recover after damage, securitability includes in addition the ability to reduce exposure to threats and the ability to reduce sensitivity/damage when hit by a threat. 14 See the discussion in Te Lintelo (2011), or UN Secretary-General (2010). Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 87 Gabriele Koehler, Des Gasper, Sir Richard Jolly, Mara Simane on a fundamental understanding that Governments retain the primary role for ensuring the survival, livelihood and dignity of their citizens” (UN Secretary-General 2010: 1). These values, and especially human security’s underlying notions of freedom from fear, freedom from want and freedom to live in dignity are likely to be of even greater importance over the next few years. In the OECD countries, economic recession, a failure to achieve economic recovery and narrow and misguided austerity-driven policies are increasing poverty and vulnerability, as consequences of increased unemployment and increasing “precarisation” of labour. The human consequences of the crisis have been made worse by the hollowing out of social services, declining social security and social assistance flows, especially affecting child benefits and pensions. Elsewhere, insecurities persist, and often are also increasing as a consequence of recession in the West. Thus, hunger and acute food insecurity and extreme poverty (less than $1.25 per person per day) continue worldwide, with an estimated 1.4 billion people still living in extreme poverty and 1.2 billion undernourished (UN DESA 2009; United Nations 2012). This situation will continue and is likely to worsen for the lowest income quintile groups and socially excluded communities (Kabeer 2010). 7. Conclusion and outlook In summary, the human security concept and paradigm are particularly fitting for deepening the MDG/SDG approach for at least three reasons. First, they include all important domains in an integrated way. Second, they make clear how economic poverty, political and personal insecurity and violence, environmental degradation, and social exclusion are decisive for all levels of human development and wellbeing: individual, community, national and international. Thirdly, they lead directly into a structured discussion of policy responses, conspicuously absent from the earlier MDG approach. The notion of human security can thus provide a fruitful conceptual point of departure for the MDG/SDG discussions on the post-2015 agenda. Insecurity is a universal dimension of the human condition. Concern for human security puts people, not states, at the centre of the stage when assessing actions to enhance security. It appeals to human solidarity, both at the level of humankind and at the level of each individual. For these reasons it can deepen the post-2015 agenda – by integrating the values and concerns outlined in the Millennium Declaration, the goals and targets of the MDGs and those of preceding and other international development summits, and the issues addressed by the climate change and humanitarian conferences and the human rights agenda. The natural disasters of the past few years have heightened climate change awareness. Accordingly the interdependence of environmental sustainability and economic and social development has become common ground, including the notion of a ‘green economy’, and these ideas have influenced the Rio +20 Conference positions and the SDGs (United Nations 2012; Melamed 2012; Raworth 2012).15 The human security approach links well with this emerging 15 Raworth for example offers the illustrative example of a ‘doughnut’ where food, water, income, education, resilience, voice, jobs, energy, social equity, gender equality and health constitute the inner, social foundation of a ‘safe and just space for humanity’, with an outer boundary imposed by upper limits for factors such as climate change, freshwater use, nitrogen and phosphorus cycles, ocean acidification, chemical pollution, atmospheric aerosol loading, biodiversity loss, and land use change (Raworth 2012: 4). Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 88 Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals discourse in that it seeks the integration of economic development, social development and environmental protection (United Nations 2012), and adds necessary intellectual, existential and ethical depth. It provides a framework for systematic attention to policy dimensions and to the empowering notion of individual and community-based securitability. The human security perspective can thus function as an organising and exploratory framework for conceptualising development goals for the period beyond 2015. It can combine a broad approach to human development and to policies for human development that are rights-based, priority-centred and genuinely empowering, with an understanding of the complexity of current vulnerabilities. It can provide a more visionary approach in framing ‘development’ objectives, inspired by a commitment to human rights and social justice. Reference Alkire, Sabine and Foster, James. 2010, “Designing the Inequality-Adjusted Human Development Index (IHDI)”, Human Development Research Papers. Human Development Report Office (HDRO), New York: United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Bachelet, Michelle. 2011, Social Protection Floor for a Fair and Inclusive Globalization, report of the Advisory Group chaired by Michelle Bachelet convened by the ILO with the collaboration of the WHO, ILO. http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/press-and-media-centre/news/WCMS_166292/lang--en/ index.htm. Burgess, J. Peter et al. 2007, Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and Educational Frameworks in Western Europe. Paris: UNESCO. http://www.unesco.org Collier, Paul et al. 2003, Breaking The Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank Policy Research Report, Washington DC: World Bank. Commission for Africa. 2005, Our Common Interest: Report of the Commission for Africa, London: Commission for Africa. Commission on Human Security. 2003, Human Security Now, New York: Commission on Human Security/UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services) De Schutter, Olivier (2010) The Right to Food, Note by the Secretary-General, United Nations General Assembly A/65/281, www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20101021_access-to-land-report_en.pdf DPI. 2012, General Assembly Adopts Consensus Text on Human Security. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2012/ga11274.doc.htm accessed on 10/09/2012. Earth Charter. The Earth Charter Initiative, www.earthcharterinaction.org/content/ Emmerij, Louis; Jolly, Richard; and Weiss, Thomas G. 2001, Ahead of the Curve? UN Ideas and Global Challenges, Indiana University Press. FAO, IFAD, WFP. 2012, The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012. http://www.fao.org/publications/sofi/en/ Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko. 2012. Recapturing the Narrative of International Development. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko (2011) MDGs and the Narrative of Development. What about Pro-poor Growth and Structural Change?, Discussion Paper, New York: The New School. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 89 Gabriele Koehler, Des Gasper, Sir Richard Jolly, Mara Simane http://www.nai.uu.se/forum/entries/2011/08/11/mdgs-and-the-narrative/index.xml accessed on 02/04/2012. Gasper, Des. 2011, ‘“Pioneering the Human Development Revolution: Analysing the Trajectory of Mahbub Ul Haq”, Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 12(3) 433–56. Gasper, Des. 2010, “The Idea of Human Security”. K. O'Brien et al. eds. Climate Change, Ethics and Human Security. Cambridge University Press, 23-46. Gasper, Des. 2009, “Global Ethics and Human Security”, G. Honor Fagan and Ronaldo Munck eds. Globalization and Security: An Encyclopedia 1, Westport CT: Greenwood: 155–71. Gasper, Des. 2007, “Human Rights, Human Needs, Human Development, Human Security: Relationships between Four International ‘Human’ Discourses”, Forum for Development Studies 34(1): 9–43. Gasper, Des. 2005, “Securing Humanity: Situating ‘Human Security’ as Concept and Discourse”, Journal of Human Development 6(2): 221–45. Gasper, Des and Gomez, Oscar. 2011, “Human Security Approaches in Recent Development Thinking and Development Cooperation”, presentation to the Baltic World Talks, Human Security: Towards Empowering Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Latvia. Gasper, Des and Truong, Thanh-Dam. 2010, “Development Ethics through the Lenses of Caring, Gender and Human Security”. Stephen Esquith and Fred Gifford eds. Capabilities, Power and Institutions: Towards a More Critical Development Ethics, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State Univ. Press: 58–95. Hampson, F.O. et al. 2002, Madness in the Multitude: Human Security and World Disorder, Ottawa: Oxford University Press. Hanlon, Joseph; Barrientos, Armando and Hulme, David. 2010, Just Give Money to the Poor: The Development Revolution from the Global South, Sterling: Kumarian Press. High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. 2004, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. United Nations, Secretary General’s Panel, www.un.org/secureworld/ accessed 02/04/2012. Hulme, David and Fukuda-Parr, Sakiko. 2009, International Norm Dynamics and ‘the End of Poverty’: Understanding the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), BWPI Working Paper 96, University of Manchester, Brookes World Poverty Institute, www.manchester.ac.uk/bwpi accessed on 02/04/2012. ILO. 2011a, Global Employment Trends. International Labour Office. http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/@dcomm/@publ/documents/publication /wcms_150440.pdf ILO. 2011b, “Social Protection Floors for Social Justice and a Fair Globalization”, Report IV (1), Geneva: International Labour Office, ILC.101/IV/1. http://www.social-protection.org/gimi/gess/RessShowRessource.do?ressourceId=24781 ILO. 2011c, World of Work Report. Making Markets Work for Jobs, Geneva: International Labour Office. ILO. 2012, “Text of the Recommendation concerning national floors of social protection”. International Labour Conference. Provisional Record. http://www.ilo.org/ilc/ILCSessions/101stSession/reports/provisional-records/WCMS_183326/l ang--en/index.htm Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 90 Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals Jolly, Richard. 2011, Reducing Inequalities: Research, Policies and Action, background note for the Roundtable on Inequality and Social Justice, Millennium Challenge Fund and IDS, London, September 2011. Jolly, Richard and Basu Ray, Deepayan. 2007, “Human Security – National Perspectives and Global Agendas – Insights from National Human Development Reports”, J. of International Development 19.4: 457–72 Jolly, Richard and Basu Ray, Deepayan. 2006, The Human Security Framework and National Human Development Reports. Human Development Report Office National Human Development Report Series, NHDR Occasional Paper 5, New York. Jolly, Richard; Emmerij, Louis; and Weiss, Thomas G. 2009, UN Ideas That Changed the World, Bloomington IN: Indiana University Press. Jolly, Richard; Emmerij, Louis; and Weiss, Thomas G. 2005, The Power of UN Ideas: Lessons from the First Sixty Years, New York: UN Intellectual History Project. www.unhistory.org/publications/UNIdeas.pdf accessed 02/04/2012. Kabeer, Naila. 2010, Can the MDGs Provide a Pathway to Social Justice? The Challenges of Intersecting Inequality, IDS/MDG Achievement Fund, http://www.ids.ac.uk Kenny, Charles and Sumner, Andy. 2011, More Money or More Development: What have the MDGs Accomplished?, draft, IDS, 1 August. Koehler, Gabriele. 2011a, “Human Security in Development: Deepening the MDGs”, presentation to the Baltic World Talks, Human Security: Towards Empowering Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Latvia, Riga 2011. Koehler, Gabriele. 2011b, “Transformative Social Protection: Reflections on Policy Experiences in Four South Asian Countries”, IDS Bulletin 42.5. Lagarde, Christine. 2011, “Global Risks are Rising, but There is a Path to Recovery”: Remarks at Jackson Hole, www.imf.org/external/index.htm (accessed 2 April 2012) LAPAS. 2011, Human Security, fact sheet, The Latvian Platform for Development Cooperation, www.lapas.lv accessed on 02/04/2012. Leichenko, Robin and O’Brien, Karen. 2008, Environmental Change and Globalization: Double Exposure, New York: Oxford University Press. MacFarlane, S. Neil and Yuen Foong Khong. 2006, Human Security and the UN: A Critical History Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press. McGregor, Allister and Sumner, Andy. 2009, “After 2015: ‘3D Human Wellbeing’”, IDS In Focus Policy Briefing, http://www.ids.ac.uk Melamed, Claire. 2012, After 2012. Contexts, Politics and Processes for a Post-2015 Global Agreement on Development, London: ODI, www.odi.org.uk/resources/docs/7537.pdf accessed on 02/04/2012. Ministry of External Relations, Colombia. 2011, Inputs of the Government of Colombia to Draft Zero of the Outcome Document. 30.11.2011, United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20), www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/372Colombia.pdf accessed 02/04/2012. Narayan, Deepa et al. 2000, Voices of the Poor, New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Nayyar, Deepak. 2011, The MDGs Beyond 2015, South Centre Research Papers 38, May, www.southcentre.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1563%3Athe-mdgs-b Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 91 Gabriele Koehler, Des Gasper, Sir Richard Jolly, Mara Simane eyond-2015&catid=60%3Athe-south-and-global-governance&Itemid=67&lang=en accessed on 02/04/2012. O'Brien, Karen; St. Clair, Asuncion eds. 2010, Climate Change, Ethics and Human Security, Cambridge University Press. Ortiz, Isabel; Chai, Jingqing; and Cummins, Matthew. 2011, Identifying Fiscal Space. Options for Social and Economic Development for Children and Poor Households in 182 Countries, Unicef Policy and Practice, Working Paper, NY, http://www.unicef.org Owen, Taylor. 2005, “Conspicuously Absent? Why the Secretary General used Human Security in all but Name”, St. Anthony’s International Review 1.2: 37–42 Picciotto, Robert. 2005, Memorandum submitted to Select Committee on International Development, UK House of Commons. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/464/5031502.htm Picciotto, R.; Olonisakin, F. and Clarke, M. 2007, Global Development and Human Security, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. Raworth, Kate. 2102, A Safe and Just Space for Humanity. Can We Live within the Doughnut?, Oxfam Discussion Papers. http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/dp-a-safe-and-just-space-for-humanity-13021 2-en.pdf Roosevelt, Franklin. 1941, Annual Address to Congress – ‘The "Four Freedoms"’, Washington, http://docs.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/od4frees.html accessed on 24/10/2011. Simane, Mara. 2011, “Human Security and Securitability”, presentation to the Baltic World Talks, Human Security: Towards Empowering Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Latvia, Riga 2011. Standing, Guy. 2011, The Precariat, The New Dangerous Class, London: Bloomsbury. Stiglitz, Joseph Sen, Amartya and Fitoussi, Jean Paul. 2009, Report on the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress, www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf accessed on 02/04/2012. Te Lintelo, Dolf. 2011, Inequality and Social Justice Roundtable Consultation, Summary, IDS Sussex and MDG Achievement Fund, 15 September 2011. http://www.ids.ac.uk UN. 2011, The Millennium Development Goals Report 2011, New York: United Nations, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/11_MDG%20Report_EN.pdf accessed on 02/04/2012. UN Conference on Sustainable Development. http://www.uncsd2012.org accessed on 21/10/2011. UN DESA. 2011, “Proposal to the Millennium Goals and Beyond: Reflections on an International Development Policy Agenda After 2015”, draft, New York: United Nations. UN DESA. 2009, Rethinking Poverty: Report on the World Social Situation 2010. New York: United Nations. UN DESA. 2008, National Development Strategies. Policy Notes, New York: United Nations. UN General Assembly. 2000, United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, UN New York, 18 September 2000, A/RES/55/2. http://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.pdf accessed on 09/11. UN General Assembly. 2010, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. Keeping the promise: united to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. A/RES/65/1. 10 October 2010. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 92 Human Security and the Next Generation of Comprehensive Human Development Goals UN Secretary-General. 2005, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All, report of the Secretary-General, UN General Assembly, A/59/2005. http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/contents.htm UN Secretary-General. 2010, Human Security, report of the Secretary-General, UN General Assembly, A/64/701, http://ochaonline.un.org/Reports/tabid/2186/language/en-US/Default.aspx accessed on 02/04/2012. UN Secretary-General. 2011, The Secretary-General’s Report to the General Assembly – ‘We – the Peoples’. New York, 21 September 2011. http://www.mm.undp.org/UN_Days/Sep_2011/Secretary-General's%20Report%20to%20the%2 0General%20Assembly%20-%20We%20the%20Peoples%20-%2021%20September%202011. pdf accessed on 12/11. UNDP. 2007, Human Development Report 2007/8 – Fighting Climate Change – Human Solidarity in a Divided World, New York: United Nations Development Program. UNDP. 2004, National Human Development Report of Afghanistan: Security with a Human Face, New York: United Nations Development Program. UNDP. 1994, Human Development Report 1994. New Dimensions of Human Security, New York: United Nations Development Program, http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr1994 (accessed on 02/04/2012. UNDP Latvia. 2003, Human Security. Human Development Report 2002/3. Riga: United Nations Development Program. UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States. 2009, Arab Human Development Report 2009.Challenges to Human Security in the Arab Countries. New York: United Nations Development Program, http://www.arab-hdr.org/contents/index.aspx?rid=5 accessed on 02/04/2012. UNESCO. 2008, Human Security – Approaches And Challenges, Paris: UNESCO. United Nations. 2012, ‘The Future We Want’, submitted by the co-Chairs on behalf of the Bureau in accordance with the decision in Prepcom 2 to present the zero-draft of the outcome document for consideration by Member States and other stakeholders no later than early January 2012. 10 January 2012, http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/content/documents/370The%20Future%20We%20Want%201 0Jan%20clean.pdf accessed 02/04/2012. UNRISD. 2010, Combating Poverty and Inequality: Structural Change, Social Policy and Politics. Geneva: United Nations Research Institute on Social Development. http://www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/events.nsf/(httpEvents)/90DF168624C41E22C12577360 04F70D1?OpenDocument Uvin, Peter. 2004, Human Rights and Development, Sterling VA: Kumarian Press. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 75-93. 93 Journal of Human Security Studies Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.94-108. Farmers in a Developing Country: An Inquiry into Human Insecurity of the Many Vu Le Thao Chi1 Abstract This is an inquiry into the basis for farmers’ behavior in a transitional society, where they themselves have very little ground to argue that their behavior could possibly help their crossing of the transition. They often need to formulate action on the conflicting councils coming from various “professionals” such as medical specialists, educators or even develop planner. That leaves them with the ultimate sense of insecurity facing the uncertain consequences of the advised course of action. Some of the key development economists often call attention to the factors, or incentives that can induce the farmers to produce more and more efficiently. However, the farmers in a transitional phase are usually deprived of the evidence that their changes in behavior can lead to where the economists say they can reach. In addition, the development economists’ almost exclusive concerns with how to make farmers more productive may blind them to the deceptively simple fact that the farmers are not consumed by how much wealth their land can produce. The essay clarifies these points on the basis of an extensive research, over nearly 10 years, in a rural community, Phu Cat, in central Vietnam. The essay argues that the farming is not merely the most important productive activities. It engages farmers in much broader activities since it is a way of life and that, therefore, it exposes the farmers to various types of uncertainties. The nature of the essay is descriptive as it heavily relies not on a statistical analysis but on the close readings of the many and lengthy interviews, the data collected through participatory observations of nearly one hundred farmers. Keywords: Agriculture, economic development, information intermediaries, empowerment, risks 1. Introduction Over nearly ten years of a close observation offers a plenty of opportunities to encounter signs of changes even in a rural community in a developing economy. Phu Cat in central coastal Vietnam is such a community, with the population of nearly 200,000 whose main source of income has been agriculture. Several new cafes have opened up at both ends of the town, and a 30-room hotel, first of its kind, stands at the northern end. As if to justify these new additions, an industrial park is being built on the former rice paddies. One wide and paved way runs through the park, even though the park remains unoccupied. During the same period, Vietnam’s macro-economic performance has been close to a miracle, 1 Vu Le Thao Chi is a doctoral candidate at Keio University, Graduate School of Media and Governance. Farmers in a Developing Country: An Inquiry into Human Insecurity of the Many recording the annual GNP growth rate of 6 to 7%. Many observers may be cautious calling it miracle mainly because of the precursors of the other East Asian “miracles” proved vulnerable, as exhibited in 1997 Asian financial crisis, to forces beyond the control of individual economies. The changes in Phu Cat may be a distant reflection of this high performance of Vietnamese economy, or may be even part of it. At the same time, there are also signs of no change in the community. The financiers in local banks, which are not many, still speak of helping the “poor,” not by way of financing venturous farmers but by blissfully ignoring the deadline for the debt payment. To have new shops is still a rarity. If any, they are usually the new branches of old shops, and the customers frequent them not because they offer something new or more, but because they belong to the old familiar shop owners. Table 1-1: National/Rural Widening Income Disparity in Lower Mekong Region 94/96 2001 2005 2007 Cambodia 1.61 1.91 2.3 2.51 Lao PDR 1.59 1.47 1.72 1.81 Myanmar x x x x Thailand 6.36 5.45 5.69 5.62 Vietnam 2.51 2.75 3.16 3.42 2010 Sources for Table 1-1: Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO Statistical Year Book, 2004 and 2010. Income disparity is arrived at by dividing GDP per capita by GDP per economically active person in agriculture. This discrepancy, especially the widening income gap (Table 1-1) -- and its broader implications -- between changes captured at a macro level and their absence at local level initially prompted this investigation. The discrepancy may be indicative of several possibilities. It may suggest simply the time-consuming trickledown effect of economic growth, i.e., it may take many years for the gains of economic growth to reach the corners of society. Or it may suggest that the gains of economic development may not be evenly distributed regionally. A third possibility is the asymmetrical sharing of the costs and gains of economic development among different sectors. Implicit in all three, however, are the fact that that the economy is still in transition and/or the assumption that the discrepancy should disappear in due time. It is in this assumption that many of the problems we need to address lie. To sum up the problems, how do farmers survive the transition without the evidence of a “better life,” without the blessings that are supposed to follow crossing the transition? How do the farmers justify their behavior to themselves when they cannot tell whether or not their behavior is possibly a crucial step to cross the transition? 