CPT Steve Kestner (right) and another unidentified Company A, 112th Signal Battalion soldier (left) conduct rappel training at Fort Bragg, NC (circa 1989-90).
CPT Steve Kestner (right) and another unidentified Company A, 112th Signal Battalion soldier (left) conduct rappel training at Fort Bragg, NC (circa 1989-90). (Photo courtesy of James S. Kestner)

“No Ordinary Signal Unit”

The 112th Signal Battalion in Panama

by Christopher E. Howard

Abstract Formed in 1986, the 112th Signal Battalion first experienced combat in Panama, during Operation JUST CAUSE, December 1989. Their support to Special Operations Command, South, validated the need for a dedicated Army Special Operations signal battalion.

In memory of COL (Ret.) Steven R. Sawdey, the second Commander, 112th Signal Battalion, who passed away on 20 November 2019. He generously shared his recollections of the 112th, and its role in JUST CAUSE and PROMOTE LIBERTY, with the author. He is remembered fondly by those who served with him, and especially by the 'Shadow Warriors' he led from 1988 to 1990.

Bullets ripped through Hangar 450 at Albrook Air Station, Panama, in the late evening of 19 December 1989, just as U.S. Army Special Forces Major (MAJ) Kevin M. Higgins and his Company A, 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (A/3-7th SFG) prepared to depart for their H-Hour target: the Pacora River Bridge. “We lifted off to go to the fight,” Higgins explained, “but the fight had come to the men at the hangar. Two of them were Staff Sergeant (SSG) Henry N. McCrae and Sergeant (SGT) Steven I. Elizalde, from the 112th Signal Battalion (Airborne), one of the newest Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) units. Their small signal element, consisting of two, three-man Special Operations Communications Assemblage (SOCA) teams, was providing secure communications for the Special Operations Command, South (SOCSOUTH), led by Colonel (COL) Robert C. ‘Jake’ Jacobelly.

1 COL (Ret.) Kevin M. Higgins email to Christopher E. Howard, “SUBJECT: Re: Note from the History Office, Thursday,” 8 October 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Higgins email, date. “Before midnight on December 19, we launched four teams (Tinajitis-4, Cimmaron-4, Cerro Azul-9, Pacora Bridge-24) to remote corners of the battlefield and into uncertain situations. As we stood outside SOCSOUTH (TF BLACK), Albrook Hangar, awaiting the UH60s for pickup, the PDF opened fire.”

2 Lawrence A. Yates, The U.S. Military Intervention in Panama: Operation JUST CAUSE, December 1989 – January 1990 (Washington D.C.: Center of Military History, 2014), 219, hereafter Yates, Operation JUST CAUSE, page number; Higgins email, 8 October 2019. “The 112th men in that Hangar, unfazed, maintained crystal clear comms throughout that long night.”

3 SFC (Ret.) Steven I. Elizalde, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 2 October 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

Later, while he scanned his target from a cow pasture on the west side of the Pacora River, MAJ Higgins talked with Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) David J. Wilderman (J-3, SOCSOUTH) and Captain (CPT) Charles T. Cleveland (S-3, 3-7th SFG) “like they were standing next to me. The SOCA team at Albrook provided Wilderman and Cleveland the situational awareness to prioritize high-demand assets, like the AC-130 Spectre gunship and the quick reaction force (QRF) at Albrook. Once committed, SOCSOUTH had nothing to reinforce other elements in contact. Clear and timely communications were essential to mission success on the opening night of Operation JUST CAUSE, and the 112th Signal Battalion SOCAs delivered. They continued to do so throughout the operation.

4 Higgins email, 8 October 2019; USASOC Post-Mission Briefing, “Operation JUST CAUSE/PROMOTE LIBERTY,” 2, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. “The Pacora River Bridge was a critical node to prevent movement of [PDF] Battalion 2000 from Ft. Cimmaron to reinforce Torrijos-Tocumen Airport. A Task Force BLACK objective, MAJ Higgins and 21 [sic] other members of Co A-3/7th SFG (A) executed a hasty ambush (with AT-4 fire) on arrival to prevent a PDF convoy from reaching the Ranger airhead that had not yet been consolidated at the airport.” Higgins’ element was credited with stopping a six-vehicle convoy at the bridge, with AC-130 support. For more information on the Pacora River Bridge mission, see Yates, Operation JUST CAUSE, 210-220, and Michael E. Krivdo, “‘Hold That Bridge,’ the 7th Special Forces Group and Operation JUST CAUSE,” 20 December 2018, https://www.army.mil/article/215407/hold_that_bridge_the_7th_special_forces_group_and_operation_just_cause .

