ETHICS IN CARDIOTHORACIC SURGERY
Saving Lives Is More Important Than Abstract
Moral Concerns: Financial Incentives Should Be
Used to Increase Organ Donation
Benjamin Hippen, MD, Lainie Friedman Ross, MD, PhD, and Robert M. Sade, MD
Metrolina Nephrology Associates and Carolinas Medical Center, Charlotte, North Carolina; Departments of Pediatrics, Medicine,
and Surgery, MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois; Division of Cardiothoracic
Surgery and Institute of Human Values in Health Care, Medical University of South Carolina, Charleston, South Carolina
E
ver since organ donation became clinically feasible,
there have not been enough organs to go around.
Figure 1 shows the rate of change from a base value in
1995 through 2008, of three variables: (1) the number of
deceased donors, (2) the number of patients with endstage organ failure who are waiting for an organ, and (3)
the number of waiting list patients who either die before
an organ becomes available (ie, death on the waiting list
or after removal from the waiting list as “too sick to
transplant”) [1]. The number of potential recipients on
transplant waiting lists has more than doubled, and now
stands at over 100,000, whereas the number of deceased
donors has increased by only half. Meanwhile, the numbers of deaths related to the organ shortage, which is now
greater than 9,000 a year, has grown in parallel with the
waiting list. Thus, the gap between supply and demand
has grown every year for the past 15 years.
Approximately two thirds of the waiting list patients
suffer from end-stage renal disease. Because the kidney is
a paired organ, living individuals can donate one kidney,
and several thousand donate every year, mostly to relatives with whom they have an emotional bond.
The problem underlying the organ gap is not a lack of
medically suitable organs from patients dying from severe brain damage; if all such patients became donors,
the waiting list would shrink rapidly, yet only half of
potential deceased donors actually donate, and many
potential living donors are medically unsuitable or are
unwilling to donate, so not enough organs are donated to
satisfy the need for them.
How can we increase the number of donors? When a
difficult or dangerous job has to be done, such as working
on high-rise construction projects, we give workers an
added incentive to take these jobs by offering them more
benefits, such as salary supplements. Perhaps offering a
financial incentive for organ donation would increase the
number of willing donors. But if offering people financial
incentives could increase the supply of organs, should we
do it? Would it be morally appropriate?
Presented at the Forty-fifth Annual Meeting of The Society of Thoracic
Surgeons, San Francisco, CA, Jan 26 –28, 2009.
Address correspondence to Dr Sade, Medical University of South Carolina, 96 Jonathan Lucas St, Suite 409, MSC 612, Charleston, SC 29425;
e-mail: sader@musc.edu.
© 2009 by The Society of Thoracic Surgeons
Published by Elsevier Inc
Kidneys are by far the most common transplants and
can come from either a deceased donor (two kidneys) or
from a living donor (one kidney). Making the case for
providing financial incentives to living donors is much
more difficult than for deceased donors, so if that case
can be made, the arguments can cover virtually all
donations, from both living and deceased donors. Although this is a cardiothoracic surgery journal, the current debate centers on living donors of kidneys. This is
more appropriate than might be obvious at first, because
the arguments for and against financial incentives for
organ donation can be generalized easily to both living
and deceased donors, and therefore these can apply to
the therapies of most immediate concern to cardiothoracic surgeons (ie, heart and lung transplantations).
The debate is rendered more concrete by focusing on
the case of a United States senator who has a decision
to make.
The Case of the Conscientious Senator
Senator Alexis Murray is a member of the Senate’s
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions,
which is holding a hearing on a bill that will permit
payment of up to $10,000 plus in reimbursement for
expenses to living kidney, liver, or lung donors. Senator
Murray listened to testimony by a few individuals and by
representatives of organizations that either support or
oppose the bill. He is particularly struck by the story told
by George Cranford, a computer repair technician.
Mr Cranford’s 25-year-old daughter, Karen, has diabetic nephropathy and has suffered from end-stage renal
disease for 5 years. On renal dialysis, she has had
frequent bloodstream infections, several of which have
been nearly fatal. She is currently hospitalized, recovering from her latest methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus infection. The recurrence rate of such infections is
high, and the mortality rate is between 50% and 75%.
