GeorGe Cassar
Defending a Mediterranean island outpost of the
Spanish Empire – the case of Malta
The Maltese archipelago, collectively known as Malta,
has a long history of possession and colonisation
running from prehistoric times till the attainment of
political independence in 1964. One such long period
of domination is that of the Aragonese who captured
the Maltese islands in 1283 following a hard-fought sea
battle won by the renowned Admiral Roger di Lauria.1
The battle, fought in Malta’s grand harbour in June
of that year, was instrumental in wrestling the island
from Angevin rule and facilitated the joining of Malta
to the other Sicilian lands which now fell under the
domination of Peter III of Aragon (I of Sicily).2 In fact,
following that crucial naval battle, it was the turn of the
castrum maris – the solitary guardian of the Maltese
harbour and which was still in Angevin hands – to fall to
the Aragonese Manfredi Lancia. With this latest victory
the takeover of the island was completed.3 This castle
(which would later become Fort St Angelo) at the tip
of one of the numerous peninsulas jutting out into the
Grand Harbour, had been described as a truly royal
and highly armed fortiication, and was at this time
considered to be a precious gem on the Sicilian ring.4
The year 1283 marked the irst of many centuries yet
to follow during which the Spanish Crown extensively
exploited the Maltese islands for its political and
strategic exigencies while substantially conceding to
the locals much less in return. The islanders had little
choice but to abide by their Spanish rulers’ whims and
pleasures. The period of Spanish domination, generally
exercised through the viceroys of Sicily, culminated
in the donation made by Holy Roman Emperor
Charles V (who was also King Charles I of Spain),
to the Order of St John and which came into effect in
1530. At that point, the history of the islands takes a
fresh turning with Malta being gradually transformed
from an insigniicant colonial backwater into a most
respected, renowned and sought after country in the
Mediterranean region. For it was during the domination
of the Hospitallers that Malta was converted into one
of the most fortiied islands to be reckoned with.
The Aragonese and their rule
As Malta joined the other Aragonese territorial
possessions it also became intrinsically entwined in the
day-to-day endeavours of that kingdom. Yet, Malta’s
situation emerges as somewhat conlicting considering
that, while the archipelago was deemed important
to retain, at the same time little effort was exerted
by the Spanish Crown to strengthen and effectively
protect it from attack or invasion, assaults which could
potentially wrest the islands from Aragon. Moreover,
when problems in the Kingdom arose, Malta generally
came out the worse off. One of the very irst instances
which put this trend in evidence developed in 1292.
With the death of King Peter III, according to his own
wish, his possessions were divided between two of his
sons. While Alfonso III (1285-1291) took Aragon, his
brother James II (1285-1295) was given Sicily and its
islands. James, however, soon took over the Crown of
The territories held by the Aragonese crown in 1441 in the
Mediterranean region which included the Maltese islands
Sacra Militia
Issue no. 13 - 2014
59
Aragon when Alfonso died. At this point the Sicilians lord to the next. Sometimes, after the Maltese protested
expressed their fervent wish to their king that he may and pleaded, the king would reintegrate the islands into
conirm his commitment not to forfeit their island to the Regio Demanio by conceding some privileges to
the Angevins who still controlled the neighbouring the locals.9 This see-saw like situation was typical of
Naples and the southern Italian peninsula. James the period of Spanish domination of Malta.
complied, and reiterated that not only would he hold
on to Sicily but would also want to extend this claim Close to the turn of the fifteenth century, that is
on Malta, Pantelleria, the
in 1397, King Martin I
Lipari Islands and Tunis.5
of Sicily, also known as
To substantiate this royal
‘the Younger’ (and whose
declaration, James gave
father, Martin ‘the Elder’,
orders for the defences
was King of Aragon), while
of Malta to be reinforced
granting the Maltese some
while the defence of
privileges, he took from
the castrum maris was
them in return much more.
entrusted to his brother
In fact, not only did he not
provide any defences for
Frederick.6 Unknown to
the Maltese islands but,
all, covert dealings were
underway between James
to the contrary, he obliged
the islanders to contribute
of Aragon and Charles of
towards equipping the
Anjou, facilitated through
naval and land forces
the efforts of the newly
which he was preparing.