5 Higgins email, 8 October 2019.

A critical H-Hour objective for 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) was to prevent the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) Battalion 2000 garrisoned at Fort Cimmaron from reinforcing PDF units in Panama City. Seizing the Pacora River Bridge, pictured here, was key to that mission. The task fell to 24 Green Berets from 1st and 3rd Battalions, 7th SFG, led by Major Kevin M. Higgins. (Photo Credit: USASOC History Office)
A critical H-Hour objective for 7th Special Forces Group (SFG) was to prevent the Panama Defense Forces (PDF) Battalion 2000 garrisoned at Fort Cimmaron from reinforcing PDF units in Panama City. Seizing the Pacora River Bridge, pictured here, was key to that mission. The task fell to 24 Green Berets from 1st and 3rd Battalions, 7th SFG, led by Major Kevin M. Higgins.

This article details 112th Signal Battalion origins and explains how it was manned and equipped as a dedicated special operations communications battalion. The battalion’s ‘trial-by-fire’ in Panama, 1989 – 1990 is highlighted. The focus is the SOCA teams that provided SOCSOUTH and ARSOF elements secure tactical communications during Operation JUST CAUSE and the follow-on stability operation, PROMOTE LIBERTY.

Origins

The Army committed to modernizing its special operations forces (SOF) after the hostage rescue mission in Iran (Operation EAGLE CLAW) failed in 1980. 1st Special Operations Command (1st SOCOM) was provisionally established at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, in 1982, to command and control ARSOF. About the same time, forward-thinking officers began ‘beating the drum’ for a signal unit capable of supporting both 1st SOCOM and theater-level Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Forces (JUWTF).

6 MG (Ret.) James D. ‘Dave’ Bryan, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 17 September 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Bryan interview, date; COL (Ret.) Donald Kropp interview with Christopher E. Howard, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Kropp interview, date; MG (Ret.) James D. Bryan email to Christopher E. Howard, “SUBJECT: Re: 112th in Panama,” 2 December 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC. Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Forces (JUWTFs) were the precursors of both Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) and Joint Special Operations Task Forces (JSOTFs). JUWTFs were not permanent, rather they were established by a Theater Combatant Commander for a specific operation or mission, and answered directly to a Joint Task Force (JTF). They were sometimes designated by a Theater designation such as JUWTF-A, for Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). In the early 1980s, “Special Operations” started supplanting “Unconventional Warfare” as the umbrella term for the Special Operations Forces (SOF) mission set. Theaters began adopting the term Special Operations Command (SOC) as early as 1983, in lieu of JUWTF. These SOCs, codified as Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) in 1986, were subordinate unified commands, vice temporary task forces. Concurrently, the terms JSOTF and Army Special Operations Task Force (ARSOTF) replaced JUWTF to refer to a TF established for specific operations or missions.

From its activation in 1986 until 1990, 112th Signal Battalion soldiers wore the Shoulder Sleeve Insignia (SSI) of 1st Special Operations Command, its higher headquarters.
From its activation in 1986 until 1990, 112th Signal Battalion soldiers wore the Shoulder Sleeve Insignia (SSI) of 1st Special Operations Command, its higher headquarters.

One such officer was MAJ James D. ‘Dave’ Bryan, a Special Forces (SF) and Ranger-qualified Signal Officer. His experience in 7th SFG (including two years commanding its signal company [1977 – 1979]) made him aware of the challenges inherent to joint special operations communications. When Bryan returned to Fort Bragg in June 1984 as the Assistant Chief of Staff/Communications and Electronics Officer, 1st SOCOM, he championed the creation of an ARSOF signal unit capable of supporting ARSOF headquarters and task forces in multiple theaters. At the time, neither the Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE), the only joint SOF signal unit, nor the SF signal companies, were resourced for those missions.

