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Nils Peterson on the People's Republic of China's theory of hybrid warfare.

Fred Kagan writes about why the positional war in Ukraine is not a stable stalemate and how the current balance could readily be tipped in either direction by decisions made in the West.

ISW and AEI’s Critical Threats Project have launched a high-fidelity interactive map of Israeli ground operations in the Israel-Hamas War.

By Mason Clark and Karolina Hird

The first installment of ISW's series on the structure and capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces.

Nataliya Bugayova, Kateryna Stepanenko, and Frederick W. Kagan explain why Putin invaded Ukraine and how the war must end.
October 1, 2023

Latest from ISW

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 11, 2023

The Russian Central Election Commission (CEC) announced on December 11 that Russia will conduct voting for the 2024 presidential election in occupied Ukraine, likely in an attempt to legitimize the Russian occupation and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s rule. The CEC reported that it made the decision to hold the election in occupied territories – all of which except Crimea are under martial law – in consultations with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), the Federal Security Service (FSB), and occupation authorities. Russian law notably requires the CEC to consult with these agencies when considering holding elections in areas under martial law, including occupied Ukraine. Russia will likely use the March 2024 presidential election to further establish a veneer of legitimacy for its occupation of Ukraine as it has done during the illegal 2022 annexation referenda and the 2023 regional elections. Russian CEC Chairperson Ella Pamfilova stated on December 7 that elections in occupied Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson oblasts “will differ somewhat” in procedure from elections in Russia and occupied Crimea. The CEC will likely use these differing procedures to falsify votes in Putin’s favor and claim a high voter turnout while falsely portraying occupied Ukraine’s participation in the election as legitimate to the international community.

Iran Update, December 11, 2023

Israeli forces are degrading Hamas’ battalions in Shujaiya and Jabalia. Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said on December 11 that Hamas’ Jabalia and Shujaiya Battalions are “on the verge of being dismantled.” CTP-ISW defines “degrade” as a temporary effect whereby a unit’s losses seriously impede its ability to continue executing assigned missions while the unit remains able to operate. Israeli forces captured Hamas military infrastructure in Jabalia, including explosives manufacturing facilities, training facilities, and weapons caches. The loss of these facilities will temporarily negatively affect Hamas’ Jabalia al Balad Battalion’s ability to execute its assigned missions, which include using improvised explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades to resist Israeli advances.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 10, 2023

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Maria Zakharova emphasized that Russia's maximalist objectives in Ukraine have not changed, repeating the Kremlin’s demand for full Ukrainian political capitulation and Kyiv’s acceptance of Russia’s military and territorial demands rather than suggesting any willingness to negotiate seriously. In a written interview with AFP on December 9, Zakharova claimed that a "comprehensive, sustainable, and fair resolution" in Ukraine can only happen if the West stops "pumping up the Armed Forces of Ukraine with weapons" and that Ukraine surrenders Russia’s claimed Ukrainian territory and "withdraws its troops," presumably from Ukrainian territory Russia claims to have annexed. Zakharova emphasized the Kremlin's longstanding claim that Russia invaded Ukraine for "de-militarization," "denazification," and to "ensure the rights of Russian-speaking citizens" in Ukraine. The Kremlin has consistently used the term “denazification” as code for the removal of the elected government of Ukraine and its replacement by some government the Kremlin regards as acceptable—i.e., regime change.

Iran Update, December 10, 2023

Palestinian militias continued to attack Israeli forces on the Israeli forward line of advance in Khan Younis on December 10. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued targeting Palestinian militia sites in Khan Younis, Jabalia, Shujaiya, and Beit Hanoun. Israeli forces attacked underground tunnels in Khan Younis and conducted airstrikes to support ground maneuvers. The al Qassem Brigades—the militant wing of Hamas—claimed that its fighters detonated an explosively formed penetrator (EFP) targeting Israeli forces northeast of Khan Younis. The militia claimed to kill 13 Israeli soldiers in the EFP attack and two more soldiers with small arms afterward the initial explosion. EFPs are particularly lethal improvised explosive devices designed to penetrate armored vehicles, such as main battle tanks. This attack is consistent with the shift of Hamas and other Palestinian militias using increasingly sophisticated tactics since the humanitarian pause expired on December 1.

Iran Update, December 9, 2023

Israeli forces continued clearing operations in Khan Younis as Palestinian militias attempt to resist Israeli advances. Israeli forces located several tunnel shafts and a Hamas military headquarters as they advanced in Khan Younis. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) engaged three Palestinian fighters as they emerged from a tunnel in central Khan Younis and fired a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG).Hamas maintains an extensive tunnel system across the Gaza Strip, which Israeli forces have destroyed as they have advanced. Israeli forces also raided a mosque from which Hamas fighters were operating. The IDF said the Hamas fighters detonated an IED near Israeli forces.

Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, December 9, 2023

Russian forces have likely committed to offensive operations in multiple sectors of the front during a period of the most challenging weather of the fall-winter season in an effort to seize and retain the initiative prior to the Russian presidential elections in March 2024. Russian forces are currently pursuing offensive efforts along much of the frontline in Ukraine, particularly along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border, near Bakhmut, and towards Avdiivka as Ukrainian military officials have repeatedly noted, and Russian forces are also conducting continuous ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast. The current pace of fighting across the entire frontline in Ukraine is generally consistent with ISW's standing assessment that Russian forces have been trying to regain the theater-level initiative since at least mid-November 2023. Recent Ukrainian military official statements further suggest that Russian forces have succeeded in seizing the initiative along the Kharkiv-Luhansk Oblast border, near Bakhmut, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City axis, while Ukrainian forces maintain the initiative in key areas of southern Ukraine, as evidenced by continued Ukrainian counterattacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast and the sustained, larger-than-usual Ukrainian presence in east bank Kherson Oblast.