elected Pope Boniface
The locals were also to
VIII, for a deal which
pay ive per cent of all the
included the concession
booty from the corsairing
of Sicily and Malta as
activities carried out by
a fief to the Angevins
them, which money was
in exchange of the fiefs
normally used to support
of Sardinia and Corsica
the Maltese treasury and
which would be taken over
give employment to the
by the Aragonese. As the
majority of the locals. And
dealing became known,
King Martin I ‘the Younger’
to add insult to injury the
the Sicilians reacted in a
bout of nationalistic fervour. They thus deposed their Maltese were also to build and maintain a galley from
king, James, and crowned his brother Frederick as their own pockets for the defence of their island, and
their new king.7 Thus also the Maltese, by implication, which would come to cost around 200 golden uncie.
now came to owe their allegiance to Frederick III. Yet This was an expense which the local population could
James, not prepared to accept this affront, ordered his ill afford; though the Maltese could not really refuse if
leet to attack Pantelleria and then go on to take Malta. they wanted to see a resurgence of Aragonese authority
Thus, the Maltese experienced their irst negative over the neighbouring waters – which by that time had
taste of Aragonese actions when the invading leet plummeted. Thus, the only way to alleviate the burden
disembarked its men, who swooped on the villages, was to move a plea to the Royal Court, which in turn
burning them and seizing the locals; while those who conceded to a downsizing of the contribution to 50
managed to escape from the ire and the plunder were golden uncie.10
then tortured in prison.8 This was the price the Maltese
paid for siding with Frederick. They could not defend The islands could not really enjoy political stability as
themselves; and no one was there to protect them from different kings operated different policies and acted
the incursions and the violence of assailers. The island according to necessities, opportunities, circumstances
was open to attack and each time the inhabitants would and exigencies. This, the Maltese tried to mitigate
invariably have to pay a heavy price in human lives, through periodic delegations and requests to the
animal stock, the destruction of crops, and the loss viceroys in Sicily under whose authority Malta was
of property. The Maltese islands were largely treated placed, and who were the representatives of the
as objects of merchandise. In fact, the Spanish kings Crown of Aragon. With regard to the incolumity of the
regularly relegated Malta to the status of a iefdom, Maltese archipelago which was under constant threat of
with the archipelago changing hands from one feudal Muslim piratical attacks and incursions, one recurrent
60
Sacra Militia
Issue no. 13 - 2014
Aragonese Crown to help them in this pressing need.
One of these requests was forwarded to King Alfonso
V ‘the Magniicent’ via a delegation which presented
this plea to the viceroy in Sicily in 1418.12 The Maltese
petition was accepted and taxes were levied on wine,
on the Malta-Gozo ferryboat service, and on money
borrowing, amongst others, with the funds collected
being earmarked to inance the much-needed tower
on Comino. However, as usually happened during
the Spanish period, promises were broken without
much effort, and this instance was no exception – the
funds accumulated were in fact diverted to Alfonso’s
Mediterranean expansion and Comino would remain a
pirates’ haven for another couple of centuries.13
King Alfonso V
request was that for the curtailment of the practice by
many locals of paying money to the regal authorities
in exchange for an exemption of obligatory guard
duties around the coast. One such instance was that
of 1416 made to Viceroy John. Each year there would
be between 150 and 200 exemptions and this practice
crippled any effective defence of the Maltese islands
while opening them further to severe plundering forays
which not only resulted in looted and destroyed villages
but caused many inhabitants to be taken into slavery
by the invaders. Besides, the castrum maris, the only
defensive structure guarding Malta’s grand harbour and
considered the key to the archipelago, needed repairs
and new equipment if this was to become an effective
and worthy fortiication.11
The neglect in the
defences of the
archipelago was most
manifest on the smaller
island of Comino which
is situated between the
two bigger islands of
Malta and Gozo. This
was a nest for pirates
as these regularly took
shelter within its coves
with their ships without
fear of reprisals. The
Maltese knew that to
fortify this island was
indispensible and they
thus turned to the
Sacra Militia
Issue no. 13 - 2014
The Maltese continued to hope for better outcomes,
even though, realistically, little could be assumed.