7 Bryan interview with Christopher E. Howard, 15 November 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Bryan interview, date. Bryan’s experience as JUWTF J-6 (Communications Officer) during multiple U.S. Readiness Command (USREDCOM) Joint Readiness Exercises (JRX) from 1974 to 1977 exposed him to joint SOF communications requirements. Bryan spearheaded efforts to modify existing 7th SFG signal equipment to better enable the JUWTF and Army Special Operations Forces to talk to the Joint Task Force (JTF). This kind of adaptive problem-solving proved valuable, once Bryan took command of the 112th Signal Battalion in 1986.

8 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; Kropp interview, 30 October 2019.

Armed with Army studies and requirements documents, such as the Army Mission Area Analysis (1983), Special Operations Forces Master Plan (1984), and the Multi-command Required Operational Capability 2-84 (1984), Bryan prepared to brief his plan to the Army. He recognized that the Signal Corps would be reluctant to support the creation of a dedicated “ARSOF Communications Support Element,” which borrowed from Joint terminology; a signal battalion similar to those in the ‘Big Army’ would be an easier sell. Bryan identified three specific needs for an ARSOF communications battalion: a flexible structure that allowed SOF communications packages to be tailored to the supported mission; a modernization strategy that ensured ARSOF communicators had state-of-the-art equipment, through priority placement on the Department of the Army Master Priority List; and a “professional home for ARSOF communicators” that grounded them for continuity and did not stunt their career progression. His pitch succeeded, and the Army approved Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) 11015J500, “Special Operations Communications Battalion,” on 1 April 1985.

9 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; LTC J. David Bryan, “Theater Signal Support of Special Operations Forces Headquarters,” 10 March 1989, https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA209806 ; Bryan email to Christopher E. Howard, “SUBJECT: Re: 112th in Panama,” 3 December 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC.

10 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019.

11 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; email to Christopher E. Howard, “SUBJECT: Re: 112th in Panama,” 28 November 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Bryan email, date. “The Army Signal Corps in the mid-80’s,” Bryan explained, “was equipped and organized for a European war with the Warsaw Pact - in other words, big trucks, big vans, big generators, huge logistics tail, and large numbers of Signal soldiers each trained in a single MOS. The 112th, on the other hand, was required to be highly deployable and mobile, highly mission-tailorable. To get those unique capabilities in the aggressive timeline we were facing to be [operational], we were moved up as an Army priority for fielding (its Master Priority List [MPL]).”

Photo Courtesy of William D. Childs)" data-desc="Image credit: U.S. Army"> The 112th Signal Battalion activation ceremony program from 26 September 1986 became a keepsake for William D. Childs, one of its charter members. (Photo Courtesy of William D. Childs)
The 112th Signal Battalion activation ceremony program from 26 September 1986 became a keepsake for William D. Childs, one of its charter members. (Photo Courtesy of William D. Childs)

The 112th Signal Battalion (Special Operations) (Airborne) was established provisionally in June 1986, with Bryan in command, and was formally activated at Fort Bragg on 17 September 1986. It inherited the lineage of the World War II-era 512th Airborne Signal Company and the 112th Airborne Army Signal Battalion, both inactive since 1945. It had an authorized strength of 16 officers and 229 enlisted soldiers, organized into a Headquarters Detachment, a Base Operations Company and a Forward Communications Support Company. Manning came from excess Signal Corps billets rather than from within 1st SOCOM. Its soldiers quickly identified themselves as ‘Shadow Warriors,’ derived from the unit motto Penetra Le Tenebre – Penetrate the Shadows.

12 Although the activation ceremony was held on 26 September 1986, the date of the activation orders, and hence in the official lineage and honors, was 17 September 1986. The battalion recognizes 17 September as its birthday.

13 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019.

14 LTC William E. Lane, “Joint Special Operations Task Force Communications: Tenets for Successful Operational Communications in Military Operations Other Than War,” 19 May 1997, 4, https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA328080 , hereafter Lane, “JSOTF Communications,” page number; Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; Kropp interview, 30 October 2019. In the mid-1980s, the Army fielded a system called Mobile Subscriber Equipment, similar to a cellular phone network. The automation it permitted reduced the demand for Signal Corps positions. This, and the inactivation of a signal battalion in Germany, provided the billets used to create the 112th Signal Battalion. That the positions came from the Signal Corps, and not from within 1st SOCOM, helped protect the 112th from inactivation, when 1st SOCOM proposed to disband the battalion to create more Special Forces positions (circa 1989-90).