2. Farmers in Development Economics and Economic Development One of the problems concerning the farmers in economic development is that they are held in an unusually fixed view to do nothing but produce. They are exclusively “producers,” and not much else. So much so that one development planner even scolded the farmers for allocating spare time for “side-business.”(Tung, 1993, 374) For the planner, if they need side-business to earn more, they should have allocated anything extra for concentrating on increasing productivity. The planner’s Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 95 Vu Le Thao Chi frustration has its origin in his belief that the increasing agriculture is critical in making the transition from planned economy to market economy smooth. In a broader perspective, the planner’s belief has its roots in Vietnam’s recent growth policy, which aims at luring farmers to increase productivity. Vietnam’s growth policy has at its core several key parts: 1) Establishment of a household as the principal production unit replacing the collective farming where the farmers are expected to perform prescribed, thus disparate, roles in sustaining the performance of the whole cooperatives – i.e., division of labour in farm works; 2) Farmers are rewarded on the basis of the production – as opposed to the points allocated on the basis of their contributions measured in hours of work. (Kerkviliet, 2005, chs. 2 and 5) Beginning in 1981, through what came to be known as Contract 100, climaxing in the Do Moi reforms since 1986 (the most recent one in 2003 being the amendment to 1993 reform), the government launched a series of land policies. They virtually instituted land private ownership, insuring the famers the rights to cultivate, transfer, inherit, lease, mortgage and exchange the land.2 Also by releasing the farmers from the collective obligations inherent in the old cooperative system, the farmers (or their households) are given freedom to make the best use of the land. In brief, the farmers, entrenched in the mold of the producers of wealth from the land, are to expend the resources to exploit the reform-induced opportunities. The planner is not alone. The agriculture, accounting for the largest portion of labor force and holding the key to securing sufficient food supply, has been given a prominent role in economic development. In Arthur Lewis (Lewis, 1954) and those who have followed him (see especially, Figueroa, 2004), the increase in agricultural productivity is critical as it meets the two needs simultaneously: to release the surplus labor so that the industrial sector is assured of labor supply without the pressure of its rising cost and to secure food supply so as not to allocate precious foreign reserves for its import.3 Lewis’s dual economy model depicts a developing economy exploiting or failing to exploit what appears to be the infinite supply of cheap labor, which in turn hinges upon the increase in agricultural productivity. How a stagnant agriculture takes the first step toward increasing its productivity depends on a group of men “who think in terms of investing capital productively.” (Lewis, 1954, 160) The utmost significance notwithstanding, the question of how, then, the ordinary farmers should join the ranks of investment-minded men has no place in Lewis’s dual economy model. As Meier comments, the model is concerned “only with the processes by which more goods and services become available.” (Meier, 2005, 193) He rarely went beyond the suggestions for the presence of institutions which might help people to think along the line of economic growth 2 3 The Land policy in Vietnam since 1981 up to 2003, when amendments were added to 1993 Land Reform, has gone through many phases. Please see Herbert Christ and Dirk Kloss (1998), Nguyen Tan Phat and Ngyuen Tien Dung (2011) and Tran Duc Vien (2006) for the documents and succinct accounts of land policies available in English. This is a summary of Lewis (1954). The particular attention to the agriculture which may provide the surplus labor force comes from the now famous realization that Lewis had while walking down a Bangkok street. He realized that one neo-classicist assumption of the fixed labor supply had been blinding him to the dynamic production factor – labor – abundant in both 19th century Britain and in developing nations (Lewis ,1980). Lewis only later argues that “the model is intended to work equally well whether the capitalists are agriculturalists or industrialists . . . In its first version . . . the model presupposes that the capitalist sector is self-sufficient and contains every kind of economic activity. This explanation may serve to refute the charge that the model identifies economic growth with industrialization.” Then he made a similar argument a little earlier: “In the model, the non-capitalist sector serves for a time as a reservoir from which the capitalist sector draws labor. The original [1954] paper makes it clear that this labor does not all come from agriculture —a fact which has escaped the attention of many subsequent writers.” (Lewis, 1972, 76 italics mine) Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 96 Farmers in a Developing Country: An Inquiry into Human Insecurity of the Many requirements. (Meier, ibid,1993-201) The importance of agriculture and increasing agricultural productivity also did not escape another development economist, Theodore Shultz, who has the usual (Lewis’s) perspective on economic development in reverse. He starts with what economic development in developing areas has not achieved. What puzzled him is the poverty of the vast majority in agriculture which is given so much importance in economic development: Most of the people in the world are poor, so if we knew the economics of being poor we would know much of' the economics that really matters. Most of' the world's poor people earn their living from agriculture, so if' we knew the economics of' agriculture we would know much of' the economics of being poor. (Shultz, 1980, 639) There is a puzzle underscoring his contrasting representation of rich and poor farmers: how does the increase in the usual agricultural input produce more than the corresponding increase in the output, as witnessed in the developed economies?4 Shultz observes: The man who farms as his forefathers did cannot produce much food no matter how rich the land or how hard he works. The farmer who has access to and knows how to use what science knows about soils, plants, animals, and machines can produce an abundance of food though the land be poor. Nor need he work nearly so hard and long. He can produce so much that his brothers and some of his neighbors will move to town to earn their living. Enough farm products can be produced without them. The knowledge that makes this transformation possible is a form of capital whenever it is an integral part of the material inputs farmers use and whenever it is a part of their skills and what they know. (Shultz, 1964, 3) The crucial factor is the “quality of human agent,” endowed with skills and knowledge, who can make the decisive difference, not the “space, energy and cropland.” (Shultz, 1980, 640) For Shultz, therefore, the task of economic development rests with the investment in the farmers to instill among them the predisposition to think that they are not at the mercy of things other than themselves. The notion of investment in human beings reminds many of treating them as “capital goods”(Shultz, 1961, 2), a sort of anathema in the United States with its history of slavery. However, Shultz argues, there is nothing wrong with the investment in people that “can enlarge the range of choice available to them.(Shultz, ibid.) In sum, the increase in agricultural productivity, viewed either from its consequences (Lewis) or from the cause for it (Shultz), firmly grips the development economists. What is as firm as its grip in the eyes of development economists is the farmer’s location in economic development. They are the producers of wealth from the land; whether their production is as efficient as the development scenario prescribes depends upon whether the farmers are given the proper incentives, “explicit in the prices that farmers receive for their products and in the prices they pay for producer and consumer goods and services that they purchase” (Shultz, 1980, 643). As Michael Todaro succinctly puts it, “irrational” (1989, 290) is the characterization of the behavior of the farmers deviating from this development prescription. [farmers who fail to respond to these incentives] 4 This may be a development economist’s attention to total productivity factor (TFP), which accounts for the margin of differences in outputs not caused by the usual agricultural inputs. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 97 Vu Le Thao Chi A farmer in Phu Cat, Mr. V.T., with four children and a score of the relatives to support, considers the land, which he “borrowed from the government,” is large enough to support the clan. In 2010, he was provided a poor relief fund from the government. He used it to build a brick house. “I can keep everyone happy,” he said while pointing a little shack – his old home about one quarter the size of the new-- next to it.( .(Field Notes: Oct. 29, 2004 and March 4, 2010) He was proud to pronounce the improvement in his and the clan’s life. That the government is now capable of extending its poverty relief even to this former member of ARVN (Army of Republic of Vietnam) in and of itself is a good indication that Vietnamese economic growth is extending its spoils to many in society; that its gains can be re-distributed even to the previously neglected portion of the population. At the same time, a nagging question remains: could this anecdote be illustrious of the farmers’ irrationality, of not exploiting the resource for increasing his productivity? For the development planner above or many development economists, perhaps the answer is yes. An equally nagging question may be why Mr V.T’s acquisition of a new house for the clan should be so puzzling? Mr. V.T’s behavior may be pointing a striking omission in development economics that the farmer’s life is not consumed by productive activities only. 3. Farmers as They see Themselves Farmers in Vietnam still accounts for 70% of the labor force, while they contribute merely 30% (and declining) to the nation’s wealth. (Table 1-2) This discrepancy suggests that Vietnam’s agriculture, though typical of many developing economies, is not as productive as laid out in the development prescription, or conversely that Vietnamese economy still has a great deal more potentials untapped for economic growth. That the Vietnamese economy could be characterized as either of these two, however, may not occupy much of the minds of many farmers in Phu Cat. Table 1-2: Rural Population (%) in Lower Mekong Region 95 2001 2005 2007 2010 Cambodia 85.8 82.54 80.3 79.06 77.2 Lao PDR 82.6 76.92 72.6 70.28 66.8 Myanmar 73.9 71.48 69.4 68.08 66.1 Thailand 69.7 68.66 67.7 67.02 66 Vietnam 77.8 75.28 73.6 72.64 71.2 Sources for Table 1-2: Food and Agriculture Organization, FAO Statistical Year Book, 2004 and 2010. Income disparity is arrived at by dividing GDP per capita by GDP per economically active person in agriculture. Farmers sampled here, including Mr. V. T. are from the 81 households whom I have observed over the past nine years. Variously shuffled, the sample farmers can represent typical rural poor, transitional farmers who grow produce both for self-consumption and for sale to the commercial sector, farmers who are less than well informed both of the blessings and dangers of agrochemicals, farmers whose chances of better life, they believe, hinge upon their children, or who fastidiously observe seasonal rituals such as the Tet almost regardless of the cost. These farmers, in short, speak for the diversity behind their uniform self-identification as farmers. The first inkling that the farmers may not be as concerned with how much wealth their farms Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 98 Farmers in a Developing Country: An Inquiry into Human Insecurity of the Many bring about is the way they responded to the question regarding the farm earnings. They usually present figures such as 5,000,000 VND (Vietnamese Dong) or 7,000,000VND which are perfect round figures. They sometimes fail to answer. One farmer, Mr. N.H., even gave the exact same figure in 2005 and again in 2009, “between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000VND.” (Field Notes: March 25, 2005 and September 2009) There is no doubt that they are concerned if their farms can support the families’ daily consumption including sufficient food, or if their subsistence is secured. What matters to them is that they are above the subsistence. Beyond that, the income is of the secondary significance within the wide range of concerns inundating their daily life. The efforts to gain additional income may be illustrious of this point. Nearly all keep cows and pigs for extra cash income. That, however, is still no indication how closely they monitor and manage the sources of income for the household. Conscious efforts to make the extra-income as part of the means for safeguarding their livelihood are conspicuously missing. One farmer, Mr. D.N. testified: “It would be nice if this cow (which he acquired by using 3,000,000 VND two-year loan from a local bank) gives birth to two or three calves. It would be a big surprise.” So why would he bother with this means of income? “Oh, everyone else does. Besides I have a plenty of animal feeds from the field.”(Field Notes: March 25, 2005) “Farming” is a typical response to the inquiry concerning their vocation. And that response, too, can be a misleading pointer. It speaks first and foremost for what they own, the land or the right to use it. Maximization of that right for the purpose of profit, again, is not at the top of their priority. There are many who produce cashew nuts and other products for sale, in addition to rice. Still, they exhibit little or no sign that they are engaged in the efforts to produce surplus beyond what is needed to support the household. If anything, the additional income offers the distance for their life away from the line of subsistence; it makes the difference between easier and tighter life. Looking at the peanuts farm nearly as large as the rice paddies, a farmer, Mr. M.C.T., who still considers himself poor, confesses that he and his family do not wish more. His wish has not changed between 2005 and 2009. Security not prosperity occupies his mind. (Field Notes: March 11, 2005 and March 15, 2009) Farming occupies much of what these farmers do as farmers. Farming, however, is often the manifestation of the social relationship within a community which owning the land, or the right to use it, has necessitated. Some parts of Phu Cat farmland are better irrigated allowing them to have twice-a-year harvesting of rice, doubling the opportunities for, or burden of, farm works. Regardless of the sizes of farms they own, it is customary for the farmers to offer each other hands in plowing, growing and planting seedlings, weeding and harvesting. It is a custom which may be harmonious with a tightly-knit community with untraceable origins, or a practice traceable to and reinforced by the collective farming era especially of the decade following the unification in 1975. It is also a commonsensical understanding of the farmers that a free-ride is not a choice for the majority of the land owners, for the consequence of that choice would have to be that he would face the farm works of his own all alone.5 In other words, whether to fulfill the collective obligation (reminiscent of the days of collective farming or of traditional communal duty) or to respect mutual help practices, farming is that much removed from the inspiration for producing “surplus” for profits. Farming is deeply embedded in a 5 An excellent observation of how the collectivization of farming demoralized the farmers through the division of labor in the process of production, thus contributed to the decline of agricultural productivity which eventually led to the dismantling of the collectivization, see Kerkvliet, 2005. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 99 Vu Le Thao Chi communal life so much so that it is “not just an economic activity,” to borrow Michael Todaro’s observation, “it is a way of life.”(Todaro, 1989, 313) Efforts to produce more than needed is, of course, part of their being farmers. In Phu Cat, too, a substantial portion of the farmers produce products for self-consumption and for market. In a development economics purview, they are at the second stage of a three-stage progression that agricultural transformation may go hand in hand with the economic development, with the subsistence farming at the first and commercial agriculture at the final.6 (Todaro, ibid.) One such farmer, Mr. N.V.T., (Field Notes: November 21, 2010) has done everything since 1981, through the gradual and virtual dismantling of the collective farming system, which has made him the owner of 8 hectare of productive land. He now produces rice, grows cashew nuts, and at times, has grown eucalyptus around the cashew farm. He chopped down the eucalyptus recently to build a road to a nearby dam. He now comfortably supports his family of five and some relatives. Over the past 30 years, he has moved, or so it appears, from stage one to stage two, poised to reach the final stage of the agricultural transformation. However, a closer look at the way he has reached where he is tells a different story. Earlier he was no more or less a collective farming worker in a cooperative’s production unit with the assignment in the state-owned, mountainous farm in Phu Cat, to produce pineapples, sugarcanes, and cashew nuts.7 Later, the production was reduced to cashew nuts only, reflecting the changing market value of their produce. All the while, his family livelihood was “secured” by a small land in the mountain, reserved for producing rice and others for self-consumption. Soon after the 1986 Doi Moi reforms were launched, his family took upon itself the responsibility for the entire process of producing farm products within the assigned land, which was about 1.5 hectare. Of the reforms, the directive known as Contract 10 of 1988 is often hailed as the land mark decision in agriculture as it designated families as the production units, and transformed the cooperatives into more a service cooperatives taking care of the distribution of agricultural inputs and outputs. However, as far Mr. N.V.T is concerned, the shift was not so much disruption as reinforcement of what he and his family, with the help from his relatives, had been practicing – family as the most dominant unit of taking care of itself, including production. The 1993 Land Reform and their amendments in 1995 and 2003 formally instituted his land use and other rights over this 1.5 hectare. In the same 1993, when he was only slightly older than 30 years old, under the program 327, the Forest Land Allocation Program which was both a land reclamation and reforestation program, he acquired the right to use additional 7.5 hectare in exchange for 20% of the profit he made from the land to the state. In 2007, the management authority of the state-owned land moved to Phu Cat People’s Committee, he was presented with a choice of leaving the area and of purchasing the land he had cultivated since 1993 for a token sum of cash; he chose the latter. He does not remember how much he needed to pay. In retrospect, Mr. N.V.T. always seized the opportunity to acquire the land use right, and to expand the land. However, what is obvious is that these opportunities were the making of national or local authorities’ changing land policies, and leaving him with little or no room to exercise his own 6 7 Some of the suggestions for the easier transition from one stage to another include small-scale, labor intensive, rural-area-based non-agricultural activities. This addition can be viewed as a serious modification of a Lewis’s dual-economy model. (Mellor, 1986, 67-89) For the specifics of land and forestry policies in this and the following paragraph, see Christ and Kloss (1998) and Vien (2006) Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 100 Farmers in a Developing Country: An Inquiry into Human Insecurity of the Many critical faculties for investment. What mattered to him was the consistency that his family was always the unit for the entire process of production, even though his status changed from a collective farm worker to another as a head of an independent production unit, a family, as prescribed by changing status of the farmland. Even the last opportunity, to acquire the land or leave the land, was not much of a choice of a venturous farmer where he would have to run a cost-gain calculation; it was one between continuing to be a farmer or ceasing to be a farmer. He was the least aware that he was at the second stage and had only one more to move. 4. Risks8 in Farm Land: Insecurity of the Many Raising productivity, therefore, ranks not at the top but among many concerns of the farmers, at best. Their concerns may lie elsewhere and not exclusively in how to motivate themselves to produce more and more efficiently. Given this, Shultz’s point that with the increased productivity, a farmer would no longer need to “work nearly so hard and long” is hardly a blessing. Neither is another observation that a farmer’s increased productivity would make it possible for “his brothers and some of his neighbors [to] move to town to earn their living.”(Shultz, 1964, 1.) “Many suicides are committed around the Tet time,” a casual remark, by an official of Plant Protection Department in Phu Cat, in charge of distributing seeds, fertilizers, pesticides and other agrochemicals, is an unintended testimony that familial intimacy is a value that many farmers wish to protect (Field Notes: March 6, 2009). For them, not having their family members, who have gone to cities for work, visiting home is a serious disruption to their lives. As if to confirm this observation, those whose family members have gone to Ho Chih Minh City are happy to see if their loved ones can come home “even once a year especially if the visit coincides with the Tet.” (Field Notes: March dates in 2004, 2006, and 2010) Besides, they are also all aware that most of those who moved to the cities may not be the more fortunate ones: “No, she does not send us money on a regular basis. She must be busy taking care of herself.” (Field Notes: December 22, 2004 and March 9, 2012.) In a few cases, the remaining family members have not heard from the loved ones in the city “for a long long time” that they “don’t know how they are doing in the city.” (Field Notes: December 22, 2004) These evidence betrays Shultz’s blessing, or for that matter, Lewis’s wish. The discrepancy between the declining contribution of agriculture to GDP and the continuation of large agricultural employment, mentioned above, suggests the presence of a vast number of labor forces with only unstable employment and unsecure basis of livelihood. The “informal sector” is where the surplus labor which the increased productivity has produced in agriculture is lost.9 That the farmers are preoccupied with concerns other than their productivity, however, does not mean that the farmers are irrational – not conscious of their prescribed role, nor ignorant and 8 9 I use the term “risk” in a broader sense than Anthony Giddens (1991) or Urlich Beck (1992) who discusses it in a specific context of modernization (industrialization) where the individuals are caught in the immensely complex web of causes and effects in production system. I call attention here to the various degrees of likelihood that any purposeful behavior is likely to produce unintended results and consequences and/or the consequences in the areas where such consequences may not be expected. For a succinct survey of issues and concepts dealing with risks, see Deborah Lupton, 1999, London and New York, Routledge The issue of the informal sector, and how to identify and measure its presence, has been one of the key development issues since late 1960s. See for example Sethurman, 1976. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 101 Vu Le Thao Chi stubborn – idly sitting by the traditional style of life. If anything, their life confronts them with often difficult decisions to make, precisely because they have more to care about. Their life is highly sensitized as if it were equipped with multi-pronged sensors. Rural life under the pressure of economic growth is full of occasions for catching signals for the sensors. The occasions are for the farmers to re-examine if the past action needs to be altered. The deviation from the past inevitably brings elements of uncertainty into their action, the decision for which, therefore, runs risks of various degrees. In a community where the majority of the residents was born and has spent most of their life without moving, still the importance of education for the younger generation is on the menu that goes along with economic growth policy. Often the primary schools are evaluated on the graduation rate, or scores in the achievement tests of the pupils. The teachers are spearheading the move to improve the school’s standing through their pupils’ academic performance. No special classes are offered for the handicapped children, for example, for such arrangement could “push down the overall performance of the school,” as testified by a principal of a local primary school.(Field Notes: March 13, 2011) Under this overall pressure, having a child performing well at school and having the alternative to go higher and elsewhere still needs to be viewed from more perspectives than that of proud parents. A loss of a farm hand quickly crosses the parents’ mind; the cost of sending and supporting the child away from home is another. Allowing the child to proceed to a higher school is a risky decision for the parents, for it means uncertainty. Mostly with the primary education only, the parents have very little evidence to fall back on to support their decision to push their child to go to a higher school elsewhere. The evidence that a better education assures one a better and easier life is not readily available, with the exception of the school teacher’s encouragement to part with a growing child. The only hard evidence, if any, with which to support their decision, is a simple and familiar fact that the absence of good education may partly explain where they are now. “I don’t want my children to repeat the farmer’s life” is heard from nearly as many farmers as I interviewed. Having a child is also an important occasion requiring the parents to exercise their critical faculties. A well-known “utility” model to explain reproductive behavior inadvertently touches upon the multi-faceted concerns behind the reproductive behavior. Child-bearing, the model explains, fulfills the three basic needs of parents: labor force, entertainment, and future insurance. (Liebenstein, 1974) To put it in an ordinary language, the parents engage in reproduction so that they can be assured of a farm hand, of the comfort of a family life, and of the safety net after their ageing disable themselves to work in the farm land. Consideration on only one of these factors, in other words, does not complete the decision-making of the farmers. The Phu Cat parents have all the markings of Leibenstein’s utility-seekers, but with one element which makes the reproductive decision for the parents that much more complex. Phu Cat is located near a major airport and a gigantic mountain which were targeted for the spraying of the infamous Agent Orange (Dioxin) during the war. Contamination of the area and the water resource was such that the area including Phu Cat has been subjected to large scale medical and other research. The purposes are to determine the extent of co-relations between certain kinds of ailment among the war-time generation residents, and of the younger generations on the one hand, and the direct and/or indirect exposure to the chemicals.10 10 I was part of the Keio-Hanoi Medical University research team between 2004-2008. The team investigated among Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 102 Farmers in a Developing Country: An Inquiry into Human Insecurity of the Many Of the 81 sample farmers, 48 have one or more children whose ailments are suspected to be caused by direct and/or indirect exposure to Agent Orange. Any one or more of their mother, a food chain and underground water is likely to be the carrier of the contaminants. One surprising discovery is that having a child seriously impaired by a birth defect rarely affected the parents’ decision to have more.(Table 2-1). Even more surprising is that having more than one child – multiplying the deterrence effect against having a child— still had very limited effect refraining the parents from having more child. (Table 2-2) Table 2-1 Deterrence Effect of the AO Damage: No of Children after the First Handicapped Child No of Families Phu Cat (48) I 0 11 II 1 child 14 III more than 2 19 na total 4 48 Table 2-2 Deterrence Effect of the AO Damage: No. of Children after the Second Handicapped Child No of Families Phu Cat (48) I 0 5 II 1 child 4 III more than 2 1 na total 10 Two observations by the outsiders may give the impression that the farmers did not exercise their critical thinking in evaluating the risk-ridden situation under which they went ahead with having a child. One is short and to the point. “[The farmers] need to be educated,” A medical doctor from Hanoi Medical University flatly denounced the parents’ ignorance. The other is a little more sympathetic and a little too dramatic, but the message is the same. A former vice-President of Vietnam, Nguyen Thi Binh, recalling the earlier days of Agent Orange research, lamented: All of our returning veterans had a burning desire for children to repopulate our devastated country. When the first child was born with a birth defect, they tried again and again. So many families now have four or five disabled children, raising them without any hope. (Binh, 2003) One more finding, however, may point to a different concern(s) that may have dictated the minds of the parents. Of the 48 families, 26 of them, more than half, stopped having a child after giving birth to a healthy child. These are among the parents who had already one or more of their children suffering from various forms of birth defects. One thing is common to the 26 families that they have already two or more children before they ceased the reproduction. (Table 3) In other words, it was not the fear of having another handicapped child but the awareness of a very usual concern, the financial burden that dictated these unusually fortunate parents. other things “social costs” for the farmers who have at least one family member suspected of Agent Orange-Dioxin contamination. Part of the findings is presented in Michio Umegaki, Vu Le Thao Chi and Tran Duc Phan (2009.) There is no comprehensive account of the damages done by the war time use of Agent Orange and other herbicides. For the outline of the US operation for the use of the chemicals, see Bukingham, 1982. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 103 Vu Le Thao Chi Table 3 No of Children in the AO Families with the Healthy Last Child No of Families Phu Cat (48) 2 children 3 children 4 children 5 or more children Total Total 5 6 6 9 26 The 26 families’ primary concern, as confirmed by them, lies either with how many children they can support or with whether or not having a number of children conform to the unwritten expectation for a “normal” family. Combined with the rest of 48 families, one important observation can be made that the risk of having a handicapped child, the least acceptable consequence of their choice in the eyes of the medical specialists, is secondary to either of the two concerns. One factor needs to be brought in, before conceding to the Hanoi Medical University doctor’s denunciation that the farmers need to be educated on the consequence of the medically questionable choice. Phu Cat is a large rural district where it may take as much as one hour by motorcycle to reach from one end to the other, with a huge mountain range in the middle. The population was 194,000. The certified victims of Agent Orange, including the children and grandchildren of the war generation, were 1857 (Binh Dinh Department of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs, 1999), 0.01% of the whole population, as of 2000. For the medical specialist, the number may represent an alarming frequency of birth defects, traceable to dioxin contamination. In the eyes of the parents, however, the evidence of the correlation is scattered all over Phu Cat and thus is virtually non-existent except within their own families. Their cases of misfortune are isolated. As if to confirm this isolation, they, 46 of the 48, testified that they don’t know other families with the handicapped children. The unmistakable difference between the medical professionals and the Phu Cat farmers lies in the foundations on which they evaluate the risks involved in the reproductive behavior. For the former, the choice is between a high risk of having a handicapped child and the assurance of having no handicapped child. The choice leaves no room for debate. For the latter, however, having no child at all is never a part of alternatives. For them, therefore, the choice is between a likelihood of having a handicapped child and a healthy child. The choice leaves very little room for re-examination. Furthermore, the farmers do have additional evidence that supports their decision for reproduction. They usually see many farmers who have lived in the area as they have, have tried to have children as they have and have healthy children unlike themselves. Their families have been an exception -rare occurrence. They often call it “fate” -- so phan – that they are the exceptionally unfortunate ones. For them, in other words, trying to have a healthy child may be a risk, but it is risk to avoid another, surest, risk of not having a child at all. Besides, the fate may work out to their advantage this time. In short, farmers do exercise their critical thinking facing difficult decisions. The critical difference between them and the professionals such as medical workers and school teachers lies in the fact that every occasion requiring their decision making touches upon integral parts of their being farmers. To follow up with the earlier metaphor of a sensor, the professionals are equipped with single sensor as opposed to the farmers’ multi-pronged sensor. One farmer’s casual comment, which may have passed as a harmless complaint, is symbolic of the burden of such highly sensitized life. “Just so many things I need to take care of like my grandfather and my children. Help my relatives… Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 104 Farmers in a Developing Country: An Inquiry into Human Insecurity of the Many Sometimes, even pigs and cows do get sick.”(Field Notes: Dates in December 2004, March 2005 and August 2006) The comment was a reply to the question following another comment that they did not want their children to repeat what they did. Shultz begins his seminal work, Transformation of Traditional Agriculture, with the now famous line that inducing farmers to produce more and more efficiently is “a rare and difficult art to master.”(Shultz, 1964, vii). Shultz’s statement, resonating with the conventional characterization of farmers as stubborn, fails to recognize the importance of the conditions under which the farmers can concentrate on only the production of wealth from the land. 5. Farmers Re-Examined The degree to which the farmers rely on the professionals for making the right decision at the right time may depend upon how much the farmers need the assurance for the consequences of what they decide. It is a form of insurance that the farmers seek the professionals’ council, and it is also a common practice tested over generations. The majority of the developing countries, and especially in their rural areas, are still in the process of installing the various forms of social safety net. Pension and health insurance, or the financial institutions offering savings and other services are not yet extensive. The overall insurance function that these limited services may offer is yet to be installed or even registered among the majority of the rural residents. The farmers in Phu Cat are not, however, without a form of insurance in addition to the time-tested customs in their villages. When asked how they cope with costly medical emergency, their responses were virtually uniform: “Oh but I know [the village clinic workers] well like my siblings.”(Field Notes: March 12 and 13, 2005, May 28, 2005, August 28, 2006) The clinic workers, especially the “assistant physicians,” who serve as the top aide to the medical doctors, operating out of the village clinics, the only public and outreach offices of the district health center, offer more services than purely medical.11 The point to note is how the farmers interact with these assistant physicians. Farmers interact with them as if they are integral part of farmers’ daily operation. Consequently, their council reaches to the matters beyond medical issues, touching upon nearly all aspects of village’s and farmer’s life from funerals to weddings, from child-bearing to domestic violence. These services that these assistant physicians render are beyond their “job-description” (Field Note: October 29, 2004, September 6, 2010) and may still be no more than a home-made safety net. Their effectiveness hinges upon the reciprocal trust among them, but helps the farmers reduce their uncertainty, thereby influencing farmers’ risky decisions. There is one underside to this predominance of the clinic workers. They are the semi-medical professionals who, because of their limited medical school training, serve as the “first contact point” for the farmers before the medical doctors are brought in. “No, I am not a medical doctor but I help him,” says one not so sheepishly when asked his role. (Field Notes: December 21, 2004, September 9, 2005, and September 6, 2010) Their medical responsibilities are limited to administering the 11 On average, the clinic in a village consists of one medical doctor, one assistant physician, several nurses and one or two mid-wife. Nearly all of these workers are local products. The assistant physician often serves as the de-facto head of the clinic in the absence of the head, a medical doctor, who often travels out of the village for academic, administrative and other “official” duties. He has usually three years, after high school, of medical training, far short of the 6 year-training required for medical doctors, which qualifies them to do just about everything above nurses and below medical doctors. There are 16 such clinics in all of Phu Cat. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 105 Vu Le Thao Chi so-called “over-the-counter” medicines or examining blood pressures or distributing birth control pills. Their casual statement such as “no cure for the Down syndrome,” (Field Notes: May 28, 2005) referring to one of the Agent Orange-induced handicapped children, could carry the weight of a statement that a medical doctor makes and well discourage the parents from seeking further advice or means of re-habilitation. This underside notwithstanding, these clinic workers do play a crucial role in the farmers’ decision making. The clinic workers’ value does not necessarily stems from their limited medical knowledge, but from their thorough and broader knowledge of the family conditions within their jurisdictions and from their ubiquitous presence in the villages. They are familiar with the family affairs so much that even who owns how much to whom or to which bank is part of their knowledge. They are in a strategically unique position to evaluate, and offer and not necessarily impose suggestions, what any signs of change could mean to the individual farmers; they are the intermediaries of information indispensable for the farmers to digest what the information could mean while contemplating especially the actions that may disrupt their previous behavior. Here, the closest notion to this reinforced ability of the farmers may be Amartya Sen’s “capability.” (Sen, 1999, ch. 4) Or in a human security language, especially since 2003 Human Security Now’s addition of the third freedom – freedom to make an informed choice of one’s own (Human Security Commission, 2003) --, the information intermediaries such as these assistant physicians serve as the means of empowering the farmers at crucial junctures of their life. The inquiry into the life of farmers in the transition, especially when the end of the transition is not in sight, thus would have to call attention to the availability of the home-made insurance system, of the intermediaries of information – information on the situation requiring to make important decisions -- which help the farmers customize within their specific life context the suggestions or even encouragement to deviate from the past. Short of having the professionals of a “transitional life”, farmers do rely on the means – like the assistant physicians at community clinics who greatly share farmer’s life -- of bridging the deep fault separating themselves who bear the burden of changing life and those who have the knowledge of what life after transition can be. Research is needed to locate and identify those who, like the assistant physicians in Phu Cat, serve to help both to transcend the fault. References Beck, Ulrich. 1992, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. New Delhi, Sage. Binh, Nguyen Thi. 2003, “An Interview by Guardian”, Guardian, 29 March, 2003. Binh Dinh Department of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs. 1999, “List of AO victims in Binh Dinh Province,” (mimeo) August 20 1999. Buckingham, William A. 1982, Operation Ranch Hand: The Air Force and Herbicides in Southeast Asia, 1961-1971, Washington, D.C., Office of Air Force History. Christ, Herbert and Dirk Kloss. 1998, “Land Use Planning and Land Allocation in Vietnam with Particular Reference to Improvement of its Process in the Social Forestry Development Project Song Da: Consultancy Report,” Social Forestry Development Project Song Da (SFDP), GTZ-Project No. 90.2226.0-031.00 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 106 Farmers in a Developing Country: An Inquiry into Human Insecurity of the Many Field Notes, 2004-2012, is a collection of the in-depth interviews that the author conducted in Phu Cat, Tanh Khe in Da Nang, Kim Bang, southeast of Hanoi, and Savanakhet, Lao PDR, covering the total of over 170 households. I use the section on Phu Cat, 81 families in total for this essay. Figueroa, Mark. 2004, “W. Arthur Lewis versus the Lewis Model: Agricultural or Industrial Development?” The Manchester School, Vol. 72, No. 6 December, pp. 736–750. Giddens, Anthony. 1991, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age. Cambridge, Polity. Glewwy, Paul et.al., eds. 2004, Economic Growth, Poverty, and Household Welfare in Vietnam, Washington D.C., The World Bank. Human Security Commission. 2003, Human Security Now, New York, Human Security Commission. Kerkvliet, Benedict J. Tria. 2005, The Power of Everyday Politics: How Vietnamese Peasants Transformed National Policy, Cornell University Press. Lewis, W. A. 1954. “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour,” The Manchester School, Vol. 22, No. 2, pp. 139–191. _____. 1972, “Reflections on Unlimited Labor”, in L. DiMarco (ed.), International Economics and Development, New York, Academic Press, pp. 75–96. _____. 1980, “Autobiographical Note”, Social and Economic Studies, Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 1–4. Liebenstein, Harvey. 1974, “An Interpretation of the Economic Theory of Fertility: Promising Path or Blind Alley?,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 12, No.2, pp.457-79. Lupton, Deborah. 1999, Risk, London and New York, Routledge. Meier, Gerald M. 2005, Biography of a Subject: An Evolution of Development Economics, New York, Oxford University Press. Mellor, John W. 1986, “Agriculture on the Road to Industrialization,” in J.P.Lewis and V. Kallab, eds., Development Strategies Reconsidered, Washington D.C., Overseas Development Council, pp. 67-89. Phat, Nguyen Tan and Ngyuen Tien Dung. 2011, “Vietnam’s Land Policy in the Transition Period,” Tokyo Jouhou Daigaku Kennkyuu Ronsou, vol. 15, no.1, pp.9-25. Sen, Amartya. 1999, Development as Freedom, New York, Anchor Books. Sethurman, S.V. 1976, “The urban informal sector: concept, measurement and policy,” International Labour Review, Vol. 114, No. 1, July-August, pp69-81. Shultz, Theodore W. 1961, “Investment in Human Capital,” American Economic Review, Vol. 51, No.1, March, pp. 1-17. _____. 1964, Transforming Traditional Agriculture, New Haven, Yale University Press. _____. 1980, “Nobel Lecture: The Economics of Being Poor,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 88, No. 4, pp. 639-651. Todaro, Michael P. 1989, Economic Development in the Third World, (Fourth ed.)New York, Longman. Tung, Nguyen Khac. 1993, “Sideline occupations of peasant households in Vietnam,” The Traditional village in Vietnam, Hanoi, The Gioi Publishers, pp. 369-374. Umegaki, Michio, Vu Le Thao Chi, and Tran Duc Phan. 2009, “Embracing human insecurity: Agent Orange and the legacies of the war in Viet Nam,” in Umegaki et. al.,eds., Human Insecurity in East Asia, Tokyo and New York, United Nations University Press, pp.21-46. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 107 Vu Le Thao Chi Vien, Tran Duc. 2006, “Forestland Management Policies in Vietnam: An Overview,” Center for Agricultural Research and Ecological Studies, mimeo, accessed at: http://www.cares.o rg.vn/webplus/Article/Forestland%20management%20policies%20in%20VietNam%20An%20 Overview.pdf Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 94-108. 108 Journal of Human Security Studies Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.109-123. Human security in the aftermath of March 11th tsunami: different levels of empowerment in provisional shelters in coastal Miyagi Paulo V.Q. SOUSA, Oscar A. GÓMEZ1 Abstract This paper reviews interactions between affected coastal communities and security providers four months after the Great East Japan Earthquake using human security as a tool for analysis. Six questions for human security analysis proposed by Gomez (2011) served for the inquiry: “What are the threats?”; “Security of which values?”; “Whose security?”; “What are the means to provide security?”; “Who is the provider of security?”; “How much security?” Applying such questions (especially the latter three) on 3 communities under different conditions of insecurity in the municipalities of Minamisanriku and Kesennuma enabled us to shed light on the means, providers and calculations (‘How much security’) which aided them most while facing the havoc wreaked by the series of disasters. Interviews with stakeholders at the sites served as valuable input to understand how the communities organized and protected themselves, as well as the means they used to voice their needs effectively to possible security providers. To guarantee the survival and minimum living standards of the victims until a sense of normalcy is regained, we conclude that a high level of communication among security providers is essential, giving way--as much as possible--to an environment where community empowerment takes place, though bearing in mind the effects such empowerment may cause in the community. Moreover, from the perspective of the disaster victims, i.e. people-centeredness within human security, delivery of the necessary security appears more important than the character of the security provider. Keywords: Great East Japan Earthquake, community empowerment, disaster response, shelter, security provider 1. Introduction The 2011 March 11th Great East Japan Earthquake was the strongest earthquake to hit earthquake-prone Japan in recorded history. Despite the thorough preparations Japanese society had undergone in order to deal with strong earthquakes, the unlikely combination of a strong magnitude 9.0 quake, followed by extremely powerful aftershocks and a giant tsunami caused not only extensive damage and loss of lives, but also overwhelmed the response capacity of administrative 1 Sousa is a doctoral candidate at Tohoku University Graduate School of Environmental Studies, Human Security Program, and Gomez is Postdoctoral Fellow, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Visiting Scholar, Graduate School of Global Studies, Doshisha University. Paulo V.Q. SOUSA, Oscar A. GÓMEZ bodies that were supposed to provide the assistance affected populations required. In addition to the loss of lives and destruction of infrastructure, the tsunami also caused a series of nuclear accidents that resulted in the forced evacuation of thousands of people. In the following hours and days after the disaster, Japanese society mobilized vast amounts of resources to guarantee the survival of hundreds of thousands of people that suddenly found themselves without life essentials such as food, water, medicine, means to keep warm in the lingering winter cold, and even housing. For those who had to live in shelters until their damaged houses were fixed, or provisional housing was secured, the disruption of daily life patterns gave rise to diverse threats and challenges. All evacuees should not, however, be dealt with as a homogeneous group. Indeed, differences can be seen in the main drivers of evacuation, conditions of shelters, time spent in shelters, community cohesiveness inside shelters, types of relief/assistance providers and so on. The above-mentioned specificities ask for a human security centered approach when one aims to shed light not only on the threats faced by the vulnerable peoples living in shelters and who was involved in the efforts to counteract the threats, but also how such agents interacted to provide ‘enough’ security from the threats. One of the main criticisms raised when human security is used as a prism through which a situation is analyzed is the blurred ‘concept’ of human security itself. Being the youngest in a family that includes human rights, human needs and human development, human security still lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework that serves as a guide; and yet, as Gasper2 points out, the strength of human security lies on it being a synthesis of human needs, human rights and human development ideas, taking vulnerability as a definite feature of humanity (not only capability), and paying attention to mundane realities of life. For this research, we consider human security to be the condition when and where individuals and communities have the option necessary to avoid or adapt to risks to their basic needs and rights; have the capacity and freedom to exercise these options; and can actively participate in attaining these options3. In order to operationalize the above idea of human security, we will use Gomez’ framework, which lays out the following 6 basic questions: What is the threat? Threats to what values? Whose security? Who is the provider of security? What are the means/instruments to provide security? What calculations are made when providing security?4 We are focusing on three of them, as we will explain in the next section. This paper, which summarizes some of the findings of a still on-going research, presents the cases of 3 shelters in coastal Miyagi Prefecture, and is followed by a discussion. 