Karen is an only child; her parents and other relatives are
unsuitable to donate a kidney. She is waiting for an organ
from a deceased donor, but her place on the waiting list
makes it likely that she will be among the 9,000 patients
who die each year because of the shortage of organs for
transplantation.
Mr Cranford has several friends and acquaintances
who have said they have considered donating a kidney
Ann Thorac Surg 2009;88:1053– 61 • 0003-4975/09/$36.00
doi:10.1016/j.athoracsur.2009.06.087
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Fig 1. Relative change (from 1988 baseline
data) in the number of patients on organ
waiting lists, deaths on the waiting list, and
number of donors each year, 1988 –2008.
Graph derived from Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network data [1].
for Karen, but have decided not to do so because of
concerns for lost income from time away from work, the
possibility of losing their jobs, possible health consequences from having only one kidney, and the stress,
pain, and physical risks of the donor operation. He
expresses the belief that these concerns could be outweighed by the offer of an award of some kind, such as
payment for health insurance, an income tax credit, or
cash payment of a few thousand dollars. If some of his
friends and perhaps many others around the country
could be persuaded by such incentives to donate a vital
organ, thousands of lives could be saved each year.
Senator Murray is impressed by the story, but is
concerned about potential negative consequences of permitting a market in human organs. After the hearing, he
seeks the advice of two thoughtful physician-ethicists,
Benjamin Hippen, MD, and Lainie Friedman Ross, MD,
PhD.
Pro
Benjamin Hippen, MD
T
he number of people with kidney failure in the
United States is increasing. By 2010 it is expected
to be 591,000, with more than 80,000 patients waiting
for a kidney transplant [2]. Incremental improvements
in immunosuppression have rendered kidney transplantation a superior therapeutic modality for more
and more patients with kidney failure. Unfortunately,
despite our best efforts, the supply of transplantable
kidneys has not and will not keep up with the growing
demand.
The current state of affairs is responsible for several
unintended, but foreseeable, consequences. Longer waiting times for transplant candidates result in patients who
are sicker at the time of transplantation. This factor,
combined with an increased reliance on extended criteria
donors (ie, marginal donors), results in inferior graft
survival. Longer waiting times also serve to increase
emotional pressure on any available living donor. Longer
waiting times and few available options have contributed
to an upsurge in international organ trafficking. This
combination of factors erodes trust in the transplant
community as a whole. In 2006, the federal government
spent $22.7 billion dollars on end-stage renal disease, of
which only $2.2 billion was spent on kidney transplantation, yet the 5-year survival with a successful kidney
transplant is more than double the survival conferred by
dialysis.
Various solutions to this problem have either proven to
be inadequate or are unlikely to succeed. The majority of
people with kidney disease die from cardiovascular complications before reaching end stage; therefore, improvements in preventive strategies that increase survival after
heart attacks and strokes will permit more people to live
long enough for their kidneys to fail, which in turn will
increase the demand for transplantable organs [3]. Despite the aggressive efforts of the Organ Donor Collaborative to increase the number of available organs, the
total number of procured organs during the last 10 years
has been flat relative to the growing demand and a
sizeable fraction of “new” organs, which are from extended criteria donors. These organs afford shorter graft
survival, increasing the likelihood that recipients of these
kidneys will return to dialysis. A policy of involuntary
organ conscription is morally problematic, and countries
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that have such policies ensconced in law have not been
able to successfully procure more organs than countries
that rely on consent for donation [4].
The costs of this public policy failure is high, measurable in the unnecessary loss of human life, the vast
expenditure of public treasure on a suboptimal therapy
(dialysis), and the spread of desperation among waiting
recipients and their families. This state of affairs supports
arguments in favor of pilot trials of incentives to increase
organ procurement from living donors.
The central argument in favor of incentives is patient
autonomy. Free societies typically do not interfere with
competent adults making choices that affect their lives
and do not significantly harm themselves or others. Free
societies rely on this principle for ethically defensible
uncompensated living donation and (rightly) look
askance at those who would abridge this liberty. Opponents of a regulated market in organs encourage us to
view this proposal through the lens of the manifest
harms to vendors and recipients who participate in
underground organ trafficking, without lingering on the
fact that organ trafficking in developing countries would
not be economically sustainable, except for the shortage
of available organs in developed countries. Because organ trafficking continues unfettered by existing laws
prohibiting the practice, those who are authentically
committed to reducing organ trafficking can find the
most straightforward solution in reducing the incentive
for recipients in wealthy, developed countries to economically support trafficking. Our public policy failure merely
ensures the continued health of international organ trafficking abroad.
