Nº113
october 2012
working paper
A Tyranny of
the Majority?
Islamists’
Ambivalence about
Human Rights
Moataz El Fegiery
About FRIDE
FRIDE is an independent think-tank based in Madrid, focused on issues related to democracy and human rights;
peace and security; and humanitarian action and development. FRIDE attempts to inluence policy-making and inform public opinion, through its research in these areas.
Working Papers
FRIDE’s working papers seek to stimulate wider debate on these issues and present policy-relevant considerations.
A Tyranny of
the Majority?
Islamists’
Ambivalence about
Human Rights
Moataz El Fegiery
Visiting fellow at FRIDE
This research acknowledges the support of the EU FP7 large-scale integrated
research project, GREEN-Global Re-ordering: Evolution through European Networks
(European Commission Project Number: 266809).
The author wishes to thank Marc Poulson, Nathan Brown and Ragab Saad for
their invaluable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
© Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE) 2010.
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ISSN: 2172-5829 (Print)
ISSN: 2172-5837 (Online)
Legal Deposit: M-45320-2010
Contents
1. Islamism, Human Rights and Islamic Reformation
2
2. Ideological Underpinnings
4
The civil state
4
The concept of human rights
7
Shari’ah and political pluralism
8
Gender equality
9
Religious freedom
10
The rights of non-Muslim citizens
11
Freedom of expression
12
3. Islamists’ Human Rights Record in Power
13
4. Conclusion
18
A TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY?
ISLAMISTS’ AMBIVALENCE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
1
MOATAZ EL FEGIERY
Arab revolutions have not yet managed to lead to democracies that are genuinely
tolerant of individual human rights. Islamists took power at the ballot boxes in
Tunisia and Egypt, but their ambivalent approach to human rights reinforces cultural
relativism and subverts universal human rights. his paper focuses on the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) and its Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the Salaist al-Nour Party
in Egypt and the al-Nahda party in Tunisia. It analyses the positions of these Islamist
parties on international human rights in programmatic theory and political practice.1
Over the past 20 months, Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia have engaged actively in
transitional processes and have achieved political power. FJP and al-Nahda are currently
the largest political parties in Egypt and Tunisia. Al-Nour became the second largest
political bloc in the irst parliamentary elections after the Egyptian revolution.
In their programmes, statements and literature, Islamists have been keen to show
that their beliefs are not incompatible with international human rights. However, the
evidence shows that, in fact, international human rights will be endangered under these
parties’ ambivalent conception of rights. Islamists vary in their opinions on speciic
rights, from hardline to reformist attitudes. But they have failed to develop a coherent
and consistent approach to human rights. Islamists have not abandoned the objective of
establishing Islamic states and a public order based on Shari‘ah (Islamic law). hey reject
the ‘civil’ or secular state that is neutral towards all religions and based on citizenship and
equality before the law. In their current zeal to support Islamist governments, Western
policymakers should not forget the longstanding struggle of Muslim liberals and Arab
human rights defenders in the cause of universal human rights. If elections can be held
without safeguards for individual human rights, the rule of law and the separation of
powers, new majoritarian tyrannies could rise up in which the rights of minorities are
sidelined. his was not the aspiration of Arab revolutionaries.
A number of key questions are relevant in assessing the human rights record of the Islamist
parties. What is the status of human rights in Islamic law and traditional thought? Before
their election, what commitments did Islamist parties make on key human rights? To what
degree are their visions of fundamental human rights in line with international human
rights standards? How have Islamist parties in government performed on human rights ?
And inally, what does Islamists’ ambivalence towards human rights mean for the immediate
future of Arab societies, and for their relations with their international partners?
1. For the purpose of this study, I will identify theoretical and practical positions using official platforms, pamphlets, statements, parliamentary
records and intellectual contributions of the main ideologues and scholars of the three parties, Freedom and Justice Party, al-Nadha and al-Nour.
In talking about al-Nahda, I will make use of the writings of Rached Al-Ghannouchi, the president of al-Nahda. He was recently re-elected as the
president of the movement and his book on public liberties in the Islamic state is acknowledged by al-Nahda as one of its official documents.
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WORKING PAPER 113
Islamism, Human Rights and
Islamic Reformation
Islamism or political Islam refers to ‘the reassertion of Islam in both public and
private life’.2 he Islamist movements and parties considered here are those
political organisations that ‘mobilise and agitate in the political sphere while deploying
signs and symbols from Islamic traditions’.3 Islamist movements are diverse in their
strategies and interpretations of Islamic legal traditions. hese diferences can be
attributed to the diferent historical and organisational evolution of these movements,
as well as to the changing socio-political contexts in which they operate.4 Bassam Tibi
diferentiates between violent jihadist Islamists and institutional Islamists. he former
use violence to achieve their political objectives. he latter pursue their goals through
non-violent means and engage in formal political processes and institutions.5
Institutional Islamists are influential political actors in the Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) today. They gained the largest number of seats in the parliamentary
elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco in 2011 and 2012. The Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood is also a key player in the Syrian opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood’s
candidate, Mohammed Morsi, recently became Egypt’s first civilian elected president.
In Libya, Islamists have failed to achieve the same electoral success as their peers in
Tunisia and Egypt, but they are still very influential actors.
he increasing political clout of Islamist parties across the region has stirred up
serious domestic and external concerns over the depth of their practical commitment
to international human rights standards. Long before the Arab revolutions, many
observers were suspicious of Islamists’ commitment to human rights and liberal
democracy. People wondered to what degree implementation would live up to the
discourse if these parties achieved power.6 hese concerns were bolstered by previous
experiences of Islamic governance and the application of Shari‘ah law, in, for example,
Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, Northern Nigeria and Afghanistan.7 Given the popularity of
Islamist parties in many Muslim states, other analysts advocated the integration of
peaceful Islamists into political processes as a tool of de-radicalisation and moderation.8
M. Monshipouri, Islamism, Secularism and Human Rights in the Middle East (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), p.2
S. Ismail, Rethinking Islamist Politics: Culture, the State and Islamism (New York: I.B Tauris, 2006), p.2.
M. Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Muslim World (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2008), pp. 14-17.
B. Tibi, Islam and Islamism (New York: Yale University Press, 2010), p.10.
See S. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (London: Simon and Schuster UK Ltd, 2002), pp.192-198; B.
Lewis, ‘Freedom and Justice in the Modern Middle East’, Foreign Affairs, 36(2002), pp. 48-50; B. Tibi, ‘Why They Can’t Be Democratic’, Journal of
Democracy, 19(3) (2008), pp. 43-48.
7. See A.E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004) Fourth edition, pp. 36-46; P. Marshall,
‘Introduction: The Rise of Extreme Shari’a’, in P. Marshall (ed.) Radical Islam’s Rules: the Worldwide Spread of Extreme Shari’a Law (Lanham:
Roman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), pp. 1-17.
8. K. Kausch, ‘Plus Ca Change: Europe’s Engagement with Moderate Islamists’, FRIDE’s Working Paper 75, 2009, available at www.fride.org/publications/563/
europe’s-engagement-with-moderate-islamists (Accessed 15 February 2012); K. Roth, ‘Time to Abandon the Autocrats and Embrace Rights: the International
Response to the Arab Spring’, in Human Rights Watch World Report 2012 (Washington: Human Rights Watch, 2012), pp. 1-21. In the introduction of the 2012
world report of the Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, the executive director of the organisation, states that ‘Islamic movements are hardly monolithic or
implacably opposed to rights. Yet rather than engage with them to demand respect for rights, Western governments have often treated them as untouchable.’
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
A TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY?
ISLAMISTS’ AMBIVALENCE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
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MOATAZ EL FEGIERY
Before the revolutions, Islamist parties were outlawed in Egypt and Tunisia. However,
they remained active in the political opposition to varying degrees. In Egypt after 1984,
Mubarak intermittently tolerated the political participation of the Muslim Brotherhood.