2. Exploring empowerment and survival The present research is framed in terms of human security5. By doing so we embrace the idea that properly addressing whatever threats menace humans is the goal of security, despite--though influenced by--the existing means and providers of traditional security. Particularly, we focus on one 2 3 4 5 Lecture delivered during September 2011 Human Security Summer School at Tohoku University. The lecture was closely related to Gasper, 2010 GECHS, 1999 Gomez, 2011 UNDP, 1994 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 110 Human security in the aftermath of March 11th tsunami: different levels of empowerment in provisional shelters in coastal Miyagi of the main contributions to the operationalization of the idea advanced by the Commission on Human Security in its final report: the necessity to combine protection and empowerment6. This guiding principle may sound straightforward and neat on paper, yet little of the subsequent literature on human security has engaged in documenting the insights of this balance of strategies in practice. The scale of the March 11th tragedy offers a great opportunity to add empirical observations to the operationalization of the protection-empowerment principle. First, the extent of the initial havoc wreaked by the disaster was wide enough to challenge the capacity of the established local disaster response strategies. During the peak of the emergency, about five hundred thousand people were displaced, while over five hundred kilometers of coast were washed out and required careful search for survivors7. Then the emergence of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant crisis drastically changed the conditions of the relief efforts, threatening to compromise the viability of the operation by changing the expected set of priorities. Under these circumstances, multiple actors stepped forward to help those under grave danger and thus supplement the perceived shortage of protection. Indeed, Quarantelli affirms that the magnitude of a disaster could be inferred from the types of organizations taking part in the relief/recovery operations8. In his work, he describes four types of organizations that may come into play during a disaster: besides regular agents such as firefighters or the military, organizations such as hospitals can extend their activities beyond their normal places of action; other organizations such as companies can venture into relief activities where their prowess could be useful—an example of which we will see later, a company distributing water—while new organizations may also spring out of a perceived necessity to act. The multiple harms followed by the complex March 11th disaster made necessary the action of all these types of organizations, which we associate with security providers and this work uses henceforth as the units of analysis. In accordance with this typology, we will start by focusing on people taking care of themselves, and thus the organizations that emerge after a disaster. These we associate to the ultimate nature of empowerment, because they represent the closest thing to what can be called self-provision of security. While research settings rarely distinguish between different categories of providers, we document the cases of three communities isolated by the disaster, following their struggle to survive, to increasingly satisfy their needs by re-connecting to other networks of providers9, and gradually to move into the phase of post-disaster reconstruction/revival. The distance from each of the three case study sites to major city centers (i.e. Sendai) was in itself a pre-existing disadvantage for relief operations, which were further hindered by infrastructure damage caused by the disaster. Additionally, only one of the sites was considered to be a shelter in the official disaster response manuals; the others became so after the tsunami waves destroyed many of the previously designated shelters. Given that relief operations chiefly expand from major centers, remote areas had to quickly develop survival strategies to compensate for the expected delay of external relief. We assume that the skills, tactics, hindering and facilitating factors emerging through these struggles for survival correlate to the level of empowerment of those communities, and set forth on documenting their different experiences. In sum, from the possible basic questions that any study on security addresses, we will concentrate on two, and tangentially address a third concern. The first is making clear what the 6 7 8 9 CHS, 2003 Kahoku Shinpo, 2011 Quarantelli, 1993 Raab and Kenis, 2009 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 111 Paulo V.Q. SOUSA, Oscar A. GÓMEZ means of security in each case were, describing the emergence of shelters and the situation around them. The second question is who the provider of security was, how different types of actors started to interact, and the challenges faced during the initial period – around the first hundred days – after the disaster. To a lesser degree, we will comment about the calculations behind these means and providers of security, underlying some of the ethical problems that arose from the whole process, but we will stop short after the description, leaving it to further studies to reflect upon the implications of our research. In order to illuminate empowerment and its limits on a disaster setting, we adopt a domestic, personal approach10, based on semi-structured interviews in each location, the first a hundred days after the earthquake, and then a second interview eight months later. The methodology is complemented with primary data from different media, as well as personal experience of the disaster—both authors lived in Sendai city during and after the disaster. It is worth noting that we do not pretend to extrapolate from our observations blunt generalizations about what human in/security was like just after the still unfolding March 11th tragedy. That may require systematic analysis of more cases, and extensive fieldwork, which was not politically, practically, or even ethically feasible in the moment when the core of the project took place. Yet, as several archive projects start to appear, we would like to advance one of the multiple options we have for further research, to frame the study of the catastrophe before the experience is lost in memory, or returns to the back seat of “normal life”. 3. Background on Minamisanriku town and Kesennuma city Minamisanriku (Figure 1.) is a town created out of a merger between the towns of Shizugawa and Utatsu in the Heisei Era Great Municipal Merger of 2005. It is located on the northern coast of Miyagi Prefecture, and until the March 11th disaster the town had an estimated population of 17,666, with fishery as its main industry11. Due to extensive media coverage, Minamisanriku became one of the symbols of the destruction caused by the tsunami. 16m high waves destroyed as much as 62% of the infrastructure and, as of June 22 2011, caused the deaths of 542 people and disappearance of another 664 12 . Such extensive damage occurred in a town which had been known all over Japan for having good defenses against tsunamis. It boasted a 6 meter high storm surge barrier surrounding Shizugawa Bay, Figure 1. Map of Miyagi Prefecture thorough evacuation protocols and yearly community drills, all as a result of the destruction caused by the 1960 tsunami caused by the Chile earthquake. 10 11 12 Pyles, Kulkarni and Lein, 2008 Minamisanriku Town Office, 2011 Kahoku Shinpo, 2011 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 112 Human security in the aftermath of March 11th tsunami: different levels of empowerment in provisional shelters in coastal Miyagi Kesennuma city in its present form can also be traced to a municipal merger that occurred in September 2009; until then there were two separate municipalities, Kesennuma city proper to the north and Motoyoshi town. Until the March 11th disaster, it boasted a thriving fishing industry which, in combination with related industries, employed as much as 85% of its 74000 inhabitants13. Case 1- Baba Nakayama Life Center According to interviewees’ reports, after learning about the tsunami warning, as many as 200 people (including children) of the 400 inhabitants from the village areas of Nakayama, Baba and Konuma went to higher ground and gathered around the Baba Nakayama Life Center (hereafter BNLC), a community hall located in the southern part of Natari (Fig.2). From their position they were able to see the tsunami washing away the road that connects the area to the old Utatsu town, flooding the Figure 2. Baba Nakayama Map areas of Konuma and Onuma to the extent that the peninsula became an island. Once the waters receded, they could see they had become isolated from the outside world. Despite the initial shock, evacuees were able to quickly organize themselves; search teams were formed a few minutes after the waters receded to look inside still-standing houses for blankets and kerosene, and look through debris for cars and refrigerator that were washed away to secure as much food, water, and gasoline as possible. As they gathered all the evacuees and supplies in BNLC, they calculated that supplies would last for about 5 days. On the first 24 hours, through cell phone e-mail, most evacuees were able to confirm the safety of relatives living in the same community but that for whatever reasons had not evacuated to BNLC. However, after the batteries that fed cellular phone antennas had run out, the evacuees were left completely isolated14. As days passed by without any contact from the outside world, the evacuees’ physical and mental health started to deteriorate under the stressful conditions. BNLC is a gathering hall of about 260m2 which ended up having to hold 200 evacuees, among which about 70 were senior citizens older than 70 years old15. During night time, most men would leave the shelter for the elder, women and children, and face even colder nights in partially destroyed houses or cars. It was in such dire conditions that they recalled an old path through the mountains that, despite not being used for many years, could connect them to road 45, the main local road. On March 14th they started to re-open the road using very rudimentary tools or even bare hands so that cars could pass through. The first contact with outside people happened on Wednesday 16th in a very unusual 13 Kesennuma City Hall, 2011 The whole town lost electricity immediately after the quake, then it was reestablished in Baba and Nakayama only on May 6th. 15 According to the Sphere Project and the UNHCR Emergency Handbook (2011), which set forth standardized minimum levels of assistance to be provided in humanitarian responses, evacuees should have a minimum of 3.5 to 5m2 of covered area as shelter. 14 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 113 Paulo V.Q. SOUSA, Oscar A. GÓMEZ manner: from the back road they had reopened, they saw a GPS-equipped car from a relief organization stuck in the snow that needed assistance. It was only after this fortunate encounter that the desperately needed supplies, as well as information started to be delivered. Knowing now that the central area of Minamisanriku had also received a devastating blow by the tsunami, the evacuees at the center were very uncertain of their future, to the extent that they were accepting any supplies without any sort of control for some 10 days to 2 weeks. After this period, because they were now facing problems of supplies storage space and quality of supplies (e.g. worn out clothes), they attempted to organize a controlling system for the incoming supplies. However, they did not have a computer to organize all the information, so they continued receiving and accepting supplies that did not necessarily match their needs. Community leadership talked to volunteer organizations and voiced their needs, but at the same time the organizations would also talk to evacuees who were not in leadership positions. There was no control over which organizations were responsible for attending what needs, so there was frequent overlapping. The situation drastically changed on April 11th, when NTT and Softbank telephone companies reached the area and set up equipments that allowed for the shelter to have access to internet, also donating a laptop and a battery. It was then that an evacuee was able to set up a blog and transmit through the Internet the situation in the shelter, their needs, as well as create a program to manage the incoming supplies. Another strategy was to use the e-sales site Amazon.com to create a “wish list” of the BNLC. By posting some of their needs and updating on their blog when such supplies arrived, they created an efficient and transparent supplies management system. As interactions with volunteer organizations and companies became more efficient, conditions in the shelter improved considerably. Between April 26th and May 10th, Doctors Without Borders constructed an annex to serve as a shelter for the female evacuees; private companies brought in chemical toilets and portable bathtubs; other voluntary organizations guaranteed a steady supply of food, water, and diverse services such as hair cutting and massage. According to interviewees, until the date of our first interview—i.e. by the end of June—the shelter had been visited by city or prefecture officials only once, in order to debate with evacuees issues related to settlement of provisional housing. This lack of official visits created a very negative feeling within the community towards first and foremost the major. The local government was overwhelmed by the magnitude of the damage, and given the distance from the City Hall to BNLC16, visits to this community were not easy; the local political context made this absence more notorious. Minamisanriku mayor Jin Sato had previously served as the mayor of Shizugawa town. There was a feeling among evacuees that because of his political roots in Shizugawa, Mr. Sato focused the efforts for recovery in Shizugawa, leaving the area of Utatsu in second place. However, because BNLC had achieved a relatively stable situation as a shelter, interviewees pointed out that the community was independent from any governmental help except for the reestablishment of electricity. Another point worth noting is the virtual lack of interaction with other shelters. Especially after the establishment of the internet blog and the inpour of targeted help, conditions in BNLC were far better than that of other shelters, even those nearby. This, however, was not translated into any sort of scheme to share supplies with shelters in direr need. They did not approach other shelters, and other shelters did not approach them. Finally, because most of the families that were living in the shelter moved to official 16 Baba Nakayama village is about 12km away by car from the City Hall Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 114 Human security in the aftermath of March 11th tsunami: different levels of empowerment in provisional shelters in coastal Miyagi provisional housing from July 4th until July 10th, as of July 10th the center has ceased to be an official shelter. The village leadership has expressed their will to continue keeping the network with the volunteer organizations and the companies that provided goods and services on a pro bono basis, mainly through their blog17, but they were still uncertain about the ways through which such a network could be maintained. Case 2 - Hotel Kan’yo Hotel Kan’yo is located on road 45 about 2.5 km south of Minamisanriku City Hall, facing Shizugawa Bay (Fig.3). According to the hotel general manager Ms. Abe, in addition to 120 hotel staff, there were about 110 customers checked-in and another group of 50 people waiting outside for the check-in procedures (which generally starts at 15:00) when the earthquake struck. Following their Figure 3. Hotel Kan'yo Map earthquake drills, the staff gathered all customers at the entrance of the hotel (which is located on the 5th floor, at the same level of the highway), and after the tsunami warning was announced, all customers (including those who had not checked in yet) were moved to a nearby building managed by the hotel on even higher ground. At the same time, people who had fled from the tsunami started to arrive at the hotel; once the main waves receded, a total of 350 people were taken into the hotel, which had suffered heavy damage on the two first floors. At the hotel, the staff realized that while there were enough food and blankets for everybody, they only had an 80-ton water tank. Acting according to disaster drills held periodically, the hotel staff gathered all evacuees in the lobby around 4:30 pm and explained how they would allocate rooms, meal times, and emphasized the importance of saving water. Later that day, the police came to the hotel to check on the situation, and were told about the needs of the hotel. The hotel staff was also informed that some 13 km inland in the city of Tome there was a support center where they could find some medicine, but no water; the road connecting Tome to Minamisanriku had been heavily damaged and was full of debris, so people had to walk to get there. According to Mrs. Abe, all the staff was very united in their sense of duty of catering for the safety of the evacuees, and they were able to a great extent to keep everybody calm, despite the lack of means to check the safety of their own relatives. This situation continued for some 4 days, until the SDF was able to reopen the road between Minamisanriku and Tome. The hotel then organized busses for the customers to return to Sendai, and 7 days after the earthquake, the majority of customers had left the hotel. The hotel staff also started to leave the hotel to check on their houses and the safety of their dear ones. Most staff ended up returning to the hotel after confirming that their houses had been damaged or washed away, or that relatives had lost their lives; the hotel was a safe place and it also provided them with some of the mental and spiritual support they needed, as well as support for their physical needs. People who 17 http://babanakayama.client.jp Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 115 Paulo V.Q. SOUSA, Oscar A. GÓMEZ had run away from the tsunami and taken shelter in the hotel also stayed. The first external supplies only arrived about 20 days after the quake, in the form of rice balls for 30 people provided by the SDF; such supplies were delivered just once, and until the end of March, the hotel basically had to rely on its own resources; they were not able to use their normal business networks either, as most of their supply chain had been heavily affected. By the end of March, the scarcity of water was becoming critical, and after negotiations with the local authorities, it was agreed that the company Central Jidosha (a Toyota group company) was to supply the hotel with 20 tons of water every day brought by a tank truck. Until April 20 the hotel was housing most of its 200 staff, as well as some 50 people who had lost their houses, and the amount of water supplied gradually increased to 80 tons/day. Through her conversations with victims, Mrs. Abe noticed that many residents were leaving Minamisanriku, as conditions in designated shelters and economic perspectives were bleak. She felt that while the direct effect of the tsunami on the city was large enough in terms of lost of lives and property, if the remaining population continued leaving the city, Minamisanriku would cease to exist. At the same time, city officials were aware of the difficulties and uncomfortable situation evacuees were facing in the shelters, and that it would take at least 6 months for the completion of enough temporary housing for all evacuees. This led to an agreement between local authorities and local hotels that had not been heavily damaged, by which hotels would take in evacuees and provide them with 3 meals a day in exchange for a daily payment of 5000 yen provided by the government. Mrs. Abe offered to take in 600 people, and she specifically requested to host evacuees with children, as well as those who had enterprises that had been destroyed by the tsunami; her intention was to try to keep in the city those she felt could play a role in the reconstruction effort. These 600 evacuees were taken in on May 20th, and added to the hotel staff and reconstruction workers, about 900 people were now staying in the hotel. Given the increased number of people in the hotel, the need to keep an acceptable level of hygiene, and the higher temperatures of summer18, increasing the availability of water became a pressing issue. Despite intense negotiations with local authorities, Hotel Kan’yo was not able to increase the amount of water brought in by tank trucks. According to Mrs. Abe, local authorities stressed that they were working as fast as possible to restore water supply in the city, and that increasing the number of water tank trucks visits to the hotel would be unfair to other shelters in Minamisanriku that were also suffering from lack of water. In order to increase the availability of water, Mrs. Abe then turned to her private network, and was able to get in touch with private companies and with Nippon Foundation19, who joined forces and agreed to provide, free of charge, a system that turned salt water into drinkable water. When Mrs. Abe presented the idea to local authorities, they were resistant to it; not only were they not sure who should take responsibility for installing such equipment, but the preeminence of equality in the reestablishment of water over prioritizing certain areas was also raised. Despite such resistance, Mrs. Abe went ahead and had the system installed on June 27th, increasing the availability of fresh water in the hotel to 160 tons per day. Toilets could then be flushed, and the air-conditioning system could also be used20. 18 Summer average highs are around 17 Celsius, but it is important to note that the previous summer in Japan was particularly long and hot, with record highs of 36 degrees Celsius, which may explain this anxiety. 