15 Bryan interview, 15 November 2019.

Per the TO&E, the 112th Signal Battalion was to “provide required C3 [command, control, and communications] systems between the unified commander, major SOF headquarters, Army Special Operations Command [1st SOCOM] subordinate commands, and other commands as required/directed. The battalion was to support SOCSOUTH and Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR), which belonged to Army-supported combatant commands (COCOMs): U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). The battalion was also “to establish communications liaison teams at various levels within the host country and/or supported and adjacent commands.” Those teams became synonymous with the equipment they used: the “Special Operations Liaison Communications Assemblage” (SOLCA), later simplified “SOCA.” The battalion’s fourteen SOCA teams were initially assigned to Company B, but a subsequent reorganization reallocated them evenly between two regionally aligned companies.

16 Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) 11015J500: Special Operations Communications Battalion,” 1 April 1985, copy in USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter TOE 11015J500, 1 April 1985.

17 Lane, “JSOTF Communications,” 4. The Special Operations Task Force Europe (SOTFE) became SOCEUR in 1983; SOCSOUTH was established in 1986.

18 TOE 11015J500, 1 April 1985. When the battalion’s two companies were regionally aligned with U.S. European Command and U.S. Southern Command, the SOCAs were divided equally between the companies (seven SOCAs each).


112th Signal BattalionOrganization and Leadership

The 112th Signal Battalion Distinctive Unit Insignia
The 112th Signal Battalion Distinctive Unit Insignia (DUI) was approved on 15 August 1986. Orange and white (silver) are the colors of the Signal Corps. The dagger, an established symbol of Special Operations organizations is black and white (silver) in reference to the Battalion’s covert and overt missions. It is winged to emphasize present day capabilities for speed of deployment by air. The black color enhances the motto which is translated “Penetrate the Shadows.” The lightning flashes reflect electronic technology. The motto is in Italian in reference to the unit’s first area of combat operations.

Each SOCA team consisted of three soldiers: one Sergeant First Class (SFC/E-7), one Sergeant (SGT/E-5), and one Specialist (SPC/E-4), although it was not uncommon for Staff Sergeants (SSG/E-6) to serve as team leaders or for Privates First Class (PFC/E-3) to serve on SOCAs. Each team member was Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 31C, Radio Operator-Maintainer or, less commonly, another 31-series MOS. Airborne-qualified and able to deploy on the first aircraft, SOCAs provided secure communications between the theater-level SOF commander and subordinate elements.

19 TOE 11015J500, 1 April 1985.  Tactical communicator (i.e. SOCA) positions in the Forward Communications Support Company were coded with Direct Combat Probability Code P1, indicating the highest probability of combat. The initial TO&E called for the SOCA team leader to be an 18E (Special Forces Communications Sergeant), but this was not implemented, largely due to the fact that excess Signal Corps billets were used to man the battalion.

20 Kropp, “Task Force Communications: The Special Operations Paradigm,” Special Warfare 6:2 (May 1993): 31, hereafter Kropp, “Task Force Communications,” page number.

As the first 112th Signal Battalion Commander (‘Shadow Six’), LTC Bryan oversaw a period of rapid growth for the new battalion. It doubled in size, from 144 soldiers at activation to its full complement of 288 by mid-1988. Bryan prioritized getting the right people, fostering the right attitude, and providing them with the right equipment for the job. In this, he was aided by Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Billie F. Phipps, a capable battalion staff, and highly competent non-commissioned officers (NCOs). His command philosophy was condensed into five words: “Excellence in everything we do.

21 COL (Ret.) James S. Kestner, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 9 September 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Kestner interview, date.

22 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019. “Despite the fact that the unit had formed during a period of relative peace where operational deployments and missions were sparse, both LTC Bryan and LTC Steven R. Sawdey [Bryan’s successor] were looking for soldiers and leaders who were eager to accomplish much, establish an enduring unit identity, and succeed on every mission…To do this, they realized that we needed soldiers with the right skill sets and attitudes, and were equipped with communications equipment packages that made them expeditionary, and not just deployable.”

23 Bryan interview, 15 November 2019. Bryan email, 28 November 2019. In his email, Bryan noted that “we did not have authority to select elite soldiers…[W]e received regular Army soldiers, sent them to jump school, and trained and trained them until they could perform a 2 or 3-soldier set of tasks. The soldiers rose to the challenge. They were not elite by selection but they became elite because of our training and the culture that we instilled in them from Day 1.”