Regulated organ markets also may be safer than the
current system of living donation. It is true, but trivially
so, that organ donors become, in some sense, a patient.
The obligations that physicians have to their patients
would not change because some donors are compensated
and others are not. The existing literature on donor
outcomes, however incomplete, nonetheless, supports
the premise that donating a kidney is safe for the long
term [5]. By vastly expanding the number of potential
living donors, one can cherry-pick to identify people who
everyone agrees would be at the lowest risk for long-term
harm from donation. Incentives would also helpfully
eliminate the psychological pressures brought to bear on
living donors, borne of their recipient’s desperate plight.
Far from suppressing altruism, the authentic altruism of
those who still choose to donate (uncompensated) would
thereby be clarified and preserved.
In itself, low socioeconomic status is an independent
risk factor for the development of kidney disease over
time, a fact which constitutes sufficient reason to exclude
the poorest among us from participation in organ vending (or for that matter, in living organ donation). Exclusion of the very poor is justified not because poor donors
and vendors are somehow incapable of autonomous
judgment. For example, the poor should not be prohibited from voting in elections for political candidates who
proffer the “coercive offer” of improving the economic lot
of the poor. Rather, exclusion is justified because the
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purpose of a regulated market in organs is to increase the
number of available organs without increasing harm to
others. The “right to sell” does not impose an “obligation
to buy,” and the interests of all involved entail an
exchange that benefits recipients without harming
sellers.
Any system of incentives requires regulation and oversight, and it is a caricature to suppose that there is a
contradiction between free exchange and the strictures of
law. Law outlines the conceptual space for articulating
obligations to donors and vendors, and the law explains
the means whereby the legitimacy and enforcement of
these obligations are possible. Among the necessary
protections to be included would be the assurances of
safety for both donors and recipients; transparency in
regard to the risk of a living kidney donation for both the
compensated and uncompensated donors; institutional
integrity to protect donors, recipients, healthcare providers, and institutions who choose to participate or abstain
from compensation arrangements; and the rule of law, to
define how the arrangements for exchange could take
place for mutual benefit [6].
These protections morally distinguish a regulated system of incentives for organ procurement from the significant harms generated by organ trafficking, and they
would provide a useful guide to the construction of pilot
trials for incentives in this country, as well as a means of
assessing the conditions in other countries. Along these
lines, the United States has something to learn from Iran,
which is the only country in the world with a legal
pseudo-market in organs from living donors, and the
22-year legacy of that institution provides useful lessons
and cautionary tales [7]. No evidence is perfect, but the
peer-reviewed evidence we have from several sources
supports the following facts: (1) for the last decade, Iran
has not had a waiting list for transplantable kidneys; (2)
the long-term outcomes of recipients of purchased organs is not significantly different from the outcomes of
recipients of donated kidneys (a useful surrogate marker
for the health of organ vendors); (3) the existence of a
flourishing market has not resulted in attrition of the
number of kidneys donated by biological relatives; and
(4) uncompensated organ donation from the deceased
has increased 10-fold since 2000, when laws recognizing
brain-death as death were approved by the Iranian
Parliament. On the other hand, the following is also true:
(1) organ vendors are disproportionately impoverished
and poorly educated; (2) the data on long-term outcomes
for organ vendors is conflicting and mixed, but at any
rate it is substantially incomplete. It does not follow that
a system of incentives inexorably leads to bad outcomes
for vendors. What does follow is that a defensible system
of incentives must offer plausible assurances that the
long-term consequences for organ vendors are at least as
safe as for organ donors.
A broader view of what might constitute “compensation” will be instrumentally useful in beginning to provide some of these assurances. Compensations need not
be limited only to cash payment. Providing a nonfungible, lifelong, comprehensive healthcare benefit for do-
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nors would intersect with the desire of the transplant
community for a long-term, prospective study of outcomes after donation. Compensation might take the form
of a deposit in a donor’s health savings account, retirement account, favorite charity, or any number of possible
permutations. The specific nature of the incentive is less
important than the following: (1) a successfully functioning incentive by making more organs available, and (2)
an incentive that would not give rise to further harms [8].