19 Nippon Foundation is a private, non-profit grant-making organization whose mission is to direct Japanese motorboat racing revenue into philanthropic activities and assistance for humanitarian work in Japan and overseas. 20 Mrs. Abe also pointed out that in her conversations with the private companies and The Nippon Foundation, she found out that as early as the end of March, they had offered their services and machineries, free of charge, to many Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 116 Human security in the aftermath of March 11th tsunami: different levels of empowerment in provisional shelters in coastal Miyagi Once the news that Hotel Kan’yo had increased their availability of water had spread through the city, many citizens started to demand that local authorities speeded up the re-establishment of water services, to the extent that on the first week of July, a petition with 1000 signatures was presented to the authorities. As of August 15th, all families that had stayed in the hotel moved to provisional housing. During its service as a shelter, the hotel management and volunteers set up a school within its facilities that served more than 70 children aged 10 to 17. By becoming a gathering place for local and outside stakeholders in the relief and reconstruction phases, the hotel has taken an important role in the discussions with local authorities for the reconstruction efforts of the city. Case 3 - Seiryouin Temple Seiryouin Temple (Sotoshu Hiraiso Seiryouin Temple) is a temple located in the old Motoyoshi town (Fig. 4), presently a part of Kesennuma city. On the first 2 nights after the tsunami, between 300 and 350 people went to the temple looking for shelter as community centers and schools located in more coastal areas were either heavily damaged or completely washed away by the tsunami. The temple could only hold 31 people, so the remaining had to stay in the vicinity in cars. On Figure 4. Seiryouin Temple Map March 13th, a community leader went to the city hall of Kesennuma to have the temple registered as a shelter. During the first 5 days, however, survivors had to rely on themselves to guarantee food and blankets; it was only on March 16th that SDF first brought supplies by helicopters, including 350 food provisions. From March 20th, in addition to food provision, SDF also started to fill on a daily basis a 1-ton water tank located in the temple, the main local road (road 45) had been reopened, and the first contacts with Shanti Volunteer Association 21 , a Tokyo based relief organization of the same religious group as that of the temple, had been established. A few days later, other volunteer organizations (as well as individuals) started to come in more noticeable numbers to offer their services. During this time, cultural events such as music concerts organized by the SDF started to take place, and their effect in lifting the spirits of the evacuees was highly regarded by all interviewees. The shelter leadership pointed out, however, that as the days passed by, the shelter was in dire need of manpower to manage not only the incoming supplies, but also the volunteers that came individually to offer help. As April started, the shelter leadership started to encourage evacuees to become independent again, and as records on the number of food provisions brought in by the SDF show, the number of 21 cities affected by the tsunami that were suffering from lack of water, but only Ishinomaki had accepted the offer. Shanti Volunteer Association started as a volunteer organization that provided relief operations and mobile library services to Cambodian refugee camps in the early 1980’s. As the organization grew in size, operations expanded to cover relief operations in different parts of Asia, as well as during the earthquakes Hanshin-Awaji (Kobe) in 1997 and Niigata Chuetsu in 2004, both in Japan. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 117 Paulo V.Q. SOUSA, Oscar A. GÓMEZ people relying on the shelter for food started to decrease from mid April (on April 10th, 267 food provisions, on April 30th, 132). According to other interviewees, the process was neither forceful nor caused any sort of embarrassment. By the second half of that month, Shanti Volunteer Association set an office in the temple to serve as a coordination base for their relief activities in Kesennuma city, so a high level of coordination with the temple and shelter leadership was obtained. According to some interviewees, the experience of the association in disaster response was fundamental for the performance exhibited by the association in the temple; they swiftly coordinated with the community leadership, learning about the needs of the community (or individuals in the community) in a dynamic way, and through an internal decision process, decided whether they could help with the needs or not. Another role played by Shanti is that of a middleman between the government and community in terms of providing assistance to victims in having their (legal) rights secured, i.e. help in filling out application forms for receiving financial support from the government. Their initial commitment period in Motoyoshi is of 2 years, after which an activity assessment report and fund availability will define their continuing presence in the area. Through some interviews, however, we learned of a different stance between the community leadership and other community members in issues related to recovery; for fishermen who lost most or all of their fishing tools, once the survival of the locals was guaranteed, most of the effort should be done in recovering the capacity of fishermen to fend for themselves economically. On the other hand, while acknowledging the need to recover the economic capacity of fishermen, community leadership was also prioritizing the allocation of resources to guarantee the reconstruction of physical infrastructure that would allow for the community to meet and thus protect the “community cohesion”. This situation can help shed some light on the reason behind the ambivalent view community leadership had towards some of the NGO’s acting in the field promoting projects to increase the economic security of some of the locals. Such projects generally included creating a level of empowerment to some individuals, a noble and welcome action, but it also means interference in the social balance of the community. As one interviewee pointed out, “the average age of local fishermen is 50 years or more, for most of their lives their identity in the community has been that of a fisherman. When an outside NGO promotes projects to help the community, invariably some community members will be better off than others, and this breaks a many-generations old traditional social balance. Some people don’t like it. But we are not that young anymore, and we can’t wait that much longer. If I can do any other work, I will accept it” 4. Discussion - interaction between traditional and non-traditional providers Through the descriptions of these three cases, we have attempted to present a picture of the situations threatening the survival of communities right after March 2011. In particular, we focused on the actors that assumed the role of providers, as well as on the means to provide relief and transitional stability. It is important to note the actual appearance of all the types of providers described by Quarantelli 22 . The emphasis on isolated communities offers insights about the emergence of 22 Quarantelli, 1993; 1997 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 118 Human security in the aftermath of March 11th tsunami: different levels of empowerment in provisional shelters in coastal Miyagi organizations who themselves provide their own security—which we associate with empowerment. Some actors, such as the Toyota group company, ventured in providing water, while hotels and developing-country oriented organization expanded their usual work to cover the needs generated by the disaster. Such emphasis in our narrative may seem to downplay the role of the established security providers, which is not our intention. Their performance has been appropriately prized nationally and internationally. Rather, the cases are intended to show the magnitude of the stresses experienced, and how solutions do not necessarily have to pass through established providers in order to accomplish its objective—i.e. human security. In each of the sites, the main means used to achieve security were different; in BNLC, it was the preexistent communal cohesion and entrepreneurship of its leadership that guaranteed survival in the first week after the disaster. Such qualities were further strengthened when the community received the necessary IT tools, giving it more ability to improve the conditions of the shelter and interact with authorities, NGOs and private companies to guarantee the survival of the community in the same area, i.e. during the reconstruction and revival phases after the disaster. In this sense, it is worth taking note of the fact that the community was able to use Amazon’s “wish-list” feature as an effective “market solution” to the provision of ever changing needs. Issues on the coordination of multiple inputs were at the beginning a problem, but later the organization started being able to control this flow. The whish-list approach offers an appealing option to the difficult task of allocating relief goods on a widely dispersed area—though it depends on the robustness of the IT infrastructure. It offers providers the ability to assess the urgency of different communities, which otherwise is done through a cautious contact with affected populations. In Seiryo temple, the means to achieve security for the evacuees in the shelter was the relative smooth interaction with local authorities and with the religious organization Shanti. Having two solid providers of security to rely on may be one of the reasons why the shelter leadership seemed to have had the least proactive role among the 3 shelter leaderships—i.e. presenting the picture of a somehow passive organization. The case of Hotel Kan’yo is unique in the sense that it played the role of two types of shelter, namely that of an emergency shelter (akin to BNLC and Seiryo temple), and that of a “second-phase” shelter (a provisional shelter with better conditions for evacuees to wait in while official provisional housing was secured). This is mainly because it is more of an extended organization than an emerging one. During these two stages of action, the hotel management used its entrepreneurship and business network to guarantee the improved living conditions of the evacuees it took in, even when that meant being in conflict with local authorities. While securing the needs of evacuees during the relief operations generally takes the form of provision of life essentials and (on a second phase) economic security, one must not overlook the effect of communal cohesion in providing psychological security for evacuees who, though at times being themselves security providers, have lost dear ones and all material possessions. Here the vision of community, as composed by different kinds of members, played an important role. During our interviews with evacuees, all of them mentioned how communal cohesion and a ‘never give up mentality’ were the only assets they had to start their lives all over again. In sum, from the point of view of the affected populations, “Who is the provider of security?” is a question whose answer is not as important as the fact that security in its broadest meaning is achieved as soon as possible. However, on the context of many more communities under stress, Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 119 Paulo V.Q. SOUSA, Oscar A. GÓMEZ entrepreneurship could have a political impact. Given the scope and complexity of the challenges caused by the March 11th disaster, traditional and non-traditional actors were in a situation where swift and smooth cooperation was called for; cooperation was un/successful in different levels. At Seiryo Temple, cooperation between security providers seemed to have achieved a level of success not seen in Minamisanriku. More studies are necessary in order to have a detailed explanation for this, but from the interview conducted we can elicit two factors. First, the administrative body of Minamisanriku was heavily damaged by the tsunami. Mayor Sato barely survived the giant waves that killed some 30 senior staff and washed away the city hall. Once the waves receded, he was faced with the daunting task of caring for the safety of more than 9000 evacuees in various shelters spread out in the city. Secondly, the same egalitarian social characteristic that gives birth to communal cohesion seems to have hampered efforts to define priorities for the allocation and distribution of resources necessary for guaranteeing security for the evacuees. However, to take prioritizing of resources allocation for relief and recovery as the one and only way to proceed in such a complex situation could also have unforeseen developments. It is hardly possible to argue against the attempts of Hotel Kan’yo to guarantee more water; such extra-resources did not come at the expense of other refugees. When looking at the situation in Seiryo Temple, however, the picture becomes more uncertain. Many smaller NGOs involved in recovery operations were already active while the temple still sheltered evacuees, and the work done by them had been meet with mixed views, as they attempt to empower individuals by helping them develop their entrepreneur ideas. Empowering individuals can be seen as a break in the balance of an otherwise ‘egalitarian’ communal life. As it has been made evident during this discussion, different kinds of calculations take place and define the nature and range of the security provision. Perhaps the case of Hotel Kan’yo is the one to offer some of the most interesting insights. According to the Sphere Project, the minimum supply of water per individual to meet his survival needs varies between 7.5 liters and 15 liters per day, depending on climate, individual physiology, and social and cultural norms23. Before the disaster, data from the Japanese Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare showed that the average water consumption in Japanese households is about 300 liters per capita per day. Even though Hotel Kan’yo had the minimum water requirements to guarantee the survival of the 600 evacuees it sheltered, it could not fulfill its role as a second-phase shelter where conditions were supposed to be better. Notwithstanding this need, the political calculations of the established security provider menaced to hinder the application of available solutions. We do not have all the factors that were considered when dealing with this issue, since we only have the view of one of the sides. More important, it is not the intention to attribute any responsibility to the local government because of its position. In fact, one important characteristic of studying security instead of justice is that the emphasis is on the people and their actual wellbeing, not on finding any wrongdoer. It seems certain that the efforts of the hotel management to increase water supply to a level closer to the one before the disaster, improving hygiene and comfort, were indeed an attempt to provide a sense of normalcy and improved psychological security essential for the evacuees to start dealing with the devastating blow of losing relatives and all material possessions in a matter of minutes. In this sense, securing 23 Sphere Project, 2011 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 120 Human security in the aftermath of March 11th tsunami: different levels of empowerment in provisional shelters in coastal Miyagi access to more water had more to do than securing survival; it had to do with securing the dignity24 and a level of psychological wellbeing essential for the evacuees to start about the business of rebuilding their lives. Another observed calculation that may deserve further attention is the determination of how much help was needed. In the first stage of the emergency, emerging organizations for self-provision affected by uncertainty and inexperience are not sure of how much they need, which most probably will result in over demand. Other providers act on nothing but the reported needs or even act without knowing what those needs are. Different strategies to determine the need may emerge, as making circumstantial judgments on the veracity of the needs expressed, or may depend on factors different to the needs of the populations, as presented by Benini et al.25 Moreover, even if there are minimum standards, on the context the distribution of goods it becomes more problematic. Such a view entails a centralized provision of security, which is not the case on a large magnitude disaster26—let alone they say little about what to do with extra resources, or whether the needs of communities with different lifestyles can be matched. Successful emerging organizations of affected communities might result in imbalance on the flow of help that may not be redistributed, as was the case in BNLC. While the consequentialist approach that lies behind human security—or at least our view of it—acknowledges a premium on this decentralized, overlapping, multi-actor strategy of security, that does not mean that improvements on the performance are not desirable. In other words, although efficiency in the use of resources is not the goal, necessary or even desirable27, that does not mean that once the goal of survival is assured, it could not influence the management of future disasters. Finally, the conception of security evolves as communities move into other phases of the post disaster, in which case the human security focus could be not the best way to approach the situation. Providers that guaranteed survival on the first moments may hinder the process of deciding the long-term plans, as the Seiryouin Temple appears to indicate. A clear movement in a direction beyond human security emerges when priorities and options start to be diverse, with a stronger political significance. Thereon, assessing human needs may be a better strategy to reestablish welfare systems, as well as allowing human rights advocacy to cover overlooked problems and using human development to motivate a common vision for the future. 5. Conclusions The 3 case studies presented here give a glimpse of how certain communities affected by the tsunami in Miyagi Prefecture responded to sudden challenges such as meeting survival needs (water, food, and shelter) and the provision of psychological security for people who lost, in a matter of minutes, relatives, friends, and in some cases all material possessions. The cases also showed the interactions of such communities with other ‘more organized’ actors, such as government bodies, relief and reconstruction NGOs, private companies engaging in volunteer relief/reconstruction 24 There was a strong sense of indignity in having to go to the river (almost on a daily basis) and wash clothes, being able to shower only twice a week and having to go to chemical toilets outside the hotel. This indignation was directed not at the hotel, but at the government for the apparent slow speed in reestablishing water until the time of the first interview late June. 25 Benini et al., 2009 26 Quarantelli, 1993 27 Hutter, 2011; Quarantelli, 1993 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 121 Paulo V.Q. SOUSA, Oscar A. GÓMEZ activities, pointing out the reasons for the different levels of success in guaranteeing security. While it has not been our aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of what human security was like in the first 100-or-so days after the tsunami hit the affected areas we believe empowerment to be a fundamental condition for a high level of human security in the form defined by GECHS. Especially in a situation as complex as the one caused by the tsunami where actors traditionally associated with security provision are not capable of functioning normally, we believe that as long as actors are able to satisfy people needs, they should have a room during the emergency phase of the disaster. Cooperation and efficiency are desired characteristics, but only once survival is assured and populations in need are reached in the shortest time, even if this means disturbing pre-disaster patterns. We believe that through this work we have contributed to the furthering of the human security concept in both theory and practice; theoretically, we have shown how human security is an effective lens through which a disaster situation can be analyzed. By describing who the actors involved in providing security are and their interactions, what means they use to provide security, and what are their calculations when providing such security, we were able to see interactions of factors that would not have been obvious under different lenses. For the practice of human security, our cases have shown that while the promotion of empowerment is often shown in the literature to be a desirable asset of communities, attention has to be given to the relation between empowerment and (preexistent) community cohesion. Finally, we hope this work will inspire other researchers to further explore the possibilities of using human security as a guide when analyzing situations of populations at risk, or even elaborate and revise some of the suggestion advanced from the three cases described to similar situations. References Benini, A., Conley, C., Dittemore, B., & Waksman, Z. 2009. “Survivor needs or logistical convenience? Factors shaping decisions to deliver relief to earthquake-affected communities, Pakistan 2005–06,” Disasters: 33(1): 110–131. Commission on Human Security. 2003. Human Security Now. New York: United Nations. Gasper, Des. 2010. “The Idea of Human Security,” Karen O’Brien, Asuncion Lera St.Clair and Berit Kristoffersen eds. Climate Change, Ethics and Human Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 23-46. GECHS. 1999. Global environment change and human security: GECHS science plan. IHDP:Bonn Gomez, Oscar A. 2011. “Beyond Securitization: Theoretical and Practical Elements for the Operationalization of Human Security,” PhD Dissertation, Tohoku University, Sendai. Hutter, G. 2011. “Organizing social resilience in the context of natural hazards: a research note,” Natural Hazards. doi:10.1007/s11069-010-9705-4. Kahoku Shinpo. 2011. The Great East Japan Disaster Full Record—Report from the disaster area (Higashi Nihon Daishinsai Zenkiroku—Hisaiichi kara no hokoku). Sendai: Kahoku Shinpo. KESENNUMA. 2012. Introducing the city. (Shi no shyokai) http://www.city.kesennuma.lg.jp/www/toppage/0000000000000/APM03000.html accessed on 03/08/2012. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 122 Human security in the aftermath of March 11th tsunami: different levels of empowerment in provisional shelters in coastal Miyagi MINAMISANRIKU. 2012. Data on the city. (Machi no deta) http://www.town.minamisanriku.miyagi.jp/modules/about/index.php accessed on March 8, 2012. Pyles, L., Kulkarni, S., and Lein, L. 2008. “Economic Survival Strategies and Food Insecurity,” Journal of Social Service Research: 34(3): 43-53. Quarantelli, E. L. 1993. “Organizational response to the Mexico City earthquake of 1985: Characteristics and implications,” Natural Hazards: 8(1): 19-38. Quarantelli, E. L. 1997. “Ten criteria for evaluating the management of community disasters,” Disasters: 21(1): 39–56. Raab, J., and Kenis, P. 2009. “Heading Toward a Society of Networks: Empirical Developments and Theoretical Challenges,” Journal of Management Inquiry: 18(3): 198-210. Sphere Project. 2011. The Sphere Project Handbook 2011: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. London: Practical Action. United Nations Development Program. 1994. Human Development Report: New Dimensions of Human Security. New York: UNDP. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 109-123. 