Experience indicated, and on-going events repeatedly
conirmed, that Malta was nothing more than a pawn
in the hands of the Spanish kings. A classical case was
the Gonsalvo Monroy episode which took the Maltese
to the verge of sedition when they rebelled against this
feudal lord who had acquired the Maltese islands from
the previous feudal lord, Antonio Cardona, for 30,000
lorins. This situation showed that though the Crown
had promised to keep the Maltese islands within the
Regio Demanio, all these pledges went up in smoke in
1421 when Alfonso granted the islands to Cardona, his
Viceroy in Sicily, against the said sum of money that
the King desperately needed to support his military
campaign against Naples. Cardona soon got his money
back when, four weeks later Malta was transferred
to the Castilian Monroy for the identical amount of
money that had been previously paid to the King.14
The islanders had thus once again been abandoned to
their sorts as was conirmed when the island of Gozo
was attacked for the nth time by a Moorish force in
The Castrum Maris in the Middle Ages,
according to a design by Dr Stephen C. Spiteri
61
1419, in which assault many islanders were taken into
captivity, and then in 1422 when the island of Malta was
attacked twice.15 Monroy’s soldiers had done nothing
to defend the locals and this inertia primed the anger
of the Gozitans who rose in rebellion in 1425. With
the feudal lord turning to the king for help to bring the
rebels back in line, the Maltese council assured their
sovereign that it was doing all it could to bring back
order. However, it also underscored the fact that there
were grievances that needed to be addressed by the
Crown. An evident explosive situation was brewing
and while King Alfonso needed to act, he continued
to procrastinate. The spirit of rebellion soon crossed
the channel and spread among the population of Malta
with the inhabitants blockading Monroy’s wife and his
followers in the castrum maris. For their actions the
Maltese were declared outlaws by Monroy who at this
time occupied the position of Admiral of Sicily and was
one of the important barons of the Reign. The Maltese
through their Universitas turned to the Crown in a plea
to the king to permit them to redeem their country by
paying back the 30,000 lorins, while beseeching him
to grant their fervent wish of being reintegrated within
the Regio Demanio. This request was accepted and by
1428 the Maltese could once again consider themselves
full subjects of the King of Spain. Not only that, but
St Paul galloping on a white horse with Mdina in
the background - a painting by Mattia Preti in the
Cathedral of Mdina commemorating
the 1429 Muslin raid on Malta and the belief by the
Maltese in his intervention to save the island
62
Alfonso also highlighted this reinstatement by calling
Malta Gioiello Eccellente (jewel of the highest order)
while Malta’s capital city became known as Notabile
(notable, worthy).16
As was perhaps to be expected, while the foreign
forces in Malta did not exert themselves unduly to
protect the inhabitants of these islands, they did, on
the other hand, prepare themselves well to protect
the masters of this ief and their property. This comes
out clearly from a list of the armaments which were
found in the castrum maris and which emerges from
the inventories of 1429. Thus the fort at the heart of the
Grand Harbour, under the command of the castellan
who was in charge of the soldiers of the lords of Malta,
had seven bombards, 20 steel bows, 15 wooden bows,
480 kg of rice, 400 kg of cheese, wood, cord, ropes
and medicines.17 Documents show that in 1398 the
castrum has a garrison compliment of one castellan,
one vice-castellan, 20 Catalan soldiers, 10 Sicilian or
Maltese soldiers and another 40 Maltese living in the
castle; with the number luctuating along the following
century.18 However, this was a drop in the ocean when
one considers the amplitude of the persistent threat
faced by the Maltese islands, not least due to their
proximity to the Barbary Coast. As has been observed,
the defensive means which Malta possessed where
never proportionate to the dangers it faced and the only
element which could make up for this deiciency was
the courage of its inhabitants.19 And one case in point
was the 1429 Muslim attack led by Kaid Ridavan who
laid siege to the Maltese capital city of Mdina and was
on the verge of taking it when he abandoned the attack.