The point is that our current system brings harm to
recipients who are dying by the thousands every year on
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a waiting list, harm to donors who (correctly) understand
the dire consequences of their choice not to donate for
their recipient, and harm to legions of victims of organ
trafficking who silently shoulder the true costs of our
ongoing public policy failure. Incentives can be structured in a way to decisively answer moral objections.
Whether the transplant community and our political
leaders see fit to understand this point in practice, or
whether the needless suffering and economic boondoggle of the status quo will simply continue, remains an
open question.
Con
Lainie Friedman Ross, MD, PhD
W
e are posed with the hypothetical case of a senator
who is considering a bill that will permit payment
for living donors. The case may not be purely hypothetical, since the bill was introduced into the United States’
Senate in 2008 [9]. Our hypothetical senator is particularly struck by the story told by George Cranford, a
computer repair technician whose 25-year-old daughter,
Karen, has end-stage renal disease and is currently doing
poor on dialysis while waiting for a deceased donor
organ. According to Mr Cranford, several friends and
acquaintances would donate a kidney for Karen, but they
have declined to do so because of concerns of lost income
from time away from work, the possibility of losing their
jobs, the possible health consequences from having only
one kidney, and the stress, pain, and risks of the donation. Mr Cranford expresses the belief that these concerns could be outweighed by the offer of a financial
reward of some kind.
Karen’s story is sad, but so is the story of every individual
in end-stage renal disease on dialysis. In addition, there
are many such cases, because the demand for solid
organs for transplantation greatly exceeds the supply.
Despite two decades of attempts to increase the organ
donor supply, the gap is growing [10]. This gap is
growing despite some real increases in the deceased
donor supply due to policies, such as required request
policies, first-person consent registries, the acceptance of
expanded criteria donors, and donation after cardiac
death [10]. For some organs, a significant increase in
supply has occurred with the greater acceptance of the
role of living donors. Although the number of kidneys
available for transplantation has grown significantly
since 1988, (ie, in 1997, there were 7,774 deceased donor
kidneys and 3,929 living donors compared with 10,588
deceased donor kidneys and 6,041 living donors in 2007)
[11], the demand is still growing faster. Although there
were 35,526 patients listed at the end of 1997, there were
66,961 at the end of 2006 [12]. The waiting list surpassed
100,000 in 2009 [13]. This growth in the waiting list can be
explained by: (1) the success of modern medicine to keep
people alive long enough for their kidneys to fail; (2) an
inadequate supply of deceased donor organs; (3) an
expanded criteria for eligibility onto the organ waiting
list; (4) our aging population; and (5) very significantly,
some of our lifestyle choices (the obesity epidemic has
contributed to a dramatic rise in diabetes and hypertension, which are the two main risk factors for renal
failure).
Although the National Organ Transplant Act made it
illegal to buy or sell organs in the United States in 1984
[14], and the World Health Organization recommended a
similar ban in 1991 [15] (that was reaffirmed in 2008) [16],
support for a kidney market has blossomed in the past
decade [17–23]. In this article, I argue that the market is
not an ethical solution to the organ shortage. I argue this
position using the bioethical framework developed by
Beauchamp and Childress [24]. Although Matas [21] has
used these principles to argue why a market is ethical, I
show why he and other pro-marketers have misrepresented these principles.
The Four Principles
In the book titled the Principles of Bioethics, Beauchamp
and Childress [24] explicate four fundamental principles
of bioethics: (1) autonomy, (2) beneficence, (3) nonmaleficence, and (4) justice. The principle of autonomy (or more
accurately, the principle of respect for autonomy) refers
to the right of self-determination. In medical ethics, we
say that the competent patient (an individual who has
decision-making capacity) has the right to accept or
refuse medical care, even lifesaving medical care. The
principle of beneficence addresses the obligation of physicians to act in their patient’s best interest, whereas the
principle of nonmaleficence states that physicians should
avoid, when possible, harming a patient. Neither of these
principles is absolute in that we often cause some harm
with our treatments, with chemotherapy for cancer being
a case in point. Rather, these principles are understood to
mean that the benefits should outweigh the risks of harm.