MB members were represented in the parliament of 1984 and 1987 as independent
members of parliament, and they also dominated the professional syndicates and student
unions. he group was subjected to a security crackdown during the 1990s. In 2000 and
2005, the MB emerged as a powerful oppositional bloc in the parliament. In Tunisia,
al-Nahda, which was known before 1989 as al-Itijah al-Islami, was a major political
player during 1980s. It was systematically banned and repressed in Tunisia after 1989.
Many of the top leaders of al-Nahda lived in exile. After the fall of Mubarak and Ben Ali,
the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Nahda have lourished in the political scenes of their
respective countries.
Other Islamist actors have emerged as well. In Egypt, Salaists, as well as former violent
jihadist movements such as Gama’a al-Islamiya, have formed political parties. After decades
of staying away from formal politics, Salaists decided to make use of the free political space
in the post-Mubarak era and to participate in politics. he main social base of the al-Nour
party is the Salaist Call Association in Alexandria, a major organisational umbrella group
for Salaists in Egypt.9 Tunisian Salaists have also become visible in public life, but unlike
their Egyptian counterparts, they have not yet participated in post-revolution elections.
On 30 March 2012, the irst Tunisian Salaist parties were established, with a view to
contesting the parliamentary elections scheduled for the spring of 2013.10
Any future introduction of Islamic law as interpreted by Islamists will risk undermining
international human rights standards in Tunisia and Egypt. A recent comparative study
of the incorporation of Islamic law in the legal systems of Muslim states revealed that
‘a number of violations are directly related to norms and practices based in Islamic
legal traditions’.11 Liberal Muslims maintain that international human rights law and
modern constitutionalism cannot be put into practice unless Muslim scholars engage
in drastic reformation of traditional Islamic law. The Sudanese scholar Abdullahi
An-Na’im argues that there is nothing divine in Islamic law. Its methods or content
have been a product of human interpretation of Islamic sacred sources, and hence,
Muslims can review it in the course of history in light of changes.12 Moreover, many
Muslim scholars have rejected the idea of using Shari‘ah as the state law. For instance,
the Egyptian judge Muhammad Sa’îd Al-‘Ashmāwî argues that Shari‘ah in the Qur’an
means the way of God or of Islam, but that the term was changed by Muslim jurists
in the second century of Islam to apply mostly to legal matters.13
An-Na’im contends that the secular state is necessary in Islam. He explains that
Islamists overlook the significant differences between the modern nation state and the
pre-modern Islamic community. Islamic law in history was by and large interpreted
9. U. Abdul Latif, ‘Salafists and Politics in Egypt’, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2012, available at http://english.dohainstitute.org/
release/508a64a4-3f6e-4958-8e1b-e0c9d6288d67 , p. 11.
10. The Reform Front Party was officially established on 30 March 2012. See S. Ajmi, ‘Reform Front Party: Tunisia’s First Salafist Party’, Tunisia Live,
11 May 2012, available at http://www.tunisia-live.net/2012/05/11/reform-front-party-tunisias-first-salafist-party/.
11. J. Otto, ‘Towards Comparative Conclusions’, in J. Otto (ed.), Sharia Incorporated. A Comparative Overview of the Legal Systems of Twelve Muslim
Countries in Past and Present (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), pp. 618.
12. See A. An-Na‘im, Towards an Islamic Reformation: Civil Liberties, Human Rights and International Law (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996).
13. E.W. Shepard, ‘Muhammad Said al-Ashmawi and the Application of Shari‘a in Egypt’, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 28 (1) (1996), p. 43.
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WORKING PAPER 113
and applied by independent Muslim jurists and judges, away from the central
authority. Early Muslims committed themselves voluntarily to Shari‘ah in accordance
with their convictions, without any need for coercion. According to An-Na‘im, any
law applied by the central authority will always be secular. It cannot be described as
wholly Islamic, because Muslims will always disagree on the exact interpretations of
Shari‘ah.14
Respect for international human rights norms through creating inclusive, equal
citizenship will be essential to guarantee the peaceful co-existence of multiple
religious, ethnic and cultural communities in Arab societies. So, it is mistaken to
consider advocacy for international human rights an imposition of alien values on
Muslims. Muslims do not all hold one monolithic view on the place they assign to
religion in the public domain. And many Muslim scholars and human rights actors
increasingly support international human rights norms, Islamic reformation and a
secular state.15
Ideological Underpinnings
Examining the ideological and programmatic deliberations of the Muslim
Brotherhood, Al-Nour party and Al-Nahda can provide insight into these
groups’ theoretical commitments to human rights. It can also shed some light on the
way in which they aim to build the relationship between religion and the state.
Some issues appear both particularly important and extremely contentious in debates
on Islamists’ commitment to human rights and democracy. These include the role
and nature of the state; the definition of human rights; tensions between Shari‘ah and
pluralism; gender equality; the limits of religious freedom; the rights of non-Muslim
citizens; and the degree of restrictions on the freedom of expression.
The civil state
Islamists have argued that their conception of Shari‘ah as state law is reconcilable with
a constitutional democratic state. Many have pointed out that they seek to establish
not a religious state but a ‘civil state with an Islamic reference’. At the same time, the
distinction made by many Islamists between a theocratic state and an Islamic civil
state state fails to address the fears expressed by non-Muslims, liberals and the human
rights community.
14. A. An-Na‘im, ‘The Compatibility Dialectic: Meditaing the Legitimate Coexistence of Islamic Law and State Law’, The Modern Law Review 73 (1) (2010).
15. See A.E. Mayer, Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004) Fourth edition; see also the analysis of the work of
some liberal reformers in W. Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī usūl Al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997), pp. 207-254.
A TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY?
ISLAMISTS’ AMBIVALENCE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
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MOATAZ EL FEGIERY
Both the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Nahda consider themselves to be part of a centrist,
‘moderate’ Islamism. Tunisia’s Al-Nahda underlines in its platform the movement’s
enlightened understanding of Islam. It has expressed its readiness to let its doctrine beneit
from modern human and civilizational achievements through ijtihad (independent juristic
reasoning).16 FJP and Al-Nahda say that a very few rulings in Shari‘ah are ixed, in that
their meaning and authenticity are governed by speciic Islamic texts. hese rulings, they
argue, are not amenable to change. But other rulings are derived through ijtihad, guided
by the general rules and objectives of Shari‘ah.17
This approach to Shari‘ah leaves open a wide space for human reasoning, but it does
not provide a sufficient basis for Islamic law reform. Many of the so-called fixed
rulings in the Qur’an and Sunna are not compatible with basic human rights such as
gender equality, the rights of non-Muslims and the prohibition of cruel punishment.
Moreover, this approach leaves too many loopholes for arbitrary subjectivity, since
its outcomes will be contingent upon the attitudes and values of the bodies who are
given the task of interpreting Shari‘ah as state law.
Like the FJP and Al-Nahda, the Salaist Al-Nour Party shares the view that Islam ofers
comprehensive guidance across the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, and
so believes in the supremacy of Shari‘ah.18 Generally, Salaism refers to the Islamist trend
that aims to purify Islamic belief and practices through the return to Islamic origins
as embodied by the Prophet and his companions. his deinition can be applied to
many Islamists, including Muslim reformers in the nineteenth century, as well as the
Muslim Brotherhood. Since the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood has been exposed to
increasing Salaist inluence. Many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood are also part of
Salaist associations in Egypt.19 However, today, the term Salaism is usually used to
refer to Islamists inluenced by Saudi Arabian Wahabism, who are characterised by their
emphasis on strict and literal interpretations of the Qur’an and Sunna.20
The MB states that it aims to establish a ‘civil state with an Islamic reference’.21
Under this model, the MB says, unlike in theocracies in Medieval Europe, no special
privileges are given to clergy in the name of God. The source of power is the people,
and democratic institutions are entrusted with the protection of the teachings of
Islam.22 The constitution is based on the principles of Shari‘ah. The function of
shura (consultation) is performed through an elected parliament whose decisions are
binding on the ruler. The parliament legislates in accordance with the principles of
Shari‘ah, and the Supreme Constitutional Court oversees the compatibility of laws
with these principles.23
16. Parnāmij H.arakat al-Nahdah (2011), available at http://www.365p.info/livre/index.html, p.3.
17. Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adallah, Parnāmij al-Hizb (2011), p.28. See also Al-Nahdah Movement, al-Rū’iyyah al-Fikriyyah wa al-Manhaj al-ūsūlî (2011),
available at http://www.ennahdha.tn/ةيؤرلا-ةيركفلا.
