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1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group products

The Ganders

1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group
Conducts PSYWAR in Korea, Part II

by Robert W. Jones, Jr.

The term Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) was the doctrinal standard for the U.S. Army and later the Department of Defense from World War II through the Korean War. The term Psychological Operations (PSYOP) came into effect by the mid-1960s. For historical accuracy the term PSYWAR is used throughout the article.

With the North Korean invasion of South Korea in June 1950 the U.S. Army was ill prepared for war in many crucial areas, one being Psychological Warfare. The Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) of the Far East Command quickly adapted to the situation, taking on responsibilities far beyond the scope of a small staff section. The PWB staff performed Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) at the tactical and strategic levels for the first few months of the war (after 1951 the PWB became the Psychological Warfare Section, PWS). The ever-increasing requirements quickly overwhelmed them. The U.S. Army’s solution was to form two new units, the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (for the tactical mission) and the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group to fill the strategic void. This article is the second of two about the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L) and its contributions during the Korean War. Read Part 1 here.

1 Stanley Sandler, “Cease Resistance: It’s Good for You”: A History of U.S. Army Combat Psychological Operations (Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1999), 206, 210, 218; Colonel Kenneth Hansen, Psywar in Korea (Washington DC: Joint Subsidiary Activities Group, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1960), 26; Charles H. Briscoe, “”Volunteering” for Combat: Loudspeaker Psywar in Korea,” Veritas: The Journal of Army Special Operations History, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2005, 47; Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1982), 99; George S. Pettee, US PSYWAR Operations in the Korean War (Washington DC: Operations Research Office John Hopkins University, 1951), 29; Paul A. Wolfgeher, telephone interview by Steven Kuni, 2 January 2006, written notes, USASOC History Office Classified files, Fort Bragg, NC; In the post WWII PSYWAR doctrine there were three levels of PSYWAR: Tactical; Strategic; and Consolidation. Strategic level PSYWAR, aimed at achieving long-term effects on enemy combatants and populations were the purview of Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Groups. Tactical PSYWAR, aimed at short-term effects on enemy troops close to the front lines, was the mission of a Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company. In the FEC the strategic mission fell to the PWB/PWS assisted by the 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group. In Korea the Eighth U.S. Army’s (EUSA) Psychological Warfare Division (PWD), assisted by the 1st Loudspeaker and Leaflet Company (1st L&L) conducted the tactical mission.

The mainstay of Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) operations in Tokyo were dedicated civilians. Sang Moon Chang and David An of the PWB prepared copy for leaflets to be disseminated in Korea. Both men would work with the 1st RB&L.
The mainstay of Psychological Warfare Branch (PWB) operations in Tokyo were dedicated civilians. Sang Moon Chang (Korean calligrapher, on the left) and David An (translator on the right) of the PWB prepared copy for leaflets to be disseminated in Korea. Both men would work with the 1st RB&L.;
The 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group would establish elements in Japan and Korea.
The 1st Radio Broadcasting & Leaflet Group would establish elements in Japan and Korea.

Kim Il Sung’s North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) invaded South Korea in the early morning of 25 June 1950. The numerically superior and better armed North Korean units quickly pushed aside the Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. President Harry S. Truman ordered U.S. forces to assist the South Koreans on 27 June 1950. American advisors with ROK units continued to fight while in Japan the U.S. occupation forces prepared to deploy. In the meantime, Republic of Korean and the advance elements of U.S. forces were pushed south, to what became known as the “Pusan Perimeter.” The tactical and strategic situation rapidly changed with the simultaneous execution of Operation CHROMITE, the Inchon invasion, and the Allied breakout from Pusan on 15 September 1950. United Nations (UN) forces pushed the NKPA back across the 38th parallel and seized large sections of North Korea. The strategic situation changed in late October 1950 when the “Chinese Peoples Volunteer Army” crossed the Yalu River. As the combined Chinese and North Korean forces pushed the UN command south towards Pusan, Seoul was abandoned a second time. This was the situation when the 1st RB&L Group got to Japan.