Ann Thorac Surg
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The fourth principle, the principle of justice, is the
most complicated one, because it refers to obligations
beyond the doctor–patient relationship. Jonsen and colleagues [25] discuss the importance of justice in policy
decisions, but that it should not be used to make distribution decisions at the bedside. There are two main
competing conceptions of justice in medical ethics: (1)
utilitarian justice and (2) deontological or principle-based
justice [24, 26]. Utilitarian justice focuses on utility or
efficiency. A distribution scheme of organs is just if it
maximizes the number of lives or the number of lifeyears gained. That is, the focus is on maximizing the
well-being of the greatest number. In contrast, egalitarian justice focuses on equity and a fair distribution of
resources, even at the expense of efficiency. In general, in
the realm of organ transplantation, the practice has been
to use policies and practices that balance equity and
efficiency [26]. For example, the current deceased donor
allocation system focuses on ABO blood type matching
(efficiency) and on waiting time (equity).
Consider then how the supporters of a market for
kidneys would use the four principles to justify the
position that Mr Cranford’s colleagues should receive a
$10,000 incentive to serve as Amy’s kidney donor. First,
they would argue that the principle of autonomy means
that individuals have the right to do as they please with
their own bodies. As long as a vendor sells his kidneys
voluntarily, without coercion, he should be free to do so
[27, 28]. Beneficence also supports a market because
thousands of individuals die each year on the kidney
transplant waiting list so physicians are acting in their
patient’s best interest by allowing the sale of kidneys [29].
Although the principle of nonmaleficence may argue
against kidney sales, the supporters of a market note that
we allow emotionally-related living donors to donate
their kidneys. If the risks to kidney donors are considered
acceptable when given voluntarily, then the risks do not
change when money is involved [21]. Finally, they point
out that a utilitarian conception of justice would support
any means to increase organ procurement and save lives.
Therefore, if the market will reduce the organ shortage
and there are good reasons to believe it will [30, 31],
then a market is moral. They do not deny that inequalities exist, but argue that the market will allow individuals with fewer resources to try to improve their
situation by vending their kidneys through a voluntary
market [29, 32].
So where is the fallacy in their arguments? First, let us
look at the principle of autonomy. The principle of
autonomy is not absolute, as with all guiding bioethics
principles [24, 33]. There are moral constraints on autonomy. As Oliver Wendell Holmes remarked, “The right to
swing my fist ends where the other man’s nose begins
[34].” That is, one moral constraint on autonomy is harm
to others. But the harm to the organ vendor is to himself,
not to others, except insofar as one believes that we as a
society are worse off if we allow vulnerable individuals to
sell their body parts on the grounds of commodification
[35]. The argument from commodification holds that
market valuation has a degrading effect on certain goods
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and practices if they are bought and sold, even if fair
bargaining positions exist (a most unlikely position).
But we do place limits on autonomy to protect individuals from themselves. For example, we do not allow
individuals to sell themselves into slavery. Part of the
argument is the moral dignity of the individual [36, 37],
part of the argument is the concern that the individual is
not acting voluntarily or is being coerced due to circumstances that are unjust [35]. Respect for autonomy, which
is the real principle articulated by Beauchamp and Childress [24], permits one to challenge an individual’s decision when it is contrary to the individual’s best interest.
There are many reasons why an individual may make a
decision that is contrary to their interests: misinformation, miscalculation, coercion, or even undue influence
(an offer that seems too good to be true). Thus, to the
extent that one believes that individuals who are willing
to sell their kidneys are not acting voluntarily, it would be
morally imperative to prohibit them from doing so.
Another moral constraint on the vendor’s autonomy is
the need for third party participation. Even if an individual were to argue that he has the right to sell his kidney,
the transplant surgeon is also a moral agent who has the
right to say that I am not willing to harm you for financial
ends. Yes, I may be willing to perform the same procedure if you were giving it to your brother freely without
constraints, but my personal integrity prohibits me from
maiming your body purely for economic gain [38].
What is interesting about the autonomy debate, however, is that all of the market supporters do not discuss a
free market. The debate in the United States regarding a
market in organs assumes the current financing of transplants to ensure that this debate does not become one in
which only the rich can buy organs [39]. That is, the
government buys kidneys from poor people to pay for
kidney transplants for the rich and poor alike! It is
economically savvy of the government to do this because
under the End-Stage Renal Disease program of the Medicare Act of 1972, the government extends Medicare coverage to greater than 90% of Americans if they have
permanent kidney failure and require dialysis or transplantation to live. Becker and Elias [40] have shown that
a price tag of $20,000 is fair in the United States, given the
risks of morbidity and mortality, but a reward of up to
$90,000 would still be cost-saving [41].