18. See Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
19. See H. Tammām, Tassaluf al-Ikhwan (Alexandria: Bibliotheca Alexandrina, 2010); J. Brown, ‘Salaists and Suis in Egypt’. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace (2011), available at: http://carnegieendowment.org/iles/salais_suis.pdf, p.5.
20. G. Denoeux, (2011) ‘The Forgotten Swamp: Navigating Political Islam’, in Volpi, F., (ed.) Political Islam: a Critical Reader. New York: Routledge. pp. 59-60.
21. ‘I Al-‘Iryān, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa Al-dawlah al-Madanyah (Cairo: Markaz al-‘ilām al-arabi, 2011).
22. Ibid., pp. 30-31.
23. Ibid., pp. 44-45.
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WORKING PAPER 113
Al-Nour party generally agrees with the FJP on the structure and nature of the
‘Islamic version’ of democracy ruled by Shari‘ah. But it rejects the term ‘civil state’,
fearing that this idea could undermine the application of Islamic law.24 Like the FJP,
al-Nour rejects both the theocratic and the secular state. It affirms its belief in an
Islamic, modern, constitutional state where representative democracy is practiced in
accordance with Shari‘ah. This state, according to al-Nour, would be based on the
separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, and the respect of rights and
public liberties.25
The concept of a civil state with an Islamic reference contains dangers for the future
of human rights and constitutionalism. Fundamental human rights such as freedom
of religion could be exposed to serious violations in the name of Shari‘ah, unless
strong constitutional and legal safeguards are provided in the constitution to protect
citizens from potential arbitrary interpretations of Islamic law. But including a
constitutional clause on Islamic law determines the scope of other articles. Further,
giving a privileged status in the constitutional and legal process to one specific religion
undermines the state’s neutrality towards the religious beliefs of its people. It serves
to alienate those who profess other religions, since laws would be made according
to the religious rationale of the dominant religion. And under the constitution, the
law-making process would necessarily lack legal certainty and transparency. The
interpretation of Shari‘ah would be left up to the parliament and judiciary, which
would probably lead to religious competition between different actors about whose
interpretation is ‘more Islamic’.
Islamists assert that in their model of an Islamic state, no one would monopolise
the interpretation of Shari‘ah and that ijtihad is open to all Muslims. But, as stated,
they say that there are fixed rulings in Shari‘ah that cannot be open to change. This
view is widely held in Egypt, even by well-respected institutions such as the Supreme
Constitutional Court and al-Azhar. While there is no definite list of these fixed
rulings, a Muslim jurist who practices ijtihad in any of these areas can be declared
apostate, as he or she would be considered by other Islamists to be denying an Islamic
fact. So, under the model of the Islamic state advocated by these Islamist groups, one
specific understanding of Islam would be institutionalised and adopted by the state
as authentic. In consequence, any religious belief that differs from the mainstream of
ijtihad and Shari‘ah would be denounced as heresy.
Al-Nahda has avoided explicit reference to Shari‘ah as the state law in its platform.
It maintains only that Islam is the oicial religion of the state. It considers Islam to
be its supreme reference and says that its programme is in its entirety committed to
Islamic values. Contrary to their Islamist peers, Al-Nahda and its leaders have been
openly using the term ‘secularism’, with some reinement. Al-Nahda’s leader, Rachid
al-Ghannouchi, has argued that Islam is reconcilable with ‘procedural secularism’,
under which constitutional safeguards on religious freedom and freedom of expression
can be set to ensure the state’s neutrality towards religions. Since the state refrains
from intervening in the religious way of life of its citizens, the coercive apparatus of
24. Hizb al-Nour: Narfud. al-Dawlah al-Madaniyyah, available at http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=567760.
25. Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
A TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY?
ISLAMISTS’ AMBIVALENCE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
7
MOATAZ EL FEGIERY
the state would not be used to impose religious habits or practices.26 In the sphere of
politics, according to al-Ghannouchi, ‘the state is Islamic insofar that it assures its
actions are in accordance with Islam’s values without being subjected to the tutelage
of any religious institution.’ he parliament conducts peaceful management of diverse
interpretations of Islam.27
But al-Ghannouchi theory aims to maintain two irreconcilable ideas: the religious
neutrality of the state and Islam as the supreme source of law. In the words of AnNa‘im, ‘the rationale and purpose of public policy or legislation is based on the sort
of reasoning that the generality of citizens can accept or reject, which cannot happen
when such matters are demanded as categorical religious mandate’.28
Al-Nahda has different political priorities during the transitional period than do its
counterparts in Egypt. The official party platform does not call for the application
of Shari‘ah. And al-Ghannouchi has stated that his party is not concerned at this
stage with implementing Shari‘ah or including it in the constitution. Despite pressure
from Tunisian Salafists and hardliners among Al-Nahda’s ranks, Al-Nahda agreed to
liberal demands that Shari‘ah not be mentioned in the new constitution. Instead, it
contented itself with keeping Islam in the constitution as the official religion of the
state.29 This represented a significant move in reducing tensions between secularists
and Islamists.
Al-Ghannouchi says that his movement’s priority is to consolidate freedom and
democratic transition in Tunisia, which he claims is in any case a central part of
Shari‘ah.30 However, on different occasions, Al-Nahda leaders have stated that reference
to Islam as the official religion of the state allows the party to adopt Islamic laws and
nullifies any laws that are not consistent with Shari‘ah.31 And al-Nahda’s longer-term
aspiration to implement the rule of Shari‘ah has not been fully abandoned. The issue
has been set aside to be addressed at a later stage, when the movement is better
established socially and politically.
The concept of human rights
All three parties acknowledge the value of human rights and international human
rights treaties. The protection of human rights as a basic function of the Islamic
state has been repeatedly addressed in the literature of the Muslim Brotherhood and
Al-Nahda over the last three decades.32 Al-Nour has also shown openness towards
26. R. Al-Ghannouchi, ‘Secularism and Relations between Religion and the State from the Perspective of al-Nahdah Party’, a lecture organised by the Centre
for the Study of Islam and Democracy, 2 March 2012. The video of the lecture is available at http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/20827717?utm_source
=Transcript+of+Rached+Ghannouchi%27s+lecture+on+Secularism++March+2%2C+2012&utm_campaign=Tunisia+Democracy+Rached+Ghannouchi+
Transition+Center+for+the+Study+of+Islam+and+Democracy+%28CSID%29&utm_medium=email. The full transcript is available in English at http://
blog.sami-aldeeb.com/2012/03/09/full-transcript-of-rached-ghannouchis-lecture-on-secularism-march-2-2012/.
27. Ibid.
28. A. An-Na‘im, ‘The Compatibility Dialectic: Mediating the Legitimate Coexistence of Islamic Law and State Law, The Modern Law Review, 73 (1) (2010), p. 3.
29. K. Fahim, ‘Tunisia Says Constitution Will Not Cite Islamic Law’, New York Times, 28 March 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/world/
africa/tunisia-says-constitution-will-not-cite-islamic-law.html.
30. Al-Assad Ben Ahmad, ‘We Fought for Freedom, Not Sharia Law’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 5 April 2012, available at http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1092/re4.htm.
31. See interview with al-Ghannouchi, ‘Mijalat Al-Mujtama‘, 7 April 2012, available at http://magmj.com/index.jsp?inc=5&id=9419&pid=2456&version=137.