Major General (Ret.) James David Bryan
Major General (Ret.) James David Bryan was instrumental in winning Army approval for what became the 112th Signal Battalion. He then served as its first Commander, the first to hold the title “Shadow Six.” In 2019, he was named an Army Special Operations Forces Icon.

From the beginning, battalion leaders promoted a competitive mindset. The soldiers responded, believing that theirs was a special unit, due to its unique ARSOF support mission. Team sports and battalion runs built unit cohesion. Physical training was tough. Expectations were high, initiative was rewarded, and leaders were held accountable. Unit morale surged as a result. “They knew it was not ‘business as usual,’” Bryan recalled.

24 SFC (Ret.) Darell A. Brown, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 27 September 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Brown interview, date; Bryan interview, 17 September 2019.

25 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; Brown interview, 27 September 2019; Kestner interview, 9 September 2019. 112th Signal Battalion veterans interviewed were in unanimous agreement that unit esprit de corps was high during the period 1986-1990; most credited this to the leadership of LTC Bryan and LTC Sawdey, the first two battalion commanders.

26 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019.

Photo Courtesy of William D. Childs)" data-desc="Image credit: U.S. Army"> 112th Signal Battalion soldiers pose outside their temporary battalion headquarters near Gruber Road on Fort Bragg, NC, circa fall 1986. The battalion relocated across post early the following year.
112th Signal Battalion soldiers pose outside their temporary battalion headquarters near Gruber Road on Fort Bragg, NC, circa fall 1986. The battalion relocated across post early the following year. (Photo Courtesy of William D. Childs)

Bryan also understood that most conventional Army communications systems were too bulky for ARSOF’s short notice, small footprint deployments. To get the right equipment, the battalion customized standard Army signal systems to meet mission requirements and procured cutting-edge commercial systems when necessary. It also fielded new super high frequency (SHF) satellite communications and high frequency (HF) multichannel systems. Special fabrication was done ‘in house,’ often with assistance from Tobyhanna Army Depot, Pennsylvania. Two such projects had major impacts.

27 Bryan email, 28 November 2019. “The strategy was straightforward: take what the Army had to issue and modify it to fit on a C-130; move from the ancient Army standard teletype to light weight commercial computers being built by Apple; and use the Army’s PRC-70 high frequency (HF) and PSC-3 tactical satellite (TACSAT) radios until we could get something better, lighter, smaller and more capable.” New requirements were prepared from scratch and industry was enlisted to rapidly develop new systems such as multi-band radios like the Harris-built PRC-117 and the LST-5 TACSAT.

28 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

The first was the SOCA kit, consisting of ultra-high frequency (UHF) tactical satellite (TACSAT), HF, and frequency modulation (FM) line-of-sight (LOS) radios; secure facsimile and teletype; encryption devices (KY-84, KY-57, KYV-5 or Sunburst processor); commercial power interface; and a generator. In its original configuration, the kit weighed over 1,200 pounds and was transported in a coffin-sized container. Battalion personnel cut the bulky metal racks that held the various systems to a more manageable size, and reorganized the other SOCA components until the entire kit fit in four footlocker-sized containers that could be carried by two soldiers and transported on a commercial aircraft. This was important because aircraft space dictated number of personnel and equipment size. The SOCA was often the only 112th communications package deployed on ARSOF missions.

29 Kropp, “Task Force Communications,” 30-31; Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

30 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019.

31 Bryan interview, 17 September 2019; William D. Childs, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 18 September 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Childs interview, date; Mark Buchner, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 18 November 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Buchner interview, date; Kropp interview, 30 October 2019; Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

32 Kropp, “Task Force Communications,” 31.

A second customization project was installing a dual rear axle on the standard five-quarter ton M-1028 Commercial Utility Cargo Vehicle (CUCV), making it capable of hauling an AN/TSC-93A multichannel satellite terminal previously transported by an M35 two-and-a-half ton truck. The eight-foot parabolic antenna, previously carried on a second truck, was modified to fit on a trailer attached to the custom CUCV. The entire system could roll on/off a C-130 or C-141 aircraft, something not possible in its original configuration, but essential for SOF employment.