123 Journal of Human Security Studies Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.124-143. THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT Aleksandra Babovic1 Abstract In the last few decades, a conventional public law has been changing with the inclusion of individuals as its subjects, the creation of criminal tribunals and the ICC. With the universal mission to punish and prevent the worst atrocities and provide a safe environment in conflict vulnerable territories, the ICC deserves recognition as a project aimed at human security. The question that remains is to what extent did the ICC reconcile the universality of human security demands and States' sovereignty concerns? Which one is best served? Has the concept of sovereignty been transformed as a result? The article will argue that in every single aspect of its activity, the ICC faces a critical dilemma when making justice while protecting States' interests. The ICC represents institutional innovation that consolidates the international criminal customary law, builds proper criminal procedure and removes some obstacles posed by the sovereignty screen. As these developments are grounded in the pre-existing international law, the ICC does not pose a fundamental threat to national sovereignty; it rather broadens the reach of national criminal justice. Tools conferred to the court contain elements that strongly reflect the States' interests and this could in turn have a negative effect on its mission objectives. Dependent on States' willingness to cooperate and political opportunism, the Court of the last resort offers partial and selective answers to human security demands. Establishing effective and equally applied instruments of human security while preserving the present nature of States' sovereignty is equal to “squaring the circle”.Although the concept of human security challenges States' sovereignty, the ICC did not transform it. Finally, the ICC has to be considered as part of a broader international criminal justice mechanism, composed of ad-hoc, hybrid tribunals and universal jurisdiction. Keywords: ICC, sovereignty, human security, criminal principles, cooperation 1 MA International Affairs – Management Public International at Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po Paris) Research student at Kobe University, Graduate School of Law THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT On March 14, 2012, the ICC delivered its very first verdict convicting Congolese rebel leader Thomas Lubanga Dyilo of war crimes specifically, of using child soldiers under age of 152 to participate in hostilities. Only one decision delivered in ten years, a long investigation and trial period shows that “the wheels of justice grind exceeding slow”3 and questions the functioning of the court; the fairness of trials, and the reach of criminal justice. However, the decision could have deterrent effect for warlords, ameliorating the fate of child soldiers3 while victims in the case got their share of justice through the Court's reparations4. Human security as a recent academic discipline and policy approach challenges global governance and the role of sovereign states. It places the security of individuals as a main prerequisite for state and international security, identifies threats critical to it and suggests solutions for their prevention and control. This article retains Gerd Oberleitner's definition of human security as “an emerging new concept concerned with security of people and the individual rather that with the security of territorial state; concerned with survival, dignity and daily life of human beings […] survival means protection from threats to the physical integrity as well as provision of basic needs; dignity refers to a strong link between human rights and human security and daily life links security issues with the life in the communities and families and extends security beyond violent threats to yet unexplored limits”. The security of individuals has already influenced the content of international initiatives, norms, and institutions as Gerd Oberlitner's writes “human security concerns are already shaping international legal documents”. In like manner, the Rome Statute, assembling the international criminal justice rules, establishes the ICC's jurisdiction to punish individuals responsible for most serious international crimes and completes the existing ad-hoc mechanisms. Retrospectively, the idea of protecting individuals by international law is not brand new. Traditionally, international law was dominated by a dichotomy between States and individuals, its subjects and objects. The horrors of WWII urged for the punishment of criminals and introduction of individual criminal responsibility directly under international law by means of International Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo. In the same way, the proliferation of international treaties destined to protect individuals in time of war and peace named as international human rights and humanitarian law can be observed. The creation of criminal tribunals have always challenged one of the essential components of state sovereignty; that is, its primary authority over subjects living in its territory and right to render justice. The state practice has shown that national courts are reluctant to prosecute individuals for international crimes without existence of any clear jurisdictional link to that state such as nationality or territoriality5. Sovereignty was interpreted as the state's power to act discretionary towards its nationals. Naturally, the constitution of an international criminal court proposed at the time was frozen by the Cold War and States' fear of its interference into their domestic affairs. In the context of the tremendous rise in intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era, the 2 3 4 5 Although under Lubaga's command, rebels killed, raped and pillaged numerous civilians, the prosecutors held that the best evidence the Court had was related to children enlisting and recruiting. 14 March 2012, New York Times According to Aloys Tegera of the Pole Institute more than 250,000 children are conscripted as militias' bodyguards, messengers, soldiers and sex slaves in various conflicts and it is likely this trend will be continued by new militias. Belgium represents an interesting case of the state that overused the universal jurisdiction (law amended in 1999) for international crimes without any nexus requirements. However, in 2003 Belgium repealed this law and adopted amendments that considerably restricted its previous practice in the field of universal jurisdiction. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 124-143. 125 Aleksandra Babovic impunity of crime perpetrators and the deprivation of human rights and humanitarian law from their moral and deterrent power, the idea of a permanent ICC was revived. Simultaneously, the long artificially fostered incoherence between governments' commitment to the protection of individuals and their reasserted attachment to state sovereignty laid down in article 2§7 of the United Nations Charter had finally been challenged by the human security paradigm that offered a new analysis framework to the political and legal mainstream6. Even some went so far as to assert that human security marked an end of state sovereignty and a victory of “people's sovereignty”7. The Rome Statute adopted in 1998, as well as the Ottawa Treaty, has been one of the examples of how the human security approach, promoted by strong civil society and like-minded States8, was reconciled, implemented and controlled by legalism. Although the body of the Statute itself does not make any direct reference to the concept of human security, its establishment had been promoted as a constitutive part of human security policy of like-minded States such as, Canada and Norway. The Human Security Network9 had been an important hub for introducing the ICC as one of the basic projects responding to the objectives of human security through privileged channel of law-making. The nexus between the two lies in the presence of judicial body as a precondition for preserving peace and human security. As Lloyd Axworthy put it “The reverse side of human security is human responsibility[...]Without justice there is no reconciliation, and without reconciliation there is no lasting peace.” Although the first objective of the criminal justice is not the maintenance of peace and reparation of victims, these overlap with its main objective that is punishment of criminals respecting their right to a fair trial. The ICC grasps the spirit of the human security concept, employing terms related to it such as “criminal protection of humanity”, “the security of individuals”, and allows for its operationalization and institutionalization. The ICC was conceptualized as universal and permanent justice, unlike the ad-hoc tribunals ICTY and ICTR so often reputed for being selective, retroactive and offering highly politicized criminal justice imposed by the UN Security Council. The ICC and its Rome Statute are often put forth as the greatest achieved projects of human security policy since many distinctive features and prerogatives of state sovereignty are no longer an obstacle to international judicial intervention. As the last resort provider of juridical security by punishing criminals and indemnifying victims when the State apparatus is not able or willing to do so, many authors argue that the Rome Statute reformed the traditional security approach of the state being the ultimate beneficiary of security and having discretionary power over its subjects due to its sovereignty. On the one hand, the universal tenet of human security policy and criminal justice and the territorial character of its implementation due to its contractual nature on the other reveal difficulties when it comes to its application. What is at stake is: to what extent can the International Criminal Court be considered as a human security project able to reconcile the protection of humanity and obstacles posed by States' sovereignty? The ICC sets high standards of protection for individuals and aims to provide justice and fair trial while certain features of state sovereignty no longer pose an obstacle. As it will be 6 7 8 9 See Oberleitner, 2005, The UN Secretary- General Kofi Annan in his famous speech “Two concepts of sovereignty” delivered in 1999 claimed the shift from state to individual sovereignty. The coalition of more that 200 NGOs, 160 States closely followed by the press and other observers. In 1998, Japan and Norway signed Lysoen Declaration that posed a framework for cooperation and consultation for human security issues agenda among which was the creation of the ICC. Later on, it expanded to Human Security network, a lobby service of like-minded States for human security promotion within multilateral institutions. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.124-143 126 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT demonstrated, in every stage of its activity the ICC faces the tension between its mission and States' interests and resolve this on a case-by-case basis. The ICC itself promotes the state as the first and best provider of human security and cannot function independently of their will. As the ICC stretches content of state sovereignty without qualitatively transforming it, the fascination for the ICC appears to be moderated. Although its existence is fortunate and important, it remains symbolic and provides only partial answers to the issues. I/ The ICC : judicial mechanism with high standards for criminal protection of humanity Legalism offers a means for human security issues to be addressed, or at least to pretend to do so. Human security as a political campaign gathers the governmental and civil sectors around the legal agenda. The norms are lobbied, discussed, contested, and compromised, which shows its strength to somewhat curve the rigid frame posed by States' sovereignties. 1. Universal and permanent justice with mission to prevent and punish crimes a. Consolidation of normative framework to address threats to human security The Court's rationae-materiae jurisdiction10 shows the State's commitment to prevent and deal with threats or possible harms that have been or might be critical to human security. The “core crimes” whose definition was inspired by customary international law and recent developments in the laboratory of ad-hoc ICTY and ICTR found their place in the Rome Statute. The crime of genocide has been traced to Article II of 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of Genocide. Since the Genocide Convention reflects customary international law,11 any changes in terms of innovation would have been disputable. In addition, the Rome Statute, with its substantially different definition would have created conflicting obligations for State Parties when transposed into their internal legislation. Crimes against humanity have provoked a great deal of discussion and controversy between delegations due to the obvious inconsistency of decisions and opinions provided by authorities such as the International Law Commission and ad-hoc tribunals. In customary international law crimes against humanity are qualified as such only if committed as a part of a policy. 12 Article 7§2 lowers the rigorous threshold 13 of “widespread” attack to “ multiple 10 With respect of a court's jurisdiction: by reason of the subject matter To be considered custom under the international law, it requires the existence of two elements – behavioral one meaning that it is a part of agreed and general State practice and opinio juris or psychological element coming from the conviction and belief that the practice is a legal obligation under the international law, not a pure habit or tradition. Documents published by the governments, international legal acts or court decisions as well as agreements issues at the occasion of international conferences can be taken as proof that certain custom is accepted as a law in State's general practice. The changes within the customary law may be envisaged as quickly accepted but in same cases they might be strongly opposed as contrary to the law. Especially in some controversial cases the formation of opinion juris may take a longer time. For more details, see in Boczek 2005. According to Advisory Opinion Concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 28 May 1951: “The principle underlying the Convention are recognized by civilizing nations as binding on States even without any conventional obligations.”. 12 During the negotiations in Rome, reference was made to the Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic aka "Dule" (Opinion and Judgment), IT-94-1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 7 May 1997. Accordingly, the inhumane acts should be committed in a systematic manner (as a part of a policy) and on a large scale (against multiplicity of victims). 11 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 124-143. 127 Aleksandra Babovic commission of acts” and the word “systematic” is understood as attack “pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy”. The policy is not necessarily that of a State and attack can be fomented by non-State actors. The experience from Rwanda and former Yugoslavia where “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy14, enforced sterilization or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” were widely practiced served as a basis for Article 7§1(g) enlisting crimes against humanity. Novel in comparison to precedents is the recognition of apartheid15 and enforced disappearance as crimes against humanity thanks to the strong political will of certain States. The list stays future-oriented with the vague category of “ other inhuman acts” leaving place for crimes “of similar character” that might appear in the future. The negotiations on war crimes definition and scope were critical and reflected some States' clear intention to go far in protecting their interests at the expense of a proper war crimes definition. The Article 8§1 establishes the threshold for war crimes to be committed as a part of a policy or large-scale commission, thus excluding isolated cases 16from the Court's jurisdiction. As it might be presumed, the threshold clause was strongly defended by States militarily engaged in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations and whose soldiers at the occasion could commit an isolated war crime. It is worth noting that the list of prohibited weapons is limited and excludes weapons of mass destruction since compromise could not have been achieved; and the extension of the list would be left to the State Parties. The internal armed conflicts between governmental authorities and armed groups’ inclusion marked progress in comparison to Additional Protocol II17 as to englobe situation like Somalia where rebel groups were fighting each other in absence of governmental authority. However, “internal disturbances and tensions” cannot be qualified as war crimes.18 The crime of aggression, previously on stand-by in the Statute, deserves few words as it gave rise to an intractable conflict between the traditional guardian of international peace and security and an independent court meant to protect individuals from the worst atrocities. In May-June 2010, State Parties gathered in Kampala for the ICC review conference and established special jurisdictional regime for the crime of aggression. According to Article 8 bis, the crime of aggression is defined as “planing, preparation and initiation or execution by a person occupying a leader position of an act of aggression that manifestly violates the UN Charter”. Article 15 ter confers greater authority to UNSC referral of a case and poses restrictions on Prosecutor's proprio motu investigation or State Party referral.19 The activation of the Court's jurisdiction for the crime of aggression is subject to a decision to be taken by State Parties after January 1st 2017, and when at least thirty countries have 13 Specific conditions under which crime needs to occur in order to be qualified as crimes against humanity In particular, the inclusion of “forced pregnancy” encountered opposition from few conservative Catholic and Arab countries, worrisome for their domestic legislation and religious principles, as they feared it might produce secondary obligations for these States to legalize abortion for his category of women. 15 These have been already defined as such in relevant international law instruments such as the Convention on Apartheid and 1992 UN Declaration on Enforced Disappearance. 16 Delegations opposed to the threshold clause considered the existence of such clause would only discourage national courts to prosecute these isolated cases of war crimes since they do not fall under the scope of Court's jurisdiction. 17 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, 8 June 1977 (Protocol II) related to internal armed conflicts is applicable only to armed conflicts where Government is one conflicting side. 18 Article 8§2 (d) 19 Article 15 bis requires conditions in case of Prosecutor's own initiative for an investigation as follows : after the UNSC has qualified the situation as representing a threat to international peace and security; when the act of aggression concerns two State-Parties; when it got the Pre-Trial Chamber authorization to start an investigation. On the contrary, in case of the UNSC referral, the Prosecutor can directly proceed to an investigation. 14 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.124-143 128 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT ratified or accepted the amendments.20 The ICC jurisdiction rationae termporis starts after 1st July 2002, the date when the Rome Statute entered into force, thus respecting the important non-retroactivity principle as stated in Article 24§1 of the Statute “No person shall be criminally responsible under this Statute for conduct prior to the entry into force of the Statute”. In many countries that had already experienced violent civil wars, peace was brought through mediation, reconciliation, amnesty or other methods. The Court's permanent character and orientation towards the future was meant to make out of it an effective institution that is to deter governments to use violence over their populations under the threat of individual criminal responsibility for its perpetrators. This valuable feature of the Court, not applicable to ad-hoc criminal courts with retro-active and time limited jurisdiction, addresses the need for prevention when it comes to human security issues. However, the idle attitude of the Court in the context of “Arab spring” towards the autocrats from Yemen, Bahrein, Syria who keep killing civilians in their countries undermined the legitimacy and expected capacity of the Court to punish and deter further commitment of crimes. b. The Court governed by the principles of criminal justice altering protection granted to State officials by sovereignty screen For a long time, many senior State officials who committed serious international crimes were shielded by immunity due to their official capacity. Immunity is a right conferred to Head of a State as a right of a State, not relevant to the person him or herself. After WWII, under the imperative to protect populations from atrocities inflicted by their governments, the individual criminal responsibility regardless of official capacity of the person was introduced by the first military tribunals as reflecting customary international law. Likewise, Article 27 of the ICC Statute rejoins the general trend as no person can be exempted of criminal responsibility or find its sentence reduced due to immunity or other procedural rules attached to its official capacity. An important point of reference with respect to immunities of State officials is the International Court of Justice 2002 Yerodia case (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Belgium). The Court held that the immunity of the Minister of Foreign Affairs is opposable to foreign courts even if their jurisdiction is established by an international convention related to serious crimes, unless his state waived the immunity. Yet, the most problematic point in the Yerodia case is the absolute immunity granted to State officials for official acts committed during their incumbency. However, the Court appeased its rationale by concluding that immunity is not synonym for consonantly identical impunity and suggested that serving Heads of States can be prosecuted before “certain international jurisdictions” referring to the ICC. The latter is not a general rule under customary international law, but is applicable only if the instrument establishing jurisdiction of the tribunal waives the immunity of the officials and if the State in question gave its consent to be bound. 21 The ICC Statute is a treaty which implies that the non-immunity clause is binding only for its State Parties, not for Third Parties in respect of the non tertis pacta principle. Sudan is not a State Party to the ICC, but as a result of a UNSC referral to the Court, it issued the arrest warrant against serving Head of State Omar Al-Bashir. The question is: can non-ICC party state's officials see their 20 Liechtenstein is the first country to deposit its instrument of ratification of the amendments to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression on May 8, 2012. Trinidad and Tobago ratified the amendments on November 15, 2012. 21 Akande, 2008, 2 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 124-143. 129 Aleksandra Babovic immunity waived before the ICC if the situation had been referred to the Court by the UNSC under Chapter VII? It could be assumed that in the case of the UNSC referral to the Court, the Statute becomes binding for that State or the UNSC Resolution 1593 deciding that “ Sudan shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court” can be interpreted as waiving the immunity; or the Genocide Convention lifted immunity and prescribed punishment by national or international court having the jurisdiction. 