32. M. Al-Ghazzali, Huqūq al-Insan Bayn Ta‘ālym al-Islam wa ‘I’lān al-‘ūmm al-Mutahidah. 4th edn. (Cairo: Nahdat Misr, 2005); Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun,
‘Bayān Li al-Nāss’, in ‘A Al-Shamākh, Dalîlak Ila Jama‘ah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo: Iqra’, 2011) pp. 315-320; M.M. El-Hodaiby, The Principles of
Politics in Islam (Cairo: Islamic INC, 1997); R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Ammah Fî al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 1 and 2 (2011).
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international human rights norms.33 The rights proposed and advocated by Islamists
intersect with international human rights norms, with some important conceptual
differences. These differences give rise to tensions, especially in the areas of gender
equality, the rights of non-Muslims, freedom of expression, political pluralism,
religious freedom, and the prohibition of inhumane and cruel punishment.
Islamists’ theocentric foundation of human rights is in conflict with the secular
foundations of universal human rights. It is understood from Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) that each individual in the world can claim
human rights by appealing to human reason and conscience. Religion can form a
conceptual basis for human rights. But the existence of various interpretations of
certain religious doctrines appears to many Islamists to be irreconcilable with the
universal claim made by international human rights norms.
FJP says that it is commited to international human rights, provided they are not
inconsistent with Shari‘ah.34 The electoral platform of President Morsi mentioned the
protection of human rights as stipulated in Shari‘ah and fundamental religious values.35
Al-Nour says that public liberties and fundamental rights should be protected in
accordance with Islamic Shari‘ah and the foundational values of the nation (thawabit
al-ummah).36
In many Arab countries, vague references to Shari‘ah and the respect of religious
values have often been misused by secular governments and Islamists to erode the
guarantees that international human rights law provides. Of the three parties assessed,
only Al-Nahda does not subject human rights to the limitations of Shari‘ah. It states
in its platform that ‘international human rights treaties are generally consistent with
the objectives and values of Islam’.37 However, on other occasions, al-Ghannouchi
and other party representatives have expressed their support for the reservations on
the CEDAW38 previously expressed by the Tunisian state.39
Shari‘ah and political pluralism
Before the 2011 uprisings, Islamist movements such the MB and Al-Nahda focused
largely on political rights. Working in a repressive environment for decades, Islamists
could only survive and engage in the political system by demanding their political
rights. The revolutions that toppled the autocratic regimes in Tunisia and Egypt
changed this situation, with important implications for Islamists’ discourse on
pluralism.
33. In an Amnesty International survey on the positions of Egyptian political parties on international human rights, ‘al Nour Party agreed to all pledges with
the exception of the abolition of the death penalty and protection of women’s rights’. See Amnesty International, ‘Egypt: Survey of Political Parties’
Views Reveals ‘Disturbing’ Opposition to Women’s Rights’, 2011, available at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID=19911, accessed
23 August 2012.
34. Hizb al-Hurriyyah Wa al-‘Adallah, Parnāmij al-Hizb (2011), p. 29.
35. Hizb al-Hurriyyah Wa al-‘Adallah, al-Parnāmij al-Ri’āsî li Mohammad Morsi (2012), p.8.
36. See Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
37. Parnāmij H.arakat al-Nahdah (2011), available at http://www.365p.info/livre/index.html, p.7.
38. The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women.
39. See interview with al-Ghannouchi, Mijalat Al-Mujtama‘, 7 April 2012, available at http://magmj.com/index.jsp?inc=5&id=9419&pid=2456&version=137.
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Today, Islamists argue that political pluralism in modern democracies is similar to
the pluralism in schools of Islamic law. The MB and al-Nour party state that political
pluralism in the Islamic state exists within the supremacy of Shari‘ah.40 This means
that any party or association that differs from their version of Islamic orthodoxy
could be subjected to restrictions or dissolution, since Shari‘ah constitutes the public
order of the Islamic state and neither Muslims nor non-Muslims can challenge it.
Al-Nahda and its chief thinker, al-Ghannouchi, have asserted that secular and atheist
parties and associations can exist in an Islamic state.41 But in practice, this assertion
seems dubious, since Al-Nahda aims to criminalise certain forms of expression in the
name of the protection of religious sanctities. This argument could easily be turned
into a tool to silence secular and liberal Muslim voices.
Gender equality
he most controversial area in the debate on Islamism and human rights is the rights of
women. In general, neither the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Nour nor al-Nahda believe in the
concept of gender equality as stipulated in international human rights treaties. Members
and leaders of the MB have usually been critical of the concept of gender equality as
stipulated in in the CEDAW, arguing that international women’s rights corrupt Islamic
social values and morals.42 Instead, Islamists advocate the concept of complementary roles
for men and women.43 his means in reality that not all the rights enjoyed by men are
provided to women. his understanding inluences the discriminatory positions held by
many Islamists on marriage, divorce and the political rights of women.
The three parties agree on some legal aspects of the relationship between men and
women in Islamic law. These include the responsibility of men to provide for their
wives financially, according to the doctrine of Qawammah, in exchange for advantages
for men in the family institution. They also agree that women should inherit half of
the share of inheritance allocated to their male siblings. And they think that the
marriage of Muslim women to non-Muslim men should be prohibited. These legal
opinions are common among scholars of Islamic law, since they are directly derived
from clear stipulations in the Qur’an and Sunna. Therefore, even reformist Islamists
such as al-Ghannouchi have not departed from these views.
There are remarkable differences between the three parties in the understanding
of many other aspects of women’s rights. Al-Nahda, for example, is much more
progressive than Egyptian Islamists on many controversial areas of women’s rights.
On polygamy, al-Nahda does not oppose restricting the practice of polygamy but
it takes the view that the abolition of polygamy should not be the norm.44 Most
Egyptian Islamists, by contrast, maintain that polygamy is permissible in Islam and
40. ‘I. Al-‘Iryān, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun wa Al-dawlah al-Madanyah (Cairo: Markaz al-‘ilām al-arabi, 2011); Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at: http://
www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
41. R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Ammah Fî al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 2 (2011), pp. 147-150.
42. See interview with Makarim al-Dirî, 11 August 2012, available at http://ikhwanonline.com/ramadan/Pageview.aspx?ID=2333&SectionID=9.
43. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun ‘Wathîqat al-Mar’ah wa al-Shūrah’, in ‘A Al-Shamākh, Dalîlak Ila Jama‘ah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo: Iqra’, 2011), p. 307. The
same meaning is also clear in the programme of FJP, Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adallah, Parnāmij al-Hizb (2011), pp. 112-113 and p. 31; Parnāmij Hizb alNour (2011), available at http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_social; and R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Ammah Fî al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah
part 1 (2011), p. 90.
44. R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Mar’ah bayn al-Qur’an wa Waq’ al-Muslimîn, 3rd edn. (London: Maghreb Center for Research and Translation, 2000), p.98 and p. 104.
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cannot be subjected to legal restrictions, as long as men are committed to a just and
fair treatment of their wives.45
On the political rights of women, the Muslim Brotherhood has maintained that
Shari‘ah allows women to run in parliamentary elections and to occupy any public
post aside from the presidency of the state.46 Before 2011, Egyptian Salaists were of
the view that women should not be allowed to run for parliament.47 Leading scholars
of Salaism reviewed this position after the revolution and the establishment of AlNour. However, it is clear from a legal opinion by leading Salaist Yasser al-Borhami
that Salaists have adopted this position to conform to the Egyptian electoral law that
required all parties to nominate at least one female candidate in their electoral lists.