Malta had suffered much during this invasion by the
Moorish leet and the inhabitants had to endure many
sacriices.20 It may be that the city of Malta did not fall,
only because it could offer a realistic level of resistance
due to its relatively strong fortiied enceinte which had
been upgraded and reinforced along the years.21 On the
other hand the whole landscape of the Maltese islands,
trampled by around 18,000 troops that poured out of the
70 galleys on which they were transported, was left in a
pitiful state in the wake of their re-embarkation. Many
people ended up in captivity and only those whose
family could muster enough money for a ransom would
eventually manage to return to their homeland, while
the money paid to buy back their freedom drained any
inancial assets Malta had possessed. It is also doubtful
how many of the poorer villagers did in fact ever see
their birthplace again, and much of the land remained
uncultivated for long years given that about a third of
the population that worked it till that fateful year of
1429, were lost forever. The defences were now even
worse than they had already been and inevitably yet
more uncertainty crept among the inhabitants.22
Sacra Militia
Issue no. 13 - 2014
An etching depicting the Ottoman attack on the city of Tripoli
which was under the Order of St John and which was lost in 1551
For Malta, life in the Early Renaissance continued
with little variation, and was generally broken only
by more Moorish attacks in regular and relentless
waves. Maltese petitions to the Sicilian viceroys, as
representatives of the Spanish Crown, were also as
consistently regular as the razzias and the many other
calamities that hit the archipelago devastating both
life and property. Then, in the third decade of the 16th
century, a centuries-old familiar decision was about to
be taken by yet another Spanish King. With the decision
taken in 1524 and materialising in 1530, Charles
I – who was at the same time Holy Roman Emperor
Charles V – Malta’s future was about to change.
The Order of St John takes over Malta
The monastic warrior Order of the Hospitallers had
been ruling Rhodes since 1309. Then, in 1522, after a
six-month siege, the Knights of St John lost their island
home to the Ottoman Turkish forces of Suleiman I ‘the
Magniicent’. Defeated and demoralised, they had to
move out. For years the brethren roamed the European
continent missing a permanent home base which they
could call their Convent. While visiting monarchs all
over the continent, one deputation visited the Court of
Charles V who made an offer which could provide the
Religion with a stable place from where it could rebuild
itself. His proposition was that the Order would take
Sacra Militia
Issue no. 13 - 2014
the city and fortress of Tripoli on the Barbary Coast
together with the islands of Malta and Gozo with all the
dependencies, territories and jurisdictions that belonged
to them. All this, the Knights could enjoy as a perpetual
ief on condition that the Grand Master (binding also
all his successors) swore loyalty to His Majesty and all
the future rulers of the Kingdom of Sicily. The sign of
homage would be the annual presentation of one falcon
on All Saints Day; but there were also many other stiff
conditions which were seen as shackles to the Order’s
freedom of ruling these territories without interference.
Furthermore, giving them Tripoli to administer and
defend – an area in the middle of hostile Muslim
territory – was a responsibility way beyond the Order’s
means at that weak point of its existence.23
The Order procrastinated but did not refuse the offer.
They also asked Pope Clement to intervene on their
behalf so that Charles might alleviate some of the
binding conditions he had imposed with his offer –
which, one may say, was more to the beneit of the
Spanish Crown than to the Order itself. By passing on
Malta to others, the Spanish kings were thus continuing
to play their centuries-old win-win game of keeping
Malta within their realm without having to pay for its
upkeep and protection, yet resting their minds that there
was a trusted vassal administering their property.24
63
the new capital city of Valletta). Together with the city,
town and castle mentioned, about 40 small villages and
hamlets provided dwellings for the 12,000 inhabitants,
most of whom were poor as the barren land did not
yield much produce. According to the commissioners
what redeemed this island were the numerous good
inlets and ports which could serve the Order’s leet,
and it was thus for this reason that they opined that
the Emperor’s offer was not to be outright discarded.25
Grand Master L’Isle Adam who took over the
Maltese island with the Donation of Charles V
Not knowing exactly what to do, and with their minds
still on their beloved Rhodes to which the Order dreamt
it would someday return, a commission was sent to
review the offered territories and draw a report for
the Grand Master and his Council. It is interesting to
examine what was written in this report, as it reveals
what the Spanish were going to be ‘losing’ and the
legacy they would be passing on to the Hospitallers
after more than 200 years of direct Spanish/Sicilian
domination.
On disembarking in Malta, the commissioners
described it as “one continued rock of sandy stone”.
Water was scarce and had to be collected in cisterns;
the soil was very shallow with cereals having to be
imported as these did not grow on the island, while
there was an abundance of igs, melons and other
fruits. The main exports were honey, cumin and cotton
while wood was very scarce and the locals lit their
ires with cow dung and wild thistle. Regarding the
capital city of Mdina, the commissioners noted that this
was sited on a hill in the middle of the island and was
rather dificult to reach as all the terrain around it was
rocky. The defences of the city practically consisted
of a defensive wall with a few towers erected to give
protection to the gates. The only other fortiication
was the castrum maris also known as the castle of St
Angelo, which was situated in Malta’s main port, and
overlooked a town called the Borgo. The principal
harbour of the island was split into two havens by a
peninsula (which would later on become the site for
64
With the observations on the main island of Malta
complete, they then hopped over to the smaller sister
island of Gozo. The commissioners noted that Gozo did
not possess a proper port, and that it was surrounded
by craggy rocks and shelves. There, 5,000 inhabitants
lived and the soil was more fertile than that of Malta.