33 Kropp, “Task Force Communications,” 31; Jared A. Kline, “Joint Communications in support of Joint Task Force South during Operation Just Cause,” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), 217,  https://archive.org/details/DTIC_ADA241732 , hereafter Kline, “Joint Communications,” page number. The CUCV modification was accomplished with assistance from both the 528th Special Operations Support Battalion and Tobyhanna Army Depot. The TSC-93A it carried was a smaller version of the TSC-85A.

34 Kropp interview, 30 October 2019.

35 COL (Ret.) Steven R. Sawdey, interview with Christopher E. Howard, 3 October 2019, USASOC History Office Classified Files, Fort Bragg, NC, hereafter Sawdey interview, date.

Hercules aircraft in preparation for an airborne operation at Sicily Drop Zone, Fort Bragg, NC in March 1990. The Airborne requirement helped build esprit de corps and promoted an elite mindset among 112th soldiers. (Photo courtesy of James S. Kestner)" data-desc="Image credit: U.S. Army"> Soldiers from Company A, 112th Signal Battalion conduct an engine running operation (i.e. ‘hot load’) onto a waiting C-130 Hercules aircraft in preparation for an airborne operation at Sicily Drop Zone, Fort Bragg, NC in March 1990.
Soldiers from Company A, 112th Signal Battalion conduct an engine running operation (i.e. ‘hot load’) onto a waiting C-130 Hercules aircraft in preparation for an airborne operation at Sicily Drop Zone, Fort Bragg, NC in March 1990. The Airborne requirement helped build esprit de corps and promoted an elite mindset among 112th soldiers. (Photo courtesy of James S. Kestner)

In June 1988, LTC Bryan handed over command of the 112th to LTC Steven R. Sawdey, a likeminded officer who Bryan first met in Korea in the early 1970s, when both were in the 2nd Infantry Division. The transition was nearly seamless, as Sawdey shared his predecessor’s commitment to technological innovation and realistic, mission-focused training. To him, getting the “right people” included airborne-qualified soldiers, and he fought to keep this requirement when manning shortfalls led the Army to send non-airborne personnel to the 112th. He also believed the best way to gain acceptance in the SOF community was to “get out there and do stuff. Sawdey’s command philosophy reflected an aggressive mentality, and included an addenda: “Be prepared to kill for the mission. CPT James S. ‘Steve’ Kestner, one of his company commanders, made sure that every one of his soldiers read it: “We were not your conventional signal unit.

36 Sawdey interview, 3 October 2019.

37 Sawdey interview, 3 October 2019; Kestner interview, 9 September 2019. “When manning shortfalls in the battalion forced us to accept non-airborne qualified soldiers, LTC Sawdey sought to preserve and protect the character of our unit by highlighting to Personnel Command (PERSCOM) that while the Army will always need solid professionals, they should accept that special requirement units demand a different skill set.”

38 Kropp interview, 30 October 2019. Kropp recalls that LTC Sawdey was action-oriented, and wanted to ‘sell’ the battalion to the ARSOF community by getting into the fight, whenever possible.

39 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

40 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

The combination of tough training and high morale had LTC Sawdey’s ‘Shadow Warriors’ eager to deploy and prove themselves. Many of the battalion leaders, Kestner noted, were SF-qualified ‘long-tabbers’ or had previously served in Special Operations units, including its first two commanders. Senior NCOs were highly trusted, having been proven under stress. Experience had been gained in exercises like FUERZAS UNIDAS in USSOUTHCOM, and FLINTLOCK in USEUCOM. These exercises allowed the battalion to practice supporting a JSOTF, while identifying organizational and individual strengths and weaknesses.

41 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019.

42 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019. “Long-tabber” is Army lingo for a Special Forces-qualified soldier (i.e. a Green Beret). The Special Forces tab, typically worn on the left sleeve, is longer than the Airborne, Ranger, or Sapper tabs.

43 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019; Brown interview, 27 September 2019; Buchner interview, 18 November 2019. One such NCO was the Company B First Sergeant, David M. Dalton, who many early 112th Signal veterans remember fondly as ‘Dog’ Dalton. He provided no-nonsense leadership and tough, realistic training that prepared his soldiers, both physically and mentally, for their ARSOF support mission. In 1996, Dalton became the 112th Signal Battalion command sergeant major.

44 Kestner interview, 9 September 2019; Bryan interview 17 September 2019.

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