Al-Borhami says that the nomination of women to the parliamentary elections is in
principle not permitted. But, he goes on, this position can be changed to prevent
the moral damage and corruption that could be caused by nominating secular
people who refuse the rule of Shari‘ah.48 During the parliamentary elections of 2011,
al-Nour Party did not publish the photos of their female candidates in the electoral lists,
instead replacing them with lowers or photos of the candidates’ husbands. Al-Nahda’s
al-Ghannouchi, by contrast, stated in his book on public liberties in the Islamic state
that Islam does not prohibit women from being nominated for all public posts including
the judiciary and the presidency.49
Religious freedom
The political platforms of all three Islamist parties state that freedom of religion is a
key right in Islam. However, Islamists conceive of religious freedom differently than
international human rights law. The mainstream opinion in the Muslim Brotherhood
and al-Nour in Egypt is that conversion from Islam is prohibited and can be subject to
the death penalty.50 Converts from Islam can be deprived of their rights in marriage,
inheritance and custody of children. Some Egyptian jurists such as al-Qaradawi and
al-‘Awa have argued that the punishment of apostasy is a discretionary punishment
and that it is not part of the fixed punishments in Islam. But many Islamists think
that apostasy is a serious crime that should be punished in the Islamic state. The MB
and the Salafists contend that Islam is the system of belief in the Islamic state and
that apostasy represents a rebellion against this system.51 During an electoral debate,
presidential candidate Mohamed Morsi was asked about his position on apostasy. He
stated that people can change their religion in private but that they are not allowed
to display their conversion from Islam in public.52
45. The Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptian Islamists have traditionally opposed the restriction of polygamy in the amendments to the family
law in 1979. See S. Al-Bahnasāwî, Qawānîn al-’Ussrah Bayn ‘Ajz al-Nissa’ wa -D. a‘f al-‘Ulamā’ (Kuwait: Dār al-Qalam, 1984) pp. 144-146; S. AlBahnasāwî, Hurriyyat al-Ra’i: al-Waqi’ wa al-D.awabit (Al-Mans. urah: Dār al-Wafa’, 2003) p. 115.
46. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, ‘Wathîqat al-Mar’ah wa al-Shūrah’, in ‘A Al-Shamākh, Dalîlak Ila Jama‘ah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Cairo: Iqra’, 2011), p.
310.
47. Y. Al-Borhami, ‘Fatwa Tarashuh. al-Mara’h li Majlis al-Sha‘b’, 2010, available at http://www.salafvoice.com/article.php?a=4821.
48. Y. Al-Borhami, ‘H.ukm Musharakat al-Mar’ah fî al-Majalis al-Niyabiyyah’, 2011, available at http://www.salafvoice.com/article.php?a=5710.
49. R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Mar’ah bayn al-Qur’an wa Waq’ al-Muslimîn. 3rd edn. (London: Maghreb Center for Research and Translation, 2000), pp.
115-128.
50. See the legal opinion (fatwa) published on the official web site of the Department of Da‘wa at the Muslim Brotherhood on 27 March 2012,
available at: http://www.manaratweb.com/e-print.php?id=1608. Similar fatwas have previously been published and are available on the web
site. See also the opinion of the leading Salafist scholar Yasser al-Borhamî on apostasy in Islam, 12 May 2012, available at http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=lL3AhugZ_5E.
51. Ibid.
52. See the electoral debate ‘Maw‘id M’a al-Ra’îs’, al-Nahar TV 18 May 2012, available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ReJFzuKONk.
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Al-Nahda’s al-Ghannouchi, by contrast, says that religious freedom is absolutely
protected in Islam, including apostasy.53 But he too fails to address the consequences
of apostasy on the civil status of apostates. Without ending the civil punishment of
apostates, allowing conversion is a hollow concession.
The rights of non-Muslim citizens
The majority of Egyptians are Sunni Muslims. Christians are the largest religious
minority. Other religious communities include Baha’is, Jews, Shi’a, Ahmadiyas,
Quranists and Jehovah’s Witnesses. Religious minorities have lately become deeply
concerned about their future rights under Islamist rule.54 Over the last two decades,
the Muslim Brotherhood has on numerous occasions stressed its respect for the
principle of citizenship and equality between all Egyptians. But the rights of religious
minorities in Muslim Brotherhood thinking remain problematic.
The MB’s Reform Initiative of 2004 stated that ‘religious freedom is guaranteed for the
recognized monotheistic religions’ (that is, Christians and Jews, also often referred to
as the ‘people of the book’).55 A similar restriction can be found in the FJP’s platform,
which talks about the state’s duty to protect only the monotheistic religions.56 MB
leaders have stated that non-Muslim citizens who are not people of the book have the
right to live in Egypt, but are not allowed to publicly express their religious beliefs or
to build their own places of worship.57 The platform of al-Nour names Christianity
as the only non-Muslim minority in Egypt whose religious freedom is protected.58
In contrast, al-Nahda’s al-Ghannouchi has supported the opinion of many Muslim
jurists that other religions than the people of the book should be protected in the
Islamic state.59
The FJP and Al-Nour party state in their platforms that non-Muslims should apply
their own religious regulations in their family and religious affairs. But they agree
that in all other areas, state laws, that is, Islamic law, should be applied equally
to Muslims and non-Muslims. Similarly, al-Nahda’s chief ideologue al-Ghannouchi
also says that all Islamic regulations related to public order should be applicable
to Muslims and non-Muslims alike.60 Non-Muslims in Egypt have expressed their
refusal to be governed by Islamic law, particularly with reference to Islamic corporal
penalties (hudud).
On political rights for non-Muslims, the oicial documents published by the FJP and the
MB after the revolution avoid discussing the right of non-Muslims to be nominated for
the presidency. By contrast, in the draft political platform of 2007, the MB unequivocally
53. R. Al-Ghannouchi Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Ammah Fî al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 1 (2011), pp. 72-77.
54. See O. Halawa, ‘Egyptian Religious Minorities Fear Rise of Islamists’, Egyptian Independent, 3 June 2011, available at http://www.
egyptindependent.com/node/462243, accessed 20 March 2012.
55. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, ‘Mubadarat al-Ikhwan Lil-Islāh. ’, in ‘A. Al-Shamākh, Dalîlak ‘Ila Jama‘ah al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun. (Cairo: Iqra’, 2004) p.
324.
56. Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adallah, Parnāmij al-Hizb (2011), p. 154.
57. See R. Scott, The Challenge of Political Islam: Non-Muslims and the Egyptian State (California: Stanford University Press, 2010); M. Tadros, The
Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt (London: Routledge, 2012).
58. See Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
59. R. Al-Ghannouchi, Huquq al-Muwat.anah. 3rd edn. (Virginia: Al-Ma’had al-‘Alāmî li al-Fikr al-Islami, 1993) pp. 56-57.
60. Ibid., p. 105
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excluded non-Muslims from running for the positions of president and prime minister.
hese positions of ‘grand leadership’ (willayah ‘uzmah), they said, must be occupied by
male Muslims.61 Following the revolution, MB leaders stated that the group would not
nominate non-Muslim or female candidates to the presidency, but that they did not object
if other parties did.62 In the ideological literature of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is explicitly stipulated that non-Muslims and women are excluded from positions of ‘grand leadership’.63 In Tunisia, al-Ghannouchi states that the Muslim faith is a requirement for the
presidency. But he says that in some exceptional cases, such as the preservation of national
unity in multi-religious societies, this requirement may be lifted.64 he leaders of al-Nour
have made it clear that non-Muslims will not be allowed to occupy positions of grand
leadership in the Islamic state. For them, this also includes the position of vice president.65
Freedom of Expression
he deinition of the scope of freedom of expression and its relation to religion and
morality is problematic in Islamist agendas. he programmes of the FJP and al-Nour are
full of vague and broad formulations that allow limitations on freedom of expression. For
example, the FJP says it is commited to ‘freedom of expression provided that it respects
the fundamental values of the society’.66 he FJP also establishes a direct connection
between freedom of artistic creativity and respect for the morals, values and traditions
of society.67 he party platform includes a special section on media reform, where it says
that the ‘press is free and it is not subject to any form of censorship except the censorship
of the professional conscience, the values of the society and the law’. It adds that ‘the
freedom to publish newspapers, magazines or any other printed or electronic outlets is
guaranteed without any legal or administrative obstacles, as long as the outlet respects the
constitution and the law as well as the public morals’.68 Similarly, the party programme
ensures the right to establish private TV channels and radio stations, provided that they
respect the values of the society and public morals, and emphasises that media must
respect the monotheistic religions.69 hese references to the values of society and respect
for religions leave the door wide open for arbitrary interference in the media on religious
grounds. Moreover, the FJP fails to deine what kinds of restrictions can be imposed
by the law, and on what grounds. he programme does not include a commitment to
amend the penal code to abolish the prison sentences for journalists that have been a
serious concern in Egypt for decades. In Egypt, state-owned media were frequently used
by the Mubarak regime for repressive purposes. he FJP’s platform therefore vows to
restructure the ownership of the state-owned printed and broadcast media to ensure
their independence.