The people were spread all over the island while for
their protection they had built a castle on the top of a
hill which, however, was badly fortiied and of no real
defensive value. Yet, the commissioners’ advice to the
Council of the Order was that it would not make sense
accepting Malta but not also Gozo. The latter was too
geographically close; were an enemy to land on Gozo
and use it as a base this could prove quite harmful to
Malta. The report also spoke about the town and castle
of Tripoli. In the opinion of the commissioners, to hold
and defend it would simply be a futile effort.26
Having all the details in hand, the Order’s Council
had now to deliberate on what to do next; a Hobson’s
choice really, as there was no other place available.
Up till the Donation was made oficial, the Order had
managed to get some concessions which made the
taking over of Malta, Gozo and Tripoli a little more
bearable and respectable for the Knights. The Donation
of 1530 declared that these territories were given “in
perpetuo Feudo, nobile, libero, e franco”. Also, the
annual falcon which was to be presented to the King
of Sicily, would be “in segno di vera riconoscenza” of
the ief. These developments, together with some other
concessions and the pressing need for a permanent
home, induced the Order into deciding in favour of the
donation being offered by Charles V. Of course they
would have preferred to keep Tripoli out of the bargain
but the royal donor was unbending on this point and
nothing better could by extracted.27
This was the irst stage in the Order’s domination of the
Maltese islands which stretched for 268 years. As one
author put it: “The knights eventually settled at Malta,
at that time a nearly desert island. They made it the seat
of their Order and fortiied it. Its central position in
the Mediterranean made it a stronghold of the utmost
importance.”28 Work on the existing fortifications
started as soon as the Order took Malta, and even before
Sacra Militia
Issue no. 13 - 2014
Grand Master L’Isle Adam had set foot on the island,
when an advanced party of masons and carpenters was
sent to patch up the harbour castle29 which at some
point began to bear the oficial name of St Angelo. It
is known that in the inner castrum there had existed
a chapel dedicated to that saint in the proximity of a
round tower which Sicilian documents indicate as the
Tower of St Angelo.30
On disembarking in Malta, the Grand Master and his
Order brought with them a big dilemma and which
persisted for many years. The question was very
straight and direct: How much should the Knights
invest in an island that was considered by the Order
to be a temporary base? With their minds and hearts
still in Rhodes, this emerged as a licit quandary, and
to which no Knight had, at that particular moment, a
solution. Thus, till 1565, all fortiications and defences
taken up were more or less for the sake of momentary
needs rather than for a permanent and far-seeking
objective. The Order decided that it made more sense
for their actual needs – such as keeping an eye on
their leet – to take up residence in the old fort of St
Angelo and its attached town or borgo.31 The fort was
therefore strengthened enough to make it decently
defendable while buildings in the town were adapted to
the administrative and everyday needs of the confreres.
A defensive ditch was dug between the fort and the
town and then deepened a few years after, while a new
bastion was erected.32 The town was also renovated
with the construction of seven auberges for the different
langues of the Order.33 The city of Malta, Mdina, too
received some initial attention and a new land front was
designed with pentagonal bastions34 so as to provide it
with a feasible chance of defence though nothing of the
sort was done to the Gozo castello, alterations which
had to wait till late in the sixteenth century when a new
land front defensive structure was provided.35
With doing little the Knights were however inviting
trouble. They were now in Malta and their presence
would sooner or later attract attacks by their longtime enemies ordered from the Barbary Coast and the
Ottoman Sultan. One such assault came in 1551 when
a Turkish invading party jointly commanded by Sinan
Pasha and Turgut Reis disembarked 10,000 men to be
contrasted by a local force of 800 men. Though there
was no comparison in strength between the invaders
and the defenders, yet the Turkish commanders did not
feel comfortable risking their troops as these feared that
a stiffer defence may be in the ofing and did not want to
risk being cut off from their leet anchored in one of the
harbours. They thus re-embarked and attacked the sister
island of Gozo instead. Here they found no resistance
worth the name as the castle was defensibly ineffective
and could not realistically resist such a strong force.