2. Procedural mechanisms that protect every person appearing before the Court a. The procedural mechanism protecting criminals and victims All criminal justice systems have to find a delicate balance between two extremes – one, protecting the rights of the accused regardless of guilt and other, protecting interests of victims and favoring repression. The practice of ad-hoc tribunals in procedural matters has shown strong preference for retribution often at the expense of rights of the accused. The provisions of the Statute with respect to REP, aiming at protection of every person, both the accused and victims, can be considered as an human security objective to be attained. Article 51 of the Statute explicitly shows the drafters' willingness to establish and guarantee fair and certain rules of trial for the Parties involved. It poses strict conditions for RPE (Rules of Evidence and Procedure) amendments' adoption to two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly of States Parties. The ICC judges' role in drafting amendments or rules is limited to specific situations and the adoption of provisional rules that should be further amended, rejected, or adopted by the Assembly of States. Persons under investigation, on trial or already prosecuted should not be prejudiced by the retroactive application of amendments; as well rules and related amendments must be consistent with the Statute. In retrospect, ad-hoc tribunals have granted excessive power to judges to draft and amend rules of evidence and procedure without external control. This quasi-legislative absolutism of judges harmed the principles of legality and legal certainty requiring that the rules are fixed, knowable, and certain. The inflation of amendments22 at the Tribunals testified to the little respect for the rights of accused. Although the excessive detention period of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza and his late transfer to ICTR detention unit constitutes clear violation of rights of the accused, the Appeals Chamber acting under political pressure, reversing its decision and specifying that the detention period is to be counted from the day the person reaches ICTR, not while he or she is in constructive custody. The Court was solicitous in drafting rights of the accused and used the Covenant on Civil and Political rights as a point of reference while some clauses reached standards of protection higher than in some national legislations. The trial should be held in the presence of the accused23, he is entitled to a public hearing and informed in detail about the charges and evidence against him, to due 22 According to ICTY official data published on their website, by October 20th 2011 the rules of evidence and procedure have been amended 46 times in total. When reproached that the rules are amended too often arising suspicion, Judge Cassese replied to the General Assembly in 1996 that : “In reply to this criticism, I would say that our whole enterprise has been very much a step into the unknown. It has been impossible to foresee all the new problems that have arisen, and may well continue to arise during our proceedings.“ 23 The hearing under specific circumstances can be proceeded in the absence of the accused when he waived his right to be present (Art. 63§2) or in case all undertaken reasonable measures failed to assure its presence before the Court (Article 63§2 ). Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.124-143 130 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT and fair trial, to legal counsel of his choice or assigned by the Court, to be tried without excessive delays, to examine or have examined witnesses for the prosecution and defense. The accused and the prosecutor are allowed to make an appeal against the decision of the Trial Chamber. The accused can be convicted to imprisonment not exceeding thirty years or for life only due to extreme gravity of his crimes charged24. The groundbreaking victims' participation in this process deserves special attention. The ICC entitles victims with statutory right to participation25 in all stages of a trial, right to protection26 of their well-being, privacy, safety and dignity by the Court. The most far-reaching facet of victims' rights in international criminal trial is the right to reparations27. An interesting observation here is the evident effort of the Court to integrate streams of restorative and reparative justice within the essentially retributive justice system. The ICC incarnates the tension between the two and has encountered difficulties in finding balance with respect to offenders and victims' rights. With regard to the right to participation, the ICC jurisprudence has favored efficiency in the trial at the detriment of fully satisfying victims' right to participation. In particular, the Trial Chamber's Lubanga decision that victims of any crime committed in DR Congo could participate in the trial was circumscribed by the Appeal Chamber demanding the direct link between personal harm and charges of the accused28. Despite of these limitations, in later decisions the Pre-Trial Chambers used other articles to base more expansionist approaches like in the Bemba case where the consultative process was used. Victims' participation through Legal Representatives and opportunity to challenge and lead evidence is admitted as possible but only when it does not prejudice the rights of the accused. In some cases, the Court adopted a more protectionist approach toward victims at the expense of efficiency in trials. For instance, it considered the possibility to use in situ hearings in case of Kenya29 based on article 6830 and non-disclosure of evidence for safety reasons and anonymity of victims and witnesses in the Lubanga case. On August 7, 2012 the Trial Chamber I of the ICC issued its first ever decision on victims' reparation in Lubanga case. After the consultation and evaluation process with victims and local communities, managed by the Trust Fund for Victims , they will receive collective reparations. The decision represents a historical moment for victims of international crimes as its sets the principles applicable to the reparations before the ICC by according the centrality to victims in reparation proceedings and addressing the needs of vulnerable and sexual violence victims, children and women as a priority. b. The figure of Independent Prosecutor and admissibility mechanisms to enhance the impartiality of the Court The Office of Prosecutor, an independent body of the Court, can in addition to State Parties and 24 Article 77 Article 15§3 26 Article 68§1 27 Article 75 enumerates that they can take the form of compensation, rehabilitation and restitution.This model was later adopted by the Extraordinary Chambers in Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). 28 ICC Appeals Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, July 2008 where it is explained that those who have suffered harm from child soldier (direct victim) cannot participate in the trial since their harm is not in direct connection with the stated charge. 29 ICC Pre-Trial Chamber II, The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang, 3 June 2011. 30 Rome Statute, Article 68§5 on Protection of the victims and witnesses and their participation in the proceedings. 25 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 124-143. 131 Aleksandra Babovic the UNSC, initiate an investigation proprio motu after having examined information at his or her disposal received by the State Parties, intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, individuals or other relevant sources in order to confirm the existence of criminal responsibility. However, the Prosecutor’s authority is limited by the Pre-Trial Chamber's authorization of an investigation based on foundation of his or her request and collected material31. As well, the latter gives its approval to the Prosecutor's decision not to proceed32. The figure of Prosecutor was created to give more credibility to the Court and assure the administration of effective and independent justice. He or she should establish the truth33 by examining both the incriminating and exonerating facts and take into account the personal condition and interests of victims and witnesses and the nature of the crime. The Prosecutor shall act exclusively in the interest of justice, thus mobilizing appropriate measures for effective investigation and prosecution of criminals. Although a considerable portion of success depends on Prosecutor's engagement and persistence in managing the case, the performance of this “human security ranger” cannot be assessed without a broader picture including other actors such as State Parties, relevant States or the UNSC in position to obstruct the investigation. As an illustration, the former ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo was, among others, severely criticized for his poor initiatives in Darfur case where due to the ongoing violence he deemed it impossible to collect on-site evidence; also, for his failure to provide reasonable grounds in the application for Al-Bashir's arrest-warrant that would prove that Sudanese Government, in particular Al-Bashir acted with specific intent34 to destroy the ethnic groups . In addition, several ICC State parties did not arrest Al-Bashir when on their territory, although it recognized that the genocide has been occurring in Darfur, the US Government abstained from concrete action and the UNSC did not have much success either35. As negotiations and later practice of the Court have shown, the legalism gravitates towards utopianism when States and other relevant actors are not motivated to act bona fide in fulfilling their obligations. II/ The ICC : a two-way street privileging the position of States in protection of humanity Human security did not transform State sovereignty, but reformed its content in an era where human life matters more than ever. Unfortunately, concrete actions are still subordinate to States' interests and the opportunities to take such action. 31 Rome Statute, Article 15§4 and Article 13 (c) found the Prosecutor's power to trigger the jurisdiction of the Court. 32 Article 53§3 (b) 33 Article 54§1(a), (b) 34 While qualifying the crime of genocide, it is crucial to establish the existence of the specific intent or dolus specialis to destroy a whole or in part of group (ethnic, religious, national or racial). For instance, in its Prosecutor v. Radislav Krstic decision ICTY ruled that in Srebrenica case the killing of all men in a specific village or forcible transfer of children can be considered as a clear intent to destroy a group as such. In reaction to the first application for Al-Bashir's arrest-warrant issued in March 2009 the Pre-Trial Chamber I ruled that the Prosecutor failed to establish the special intent. In the second application for arrest-warrant issued on July 12th 2010 the Prosecutor did not rectify the first arrest-warrant or added new elements. 35 In 2008, the UN Security Council reconsidered the idea of deferring the arrest-warrant for Al-Bashir in the context of the extension of UNDAMID mandate. It was considered that the interest of applying justice should be deferred (by using Article 16) in the name of preserving the security in the region. However, many figures argued it would send a wrong signal to Al-Bashir and all other criminals about the battle against impunity. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.124-143 132 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT 1. Universal criminal justice is dependent on States' national repressive mechanisms a. Human security vs. state sovereignty : the matter of competing responsibilities By placing the security of individuals in terms of protection of their fundamental and inviolable rights at the center of State concerns, human security appears as a framework for reevaluation of the content and features of state sovereignty. The latter is no longer defined exclusively in terms of state power to secure its independence and territorial integrity vis-a-vis third states, but also as a responsibility to protect individuals living within its borders from threats that endanger their survival and dignity. Human security has not bypassed state sovereignty, it brought alterations to its content in terms of responsibilities that go beyond states and are shared by international community and other actors. In the name of that shared responsibility, international community is expected to provide solutions when the fundamental rights of individuals, regardless of nationality, are endangered. As a result of the shared responsibility to protect, sovereign features such as immunity of state officials and non-interference principle became eroded. Indisputably, sovereign state remains the main actor in international relations and the first provider of human security to individuals that has to assume challenges in terms of shared responsibility and reduced scope of sovereignty features. b. The Court of last resort: complementarity principle The Court's complementarity36 to national criminal jurisdiction distinguishes it from other international criminal tribunals governed by primacy over national ones. Only when a State is unwilling or unable to perform investigation or prosecution, the Court should step in. To determine the genuine unwillingness behind the State's actions the Court should analyze whether the proceedings were held in order to exonerate that person from the criminal responsibility under the statute, excessively delayed or impartially conducted37. Furthermore, the admissibility is founded on total or substantial failure of the national judicial system defined as a State's inability to prosecute38. The test for admissibility might appear as a difficult task as it involves subjective elements such as the State's real intent in certain circumstances or the level of inability to carry out proceedings. According to preliminary rulings regarding admissibility, the Court should notify the relevant State about its interest in the case and in turn, the latter might inform the Court of its investigation, proceedings or other measures for bringing criminals to justice. The State can make an appeal to the Appeals Chamber. The risk that the evidence or witnesses might be subverted or actions masked by the State during the awaiting of Pre-Trial or Appeals's Chamber decision exists since the Prosecutor must suspend his activities39. The idea behind complementarity is clear, States should respect their obligations under international law and protect their population. State sovereignty is not interpreted as the uncontrollable and absolute authority over its territory and population. More likely, it's the first provider of human security entitled with executive apparatus to establish order and enforce the 36 Article 1 Article 17§2 (a), (b), (c) 38 Article 17§3 raises the hurdle for the admissibility test. The initial criteria of “partial” was replaced by“total” collapse of national system . 39 Article 19 on Challenged to jurisdiction of the Court or the admissibility of a case specifies all details on actors that can proceed to a challenge, at what time, etc. 37 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 124-143. 133 Aleksandra Babovic respect of law better than any other institution. c. The procedure efficiency dependent on States' will to cooperate with the Court The tools at the Court's disposal appear to set its ardent mission to a loss especially when it comes to the full cooperation of States in arresting and surrendering persons or assistance in evidence finding. According to the Statute, contracting States have general obligation to cooperate fully with the Court 40 and must ensure the existence of procedures under national law allowing the required form of cooperation to take place.41 States have a specific obligation to comply with the Court's demand for the arrest or surrender, the latter being defined by Article 102 as a transfer of a person to a Court.42 In the case of competing requests for surrender and extradition, if the requesting State is the State party, priority should be given to the Court; otherwise, surrender can be limited by the State's obligation under the international agreement to extradite. 43 Later on, the forms of assistance within the investigation are detailed such as the taking of evidence, including testimony and oath44; the questioning of persons being investigated or prosecuted45; the provision of official documents and records46and the examination of places and sites, including exhumation of and examination of grave sites47. However, there are two exonerating bases for States' cooperation with the Court. First, the case of inconsistence of such requests with domestic fundamental law that requires the consultation with the Court or the revision of the request in order to resolve that matter. Then, national security can be advanced as an argument in favor of non-compliance. 48 The non-cooperating State can be referred to the Assembly of States Parties or the UN Security Council49, if it triggered the investigation. The Court does not dispose of any coercive powers to exert pressure upon States to cooperate and relies heavily on other States' motivation and power to do so. It is important to mention that Article 93 of the Statute has been inspired by the Appeal Chamber Blaskic judgement50 reversing the Trial Chamber's reasoning51 that the ICTY cannot issue subpoenas to 40 Article 86 General obligation to cooperate (Part 9 on International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance); Article 88 Availability of procedures under national law; 42 The term “surrender” was considered more suitable than “extradition” that governs the duties and rights of a State to hand the person to another State. Since the nature of relationship is different with the Court, an international institution created by the multilateral agreement, it was more appropriate to use term surrender. 43 Article 90 (7) 44 Article 93§1(b) 45 Article 93§1(c) 46 Article 93§1(i) 47 Article 93§1(g) 48 Article 72 49 Article 87§7 of the Rome Statute. In December 2011 the Pre-Trial Chamber I issued two decisions pursuant to the article 87 (7) informing the UNSC and Assembly of State Parties about Malawi (ICC-02/05-01/09-139) and Chad's (ICC-02/05-01/09-140) failure to cooperate with the Court and respond to its demands to arrest and surrender Omar Al-Bashir during his visit to these countries. The decisions underlined there was no conflict between the countries' obligations towards the Court and their obligations under customary international law. Thus, State Parties as well as African Union cannot rely on article 98§1 to refuse the cooperation with the Court. 50 In 1997 the Office of the Prosecutor, Gabrielle Kirk McDonald in charge for Blaskic case, issued subpoena duces tecum (subpoena for the production of evidence) to the Republic of Croatia and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 51 In Blaskic case the Trial Chamber of ICTY held that the Court, as being created by UNSC under Chapter VII, has inherent power to issue orders for the conduct of trials ( Art. 18,19 of ICTY Statute) and judges may issue orders, summonses, subpoenas necessary for the purposes of the trial (Art. 54 of ICTY Statute). As well, the Court made parallel with International Court of Justice and its power of negative interference if States are not cooperating. In fact, according to article 49 of the ICJ Statute, in case of non-cooperation, it can only take the “formal note” on State's behavior. As well, the unique context in which international tribunals are operating justified the analogy that 41 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.124-143 134 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT non-cooperating States or any binding orders, but may simply issue a request. Therefore, the Court's effectiveness and fairness in trial are endangered by the impossibility to obtain probative evidences and persons for the investigation and prosecution. In addition, its success is directly dependent upon political calculations, which strains the credibility of the court as an independent institution. This aspect of the Court is directly reflecting the realism of international relations and the primacy of States, their interests, sovereignty concerns even in cases such as humanitarian crisis52. 2. The triggering and efficiency of universal justice dependent on political will and opportunism in international relations a. UNSC and the ICC : competing interests of justice and peace The ICC entertains close relationship with the UNSC that, acting under Chapter VII, can refer a situation to the Prosecutor.53 What is more, the UNSC can suspend any starting or proceeding of the Court's investigation or prosecution, for 12 months renewable, if it deems it necessary for the conflict resolution or peace process. The Court is not immune to political pressures exerted in the name of opportunism, which effectively blurs the idea of its impartiality. Although we might consider the UNSC involvement as criminal justice's reach extending to situations involving Non-Parties to the ICC, the UNSC resolutions 1422 (2002) and 1497 (2003) establishing a multinational forces exonerating officials and personnel of the contributing state not party to the ICC from its and any third state jurisdiction are clearly contrary to international criminal law principles54. Many authors argue that Article 16 of the ICC represents the balance between the SC authority of international peace and security keeper and the criminal justice that, not always, serves the interests of peace. This estimation will belong exclusively to the UNSC. In cases that do not attract enough of the UNSC’s attention, the ICC is welcomed as a cheaper alternative to much costlier humanitarian military interventions selectively operated in the name of human security. It is interesting to observe that while qualifying a situation as a threat to international peace and security, in addition to traditional threats to state security, the UNSC has started to include the ones concerning human security.55 In addition, the UNSC has never used its authority to draw the attention of the ICC to investigate grave violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Sri Lanka, Gaza, Yemen, Syria and Bahrein, non-signatories of the Rome Statute. Apparently, as long as these countries have a “patron on P5”, they will never get referred. In order to retain legitimacy, the Court must stop applying double standard justice.56 b. Disguised reservations to exclude the Court's jurisdiction has been made with domestic courts powers. As well, it was held that national security argument prejudice the nature and the purpose of the Court. 52 Cogan, 2000 53 Article 13(b) Exercise of Jurisdiction 54 These provisions were demanded by the US as a pre-condition for extending the mandate or approving new missions. As well, these do not limit the Court's jurisdiction to one-year period, but longer since the ICC will be bound by that provision except the UNSC removes it expressively. 55 The term has never been explicitly used in UNSC resolutions. 56 July 7 2012, New York Times Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 124-143. 135 Aleksandra Babovic The famous Article 124 of the Statute deserves a closer look since it excludes the Court's jurisdiction for war crimes committed by nationals or on territory of State that made such declaration for a period of seven years, starting from the date of its entry into force57. In spite of Article 12 establishing the Court ipso facto subject-matter jurisdiction and Article 120 prohibiting reservations to the Rome Statute, the transitional Article 124 representing an exception to its jurisdiction regarding war crimes for period of seven years curiously cohabits within the Statute. Absent from the Draft Statute, this provision was advocated by the five permanent members of the SC a few days before the closure of the Rome Conference as to guarantee their adherence to the Statute. However, only France and Colombia adopted “opting-out” provision. There is no clear answer to whether Article 124 represents reservation58 excluding or modifying the legal effect of certain provisions or interpretative declaration specifying or clarifying the meaning or scope attributed by the declarant to a treaty or to certain of its provisions. Given that the Rome Statute is constitutive and a human rights treaty, the ICJ's advisory opinion on the Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1951) is relevant since it provides that reservations, unless proscribed, are allowed if they do not defeat the object and purpose59 of that multilateral treaty. Article 124 modifies the legal effect of Article 8 by excluding its application in cases when crimes occur in France or Colombia or by their nationals for a period of seven years, which amounts to a disguised reservation. The counter-argument could be that it limits the scope of application of Article 8 for a period of seven years only thus being regarded as interpretative declaration. Since the Article is contrary to the main object and purpose of the treaty “ending impunity for core crimes” it could be positioned closer to a “downright reservation”60. c. Issues of selective justice : reflection of States' power After being the active player in the Rome Statute negotiation, the United States ended up removing its signature and passing a series of bilateral non-surrender agreements with ICC State Parties in order to prevent extradition of its nationals to the Court. The US propensity for threat to use force and its over-engagement in military actions in geo-strategic zones explains its negative stance and other concerns61 towards the hypothesis in which its military or high-rank officers are to be tried for international crimes by the Court. If such a situation occurs, the State parties could invoke non-surrender agreements under Article 98§2 of the Statute stipulating that “the Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements...”