Freedom of expression on the Internet might also be subject to restrictions. he FJP
aims to establish a specialised council for new media, tasked with drawing up guidelines
61. Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun, ‘Parnāmij Hizb al-Ikhwan’, Al-Mawsü‘ah al-Tarikhiyyah al-Rasmiyyah li al-Ikhwan, 2007, available at http://bit.ly/
e2JXBE, accessed 15 May 2012.
62. M. Tadros, The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt (London: Routledge, 2012).
63. M. Ghuzlān, al-Islam Huwa al- H.al (Cairo: Dār al-Tawzî‘ wa al-Nashr al-Islamiyyah, 2006).
64. R. Al-Ghannouchi, Al-Hurriyyat al-‘Ammah Fî al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah part 1 (2011), pp. 235-241.
65. See statements of Yasser al-Borhamî, 4 July 2012, available at http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=722750&.
66. Hizb al-Hurriyyah wa al-‘Adallah, Parnāmij al-Hizb (2011), p. 31.
67. Ibid., p. 140.
68. Ibid., pp. 153-158.
69. Ibid., p. 154.
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for electronic media so that their work is guided by ‘the spirit of Islam and the values
and morals of the Egyptian civilisational project’.70 While the exact tasks of this council
are not clearly deined, the proposal raises concerns that restrictions might be imposed
on the use of the Internet. he FJP also pledged to adopt a new law on ofences on
the Internet related to intellectual property rights, piracy and the protection of public
morals. his kind of law is common in many other states. But the vague reference to the
protection of public morals could be used to restrict and block certain websites.
Al-Nour has stated that freedom of expression and media freedoms should be consistent
with Shari‘ah, the fundamental values of society and the maintenance of public order.
he party points out that the government and its institutions, including the ministry
of information, should promote Islamic identity and culture. his position does not
relect religious and cultural pluralism in Egyptian society. And it raises concerns that
a Salaist-led government could systematically use the state media as a tool to boost
Islamic religious education and promote Islamic values. In addition, the Salaist party’s
programme does not mention freedom for artistic creativity.71
Al-Nahda states in its programme that freedom of expression is guaranteed, without
naming any explicit restrictions. It also asserts that ‘freedom of artistic creativity is
protected and the state should make the laws to guarantee its practice’. On media,
the programme generally refers to ‘the development of media in order to enrich the
cultural scene’. But it fails to explain exactly how public and private media are to be
reformed.72
In summary, the theoretical positions of all three groups on key human rights issues are
extremely worrying. While al-Nahda adopts more progressive positions in many instances,
it remains ambiguous in others. And the visions of both the Muslim Brotherhood and alNour are lagrantly restrictive on several fundamental international human rights.
Islamists’ human rights record
in power
Twenty months into the beginning of a new political era in Tunisia and Egypt, the
experiences of al-Nahda, the MB/FJP and al-Nour in political oice in parliament
and/or government warrant a look at their practical record in terms of human rights. his
can help to shed light on the degree to which the positions outlined above have been implemented in political practice.
70. Ibid., p. 157.
71. Parnāmij Hizb al-Nour (2011), available at: http://www.alnourparty.org/page/program_headers.
72. Parnāmij H. arakat al-Nahdah (2011), available at: http://www.365p.info/livre/index.html.
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After achieving power, Egyptian Islamists have been far more taken up with securing
an important place in the emerging regime than with working with other political
forces to consolidate the transition to democracy. Even more worryingly, many of
their actions have raised doubts about their genuine commitment to democracy and
the rule of law. Although al-Nahda showed a liberal and consensus-driven mindset
throughout the transition in Tunisia, its recent political behaviour and its stance on
certain human rights are cause for concern.
With the majority of seats in the parliament, Egyptian Islamists have dominated the
Constituent Assembly.73 They have refused to develop a set of supra-constitutional
principles on human rights, citizenship and democratic governance. FJP and al-Nour
firmly maintain that the elected parliament should have exclusive powers to appoint
and write the constitution. They have refused to give international human rights a
privileged status in the constitution, arguing these rights reflect ‘Western values’.74
President Morsi has succeeded in asserting his power over the military.75 But no
reforms have yet been undertaken to avoid the politicisation of the army. The
Muslim Brotherhood has dominated state-owned media and used Mubarak’s press
law to silence journalists. Moreover, President Morsi has confronted the Supreme
Constitutional Court (SCC) and circumvented its judgment on the dissolution of the
parliament. Egyptian Islamists are not comfortable with the secular attitudes of the
SCC. One of the stated objectives of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood
has been, in the name of reforming the judiciary, to stifle the powers of the SCC.76
The SCC does need reforms to ensure its full independence. But these reforms must
not serve as a pretext to weaken the court.
President Morsi has also broken his electoral promise to restructure the membership of
the constituent assembly to relect Egypt’s social diversity. And he failed to deliver on
his promise of an inclusive cabinet. Islamists’ imprint on public institutions was obvious
in the formation of the National Council for Human Rights. Some members on the
council are known for their hostility to human rights.77 And one of them was previously
involved in a lagrant incitement to hatred and violence against Muslim Shiites.78
he reference to Islamic Shari‘ah in the constitution has been a non-negotiable issue for
the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Nour. Salaist members of the constituent assembly
have attempted to strengthen the reference to Islamic law in the new constitution.
hey have proposed replacing the ‘principles’ of Shari‘ah with the ‘rulings’ of Shari‘ah,
or referring to Islamic Shari‘ah without any further clariication. Other members of the
constituent assembly, including the Muslim Brotherhood, have opposed this proposal
and insisted on keeping the language used in the Egyptian constitution of 1971.
73. See M. Ottoway, ‘The Death of the Constitutent Assembly’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012, available at http://carnegieendowment.
org/2012/06/13/egypt-death-of-constituent-assembly/brzn.
74. See ‘A Statement by the Freedom and Justice Party’, 6 September 2011, available at: http://www.hurryh.com/ar_print.aspx?print_ID=2308.
75. See M. El Fegiery, ‘Crunch Time for Egypt’s Civil-Military Relations’, FRIDE Policy Brief, 14 August 2012, available at http://www.fride.org/
publication/1054/crunch-time-for-egypt’s-civil-military-relations.
76. See the statement of the leftist al-Tagammuh Party on 8 August 2012, available at http://www.elwatannews.com/news/details/35934.
77. See ‘Political Groups, Figures Concerned over Politicised Human Rights Council’, Ahram Online, available at http://english.ahram.org.eg/
NewsContent/1/64/52100/Egypt/Politics-/Political-groups,-figures-concerned-over-politicis.aspx, accessed 6 May 2012.
78. See the statement of S. afwat H. egazî, a leading Islamist who is a close ally of the Muslim Brotherhood, available at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=j_3m10LZ4mU, accessed 6 May 2012.