Ignoring the financing, the proponents of an organ
market reject a free market (on grounds of its potential to
be exploitative) and focus instead on a regulated market,
and then often a regulated market restricted to United
States citizen vendors [23, 42– 44]. It is not clear if those
who promote this believe they are protecting recipients
or vendors. The answer is probably both. They are
protecting recipients because of the greater risks of
infectious diseases in potential vendors abroad [45, 46].
They claim to be protecting the vendors because a
market price of $10,000 in the United States would bring
hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of individuals
from third-world countries for whom the dollar amount
would be undue inducement. If vendors were not restricted to citizens of the United States, then the market
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value could fall to less than $1,000 [30]. This may not be a
large enough incentive for Mr Cranford’s friends, but
$1,000 could go a long way in China and India. In
addition, if this is the only way for the individual to
escape poverty, it is not clear how our protection helps
them. The same arguments regarding the opportunity to
escape poverty should hold true for citizens in the United
States who are poor and for poor citizens of China and
India.
Yet there is something offensive to the United States
government buying kidneys abroad. We exploited Asia
and Africa for their natural resources of gold and oil in
the 20th century, and we could exploit them for their
kidneys and liver lobes in the 21st century. However, if
the argument were about unconstrained autonomy, we
may not have a good counter argument. The fact is that
the debate is not about unconstrained autonomy. Rather,
autonomy must be understood within a social context,
and now we must be concerned about exploitation [35,
47]; when people buy and sell things under conditions of
severe inequality, the selling is not voluntary. The reason
to restrict the market to legal residents in the United
States is the acknowledgement of global economic injustices that exist. In a global market, we can not ensure that
the organ sale respects the autonomy of the vendors
because of the high risk of exploitation. Although, once it
is legal to buy and sell organs in the United States, it will
be difficult to prevent sales across borders [45].
It is also the case that autonomy must be understood
within a social context. In a society in which great
disparities exist in wealth and opportunities, the claim
that poor people should have the right to sell their kidney
as one more option to escape poverty [32] denies any
social responsibility we may have to prevent such a tragic
option. Rivera-Lopez eloquently explains, “When we feel
that the rest of us are (even minimally) responsible for
that behavior [willingness to sell a kidney because of
poverty], we have lost the moral authority to justify the
permission of that behavior by appeal to an alleged
concern for the autonomy of the individual or for the
well-being of the community” [48].
The argument that beneficence requires physicians to
help treat the thousands of patients in organ failure at
any price also fails. First, we must remember that in
transplantation with living sources, the vendor or donor
becomes a patient as well [49]. It is not the case that
taking an organ in a setting of exploitation is acting in the
vendor’s best interest. This argument also ignores the
fact that the whole focus of organ failure is about how to
procure more organs without consideration of our failure
in the public health and preventive health mission to
reduce organ failure in the first place. In Iran, where
kidney vendors are legal, supporters acknowledge that
there is no long-term follow-up of the kidney vendors
and that that the program, as Ghods and Savaj explain,
“neither has enough life-changing potential nor has
enough long-term compensatory effect, resulting in longterm dissatisfaction of some donors” [31].
The concerns of harm (nonmaleficence) can not be
pushed aside on the grounds that we take kidneys from
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family members and view the harms as acceptable. As
previously explained, the principles of beneficence and
nonmaleficence must be understood in tandem and evaluated as benefit-to-harm ratio. Then, here is why there
may be a difference between exposing a paid kidney
vendor to the risks of surgery and long-term psychological and clinical risks of unilateral nephrectomy compared with the altruistic donor. That is, we believe that
the altruistic donor gains significant psychological benefits by aiding an emotionally related family member or
friend [50, 51]. In contrast, data (from Iran and India)
show that the paid vendors do not reap the benefits they
expected (improved financial circumstances) [52, 53]; in
fact, data show they experience many emotional and
social harms in the stigma that they face for having sold
a part of their body [52, 53].
Those who support an organ market argue that it is
consistent with a utilitarian conception of justice that
seeks to maximize the greatest good for the greatest
number. It is consistent, however, only if we assume that
the current crisis in end-stage renal failure is inevitable.