The outcome was that practically all the inhabitants of
the island were taken into slavery.36 This was a clear
indication that without strong defences, Malta could
not resist such incursions. Yet, with the Order still
generally bonded to its beloved Rhodes and the hope
that it would, one day, go back there, the inal decision
to settle in Malta and invest all their energy and money
to create a strong base and establish a stable Convent
was kept in abeyance. They did however decide on
building a key fort at the tip of the Sciberras peninsula
which could thus provide some protection to the mouths
of the grand harbour and the small harbour (known as
Marsamxett). The new fortiication was the star-shaped
Fort St Elmo whose irst stone was laid in 1552.37
The turning point in the Order’s mindset came in 1565
with yet another Turkish incursion. This momentous
event inally caused the Order to relect and decide.
The Ottoman attack on Malta, known locally as the
The medieval walls of the main town of Gozo known as the Cittadella which was attacked by
Muslim forces in 1551 and which had little defensive potential
Sacra Militia
Issue no. 13 - 2014
65
Great Siege, was no hit and run affair. It was neither
a two or three-day expedition. It was a fully blown
four-month siege with all the requisites to make it a
battle to the last man. Both sides knew the stakes –
with the Maltese side realising full well that if Malta
was lost, this would mean that Europe would become
vulnerable to an Ottoman attack via Sicily. The siege
was bloody, dirty, and ruthless. Nothing different may
be expected from war and the Great Siege of Malta
was no exception. It was a clash of religions; and a
standoff that had been long coming. It was the Turk
against the Knight; the Muslim Sultan Suleiman against
the Christian Grand Master Jean de Valette. In the
end, the Order and its allies came out the victors and
with the positive outcome Europe, its people and their
monarchs breathed a sigh of relief and lauded Malta
for its heroism.38
The victory, a veritable feat considering the odds, raised
the Order’s status in Europe among both Catholics and
Protestants and gave it that boost of morale it needed
to put behind it once and for all the defeat at Rhodes.39
Psychologically, the confreres led by de Valette could
now face their reality. Propped by its victory and newly
found self-conidence, the Hospitaller Order decided to
take up permanent residence in Malta and to underscore
this decision and seal it, the Grand Master decided to
build a new fortiied city on Mount Sciberras – the
long-identiied site on the tongue of land which split
the port of Malta into two harbours.40
The new city (it was known as Città Nuova to
distinguish it from Mdina which became Città Vecchia)
which was built combined defensive strength with
architectural beauty. So much so that observers and
writers would laud it for both its qualities.41 It was
undoubtedly considered to be a very respectable
fortiication, or as one author would put it “Questa
Cittá è una delle meglio fortiicate di tutta l’Europa,
contribuito avendovi egualmente la Natura, e l’Arte a
renderla tale; e difesa viene all’intorno da parecchi
gran Bastioni…”.42 Designed by the Italian military
engineer Francesco Laparelli and embellished by the
Maltese Giloramo Cassar and many others, Valletta
became the epitome of all Malta.
It was from 1566 that the Order embarked on a relentless
project of buildings and fortiications with the objective
of virtually turning the island of Malta into one
complete and impregnable fortress while also keeping it
architecturally inline with continental Europe. Having
a strong Malta, it was hoped, would deter any further
Ottoman attack and the periodic incursions by their
Barbary Coast allies. It had from early been recognised,
as stated in Spanish oficial documents of the time,
that any Muslim attempt to conquer the stronghold of
Malta would not be an easy task because the invading
forces would have irst needed to overcome the new
city fortress and this was likely to cause them the loss
of many men, time and munitions.43 The more so with
the many other fortiied towns, fortresses, towers,
batteries, and the rest of the fortiications which were
added during the years that the Order would remain
in the Maltese islands (till 1798). Added to the static
A moment during the Great Siege of Malta of 1565 according to Matteo Perez d’Aleccio
66
Sacra Militia
Issue no. 13 - 2014
defensive structures, the
Order also made eficient
use of its advanced line of
defences. This consisted