2 Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Washington DC: Center for Military History, 1992), 21; T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (Washington DC: Brassey’s, 2000), 34.

3 Appleman, South to the Naktong, 38.

BG Robert A. McClure
BG Robert A. McClure

To provide a strategic PSYWAR capability, Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the newly appointed Chief of Psychological Warfare, directed the formation of a new unit called a Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group to conduct radio broadcasts and produce leaflets. The mission to conduct strategic PSYWAR encompassed the creation, production, and dissemination of PSYWAR products. Three Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Groups were authorized with plans to form additional groups in the Active Army and Reserves. The 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group (RB&L) was formed at Fort Riley, Kansas, from reservists and draftees and sent to Japan. The 301st RB&L, a Reserve unit from New York, was quickly mobilized, and joined the 1st RB&L at Fort Riley for training. They were headed for Europe. After the 1st RB&L deployed, the 6th RB&L Group was formed to support the school at Fort Riley and later the PSYWAR Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Since Korea was the priority for BG McClure, the Army PSYWAR program had to be organized quickly.

4 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 98-99; Department of the Army, Training Circular 17, Military Aspects of Psychological Warfare (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 12 December 1950), 4.

5 Sandler, Cease Resistance , 216; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 99.

Once in Japan the RB&L was assigned to the FEC General Headquarters (GHQ)
Once in Japan the RB&L; was assigned to the FEC General Headquarters (GHQ)

The 1st RB&L Group consisted of three companies. The Headquarters Company was the largest, with 19 officers, 3 warrant officers, and 111 enlisted men. It was responsible for the group’s administration, maintenance, and logistical support.

Two sections provided the Group with specialized capabilities. The Operations Section had linguists, artists, draftsmen, and scriptwriters to prepare strategic leaflets and radio broadcasts. The Research and Analysis Section was “responsible for the preparation and composition of propaganda material” at the theater level.

6 Colonel Donald F. Hall, “Organization for Combat Propaganda,” Army Information Digest, May 1951, 12-13.

7 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group Command Report, 6-31 August 1951, National Archives, entry 439, box 5015, record group 407, copy at the USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Colonel Donald F. Hall, “Organization for Combat Propaganda,” Army Information Digest, May 1951, 12-13; The Research and Analysis Section would be the combination of a Strategic Studies Detachment and Product Development Center in a Psychological Operations Battalion or Joint PSYOP Task Force today.

The 3rd Reproduction Company, with 3 officers and 54 enlisted men, produced strategic leaflets, newspapers, and other paper products using four high-speed Harris offset printing presses. With a strength of 16 officers and 99 enlisted men, the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company’s mission was to broadcast PSYWAR from both fixed and mobile radio stations. The three radio platoons were organized to repair and operate ”… captured or indigenous fixed transmitters,” and to operate its mobile transmitters mounted aboard 6x6 trucks.

8 Stephen E. Pease, Psywar: Psychological Warfare in Korea 1950-1953 (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1992), 22-24; 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group Command Report, 6-31 August 1951, B 5015, E 439, RG 407, NARA, copy in the USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

9 Hall, “Organization for Combat Propaganda,” 12-13.

CPL Dick Crimer operates a Harris printing press at the FEC print plant in Motosumiyoshi, Japan. Crimer was assigned to the 1st RB&L Group’s 3rd Reproduction Company.
CPL Dick Crimer operates a Harris printing press at the FEC print plant in Motosumiyoshi, Japan. Crimer was assigned to the 1st RB&L; Group’s 3rd Reproduction Company.

At Fort Riley, the division between tactical and strategic operations was blurred. In Japan it was determined that the 1st RB&L’s area of operations for printed products began where the 1st L&L Company’s ended, forty miles behind the line of contact. Although the entire Group was authorized 305 soldiers, it deployed overseas in three increments with less than 250 men.

10 Pease, Psywar, 22-24; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 93.

Between June 1950 and June 1951 the Army was trying to simultaneously fill staff positions worldwide, establish the PSYWAR school, and fill the newly-formed units. Recruits were primarily draftees and mobilized reservists having civilian skills related to PSYWAR (i.e. journalists, artists, printers, graphics designers, etc).