A utilitarian conception of justice could be interpreted to
require a greater focus on prevention to maximize benefit
(prevention or delay of renal failure) and minimize harm
(by obviating the need to have living donors in the first
place).
Even if we assume the current state of affairs, many
justice theorists reject utilitarianism because of a theory
limited to maximizing good consequences that could
allow for significant harm to specific subpopulations.
That is, it could be allowed for one adult to sacrifice
himself to serve as an organ donor for 10 individuals on
the waiting list for financial gain to his next of kin. Worse
yet, it might justify lotteries in which individuals were
sacrificed to maximize the well-being of 10 individuals
per sacrifice! Rather, most justice theorists would argue
that in organ transplantation, as in many areas of medicine, we need to consider the distribution of goods and
not just the maximization of goods [26, 54]. One widely
accepted theory of egalitarian justice was developed by
John Rawls [54]. It would permit policies that increase
organ transplantation using living vendors if this policy
would be accepted behind a veil of ignorance where one
was not aware of one’s personal traits but did have
knowledge of the social and political state of affairs.
Behind the veil of ignorance, an individual would know
that demand for organs greatly outstripped supply. Behind the veil, the rational Rawlsian individual would
adopt policies to increase organ transplants provided
that the new policies were not harmful to those who are
already “worse off” [54]. A market in organs would be
most attractive to those who are poor without other
alternatives. Then, Rawlsian justice would judge those
who are willing to vend as some of the “worst off”
members of society. Such a market would be exploitative
and not permissible [54]. The market proponents who
seek to restrict the kidney market to citizens of the United
States are conceding this point. They are failing to
acknowledge that if this practice were to be legalized in
the United States, then other countries could quickly
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2009;88:1053– 61
follow suit, and it would be hard to restrict trade across
borders. Even if we could restrict border trades, we could
be doing great harm to the “worst off” in poor countries
who may now feel that this is an opportunity that they
cannot resist, even if it leaves them no better off in the
long-run.
Furthermore, distributive justice in organ allocation
must not only account for fairness in this generation but
in future generations. An organ market may take away
many of the incentives that we have (and already fail to
use) to focus on prevention. Therefore, although a market
may achieve society gains by improving the life-years of
those individuals already on dialysis, society may be
harmed overall if more people need a kidney transplant.
This includes the vendors, the recipients who no longer
fear loss of an organ because there is an abundance of
organs, and society at large who fail to use the preventive
methods that are known to be effective in reducing
kidney failure (eg, control of diabetes, hypertension, and
obesity).
Conclusion
Although proponents try to use the “Four Principles of
Bioethics” to support a market in organs, I have shown
that the four principles, when properly operationalized,
do not support a market. Rather, I have shown that the
pro-market interpretation fails to understand that the
principles need to be understood within a particular
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1059
conception of justice. In a liberal society that values
human rights and the dignity of man, an egalitarian
conception of justice is the most appropriate conception
of justice for public policy. An egalitarian theory of
justice must prohibit the sale of organs on grounds of
exploitation! The concern of exploitation makes the vendor’s autonomy suspect, and it clearly does not minimize
the harms to which we expose any living source of organs
nor does it ensure that they truly benefit from the
procurement.
Bad cases make bad laws. I am sympathetic to Karen,
but I am also sympathetic to all individuals with chronic
renal failure, even if their illness is somewhat selfinduced. A policy to pay Karen’s father’s friends may
resolve the stress, pain and risks of donation, but they do
not address the risk of death, which is a real but rare
event. If Mr Cranford’s friends really thought about the
risk of mortality, they would realize that $10,000 is too
little, given the real but remote risk of death [11]. They
should also realize that money should not fully resolve
their reluctance. In fact, the risk of mortality should
give us reason to pause and realize that the solution to
our organ shortage should not be based on increasing
the number of living donors. Rather, we need to focus
on prevention, to maximize voluntary deceased donation, to develop alternative organ sources (such as
therapeutic organ cloning), and even to promote research in xenotransplantation.