of a small but expert
fleet which was highly
mobile and skillfully
manoeuvred; a veritable
war machine dreaded
by all those who had to
confront it. The naval
units were well-known
for their audacity and
effective results – an
added asset to an already
nearly impregnable
island-fortress.44
Matteo Perez d’Aleccio’s artistic reportage of the building of the
However, things
new city for Malta which was named Valletta
were changing in the
Mediterranean region. Many countries that had been
sworn enemies for centuries were slowly turning into
commercial and trading allies. This trend, dictated by
new political and economic realities and exigencies,
went back to the 1530s when a peace treaty was signed
between the French king and the Turkish sultan and
which was regularly renewed. The Barbary States
George Cassar is Senior Lecturer in the Institute
and many countries in Europe soon followed suit and
for Tourism, Travel and Culture (ITTC) of the
this meant that hostility between once archenemies
University of Malta. He is a historical sociologist
gradually faded out with attacks from Muslims on
45
whose main research interests include the History
Christian territories becoming evermore rare. This
and Sociology of Education; the Pedagogy of
systematically isolated Hospitaller Malta from a sizable
Heritage, Heritage Interpretation, the History
part of the Christian world in that few were seeking
of History Teaching; the Study of the Order of
to ight or attack Turkish and Muslim shipping with
St John (SMOM); the History and Culture of
cooperation becoming the order of the day. The Order
Malta; Heritage and Culture; Cultural Tourism;
now needed to ind other raisons d’être if it were to
and, the Culture and Sociology of Food. He is the
continue to exist in a meaningful way. Malta had by the
author or editor of numerous books and academic
eighteenth century become nearly impenetrable but the
journals, and has published numerous papers in
former eternal enemies were now too much focussed
journals and chapters in books related to his areas
on other activities to even dream of attacking the small
of interest. Comm. Dr Cassar is a member of the
island in the middle of the Mediterranean. Other powers
Research Coordinating Committee of the V.18
were now eyeing and vying for a foothold and these
– Valletta European Capital of Culture 2018 –
were all from the European fold.
representing the University of Malta. The Grand
Master of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta
In 1798 the irst serious and fatal assault for many
conferred on him the award of ‘Commendatore
years took place on the island, and it came from
pro Merito Melitensi’.
Revolutionary France, but that is a new historical page.
Notes and references
1 F.M, Pagano, Istoria dell’regno di Napoli, ii (Palermo, 1835), 359.
2 F. Capecelatro, ‘Dell’istoria della città e regno di Napoli detto di Sicilia’, Biblioteca Enciclopedica Italiana, XV (Milano,
1831), 564.
3 P. Sardina, ‘Lancia (Lanza) Manfredi’, Dizionario Biograico degli Italiani, 63 (2004), Treccani.it Enciclopedia Italiana,
available at: http://www.treccani.it/enciclopedia/manfredi-lancia_(Dizionario_Biograico)/ (accessed 12 Jan 2014).
Sacra Militia
Issue no. 13 - 2014
67
4 R. Muntaner, Cronache catalane del secolo XIII e XIV; una di Raimondo Muntaner, l’altra di Bernardo d’Esclot, transl.
in Italian by F. Mois̀ (Firenze, 1843), 244.
5 F. Giunta, ‘Sicilia e Tunisi nei secoli XIV e XV’, Medioevo Mediterraneo: saggi storici (Palermo, 1954), 153, in A.P.
Vella, Storja ta’ Malta, i (Malta, 1974), 119.
6 G. Ninfa, Malta nel periodo degli Aragonesi (1282-1416), Doc. IV, 1292, in Vella, 119.
7 F. Savelli, ‘Il meridione d’Italia – Angioino e Aragonese’ (2012), available at: http://cronologia.leonardo.it/umanita/slavi/
cap109c.htm (accessed 12 Jan 2014).
8 R. Valentini, ‘La sopravvivenza della Universitas Melivetana ino alla cessazione delle infeudazioni dell’isola’, Archivio
Storico di Malta, vii/1 (1935-36), 42.
9 See details of feudal lords and regal concessions in, P. de Jove y Hevia, Indagaciones acerca de la Dominación de España
en Malta de 1285 a 1530: Con inserción de documentos auténticos y en su mayor parte inéditos (Madrid, 1863).
10 R. Valentini, ‘Gli ultimi re Aragonesi ed i primi Castigliani a Malta’, Archivio Storico di Malta, vii/4 (1935-36), 411-2.
11 Ibid., 431-2; Vella, 128.
12 For the original document see, S. Giambruno and L. Genuardi, Capitoli inediti delle città demaniali di Sicilia approvati
sino al 1458 (Palermo, 1918), 382-9. See also, Vella, 129.