. The internal rules governing the ICC and procedural guarantees for the accused leveling at least and if not, above the one 57 Article 124 ILC, 1999. Reservation is “unilateral statement made by a state or an international organization when signing ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, or by a state when making a notification of succession to a treaty, will be defined as a reservation regardless of how it is phrased or named where the state or organization purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state or to that international organization. “ 59 The object and purpose of the treaty are vague and often used terms to designate treaty's essential goals. Many scholars that made attempts to define it more in detail stated that it remains an “enigma” that is more likely to create conflicts rather than reduce them. In Vienna Convention of Law of the Treaties (1969) the term is used for various purposes. 60 Entry into Force and Amendment of the Statute, Cassese and al, 2002, 145-184. 61 Regular fears State express toward the ICC jurisdiction are politicized and frivolous judgements, sovereignty concerns over jurisdiction reach to Non-State Parties, fair trial, etc. 58 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.124-143 136 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT accorded by their Bill of Rights exaggerates the US’ fear. The legal analysis of the relation between non-surrender62 agreements and the ICC or whether they can be invoked under Article 98§2 as a pretext for no cooperation with the Court is necessary. First, signing the US agreements is inconsistent with State Parties' general obligation to cooperate fully with the Court63 and the Statute applies without exception to all persons without distinction64. Under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), State Parties are bound to refrain from acts which would defeat object and purpose of the treaty. Second, the interpretation65 of Article 98§2 is crucial to verify whether non-surrender agreements fall under its provision. The article requires the consent of a sending state to surrender a person of that state to the Court. ‘Person of the sending state’ refers to a person that maintains a functional link with that state or is sent in official capacity to the territory of the requested state, meaning that bilateral agreements protecting all US citizens do not fall under this Article. The wording “sending state” is used in Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)66 to designate a contracting party whose forces benefit the protection when in the territory of the receiving state in connection with their official duties. 67 Finally, the logic behind the Article 98§2 is to protect the requested State from incurring international responsibility due to conflicting obligations resulting from its obligations towards the ICC (cooperation, extradition) and the third party (immunity of foreign officials). What's more, the history of the Rome Statute shows that these agreements refer to those concluded before the ICC Statute comes into effect since States were concerned about the breaching of previously concluded agreements as SOFA or bilateral extradition treaties. Hence, concluding such agreements clearly impedes State Parties’ obligation to the ICC and prejudices the principle of good faith in fulfillment of treaties' obligations.68 The ICC was promoted as a human security project at its outset. Its activity has shown that in certain aspects such as the selection of cases for prosecution and cooperation with the Court, the interests of State and traditional security approach still prevail over human security concerns. The ICC acknowledges and strengthens the primary role of States in provision of human security, but heavily depends on them when trying to assure fair and efficient trial and extradition of suspects. It can be concluded that the ICC responds more or less successfully to human security objectives it promotes such as criminal protection of humanity by defining threats to individuals and punishing offenders, guaranteeing protection of offenders and victims' rights, providing reparations and deterrence of future atrocities occurrence. Its operationalization of human security is rather selective and partial due to the tension between competing interests of human security and sovereign States it 62 Article 102 defines surrender as “delivering up of a person by a State to the Court”. Article 86 64 Article 27 65 Article 31 of VCLT disposes that “ordinary meaning should be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of the purpose and object of the treaty”. 66 Furthermore, in Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (1961) and Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963) term “sending state” is used with reference to a state which sends its diplomatic mission in another state (“receiving state”). 67 19 June 1951 Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces Article 1§1 “ [..]the two Contracting Parties concerned may agree that certain individuals, units or formations shall not be regarded as constituting or included in a 'force' for the purpose of the present Agreement”. 68 Article 26 of VCLT 63 Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 124-143. 137 Aleksandra Babovic reflects. Although aspirant towards universality, the ICC has to be assessed as a part of a broader international criminal justice mechanism composed of ad-hoc, internationalized tribunals and universal jurisdiction that to some extent respond to human security demands. Given its limited territorial jurisdiction to State Parties or situations in non-State Parties referred by the UNSC, the Court's mission should be complemented by these criminal justice mechanisms. The ICC should insist on prosecution since its main purpose is to prevent that the most serious crimes go unpunished and to provide their effective prosecution. In exceptional cases when prosecution does not serve the interests of justice or disturbs the reconciliation process and truth efforts, the Court could allow for deferral of some cases to national mechanisms that offer healing process, dealing with the past and reconciliation. Even though measuring the exact impact of the ICC to individuals' lives is an ambitious task, the fact that some heads of State are worried when traveling abroad; the growing number of cases before the Court, and the participation of victims leaves the impression that impunity is no longer tolerable. Achieving high levels of deterrence on the international level and changing the course of events in societies affected by conflict remains difficult since perpetrators have different knowledge about the law or perception of cost-benefit analysis. Nevertheless, the existence of the Court and every decision going in direction of meeting human security needs should be welcomed and encouraged. The ICC is not fully achieved project in terms of possibilities for change and improvements. It is likely that in the near future the Court will continue to develop new tools of justice that serve the interests of States better while those of individuals will be selected on case by case basis. Reference Books Bacon, Paul. 2001, “Community, Solidarity and Late-Westphalian International Relations”. Newman, Edward and Richmond, Oliver eds. The United Nations and Human Security. Hampshire: Palgrave. 83-99. Black, David. 2006, “Maping the Interplay of Human Secuirity Practice and Debates : The Canadian Experience”. MacLean, Sandra and Black, David and Shaw, Timothy eds. A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms (Global Security in a Changing World). Ashgate Publishing, 53-62. Cassese, Antonio and Gaeta, Paolo and Jones, R.W.D. John, eds. 2002, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary”, Oxford : Oxford University Press. Colard, Daniel. 2001, “La doctrine de la “sécurité humaine”: le point de vue d'un jurist”. Rioux, Jean- François ed. La sécurité humaine: une nouvelle conception des relations internationals. Paris : L'Harmattan. 31-56. Cooper, Andrew and English, John and Ramesh, Thakur. eds. 2002, Enhancing Global Governance: Towards a New Diplomacy. New York: The United Nations University Press. Corell, Hans. 1999, “Banquet Speech : From Territorial Sovereignty to Human Security”. From Territorial Sovereignty to Human Security: Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of Canadian Council on International Law: 231-241. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.124-143 138 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT Desjardin, Alice. 1999, “International Justice to End Impunity: Is it for tomorrow?”. From Territorial Sovereignty to Human Security: Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of Canadian Council on International Law. 53-60. Franceschet, Antonio. 2006, “Global Legalism and Human Security”. MacLean, Sandra and Black, David and Shaw, Timothy eds. A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms (Global Security in a Changing World). Ashgate publishing. 31-37. Garcin, Claude. 2001, “Aspects pénaux de la sécurité humaine”. Rioux, Jean- François ed. La sécurité humaine: une nouvelle conception des relations internationals. Paris : L'Harmattan. 245-262. Harrington, Joanna and Milde Michael, Vernon Richard, eds. 2006, Bringing power to justice?: the prospects of the International Criminal Court. London : McGill-Queen's University Press. Kerr, Rachel. 2001, “International Peace and Security and International Criminal Justice”. Newman, Edward and Richmond, Oliver eds. The United Nations and Human Security. Hampshire: Palgrave. 121-136. Krause, Keith. 2001. “Une approche critique de la sécurité humaine”. Rioux, Jean- François ed. La sécurité humaine: une nouvelle conception des relations internationals. Paris: L'Harmattan. 73-98. Lee, Roy ed. 1999, The International Criminal Court: The Making of Rome Statute. Issues, Negotiations, Results. Hague : Kluwer Law International. Leonza, Umberto. 2009, “De la souverainté à la coopération : l'émergence d'intérêts collectifs”. Constantinides, Aristotle and Zaikos, Nikos eds. The Diversity of International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K. Koufa. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. 609 - 625. MacLean George. 2006, “Human Security in the National Interest? Canada, POGG and the ‘New’ Multilateralism”. From Territorial Sovereignty to Human Security: Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of Canadian Council on International Law Ottawa, October 28-29,1999, 63-72. Hague: Kluwer Law International. MacLean, Sandra and Black, David and Shaw, Timothy, eds. 2006, A Decade of Human Security: Global Governance and New Multilateralisms (Global Security in a Changing World). Ashgate Publishing. Newman, Edward and Richmond, Oliver. 2001, “Introduction: Beyond Peacekeeping”. The United Nations and Human Security. Hampshire: Palgrave. 3-14. Paust, Jordan. 2009. “Restoring the rule of Law: Ending Official Elite Impunity for International Crimes”. Constantinides, Aristotle and Zaikos, Nikos eds. The Diversity of International Law: Essays in Honour of Professor Kalliopi K. Koufa. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. 581-606. Rioux, Jean- François et David Charles- Phillipe. 2001, “Le concept de la sécurité humaine”. Rioux, Jean- François ed. La sécurité humaine: une nouvelle conception des relations internationals. Paris : L'Harmattan. 19-30. Sire-Marin, E velyne et Crenier, Anne. 2001, Justice pour tous: La nouvelle justice pe nale internationale : l'humanite biento t au banc des parties civiles?. Paris : La Decouverte. 13-26. Triffterer, Otto, ed. 1999, Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article.Baden-Baden : Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft. Vogelweith Alain. 2001, Justice pour tous: Ce qui doit e tre surveille et puni. Paris : La Decouverte. 119-129. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 124-143. 139 Aleksandra Babovic Journal Articles Akande, Dapo. 2003. “The Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court over Nationals of Non-Parties : Legal Basis and Limits”. Journal of International Criminal Justice. 1(3):618-650. Becker, Steven. 2010. “The objections of larger nations to the international criminal court”, Revue Internationale de droit penal, 81(1): 47-64. Cogan Katz, Jacob. 2000. “The Problem of Obtaining Evidence for International Criminal Courts”, Human Rights Quarterly, 22: 404-472. Cryer, Robert. 2006. “International Criminal Law vs. State Sovereignty: Another Round?”, The European Journal Of International Law, 16(5):979-1000. Heaphy, Matthew. 2010. “The United States and Its Interests In the 2010 Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the ICC”, Revue internationale de droit penal, 81(1): 77-97. Jonas, David and Saunders, Thomas. 2010. “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty: Three Interpretative Methods”, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, 43 (3): 565-609. Koller, David S. 2004. “Immunities of Foreign Ministers: Paragraph 61 of Yerodia Judgement as it Pertains to the Security Council and the International Criminal Court”, Am.U.Int'l L. Rev., 20:7 – 42. Mamdani, Mahmood. 2009. “The International Criminal Court's Case Against The President of Sudan: A Critical Look”, Journal of International Affairs 62(2) : 85-92. Newman, Dwight. 2005. “The Rome Statute, Some Reservations Concerning Amnesties, and a Distributive Problem”, AM. U.INT'LL.REv., 20(2): 293-357. Oberleitner, Gerd. 2005. “Human Security: A Challenge to International Law?”, Global Governance: 185-203. Olasolo, He ctor et Kiss, Alejandro. 2010. “ The role of victims in criminal proceedings before the International Criminal Court”, Revue internationale de droit pe nal, 81(1): 125-163. Trumbull IV, Charles P. 2008. “ The Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 29:777 -826. Valerie Oosterveld, Valerie and Perry, Mike and McManus, John. 2001. “The Cooperation of States With the International Criminal Court”, Fordham International Law Journal, 25(3): 765 – 839. Pellet, Alain. 1998. “ Pour la Cour Pénale Internationale, quand même!”, L'Observateur des Nations Unies:143-163. Roland, Paris. 2001. “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?”, International Security, 26(2): 87-102. Schabas, William. 2004. “United States Hostility to the International Criminal Court : It's All About the Security Council”, EIJL, 15(4): 701-720. Swart, Mia. 2002. “Ad Hoc Rules For Ad Hoc Tribunals? The Rule-Making Power of the Judges of the ICTY and ICTR”, S. Afr. J. on Hum. Rts., 18: 570 – 589. Swoboda, Sabine. 2010. “Confidentiality for the protection of national security interests”, Revue internationale de droit pe nal, January 2010: 209-229. Zappala, Salvatore. 2003. “ Are Some Peacekeepers Better Than Others? UN Security Council Resolution 1497 (2003) and the ICC”, Journal of InternationalCriminal Justice 1, 671-678. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.124-143 140 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT Web Sources Akande, Dapo. 2008. “The Bashir Indictment: Are Serving Heads of State Immune From ICC Prosecution”, http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/Akande.pdf accessed on 09/02/2012, 1-3. Amnesty International. 2005. “International Criminal Court: Declarations amounting to prohibited reservations to the Rome Statute”, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,AMNESTY,COUNTRYREP,FRA,,45be009d2,0.html accessed on 8/3/2012, 1-40. Adjova, Roland. 2006. “Regard sur la Cour Pénale Internationale”, http://www.droits-fondamentaux.org/spip.php?article117 accessed on 27/10/2011. Arieff, Alexis and Margesson Roda, Browne Marjorie Ann and Weed Matthew C. 2011. “International Criminal Court Cases in Africa: Status and Policy Issues”, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34665.pdf accessed on 18/02/2012, 1-32. Assembly of State Parties. 3-10 September, 2002. “Rules of Evidence and Procedure”, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1E0AC1C-A3F3-4A3C-B9A7-B3E8B115E886/140164/ Rules_of_procedure_and_Evidence_English.pdf accessed on 20/09/2011. Benzing, Markus. 2004. “U.S. Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements and Article 98 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court: An Exercise in the Law of Teaties”, http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/benzing_8.pdf accessed on 8/12/2011, 181-203. Clark, Phil. 2012. “State Impunity in Central Africa”, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/02/opinion/02iht-edclark.html?_r=1&ref=luismorenoocampo accessed on 01/04/2012. Coalition for the International Criminal Court. http://www.iccnow.org/ accessed on 19/09/2011. Gansner, Margaret-Anne. 2011. “Challenges to Victim Involvement at the International Criminal Court : Shedding Light on the Competing Purposes of Justice”, http://dalspace.library.dal.ca/bitstream/handle/10222/14267/Gansner,%20Margaret-Anne,%20 MA,%20POLISCI,%20August%202011.pdf?sequence=5 accessed on 17/02/2012, 1-134. Harvey, Morris. 2002. “The Wheels of Justice Grind Slowly to a Verdict”, http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/14/the-wheels-of-justice-grind-slowly-to-a-verdi ct/?ref=luismorenoocampo accessed on 14/03/2012. International Court of Justice, 28 May 1951, “ Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide”, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/4283.pdf accessed on 16/02/2012, 15-58. International Criminal Court. 11, July 2008. “ Appeals Chamber on Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo No. ICC-01/04-01/06 (The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dylo )”, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc529409.pdf, accessed on 5/12/2011. International Criminal Court. 2 March 2009. “Pre-Trial Chamber I Second Warrant of Arrest for Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir No. ICC-02/0501/09”,http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation +ICC+0205/Related+Cases/ICC02050109/Court+Records/Chambers/PTCI/1.htm accessed on 18/02/2012. International Criminal Court, 12 July 2010. “Pre-Trial Chamber I Second Warrant of Arrest for Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (No. ICC-02/05-01/09-95) (The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 124-143. 141 Aleksandra Babovic shir)”,http://www.icc-cpi.int/menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc %200205/related%20cases/icc02050109/court%20records/chambers/ptci/95?lan=en-GB accessed on 18/02/2012. International Criminal Court. 3, June 2011. “Pre-Trial Chamber II Decision Requesting Observations on the Place of the Proceedings for the Purposes of the Confirmation of Charges Hearing No. ICC-01/09-01/11-106 (The Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang),http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1083960.pdf accessed on 5/12/2011. The International Criminal Court. 14 March, 2012. “Trial Chamber I on Situation in Democratic Republic of Congo No. ICC!01/04!01/06 (Case The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo)”, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1380068.pdf accessed on 14/03/2012. The International Criminal Court. 7 August,2012. “Decision establishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations No. ICC -01/04-01/06 (Case The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo)”, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1447971.pdf accessed on 16/11/2012. The International Criminal Court. 12 December 2011. “ Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Case The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir)”, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1287184.pdf accessed on 16/11/ 2012. The International Criminal Court. 13 December 2011. “Decision pursuant to article 87 (7) of the Rome Statute on the refusal of the Republic of Chad to comply with the cooperation requests issued by the Court with respect to the arrest and surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Case The Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir)”, http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1287888.pdf accessed on 16/11/ 2012. International Criminal Court. http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC?lan=en-GB accessed on 15/09/2011. International Criminal Court Revision Conference. http://www.kampala.icc-cpi.info/ accessed on 16/09/2011. The United Nations Conference in Rome. 17 July, 1998. “ The Rome Statute”, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/ RomeStatutEng1.pdf accessed on 15/09/2011. The United Nations. 9 December, 1948. “Convention on the"Prevention and Punishment"of the Crime of Genocide”, http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html accessed on 19/09/2011. The United Nations. 26 June, 1946. “Charter of the United Nations”, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ accessed on 19/09/2011. Security Council. 25 May, 1993. “The Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/avl/ha/icty/icty.html accessed on 16/09/2011. Security Council. 8 November, 1994. “The Statute of International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda”, http://www.unictr.org/Portals/0/English/Legal/Statute/2010.pdf accessed on 16/09/2011. ICTY. 1997. “Order of a Judge to Ensure Compliance With A Subpoena Duces Tecum in Prosecutor vs. Blaskic case”, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tord/en/70220SPM.htm accessed on 18/11/2011. ICTY. http://www.icty.org/ accessed on 15/09/2011. ICTR. http://www.unictr.org/ accessed on 15/09/2011. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp.124-143 142 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AS A HUMAN SECURITY PROJECT International Law Commission. 3 May to 23 July 1999. “Draft Report of the International Law Commission: Chapter VI - Reservations to Treaties”, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/summaries/1_8.htm accessed on 21/01/2012. Kayal, Mona. Novembre 2009. “Comprendre l'édification de la Cour pénale internationale : l'exemple canadien”, http://www.ieim.uqam.ca/IMG/pdf/SerieMemoire9-M-Kayal.pdf accessed on 16/11/2012. NATO. 19 June, 1951. “Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces”, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-F4D73179-C6BBC855/natolive/official_texts_17265.htm? accessed on 18/02/2012. Oberleitner, Gerd. 2002. “Human Secuity and Human Rights”, kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/.../08.pdf accessed on 12/10/2011. Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie. Janiver 2006. “Sécurité humaine : Clarification du concept et approches par les organisations internationales”, http://democratie.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/Securite_humaine__20_janv.__.pdf accessed on 13/11/ 2012. Ozaki, Kuniko. 2010. “Universalisation of International Criminal Justice System: the Role of the International Criminal Court? “, http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/inter_law/law/pdfs/icc_rt1.pdf accessed on 29/2/2012. Polgreeen, Lydia. 2012. “Arab Uprisings Point Up Flaws in Global Court”, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/08/world/middleeast/arab-spring-reveals-international-court-f laws.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 accessed on 20/11/2012. Simons, Marlise. 2011. “Gambian Will Lead Prosecution in Hague”, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/13/world/europe/fatou-bensouda-becomes-lead-prosecutor-at -international-criminal-court.html?ref=luismorenoocampo accessed on 15/12/2011. Sluiter, Go ran and Schabas William. 2008. “Third Report on International Criminal Court”, http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/97332CF2-330C-4704-812F1205D6C66B77 accessed on 9/02/2012, 1-18. Sluiter, Go ran and Schabas William. 2010. “Fourth Report on International Criminal Court”,http://www.ila-hq.org/download.cfm/docid/CCECC02B-7756-413D-A20FC18C42833E B3 accessed on 9/02/2012, 1-15. United Nations. 18 April,1961. “Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961”, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_1_1961.pdf, accessed on 20/12/2011. United Nations. 23 May, 1969. “Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties”, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf assessed on 20/12/2011. United Nations. 24 April 1963 “Vienna Convention on Consular Relations”, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf accessed on 20/12/2011. Journal of Human Security Studies. Vol.1, No.2, Summer 2012. pp. 124-143. 143

Log In

Human security and the next generation of comprehensive development goals.

Human security and the next generation of comprehensive development goals.

Related Papers

RELATED PAPERS