Concluding Remarks
Robert M. Sade, MD
A
lthough our debaters’ styles and lines of reasoning
are quite different, they agree on a number of
important points. They view the scope of the problem
similarly: the demand for transplantable organs greatly
exceeds the supply, the gap between the number of
organs donated, and the number of recipients on the
waiting lists grows continuously, so thousands of patients
on transplant waiting lists die each year. Both authors
reject an unregulated free market for organs (although
Hippen supports a regulated market, whereas Ross rejects any form of financial incentives), and both view the
idea of international organ trafficking as highly undesirable, and even evil. They both believe that an incentive to
donate an organ for financial benefit would have its
greatest appeal among poor people, but they draw
starkly differing conclusions from that belief. Beyond
those shared beliefs and facts, however, Hippen and Ross
part company.
Hippen grounds his moral position in personal autonomy, stating: “Free societies typically do not interfere
with competent adults making choices that affect their
lives and do not significantly harm themselves or others.”
Opponents of a regulated market, he asserts, support
their position by pointing to the harms international
organ trafficking would be for both buyers and sellers of
organs, while failing to acknowledge two critical issues:
(1) such trafficking thrives because the organ shortage
strongly motivates people on waiting lists in developed
countries to buy organs where they can (ie, usually in
third world countries), and (2) increasing the supply of
organs will lead to reduction and eventually disappearance of organ trafficking. Hippen undercuts the central
argument of opponents — exploitation of the poor — by
excluding the poorest individuals from becoming paid
donors, not on moral grounds, but for medical reasons:
low socioeconomic status is a significant risk factor for
donors, so excluding the poor is medically justified.
Ross bases her discussion on the four principles of the
so-called Georgetown mantra of respect for autonomy,
beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. The principle
of respect for autonomy allows the challenging a patient’s decision, she says, if the decision was not voluntary because of misinformation, miscalculation, coercion,
or undue influence. To the extent that one believes that
1060
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decisions by poor people to sell their organs are based on
any of these factors, she asserts that the transaction is not
voluntary and should be prohibited. Autonomy is also
limited if an individual’s action threatens to harm others,
and the sale of body parts harms society by their “degrading effect on certain goods and practices.” The principle of beneficence is violated because poor people
might be exploited by financial incentives. A market for
organs also violates the principle of nonmaleficence,
because, on balance, harms resulting from such a market
outweigh benefits. Ross expresses her belief that the
appropriate theory of justice to guide public policy is
Rawlsian distributive justice, which would view financial
incentives for organ donation as unacceptable because
they exploit the poor.
The conclusions readers should draw from these opposing positions, which start with mostly identical facts,
but reach radically different conclusions, depend largely
on how they weigh the two central facts of the issue at
hand in the context of their own personal value systems.
The central facts are: (1) in this country more than 9,000
patients in need of a transplant die each year because the
number of available organs is inadequate; and (2) financial incentives in a regulated market would increase the
supply of organs (a fact asserted by Hippen and not
denied by Ross).
A reader will support Hippen’s position if persuaded
that people in a mature liberal democracy, such as the
United States, should be allowed the freedom to choose
among three options (in the context of a carefully regulated market that excludes poor people as donors and
ensures safety for all participants): that is, to donate
altruistically, to donate for financial benefit, or not to
donate at all.
A reader will support Ross’s position if persuaded that
egalitarian (distributive) justice is the best guide for
public policy, that financial incentives for organ donations must therefore be prohibited on grounds of exploitation of the poor, and that we should not attempt to
increase the number of living donors but should pursue
alternative strategies, including a greater emphasis on
public health and preventive health measures that may
reduce or retard the development of kidney failure.
The heat generated by the public debate on financial
incentives for organ donors has been rising as more
voices join each side. Congress has shown interest in this
issue, including Representative James Greenwood in
2003 [55, 56], and most recently Senator Arlen Specter by
way of his proposed bill, the Organ Donor Clarification
Act [57]. How public policy makers respond to the
opposing views presented in this debate will have longterm effects on the quality and duration of the lives of
many patients, and on the moral foundations of our
society.
Disclosures
Dr Ross’ work is funded by a National Library Medicine
Grant of the National Institutes of Health to write a book
on the Ethics and Policy Issues in Living Donor Trans-
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2009;88:1053– 61
plantation. Dr Ross serves on the Ethics Committe of the
United Network of Organ Sharing (UNOS). The views
she expresses are her own.
Dr Ross thanks Walter Glannon, PhD, for his comments on an
earlier draft of her manuscript.
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