13 G.A. Vassallo, Storia di Malta (Malta, 1854), 117.
14 G. Wettinger, ‘The pawning of Malta to Monroy’, Melita Historica, vii/3 (1978), 265-283.
15 A. Mifsud, ‘Le franchigie costituzionali alfonsiane e l’invasione dei Mori del 1429 nella compilazione della storia di
Malta’, Archivium Melitense, iii/8 (1918-1919), 312.
16 G.F. Abela, Della Descrittione di Malta isola nel mare siciliano con le sue antichità, ed altre notitie (Malta, 1647), 288-90.
17 H. Bresc, ‘The ‘Secrezia’ and the Royal Patrimony’, A.T. Luttrell (ed.), Medieval Malta: Studies on Malta before the
Knights (London, 1975), 140.
18 S. Fiorini, ‘Id-Dejma, il-Maħras and the defence of the Maltese Islands in the late medieval and early modern times’,
Sacra Militia, 2 (2003), 25.
19 Vassallo, 218, 219, 238.
20 Mifsud, (1918-1919), 321.
21 S.C. Spiteri, ‘The ‘Castellu di la Chitati’ the medieval castle of the walled town of Mdina’, ARX – online journal of military
architecture, 1-4 (2004-7), 3-11, available at: http://www.militaryarchitecture.com/Arx/arx1_4_2008.pdf (accessed 21
Jan 2014).
22 C. Dalli, Malta: The Medieval Millenium (Malta, 2006), 235-6.
23 G. Bosio, Dell’Istoria della Sacra Religione et ill.ma Militia di San Giovanni Gierosolimitano, iii (Rome, 1602), 26-7.
24 Vella, 185-6.
25 Abbe de Vertot, The History of the Knights of Malta, ii (London, 1728), 18-9.
26 Ibid., 19.
27 Bosio, 80-1.
28 Lord Eversley, The Turkish Empire: its growth and decay (London, 1917), 118.
29 S.C. Spiteri, Fortresses of the Cross (Malta, 1994), 262.
30 Ibid., 291.
31 A. Hoppen, The Fortiication of Malta by the Order of St John (Edinburgh, 1979), 24.
32 Q. Hughes & C. Thake, Malta: The Baroque Island (Malta, 2003), 49.
33 Ibid., 51.
34 Ibid., 54.
35 Ibid., 55.
36 G. Cassar, ‘The suffering of the innocent: wartime violence and the common people – the case of the Great Siege of Malta
of 1565’, History Research, 3/2 (2013), 81.
37 Spiteri, (1994), 345-6.
38 For the various aspects of the Great Siege of Malta cf., G. Cassar (ed.), The Great Siege 1565: Separating fact from iction
(Malta, 2005). For a plea to all the European powers in support of Malta after the 1565 Siege cf., G. Bugeja, Invocazione
di Malta (Una poesia del XVI secolo) (Malta, 2000); G. Bugeja, ‘The Great Siege of 1565 and Giano Pelusio’s Ad
proceres Christianos cohortatio’, G. Cassar (ed.), From the Great Siege to the Battle of Lepanto: the life and times of
Malta and the Order of St John 1565-1571 (Malta, 2011), 1-44.
39 H. Nicholson, The Knights Hospitaller (Woodbridge, 2001), 124.
40 G. Cassar, ‘Jean de la Valette and Pietro de Monte: two grand masters, one mission’, in G. Cassar (ed.), From the Great
Siege to the Battle of Lepanto: the life and times of Malta and the Order of St John 1565-1571 (Malta, 2011), 176-7.
41 For a summary of appreciations see, A. Ganado, Valletta Città Nuova: A map history (1566-1600) (Malta, 2003), 463-6.
42 G. Albrizzi, Lo stato presente di tutti i paesi, e popoli del mondo naturale, politico, e morale, con nuove osservazioni e
corresioni degli antichi e moderni viaggiatori, xxiv (Venice, 1762), 173.
43 Archivo General de Simanca, Estado, 1144, leg. 218, in F. Menchetti, Architects and Knights; Italian inluence in Malta
during the Late Renaissance (Malta, 2013), 78.
44 See for example, J. Muscat & A. Cuschieri, Naval activities of the Knights of St John 1530-1798 (Malta, 2002), ch. IV.
45 Hoppen, 156-7.
68
Sacra Militia
Issue no. 13 - 2014