11 James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War. Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1978), 120-121; With the Selective Service Extension Act of 1950 President Harry S. Truman had the authority to mobilize Reserve and National Guard units, and individuals, and draft new men. However, draftees were limited to 24 months of service, with Reserve and National Guard units and individuals limited to 21 months.

Psywar Graduation Program. Ft Riley, 1951.
Psywar Graduation Program. Ft Riley, 1951.

In the Spring of 1951, the Psychological Warfare Department of the Army General Ground School at Fort Riley began training students with an emphasis on producing propaganda. The course was six to seven weeks long, covered psychological warfare, strategic intelligence, foreign army organization, and intelligence. Four officer and two NCO classes produced 334 graduates from all four services and some Allied nations. When Army Reservists and draftees with PSYWAR skills (psychologists, journalists, illustrators, advertising executives, newspapermen, commercial radio technicians, etc) were called up, they were sent to Fort Riley for training and assignment. The Reservists received no theater-specific training until they arrived in Japan or Korea. The Psychological Warfare Department at the Army General Ground School became an independent Army School, the Psychological Warfare Center, when it relocated to Fort Bragg, North Carolina in early 1952.

The Psychological Warfare Center, the predecessor of today’s U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, was the proponent for Psychological Warfare training, doctrine, and equipment. The Center’s Psychological Warfare Board evaluated PSYWAR tactics, techniques, procedures, doctrine, and equipment. During the Korean War, the board conducted over forty evaluations of radio receiver/ transmitters, loudspeakers, mobile print shops, and improved leaflet dissemination techniques.

Unlike World War II, many of the recruits had college educations and better technical skills. Some Reservists called-up were World War II veterans who had used the GI Bill for college and who had acquired new job skills. To capitalize on the situation, the Army established a Classification and Assignment (C&A) station at Fort Myer, VA, to screen basic trainees with a college education and/or specific job skills. During the C&A process, the men were usually asked questions about their civilian background (i.e. education, job experience, language ability). Some soldiers did not have to produce evidence; their qualifications were accepted as given. Others had to present proof of education or professional certification. While the evaluation relied on interviewers “gut reactions,” they seemed to have “… terrific insight in who would fit into the 1st RB&L,” said Tom Klein, one of the many draftees slated for PSYWAR. The Fort Myer pool provided soldiers, while officers were often assigned directly.

12 Thomas M. Klein, with Robert Herguth and Robert McConaughey, Psychological Warfare in Korea: Life and Times in the First Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group 1951-1952 (Greenwich, CT: Round Hill Productions, 2002), 5 (hereafter noted as Reunion book); Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 93.

13 Thomas Klein, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, email to Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 20 April 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

The majority of the 1st RB&L officers were Reservists, with World War II combat experience. Most officers did not have “official” PSYWAR experience. Instead their education and work experience between WWII and Korea was critical. Other officers were college graduates fulfilling their ROTC obligation. Captain (CPT) Robert Horn had a Ph.D in political science from Princeton. He was a professor at the University of Chicago when he received his recall notice. The WWII veteran became the head of the Group’s Operations Research Section.

Captain Fred Laffey was another veteran. He worked a variety of civilian radio jobs at home in Massachusetts. Laffey was assigned as a radio program manager in the 4th Mobile Radio Broadcasting Company.

First Lieutenant (1LT) Eddie Deerfield had earned a Distinguished Flying Cross, three Air Medals, and a Purple Heart as a B-17 radio operator/aerial gunner in Europe. After the war, he used his GI Bill to attend Northwestern University and earned a journalism degree. He he also received a direct commission in the Reserves. Deerfield was working as a reporter for the Chicago Times when he got orders to report by April 1951 to the 1st RB&L at Fort Riley. Deerfield became the officer in charge of the Pusan radio detachment.

14 Eddie Deerfield, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, e-mail to Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 5 March 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Reunion Book, 164-165.