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Salafists have proposed that al-Azhar become the authority that interprets the
principles of Islamic Shari‘ah. The Muslim Brotherhood and many other members of
the constituent assembly have supported this proposal. The idea of giving authority
to Muslim scholars for the interpretation of Islamic law was mentioned in the draft
political platform of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2007. But it was omitted in the 2011
programme of the Freedom and Justice Party. The Muslim Brotherhood has stated
several times in the past that the Supreme Constitutional Court is the competent
body to interpret Islamic law. So, their change of heart on this issue was a concession
to the demands of the Salafists. This proposal has provoked outrage from a wide
range of liberals and human rights activists. They consider this move a bold step
towards theocracy, where unaccountable religious scholars intervene in the work of
the elected bodies.79
Tunisia’s al-Nahda has tended in the early months of the transition to try to reach a
political compromise with secular parties, even when the concessions involved came
at the expense of important elements of the party’s ideological underpinnings. It
confirmed its willingness to share power with other Tunisian political forces and to
devise an inclusive and participatory constitution. It also declared its respect for the
rights of women as enshrined in family law. One major step was al-Nahda’s agreement
with other political forces to leave the first section of the constitution referring to
Islam as the official religion of the state without citing Shari‘ah as the main source of
legislation. This move did not entail an abandonment of its Islamist agenda. Rather,
it reflects a new organisational and political reality that is different from the situation
of Islamists in Egypt.
Al-Nahda has chosen to defer controversial political issues likely to divide Tunisian
political society so as to successfully steer the country through the fragile political
transition. Unlike their counterparts in Egypt, Tunisian Islamists have been confronted
with a strong secular opposition and feminist movement. hese actors pressure the
Islamist movement and its political leadership to emphasise their reformist understanding
of Islamic law. Al-Nahda has not rejected the doctrine of supremacy of Shari‘ah and the
traditional methods of Islamic law. But it has exhausted the ability of these methods
to develop many of its comparatively progressive views on human rights. here are
still tensions between its Islamist agenda and international human rights norms. But
compared with the thought and practice of Islamists in Egypt, al-Nahda has so far
introduced a relatively soft version of Islamism. Political leaders of al-Nahda have
engaged in dialogue with secular Tunisian political forces and reached an agreement
with them on many sensitive issues.80 Nevertheless, this consensus has been recently
threatened amid accusations by its political partners that al-Nahda is attempting to
dominate the public service, as well as restricting media freedom and gender equality.81
Moreover, the Party has been criticised for being too lenient with hardline Salaists who
have committed violence against intellectuals and artistic activities.82
79. See the statement by the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights on 16 July 2012, available at http://www.eipr.org/pressrelease/2012/07/16/1453.
80. See L. Hajji, ‘The 18 October Coalition for Rights and Freedoms in Tunisia’, Arab Reform Initiative, February 2007, available at http://www.arabreform.net/18-october-coalition-rights-and-freedoms-tunisia.
81. ‘Tunisia President Launches Attack against Ruling Islamists’, AFP, available at http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/
ALeqM5icOQzez62kG3rLP2EptGS3vbTT-Q?docId=CNG.6ecabf95f500747be87b57255a70d2e9.7b1.
82. N. Dalaa, ‘Is the Ennahda Government Soft on Salaists?’, Al-Monitor, 24 May 2012, available at http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2012/05/
tunisian-media-and-political-ana.html.
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Egypt’s President Morsi has vowed to respect the right to artistic creativity and freedom
of expression. But Islamists’ bleak record in practice in this area casts doubt on the
official positions of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists. Since the 1990s, Islamist
activists have pressured the Mubarak regime to restrict certain types of expression
that are protected under international human rights. Numerous parliamentary
interrogations were presented by members of the Muslim Brotherhood, including
President Morsi himself, against publications released by the ministry of culture and
the ministry of information that were deemed offensive to Islam. One prominent
leader of the MB recently sponsored actions taken by al-Azhar and the government
against academic freedom, freedom of expression and artistic creativity, stating that
freedom of expression should respect the values and morals of the society.83
A group of Egyptian intellectuals, actors, artists and novelists have formed ‘Egypt’s
Creativity Front’ to protect the right to artistic creativity and freedom of expression.
Those artists were alarmed by a series of cases filed against Egyptian artists by Islamist
lawyers who accused them of offending Islam and its symbols. The Front has vowed
to combat any attempts to impose censorship on cultural activities by Islamists.84
President Morsi has taken no legal measures to ensure that artists are protected from this
kind of lawsuit. And the new draft constitution includes an article that prohibits the
defamation of religion, the Prophet and his family and companions. his draft article
was presented by al-Azhar and backed by Islamists, as well as other political forces.85
he article could, for example, be used to prosecute Muslims deemed heretics under the
dominant Sunni perspective, such as Shî’i Muslims. It will have a far-reaching negative
impact on freedom of expression and religious freedom in Egypt’s emerging order.
President Morsi and his government have taken tough stances against media in recent
months. An increasing number of lawsuits have been iled against journalists on charges
of defaming the president and the Muslim Brotherhood. At the same time, Presdient
Morsi and his government have tolerated the discriminatory discourse engaged in by
Salaist media and some Islamists. Instead of working to reconstruct the ownership of
the state-owned media as promised in its platform, the Muslim Brotherhood has used its
political power inter alia to control the appointment of the leaders of public newspapers.86
The prosecution of journalists in Tunisia over the last few months has given rise to
doubts about the commitment of al-Nahda to freedom of expression. Al-Nahda has
proposed criminalising offenses against the sanctity of Islam in the future constitution.
Some observers argue that the movement has given in to the demands of Salafists.87
In the meantime, it has failed to deter hardline Islamists who threaten public liberties
and freedom of artistic creativity.
83. See the statements of Abd al-Rahmman al-Barr to al-Hurrah Tv on 13 January 2012, Taqrîr Khas., available at http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=ZXOG6c9WNkI.
84. A. Mohsen, ‘Dark Comedy: Is Adel Imam’s Sentence the Start of a Worrying Trend?’, Egypt Independent, 25 May 2012, available at http://www.
egyptindependent.com/news/dark-comedy-adel-imam’s-prison-sentence-start-worrying-trend.
85. See Makhawif Ala Huriyyah al-Aqiddah Fî Misr, August 2012, available a http://almarayanews.com/new/permalink/5501.html.
86. See the Joint Statement by Egyptian Rights Groups on 9 August 2012, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood Following Mubarak’s Footsteps’, available at
http://www.cihrs.org/?p=3773&lang=en.
87. See Amnesty International, ‘Tunisian Journalist Faces ‘Public Morals’ Charge after Criticizing Government’, 8 August 2012, available at http://www.
amnesty.org/en/news/tunisian-journalist-faces-public-morals-charge-after-criticizing-government-2012-08-07; A. Guellali, ‘Tunisia’s Setback in
Freedom of Expression’. Human Rights Watch, 2012, available at http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/24/tunisia-s-setback-freedom-expression.
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ISLAMISTS’ AMBIVALENCE ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS
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In terms of gender equality, human rights activists in Egypt fear that previous reforms in the
Personal Status Law could be reversed under the Islamists.88 Female leaders of the Freedom
and Justice Party have stated on many occasions that family law should be amended to be
consistent with Shari‘ah. hey have also said that international treaties on the rights of women
have been destructive to the values of Muslim families. Members of al-Nour have proposed
draft laws in the post-revolution parliament that are inconsistent with the rights of women.
One of these proposals aimed to reduce the age of marriage for girls to 12 years old. In an
electoral debate, President Morsi said he thought that early marriage should be legalised. AlNour has also proposed decriminalisation of the practice of female genital mutilation. his
is consistent with the position of the Muslim Brotherhood, which believes that this practice
should be left to the discretion of families but that doctors must conduct it.89 In 2008, the
parliamentary bloc of the Muslim Brotherhood opposed the criminalisation of female genital
mutilation and resisted raising the age of marriage to 18 years old.90
After the fall of Ben Ali, al-Nahda was keen to assure Tunisian women that their
rights under family law would not be taken away. The party accepted the electoral
law that allocated an equal number of seats to men and women in the electoral lists of
parties. In August 2011, the Tunisian government lifted its reservations on CEDAW.