1st Lieutenant Alvin Yudkoff had been assigned to a Japanese Language Detachment in the Pacific. It was filled primarily with Nisei (2nd generation Japanese-American) soldiers. He was in the invasion of Okinawa and served in the occupation of Japan. After the war he became a writer. He had begun documentary filmmaking when he was recalled to active duty with orders to the 1st RB&L Group where he was put in charge of radio script production.

15 Alvin Yudkoff, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 15 February 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, telephone interview notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Reunion book, 250-251.

Princeton ROTC graduate Robert Carlisle had been a field artillery officer in WWII. After the war he was a journalist for the Passaic (New Jersey) Herald-News for three years. Then he joined Newsweek, working in New York City and Detroit.

16 Arthur Holch, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 13 August 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, telephone interview notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

Other officers were recent college graduates. 2LT Jim Haynes, armed with his Princeton degree, reported to Fort Riley on 1 April 1951. He would serve as a liaison officer to the Air Force planning leaflet drops. 1LT Bill Barry, a Princeton graduate with an English degree, had been working as a reporter for the Bureau of National Affairs when he got his call-up notice. After serving in Panama during most of WWII he was commissioned through Officer Candidate School. 2nd Lieutenant Arthur Holch, with a Masters degree from the Medill School of Journalism at Northwestern University, had worked as a print reporter for the Denver Rocky Mountain News and CBS and NBC radio when he was drafted in 1948. After only a year in uniform as an Armed Forces Press Service reporter in New York, Holch went to work for NBC television in New York as part of the Camel News Caravan with John Cameron Swayze. He received a direct commission and recall notice with orders to report to Fort Riley.

17 Bill Barry, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 8 August 2007, telephone interview notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

The mobile radio station at Fort Riley: During the graduation of PSYWAR Class #1 the mobile radio station was set up for visiting dignitaries. This was the prototype system. It would take a few months to produce the systems for the 1st RB&L in Korea. The two vans on the left are production studios; on the right are the radio transmitter and receiver, each mounted in a truck shelter. In the center of the photo are BG McClure, the Chief of PSYWAR (indicated by arrow) and COL Greene, the Chief of PSYWAR for FEC.
The mobile radio station at Fort Riley: During the graduation of PSYWAR Class #1 the mobile radio station was set up for visiting dignitaries. This was the prototype system. It would take a few months to produce the systems for the 1st RB&L; in Korea. The two vans on the left are production studios; on the right are the radio transmitter and receiver, each mounted in a truck shelter. In the center of the photo are BG McClure, the Chief of PSYWAR (indicated by arrow) and COL Greene, the Chief of PSYWAR for FEC.

Over one-third of the enlisted men were college graduates and some had advanced degrees. Gudmund Berge had served in the Navy, before completing an architecture degree at the University of Washington. He was working as an architect in Seattle when he was drafted to serve as a combat engineer. Jim McCrory, with a degree from Marquette University was working as a reporter for the Milwaukee Sentinel when drafted. He was sent to a transportation truck company at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin. Draftee John Davenport, an experienced commercial artist, was at Artillery basic training at Camp Atterbury, Indiana when he received orders for 1st RB&L.

18 Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 93.

19 Gudmund Berge, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 21 February 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, telephone interview notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

20 James McCrory, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, email to Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 26 June 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

21 John Davenport, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 20 August 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, telephone interview notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

Hanno Fuchs had earned a Bachelors degree in Journalism from Syracuse University and attended Columbia University’s Graduate School of Business before he started working at the advertising firm of Young and Rubicam. Bob Herguth, a graduate of the University of Missouri’s School of Journalism was working for the Peoria Star newspaper when he got his draft notice. Thomas Klein, with a Masters degree in economics (University of Michigan) reported to Fort Sheridan, Illinois in December 1950 and was immediately shipped to Fort Meyer for classification. There, he first heard of “this PSYWAR outfit and it seemed pretty interesting.” Klein was shipped to the 1st RB&L and assigned to the Research and Analysis Section. These experiences of only a few men are a “snapshot” of the varied backgrounds, education and job experiences of the unit members.