But it has made an ambigious declaration saying that the implementation of the
treaty should not violate Islam as the official religion of the state.91 Al-Nahda has
been under attack as a result of its proposal to use the expression ‘complementarity
of roles between men and women’ in the constitution. This proposal has triggered
outrage among secularists and human rights advocates. They fear that it could be
used to justify future retreat from the protection of women in Tunisian law.92
he rights of religious minorities under the Egyptian draft constitution are in peril.
According to the draft constitutional provisions proposed by the Islamist-led Constituent
Assembly, the practice of religious freedom will only be guaranteed for monotheistic
religions. his means that other religious minorities such as Baha’is will continue to be
deprived of their religious rights. he parliamentary bloc of the Muslim Brotherhood was
outspoken against the recognition of the Baha’i religious minority in the parliament of
2005. It considers Baha’i a heretical belief that should not be protected in a Muslim society.
he constitutional clause on Islamic law recognises the rights of non-Muslims to apply their
own religious regulations within their family and religious afairs. Many observers have seen
this article as a step forward for the rights of non-Muslims, since it represents the irst time
that a constitution has recognised the existence of other religions in Egypt. However, this
article entrenches the sectarian regulation of family in Egypt, rather than having one civil law
for all citizens regardless of their religion. Many Christians sufer from the strict regulations
on divorce applied by the Orthodox and Catholic Churches. Some Christians have had
88. H. Badran, ‘The Arab Spring Represents a Leap Backward for Women’. The Daily Star. 27 August 2012, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/
Opinion/Commentary/2012/Aug-27/185770-the-arab-spring-represents-a-leap-backward-for-women.ashx#axzz24mOSmBKj.
89. Ibid.
90. See Al-Markaz al-I’lāmî Lil Ikwan al-Muslimun, ‘Al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun fî Parlamān 2005’, Al-Mawsü‘ah al-Tarikhiyyah al-Rasmiyyah li al-Ikhwan,
2008, available at http://bit.ly/O99T9U, accessed 23 August 2012.
91. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Tunisia: Government Lifts Restrictions on Women’s Rights Treaty’, 7 September 2011, available at http://www.hrw.
org/news/2011/09/06/tunisia-government-lifts-restrictions-women-s-rights-treaty.
92. H. Mcrobie, ‘Will the Tunisian Constitution Erode the gains of Women in the Arab Spring’ New Statesman, 15 August 2012, available at http://
www.newstatesman.com/blogs/politics/2012/08/will-tunisian-constitution-erode-gains-women-arab-spring.
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WORKING PAPER 113
to convert to Islam in order to avoid Christian regulations prohibiting divorce.93 Applying
sectarian religious family laws means that members of each religious community will be
subject to discriminatory religious regulations that are not in line with human rights.
he rights of the Christian minority in Egypt have not improved after the revolution. he
intolerant religious climate aggravated by Islamists’ political dominance has deepened the
fears of Christians. Egypt witnessed a series of sectarian clashes over the past year, without
tackling the root causes of the injustice felt by religious minorities. By dealing with the
sectarian clashes as a security issue rather than addressing the legitimate rights of Christians
to equality and non-discrimination, the Muslim Brotherhood and President Morsi have
repeated the mistakes of the outgoing regime. One fundamental demand of Christians in
Egypt has been to remove legal restrictions on building and maintaining churches. In June
2011, the transitional government headed by Essam Sharaf presented a draft uniied law
on building places of worship. Many Christians opposed the law, considering it restrictive
and below their expectations. he Muslim Brotherhood and al-Nour have been irm that
any regulations must be proportional to the number of Christians and their exact needs.
hey therefore oppose having a uniied law on places of worship.94
he appointment of non-Muslims and women to senior political positions is contentious for
Islamists in Egypt. In his electoral campaign, President Morsi vowed to appoint a Christian
and a woman as vice presidents. his proposal was opposed by Salaists, who considered that
the position of vice president, similar to the president, should only be occupied by a Muslim
male. President Morsi gave in to the pressure and changed his mind. He appointed a woman
and a Christian as presidential assistants and named a prominent male judge as his deputy.
To sum up, Islamists’ ambivalence about the foundations and content of human rights
has translated into constitutional and legal practices that endanger the full enjoyment
of certain universal human rights in the emerging regimes in Egypt and Tunisia. he
experience of Islamists in power so far demonstrates that their conception of democracy
has been reduced to competition in ballot boxes with less appreciation for the rights of
minorities, individual liberties, the separation of powers and the independence of public
institutions. If this trend were to continue, Islamists would lead post-revolutionary regimes
to authoritarian majorities and not true democracies as envisaged by the revolutions.
Conclusion
Scrutinising the human rights records of Islamists is very important at this
stage in the Arab transitions. It could be argued that Islamists are not the
only actors who are hostile to human rights. It is true that the belief in international
93. See ‘Protesting for the Right to Divorce’, Ahram Weekly, 28 July 2011.
94. See al-Wafd Newspaper, 16 May 2012, available at http://www.alwafd.org/ناملرب-ةروثلا/471-تاشقانم-بعشلا/210983-نويفلسلا-ناوخإلاونوضرتعي-ىلع-نوناق-رود-ةدابعلا, and al Masry al-Youm, 21 March 2012, available at http://www.almasryalyoum.com/node/725126.
A TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY?
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MOATAZ EL FEGIERY
human rights of many non-Islamist actors is questionable. But the Arab revolutions
have shown that the political culture of Muslims is not monolithic and that the
popularity of international human rights is on the rise. Islamists’ impact on religious
discourse is immense. The political rise of Islamists in a country like Egypt since the
1970s prompted Sadat and Mubarak to adopt repressive religious policies to appease
Islamists. This political and social ascendancy has influenced society as a whole.
Its ideology has infiltrated cultural, media, educational and religious institutions.
Islamists reinforce cultural relativism and conservatism in society.
There has been no expectation that Islamists in power will positively transform the
human rights landscape in the region. Islamists have so far failed to offer a coherent and
consistent theory and practice in harmonising their Islamist agenda with international
human rights. The positions of al-Nahda can be considered more progressive than
those of Egyptian Islamists. But there are important tensions between fundamental
human rights and the positions and actions of all three Islamist parties examined.
A promising factor in both Tunisia and Egypt is the increasing constituency backing
international human rights among liberals, young activists and civil society. Liberals
are potential competitors of Islamists. If they strengthened their organisational
and communications capacity, they could well achieve electoral success in future
elections. Human rights defenders have also been outspoken about Islamists’ human
rights records. While adhering to their universal aspirations, human rights defenders
and liberals should not leave religion to be hijacked and distorted by Islamists.
Islamic reform and rooting international human rights in Islamic discourse should
be a strategic objective. The international community should make sure that Islamist
governments effectively respect freedoms of expression and association. These rights
can secure a vibrant debate on the future of international human rights and religion,
free from intimidation.
Beyond the domestic arena, Islamists’ ambivalence about human rights can be expected
also to have an impact in the regional and global contexts. Arab governments led by
Islamists will likely attempt to trigger a debate on cultural speciicities in international
human rights institutions. Issues such as gender equality and defamation of religions
can be expected to come to the fore both globally and regionally. Universal human
rights in bilateral and multi-lateral cooperative frameworks between the EU and the
Southern-Mediterranean will be contested on cultural grounds. After a long history
of suspicion of Islamists, the US and Europe have recently become supportive of the
inclusion of Islamists in political processes. But this policy shift should not come at the
expense of the respect of international human rights norms in Arab states. It should
also avoid overshadowing the long struggle of liberal Muslims and the human rights
community to ind common ground between Islamic traditions and international
human rights. he US and Europe should enhance their support to liberal Muslims
and human rights defenders who share common universal values. International human
rights, and particularly gender equality, non-discrimination, and freedom of expression,
must continue to be the framework of reference between the EU and its Arab partners.
he EU can draw on the diverse experience of Muslim states in human rights and
refer to best practices to encourage Islamist parties to develop their legal positions on
international human rights treaties.
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WORKING PAPER 113
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