22 Reunion book, 173-174.

23 Robert Herguth, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 15 February 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, telephone interview notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Reunion book, 184.

24 Thomas Klein, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 1 March 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, telephone interview notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

25 Klein interview; Reunion book, 194-195.

Not all 1st RB&L Group soldiers were screened through Fort Myer. Tony Severino was in infantry basic training at Fort Jackson. When his company commander denied a reclassification request, stating, “It is an honor to die for your country,” Severino and another college graduate visited the classification building that night. There they found “… a lone corporal working overtime. He listened to our plea and the next day we were transferred,” said Severino. Sig Front had been trained to be an infantry platoon radio operator in the 31st Infantry (“Dixie”) Division. He became a replacement for Korea when the unit was demobilized. En route to Korea, the graduate of the School of Radio and Television Techniques (in New New) and former West Virginia radio announcer found himself transferred. Equipment and training became the next step for the 1st RB&L.

26 Tony Severino, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview by Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 6 August 2007, Fort Bragg, NC, telephone interview notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC; Tony Severino, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, email to Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 5 August 2007, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

27 Sig Front, 1st Radio Broadcasting and Leaflet Group, interview with Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Jones Jr., 6 August 2007, telephone interview notes, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

The individual soldier’s equipment came primarily from World War II stocks. As a major training and mobilization base, Fort Riley had plenty of uniforms, boots, and field gear. The M-1 carbine and M-1911 .45 caliber pistols were the primary weaponry. While individual equipment was readily available, the unit equipment was a problem.

LTC Homer E. Shields
1st RB&L crest

Lieutenant Colonel Homer E. Shields, a European PSYWAR veteran was selected by Brigadier General McClure to command the 1st RB&L. Mobilized with the Indiana National Guard in 1942 as an infantry lieutenant, Shields later served as the executive officer of the 7th Army Combat Propaganda Team in March 1944. After service in North Africa, Italy, and Southern France, then Major Shields became chief of PSYWAR for the 6th Army in October 1944. Afterward he became Brigadier General McClure’s executive officer at Supreme Headquarters until the end of the war in Europe. Following the war, Shields returned to Indianapolis and the newspaper business as a circulation manager, but maintained his commission in the Indiana National Guard.

Because PSYWAR had languished after WWII most of the equipment had been declared surplus and sold. “With the end of World War II, the U.S. Army . . . rapidly dismantled its extensive psychological operations network. PSYWAR was dropped from Army training programs, from military schools and curricula, and from Tables of Organization and Equipment for Army units.” Faced with the presence of war the Psychological Warfare Board developed new requirements for equipment and arranged to buy “off the shelf.” Two of the critical items for the Group were printing presses and truck-mounted radio transmitters. The printing presses could be purchased from civilian companies, but it took a few months for assembly. Printers had to be trained on the idiosyncrasies of the presses. The mobile radio sets were built from scratch, with new technology, based on old WWII designs. The operators and maintenance personnel had to be trained on the equipment which did not yet exist. The 1st RB&L received its radio vans (as they were commonly called) in Japan in late December 1951. Despite a shortage of unit equipment Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Homer E. Shields, the 1st RB&L Group commander, had to provide FEC with interim reinforcements.

28 Paul M.A. Linebarger, Psychological Warfare (Washington, DC: Combat Forces Press, 1954), 93; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 9, 11, 15, 17, 18, 20, 45; Sandler, Cease Resistance, 204-205.

LTC Shields and his small staff, had less than four months to field the unit. The three-phase training program consisted of basic military training, a general introduction to PSYWAR, and specialty training. The basic military training included the standard military subjects, common soldier tasks, and weapons marksmanship. Not knowing where they would be assigned, base defense was taught to the mobile radio company. With other units also preparing for deployment the 1st RB&L competed for tight resources. PSYWAR training was less competitive.

29 Reunion book, 26-27.

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